diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/67097-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/67097-0.txt | 19161 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 19161 deletions
diff --git a/old/67097-0.txt b/old/67097-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index e2dad80..0000000 --- a/old/67097-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19161 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of Early Greek philosophy, by John Burnet - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Early Greek philosophy - -Author: John Burnet - -Release Date: January 3, 2022 [eBook #67097] - -Language: English - -Produced by: KD Weeks, Steven Rowland, Turgut Dincer and the Online - Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY *** - - - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - Transcriber’s Note: - -This version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects. -Italics are delimited with the ‘_’ character as _italic_. The single -instance of a superscript is given as ‘Z^5’. - -In the original text, footnote references were numbered, beginning with -‘1’ on each page. They have been renumbered consecutively for uniqueness -and have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they are -referenced. References to notes in the index and elsewhere have been -changed to reflect the revised numbers. - -Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please -see the transcriber’s note at the end of this text for details regarding -the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation. - - - - - EARLY - GREEK PHILOSOPHY - - BY - - JOHN BURNET, M.A., LL.D. - - PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNITED COLLEGE OF ST. SALVATOR - AND ST. LEONARD, ST. ANDREWS - - Περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν, τὰ δ’ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον - εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον.—ARISTOTLE. - - - - - _SECOND EDITION_ - - - - - LONDON - - ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK - - 1908 - - - - - _First Edition published April 1892._ - - - - - PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION - - -It has been no easy task to revise this volume in such a way as to make -it more worthy of the favour with which it has been received. Most of it -has had to be rewritten in the light of certain discoveries made since -the publication of the first edition, above all, that of the extracts -from Menon’s Ἰατρικά, which have furnished, as I believe, a clue to the -history of Pythagoreanism. I trust that all other obligations are duly -acknowledged in the proper place. - -It did not seem worth while to eliminate all traces of a certain -youthful assurance which marked the first edition. I should not write -now as I wrote at the age of twenty-five; but I still feel that the main -contentions of the book were sound, so I have not tried to amend the -style. The references to Zeller and “Ritter and Preller” are adapted -throughout to the latest editions. The Aristotelian commentators are -referred to by the pages and verses of the Berlin Academy edition, and -Stobaeus by those of Wachsmuth. - - J. B. - -ST. ANDREWS, 1908. - - - - - PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION - - -No apology is needed for the appearance of a work dealing with Early -Greek Philosophy. The want of one has long been felt; for there are few -branches of philology in which more progress has been made in the last -twenty years, and the results of that progress have not yet been made -accessible to the English reader. My original intention was simply to -report these results; but I soon found that I was obliged to dissent -from some of them, and it seemed best to say so distinctly. Very likely -I am wrong in most of these cases, but my mistakes may be of use in -calling attention to unobserved points. In any case, I hope no one will -think I have been wanting in the respect due to the great authority of -Zeller, who was the first to recall the history of philosophy from the -extravagances into which it had wandered earlier in the century. I am -glad to find that all my divergences from his account have only led me a -little further in the path that he struck out. - -I am very sensible of the imperfect execution of some parts of this -work; but the subject has become so large, and the number of authorities -whose testimony must be weighed is so great, that it is not easy for any -one writer to be equally at home in all parts of the field. - -I have consulted the student’s convenience by giving references to the -seventh edition of Ritter and Preller (ed. Schultess) throughout. The -references to Zeller are to the fourth German edition, from which the -English translation was made. I have been able to make some use also of -the recently published fifth edition (1892), and all references to it -are distinguished by the symbol Z^5. I can only wish that it had -appeared in time for me to incorporate its results more thoroughly. - -I have to thank many friends for advice and suggestions, and, above all, -Mr. Harold H. Joachim, Fellow of Merton College, who read most of the -work before it went to press. - - J. B. - -OXFORD, 1892. - - - - - CONTENTS - - - PAGES - - INTRODUCTION 1-35 - - - CHAPTER I - THE MILESIAN SCHOOL 37-84 - - - CHAPTER II - SCIENCE AND RELIGION 85-142 - - - CHAPTER III - HERAKLEITOS OF EPHESOS 143-191 - - CHAPTER IV - PARMENIDES OF ELEA 192-226 - - CHAPTER V - EMPEDOKLES OF AKRAGAS 227-289 - - CHAPTER VI - ANAXAGORAS OF KLAZOMENAI 290-318 - - CHAPTER VII - THE PYTHAGOREANS 319-356 - - CHAPTER VIII - THE YOUNGER ELEATICS 357-379 - - CHAPTER IX - LEUKIPPOS OF MILETOS 380-404 - - CHAPTER X - ECLECTICISM AND REACTION 405-418 - - APPENDIX - THE SOURCES 419-426 - - INDEX 427-433 - - - - - ABBREVIATIONS - - - _Arch._ _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie._ Berlin, - 1888-1908. - - BEARE. _Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition_, by John - I. Beare. Oxford, 1906. - - DIELS _Dox._ _Doxographi graeci._ Hermannus Diels. Berlin, - 1879. - - DIELS _Vors._ _Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker_, von Hermann - Diels, Zweite Auflage, Erster Band. Berlin, - 1906. - - GOMPERZ. _Greek Thinkers_, by Theodor Gomperz, Authorised - (English) Edition, vol. i. London, 1901. - - JACOBY. _Apollodors Chronik_, von Felix Jacoby (_Philol. - Unters._ Heft xvi.). Berlin, 1902. - - R. P. _Historia Philosophiae Graecae_, H. Ritter et L. - Preller. Editio octava, quam curavit Eduardus - Wellmann. Gotha, 1898. - - ZELLER. _Die Philosophie der Griechen, dargestellt von Dr. - Eduard Zeller._ Erster Theil, Fünfte Auflage. - Leipzig, 1892. - - - - - EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY - - - - - INTRODUCTION - -[Sidenote: The cosmological character of early Greek philosophy.] - -I. It was not till the primitive view of the world and the customary -rules of life had broken down, that the Greeks, began to feel the needs -which philosophies of nature and of conduct seek to satisfy. Nor were -those needs felt all at once. The traditional maxims of conduct were not -seriously questioned till the old view of nature had passed away; and, -for this reason, the earliest philosophers busied themselves mainly with -speculations about the world around them. In due season, Logic was -called into being to meet a fresh want. The pursuit of cosmological -inquiry beyond a certain point inevitably brought to light a wide -divergence between science and common sense, which was itself a problem -that demanded solution, and moreover constrained philosophers to study -the means of defending their paradoxes against the prejudices of the -unscientific many. Later still, the prevailing interest in logical -matters raised the question of the origin and validity of knowledge; -while, about the same time, the breakdown of traditional morality gave -rise to Ethics. The period which precedes the rise of Logic and Ethics -has thus a distinctive character of its own, and may fitly be treated -apart.[1] - -Footnote 1: - - It will be observed that Demokritos falls outside the period thus - limited. The common practice of treating this younger contemporary of - Sokrates along with the “pre-Socratic philosophers” obscures the true - course of historical development. Demokritos comes after Protagoras, - and his theory is already conditioned by the epistemological problem. - (See Brochard, “Protagoras et Démocrite,” _Arch._ ii. p. 368.) He has - also a regular theory of conduct (E. Meyer, _Gesch. des Alterth._ iv. - § 514 n.). - -[Sidenote: The primitive view of the world.] - -II. Even in the earliest times of which we have any record, the -primitive view of the world is fast passing away. We are left to gather -what manner of thing it was from the stray glimpses we get of it here -and there in the older literature, to which it forms a sort of sombre -background, and from the many strange myths and stranger rites that -lived on, as if to bear witness of it to later times, not only in -out-of-the-way parts of Hellas, but even in the “mysteries” of the more -cultivated states. So far as we can see, it must have been essentially a -thing of shreds and patches, ready to fall in pieces as soon as stirred -by the fresh breeze of a larger experience and a more fearless -curiosity. The only explanation of the world it could offer was a wild -tale of the origin of things. Such a story as that of Ouranos, Gaia, and -Kronos belongs plainly, as Mr. Lang has shown in _Custom and Myth_, to -the same level of thought as the Maori tale of Papa and Rangi; while in -its details the Greek myth is, if anything, the more savage of the two. - -We must not allow ourselves to be misled by metaphors about “the -childhood of the race,” though even these, if properly understood, are -suggestive enough. Our ideas of the true state of a child’s mind are apt -to be coloured by that theory of antenatal existence which has found, -perhaps, its highest expression in Wordsworth’s _Ode on the Intimations -of Immortality_. We transfer these ideas to the race generally, and are -thus led to think of the men who made and repeated myths as simple, -innocent creatures who were somehow nearer than we are to the beginning -of things, and so, perhaps, saw with a clearer vision. A truer view of -what a child’s thoughts really are will help to put us on the right -track. Left to themselves, children are often tormented by vague terrors -of surrounding objects which they fear to confide to any one. Their -games are based upon an animistic theory of things, and they are great -believers in luck and in the lot. They are devotees, too, of that “cult -of odds and ends” which is fetishism; and the unsightly old dolls which -they often cherish more fondly than the choicest products of the -toy-shop, remind us forcibly of the ungainly stocks and stones which -Pausanias found in the Holy of Holies of many a stately Greek temple. At -Sparta the Tyndaridai were a couple of boards, while the old image of -Hera at Samos was a roughly-hewn log.[2] - -Footnote 2: - - See E. Meyer, _Gesch. des Alterth._ ii. § 64; Menzies, _History of - Religion_, pp. 272-276. - -On the other hand, we must remember that, even in the earliest times of -which we have any record, the world was already very old. Those Greeks -who first tried to understand nature were not at all in the position of -men setting out on a hitherto untrodden path. There was already in the -field a tolerably consistent view of the world, though no doubt it was -rather implied and assumed in ritual and myth than distinctly realised -as such. The early thinkers did a far greater thing than merely to make -a beginning. By turning their backs on the savage view of things, they -renewed their youth, and with it, as it proved, the youth of the world, -at a time when the world seemed in its dotage. - -The marvel is that they were able to do this so thoroughly as they did. -A savage myth might be preserved here and there to the scandal of -philosophers; fetishes, totems, and magic rites might lurk in holes and -corners with the moles and with the bats, to be unearthed long -afterwards by the curious in such matters. But the all-pervading -superstition, which we call primitive because we know not how or whence -it came, was gone for ever; and we find Herodotos noting with unfeigned -surprise the existence among “barbarians” of beliefs and customs which, -not so long ago, his own forefathers had taught and practised quite as -zealously as ever did Libyan or Scyth. Even then, he might have found -most of them surviving on the “high places” of Hellas. - -[Sidenote: Traces of the primitive view in early literature.] - -III. In one respect the way had been prepared already. Long before -history begins, the colonisation of the islands and the coasts of Asia -Minor had brought about a state of things that was not favourable to the -rigid maintenance of traditional customs and ways of thought. A myth is -essentially a local thing, and though the emigrants might give the names -of ancestral sanctuaries to similar spots in their new homes, they could -not transfer with the names the old sentiment of awe. Besides, these -were, on the whole, stirring and joyful times. The spirit of adventure -is not favourable to superstition, and men whose chief occupation is -fighting are not apt to be oppressed by that “fear of the world” which -some tell us is the normal state of the savage mind. Even the savage -becomes in great measure free from it when he is really happy. - -[Sidenote: 1. Homer.] - -That is why we find so few traces of the primitive view of the world in -Homer. The gods have become frankly human, and everything savage is, so -far as may be, kept out of sight. There are, of course, vestiges of -early beliefs and practices, but they are exceptional. In that strange -episode of the Fourteenth Book of the _Iliad_ known as _The Deceiving of -Zeus_ we find a number of theogonical ideas which are otherwise quite -foreign to Homer, but they are treated with so little seriousness that -the whole thing has even been regarded as a parody or burlesque of some -primitive poem on the birth of the gods. That, however, is to mistake -the spirit of Homer. He finds the old myth ready to his hand, and sees -in it matter for a “joyous tale,” just as Demodokos did in the loves of -Ares and Aphrodite. There is no antagonism to traditional views, but -rather a complete detachment from them. - -It has often been noted that Homer never speaks of the primitive custom -of purification for bloodshed. The dead heroes are burned, not buried, -as the kings of continental Hellas were. Ghosts play hardly any part. In -the _Iliad_ we have, to be sure, the ghost of Patroklos, in close -connexion with the solitary instance of human sacrifice in Homer. All -that was part of the traditional story, and Homer says as little about -it as he can. There is also the _Nekyia_ in the Eleventh Book of the -_Odyssey_, which has been assigned to a late date on the ground that it -contains Orphic ideas. The reasoning does not appear cogent. As we shall -see, the Orphics did not so much invent new ideas as revive old ones, -and if the legend took Odysseus to the abode of the dead, that had to be -described in accordance with the accepted views about it. - -In fact, we are never entitled to infer from Homer’s silence that the -primitive view was unknown to him. The absence of certain things from -the poems is due to reticence rather than ignorance; for, wherever -anything to his purpose was to be got from an old story, he did not -hesitate to use it. On the other hand, when the tradition necessarily -brought him into contact with savage ideas, he prefers to treat them -with reserve. We may infer, then, that at least in a certain society, -that of the princes for whom Homer sang, the primitive view of the world -was already discredited by a comparatively early date.[3] - -Footnote 3: - - On all this, see especially Rohde, _Psyche_, pp. 14 sqq. - -[Sidenote: 2. Hesiod.] - -IV. When we come to Hesiod, we seem to be in another world. We hear -stories of the gods which are not only irrational but repulsive, and -these stories are told quite seriously. Hesiod makes the Muses say: “We -know how to tell many false things that are like the truth; but we know -too, when we will, to utter what is true.”[4] This means that he was -quite conscious of the difference between the Homeric spirit and his -own. The old light-heartedness is gone, and it is important to tell the -truth about the gods. Hesiod knows, too, that he belongs to a later and -a sadder time than Homer. In describing the Ages of the World, he -inserts a fifth age between those of Bronze and Iron. That is the Age of -the Heroes, the age Homer sang of. It was better than the Bronze Age -which came before it, and far better than that which followed it, the -Age of Iron, in which Hesiod lives.[5] He also feels that he is singing -for another class. It is to shepherds and husbandmen he addresses -himself, and the princes for whom Homer sang have become remote persons -who give “crooked dooms.” For common men there is no hope but in hard, -unceasing toil. It is the voice of the people we now hear for the first -time, and of a people for whom the romance and splendour of the Greek -Middle Ages meant nothing. The primitive view of the world had never -really died out among them; so it was natural for their first spokesman -to assume it in his poems. That is why we find in Hesiod these old, -savage tales, which Homer disdained to speak of. - -Footnote 4: - - Hes. _Theog._ 27. They are the same Muses who inspired Homer, which - means, in our language, that Hesiod wrote in hexameters and used the - Epic dialect. The new literary _genre_ has not yet found its - appropriate vehicle, which is elegy. - -Footnote 5: - - There is great historical insight here. It was Hesiod, not our modern - historians, who first pointed out that the “Greek Middle Ages” were a - break in the normal development. - -Yet it would be wrong to see in the _Theogony_ a mere revival of the old -superstition. Nothing can ever be revived just as it was; for in every -reaction there is a polemical element which differentiates it completely -from the earlier stage it vainly seeks to reproduce. Hesiod could not -help being affected by the new spirit which trade and adventure had -awakened over the sea, and he became a pioneer in spite of himself. The -rudiments of what grew into Ionic science and history are to be found in -his poems, and he really did more than any one to hasten that decay of -the old ideas which he was seeking to arrest. The _Theogony_ is an -attempt to reduce all the stories about the gods into a single system, -and system is necessarily fatal to so wayward a thing as mythology. -Hesiod, no less than Homer, teaches a panhellenic polytheism; the only -difference is that with him this is more directly based on the legends -attached to the local cults, which he thus sought to invest with a -national significance. The result is that the myth becomes primary and -the cult secondary, a complete inversion of the primitive relation. -Herodotos tells us that it was Homer and Hesiod who made a theogony for -the Hellenes, who gave the gods their names, and distributed among them -their offices and arts,[6] and it is perfectly true. The Olympian -pantheon took the place of the old local gods in men’s minds, and this -was as much the doing of Hesiod as of Homer. The ordinary man had no -ties to this company of gods, but at most to one or two of them; and -even these he would hardly recognise in the humanised figures, detached -from all local associations, which poetry had substituted for the older -objects of worship. The gods of Greece had become a splendid subject for -art; but they came between the Hellenes and their ancestral religions. -They were incapable of satisfying the needs of the people, and that is -the secret of the religious revival which we shall have to consider in -the sequel. - -Footnote 6: - - Herod. ii. 53. - -[Sidenote: Cosmogony.] - -V. Nor is it only in this way that Hesiod shows himself a child of his -time. His _Theogony_ is at the same time a Cosmogony, though it would -seem that here he was following others rather than working out a thought -of his own. At any rate, he only mentions the two great cosmogonical -figures, Chaos and Eros, and does not really bring them into connexion -with his system. The conception of Chaos represents a distinct effort to -picture the beginning of things. It is not a formless mixture, but -rather, as its etymology indicates, the yawning gulf or gap where -nothing is as yet.[7] We may be sure that this is not primitive. Savage -man does not feel called upon to form an idea of the very beginning of -all things; he takes for granted that there was something to begin with. -The other figure, that of Eros, was doubtless intended to explain the -impulse to production which gave rise to the whole process. That, at -least, is what the Maoris mean by it, as may be seen from the following -remarkable passage[8]:— - - From the conception the increase, - From the increase the swelling, - From the swelling the thought, - From the thought the remembrance, - From the remembrance the desire. - The word became fruitful, - It dwelt with the feeble glimmering, - It brought forth the night. - -Hesiod must have had some such primitive speculation to work on, but he -does not tell us anything clearly on the subject. - -Footnote 7: - - The word χάος certainly means the “gape” or “yawn,” the Orphic χάσμα - πελώριον. Grimm compared it with the Scandinavian _Ginnunga-Gap_. - -Footnote 8: - - Quoted from Taylor’s _New Zealand_, pp. 110-112, by Mr. Andrew Lang, - in _Myth, Ritual, and Religion_, vol. ii. p. 52 (2nd ed.). - -We have records of great activity in the production of cosmogonies -during the whole of the sixth century B.C., and we know something of the -systems of Epimenides, Pherekydes,[9] and Akousilaos. As there were -speculations of this kind even before Hesiod, we need have no hesitation -in believing that the earliest Orphic cosmogony goes back to that -century too.[10] The feature which is common to all these systems is the -attempt to get behind the gap, and to put Kronos or Zeus in the first -place. This is what Aristotle has in view when he distinguishes the -“theologians” from those who were half theologians and half -philosophers, and who put what was best in the beginning.[11] It is -obvious, however, that this process is the very reverse of scientific, -and might be carried on indefinitely; so we have nothing to do with the -cosmogonists in our present inquiry, except so far as they can be shown -to have influenced the course of more sober investigations. Indeed, -these speculations are still based on the primitive view of the world, -and so fall outside the limits we have traced for ourselves. - -Footnote 9: - - For the remains of Pherekydes, see Diels, _Vorsokratiker_, pp. 506 - sqq. (1st ed.), and the interesting account in Gomperz, _Greek - Thinkers_, vol. i. pp. 85 sqq. - -Footnote 10: - - This was the view of Lobeck with regard to the so-called “Rhapsodic - Theogony” described by Damaskios, and was revived by Otto Kern (_De - Orphei Epimenidis Pherecydis Theogoniis_, 1888). Its savage character - is the best proof of its antiquity. Cf. Lang, _Myth, Ritual, and - Religion_, vol. i. chap. x. - -Footnote 11: - - Arist. _Met._ Ν, 4. 1091 b 8. - -[Sidenote: General characteristics of early Greek cosmology.] - -VI. What, then, was the step that placed the Ionian cosmologists once -for all above the level of the Maoris? Grote and Zeller make it consist -in the substitution of impersonal causes acting according to law for -personal causes acting arbitrarily. But the distinction between personal -and impersonal was not really felt in antiquity, and it is a mistake to -lay much stress on it. It seems rather that the real advance made by the -scientific men of Miletos was that they left off telling tales. They -gave up the hopeless task of describing what was when as yet there was -nothing, and asked instead what all things really are now. - -[Sidenote: _Ex nihilo nihil._] - -The great principle which underlies all their thinking, though it is -first put into words by Parmenides, is that _Nothing comes into being -out of nothing, and nothing passes away into nothing_. They saw, -however, that particular things were always coming into being and -passing away again, and from this it followed that their existence was -no true or stable one. The only things that were real and eternal were -the original matter which passed through all these changes and the -motion which gave rise to them, to which was soon added that law of -proportion or compensation which, despite the continual becoming and -passing away of things, secured the relative permanence and stability of -the various forms of existence that go to make up the world. That these -were, in fact, the leading ideas of the early cosmologists, cannot, of -course, be proved till we have given a detailed exposition of their -systems; but we can show at once how natural it was for such thoughts to -come to them. It is always the problem of change and decay that first -excites the wonder which, as Plato says, is the starting-point of all -philosophy. Besides this, there was in the Ionic nature a vein of -melancholy which led it to brood upon the instability of things. Even -before the time of Thales, Mimnermos of Kolophon sings the sadness of -change; and, at a later date, the lament of Simonides, that the -generations of men fall like the leaves of the forest, touches a chord -already struck by the earliest singer of Ionia.[12] Now, so long as men -could believe everything they saw was alive like themselves, the -spectacle of the unceasing death and new birth of nature would only -tinge their thoughts with a certain mournfulness, which would find its -expression in such things as the Linos dirges which the Greeks borrowed -from their Asiatic neighbours;[13] but when primitive animism, which had -seen conscious life everywhere, was gone, and polytheistic mythology, -which had personified at least the more striking natural phenomena, was -going, it must have seemed that there was nowhere any abiding reality. -Nowadays we are accustomed, for good and for ill, to the notion of dead -things, obedient, not to inner impulses, but solely to mechanical laws. -But that is not the view of the natural man, and we may be sure that, -when first it forced itself on him, it must have provoked a strong sense -of dissatisfaction. Relief was only to be had from the reflexion that as -nothing comes from nothing, nothing can pass away into nothing. There -must, then, be something which always is, something fundamental which -persists throughout all change, and ceases to exist in one form only -that it may reappear in another. It is significant that this something -is spoken of as “deathless” and “ageless.”[14] - -Footnote 12: - - Simonides, fr. 85, 2 Bergk. _Il._ vi. 146. - -Footnote 13: - - On Adonis-Thammuz, Lityerses, Linos, and Osiris, see Frazer, _Golden - Bough_, vol. i. pp. 278 sqq. - -Footnote 14: - - The Epic phrase ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήρως seems to have suggested this. - Anaximander applied both epithets to the primary substance (R. P. 17 - and 17 a). Euripides, in describing the blessedness of the scientific - life (fr. inc. 910), says ἀθανάτου ... φύσεως κόσμον ἀγήρω (R. P. 148 - c fin.). - -[Sidenote: Φύσις] - -VII. So far as I know, no historian of Greek philosophy has clearly laid -it down that the word which was used by the early cosmologists to -express this idea of a permanent and primary substance was none other -than φύσις; and that the title Περὶ φύσεως, so commonly given to -philosophical works of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.,[15] means -simply _Concerning the Primary Substance_. Both Plato and Aristotle use -the term in this sense when they are discussing the earlier -philosophy,[16] and its history shows clearly enough what its original -meaning must have been. In Greek philosophical language, φύσις always -means that which is primary, fundamental, and persistent, as opposed to -what is secondary, derivative, and transient; what is “given,” as -opposed to that which is made or becomes. It is what is there to begin -with. It is true that Plato and his successors also identify φύσις with -the best or most normal condition of a thing; but that is just because -they held the goal of any development to be prior to the process by -which it is reached. Such an idea was wholly unknown to the pioneers of -philosophy. They sought the explanation of the incomplete world we know, -not in the end, but in the beginning. It seemed to them that, if only -they could strip off all the modifications which Art and Chance had -introduced, they would get at the ultimately real; and so the search -after φύσις, first in the world at large and afterwards in human -society, became the chief interest of the age we have to deal with. - -Footnote 15: - - I do not mean to imply that the philosophers used this title - themselves; for early prose writings had no titles. The writer - mentioned his name and the subject of his work in the first sentence, - as Herodotos, for instance, does. - -Footnote 16: - - Plato, _Laws_, 892 c 2, φύσιν βούλονται λέγειν γένεσιν (_i.e._ τὸ ἐξ - οὗ γίγνεται) τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα (_i.e._ τὴν τῶν πρώτων). Arist. _Phys._ - Β, 1. 193 a 21, διόπερ οἱ μὲν πῦρ, οἱ δὲ γῆν, οἱ δ’ ἀέρα φασίν, οἱ δὲ - ὗδωρ, οἱ δ’ ἔνια τούτων, οἱ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν εἶναι τὴν τῶν - ὄντων. - -The word ἀρχή, by which the early cosmologists are usually said to have -designated the object of their search, is in this sense purely -Aristotelian. It is quite natural that it should be employed in the -well-known historical sketch of the First Book of the _Metaphysics_; for -Aristotle is there testing the theories of earlier thinkers by his own -doctrine of the four causes. But Plato never uses the term in this -connexion, and it does not occur once in the genuine fragments of the -early philosophers. It is confined to the Stoic and Peripatetic -handbooks from which most of our knowledge is derived, and these simply -repeat Aristotle. Zeller has pointed out in a footnote[17] that it would -be an anachronism to refer the subtle Aristotelian use of the word to -the beginnings of speculation. To Anaximander ἀρχή could only have meant -“beginning,” and it was far more than a beginning that the early -cosmologists were looking for: it was the _eternal_ ground of all -things. - -There is one very important conclusion that follows at once from the -account just given of the meaning of φύσις, and it is, that the search -for the primary substance really was the thing that interested the -Ionian philosophers. Had their main object been, as Teichmüller held it -was, the explanation of celestial and meteorological phenomena, their -researches would not have been called Περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίη,[18] but -rather Περὶ οὐρανοῦ or Περὶ μετεώρων. And this we shall find confirmed -by a study of the way in which Greek cosmology developed. The growing -thought which may be traced through the successive representatives of -any school is always that which concerns the primary substance, while -the astronomical and other theories are, in the main, peculiar to the -individual thinkers. Teichmüller undoubtedly did good service by his -protest against the treatment of these theories as mere isolated -curiosities. They form, on the contrary, coherent systems which must be -looked at as wholes. But it is none the less true that Greek philosophy -began, as it ended, with the search for what was abiding in the flux of -things. - -Footnote 17: - - Zeller, p. 217, n. 2 (Eng. trans. p. 248, n. 2). See below, Chap. I. - p. 57, _n._ 105. - -Footnote 18: - - We have the authority of Plato for giving them this name. Cf. _Phd._ - 96 a 7, ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. So, in - the fragment of Euripides referred to on p. 12, _n._ 14, the man who - discerns “the ageless order of immortal φύσις” is referred to as ὅστις - τῆς ἱστορίας ἔσχε μάθησιν. - -[Sidenote: Motion and rest.] - -VIII. But how could this give back to nature the life of which it had -been robbed by advancing knowledge? Simply by making it possible for the -life that had hitherto been supposed to reside in each particular thing -to be transferred to the one thing of which all others were passing -forms. The very process of birth, growth, and decay might now be -regarded as the unceasing activity of the one ultimate reality. -Aristotle and his followers expressed this by saying that the early -cosmologists believed in an “eternal motion,” and in substance this is -correct, though it is not probable that they said anything about the -eternal motion in their writings. It is more likely that they simply -took it for granted. In early times, it is not movement but rest that -has to be accounted for, and we may be sure that the eternity of motion -was not asserted till it had been denied. As we shall see, it was -Parmenides who first denied it. The idea of a single ultimate substance, -when thoroughly worked out, seemed to leave no room for motion; and -after the time of Parmenides, we do find that philosophers were -concerned to show how it began. At first, this would not seem to require -explanation at all. - -Modern writers sometimes give the name of Hylozoism to this way of -thinking, but the term is apt to be misleading. It suggests theories -which deny the separate reality of life and spirit, whereas, in the days -of Thales, and even far later, the distinction between matter and spirit -had not been felt, still less formulated in such a way that it could be -denied. The uncreated, indestructible reality of which these early -thinkers tell us was a body, or even matter, if we choose to call it so; -but it was not matter in the sense in which matter is opposed to spirit. - -[Sidenote: The downfall of the primitive view of the world.] - -IX. We have indicated the main characteristics of the primitive view of -the world, and we have sketched in outline the view which displaced it; -we must now consider the causes which led to the downfall of the one and -the rise of the other. Foremost among these was undoubtedly the widening -of the Greek horizon occasioned by the great extension of maritime -enterprise which followed the decay of the Phoenician naval supremacy. -The scene of the old stories had, as a rule, been laid just outside the -boundaries of the world known to the men who believed them. Odysseus -does not meet with Kirke or the Kyklops or the Sirens in the familiar -Aegean, but in regions which lay beyond the ken of the Greeks at the -time the _Odyssey_ was composed. Now, however, the West was beginning to -be familiar too, and the fancy of the Greek explorers led them to -identify the lands which they discovered with the places which the hero -of the national fairy-tale had come to in his wanderings. It was soon -discovered that the monstrous beings in question were no longer to be -found there, and the belief grew up that they had never been there at -all. So, too, the Milesians had settled colonies all round the Euxine. -The colonists went out with Ἀργὼ πᾶσι μέλουσα in their minds; and, at -the same time as they changed the name of the Inhospitable to the -Hospitable Sea, they localised the “far country” (αἶα) of the primitive -tale, and made Jason fetch the Golden Fleece from Kolchis. Above all, -the Phokaians had explored the Mediterranean as far as the Pillars of -Herakles,[19] and the new knowledge that the “endless paths” of the sea -had boundaries must have moved men’s minds in much the same way as the -discovery of America did in later days. A single example will illustrate -the process which was always going on. According to the primitive view, -the heavens were supported by a giant called Atlas. No one had ever seen -him, though he was supposed to live in Arkadia. The Phokaian explorers -identified him with a cloud-capped mountain in Africa, and once they had -done this, the old belief was doomed. It was impossible to go on -believing in a god who was also a mountain, conveniently situated for -the trader to steer by, as he sailed to Tarshish in quest of silver. - -Footnote 19: - - Herod. i. 163. - -[Sidenote: Alleged Oriental origin of philosophy.] - -X. But by far the most important question we have to face is that of the -nature and extent of the influence exercised by what we call Eastern -wisdom on the Greek mind. It is a common idea even now that the Greeks -in some way derived their philosophy from Egypt and Babylon, and we must -therefore try to understand as clearly as possible what such a statement -really means. To begin with, we must observe that no writer of the -period during which Greek philosophy flourished knows anything at all of -its having come from the East. Herodotos would not have omitted to say -so, had he ever heard of it; for it would have confirmed his own belief -in the Egyptian origin of Greek religion and civilisation.[20] Plato, -who had a very great respect for the Egyptians on other grounds, -distinctly implies that they were a businesslike rather than a -philosophical people.[21] Aristotle speaks only of the origin of -mathematics in Egypt[22] (a point to which we shall return), though, if -he had known of an Egyptian philosophy, it would have suited his -argument better to mention that. It is not till a far later date, when -Egyptian priests and Alexandrian Jews began to vie with one another in -discovering the sources of Greek philosophy in their own past, that we -first have definite statements to the effect that it came from Phoenicia -or Egypt. Here, however, we must carefully note two things. In the first -place, the word “philosophy” had come by that time to include theology -of a more or less mystical type, and was even applied to various forms -of asceticism.[23] In the second place, the so-called Egyptian -philosophy was only arrived at by a process of turning primitive myths -into allegories. We are still able to judge Philo’s Old Testament -interpretation for ourselves, and we may be sure that the Egyptian -allegorists were even more arbitrary; for they had far less promising -material to work on. Nothing can be more savage than the myth of Isis -and Osiris;[24] yet it is first interpreted according to the ideas of -later Greek philosophy, and then declared to be the original source of -that philosophy. - -Footnote 20: - - All he can say is that the worship of Dionysos and the doctrine of - transmigration came from Egypt (ii. 49, 123). We shall see that both - these statements are incorrect, and in any case they do not imply - anything directly as to philosophy. - -Footnote 21: - - In _Rep._ 435 e, after saying that τὸ θυμοειδές is characteristic of - the Thracians and Scythians, and τὸ φιλομαθές of the Hellenes, he - refers us to Phoenicia and Egypt for τὸ φιλοχρήματον. In the _Laws_, - where the Egyptians are so strongly commended for their conservatism - in matters of art, he says (747 b 6) that arithmetical studies are - valuable only if we remove all ἀνελευθερία and φιλοχρηματία from the - souls of the learners. Otherwise, we produce πανουργία instead of - σοφία, as we can see that the Phoenicians, the Egyptians, and many - other peoples do. - -Footnote 22: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 1. 981 b 23. - -Footnote 23: - - See Zeller, p. 3, n. 2. Philo applies the term πάτριος φιλοσοφία to - the theology of the Essenes and Therapeutai. - -Footnote 24: - - On this, see Lang, _Myth, Ritual, and Religion_, vol. ii. p. 135. - -This method of interpretation may be said to culminate with the -Neopythagorean Noumenios, from whom it passed to the Christian -Apologists. It is Noumenios who asks, “What is Plato, but Moses speaking -Attic?”[25] It seems likely, indeed, that he was thinking of certain -marked resemblances between Plato’s _Laws_ and the Levitical Code when -he said this—resemblances due to the fact that certain primitive legal -ideas are similarly modified in both; but in any case Clement and -Eusebios give the remark a far wider application.[26] At the -Renaissance, this absurd farrago was revived along with everything else, -and certain ideas derived from the _Praeparatio Evangelica_ continued -for long to colour accepted views on the subject. Even Cudworth speaks -complacently of the ancient “Moschical or Mosaical philosophy” taught by -Thales and Pythagoras.[27] It is important to realise the true origin of -this deeply-rooted prejudice against the originality of the Greeks. It -does not come from modern researches into the beliefs of ancient -peoples; for these have disclosed absolutely nothing in the way of -evidence for a Phoenician or Egyptian philosophy. It is a mere residuum -of the Alexandrian passion for allegory. - -Footnote 25: - - Noumenios, fr. 13 (R. P. 624), Τί γάρ ἐστι Πλάτων ἢ Μωυσῆς ἀττικίζων; - -Footnote 26: - - Clement (_Strom._ i. p. 8, 5, Stählin) calls Plato ὁ ἐξ Ἑβραίων - φιλόσοφος. - -Footnote 27: - - We learn from Strabo (xvi. p. 757) that it was Poseidonios who - introduced Mochos of Sidon into the history of philosophy. He - attributes the atomic theory to him. His identification with Moses, - however, is a later _tour de force_. Philon of Byblos published what - purported to be a translation of an ancient Phoenician history by - Sanchuniathon, which was used by Porphyry and afterwards by Eusebios. - How familiar all this became, is shown by the speech of the stranger - in the _Vicar of Wakefield_, chap. xiv. - -Of course no one nowadays would rest the case for the Oriental origin of -Greek philosophy on the evidence of Clement or Eusebios; the favourite -argument in recent times has been the analogy of the arts and religion. -We are seeing more and more, it is said, that the Greeks derived their -art and many of their religious ideas from the East; and it is urged -that the same will in all probability prove true of their philosophy. -This is a specious argument, but not in the least conclusive. It ignores -altogether the essential difference in the way these things are -transmitted from people to people. Material civilisation and the arts -may pass easily from one people to another, though they have not a -common language, and certain simple religious ideas can be conveyed by -ritual better than in any other way. Philosophy, on the other hand, can -only be expressed in abstract language, and it can only be transmitted -by educated men, whether by means of books or oral teaching. Now we know -of no Greek, in the times we are dealing with, who knew enough of any -Oriental language to read an Egyptian book or even to listen to the -discourse of an Egyptian priest, and we never hear till a late date of -Oriental teachers who wrote or spoke in Greek. The Greek traveller in -Egypt would no doubt pick up a few words of Egyptian, and it is certain -that somehow or other the priests could make themselves understood by -the Greeks. They were able to rebuke Hekataios for his family pride, and -Plato tells a story of the same sort at the beginning of the -_Timaeus_.[28] But they must have made use of interpreters, and it is -impossible to conceive of philosophical ideas being communicated through -an uneducated dragoman.[29] - -Footnote 28: - - Herod. ii. 143; Plato, _Tim._ 22 b 3. - -Footnote 29: - - Gomperz’s “native bride,” who discusses the wisdom of her people with - her Greek lord (_Greek Thinkers_, vol. i. p. 95), does not convince me - either. She would probably teach her maids the rites of strange - goddesses; but she would not be likely to talk theology with her - husband, and still less philosophy or science. The use of Babylonian - as an international language will account for the fact that the - Egyptians knew something of Babylonian astronomy; but it does not help - us to explain how the Greeks could communicate with the Egyptians. It - is plain that the Greeks did not even know of this international - language; for it is just the sort of thing they would have recorded - with interest if they had. In early days, they may have met with it in - Cyprus, but that was apparently forgotten. - -But really it is not worth while to ask whether the communication of -philosophical ideas was possible or not, till some evidence has been -produced that any of these peoples had a philosophy to communicate. No -such evidence has yet been discovered, and, so far as we know, the -Indians were the only people besides the Greeks who ever had anything -that deserves the name. No one now will suggest that Greek philosophy -came from India, and indeed everything points to the conclusion that -Indian philosophy came from Greece. The chronology of Sanskrit -literature is an extremely difficult subject; but, so far as we can see, -the great Indian systems are later in date than the Greek philosophies -which they most nearly resemble. Of course the mysticism of the -Upanishads and of Buddhism were of native growth and profoundly -influenced philosophy, but they were not themselves philosophy in any -true sense of the word.[30] - -Footnote 30: - - For the possibility that Indian philosophy came from Greece, see - Weber, _Die Griechen in Indien_ (Berl. Sitzb. 1890, pp. 901 sqq.), and - Goblet d’Alviella, _Ce que l’Inde doit à la Grèce_ (Paris, 1897). - -[Sidenote: Egyptian mathematics.] - -XI. It would, however, be another thing to say that Greek philosophy -originated quite independently of Oriental influences. The Greeks -themselves believed their mathematical science to be of Egyptian origin, -and they must also have known something of Babylonian astronomy. It -cannot be an accident that philosophy originated in Ionia just at the -time when communication with these two countries was easiest, and it is -significant that the very man who was said to have introduced geometry -from Egypt is also regarded as the first of the philosophers. It thus -becomes very important for us to discover, if we can, what Egyptian -mathematics meant. We shall see that, even here, the Greeks were really -original. - -There is a papyrus in the Rhind collection at the British Museum[31] -which gives us an instructive glimpse of arithmetic and geometry as -these sciences were understood on the banks of the Nile. It is the work -of one Aahmes, and contains rules for calculations both of an -arithmetical and a geometrical character. The arithmetical problems -mostly concern measures of corn and fruit, and deal particularly with -such questions as the division of a number of measures among a given -number of persons, the number of loaves or jars of beer that certain -measures will yield, and the wages due to the workmen for a certain -piece of work. It corresponds exactly, in fact, to the description of -Egyptian arithmetic which Plato has given us in the _Laws_, where he -tells us that the children learnt along with their letters to solve -problems in the distribution of apples and wreaths to greater or smaller -numbers of people, the pairing of boxers and wrestlers, and so -forth.[32] This is clearly the origin of the art which the Greeks called -λογιστική, and they certainly borrowed that from Egypt; but there is not -the slightest trace of what the Greeks called ἀριθμητική, or the -scientific study of numbers. - -Footnote 31: - - I am indebted for most of the information which follows to Cantor’s - _Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Mathematik_, vol. i. pp. 46-63. See - also Gow’s _Short History of Greek Mathematics_, §§ 73-80; and - Milhaud, _La science grecque_, pp. 91 sqq. The discussion in the - last-named work is of special value because it is based on M. Rodet’s - paper in the _Bulletin de la Société Mathématique_, vol. vi., which in - some important respects supplements the interpretation of Eisenlohr, - on which the earlier accounts depend. - -Footnote 32: - - Plato, _Laws_, 819 b 4, μήλων τέ τινων διανομαὶ καὶ στεφάνων πλείοσιν - ἄμα καὶ ἐλάττοσιν ἁρμοττόντων ἀριθμῶν τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ πυκτῶν καὶ - παλαιστῶν ἐφεδρείας τε καὶ συλλήξεως ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ ὡς - πεφύκασι γίγνεσθαι. καὶ δὴ καὶ παίζοντες, φιάλας ἅμα χρυσοῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ - καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν ἄλλων κεραννύντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅλας πως - διαδιδόντες. In its context, the passage implies that no more than - this could be learnt in Egypt. - -The geometry of the Rhind papyrus is of a similarly utilitarian -character, and Herodotos, who tells us that Egyptian geometry arose -from the necessity of measuring the land afresh after the inundations, -is obviously far nearer the mark than Aristotle, who says that it grew -out of the leisure enjoyed by the priestly caste.[33] We find, -accordingly, that the rules given for calculating areas are only exact -when these are rectangular. As fields are usually more or less -rectangular, this would be sufficient for practical purposes. The rule -for finding what is called the _seqt_ of a pyramid is, however, on a -rather higher level, as we should expect; for the angles of the -Egyptian pyramids really are equal, and there must have been some -method for obtaining this result. It comes to this. Given the “length -across the sole of the foot,” that is, the diagonal of the base, and -that of the _piremus_ or “ridge,” to find a number which represents -the ratio between them. This is done by dividing half the diagonal of -the base by the “ridge,” and it is obvious that such a method might -quite well be discovered empirically. It seems an anachronism to speak -of elementary trigonometry in connexion with a rule like this, and -there is nothing to suggest that the Egyptians went any further.[34] -That the Greeks learnt as much from them, we shall see to be highly -probable, though we shall see also that, from a comparatively early -period, they generalised it so as to make it of use in measuring the -distances of inaccessible objects, such as ships at sea. It was -probably this generalisation that suggested the idea of a science of -geometry, which was really the creation of the Pythagoreans, and we -can see how far the Greeks soon surpassed their teachers from a remark -of Demokritos which has been preserved. He says (fr. 299): “I have -listened to many learned men, but no one has yet surpassed me in the -construction of figures out of lines accompanied by demonstration, not -even the Egyptian _harpedonapts_, as they call them.”[35] Now the word -ἁρπεδονάπτης is not Egyptian but Greek. It means “cord-fastener,”[36] -and it is a striking coincidence that the oldest Indian geometrical -treatise is called the _Çulvasutras_ or “rules of the cord.” These -things point to the use of the triangle of which the sides are 3, 4, -5, and which has always a right angle. We know that this triangle was -used from an early date among the Chinese and the Hindus, who -doubtless got it from Babylon, and we shall see that Thales probably -learnt the use of it in Egypt.[37] There is no reason whatever for -supposing that any of these peoples had in any degree troubled -themselves to give a theoretical demonstration of its properties, -though Demokritos would certainly have been able to do so. Finally, we -must note the highly significant fact that all mathematical terms are -of purely Greek origin.[38] - -Footnote 33: - - Herod. ii. 109; Arist. _Met._ Α, 1. 981 b 23. - -Footnote 34: - - For a fuller account of this method, see Gow, _Short History of Greek - Mathematics_, pp. 127 sqq.; and Milhaud, _Science grecque_, p. 99. - -Footnote 35: - - R. P. 188. - -Footnote 36: - - The real meaning of ἁρπεδονάπτης was first pointed out by Cantor. The - gardener laying out a flower-bed is the true modern representative of - the “harpedonapts.” - -Footnote 37: - - See Milhaud, _Science grecque_, p. 103. - -Footnote 38: - - The word πυραμίς is often supposed to be derived from the term - _piremus_ used in the Rhind papyrus, which does not mean pyramid, but - “ridge.” It is really, however, a Greek word too, and is the name of a - kind of cake. The Greeks called crocodiles lizards, ostriches - sparrows, and obelisks meat-skewers, so they may very well have called - the pyramids cakes. We seem to hear an echo of the slang of the - mercenaries that carved their names on the colossus at Abu-Simbel. - -[Sidenote: Babylonian astronomy.] - -XII. The other source from which the Ionians directly or indirectly -derived material for their cosmology was the Babylonian astronomy. There -is no doubt that the Babylonians from a very early date had recorded all -celestial phenomena like eclipses. They had also studied the planetary -motions, and determined the signs of the zodiac. Further, they were able -to predict the recurrence of the phenomena they had observed with -considerable accuracy by means of cycles based on their recorded -observations. I can see no reason for doubting that they had observed -the phenomenon of precession. Indeed, they could hardly have failed to -notice it; for their observations went back over so many centuries, that -it would be quite appreciable. We know that, at a later date, Ptolemy -estimated the precession of the equinoxes at one degree in a hundred -years, and it is extremely probable that this is just the Babylonian -value. At any rate, it agrees very well with their division of the -celestial circle into 360 degrees, and made it possible for a century to -be regarded as a day in the “Great Year,” a conception we shall meet -with later on.[39] - -Footnote 39: - - Three different positions of the equinox are given in three different - Babylonian tablets, namely, 10°, 8° 15′, and 8° 0′ 30″ of Aries. - (Kugler, _Mondrechnung_, p. 103; Ginzel, _Klio_, i. p. 205.) Given - knowledge of this kind, and the practice of formulating recurrences in - cycles, it is scarcely conceivable that the Babylonians should not - have invented a cycle for precession. It is equally intelligible that - they should only have reached a rough approximation; for the - precessional period is really about 27,600 years and not 36,000. It is - to be observed that Plato’s “perfect year” is also 36,000 solar years - (Adam’s _Republic_, vol. ii. p. 302), and that it is probably - connected with the precession of the equinoxes. (Cf. _Tim._ 39 d, a - passage which is most easily interpreted if referred to precession.) - This suggestion as to the origin of the “Great Year” was thrown out by - Mr. Adam (_op. cit._ p. 305), and is now confirmed by Hilprecht, _The - Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania_ - (Philadelphia, 1906). - -We shall see that Thales probably knew the cycle which the Babylonians -used to predict eclipses (§ 3); but it would be a mistake to suppose -that the pioneers of Greek science had any detailed knowledge of the -Babylonian astronomy. It was not till the time of Plato that even the -names of the planets were known,[40] and the recorded observations were -only made available in Alexandrian times. But, even if they had known -these, their originality would remain. The Babylonians studied and -recorded celestial phenomena for what we call astrological purposes, not -from any scientific interest. There is no evidence at all that their -accumulated observations ever suggested to them the least -dissatisfaction with the primitive view of the world, or that they -attempted to account for what they saw in any but the crudest way. The -Greeks, on the other hand, with far fewer data to go upon, made at least -three discoveries of capital importance in the course of two or three -generations. In the first place, they discovered that the earth is a -sphere and does not rest on anything. In the second place, they -discovered the true theory of lunar and solar eclipses; and, in close -connexion with this, they came to see, in the third place, that the -earth is not the centre of our system, but revolves round it like the -other planets. Not very much later, certain Greeks even took, at least -tentatively, the final step of identifying the centre round which the -earth and the planets revolve with the sun. These discoveries will be -discussed in their proper place; they are only mentioned here to show -the gulf between Greek astronomy and everything that had preceded it. -The Babylonians had as many thousand years as the Greeks had centuries -to make these discoveries, and it does not appear that they ever thought -of one of them. The originality of the Greeks cannot be successfully -questioned till it can be shown that the Babylonians had even an -incorrect idea of what we call the solar system. - -Footnote 40: - - In classical Greek literature, no planets but Ἕσπερος and Ἑωσφόρος are - mentioned by name at all. Parmenides (or Pythagoras) first identified - these as a single planet (§ 93). Mercury appears for the first time by - name in _Tim._ 38 e, and the other divine names are given in _Epin._ - 987 b sq., where they are said to be “Syrian.” The Greek names Φαίνων, - Φαέθων, Πυρόεις, Φωσφόρος, Στίλβων, may be older, but this cannot be - proved. - -We may sum up all this by saying that the Greeks did not borrow either -their philosophy or their science from the East. They did, however, get -from Egypt certain rules of mensuration which, when generalised, gave -birth to geometry; while from Babylon they learnt that the phenomena of -the heavens recur in cycles with the greatest regularity. This piece of -knowledge undoubtedly had a great deal to do with the rise of science; -for to the Greek it suggested further questions such as the Babylonian -did not dream of.[41] - -Footnote 41: - - The Platonic account of this matter is to be found in the _Epinomis_, - 986 e 9 sqq., and is summed up by the words λάβωμεν δὲ ὡς ὅτιπερ ἂν - Ἕλληνες βαρβάρων παραλάβωσι, κάλλιον τοῦτο εἰς τέλος ἀπεργάζονται (987 - d 9). The point is well put by Theon (Adrastos), _Exp._ p. 177, 20 - Hiller, who speaks of the Chaldaeans and Egyptians as ἄνευ φυσιολογίας - ἀτελεῖς ποιούμενοι τὰς μεθόδους, δέον ἅμα καὶ φυσικῶς περὶ τούτων - ἐπισκοπεῖν· ὅπερ οἱ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀστρολογήσαντες ἐπειρῶντο - ποιεῖν, τὰς παρὰ τούτων λαβόντες ἀρχὰς καὶ τῶν φαινομένων τηρήσεις. - The importance of this last passage is that it represents the view - taken at Alexandria, where the facts were accurately known. - -[Sidenote: The scientific character of the early Greek cosmology.] - -XIII. It is necessary to say something as to the scientific worth of the -philosophy we are about to study. We have just seen that the Eastern -peoples were, at the time of which we write, considerably richer than -the Greeks in accumulated facts, though these facts had certainly not -been observed for any scientific purpose, and their possession never -suggested a revision of the primitive view of the world. The Greeks, -however, saw in them something that could be turned to account, and they -were never as a people slow to act on the maxim, _Chacun prend son bien -partout où il le trouve_. The most striking monument of this spirit -which has come down to us is the work of Herodotos; and the visit of -Solon to Croesus which he describes, however unhistorical it may be, -gives a very lively and faithful picture of it. Croesus tells Solon that -he has heard much of “his wisdom and his wanderings,” and how, from love -of knowledge (φιλοσοφέων), he has travelled over much land for the -purpose of seeing what was to be seen (θεωρίης εἵνεκεν). The words -θεωρίη, φιλοσοφίη, and ἱστορίη are, in fact, the catchwords of the time, -though they had, we must remember, a somewhat different meaning from -that which they were afterwards made to bear at Athens.[42] The idea -that underlies them all may, perhaps, be best rendered in English by the -word _Curiosity_; and it was just this great gift of curiosity, and the -desire to see all the wonderful things—pyramids, inundations, and so -forth—that were to be seen, which enabled the Greeks to pick up and turn -to their own use such scraps of knowledge as they could come by among -the barbarians. No sooner did a Greek philosopher learn half a dozen -geometrical propositions, and hear that the phenomena of the heavens -recur in cycles, than he set to work to look for law everywhere in -nature, and, with a splendid audacity, almost amounting to ὕβρις, to -construct a system of the universe. We may smile, if we please, at the -strange medley of childish fancy and true scientific insight which these -Titanic efforts display, and sometimes we feel disposed to sympathise -with the sages of the day who warned their more daring contemporaries -“to think the thoughts befitting man’s estate” (ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν). But -we shall do well to remember at the same time that even now it is just -such hardy anticipations of experience that make scientific progress -possible, and that nearly every one of the early inquirers whom we are -about to study made some permanent addition to the store of positive -knowledge, besides opening up new views of the world in every direction. - -Footnote 42: - - Still, the word θεωρία never wholly lost its early associations, and - the Greeks always felt that the θεωρητικὸς βίος meant literally “the - life of the spectator.” Its special use, and the whole theory of the - “three lives,” seem to be of Pythagorean origin. See my edition of - Aristotle’s _Ethics_, p. 19 n. - -There is no justification either for the idea that Greek science was -built up solely by more or less lucky guesswork, instead of by -observation and experiment. The nature of our tradition, which mostly -consists of _Placita_—that is, of what we call “results”—tends, no -doubt, to create this impression. We are seldom told why any early -philosopher held the views he did, and the appearance of a string of -“opinions” suggests dogmatism. There are, however, certain exceptions to -the general character of the tradition; and we may reasonably suppose -that, if the later Greeks had been interested in the matter, there would -have been many more. We shall see that Anaximander made some remarkable -discoveries in marine biology, which the researches of the nineteenth -century have fully confirmed (§ 21), and even Xenophanes supported one -of his theories by referring to the fossils and petrifactions of such -widely separated places as Malta, Paros, and Syracuse (§ 59). This is -enough to show that the theory, so commonly held by the earlier -philosophers, that the earth had been originally in a moist state, was -not mythological in origin, but was based on, or at any rate confirmed -by, biological and palaeontological observations of a thoroughly modern -and scientific type. It would surely be absurd to imagine that the men -who could make these observations had not the curiosity or the ability -to make many others of which the memory is lost. Indeed, the idea that -the Greeks were not observers is almost ludicrously wrong, as is proved -by two simple considerations. The anatomical accuracy of Greek sculpture -bears witness to trained habits of observation, and those of the highest -order, while the fixing of the seasons by the heliacal rising and -setting of the stars shows a familiarity with celestial phenomena which -is by no means common at the present day.[43] We know, then, that the -Greeks could observe well in matters affecting agriculture, navigation, -and the arts, and we know that they were curious about the world. Is it -conceivable that they did not use their powers of observation to gratify -that curiosity? It is true, of course, that they had not our instruments -of precision; but a great deal can be discovered by the help of very -simple apparatus. It is not to be supposed that Anaximander erected his -_gnomon_ merely that the Spartans might know the seasons.[44] - -Footnote 43: - - These two points are rightly emphasised by Staigmüller, _Beiträge zur - Gesch. der Naturwissenschaften im klassischen Altertume_ (Progr. - Stuttgart, 1899, p. 8). - -Footnote 44: - - The gnomon was not a sundial, but an upright erected on a flat - surface, in the centre of three concentric circles. These were drawn - so that the end of the gnomon’s shadow touched the innermost circle at - midday on the summer solstice, the intermediate circle at the - equinoxes, and the outermost circle at the winter solstice. See - Bretschneider, _Die Geometrie vor Euklid_, p. 60. - -Nor is it true that the Greeks made no use of experiment. The rise of -the experimental method dates from the time when the medical schools -began to influence the development of philosophy, and accordingly we -find that the first recorded experiment of a modern type is that of -Empedokles with the _klepsydra_. We have his own account of this (fr. -100), and we can see how it brought him to the verge of anticipating -both Harvey and Torricelli. It is once more inconceivable that an -inquisitive people should have applied the experimental method in a -single case without extending it to the elucidation of other problems. - -Of course the great difficulty for us is the geocentric hypothesis from -which science inevitably started, though only to outgrow it in a -surprisingly short time. So long as the earth is supposed to be in the -centre of the world, meteorology, in the later sense of the word, is -necessarily identified with astronomy. It is difficult for us to feel at -home in this point of view, and indeed we have no suitable word to -express what the Greeks at first called an οὐρανός. It will be -convenient to use the word “world” for it; but then we must remember -that it does not refer solely, or even chiefly, to the earth. The later -word κόσμος bears witness to the growth of scientific ideas. It meant at -first the marshalling of an army, and next the ordered constitution of a -state. It was transferred from this to the world because in early days -the regularity and constancy of human life was far more clearly seen -than the uniformity of nature. Man lived in a charmed circle of law and -custom, but the world around him still seemed lawless. That, too, is -why, when the regular course of nature was first realised, no better -word for it could be found than δίκη. It is the same metaphor which -still lives on in the expression “natural law.”[45] - -Footnote 45: - - The term κόσμος seems to be Pythagorean in this sense. It was not - familiar even at the beginning of the fourth century. Xenophon speaks - of “what the sophists call the κόσμος” (Mem. i. 11). For δίκη, see - below, §§ 14, 72. - -The science of the sixth century was mainly concerned, then, with those -parts of the world that are “aloft” (τὰ μετέωρα), and these include, -along with the heavenly bodies, such things as clouds, rainbows, and -lightning. That is how the heavenly bodies came sometimes to be -explained as ignited clouds, an idea which seems astonishing to us. But -we must bear in mind that science inevitably and rightly began with the -most obvious hypothesis, and that it was only the thorough working out -of this that could show its inadequacy. It is just because the Greeks -were the first people to take the geocentric hypothesis seriously that -they were able to go beyond it. Of course the pioneers of Greek thought -had no clear idea of the nature of scientific hypothesis, and supposed -themselves to be dealing with ultimate reality. That was inevitable -before the rise of Logic. At the same time, a sure instinct guided them -to the right method, and we can see how it was the effort to “save -appearances”[46] that really operated from the first. It is, therefore, -to those men that we owe the conception of an exact science which should -ultimately take in the whole world as its object. They fancied—absurdly -enough, no doubt—that they could work out this science at once. We -sometimes make the same mistake nowadays; and it can no more rob the -Greeks of the honour of having been the first to see the true, though -perhaps unattainable, end of all science than it can rob our own -scientific men of the honour of having brought that end nearer than it -was. It is still knowledge of the kind foreseen and attempted by the -Greeks that they are in search of. - -Footnote 46: - - This phrase originated in the school of Plato. The method of research - in use there was for the leader to “propound” (προτείνειν, - προβάλλεσθαι) it as a “problem” (πρόβλημα) to find the simplest - “hypothesis” (τίνων ὑποτεθέντων) on which it is possible to account - for and do justice to all the observed facts (σῴζειν τὰ φαινόμενα). It - was in its French form, _sauver les apparences_, that the phrase - acquired the meaning it usually has now. - -[Sidenote: Schools of philosophy.] - -XIV. Theophrastos, the first writer to treat the history of Greek -philosophy in a systematic way,[47] represented the early cosmologists -as standing to one another in the relation of master and scholar, and as -members of regular societies. This has been regarded by many modern -writers as an anachronism, and some have even denied the existence of -“schools” of philosophy altogether. Such a reaction against the older -view was quite justified in so far as it was directed against arbitrary -classifications like the “Ionic” and “Italian” schools, which are -derived through Laertios Diogenes from the Alexandrian writers of -“Successions.” But the express statements of Theophrastos are not to be -so lightly set aside. As this point is of great importance, it will be -necessary to elucidate it still further before we enter upon our story. - -Footnote 47: - - See Appendix, § 7. - -The modern view really rests upon a mistaken idea of the way in which -civilisation develops. In almost every department of life, we find that -the corporation at first is everything and the individual nothing. The -peoples of the East hardly got beyond this stage at all; their science, -such as it is, is anonymous, the inherited property of a caste or guild, -and we still see clearly in some cases that it was once the same among -the Hellenes. Medicine, for instance, was originally the “mystery” of -the Asklepiads, and it is to be supposed that all craftsmen -(δημιουργοί), amongst whom Homer classes the bards (ἀοιδοί), were at -first organised in a similar way. What distinguished the Hellenes from -other peoples was that at a comparatively early date these crafts came -under the influence of outstanding individuals, who gave them a fresh -direction and a new impulse. It is doubtless in some such way that we -should understand the relation of Homer to the Homeridai. The Asklepiads -at a later date produced Hippokrates, and if we knew more of such guilds -as the Daidalids, it is likely we should find something of the same -kind. But this does not destroy the corporate character of the craft; -indeed, it rather intensifies it. The guild becomes what we call a -“school,” and the disciple takes the place of the apprentice. That is a -vital change. A close guild with none but official heads is essentially -conservative, while a band of disciples attached to a master they revere -is the greatest progressive force the world knows. - -It is certain that the later Athenian schools were organised -corporations, the oldest of which, the Academy, maintained its existence -as such for some nine hundred years, and the only question we have to -decide is whether this was an innovation made in the fourth century -B.C., or rather the continuance of an old tradition. As it happens, we -have the authority of Plato for speaking of the chief early systems as -handed down in schools. He makes Sokrates speak of “the men of Ephesos,” -the Herakleiteans, as forming a strong body in his own day,[48] and the -stranger of the _Sophist_ and the _Statesman_ speaks of his school as -still in existence at Elea.[49] We also hear of “Anaxagoreans,”[50] and -no one, of course, can doubt that the Pythagoreans were a society. In -fact, there is hardly any school but that of Miletos for which we have -not external evidence of the strongest kind; and even as regards it, we -have the significant fact that Theophrastos speaks of philosophers of a -later date as having been “associates of the philosophy of -Anaximenes.”[51] We shall see too in the first chapter that the internal -evidence in favour of the existence of a Milesian school is very strong -indeed. It is from this point of view, then, that we shall now proceed -to consider the men who created Hellenic science. - -Footnote 48: - - _Tht._ 179 e 4, αὐτοῖς ... τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἔφεσον. The humorous denial - that the Herakleiteans had any disciples (180 b 8, Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ - δαιμόνιε;) implies that this was the normal and recognised relation. - -Footnote 49: - - _Soph._ 242 d 4, τὸ ... παρ’ ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος. Cf. ib. 216 a 3, - ἑταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα [ἑταίρων] (where ἑταίρων is - probably interpolated, but gives the right sense); 217 a, 1, οἱ περὶ - τὸν ἐκεῖ τόπον. - -Footnote 50: - - _Crat._ 409 b 6, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι λέγουσιν. - -Footnote 51: - - Cf. Chap. VI. § 122; and, on the whole subject, see Diels, “Über die - ältesten Philosophenschulen der Griechen” in _Philosophische Aufsätze - Eduard Zeller gewidmet_ (Leipzig, 1887). - - - - - CHAPTER I - THE MILESIAN SCHOOL - - -[Sidenote: Miletos and Lydia.] - -1. It was at Miletos that the earliest school of scientific cosmology -had its home. At the time it arose, the Milesians were in an -exceptionally favourable position for scientific as well as commercial -pursuits. They had, indeed, come into conflict more than once with the -neighbouring Lydians, whose rulers were now bent upon extending their -dominion to the coast; but, towards the end of the seventh century B.C., -Thrasyboulos, tyrant of Miletos, had succeeded in making terms with King -Alyattes, and an alliance was concluded between them, which not only -saved Miletos for the present from a disaster like that which befell -Smyrna, but secured it against molestation for the future. Even half a -century later, when Croesus, resuming his father’s forward policy, made -war upon and conquered Ephesos, Miletos was still able to maintain the -old treaty-relation, and never, strictly speaking, became subject to the -Lydians at all. We can hardly doubt that the sense of security which -this exceptional position would foster had something to do with the rise -of scientific inquiry. Material prosperity is necessary as a foundation -for the highest intellectual effort; and at this time Miletos was in -possession of all the refinements of life to a degree unknown in -continental Hellas. - -Nor was it only in this way that the Lydian connexion would favour the -growth of science at Miletos. What was called Hellenism at a later date -seems to have been traditional in the dynasty of the Mermnadai. There -may well be some truth in the statement of Herodotos, that all the -“sophists” of the time flocked to the court of Sardeis.[52] The -tradition which represents Croesus as what we should call the “patron” -of Greek wisdom, was fully developed in the fifth century; and, however -unhistorical its details may be, it must clearly have some sort of -foundation in fact. Particularly noteworthy is “the common tale among -the Greeks,” that Thales accompanied him on his luckless campaign -against Pteria, apparently in the capacity of military engineer. -Herodotos, indeed, disbelieves the story that he diverted the course of -the Halys;[53] but he does not attack it on the ground of any antecedent -improbability, and it is quite clear that those who reported it found no -difficulty in accepting the relation which it presupposes between the -philosopher and the king. - -Footnote 52: - - Herod. i. 29. Some other points may be noted in confirmation of what - has been said as to the “Hellenism” of the Mermnadai. Alyattes had two - wives, one of whom, the mother of Croesus, was a Karian; the other was - an Ionian, and by her he had a son called by the Greek name Pantaleon - (_ib._ 92). The offerings of Gyges were pointed out in the treasury of - Kypselos at Delphoi (_ib._ 14), and those of Alyattes were one of the - “sights” of the place (_ib._ 25). Croesus also showed great liberality - to Delphoi (_ib._ 50), and to many other Greek shrines (_ib._ 92). He - gave most of the pillars for the great temple at Ephesos. The stories - of Miltiades (vi. 37) and Alkmeon (_ib._ 125) should also be mentioned - in this connexion. - -Footnote 53: - - Herod. i. 75. He disbelieves it because he had heard, probably from - the Greeks of Sinope, of the great antiquity of the bridge on the - royal road between Ankyra and Pteria (Ramsay, _Asia Minor_, p. 29). - Xanthos recorded a tradition that it was Thales who induced Croesus to - ascend his pyre when he knew a shower was coming (fr. 19). - -It should be added that the Lydian alliance would greatly facilitate -intercourse with Babylon and Egypt. Lydia was an advanced post of -Babylonian culture, and Croesus was on friendly terms with the kings of -both Egypt and Babylon. It is noteworthy, too, that Amasis of Egypt had -the same Hellenic sympathies as Croesus, and that the Milesians -possessed a temple of their own at Naukratis.[54] - -Footnote 54: - - Milesians at Naukratis, Herod. ii. 178, where Amasis is said to have - been φιλέλλην. He subscribed to the rebuilding of the temple at - Delphoi after the great fire (_ib._ 180). - - - I. THALES - -[Sidenote: Origin.] - -2. There can be no doubt that the founder of the Milesian school, and -therefore the first of the cosmologists, was Thales;[55] but all we can -really be said to know of him comes from Herodotos, and the romance of -the Seven Wise Men was already in existence when he wrote. He tells us, -in the first place, that Thales was of Phoenician descent, a statement -which other writers explained by saying he belonged to the Thelidai, a -noble house descended from Kadmos and Agenor.[56] This is clearly -connected with the view of Herodotos that there were “Kadmeians” from -Boiotia among the original Ionian colonists, and it is certain that -there really were people called Kadmeians in several Ionic cities.[57] -Whether they were of Semitic origin is, of course, another matter. -Herodotos probably mentions the supposed descent of Thales simply -because he was believed to have introduced certain improvements in -navigation from Phoenicia.[58] At any rate, the name Examyes, which his -father bore, lends no support to the view that he was a Semite. It is a -Karian name, and the Karians had been almost completely assimilated by -the Ionians. On the monuments, we find Greek and Karian names -alternating in the same families, and there is therefore no reason to -suppose that Thales was anything else than an ordinary Milesian citizen, -though perhaps with Karian blood in his veins.[59] - -Footnote 55: - - Simplicius, indeed, quotes from Theophrastos the statement that Thales - had many predecessors (_Dox._ p. 475, 11). This, however, need not - trouble us; for the scholiast on Apollonios Rhodios (ii. 1248) tells - us that Theophrastos made Prometheus the first philosopher, which is - merely an application of Peripatetic literalism to a remark of Plato’s - (_Phileb._ 16 c 6). Cf. Appendix, § 2. - -Footnote 56: - - Herod. i. 170 (R. P. 9 d.); Diog. i. 22 (R. P. 9). - -Footnote 57: - - Strabo, xiv. pp. 633, 636; Pausan. vii. 2, 7. Priene was called Kadme, - and the oldest annalist of Miletos bore the name Kadmos. See E. Meyer, - _Gesch. des Alterth._ ii. § 158. - -Footnote 58: - - Diog. i. 23, Καλλίμαχος δ’ αὐτὸν οἶδεν εὑρετὴν τῆς ἄρκτου τῆς μικρᾶς - λέγων ἐν τοῖς Ἰάμβοις οὕτως— - - καὶ τῆς ἁμάξης ἐλέγετο σταθμήσασθαι - τοὺς ἀστερίσκους, ᾗ πλέουσι Φοίνικες. - -Footnote 59: - - See Diels, “Thales ein Semite?” (_Arch._ ii. 165 sqq.), and Immisch, - “Zu Thales Abkunft” (_ib._ p. 515). The name Examyes occurs also in - Kolophon (Hermesianax, _Leontion_, fr. 2, 38 Bgk.), and may be - compared with other Karian names such as Cheramyes and Panamyes. - -[Sidenote: The eclipse foretold by Thales.] - -3. By far the most remarkable statement that Herodotos makes about -Thales is that he foretold the eclipse of the sun which put an end to -the war between the Lydians and the Medes.[60] Now, we may be sure that -he was quite ignorant of the true cause of eclipses. Anaximander and his -successors certainly were so,[61] and it is incredible that the right -explanation should once have been given and then forgotten so soon. Even -supposing, however, Thales had known the cause of eclipses, no one can -believe that such scraps of elementary geometry as he picked up in Egypt -would enable him to calculate one from the elements of the moon’s path. -Yet the evidence for the prediction is too strong to be rejected -off-hand. The testimony of Herodotos to an event which must have -happened about a hundred years before his own birth may, perhaps, be -deemed insufficient; but that of Xenophanes is a very different matter, -and it is this we have really to deal with.[62] According to -Theophrastos, Xenophanes was a disciple of Anaximander, and he may quite -well have seen and spoken with Thales. In any case, he must have known -scores of people who were able to remember what happened, and he had no -conceivable interest in misrepresenting it. The prediction of the -eclipse is really better attested than any other fact about Thales -whatsoever, and the evidence for it is about as strong as for anything -that happened in the early part of the sixth century B.C. - -Footnote 60: - - Herod. i. 74. - -Footnote 61: - - For the theories held by Anaximander and Herakleitos, see _infra_, §§ - 19, 71. - -Footnote 62: - - Diog. i. 23, δοκεῖ δὲ κατά τινας πρῶτος ἀστρολογῆσαι καὶ ἡλιακὰς - ἐκλείψεις καὶ τροπὰς προειπεῖν, ὥς φησιν Εὔδημος ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν - ἀστρολογουμένων ἱστορίᾳ, ὅθεν αὐτὸν καὶ Ξενοφάνης καὶ Ἡρόδοτος - θαυμάζει. - -Now it is quite possible to predict eclipses without knowing their true -cause, and there is no doubt that the Babylonians actually did so. On -the basis of their astronomical observations, they had made out a cycle -of 223 lunar months, within which eclipses of the sun and moon recurred -at equal intervals of time.[63] This, it is true, would not enable them -to predict eclipses of the sun for a given spot on the earth’s surface; -for these phenomena are not visible at all places where the sun is above -the horizon at the time. We do not occupy a position at the centre of -the earth, and what astronomers call the geocentric parallax has to be -taken into account. It would only, therefore, be possible to tell by -means of the cycle that an eclipse of the sun would be visible -somewhere, and that it might be worth while to look out for it. Now, if -we may judge from a report by a Chaldaean astronomer which has been -preserved, this was just the position of the Babylonians. They watched -for eclipses at the proper dates; and, if they did not occur, they -announced the fact as a good omen.[64] To explain what we are told about -Thales no more than this is required. He simply said there would be an -eclipse; and, as good luck would have it, it was visible in Asia Minor, -and on a striking occasion. - -Footnote 63: - - The first to call attention to the Chaldaean cycle in this connexion - seems to have been the Rev. George Costard, Fellow of Wadham College. - See his _Dissertation on the Use of Astronomy in History_ (London, - 1764), p. 17. It is inaccurate to call it the _Saros_; that was quite - another thing (see Ginzel, _Klio_, i. p. 377). - -[Sidenote: Date of Thales.] - -4. The prediction of the eclipse does not, then, throw much light upon -the scientific attainments of Thales; but, if we can fix its date, it -will give us a point from which to start in trying to determine the time -at which he lived. Modern astronomers have calculated that there was an -eclipse of the sun, probably visible in Asia Minor, on May 28 (O.S.), -585 B.C.,[65] while Pliny gives the date of the eclipse foretold by -Thales as Ol. XLVIII. 4 (585/4 B.C.).[66] This, it is true, does not -exactly tally; for May 585 belongs to the year 586/5 B.C. It is -sufficiently near, however, to justify us in identifying the eclipse as -that of Thales, and this is confirmed by Apollodoros, who fixed his -_floruit_ in the same year.[67] The further statement that, according to -Demetrios Phalereus, Thales “received the name of wise” in the -archonship of Damasias at Athens, agrees very well with this, and is -doubtless based on the story of the Delphic tripod; for the archonship -of Damasias is the era of the restoration of the Pythian Games.[68] - -Footnote 64: - - See George Smith, _Assyrian Discoveries_ (1875), p. 409. The - inscription which follows was found at Kouyunjik:— - - “To the king my lord, thy servant Abil-Istar. - - * * * * * - - “Concerning the eclipse of the moon of which the king my lord sent to - me; in the cities of Akkad, Borsippa, and Nipur, observations they - made, and then in the city of Akkad, we saw part.... The observation - was made, and the eclipse took place. - - * * * * * - - “And when for the eclipse of the sun we made an observation, the - observation was made and it did not take place. That which I saw with - my eyes to the king my lord I send.” - -Footnote 65: - - For the literature of this subject, see R. P. 8 b, adding Ginzel, - _Spezieller Kanon_, p. 171. See also Milhaud, _Science grecque_, p. - 62. - -Footnote 66: - - Pliny, _N.H._ ii. 53. - -Footnote 67: - - For Apollodoros, see Appendix, § 20. The dates in our text of Diogenes - (i. 37; R. P. 8) cannot be reconciled with one another. That given for - the death of Thales is probably right; for it is the year before the - fall of Sardeis in 546/5 B.C., which is one of the regular eras used - by Apollodoros. It no doubt seemed natural to make Thales die the year - before the “ruin of Ionia” which he foresaw. Seventy-eight years - before this brings us to 625/4 B.C. for the birth of Thales, and this - gives us 585/4 B.C. for his fortieth year. That is Pliny’s date for - the eclipse, and Pliny’s dates come from Apollodoros through Nepos. - For a full discussion of the subject, see Jacoby, pp. 175 sqq. - -Footnote 68: - - Diog. i. 22 (R. P. 9). I do not discuss the Pythian era and the date - of Damasias here, though it appears to me that the last word has not - yet been said upon the subject. Jacoby (pp. 170 sqq.) argues strongly - for 582/1, the date now generally accepted. Others favour the Pythian - year 586/5 B.C., which is the very year of the eclipse, and this would - help to explain how those historians who used Apollodoros came to date - it a year too late; for Damasias was archon for two years and two - months. It is even possible that they misunderstood the words Δαμασίου - τοῦ δευτέρου, which are intended to distinguish him from an earlier - archon of the same name, as meaning “in the second year of Damasias.” - Apollodoros gave only Athenian archons, and the reduction to Olympiads - is the work of later writers. Kirchner, adopting the year 582/1 for - Damasias, brings the archonship of Solon down to 591/0 (_Rh. Mus._ - liii. pp. 242 sqq.). But the date of Solon’s archonship can never have - been doubtful. On Kirchner’s reckoning, we come to 586/5 B.C., if we - keep the traditional date of Solon. See also E. Meyer, _Forschungen_, - ii. pp. 242 sqq. - -[Sidenote: Thales in Egypt.] - -5. The introduction of Egyptian geometry into Hellas is universally -ascribed to Thales, and it is extremely probable that he did visit -Egypt; for he had a theory of the inundations of the Nile. In a -well-known passage,[69] Herodotos gives three explanations of the fact -that this alone of all rivers rises in summer and falls in winter; but, -as his custom is in such cases, he does not name their authors. The -first of them, however, that which attributes the floods to the Etesian -winds, is ascribed to Thales in the _Placita_,[70] and also by many -later writers. Now, those statements are derived from a treatise on the -Rise of the Nile attributed to Aristotle and known to the Greek -commentators, but now extant only in a Latin epitome of the thirteenth -century.[71] In this work the first of the three theories mentioned by -Herodotos is ascribed to Thales, the second to Euthymenes of Massalia, -and the third to Anaxagoras. Where did Aristotle, or whoever wrote the -book, get these names? We think naturally once more of Hekataios, whom -Herodotos so often reproduces without mentioning his name; and this -conjecture is much strengthened when we find that Hekataios actually -mentioned Euthymenes.[72] We may conclude, then, that Thales really was -in Egypt; and, perhaps, that Hekataios, in describing the Nile, took -account, as was only natural, of his distinguished fellow-citizen’s -views. - -Footnote 69: - - Herod. ii. 20. - -Footnote 70: - - Aet. iv. I. 1 (_Dox._ p. 384). - -Footnote 71: - - _Dox._ pp. 226-229. The Latin epitome will be found in Rose’s edition - of the Aristotelian fragments. - -Footnote 72: - - Hekataios, fr. 278 (_F.H.G._ i. p. 19). - -[Sidenote: Thales and geometry.] - -6. As to the nature and extent of the mathematical knowledge brought -back by Thales from Egypt, it seems desirable to point out that many -writers have seriously misunderstood the character of the tradition.[73] -In his commentary on the First Book of Euclid, Proclus enumerates, on -the authority of Eudemos, certain propositions which he says were known -to Thales.[74] One of the theorems with which he credits him is that two -triangles are equal when they have one side and the two adjacent angles -equal. This he must have known, said Eudemos, as otherwise he could not -have measured the distances of ships at sea from a watch-tower in the -way he was said to have done.[75] Here we see how all these statements -arose. Certain remarkable feats in the way of measurement were -traditionally ascribed to Thales, and it was assumed that he must have -known all the propositions which these imply. But this is quite an -illusory method of inference. Both the measurement of the distance of -ships at sea, and that of the height of the pyramids, which is also -ascribed to him,[76] are easy applications of what Aahmes calls the -_seqt_. These rules of mensuration may well have been brought from Egypt -by Thales, but we have no ground for supposing that he knew any more -about their _rationale_ than did the author of the Rhind papyrus. -Perhaps, indeed, he gave them a wider application than the Egyptians had -done. Still, mathematics, properly so called, did not come into -existence till some time after Thales. - -Footnote 73: - - See Cantor, _Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Mathematik_, vol. i. pp. - 112 sqq.; Allman, “Greek Geometry from Thales to Euclid” - (_Hermathena_, iii. pp. 164-174). - -Footnote 74: - - Proclus, _in Eucl._ pp. 65, 7; 157, 10; 250, 20; 299, 1; 352, 14; - (Friedlein). Eudemos wrote the first histories of astronomy and - mathematics, just as Theophrastos wrote the first history of - philosophy. - -Footnote 75: - - Proclus, p. 352, 14, Εὔδημος δὲ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρικαῖς ἱστορίαις εἰς - Θαλῆν τοῦτο ἀνάγει τὸ θεώρημα (_Eucl._ i. 26)· τὴν γὰρ τῶν ἐν θαλάττῃ - πλοίων ἀπόστοσιν δι’ οὗ τρόπου φασὶν αὐτὸν δεικνύναι τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαί - φησιν ἀναγκαῖον. For the method adopted by Thales, see Tannery, - _Géométrie grecque_, p. 90. I agree, however, with Dr. Gow (_Short - History of Greek Mathematics_, § 84) that it is very unlikely Thales - reproduced and measured on land the enormous triangle which he had - constructed in a perpendicular plane over the sea. Such a method would - be too cumbrous to be of use. It is much simpler to suppose that he - made use of the Egyptian _seqt_. - -Footnote 76: - - The oldest version of this story is given in Diog. i. 27, ὁ δὲ - Ἱερώνυμος καὶ ἐκμετρῆσαί φησιν αὐτὸν τὰς πυραμίδας, ἐκ τῆς σκιᾶς - παρατηρήσαντα ὅτε ἡμῖν ἰσομεγέθης ἐστίν. Cf. Pliny, _H. Nat._ xxxvi. - 82, _mensuram altitudinis earum deprehendere invenit Thales Milesius - umbram metiendo qua hora par esse corpori solet_. (Hieronymos of - Rhodes was contemporary with Eudemos.) This need imply no more than - the simple reflexion that the shadows of all objects will probably be - equal to the objects at the same hour. Plutarch (_Conv. sept. sap._ - 147 a) gives a more elaborate method, τὴν βακτηρίαν στήσας ἐπὶ τῷ - πέρατι τῆς σκιᾶς ἣν ἡ πυραμὶς ἐποίει, γενομένων τῇ ἐπαφῇ τῆς ἀκτῖνος - δυοῖν τριγώνων, ἔδειξας ὃν ἡ σκιὰ πρὸς τὴν σκιὰν λόγον εἶχε, τὴν - πυραμίδα πρὸς τὴν βακτηρίαν ἔχουσαν. This, as Dr. Gow points out, is - only another calculation of _seqt_, and may very well have been the - method of Thales. - -[Sidenote: Thales as a politician.] - -7. Thales appears once more in the pages of Herodotos some time before -the fall of the Lydian empire. He is said to have urged the Ionian -Greeks to unite in a federal state with its capital at Teos.[77] We -shall have occasion to notice more than once in the sequel that the -early schools of philosophy were in the habit of trying to influence the -course of political events; and there are many things, for instance the -part played by Hekataios in the Ionian revolt, which point to the -conclusion that the scientific men of Miletos took up a very decided -position in the stirring times that followed the death of Thales. It is -this political action which has gained the founder of the Milesian -school his undisputed place among the Seven Wise Men; and it is owing -mainly to his inclusion among those worthies that the numerous anecdotes -which were told of him in later days attached themselves to his -name.[78] - -Footnote 77: - - Herod. i. 170 (R. P. 9 d). - -Footnote 78: - - The story of Thales falling into a well (Plato, _Tht._ 174 a) is - nothing but a fable teaching the uselessness of σοφία; the anecdote - about the “corner” in oil (Ar. _Pol._ Α, 11. 1259 a 6) is intended to - inculcate the opposite lesson. - -[Sidenote: Uncertain character of the tradition.] - -8. If Thales ever wrote anything, it soon was lost, and the works which -were written in his name did not, as a rule, deceive even the -ancients.[79] Aristotle professes to know something about the views of -Thales; but he does not pretend to know how they were arrived at, nor -the arguments by which they were supported. He does, indeed, make -certain suggestions, which are repeated by later writers as statements -of fact; but he himself simply gives them for what they are worth.[80] -There is another difficulty in connexion with the tradition. Many a -precise-looking statement in the _Placita_ has no other foundation than -the habit of ascribing any doctrine which was, roughly speaking, -characteristic of the whole Ionic “Succession” to “Thales and his -followers,” and so producing the appearance of a definite statement -about Thales. But, in spite of all this, we need not doubt that -Aristotle was correctly informed with regard to the leading points. We -have seen traces of reference to Thales in Hekataios, and nothing can be -more likely than that later writers of the school should have quoted the -views of its founder. We may venture, therefore, upon a conjectural -restoration of his cosmology, in which we shall be guided by what we -know for certain of the subsequent development of the Milesian school; -for we should naturally expect to find its characteristic doctrines at -least foreshadowed in the teaching of its earliest representative. But -all this must be taken for just what it is worth; speaking strictly, we -do not know anything about the teaching of Thales at all. - -Footnote 79: - - See R. P. 9 e. - -Footnote 80: - - R. P. _ib._ - -[Sidenote: Conjectural account of the cosmology of Thales.] - -9. The statements of Aristotle may be reduced to three: - - (1) The earth floats on the water.[81] - (2) Water is the material cause[82] of all things. - (3) All things are full of gods. The magnet is alive; for it has - the power of moving iron.[83] - -Footnote 81: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 983 b 21 (R. P. 10); _de Caelo_, Β, 13. 294 a 28 - (R. P. 11). Later writers add that he gave this as an explanation of - earthquakes (so Aet. iii. 15, 1); but this is probably due to a - “Homeric allegorist” (Appendix, § 11), who wished to explain the - epithet ἐννοσίγαιος. Cf. Diels, _Dox._ p. 225. - -Footnote 82: - - _Met._ Α, 3. 983 b 20 (R. P. 10). I have said “material cause,” - because τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς (b 19) means τῆς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει ἀρχῆς (b 7). - -Footnote 83: - - Arist. _de An._ Α, 5. 411 a 7 (R. P. 13); _ib._ 2. 405 a 19 (R. P. 13 - a). Diog. i. 24 (R. P. _ib._) adds amber. This comes from Hesychios of - Miletos; for it occurs in the scholium of Par. A on Plato, _Rep._ 600 - a. - -The first of these statements must be understood in the light of the -second, which is expressed in Aristotelian terminology, but would -undoubtedly mean that Thales had said water was the fundamental or -primary thing, of which all other things were mere transient forms. It -was, we shall see, just such a primary substance that the Milesian -school as a whole was seeking, and it is unlikely that the earliest -answer to the great question of the day should have been the -comparatively subtle one given by Anaximander. We are, perhaps, -justified in holding that the greatness of Thales consisted in this, -that he was the first to ask, not what _was_ the original thing, but -what _is_ the primary thing now; or, more simply still, “What is the -world made of?” The answer he gave to this question was: _Water_. - -[Sidenote: Water.] - -10. Aristotle and Theophratos, followed by Simplicius and the -doxographers, suggest several explanations of this answer. By Aristotle -these explanations are given as conjectural; it is only later writers -that repeat them as if they were quite certain.[84] The most probable -view of them seems to be that Aristotle simply ascribed to Thales the -arguments used at a later date by Hippon of Samos in support of a -similar thesis.[85] This would account for their physiological -character. The rise of scientific medicine had made biological arguments -very popular in the fifth century; but, in the days of Thales, the -prevailing interest was not physiological, but rather what we should -call meteorological, and it is therefore from this point of view we must -try to understand the theory. - -Footnote 84: - - _Met._ Α, 3. 983 b 22; Aet. i. 3, 1; Simpl. _Phys._ p. 36, 10 (R. P. - 10, 12, 12 a). The last of the explanations given by Aristotle, - namely, that Thales was influenced by early cosmogonical theories - about Okeanos and Tethys, has strangely been supposed to be more - historical than the rest, whereas it is merely a fancy of Plato’s - taken literally. Plato says more than once (_Tht._ 180 d 2; _Crat._ - 402 b 4) that Herakleitos and his predecessors (οἱ ῥέοντες) derived - their philosophy from Homer (_Il._ xiv. 201), and even earlier sources - (Orph. frag. 2, Diels, _Vors._ 1st ed. p. 491). In quoting this - suggestion, Aristotle refers it to “some”—a word which often means - Plato—and he calls the originators of the theory παμπαλαίους, as Plato - had done (_Met._ 983 b 28; cf. _Tht._ 181 b 3). This is a - characteristic example of the way in which Aristotle gets history out - of Plato. See Appendix, § 2. - -Footnote 85: - - Compare Arist. _de An._ Α, 2. 405 b 2 (R. P. 220) with the passages - referred to in the last note. The same suggestion is made in Zeller’s - fifth edition (p. 188, n. 1), which I had not seen when the above was - written. Döring, “Thales” (_Zschr. f. Philos._ 1896, pp. 179 sqq.), - takes the same view. We now know that, though Aristotle declines to - consider Hippon as a philosopher (_Met._ Α, 3. 984 a 3; R. P. 219 a), - he was discussed in the history of medicine known as Menon’s - _Iatrika_. See Diels in _Hermes_, xxviii. p. 420. - -Now it is not very hard to see how considerations of a meteorological -kind may have led Thales to adopt the view he did. Of all the things we -know, water seems to take the most various shapes. It is familiar to us -in a solid, a liquid, and a vaporous form, and so Thales may well have -thought that he saw the world-process from water and back to water again -going on before his very eyes. The phenomenon of evaporation naturally -suggests everywhere that the fire of the heavenly bodies is kept up by -the moisture which they draw from the sea. Even at the present day, the -country people speak of the appearance of sunbeams as “the sun drawing -water.” Water comes down again in the rain; and lastly, so the early -cosmologists thought, it turns to earth. This seems strange to us, but -it may have seemed natural enough to men who were familiar with the -river of Egypt which had formed the Delta, and with the torrents of Asia -Minor, which bring down unusually large alluvial deposits. At the -present day the Gulf of Latmos, on which Miletos used to stand, is -completely filled up. Lastly, they thought, earth turns once more to -water—an idea derived from the observation of dew, night-mists, and -subterranean springs. For these last were not in early times supposed to -have anything at all to do with the rain. The “waters under the earth” -were regarded as an entirely independent source of moisture.[86] - -Footnote 86: - - The view here taken most resembles that of the “Homeric allegorist” - Herakleitos (R. P. 12 a). That, however, is also a conjecture, - probably of Stoic, as the others are of Peripatetic, origin. - -[Sidenote: Theology.] - -11. The third of the statements mentioned above is supposed by Aristotle -himself to imply that Thales believed in a “soul of the world,” though -he is careful to mark this as no more than an inference.[87] The -doctrine of the world-soul is then attributed quite positively to Thales -by Aetios, who gives it in the Stoic phraseology which he found in his -immediate source, and identifies the world-intellect with God.[88] -Cicero found a similar account of the matter in the Epicurean manual -which he followed, but he goes a step further. Eliminating the Stoic -pantheism, he turns the world-intellect into a Platonic _demiourgos_, -and says that Thales held there was a divine mind which formed all -things out of water.[89] All this is derived from the cautious statement -of Aristotle, and can have no greater authority than its source. We need -not enter, then, upon the old controversy whether Thales was an atheist -or not. It is really irrelevant. If we may judge from his successors, he -may very possibly have called water divine; but, if he had any religious -beliefs at all, we may be sure they were quite unconnected with his -cosmological theory. - -Footnote 87: - - Arist. _de An._ Α, 5. 411 a 7 (R. P. 13). - -Footnote 88: - - Aet. i. 7, 11 = Stob. i. 56 (R. P. 14). On the sources here referred - to, see Appendix, §§ 11, 12. - -Footnote 89: - - Cicero, _de Nat. D._ 1. 25 (R. P. 13 b). On Cicero’s source, see - _Dox._ pp. 125, 128. The Herculanean papyrus of Philodemos is, - unfortunately, defective just at this point, but it is not likely that - the Epicurean manual anticipated Cicero’s mistake. - -Nor must we make too much of the saying itself that “all things are full -of gods.” It is often supposed to mean that Thales attributed a “plastic -life” to matter, or that he was a “hylozoist.” We have seen already how -misleading this way of speaking is apt to be,[90] and we shall do well -to avoid it. It is not safe to regard such an apophthegm as evidence for -anything; the chances are that it belongs to Thales as one of the Seven -Wise Men, rather than as founder of the Milesian school. Further, such -sayings are, as a rule, anonymous to begin with, and are attributed now -to one sage and now to another.[91] On the other hand, it is extremely -probable that Thales did say that the magnet and amber had souls. That -is no apophthegm, but something more on the level of the statement that -the earth floats on the water. It is, in fact, just the sort of thing we -should expect Hekataios to record about Thales. It would be wrong, -however, to draw any inferences from it as to his view of the world; for -to say that the magnet and amber are alive is to imply, if anything, -that other things are not.[92] - -Footnote 90: - - See Introd. § VIII. - -Footnote 91: - - Plato refers to the saying πάντα πλήρη θεῶν in _Laws_, 899 b 9 (R. P. - 14 b), without mentioning Thales. That ascribed to Herakleitos in the - _de part. An._ Α, 5. 645 a 17 seems to be a mere variation on it. So - in Diog. ix. 7 (R. P. 46 d) Herakleitos is credited with the saying - πάντα ψυχῶν εἶναι κα δαιμόνων πλήρη. - -Footnote 92: - - Bäumker, _Das Problem der Materie_, p. 10, n. 1. - - - II. ANAXIMANDER - -[Sidenote: Life.] - -12. The next name that has come down to us is that of Anaximander, son -of Praxiades. He too was a citizen of Miletos, and Theophrastos -described him as an “associate” of Thales.[93] We have seen how that -expression is to be understood (§ XIV.). - -According to Apollodoros, Anaximander was sixty-four years old in Ol. -LVIII. 2 (547/6 B.C.); and this is confirmed by Hippolytos, who says he -was born in Ol. XLII. 3 (610/9 B.C.), and by Pliny, who assigns his -discovery of the obliquity of the zodiac to the same Olympiad.[94] We -seem to have here something more than a mere combination of the ordinary -type; for, according to all the rules of Alexandrian chronology, -Anaximander should have “flourished” in 565 B.C., that is, just half-way -between Thales and Anaximenes, and this would make him sixty, not -sixty-four, in 546. Now Apollodoros appears to have said that he had met -with the work of Anaximander; and his reason for mentioning this must be -that he found in it some indication which enabled him to fix its date -without having recourse to conjecture. Diels suggests that Anaximander -may have given his age at the time of writing as sixty-four, and that -the book may have contained some other statement showing it to have been -published in 547/6 B.C.[95] Perhaps, however, this hardly does justice -to the fact that the year given is just that which preceded the fall of -Sardeis and the subjugation of the Lydian empire by the Persians. It may -be a more plausible conjecture that Anaximander, writing some years -later, incidentally mentioned what his age had been at the time of that -great crisis. We know from Xenophanes that the question, “How old were -you when the Mede appeared?” was considered an interesting one in those -days.[96] At all events, we seem to be justified in believing that -Anaximander was a generation younger than Thales. When he died we do not -really know.[97] - -Footnote 93: - - R. P. 15 d. That the words πολίτης καὶ ἑταῖρος, given by Simplicius, - _de Caelo_, p. 615, 13, are the original words of Theophrastos is - shown by the agreement of Cic. _Acad._ ii. 118, _popularis et - sodalis_. The two passages represent quite independent branches of the - tradition. See Appendix, §§ 7, 12. - -Footnote 94: - - Diog. ii. 2 (R. P. 15); Hipp. _Ref._ i. 6 (_Dox._ p. 560); Plin. - _N.H._ ii. 31. Pliny’s dates come from Apollodoros through Nepos. - -Footnote 95: - - _Rhein. Mus._ xxxi. p. 24. - -Footnote 96: - - Xenophanes, fr. 22 (fr. 17, Karsten; R. P. 95 a). Jacoby (p. 190) - thinks that Apollodoros fixed the _floruit_ of Anaximander forty years - before that of Pythagoras, that is, in 572/1 B.C., and that the - statement as to his age in 547/6 is a mere inference from this. - -Footnote 97: - - The statement that he “died soon after” (Diog. ii. 2; R. P. 15) seems - to mean that Apollodoros made him die in the year of Sardeis (546/5), - one of his regular epochs. If this is so, Apollodoros cannot have said - also that he flourished in the days of Polykrates, and Diels is - probably right in supposing that this notice refers to Pythagoras and - has been inserted in the wrong place. - -Like his predecessor, Anaximander distinguished himself by certain -practical inventions. Some writers credited him with that of the -_gnomon_; but that can hardly be correct. Herodotos tells us this -instrument came from Babylon, so perhaps it was Anaximander who made it -known among the Greeks. He was also the first to construct a map, and -Eratosthenes said this was the map elaborated by Hekataios.[98] - -Footnote 98: - - For the gnomon, see Introd. p. 31, _n._ 44; and cf. Diog. ii. 1 (R. P. - 15); Herod. ii. 109 (R. P. 15 a). Pliny, on the other hand, ascribes - the invention of the gnomon to Anaximenes (_N.H._ ii. 87). The truth - seems to be that the erection of celebrated gnomons was traditionally - ascribed to certain philosophers. That of Delos was referred to - Pherekydes. For the map see Agathemeros, i. 1, Ἀναξίμανδρος ὁ Μιλήσιος - ἀκουστὴς Θαλέω πρώτος ἐτόλμησε τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν πίνακι γράψαι, μεθ’ - ὃν Ἑκαταῖος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀνὴρ πολυπλανὴς διηκρίβωσεν, ὥστε θαυμασθῆναι - τὸ πρᾶγμα. This is from Eratosthenes. Cf. Strabo, i. p. 7. - -[Sidenote: Theophrastos on Anaximander’s theory of the primary - substance.] - -13. Nearly all we know of Anaximander’s system is derived in the last -resort from Theophrastos.[99] As to the credibility of what we are told -on his authority, it is enough to remark that the original work, which -was in the hands of Apollodoros, must certainly have existed in the time -of Theophrastos. Moreover, he seems once at least to have quoted -Anaximander’s own words, and he criticised his style. Here are the -remains of what he said of him in the First Book:— - - Anaximander of Miletos, son of Praxiades, a fellow-citizen and - associate of Thales,[100] said that the material cause and first - element of things was the Infinite, he being the first to introduce - this name for the material cause. He says it is neither water nor any - other of the so-called[101] elements, but a substance different from - them which is infinite, from which arise all the heavens and the - worlds within them.—_Phys. Op._ fr. 2 (_Dox._ p. 476; R. P. 16). - - He says that this is eternal and ageless, and that it encompasses all - the worlds.—Hipp. _Ref._ i. 6 (R. P. 17 a). - - And into that from which things take their rise they pass away once - more, “as is ordained; for they make reparation and satisfaction to - one another for their injustice according to the appointed time,” as - he says[102] in these somewhat poetical terms.—_Phys. Op._ fr. 2 (R. - P. 16). - - And besides this, there was an eternal motion, in the course of which - was brought about the origin of the worlds.—Hipp. _Ref._ i. 6 (R. P. - 17 a). - - He did not ascribe the origin of things to any alteration in matter, - but said that the oppositions in the substratum, which was a boundless - body, were separated out.—Simpl. _Phys._ p. 150, 20 (R. P. 18). - -Footnote 99: - - See the conspectus of extracts from Theophrastos given by Diels, - _Dox._ p. 133; _Vors._ pp. 13 sqq. In this and other cases, where the - words of the original have been preserved by Simplicius, I have given - them alone. On the various writers quoted, see Appendix, § 9 sqq. - -Footnote 100: - - Simplicius says “successor and disciple” (διάδοχος καὶ μαθητής) in his - Commentary on the _Physics_; but see above, p. 52, n. 2. - -Footnote 101: - - For the expression τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα, see Diels, _Elementum_, p. - 25, n. 4. In view of this, we must keep the MS. reading εἶναι, instead - of writing νυνί with Usener. - -Footnote 102: - - Diels (_Vors._ p. 13) begins the actual quotation with the words ἐξ ὧν - δὲ ἡ γένεσις.... The Greek practice of blending quotations with the - text tells against this. It is very rare for a Greek writer to open a - verbal quotation abruptly. Further, it is safer not to ascribe the - terms γένεσις and φθορά in their technical Platonic sense to - Anaximander. - -[Sidenote: The primary substance is not one of the “elements.”] - -14. Anaximander taught, then, that there was one eternal, indestructible -substance out of which everything arises, and into which everything once -more returns; a boundless stock from which the waste of existence is -continually being made good. This is only the natural development of the -thought we have ventured to ascribe to Thales, and there can be no doubt -that Anaximander at least distinctly formulated it. Indeed, we can still -follow to some extent the reasoning which led him to do so. Thales had -regarded water as the most likely of all the things we know to be that -of which all others are forms; Anaximander appears to have asked himself -how the primary substance could be one of these particular things. His -argument seems to be preserved by Aristotle, who has the following -passage in his discussion of the Infinite:— - - Further, there cannot be a single, simple body which is infinite, - either, as some hold, one distinct from the elements, which they then - derive from it, nor without this qualification. For there are some who - make this (_i.e._ a body distinct from the elements) the infinite, and - not air or water, in order that the other things may not be destroyed - by their infinity. _They are in opposition one to another_—air is - cold, water moist, and fire hot—and therefore, _if any one of them - were infinite, the rest would have ceased to be by this time_. - Accordingly they say that what is infinite is something other than the - elements, and from it the elements arise.—Arist. _Phys._ Γ, 5. 204 b - 22 (R. P. 16 b). - -It is clear that in this passage Anaximander is contrasted with Thales -and with Anaximenes. Nor is there any reason to doubt that the account -given of his reasoning is substantially correct, though the form is -Aristotle’s own, and the mention of “elements” is an anachronism.[103] -Anaximander was struck, it would seem, by the opposition and strife -between the things which go to make up the world; the warm fire was -opposed to the cold air, the dry earth to the moist sea. These opposites -were at war, and any predominance of one over the other was an -“injustice” for which they must make reparation to one another.[104] We -may suppose that his thoughts ran somewhat as follows. If Thales had -been right in saying that water was the fundamental reality, it would -not be easy to see how anything else could ever have existed. One side -of the opposition, the cold and moist, would have had its way unchecked, -injustice would have prevailed, and the warm and dry would have been -driven from the field long ago. We must, then, have something which is -not itself one of the warring opposites we know, something more -primitive, out of which they arise, and into which they once more pass -away. That Anaximander called this something by the name of φύσις, is -clear from the doxographers; the current statement that the word ἀρχή in -the sense of a “first principle” was introduced by him, is probably due -to a misunderstanding of what Theophrastos said.[105] - -Footnote 103: - - The conception of elements is not older than Empedokles (§ 106), and - the _word_ στοιχεῖα, which is properly translated by _elementa_, was - first used in this sense by Plato. For the history of the term, see - Diels, _Elementum_ (1899). - -Footnote 104: - - The important word ἀλλήλοις was omitted in the Aldine Simplicius, but - is in all the MSS. We shall see that in Herakleitos “justice” means - the observance of an equal balance between what were called later the - elements (§ 72). See also Introd. p. 32, _n._ 45. - -Footnote 105: - - If the words quoted from Theophrastos by Simplicius, _Phys._ p. 24, 15 - (R. P. 16), stood by themselves, no one would ever have supposed them - to mean that Anaximander called the Boundless ἀρχή. They would - naturally be rendered: “having been the first to introduce this name - (_i.e._ τὸ ἄπειρον) for the ἀρχή”; but the words of Hippolytos (_Ref._ - i. 6, 2), πρῶτος τοὔνομα καλέσας τῆς ἀρχῆς, have led nearly all - writers to take the passage in the less obvious sense. We now know, - however, that Hippolytos is no independent authority, but rests - altogether on Theophrastos; so the natural view to take is that either - his immediate source, or he himself, or a copyist, has dropped out - τοῦτο before τοὔνομα, and corrupted κομίσας into καλέσας. It is not - credible that Theophrastos made both statements. The other passage - from Simplicius compared by Usener (p. 150, 23), πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἀρχὴν - ὀνομάσας τὸ ὑποκείμενον, does not seem to me to have anything to do - with the question. It means simply that Anaximander was the first to - name the substratum as the “material cause,” which is a different - point altogether. This is how Neuhäuser takes the passage - (_Anaximander_, pp. 7 sqq.); but I cannot agree with him in holding - that the _word_ ὑποκείμενον is ascribed to the Milesian. - -[Sidenote: Aristotle’s account of the theory.] - -15. It was natural for Aristotle to regard this theory as an -anticipation or presentiment of his own doctrine of “indeterminate -matter.”[106] He knew very well, of course, that he himself was the -author of that; but it is in accordance with his method to represent his -own theories as the distinct formulation of truths which earlier -thinkers had only guessed at. It was to be expected, then, that he -should sometimes express the views of Anaximander in terms of the theory -of “elements.” He knew too that the Boundless was a body,[107] though in -his own system there was no room for anything corporeal prior to the -elements; so he had to speak of it as a boundless body “alongside of” or -“distinct from” the elements (παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα). So far as I know, no -one has doubted that, when he uses this phrase, he is referring to -Anaximander. - -Footnote 106: - - Arist. _Met._ Λ, 2. 1069 b 18 (R. P. 16 c). - -Footnote 107: - - This is taken for granted in _Phys._ Γ, 4. 203 a 16; 204 b 22 (R. P. - 16 b), and stated in Γ, 8. 208 a 8 (R. P. 16 a). Cf. Simpl. _Phys._ p. - 150, 20 (R. P. 18). - -In a number of other places Aristotle speaks of a thinker, whom he does -not happen to name, who held that the primary substance was something -“intermediate between” the elements or between two of them.[108] Nearly -all the Greek commentators referred this to Anaximander also, but most -modern writers refuse to follow them. It is, no doubt, easy to show that -Anaximander can have never meant to describe the Boundless in this way, -but that is no real objection to the older interpretation. It is -difficult to see that it is more of an anachronism to call the Boundless -“intermediate between the elements” than to say that it is “distinct -from the elements”; and indeed, if once we introduce the elements at -all, the former description is in some ways the more adequate of the -two. At any rate, if we refuse to understand these passages as referring -to Anaximander, we shall have to say that Aristotle paid a great deal of -attention to some early thinker, whose very name has been lost, and who -not only agreed with some of Anaximander’s views, but also, as is shown -by one passage, used some of his most characteristic expressions.[109] -We may add that in one or two places Aristotle certainly seems to -identify the “intermediate” with the something “distinct from” the -elements.[110] - -Footnote 108: - - Aristotle speaks four times of something intermediate between Fire and - Air (_Gen. Corr._ Β, 1. 328 b 35; _ib._ 5. 332 a 21; _Phys._ Α, 4. 187 - a 14; _Met._ Α, 7. 988 a 30). In five places we have something - intermediate between Water and Air (_Met._ Α, 7. 988 a 13; _Gen. - Corr._ Β, 5. 332 a 21; _Phys._ Γ, 4. 203 a 18; _ib._ 5. 205 a 27; _de - Caelo_, Γ, 5. 303 b 12). Once (_Phys._ Α, 6. 189 b 1) we hear of - something between Water and Fire. This variation shows at once that he - is not speaking historically. If any one ever held the doctrine of τὸ - μεταξύ, he must have known perfectly well which two elements he meant. - -Footnote 109: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Γ, 5. 303 b 12, ὕδατος μὲν λεπτότερον, ἀέρος - πυκνότερον, ὃ περιέχειν φασὶ πάντας τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ἄπειρον ὄν. That - this refers to Idaios of Himera, as suggested by Zeller (p. 258), - seems very improbable. Aristotle nowhere mentions his name, and the - tone of his reference to Hippon in _Met._ Α, 3. 984 a 3 (R. P. 219 a) - shows that he was not likely to pay so much attention to the ἐπίγονοι - of the Milesian school. - -Footnote 110: - - Cf. _Phys._ Γ, 5. 204 b 22 (R. P. 16 b), where Zeller rightly refers - τὸ παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα to Anaximander. Now, at the end (205 a 25) the - whole passage is summarised thus: καὶ διὰ τοῦτ’ οὐθεὶς τὸ ἓν καὶ - ἄπειρον πῦρ ἐποίησεν οὐδὲ γῆν τῶν φυσιολόγων, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα ἢ τὸ - μέσον αὐτῶν. In _Gen. Corr._ Β, 1. 328 b 35 we have first τι μεταξὺ - τούτων σῶμά τε ὂν καὶ χωριστόν, and a little further on (329 a 9) μίαν - ὕλην παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα. In Β, 5. 332 a 20 we have οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἄλλο τί - γε παρὰ ταῦτα, οἶον μέσον τι ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος καὶ πυρός. - -There is even one place in which he appears to speak of Anaximander’s -Boundless as a “mixture,” though his words may perhaps admit of another -interpretation.[111] But this is of no consequence for our -interpretation of Anaximander himself. It is certain that he cannot have -said anything about “elements,” which no one thought of before -Empedokles, and no one could think of before Parmenides. The question -has only been mentioned at all because it has been the subject of a -lengthy controversy,[112] and because it throws great light on the -historical value of Aristotle’s statements. From the point of view of -his own system, these are abundantly justified; but we shall have to -remember in other cases that, when he seems to attribute an idea to some -earlier thinker, we are not in the least bound to believe what he says -in a historical sense. - -Footnote 111: - - _Met._ Λ, 2. 1069 b 18 (R. P. 16 c). Zeller (p. 205, n. 1) assumes an - “easy zeugma.” I should prefer to say that καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μῖγμα - was an afterthought, and that Aristotle really meant τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἓν - ... καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρου. _Met._ Α, 4. 187 a 20 does not assign the - “mixture” to Anaximander. - -Footnote 112: - - For the literature of this controversy, see R. P. 15. A good deal of - light is thrown on this and similar questions by W. A. Heidel, - “Qualitative Change in Pre-Socratic Philosophy” (_Arch._ xix. p. 333). - -[Sidenote: The primary substance is infinite.] - -16. Anaximander’s reason for conceiving the primary substance as -boundless was, no doubt, that indicated by Aristotle, namely, “that -becoming might not fail.”[113] It is not likely, however, that these -words are his own, though the doxographers speak as if they were. It is -enough for us to know that Theophrastos, who had seen his book, -attributed the thought to him. And certainly the way in which he -regarded the world would bring home to him with more than common force -the need of a boundless stock of matter. The “opposites” of which our -world consists are, we have seen, at war with one another, and their -strife is marked by “unjust” encroachments on either side. The warm -commits “injustice” in summer, the cold in winter. To redress the -balance, they must be absorbed once more in their common ground; and -this would lead in the long run to the destruction of everything but the -Boundless itself, if there were not an inexhaustible supply of it from -which opposites might continually be separated out afresh. We must -picture to ourselves, then, an endless mass, which is not any one of the -opposites we know, stretching out without limit on every side of the -heavens which bound the world we live in.[114] This mass is a body, and -out of it our world once emerged by the “separating out” of the -opposites, which one day will all be absorbed again in the Boundless, -and our world will cease to be. - -Footnote 113: - - _Phys._ Γ, 8. 208 a 8 (R. P. 16 a). That this refers to Anaximander is - shown by Aet. i. 3, 3 (R. P. 16 a). The same argument is given in - _Phys._ Γ, 4. 203 b 18, a passage where Anaximander has just been - quoted by name, τῷ οὕτως ἂν μόνον μὴ ὑπολείπειν γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν, εἰ - ἄπειρον εἴη ὅθεν ἀφαιρεῖται τὸ γιγνόμενον. I cannot, however, believe - that the arguments given at the beginning of this chapter (203 b 7; R. - P. 17) are Anaximander’s. They bear the stamp of the Eleatic - dialectic, and are, in fact, those of Melissos. - -Footnote 114: - - I have assumed that the word ἄπειρον means _spatially infinite_ - (though not in any precise mathematical sense), not _qualitatively - indeterminate_, as maintained by Teichmüller and Tannery. The decisive - reasons for holding that the sense of the word is “boundless in - extent” are as follows: (1) Theophrastos said that the primary - substance of Anaximander was ἄπειρον and contained all the worlds, and - the word περιέχειν everywhere means “to encompass,” not, as has been - suggested, “to contain potentially.” (2) Aristotle says (_Phys._ Γ, 4. - 203 b 23) διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν τῇ νοήσει μὴ ὑπολείπειν καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς δοκεῖ - ἄπειρος εἶναι καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ· ἀπείρου - δ’ ὄντος τοῦ ἔξω, καὶ σῶμα ἄπειρον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ κόσμοι. (3) - Anaximander’s theory of the ἄπειρον was adopted by Anaximenes, and he - identified it with Air, which is not qualitatively indeterminate. - -[Sidenote: The eternal motion.] - -17. The doxographers say it was the “eternal motion” that brought into -being “all the heavens and all the worlds within them.” As we have seen -(§ VIII), it is not likely that Anaximander himself used the phrase -“eternal motion.” That is rather Aristotle’s own version of what he -found stated about the “separating out” of opposites. We are not told -expressly how Anaximander conceived this to operate, but the term -“separating out” suggests some process of shaking and sifting as in a -sieve. Now it is just such a process that Plato makes the Pythagorean -Timaios describe, and the most probable theory is certainly that here, -as in many other cases, he has reproduced a genuinely early view. As we -shall see, it is quite likely that the Pythagoreans should have followed -Anaximander in this.[115] In any case, it is wrong to identify the -“eternal motion” with the diurnal revolution of the heavens, as has -sometimes been done. That motion cannot possibly be eternal, for the -simple reason that the heavens themselves are perishable. Aristotle -says, indeed, that all who believe the world has come into being -represent the earth as having been forced into the centre by the -circular motion;[116] but, though this doubtless refers to Anaximander -among others, it is quite irrelevant here. It has to do only with the -formation of the world after it has been once for all separated off and -enclosed in its own heaven, and we shall have to remember it when we -come to that part of the theory. At present, we have only to do with the -motion of the Boundless itself; and, if we wish to picture that, it is -much safer to regard it as a sort of shaking up and down which sorts out -the opposites from the infinite mass. - -Footnote 115: - - Plato, _Tim._ 52 e, where the elements are separated by being shaken, - stirred, and carried in different directions: “just as by sieves and - instruments for winnowing corn, the grain is shaken and sifted, and - the dense and heavy parts go one way, and the rare and light are - carried to a different place and settle there.” For the relation of - Pythagoreanism to Anaximander, see below, § 53. - -Footnote 116: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Β, 13. 295 a 9. The identification of the eternal - motion with the diurnal revolution is insisted on by Teichmüller and - Tannery, and is the real source of the very unnatural interpretation - which they give to the word ἄπειρον. It was obviously difficult to - credit Anaximander with a belief in an infinite body which revolves in - a circle. The whole theory rests upon a confusion between the finite - spherical κόσμος within the οὐρανός and the infinite περιέχον outside - it. - -[Sidenote: The innumerable worlds.] - -18. We are told more than once that Anaximander believed there were -“innumerable worlds in the Boundless,”[117] and it is now usual to -regard these with Zeller as an infinite series succeeding one another in -time. It may be allowed at once that his disproof of the idea that the -worlds are coexistent and eternal is decisive. To suppose that -Anaximander regarded this or any other world as eternal, is a flat -contradiction of everything we otherwise know, and of the Theophrastean -tradition that he taught the world was perishable. We have, then, to -decide between the view that, though all the worlds are perishable, -there may be an unlimited number of them in existence at the same time, -and the view that a new world never comes into existence till the old -one has passed away. Now, Zeller allows[118] that there is nothing in -the first of these views that is inconsistent with what we know of -Anaximander; but he thinks all the statements which have come down to us -point rather to the second. It seems to me that this is by no means the -case, and, as the matter is of fundamental importance, it will be -necessary to examine the evidence once more. - -Footnote 117: - - [Plut.] _Strom._ fr. 2 (R. P. 21 b). The words ἀνακυκλουμένων πάντων - αὐτῶν are most naturally to be interpreted as referring to an - ἀνακύκλησις or cycle of γένεσις and φθορά in each of a multitude of - coexistent worlds. It would be a very strange phrase to use of a - succession of single worlds. - -Footnote 118: - - Zeller, pp. 234 sqq. - -In the first place, the doxographical tradition proves that Theophrastos -discussed the views of all the early philosophers as to whether there -was one world or an infinite number, and there can be no doubt that, -when he ascribed “innumerable worlds” to the Atomists, he meant -coexistent and not successive worlds. Now, if he had really classed two -such different views under one head, he would at least have been careful -to point out in what respect they differed, and there is no trace of any -such distinction in our tradition. On the contrary, Anaximander, -Anaximenes, Archelaos, Xenophanes, Diogenes, Leukippos, Demokritos, and -Epicurus are all mentioned together as holding the doctrine of -“innumerable worlds” on all sides of this one,[119] and the only -distinction drawn between their views is that, while Epicurus made the -distances between these worlds unequal, Anaximander said all the worlds -were equidistant.[120] Zeller rejected this evidence, which he supposed -to be merely that of Stobaios, on the ground that we can have no -confidence in a writer who attributes “innumerable worlds” to -Anaximenes, Archelaos, and Xenophanes. With regard to the first two, I -hope to show that the statement is quite correct, and that it is not -even incorrect in the case of the last.[121] In any case, it can be -proved that the passage comes from Aetios,[122] and there is no reason -for doubting that, in the last resort, it is derived from Theophrastos, -though the name of Epicurus may have been added later. This is still -further confirmed by what Simplicius says in his commentary on the -_Physics_.[123] - - Those who assumed innumerable worlds, _e.g._ Anaximander, Leukippos, - Demokritos, and, at a later date, Epicurus, held that they came into - being and passed away _ad infinitum_, some always coming into being - and others passing away. - -Footnote 119: - - Aet. ii. 1, 3 (_Dox._ p. 327). Zeller is wrong in understanding κατὰ - πᾶσαν περιαγωγήν here of the revolution of a cycle. It means simply - “in every direction we turn,” and so does the alternative reading κατὰ - πᾶσαν περίστασιν. The six περιστάσεις are πρόσω, ὀπίσω, ἄνω, κάτω, - δεξιά, ἀριστερά (Nicom. _Introd._ p. 85, 11, Hoche), and Polybios uses - περίστασις of surrounding space. - -Footnote 120: - - Aet. ii. 1, 8 (_Dox._ p. 329), τῶν ἀπείρους ἀποφηναμένων τοὺς κόσμους - Ἀναξίμανδρος τὸ ἴσον αὐτοὺς ἀπέχειν ἀλλήλων, Ἐπίκουρος ἄνισον εἶναι τὸ - μεταξὺ τῶν κόσμων διάστημα. - -Footnote 121: - - For Anaximenes, see § 30; Xenophanes, § 59; Archelaos, Chap. X. - -Footnote 122: - - This is shown by the fact that the list of names is given also by - Theodoret. See Appendix, § 10. - -Footnote 123: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 1121, 5 (R. P. 21 b). Zeller says (p. 234, n. 4) - that Simplicius elsewhere (_de Caelo_, p. 273 b 43) makes the same - statement more doubtfully. But the words ὡς δοκεῖ, on which he relies, - are hardly an expression of doubt, and refer, in any case, to the - derivation of the doctrine of “innumerable worlds” from that of the - ἄπειρον, not to the doctrine itself. - -It is probable that this too comes from Theophrastos through Alexander. -Simplicius does not invent such things. - -We come lastly to a very important statement which Cicero has copied -from Philodemos, the author of the Epicurean treatise on Religion found -at Herculaneum, or perhaps from the immediate source of that work. -“Anaximander’s opinion was,” he makes Velleius say, “that there were -gods who came into being, rising and passing away at long intervals, and -that these were the innumerable worlds”;[124] and this must clearly be -taken along with the statement of Aetios to the effect that, according -to Anaximander, the “innumerable heavens” were gods.[125] Now it is very -much more natural to understand the “long intervals” which Cicero -mentions as intervals of space than as intervals of time;[126] and, if -we take the passage in this way, we have a perfect agreement among all -our authorities. - -Footnote 124: - - Cicero, _de Nat. D._ i. 25 (R. P. 21). - -Footnote 125: - - Aet. i. 7, 12 (R. P. 21 a). The reading of Stob., ἀπείρους οὐρανούς, - is guaranteed by the ἀπείρους κόσμους of Cyril, and the ἀπείρους νοῦς - (_i.e._ οὐνους) of the pseudo-Galen. See _Dox._ p. 11. - -It may be added that it is very unnatural to understand the statement -that the Boundless “encompasses all the worlds” of worlds succeeding one -another in time; for on this view there is at a given time only one -world to “encompass.” Moreover, the argument mentioned by Aristotle -that, if what is outside the heavens is infinite, body must be infinite, -and there must be innumerable worlds, can only be understood in this -sense, and is certainly intended to represent the reasoning of the -Milesians; for they were the only cosmologists who held there was a -boundless body outside the heavens.[127] Lastly, we happen to know that -Petron, one of the earliest Pythagoreans, held there were just one -hundred and eighty-three worlds arranged in a triangle,[128] which shows -that views of this sort existed long before the Atomists, and looks like -an attempt to introduce some order into Anaximander’s universe. - -Footnote 126: - - It is simplest to suppose that Cicero found διαστήμασιν in his - Epicurean source, and that is a technical term for the _intermundia_. - -Footnote 127: - - Arist. _Phys._ Γ, 4. 203 b 25, ἀπείρου δ’ ὄντος τοῦ ἔξω (sc. τοῦ - οὐρανοῦ), καὶ σῶμα ἄπειρον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ κόσμοι (sc. ἄπειροι). It is - to be observed that the next words—τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦ κενοῦ ἐνταῦθα ἢ - ἐνταῦθα;—show clearly that this refers to the Atomists as well; but - the ἄπειρον σῶμα will not apply to them. The suggestion is rather that - both those who made the Boundless a body and those who made it a κενόν - held the doctrine of ἀπειροι κόσμοι in the same sense. - -Footnote 128: - - See below, § 53. Cf. Diels, _Elementum_, pp. 63 sqq. - -[Sidenote: Origin of the heavenly bodies.] - -19. The doxographers have not left us in the dark as to the process by -which the different parts of the world arose from the Boundless. The -following statement comes ultimately from Theophrastos:— - - He says that something capable of begetting hot and cold was separated - off from the eternal at the origin of this world. From this arose a - sphere of flame which grew round the air encircling the earth, as the - bark grows round a tree. When this was torn off and enclosed in - certain rings, the sun, moon, and stars came into existence.—Ps.-Plut. - _Strom._ fr. 2 (R. P. 19). - -We see from this that when a portion of the Boundless had been separated -off from the rest to form a world, it first of all differentiated itself -into the two opposites, hot and cold. The hot appears as a sphere of -flame surrounding the cold; the cold, as earth with air surrounding it. -We are not told, however, in this extract how the cold came to be -differentiated into earth, air, and water; but there is a passage in -Aristotle’s _Meteorology_ which throws some light on the subject. We -read there:— - - But those who are wiser in the wisdom of men give an origin for the - sea. At first, they say, all the terrestrial region was moist; and, as - it was dried up by the sun, the portion of it that evaporated produced - the winds and the turnings of the sun and moon, while the portion left - behind was the sea. So they think the sea is becoming smaller by being - dried up, and that at last it will all be dry.—_Meteor._ Β, 1. 353 b - 5. - - * * * * * - - And the same absurdity arises for those who say that the earth and the - terrestrial part of the world at first were moist, but that air arose - from the heat of the sun, and that the whole world was thus increased, - and that this is the cause of winds and the turnings of the - heavens.[129]—_Ib._ 2. 355 a 21 (R. P. 20 a). - -In his commentary on the passage, Alexander tells us that this was the -view of Anaximander and Diogenes; and what he says is amply confirmed by -Anaximander’s theory of the sea as it is given by the doxographers (§ -20). We conclude, then, that after the first separation of the hot and -the cold, the heat of the sphere of flame turned part of the moist, cold -interior of the world into air or vapour—it is all one at this date—and -that the expansion of this mist broke up the sphere of flame itself into -rings. I give the theory which he adopted to explain the origin of the -heavenly bodies from these rings as it has been preserved by Hippolytos, -with some supplements from Aetios:— - - The heavenly bodies are wheels of fire separated off from the fire - which encircles the world, and enclosed in air. And they have - breathing-holes, certain pipe-like passages at which the heavenly - bodies are seen. For this reason, too, when the breathing-holes are - stopped, eclipses occur. And the moon appears now to wax and now to - wane because of the stopping and opening of the passages. The circle - of the sun is twenty-seven times the size (of the earth, while that) - of the moon is eighteen times as large.[130] The sun is highest of - all, and lowest are the wheels of the fixed stars.—Hipp. _Ref._ i. 6 - (R. P. 20). - - Anaximander said the stars were hoop-like compressions of air, full of - fire, breathing out flames at a certain point from orifices. The sun - was highest of all, after it came the moon, and below these the fixed - stars and the planets.—Aetios, ii. 13, 7; 15, 6 (R. P. 19 a). - - Anaximander said the sun was a ring twenty-eight times the size of the - earth, like a cart-wheel with the felloe hollow and full of fire, - showing the fire at a certain point, as if through the nozzle of a - pair of bellows.—Aet. ii. 20, 1 (R. P. 19 a). - - Anaximander said the sun was equal to the earth, but the ring from - which it breathes out and by which it is carried round was - twenty-seven times as large as the earth.—Aet. ii. 21, 1 (_Dox._ p. - 351). - - Anaximander said the moon was a ring eighteen times the size of the - earth....—Aet. ii. 25, 1 (_Dox._ p. 355).[131] - - Anaximander held that thunder and lightning were caused by the blast. - When it is shut up in a thick cloud and bursts forth with violence, - then the breakage of the cloud makes the noise, and the rift gives the - appearance of a flash by contrast with the darkness of the cloud.—Aet. - iii. 3, 1 (_Dox._ p. 367). - - Anaximander held that wind was a current of air (_i.e._ vapour) which - arose when its finest and moistest particles were set in motion or - dissolved by the sun.—Aet. iii. 6, 1 (_Dox._ p. 374). - - Rain was produced by the moisture drawn up from the earth by the - sun.—Hipp. _Ref._ i. 6, 7 (_Dox._ p. 560). - -Footnote 129: - - Zeller’s difficulty about the meaning of τροπαί here (p. 223, n. 2) - seems to be an imaginary one. The moon has certainly a movement in - declination and, therefore, τροπαί (Dreyer, _Planetary Systems_, p. - 17, n. 1). - -Footnote 130: - - I assume with Diels (_Dox._ p. 560) that something has fallen out in - our text of Hippolytos. I have, however, with Tannery, _Science - hellène_, p. 91, supplied “eighteen times” rather than “nineteen - times.” Zeller (p. 224, n. 2) prefers the text of our MS. of - Hippolytos to the testimony of Aetios. - -Footnote 131: - - Aetios goes on to say that the moon also is like a hollow cart-wheel - full of fire with an ἐκπνοή. The difference in the figures of - Hippolytos and Aetios is due to the fact that one refers to the - internal and the other to the external circumferences of the rings. - Cf. Tannery, _Science hellène_, p. 91; and Diels, “Ueber Anaximanders - Kosmos” (_Arch._ x. pp. 231 sqq.). - -We saw above that the sphere of flame was broken up into rings by the -expansion of the air or vapour that its own heat had drawn up from the -moist, cold interior. We must remember that Anaximander knew nothing of -the ring of Saturn. There are three of these rings, that of the sun, -that of the moon, and, lastly, nearest to the earth, the circle of the -stars. The circle of the sun was twenty-seven times, and that of the -moon eighteen times as large as the earth, from which we may perhaps -infer that the circle of the stars was nine times as large. The numbers -nine, eighteen, twenty-seven, play a considerable part in primitive -cosmogonies.[132] We do not see the rings of fire as complete circles; -for the mist that formed them encloses the fire, and becomes an outer -ring of opaque vapour. These outer rings, however, have openings at one -point of their circumference, through which the fire escapes, and these -are the heavenly bodies we actually see.[133] - -Footnote 132: - - As Diels points out (_Arch._ x. p. 229) the explanation given by - Gomperz, p. 53, cannot be right. It implies the fifth century theory - of μύδροι. Anaximander knew nothing of the “great mass” of the sun. - -Footnote 133: - - The true meaning of this doctrine was first explained by Diels (_Dox._ - pp. 25 sqq.). The flames rush forth _per magni circum spiracula - mundi_, as Lucretius has it (vi. 493). The πρηστῆρος αὐλός, to which - these are compared, is simply the nozzle of a pair of bellows, a sense - which the word πρηστήρ has in Apollonios Rhodios (iv. 776), and has - nothing to do with the meteorological phenomenon of the same name, for - which see Chap. III. § 71. It is not now necessary to refute the - earlier interpretations. - -It will be observed that we only hear of three circles, and that the -circle of the sun is the highest. The circle of the stars presents some -difficulty. It is, in all probability, the Milky Way, the appearance of -which may well have suggested the whole theory.[134] It seems that -Anaximander must have thought it had more “breathing-holes” than one, -though the tradition is silent on this point. There is not the slightest -reason for supposing that he regarded it as a sphere. He could not have -failed to see that a sphere so placed would make the sun and moon -permanently invisible. What, then, are we to say of the fixed stars that -do not lie in the Milky Way? There seems to be no way of accounting for -them unless we assume that they are the “innumerable worlds” which we -have just discussed. As the fire and air which surrounded the world have -been broken up into rings, we must be able to see right out into the -Boundless, and the fixed stars must be just the worlds, each surrounded -by its fiery envelope. It does not seem possible to explain all we are -told in any other way; and, if this is right, the statement of some -authors, that Anaximander regarded the stars of heaven as gods, may be -more than the mere mistake which it is now generally taken to be.[135] - -Footnote 134: - - It cannot be the Zodiac; for the planets were not separately studied - yet. - -Footnote 135: - - The _Placita_ and Eusebios both have τοὺς ἀστέρας οὐρανίους instead of - τοὺς ἀπείρους οὐρανούς (see above, p. 65, n. 2), and it seems just - possible that this is not a mere corruption of the text. The common - source may have had both statements. I do not, however, rest the - interpretation given above on this very insecure basis. Quite apart - from it, it seems to be the only way out of the difficulty. - -The explanation given of thunder and lightning was very similar. They -too were caused by fire breaking through compressed air, that is to say, -through the storm-clouds. It seems probable that this is really the -origin of the theory, and that Anaximander explained the heavenly bodies -on the analogy of lightning, not _vice versa_. That would be in perfect -agreement with the meteorological interest of the time. - -[Sidenote: Earth and sea.] - -20. We turn now to what we are told of the origin of earth and sea from -the moist, cold matter which was “separated off” in the beginning, and -which filled the inside of the sphere of flame:— - - The sea is what is left of the original moisture. The fire has dried - up most of it and turned the rest salt by scorching it.—Aet. iii. 16, - 1 (R. P. 20 a). - - He says that the earth is cylindrical in form, and that its depth is - as a third part of its. breadth.—Ps.-Plut. _Strom._ fr. 2 (R. P. - _ib._). - - The earth swings free, held in its place by nothing. It stays where it - is because of its equal distance from everything. Its shape is convex - and round, and like a stone pillar. We are on one of the surfaces, and - the other is on the opposite side.[136]—Hipp. _Ref._ i. 6 (R. P. 20). - -Footnote 136: - - The MSS. of Hippolytos have ὑγρὸν στρογγύλον. Roeper read γυρὸν - [στρογγύλον], supposing the second word to be a gloss on the first; - but Diels has shown (_Dox._ p. 218) that both are wanted. The first - means “convex,” and applies to the _surface_ of the earth; while the - second means “round,” and refers to its circuit. As to κίονι λίθῳ, it - is not easy to say anything positive. It might, possibly, be a mere - corruption of κυλίνδρῳ (cf. Plut. _Strom._ fr. 2; R. P. 20 a); but, if - so, it is a very old one. Aetios (iii. 10, 2), who is quite - independent of Hippolytos, has λίθῳ κίονι; Roeper suggested κιονέῃ - λίθῳ; Teichmüller, κίονος λιθῷ; while Diels doubtfully puts forward - λιθῷ κίονι, which he suggests might be a Theophrastean modernisation - of an original λιθέῃ κίονι (_Dox._ p. 219). - -Adopting for a moment the later theory of “elements,” we see that -Anaximander put fire on one side as “the hot,” and all the rest on the -other as “the cold,” which is also moist. This may explain how Aristotle -came to speak of the Boundless as intermediate between fire and water. -And we have seen also that the moist element was partly turned into -“air” or vapour by the fire, which explains how he could say the -Boundless was something between fire and air, or between air and -water.[137] - -Footnote 137: - - See above, p. 58, _n._ 48. - -The moist, cold interior of the world is not, it will be noticed, pure -water. It is always called “the moist” or “the moist state.” That is -because it has to be still further differentiated under the influence of -heat into earth, water, and vapour. The gradual drying up of the water -by the fire is a good example of what Anaximander meant by “injustice.” -And we see how this injustice brings about the destruction of the world. -The fire will in time dry up and burn up the whole of the cold, moist -element. But then it will not be fire any longer; it will simply be the -“mixture,” if we choose to call it so, of the hot and cold—that is, it -will be the same as the Boundless which surrounds it, and will pass away -into it. - -The view which Anaximander takes of the earth is a great advance upon -anything we can reasonably attribute to Thales, and Aristotle has -preserved the arguments by which he supported it. It is equally distant -from the extremes in every direction, and there is no reason for it to -move up or down or sideways.[138] Still, he does not attain to the idea -that it is spherical. He believes that we live on a convex disc, and -from this the cylindrical form follows as a matter of course. The really -remarkable thing is that he should have seen, however dimly, that there -is no absolute up and down in the world. - -Footnote 138: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Β, 13. 295 b 10, εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητά - φασιν αὐτὴν (τὴν γῆν) μένειν, ὥσπερ τῶν ἀρχαίων Ἀναξίμανδρος· μᾶλλον - μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν ἄνω ἢ κάτω ἢ εἰς τὰ πλάγια φέρεσθαι προσήκειν τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ - μέσου ἱδρυμένον καὶ ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχον. That Aristotle is - really reproducing Anaximander seems to be shown by the use of - ὁμοιότης in the old sense of “equality.” - -[Sidenote: Animals.] - -21. We have seen enough to show us that the speculations of Anaximander -about the world were of an extremely daring character; we come now to -the crowning audacity of all, his theory of the origin of living -creatures. The Theophrastean account of this has been well preserved by -the doxographers:— - - Living creatures arose from the moist element as it was evaporated by - the sun. Man was like another animal, namely, a fish, in the - beginning.—Hipp. _Ref._ i. 6 (R. P. 22 a). - - The first animals were produced in the moisture, each enclosed in a - prickly bark. As they advanced in age, they came out upon the drier - part. When the bark broke off,[139] they survived for a short - time.—Aet. v. 19, 1 (R. P. 22). - - Further, he says that originally man was born from animals of another - species. His reason is that while other animals quickly find food by - themselves, man alone requires a lengthy period of suckling. Hence, - had he been originally as he is now, he would never have - survived.—Ps.-Plut. _Strom._ fr. 2 (R. P. _ib._). - - He declares that at first human beings arose in the inside of fishes, - and after having been reared like sharks,[140] and become capable of - protecting themselves, they were finally cast ashore and took to - land.—Plut. _Symp. Quaest._ 730 f (R. P. _ib._). - -Footnote 139: - - This is to be understood in the light of what we are told about γαλεοί - below. Cf. Arist. _Hist. An._ Ζ, 10. 565 a 25, τοῖς μὲν οὖν σκυλίοις, - οὓς καλοῦσί τινες νεβρίας γαλεούς, ὅταν περιρραγῇ καὶ ἐκπέσῃ τὸ - ὄστρακον, γίνονται οἱ νεοττοί. - -Footnote 140: - - Reading ὥσπερ οἱ γαλεοί for ὥσπερ οἱ παλαιοί with Doehner, who - compares Plut. _de soll. anim._ 982 a, where the φιλόστοργον of the - shark is described. See p. 74, _n._ 141. - -The importance of these statements has sometimes been overrated and -still more often underestimated. Anaximander has been called a precursor -of Darwin by some, while others have treated the whole thing as a -mythological survival. It is therefore important to notice that this is -one of the rare cases where we have not merely a _placitum_, but an -indication, meagre though it be, of the observations on which it was -based, and the line of argument by which it was supported. It is clear -from this that Anaximander had an idea of what is meant by adaptation to -environment and survival of the fittest, and that he saw the higher -mammals could not represent the original type of animal. For this he -looked to the sea, and he naturally fixed upon those fishes which -present the closest analogy to the _mammalia_. The statements of -Aristotle about the _galeus levis_ were shown long ago by Johannes -Müller to be more accurate than those of later naturalists, and we now -know that these observations were already made by Anaximander. The -manner in which the shark nourishes its young furnished him with the -very thing he required to explain the survival of the earliest -animals.[141] - -Footnote 141: - - On Aristotle and the _galeus levis_, see Johannes Müller, “Ueber den - glatten Hai des Aristoteles” (_K. Preuss. Akad._, 1842), to which my - attention has been directed by my colleague, Prof. D’Arcy Thomson. The - precise point of the words τρεφόμενοι ὥσπερ οἱ γαλεοί appears from - Arist. _Hist. An._ Ζ, 10. 565 b 1, οἱ δὲ καλούμενοι λεῖοι τῶν γαλεῶν - τὰ μὲν ᾠὰ ἴσχουσι μεταξὺ τῶν ὑστερῶν ὁμοίως τοῖς σκυλίοις, περιστάντα - δὲ ταῦτα εἰς ἑκατέραν τὴν δικρόαν τῆς ὑστέρας καταβαίνει, καὶ τὰ ζῷα - γίνεται τὸν ὀμφαλὸν ἔχοντα πρὸς τῇ ὑστέρᾳ, ὥστε ἀναλισκομένων τῶν ᾠῶν - ὁμοίως δοκεῖν ἔχειν τὸ ἔμβρυον τοῖς τετράποσιν. It is not necessary to - suppose that Anaximander referred to the further phenomenon described - by Aristotle, who more than once says that all the γαλεοί except the - ἀκανθίας “send out their young and take them back again” (ἐξαφιᾶσι καὶ - δέχονται εἰς ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς νεοττούς, _ib._ 565 b 23), for which compare - also Ael. i. 17; Plut. _de soll. anim._ 982 a. The _placenta_ and - umbilical cord described by Johannes Müller will account sufficiently - for all he says. At the same time, I understand that deep-sea - fishermen at the present day confirm this remarkable statement also, - and two credible witnesses have informed me that they believe they - have seen the thing happen with their own eyes. - -[Sidenote: Theology.] - -22. In the course of our discussion of the “innumerable worlds” we saw -that Anaximander regarded these as gods. It is true, of course, as -Zeller says,[142] that to the Greeks the word θεός meant primarily an -object of worship, and he rightly adds that no one would think of -worshipping innumerable worlds. This, however, is no real objection to -our interpretation, though it serves to bring out an interesting point -in the development of Greek theological ideas. The philosophers, in -fact, departed altogether from the received usage of the word θεός. -Empedokles called the Sphere and the Elements gods, though it is not to -be supposed that he regarded them as objects of worship, and in the same -way we shall find that Diogenes of Apollonia spoke of Air as a god.[143] -As we may learn from the _Clouds_ of Aristophanes, it was just this way -of speaking that got philosophers the name of being ἄθεοι. It is of -great importance to bear this point in mind; for, when we come to -Xenophanes, we shall see that the god or gods he spoke of meant just the -world or worlds. It seems also that Anaximander called the Boundless -itself divine,[144] which is quite in accordance with the language of -Empedokles and Diogenes referred to above. - -Footnote 142: - - Zeller, p. 230. - -Footnote 143: - - For Empedokles, see Chap. V. § 119; and for Diogenes, Chap. X. § 188, - fr. 5. The cosmologists followed the theogonists and cosmogonists in - this. No one worshipped Okeanos and Tethys, or even Ouranos. - -Footnote 144: - - Arist. _Phys._ Γ, 4. 203 b 13 (R. P. 17). - - - III. ANAXIMENES - -[Sidenote: Life.] - -23. Anaximenes of Miletos, son of Eurystratos, was, according to -Theophrastos, an “associate” of Anaximander.[145] Apollodoros said, it -appears, that he “flourished” about the time of the fall of Sardeis -(546/5 B.C.), and died in Ol. LXIII. (528/524 B.C.).[146] In other -words, he was born when Thales “flourished,” and “flourished” when -Thales died, and this means that Apollodoros had no definite information -about his date at all. He most probably made him die in the sixty-third -Olympiad because that gives just a hundred years, or three generations, -for the Milesian school from the birth of Thales. We cannot, therefore, -say anything positive as to his date, except that he must have been -younger than Anaximander, and must have flourished before 494 B.C., when -the school was, of course, broken up by the destruction of Miletos. - -Footnote 145: - - Theophr. _Phys. Op._ fr. 2 (R. P. 26). - -Footnote 146: - - This follows from a comparison of Diog. ii. 3. with Hipp. _Ref._ i. 7 - (R. P. 23). In the latter passage we must, however, read τρίτον for - πρῶτον with Diels. The suggestion in R. P. 23 e that Apollodoros - mentioned the Olympiad without giving the number of the year is - inadequate; for Apollodoros did not reckon by Olympiads, but Athenian - archons. Jacoby (p. 194) brings the date of his death into connexion - with the _floruit_ of Pythagoras, which seems to me less probable. - Lortzing (_Jahresber._, 1898, p. 202) objects to my view on the ground - that the period of a hundred years plays no part in Apollodoros’s - calculations. It will be seen, however, from Jacoby, pp. 39 sqq., that - there is some reason for believing he made use of the generation of - 33⅓ years. - -[Sidenote: His book.] - -24. Anaximenes wrote a book which certainly survived until the age of -literary criticism; for we are told that he used a simple and -unpretentious Ionic,[147] very different, we may suppose, from the -poetical prose of Anaximander.[148] We may probably trust this -criticism, which comes ultimately from Theophrastos; and it furnishes a -good illustration of the truth that the character of a man’s thoughts is -sure to find expression in his style. We have seen that the speculations -of Anaximander were distinguished for their hardihood and breadth; those -of Anaximenes are marked by just the opposite quality. He appears to -have thought out his system carefully, but he rejects the more audacious -theories of his predecessor. The result is that, while his view of the -world is on the whole much less like the truth than Anaximander’s, it is -more fruitful in ideas that were destined to hold their ground. - -Footnote 147: - - Diog. ii. 3 (R. P. 23). - -Footnote 148: - - Cf. the statement of Theophrastos above, § 13. - -[Sidenote: Theory of the primary substance.] - -25. Anaximenes is one of the philosophers on whom Theophrastos wrote a -special monograph;[149] and this gives us an additional guarantee for -the trustworthiness of the tradition derived from his great work. The -following[150] are the passages which seem to contain the fullest and -most accurate account of what he had to say on the central feature of -the system:— - - Anaximenes of Miletos, son of Eurystratos, who had been an associate - of Anaximander, said, like him, that the underlying substance was one - and infinite. He did not, however, say it was indeterminate, like - Anaximander, but determinate; for he said it was Air.—_Phys. Op._ fr. - 2 (R. P. 26). - - From it, he said, the things that are, and have been, and shall be, - the gods and things divine, took their rise, while other things come - from its offspring.—Hipp. _Ref._ i. 7 (R. P. 28). - - “Just as,” he said, “our soul, being air, holds us together, so do - breath and air encompass the whole world.”—Aet. i. 3, 4 (R. P. 24). - - And the form of the air is as follows. Where it is most even, it is - invisible to our sight; but cold and heat, moisture and motion, make - it visible. It is always in motion; for, if it were not, it would not - change so much as it does.—Hipp. _Ref._ i. 7 (R. P. 28). - - It differs in different substances in virtue of its rarefaction and - condensation.—_Phys. Op._ fr. 2 (R. P. 26). - - When it is dilated so as to be rarer, it becomes fire; while winds, on - the other hand, are condensed Air. Cloud is formed from Air by - felting;[151] and this, still further condensed, becomes water. Water, - condensed still more, turns to earth; and when condensed as much as it - can be, to stones.—Hipp. _Ref._ i. 7 (R. P. 28).[152] - -Footnote 149: - - On these monographs see _Dox._ p. 103. - -Footnote 150: - - See the conspectus of extracts from Theophrastos given in _Dox._ p. - 135. - -Footnote 151: - - “Felting” (πίλησις) is the regular term for this process with all the - early cosmologists, from whom Plato has taken it (_Tim._ 58 b 4; 76 c - 3). - -Footnote 152: - - A more condensed form of the same doxographical tradition is given by - Ps.-Plut. _Strom._ fr. 3 (R. P. 25). - -[Sidenote: Rarefaction and condensation.] - -26. At the first glance, this undoubtedly looks like a falling off from -the more refined doctrine of Anaximander to a cruder view; but a -moment’s reflexion will show that this is not altogether the case. On -the contrary, the introduction of rarefaction and condensation into the -theory is a notable advance.[153] In fact, it makes the Milesian -cosmology thoroughly consistent for the first time; since it is clear -that a theory which explains everything by the transformations of a -single substance is bound to regard all differences as purely -quantitative. The infinite substance of Anaximander, from which the -opposites “in it” are “separated out,” cannot, strictly speaking, be -thought of as homogeneous, and the only way to save the unity of the -primary substance is to say that all diversities are due to the presence -of more or less of it in a given space. And when once this important -step has been taken, it is no longer necessary to make the primary -substance something “distinct from the elements,” to use Aristotle’s -inaccurate but convenient phrase; it may just as well be one of them. - -Footnote 153: - - Simplicius, _Phys._ p. 149, 32 (R. P. 26 b), says, according to the - MSS., that Theophrastos spoke of rarefaction and condensation in the - case of Anaximenes _alone_. We must either suppose with Zeller (p. - 193, n. 2) that this means “alone among the oldest Ionians” or read - πρῶτου for μόνου with Usener. The regular terms are πύκνωσις and - ἀραίωσις or μάνωσις. Plutarch, _de prim. frig._ 947 f (R. P. 27), says - that Anaximenes used the term τὸ χαλαρόν for the rarefied air. - -[Sidenote: Air.] - -27. The air that Anaximenes speaks of includes a good deal that we -should not call by that name. In its normal condition, when most evenly -distributed, it is invisible, and it then corresponds to our “air”; it -is identical with the breath we inhale and the wind that blows. That is -why he called it πνεῦμα. On the other hand, the old idea, familiar to us -in Homer, that mist or vapour is condensed air, is still accepted -without question. In other words, we may say that Anaximenes supposed it -to be a good deal easier to get liquid air than it has since proved to -be. It was Empedokles, we shall see, who first discovered that what we -call air was a distinct corporeal substance, and was not identical -either with vapour or with empty space. In the earlier cosmologists -“air” is always a form of vapour, and even darkness is a form of it. It -was Empedokles who cleared up this point too by showing that darkness is -a shadow.[154] - -Footnote 154: - - For the meaning of ἀήρ in Homer, see Schmidt, _Synonomik_, § 35; and - for its survival in Ionic prose, Hippokrates, Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων, - τόπων, 15, ἀήρ τε πολὺς κατέχει τὴν χώρην ἀπὸ τῶν ὑδάτων. Plato is - still conscious of the old meaning of the word; for he makes Timaios - say ἀέρος (γένη) τὸ μὲν εὐαγέστατον ἐπίκλην αἰθὴρ καλούμενος, ὁ δὲ - θολερώτατος ὁμίχλη καὶ σκότος (_Tim._ 58 d). The view given in the - text has been criticised by Tannery, “Une nouvelle hypothèse sur - Anaximandre” (_Arch._ viii. pp. 443 sqq.), and I have slightly altered - my expression of it to meet these criticisms. The point is of - fundamental importance, as we shall see, for the interpretation of - Pythagoreanism. - -It was natural for Anaximenes to fix upon Air in this sense as the -primary substance; for, in the system of Anaximander, it occupied an -intermediate place between the two fundamental opposites, the sphere of -flame and the cold, moist mass within it (§ 19). We know from Plutarch -that he fancied air became warmer when rarefied, and colder when -condensed. Of this he satisfied himself by a curious experimental proof. -When we breathe with our mouths open, the air is warm; when we breathe -with our lips closed, it is cold.[155] - -Footnote 155: - - Plut. _de prim. frig._ 947 f (R. P. 27). - -[Sidenote: The world breathes.] - -28. This argument from human breathing brings us to an important point -in the theory of Anaximenes, which is attested by the single fragment -that has come down to us.[156] “Just as our soul, being air, holds us -together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world.” The primary -substance bears the same relation to the life of the world as to that of -man. Now this, we shall see, was the Pythagorean view;[157] and it is -also an early instance of the argument from the microcosm to the -macrocosm, and so marks the first beginnings of an interest in -physiological matters. - -Footnote 156: - - Aet. i. 3, 4 (R. P. 24). - -Footnote 157: - - See Chap. II. § 53. - -[Sidenote: The parts of the world.] - -29. We turn now to the doxographical tradition concerning the formation -of the world and its parts:— - - He says that, as the air was felted, the earth first came into being. - It is very broad and is accordingly supported by the air.—Ps.-Plut. - _Strom._ fr. 3 (R. P. 25). - - In the same way the sun and the moon and the other heavenly bodies, - which are of a fiery nature, are supported by the air because of their - breadth. The heavenly bodies were produced from the earth by moisture - rising from it. When this is rarefied, fire comes into being, and the - stars are composed of the fire thus raised aloft. There were also - bodies of earthy substance in the region of the stars, revolving along - with them. And he says that the heavenly bodies do not move under the - earth, as others suppose, but round it, as a cap turns round our head. - The sun is hidden from sight, not because it goes under the earth, but - because it is concealed by the higher parts of the earth, and because - its distance from us becomes greater. The stars give no heat because - of the greatness of their distance.—Hipp. _Ref._ i. 7, 4-6 (R. P. 28). - - Winds are produced when air is condensed and rushes along under - propulsion; but when it is concentrated and thickened still more, - clouds are generated; and, lastly, it turns to water.[158]—Hipp. - _Ref._ i. 7, 7 (Dox. p. 561). - - The stars are fixed like nails in the crystalline vault of the - heavens.—Aet. ii. 14, 3 (_Dox._ p. 344). - - They do not go under the earth, but turn round it.—_Ib._ 16, 6 (_Dox._ - p. 346). - - The sun is fiery.—_Ib._ 20, 2 (_Dox._ p. 348). - - It is broad like a leaf.—_Ib._ 22, 1 (_Dox._ p. 352). - - The heavenly bodies are diverted from their courses by the resistance - of compressed air.—_Ib._ 23, 1 (_Dox._ p. 352). - - The moon is of fire.—_Ib._ 25, 2 (_Dox._ p. 356). - - Anaximenes explained lightning like Anaximander, adding as an - illustration what happens in the case of the sea, which flashes when - divided by the oars.—_Ib._ iii. 3, 2 (_Dox._ p. 368). - - Hail is produced when water freezes in falling; snow, when there is - some air imprisoned in the water.—Aet. iii 4, 1 (_Dox._ p. 370). - - The rainbow is produced when the beams of the sun fall on thick - condensed air. Hence the anterior part of it seems red, being burnt by - the sun’s rays, while the other part is dark, owing to the - predominance of moisture. And he says that a rainbow is produced at - night by the moon, but not often, because there is not constantly a - full moon, and because the moon’s light is weaker than that of the - sun.—_Schol. Arat._[159] (_Dox._ p. 231). - - The earth was like a table in shape.—Aet. iii. 10, 3 (_Dox._ p. 377). - - The cause of earthquakes was the dryness and moisture of the earth, - occasioned by droughts and heavy rains respectively.—_Ib._ 15, 3 - (_Dox._ p. 379). - -Footnote 158: - - The text is very corrupt here. I retain ἐκπεπυκνωμένος, because we are - told above that winds are condensed air, and I adopt Zeller’s ἀραιῷ - εἰσφέρηται (p. 246, _n._ 554). - -We have seen that Anaximenes was quite justified in going back to Thales -in regard to his general theory of the primary substance; but it cannot -be denied that the effect of this upon the details of his cosmology was -unfortunate. The earth is once more imagined as a table-like disc -floating upon the air. The sun, moon, and planets are also fiery discs -which float on the air “like leaves.” It follows that the heavenly -bodies cannot be thought of as going under the earth at night, but only -as going round it laterally like a cap or a millstone.[160] This curious -view is also mentioned in Aristotle’s _Meteorology_,[161] where the -elevation of the northern parts of the earth, which makes it possible -for the heavenly bodies to be hidden from sight, is referred to. In -fact, whereas Anaximander had regarded the orbits of the sun, moon, and -stars as oblique with reference to the earth, Anaximenes regarded the -earth itself as inclined. The only real advance is the distinction of -the planets, which float freely in the air, from the fixed stars, which -are fastened to the “crystalline” vault of the sky.[162] - -Footnote 159: - - The source of this is Poseidonios, who used Theophrastos. _Dox._ p. - 231. - -Footnote 160: - - Theodoret (iv. 16) speaks of those who believe in a revolution like - that of a millstone, as contrasted with one like that of a wheel. - Diels (_Dox._ p. 46) refers these similes to Anaximenes and - Anaximander respectively. They come, of course, from Aetios (Appendix, - § 10), though they are given neither by Stobaios nor in the _Placita_. - -Footnote 161: - - Β, 1. 354 a 28 (R. P. 28 c). - -Footnote 162: - - We do not know how Anaximenes imagined the “crystalline” sky. It is - probable that he used the word πάγος as Empedokles did. Cf. Chap. V. § - 112. - -The earthy bodies, which circulate among the planets, are doubtless -intended to account for eclipses and the phases of the moon.[163] - -Footnote 163: - - See Tannery, _Science hellène_, p. 153. For the precisely similar - bodies assumed by Anaxagoras, see below, Chap. VI. § 135. See further - Chap. VII. § 151. - -[Sidenote: Innumerable worlds.] - -30. As might be expected, there is the same difficulty about the -“innumerable worlds” ascribed to Anaximenes as about those of -Anaximander, and most of the arguments given above (§ 18) apply here -also. The evidence, however, is far less satisfactory. Cicero says that -Anaximenes regarded air as a god, and adds that it came into being.[164] -That there is some confusion here is obvious. Air, as the primary -substance, is certainly eternal, and it is quite likely that Anaximenes -called it “divine,” as Anaximander did the Boundless; but it is certain -that he also spoke of gods who came into being and passed away. These -arose, he said, from the air. This is expressly stated by -Hippolytos,[165] and also by St. Augustine.[166] These gods are probably -to be explained like Anaximander’s. Simplicius, indeed, takes another -view;[167] but he may have been misled by a Stoic authority. - -Footnote 164: - - Cic. _de nat. D._ i. 26 (R. P. 28 b). On what follows see Krische, - _Forschungen_, pp. 52 sqq. - -Footnote 165: - - Hipp. _Ref._ i. 7, 1 (R. P. 28). - -Footnote 166: - - Aug. _de civ. D._ viii. 2: “Anaximenes omnes rerum causas infinito - aëri dedit: nec deos negavit aut tacuit; non tamen ab ipsis aërem - factum, sed ipsos ex aëre ortos credidit” (R. P. 28 b). - -Footnote 167: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 1121, 12 (R. P. 28 a). The passage from the - _Placita_ is of higher authority than this from Simplicius. Note, - further, that it is only to Anaximenes, Herakleitos, and Diogenes that - successive worlds are ascribed even here. With regard to Anaximander, - Simplicius is quite clear. For the Stoic view of Herakleitos, see - Chap. III. § 78; and for Diogenes, Chap. X. § 188. That Simplicius is - following a Stoic authority is suggested by the words καὶ ὕστερον οἱ - ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς. Cf. also Simpl. _de Caelo_, p. 202, 13. - -[Sidenote: Influence of Anaximenes.] - -31. It is not quite easy for us to realise that, in the eyes of his -contemporaries, and for long after, Anaximenes was a much more important -figure than Anaximander. And yet the fact is certain. We shall see that -Pythagoras, though he followed Anaximander in his account of the -heavenly bodies, was far more indebted to Anaximenes for his general -theory of reality (§ 53). We shall see further that when, at a later -date, science revived once more in Ionia, it was “the philosophy of -Anaximenes” to which it attached itself (§ 122). Anaxagoras adopted many -of his most characteristic views (§ 135), and some of them even found -their way into the cosmology of the Atomists.[168] Diogenes of Apollonia -went back to the central doctrine of Anaximenes, and once more made Air -the primary substance, though he also tried to combine it with the -theories of Anaxagoras (§ 188). We shall come to all this later on; but -it seemed desirable to point out at once that Anaximenes marks the -culminating point of the line of thought which started with Thales, and -to show how the “philosophy of Anaximenes” came to mean the Milesian -doctrine as a whole. This it can only have done because it was really -the work of a school, of which Anaximenes was the last distinguished -representative, and because his contribution to it was one that -completed the system he had inherited from his predecessors. That the -theory of rarefaction and condensation was really such a completion of -the Milesian system, we have seen already (§ 26), and it need only be -added that a clear realisation of this fact will be the best clue at -once to the understanding of the Milesian cosmology itself and to that -of the systems which followed it. In the main, it is from Anaximenes -that they all start. - -Footnote 168: - - In particular, the authority of Anaximenes was so great that both - Leukippos and Demokritos adhered to his theory of a disc-like earth. - Cf. Aet. iii. 10, 3-5 (Περὶ σχήματος γῆς), Ἀναξιμένης τραπεζοειδῆ (τὴν - γῆν). Λεύκιππος τυμπανοειδῆ. Δημόκριτος δισκοειδῆ μὲν τῷ πλάτει, - κοίλην δὲ τῷ μέσῳ. This, in spite of the fact that the spherical form - of the earth was already a commonplace in circles affected by - Pythagoreanism. - - - - - CHAPTER II - SCIENCE AND RELIGION - - -[Sidenote: Migrations to the West.] - -32. So far we have not met with any trace of direct antagonism between -science and popular beliefs, though the views of the Milesian -cosmologists were really as inconsistent with the religions of the -people as with the mythology of the anthropomorphic poets.[169] Two -things hastened the conflict—the shifting of the scene to the West, and -the religious revival which swept over Hellas in the sixth century B.C. - -Footnote 169: - - For the theological views of Anaximander and Anaximenes, see § 22 and - 30. - -The chief figures in the philosophical history of the period were -Pythagoras of Samos and Xenophanes of Kolophon. Both were Ionians by -birth, and yet both spent the greater part of their lives in the West. -We see from Herodotos how the Persian advance in Asia Minor occasioned a -series of migrations to Sicily and Southern Italy;[170] and this, of -course, made a great difference to philosophy as well as to religion. -The new views had probably grown up so naturally and gradually in Ionia -that the shock of conflict and reaction was avoided; but that could no -longer be so, when they were transplanted to a region where men were -wholly unprepared to receive them. - -Footnote 170: - - Cf. Herod. i. 170 (advice of Bias); vi. 22 sqq. (Kale Akte). - -Another, though a somewhat later, effect of these migrations was to -bring Science into contact with Rhetoric, one of the most characteristic -products of Western Hellas. Already in Parmenides we may note the -presence of that dialectical and controversial spirit which was destined -to have so great an influence on Greek thought, and it was just this -fusion of the art of arguing for victory with the search for truth that -before long gave birth to Logic. - -[Sidenote: The religious revival.] - -33. Most important of all in its influence on philosophy was the -religious revival which culminated about this time. The religion of -continental Hellas had developed in a very different way from that of -Ionia. In particular, the worship of Dionysos, which came from Thrace, -and is barely mentioned in Homer, contained in germ a wholly new way of -looking at man’s relation to the world. It would certainly be wrong to -credit the Thracians themselves with any very exalted views; but there -can be no doubt that, to the Greeks, the phenomenon of ecstasy suggested -that the soul was something more than a feeble double of the self, and -that it was only when “out of the body” it could show its true -nature.[171] To a less extent, such ideas were also suggested by the -worship of Demeter, whose mysteries were celebrated at Eleusis; though, -in later days, these came to take the leading place in men’s minds. That -was because they were incorporated in the public religion of Athens. - -Footnote 171: - - On all this, see Rohde, _Psyche_, pp. 327 sqq. It is probable that he - exaggerated the degree to which these ideas were already developed - among the Thracians, but the essential connexion of the new view of - the soul with Northern worships is confirmed by the tradition over and - over again. - -Before the time with which we are dealing, tradition shows us dimly an -age of inspired prophets—Bakides and Sibyls—followed by one of strange -medicine-men like Abaris and Aristeas of Prokonnesos. With Epimenides of -Crete, we touch the fringe of history, while Pherekydes of Syros is the -contemporary of the early cosmologists, and we still have some fragments -of his discourse. It looked as if Greek religion were about to enter -upon the same stage as that already reached by the religions of the -East; and, but for the rise of science, it is hard to see what could -have checked this tendency. It is usual to say that the Greeks were -saved from a religion of the Oriental type by their having no -priesthood; but this is to mistake the effect for the cause. Priesthoods -do not make dogmas, though they preserve them once they are made; and in -the earlier stages of their development, the Oriental peoples had no -priesthoods either in the sense intended.[172] It was not so much the -absence of a priesthood as the existence of the scientific schools that -saved Greece. - -Footnote 172: - - See Meyer, _Gesch. des Alterth._ ii. § 461. The exaggerated rôle often - attributed to priesthoods is a survival of French eighteenth century - thinking. - -[Sidenote: The Orphic religion.] - -34. The new religion—for in one sense it was new, though in another as -old as mankind—reached its highest point of development with the -foundation of the Orphic communities. So far as we can see, the original -home of these was Attika; but they spread with extraordinary rapidity, -especially in Southern Italy and Sicily.[173] They were first of all -associations for the worship of Dionysos; but they were distinguished by -two features which were new among the Hellenes. They looked to a -revelation as the source of religious authority, and they were organised -as artificial communities. The poems which contained their theology were -ascribed to the Thracian Orpheus, who had himself descended into Hades, -and was therefore a safe guide through the perils which beset the -disembodied soul in the next world. We have considerable remains of this -literature, but they are mostly of late date, and cannot safely be used -as evidence for the beliefs of the sixth century. We do know, however, -that the leading ideas of Orphicism were quite early. A number of thin -gold plates with Orphic verses inscribed on them have been discovered in -Southern Italy;[174] and though these are somewhat later in date than -the period with which we are dealing, they belong to the time when -Orphicism was a living creed and not a fantastic revival. What can be -made out from them as to the doctrine has a startling resemblance to the -beliefs which were prevalent in India about the same time, though it -seems impossible that there should have been any actual contact between -India and Greece at this date. The main purpose of the _Orgia_[175] was -to “purify” the believer’s soul, and so enable it to escape from the -“wheel of birth,” and it was for the better attainment of this end that -the Orphics were organised in communities. Religious associations must -have been known to the Greeks from a fairly early date;[176] but the -oldest of these were based, at least in theory, on the tie of kindred -blood. What was new was the institution of communities to which any one -might be admitted by initiation.[177] This was, in fact, the -establishment of churches, though there is no evidence that these were -connected with each other in such a way that we could rightly speak of -them as a single church. The Pythagoreans came nearer to realising that. - -Footnote 173: - - See E. Meyer, _Gesch. des Alterth._ ii. §§ 453-460, who rightly - emphasises the fact that the Orphic theogony is the continuation of - Hesiod’s work. As we have seen, some of it is even older than Hesiod. - -Footnote 174: - - For the gold plates of Thourioi and Petelia, see the Appendix to Miss - Harrison’s _Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion_, where the - text of them is discussed and a translation given by Professor Gilbert - Murray. - -Footnote 175: - - This was the oldest name for these “mysteries,” and it simply means - “sacraments” (cf. ἔοργα). _Orgia_ are not necessarily “orgiastic.” - That association of ideas merely comes from the fact that they - belonged to the worship of Dionysos. - -Footnote 176: - - Herodotos mentions that Isagoras and those of his γένος worshipped the - Karian Zeus (v. 66), and it is probable that the _Orgeones_ attached - by Kleisthenes to the Attic _phratriai_ were associations of this - kind. See Foucart, _Les associations religieuses chez les Grecs_. - -Footnote 177: - - A striking parallel is afforded to all this by what we are told in - Robertson Smith’s _Religion of the Semites_, p. 339. “The leading - feature that distinguished them” (the Semitic mysteries of the seventh - century B.C.) “from the old public cults with which they came into - competition, is that they were not based on the principle of - nationality, but sought recruits from men of every race who were - willing to accept initiation through the mystic sacraments.” - -[Sidenote: Philosophy as a Way of Life.] - -35. We have to take account of the religious revival here, chiefly -because it suggested the view that philosophy was above all a “way of -life.” Science too was a “purification,” a means of escape from the -“wheel.” This is the view expressed so strongly in Plato’s _Phaedo_, -which was written under the influence of Pythagorean ideas.[178] -Sokrates became to his followers the ideal “wise man,” and it was to -this side of his personality the Cynics mainly attached themselves. From -them proceeded the Stoic sage and the Christian saint, and also the -whole brood of impostors whom Lucian has pilloried for our -edification.[179] Saints and sages are apt to appear in questionable -shapes, and Apollonios of Tyana showed in the end where this view may -lead. It was not wholly absent from any Greek philosophy after the days -of Pythagoras. Aristotle is as much possessed by it as any one, as we -may see from the Tenth Book of the _Ethics_, and as we should see still -more distinctly if we possessed such works as the _Protreptikos_ in -their entirety.[180] Plato, indeed, tried to make the ideal wise man of -service to the state and mankind by his doctrine of the philosopher -king. It was he alone, so far as we know, that insisted on philosophers -descending by turns into the cave from which they had been released and -coming to the help of their former fellow-prisoners.[181] That was not, -however, the view that prevailed, and the “wise man” became more and -more detached from the world. Apollonios of Tyana was quite entitled to -regard himself as the spiritual heir of Pythagoras; for the theurgy and -thaumaturgy of the late Greek schools was but the fruit of the seed sown -in the generation before the Persian Wars. - -Footnote 178: - - The _Phaedo_ is dedicated, as it were, to Echekrates and the - Pythagorean society at Phleious, and it is evident that Plato in his - youth was impressed by the religious side of Pythagoreanism, though - the influence of Pythagorean science is not clearly marked till a - later period. Note specially the ἄτραπος of _Phd._ 66 b 4. In _Rep._ - x. 600 b 1, Plato speaks of Pythagoras as the originator of a private - ὁδός τις βίου. - -Footnote 179: - - Cf. especially the point of view of the _Auction of Lives_ (Βίων - πρᾶσις). - -Footnote 180: - - For the Προτρεπτικός of Aristotle, see Bywater in _J. Phil._ ii. p. - 55; Diels in _Arch._ i. p. 477; and the notes on _Ethics_, i. 5, in my - edition. - -Footnote 181: - - Plato, _Rep._ 520 c 1, καταβατέον οὖν ἐν μέρει. The allegory of the - Cave seems to be Orphic, and I believe Professor Stewart’s suggestion - (_Myths of Plato_, p. 252, n. 2), that Plato had the κατάβασις εἰς - Ἅιδου in mind, to be quite justified. The idea of rescuing the - “spirits in prison” is thoroughly Orphic. - -[Sidenote: No doctrine in the “Mysteries.”] - -36. On the other hand, it would be wrong to suppose that Orphicism or -the Mysteries suggested any definite doctrines to philosophers, at least -during the period which we are about to consider. We have admitted that -they really implied a new view of the soul, and we might therefore have -expected to find that they profoundly modified men’s theory of the world -and their relation to it. The striking thing is that this did not -happen. Even those philosophers who were most closely in touch with the -religious movement, like Empedokles and the Pythagoreans, held views -about the soul which really contradicted the theory implied by their -religious practices.[182] There is no room for an immortal soul in any -philosophy of this period. Up to Plato’s time immortality was never -treated in a scientific way, but merely assumed in the Orphic rites, to -which Plato half seriously turns for confirmation of his own -teaching.[183] - -Footnote 182: - - For Empedokles, see § 119; for the Pythagoreans, see § 149. - -Footnote 183: - - Cf. _Phd._ 69 c 2, καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι - καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι - κ.τ.λ. The gentle irony of this and similar passages ought to be - unmistakable. - -All this is easily accounted for. With us a religious revival generally -means the vivid realisation of a new or forgotten doctrine, while -ancient religion has properly no doctrine at all. “The initiated,” -Aristotle said, “were not expected to learn anything, but merely to be -affected in a certain way and put into a certain frame of mind.”[184] -Nothing was required but that the ritual should be correctly performed, -and the worshipper was free to give any explanation of it he pleased. It -might be as exalted as that of Pindar and Sophokles, or as material as -that of the itinerant mystery-mongers described by Plato in the -_Republic_. The essential thing was that he should duly sacrifice his -pig. - -Footnote 184: - - Arist. fr. 45, 1483 a 19, τοὺς τελουμένους οὐ μαθεῖν τι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ - παθεῖν καὶ διατεθῆναι. - - - I. PYTHAGORAS OF SAMOS - -[Sidenote: Character of the tradition.] - -37. It is no easy task to give an account of Pythagoras that can claim -to be regarded as history. Our principal sources of information[185] are -the Lives composed by Iamblichos, Porphyry, and Laertios Diogenes. That -of Iamblichos is a wretched compilation, based chiefly on the work of -the arithmetician Nikomachos of Gerasa in Judaea, and the romance of -Apollonios of Tyana, who regarded himself as a second Pythagoras, and -accordingly took great liberties with his materials.[186] Porphyry -stands, as a writer, on a far higher level than Iamblichos; but his -authorities do not inspire us with more confidence. He, too, made use of -Nikomachos, and of a certain novelist called Antonius Diogenes, author -of a work entitled _Marvels from beyond Thule_.[187] Diogenes quotes, as -usual, a considerable number of authorities, and the statements he makes -must be estimated according to the nature of the sources from which they -were drawn.[188] So far, it must be confessed, our material does not -seem promising. Further examination shows, however, that a good many -fragments of two much older authorities, Aristoxenos and Dikaiarchos, -are embedded in the mass. These writers were both disciples of -Aristotle; they were natives of Southern Italy, and contemporary with -the last generation of the Pythagorean school. Both wrote accounts of -Pythagoras; and Aristoxenos, who was personally intimate with the last -representatives of scientific Pythagoreanism, also made a collection of -the sayings of his friends. Now the Neopythagorean story, as we have it -in Iamblichos, is a tissue of incredible and fantastic myths; but, if we -sift out the statements which go back to Aristoxenos and Dikaiarchos, we -can easily construct a rational narrative, in which Pythagoras appears -not as a miracle-monger and religious innovator, but simply as a -moralist and statesman. We might then be tempted to suppose that this is -the genuine tradition; but that would be altogether a mistake. There is, -in fact, a third and still earlier stratum in the Lives, and this agrees -with the latest accounts in representing Pythagoras as a wonder-worker -and a religious reformer. - -Footnote 185: - - See E. Rohde’s admirable papers, “Die Quellen des Iamblichus in seiner - Biographie des Pythagoras” (_Rh. Mus._ xxvi., xxvii.). - -Footnote 186: - - Iamblichos was a disciple of Porphyry, and contemporary with - Constantine. The _Life of Pythagoras_ has been edited by Nauck (1884). - Nikomachos belongs to the beginning of the second century A.D. There - is no evidence that he added anything to the authorities he followed, - but these were already vitiated by Neopythagorean fables. Still, it is - to him we chiefly owe the preservation of the valuable evidence of - Aristoxenos. - -Footnote 187: - - Porphyry’s _Life of Pythagoras_ is the only considerable extract from - his _History of Philosophy_, in four books, that has survived. The - romance of Antonius is the original parodied by Lucian in his _Vera - Historia_. - -Footnote 188: - - The importance of the life in Laertios Diogenes lies in the fact that - it gives us the story current at Alexandria before the rise of - Neopythagoreanism and the promulgation of the gospel according to - Apollonios of Tyana. - -Some of the most striking miracles of Pythagoras are related on the -authority of Andron’s _Tripod_, and of Aristotle’s work on the -Pythagoreans.[189] Both these treatises belong to the fourth century -B.C., and are therefore untouched by Neopythagorean fancies. Further, it -is only by assuming the still earlier existence of this view that we can -explain the allusions of Herodotos. The Hellespontine Greeks told him -that Salmoxis or Zamolxis had been a slave of Pythagoras,[190] and -Salmoxis is a figure of the same class as Abaris and Aristeas. - -Footnote 189: - - Andron of Ephesos wrote a work on the Seven Wise Men, called _The - Tripod_, in allusion to the well-known story. The feats ascribed to - Pythagoras in the Aristotelian treatise remind us of an ecclesiastical - legend. For example, he kills a deadly snake by biting it; he was seen - at Kroton and Metapontion at the same time; he exhibited his golden - thigh at Olympia, and was addressed by a voice from heaven when - crossing the river Kasas. The same authority stated that he was - identified by the Krotoniates with Apollo Hyperboreios (Arist. fr. - 186). - -Footnote 190: - - Herod. iv. 95. - -It seems, then, that both the oldest and the latest accounts agree in -representing Pythagoras as a man of the class to which Epimenides and -Onomakritos belonged—in fact, as a sort of “medicine-man”; but, for some -reason, there was an attempt to save his memory from this imputation, -and that attempt belonged to the fourth century B.C. The significance of -this will appear in the sequel. - -[Sidenote: Life of Pythagoras.] - -38. We may be said to know for certain that Pythagoras passed his early -manhood at Samos, and was the son of Mnesarchos;[191] and he -“flourished,” we are told, in the reign of Polykrates.[192] This date -cannot be far wrong; for Herakleitos already speaks of him in the past -tense.[193] - -Footnote 191: - - Cf. Herod. iv. 95, and Herakleitos, fr. 17 (R. P. 31 a). Herodotos - represents him as living at Samos. On the other hand, Aristoxenos said - that he came from one of the islands which the Athenians occupied - after expelling the Tyrrhenians (Diog. viii. 1). This suggests Lemnos, - from which the Tyrrhenian “Pelasgians” were expelled by Miltiades - (Herod. vi. 140), or possibly some other island which was occupied at - the same time. There were also Tyrrhenians at Imbros. This explains - the story that he was an Etrurian or a Tyrian. Other accounts bring - him into connexion with Phleious, but that is perhaps a pious - invention of the Pythagorean society which flourished there at the - beginning of the fourth century B.C. Pausanias (ii. 13, 1) gives it as - a Phleiasian tradition that Hippasos, the great-grandfather of - Pythagoras, had emigrated from Phleious to Samos. - -Footnote 192: - - Eratosthenes identified Pythagoras with the Olympic victor of Ol. - XLVIII. 1 (588/7 B.C.), but Apollodoros gave his _floruit_ as 532/1, - the era of Polykrates. He doubtless based this on the statement of - Aristoxenos quoted by Porphyry (_V. Pyth._ 9), that Pythagoras left - Samos from dislike to the tyranny of Polykrates (R. P. 53 a). For a - full discussion, see Jacoby, pp. 215 sqq. - -Footnote 193: - - Herakl. fr. 16, 17 (R. P. 31, 31 a). - -The extensive travels attributed to Pythagoras by late writers are, of -course, apocryphal. Even the statement that he visited Egypt, though far -from improbable if we consider the close relations between Polykrates of -Samos and Amasis, rests on no sufficient authority.[194] Herodotos, it -is true, observes that the Egyptians agreed in certain practices with -the rules called Orphic and Bacchic, which are really Egyptian, and with -the Pythagoreans;[195] but this does not imply that the Pythagoreans -derived these directly from Egypt. He says also in another place that -the belief in transmigration came from Egypt, though certain Greeks, -both at an earlier and a later date, had passed it off as their own. He -refuses, however, to give their names, so he can hardly be referring to -Pythagoras.[196] Nor does it matter; for the Egyptians did not believe -in transmigration at all, and Herodotos was simply deceived by the -priests or the symbolism of the monuments. - -Footnote 194: - - It occurs first in the _Bousiris_ of Isokrates, § 28 (R. P. 52). - -Footnote 195: - - Herod. ii. 81 (R. P. 52 a). The comma at Αἰγυπτίοισι is clearly right. - Herodotos believed that the worship of Dionysos was introduced from - Egypt by Melampous (ii. 49), and he means to suggest that the Orphics - got these practices from the worshippers of Bakchos, while the - Pythagoreans got them from the Orphics. - -Footnote 196: - - Herod. ii. 123 (R. P. _ib._). The words “whose names I know, but do - not write” cannot refer to Pythagoras; for it is only of - contemporaries that Herodotos speaks in this way (cf. i. 51; iv. 48). - Stein’s suggestion that he meant Empedokles seems to me convincing. - Herodotos may have met him at Thourioi. Nor is there any reason to - suppose that οἱ μὲν πρότερον refers specially to the Pythagoreans. If - Herodotos had ever heard of Pythagoras visiting Egypt, he would surely - have said so in one or other of these passages. There was no occasion - for reserve, as Pythagoras must have died before Herodotos was born. - -Aristoxenos said that Pythagoras left Samos in order to escape from the -tyranny of Polykrates.[197] It was at Kroton, a city already famous for -its medical school,[198] that he founded his society. How long he -remained there we do not know; he died at Metapontion, whither he had -retired on the first signal of revolt against his influence.[199] - -Footnote 197: - - Porph. _V. Pyth._ 9 (R. P. 53 a). - -Footnote 198: - - From what Herodotos tells us of Demokedes (iii. 131) we can see that - the medical school of Kroton was founded before the time of - Pythagoras. Cf. Wachtler, _De Alcmaeone Crotoniata_, p. 91. - -Footnote 199: - - It may be taken as certain that Pythagoras spent his last days at - Metapontion; Aristoxenos said so (_ap._ Iambl. _V. Pyth._ 249), and - Cicero (_De Fin._ v. 4) speaks of the honours which continued to be - paid to his memory in that city (R. P. 57 c). Cf. also Andron, fr. 6 - (_F.H.G._ ii. 347). - -[Sidenote: The Order.] - -39. There is no reason to believe that the detailed statements which -have been handed down with regard to the organisation of the Pythagorean -Order rest upon any historical basis, and in the case of many of them we -can still see how they came to be made. The distinction of grades within -the Order, variously called _Mathematicians_ and _Akousmatics_, -_Esoterics_ and _Exoterics_, _Pythagoreans_ and _Pythagorists_,[200] is -an invention designed to explain how there came to be two widely -different sets of people, each calling themselves disciples of -Pythagoras, in the fourth century B.C. So, too, the statement that the -Pythagoreans were bound to inviolable secrecy, which goes back to -Aristoxenos,[201] is intended to explain why there is no trace of the -Pythagorean philosophy proper before Philolaos. - -Footnote 200: - - For these distinctions, see Porphyry (_V. Pyth._ 37) and Iamblichos - (_V. Pyth._ 80), quoted R. P. 56 and 56 b. The name ἀκουσματικοί is - clearly related to the ἀκούσματα, with which we shall have to deal - shortly (§ 44). - -Footnote 201: - - For the “mystic silence,” see Aristoxenos, _ap._ Diog. viii. 15 (R. P. - 55 a). Tannery, “Sur le secret dans l’école de Pythagore” (_Arch._ i. - pp. 28 sqq.), thinks that the mathematical doctrines were the secrets - of the school, and that these were divulged by Hippasos; but the most - reasonable view is that there were no secrets at all except of a - ritual kind. - -The Pythagorean Order was simply, in its origin, a religious fraternity -of the type described above, and not, as has sometimes been maintained, -a political league.[202] Nor had it anything to do with the “Dorian -aristocratic ideal.” Pythagoras was an Ionian, and the Order was -originally confined to Achaian states.[203] Nor is there the slightest -evidence that the Pythagoreans favoured the aristocratic rather than the -democratic party.[204] The main purpose of the Order was to secure for -its own members a more adequate satisfaction of the religious instinct -than that supplied by the State religion. It was, in fact, an -institution for the cultivation of holiness. In this respect it -resembled an Orphic society, though it seems that Apollo, rather than -Dionysos, was the chief Pythagorean god. That is doubtless why the -Krotoniates identified Pythagoras with Apollo Hyperboreios.[205] From -the nature of the case, however, an independent society within a Greek -state was apt to be brought into conflict with the larger body. The only -way in which it could then assert its right to exist was by identifying -the State with itself, that is, by securing the control of the sovereign -power. The history of the Pythagorean Order, so far as it can be traced, -is, accordingly, the history of an attempt to supersede the State; and -its political action is to be explained as a mere incident of that -attempt. - -Footnote 202: - - Plato, _Rep._ x. 600 a, implies that Pythagoras held no public office. - The view that the Pythagorean sect was a political league, maintained - in modern times by Krische (_De societatis a Pythagora conditae scopo - politico_, 1830), goes back, as Rohde has shown (_loc. cit._), to - Dikaiarchos, the champion of the “Practical Life,” just as the view - that it was primarily a scientific society goes back to the - mathematician and musician Aristoxenos. The former antedated Archytas, - just as the latter antedated Philolaos (see Chap. VII. § 138). Grote’s - good sense enabled him to see this quite clearly (vol. iv. pp. 329 - sqq.). - -Footnote 203: - - Meyer, _Gesch. des Alterth._ ii. § 502, Anm. It is still necessary to - insist upon this, as the idea that the Pythagoreans represented the - “Dorian ideal” dies very hard. In his _Kulturhistorische Beiträge_ - (Heft i. p. 59), Max C. P. Schmidt imagines that later writers call - the founder of the sect Pythagoras instead of Pythagores, as he is - called by Herakleitos and Demokritos, because he had become “a Dorian - of the Dorians.” The fact is simply that Πυθαγόρας is the Attic form - of Πυθαγόρης, and that the writers in question wrote Attic. Similarly, - Plato calls Archytas, who did belong to a Dorian state, Archytes, - though Aristoxenos and others retained the Dorian form of his name. - -Footnote 204: - - Kylon, the chief opponent of the Pythagoreans, is described by - Aristoxenos (Iambl. _V. Pyth._ 248) as γένει καὶ δόξῃ καὶ πλούτῳ - πρωτεύων τῶν πολιτῶν. Taras, later the chief seat of the Pythagoreans, - was a democracy. The truth is that, at this time, the new religion - appealed to the people rather than the aristocracies, which were apt - to be “free-thinking” (Meyer, _Gesch. des Alt._ iii. § 252). - Xenophanes, not Pythagoras, is their man. - -Footnote 205: - - We have the authority of Aristotle, fr. 186, 1510 b 20, for the - identification of Pythagoras with Apollo Hyperboreios. The names of - Abaris and Aristeas stand for a mystical movement parallel to the - Orphic, but based on the worship of Apollo. The later tradition makes - them predecessors of Pythagoras; and that this has some historical - basis, appears from Herod. iv. 13 sqq., and above all from the - statement that Aristeas had a statue at Metapontion, where Pythagoras - died. The connexion of Pythagoras with Zamolxis belongs to the same - order of ideas. As the legend of the Hyperboreans is Delian, we see - that the religion taught by Pythagoras was genuinely Ionian in its - origin. - -[Sidenote: Downfall of the Order.] - -40. For a time the new Order seems actually to have succeeded in -securing the supreme power, but reaction came at last. Under the -leadership of Kylon, a wealthy noble, Kroton was able to assert itself -victoriously against the Pythagorean domination. This, we may well -believe, had been galling enough. The “rule of the saints” would be -nothing to it; and we can still imagine and sympathise with the -irritation felt by the plain man of those days at having his legislation -done for him by a set of incomprehensible pedants, who made a point of -abstaining from beans, and would not let him beat his own dog because -they recognised in its howls the voice of a departed friend (Xenophanes, -fr. 7). This feeling would be aggravated by the private religious -worship of the Society. Greek states could never pardon the introduction -of new gods. Their objection to this was not, however, that the gods in -question were false gods. If they had been, it would not have mattered -so much. What they could not tolerate was that any one should establish -a private means of communication between himself and the unseen powers. -That introduced an unknown and incalculable element into the -arrangements of the State, which might very likely be hostile to those -citizens who had no means of propitiating the intruding divinity. - -Aristoxenos’s version of the events which led to the downfall of the -Pythagorean Order is given at length by Iamblichos. According to this, -Pythagoras had refused to receive Kylon into his Society, and he -therefore became a bitter foe of the Order. From this cause Pythagoras -removed from Kroton to Metapontion, where he died. The Pythagoreans, -however, still retained possession of the government of Kroton, till at -last the partisans of Kylon set fire to Milo’s house, where they were -assembled. Of those in the house only two, Archippos and Lysis, escaped. -Archippos retired to Taras; Lysis, first to Achaia and then to Thebes, -where he became later on the teacher of Epameinondas. The Pythagoreans -who remained concentrated themselves at Rhegion; but, as things went -from bad to worse, they all left Italy except Archippos.[206] - -Footnote 206: - - See Rohde, _Rh. Mus._ xxvi. p. 565, n. 1. The narrative in the text - (Iambl. _V. Pyth._ 250; R. P. 59 b) goes back to Aristoxenos and - Dikaiarchos (R. P. 59 a). There is no reason to suppose that their - view of Pythagoras has vitiated their account of what must have been a - perfectly well-known piece of history. According to the later story, - Pythagoras himself was burned to death in the house of Milo, along - with his disciples. This is merely a dramatic compression of the whole - series of events into a single scene; we have seen that Pythagoras - died at Metapontion before the final catastrophe. The valuable - reference in Polybios ii. 39 (R. P. 59) to the burning of Pythagorean - συνέδρια certainly implies that the disturbances went on for a very - considerable time. - -This account has all the air of being historical. The mention of Lysis -proves, however, that those events were spread over more than one -generation. The _coup d’état_ of Kroton can hardly have occurred before -450 B.C., if the teacher of Epameinondas escaped from it, and it may -well have been even later. But it must have been before 410 B.C. that -the Pythagoreans left Rhegion for Hellas; Philolaos was certainly at -Thebes about that time.[207] - -Footnote 207: - - Plato, _Phd._ 61 d 7, e 7. - -The political power of the Pythagoreans as an Order was now gone for -ever, though we shall see that some of them returned to Italy at a later -date. In exile they seem to have dropped the merely magical and -superstitious parts of their system, and this enabled them to take their -place as one of the scientific schools of Hellas. - -[Sidenote: Want of evidence as to the teaching of Pythagoras.] - -41. Of the opinions of Pythagoras we know even less than of his life. -Aristotle clearly knew nothing for certain of ethical or physical -doctrines going back to the founder of the Society himself.[208] -Aristoxenos only gave a string of moral precepts.[209] Dikaiarchos is -quoted by Porphyry as asserting that hardly anything of what Pythagoras -taught his disciples was known except the doctrine of transmigration, -the periodic cycle, and the kinship of all living creatures.[210] The -fact is, that, like all teachers who introduce a new way of living -rather than a new view of the world, Pythagoras preferred oral -instruction to the dissemination of his opinions by writing, and it was -not till Alexandrian times that any one ventured to forge books in his -name. The writings ascribed to the earliest Pythagoreans were also -forgeries of the same period.[211] The early history of Pythagoreanism -is, therefore, wholly conjectural; but we may still make an attempt to -understand, in a very general way, what the position of Pythagoras in -the history of Greek thought must have been. - -Footnote 208: - - When discussing the Pythagorean system, Aristotle always refers it to - “the Pythagoreans,” not to Pythagoras himself. That this was - intentional seems to be proved by the phrase οἱ καλούμενοι - Πυθαγόρειοι, which occurs more than once (_e.g._ _Met._ Α, 5. 985 b - 23; _de Caelo_, Β, 13. 293 a 20). Pythagoras himself is only thrice - mentioned in the whole Aristotelian corpus, and in only one of these - places (_M. Mor._ 1182 a 11) is any philosophical doctrine ascribed to - him. We are told there that he was the first to discuss the subject of - goodness, and that he made the mistake of identifying its various - forms with numbers. But this is just one of the things which prove the - late date of the _Magna Moralia_. Aristotle himself is quite clear - that what he knew as the Pythagorean system belonged in the main to - the days of Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Leukippos; for, after - mentioning these, he goes on to describe the Pythagoreans as - “contemporary with and earlier than them” (ἐν δὲ τούτοις καὶ πρὸ - τούτων, _Met._ Α, 5. 985 b 23). - -Footnote 209: - - The fragments of the Πυθαγορικαὶ ἀποφάσεις of Aristoxenos are given by - Diels, _Vors._ pp. 282 sqq. - -Footnote 210: - - _V. Pyth._ 19 (R. P. 55). - -Footnote 211: - - See Diels, _Dox._ p. 150; and “Ein gefälschtes Pythagorasbuch” - (_Arch._ iii. pp. 451 sqq.). Cf. also Bernays, _Die Heraklitischen - Briefe_, n. 1. - -[Sidenote: Transmigration.] - -42. In the first place, then, there can be no doubt that he really -taught the doctrine of transmigration.[212] The story told by the Greeks -of the Hellespont and Pontos as to his relations with Salmoxis could -never have gained currency by the time of Herodotos if he had not been -known as a man who taught strange views of the life after death.[213] -Now the doctrine of transmigration is most easily to be explained as a -development of the savage belief in the kinship of men and beasts, as -all alike children of the Earth,[214] a view which Dikaiarchos said -Pythagoras certainly held. Further, among savages, this belief is -commonly associated with a system of taboos on certain kinds of food, -and the Pythagorean rule is best known for its prescription of similar -forms of abstinence. This in itself goes far to show that it originated -in the same ideas, and we have seen that the revival of these would be -quite natural in connexion with the foundation of a new religious -society. There is a further consideration which tells strongly in the -same direction. In India we have a precisely similar doctrine, and yet -it is not possible to assume any actual borrowing of Indian ideas at -this date. The only explanation which will account for the facts is that -the two systems were independently evolved from the same primitive -ideas. These are found in many parts of the world; but it seems to have -been only in India and in Greece that they were developed into an -elaborate doctrine. - -Footnote 212: - - The proper Greek term for this is παλιγγενεσία, and the inaccurate - μετεμψύχωσις only occurs in late writers. Hippolytos and Clement of - Alexandria say μετενσωμάτωσις, which is accurate but cumbrous. See - Rohde, _Psyche_, p. 428, n. 2. - -Footnote 213: - - On the significance of this, see above, p. 93. - -Footnote 214: - - Dieterich, “Mutter Erde” (_Archiv für Religionswissenschaft_, viii. - pp. 29 and 47). - -[Sidenote: Abstinence.] - -43. It has indeed been doubted whether we have a right to accept what -we are told by such late writers as Porphyry on the subject of -Pythagorean abstinence. Aristoxenos, whom we have admitted to be one -of our earliest witnesses, may be cited to prove that the original -Pythagoreans knew nothing of these restrictions on the use of animal -flesh and beans. He undoubtedly said that Pythagoras did not abstain -from animal flesh in general, but only from that of the ploughing ox -and the ram.[215] He also said that Pythagoras preferred beans to -every other vegetable, as being the most laxative, and that he was -partial to sucking-pigs and tender kids.[216] Aristoxenos, however, is -a witness who very often breaks down under cross-examination, and the -palpable exaggeration of these statements shows that he is -endeavouring to combat a belief which existed in his own day. We are -therefore able to show, out of his own mouth, that the tradition which -made the Pythagoreans abstain from animal flesh and beans goes back to -a time long before there were any Neopythagoreans interested in -upholding it. Still, it may be asked what motive Aristoxenos could -have had for denying the common belief? The answer is simple and -instructive. He had been the friend of the last of the Pythagoreans; -and, in their time, the merely superstitious part of Pythagoreanism -had been dropped, except by some zealots whom the heads of the Society -refused to acknowledge. That is why he represents Pythagoras himself -in so different a light from both the older and the later traditions; -it is because he gives us the view of the more enlightened sect of the -Order. Those who clung faithfully to the old practices were now -regarded as heretics, and all manner of theories were set on foot to -account for their existence. It was related, for instance, that they -descended from one of the “Akousmatics,” who had never been initiated -into the deeper mysteries of the “Mathematicians.”[217] All this, -however, is pure invention. The satire of the poets of the Middle -Comedy proves clearly enough that, even though the friends of -Aristoxenos did not practise abstinence, there were plenty of people -in the fourth century, calling themselves followers of Pythagoras, who -did.[218] History has not been kind to the Akousmatics, but they never -wholly died out. The names of Diodoros of Aspendos and Nigidius -Figulus help to bridge the gulf between them and Apollonios of Tyana. - -Footnote 215: - - Aristoxenos _ap._ Diog. viii. 20, πάντα μὲν τὰ ἄλλα συγχωρεῖν αὐτὸν - ἐσθίειν ἔμψυχα, μόνον δ’ ἀπέχεσθαι βοὸς ἀροτῆρος καὶ κριοῦ. - -Footnote 216: - - Aristoxenos _ap._ Gell. iv. 11, 5, Πυθαγόρας δὲ τῶν ὀσπρίων μάλιστα - τὸν κύαμον ἐδοκίμασεν· λειαντικόν τε γὰρ εἶναι καὶ διαχωρητικόν· διὸ - καὶ μάλιστα κέχρηται αὐτῷ; _ib._ 6, “porculis quoque minusculis et - haedis tenerioribus victitasse, idem Aristoxenus refert.” It is, of - course, possible that Aristoxenos may be right about the taboo on - beans. We know that it was Orphic, and it may have been transferred to - the Pythagoreans by mistake. That, however, would not affect the - general conclusion that at least some Pythagoreans practised - abstinence from various kinds of food, which is all that is required. - -Footnote 217: - - The sect of the “Akousmatics” was said to descend from Hippasos - (Iambl. _V. Pyth._ 81; R. P. 56). Now Hippasos was the author of a - μυστικὸς λόγος (Diog. viii. 7; R. P. 56 c), that is to say, of a - superstitious ceremonial or ritual handbook, probably containing - Akousmata like those we are about to consider; for we are told that it - was written ἐπὶ διαβολῇ Πυθαγόρου. - -Footnote 218: - - Diels has collected these fragments in a convenient form (_Vors._ pp. - 291 sqq.). For our purpose the most important passages are Antiphanes, - fr. 135, Kock, ὥσπερ Πυθαγορίζων ἐσθίει | ἔμψυχον οὐδέν; Alexis, fr. - 220, οἱ Πυθαγορίζοντες γάρ, ὡς ἀκούομεν, | οὔτ’ ὄψον ἐσθίουσιν οὔτ’ - ἄλλ’ οὐδὲ ἓν | ἔμψυχον; fr. 196 (from the Πυθαγορίζουσα), ἡ δ’ - ἑστίασις ἰσχάδες καὶ στέμφυλα | καὶ τυρὸς ἔσται· ταῦτα γὰρ θύειν νόμος - | τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις; Aristophon, fr. 9 (from the Πυθαγοριστής), πρὸς - τῶν θεῶν οἰόμεθα τοὺς πάλαι ποτέ, | τοὺς Πυθαγοριστὰς γενομένους ὄντως - ῥυπᾶν | ἑκόντας ἢ φορεῖν τριβῶνας ἡδέως; Mnesimachos, fr. 1, ὡς - Πυθαγοριστὶ θύομεν τῷ Λοξίᾳ | ἔμψυχον οὐδὲν ἐσθίοντες παντελῶς. See - also Theokritos, xiv. 5, τοιοῦτος καὶ πρᾶν τις ἀφίκετο Πυθαγορικτάς, | - ὠχρὸς κἀνυποδητός· Ἀθηναῖος δ’ ἔφατ’ ἦμεν. - -We know, then, that Pythagoras taught the kinship of beasts and men, and -we infer that his rule of abstinence from flesh was based, not upon -humanitarian or ascetic grounds, but on taboo. This is strikingly -confirmed by a fact which we are told in Porphyry’s _Defence of -Abstinence_. The statement in question does not indeed go back to -Theophrastos, as so much of Porphyry’s tract certainly does;[219] but it -is, in all probability, due to Herakleides of Pontos, and is to the -effect that, though the Pythagoreans did as a rule abstain from flesh, -they nevertheless ate it when they sacrificed to the gods.[220] Now, -among savage peoples, we often find that the sacred animal is slain and -eaten sacramentally by its kinsmen on certain solemn occasions, though -in ordinary circumstances this would be the greatest of all impieties. -Here, again, we have to do with a very primitive belief; and we need not -therefore attach any weight to the denials of Aristoxenos.[221] - -Footnote 219: - - See Bernays, _Theophrastos’ Schrift über Frömmigkeit_. Porphyry’s - tract, Περὶ ἀποχῆς ἐμψύχων, was doubtless saved from the general - destruction of his writings by its conformity to the ascetic - tendencies of the age. Even St. Jerome made constant use of it in his - polemic against Iovianus, though he is careful not to mention - Porphyry’s name (_Theophr. Schr._ n. 2). The tract is addressed to - Castricius Firmus, the disciple and friend of Plotinos, who had fallen - away from the strict vegetarianism of the Pythagoreans. - -Footnote 220: - - The passage occurs _De Abst._ p. 58, 25 Nauck: ἱστοροῦσι δέ τινες καὶ - αὐτοὺς ἅπτεσθαι τῶν ἐμψύχων τοὺς Πυθαγορείους, ὅτε θύοιεν θεοῖς. The - part of the work from which this is taken comes from one Clodius, on - whom see Bernay, _Theophr. Schr._ p. 11. He was probably the - rhetorician Sextus Clodius, and a contemporary of Cicero. Bernays has - shown that he made use of the work of Herakleides of Pontos (_ib._ n. - 19). On “mystic sacrifice” generally, see Robertson Smith, _Rel. Sem._ - i. p. 276. - -Footnote 221: - - Porphyry (_V. Pyth._ c 15) has preserved a tradition to the effect - that Pythagoras recommended a flesh diet for athletes (Milo?). This - story must have originated at the same time as those related by - Aristoxenos, and in a similar way. In fact, Bernays has shown that it - comes from Herakleides of Pontos (_Theophr. Schr._ n. 8). Iamblichos - (_V. Pyth._ 5. 25) and others (Diog. viii. 13, 47) got out of this by - supposing it referred to a gymnast of the same name. We see here very - distinctly how the Neoplatonists for their own ends endeavoured to go - back to the original form of the Pythagorean legend, and to explain - away the fourth century reconstruction. - -[Sidenote: _Akousmata._] - -44. We shall now know what to think of the various Pythagorean rules and -precepts which have come down to us. These are of two kinds, and have -very different sources. Some of them, derived from the collection of -Aristoxenos, and for the most part preserved by Iamblichos, are mere -precepts of morality. They do not pretend to go back to Pythagoras -himself; they are only the sayings which the last generation of -“Mathematicians” heard from their predecessors.[222] The second class is -of a very different nature, and the sayings which belong to it are -called _Akousmata_,[223] which points to their being the property of -that sect of Pythagoreans which had faithfully preserved the old -customs. Later writers interpret them as “symbols” of moral truth; but -their interpretations are extremely far-fetched, and it does not require -a very practised eye to see that they are genuine taboos of a thoroughly -primitive type. I give a few examples in order that the reader may judge -what the famous Pythagorean rule of life was really like. - - 1. To abstain from beans. - 2. Not to pick up what has fallen. - 3. Not to touch a white cock. - 4. Not to break bread. - 5. Not to step over a crossbar. - 6. Not to stir the fire with iron. - 7. Not to eat from a whole loaf. - 8. Not to pluck a garland. - 9. Not to sit on a quart measure. - 10. Not to eat the heart. - 11. Not to walk on highways. - 12. Not to let swallows share one’s roof. - 13. When the pot is taken off the fire, not to leave the mark of it in - the ashes, but to stir them together. - 14. Do not look in a mirror beside a light. - 15. When you rise from the bedclothes, roll them together and smooth - out the impress of the body. - -Footnote 222: - - For these see Diels, _Vors._ pp. 282 sqq. - -Footnote 223: - - There is an excellent collection of Ἀκούσματα καὶ σύμβολα in Diels, - _Vors._ pp. 279 sqq., where the authorities will be found. It is - impossible to discuss these in detail here, but students of folklore - will see at once to what order of ideas they belong. - -It would be easy to multiply proofs of the close connexion between -Pythagoreanism and primitive modes of thought, but what has been said is -really sufficient for our purpose. The kinship of men and beasts, the -abstinence from flesh, and the doctrine of transmigration all hang -together and form a perfectly intelligible whole from the point of view -which has been indicated. - -[Sidenote: Pythagoras as a man of science.] - -45. Were this all, we should be tempted to delete the name of Pythagoras -from the history of philosophy altogether, and relegate him to the class -of “medicine-men” (γόητες) along with Epimenides and Onomakritos. This, -however, would be quite wrong. As we shall see, the Pythagorean Society -became one of the chief scientific schools of Hellas, and it is certain -that Pythagorean science as well as Pythagorean religion originated with -the master himself. Herakleitos, who is not partial to him, says that -Pythagoras had pursued scientific investigation further than other men, -though he also says that he turned his much learning into an art of -mischief.[224] Herodotos called Pythagoras “by no means the weakest -sophist of the Hellenes,” a title which at this date does not imply the -slightest disparagement.[225] Aristotle even said that Pythagoras first -busied himself with mathematics and numbers, and that it was later on he -attached himself to the miracle-mongering of Pherekydes.[226] Is it -possible for us to trace any connexion between these two sides of his -activity? - -Footnote 224: - - Herakl. fr. 17 (R. P. 31 a). The word ἱστορίη is in itself quite - general. What it chiefly means here we see from a valuable notice - preserved by Iamblichos, _V. Pyth._ 89, ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ ἡ γεωμετρία πρὸς - Πυθαγόρου ἱστορία. Tannery’s interpretation of this statement is based - on a misunderstanding, and need not be discussed here. - -Footnote 225: - - Herod. iv. 95. - -Footnote 226: - - Arist. Περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων, fr. 186, 1510 a 39, Πυθαγόρας Μνησάρχου - υἱὸς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διεπονεῖτο περὶ τὰ μαθήματα καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, - ὕστερον δέ ποτε καὶ τῆς Φερεκύδου τερατοποιΐας οὐκ ἀπέστη. - -We have seen that the aim of the Orphic and other _Orgia_ was to obtain -release from the “wheel of birth” by means of “purifications,” which -were generally of a very primitive type. The new thing in the Society -founded by Pythagoras seems to have been that, while it admitted all -these half-savage customs, it at the same time suggested a more exalted -idea of what “purification” really was. Aristoxenos tells us that the -Pythagoreans employed music to purge the soul as they used medicine to -purge the body, and it is abundantly clear that Aristotle’s famous -theory of κάθαρσις is derived from Pythagorean sources.[227] Such -methods of purifying the soul were familiar in the _Orgia_ of the -Korybantes, and will serve to explain the Pythagorean interest in -Harmonics. But there is more than this. If we can trust Herakleides so -far, it was Pythagoras who first distinguished the “three lives,” the -Theoretic, the Practical, and the Apolaustic, which Aristotle made use -of in the _Ethics_. The general theory of these lives is clear, and it -is impossible to doubt that in substance it belongs to the very -beginning of the school. It is to this effect. We are strangers in this -world, and the body is the tomb of the soul, and yet we must not seek to -escape by self-murder; for we are the chattels of God who is our -herdsman, and without his command we have no right to make our -escape.[228] In this life, there are three kinds of men, just as there -are three sorts of people who come to the Olympic Games. The lowest -class is made up of those who come to buy and sell, and next above them -are those who come to compete. Best of all, however, are those who come -simply to look on (θεωρεῖν). The greatest purification of all is, -therefore, disinterested science, and it is the man who devotes himself -to that, the true philosopher, who has most effectually released himself -from the “wheel of birth.” It would be rash to say that Pythagoras -expressed himself exactly in this manner; but all these ideas are -genuinely Pythagorean, and it is only in some such way that we can -bridge the gulf which separates Pythagoras the man of science from -Pythagoras the religious teacher.[229] We must now endeavour to discover -how much of the later Pythagorean science may reasonably be ascribed to -Pythagoras himself. - -Footnote 227: - - Its immediate source is to be found in Plato, _Laws_, 790 d 2 sqq., - where the Korybantic rites are adduced as an instance. For a full - account see Rohde, _Psyche_, p. 336, n. 2. - -Footnote 228: - - Plato gives this as the Pythagorean view in _Phd._ 62 b, for the - interpretation of which cf. Espinas in _Arch._ viii. pp. 449 sqq. - Plato distinctly implies that it was not merely the theory of - Philolaos, but something older. - -Footnote 229: - - See Döring in _Arch._ v. pp. 505 sqq. There seems to be a reference to - the theory of the “three lives” in Herakleitos, fr. 111. It was - apparently taught in the Pythagorean Society of Phleious; for - Herakleides made Pythagoras expound it in a conversation with the - tyrant of Phleious (Cic. _Tusc._ v. 3; Diog. pr. 12, viii. 8), and it - is developed by Plato in a dialogue which is, as it were, dedicated to - Echekrates. If it should be thought that this is interpreting - Pythagoras too much in the light of Schopenhauer, it may be answered - that even the Orphics came very near such a theory. The soul must not - drink of Lethe, but go past it and drink of the water of Memory, - before it can claim to become one of the heroes. This has obvious - points of contact with Plato’s ἀνάμνησις, and the only question is how - much of the _Phaedo_ we are to ascribe to Pythagorean sources. A great - deal, I suspect. See Prof. Stewart’s _Myths of Plato_, pp. 152 sqq. - -[Sidenote: Arithmetic.] - -46. In his treatise on Arithmetic, Aristoxenos said that Pythagoras was -the first to carry that study beyond the needs of commerce,[230] and his -statement is confirmed by everything we otherwise know. By the end of -the fifth century B.C., we find that there is a widespread interest in -such subjects and that these are studied for their own sake. Now this -new interest cannot have been wholly the work of a school; it must have -originated with some great man, and there is no one but Pythagoras to -whom we can refer it. As, however, he wrote nothing, we have no sure -means of distinguishing his own teaching from that of his followers in -the next generation or two. All we can safely say is that, the more -primitive any Pythagorean doctrine appears, the more likely it is to be -that of Pythagoras himself, and all the more so if it can be shown to -have points of contact with views which we know to have been held in his -own time or shortly before it. In particular, when we find the later -Pythagoreans teaching things that were already something of an -anachronism in their own day, we may be reasonably sure that we are -dealing with survivals which only the authority of the master’s name -could have preserved. Some of these must be mentioned at once, though -the developed system belongs to a later part of our story. It is only by -separating its earliest form from its later that the true place of -Pythagoreanism in Greek thought can be made clear, though we must always -remember that no one can now pretend to draw the line between its -successive stages with any certainty. - -Footnote 230: - - Stob. i. p. 20, 1, ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοξένου περὶ ἀριθμητικῆς, Τὴν δὲ περὶ - τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς πραγματείαν μάλιστα πάντων τιμῆσαι δοκεῖ Πυθαγόρας καὶ - προαγαγεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσθεν ἀπαγαγὼν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἐμπόρων χρείας. - -[Sidenote: The figures.] - -47. Now one of the most remarkable statements that we have about -Pythagoreanism is what we are told of Eurytos on the unimpeachable -authority of Archytas. Eurytos was the disciple of Philolaos, and -Aristoxenos expressly mentioned him along with Philolaos as having -taught the last of the Pythagoreans, the men with whom he himself was -personally acquainted. He therefore belongs to the beginning of the -fourth century B.C., by which time the Pythagorean system was fully -developed, and he was no eccentric enthusiast, but one of the foremost -men in the school.[231] We are told of him, then, that he used to give -the number of all sorts of things, such as horses and men, and that he -demonstrated these by arranging pebbles in a certain way. It is to be -noted further that Aristotle compares his procedure to that of those who -bring numbers into figures like the triangle and the square.[232] - -Footnote 231: - - Apart from the story in Iamblichos (_V. Pyth._ 148) that Eurytos heard - the voice of Philolaos from the grave after he had been many years - dead, it is to be noticed that he is mentioned after him in the - statement of Aristoxenos referred to (Diog. viii. 46; R. P. 62). - -Footnote 232: - - Arist. _Met._ Ν, 5. 1092 b 8 (R. P. 76 a). Aristotle does not quote - the authority of Archytas here, but the source of his statement is - made quite clear by Theophr. _Met._ p. vi. a 19 (Usener), τοῦτο γὰρ - (sc. τὸ μὴ μέχρι του προελθόντα παύεσθαι) τελέου καὶ φρονοῦντος, ὅπερ - Ἀρχύτας ποτ’ ἔφη ποιεῖν Εὔρυτον διατιθέντα τινὰς ψήφους· λέγειν γὰρ ὡς - ὅδε μὲν ἀνθρώπου ὁ ἀριθμός, ὅδε δὲ ἵππου, ὅδε δ’ ἄλλου τινὸς τυγχάνει. - -Now these statements, and especially the remark of Aristotle last -quoted, seem to imply the existence at this date, and earlier, of a -numerical symbolism quite distinct from the alphabetical notation on the -one hand and from the Euclidean representation of numbers by lines on -the other. The former was inconvenient for arithmetical purposes, just -because the zero was one of the few things the Greeks did not invent, -and they were therefore unable to develop a really serviceable numerical -symbolism based on position. The latter, as will appear shortly, is -intimately bound up with that absorption of arithmetic by geometry, -which is at least as old as Plato, but cannot be primitive.[233] It -seems rather that numbers were represented by dots arranged in -symmetrical and easily recognised patterns, of which the marking of dice -or dominoes gives us the best idea. And these markings are, in fact, the -best proof that this is a genuinely primitive method of indicating -numbers; for they are of unknown antiquity, and go back to the time when -men could only count by arranging numbers in such patterns, each of -which became, as it were, a fresh unit. This way of counting may well be -as old as reckoning with the fingers, or even older. - -Footnote 233: - - Arithmetic is older than geometry, and was much more advanced in - Egypt, though still in the form which the Greeks called λογιστική - rather than as ἀριθμητική proper. Even Plato puts Arithmetic before - Geometry in the _Republic_ in deference to the tradition. His own - theory of number, however, suggested the inversion of this order which - we find carried out in Euclid. - -It is, therefore, very significant that we do not find any adequate -account of what Aristotle can have meant by “those who bring numbers -into figures like the triangle and the square” till we come to certain -late writers who called themselves Pythagoreans, and revived the study -of arithmetic as a science independent of geometry. These men not only -abandoned the linear symbolism of Euclid, but also regarded the -alphabetical notation, which they did use, as something conventional, -and inadequate to represent the true nature of number. Nikomachos of -Gerasa says expressly that the letters used to represent numbers are -only significant by human usage and convention. The most natural way -would be to represent linear or prime numbers by a row of units, -polygonal numbers by units arranged so as to mark out the various plane -figures, and solid numbers by units disposed in pyramids and so -forth.[234] He therefore gives us figures like this:— - - α α α α - α α α ααα - α α α α α α α α - α α α α ααα - α α α α α - -Now it ought to be obvious that this is no innovation, but, like so many -things in Neopythagoreanism, a reversion to primitive usage. Of course -the employment of the letter _alpha_ to represent the units is derived -from the conventional notation; but otherwise we are clearly in presence -of something which belongs to the very earliest stage of the -science—something, in fact, which gives the only possible clue to the -meaning of Aristotle’s remark, and to what we are told of the method of -Eurytos. - -Footnote 234: - - Nikomachos of Gerasa, _Introd. Arithm._ p. 83, 12, Hoche, Πρότερον δὲ - ἐπιγνωστέον ὅτι ἕκαστον γράμμα ᾧ σημειούμεθα ἀριθμόν, οἷον τὸ ι, ᾧ τὸ - δέκα, τὸ κ, ᾧ τὰ εἴκοσι, τὸ ω, ᾧ τὰ ὀκτακόσια, νόμῳ καὶ συνθήματι - ἀνθρωπίνῳ, ἀλλ’ οὐ φύσει σημαντικόν, ἐστι τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, κ.τ.λ. The same - symbolism is used by Theo, _Expositio_, pp. 31 sqq. Cf. also Iambl. - _Introd._ p. 56, 27, Pistelli, ἰστέον γὰρ ὡς τὸ παλαιὸν φυσικώτερον οἱ - πρόσθεν ἐσημαίνοντο τὰς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ποσότητας, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν - συμβολικῶς. - -[Sidenote: Triangular, square, and oblong numbers.] - -48. This is still further confirmed by the tradition which represents -the great revelation made by Pythagoras to mankind as having been -precisely a figure of this kind, namely the _tetraktys_, by which the -Pythagoreans used to swear,[235] and we have no less an authority than -Speusippos for holding that the whole theory which it implies was -genuinely Pythagorean.[236] In later days there were many kinds of -_tetraktys_,[237] but the original one, that by which the Pythagoreans -swore, was the “tetraktys of the dekad.” It was a figure like this— - - • - • • - • • • - • • • • - -and represented the number ten as the triangle of four. In other words, -it showed at a glance that 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10. Speusippos tells us of -several properties which the Pythagoreans discovered in the dekad. It -is, for instance, the first number that has in it an equal number of -prime and composite numbers. How much of this goes back to Pythagoras -himself, we cannot tell; but we are probably justified in referring to -him the conclusion that it is “according to nature” that all Hellenes -and barbarians count up to ten and then begin over again. - -Footnote 235: - - Cf. the formula Οὐ μὰ τὸν ἁμετέρᾳ γενεᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν, which is - all the more likely to be old that it is put into the mouth of - Pythagoras by the forger of the Χρυσᾶ ἔπη, thus making him swear by - himself! See Diels, _Arch._ iii. p. 457. The Doric dialect shows, - however, that it belongs to the later generations of the school. - -Footnote 236: - - Speusippos wrote a work on the Pythagorean numbers, based chiefly on - Philolaos, and a considerable fragment of it is preserved in the - _Theologumena Arithmetica_. It will be found in Diels, - _Vorsokratiker_, p. 235, 15, and is discussed by Tannery, _Science - hellène_, pp. 374 sqq. - -Footnote 237: - - For these see Theon, _Expositio_, pp. 93 sqq. Hiller. The τετρακτύς - used by Plato in the _Timaeus_ is the second described by Theon - (_Exp._ p. 94, 10 sqq.). It is no doubt Pythagorean, but hardly as old - as Pythagoras. - -It is obvious that the _tetraktys_ may be indefinitely extended so as to -exhibit the sums of the series of successive numbers in a graphic form, -and these sums are accordingly called “triangular numbers.” - -For similar reasons, the sums of the series of successive odd numbers -are called “square numbers,” and those of successive even numbers -“oblong.” If odd numbers are added to the unit in the form of _gnomons_, -the result is always a similar figure, namely a square, while, if even -numbers are added, we get a series of rectangles,[238] as shown by the -figure:— - - Square Numbers. Oblong Numbers. - ─────────────┐ ───────────────┐ - • • • │ • • • • │ - ───────┐ │ ───────────┐ │ - • • │ • │ • • • │ • │ - ──┐ │ │ ──────┐ │ │ - • │ • │ • │ • • │ • │ • │ - -It is clear, then, that we are entitled to refer the study of sums of -series to Pythagoras himself; but whether he went beyond the oblong, and -studied pyramidal or cubic numbers, we cannot say.[239] - -Footnote 238: - - Cf. Milhaud, _Philosophes géomètres_, pp. 115 sqq. Aristotle puts the - matter thus (_Phys._ Γ, 4. 203 a 13): περιτιθεμένων γὰρ τῶν γνωμόνων - περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ χωρὶς ὁτὲ μὲν ἄλλο ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι τὸ εἶδος, ὁτὲ δὲ ἕν. - This is more clearly stated by Ps.-Plut. (Stob. i. p. 22, 16), Ἔτι δὲ - τῇ μονάδι τῶν ἐφεξῆς περισσῶν περιτιθεμένων ὁ γινόμενος ἀεὶ τετράγωνός - ἐστι· τῶν δὲ ἀρτίων ὁμοίως περιτιθεμένων ἑτερομήκεις καὶ ἄνισοι πάντες - ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἴσως δὲ ἰσάκις οὐδείς. I cannot feel satisfied with any - of the explanations which have been given of the words καὶ χωρίς in - the Aristotelian passage (see Zeller, p. 351, n. 2), and I would - therefore suggest ταῖς χώραις comparing Boutheros (Stob. i. p. 19, 9), - who says, according to the MS. reading, Καὶ ὁ μὲν (ὁ περισσός), ὁπόταν - γεννῶνται ἀνὰ λόγον καὶ πρὸς μονάδας, ταῖς αὑτοῦ χώραις καταλαμβάνει - τοὺς ταῖς γραμμαῖς περιεχομένους (sc. ἀριθμούς). - -Footnote 239: - - In the fragment referred to above (p. 113, _n._ 236), Speusippos - speaks of four as the first pyramidal number; but this is taken from - Philolaos, so we cannot safely ascribe it to Pythagoras. - -[Sidenote: Geometry and harmonics.] - -49. It is easy to see how this way of representing numbers would suggest -problems of a geometrical nature. The dots which stand for the pebbles -are regularly called “boundary-stones” (ὅροι, _termini_, “terms”), and -the area which they occupy, or rather mark out, is the “field” -(χώρα).[240] This is evidently a very early way of speaking, and may -therefore be referred to Pythagoras himself. Now it must have struck him -that “fields” could be compared as well as numbers,[241] and it is even -likely that he knew the rough methods of doing this which were -traditional in Egypt, though certainly these would fail to satisfy him. -Once more the tradition is singularly helpful in suggesting the -direction that his thoughts must have taken. He knew, of course, the use -of the triangle 3, 4, 5 in constructing right angles. We have seen (p. -24) that it was familiar in the East from a very early date, and that -Thales introduced it to the Hellenes, if they did not know it already. -In later writers it is actually called the “Pythagorean triangle.” Now -the Pythagorean proposition _par excellence_ is just that, in a -right-angled triangle, the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the -squares on the other two sides, and the so-called Pythagorean triangle -is the application of its converse to a particular case. The very name -“hypotenuse” affords strong confirmation of the intimate connexion -between the two things. It means literally “the cord stretching over -against,” and this is surely just the rope of the “harpedonapt.”[242] An -early tradition says that Pythagoras sacrificed an ox when he discovered -the proof of this proposition, and indeed it was the real foundation of -scientific mathematics.[243] - -Footnote 240: - - We have ὅροι of a series (ἔκθεσις), then of a proportion, and in later - times of a syllogism. The signs :, ::, and ∴ are a survival of the - original use. The term χώρα is often used by the later Pythagoreans, - though Attic usage required χωρίον for a rectangle. The spaces between - the γραμμαί of the _abacus_ and the chess-board were also called - χῶραι. - -Footnote 241: - - In his commentary on Euclid i. 44, Proclus tells us on the authority - of Eudemos that the παραβολή, ἔλλειψις, and ὑπερβολή of χωρία were - Pythagorean inventions. For an account of these and the subsequent - application of the terms in Conic Sections, see Milhaud, _Philosophes - géomètres_, pp. 81 sqq. - -Footnote 242: - - The verb ὑποτείνειν is, of course, used intransitively. The - explanation suggested in the text seems to me much simpler than that - of Max C. P. Schmidt (_Kulturhistorische Beiträge_, Heft i. pp. 64 - sqq.). He explains the hypotenuse as the longest string in a - triangular harp; but my view seems more in accordance with analogy. So - ἡ κάθετος is, literally, a plumb-line. - -Footnote 243: - - The statement comes from Eudemos; for it is found in Proclus’s - commentary on Euclid i. 47. Whether historical or not, it is no - Neopythagorean fancy. - -[Sidenote: Incommensurability.] - -50. One great disappointment, however, awaited Pythagoras. It follows at -once from the Pythagorean proposition that the square on the diagonal of -a square is double the square on its side, and this ought surely to be -capable of numerical expression. As a matter of fact, however, there is -no square number which can be divided into two equal square numbers, and -so the problem cannot be solved. In this sense, it is doubtless true -that Pythagoras discovered the incommensurability of the diagonal and -the side of a square, and the proof mentioned by Aristotle, namely, -that, if they were commensurable, we should have to say that an even -number was equal to an odd number, is distinctly Pythagorean in -character.[244] However that may be, it is certain that Pythagoras did -not care to pursue the subject any further. He had, as it were, stumbled -on the fact that the square root of two is a surd, but we know that it -was left for Plato’s friends, Theodoros of Kyrene and Theaitetos, to -give a complete theory of the matter.[245] The fact is that the -discovery of the Pythagorean proposition, by giving birth to geometry, -had really superseded the old view of quantity as a sum of units; but it -was not till Plato’s time that the full consequences of this were -seen.[246] For the present, the incommensurability of the diagonal and -the square remained, as has been said, a “scandalous exception.” Our -tradition says that Hippasos of Metapontion was drowned at sea for -revealing this skeleton in the cupboard.[247] - -Footnote 244: - - Arist. _An. Pr._ Α, 23. 41 a 26, ὅτι ἀσύμμετρος ἡ διάμετρος διὰ τὸ - γίγνεσθαι τὰ περιττὰ ἴσα τοῖς ἀρτίοις συμμέτρου τεθείσης. The proofs - given at the end of Euclid’s Tenth Book (vol. iii. pp. 408 sqq., - Heiberg) turn on this very point. They are not Euclidean, and may be - substantially Pythagorean. Cf. Milhaud, _Philosophes géomètres_, p. - 94. - -Footnote 245: - - Plato, _Theaet._ 147 d 3 sqq. - -Footnote 246: - - How novel these consequences were, is shown by the fact that in - _Laws_, 819 d 5, the Athenian Stranger says that he had only realised - them late in life. - -Footnote 247: - - This version of the tradition is mentioned in Iamblichos, _V. Pyth._ - 247, and looks older than the other, which we shall come to later (§ - 148). Hippasos is the _enfant terrible_ of Pythagoreanism, and the - traditions about him are full of instruction. - -[Sidenote: Proportion and harmony.] - -51. These last considerations show that, while it is quite safe to -attribute the substance of the First Book of Euclid to Pythagoras, the -arithmetic of Books VII.-IX., and the “geometrical algebra” of Book II. -are certainly not his. They operate with lines or with areas instead of -with units, and the relations which they establish therefore hold good -whether they are capable of numerical expression or not. That is -doubtless why arithmetic is not treated in Euclid till after plane -geometry, a complete inversion of the original order. For the same -reason, the doctrine of proportion which we find in Euclid cannot be -Pythagorean, and is indeed the work of Eudoxos. Yet it is clear that the -early Pythagoreans, and probably Pythagoras himself, studied proportion -in their own way, and that the three “medieties” in particular go back -to the founder, especially as the most complicated of them, the -“harmonic,” stands in close relation to his discovery of the octave. If -we take the harmonic proportion 12 : 8 : 6,[248] we find that 12 : 6 is -the octave, 12 : 8 the fifth, and 8 : 6 the fourth, and it can hardly be -doubted that it was Pythagoras himself who discovered these intervals. -The stories which have come down to us about his observing the harmonic -intervals in a smithy, and then weighing the hammers that produced them, -or of his suspending weights corresponding to those of the hammers to -equal strings, are, indeed, impossible and absurd; but it is sheer waste -of time to rationalise them.[249] For our purpose their absurdity is -their chief merit. They are not stories which any Greek mathematician or -musician could possibly have invented, but genuine popular tales bearing -witness to the existence of a real tradition that Pythagoras was the -author of this momentous discovery. - -Footnote 248: - - Plato (_Tim._ 36 a 3) defines the harmonic mean as τὴν ... ταὐτῷ μέρει - τῶν ἄκρων αὐτῶν ὑπερέχουσαν καὶ ὑπερεχομένην. The harmonic mean of 12 - and 6 is therefore 8; for 8 = 12 - 12/3 = 6 + 6/3. - -Footnote 249: - - For these stories and a criticism of them, see Max C. P. Schmidt, - _Kulturhistorische Beiträge_, i. pp. 78 sqq. The smith’s hammers - belong to the region of _Märchen_, and it is not true either that the - notes would be determined by the weight of the hammers, or that, if - they were, the weights hung to equal strings would produce the notes. - These inaccuracies were pointed out by Montucla (Martin, _Études sur - le Timée_, i. p. 391). - -[Sidenote: Things are numbers.] - -52. It was this too, no doubt, that led Pythagoras to say all things -were numbers. We shall see that, at a later date, the Pythagoreans -identified these numbers with geometrical figures; but the mere fact -that they called them “numbers,” when taken in connexion with what we -are told about the method of Eurytos, is sufficient to show this was not -the original sense of the doctrine. It is enough to suppose that -Pythagoras reasoned somewhat as follows. If musical sounds can be -reduced to numbers, why should not everything else? There are many -likenesses to number in things, and it may well be that a lucky -experiment, like that by which the octave was discovered, will reveal -their true numerical nature. The Neopythagorean writers, going back in -this as in other matters to the earliest tradition of the school, -indulge their fancy in tracing out analogies between things and numbers -in endless variety; but we are fortunately dispensed from following them -in these vagaries. Aristotle tells us distinctly that the Pythagoreans -explained only a few things by means of numbers,[250] which means that -Pythagoras himself left no developed doctrine on the subject, while the -Pythagoreans of the fifth century did not care to add anything of the -sort to the school tradition. Aristotle does imply, however, that, -according to them the “right time” (καιρός) was seven, justice was four, -and marriage three. These identifications, with a few others like them, -we may safely refer to Pythagoras or his immediate successors; but we -must not attach much importance to them. They are mere sports of the -analogical fancy. If we wish to understand the cosmology of Pythagoras, -we must start, not from them, but from any statements we can find that -present points of contact with the teaching of the Milesian school. -These, we may fairly infer, belong to the system in its most primitive -form. - -Footnote 250: - - Arist. _Met._ Μ, 4. 1078 b 21 (R. P. 78); Zeller, p. 390, n. 2. The - _Theologumena Arithmetica_, wrongly attributed to Nikomachos of - Gerasa, is full of fanciful doctrine on this subject (R. P. 78 a). - Alexander _in Met._ p. 38, 8, gives a few definitions which may be old - (R. P. 78 c). - -[Sidenote: Cosmology.] - -53. Now the most striking statement of this kind is one of Aristotle’s. -The Pythagoreans held, he tells us, that there was “boundless breath” -outside the heavens, and that it was inhaled by the world.[251] In -substance, this is the doctrine of Anaximenes, and it becomes -practically certain that it was that of Pythagoras, when we find that -Xenophanes denied it.[252] We may infer, then, that the further -development of the idea is also due to Pythagoras himself. We are told -that, after the first unit had been formed—however that may have taken -place—the nearest part of the Boundless was first drawn in and -limited;[253] and further, that it is just the Boundless thus inhaled -that keeps the units separate from each other.[254] It represents the -interval between them. This is a very primitive way of describing the -nature of discrete quantity. - -Footnote 251: - - Arist. _Phys._ Δ, 6. 213 b 22 (R. P. 75). - -Footnote 252: - - Diog. ix. 19 (R. P. 103 c). It is true that Diogenes is here drawing - from a biographical rather than a doxographical source (_Dox._ p. - 168), but this touch can hardly be an invention. - -Footnote 253: - - Arist. _Met._ Μ, 3. 1091 a 13 (R. P. 74). - -Footnote 254: - - Arist. _Phys._ Δ, 6. 213 b 23 (R. P. 75 a). The words διορίζει τὰς - φύσεις have caused unnecessary difficulty, because they have been - supposed to attribute the function of limiting to the ἄπειρον. - Aristotle makes it quite clear that his meaning is that stated in the - text. Cf. especially the words χωρισμοῦ τινος τῶν ἐφεξῆς καὶ - διορίσεως. The term διωρισμένον is the proper antithesis to συνεχές. - In his work on the Pythagorean philosophy, Aristotle used instead the - phrase διορίζει τὰς χώρας (Stob. i. p. 156, 8; R. P. 75), which is - also quite intelligible if we remember what the Pythagoreans meant by - χώρα (cf. p. 115, _n._ 240). - -In the passages of Aristotle just referred to, the Boundless is also -spoken of as the void or empty. This identification of air and the void -is a confusion which we have already met with in Anaximenes, and it need -not surprise us to find it here too.[255] We find also, as we might -expect, distinct traces of the other confusion, that of air and vapour. -It seems certain, in fact, that Pythagoras identified the Limit with -fire, and the Boundless with darkness. We are told by Aristotle that -Hippasos made Fire the first principle,[256] and we shall see that -Parmenides, in discussing the opinions of his contemporaries, attributes -to them the view that there were two primary “forms,” Fire and -Night.[257] We also find that Light and Darkness appear in the -Pythagorean table of opposites under the heads of the Limit and the -Unlimited respectively.[258] The identification of breath with darkness -here implied is a strong proof of the primitive character of the -doctrine; for in the sixth century darkness was supposed to be a sort of -vapour, while in the fifth, its true nature was well known. Plato, with -his usual historical tact, makes the Pythagorean Timaios describe mist -and darkness as condensed air.[259] We must think, then, of a “field” of -darkness or breath marked out by luminous units, an imagination which -the starry heavens would naturally suggest. It is even probable that we -should ascribe to Pythagoras the Milesian view of a plurality of worlds, -though it would not have been natural for him to speak of an infinite -number. We know, at least, that Petron, one of the early Pythagoreans, -said there were just a hundred and eighty-three worlds arranged in a -triangle;[260] and Plato makes Timaios admit, when laying down that -there is only one world, that something might be urged in favour of the -view that there are five, as there are five regular solids.[261] - -Footnote 255: - - Cf. Arist. _Phys._ Δ, 6. 213 a 27, οἱ δ’ ἄνθρωποι ... φασὶν ἐν ᾦ ὅλως - μηδέν ἐστι, τοῦτ’ εἶναι κενόν, διὸ τὸ πλῆρες ἀέρος κενὸν εἶναι; _de - Part. An._ Β, 10. 656 b 15, τὸ γὰρ κενὸν καλούμενον ἀέρος πλῆρές ἐστι; - _de An._ Β, 10 419 b 34, δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι κενὸν ὁ ἀήρ. - -Footnote 256: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 984 a 7 (R. P. 56 c). - -Footnote 257: - - See Chap. IV. § 91. - -Footnote 258: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 5. 986 a 25 (R. P. 66). - -Footnote 259: - - Plato, _Tim._ 58 d 2. - -Footnote 260: - - This is quoted by Plutarch, _de def. orac._ 422 b, d, from Phanias of - Eresos, who gave it on the authority of Hippys of Rhegion. If we may - follow Wilamowitz (_Hermes_, xix. p. 444) in supposing that this - really means Hippasos of Metapontion (and it was in Rhegion that the - Pythagoreans took refuge), this is a very valuable piece of evidence. - -Footnote 261: - - Plato, _Tim._ 55 c 7 sqq. - -[Sidenote: The heavenly bodies.] - -54. Anaximander had regarded the heavenly bodies as wheels of “air” -filled with fire which escapes through certain openings (§ 19), and -there is evidence that Pythagoras adopted the same view.[262] We have -seen that Anaximander only assumed the existence of three such wheels, -and held that the wheel of the sun was the lowest. It is extremely -probable that Pythagoras identified the intervals between these rings -with the three musical intervals which he had discovered, the fourth, -the fifth, and the octave. That would be the most natural beginning for -the later doctrine of the “harmony of the spheres,” though that -expression would be doubly misleading if applied to any theory we can -properly ascribe to Pythagoras himself. The word ἁρμονία does not mean -harmony, and the “spheres” are an anachronism. We are still at the stage -when wheels or rings were considered sufficient to account for the -motions of the heavenly bodies. It is also to be observed that sun, -moon, planets, and fixed stars must all be regarded as moving in the -same direction from east to west. Pythagoras certainly did not ascribe -to the planets an orbital motion of their own from west to east. The old -idea was rather that they were left behind more or less every day. As -compared with the fixed stars, Saturn is left behind least of all, and -the Moon most; so, instead of saying that the Moon took a shorter time -than Saturn to complete its path through the signs of the Zodiac, men -said Saturn travelled quicker than the Moon, because it more nearly -succeeds in keeping up with the signs. Instead of holding that Saturn -takes thirty years to complete its revolution, they said it took the -fixed stars thirty years to pass Saturn, and only twenty-nine days and a -half to pass the Moon. This is one of the most important points to bear -in mind regarding the planetary systems of the Greeks, and we shall -return to it again.[263] - -Footnote 262: - - This will be found in Chap. IV. § 93. - -Footnote 263: - - For a clear statement of this view (which was still that of - Demokritos), see Lucretius, v. 621 sqq. The view that the planets had - an orbital motion from west to east is attributed by Aetios, ii. 16, - 3, to Alkmaion (§ 96), which certainly implies that Pythagoras did not - hold it. As we shall see (§ 152), it is far from clear that any of the - Pythagoreans did. It seems rather to be Plato’s discovery. - -The account just given of the views of Pythagoras is, no doubt, -conjectural and incomplete. We have simply assigned to him those -portions of the Pythagorean system which appear to be the oldest, and it -has not even been possible at this stage to cite fully the evidence on -which our discussion is based. It will only appear in its true light -when we have examined the second part of the poem of Parmenides and the -system of the later Pythagoreans.[264] For reasons which will then be -apparent, I do not venture to ascribe to Pythagoras himself the theory -of the earth’s revolution round the central fire. It seems safest to -suppose that he still adhered to the geocentric hypothesis of -Anaximander. In spite of this, however, it will be clear that he opened -a new period in the development of Greek science, and it was certainly -to his school that its greatest discoveries were directly or indirectly -due. When Plato deliberately attributes some of his own most important -discoveries to the Pythagoreans, he was acknowledging in a -characteristic way the debt he owed them. - -Footnote 264: - - See Chap. IV. §§ 92-93, and Chap. VII. §§ 150-152. - - - II. XENOPHANES OF KOLOPHON - -[Sidenote: Life.] - -55. We have seen how Pythagoras identified himself with the religious -movement of his time; we have now to consider a very different -manifestation of the reaction against that view of the gods which the -poets had made familiar to every one. Xenophanes denied the -anthropomorphic gods altogether, but was quite unaffected by the revival -of more primitive ideas that was going on all round him. We still have a -fragment of an elegy in which he ridiculed Pythagoras and the doctrine -of transmigration. “Once, they say, he was passing by when a dog was -being ill-treated. ‘Stop!’ he said, ‘don’t hit it! It is the soul of a -friend! I knew it when I heard its voice.’”[265] We are also told that -he opposed the views of Thales and Pythagoras, and attacked Epimenides, -which is likely enough, though no fragments of the kind have come down -to us.[266] His chief importance lies in the fact that he was the author -of the quarrel between philosophy and poetry which culminated in Plato’s -_Republic_. - -Footnote 265: - - See fr. 7 (= 18 Karst.), _ap._ Diog. viii. 36 (R. P. 88). - -Footnote 266: - - Diog. ix. 18 (R. P. 97). We know that Xenophanes referred to the - prediction of an eclipse by Thales (Chap. I. p. 41, _n._ 62). We shall - see that his own view of the sun was hardly consistent with the - possibility of such a prediction, so it may have been in connexion - with this that he opposed him. - -It is not easy to determine the date of Xenophanes. Timaios said he was -a contemporary of Hieron and Epicharmos, and he certainly seems to have -played a part in the anecdotical romance of Hieron’s court which amused -the Greeks of the fourth century much as that of Croesus and the Seven -Wise Men amused those of the fifth.[267] As Hieron reigned from 478 to -467 B.C., that would make it impossible to date the birth of Xenophanes -much earlier than 570 B.C., even if we suppose him to have lived till -the age of a hundred. On the other hand, both Sextus and Clement say -that Apollodoros gave Ol. XL. (620-616 B.C.) as the date of his birth, -and the former adds that his days were prolonged till the time of -Dareios and Cyrus.[268] Again, Diogenes, whose information on such -matters mostly comes from Apollodoros, says that he flourished in Ol. -LX. (540-537 B.C.), and Diels holds that Apollodoros really said -so.[269] However that may be, it is evident that the date 540 B.C. is -based on the assumption that he went to Elea in the year of its -foundation, and is, therefore, a mere combination.[270] - -Footnote 267: - - Timaios _ap._ Clem. _Strom._ i. p. 533 (R. P. 95). There is only one - anecdote which actually represents Xenophanes in conversation with - Hieron (Plut. _Reg. apophth._ 175 e), but it is natural to understand - Arist. _Met._ Γ, 5. 1010 a 4 as an allusion to a remark made by - Epicharmos to him. Aristotle has more than one anecdote about - Xenophanes, and it seems most likely that he derived them from the - romance of which Xenophon’s _Strom._ is an echo. - -Footnote 268: - - Clem., _loc. cit._; Sext. _Strom._ i. 257. The mention of Cyrus is - confirmed by Hipp. _Strom._ i. 94. Diels thinks that Dareios was - mentioned first for metrical reasons; but no one has satisfactorily - explained why Cyrus should be mentioned at all, unless the early date - was intended. On the whole subject, see Jacoby, pp. 204 sqq., who is - certainly wrong in supposing that ἄχρι τῶν Δαρείου καὶ Κύρου χρόνων - can mean “during the times of Dareios and Cyrus.” - -Footnote 269: - - _Strom._ xxxi. p. 22. He assumes an early corruption of N into M. As - Apollodoros gave the Athenian archon, and not the Olympiad, we might - with more probability suppose a confusion due to two archons having - the same name. - -Footnote 270: - - As Elea was founded by the Phokaians six years after they left Phokaia - (Herod. i. 164 sqq.) its date is just 540-39 B.C. Cf. the way in which - Apollodoros dated Empedokles by the era of Thourioi (§ 98). - -What we do know for certain is that Xenophanes had led a wandering life -from the age of twenty-five, and that he was still alive and making -poetry at the age of ninety-two. He says himself (fr. 8 = 24 Karst.; R. -P. 97):— - - There are by this time threescore years and seven that have tossed my - careworn soul[271] up and down the land of Hellas; and there were then - five-and-twenty years from my birth, if I can say aught truly about - these matters. - -Footnote 271: - - Bergk (_Litteraturgesch._ ii. p. 418, n. 23) took φροντίς here to mean - the literary work of Xenophanes, but it is surely an anachronism to - suppose that at this date it could be used like the Latin _cura_. - -It is tempting to suppose that in this passage Xenophanes was referring -to the conquest of Ionia by Harpagos, and that he is, in fact, answering -the question asked in another poem[272] (fr. 22 = 17 Karst.; R. P. 95 -a):— - - This is the sort of thing we should say by the fireside in the - winter-time, as we lie on soft couches after a good meal, drinking - sweet wine and crunching chickpeas: “Of what country are you, and how - old are you, good sir? And how old were you when the Mede appeared?” - -Footnote 272: - - It was certainly another poem; for it is in hexameters while the - preceding fragment is in elegiacs. - -We cannot, however, be sure of this, and we must be content with what -is, after all, for our purpose the main fact, namely, that he refers to -Pythagoras in the past tense, and is in turn so referred to by -Herakleitos.[273] - -Footnote 273: - - Xenophanes, fr. 7 (above, p. 124, _n._ 265); Herakleitos, frs. 16, 17 - (below, p. 147). - -Theophrastos said that Xenophanes had “heard” Anaximander,[274] and we -shall see that he was certainly acquainted with the Ionian cosmology. -When driven from his native city, he lived in Sicily, chiefly, we are -told, at Zankle and Katana.[275] Like Archilochos before him, he -unburdened his soul in elegies and satires, which he recited at the -banquets where, we may suppose, the refugees tried to keep up the usages -of good Ionian society. The statement that he was a rhapsode has no -foundation at all.[276] The singer of elegies was no professional like -the rhapsode, but the social equal of his listeners. In his -ninety-second year he was still, we have seen, leading a wandering life, -which is hardly consistent with the statement that he settled at Elea -and founded a school there, especially if we are to think of him as -spending his last days at Hieron’s court. It is quite probable that he -visited Elea, and it is just possible that he wrote a poem of two -thousand hexameters on the foundation of that city, which was naturally -a subject of interest to all the Ionic _émigrés_.[277] But it is very -remarkable that no ancient writer expressly says that he ever was at -Elea, and the only thing besides the doubtful poem referred to which -connects him with it is a single anecdote of Aristotle’s as to the -answer he gave the Eleates when they asked whether they should sacrifice -to Leukothea and lament her or not. “If you think her a goddess,” he -said, “do not lament her; if not, do not sacrifice to her.” That is -absolutely all, and it is only an apophthegm.[278] It is strange there -should be no more if Xenophanes had really found a home at last in the -Phokaian colony. - -Footnote 274: - - Diog. ix. 21 (R. P. 96 a). - -Footnote 275: - - Diog. ix. 18 (R. P. 96). The use of the old name Zankle, instead of - the later Messene, points to an early source for this - statement—probably the elegies of Xenophanes himself. - -Footnote 276: - - Diog. ix. 18 (R. P. 97) says αὐτὸς ἐρραψῴδει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, which is a - very different thing. Nothing is said anywhere of his reciting Homer, - and the word ῥαψῳδεῖν is used quite loosely for “to recite.” Gomperz’s - imaginative picture (_Greek Thinkers_, vol. i. p. 155) has no further - support than this single word. Nor is there any trace of Homeric - influence in the fragments. They are in the usual elegiac style. - -Footnote 277: - - The statement is justly suspected by Hiller (_Rh. Mus._ xxxiii. p. - 529) to come from Lobon of Argos, who provided the Seven Wise Men, - Epimenides, etc., with stichometric notices, all duly recorded in - Diogenes. Even if true, however, it proves nothing. - -Footnote 278: - - Arist. _Rhet._ Β, 26. 1400 b 5 (R. P. 98 a). Anecdotes like this are - really anonymous. Plutarch transfers the story to Egypt (_P. Ph. Fr._ - p. 22, § 13), and others tell it of Herakleitos. It is hardly safe to - build on such a foundation. - -[Sidenote: Poems.] - -56. According to a notice preserved in Diogenes, Xenophanes wrote in -hexameters and also composed elegies and iambics against Homer and -Hesiod.[279] No good authority says anything about his having written a -philosophical poem.[280] Simplicius tells us he had never met with the -verses about the earth stretching infinitely downwards (fr. 28),[281] -and this means that the Academy possessed no copy of such a poem, which -would be very strange if it had ever existed. Simplicius was able to -find the complete works of much smaller men. Nor does internal evidence -lend any support to the view that he wrote a philosophical poem. Diels -refers about twenty-eight lines to it, but they would all come in quite -as naturally in his attacks on Homer and Hesiod, as I have endeavoured -to show. It is also significant that a considerable number of them are -derived from commentators on Homer.[282] It seems probable, then, that -Xenophanes expressed his theological and philosophical views -incidentally in his satires. That would be quite in the manner of the -time, as we can see from the remains of Epicharmos. - -Footnote 279: - - Diog. ix. 18 (R. P. 97). The word ἐπικόπτων is a reminiscence of - Timon, fr. 60; Diels, Ξεινοφάνης ὑπάτυφος Ὁμηραπάτης ἐπικόπτης. - -Footnote 280: - - The oldest reference to a poem Περὶ φύσεως is in the Geneva scholium - on _Il._ xxi. 196 (quoting fr. 30), and this goes back to Krates of - Mallos. We must remember, however, that such titles are of later date - than Xenophanes, and he had been given a place among philosophers long - before the time of Krates. All we can say, therefore, is that the - Pergamene librarians gave the title Περὶ φύσεως to some poem of - Xenophanes. - -Footnote 281: - - Simpl. _de Caelo_, p. 522, 7 (R. P. 97 b). It is true that two of our - fragments (25 and 26) are preserved by Simplicius, but he got them - from Alexander. Probably they were quoted by Theophrastos; for it is - plain that Alexander had no first-hand knowledge of Xenophanes either. - If he had, he would not have been taken in by _M.X.G._ (See p. 138, - _n._ 305.) - -Footnote 282: - - Three fragments (27, 31, 33) come from the _Homeric Allegories_, two - (30, 32) are from Homeric scholia. - -The satires themselves are called _Silloi_ by late writers, and this -name may go back to Xenophanes himself. It is also possible, however, -that it originates in the fact that Timon of Phleious, the -“sillographer” (_c._ 259 B.C.), put much of his satire upon philosophers -into the mouth of Xenophanes. Only one iambic line has been preserved, -and that is immediately followed by a hexameter (fr. 14 = 5 Karst.). -This suggests that Xenophanes inserted iambic lines among his hexameters -in the manner of the _Margites_, which would be a very natural thing for -him to do.[283] - -Footnote 283: - - Cf. Wilamowitz, Progr. Gryphiswald. 1880. - -[Sidenote: The fragments.] - -57. I give all the fragments of any importance according to the text and -arrangement of Diels. - - ELEGIES - - (1) - - Now is the floor clean, and the hands and cups of all; one sets - twisted garlands on our heads, another hands us fragrant ointment on a - salver. The mixing bowls stand ready, full of gladness, and there is - more wine at hand that promises never to leave us in the lurch, soft - and smelling of flowers in the jars. In the midst the frankincense - sends up its holy smoke, and there is cold water, sweet and clean. - Brown loaves are set before us and a lordly table laden with cheese - and rich honey. The altar in the midst is clustered round with - flowers; song and revel fill the halls. - - But first it is meet that men should hymn the god with joyful song, - with holy tales and pure words; then after libation and prayer made - that we may have strength to do right—for that is in truth the better - way—no sin is it to drink as much as a man can take and get home - without an attendant, so he be not stricken in years. And above all - men is he to be praised who after drinking gives goodly proof of - himself in the trial of skill, as memory and voice will serve him. Let - him not sing of Titans and Giants—those fictions of the men of old—nor - of turbulent civil broils in which is no good thing at all; but ever - give heedful reverence to the gods. - - (2) - - What if a man win victory in swiftness of foot, or in the - _pentathlon_, at Olympia, where is the precinct of Zeus by Pisa’s - springs, or in wrestling,—what if by cruel boxing or that fearful - sport men call _pankration_ he become more glorious in the citizens’ - eyes, and win a place of honour in the sight of all at the games, his - food at the public cost from the State, and a gift to be an heirloom - for him,—what if he conquer in the chariot-race,—he will not deserve - all this for his portion so much as I do. Far better is our art than - the strength of men and of horses! These are but thoughtless - judgments, nor is it fitting to set strength before our art. Even if - there arise a mighty boxer among a people, or one great in the - _pentathlon_ or at wrestling, or one excelling in swiftness of - foot—and that stands in honour before all tasks of men at the - games—the city would be none the better governed for that. It is but - little joy a city gets of it if a man conquer at the games by Pisa’s - banks; it is not this that makes fat the store-houses of a city. - - (3) - - They learnt dainty and unprofitable ways from the Lydians, so long as - they were free from hateful tyranny; they went to the market-place - with cloaks of purple dye, not less than a thousand of them all told, - vainglorious and proud of their comely tresses, reeking with fragrance - from cunning salves. - - - SATIRES - - (10) - - Since all at first have learnt according to Homer.... - - (11) - - Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame - and a disgrace among mortals, stealings and adulteries and deceivings - of one another. R. P. 99. - - (12) - - They have uttered many, many lawless deeds of the gods, stealings and - adulteries and deceivings of one another. R. P. _ib._ - - (14) - - But mortals deem that the gods are begotten as they are, and have - clothes[284] like theirs, and voice and form. R. P. 100. - - (15) - - Yes, and if oxen and horses or lions had hands, and could paint with - their hands, and produce works of art as men do, horses would paint - the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, and make their - bodies in the image of their several kinds. R. P. _ib._ - - (16) - - The Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; the Thracians say - theirs have blue eyes and red hair. R. P. 100 b. - - (18) - - The gods have not revealed all things to men from the beginning, but - by seeking they find in time what is better. R. P. 104 b. - - (23) - - One god, the greatest among gods and men, neither in form like unto - mortals nor in thought.... R. P. 100. - - (24) - - He sees all over, thinks all over, and hears all over. R. P. 102. - - (25) - - But without toil he swayeth all things by the thought of his mind. R. - P. 108 b. - - (26) - - And he abideth ever in the selfsame place, moving not at all; nor doth - it befit him to go about now hither now thither. R. P. 110 a. - - (27) - - All things come from the earth, and in earth all things end. R. P. 103 - a. - - (28) - - This limit of the earth above is seen at our feet in contact with the - air;[285] below it reaches down without a limit. R. P. 103. - - (29) - - All things are earth and water that come into being and grow. R. P. - 103. - - (30) - - The sea is the source of water and the source of wind; for neither in - the clouds (would there be any blasts of wind blowing forth) from - within without the mighty sea, nor rivers’ streams nor rain-water from - the sky. The mighty sea is father of clouds and of winds and of - rivers.[286] R. P. 103. - - (31) - - The sun swinging over[287] the earth and warming it.... - - (32) - - She that they call Iris is a cloud likewise, purple, scarlet and green - to behold. R. P. 103. - - (33) - - For we all are born of earth and water. R. P. _ib._ - - (34) - - There never was nor will be a man who has certain knowledge about the - gods and about all the things I speak of. Even if he should chance to - say the complete truth, yet he himself knows not that it is so. But - all may have their fancy. R. P. 104. - - (35) - - Let these be taken as fancies[288] something like the truth. R. P. 104 - a. - - (36) - - All of them[289] that are visible for mortals to behold. - - (37) - - And in some caves water drips.... - - (38) - - If god had not made brown honey, men would think figs far sweeter than - they do. - -Footnote 284: - - I formerly, with Zeller, preferred Theodoret’s reading αἴσθησιν, but - both Clement and Eusebios have ἐσθῆτα, and Theodoret is entirely - dependent on them. - -Footnote 285: - - Reading ἠέρι for καὶ ῥεῖ with Diels. - -Footnote 286: - - This fragment has been recovered in its entirety from the Geneva - scholia on Homer (see _Arch._ iv. p. 652). The words in brackets are - added by Diels. See also Praechter, “Zu Xenophanes” (_Philol._ xviii. - p. 308). - -Footnote 287: - - The word is ὑπεριέμενος. This is quoted from the _Allegories_ as an - explanation of the name Hyperion, and doubtless Xenophanes so meant - it. - -Footnote 288: - - Reading δεδοξάσθω with Wilamowitz. - -Footnote 289: - - As Diels suggests, this probably refers to the stars, which Xenophanes - held to be clouds. - -[Sidenote: The heavenly bodies.] - -58. The intention of one of these fragments (fr. 32) is perfectly clear. -“Iris too” is a cloud, and we may infer that the same thing had just -been said of the sun, moon, and stars; for the doxographers tell us that -these were all explained as “clouds ignited by motion.”[290] To the same -context clearly belongs the explanation of the St. Elmo’s fire which -Aetios has preserved. “The things like stars which appear on ships,” we -are told, “which some call the Dioskouroi, are little clouds made -luminous by motion.”[291] In the doxographers this explanation is -repeated with trifling variations under the head of moon, stars, comets, -lightning, shooting stars, and so forth, which gives the appearance of a -systematic cosmology.[292] But the system is due to the arrangement of -the work of Theophrastos, and not to Xenophanes; for it is obvious that -a very few hexameters added to those we possess would amply account for -the whole doxography. - -Footnote 290: - - Cf. Diels _ad loc._ (_P. Ph. Fr._ p. 44), “ut Sol et cetera astra, - quae cum in nebulas evanescerent, deorum simul opinio casura erat.” - Cf. _Arch._ x. p. 533. - -Footnote 291: - - Aet. ii. 18, 1 (_Dox._ p. 347), Ξενοφάνης τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πλοίων - φαινομένους οἷον ἀστέρας, οὓς καὶ Διοσκούρους καλοῦσί τινες, νεφέλια - εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ποιὰν κίνησιν παραλάμποντα. - -What we hear of the sun presents some difficulties. We are told, on the -one hand, that it too was an ignited cloud; but this can hardly be -right. The evaporation of the sea from which clouds arise is distinctly -said to be due to the sun’s heat. Theophrastos stated that the sun, -according to Xenophanes, was a collection of sparks from the moist -exhalation; but even this leaves the exhalation itself unexplained.[293] -That, however, matters little, if the chief aim of Xenophanes was to -discredit the anthropomorphic gods, rather than to give a scientific -theory of the heavenly bodies. The important thing is that Helios too is -a temporary phenomenon. The sun does not go round the earth, as -Anaximander taught, but straight on, and the appearance of a circular -path is solely due to its increasing distance. So it is not the same sun -that rises next morning, but a new one altogether; while the old one -“tumbles into a hole” when it comes to certain uninhabited regions of -the earth. Besides that, there are many suns and moons, one of each for -every region of the earth.[294] It is obvious that things of that kind -cannot be gods. - -Footnote 292: - - The passages from Aetios are collected in _P. Ph. Fr._ pp. 32 sqq. - (_Vors._ p. 42). - -Footnote 293: - - Aet. ii. 20, 3 (_Dox._ p. 348), Ξενοφάνης ἐκ νεφῶν πεπυρωμένων εἶναι - τὸν ἥλιον. Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς γέγραφεν ἐκ πυριδίων μὲν τῶν - συναθροιζομένων ἐκ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως, συναθροιζόντων δὲ τὸν - ἥλιον. - -Footnote 294: - - Aet. ii. 24, 9 (_Dox._ p. 355). πολλοὺς εἶναι ἡλίους καὶ σελήνας κατὰ - κλίματα τῆς γῆς καὶ ἀποτομὰς καὶ ζώνας, κατὰ δέ τινα καιρὸν ἐμπίπτειν - τὸν δίσκον εἴς τινα ἀποτομὴν τῆς γῆς οὐκ οἰκουμένην ὑφ’ ἡμῶν καὶ οὕτως - ὥσπερ κενεμβατοῦντα ἔκλειψιν ὑποφαίνειν· ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς τὸν ἥλιον εἰς - ἄπειρον μὲν προιέναι, δοκεῖν δὲ κυκλεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀπόστασιν. It is - clear that in this notice ἔκλειψινἕκλειψιν has been erroneously - substituted for δύσιν, as it has also in Aet. ii. 24, 4 (_Dox._ p. - 354). - -The vigorous expression “tumbling into a hole”[295] seems clearly to -come from the verses of Xenophanes himself, and there are others of a -similar kind, which we must suppose were quoted by Theophrastos. The -stars go out in the daytime, but glow again at night “like charcoal -embers.”[296] The sun is of some use in producing the world and the -living creatures in it, but the moon “does no work in the boat.”[297] -Such expressions can only be meant to make the heavenly bodies appear -ridiculous, and it will therefore be well to ask whether the other -supposed cosmological fragments can be interpreted on the same -principle. - -Footnote 295: - - That this is the meaning of ὥσπερ κενεμβατοῦντα appears sufficiently - from the passages referred to in Liddell and Scott. - -Footnote 296: - - Aet. ii. 13, 14 (_Dox._ p. 343), ἀναζωπυρεῖν νύκτωρ καθάπερ τοὺς - ἄνθρακας. - -Footnote 297: - - Aet. ii. 30, 8 (_Dox._ p. 362), τὸν μὲν ἥλιον χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν - τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ζῴων γένεσίν τε καὶ διοίκησιν, τὴν δὲ - σελήνην παρέλκειν, The verb παρέλκειν means “to cork.” Cf. - Aristophanes, _Pax_, 1306. - -[Sidenote: Earth and water.] - -59. In fr. 29 Xenophanes says that “all things are earth and water,” and -Hippolytos has preserved the account given by Theophrastos of the -context in which this occurred. It was as follows:— - - Xenophanes said that a mixture of the earth with the sea is taking - place, and that it is being gradually dissolved by the moisture. He - says that he has the following proofs of this. Shells are found in - midland districts and on hills, and he says that in the quarries at - Syracuse has been found the imprint of a fish and of seaweed, at Paros - the form of an anchovy in the depth of the stone, and at Malta flat - impressions of all marine animals. These, he says, were produced when - all things were formerly mud, and the outlines were dried in the mud. - All human beings are destroyed when the earth has been carried down - into the sea and turned to mud. This change takes place for all the - worlds.—Hipp. _Ref._ i. 14 (R. P. 103 a). - -This is, of course, the theory of Anaximander, and we may perhaps credit -him rather than Xenophanes with the observations of fossils.[298] Most -remarkable of all, however, is the statement that this change applies to -“all the worlds.” It really seems impossible to doubt that Theophrastos -attributed a belief in “innumerable worlds” to Xenophanes. As we have -seen already, Aetios includes him in his list of those who held this -doctrine, and Diogenes ascribes it to him also.[299] In this place, -Hippolytos seems to take it for granted. We shall also find, however, -that in another connexion he said the World or God was one. If our -interpretation of him is correct, there is no difficulty here. The main -point is that, so far from being a primeval goddess, and “a sure seat -for all things ever,” Gaia too is a passing appearance. That belongs to -the attack upon Hesiod, and, if in this connexion Xenophanes spoke, with -Anaximander, of “innumerable worlds,” while elsewhere he said that God -or the World was one, that is probably connected with a still better -attested contradiction which we have now to examine. - -Footnote 298: - - There is an interesting note on these in Gomperz’s _Greek Thinkers_ - (Eng. trans. i. p. 551). I have translated his conjecture φυκῶν - instead of the MS. φωκῶν, as this is said to involve a palæontological - impossibility, and impressions of fucoids are found, not indeed in the - quarries of Syracuse, but near them. It is said also that there are no - fossils in Paros, so the anchovy must have been an imaginary one. - -Footnote 299: - - Aet. ii. 1, 2 (_Dox._, p. 327); Diog. ix. 19 (R. P. 103 c). It is - true, of course, that this passage of Diogenes comes from the - biographical compendium (_Dox._ p. 168); but, for all that, it is a - serious matter to deny the Theophrastean origin of a statement found - in Aetios, Hippolytos, and Diogenes. - -[Sidenote: Finite or infinite?] - -60. Aristotle tried without success to discover from the poems of -Xenophanes whether he regarded the world as finite or infinite. “He made -no clear pronouncement on the subject,” he tells us.[300] Theophrastos, -on the other hand, decided that he regarded it as spherical and finite -because he said it was “equal every way.”[301] This, however, leads to -very serious difficulties. We have seen already that Xenophanes said the -sun went right on to infinity, and this agrees with his view of the -earth as an infinitely extended plain. Still more difficult to reconcile -with the idea of a spherical and finite world is the statement of fr. 28 -that, while the earth has an upper limit which we see, it has no limit -below. This is attested by Aristotle, who speaks of the earth being -“infinitely rooted,” and adds that Empedokles criticised Xenophanes for -holding this view.[302] It further appears from the fragment of -Empedokles quoted by Aristotle that Xenophanes said the vast Air -extended infinitely upwards.[303] We are therefore bound to try to find -room for an infinite earth and an infinite air in a spherical and finite -world! That comes of trying to find science in satire. If, on the other -hand, we regard these statements from the same point of view as those -about the heavenly bodies, we shall at once see what they most probably -mean. The story of Ouranos and Gaia was always the chief scandal of the -_Theogony_, and the infinite air gets rid of Ouranos altogether. As to -the earth stretching infinitely downwards, that gets rid of Tartaros, -which Homer described as situated at the bottommost limit of earth and -sea, as far beneath Hades as heaven is above the earth.[304] This is -pure conjecture, of course; but, if it is even possible, we are entitled -to disbelieve that such startling contradictions occurred in a -cosmological poem. - -Footnote 300: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 5. 986 b 23 (R. P. 101), οὐδὲν διεσαφήνισεν. - -Footnote 301: - - This is given as an inference by Simpl. _Phys._ p. 23, 18 (R. P. 108 - b), διὰ τὸ πανταχόθεν ὅμοιον. It does not merely come from _M.X.G._ - (R. P. 108), πάντῃ δ’ ὅμοιον ὄντα σφαιροειδῆ εἶναι. Hippolytos has it - too (_Ref._ i. 14; R. P. 102 a), so it goes back to Theophrastos. - Timon of Phleious understood Xenophanes in the same way; for he makes - him call the One ἴσον ἁπάντῃ (fr. 60, Diels = 40 Wachsm.; R. P. 102 - a). - -Footnote 302: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Β, 13. 294 a 21 (R. P. 103 b). - -Footnote 303: - - I take δαψιλός as an attribute and ἀπείρονα as predicate to both - subjects. - -Footnote 304: - - _Il._ viii. 13-16, 478-481, especially the words οὐδ’ εἴ κε τὰ νείατα - πείραθ’ ἵκηαι | γαίης καὶ πόντοιο κ.τ.λ. _Iliad_ viii. must have - seemed a particularly bad book to Xenophanes. - -A more subtle explanation of the difficulty commended itself to the late -Peripatetic who wrote an account of the Eleatic school, part of which is -still extant in the Aristotelian corpus, and is generally known now as -the treatise on _Melissos, Xenophanes, and Gorgias_.[305] He said that -Xenophanes declared the world to be neither finite nor infinite, and he -composed a series of arguments in support of this thesis, to which he -added another like it, namely, that the world is neither in motion nor -at rest. This has introduced endless confusion into our sources. -Alexander used this treatise as well as the great work of Theophrastos, -and Simplicius supposed the quotations from it to be from Theophrastos -too. Having no copy of the poems he was completely baffled, and until -recently all accounts of Xenophanes were vitiated by the same confusion. -It may even be suggested that, but for this, we should have heard very -little of the “philosophy of Xenophanes,” a way of speaking which is in -the main a survival from the days before this scholastic exercise was -recognised as having no authority. - -Footnote 305: - - In Bekker’s edition this treatise bears the title Περὶ Ξενοφάνους, - περὶ Ζήνωνος, περὶ Γοργίου, but the best MS. gives as the titles of - its three sections: (1) Περὶ Ζήνωνος, (2) Περὶ Ξενοφάνους, (3) Περὶ - Γοργίου. The first section, however, plainly refers to Melissos, so - the whole treatise is now entitled _De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia_ - (_M.X.G._). It has been edited by Apelt in the Teubner Series, and - more recently by Diels (_Abh. der k. Preuss. Akad._ 1900), who has - also given the section dealing with Xenophanes in _P. Ph. Fr._ pp. - 24-29 (_Vors._ pp. 36 sqq.). He has now withdrawn the view maintained - in _Dox._ p. 108 that the work belongs to the third century B.C., and - holds that it was _a Peripatetico eclectico (i.e. sceptica, platonica, - stoica admiscente) circa Christi natalem conscriptum_. If that is so, - there is no reason to doubt, as I formerly did, that the second - section is really meant to deal with Xenophanes. The writer would have - no first-hand knowledge of his poems, and the order in which the - philosophers are discussed is that of the passage in the _Metaphysics_ - which suggested the whole thing. It is possible that a section on - Parmenides preceded what we now have. - -[Sidenote: God and the world.] - -61. In the passage of the _Metaphysics_ just referred to, Aristotle -speaks of Xenophanes as “the first partisan of the One,”[306] and the -context shows that he means to suggest he was the first of the Eleatics. -We have seen already that the certain facts of his life make it very -unlikely that he settled at Elea and founded a school there, and it is -probable that, as usual in such cases, Aristotle is simply reproducing -certain statements of Plato. At any rate, Plato had spoken of the -Eleatics as the “partisans of the Whole,”[307] and he had also spoken of -the school as “starting with Xenophanes and even earlier.”[308] The last -words, however, show clearly enough what he meant. Just as he called the -Herakleiteans “followers of Homer and still more ancient teachers,”[309] -so he attached the Eleatic school to Xenophanes and still earlier -authorities. We have seen in other instances how these playful and -ironical remarks of Plato were taken seriously by his successors, and we -need not let this fresh instance of the same thing influence our general -view of Xenophanes unduly. - -Footnote 306: - - _Met._ Α, 5. 986 b 21 (R. P. 101), πρῶτος τούτων ἑνίσας. The verb - ἑνίζειν occurs nowhere else, but is plainly formed on the analogy of - μηδίζειν, φιλιππίζειν, and the like. It is not likely that it means - “to unify.” Aristotle could easily have said ἑνώσας if he had meant - that. - -Footnote 307: - - _Tht._ 181 a 6, τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται. The noun στασιῶτης has no other - meaning than “partisan.” There is no verb στασιοῦν “to make - stationary,” and such a formation would be against all analogy. The - derivation στασιώτας ... ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως appears first in Sext. - _Math._ x. 46, from which passage we may infer that Aristotle used the - word, not that he gave the derivation. - -Footnote 308: - - _Soph._ 242 d 5 (R. P. 101 b). If the passage implies that Xenophanes - settled at Elea, it equally implies this of his predecessors. But Elea - was not founded till Xenophanes was in the prime of life. - -Footnote 309: - - _Tht._ 179 e 3, τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων ἤ, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις Ὁμηρείων καὶ ἔτι - παλαιοτέρων. In this passage, Homer stands to the Herakleiteans in - exactly the same relation as Xenophanes does to the Eleatics in the - _Sophist._ - -Aristotle goes on to tell us that Xenophanes, “referring to the whole -world,[310] said the One was god.” This clearly alludes to frs. 23-26, -where all human attributes are denied of a god who is said to be one and -“the greatest among gods and men.” It may be added that these verses -gain very much in point if we may think of them as closely connected -with frs. 11-16, instead of referring the one set of verses to the -Satires and the other to a cosmological poem. It was probably in the -same context that Xenophanes called the world or god “equal every -way”[311] and denied that it breathed.[312] The statement that, there is -no mastership among the gods[313] also goes very well with fr. 26. A god -has no wants, nor is it fitting for one god to be the servant of others, -like Iris and Hermes in Homer. - -Footnote 310: - - _Met._ 981 b 24. The words cannot mean “gazing up at the whole - heavens,” or anything of that sort. They are taken as I take them by - Bonitz (_im Hinblicke auf den ganzen Himmel_) and Zeller (_im Hinblick - auf das Weltganze_). The word ἀποβλέπειν had become much too - colourless to bear the other meaning, and οὐρανός, as we know, means - what was later called κόσμος. - -Footnote 311: - - See above, p. 137, _n._ 301. - -Footnote 312: - - Diog. ix. 19 (R. P. 103 c), ὅλον δ’ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὅλον ἀκούειν, μὴ μέντοι - ἀναπνεῖν. See above, p. 120, _n._ 252. - -Footnote 313: - - [Plut.] _Strom._ fr. 4, ἀποφαίνεται δὲ καὶ περὶ θεῶν ὡς οὐδεμιᾶς - ἡγεμονίας ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης· οὐ γὰρ ὅσιον δεσπόζεσθαί τινα τῶν θεῶν, - ἐπιδεῖσθαί τε μηδενὸς αὐτῶν μηδένα μηδ’ ὅλως, ἀκούειν δὲ καὶ ὁρᾶν - καθόλου καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος. - -[Sidenote: Monotheism or polytheism.] - -62. That this “god” is just the world, Aristotle tells us, and the use -of the word θεός is quite in accordance with Anaximander’s. Xenophanes -regarded it as sentient, though without any special organs of sense, and -it sways all things by the thought of its mind. He also calls it “one -god,” and, if that is monotheism, then Xenophanes was a monotheist, -though this is surely not how the word is generally understood. The fact -is that the expression “one god” wakens all sorts of associations in our -mind which did not exist at all for the Greeks of this time. His -contemporaries would have been more likely to call Xenophanes an atheist -than anything else. As Eduard Meyer excellently says: “In Greece the -question of one god or gods many hardly plays any part. Whether the -divine power is thought of as a unity or a plurality, is irrelevant in -comparison with the question whether it exists at all, and how its -nature and its relation to the world is to be understood.”[314] - -Footnote 314: - - _Gesch. des Alterth._ ii. § 466. - -On the other hand, it is wrong to say with Freudenthal that Xenophanes -was in any sense a polytheist.[315] That he should use the language of -polytheism in his elegies is only what we should expect, and the other -references to “gods” can be best explained as incidental to his attack -on the anthropomorphic gods of Homer and Hesiod. In one case, -Freudenthal has pressed a proverbial way of speaking too hard.[316] -Least of all can we admit that Xenophanes allowed the existence of -subordinate or departmental gods; for it was just the existence of such -that he was chiefly concerned to deny. At the same time, I cannot help -thinking that Freudenthal was more nearly right than Wilamowitz, who -says that Xenophanes “upheld the only real monotheism that has ever -existed upon earth.”[317] Diels, I fancy, comes nearer the mark, when he -calls it a “somewhat narrow pantheism.”[318] But all these views would -have surprised Xenophanes himself about equally. He was really Goethe’s -_Weltkind_, with prophets to right and left of him, and he would have -smiled if he had known that one day he was to be regarded as a -theologian. - -Footnote 315: - - Freudenthal, _Die Theologie des Xenophanes_. - -Footnote 316: - - Xenophanes calls his god “greatest among gods and men,” but this is - simply a case of “polar expression,” to which parallels will be found - in Wilamowitz’s note to the _Herakles_, v. 1106. Cf. especially the - statement of Herakleitos (fr. 20) that “no one of gods or men” made - the world. - -Footnote 317: - - _Griechische Literatur_, p. 38. - -Footnote 318: - - _Parmenides Lehrgedicht_, p. 9. - - - - - CHAPTER III - HERAKLEITOS OF EPHESOS - - -[Sidenote: Life of Herakleitos.] - -63. Herakleitos of Ephesos, son of Blyson, is said to have “flourished” -in Ol. LXIX. (504/3-501/0 B.C.);[319] that is to say, just in the middle -of the reign of Dareios, with whom several traditions connected -him.[320] We shall see that Parmenides was assigned to the same -Olympiad, though for another reason (§ 84). It is more important, -however, for our purpose to notice that, while Herakleitos refers to -Pythagoras and Xenophanes by name and in the past tense (fr. 16), he is -in turn referred to by Parmenides (fr. 6). These references are -sufficient to mark his proper place in the history of philosophy. Zeller -holds, indeed, that he cannot have published his work till after 478 -B.C., on the ground that the expulsion of his friend Hermodoros, alluded -to in fr. 114, could not have taken place before the downfall of Persian -rule. If that were so, it might be hard to see how Parmenides could have -known the views of Herakleitos; but there is surely no difficulty in -supposing that the Ephesians may have sent one of their foremost -citizens into banishment at a time when they were still paying tribute -to the Great King. The Persians never took their internal -self-government from the Ionian cities, and the spurious _Letters_ of -Herakleitos show the accepted view was that the expulsion of Hermodoros -took place during the reign of Dareios.[321] - -Footnote 319: - - Diog. ix. 1 (R. P. 29), no doubt from Apollodoros through some - intermediate authority. Jacoby, pp. 227 sqq. - -Footnote 320: - - Bernays, _Die Heraklitischen Briefe_, pp. 13 sqq. - -Footnote 321: - - Bernays, _op. cit._ pp. 20 sqq. - -Sotion said that Herakleitos was a disciple of Xenophanes,[322] which is -not probable; for Xenophanes seems to have left Ionia for ever before -Herakleitos was born. More likely he was not a disciple of any one; but -it is clear, at the same time, that he was acquainted both with the -Milesian cosmology and with the poems of Xenophanes. He also knew -something of the theories taught by Pythagoras (fr. 17). - -Footnote 322: - - Sotion _ap._ Diog. ix. 5 (R. P. 29 c). - -Of the life of Herakleitos we really know nothing, except, perhaps, that -he belonged to the ancient royal house and resigned the nominal position -of Basileus in favour of his brother.[323] The origin of the other -statements bearing on it is quite transparent.[324] - -Footnote 323: - - Diog. ix. 6 (R. P. 31). - -Footnote 324: - - See Patin, _Heraklits Einheitslehre_, pp. 3 sqq. Herakleitos said (fr. - 68) that it was death to souls to become water; and we are told - accordingly that he died of dropsy. He said (fr. 114) that the - Ephesians should leave their city to their children, and (fr. 79) that - Time was a child playing draughts. We are therefore told that he - refused to take any part in public life, and went to play with the - children in the temple of Artemis. He said (fr. 85) that corpses were - more fit to be cast out than dung; and we are told that he covered - himself with dung when attacked with dropsy. Lastly, he is said to - have argued at great length with his doctors because of fr. 58. For - these tales see Diog. ix. 3-5, and compare the stories about - Empedokles discussed in Chap. V. § 100. - -[Sidenote: His book.] - -64. We do not know the title of the work of Herakleitos[325]—if, indeed, -it had one at all—and it is not very easy to form a clear idea of its -contents. We are told that it was divided into three discourses: one -dealing with the universe, one political, and one theological.[326] It -is not likely that this division is due to Herakleitos himself; all we -can infer from the statement is that the work fell naturally into these -three parts when the Stoic commentators took their editions of it in -hand. - -Footnote 325: - - The variety of titles enumerated in Diog. ix. 12 (R. P. 30 b) seems to - show that none was authentically known. That of “Muses” comes from - Plato, _Soph._ 242 d 7. The others are mere “mottoes” (Schuster) - prefixed by Stoic editors, and intended to emphasise their view that - the subject of the work was ethical or political (Diog. ix. 15; R. P. - 30 c). - -Footnote 326: - - Diog. ix. 5 (R. P. 30). Bywater has followed this hint in his - arrangement of the fragments. The three sections are 1-90, 91-97, - 98-130. - -The style of Herakleitos is proverbially obscure, and, at a later date, -got him the nickname of “the Dark.”[327] Now the fragments about the -Delphic god and the Sibyl (frs. 11 and 12) seem to show that he was -quite conscious of writing an oracular style, and we have to ask why he -did so. In the first place, it was the manner of the time.[328] The -stirring events of the age, and the influence of the religious revival, -gave something of a prophetic tone to all the leaders of thought. Pindar -and Aischylos have it too. They all feel that they are in some measure -inspired. It is also the age of great individualities, who are apt to be -solitary and disdainful. Herakleitos at least was so. If men cared to -dig for the gold they might find it (fr. 8); if not, they must be -content with straw (fr. 51). This seems to have been the view taken by -Theophrastos, who said that the headstrong temperament of Herakleitos -sometimes led him into incompleteness and inconsistencies of -statement.[329] But that is a very different thing from studied -obscurity and the _disciplina arcani_ sometimes attributed to him; if -Herakleitos does not go out of his way to make his meaning clear, -neither does he hide it (fr. 11). - -Footnote 327: - - R. P. 30 a. The epithet ὁ σκοτεινός is of late date, but Timon of - Phleious already called him αἰνικτής (fr. 43, Diels). - -Footnote 328: - - See the valuable observations of Diels in the Introduction to his - _Herakleitos von Ephesos_, pp. iv. sqq. - -Footnote 329: - - Cf. Diog. ix. 6 (R. P. 31). - -[Sidenote: The fragments.] - -65. I give a version of the fragments according to the arrangement of -Mr. Bywater’s exemplary edition.[330] - - (1) It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my Word, and to confess - that all things are one.[331] R. P. 40. - - (2) Though this Word[332] is true evermore, yet men are as unable to - understand it when they hear it for the first time as before they have - heard it at all. For, though all things come to pass in accordance - with this Word, men seem as if they had no experience of them, when - they make trial of words and deeds such as I set forth, dividing each - thing according to its nature and showing how it truly is. But other - men know not what they are doing when awake, even as they forget what - they do in sleep. R. P. 32. - - (3) Fools when they do hear are like the deaf: of them does the saying - bear witness that they are absent when present. R. P. 31 a. - - (4) Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men if they have souls that - understand not their language. R. P. 42. - - (5) The many do not take heed of such things as those they meet with, - nor do they mark them when they are taught, though they think they do. - - (6) Knowing not how to listen nor how to speak. - - (7) If you do not expect the unexpected, you will not find it; for it - is hard to be sought out and difficult.[333] - - (8) Those who seek for gold dig up much earth and find a little. R. P. - 44 b. - - (10) Nature loves to hide. R. P. 34 f. - - (11) The lord whose is the oracle at Delphoi neither utters nor hides - his meaning, but shows it by a sign. R. P. 30 a. - - (12) And the Sibyl, with raving lips uttering things mirthless, - unbedizened, and unperfumed, reaches over a thousand years with her - voice, thanks to the god in her. R. P. 30 a. - - (13) The things that can be seen, heard, and learned are what I prize - the most. R. P. 42. - - (14) ... bringing untrustworthy witnesses in support of disputed - points. - - (15) The eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears.[334] R. P. 42 c. - - (16) The learning of many things teacheth not understanding, else - would it have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and - Hekataios. R. P. 31. - - (17) Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchos, practised inquiry beyond all other - men, and choosing out these writings, claimed for his own wisdom what - was but a knowledge of many things and an art of mischief.[335] R. P. - 31 a. - - (18) Of all whose discourses I have heard, there is not one who - attains to understanding that wisdom is apart from all. R. P. 32 b. - - (19) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all - things are steered through all things. R. P. 40. - - (20) This world,[336] which is the same for all, no one of gods or men - has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be an ever-living - Fire, with measures kindling, and measures going out. R. P. 35.[337] - - (21) The transformations of Fire are, first of all, sea; and half of - the sea is earth, half whirlwind.[338] ... R. P. 35 b. - - (22) All things are an exchange for Fire, and Fire for all things, - even as wares for gold and gold for wares. R. P. 35. - - (23) It becomes liquid sea, and is measured by the same tale as before - it became earth.[339] R. P. 39. - - (24) Fire is want and surfeit. R. P. 36 a. - - (25) Fire lives the death of air,[340] and air lives the death of - fire; water lives the death of earth, earth that of water. R. P. 37. - - (26) Fire in its advance will judge and convict[341] all things. R. P. - 36 a. - - (27) How can one hide from that which never sets? - - (28) It is the thunderbolt that steers the course of all things. R. P. - 35 b. - - (29) The sun will not overstep his measures; if he does, the Erinyes, - the handmaids of Justice, will find him out. R. P. 39. - - (30) The limit of East and West is the Bear; and opposite the Bear is - the boundary of bright Zeus.[342] - - (31) If there were no sun it would be night, for all the other stars - could do.[343] - - (32) The sun is new every day. - - (33) See above, Chap. I. p. 41, _n._ 62. - - (34) ... the seasons that bring all things. - - (35) Hesiod is most men’s teacher. Men think he knew very many things, - a man who did not know day or night! They are one.[344] R. P. 39 b. - - (36) God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit - and hunger; but he takes various shapes, just as fire,[345] when it is - mingled with spices, is named according to the savour of each. R. P. - 39 b. - - (37) If all things were turned to smoke, the nostrils would - distinguish them. - - (38) Souls smell in Hades. R. P. 46 d. - - (39) Cold things become warm, and what is warm cools; what is wet - dries, and the parched is moisted. - - (40) It scatters and it gathers; it advances and retires. - - (41, 42) You cannot step twice into the same rivers; for fresh waters - are ever flowing in upon you. R. P. 33. - - (43) Homer was wrong in saying: “Would that strife might perish from - among gods and men!” He did not see that he was praying for the - destruction of the universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things - would pass away.[346]... R. P. 34 d. - - (44) War is the father of all and the king of all; and some he has - made gods and some men, some bond and some free. R. P. 34. - - (45) Men do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is - an attunement of opposite tensions,[347] like that of the bow and the - lyre. R. P. 34. - - (46) It is the opposite which is good for us.[348] - - (47) The hidden attunement is better than the open. R. P. 34. - - (48) Let us not conjecture at random about the greatest things. - - (49) Men that love wisdom must be acquainted with very many things - indeed. - - (50) The straight and the crooked path of the fuller’s comb is one and - the same. - - (51) Asses would rather have straw than gold. R. P. 31 a. - - (51_a_) Oxen are happy when they find bitter vetches to eat.[349] R. - P. 48 b. - - (52) The sea is the purest and the impurest water. Fish can drink it, - and it is good for them; to men it is undrinkable and destructive. R. - P. 47 c. - - (53) Swine wash in the mire, and barnyard fowls in dust. - - (54) ... to delight in the mire. - - (55) Every beast is driven to pasture with blows.[350] - - (56) Same as 45. - - (57) Good and ill are one. R. P. 47 c. - - (58) Physicians who cut, burn, stab, and rack the sick, demand a fee - for it which they do not deserve to get. R. P. 47 c.[351] - - (59) Couples are things whole and things not whole, what is drawn - together and what is drawn asunder, the harmonious and the discordant. - The one is made up of all things, and all things issue from the - one.[352] - - (60) Men would not have known the name of justice if these things were - not.[353] - - (61) To God all things are fair and good and right, but men hold some - things wrong and some right. R. P. 45. - - (62) We must know that war is common to all and strife is justice, and - that all things come into being and pass away (?) through strife. - - (64) All the things we see when awake are death, even as all we see in - slumber are sleep. R. P. 42 c.[354] - - (65) The wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by - the name of Zeus. R. P. 40. - - (66) The bow (βιός) is called life (βίος), but its work is death. R. - P. 49 a. - - (67) Mortals are immortals and immortals are mortals, the one living - the others’ death and dying the others’ life. R. P. 46. - - (68) For it is death to souls to become water, and death to water to - become earth. But water comes from earth; and from water, soul. R. P. - 38. - - (69) The way up and the way down is one and the same. R. P. 36 d. - - (70) In the circumference of a circle the beginning and end are - common. - - (71) You will not find the boundaries of soul by travelling in any - direction, so deep is the measure of it.[355] R. P. 41 d. - - (72) It is pleasure to souls to become moist. R. P. 46 c. - - (73) A man, when he gets drunk, is led by a beardless lad, tripping, - knowing not where he steps, having his soul moist. R. P. 42. - - (74-76) The dry soul is the wisest and best.[356] R. P. 42. - - (77) Man is kindled and put out like a light in the night-time. - - (78) And it is the same thing in us that is quick and dead, awake and - asleep, young and old; the former are shifted[357] and become the - latter, and the latter in turn are shifted and become the former. R. - P. 47. - - (79) Time is a child playing draughts, the kingly power is a child’s. - R. P. 40 a. - - (80) I have sought for myself. R. P. 48. - - (81) We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not. - R. P. 33 a. - - (82) It is a weariness to labour for the same masters and be ruled by - them. - - (83) It rests by changing. - - (84) Even the posset separates if it is not stirred. - - (85) Corpses are more fit to be cast out than dung. - - (86) When they are born, they wish to live and to meet with their - dooms—or rather to rest—and they leave children behind them to meet - with their dooms in turn. - - (87-89) A man may be a grandfather in thirty years. - - (90) Those who are asleep are fellow-workers.... - - (91_a_) Thought is common to all. - - (91_b_) Those who speak with understanding must hold fast to what is - common to all as a city holds fast to its law, and even more strongly. - For all human laws are fed by the one divine law. It prevails as much - as it will, and suffices for all things with something to spare. R. P. - 43. - - (92) So we must follow the common,[358] yet the many live as if they - had a wisdom of their own. R. P. 44. - - (93) They are estranged from that with which they have most constant - intercourse.[359] R. P. 32 b. - - (94) It is not meet to act and speak like men asleep. - - (95) The waking have one common world, but the sleeping turn aside - each into a world of his own. - - (96) The way of man has no wisdom, but that of God has. R. P. 45. - - (97) Man is called a baby by God, even as a child by a man. R. P. 45. - - (98, 99) The wisest man is an ape compared to God, just as the most - beautiful ape is ugly compared to man. - - (100) The people must fight for its law as for its walls. R. P. 43 b. - - (101) Greater deaths win greater portions. R. P. 49 a. - - (102) Gods and men honour those who are slain in battle. R. P. 49 a. - - (103) Wantonness needs putting out, even more than a house on fire. R. - P. 49 a. - - (104) It is not good for men to get all they wish to get. It is - sickness that makes health pleasant; evil,[360] good; hunger, plenty; - weariness, rest. R. P. 48 b. - - (105-107) It is hard to fight with one’s heart’s desire.[361] Whatever - it wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of soul. R. P. 49 a. - - (108, 109) It is best to hide folly; but it is hard in times of - relaxation, over our cups. - - (110) And it is law, too, to obey the counsel of one. R. P. 49 a. - - (111) For what thought or wisdom have they? They follow the poets and - take the crowd as their teacher, knowing not that there are many bad - and few good. For even the best of them choose one thing above all - others, immortal glory among mortals, while most of them are glutted - like beasts.[362] R. P. 31 a. - - (112) In Priene lived Bias, son of Teutamas, who is of more account - than the rest. (He said, “Most men are bad.”) - - (113) One is ten thousand to me, if he be the best. R. P. 31 a. - - (114) The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown man - of them, and leave the city to beardless lads; for they have cast out - Hermodoros, the best man among them, saying, “We will have none who is - best among us; if there be any such, let him be so elsewhere and among - others.” R. P. 29 b. - - (115) Dogs bark at every one they do not know. R. P. 31 a. - - (116) ... (The wise man) is not known because of men’s want of belief. - - (117) The fool is fluttered at every word. R. P. 44 b. - - (118) The most esteemed of them knows but fancies;[363] yet of a truth - justice shall overtake the artificers of lies and the false witnesses. - - (119) Homer should be turned out of the lists and whipped, and - Archilochos likewise. R. P. 31. - - (120) One day is like any other. - - (121) Man’s character is his fate.[364] - - (122) There awaits men when they die such things as they look not for - nor dream of. R. P. 46 d. - - (123) ... [365]that they rise up and become the wakeful guardians of - the quick and dead. R. P. 46 d. - - (124) Night-walkers, Magians, priests of Bakchos and priestesses of - the wine-vat, mystery-mongers.... - - (125) The mysteries practised among men are unholy mysteries. R. P. - 48. - - (126) And they pray to these images, as if one were to talk with a - man’s house, knowing not what gods or heroes are. R. P. 49 a. - - (127) For if it were not to Dionysos that they made a procession and - sang the shameful phallic hymn, they would be acting most shamelessly. - But Hades is the same as Dionysos in whose honour they go mad and keep - the feast of the wine-vat. R. P. 49. - - (129, 130) They vainly purify themselves by defiling themselves with - blood, just as if one who had stepped into the mud were to wash his - feet in mud. Any man who marked him doing thus, would deem him mad. R. - P. 49 a. - -Footnote 330: - - In his edition, Diels has given up all attempt to arrange the - fragments according to subject, and this makes his text unsuitable for - our purpose. I think, too, that he overestimates the difficulty of an - approximate arrangement, and makes too much of the view that the style - of Herakleitos was “aphoristic.” That it was so, is an important and - valuable remark; but it does not follow that Herakleitos wrote like - Nietzsche. For a Greek, however prophetic in his tone, there must - always be a distinction between an aphoristic and an incoherent style. - See the excellent remarks of Lortzing in _Berl. Phil. Wochenschr._ - 1896, pp. 1 sqq. - -Footnote 331: - - Both Bywater and Diels accept Bergk’s λόγου for δόγματος and Miller’s - εἶναι for εἰδέναι. Cf. Philo, _leg. all._ iii. c, quoted in Bywater’s - note. - -Footnote 332: - - The λόγος is simply the discourse of Herakleitos himself; though, as - he is a prophet, we may call it “the Word.” It can neither mean a - discourse addressed to Herakleitos nor yet “reason.” (Cf. Zeller, p. - 630, n. 1; Eng. trans. ii. p. 7, n. 2.) A difficulty has been raised - about the words ἐόντας αἰεί. How could Herakleitos say that his - discourse had always existed? The answer is that in Ionic ἐών means - “true” when coupled with words like λόγος. Cf. Herod. i. 30, τῷ ἐόντι - χρησάμενος λέγει; and even Aristoph. _Frogs_, 1052, οὐκ ὄντα λόγον. It - is only by taking the words in this way that we can understand - Aristotle’s hesitation as to the proper punctuation of the fragment - (_Rhet._ Γ 5. 1407 b 15; R. P. 30 a). The Stoic interpretation given - by Marcus Aurelius, iv. 46 (R. P. 32 b), must be rejected altogether. - The word λόγος was never used like that till post-Aristotelian times. - -Footnote 333: - - I have departed from the punctuation of Bywater here, and supplied a - fresh object to the verb as suggested by Gomperz (_Arch._ i. 100). - -Footnote 334: - - Cf. Herod, i. 8. The application is, no doubt, the same as that of the - last two fragments. Personal inquiry is better than tradition. - -Footnote 335: - - See Chap. II. p. 107, _n._ 224. The best attested reading is - ἐποιήσατο, not ἐποίησεν, and ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ means “claimed as his - own.” The words ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφάς have been doubted - since the time of Schleiermacher, and Diels has now come to regard the - whole fragment as spurious. This is because it was used to prove that - Pythagoras wrote books (cf. Diels, _Arch._ iii. p. 451). As Mr. - Bywater has pointed out, however, the fragment itself makes no such - statement; it only says that he read books, which we may presume he - did. I would further suggest that the old-fashioned συγγραφάς is - rather too good for a forger, and that the omission of the very thing - to be proved is remarkable. The last suggestion of a book by - Pythagoras disappears with the reading ἐποιήσατο for ἐποίησεν. Of - course a late writer who read of Pythagoras making extracts from books - would assume that he put them into a book of his own, just as people - did in his own days. For the rest, I understand ἱστορίη of science, - which is contrasted with the κακοτεχνίη which Pythagoras derived from - the συγγραφαί of men like Pherekydes of Syros. - -Footnote 336: - - The word κόσμος must mean “world” here, not merely “order;” for only - the world could be identified with fire. This use of the word is - Pythagorean, and there is no reason to doubt that Herakleitos may have - known it. - -Footnote 337: - - It is important to notice that μέτρα is internal accusative with - ἁπτόμενον, “with its measures kindling and its measures going out.” - -Footnote 338: - - On the word πρηστήρ, see below, p. 165, _n._ 380. - -Footnote 339: - - The subject of fr. 23 is γῆ, as we see from Diog. ix. 9 (R. P. 36), - πάλιν τε αὖ τὴν γὴν χεῖσθαι; and Aet. i. 3, 11 (_Dox._ p. 284 a 1; b - 5), ἔπειτα ἀναχαλωμένην τὴν γῆν ὑπὸ τοῦ τυρὸς χύσει (Dübner: φύσει, - libri) ὕδωρ ἀποτελεῖσθαι. Herakleitos might quite well say γῆ θάλασσα - διαχέεται, and the context in Clement (_Strom._ v. p. 712) seems to - imply this. The phrase μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον can only mean - that the proportion of the measures remains constant. So practically - Zeller (p. 690, n. 1), _zu derselben Grösse_. - -Footnote 340: - - With Diels I adopt the transposition (proposed by Tocco) of ἀέρος and - γῆς. - -Footnote 341: - - I understand ἐπελθόν of the πυρὸς ἔφοδος, for which see below, p. 168. - Diels has pointed out that καταλαμβάνειν is the old word for “to - convict.” It is, literally, “to overtake,” just as αἱρεῖν is “to - catch.” - -Footnote 342: - - In this fragment it is clear that οὖρος = τέρματα, and therefore means - “boundary,” not “hill.” As αἴθριος Ζεύς means the bright blue sky, I - do not think its οὖρος can be the South Pole, as Diels says. It is - more likely the horizon. I am inclined to take the fragment as a - protest against the Pythagorean theory of a southern hemisphere. - -Footnote 343: - - We learn from Diog. ix. 10 (quoted below, p. 164) that Herakleitos - explained why the sun was warmer and brighter than the moon, and this - is doubtless a fragment of that passage. I now think the words ἕνεκα - τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων are from Herakleitos. So Diels. - -Footnote 344: - - Hesiod said Day was the child of Night (_Theog._ 124). - -Footnote 345: - - Reading ὅκωσπερ πῦρ for ὅκωσπερ with Diels. - -Footnote 346: - - _Il._ xviii. 107. I add the words οἰχήσεσθαι γὰρ πάντα from Simpl. _in - Cat._ (88 b 30 schol. Br.). They seem to me at least to represent - something that was in the original. - -Footnote 347: - - I cannot think it likely that Herakleitos said both παλίντονος and - παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη, and I prefer Plutarch’s παλίντονος (R. P. 34 b) - to the παλίντροπος of Hippolytos. Diels thinks that the polemic of - Parmenides decides the question in favour of παλίντροπος; but see - below, p. 184, _n._ 415, and Chap. IV. p. 198, _n._ 438. - -Footnote 348: - - This, I now think, is the medical rule αἱ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, - _e.g._ βοηθεῖν τῷ θερμῷ ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν (Stewart on Arist. _Eth._ 1104 b - 16). - -Footnote 349: - - Fr. 51_a_ was recovered by Bywater from Albertus Magnus. See _Journ. - Phil._ ix. p. 230. - -Footnote 350: - - On fr. 55 see Diels in _Berl. Sitzb._ 1901, p. 188. - -Footnote 351: - - I now read ἐπαιτέονται with Bernays and Diels. - -Footnote 352: - - On fr. 59 see Diels in _Berl. Sitzb._ 1901, p. 188. The reading - συνάψιες seems to be well attested and gives an excellent sense. It is - not, however, correct to say that the optative could not be used in an - imperative sense. - -Footnote 353: - - By “these things,” he probably meant all kinds of injustice. - -Footnote 354: - - Diels supposes that fr. 64 went on ὁκόσα δὲ τεθνηκότες ζωή. “Life, - Sleep, Death is the threefold ladder in psychology, as in physics - Fire, Water, Earth.” - -Footnote 355: - - I think now with Diels that the words οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει are - probably genuine. They present no difficulty if we remember that λόγος - means “measurement,” as in fr. 23. - -Footnote 356: - - This fragment is interesting because of the great antiquity of the - corruptions which it has suffered. According to Stephanus, who is - followed by Bywater and Diels, we should read: Αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ - ἀρίστη, ξηρή (or rather ξηρά—the Ionic form would only appear when the - word got into the text) being a mere gloss upon the somewhat unusual - αὔη. When once ξηρή got into the text, αὔη became αὐγή, and we get the - sentence: “the dry light is the wisest soul,” whence the _siccum - lumen_ of Bacon. Now this reading is certainly as old as Plutarch, - who, in his Life of Romulus (c. 28), takes αὐγή to mean lightning, as - it sometimes does, and supposes the idea to be that the wise soul - bursts through the prison of the body like dry lightning (whatever - that may be) through a cloud. I do not think that Clement’s making the - same mistake proves anything at all (Zeller, p. 705, n. 3; Eng. trans. - i. p. 80, n. 2), except that he had read his Plutarch. Lastly, it is - worth noticing that, though Plutarch must have written αὐγή, the MSS. - vary between αὕτη and αὐτή. The next stage is the corruption of the - corrupt αὐγή into οὗ γῆ. This yields the sentiment that “where the - earth is dry, the soul is wisest,” and is as old as Philo (see Mr. - Bywater’s notes). - -Footnote 357: - - I understand μεταπεσόντα here as meaning “moved” from one γραμμή or - division of the draught-board to another. - -Footnote 358: - - Sext. _Math._ vii. 133, διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ ξυνῷ. It seems to me that - these words must belong to Herakleitos, though Bywater omits them. On - the other hand, the words τοῦ λόγου δὲ ὄντος ξυνοῦ (so, not δ’ ἐόντος, - the best MSS.) seem clearly to belong to the Stoic interpreter whom - Sextus is following, and who was anxious to connect this fragment with - fr. 2 (ὀλίγα προσδιελθὼν ἐπιφέρει) in order to get the doctrine of the - κοινὸς λόγος. The whole context in Sextus should be read. - -Footnote 359: - - The words λόγῳ τῳ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι, which Diels prints as part of - this fragment, seem to me to belong to Marcus Aurelius and not to - Herakleitos. - -Footnote 360: - - Adopting Heitz’s κακὸν for καὶ with Diels. - -Footnote 361: - - The word θυμός has its Homeric sense. The gratification of desire - implies the exchange of dry soul-fire (fr. 74) for moisture (fr. 72). - Aristotle understood θυμός here as anger (_Eth. Nic._ Β 2, 1105 a 8). - -Footnote 362: - - This seems to be a clear reference to the “three lives.” See Chap. II. - § 45, p. 108. - -Footnote 363: - - Reading δοκέοντα with Schleiermacher (or δοκέοντ’ ὧν with Diels). I - have omitted φυλάσσειν, as I do not know what it means, and none of - the conjectures commends itself. - -Footnote 364: - - On the meaning of δαίμων here, see my edition of Aristotle’s _Ethics_, - pp. 1 sq. As Professor Gildersleeve puts it, the δαίμων is the - individual form of τύχη, as κήρ is of θάνατος. - -Footnote 365: - - I have not ventured to include the words ἔνθα δ’ ἐόντι at the - beginning, as the text seems to me too uncertain. See, however, - Diels’s interesting note. - -[Sidenote: The doxographical tradition.] - -66. It will be seen that some of these fragments are far from clear, and -there are probably not a few of which the meaning will never be -recovered. We naturally turn, then, to the doxographers for a clue; but, -as ill-luck will have it, they are far less instructive with regard to -Herakleitos than we have found them in other cases. We have, in fact, -two great difficulties to contend with. The first is the unusual -weakness of the doxographical tradition itself. Hippolytos, upon whom we -can generally rely for a fairly accurate account of what Theophrastos -really said, derived the material for his first four chapters, which -treat of Thales, Pythagoras, Herakleitos, and Empedokles, not from the -excellent epitome which he afterwards used, but from a biographical -compendium,[366] which consisted for the most part of apocryphal -anecdotes and apophthegms. It was based, further, on some writer of -_Successions_ who regarded Herakleitos and Empedokles as Pythagoreans. -They are therefore placed side by side, and their doctrines are -hopelessly mixed up together. The link between Herakleitos and the -Pythagoreans was Hippasos of Metapontion, in whose system, as we know, -fire played an important part. Theophrastos, following Aristotle, had -spoken of the two in the same sentence, and this was enough to put the -writers of _Successions_ off the track.[367] We are forced, then, to -look to the more detailed of the two accounts of the opinions of -Herakleitos given in Diogenes,[368] which goes back to the _Vetusta -Placita_, and is, fortunately, pretty full and accurate. All our other -sources are more or less tainted. - -Footnote 366: - - On the source used by Hippolytos in the first four chapters of _Ref._ - i. see Diels, _Dox._ p. 145. We must carefully distinguish _Ref._ i. - and _Ref._ ix. as sources of information about Herakleitos. The latter - book is an attempt to show that the Monarchian heresy of Noetos was - derived from Herakleitos instead of from the Gospel, and is a rich - mine of Herakleitean fragments. - -Footnote 367: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 984 a 7 (R. P. 56 c): Theophr. _ap._ Simpl. - _Phys._ 23, 33 (R. P. 36 c). - -Footnote 368: - - For these double accounts see _Dox._ pp. 163 sqq. and Appendix, § 15. - -The second difficulty which we have to face is even more serious. Most -of the commentators on Herakleitos mentioned in Diogenes were -Stoics,[369] and it is certain that their paraphrases were sometimes -taken for the original. Now, the Stoics held the Ephesian in peculiar -veneration, and sought to interpret him as far as possible in accordance -with their own system. Further, they were fond of “accommodating”[370] -the views of earlier thinkers to their own, and this has had serious -consequences. In particular, the Stoic theories of the λόγος and the -ἐκπύρωσις are constantly ascribed to Herakleitos by our authorities, and -the very fragments are adulterated with scraps of Stoic terminology. - -Footnote 369: - - Diog. ix. 15 (R. P. 30 c). Schleiermacher rightly insisted upon this. - -Footnote 370: - - The word συνοικειοῦν is used of the Stoic method of interpretation by - Philodemos (cf. _Dox._ 547 b, n.), and Cicero (_N.D._ i. 41) renders - it by _accommodare_. Chrysippos in particular gave a great impulse to - this sort of thing, as we may best learn from Galen, _de Plac. - Hippocr. et Plat._ Book iii. Good examples are Aet. i. 13, 2; 28, 1; - iv. 3, 12,—where distinctively Stoic doctrines are ascribed to - Herakleitos. What the Stoics were capable of, we see from Kleanthes, - fr. 55, Pearson. He proposed to read Ζεῦ ἀναδωδωναῖε in _Il._ xvi. - 233, ὡς τὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναθυμιώμενον ἀέρα διὰ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν - Ἀναδωδωναῖον ὄντα. - -[Sidenote: The discovery of Herakleitos.] - -67. Herakleitos looks down not only on the mass of men, but on all -previous inquirers into nature. This must mean that he believed himself -to have attained insight into some truth which had not hitherto been -recognised, though it was, as it were, staring men in the face (fr. 93). -Clearly, then, if we wish to get at the central thing in his teaching, -we must try to find out what he was thinking of when he launched into -those denunciations of human dulness and ignorance.[371] The answer -seems to be given in two fragments, 18 and 45. From them we gather that -the truth hitherto ignored is that the many apparently independent and -conflicting things we know are really one, and that, on the other hand, -this one is also many. The “strife of opposites” is really an -“attunement” (ἁρμονία). From this it follows that wisdom is not a -knowledge of many things, but the perception of the underlying unity of -the warring opposites. That this really was the fundamental thought of -Herakleitos is stated by Philo. He says: “For that which is made up of -both the opposites is one; and, when the one is divided, the opposites -are disclosed. Is not this just what the Greeks say their great and much -belauded Herakleitos put in the forefront of his philosophy as summing -it all up, and boasted of as a new discovery?”[372] We shall take the -elements of this theory one by one, and see how they are to be -understood. - -Footnote 371: - - See Patin, _Heraklits Einheitslehre_ (1886). To Patin undoubtedly - belongs the credit of showing clearly that the unity of opposites was - the central doctrine of Herakleitos. It is not always easy, however, - to follow him when he comes to details. - -Footnote 372: - - Philo, _Rer. Div. Her._ 43 (R. P. 34 c). - -[Sidenote: The One and the Many.] - -68. Anaximander had taught already that the opposites were separated out -from the Boundless, but passed away into it once more, so paying the -penalty for their unjust encroachments on one another. It is here -implied that there is something wrong in the war of opposites, and that -the existence of the Many is a breach in the unity of the One. The truth -which Herakleitos proclaimed was that there is no One without the Many, -and no Many without the One. The world is at once one and many, and it -is just the “opposite tension” of the Many that constitutes the unity of -the One. - -The credit of having been the first to see this is expressly assigned to -Herakleitos by Plato. In the _Sophist_ (242 d), the Eleatic stranger, -after explaining how the Eleatics maintained that what we call many is -really one, proceeds:— - - But certain Ionian and (at a later date) certain Sicilian Muses - remarked that it was safest to unite these two things, and to say that - reality is both many and one, and is kept together by Hate and Love. - “For,” say the more severe Muses, “in its division it is always being - brought together” (cf. fr. 59); while the softer Muses relaxed the - requirement that this should always be so, and said that the All was - alternately one and at peace through the power of Aphrodite, and many - and at war with itself because of something they called Strife. - -In this passage the Ionian Muses stand, of course, for Herakleitos, and -the Sicilian for Empedokles. We remark also that the differentiation of -the one into many, and the integration of the many into one, are both -eternal and simultaneous, and that this is the ground upon which the -system of Herakleitos is contrasted with that of Empedokles. We shall -come back to that point again. Meanwhile we confine ourselves to this, -that, according to Plato, Herakleitos taught that reality was at once -many and one. - -We must be careful, however, not to imagine that what Herakleitos thus -discovered was a logical principle. This was the mistake of Lassalle’s -book.[373] The identity in and through difference which he proclaimed -was purely physical; logic did not yet exist, and as the principle of -identity had not been formulated, it would have been impossible to -protest against an abstract application of it. The identity which he -explains as consisting in difference is simply that of the primary -substance in all its manifestations. This identity had been realised -already by the Milesians, but they had found a difficulty in the -difference. Anaximander had treated the strife of opposites as an -“injustice,” and what Herakleitos set himself to show was that, on the -contrary, it was the highest justice (fr. 62). - -Footnote 373: - - The source of his error was Hegel’s remarkable statement that there - was no proposition of Herakleitos that he had not taken up into his - own logic (_Gesch. d. Phil._ i. 328). The example which he cites is - the statement that Being does not exist any more than not-Being, for - which he refers to Arist. _Met._ Α, 4. This, however, is not there - ascribed to Herakleitos at all, but to Leukippos or Demokritos, with - whom it meant that space was as real as matter (§ 175). Aristotle - does, indeed, tell us in the _Metaphysics_ that “some” think - Herakleitos says that the same thing can be and not be; but he adds - that it does not follow that a man thinks what he says (_Met._ Γ 3. - 1005 b 24). I take this to mean that, though Herakleitos did make this - assertion in words, he did not mean by it what the same assertion - would naturally have meant at a later date. Herakleitos was speaking - only of nature; the logical meaning of the words never occurred to - him. This is confirmed by Κ, 5. 1062 a 31, where we are told that by - being questioned in a certain manner Herakleitos could be made to - admit the principle of contradiction; as it was, he did not understand - what he said. In other words, he was unconscious of its logical - bearing. - - Aristotle was aware, then, that the theories of Herakleitos were not - to be understood in a logical sense. On the other hand, this does not - prevent him from saying that according to the view of Herakleitos, - everything would be true (_Met._ Δ, 7. 1012 a 24). If we remember his - constant attitude to earlier thinkers, this will not lead us to - suspect either his good faith or his intelligence. (See Appendix, § - 2.) - -[Sidenote: Fire.] - -69. All this made it necessary for him to seek out a new primary -substance. He wanted not merely something out of which the diversified -world we know might conceivably be made, or from which opposites could -be “separated out,” but something which of its own nature would pass -into everything else, while everything else would pass in turn into it. -This he found in Fire, and it is easy to see why, if we consider the -phenomenon of combustion, even as it appears to the plain man. The -quantity of fire in a flame burning steadily appears to remain the same, -the flame seems to be what we call a “thing.” And yet the substance of -it is continually changing. It is always passing away in smoke, and its -place is always being taken by fresh matter from the fuel that feeds it. -This is just what we want. If we regard the world as an “ever-living -fire” (fr. 20), we can understand how it is always becoming all things, -while all things are always returning to it.[374] - -Footnote 374: - - That the Fire of Herakleitos was something on the same level as the - “Air” of Anaximenes and not a “symbol,” is clearly implied in such - passages as Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 984 a 5. In support of the view that - something different from common fire is meant, Plato, _Crat._ 413 b, - is sometimes quoted; but a consideration of the context shows that the - passage will not bear this interpretation. Plato is discussing the - derivation of δίκαιον from δια-ιόν, and certainly δίκη was a prominent - Herakleitean conception, and a good deal that is here said may be the - authentic doctrine of the school. Sokrates goes on to complain that - when he asks what this is which “goes through” everything, he gets - very inconsistent answers. One says it is the sun. Another asks if - there is no justice after sunset, and says it is simply fire. A third - says it is not fire itself, but the heat which is in fire. A fourth - identifies it with Mind. Now all we are entitled to infer from this is - that different accounts were given in the Herakleitean school. These - were a little less crude than the original doctrine of the master, but - for all that not one of them implies anything immaterial or - symbolical. The view that it was not fire itself, but Heat, which - “passed through” all things, is related to the theory of Herakleitos - as Hippo’s Moisture is related to the Water of Thales. It is quite - likely, too, that some Herakleiteans attempted to fuse the system of - Anaxagoras with their own, just as Diogenes of Apollonia tried to fuse - it with that of Anaximenes. We shall see, indeed, that we still have a - work in which this attempt is made (p. 167, _n._ 383). - -[Sidenote: Flux.] - -70. This necessarily brings with it a certain way of looking at the -change and movement of the world. Fire burns continuously and without -interruption. It is therefore always consuming fuel and always -liberating smoke. Everything is either mounting upwards to serve as -fuel, or sinking downwards after having nourished the flame. It follows -that the whole of reality is like an ever-flowing stream, and that -nothing is ever at rest for a moment. The substance of the things we see -is in constant change. Even as we look at them, some of the matter of -which they are composed has already passed into something else, while -fresh matter has come into them from another source. This theory is -usually summed up, appropriately enough, in the phrase “All things are -flowing” (πάντα ῥεῖ), though, as it happens, it cannot be proved that -this is a quotation from Herakleitos. Plato, however, expresses the idea -quite clearly. “Nothing ever is, everything is becoming”; “All things -are in motion like streams”; “All things are passing, and nothing -abides”; “Herakleitos says somewhere that all things pass and naught -abides; and, comparing things to the current of a river, he says that -you cannot step twice into the same stream” (cf. fr. 41)—these are the -terms in which he describes the system. And Aristotle says the same -thing, “All things are in motion,” “nothing steadfastly is.”[375] -Herakleitos held, in fact, that any given thing, however stable in -appearance, was merely a section in the stream, and that the matter -composing it was never the same in any two consecutive moments of time. -We shall see presently how he conceived this process to operate; -meanwhile we remark that the idea was not altogether novel, and that it -is hardly the central point in the system of Herakleitos. The Milesians -held a similar view. The flux of Herakleitos was at most more unceasing -and universal. - -Footnote 375: - - Plato, _Tht._ 152 e 1; _Crat._ 401 d 5, 402 a 8; Arist. _Top._ Α, 11. - 104 b 22; _de Caelo_, Γ, 1. 298 b 30; _Phys._ Θ, 3. 253 b 2. - -[Sidenote: The Upward and Downward path.] - -71. Herakleitos appears to have worked out the details of the perpetual -flux with reference to the theories of Anaximenes.[376] It is unlikely, -however, that he explained the transformations of matter by means of -rarefaction and condensation.[377] Theophrastos, it appears, suggested -that he did; but he allowed it was by no means clear. The passage from -Diogenes which we are about to quote has faithfully preserved this -touch.[378] In the fragments, at any rate, we find nothing about -rarefaction and condensation. The expression used is “exchange” (fr. -22); and this is certainly a very good name for what happens when fire -gives out smoke and takes in fuel instead. - -Footnote 376: - - See above, Chap. I. § 29. - -Footnote 377: - - See, however, the remark of Diels quoted R. P. 36 c. - -Footnote 378: - - Diog. ix. 8, σαφῶς δ’ οὐθὲν ἐκτίθεται. - -It has been pointed out that, in default of Hippolytos, our best account -of the Theophrastean doxography of Herakleitos is the fuller of the two -accounts given in Laertios Diogenes. It is as follows:— - - His opinions on particular points are these:— - - He held that Fire was the element, and that all things were an - exchange for fire, produced by condensation and rarefaction. But he - explains nothing clearly. All things were produced in opposition, and - all things were in flux like a river. - - The all is finite and the world is one. It arises from fire, and is - consumed again by fire alternately through all eternity in certain - cycles. This happens according to fate. That which leads to the - becoming of the opposites is called War and Strife; that which leads - to the final conflagration is Concord and Peace. - - He called change the upward and the downward path, and held that the - world comes into being in virtue of this. When fire is condensed it - becomes moist, and when compressed it turns to water; water being - congealed turns to earth, and this he calls the downward path. And, - again, the earth is in turn liquefied, and from it water arises, and - from that everything else; for he refers almost everything to the - evaporation from the sea. This is the path upwards. R. P. 36. - - He held, too, that exhalations arose both from the sea and the land; - some bright and pure, others dark. Fire was nourished by the bright - ones, and moisture by the others. - - He does not make it clear what is the nature of that which surrounds - the world. He held, however, that there were bowls in it with the - concave sides turned towards us, in which the bright exhalations were - collected and produced flames. These were the heavenly bodies. - - The flame of the sun was the brightest and warmest; for the other - heavenly bodies were more distant from the earth; and for that reason - gave less light and heat. The moon, on the other hand, was nearer the - earth; but it moved through an impure region. The sun moved in a - bright and unmixed region, and at the same time was at just the right - distance from us. That is why it gives more heat and light. The - eclipses of the sun and moon were due to the turning of the bowls - upwards, while the monthly phases of the moon were produced by a - gradual turning of its bowl. - - Day and night, months and seasons and years, rains and winds, and - things like these, were due to the different exhalations. The bright - exhalation, when ignited in the circle of the sun, produced day, and - the preponderance of the opposite exhalations produced night. The - increase of warmth proceeding from the bright exhalation produced - summer, and the preponderance of moisture from the dark exhalation - produced winter. He assigns the causes of other things in conformity - with this. - - As to the earth, he makes no clear statement about its nature, any - more than he does about that of the bowls. - - These, then, were his opinions. R. P. 39 b. - -It is obvious that, if we can trust this passage, it is of the greatest -possible value; and that, upon the whole, we can trust it is shown by -the fact that it follows the exact order of topics to which all the -doxographies derived from the great work of Theophrastos adhere. First -we have the primary substance, then the world, then the heavenly bodies, -and lastly, meteorological phenomena. We conclude, then, that it may be -accepted with the exceptions, firstly, of the probably erroneous -conjecture of Theophrastos as to rarefaction and condensation mentioned -above; and secondly, of some pieces of Stoical interpretation which come -from the _Vetusta Placita_. - -Let us look at the details of the theory. The pure fire, we are told, is -to be found chiefly in the sun. This, like the other heavenly bodies, is -a trough or bowl, or perhaps a sort of boat, with the concave side -turned towards us, in which the bright exhalations from the sea collect -and burn. How does the fire of the sun pass into other forms? If we look -at the fragments which deal with the downward path, we find that the -first transformation that it undergoes is into sea, and we are further -told that half of the sea is earth and half of it πρηστήρ (fr. 21). The -full meaning of this we shall see presently, but we must settle at once -what πρηστήρ is. Many theories have been advanced upon the subject; but, -so far as I know, no one[379] has yet proposed to take the word in the -sense which it always bears elsewhere, that, namely, of hurricane -accompanied by a fiery waterspout.[380] Yet surely this is just what is -wanted. It is amply attested that Herakleitos explained the rise of the -sea to fire by means of the bright evaporations; and we want a similar -meteorological explanation of the passing of the fire back into sea. We -want, in fact, something which will stand equally for the smoke produced -by the burning of the sun and for the immediate stage between fire and -water. What could serve the turn better than a fiery waterspout? It -sufficiently resembles smoke to be accounted for as the product of the -sun’s combustion, and it certainly comes down in the form of water. And -this interpretation becomes practically certain when taken in connexion -with the report of Aetios as to the Herakleitean theory of πρηστῆρες. -They were due, we are told, “to the kindling and extinction of -clouds.”[381] In other words, the bright vapour, after kindling in the -bowl of the sun and going out again, reappears as the dark fiery -storm-cloud, and so passes once more into sea. At the next stage we find -water continually passing into earth. We are already familiar with this -idea (§ 10), and no more need be said about it. Turning to the “upward -path,” we find that the earth is liquefied in the same proportion as the -sea becomes earth, so that the sea is still “measured by the same tale” -(fr. 23). Half of it is earth and half of it is πρηστήρ (fr. 21). This -must mean that, at any given moment, half of the sea is taking the -downward path, and has just been fiery storm-cloud, while half of it is -going up, and has just been earth. In proportion as the sea is increased -by rain, water passes into earth; in proportion as the sea is diminished -by evaporation, it is fed by the earth. Lastly, the ignition of the -bright vapour from the sea in the bowl of the sun completes the circle -of the “upward and downward path.” - -Footnote 379: - - This was written in 1890. In his _Herakleitos von Ephesos_ (1901) - Diels takes it as I did, rendering _Glutwind_. - -Footnote 380: - - Cf. Herod. vii. 42, and Lucretius, vi. 424. Seneca (_Quaest. Nat._ ii. - 56) calls it _igneus turbo_. The opinions of early philosophers on - these phenomena are collected in Aetios, iii. 3. The πρηστήρ of - Anaximander (Chap. I. p. 69, _n._ 133) is a different thing - altogether, but it is quite likely that Greek sailors named the - meteorological phenomenon after the familiar bellows of the smith. - -Footnote 381: - - Aet. iii. 3, 9, πρηστῆρας δὲ κατὰ νεφῶν ἐμπρήσεις καὶ σβέσεις (sc. - Ἡράκλειτος ἀποφαίνεται γίγνεσθαι). Diels (_Herakleitos_, p. v.) seems - to regard the πρηστήρ as the form in which water ascends to heaven. - But the Greeks were well aware that waterspouts burst and come down. - -[Sidenote: Measure for measure.] - -72. The question now arises, How is it that, in spite of this constant -flux, things appear relatively stable? The answer of Herakleitos was -that it is owing to the observance of the “measures,” in virtue of which -the aggregate bulk of each form of matter in the long run remains the -same, though its substance is constantly changing. Certain “measures” of -the “ever-living fire” are always being kindled, while like “measures” -are always going out (fr. 20); and these measures the sun will not -exceed. All things are “exchanged” for fire and fire for all things (fr. -22), and this implies that for everything it takes, fire will give as -much. “The sun will not exceed his measures” (fr. 29). - -And yet the “measures” are not to be regarded as absolutely fixed. We -gather from the passage of Diogenes quoted above that Theophrastos spoke -of an alternate preponderance of the bright and dark exhalations, and -Aristotle speaks of Herakleitos as explaining all things by -evaporation.[382] In particular, the alternation of day and night, -summer and winter, were accounted for in this way. Now, in a passage of -the pseudo-Hippokratean treatise Περὶ διαίτης which is almost certainly -of Herakleitean origin,[383] we read of an “advance of fire and water” -in connexion with day and night and the courses of the sun and -moon.[384] In fr. 26, again, we read of fire “advancing,” and all these -things seem to be intimately connected. We must therefore try to see -whether there is anything in the remaining fragments that bears upon the -subject. - -Footnote 382: - - Arist. _de An._ Β, 2. 405 a 26, τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐξ ἧς τἆλλα - συνίστησιν. - -Footnote 383: - - The presence of Herakleitean matter in this treatise was pointed out - by Gesner, but Bernays was the first to make any considerable use of - it in reconstructing the system. The older literature of the subject - has been in the main superseded by Carl Fredrichs’ _Hippokratische - Untersuchungen_ (1899), where also a satisfactory text of the sections - which concern us is given for the first time. Fredrichs shows that (as - I said already in the first edition) the work belongs to the period of - eclecticism and reaction which I have briefly characterised in § 184, - and he points out that c 3, which was formerly supposed to be mainly - Herakleitean, is really from some work which was strongly influenced - by Empedokles and Anaxagoras. I think, however, that he goes wrong in - attributing the section to a nameless “Physiker” of the school of - Archelaos, or even to Archelaos himself; it is far more like what we - should expect from the eclectic Herakleiteans whom Plato describes in - _Crat._ 413 c (see p. 161, _n._ 374). He is certainly wrong in holding - the doctrine of the balance of fire and water not to be Herakleitean, - and there is no justification for separating the remark quoted in the - text from its context because it happens to agree almost verbally with - the beginning of c. 3. As we shall see, that passage too is of - Herakleitean origin. - -Footnote 384: - - Περὶ διαίτης, i. 5. I should read thus: ἡμέρη καὶ εὐφρόνη ἐπὶ τὸ - μήκιστον καὶ ἐλάχιστον· ἥλιος, σελήνη ἐπὶ τὸ μήκιστον καὶ ἐλάχιστον· - πυρὸς ἔφοδος καὶ ὕδατος. In any case, the meaning is the same, and the - sentence occurs between χωρεῖ δὲ πάντα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα ἄνω καὶ - κάτω ἀμειβόμενα and πάντα ταὐτὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ αὐτά, which are surely - Herakleitean utterances. - -[Sidenote: Man] - -73. In studying this alternate advance of fire and water, it will be -convenient to start with the microcosm. We have more definite -information about the two exhalations in man than about the analogous -processes in the world at large, and it would seem that Herakleitos -himself explained the world by man rather than man by the world. In a -well-known passage, Aristotle implies that soul is identical with the -dry exhalation,[385] and this is fully confirmed by the fragments. Man -is made up of three things, fire, water, and earth. But, just as in the -macrocosm fire is identified with the one wisdom, so in the microcosm -the fire alone is conscious. When it has left the body, the remainder, -the mere earth and water, is altogether worthless (fr. 85). Of course, -the fire which animates man is subject to the “upward and downward -path,” just as much as the fire of the world. The Περὶ διαίτης has -preserved the obviously Herakleitean sentence: “All things are passing, -both human and divine, upwards and downwards by exchanges.”[386] We are -just as much in perpetual flux as anything else in the world. We are and -are not the same for two consecutive instants (fr. 81). The fire in us -is perpetually becoming water, and the water earth; but, as the opposite -process goes on simultaneously, we appear to remain the same.[387] - -Footnote 385: - - Arist. _de An._ Α, 2. 405 a 25 (R. P. 38). Diels attributes to - Herakleitos himself the words καὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιῶνται, - which are found in Areios Didymos after fr. 42. I can hardly believe, - however, that the _word_ ἀναθυμίασις is Herakleitean. He seems rather - to have called the two exhalations καπνός and ἀήρ (cf. fr. 37). - -Footnote 386: - - Περὶ διαίτης, i. 5, χωρεῖ δὲ πάντα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα ἄνω καὶ κάτω - ἀμειβόμενα. - -Footnote 387: - - We seem to have a clear reference to this in Epicharmos, fr. 2, Diels - (170 b, Kaibel): “Look now at men too. One grows and another passes - away, and all are in change always. What changes in its substance - (κατὰ φύσιν) and never abides in the same spot, will already be - something different from what has passed away. So thou and I were - different yesterday, and are now quite other people, and again we - shall become others and never the same again, and so on in the same - way.” This is put into the mouth of a debtor who does not wish to pay. - See Bernays on the αὐξανόμενος λόγος (_Ges. Abh._ i. pp. 109 sqq.). - -[Sidenote: (_a_) Sleeping and waking.] - -74. This, however, is not all. Man is subject to a certain oscillation -in his “measures” of fire and water, and this gives rise to the -alternations of sleeping and waking, life and death. The _locus -classicus_ on this subject is a passage of Sextus Empiricus, which -reproduces the account of the Herakleitean psychology given by -Ainesidemos (Skeptic, _c._ 80-50 B.C.).[388] It is as follows (R. P. -41):— - - The natural philosopher is of opinion that what surrounds us[389] is - rational and endowed with consciousness. According to Herakleitos, - when we draw in this divine reason by means of respiration, we become - rational. In sleep we forget, but at our waking we become conscious - once more. For in sleep, when the openings of the senses close, the - mind which is in us is cut off from contact with that which surrounds - us, and only our connexion with it by means of respiration is - preserved as a sort of root (from which the rest may spring again); - and, when it is thus separated, it loses the power of memory that it - had before. When we awake again, however, it looks out through the - openings of the senses, as if through windows, and coming together - with the surrounding mind, it assumes the power of reason. Just, then, - as embers, when they are brought near the the fire, change and become - red-hot, and go out when they are taken away from it again, so does - the portion of the surrounding mind which sojourns in our body become - irrational when it is cut off, and so does it become of like nature to - the whole when contact is established through the greatest number of - openings. - -Footnote 388: - - Sextus quotes “Ainesidemos according to Herakleitos.” Natorp holds - (_Forschungen_, p. 78) that Ainesidemos really did combine - Herakleiteanism with Skepticism. Diels, on the other hand (_Dox._ pp. - 210, 211), insists that Ainesidemos only gave an account of the - theories of Herakleitos. This controversy does not affect the use we - make of the passage. - -Footnote 389: - - τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς, opposed to but parallel with τὸ περιέχον τὸν κόσμον. - -In this passage there is obviously a very large admixture of later -phraseology and of later ideas. In particular, the identification of -“that which surrounds us” with the air cannot be Herakleitean; for -Herakleitos can have known nothing of air, which in his day was regarded -as a form of water (§ 27). The reference to the pores or openings of the -senses is probably foreign to him also; for the theory of pores is due -to Alkmaion (§ 96). Lastly, the distinction between mind and body is far -too sharply drawn. On the other hand, the important rôle assigned to -respiration may very well be Herakleitean; for we have met with it -already in Anaximenes. And we can hardly doubt that the striking simile -of the embers which glow when they are brought near the fire is genuine -(cf. fr. 77). The true Herakleitean doctrine doubtless was, that sleep -was produced by the encroachment of moist, dark exhalations from the -water in the body, which cause the fire to burn low. In sleep, we lose -contact with the fire in the world which is common to all, and retire to -a world of our own (fr. 95). In a soul where the fire and water are -evenly balanced, the equilibrium is restored in the morning by an equal -advance of the bright exhalation. - -[Sidenote: (_b_) Life and death.] - -75. But in no soul are the fire and water thus evenly balanced for long. -One or the other acquires predominance, and the result in either case is -death. Let us take each of these cases in turn. It is death, we know, to -souls to become water (fr. 68); but that is just what happens to souls -which seek after pleasure. For pleasure is a moistening of the soul (fr. -72), as may be seen in the case of the drunken man, who, in pursuit of -it, has moistened his soul to such an extent that he does not know where -he is going (fr. 73). Even in gentle relaxation over our cups, it is -more difficult to hide folly than at other times (fr. 108). That is why -it is so necessary for us to quench wantonness (fr. 103); for whatever -our heart’s desire insists on it purchases at the price of life, that -is, of the fire within us (fr. 105). Take now the other case. The dry -soul, that which has least moisture, is the best (fr. 74); but the -preponderance of fire causes death as much as that of water. It is a -very different death, however, and wins “greater portions” for those who -die it (fr. 101). Apparently those who fall in battle share their lot -(fr. 102). We have no fragment which tells us directly what it is, but -the class of utterances we are about to look at next leaves little doubt -on the subject. Those who die the fiery and not the watery death, -become, in fact, gods, though in a different sense from that in which -the one Wisdom is god. It is probable that the corrupt fragment 123 -refers to this unexpected fate (fr. 122) that awaits men when they die. - -Further, just as summer and winter are one, and necessarily reproduce -one another by their “opposite tension,” so do life and death. They, -too, are one, we are told; and so are youth and age (fr. 78). It follows -that the soul will be now living and now dead; that it will only turn to -fire or water, as the case may be, to recommence once more its unceasing -upward and downward path. The soul that has died from excess of moisture -sinks down to earth; but from the earth comes water, and from water is -once more exhaled a soul (fr. 68). So, too, we are told (fr. 67) that -gods and men are really one. They live each others’ life, and die each -others’ death. Those mortals that die the fiery death become -immortal,[390] they become the guardians of the quick and the dead (fr. -123);[391] and those immortals become mortal in their turn. Everything -is really the death of something else (fr. 64). The living and the dead -are always changing places (fr. 78), like the pieces on a child’s -draught-board (fr. 79), and this applies not only to the souls that have -become water, but to those that have become fire and are now guardian -spirits. The real weariness is continuance in the same state (fr. 82), -and the real rest is change (fr. 83). Rest in any other sense is -tantamount to dissolution (fr. 84).[392] So they too are born once more. -Herakleitos estimated the duration of the cycle which preserves the -balance of life and death as thirty years, the shortest time in which a -man may become a grandfather (frs. 87-89).[393] - -Footnote 390: - - The popular word is used for the sake of its paradoxical effect. - Strictly speaking, they are all mortal from one point of view and - immortal from another. - -Footnote 391: - - We need not hesitate to ascribe to Herakleitos the view that the dead - become guardian demons of the living; it appears already in Hesiod, - _Works and Days_, 121, and the Orphic communities had popularised it. - Rohde, _Psyche_ (pp. 442 sqq.), refused to admit that Herakleitos - believed the soul survived after death. Strictly speaking, it is no - doubt an inconsistency; but I believe, with Zeller and Diels, that it - is one of a kind we may well admit. Many thinkers have spoken of a - personal immortality, though there was really no room for it in their - systems. It is worthy of note in this connexion that the first - argument which Plato uses to establish the doctrine of immortality in - the _Phaedo_ is just the Herakleitean parallelism of life and death - with sleeping and waking. - -Footnote 392: - - These fragments are quoted by Plotinos, Iamblichos, and Noumenios in - this very connexion (see R. P. 46 c), and it does not seem to me - possible to hold, with Rohde, that they had no grounds for so - interpreting them. They knew the context and we do not. - -Footnote 393: - - Plut. _def. orac._ 415 d, ἔτη τριάκοντα ποιοῦσι τὴν γενεὰν καθ’ - Ἡράκλειτον, ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ γεννῶντα παρέχει τὸν ἐξ αὑτοῦ γεγεννημένον ὁ - γεννήσας. Philo, fr. Harris, p. 20, δυνατὸν ἐν τριακοστῷ ἔτει αὖ τὸν - ἄνθρωπον πάππον γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ. Censorinus, _de die nat._ 17, 2, “hoc - enim tempus (triaginta annos) _genean_ vocari Heraclitus auctor est, - quia _orbis aetatis_ in eo sit spatio: orbem autem vocat aetatis, dum - natura ab sementi humana ad sementim revertitur.” The words _orbis - aetatis_ seem to mean αἰῶνος κύκλος, “the circle of life.” If so, we - may compare the Orphic κύκλος γενέσεως. - -[Sidenote: The day and the year.] - -76. Let us turn now to the world. Diogenes tells us that fire was kept -up by the bright vapours from land and sea, and moisture by the -dark.[394] What are these “dark” vapours which increase the moist -element? If we remember the “Air” of Anaximenes, we shall be inclined to -regard them as darkness itself. We know that the idea of darkness as -privation of light is not natural to the unsophisticated mind. We -sometimes hear even now of darkness “thick enough to cut with a knife.” -I suppose, then, that Herakleitos believed night and winter to be -produced by the rise of darkness from earth and sea—he saw, of course, -that the valleys were dark before the hill-tops,—and that this darkness, -being moist, so increased the watery element as to put out the sun’s -light. This, however, destroys the power of darkness itself. It can no -longer rise upwards unless the sun gives it motion, and so it becomes -possible for a fresh sun (fr. 32) to be kindled, and to nourish itself -at the expense of the moist element for a time. But it can only be for a -time. The sun, by burning up the bright vapour, deprives himself of -nourishment, and the dark vapour once more gets the upper hand. It is in -this sense that “day and night are one” (fr. 35). Each implies the -other, and they are therefore to be regarded as merely two sides of the -one, in which alone their true ground of explanation is to be found (fr. -36). - -Footnote 394: - - Diog. ix. 9 (R. P. 39 b). - -Summer and winter were easily to be explained in the same way. We know -that the “turnings” of the sun were a subject of interest in those days, -and it was natural for Herakleitos to see in its retreat further to the -south the gradual advance of the moist element, caused by the heat of -the sun itself. This, however, diminishes the power of the sun to cause -evaporation, and so it must return to the north once more that it may -supply itself with nourishment. Such was, at any rate, the Stoic -doctrine on the subject,[395] and that it comes from Herakleitos seems -to be proved by its occurrence in the Περὶ διαίτης. It seems impossible -to refer the following sentence to any other source:— - - And in turn each (fire and water) prevails and is prevailed over to - the greatest and least degree that is possible. For neither can - prevail altogether for the following reasons. If fire advances towards - the utmost limit of the water, its nourishment fails it. It retires, - then, to a place where it can get nourishment. And if water advances - towards the utmost limit of the fire, movement fails it. At that - point, then, it stands still; and, when it has come to a stand, it has - no longer power to resist, but is consumed as nourishment for the fire - that falls upon it. For these reasons neither can prevail altogether. - But if at any time either should be in any way overcome, then none of - the things that exist would be as they are now. So long as things are - as they are, fire and water will always be too, and neither will ever - fail.[396] - -Footnote 395: - - See Kleanthes, fr. 29, Pearson, ὠκεανὸς δ’ ἐστὶ <καὶ γῆ> ἧς τὴν - ἀναθυμίασιν ἐπινέμεται (ὁ ἥλιος). Cf. Cic. _N.D._ iii. 37: “Quid enim? - non eisdem vobis placet omnem ignem pastus indigere nec permanere ullo - modo posse, nisi alitur: ali autem solem, lunam, reliqua astra aquis, - alia dulcibus (from the earth), alia marinis? eamque causam Cleanthes - adfert cur se sol referat nec longius progrediatur solstitiali orbi - itemque brumali, ne longius discedat a cibo.” - -Footnote 396: - - For the Greek text of this passage, see below, p. 183, _n._ 413. - Fredrichs allows that it is from the same source as that quoted above - (p. 169), and, as that comes from Περὶ διαίτης, i. 3, he denies the - Herakleitean origin of this too. He has not taken account of the fact - that it gives the Stoic doctrine, which raises a presumption in favour - of that being Herakleitean. If I could agree with Fredrichs’ theory, I - should still say that the present passage was a Herakleitean - interpolation in the _Physiker_ rather than that the other was an - interpolation from the _Physiker_ in the Herakleitean section. As it - is, I find no difficulty in believing that both passages give the - Herakleitean doctrine, though it becomes mixed up with other theories - in the sequel. See p. 167, _n._ 383. - -[Sidenote: The Great Year.] - -77. Herakleitos spoke also of a longer period, which is identified with -the “Great Year,” and is variously described as lasting 18,000 and -10,800 years.[397] We have no definite statement, however, of what -process Herakleitos supposed to take place in the Great Year. We have -seen that the period of 36,000 years was, in all probability, -Babylonian, and was that of the revolution which produces the precession -of the equinoxes.[398] Now 18,000 years is just half that period, a fact -which may be connected with Herakleitos’s way of dividing all cycles -into an “upward and downward path” It is not at all likely, however, -that Herakleitos, who held with Xenophanes that the sun was “new every -day,” would trouble himself about the precession of the equinoxes, and -we seem forced to assume that he gave some new application to the -traditional period. The Stoics, or some of them, held that the Great -Year was the period between one world-conflagration and the next. They -were careful, however, to make it a good deal longer than Herakleitos -did, and, in any case, we are not entitled without more ado to credit -him with the theory of a general conflagration.[399] We must try first, -if possible, to interpret the Great Year on the analogy of the shorter -periods discussed already. - -Footnote 397: - - Aet. ii. 32, 3, Ἡράκλειτος ἐκ μυρίων ὀκτακισχιλίων ἐνιαυτῶν ἡλιακῶν - (τὸν μέγαν ἐνιαυτὸν εἶναι). Censorinus, _de die nat._ 11, Heraclitus - et Linus, XDCCC. - -Footnote 398: - - See Introd. § XII. p. 25, _n._ 39. - -Footnote 399: - - For the Stoic doctrine, cf. Nemesios, _de nat. hom._ 38 (R. P. 503). - Mr. Adam allowed that no destruction of the world or conflagration - marked the end of Plato’s year, but he declined to draw what seems to - me the natural inference that the connexion between the two things - belongs to a later age, and should not, therefore, be ascribed to - Herakleitos in the absence of any evidence that he did so connect - them. Nevertheless, his treatment of these questions in the second - volume of his edition of the _Republic_, pp. 302 sqq., must form the - basis of all further discussion on the subject. It has certainly - helped me to put the view which he rejects (p. 303, n. 9) in what I - hope will be found a more convincing form. - -Now we have seen that a generation is the shortest time in which a man -can become a grandfather, it is the period of the upward or downward -path of the soul, and the most natural interpretation of the longer -period would surely be that it represents the time taken by a “measure” -of the fire in the world to travel on the downward path to earth or -return to fire once more by the upward path. Plato certainly implies -that such a parallelism between the periods of man and the world was -recognised,[400] and this receives a curious confirmation from a passage -in Aristotle, which is usually supposed to refer to the doctrine of a -periodic conflagration. He is discussing the question whether the -“heavens,” that is to say, what he calls the “first heaven,” is eternal -or not, and he naturally enough, from his own point of view, identifies -this with the Fire of Herakleitos. He quotes him along with Empedokles -as holding that the “heavens” are alternately as they are now and in -some other state, one of passing away; and he goes on to point out that -this is not really to say they pass away, any more than it would be to -say that a man ceases to be, if we said that he turned from boy to man -and then from man to boy again.[401] It is surely clear that this is a -reference to the parallel between the generation and the Great Year, -and, if so, the ordinary interpretation of the passage must be wrong. It -is true that it is not quite consistent with the theory to suppose that -a “measure” of Fire could preserve its identity throughout the whole of -its upward and downward path; but it is exactly the same inconsistency -that we have felt bound to recognise with regard to the continuance of -individual souls, a fact which is really in favour of our -interpretation. It should be added that, while 18,000 is half 36,000, -10,800 is 360 × 30, which would make each generation a day in the Great -Year.[402] - -Footnote 400: - - This is certainly the general sense of the parallelism between the - periods of the ἀνθρώπειον and the θεῖον γεννητόν, however we may - understand the details. See Adam, _Republic_, vol. ii. pp. 288 sqq. - -Footnote 401: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Α, 10. 279 b 14, οἱ δ’ ἐναλλὰξ ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως ὁτὲ δὲ - ἄλλως ἔχειν φθειρόμενον, ... ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὀ Ἀκραγαντῖνος καὶ - Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος. Aristotle points out that this really amounts - only to saying that it is eternal and changes its form, ὥσπερ εἴ τις - ἐκ παιδὸς ἄνδρα γιγνόμενον καὶ ἐξ ἀνδρὸς παῖδα ὁτὲ μὲν φθείρεσθαι, ὁτὲ - δ’ εἶναι οἴοιτο (280 a 14). The point of the reference to Empedokles - will appear from _de Gen. Corr._ Β, 6. 334 a 1 sqq. What Aristotle - finds fault with in both theories is that they do not regard the - substance of the heavens as something outside the upward and downward - motion of the elements. - -Footnote 402: - - This is practically Lassalle’s view of the Great Year, except that he - commits the anachronism of speaking of “atoms” of fire instead of - “measures.” - -[Sidenote: Did Herakleitos teach a general conflagration?] - -78. Most modern writers, however, ascribe to Herakleitos the doctrine of -a periodical conflagration or ἐκπύρωσις, to use the Stoic term.[403] -That this is inconsistent with the theory, as we have interpreted it, is -obvious, and is indeed admitted by Zeller. To his paraphrase of the -statement of Plato quoted above (p. 159) he adds the words: “Herakleitos -did not intend to retract this principle in the doctrine of a periodic -change in the constitution of the world; if the two doctrines are not -compatible, it is a contradiction which he has not observed.” Now, it is -in itself quite likely that there were contradictions in the discourse -of Herakleitos, but it is very unlikely that there was this particular -one. In the first place, it is a contradiction of the central idea of -his system, the thought that possessed his whole mind (§ 67), and we can -only admit the possibility of that, if the evidence for it should prove -irresistible. In the second place, such an interpretation destroys the -whole point of Plato’s contrast between Herakleitos and Empedokles (§ -68), which is just that, while Herakleitos said the One was always many, -and the Many always one, Empedokles said the All was many and one by -turns. Zeller’s interpretation obliges us, then, to suppose that -Herakleitos flatly contradicted his own discovery without noticing it, -and that Plato, in discussing this very discovery, was also blind to the -contradiction.[404] - -Footnote 403: - - Schleiermacher and Lassalle are notable exceptions. Zeller, Diels, and - Gomperz are all positive that Herakleitos believed in the ἐκπύρωσις. - -Footnote 404: - - In his fifth edition (p. 699) Zeller seems to feel this last - difficulty; for he now says: “It is a contradiction which he, _and - which probably Plato too_ (_und den wahrscheinlich auch Plato_) has - not observed.” This seems to me still less arguable. Plato may or may - not be mistaken; but he makes the perfectly definite statement that - Herakleitos says ἀεί, while Empedokles says ἐν μέρει. The Ionian Muses - are called συντονώτεραι and the Sicilian μαλακώτεραι just because the - latter “lowered the pitch” (ἐχάλασαν) of the doctrine that this is - always so (τὸ ἀεὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν). - -Nor is there anything in Aristotle to set against Plato’s emphatic -statement. We have seen that the passage in which he speaks of him along -with Empedokles as holding that the heavens were alternately in one -condition and in another refers not to the world in general, but to -fire, which Aristotle identified with the substance of his own “first -heaven.”[405] It is also quite consistent with our interpretation when -he says that all things at one time or another become fire. This does -not necessarily mean that they all become fire at the same time, but is -merely a statement of the undoubted Herakleitean doctrine of the upward -and downward path.[406] - -Footnote 405: - - See above, p. 177, _n._ 401. - -Footnote 406: - - _Phys._ Γ 5, 205 a 3 (_Met._ Κ, 10. 1067 a 4), ὥσπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν - ἅπαντα γίνεσθαί ποτε πῦρ. Even in his fifth edition (p. 691) Zeller - translates this _es werde alles dereinst zu Feuer werden_; but that - would require γενήσεσθαι. Nor is there anything in his suggestion that - ἅπαντα (“not merely πάντα”) implies that all things become fire at - once. In Aristotle’s day, there was no distinction of meaning between - πᾶς and ἅπας. Even if he had said σύμπαντα, we could not press it. - What is really noticeable is the present infinitive γίνεσθαι which - surely suggests a continuous process, not a series of conflagrations. - -The only clear statements to the effect that Herakleitos taught the -doctrine of a general conflagration are posterior to the rise of -Stoicism. It is unnecessary to enumerate them, as there is no doubt -about their meaning. The Christian apologists too were interested in the -idea of a final conflagration, and reproduce the Stoic view. The curious -thing, however, is that there was a difference of opinion on the subject -even among the Stoics. In one place, Marcus Aurelius says: “So that all -these things are taken up into the Reason of the universe, whether by a -periodical conflagration or a renovation effected by external -exchanges.”[407] Indeed, there were some who said there was no general -conflagration at all in Herakleitos. “I hear all that,” Plutarch makes -one of his personages say, “from many people, and I see the Stoic -conflagration spreading over the poems of Hesiod, just as it does over -the writings of Herakleitos and the verses of Orpheus.”[408] We see from -this that the question was debated, and we should therefore expect that -any statement of Herakleitos which could settle it would be quoted over -and over again. It is highly significant that not a single quotation of -the kind can be produced. - -Footnote 407: - - Marcus Aurelius, x. 7, ὥστε καὶ ταῦτα ἀναληφθῆναι εἰς τὸν τοῦ ὅλου - λόγον, εἴτε κατὰ περίοδον ἐκπυρουμένου, εἴτε ἀιδίοις ἀμοιβαῖς - ἀνανεουμένου. The ἀμοιβαί are specifically Herakleitean, and the - statement is the more remarkable as Marcus elsewhere follows the usual - Stoic interpretation. - -Footnote 408: - - Plut. _de def. orac._ 415 f, καὶ ὁ Κλεόμβροτος, Ἀκούω ταῦτ’, ἔφη, - πολλῶν καὶ ὁρῶ τὴν Στωικὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου καὶ Ὀρφέως - ἐπινεμομένην ἔπη οὕτω καὶ τὰ Ἡσιόδου καὶ συνεξάπτουσαν. As Zeller - admits (p. 693 n.), this proves that some opponents of the Stoic - ἐκπύρωσις tried to withdraw the support of Herakleitos from it. Could - they have done so if Herakleitos had said anything about it, or would - not some one have produced a decisive quotation? We may be sure that, - if any one had, it would have been reiterated _ad nauseam_, for the - indestructibility of the world was one of the great questions of the - day. - -On the contrary, the absence of anything to show that Herakleitos spoke -of a general conflagration only becomes more patent when we turn to the -few fragments which are supposed to prove it. The favourite is fr. 24, -where we are told that Herakleitos said Fire was Want and Surfeit. That -is just in his manner, and it has a perfectly intelligible meaning on -our interpretation, which is further confirmed by fr. 36. On the other -hand, it seems distinctly artificial to understand the Surfeit as -referring to the fact that fire has burnt everything else up, and still -more so to interpret Want as meaning that fire, or most of it, has -turned into a world. The next is fr. 26, where we read that fire in its -advance will judge and convict all things. There is nothing in this, -however, to suggest that fire will judge all things at once rather than -in turn, and, indeed, the phraseology reminds us of the advance of fire -and water which we have seen reason for attributing to Herakleitos, but -which is expressly said to be limited to a certain maximum.[409] These -appear to be the only passages which the Stoics and the Christian -apologists could discover, and, whether our interpretation of them is -right or wrong, it is surely obvious that they cannot bear the weight of -their conclusion, and that there was certainly nothing more definite to -be found. - -Footnote 409: - - Περὶ διαίτης, i. 3, ἐν μέρει δὲ ἑκάτερον κρατεῖ καὶ κρατεῖται ἐς τὸ - μήκιστον καὶ ἐλάχιστον ὡς ἀνυστόν. - -It is much easier to find fragments which are on the face of them -inconsistent with a general conflagration. The “measures” of fr. 20 and -fr. 29 must be the same thing, and they must surely be interpreted in -the light of fr. 23. If this be so, fr. 20, and more especially fr. 29, -directly contradict the idea of a general conflagration. “The sun will -not overstep his measures.”[410] Secondly, the metaphor of “exchange,” -which is applied to the transformations of fire in fr. 22, points in the -same direction. When gold is given in exchange for wares and wares for -gold, the sum or “measure” of each remains constant, though they change -owners. All the wares and gold do not come into the same hands. In the -same way, when anything becomes fire, something of equal amount must -cease to be fire, if the “exchange” is to be a just one; and that it -will be just, we are assured by the watchfulness of the Erinyes (fr. -29), who see to it that the sun does not take more than he gives. Of -course there is, as we have seen, a certain variation; but this is -strictly confined within limits, and is compensated in the long run by a -variation in the other direction. Thirdly, fr. 43, in which Herakleitos -blames Homer for desiring the cessation of strife, is very conclusive. -The cessation of strife would mean that all things should take the -upward or downward path at the same time, and cease to “run in opposite -directions.” If they all took the upward path, we should have a general -conflagration. Now, if Herakleitos had himself held that this was the -appointment of fate, would he have been likely to upbraid Homer for -desiring so necessary a consummation?[411] Fourthly, we note that in fr. -20 it is _this_ world,[412] and not merely the “ever-living fire,” which -is said to be eternal; and it appears also that its eternity depends -upon the fact that it is always kindling and always going out in the -same “measures,” or that an encroachment in one direction is compensated -by a subsequent encroachment in the other. Lastly, Lassalle’s argument -from the concluding sentence of the passage from the Περὶ διαίτης, -quoted above, is really untouched by Zeller’s objection, that it cannot -be Herakleitean because it implies that all things are fire and water. -It does not imply this, but only that _man_, like the heavenly bodies, -oscillates between fire and water; and that is just what Herakleitos -taught. It does not appear either that the measures of earth varied at -all. Now, in this passage we read that neither fire nor water can -prevail completely, and a very good reason is given for this, a reason -too which is in striking agreement with the other views of -Herakleitos.[413] And, indeed, it is not easy to see how, in accordance -with these views, the world could ever recover from a general -conflagration if such a thing were to take place. The whole process -depends, so far as we can see, on the fact that Surfeit is also Want, -or, in other words, that an advance of fire increases the moist -exhalation, while an advance of water deprives the fire of the power to -cause evaporation. The conflagration, though it lasted but for a -moment,[414] would destroy the opposite tension on which the rise of a -new world depends, and then motion would become impossible. - -Footnote 410: - - If any one doubts that this is really the meaning of the “measures,” - let him compare the use of the word by Diogenes of Apollonia, fr. 3. - -Footnote 411: - - This is just the argument which Plato uses in the _Phaedo_ (72 c) to - prove the necessity of ἀνταπόδοσις, and the whole series of arguments - in that passage is distinctly Herakleitean in character. - -Footnote 412: - - However we understand the term κόσμος here, the meaning is the same. - Indeed, if we suppose with Bernays that it means “order,” the argument - in the text will be all the stronger. In no sense of the word could a - κόσμος survive the ἐκπύρωσις, and the Stoics accordingly said the - κόσμος was φθαρτός. - -Footnote 413: - - Περὶ διαίτης, i. 3 (see above, p. 167, _n._ 383, οὐδέτερον γὰρ - κρατῆσαι παντελῶς δύναται διὰ τάδε· τό <τε> πῦρ ἐπεξιὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον - τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιλείπει ἡ τροφή· ἀποτρέπεται οὖν ὅθεν μέλλει τρέφεσθαι· - τὸ ὕδωρ τε ἐπεξιὸν τοῦ πυρὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, ἐπιλείπει ἡ κίνησις· - ἵσταται οὖν ἐν τούτῳ, ὅταν δὲ στῇ, οὐκέτι ἐγκρατές ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἤδη τῷ - ἐμπίπτοντι πυρὶ ἐς τῆν τροφὴν καταναλίσκεται· οὐδέτερον δὲ διὰ ταῦτα - δύναται κρατῆσαι παντελῶς, εἰ δέ ποτε κρατηθείη καὶ ὁπότερον, οὐδὲν ἂν - εἴη τῶν νῦν ἐόντων ὥσπερ ἔχει νῦν· οὕτω δὲ ἐχόντων ἀεὶ ἔσται τὰ αὐτὰ - καὶ οὐδέτερον οὐδαμὰ ἐπιλείψει. - -Footnote 414: - - In his note on fr. 66 (= 26 Byw.), Diels seeks to minimise the - difficulty of the ἐκπύρωσις by saying that it is only a little one, - and can last but a moment; but the contradiction noted above remains - all the same. Diels holds that Herakleitos was “dark only in form,” - and that “he himself was perfectly clear as to the sense and scope of - his ideas” (_Herakleitos_, p. i.). To which I would add that he was - probably called “the Dark” just because the Stoics sometimes found it - hard to read their own ideas into his words. - -[Sidenote: Strife and “harmony.”] - -79. We are now in a position to understand more clearly the law of -strife or opposition which manifests itself in the “upward and downward -path.” At any given moment, each of the three forms of matter, Fire, -Water, and Earth, is made up of two equal portions,—subject, of course, -to the oscillation described above,—one of which is taking the upward -and the other the downward path. Now, it is just the fact that the two -halves of everything are being “drawn in opposite directions,” this -“opposite tension,” that “keeps things together,” and maintains them in -an equilibrium which can only be disturbed temporarily and within -certain limits. It thus forms the “hidden attunement” of the universe -(fr. 47), though, in another aspect of it, it is Strife. Bernays has -pointed out that the word ἁρμονία meant originally “structure,” and the -illustration of the bow and the lyre shows that this idea was present. -On the other hand, that taken from the concord of high and low notes -shows that the musical sense of the word, namely, an octave, was not -wholly absent. As to the “bow and the lyre” (fr. 45), I think that -Professor Campbell has best brought out the point of the simile. “As the -arrow leaves the string,” he says, “the hands are pulling opposite ways -to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cf. Plato, _Rep._ -4. 439); and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and -retention. The secret of the universe is the same.”[415] War, then, is -the father and king of all things, in the world as in human society (fr. -44); and Homer’s wish that strife might cease was really a prayer for -the destruction of the world (fr. 43). - -Footnote 415: - - Campbell’s _Theaetetus_ (2nd ed.), p. 244. See above, p. 150, _n._ - 347. Bernays explained the phrase as referring to the _shape_ of the - bow and lyre, but this is much less likely. Wilamowitz’s - interpretation is substantially the same as Campbell’s. “Es ist mit - der Welt wie mit dem Bogen, den man auseinanderzieht, damit er - zusammenschnellt, wie mit der Saite, die man ihrer Spannung - entgegenziehen muss, damit sie klingt” (_Lesebuch_, ii. p. 129). - -We know from Philo that Herakleitos supported his theory of the -attainment of harmony through strife by a multitude of examples; and, as -it happens, some of these can be recovered. There is a remarkable -agreement between a passage of this kind in the pseudo-Aristotelian -treatise, entitled _The Kosmos_, and the Hippokratean work to which we -have already referred. That the authors of both drew from the same -source, namely, Herakleitos, is probable in itself, and is made -practically certain by the fact that this agreement extends in part to -the _Letters of Herakleitos_, which, though spurious, were certainly -composed by some one who had access to the original work. The argument -was that men themselves act just in the same way as Nature, and it is -therefore surprising that they do not recognise the laws by which she -works. The painter produces his harmonious effects by the contrast of -colours, the musician by that of high and low notes. “If one were to -make all things alike, there would be no delight in them.” There are -many similar examples in the Hippokratean tract, some of which must -certainly come from Herakleitos; but it is not easy to separate them -from the later additions.[416] - -Footnote 416: - - See on all this Patin’s _Quellenstudien zu Heraklit_ (1881). The - sentence (Περὶ διαίτης, i. 5): καὶ τὰ μὲν πρήσσουσιν οὐκ οἴδασιν, ἃ δὲ - οὐ πρήσσουσι δοκέουσιν εἰδέναι· καὶ τὰ μὲν ὁρέουσιν οὐ γινώσκουσιν, - ἀλλ’ ὅμως αὐτοῖσι πάντα γίνεται ... καὶ ἃ βούλονται καὶ ἃ μὴ - βούλονται, has the true Herakleitean ring. This, too, can hardly have - had another author: “They trust to their eyes rather than to their - understanding, though their eyes are not fit to judge even of the - things that are seen. But I speak these things from understanding.” - These words are positively grotesque in the mouth of the medical - compiler; but we are accustomed to hear such things from the Ephesian. - Other examples which may be Herakleitean are the image of the two men - sawing wood—“one pushes, the other pulls”—and the illustration from - the art of writing. - -[Sidenote: Correlation of opposites.] - -80. There are a number of Herakleitean fragments which form a class by -themselves, and are among the most striking of all the utterances that -have come down to us. Their common characteristic is, that they assert -in the most downright way the identity of various things which are -usually regarded as opposites. The clue to their meaning is to be found -in the account already given of the assertion that day and night are -one. We have seen that Herakleitos meant to say, not that day was night -or that night was day, but that they were two sides of the same process, -namely, the oscillation of the “measures” of fire and water, and that -neither would be possible without the other. Any explanation that can be -given of night will also be an explanation of day, and _vice versa_; for -it will be an account of that which is common to both, and manifests -itself now as one and now as the other. Moreover, it is just because it -has manifested itself in the one form that it must next appear in the -other; for this is required by the law of compensation or Justice. - -This is only a particular application of the universal principle that -the primary fire is one even in its division. It itself is, even in its -unity, both surfeit and want, war and peace (fr. 36). In other words, -the “satiety” which makes fire pass into other forms, which makes it -seek “rest in change” (frs. 82, 83), and “hide itself” (fr. 10) in the -“hidden attunement” of opposition, is only one side of the process. The -other is the “want” which leads it to consume the bright vapour as fuel. -The upward path is nothing without the downward (fr. 69). If either were -to cease, the other would cease too, and the world would disappear; for -it takes both to make an apparently stable reality. - -All other utterances of the kind are to be explained in the same way. If -there were no cold, there would be no heat; for a thing can only grow -warm if, and in so far as, it is already cold. And the same thing -applies to the opposition of wet and dry (fr. 39). These, it will be -observed, are just the two primary oppositions of Anaximander, and -Herakleitos is showing that the war between them is really peace, for it -is the common element in them (fr. 62) which appears as strife, and that -very strife is justice, and not, as Anaximander had taught, an injustice -which they commit one against the other, and which must be expiated by a -reabsorption of both in their common ground.[417] The strife itself is -the common ground (fr. 62), and is eternal. - -Footnote 417: - - Chap. I. § 16. - -The most startling of these sayings is that which affirms that good and -evil are the same (fr. 57). This does not mean in the least, however, -that good is evil or that evil is good, but simply that they are the two -inseparable halves of one and the same thing. A thing can become good -only in so far as it is already evil, and evil only in so far as it is -already good, and everything depends on the contrast. The illustration -given in fr. 58 shows this clearly. Torture, one would say, was an evil, -and yet it is made a good by the presence of another evil, namely, -disease; as is shown by the fact that surgeons expect a fee for -inflicting it upon their patients. Justice, on the other hand, which is -a good, would be altogether unknown were it not for the existence of -injustice, which is an evil (fr. 60). And that is why it is not good for -men to get everything they wish (fr. 104). Just as the cessation of -strife in the world would mean its destruction, so the disappearance of -hunger, disease, and weariness would mean the disappearance of -satisfaction, health, and rest. - -This leads to a theory of relativity which prepares the way for the -doctrine of Protagoras, that “Man is the measure of all things.”[418] -Sea-water is good for fish and bad for men (fr. 52), and so with many -other things. At the same time, Herakleitos is not a believer in -absolute relativity. The process of the world is not merely a circle, -but an “upward and downward path.” At the upper end, where the two paths -meet, we have the pure fire, in which, as there is no separation, there -is no relativity. We are told expressly that, while to man some things -are evil and some things are good, all things are good to God (fr. 61). -Now by God there is no doubt that Herakleitos meant Fire. He also calls -it the “one wise,” and perhaps said that it “knows all things.” There -can hardly be any question that what he meant to say was that in it the -opposition and relativity which are universal in the world disappear. It -is doubtless to this that frs. 96, 97, and 98 refer. - -Footnote 418: - - Plato’s exposition of the relativity of knowledge in the _Theaetetus_ - (152 d sqq.) can hardly go back to Herakleitos himself, but is meant - to show how Herakleiteanism might naturally give rise to such a - doctrine. If the soul is a stream and things are a stream, then of - course knowledge is relative. Very possibly the later Herakleiteans - had worked out the theory in this direction, but in the days of - Herakleitos himself the problem of knowledge had not yet arisen. - -[Sidenote: The Wise.] - -81. Herakleitos speaks of “wisdom” or the “wise” in two senses. We have -seen already that he said wisdom was “something apart from everything -else” (fr. 18), meaning by it the perception of the unity of the many; -and he also applies the term to that unity itself regarded as the -“thought that directs the course of all things.” This is synonymous with -the pure fire which is not differentiated into two parts, one taking the -upward and the other the downward path. That alone has wisdom; the -partial things we see have not. We ourselves are only wise in so far as -we are fiery (fr. 74). - -[Sidenote: Theology.] - -82. With certain reservations, Herakleitos was prepared to call the one -Wisdom by the name of Zeus. Such, at least, appears to be the meaning of -fr. 65. What these reservations were, it is easy to guess. It is not, of -course, to be pictured in the form of a man. In saying this, Herakleitos -would only have been repeating what had already been laid down by -Anaximander and Xenophanes. He agrees further with Xenophanes in holding -that this “god,” if it is to be called so, is one; but his polemic -against popular religion was directed rather against the rites and -ceremonies themselves than their mere mythological outgrowth. He gives a -list (fr. 124) of some of the most characteristic religious figures of -his time, and the context in which the fragment is quoted shows that he -in some way threatened them with the wrath to come. He comments upon the -absurdity of praying to images (fr. 126), and the strange idea that -blood-guiltiness can be washed out by the shedding of blood (fr. 130). -He seems also to have said that it was absurd to celebrate the worship -of Dionysos by cheerful and licentious ceremonies, while Hades was -propitiated by gloomy rites (fr. 127). According to the mystic doctrine -itself, the two were really one; and the one Wisdom ought to be -worshipped in its integrity. - -The few fragments which deal with theology and religion hardly suggest -to us that Herakleitos was in sympathy with the religious revival of the -time, and yet we have been asked to consider his system “in the light of -the idea of the mysteries.”[419] Our attention is called to the fact -that he was “king” of Ephesos, that is, priest of the branch of the -Eleusinian mysteries established in that city, which was also connected -in some way with the worship of Artemis or the Great Mother.[420] These -statements may be true; but, even if they are, what follows? We ought -surely to have learnt from Lobeck by this time that there was no “idea” -in the mysteries at all; and on this point the results of recent -anthropological research have abundantly confirmed those of philological -and historical inquiry. - -Footnote 419: - - E. Pfleiderer, _Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus im Lichte der - Mysterienidee_ (1886). - -Footnote 420: - - Antisthenes (the writer of _Successions_) _ap._ Diog. ix. 6 (R. P. - 31). Cf. Strabo, xiv. p. 633 (R. P. 31 b). - -[Sidenote: Ethics of Herakleitos.] - -83. The moral teaching of Herakleitos has sometimes been regarded as an -anticipation of the “common-sense” theory of Ethics.[421] The “common” -upon which Herakleitos insists is, nevertheless, something very -different from common sense, for which, indeed, he had the greatest -possible contempt (fr. 111). It is, in fact, his strongest objection to -“the many,” that they live each in his own world (fr. 95), as if they -had a private wisdom of their own (fr. 92); and public opinion is -therefore just the opposite of “the common.” - -Footnote 421: - - Köstlin, _Gesch. d. Ethik_, i. pp. 160 sqq. - -The Ethics of Herakleitos are to be regarded as a corollary of his -anthropological and cosmological views. Their chief requirement is that -we keep our souls dry, and thus assimilate them to the one Wisdom, which -is fire. That is what is really “common,” and the greatest fault is to -act like men asleep (fr. 94), that is, by letting our souls grow moist, -to cut ourselves off from the fire in the world. We do not know what -were the consequences which Herakleitos deduced from his rule that we -must hold fast to what is common, but it is easy to see what their -nature must have been. The wise man would not try to secure good without -its correlative evil. He would not seek for rest without exertion, nor -expect to enjoy contentment without first suffering discontent. He would -not complain that he had to take the bad with the good, but would -consistently look at things as a whole. - -Herakleitos prepared the way for the Stoic world-state by comparing “the -common” to the laws of a city. And these are even more than a type of -the divine law: they are imperfect embodiments of it. They cannot, -however, exhaust it altogether; for in all human affairs there is an -element of relativity (fr. 91). “Man is a baby compared to God” (fr. -97). Such as they are, however, the city must fight for them as for its -walls; and, if it has the good fortune to possess a citizen with a dry -soul, he is worth ten thousand (fr. 113); for in him alone is “the -common” embodied. - - - - - CHAPTER IV - PARMENIDES OF ELEA - - -[Sidenote: Life.] - -84. Parmenides, son of Pyres, was a citizen of Hyele, Elea, or Velia, a -colony founded in Oinotria by refugees from Phokaia in 540-39 B.C.[422] -Diogenes tells us that he “flourished” in Ol. LXIX. (504-500 B.C.), and -this was doubtless the date given by Apollodoros.[423] On the other -hand, Plato says that Parmenides came to Athens in his sixty-fifth year, -accompanied by Zeno, and conversed with Sokrates, who was then quite -young. Now Sokrates was just over seventy when he was put to death in -399 B.C.; and therefore, if we suppose him to have been an _ephebos_, -that is, from eighteen to twenty years old, at the time of his interview -with Parmenides, we get 451-449 B.C. as the date of that event. I do not -hesitate to accept Plato’s statement,[424] especially as we have -independent evidence of the visit of Zeno to Athens, where Perikles is -said to have “heard” him.[425] The date given by Apollodoros, on the -other hand, depends solely on that of the foundation of Elea, which he -had adopted as the _floruit_ of Xenophanes. Parmenides is born in that -year, just as Zeno is born in the year when Parmenides “flourished.” Why -any one should prefer these transparent combinations to the testimony of -Plato, I am at a loss to understand, though it is equally a mystery why -Apollodoros himself should have overlooked such precise data. - -Footnote 422: - - Diog. ix. 21 (R. P. 111). For the foundation of Elea, see Herod. i. - 165 sqq. It was on the coast of Lucania, south of Poseidonia - (Paestum). - -Footnote 423: - - Diog. ix. 23 (R. P. 111). Cf. Diels, _Rhein. Mus._ xxxi. p. 34; and - Jacoby, pp. 231 sqq. - -Footnote 424: - - Plato, _Parm._ 127 b (R. P. 111 d). There are, as Zeller has shown, a - certain number of anachronisms in Plato, but there is not one of this - character. In the first place, we have exact figures as to the ages of - Parmenides and Zeno, which imply that the latter was twenty-five years - younger than the former, not forty as Apollodoros said. In the second - place, Plato refers to this meeting in two other places (_Tht._ 183 e - 7 and _Soph._ 217 c 5), which do not seem to be mere references to the - dialogue entitled _Parmenides_. No parallel can be quoted for an - anachronism so glaring and deliberate as this would be. E. Meyer - (_Gesch. des Alterth._ iv. § 509, _Anm._) also regards the meeting of - Sokrates and Parmenides as historical. - -Footnote 425: - - Plut. _Per._ 4, 3. See below, p. 358, _n._ 852. - -We have seen already (§ 55) that Aristotle mentions a statement which -made Parmenides the disciple of Xenophanes; but the value of this -testimony is diminished by the doubtful way in which he speaks, and it -is more than likely that he is only referring to what Plato says in the -_Sophist_.[426] It is, we also saw, very improbable that Xenophanes -founded the school of Elea, though it is quite possible he visited that -city. He tells us himself that, in his ninety-second year, he was still -wandering up and down (fr. 8). At that time Parmenides would be well -advanced in life. And we must not overlook the statement of Sotion, -preserved to us by Diogenes, that, though Parmenides “heard” Xenophanes, -he did not “follow” him. According to this account, our philosopher was -the “associate” of a Pythagorean, Ameinias, son of Diochaitas, “a poor -but noble man to whom he afterwards built a shrine as to a hero.” It was -Ameinias and not Xenophanes that “converted” Parmenides to the -philosophic life.[427] This does not read like an invention, and we must -remember that the Alexandrians had information about the history of -Southern Italy which we have not. The shrine erected by Parmenides would -still be there in later days, like the grave of Pythagoras at -Metapontion. It should also be mentioned that Strabo describes -Parmenides and Zeno as Pythagoreans, and that Kebes talks of a -“Parmenidean and Pythagorean way of life.”[428] Zeller explains all this -by supposing that, like Empedokles, Parmenides approved of and followed -the Pythagorean mode of life without adopting the Pythagorean system. It -is possibly true that Parmenides believed in a “philosophic life” (§ -35), and that he got the idea from the Pythagoreans; but there is very -little trace, either in his writings or in what we are told about him, -of his having been in any way affected by the religious side of -Pythagoreanism. The writing of Empedokles is obviously modelled upon -that of Parmenides, and yet there is an impassable gulf between the two. -The touch of charlatanism, which is so strange a feature in the copy, is -altogether absent from the model. It is true, no doubt, that there are -traces of Orphic ideas in the poem of Parmenides;[429] but they are all -to be found either in the allegorical introduction or in the second part -of the poem, and we need not therefore take them very seriously. Now -Parmenides was a western Hellene, and he had probably been a -Pythagorean, so it is not a little remarkable that he should be so free -from the common tendency of his age and country. It is here, if -anywhere, that we may trace the influence of Xenophanes. As regards his -relation to the Pythagorean system, we shall have something to say later -on. At present we need only note further that, like most of the older -philosophers, he took part in politics; and Speusippos recorded that he -legislated for his native city. Others add that the magistrates of Elea -made the citizens swear every year to abide by the laws which Parmenides -had given them.[430] - -Footnote 426: - - See above, Chap. II. p. 140, _n._ 308. - -Footnote 427: - - Diog. ix. 21 (R. P. III), reading Ἀμεινίᾳ Διοχαίτα with Diels - (_Hermes_, xxxv. p. 197). Sotion, in his _Successions_, separated - Parmenides from Xenophanes and associated him with the Pythagoreans - (_Dox._ pp. 146, 148, 166). - -Footnote 428: - - Strabo, vi. 1, p. 252 (p. 195, _n._ 430); Ceb. _Tab._ 2 (R. P. 111 c). - This Kebes is not the Kebes of the _Phaedo_; but he certainly lived - some time before Lucian, who speaks of him as a well-known writer. A - Cynic of the name is mentioned by Athenaios (156 d). The statements of - Strabo are of the greatest value; for they are based upon historians - now lost. - -Footnote 429: - - O. Kern in _Arch._ iii. pp. 173 sqq. We know too little, however, of - the apocalyptic poems of the sixth century B.C. to be sure of the - details. All we can say is that Parmenides has taken the form of his - poem from some such source. See Diels, “Ueber die poetischen Vorbilder - des Parmenides” (_Berl. Sitzb._ 1896), and the Introduction to his - _Parmenides Lehrgedicht_, pp. 9 sqq. - -Footnote 430: - - Diog. ix. 23 (R. P. 111). Plut. _adv. Col._ 1226 a, Παρμενίδης δὲ τὴν - ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδα διεκόσμησε νόμοις ἀρίστοις, ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς καθ’ ἕκαστον - ἐνιαυτὸν ἐξορκοῦν τοὺς πολίτας ἐμμενεῖν τοῖς Παρμενίδου νόμοις. - Strabo, vi. 1. p. 252, (Ἐλέαν) ἐξ ἧς Παρμενίδης καὶ Ζήνων ἐγένοντο - ἄνδρες Πυθαγόρειοι. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ δι’ ἐκείνους καὶ ἔτι πρότερον - εὐνομηθῆναι. - -[Sidenote: The poem.] - -85. Parmenides was really the first philosopher to expound his system in -metrical language. As there is some confusion on this subject, it -deserves a few words of explanation. In writing of Empedokles, Mr. J. A. -Symonds said: “The age in which he lived had not yet thrown off the form -of poetry in philosophical composition. Even Parmenides had committed -his austere theories to hexameter verse.” Now this is wrongly put. The -earliest philosophers, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Herakleitos, all -wrote in prose, and the only Greeks who ever wrote philosophy in verse -at all were just these two, Parmenides and Empedokles; for Xenophanes -was not primarily a philosopher any more than Epicharmos. Empedokles -copied Parmenides; and he, no doubt, was influenced by Xenophanes and -the Orphics. But the thing was an innovation, and one that did not -maintain itself. - -The fragments of Parmenides are preserved for the most part by -Simplicius, who fortunately inserted them in his commentary, because in -his time the original work was already rare.[431] I follow the -arrangement of Diels. - -Footnote 431: - - Simpl. _Phys._ 144, 25 (R. P. 117). Simplicius, of course, had the - library of the Academy at his command. Diels notes, however, that - Proclus seems to have used a different MS. - - - (1) - - The car that bears me carried me as far as ever my heart desired, - since it brought me and set me on the renowned way of the goddess, - which alone leads the man who knows through all things. On that way - was I borne along; for on it did the wise steeds carry me, drawing my - car, and maidens <<5>> showed the way. And the axle, glowing in the - socket—for it was urged round by the whirling wheels at each end—gave - forth a sound as of a pipe, when the daughters of the Sun, hasting to - convey me into the light, threw back their veils from off their faces - and left the abode of Night. <<10>> - - There are the gates of the ways of Night and Day,[432] fitted above - with a lintel and below with a threshold of stone. They themselves, - high in the air, are closed by mighty doors, and Avenging Justice - keeps the keys that fit them. Her did the maidens entreat with gentle - words and cunningly persuade <<15>> to unfasten without demur the - bolted bars from the gates. Then, when the doors were thrown back, - they disclosed a wide opening, when their brazen posts fitted with - rivets and nails swung back one after the other. Straight through - them, on the broad way, did the maidens guide the horses and the - <<20>> car, and the goddess greeted me kindly, and took my right hand - in hers, and spake to me these words: - - Welcome, O youth, that comest to my abode on the car that bears thee - tended by immortal charioteers! It is no ill <<25>> chance, but right - and justice that has sent thee forth to travel on this way. Far, - indeed, does it lie from the beaten track of men! Meet it is that thou - shouldst learn all things, as well the unshaken heart of well-rounded - truth, as the opinions of mortals in which is no true belief at all. - Yet <<30>> none the less shalt thou learn these things also,—how they - should have judged that the things which seem to them are,—as thou - goest through all things in thy journey.[433] - - * * * * * - - But do thou restrain thy thought from this way of inquiry, nor let - habit by its much experience force thee to cast upon this way a - wandering eye or sounding ear or tongue; but <<35>> judge by argument - the much disputed proof uttered by me. There is only one way left that - can be spoken of.[434]... R. P. 113. - - THE WAY OF TRUTH - - (2) - - Look steadfastly with thy mind at things though afar as if they were - at hand. Thou canst not cut off what is from holding fast to what is, - neither scattering itself abroad in order nor coming together. R. P. - 118 a. - - (3) - - It is all one to me where I begin; for I shall come back again there. - - (4, 5) - - Come now, I will tell thee—and do thou hearken to my saying and carry - it away—the only two ways of search that can be thought of. The first, - namely, that _It is_, and that it is impossible for it not to be, is - the way of belief, for truth is its companion. The other, namely, that - _It is not_, and that <<5>> it must needs not be,—that, I tell thee, - is a path that none can learn of at all. For thou canst not know what - is not—that is impossible—nor utter it; for it is the same thing that - can be thought and that can be.[435] R. P. 114. - - (6) - - It needs must be that what can be thought and spoken of is; for it is - possible for it to be, and it is not possible for what is nothing to - be.[436] This is what I bid thee ponder. I hold thee back from this - first way of inquiry, and from this other also, upon which mortals - knowing naught wander <<5>> two-faced; for helplessness guides the - wandering thought in their breasts, so that they are borne along - stupefied like men deaf and blind. Undiscerning crowds, in whose eyes - it is, and is not, the same and not the same,[437] and all things - travel in opposite directions![438] R. P. 115. - - (7) - - For this shall never be proved, that the things that are not are; and - do thou restrain thy thought from this way of inquiry. R. P. 116. - - (8) - - One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that _It is_. In it - are very many tokens that what is is uncreated and indestructible; for - it is complete,[439] immovable, and without end. Nor was it ever, nor - will it be; for now _it is_, all at once, a continuous one. For what - kind of origin for it wilt <<5>> thou look for? In what way and from - what source could it have drawn its increase? I shall not let thee say - nor think that it came from what is not; for it can neither be thought - nor uttered that anything is not. And, if it came from nothing, what - need could have made it arise later rather than sooner? <<10>> - Therefore must it either be altogether or be not at all. Nor will the - force of truth suffer aught to arise besides itself from that which is - not.[440] Wherefore, Justice doth not loose her fetters and let - anything come into being or pass away, but holds it fast. Our judgment - thereon depends on this: “_Is it_ <<15>> or _is it not_?” Surely it is - adjudged, as it needs must be, that we are to set aside the one way as - unthinkable and nameless (for it is no true way), and that the other - path is real and true. How, then, can what _is_ be going to be in the - future? Or how could it come into being? If it came into <<20>> being, - it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future. Thus is - becoming extinguished and passing away not to be heard of. R. P. 117. - - Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike, and there is no more[441] - of it in one place than in another, to hinder it from holding - together, nor less of it, but everything is full of what is. Wherefore - it is wholly continuous; for what is, is in contact <<25>> with what - is. - - Moreover, it is immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without - beginning and without end; since coming into being and passing away - have been driven afar, and true belief has cast them away. It is the - same, and it rests in the self-same place, abiding in itself. And thus - it remaineth constant in <<30>> its place; for hard necessity keeps it - in the bonds of the limit that holds it fast on every side. Wherefore - it is not permitted to what is to be infinite; for it is in need of - nothing; while, if it were infinite, it would stand in need of - everything.[442] R. P. 118. - - The thing that can be thought and that for the sake of which the - thought exists is the same;[443] for you cannot find <<35>> thought - without something that is, as to which it is uttered.[444] And there - is not, and never shall be, anything besides what is, since fate has - chained it so as to be whole and immovable. Wherefore all these things - are but names which mortals have given, believing them to be - true—coming into being and <<40>> passing away, being and not being, - change of place and alteration of bright colour. R. P. 119. - - Since, then, it has a furthest limit, it is complete on every side, - like the mass of a rounded sphere, equally poised from the centre in - every direction; for it cannot be greater or <<45>> smaller in one - place than in another. For there is no nothing that could keep it from - reaching out equally, nor can aught that is be more here and less - there than what is, since it is all inviolable. For the point from - which it is equal in every direction tends equally to the limits. R. - P. 120. - - - THE WAY OF OPINION - - Here shall I close my trustworthy speech and thought <<50>> about the - truth. Henceforward learn the opinions of mortals, giving ear to the - deceptive ordering of my words. - - Mortals have made up their minds to name two forms, one of which they - should not name,[445] and that is where they go astray from the truth. - They have distinguished them as <<55>> opposite in form, and have - assigned to them marks distinct from one another. To the one they - allot the fire of heaven, gentle, very light, in every direction the - same as itself, but not the same as the other. The other is just the - opposite to it, dark night, a compact and heavy body. Of these I tell - thee <<60>> the whole arrangement as it seems likely; for so no - thought of mortals will ever outstrip thee. R. P. 121. - - (9) - - Now that all things have been named light and night, and the names - which belong to the power of each have been assigned to these things - and to those, everything is full at once of light and dark night, both - equal, since neither has aught to do with the other. - - (10, 11) - - And thou shalt know the substance of the sky, and all the signs in the - sky, and the resplendent works of the glowing sun’s pure torch, and - whence they arose. And thou shalt learn likewise of the wandering - deeds of the round-faced moon, and of her substance. Thou shalt know, - too, the heavens that surround <<5>> us, whence they arose, and how - Necessity took them and bound them to keep the limits of the stars ... - how the earth, and the sun, and the moon, and the sky that is common - to all, and the Milky Way, and the outermost Olympos, and the burning - might of the stars arose. <<10>> R. P. 123, 124. - - (12) - - The narrower rings are filled with unmixed fire, and those next them - with night, and in the midst of these rushes their portion of fire. In - the midst of these circles is the divinity that directs the course of - all things; for she is the beginner of all painful birth and all - begetting, driving the female to the <<5>> embrace of the male, and - the male to that of the female. R. P. 125. - - (13) - - First of all the gods she contrived Eros. R. P. 125. - - (14) - - Shining by night with borrowed light,[446] wandering round the earth. - - (15) - - Always looking to the beams of the sun. - - (16) - - For just as thought finds at any time the mixture of its erring - organs, so does it come to men; for that which thinks is the same, - namely, the substance of the limbs, in each and every man; for their - thought is that of which there is more in them.[447] R. P. 128. - - (17) - - On the right boys; on the left girls.[448] - - (19) - - Thus, according to men’s opinions, did things come into being, and - thus they are now. In time they will grow up and pass away. To each of - these things men have assigned a fixed name. R. P. 129 b. - -Footnote 432: - - For these see Hesiod, _Theog._ 748. - -Footnote 433: - - See below, p. 211, _n._ 459. - -Footnote 434: - - I read μῦθος as in the parallel passage fr. 8 _ad init._ Diels’s - interpretation of θυμὸς ὁδοῖο (the MS. reading here) as _ein - lebendiger Weg_ does not convince me, and the confusion of the two - words is fairly common. - -Footnote 435: - - I read with Zeller (p. 558 n. 1, Eng. trans. p. 584, n. 1) τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ - νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι. Apart from the philosophical anachronism of - making Parmenides say that “thought and being are the same,” it is a - grammatical anachronism to make him use the infinitive (with or - without the article) as the subject of a sentence. On the other hand, - he does use the active infinitive after εἶναι in the construction - where we usually use a passive infinitive (Monro, _H. Gr._ § 231 _sub - fin._). Cf. fr. 4, εἰσὶ νοῆσαι, “are for thinking,” _i.e._ “can be - thought.” - -Footnote 436: - - The construction here is the same as that explained in the last note. - It is surprising that good scholars should acquiesce in the - translation of τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τε as “to say and think this.” Then - ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι means “it can be,” not “being is,” and the last phrase - should be construed οὐκ ἔστι μηδὲν (εἶναι). - -Footnote 437: - - I construe οἷς νενόμισται τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν καὶ οὐ - ταὐτόν. The subject of the infinitives πέλειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι is the - _it_, which has to be supplied also with ἔστιν and οὐκ ἔστιν. This way - of taking the words makes it unnecessary to believe that Parmenides - said (τὸ) οὐκ εἶναι instead of (τὸ) μὴ εἶναι for “not-being.” There is - no difference between πέλειν and εἶναι except in rhythmical value. - -Footnote 438: - - I take πάντων as neuter and understand παλίντροπος κέλευθος as - equivalent to the ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω of Herakleitos. I do not think it has - anything to do with the παλίντονος (or παλίντροπος) ἁρμονίη. See Chap. - III. p. 150, _n._ 347. - -Footnote 439: - - I still prefer to read ἔστι γὰρ οὐλομελές with Plutarch (_adv. Col._ - 1114 c). Proklos (_in Parm._ 1152, 24) also read οὐλομελές. - Simplicius, who has μουνογενές here, calls the One of Parmenides - ὁλομελές elsewhere (_Phys._ p. 137, 15). The reading of [Plut.] - _Strom._ 5, μοῦνον μουνογενές helps to explain the confusion. We have - only to suppose that the letters μ, ν, γ were written above the line - in the Academy copy of Parmenides by some one who had _Tim._ 31 b 3 in - mind. - -Footnote 440: - - Diels formerly read ἔκ πη ἐόντος, “from that which in any way is”; but - he has now reverted to the reading ἔκ μὴ ἐόντος, supposing that the - other horn of the dilemma has dropped out. In any case, “nothing but - what is not can arise from what is not” gives a perfectly good sense. - -Footnote 441: - - For the difficulties which have been felt about μᾶλλον here, see - Diels’s note. If the word is to be pressed, his interpretation is - admissible; but it seems to me that this is simply an instance of - “polar expression.” It is true that it is only the case of there being - less of what is in one place than another that is important for the - divisibility of the One; but if there is less in one place, there is - more in another _than in that place_. The Greek language tends to - express these implications. The position of the relative clause makes - a difficulty for us, but hardly for a Greek. - -Footnote 442: - - Simplicius certainly read μὴ ἐὸν δ’ ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο, which is - metrically impossible. I followed Bergk in deleting μή, and have - interpreted with Zeller. So too Diels. - -Footnote 443: - - For the construction of ἔστι νοεῖν, see above, p. 198, _n._ 435. - -Footnote 444: - - As Diels rightly points out, the Ionic φατίζειν is equivalent to - ὀνομάζειν. The meaning, I think, is this. We may name things as we - choose, but there can be no thought corresponding to a name that is - not the name of something real. - -Footnote 445: - - This is Zeller’s way of taking the words, and still seems to me the - best. Diels objects that ἑτέρην would be required, and renders _nur - eine derselben, das sei unerlaubt_, giving the words to the “mortals.” - This seems to me to involve more serious grammatical difficulties than - the use of μίαν for τὴν ἑτέραν, which is quite legitimate when there - is an emphasis on the number. Aristotle must have taken it so; for he - infers that one of the μορφαί is to be identified with τὸ ἐόν. - -Footnote 446: - - Note the curious echo of _Il._ v. 214. Empedokles has it too (v. 154). - It appears to be a joke, made in the spirit of Xenophanes, when it was - first discovered that the moon shone by reflected light. - -Footnote 447: - - This fragment of the theory of knowledge which was expounded in the - second part of the poem of Parmenides must be taken in connexion with - what we are told by Theophrastos in the “Fragment on Sensation” - (_Dox._ p. 499; cf. p. 222). It appears from this that he said the - character of men’s thought depended upon the preponderance of the - light or the dark element in their bodies. They are wise when the - light element predominates, and foolish when the dark gets the upper - hand. - -Footnote 448: - - This is a fragment of Parmenides’s embryology. Diels’s fr. 18 is a - retranslation of the Latin hexameters of Caelius Aurelianus quoted R. - P. 127 a. - -[Sidenote: “It is.”] - -86. In the First Part of his poem, we find Parmenides chiefly interested -to prove that _it is_; but it is not quite obvious at first sight what -it is precisely that _is_. He says simply, _What is, is_. To us this -does not seem very clear, and that for two reasons. In the first place, -we should never think of doubting it, and we cannot, therefore, -understand why it should be asserted with such iteration and vigour. In -the second place, we are accustomed to all sorts of distinctions between -different kinds and degrees of reality, and we do not see which of these -is meant. Such distinctions, however, were quite unknown in those days. -“That which is,” with Parmenides, is primarily what, in popular -language, we call matter or body; only it is not matter as distinguished -from anything else. It is certainly regarded as spatially extended; for -it is quite seriously spoken of as a sphere (fr. 8, 40). Moreover, -Aristotle tells us that Parmenides believed in none but a sensible -reality, which does not necessarily mean with him a reality that is -actually perceived by the senses, but includes any which might be so -perceived if the senses were more perfect than they are.[449] Parmenides -does not say a word about “Being” anywhere.[450] The assertion that _it -is_ amounts just to this, that the universe is a _plenum_; and that -there is no such thing as empty space, either inside or outside the -world. From this it follows that there can be no such thing as motion. -Instead of endowing the One with an impulse to change, as Herakleitos -had done, and thus making it capable of explaining the world, Parmenides -dismissed change as an illusion. He showed once for all that if you take -the One seriously you are bound to deny everything else. All previous -solutions of the question, therefore, had missed the point. Anaximenes, -who thought to save the unity of the primary substance by his theory of -rarefaction and condensation, did not observe that, by assuming there -was less of what is in one place than another, he virtually affirmed the -existence of what is not (fr. 8, 42). The Pythagorean explanation -implied that empty space or air existed outside the world, and that it -entered into it to separate the units (§ 53). It, too, assumes the -existence of what is not. Nor is the theory of Herakleitos any more -satisfactory; for it is based upon the contradiction that fire both is -and is not (fr. 6). - -Footnote 449: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Γ, 1. 298 b 21, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ (οἱ περὶ Μέλισσόν τε καὶ - Παρμενίδην) διὰ τὸ μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίαν - ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι κ.τ.λ. So too Eudemos, in the first book of his - Physics (_ap._ Simpl. _Phys._ p. 133, 25), said of Parmenides: τὸ μὲν - οὖν κοινὸν οὐκ ἂν λέγοι. οὔτε γὰρ ἐζητεῖτό πω τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ’ ὕστερον - ἐκ τῶν λόγων προήλθεν, οὔτε ἐπιδέχοιτο ἂν ἂ τῷ ὅντι ἐπιλέγει. πῶς γὰρ - ἔσται τοῦτο “μέσσοθεν ἰσοπαλὲς” καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; τῷ δὲ οὐρανῷ (the - world) σχεδὸν πάντες ἐφαρμόσουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι The Neoplatonists, - of course, saw in the One the νοητὸς κόσμος, and Simplicius calls the - sphere a “mythical figment.” See especially Baümker, “Die Einheit des - Parmenideischen Seiendes” (_Jahrb. f. kl. Phil._ 1886, pp. 541 sqq.), - and _Das Problem der Materie_, pp. 50 sqq. - -Footnote 450: - - We must not render τὸ ἐόν by “Being,” _das Sein_ or _l’être_. It is - “what is,” _das Seiende, ce qui est_. As to (τὸ) εἶναι it does not, - and could not, occur. Cf. p. 198, _n._ 435, above. - -The allusion to Herakleitos in the verses last referred to has been -doubted, though upon insufficient grounds. Zeller points out quite -rightly that Herakleitos never says Being and not-Being are the same -(the common translation of fr. 6, 8); and, were there nothing more than -this, the reference might well seem doubtful. The statement, however, -that, according to the view in question, “all things travel in opposite -directions,” can hardly be understood of anything but the “upward and -downward path” of Herakleitos (§ 71). And, as we have seen, Parmenides -does not attribute the view that Being and not-Being are the same to the -philosopher whom he is attacking; he only says that _it_ is and is not, -the same and not the same.[451] That is the natural meaning of the -words; and it furnishes a very accurate description of the theory of -Herakleitos. - -Footnote 451: - - See above, p. 198, _n._ 437. - -[Sidenote: The method of Parmenides.] - -87. The great novelty in the poem of Parmenides is the method of -argument. He first asks what is the common presupposition of all the -views with which he has to deal, and he finds that this is the existence -of what is not. The next question is whether this can be thought, and -the answer is that it cannot. If you think at all, you must think of -something. Therefore there is no nothing. Philosophy had not yet learned -to make the admission that a thing might be unthinkable and nevertheless -exist. Only that can be which can be thought (fr. 5); for thought exists -for the sake of what is (fr. 8, 34). - -This method Parmenides carries out with the utmost rigour. He will not -have us pretend that we think what we must admit to be unthinkable. It -is true that if we resolve to allow nothing but what we can understand, -we come into direct conflict with the evidence of our senses, which -present us with a world of change and decay. So much the worse for the -senses, says Parmenides. To many this will doubtless seem a mistake on -his part, but let us see what history has to say on the point. The -theory of Parmenides is the inevitable outcome of a corporeal monism, -and his bold declaration of it ought to have destroyed that theory for -ever. If he had lacked courage to work out the prevailing views of his -time to their logical conclusion, and to accept that conclusion, however -paradoxical it might seem to be, men might have gone on in the endless -circle of opposition, rarefaction and condensation, one and many, for -ever. It was the thorough-going dialectic of Parmenides that made -progress possible. Philosophy must now cease to be monistic or cease to -be corporealist. It could not cease to be corporealist; for the -incorporeal was still unknown. It therefore ceased to be monistic, and -arrived at the atomic theory, which, so far as we know, is the last word -of the view that the world is matter in motion. Having worked out its -problems on those conditions, philosophy next attacked them on the other -side. It ceased to be corporealist, and found it possible to be monistic -once more, at least for a time. This progress would have been impossible -but for that faith in reason which gave Parmenides the courage to reject -as untrue what was to him unthinkable, however strange the result might -be. - -[Sidenote: The results.] - -88. He goes on to develop all the consequences of the admission that _it -is_. It must be uncreated and indestructible. It cannot have arisen out -of nothing; for there is no such thing as nothing. Nor can it have -arisen from something; for there is no room for anything but itself. -What is cannot have beside it any empty space in which something else -might arise; for empty space is nothing, nothing cannot be thought, and -therefore cannot exist. What is, never came into being, nor is anything -going to come into being in the future. “Is it or is it not?” If it is, -then it is now, all at once. - -That Parmenides was really denying the existence of empty space was -quite well known to Plato. He says that Parmenides held “all things were -one, and that the one remains at rest in itself, _having no place in -which to move_.”[452] Aristotle is no less clear. In the _de Caelo_ he -lays it down that Parmenides was driven to take up the position that the -One was immovable just because no one had yet imagined that there was -any reality other than sensible reality.[453] - -Footnote 452: - - Plato, _Tht._ 180 e 3, ὡς ἕν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ - οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται. - -Footnote 453: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Γ, 1. 298 b 21, quoted above, p. 203, _n._ 449. - -That which is, is; and it cannot be more or less. There is, therefore, -as much of it in one place as in another, and the world is a continuous, -indivisible _plenum_. From this it follows at once that it must be -immovable. If it moved, it must move into an empty space, and there is -no empty space. It is hemmed in by _what is_, by the real, on every -side. For the same reason, it must be finite, and can have nothing -beyond it. It is complete in itself, and has no need to stretch out -indefinitely into an empty space that does not exist. Hence, too, it is -spherical. It is equally real in every direction, and the sphere is the -only form which meets this condition. Any other would _be_ in one -direction more than in another. And this sphere cannot even move round -its own axis; for there is nothing outside of it with reference to which -it could be said to move. - -[Sidenote: Parmenides the father of materialism.] - -89. To sum up. What _is_, is a finite, spherical, motionless corporeal -_plenum_, and there is nothing beyond it. The appearances of -multiplicity and motion, empty space and time, are illusions. We see -from this that the primary substance of which the early cosmologists -were in search has now become a sort of “thing in itself.” It never -quite lost this character again. What appears later as the elements of -Empedokles, the so-called “homoeomeries” of Anaxagoras and the atoms of -Leukippos and Demokritos, is just the Parmenidean “being.” Parmenides is -not, as some have said, the “father of idealism”; on the contrary, all -materialism depends on his view of reality. - -[Sidenote: The beliefs of “mortals.”] - -90. It is commonly said that, in the Second Part of his poem, Parmenides -offered a dualistic theory of the origin of things as his own -conjectural explanation of the sensible world, or that, as Gomperz says, -“What he offered were the Opinions of Mortals; and this description did -not merely cover other people’s opinions. It included his own as well, -as far as they were not confined to the unassailable ground of an -apparent philosophical necessity.”[454] Now it is true that in one place -Aristotle appears to countenance a view of this sort, but nevertheless -it is an anachronism.[455] Nor is it really Aristotle’s view. He was -perfectly well aware that Parmenides did not admit the existence of -“not-being” in any degree whatever; but it was a natural way speaking to -call the cosmology of the Second Part of the poem that of Parmenides. -His hearers would understand at once in what sense this was meant. At -any rate, the Peripatetic tradition was that Parmenides, in the Second -Part of the poem, meant to give the belief of “the many.” This is how -Theophrastos put the matter, and Alexander seems to have spoken of the -cosmology as something which Parmenides himself regarded as wholly -false.[456] The other view comes from the Neoplatonists, and especially -Simplicius, who very naturally regarded the Way of Truth as an account -of the intelligible world, and the Way of Opinion as a description of -the sensible. It need hardly be said that this is almost as great an -anachronism as the Kantian parallelism suggested by Gomperz.[457] -Parmenides himself tells us in the most unequivocal language that there -is no truth at all in the theory which he expounds, and he gives it -merely as the belief of “mortals.” It was this that led Theophrastos to -speak of it as the opinion of “the many.” - -Footnote 454: - - _Greek Thinkers_, pp. 180 sqq. - -Footnote 455: - - _Met._ Α, 5. 986 b 31 (R. P. 121 a). Aristotle’s way of putting the - matter is due to his interpretation of fr. 8, 54, which he took to - mean that one of the two “forms” was to be identified with τὸ ὄν and - the other with τὸ μὴ ὄν. Cf. _Gen. Corr._ Α, 3. 318 b 6, ὥσπερ - Παρμενίδης λέγει δύο, τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι φάσκων. This last - sentence shows clearly that when Aristotle says Παρμενίδης, he means - what we should call “Parmenides.” He cannot have supposed that - Parmenides admitted the being of τὸ μὴ ὄν in any sense whatever (cf. - Plato, _Soph._ 241 d 5). - -Footnote 456: - - Theophr. _Phys. Op._ fr. 6 (_Dox._ p. 482; R. P. 121 a), κατὰ δόξαν δὲ - τῶν πολλῶν εἰς τὸ γένεσιν ἀποδοῦναι τῶν φαινομένων δύο ποιῶν τὰς - ἀρχάς. For Alexander cf. Simpl. _Phys._ p. 38, 24. - -Footnote 457: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 39, 10 (R. P. 121 b). Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, p. - 180. E. Meyer says (_Gesch. des Alterth._ iv. § 510, _Anm._): “How too - can we think that a teacher of wisdom taught his disciples nothing as - to the way in which they must take the existing sensible world, even - if only as a deception?” This implies (1) that the distinction between - Appearance and Reality had been clearly grasped; and (2) that a - certain hypothetical and relative truth was allowed to Appearance. - These are palpable anachronisms. Both views are Platonic, and they - were not held even by Plato in his earlier writings. - -His explanation however, though preferable to that of Simplicius, is not -convincing either. “The many” are as far as possible from believing in -an elaborate dualism such as Parmenides expounded, and it is a highly -artificial hypothesis to assume that he wished to show how the popular -view of the world could best be systematised. “The many” would hardly be -convinced of their error by having their beliefs presented to them in a -form which they would certainly fail to recognise. This, indeed, seems -the most incredible interpretation of all. It still, however, finds -adherents, so it is necessary to point out that the beliefs in question -are called “the opinions of mortals” simply because the speaker is a -goddess. Further, we have to note that Parmenides forbids two ways of -research, and we have seen that the second of these, which is also -expressly ascribed to “mortals,” must be the system of Herakleitos. We -should surely expect, then, to find that the other way too is the system -of some contemporary school, and it seems hard to discover any of -sufficient importance except the Pythagorean. Now it is admitted by -every one that there are Pythagorean ideas in the Second Part of the -poem, and it is therefore to be presumed, in the absence of evidence to -the contrary, that the whole system comes from the same source. It does -not appear that Parmenides said any more about Herakleitos than the -words to which we have just referred, in which he forbids the second way -of inquiry. He implies, indeed, that there are really only two ways that -can be thought of, and that the attempt of Herakleitos to combine them -was futile.[458] In any case, the Pythagoreans were far more serious -opponents at that date in Italy, and it is certainly to them that we -should expect Parmenides to define his attitude. - -Footnote 458: - - Cf. frs. 4 and 6, especially the words αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι - νοῆσαι. The third way, that of Herakleitos, is only added as an - afterthought—αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ’ ἀπὸ τῆς κ.τ.λ. - -It is still not quite clear, however, why he should have thought it -worth while to put into hexameters a view which he believed to be false. -Here it becomes important to remember that he had been a Pythagorean -himself, and that the poem is a renunciation of his former beliefs. In -such cases men commonly feel the necessity of showing where their old -views were wrong. The goddess tells him that he must learn of those -beliefs also “how men ought to have judged that the things which seem to -them really are.”[459] That is clear so far; but it does not explain the -matter fully. We get a further hint in another place. He is to learn -these beliefs “in order that no opinion of mortals may ever get the -better of him” (fr. 8, 61). If we remember that the Pythagorean system -at this time was handed down by oral tradition alone, we shall perhaps -see what this means. Parmenides was founding a dissident school, and it -was quite necessary for him to instruct his disciples in the system they -might be called upon to oppose. In any case, they could not reject it -intelligently without a knowledge of it, and this Parmenides had to -supply himself.[460] - -Footnote 459: - - I read χρῆν δοκιμῶσ’ εἶναι in fr. 1, 32 with Diels, but I do not feel - able to accept his rendering _wie man bei gründlicher Durchforschung - annehmen müsste, dass sich jenes Scheinwesen verhalte_. We must, I - think, take χρῆν δοκιμῶσαι (_i.e._ δοκιμάσαι) quite strictly, and χρῆν - with the infinitive means “ought to have.” The most natural subject - for the infinitive in that case is βροτούς, while εἶναι will be - dependent on δοκιμῶσαι, and have τὰ δοκοῦντα for its subject. This way - of taking the words is confirmed by fr. 8, 54, τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών - ἐστιν, if taken as I have taken it with Zeller. See above, p. 201, - _n._ 445. - -Footnote 460: - - The view that the opinions contained in the Second Part are those of - others, and are not given as true in any sense whatsoever, is that of - Diels. The objections of Wilamowitz (_Hermes_, xxxiv. pp. 203 sqq.) do - not appear to me cogent. If we interpret him rightly, Parmenides never - says that “this hypothetical explanation is ... better than that of - any one else” (E. Meyer, iv. § 510, _Anm._). What he does say is that - it is untrue altogether. It seems to me, however, that Diels has - weakened his case by refusing to identify the theory here expounded - with Pythagoreanism, and referring it mainly to Herakleitos. - Herakleitos was emphatically _not_ a dualist, and I cannot see that to - represent him as one is even what Diels calls a “caricature” of his - theory. Caricatures must have some point of likeness. It is still more - surprising to me that Patin, who makes ἓν πάντα εἶναι the corner-stone - of Herakleiteanism, should adopt this view (_Parmenides im Kampfe - gegen Heraklit_, 1899). E. Meyer (_loc. cit._) seems to think that the - fact of Zeno’s having modified the δόξα of Parmenides in an - Empedoklean sense (Diog. ix. 29; R. P. 140) proves that it was - supposed to have some sort of truth. On the contrary, it would only - show, if true, that Zeno had other opponents to face than Parmenides - had. - -[Sidenote: The dualist cosmology.] - -91. The view that the Second Part of the poem of Parmenides was a sketch -of contemporary Pythagorean cosmology is, doubtless, incapable of -rigorous demonstration, but it can, I think, be made extremely probable. -The entire history of Pythagoreanism up to the end of the fifth century -B.C. is certainly conjectural; but, if we find in Parmenides ideas which -are wholly unconnected with his own view of the world, and if we find -precisely the same ideas in later Pythagoreanism, the most natural -inference will surely be that the later Pythagoreans derived these views -from their predecessors, and that they formed part of the original -stock-in-trade of the society to which they belonged. This will only be -confirmed if we find that they are developments of certain features in -the old Ionian cosmology. Pythagoras came from Samos, which always stood -in the closest relations with Miletos; and it was not, so far as we can -see, in his cosmological views that he chiefly displayed his -originality. It has been pointed out above (§ 53) that the idea of the -world breathing came from Anaximenes, and we need not be surprised to -find traces of Anaximander as well. Now, if we were confined to what -Aristotle tells us on this subject, it would be almost impossible to -make out a case; but his statements require, as usual, to be examined -with a certain amount of care. He says, first of all, that the two -elements of Parmenides were the Warm and the Cold.[461] In this he is so -far justified by the fragments that, since the Fire of which Parmenides -speaks is, of course, warm, the other “form,” which has all the opposite -qualities, must of necessity be cold. But, nevertheless, the habitual -use of the terms “_the_ warm” and “_the_ cold” is an accommodation to -Aristotle’s own system. In Parmenides himself they were simply one pair -of attributes amongst others. - -Footnote 461: - - _Met._ Α, 5. 986 b 34, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν; _Phys._ Α, 5. 188 a 20; - _Gen. Corr._ Α, 3. 318 b 6; Β, 3. 330 b 14. - -Still more misleading is Aristotle’s identification of these with Fire -and Earth. It is not quite certain that he meant to say Parmenides -himself made this identification; but, on the whole, it is most likely -that he did, and Theophrastos certainly followed him in this.[462] It is -another question whether it is accurate. Simplicius, who had the poem -before him (§ 85), after mentioning Fire and Earth, at once adds “or -rather Light and Darkness”;[463] and this is suggestive enough. Lastly, -Aristotle’s identification of the dense element with “what is not,”[464] -the unreal of the First Part of the poem, is not very easy to reconcile -with the view that it is earth. On the other hand, if we suppose that -the second of the two “forms,” the one which should not have been -“named,” is the Pythagorean Air or Void, we get a very good explanation -of Aristotle’s identification of it with “what is not.” We seem, then, -to be justified in neglecting the identification of the dense element -with earth for the present. At a later stage, we shall be able to see -how it may have originated.[465] The further statement of Theophrastos, -that the Warm was the efficient cause and the Cold the material or -passive,[466] is intelligible enough if we identify them with the Limit -and the Unlimited respectively; but is not, of course, to be regarded as -historical. - -Footnote 462: - - _Phys._ Α, 5. 188 a 21, ταῦτα δὲ (θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν) προσαγορεύει πῦρ - καὶ γῆν; _Met._ Α, 5. 986 b 34, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν λέγων. Cf. Theophr. - _Phys. Op._ fr. 6 (_Dox._ p. 482; R. P. 121 a). [Plut.] _Strom._ fr. 5 - (_Dox._ p. 581), λέγει δὲ τῆν γῆν τοῦ πυκνοῦ καταρρυέντος ἀέρος - γεγονέναι. Zeller, p. 568, n. 1 (Eng. trans. p. 593, n. 2). - -Footnote 463: - - _Phys._ p. 25, 15, ὡς Παρμενίδης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν πῦρ καὶ γῆν (ἢ - μᾶλλον φῶς καὶ σκότος). - -Footnote 464: - - _Met._ Α, 5. 986 b 35, τούτων δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὂν τὸ θερμὸν τάττει, - θάτερον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν. See above, p. 208, _n._ 457. - -Footnote 465: - - See below, Chap. VII. § 147. - -Footnote 466: - - Theophr. _Phys. Op._ fr. 6 (_Dox._ p. 482; R. P. 121 a), followed by - the doxographers. - -We have seen that Simplicius, with the poem of Parmenides before him, -corrects Aristotle by substituting Light and Darkness for Fire and -Earth, and in this he is amply borne out by the fragments which he -quotes. Parmenides himself calls one “form” Light, Flame, and Fire, and -the other Night, and we have now to consider whether these can be -identified with the Pythagorean Limit and Unlimited. We have seen good -reason to believe (§ 58) that the idea of the world breathing belonged -to the earliest form of Pythagoreanism, and there can be no difficulty -in identifying this “boundless breath” with Darkness, which stands very -well for the Unlimited. “Air” or mist was always regarded as the dark -element.[467] And that which gives definiteness to the vague darkness is -certainly light or fire, and this may account for the prominence given -to that element by Hippasos.[468] We may probably conclude, then, that -the Pythagorean distinction between the Limit and the Unlimited, which -we shall have to consider later (Chap. VII.), made its first appearance -in this crude form. If, on the other hand, we identify darkness with the -Limit, and light with the Unlimited, as most critics do, we get into -insuperable difficulties. - -Footnote 467: - - Note the identification of the dense element with “air” in [Plut.] - _Strom._, quoted p. 213, _n._ 462; and for the identification of this - “air” with “mist and darkness,” cf. Chap. I. § 27, and Chap. V. § 107. - It is to be observed further that Plato puts this last identification - into the mouth of a Pythagorean (_Tim._ 52 d). - -Footnote 468: - - See above, p. 121. - -[Sidenote: The heavenly bodies.] - -92. We must now look at the general cosmical view expounded in the -Second Part of the poem. The fragments are scanty, and the doxographical -tradition hard to interpret; but enough remains to show that here, too, -we are on Pythagorean ground. All discussion of the subject must start -from the following important passage of Aetios:— - - Parmenides held that there were crowns crossing one another[469] and - encircling one another, formed of the rare and the dense element - respectively, and that between these there were other mixed crowns - made up of light and darkness. That which surrounds them all was solid - like a wall, and under it is a fiery crown. That which is in the - middle of all the crowns is also solid, and surrounded in turn by a - fiery circle. The central circle of the mixed crowns is the cause of - movement and becoming to all the rest. He calls it “the goddess who - directs their course,” “the Holder of Lots,” and “Necessity.” Aet. ii. - 7. 1 (R. P. 126). - -Footnote 469: - - It seems most likely that ἐπαλλήλους here means “crossing one - another,” as the Milky Way crosses the Zodiac. The term ἐπάλληλος is - opposed to παράλληλος. - -[Sidenote: The “crowns.”] - -93. The first thing we have to observe is that it is quite unjustifiable -to regard these “crowns” as spheres. The word στέφαναι can mean “rims” -or “brims” or anything of that sort, but it seems incredible that it -should be used of spheres. It does not appear, either, that the solid -circle which surrounds all the crowns is to be regarded as spherical. -The expression “like a wall” would be highly inappropriate in that case. -We seem, then, to be face to face with something of the same kind as the -“wheels” of Anaximander, and it is obviously quite likely that -Pythagoras should have taken this theory from him. Nor is evidence -altogether lacking that the Pythagoreans did regard the heavenly bodies -in this way. In Plato’s Myth of Er, which is certainly Pythagorean in -its general character, we do not hear of spheres, but of the “lips” of -concentric whorls fitted into one another like a nest of boxes.[470] -Even in the _Timaeus_ there are no spheres, but bands or strips crossing -each other at an angle.[471] Lastly, in the Homeric _Hymn to Ares_, -which seems to have been composed under Pythagorean influence, the word -used for the orbit of the planet is ἄντυξ, which must mean “rim.”[472] - -Footnote 470: - - _Rep._ x. 616 d 5, καθάπερ οἱ κάδοι οἱ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἁρμόττοντες; e 1, - κύκλους ἄνωθεν τὰ χείλη φαίνοντας (σφονδύλους). - -Footnote 471: - - _Tim._ 36 b 6, ταύτην οὖν τὴν σύστασιν πᾶσαν διπλῆν κατὰ μῆκος σχίσας, - μέσην πρὸς μέσην ἐκατέραν ἀλλήλαις οἷον χεῖ (the letter Χ) προσβαλὼν - κατέκαμψεν εἰς ἓν κύκλῳ. - -Footnote 472: - - _Hymn to Ares_, 6: - - πυραυγέα κύκλον ἑλίσσων - αἰθέρος ἑπταπόροις ἐνὶ τείρεσιν, ἔνθα σε πῶλοι - ζαφλεγέες τριτάτης ὑπὲρ ἄντυγος αἰὲν ἔχουσι. - - So, in allusion to an essentially Pythagorean view, Proclus says to - the planet Venus (h. iv. 17): - - εἴτε καὶ ἑπτὰ κύκλων ὑπὲρ ἄντυγας αἰθέρα ναίεις. - -The fact is, there is really no evidence that any one ever adopted the -theory of celestial spheres at all, till Aristotle turned the -geometrical construction which Eudoxos had set up as a hypothesis “to -save appearances” (σῴζειν τὰ φαινόμενα ) into real things.[473] From -that time forward we hear a great deal about spheres, and it was natural -that later writers should attribute them to the Pythagoreans; but there -is no occasion to do violence to the language of Parmenides by turning -his “crowns” into anything of the sort. At this date, spheres would not -have served to explain anything that could not be explained more simply -without them. - -Footnote 473: - - On the concentric spheres of Eudoxos, see Dreyer, _Planetary Systems_, - chap. iv. It is unfortunate that the account of Plato’s astronomy - given in this work is wholly inadequate, owing to the writer’s - excessive reliance on Boeckh, who was led by evidence now generally - regarded as untrustworthy to attribute all the astronomy of the - Academy to their predecessors, and especially to Philolaos. - -We are next told that these “crowns” encircle one another or are folded -over one another, and that they are made of the rare and the dense -element. We also learn that between them are “mixed crowns” made up of -light and darkness. Now it is to be observed, in the first place, that -light and darkness are exactly the same thing as the rare and the dense, -and it looks as if there was some confusion here. It may be doubted -whether these statements are based on anything else than fr. 12, which -might certainly be interpreted to mean that between the crowns of fire -there were crowns of night with a portion of fire in them. That may be -right; but I think it is rather more natural to understand the passage -as saying that the narrower circles are surrounded by wider circles of -night, each with its portion of fire rushing in the midst of it. These -last words would then be a simple repetition of the statement that the -narrower circles are filled with unmixed fire,[474] and we should have a -fairly exact reproduction of the planetary system of Anaximander. It is, -however, possible, though I think less likely, that Parmenides -represented the space between the circles as occupied by similar rings -in which the fire and darkness were mixed instead of having the fire -enclosed in the darkness. - -Footnote 474: - - Such a repetition (παλινδρομία) is characteristic of all Greek style, - but the repetition at the end of the period generally adds a new touch - to the statement at the opening. The new touch is here given in the - word ἵεται. I do not press this interpretation, but it seems to me - much the simplest. - -[Sidenote: The goddess.] - -94. “In the middle of those,” says Parmenides, “is the goddess who -steers the course of all things.” Aetios, that is, Theophrastos, -explains this to mean in the middle of the mixed crowns, while -Simplicius declares that it means in the middle of all the crowns, that -is to say, in the centre of the world.[475] It is not very likely that -either of them had anything better to go upon than the words of -Parmenides just quoted, and these are ambiguous. Simplicius, as is clear -from the language he uses, identified this goddess with the Pythagorean -Hestia or central fire, while Theophrastos could not do this, because he -knew and stated that Parmenides held the earth to be round and in the -centre of the world.[476] In this very passage we are told that what is -in the middle of all the crowns is solid. The data furnished by -Theophrastos, in fact, exclude the identification of the goddess with -the central fire altogether. We cannot say that what is in the middle of -_all_ the crowns is solid, and that under it there is again a fiery -crown.[477] Nor does it seem fitting to relegate a goddess to the middle -of a solid spherical earth. We must try to find a place for her -elsewhere. - -Footnote 475: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 34, 14 (R. P. 125 b). - -Footnote 476: - - Diog. ix. 21 (R. P. 126 a). - -Footnote 477: - - I do not discuss the interpretation of περὶ ὃ πάλιν πυρώδης which - Diels gave in _Parmenides Lehrgedicht_, p. 104, and which is adopted - in R. P. 162 a, as it is now virtually retracted. In the second - edition of his _Vorsokratiker_ (p. 111) he reads καὶ τὸ μεσαίτατον - πασῶν στερεόν, <ὑφ’ ᾧ> πάλιν πυρώδης [sc. στεφάνη]. That is a flat - contradiction. It is of interest to observe that Mr. Adam also gets - into the interior of the earth in his interpretation of the Myth of - Er. It is instructive, too, because it shows that we are really - dealing with the same order of ideas. The most heroic attempt to save - the central fire for Pythagoras was my own hypothesis of an annular - earth (1st ed. p. 203). This has met with well-deserved ridicule; but - all the same it is the only possible solution on these lines. We shall - see in Chap. VII. that the central fire belongs to the later - development of Pythagoreanism. - -We are further told by Aetios that this goddess was called Ananke and -the “Holder of Lots.”[478] We know already that she steers the course of -all things, that is, that she regulates the motions of the celestial -crowns. Simplicius adds, unfortunately without quoting the actual words, -that she sends souls at one time from the light to the unseen world, at -another from the unseen world to the light.[479] It would be difficult -to describe more exactly what the goddess does in the Myth of Er, and so -here once more we seem to be on Pythagorean ground. It is to be noticed -further that in fr. 10 we read how Ananke took the heavens and compelled -them to hold fast the fixed courses of the stars, and that in fr. 12 we -are told that she is the beginner of all pairing and birth. Lastly, in -fr. 13 we hear that she created Eros first of all the gods. Modern -parallels are dangerous, but it is not really going much beyond what is -written to say that this Eros is the Will to Live, which leads to -successive rebirths of the soul. So we shall find that in Empedokles it -is an ancient oracle or decree of Ananke that causes the gods to fall -and become incarnate in a cycle of births.[480] - -Footnote 478: - - R. P. 126, where Fülleborn’s ingenious emendation κλῃδοῦχον for - κληροῦχον is tacitly adopted. This is based upon the view that Aetios - (or Theophrastos) was thinking of the goddess that keeps the keys in - the Proem (fr. 1, 14). I now think that the κλῆροι of the Myth of Er - are the true explanation of the name. Philo uses the term κληροῦχος - θεός. - -Footnote 479: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 39, 19, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ - ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἀειδές (_i.e._ ἀιδές), ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλίν φησιν. We - should probably connect this with the statement of Diog. ix. 22 (R. P. - 127) that men arose from the sun (reading ἡλίου with the MSS. for the - conjecture ἰλύος in the Basel edition). - -Footnote 480: - - Empedokles, fr. 115. - -We should, then, be more certain of the place which this goddess -occupies in the universe if we could be quite sure where Ananke is in -the Myth of Er. Without, however, raising that vexed question, we may -lay down with some confidence that, according to Theophrastos, she -occupied a position midway between the earth and the heavens. Whether we -believe in the “mixed crowns” or not makes no difference in this -respect; for the statement of Aetios that she was in the middle of the -mixed crowns undoubtedly implies that she was in that region. Now she is -identified with one of the crowns in a somewhat confused passage of -Cicero,[481] and we have seen above (p. 69) that the whole theory of -wheels or crowns was probably suggested by the Milky Way. It seems to -me, therefore, that we must think of the Milky Way as a crown -intermediate between the crowns of the Sun and the Moon, and this agrees -very well with the prominent way in which it is mentioned in fr. 11. It -is better not to be too positive about the other details of the system, -though it is interesting to notice that according to some it was -Pythagoras, and according to others Parmenides, who discovered the -identity of the evening and morning star. That fits in exactly with our -general view.[482] - -Footnote 481: - - Cicero, _de nat. D._ i. 11, 28: “Nam Parmenides quidem commenticium - quiddam coronae simile efficit (στεφάνην appellat), continente ardore - lucis orbem, qui cingat caelum, quem appellat deum.” We may connect - with this the statement of Aetios, ii. 20, 8, τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν - σελήνην ἐκ τοῦ γαλαξίου κύκλου ἀποκριθῆναι. - -Footnote 482: - - Diog. ix. 23, καὶ δοκεῖ (Παρμενίδης) πρῶτος πεφωρακέναι τὸν αὐτὸν - εἶναι Ἕσπερον καὶ Φωσφόρον, ὥς φησι Φαβωρῖνος ἐν πέμπτῳ - Ἀπομνημονευμάτων· οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόραν. If, as Achilles says, the poet - Ibykos of Rhegion had anticipated Parmenides in announcing this - discovery, that is to be explained by the fact that Rhegion had become - the chief seat of the Pythagorean school. - -Besides all this, it is quite certain that Parmenides went on to -describe how the other gods were born and how they fell, an idea which -we know to be Orphic, and which may well have been Pythagorean. We shall -come to it again in Empedokles. In Plato’s _Symposium_, Agathon couples -Parmenides with Hesiod as a narrator of ancient deeds of violence -committed by the gods.[483] If Parmenides was expounding the Pythagorean -theology, all this is just what we should expect; but it seems hopeless -to explain it on any of the other theories which have been advanced on -the purpose of the Way of Belief. Such things do not follow naturally -from the ordinary view of the world, and we have no reason to suppose -that Herakleitos expounded his views of the upward and downward path of -the soul in this form. He certainly did hold that the guardian spirits -entered into human bodies; but the whole point of his theory was that he -gave a naturalistic rather than a theological account of the process. -Still less can we think it probable that Parmenides made up these -stories himself in order to show what the popular view of the world -really implied if properly formulated. We must ask, I think, that any -theory on the subject shall account for what was evidently no -inconsiderable portion of the poem. - -Footnote 483: - - Plato, _Symp._ 195 c 1. It is implied that these παλαιὰ πράγματα were - πολλὰ καὶ βίαια, including such things as ἐκτομαί and δεσμοί. The - Epicurean criticism of all this is partially preserved in Philodemos, - _de pietate_, p. 68, Gomperz; and Cicero, _de nat. D._ i. 28 (_Dox._ - p. 534; R. P. 126 b). - -[Sidenote: Physiology.] - -95. In describing the views of his contemporaries, Parmenides was -obliged, as we see from the fragments, to say a good deal about -physiological matters. Like everything else, man was composed of the -warm and the cold, and death was caused by the removal of the warm. Some -curious views with regard to generation were also stated. In the first -place, males came from the right side and females from the left. Women -had more of the warm and men of the cold, a view which we shall find -Empedokles contradicting.[484] It is just the proportion of the warm and -cold in men that determines the character of their thought, so that even -corpses, from which the warm has been removed, retain a perception of -what is cold and dark.[485] These fragments of information do not tell -us much when taken by themselves; but they connect themselves in a most -interesting way with the history of medicine, and point to the fact that -one of its leading schools stood in close relation with the Pythagorean -Society. Even before the days of Pythagoras, we know that Kroton was -famous for its doctors. A Krotoniate, Demokedes, was court physician to -the Persian king, and married Milo the Pythagorean’s daughter.[486] We -also know the name of a very distinguished medical writer who lived at -Kroton in the days between Pythagoras and Parmenides, and the few facts -we are told about him enable us to regard the physiological views -described by Parmenides not as isolated curiosities, but as landmarks by -means of which we can trace the origin and growth of one of the most -influential of medical theories, that which explains health as a balance -of opposites. - -Footnote 484: - - For all this, see R. P. 127 a, with Arist. _de Part. An._ Β, 2. 648 a - 28; _de Gen. An._ Δ, 1. 765 b 19. - -Footnote 485: - - Theophr. _de sens._ 3, 4 (R. P. 129). - -Footnote 486: - - Herod. iii. 131, 137. - -[Sidenote: Alkmaion of Kroton.] - -96. Aristotle tells us that Alkmaion of Kroton[487] was a young man in -the old age of Pythagoras. He does not actually say, as later writers -do, that he was a Pythagorean, though he points out that he seems either -to have derived his theory of opposites from the Pythagoreans or they -theirs from him.[488] In any case, he was intimately connected with the -society, as is proved by one of the scanty fragments of his book. It -began as follows: “Alkmaion of Kroton, son of Peirithous, spoke these -words to Brotinos and Leon and Bathyllos. As to things invisible and -things mortal, the gods have certainty; but, so far as men may infer -...”[489] The quotation unfortunately ends in this abrupt way, but we -learn two things from it. In the first place, Alkmaion possessed that -reserve which marks all the best Greek medical writers; and in the -second place, he dedicated his work to the heads of the Pythagorean -Society.[490] - -Footnote 487: - - On Alkmaion, see especially Wachtler, _De Alcmaeone Crotoniata_ - (Leipzig, 1896). - -Footnote 488: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 5. 986 a 27 (R. P. 66). In a 30 Diels reads, with - great probability, ἐγένετο τὴν ἡλικίαν <νέος> ἐπὶ γέροντι Πυθαγόρᾳ. - Cf. Iambl. _V. Pyth._ 104, where Alkmaion is mentioned among the - συγχρονίσαντες καὶ μαθητεύσαντες τῷ Πυθαγόρᾳ πρεσβύτῃ νέοι. - -Footnote 489: - - Ἀλκμαίων Κρωτωνιήτης τάδε ἔλεξε Πειρίθου υἱὸς Βροτίνῳ καὶ Λέοντι καὶ - Βαθύλλῳ· περὶ τῶν ἀφανέων, περὶ τῶν θνητῶν, σαφήνειαν μὲν θεοὶ ἔχοντι, - ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώποις τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. The fact that this is not - written in conventional Doric, like the forged Pythagorean books, is a - strong proof of genuineness. - -Footnote 490: - - Brotinos (not Brontinos) is variously described as the son-in-law or - father-in-law of Pythagoras. Leon is one of the Metapontines in the - catalogue of Iamblichos (Diels, _Vors._ p. 268), and Bathyllos is - presumably the Poseidoniate Bathylaos also mentioned there. - -Alkmaion’s chief importance in the history of philosophy really lies in -the fact that he is the founder of empirical psychology.[491] It is -certain that he regarded the brain as the common sensorium, an important -discovery which Hippokrates and Plato adopted from him, though -Empedokles, Aristotle, and the Stoics reverted to the more primitive -view that the heart performs this function. There is no reason to doubt -that he made this discovery by anatomical means. We have some authority -for saying that he practised dissection, and, though the nerves were not -yet recognised as such, it was known that there were certain “passages” -which might be prevented from communicating sensations to the brain by -lesions.[492] He also distinguished between sensation and understanding, -though we have no means of knowing exactly where he drew the line -between them. His theories of the special senses are of great interest. -We find in him already, what is characteristic of Greek theories of -vision as a whole, the attempt to combine the view of vision as an act -proceeding from the eye with that which attributes it to an image -reflected in the eye. He knew the importance of air for the sense of -hearing, though he called it the void, a thoroughly Pythagorean touch. -With regard to the other senses, our information is more scanty, but -sufficient to show that he treated the subject systematically.[493] - -Footnote 491: - - Everything bearing on the early history of this subject is brought - together and discussed in Prof. Beare’s _Greek Theories of Elementary - Cognition_, to which I must refer the reader for all details. - -Footnote 492: - - Theophr. _de sens._ 26 (Beare, p. 252, n. 1). Our authority for the - dissections of Alkmaion is only Chalcidius, but he gets his - information on such matters from far older sources. The πόροι and the - inference from lesions are vouched for by Theophrastos. - -Footnote 493: - - The details will be found in Beare, pp. 11 sqq. (vision), pp. 93 sqq. - (hearing), pp. 131 sqq. (smell), pp. 180 sqq. (touch), pp. 160 sqq. - (taste). - -His astronomy seems surprisingly crude for one who stood in close -relations with the Pythagoreans. We are told that he adopted Anaximenes’ -theory of the sun and Herakleitos’s explanation of eclipses.[494] It is -all the more remarkable that he is credited with originating the idea, -which it required all Plato’s authority to get accepted later, that the -planets have an orbital motion in the opposite direction to the diurnal -revolution of the heavens.[495] This, if true, probably stood in close -connexion with his saying that soul was immortal because it resembled -immortal things, and was always in motion like the heavenly bodies.[496] -He seems, in fact, to be the real author of the curious view which Plato -put into the mouth of the Pythagorean Timaios, that the soul has circles -revolving just as the heavens and the planets do. This too seems to be -the explanation of his further statement that man dies because he cannot -join the beginning to the end.[497] The orbits of the heavenly bodies -always come full circle, but the circles in the head may fail to -complete themselves. This new version of the parallelism between the -microcosm and the macrocosm would be perfectly natural for Alkmaion, -though it is, of course, no more than a playful fancy to Plato. - -Footnote 494: - - Aet. ii. 22, 4, πλατὺν εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον; 29, 3, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ - σκαφοειδοῦς στροφὴν καὶ τὰς περικλίσεις (ἐκλείπειν τὴν σελήνην). - -Footnote 495: - - Aet. ii. 16, 2, (τῶν μαθηματικῶν τινες) τοὺς πλανήτας τοῖς ἀπλάνεσιν - ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπ’ ἀνατολὰς ἀντιφέρεσθαι. τούτῳ δὲ συνομολογεῖ καὶ - Ἀλκμαίων. - -Footnote 496: - - Arist. _de An._ Α, 2. 405 a 30 (R. P. 66 c). - -Footnote 497: - - Arist. _Probl._ 17, 3. 916 a 33, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους φησὶν Ἀλκμαίων διὰ - τοῦτο ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ τέλει προσάψαι. - -Alkmaion’s theory of health as “isonomy” is at once that which most -clearly connects him with earlier inquirers like Anaximander, and also -that which had the greatest influence on the subsequent development of -philosophy. He observed, to begin with, that “most things human were -two,” and by this he meant that man was made up of the hot and the cold, -the moist and the dry, and the rest of the opposites.[498] Disease was -just the “monarchy” of any one of these—the same thing that Anaximander -had called “injustice”—while health was the establishment in the body of -a free government with equal laws.[499] This was the leading doctrine of -the Sicilian school of medicine which came into existence not long -after, and we shall have to consider in the sequel its influence on the -development of Pythagoreanism. Taken along with the theory of -“pores,”[500] it is of the greatest importance for later science. - -Footnote 498: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 5. 986 a 27 (R. P. 66). - -Footnote 499: - - Aet. v. 30, 1, Ἀλκμαίων τῆς μὲν ὑγιείας εἶναι συνεκτικὴν τὴν ἰσονομίαν - τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑγροῦ, ξηροῦ, ψυχροῦ, θερμοῦ, πικροῦ, γλυκέος, καὶ τῶν - λοιπῶν, τὴν δ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν νόσου ποιητικήν· φθοροποιὸν γὰρ - ἐκατέρου μοναρχίαν. - -Footnote 500: - - My colleague, Dr. Fraser Harris, points out to me that Alkmaion’s - πόροι may have been a better guess than he knew. The nerve-fibres, - when magnified 1000 diameters, “sometimes appear to have a clear - centre, as if the fibrils were tubular.”—Schäfer, _Essentials of - Physiology_ (7th edition), p. 132. - - - - - CHAPTER V - EMPEDOKLES OF AKRAGAS - - -[Sidenote: Pluralism.] - -97. The belief that all things are one was common to the philosophers we -have hitherto studied; but now Parmenides has shown that, if this one -thing really _is_, we must give up the idea that it can take different -forms. The senses, which present to us a world of change and -multiplicity, are deceitful. From this there was no escape; the time was -still to come when men would seek the unity of the world in something -which, from its very nature, the senses could never perceive. - -We find, accordingly, that from the time of Parmenides to that of Plato, -all thinkers in whose hands philosophy made real progress abandoned the -monistic hypothesis. Those who still held by it adopted a critical -attitude, and confined themselves to a defence of the theory of -Parmenides against the new views. Others taught the doctrine of -Herakleitos in an exaggerated form; some continued to expound the -systems of the early Milesians. This, of course, showed want of insight; -but even those thinkers who saw that Parmenides could not be left -unanswered, were by no means equal to their predecessors in power and -thoroughness. The corporealist hypothesis had proved itself unable to -bear the weight of a monistic structure; but a thorough-going pluralism -such as the atomic theory might have some value, if not as a final -explanation of the world, yet at least as an intelligible view of a part -of it. Any pluralism, on the other hand, which, like that of Empedokles -and Anaxagoras, stops short of the atoms, will achieve no permanent -result, however many may be the brilliant _aperçus_ which it embodies. -It will remain an attempt to reconcile two things that cannot be -reconciled, and may always, therefore, be developed into contradictions -and paradoxes. - -[Sidenote: Date of Empedokles.] - -98. Empedokles was a citizen of Akragas in Sicily, and his father’s -name, according to the best accounts, was Meton.[501] His grandfather, -also called Empedokles, had won a victory in the horse-race at Olympia -in Ol. LXXI. (496-95 B.C.),[502] and Apollodoros fixed the _floruit_ of -Empedokles himself in Ol. LXXXIV. 1 (444-43 B.C.). This is the date of -the foundation of Thourioi; and it appears from the quotation in -Diogenes that the almost contemporary biographer, Glaukos of -Rhegion,[503] said Empedokles visited the new city shortly after its -foundation. But we are in no way bound to believe that he was just forty -years old at the time of the event in his life which can most easily be -dated. That is the assumption made by Apollodoros; but there are reasons -for thinking that his date is too late by some eight or ten years.[504] -It is, indeed, most likely that Empedokles did not go to Thourioi till -after his banishment from Akragas, and he may well have been more than -forty years old when that happened. All, therefore, we can be said to -know of his date is, that his grandfather was still alive in 496 B.C.; -that he himself was active at Akragas after 472, the date of Theron’s -death; and that he died later than 444. - -Footnote 501: - - Aet. i. 3, 20 (R. P. 164), Apollodoros _ap._ Diog. viii. 52 (R. P. - 162). The details of the life of Empedokles are discussed, with a - careful criticism of the sources, by Bidez, _La biographie - d’Empédocle_ (Gand, 1894). - -Footnote 502: - - For this we have the authority of Apollodoros (Diog. viii. 51, 52; R. - P. 162), who follows the _Olympic Victors_ of Eratosthenes, who in - turn appealed to Aristotle. Herakleides of Pontos, in his Περὶ νόσων - (see below, p. 233, _n._ 520), spoke of the elder Empedokles as a - “breeder of horses” (R. P. 162 a); and Timaios mentioned him as a - distinguished man in his Fifteenth Book. - -Footnote 503: - - Glaukos wrote Περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν καὶ μουσικῶν, and is said to - have been contemporary with Demokritos (Diog. ix. 38). Apollodoros - adds (R. P. 162) that, according to Aristotle and Herakleides, - Empedokles died at the age of sixty. It is to be observed, however, - that the words ἔτι δ’ Ἡρακλείδης are Sturz’s conjecture, the MSS. - having ἔτι δ’ Ἡράκλειτον, and Diogenes certainly said (ix. 3) that - Herakleitos lived sixty years. On the other hand, if the statement of - Aristotle comes from the Περὶ ποιητῶν, it is not obvious why he should - mention Herakleitos at all; and Herakleides was one of the chief - sources for the biography of Empedokles. - -Footnote 504: - - See Diels, “Empedokles und Gorgias,” 2 (_Berl. Sitzb._, 1884). - Theophrastos said that Empedokles was born “not long after Anaxagoras” - (_Dox._ p. 477, 17); and Alkidamas made him the fellow-pupil of Zeno - under Parmenides, and the teacher of Gorgias (see below, p. 231, n. - 5). Now Gorgias was a little older than Antiphon (_b._ Ol. LXX.), so - it is clear we must go back _at least_ to 490 B.C. for the birth of - Empedokles. - -Even these indications are enough to show that he must have been a boy -in the reign of Theron, the tyrant who co-operated with Gelon of -Syracuse in the repulse of the Carthaginians from Himera. His son and -successor, Thrasydaios, was a man of another stamp. Before his accession -to the throne of Akragas, he had ruled in his father’s name at Himera, -and completely estranged the affections of its inhabitants. Theron died -in 472 B.C., and Thrasydaios at once displayed all the vices and follies -usual in the second holder of a usurped dominion. After a disastrous war -with Hieron of Syracuse, he was driven out; and Akragas enjoyed a free -government till it fell before the Carthaginians more than half a -century later.[505] - -Footnote 505: - - E. Meyer, _Gesch. des Alterth._ ii. p. 508. - -[Sidenote: Empedokles as a politician.] - -99. In the political events of the next few years, Empedokles certainly -played an important part; but our information on the subject is of a -very curious kind. The Sicilian historian Timaios told one or two -stories about him, which are obviously genuine traditions picked up -about a hundred and fifty years afterwards; but, like all popular -traditions, they are a little confused. The picturesque incidents are -remembered, but the essential parts of the story are dropped. Still, we -may be thankful that the “collector of old wives’ tales,”[506] as -sneering critics called him, has enabled us to measure the historical -importance of Empedokles for ourselves by showing us how he was pictured -by the great-grandchildren of his contemporaries. - -Footnote 506: - - He is called γραοσυλλέκτρια in Souidas, _s.v._ The view taken in the - text as to the value of his evidence is that of Holm. - -We read, then,[507] that once he was invited to sup with one of the -“rulers.” Tradition delights in such vague titles. “Supper was well -advanced, but no wine was brought in. The rest of the company said -nothing, but Empedokles was righteously indignant, and insisted on wine -being served. The host, however, said he was waiting for the serjeant of -the Council. When that official arrived, he was appointed ruler of the -feast. The host, of course, appointed him. Thereupon he began to give -hints of an incipient tyranny. He ordered the company either to drink or -have the wine poured over their heads. At the time, Empedokles said -nothing; but next day he led both of them before the court, and had them -condemned and put to death—both the man who asked him to supper, and the -ruler of the feast.[508] This was the beginning of his political -career.” The next tale is that Empedokles prevented the Council from -granting his friend Akron a piece of land for a family sepulchre on the -ground of his eminence in medicine, and supported his objection by a -punning epigram.[509] Lastly, he broke up the assembly of the -Thousand—perhaps some oligarchical association or club.[510] It may have -been for this that he was offered the kingship, which Aristotle tells us -he refused.[511] At any rate, we see that Empedokles was the great -democratic leader at Akragas in those days, though we have no clear -knowledge of what he did. - -Footnote 507: - - Timaios _ap._ Diog. viii. 64 (_F.H.G._ i. p. 214, fr. 88 a). - -Footnote 508: - - In the first edition, I suggested the analogy of accusations for - _incivisme_. Bidez says (p. 127), “J’imagine qu’un Jacobin aurait - mieux jugé l’histoire” (than Karsten and Holm); “sous la Terreur, on - était suspect pour de moindres vétilles.” - -Footnote 509: - - Diog. viii. 65. The epigram runs thus: - - ἄκρον ἰητρὸν Ἄκρων’ Ἀκραγαντῖνον πατρὸς Ἄκρου - κρύπτει κρημνὸς ἄκρος πατρίδος ἀκροτάτης. - - - On Akron, see M. Wellmann, _op. cit._ p. 235, n. 1. - -Footnote 510: - - Diog. viii. 66, ὕστερον δ’ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τὸ τῶν χιλίων ἄθροισμα - κατέλυσε συνεστὼς ἐπὶ ἔτη τρία. The word ἄθροισμα hardly suggests a - legal council, and συνίστασθαι suggests a conspiracy. - -Footnote 511: - - Diog. viii. 63. Aristotle probably mentioned this in his _Sophist._ - Cf. Diog. viii. 57. - -[Sidenote: Empedokles as a religious teacher.] - -100. But there is another side to his public character which Timaios -found it hard to reconcile with his political views. He claimed to be a -god, and to receive the homage of his fellow-citizens in that capacity. -The truth is, Empedokles was not a mere statesman; he had a good deal of -the “medicine-man” about him. According to Satyros,[512] Gorgias -affirmed that he had been present when his master was performing -sorceries. We can see what this means from the fragments of the -_Purifications_. Empedokles was a preacher of the new religion which -sought to secure release from the “wheel of birth” by purity and -abstinence; but it is not quite certain to which form of it he adhered. -On the one hand, Orphicism seems to have been strong at Akragas in the -days of Theron, and there are even some verbal coincidences between the -poems of Empedokles and the Orphicising Odes which Pindar addressed to -that prince.[513] There are also some points of similarity between the -_Rhapsodic Theogony_, as we know it from Damaskios, and certain -fragments of Empedokles, though the importance of these has been -exaggerated.[514] On the other hand, there is no reason to doubt the -statement of Ammonios that fr. 134 refers to Apollo;[515] and, if that -is so, it would point to his having been an adherent of the Ionic form -of the mystic doctrine, as we have seen (§ 39) that Pythagoras was. -Further, Timaios already knew the story that he had been expelled from -the Pythagorean Order for “stealing discourses,”[516] and it is probable -on the whole that fr. 129 refers to Pythagoras.[517] It would be very -hazardous to dogmatise on this subject; but it seems most likely that -Empedokles had been influenced by Orphic ideas in his youth, and that, -in later life, he preached a form of Pythagoreanism which was not -considered orthodox by the heads of the Society. In any case, it seems -far more probable that his political and scientific activity belong to -the same period of his life, and that he only became a wandering prophet -after his banishment, than that his scientific work belonged to his -later days when he was a solitary exile.[518] - -Footnote 512: - - Diog. viii. 59 (R. P. 162). Satyros probably followed Alkidamas. Diels - suggests (_Emp. u. Gorg._ p. 358) that the φυσικός of Alkidamas was a - dialogue in which Gorgias was the chief speaker. In that case, the - statement would have little historical value. - -Footnote 513: - - See Bidez, p. 115, n. 1. - -Footnote 514: - - O. Kern, “Empedokles und die Orphiker” (_Arch._ i. pp. 489 sqq.). For - the _Rhapsodic Theogony_, see Introd. p. 9, _n._ 10. - -Footnote 515: - - See below, note _in loc._ - -Footnote 516: - - Diog. viii. 54 (R. P. 162). - -Footnote 517: - - See below, note _in loc._ - -Footnote 518: - - The latter view is that of Bidez (pp. 161 sqq.); but Diels has shown - (_Berl. Sitzb._, 1898, pp. 406 sqq.) that the former is - psychologically more probable. - -We hear of a number of marvels performed by Empedokles, which are for -the most part nothing but inferences from his writings. Timaios told how -he weakened the force of the etesian winds by hanging bags of asses’ -skins on the trees to catch them. He had certainly said, in his -exaggerated way, that the knowledge of science as taught by him would -enable his disciples to control the winds (fr. 111); and this, along -with the fabled windbags of Aiolos, is enough to account for the -tale.[519] We are also told how he brought back to life a woman who had -been breathless and pulseless for thirty days. The verse where he -asserts that his teaching will enable Pausanias to bring the dead back -from Hades (fr. 111) shows how this story may have arisen.[520] Again, -we hear that he sweetened the pestilent marsh between Selinous and the -sea by diverting the rivers Hypsas and Selinos into it. We know from -coins that this purification of the marshes actually took place, but we -may doubt whether it was attributed to Empedokles till a later -time.[521] - -Footnote 519: - - I follow the wilder form of the story given by Diog. viii. 60, and not - the rationalised version of Plutarch (_adv. Col._ 1126 b). The - epithets ἀλεξανέμας and κωλυσανέμας were perhaps bestowed by some - sillographer in mockery; cf. ἀνεμοκοίτης. - -Footnote 520: - - The Περὶ νόσων of Herakleides, from which it is derived, seems to have - been a sort of medico-philosophical romance. The words are (Diog. - viii. 60): Ἡρακλείδης τε ἐν τῷ Περὶ νόσων φησὶ καὶ Παυσανίᾳ - ὑφηγήσασθαι αὐτὸν τὰ περὶ τὴν ἄπνουν. It was a case of hysterical - suffocation. - -Footnote 521: - - For these coins see Head, _Historia Numorum_, pp. 147 sqq. - -[Sidenote: Rhetoric and medicine.] - -101. Aristotle said that Empedokles was the inventor of Rhetoric;[522] -and Galen made him the founder of the Italian school of Medicine, which -he puts on a level with those of Kos and Knidos.[523] Both these -statements must be considered in connexion with his political and -scientific activity. It seems to be certain that Gorgias was his -disciple in physics and medicine, and some of the peculiarities which -marked his style are to be found in the poems of Empedokles.[524] It is -not to be supposed, of course, that Empedokles wrote a formal treatise -on Rhetoric; but it is in every way probable, and in accordance with his -character, that the speeches, of which he must have made many, were -marked by that euphuism which Gorgias introduced to Athens at a later -date, and which gave rise to the idea of an artistic prose. The -influence of Empedokles on the development of medicine was, however, far -more important, as it affected not only medicine itself, but through it, -the whole tendency of scientific and philosophical thinking. It has been -said that Empedokles had no successors,[525] and the remark is true if -we confine ourselves strictly to philosophy. On the other hand, the -medical school which he founded was still living in the days of Plato, -and it had considerable influence on him, and still more on -Aristotle.[526] Its fundamental doctrine was the identification of the -four elements with the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry. It also -held that we breathe through all the pores of the body, and that the act -of respiration is closely connected with the motion of the blood. The -heart, not the brain, was regarded as the organ of consciousness.[527] A -more external characteristic of the medicine taught by the followers of -Empedokles is that they still clung to ideas of a magical nature. A -protest against this by a member of the Koan school has been preserved. -He refers to them as “magicians and purifiers and charlatans and quacks, -who profess to be very religious.”[528] Though there is some truth in -this, it hardly does justice to the great advances in physiology that -were due to the Sicilian school. - -Footnote 522: - - Diog. viii. 57 (R. P. 162 g). - -Footnote 523: - - Galen, x. 5, ἤριζον δ’ αὐτοῖς (the schools of Kos and Knidos) ... καὶ - οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἰατροί, Φιλιστίων τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Παυσανίας - καὶ οἱ τούτων ἑταῖροι κ.τ.λ. Philistion was the contemporary and - friend of Plato; Pausanias is the disciple to whom Empedokles - addressed his poem. - -Footnote 524: - - See Diels, “Empedokles und Gorgias” (_Berl. Sitzb._, 1884, pp. 343 - sqq.). The oldest authority for saying that Gorgias was a disciple of - Empedokles is Satyros _ap._ Diog. viii. 58 (R. P. 162); but he seems - to have derived his information from Alkidamas, who was the disciple - of Gorgias himself. In Plato’s _Meno_ (76 c 4-8) the Empedoklean - theory of effluvia and pores is ascribed to Gorgias. - -Footnote 525: - - Diels (_Berl. Sitzb._, 1884, p. 343). - -Footnote 526: - - See M. Wellmann, _Fragmentsammlung der griechischen Ärtzte_, vol. i. - (Berlin, 1901). According to Wellmann, both Plato (in the _Timaeus_) - and Diokles of Karystos depend upon Philistion. It is impossible to - understand the history of philosophy from this point onwards without - keeping the history of medicine constantly in view. - -Footnote 527: - - For the four elements, cf. Anon. Lond. xx. 25 (Menon’s _Iatrika_), - Φιλιστίων δ’ οἴεται ἐκ δʹ ἰδεῶν συνεστάναι ἡμᾶς, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἐκ δʹ - στοιχείων· πυρός, ἀέρος, ὕδατος, γῆς. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἑκάστου δυνάμεις, - τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν, τοῦ δὲ ἀέρος τὸ ψυχρόν, τοῦ δὲ ὕδατος τὸ - ὑγρόν, τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ξηρόν. For the theory of respiration, see - Wellmann, pp. 82 sqq.; and for the heart as the seat of consciousness, - _ib._ pp. 15 sqq. - -Footnote 528: - - Hippokr. Περὶ ἰερῆς νόσου, c 1, μάγοι τε καὶ καθάρται καὶ ἀγύρται καὶ - ἀλαζόνες. The whole passage should be read. Cf. Wellmann, p. 29 n. - -[Sidenote: Relation to predecessors.] - -102. In the biography of Empedokles, we hear very little of his theory -of nature. The only hints we get are some statements about his teachers. -Alkidamas, who had good opportunities of knowing, made him a -fellow-student of Zeno under Parmenides. That is both possible and -likely. Theophrastos too made him a follower and imitator of Parmenides. -But the further statement that he had “heard” Pythagoras cannot be -right. Probably Alkidamas said “Pythagoreans.”[529] - -Footnote 529: - - Diog. viii. 54-56 (R. P. 162). - -Some writers hold that certain parts of the system of Empedokles, in -particular the theory of pores and effluvia (§ 118), which do not seem -to follow very naturally from his own principles, were due to the -influence of Leukippos.[530] This, however, is not necessarily the case. -We know that Alkmaion (§ 96) spoke of “pores” in connexion with -sensation, and it may equally well be from him that Empedokles got the -theory. It may be added that this is more in accordance with the history -of certain other physiological views which are common to Alkmaion and -the later Ionian philosophers. We can generally see that those reached -Ionia through the medical school which Empedokles founded.[531] - -Footnote 530: - - Diels, _Verhandl. d. 35 Philologenversamml._ pp. 104 sqq., Zeller, p. - 767. It would be fatal to the main thesis of the next few chapters if - it could be proved that Empedokles was influenced by Leukippos. I hope - to show that Leukippos was influenced by the later Pythagorean - doctrine (Chap. IX. § 171), which was in turn affected by Empedokles - (Chap. VII. § 147). - -Footnote 531: - - For πόροι in Alkmaion, cf. Arist. _de Gen. An._ Β, 6. 744 a 8; - Theophr. _de sens._ 26; and for the way in which his embryological and - other views were transmitted through Empedokles to the Ionian - physicists, cf. Fredrich, _Hippokratische Untersuchungen_, pp. 126 - sqq. - -[Sidenote: Death.] - -103. We are told that Empedokles leapt into the crater of Etna that he -might be deemed a god. This appears to be a malicious version[532] of a -tale set on foot by his adherents that he had been snatched up to heaven -in the night.[533] Both stories would easily get accepted; for there was -no local tradition. Empedokles did not die in Sicily, but in the -Peloponnese, or, perhaps, at Thourioi. He had gone to Olympia to have -his religious poem recited to the Hellenes; his enemies were able to -prevent his return, and he was seen in Sicily no more.[534] - -Footnote 532: - - R. P. 162 h. The story is always told with a hostile purpose. - -Footnote 533: - - R. P. _ib._ This was the story told by Herakleides of Pontos, at the - end of his romance about the ἄπνους. - -Footnote 534: - - Timaios took the trouble to refute the common stories at some length - (Diog. viii. 71 sqq.; R. P. _ib._). He was quite positive that - Empedokles never returned to Sicily. Nothing can be more likely than - that, when wandering as an exile in the Peloponnese, he should have - seized the opportunity of joining the colony at Thourioi, which was a - harbour for many of the “sophists” of this time. - -[Sidenote: Writings.] - -104. Empedokles was the second philosopher to expound his system in -verse, if we leave the satirist Xenophanes out of account. He was also -the last among the Greeks; for the forged Pythagorean poems may be -neglected.[535] Lucretius imitates Empedokles in this, just as -Empedokles imitated Parmenides. Of course, the poetical imagery creates -a difficulty for the interpreter; but it would be wrong to make too much -of it. It cannot be said that it is harder to extract the philosophical -kernel from the verses of Empedokles than from the prose of Herakleitos. - -Footnote 535: - - See Chap. IV. § 85. - -There is some divergence of opinion as to the poetical merit of -Empedokles. The panegyric of Lucretius is well known.[536] Aristotle -says in one place that Empedokles and Homer have nothing in common but -the metre; in another, that Empedokles was “most Homeric.”[537] To my -mind, there can be no question that he was a genuine poet, far more so -than Parmenides. No one doubts nowadays that Lucretius was one, and -Empedokles really resembles him very closely. - -Footnote 536: - - Lucr. i. 716 sqq. - -Footnote 537: - - _Poet._ 1. 1447 b 18; cf. Diog. viii. 57 (R. P. 162 i). - -[Sidenote: The remains.] - -105. We have more abundant remains of Empedokles than of any other early -Greek philosopher. If we may trust our manuscripts of Diogenes and of -Souidas, the librarians of Alexandria estimated the _Poem on Nature_ and -the _Purifications_ together as 5000 verses, of which about 2000 -belonged to the former work.[538] Diels gives about 350 verses and parts -of verses from the cosmological poem, or not a fifth of the whole. It is -important to remember that, even in this favourable instance, so much -has been lost. Besides the two poems, the Alexandrian scholars possessed -a prose work of 600 lines on medicine ascribed to Empedokles. The -tragedies and other poems which were sometimes attributed to him seem -really to belong to a younger writer of the same name, who is said by -Souidas to have been his grandson.[539] - -Footnote 538: - - Diog. viii. 77 (R. P. 162); Souidas _s.v._ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· καὶ ἔγραψε δι’ - ἐπῶν Περὶ φύσεως τῶν ὄντων βιβλία βʹ, καὶ ἔστιν ἔπη ὡς δισχίλια. It - hardly seems likely, however, that the Καθαρμοί extended to 3000 - verses, so Diels proposes to read πάντα τρισχίλια for πεντακισχίλια in - Diogenes. It is to be observed that there is no better authority than - Tzetzes for dividing the Περὶ φύσεως into three books. See Diels, - “Über die Gedichte des Empedokles” (_Berl. Sitzb._, 1898, pp. 396 - sqq.). - -Footnote 539: - - Hieronymos of Rhodes declared (Diog. viii. 58) that he had met with - forty-three of these tragedies; but see Stein, pp. 5 sqq. The poem on - the Persian Wars, which Hieronymos also refers to (Diog. viii. 57), - seems to have arisen from an old corruption in the text of Arist. - _Probl._ 929 b 16, where Bekker still reads ἐν τοῖς Περσικοῖς. The - same passage, however, is said to occur ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, in _Meteor._ - Δ, 4. 382 a 1, though there too E reads Περσικοῖς. - -I give the remains as they are arranged by Diels:— - - (1) - - And do thou give ear, Pausanias, son of Anchitos the wise! - - (2) - - For straitened are the powers that are spread over their bodily parts, - and many are the woes that burst in on them and blunt the edge of - their careful thoughts! They behold but a brief span of a life that is - no life,[540] and, doomed to swift death, are borne up and fly off - like smoke. Each is convinced of that alone which he had chanced upon - as he is <<5>> hurried to and fro, and idly boasts he has found the - whole. So hardly can these things be seen by the eyes or heard by the - ears of men, so hardly grasped by their mind! Thou,[541] then, since - thou hast found thy way hither, shalt learn no more than mortal mind - hath power. R. P. 163. - - (3) - - ... to keep within thy dumb heart. - - (4) - - But, O ye gods, turn aside from my tongue the madness of those - men.[542] Hallow my lips and make a pure stream flow from them! And - thee, much-wooed, white-armed Virgin Muse, do I beseech that I may - hear what is lawful for the children of a day! Speed me on my way from - the abode of <<5>> Holiness and drive my willing car! Thee shall no - garlands of glory and honour at the hands of mortals constrain to lift - them from the ground, on condition of speaking in thy pride beyond - that which is lawful and right, and so to gain a seat upon the heights - of wisdom. - - Go to now, consider with all thy powers in what way each thing is - clear. Hold not thy sight in greater credit as <<10>> compared with - thy hearing, nor value thy resounding ear above the clear - instructions of thy tongue;[543] and do not withhold thy confidence - in any of thy other bodily parts by which there is an opening for - understanding,[544] but consider everything in the way it is clear. - R. P. 163. - - (5) - - But it is ever the way of low minds to disbelieve their betters. Do - thou learn as the sure testimonies of my Muse bid thee, dividing the - argument in thy heart.[545] - - (6) - - Hear first the four roots of all things: shining Zeus, life-bringing - Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis whose tear-drops are a well-spring to - mortals. R. P. 164.[546] - - (7) - - ... uncreated. - - (8) - - And I shall tell thee another thing. There is no coming into being of - aught that perishes, nor any end for it in baneful death; but only - mingling and change of what has been mingled. Coming into being is but - a name given to these by men. R. P. 165. - - (9) - - But, when the elements have been mingled in the fashion of a man and - come to the light of day, or in the fashion of the race of wild beasts - or plants or birds, then men say that these come into being; and when - they are separated, they call that woeful death. They call it not - aright; but I too follow <<5>> the custom, and call it so myself. - - (10) - - Avenging death. - - (11, 12) - - Fools!—for they have no far-reaching thoughts—who deem that what - before was not comes into being, or that aught can perish and be - utterly destroyed. For it cannot be that aught can arise from what in - no way is, and it is impossible and unheard of that what _is_ should - perish; for it <<5>> will always _be_, wherever one may keep putting - it. R. P. 165 a. - - (13) - - And in the All there is naught empty and naught too full. - - (14) - - In the All there is naught empty. Whence, then, could aught come to - increase it? - - (15) - - A man who is wise in such matters would never surmise in his heart - that as long as mortals live what they call their life, so long they - are, and suffer good and ill; while before they were formed and after - they have been dissolved they are just nothing at all. R. P. 165 a. - - (16) - - For of a truth they (Strife and Love) were aforetime and shall be; nor - ever, methinks, will boundless time be emptied of that pair. R. P. 166 - c. - - (17) - - I shall tell thee a twofold tale. At one time it grew to be one only - out of many; at another, it divided up to be many instead of one. - There is a double becoming of perishable things and a double passing - away. The coming together of all things brings one generation into - being and destroys it; the other grows up and is scattered as things - become <<5>> divided. And these things never cease continually - changing places, at one time all uniting in one through Love, at - another each borne in different directions by the repulsion of Strife. - Thus, as far as it is their nature to grow into one out of many, and - to become many once more when the one is parted <<10>> asunder, so far - they come into being and their life abides not. But, inasmuch as they - never cease changing their places continually, so far they are ever - immovable as they go round the circle of existence. - - * * * * * - - But come, hearken to my words, for it is learning that increaseth - wisdom. As I said before, when I declared the <<15>> heads of my - discourse, I shall tell thee a twofold tale. At one time it grew - together to be one only out of many, at another it parted asunder so - as to be many instead of one;—Fire and Water and Earth and the mighty - height of Air; dread Strife, too, apart from these, of equal weight to - each, and Love among them, equal in length and breadth. <<20>> Her do - thou contemplate with thy mind, nor sit with dazed eyes. It is she - that is known as being implanted in the frame of mortals. It is she - that makes them have thoughts of love and work the works of peace. - They call her by the names of Joy and Aphrodite. Her has no mortal yet - marked moving <<25>> round among them,[547] but do thou attend to the - undeceitful ordering of my discourse. - - For all these are equal and alike in age, yet each has a different - prerogative and its own peculiar nature. And nothing <<30>> comes into - being besides these, nor do they pass away; for, if they had been - passing away continually, they would not be now, and what could - increase this All and whence could it come? How, too, could it perish, - since no place is empty of these things? They are what they are; but, - running through one another, they become now this, now that,[548] and - like things <<35>> evermore. R. P. 166. - - (18) - - Love. - - (19) - - Clinging Love. - - (20) - - This (the contest of Love and Strife) is manifest in the mass of - mortal limbs. At one time all the limbs that are the body’s portion - are brought together by Love in blooming life’s high season; at - another, severed by cruel Strife, they wander <<5>> each alone by the - breakers of life’s sea. It is the same with plants and the fish that - make their homes in the waters, with the beasts that have their lairs - on the hills and the seabirds that sail on wings. R. P. 173 d. - - (21) - - Come now, look at the things that bear witness to my earlier - discourse, if so be that there was any shortcoming as to their form in - the earlier list. Behold the sun, everywhere bright and warm, and all - the immortal things that are bathed in heat and bright radiance.[549] - Behold the rain, everywhere dark <<5>> and cold; and from the earth - issue forth things close-pressed and solid. When they are in strife - all these are different in form and separated; but they come together - in love, and are desired by one another. - - For out of these have sprung all things that were and are and shall - be—trees and men and women, beasts and birds <<10>> and the fishes - that dwell in the waters, yea, and the gods that live long lives and - are exalted in honour. R. P. 166 i. - - For these things are what they are; but, running through one another, - they take different shapes—so much does mixture change them. R. P. 166 - g. - - (22) - - For all of these—sun, earth, sky, and sea—are at one with all their - parts that are cast far and wide from them in mortal things. And even - so all things that are more adapted for mixture are like to one - another and united in love by Aphrodite. Those things, again, that - differ most in origin, <<5>> mixture and the forms imprinted on each, - are most hostile, being altogether unaccustomed to unite and very - sorry by the bidding of Strife, since it hath wrought their birth. - - (23) - - Just as when painters are elaborating temple-offerings, men whom - wisdom hath well taught their art,—they, when they have taken pigments - of many colours with their hands, mix them in due proportion, more of - some and less of others, and from them produce shapes like unto all - things, making trees <<5>> and men and women, beasts and birds and - fishes that dwell in the waters, yea, and gods, that live long lives, - and are exalted in honour,—so let not the error prevail over thy - mind,[550] that there is any other source of all the perishable - creatures that appear in countless numbers. Know this for sure, for - thou <<10>> hast heard the tale from a goddess.[551] - - (24) - - Stepping from summit to summit, not to travel only one path to the - end.... - - (25) - - What is right may well be said even twice. - - (26) - - For they prevail in turn as the circle comes round, and pass into one - another, and grow great in their appointed turn. R. P. 166 c. - - They are what they are; but, running through one another, they become - men and the tribes of beasts. At one time they are all brought - together into one order by Love; at another, <<5>> they are carried - each in different directions by the repulsion of Strife, till they - grow once more into one and are wholly subdued. Thus in so far as they - are wont to grow into one out of many, and again divided become more - than one, so far they come into being, and their life is not lasting; - but in <<10>> so far as they never cease changing continually, so far - are they evermore, immovable in the circle. - - (27) - - There are distinguished neither the swift limbs of the sun, no, nor - the shaggy earth in its might, nor the sea,—so fast was the god bound - in the close covering of Harmony, spherical and round, rejoicing in - his circular solitude.[552] R. P. 167. - - (27_a_) - - There is no discord and no unseemly strife in his limbs. - - (28) - - But he was equal on every side and quite without end, spherical and - round, rejoicing in his circular solitude. - - (29) - - Two branches do not spring from his back, he has no feet, no swift - knees, no fruitful parts; but he was spherical and equal on every - side. - - (30, 31) - - But, when Strife was grown great in the limbs of the god and sprang - forth to claim his prerogatives, in the fulness of the alternate time - set for them by the mighty oath, ... for all the limbs of the god in - turn quaked. R. P. 167. - - (32) - - The joint binds two things. - - (33) - - Even as when fig juice rivets and binds white milk.... - - (34) - - Cementing[553] meal with water.... - - (35, 36) - - But now I shall retrace my steps over the paths of song that I have - travelled before, drawing from my saying a new saying. When Strife was - fallen to the lowest depth of the vortex, and Love had reached to the - centre of the whirl, in it do all things come together so as to be one - only; not all at once, <<5>> but coming together at their will each - from different quarters; and, as they mingled, countless tribes of - mortal creatures were scattered abroad. Yet many things remained - unmixed, alternating with the things that were being mixed, namely, - all that Strife not fallen yet retained; for it had not yet altogether - retired <<10>> perfectly from them to the outermost boundaries of the - circle. Some of it still remained within, and some had passed out from - the limbs of the All. But in proportion as it kept rushing out, a - soft, immortal stream of blameless Love kept running in, and - straightway those things became mortal which had been immortal before, - those things were mixed that had been <<15>> unmixed, each changing - its path. And, as they mingled, countless tribes of mortal creatures - were scattered abroad endowed with all manner of forms, a wonder to - behold. R. P. 169. - - * * * * * - - (37) - - Earth increases its own mass, and Air swells the bulk of Air. - - (38) - - Come, I shall now tell thee first of all the beginning of the - sun,[554] and the sources from which have sprung all the things we now - behold, the earth and the billowy sea, the damp vapour and the Titan - air that binds his circle fast round all things. R. P. 170 a. - - (39) - - If the depths of the earth and the vast air were infinite, a foolish - saying which has been vainly dropped from the lips of many mortals, - though they have seen but a little of the All....[555] R. P. 103 b. - - (40) - - The sharp-darting sun and the gentle moon. - - (41) - - But (the sunlight) is gathered together and circles round the mighty - heavens. - - (42) - - And she cuts off his rays as he goes above her, and casts a shadow on - as much of the earth as is the breadth of the pale-faced moon.[556] - - (43) - - Even so the sunbeam, having struck the broad and mighty circle of the - moon, returns at once, running so as to reach the sky. - - (44) - - It flashes back to Olympos with untroubled countenance. R. P. 170 c. - - (45, 46) - - There circles round the earth a round borrowed light, as the nave of - the wheel circles round the furthest (goal). - - (47) - - For she gazes at the sacred circle of the lordly sun opposite. - - (48) - - It is the earth that makes night by coming before the lights. - - (49) - - ... of solitary, blind-eyed night. - - (50) - - And Iris bringeth wind or mighty rain from the sea. - - (51) - - (Fire) swiftly rushing upwards.... - - (52) - - And many fires burn beneath the earth. R. P. 171 a. - - (53) - - For so as it ran, it met them at that time, though often otherwise. R. - P. 171 a. - - (54) - - But the air sank down upon the earth with its long roots. R. P. 171 a. - - (55) - - Sea the sweat of the earth. R. P. 170 b. - - (56) - - Salt was solidified by the impact of the sun’s beams. - - (57) - - On it (the earth) many heads sprung up without necks and arms wandered - bare and bereft of shoulders. Eyes strayed up and down in want of - foreheads. R. P. 173 a. - - (58) - - Solitary limbs wandered seeking for union. - - (59) - - But, as divinity was mingled still further with divinity, these things - joined together as each might chance, and many other things besides - them continually arose. - - (60) - - Shambling creatures with countless hands. - - (61) - - Many creatures with faces and breasts looking in different directions - were born; some, offspring of oxen with faces of men, while others, - again, arose as offspring of men with the heads of oxen, and creatures - in whom the nature of women and men was mingled, furnished with - sterile[557] parts. <<5>> R. P. 173 b. - - (62) - - Come now, hear how the Fire as it was separated caused the night-born - shoots of men and tearful women to arise; for my tale is not off the - point nor uninformed. Whole-natured forms first arose from the earth, - having a portion both of water and fire.[558] These did the fire, - desirous of <<5>> reaching its like, send up, showing as yet neither - the charming form of women’s limbs, nor yet the voice and parts that - are proper to men. R. P. 173 c. - - (63) - - ... But the substance of (the child’s) limbs is divided between them, - part of it in men’s and part in women’s (body). - - (64) - - And upon him came desire reminding him through sight. - - (65) - - ... And it was poured out in the pure parts; and when it met with cold - women arose from it. - - (66) - - The divided meadows of Aphrodite. - - (67) - - For in its warmer part the womb brings forth males, and that is why - men are dark and more manly and shaggy. - - (68) - - On the tenth day of the eighth month the white putrefaction - arises.[559] - - (69) - - Double bearing.[560] - - (70) - - Sheepskin.[561] - - (71) - - But if thy assurance of these things was in any way deficient as to - how, out of Water and Earth and Air and Fire mingled together, arose - the forms and colours of all those mortal things that have been fitted - together by Aphrodite, and so are now come into being.... <<5>> - - (72) - - How tall trees and the fishes in the sea.... - - (73) - - And even as at that time Kypris, preparing warmth,[562] after she had - moistened the Earth in water, gave it to swift fire to harden it.... - R. P. 171. - - (74) - - Leading the songless tribe of fertile fish. - - (75) - - All of those which are dense within and rare without, having received - a moisture of this kind at the hands of Kypris.... - - (76) - - This thou mayest see in the heavy-backed shell-fish that dwell in the - sea, in sea-snails and the stony-skinned turtles. In them thou mayest - see that the earthy part dwells on the uppermost surface. - - (77-78) - - It is the air that makes evergreen trees flourish with abundance of - fruit the whole year round. - - (79) - - And so first of all tall olive trees bear eggs.... - - (80) - - Wherefore pomegranates are late-born and apples succulent. - - (81) - - Wine is the water from the bark, putrefied in the wood. - - (82) - - Hair and leaves, and thick feathers of birds, and the scales that grow - on mighty limbs, are the same thing. - - (83) - - But the hair of hedgehogs is sharp-pointed and bristles on their - backs. - - (84) - - And even as when a man thinking to sally forth through a stormy night, - gets him ready a lantern, a flame of blazing fire, fastening to it - horn plates to keep out all manner of winds, and they scatter the - blast of the winds that blow, but the light leaping out through them, - shines across the threshold <<5>> with unfailing beams, as much of it - as is finer;[563] even so did she (Love) then entrap the elemental - fire, the round pupil, confined within membranes and delicate tissues, - which are pierced through and through with wondrous passages. They - keep out the deep water that surrounds the pupil, but they <<10>> let - through the fire, as much of it as is finer. R. P. 177 b. - - (85) - - But the gentle flame (of the eye) has but a scanty portion of earth. - - (86) - - Out of these divine Aphrodite fashioned unwearying eyes. - - (87) - - Aphrodite fitting these together with rivets of love. - - (88) - - One vision is produced by both the eyes. - - (89) - - Know that effluences flow from all things that have come into being. - R. P. 166 h. - - (90) - - So sweet lays hold of sweet, and bitter rushes to bitter; acid comes - to acid, and warm couples with warm. - - (91) - - Water fits better into wine, but it will not (mingle) with oil. R. P. - 166 h. - - (92) - - Brass mixed with tin. - - (93) - - The berry of the blue elder is mingled with scarlet. - - (94) - - And the black colour at the bottom of a river arises from the shadow. - The same is seen in hollow caves. - - (95) - - Since they (the eyes) first grew together in the hands of Kypris. - - (96) - - The kindly earth received in its broad funnels two parts of gleaming - Nestis out of the eight, and four of Hephaistos. So arose white bones - divinely fitted together by the cement of proportion. R. P. 175. - - (97) - - The spine (was broken). - - (98) - - And the earth, anchoring in the perfect harbours of Aphrodite, meets - with these in nearly equal proportions, with Hephaistos and Water and - gleaming Air—either a little more of it, or less of them and more of - it. From these did blood arise and the manifold forms of flesh. R. P. - 175 c. - - (99) - - The bell ... the fleshy sprout (of the ear).[564] - - (100) - - Thus[565] do all things draw breath and breathe it out again. All have - bloodless tubes of flesh extended over the surface of their bodies; - and at the mouths of these the outermost surface of the skin is - perforated all over with pores closely packed together, so as to keep - in the blood while a free <<5>> passage is cut for the air to pass - through. Then, when the thin blood recedes from these, the bubbling - air rushes in with an impetuous surge; and when the blood runs back it - is breathed out again. Just as when a girl, playing with a water-clock - of shining brass, puts the orifice of the pipe upon <<10>> her comely - hand, and dips the water-clock into the yielding mass of silvery - water,—the stream does not then flow into the vessel, but the bulk of - the air inside, pressing upon the close-packed perforations, keeps it - out till she uncovers the compressed stream; but then air escapes and - an equal volume <<15>> of water runs in,—just in the same way, when - water occupies the depths of the brazen vessel and the opening and - passage is stopped up by the human hand, the air outside, striving to - get in, holds the water back at the gates of the ill-sounding neck, - pressing upon its surface, till she lets go with her hand. <<20>> - Then, on the contrary, just in the opposite way to what happened - before, the wind rushes in and an equal volume of water runs out to - make room.[566] Even so, when the thin blood that surges through the - limbs rushes backwards to the interior, straightway the stream of air - comes in with a rushing swell; <<25>> but when the blood returns the - air breathes out again in equal quantity. - - (101) - - (The dog) with its nostrils tracking out the fragments of the beast’s - limbs, and the breath from their feet that they leave in the soft - grass.[567] - - (102) - - Thus all things have their share of breath and smell. - - (103, 104) - - Thus have all things thought by fortune’s will.... And inasmuch as the - rarest things came together in their fall. - - (105) - - (The heart), dwelling in the sea of blood that runs in opposite - directions, where chiefly is what men call thought; for the blood - round the heart is the thought of men. R. P. 178 a. - - (106) - - For the wisdom of men grows according to what is before them. R. P. - 177. - - (107) - - For out of these are all things formed and fitted together, and by - these do men think and feel pleasure and pain. R. P. 178. - - (108) - - And just so far as they grow to be different, so far do different - thoughts ever present themselves to their minds (in dreams).[568] R. - P. 177 a. - - (109) - - For it is with earth that we see Earth, and Water with water; by air - we see bright Air, by fire destroying Fire. By love do we see Love, - and Hate by grievous hate. R. P. 176. - - (110) - - For if, supported on thy steadfast mind, thou wilt contemplate these - things with good intent and faultless care, then shalt thou have all - these things in abundance throughout thy life, and thou shalt gain - many others from them. For these things grow of themselves into thy - heart, where is each <<5>> man’s true nature. But if thou strivest - after things of another kind, as is the way with men, ten thousand - woes await thee to blunt thy careful thoughts. Soon will these things - desert thee when the time comes round; for they long to return once - more to their own kind; for know that all things have <<10>> wisdom - and a share of thought. - - (111) - - And thou shalt learn all the drugs that are a defence against ills and - old age; since for thee alone will I accomplish all this. Thou shalt - arrest the violence of the weariless winds that arise and sweep the - earth; and again, when thou so desirest, thou shalt bring back their - blasts with a rush. Thou <<5>> shalt cause for men a seasonable - drought after the dark rains, and again thou shalt change the summer - drought for streams that feed the trees as they pour down from the - sky. Thou shalt bring back from Hades the life of a dead man. - -Footnote 540: - - The MSS. of Sextus have ζωῆσι βίου. Diels reads ζωῆς ἰδίου. I still - prefer Scaliger’s ζωῆς ἀβίου. Cf. fr. 15, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι. - -Footnote 541: - - The person here addressed is still Pausanias, and the speaker - Empedokles. Cf. fr. 111. - -Footnote 542: - - No doubt mainly Parmenides. - -Footnote 543: - - The sense of taste, not speech. - -Footnote 544: - - Zeller in his earlier editions retained the full stop after νοῆσαι, - thus getting almost the opposite sense: “Withhold all confidence in - thy bodily senses”; but he admits in his fifth edition (p. 804, n. 2) - that the context is in favour of Stein, who put only a comma at νοῆσαι - and took ἄλλων closely with γυίων. So too Diels. The paraphrase given - by Sextus (R. P. _ib._) is substantially right. - -Footnote 545: - - There is no difficulty in the MS. διατμηθέντος if we take λόγοιο as - “discourse,” “argument” (cf. διαιρεῖν). Diels conjectures - διασσηθέντος, rendering “when their words have passed through the - sieve of thy mind.” Nor does it seem to me necessary to read χαρτά for - κάρτα in the first line. - -Footnote 546: - - The four elements are introduced under mythological names, for which - see below, p. 264, _n._ 583. Diels is clearly right in removing the - comma after τέγγει, and rendering _Nestis quae lacrimis suis laticem - fundit mortalibus destinatum_. - -Footnote 547: - - Reading μετὰ τοῖσιν. I still think, however, that Knatz’s - palaeographically admirable conjuncture μετὰ θεοῖσιν (_i.e._ among the - elements) deserves consideration. - -Footnote 548: - - Keeping ἄλλοτε with Diels. - -Footnote 549: - - Reading ἄμβροτα δ’ ὅσσ’ ἴδει with Diels. For the word ἶδος, cf. frs. - 62, 5; 73, 2. The reference is to the moon, etc., which are made of - solidified Air, and receive their light from the fiery hemisphere. See - below, § 113. - -Footnote 550: - - Reading with Blass (_Jahrb. f. kl. Phil._, 1883, p. 19): - - οὕτω μή σ’ ἀπάτη φρένα καινύτω κ.τ.λ. - - Cf. Hesychios: καινύτω· νικάτω. This is practically what the MSS. of - Simplicius give, and Hesychios has many Empedoklean glosses. - -Footnote 551: - - The “goddess” is, of course, the Muse. Cf. fr. 5. - -Footnote 552: - - The word μονίῃ, if it is right, cannot mean “rest,” but only solitude. - There is no reason for altering περιηγέι, though Simplicius has - περιγηθέι. - -Footnote 553: - - The masculine καλλήσας shows that the subject cannot have been - Φιλότης; and Karsten was doubtless right in believing that Empedokles - introduced the simile of a baker here. It is in his manner to take - illustrations from human arts. - -Footnote 554: - - The MSS. of Clement have ἥλιον ἀρχήν and the reading ἡλίου ἀρχήν is a - mere makeshift. Diels reads ἥλικά τ’ ἀρχήν, “the first (elements) - equal in age.” - -Footnote 555: - - The lines are referred to Xenophanes by Aristotle, who quotes them _de - Caelo_, Β, 13. 294 a 21. See above, Chap. II. p. 137. - -Footnote 556: - - I have translated Diels’s conjecture ἀπεστέγασεν δέ οἱ αὐγάς, | ἔστ’ - ἂν ἴῃ καθύπερθεν. The MSS. have ἀπεσκεύασεν and ἔστε αἶαν. - -Footnote 557: - - Reading στείροις with Diels, _Hermes_, xv. _loc. cit._ - -Footnote 558: - - Retaining εἴδεος (_i.e._ ἴδεος), which is read in the MSS. of - Simplicius. Cf. above, p. 243, _n._ 549. - -Footnote 559: - - That Empedokles regarded milk as putrefied blood is stated by - Aristotle (_de Gen. An._ Δ, 8. 777 a 7). The word πύον means _pus_. - There may be a punning allusion to πυός, “beestings,” but that has its - vowel long. - -Footnote 560: - - Said of women in reference to births in the seventh and ninth months. - -Footnote 561: - - Of the membrane round the fœtus. - -Footnote 562: - - Reading ἴδεα ποιπνύουσα with Diels. - -Footnote 563: - - See Beare, p. 16, n. 1, where Plato, _Tim._ 45 b 4 (τοῦ πυρὸς ὅσον τὸ - μὲν κάειν οὐκ ἔσχεν, τὸ δὲ παρέχειν φῶς ἥμερον), is aptly quoted. - Alexander _ad loc._ understands κατὰ βηλόν to mean κατ’ οὐρανόν, which - seems improbable. - -Footnote 564: - - On fr. 99, see Beare, p. 96, n. 1. - -Footnote 565: - - This passage is quoted by Aristotle (_de Respir_, 473 b 9), who makes - the curious mistake of taking ῥινῶν for the genitive of ῥίς instead of - ῥινός. The _locus classicus_ on the subject of the klepsydra is - _Probl._ 914 b 9 sqq. (where read αὐλοῦ for ἄλλου, b 12). The - klepsydra was a metal vessel with a narrow neck (αὐλός) at the top and - with a sort of strainer (ἠθμός) pierced with holes (τρήματα, - τρυπήματα) at the bottom. The passage in the _Problems_ just referred - to attributes this theory of the phenomenon to Anaxagoras, and we - shall see later that he also made use of a similar experiment (§ 131). - -Footnote 566: - - This seems to be the experiment described in _Probl._ 914 b 26, ἐὰν - γάρ τις αὐτῆς (τῆς κλεψύδρας) αὐτὴν τὴν κωδίαν ἐμπλήσας ὕδατος, - ἐπιλαβὼν τὸν αὐλόν, καταστρέψῃ ἐπὶ τὸν αὐλόν, οὐ φέρεται τὸ ὕδωρ διὰ - τοῦ αὐλοῦ ἐπὶ στόμα. ἀνοιχθέντος δὲ τοῦ στόματος, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐκρεῖ κατὰ - τὸν αὐλόν, ἀλλὰ μικροτέρῳ ὕστερον, ὡς οὐκ ὂν ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ αὐλοῦ, - ἀλλ’ ὕστερον διὰ τούτου φερόμενον ἀνοιχθέντος. The epithet δυσηχέος - applied to ἰσθμοῖο is best explained as a reference to the ἐρυγμός or - “belching” referred to at 915 a 7 as accompanying the discharge of - water through the αὐλός. Any one can produce this effect with a - water-bottle. If it were not for this epithet, it would be tempting to - read ἠθμοῖο for ἰσθμοῖο. Sturz conjectured this, and it is actually - the reading of a few MSS. - -Footnote 567: - - On fr. 101, see Beare, p. 135, n. 2. - -Footnote 568: - - That the reference is to dreams, we learn from Simpl. _de An._ p. 202, - 30. - - PURIFICATIONS - - (112) - - Friends, that inhabit the great town looking down on the yellow rock - of Akragas, up by the citadel, busy in goodly works, harbours of - honour for the stranger, men unskilled in meanness, all hail. I go - about among you an immortal god, no mortal now, honoured among all as - is meet, crowned with fillets and <<5>> flowery garlands. Straightway, - whenever I enter with these in my train, both men and women, into the - flourishing towns, is reverence done me; they go after me in countless - throngs, asking of me what is the way to gain; some desiring oracles, - while some, who for many a weary day have been pierced <<10>> by the - grievous pangs of all manner of sickness, beg to hear from me the word - of healing. R. P. 162 f. - - (113) - - But why do I harp on these things, as if it were any great matter that - I should surpass mortal, perishable men? - - (114) - - Friends, I know indeed that truth is in the words I shall utter, but - it is hard for men, and jealous are they of the assault of belief on - their souls. - - (115) - - There is an oracle of Necessity,[569] an ancient ordinance of the - gods, eternal and sealed fast by broad oaths, that whenever one of the - dæmons, whose portion is length of days, has sinfully polluted his - hands with blood,[570] or followed strife and <<5>> forsworn himself, - he must wander thrice ten thousand years from the abodes of the - blessed, being born throughout the time in all manners of mortal - forms, changing one toilsome path of life for another. For the mighty - Air drives him into the Sea, and the Sea spews him forth on the dry - Earth; Earth tosses him into the beams of the blazing Sun, and he - <<10>> flings him back to the eddies of Air. One takes him from the - other, and all reject him. One of these I now am, an exile and a - wanderer from the gods, for that I put my trust in insensate strife. - R. P. 181. - - (116) - - Charis loathes intolerable Necessity. - - (117) - - For I have been ere now a boy and a girl, a bush and a bird and a dumb - fish in the sea. R. P. 182. - - (118) - - I wept and I wailed when I saw the unfamiliar land. R. P. 182. - - (119) - - From what honour, from what a height of bliss have I fallen to go - about among mortals here on earth. - - (120) - - We have come under this roofed-in cave.[571] - - (121) - - ... the joyless land, where are Death and Wrath and troops of Dooms - besides; and parching Plagues and Rottennesses and Floods roam in - darkness over the meadow of Ate. - - (122, 123) - - There were[572] Chthonie and far-sighted Heliope, bloody Discord and - gentle-visaged Harmony, Kallisto and Aischre, Speed and Tarrying, - lovely Truth and dark-haired Uncertainty, Birth and Decay, Sleep and - Waking, Movement and Immobility, crowned Majesty and Meanness, Silence - and Voice. <<5>> R. P. 182 a. - - (124) - - Alas, O wretched race of mortals, twice unblessed: such are the - strifes and groanings from which ye have been born! - - (125) - - From living creatures he made them dead, changing their forms. - - (126) - - (The goddess) clothing them with a strange garment of flesh.[573] - - (127) - - Among beasts they[574] become lions that make their lair on the hills - and their couch on the ground; and laurels among trees with goodly - foliage. R. P. 181 b. - - (128) - - Nor had they[575] any Ares for a god nor Kydoimos, no nor King Zeus - nor Kronos nor Poseidon, but Kypris the Queen.... Her did they - propitiate with holy gifts, with painted figures[576] and perfumes of - cunning fragrancy, with offerings of pure myrrh and sweet-smelling - frankincense, casting on the <<5>> ground libations of brown honey. - And the altar did not reek with pure bull’s blood, but this was held - in the greatest abomination among men, to eat the goodly limbs after - tearing out the life. R. P. 184. - - (129) - - And there was among them a man of rare knowledge, most skilled in all - manner of wise works, a man who had won the utmost wealth of wisdom; - for whensoever he strained with all his mind, he easily saw everything - of all the things that are, in ten, yea, twenty lifetimes of men.[577] - <<5>> - - (130) - - For all things were tame and gentle to man, both beasts and birds, and - friendly feelings were kindled everywhere. R. P. 184 a. - - (131) - - If ever, as regards the things of a day, immortal Muse, thou didst - deign to take thought for my endeavour, then stand by me once more as - I pray to thee, O Kalliopeia, as I utter a pure discourse concerning - the blessed gods. R. P. 179. - - (132) - - Blessed is the man who has gained the riches of divine wisdom; - wretched he who has a dim opinion of the gods in his heart. R. P. 179. - - (133) - - It is not possible for us to set God before our eyes, or to lay hold - of him with our hands, which is the broadest way of persuasion that - leads into the heart of man. - - (134) - - For he is not furnished with a human head on his body, two branches do - not sprout from his shoulders, he has no feet, no swift knees, nor - hairy parts; but he is only a sacred and unutterable mind flashing - through the whole world with rapid thoughts. R. P. 180. - - (135) - - This is not lawful for some and unlawful for others; but the law for - all extends everywhere, through the wide-ruling air and the infinite - light of heaven. R. P. 183. - - (136) - - Will ye not cease from this ill-sounding slaughter? See ye not that ye - are devouring one another in the thoughtlessness of your hearts? R. P. - 184 b. - - (137) - - And the father lifts up his own son in a changed form and slays him - with a prayer. Infatuated fool! And they run up to the sacrifices, - begging mercy, while he, deaf to their cries, slaughters them in his - halls and gets ready the evil feast. In like manner does the son seize - his father, and children their <<5>> mother, tear out their life and - eat the kindred flesh. R. P. 184 b. - - (138) - - Draining their life with bronze. - - (139) - - Ah, woe is me that the pitiless day of death did not destroy me ere - ever I wrought evil deeds of devouring with my lips! R. P. 184 b. - - (140) - - Abstain wholly from laurel leaves. - - (141) - - Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands from beans! - - (142) - - Him will the roofed palace of aigis-bearing Zeus never rejoice, nor - yet the house of.... - - (143) - - Wash your hands, cutting the water from the five springs in the - unyielding bronze.[578] R. P. 184 c. - - (144) - - Fast from wickedness! R. P. 184 c. - - (145) - - Therefore are ye distraught by grievous wickednesses, and will not - unburden your souls of wretched sorrows. - - (146, 147) - - But, at the last, they appear among mortal men as prophets, - song-writers, physicians, and princes; and thence they rise up as gods - exalted in honour, sharing the hearth of the other gods and the same - table, free from human woes, safe from destiny, and incapable of hurt. - <<5>> R. P. 181 c. - - (148) - - ... Earth that envelops the man. - -Footnote 569: - - Bernays conjectured ῥῆμα, “decree,” for χρῆμα, but this is not - necessary. Necessity is an Orphic personage, and Gorgias, the disciple - of Empedokles, says θεῶν βουλεύμασιν καὶ ἀνάγκης ψηφίσμασιν (_Hel._ - 6). - -Footnote 570: - - I retain φόνῳ in v. 3 (so too Diels). The first word of v. 4 has been - lost. Diels suggests Νείκεϊ, which may well be right, and takes - ἁμαρτήσας as equivalent to ὁμαρτήσας. I have translated accordingly. - -Footnote 571: - - According to Porphyry, who quotes this line (_de Antro Nymph._ 8), - these words were spoken by the “powers” who conduct the soul into the - world (ψυχοπομποὶ δυνάμεις). The “cave” is not originally Platonic but - Orphic. - -Footnote 572: - - This passage is closely modelled on the Catalogue of Nymphs in _Iliad_ - xviii. 39 sqq. Chthonie is found already in Pherekydes (Diog. i. 119). - -Footnote 573: - - I have retained ἀλλόγνωτι as nearer the MSS., though a little hard to - interpret. On the subsequent history of the Orphic _chiton_ in gnostic - imagery see Bernays, _Theophr. Schr._ n. 9. It was identified with the - coat of skins made by God for Adam. - -Footnote 574: - - This is the best μετοίκησις (Ael. _Nat. an._ xii. 7). - -Footnote 575: - - The dwellers in the Golden Age. - -Footnote 576: - - The MSS. of Porphyry have γραπτοῖς τε ζώοισι, which is accepted by - Zeller and Diels. The emendation of Bernays (adopted in R. P.) does - not convince me. I venture to suggest μακτοῖς, on the strength of the - story related by Favorinus (_ap._ Diog. viii. 53) as to the bloodless - sacrifice offered by Empedokles at Olympia. - -Footnote 577: - - These lines were already referred to Pythagoras by Timaios (Diog. - viii. 54). As we are told (Diog. _ib._) that some referred the verses - to Parmenides, it is clear that no name was given. - -Footnote 578: - - On frs. 138 and 143 see Vahlen on Arist. _Poet._ 21. 1547 b 13, and - Diels in _Hermes_, xv. p. 173. - -[Sidenote: Empedokles and Parmenides.] - -106. At the very outset of his poem, Empedokles is careful to mark the -difference between himself and previous inquirers. He speaks angrily of -those who, though their experience was only partial, professed to have -found the whole (fr. 2); he even calls this “madness” (fr. 4). No doubt -he is thinking of Parmenides. His own position is not, however, -sceptical. He only deprecates the attempt to construct a theory of the -universe off-hand instead of trying to understand each thing we come -across “in the way in which it is clear” (fr. 4). And this means that we -must not, like Parmenides, reject the assistance of the senses. Weak -though they are (fr. 2), they are the only channels through which -knowledge can enter our minds at all. We soon discover, however, that -Empedokles is not very mindful of his own warnings. He too sets up a -system which is to explain everything, though that system is no longer a -monistic one. - -It is often said that this system was an attempt to mediate between -Parmenides and Herakleitos. It is not easy, however, to find any trace -of specially Herakleitean doctrine in it, and it would be truer to say -that it aimed at mediating between Eleaticism and the senses. He -repeats, almost in the same words, the Eleatic argument for the sole -reality and indestructibility of “what _is_” (frs. 11-15); and his idea -of the “Sphere” seems to be derived from the Parmenidean description of -the universe as it truly is.[579] Parmenides had held that the reality -which underlies the illusory world presented to us by the senses was a -corporeal, spherical, continuous, eternal, and immovable _plenum_, and -it is from this that Empedokles starts. Given the sphere of Parmenides, -he seems to have said, How are we to get from it to the world we know? -How are we to introduce motion into the immovable _plenum_? Now -Parmenides need not have denied the possibility of motion within the -Sphere, though he was bound to deny all motion of the Sphere itself; but -such an admission on his part, had he made it, would not have served to -explain anything. If any part of the Sphere were to move, the room of -the displaced matter must at once be taken by other matter, for there is -no empty space. This, however, would be of precisely the same kind as -the matter it had displaced; for all “that _is_” is one. The result of -the motion would be precisely the same as that of rest; it could account -for no change. But, Empedokles must have asked, is this assumption of -perfect homogeneity in the Sphere really necessary? Evidently not; it is -simply the old unreasoned feeling that existence must be one. If, -instead of this, we were to assume a number of existent things, it would -be quite possible to apply all that Parmenides says of reality to each -of them, and the forms of existence we know might be explained by the -mingling and separation of those realities. The conception of “elements” -(στοιχεῖα), to use a later term,[580] was found, and the required -formula follows at once. So far as concerns particular things, it is -true, as our senses tell us, that they come into being and pass away; -but, if we have regard to the ultimate elements of which they are -composed, we shall say with Parmenides that “what _is_” is uncreated and -indestructible (fr. 17). - -Footnote 579: - - Cf. Emp. frs. 27, 28, with Parm. fr. 8. - -Footnote 580: - - For the history of the term στοιχεῖον see Diels, _Elementum_. Eudemos - said (_ap._ Simpl. _Phys._ p. 7, 13) that Plato was the first to use - it, and this is confirmed by the way the word is introduced in _Tht._ - 201 e. The original term was μορφή or ἰδέα. - -[Sidenote: The “four roots.”] - -107. The “four roots” of all things (fr. 6) which Empedokles assumed -were those that have become traditional—Fire, Air, Earth, and Water. It -is to be noticed, however, that he does not call Air ἀήρ, but αἰθήρ, and -this must be because he wished to avoid any confusion with what had -hitherto been meant by the former word. He had, in fact, made the great -discovery that atmospheric air is a distinct corporeal substance, and is -not to be identified with empty space on the one hand or rarefied mist -on the other. Water is not liquid air, but something quite -different.[581] This truth Empedokles demonstrated by means of the -apparatus known as the _klepsydra_, and we still possess the verses in -which he applied his discovery to the explanation of respiration and the -motion of the blood (fr. 100). Aristotle laughs at those who try to show -there is no empty space by shutting up air in water-clocks and torturing -wineskins. They only prove, he says, that air is a thing.[582] That, -however, is exactly what Empedokles intended to prove, and it was one of -the most important discoveries in the early history of science. It will -be convenient for us to translate the αἰθήρ of Empedokles by “air”; but -we must be careful in that case not to render the word ἀήρ in the same -way. Anaxagoras seems to have been the first to use it of atmospheric -air. - -Footnote 581: - - Cf. Chap. I. § 27. - -Footnote 582: - - Arist. _Phys._ Δ, 6, 213 a 22 (R. P. 159). Aristotle only mentions - Anaxagoras by name in this passage; but he speaks in the plural, and - we know from fr. 100 that the _klepsydra_ experiment was used by - Empedokles. - -Empedokles also called the “four roots” by the names of certain -divinities—“shining Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis” (fr. -6)—though there is some doubt as to how these names are to be -apportioned among the elements. Nestis is said to have been a Sicilian -water-goddess, and the description of her shows that she stands for -Water; but there is a conflict of opinion as to the other three. This, -however, need not detain us.[583] We are already prepared to find that -Empedokles called the elements gods; for all the early thinkers had -spoken in this way of whatever they regarded as the primary substance. -We must only remember that the word is not used in its religious sense. -Empedokles did not pray or sacrifice to the elements, and the use of -divine names is in the main an accident of the poetical form in which he -cast his system. - -Footnote 583: - - In antiquity the Homeric Allegorists made Hera Earth and Aidoneus Air, - a view which has found its way into Aetios from Poseidonios. It arose - as follows. The Homeric Allegorists were not interested in the science - of Empedokles, and did not see that his αἰθήρ was quite a different - thing from Homer’s ἀήρ. Now this is the dark element, and night is a - form of it, so it would naturally be identified with Aidoneus. Again, - Empedokles calls Hera φερέσβιος, and that is an old epithet of Earth - in Homer. Another view current in antiquity identified Hera with Air, - which is the theory of Plato’s _Cratylus_, and Aidoneus with Earth. - The Homeric Allegorists further identified Zeus with Fire, a view to - which they were doubtless led by the use of the word αἰθήρ. Now αἰθήρ - certainly means Fire in Anaxagoras, as we shall see, but there is no - doubt that in Empedokles it meant Air. It seems likely, then, that - Knatz is right (“Empedoclea” in _Schedae Philologicae Hermanno Usenero - oblatae_, 1891, pp. 1 sqq.) in holding that the bright Air of - Empedokles was Zeus. This leaves Aidoneus to stand for Fire; and - nothing could have been more natural for a Sicilian poet, with the - volcanoes and hot springs of his native island in mind, than this - identification. He refers to the fires that burn beneath the Earth - himself (fr. 52). If that is so, we shall have to agree with the - Homeric Allegorists that Hera is Earth; and there is certainly no - improbability in that. - -Empedokles regarded the “roots of all things” as eternal. Nothing can -come from nothing or pass away into nothing (fr. 12); what is _is_, and -there is no room for coming into being and passing away (fr. 8). -Further, Aristotle tells us, he taught that they were unchangeable.[584] -This Empedokles expressed by saying that “they are what they are” (frs. -17, 34; 21, 13), and are “always alike.” Again, they are all “equal,” a -statement which seemed strange to Aristotle,[585] but was quite -intelligible in the days of Empedokles. Above all, the elements are -ultimate. All other bodies, as Aristotle puts it, might be divided till -you came to the elements; but Empedokles could give no further account -of these without saying (as he did not) that there is an element of -which Fire and the rest are in turn composed.[586] - -Footnote 584: - - Arist. _de Gen. Corr._ Β, 1. 329 b 1. - -Footnote 585: - - _Ibid._ Β, 6. 333 a 16. - -Footnote 586: - - _Ibid._ Α, 8. 325 b 19 (R. P. 164 e). This was so completely - misunderstood by later writers that they actually attribute to - Empedokles the doctrine of στοιχεῖα πρὸ τῶν στοιχείων (Aet. 1. 13, 1; - 17, 3). The criticism of the Pythagoreans and Plato had made the - hypothesis of elements almost unintelligible to Aristotle, and _a - fortiori_ to his successors. As Plato put it (_Tim._ 48 b 8), they - were “not even syllables,” let alone “letters” (στοιχεῖα). That is why - Aristotle, who derived them from something more primary, calls them τὰ - καλούμενα στοιχεῖα (Diels, _Elementum_, p. 25). - -The “four roots” are given as an exhaustive enumeration of the elements -(fr. 23 _sub fin._); for they account for all the qualities presented by -the world to the senses. When we find, as we do, that the school of -medicine which regarded Empedokles as its founder identified the four -elements with the “opposites,” the hot and the cold, the moist and the -dry, which formed the theoretical foundation of its system, we see at -once how the theory is related to previous views of reality.[587] To put -it shortly, what Empedokles did was to take the opposites of Anaximander -and to declare that they were “things,” each of which was real in the -Parmenidean sense. We must remember that the conception of quality had -not yet been formed. Anaximander had no doubt regarded his “opposites” -as things; though, before the time of Parmenides, no one had fully -realised how much was implied in saying that anything is a thing. That -is the stage we have now reached. There is still no conception of -quality, but there is a clear apprehension of what is involved in saying -that a thing _is_. - -Footnote 587: - - We know from Menon that Philistion put the matter in this way. See p. - 235, _n._ 527. - -Aristotle twice[588] makes the statement that, though Empedokles assumes -four elements, he treats them as two, opposing Fire to all the rest. -This, he says, we can see for ourselves from his poem. So far as the -general theory of the elements goes, it is impossible to see anything of -the sort; but, when we come to the origin of the world (§ 112), we shall -find that Fire certainly plays a leading part, and this may be what -Aristotle meant. It is also true that in the biology (§ 114–116) Fire -fulfils a unique function, while the other three act more or less in the -same way. But we must remember that it has no pre-eminence over the -rest: all are equal. - -Footnote 588: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 4. 985 a 31; _de Gen. Corr._ Β, 3. 330 b 19 (R. P. - 164 e). - -[Sidenote: Strife and Love.] - -108. The Eleatic criticism had made it necessary for subsequent thinkers -to explain motion.[589] Empedokles starts, as we have seen, from an -original state of the “four roots,” which only differs from the Sphere -of Parmenides in so far as it is a mixture, not a homogeneous and -continuous mass. The fact that it is a mixture makes change and motion -possible; but, were there nothing outside the Sphere which could enter -in, like the Pythagorean “Air,” to separate the four elements, nothing -could ever arise from it. Empedokles accordingly assumed the existence -of such a substance, and he gave it the name of Strife. But the effect -of this would be to separate all the elements in the Sphere completely, -and then nothing more could possibly happen; something else was needed -to bring the elements together again. This Empedokles found in Love, -which he regarded as the same impulse to union that is implanted in -human bodies (fr. 17, 22 sqq.). He looks at it, in fact, from a purely -physiological point of view, as was natural for the founder of a medical -school. No mortal had yet marked, he says, that the very same Love which -men know in their bodies had a place among the elements. - -Footnote 589: - - Cf. Introd. § VIII. - -It is important to observe that the Love and Strife of Empedokles are no -incorporeal forces, but corporeal elements like the other four. At the -time, this was inevitable; nothing incorporeal had yet been dreamt of. -Naturally, Aristotle is puzzled by this characteristic of what he -regarded as efficient causes. “The Love of Empedokles,” he says[590] “is -both an efficient cause, for it brings things together, and a material -cause, for it is a part of the mixture.” And Theophrastos expressed the -same idea by saying[591] that Empedokles sometimes gave an efficient -power to Love and Strife, and sometimes put them on a level with the -other four. The verses of Empedokles himself leave no room for doubt -that the two were thought of as spatial and corporeal. All the six are -called “equal.” Love is said to be “equal in length and breadth” to the -others, and Strife is described as equal to each of them in weight (fr. -17). - -Footnote 590: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 10. 1075 b 3. - -Footnote 591: - - Theophr. _Phys. Op._ fr. 3 (_Dox._ p. 477); _ap._ Simpl. _Phys._ p. - 25, 21 (R. P. 166 b). - -The function of Love is to produce union; that of Strife, to break it up -again. Aristotle, however, rightly points out that in another sense it -is Love that divides and Strife that unites. When the Sphere is broken -up by Strife, the result is that all the Fire, for instance, which was -contained in it comes together and becomes one; and again, when the -elements are brought together once more by Love, the mass of each is -divided. In another place, he says that, while Strife is assumed as the -cause of destruction, and does, in fact, destroy the Sphere, it really -gives birth to everything else in so doing.[592] It follows that we must -carefully distinguish between the Love of Empedokles and that -“attraction of like for like” to which he also attributed an important -part in the formation of the world. The latter is not an element -distinct from the others; it depends, we shall see, on the proper nature -of each element, and is only able to take effect when Strife divides the -Sphere. Love, on the contrary, is something that comes from outside and -produces an attraction of _unlikes_. - -Footnote 592: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 4. 985 a 21; Γ, 4. 1000 a 24; b 9 (R. P. 166 i). - -[Sidenote: Mixture and separation.] - -109. But, when Strife has once separated the elements, what is it that -determines the direction of their motion? Empedokles seems to have given -no further explanation than that each was “running” in a certain -direction (fr. 53). Plato severely condemns this in the _Laws_,[593] on -the ground that no room is thus left for design. Aristotle also blames -him for giving no account of the Chance to which he ascribed so much -importance. Nor is the Necessity, of which he also spoke, further -explained.[594] Strife enters into the Sphere at a certain time in -virtue of Necessity, or “the mighty oath” (fr. 30); but we are left in -the dark as to the origin of this. - -Footnote 593: - - Plato, _Laws_, x. 889 b. The reference is not to Empedokles - exclusively, but the language shows that Plato is thinking mainly of - him. - -Footnote 594: - - Arist. _de Gen. Corr._ Β, 6. 334 a 1; _Phys._ Θ, 1. 252 a 5 (R. P. 166 - k). - -The expression used by Empedokles to describe the movement of the -elements is that they “run through each other” (fr. 17, 34). Aristotle -tells us[595] that he explained mixture in general by “the symmetry of -pores.” And this is the true explanation of the “attraction of like for -like.” The “pores” of like bodies are, of course, much the same size, -and these bodies can therefore mingle easily. On the other hand, a finer -body will “run through” a coarse one without becoming mixed, and a -coarse body will not be able to enter into the pores of a finer one at -all. It will be observed that, as Aristotle says, this really implies -something like the atomic theory; but there is no evidence that -Empedokles himself was conscious of that. Another question raised by -Aristotle is even more instructive. Are the pores, he asks, empty or -full? If empty, what becomes of the denial of the void? If full, why -need we assume pores at all?[596] These questions Empedokles would have -found it hard to answer. They point to a real want of thoroughness in -his system, and mark it as a mere stage in the transition from Monism to -Atomism. - -Footnote 595: - - _Ibid._ Α, 8. 324 b 34 (R. P. 166 h). - -Footnote 596: - - Arist. _de Gen. Corr._ 326 b 6. - -[Sidenote: The four periods.] - -110. It will be clear from all this that we must distinguish four -periods in the cycle. First we have the Sphere, in which all the -elements are mixed together by Love. Secondly, there is the period when -Love is passing out and Strife coming in, when, therefore, the elements -are partially separated and partially combined. Thirdly, comes the -complete separation of the elements, when Love is outside the world, and -Strife has given free play to the attraction of like for like. Lastly, -we have the period when Love is bringing the elements together again, -and Strife is passing out. This brings us back in time to the Sphere, -and the cycle begins afresh. Now a world such as ours can exist only in -the second and fourth of these periods; and it is clear that, if we are -to understand Empedokles, we must discover in which of these we now are. -It seems to be generally supposed that we are in the fourth period;[597] -I hope to show that we are really in the second, that when Strife is -gaining the upper hand. - -Footnote 597: - - This is the view of Zeller (pp. 785 sqq.), but he admits that the - external testimony, especially that of Aristotle, is wholly in favour - of the other. His difficulty is with the fragments, and if it can be - shown that these can be interpreted in accordance with Aristotle’s - statements, the question is settled. Aristotle was specially - interested in Empedokles, and was not likely to misrepresent him on - such a point. - -[Sidenote: Our world the work of Strife.] - -111. That a world of perishable things arises both in the second and -fourth period is distinctly stated by Empedokles (fr. 17), and it is -inconceivable that he himself had not made up his mind which of these -worlds is ours. Aristotle is clearly of opinion that it is the world -which arises when Strife is increasing. In one place, he says that -Empedokles “holds that the world is in a similar condition now in the -period of Strife as formerly in that of Love.”[598] In another, he tell -us that Empedokles omits the generation of things in the period of Love, -just because it is unnatural to represent this world, in which the -elements are separate, as arising from things in a state of -separation.[599] This remark can only mean that the scientific theories -contained in the poem of Empedokles assumed the increase of Strife, or, -in other words, that they represented the course of evolution as the -disintegration of the Sphere, not as the gradual coming together of -things from a state of separation.[600] That is only what we should -expect, if we are right in supposing that the problem he set himself to -solve was the origin of this world from the Sphere of Parmenides, and it -is also in harmony with the universal tendency of such speculations to -represent the world as getting worse rather than better. We have only to -consider, then, whether the details of the system bear out this general -view. - -Footnote 598: - - Arist _de Gen. Corr._ Β, 6. 334 a 6: τὸν κόσμον ὁμοίως ἔχειν φησίν ἐπί - τε τοῦ νείκους νῦν καὶ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας. - -Footnote 599: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Γ, 2. 301 a 14: ἐκ διεστώτων δὲ καὶ κινουμένων οὐκ - εὔλογον ποιεῖν τὴν γένεσιν. διὸ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς παραλείπει τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς - φιλότητος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἠδύνατο συστῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐκ κεχωρισμένων μὲν - κατασκευάζων, σύγκρισιν δὲ ποιῶν διὰ τὴν φιλότητα· ἐκ διακεκριμένων - γὰρ συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος τῶν στοιχείων (“our world consists of the - elements in a state of separation”), ὥστ’ ἀναγκαῖον γενέσθαι ἐξ ἑνὸς - καὶ συγκεκριμένου. - -Footnote 600: - - It need not mean that Empedokles said nothing about the world of Love - at all; for he obviously says something of both worlds in fr. 17. It - is enough to suppose that, having described both in general terms, he - went on to treat the world of Strife in detail. - -[Sidenote: Formation of the world by Strife.] - -112. To begin with the Sphere, in which the “four roots of all things” -are mixed together, we note in the first place that it is called a god -in the fragments just as the elements are, and that Aristotle more than -once refers to it in the same way.[601] We must remember that Love -itself is a part of this mixture,[602] while Strife surrounds or -encompasses it on every side just as the Boundless encompasses the world -in earlier systems. Strife, however, is not boundless, but equal in bulk -to each of the four roots and to Love. - -Footnote 601: - - Arist. _de Gen. Corr._ Β, 6. 333 b 21 (R. P. 168 e); _Met._ Β, 4. 1000 - a 29 (R. P. 166 i). Cf. Simpl. _Phys._ p. 1124, 1 (R. P. 167 b). In - other places Aristotle speaks of it as “the One.” Cf. _de Gen. Corr._ - Α, 1. 315 a 7 (R. P. 168 e); _Met._ Β, 4. 1000 a 29 (R. P. 166 i); Α, - 4. 985 a 28 (R. P. _ib._). This, however, involves a slight - Aristotelian “development.” It is not quite the same thing to say, as - Empedokles does, that all things come together “into one,” and to say - that they come together “into the One.” The latter expression suggests - that they lose their distinct and proper character in the Sphere, and - thus become something like Aristotle’s own “matter.” As has been - pointed out (p. 265, _n._ 586), it is hard for Aristotle to grasp the - conception of irreducible elements; but there can be no doubt that in - the Sphere, as in their separation, the elements remain “what they - are” for Empedokles. As Aristotle also knows quite well, the Sphere is - a mixture. Compare the difficulties about the “One” of Anaximander - discussed in Chap. I. § 15. - -Footnote 602: - - This accounts for Aristotle’s statement, which he makes once - positively (_Met._ Β, 1. 996 a 7) and once very doubtfully (_Met._ Γ, - 4. 1001 a 12), that Love was the substratum of the One in just the - same sense as the Fire of Herakleitos, the Air of Anaximenes, or the - Water of Thales. He thinks that all the elements become merged in - Love, and so lose their identity. In this case, it is in Love he - recognises his own “matter.” - -At the appointed time, Strife begins to enter into the Sphere and Love -to go out of it (frs. 30, 31). The fragments by themselves throw little -light on this; but Aetios and the Plutarchean _Stromateis_ have between -them preserved a very fair tradition of what Theophrastos said on the -point. - - Empedokles held that Air was first separated out and secondly Fire. - Next came Earth, from which, highly compressed as it was by the - impetus of its revolution, Water gushed forth. From the water Mist was - produced by evaporation. The heavens were formed out of the Air and - the sun out of the Fire, while terrestrial things were condensed from - the other elements. Aet. ii. 6. 3 (_Dox._ p. 334; R. P. 170). - - Empedokles held that the Air when separated off from the original - mixture of the elements was spread round in a circle. After the Air, - Fire running outwards, and not finding any other place, ran up under - the solid that surrounded the Air.[603] There were two hemispheres - revolving round the earth, the one altogether composed of fire, the - other of a mixture of air and a little fire. The latter he supposed to - be the Night. The origin of their motion he derived from the fact of - fire preponderating in one hemisphere owing to its accumulation there. - Ps.-Plut. _Strom._ fr. 10 (_Dox._ p. 582; R. P. 170 a). - -Footnote 603: - - For the phrase τοῦ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα πάγου cf. Περὶ διαίτης, i. 10, 1, - πρὸς τὸν περιέχοντα πάγον. _Et. M. s.v._ βηλὸς ... τὸν ἀνωτάτω πάγον - καὶ περιέχοντα τὸν πάντα ἀέρα. This probably comes ultimately from - Anaximenes. Cf. Chap. I. p. 82, _n._ 162. - -The first of the elements to be separated out by Strife, then, was Air, -which took the outermost position surrounding the world (cf. fr. 38). We -must not, however, take the statement that it surrounded the world “in a -circle” too strictly. It appears that Empedokles regarded the heavens as -shaped like an egg.[604] Here, probably, we have a trace of Orphic -ideas. At any rate, the outer circle of the Air became solidified or -frozen, and we thus get a crystalline vault as the boundary of the -world. We note that it was Fire which solidified the Air and turned it -to ice. Fire in general had a solidifying power.[605] - -Footnote 604: - - Aet. ii. 31, 4 (_Dox._ p. 363). - -Footnote 605: - - Aet. ii. 11, 2 (R. P. 170 c). - -In its upward rush Fire displaced a portion of the Air in the upper half -of the concave sphere formed by the frozen sky. This air then sunk -downwards, carrying with it a small portion of the fire. In this way, -two hemispheres were produced: one, consisting entirely of fire, the -diurnal hemisphere; the other, the nocturnal, consisting of air with a -little fire. - -The accumulation of Fire in the upper hemisphere disturbs the -equilibrium of the heavens and causes them to revolve; and this -revolution not only produces the alternation of day and night, but by -its rapidity keeps the heavens and the earth in their places. This was -illustrated, Aristotle tells us, by the simile of a cup of water whirled -round at the end of a string.[606] The verses which contained this -remarkable account of so-called “centrifugal force” have been lost; but -the experimental illustration is in the manner of Empedokles. - -[Sidenote: The sun, moon, stars, and earth.] - -113. It will be observed that day and night have been explained without -reference to the sun. Day is produced by the light of the fiery diurnal -hemisphere, while night is the shadow thrown by the earth when the fiery -hemisphere is on the other side of it (fr. 48). What, then, is the sun? -The Plutarchean _Stromateis_[607] again give us the answer: “The sun is -not fire in substance, but a reflexion of fire like that which comes -from water.” Plutarch himself makes one of his personages say: “You -laugh at Empedokles for saying that the sun is a product of the earth, -arising from the reflexion of the light of heaven, and once more -‘flashes back to Olympos with untroubled countenance.’”[608] Aetios -says:[609] “Empedokles held that there were two suns: one, the -archetype, the fire in one hemisphere of the world, filling the whole -hemisphere always stationed opposite its own reflexion; the other, the -visible sun, its reflexion in the other hemisphere, that which is filled -with air mingled with fire, produced by the reflexion of the earth, -which is round, on the crystalline sun, and carried round by the motion -of the fiery hemisphere. Or, to sum it up shortly, the sun is a -reflexion of the terrestrial fire.” - -Footnote 606: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Β, 13. 295 a 16 (R. P. 170 b). The experiment with - τὸ ἐν τοῖς κυάθοις ὕδωρ, which κύκλῳ τοῦ κυάθου φερομένου πολλάκις - κάτω τοῦ χαλκοῦ γινόμενον ὅμως οὐ φέρεται κάτω, reminds us of the - experiment with the _klepsydra_ in fr. 100. - -Footnote 607: - - [Plut.] _Strom._ fr. 10 (_Dox._ p. 582, 11; R. P. 170 c). - -Footnote 608: - - Plut. _de Pyth. Or._ 400 b (R. P. 170 c). We must keep the MS. reading - περὶ γῆν with Bernardakis and Diels. The reading περιαυγῆ in R. P. is - a conjecture of Wyttenbach’s; but cf. Aet. ii. 20, 13, quoted in the - next note. - -Footnote 609: - - Aet. ii. 20, 13 (_Dox._ p. 350), Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δύο ἡλίους· τὸν μὲν - ἀρχέτυπον, πῦρ ὂν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἡμισφαιρίῳ τοῦ κόσμου, πεπληρωκὸς τὸ - ἡμισφαίριον, αἰεὶ κατ’ ἀντικρὺ τῇ ἀνταυγείᾳ ἑαυτοῦ τεταγμένον· τὸν δὲ - φαινόμενον, ἀνταύγειαν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἡμισφαιρίῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ - θερμομιγοῦς πεπληρωμένῳ, ἀπὸ κυκλοτεροῦς τῆς γῆς κατ’ ἀνάκλασιν - γιγνομένην εἰς τὸν ἥλιον τὸν κρυσταλλοειδῆ, συμπεριελκομένην δὲ τῇ - κινήσει τοῦ πυρίνου. ὡς δὲ βραχέως εἰρῆσθαι συντεμόντα, ἀνταύγειαν - εἶναι τοῦ περὶ τὴν γὴν πυρὸς τὸν ἥλιον. - -These passages, and especially the last, are by no means clear. The -reflexion which we call the sun cannot be in the hemisphere opposite to -the fiery one; for that is the nocturnal hemisphere. We must say rather -that the light of the fiery hemisphere is reflected by the earth on to -the fiery hemisphere itself in one concentrated flash. From this it -follows that the appearance which we call the sun is the same size as -the earth. We may explain the origin of this view as follows. It had -just been discovered that the moon shone by reflected light, and there -is always a tendency to give any novel theory a wider application than -it really admits of. In the early part of the fifth century B.C., men -saw reflected light everywhere; the Pythagoreans held a very similar -view, and when we come to them, we shall see why Aetios, or rather his -source, expresses it by speaking of “two suns.” - -It was probably in this connexion that Empedokles announced that light -takes some time to travel, though its speed is so great as to escape our -perception.[610] - -“The moon,” we are told, “was composed of air cut off by the fire; it -was frozen just like hail, and had its light from the sun.” It is, in -other words, a disc of frozen air, of the same substance as the solid -sky which surrounds the heavens. Diogenes says that Empedokles taught it -was smaller than the sun, and Aetios tells us it was only half as -distant from the earth.[611] - -Empedokles did not attempt to explain the fixed stars by reflected -light, nor even the planets. They were fiery, made out of the fire which -the air carried with it when forced beneath the earth by the upward rush -of fire at the first separation, as we saw above. The fixed stars were -attached to the frozen air; the planets moved freely.[612] - -Empedokles was acquainted (fr. 42) with the true theory of solar -eclipses, which, along with that of the moon’s light, was the great -discovery of this period. He also knew (fr. 48) that night is the -conical shadow of the earth, and not a sort of exhalation. - -Wind was explained from the opposite motions of the fiery and airy -hemispheres. Rain was caused by the compression of the Air, which forced -any water there might be in it out of its pores in the form of drops. -Lightning was fire forced out from the clouds in much the same way.[613] - -Footnote 610: - - Arist. _de Sensu_, 6. 446 a 28; _de An._ Β, 7. 418 b 20. - -Footnote 611: - - [Plut.] _Strom._ fr. 10 (_Dox._ p. 582, 12; R. P. 170 c); Diog. viii. - 77; Aet. ii. 31, 1 (cf. _Dox._ p. 63). - -Footnote 612: - - Aet. ii. 13, 2 and 11 (_Dox._ pp. 341 sqq.). - -Footnote 613: - - Aet. iii. 3, 7; Arist. _Meteor._ Β, 9. 369 b 12, with Alexander’s - commentary. - -The earth was at first mixed with water, but the increasing compression -caused by the velocity of the world’s revolution made the water gush -forth, so that the sea is called “the sweat of the earth,” a phrase to -which Aristotle objects as a mere poetical metaphor. The saltness of the -sea was explained by the help of this analogy.[614] - -Footnote 614: - - Arist. _Meteor._ Β, 3. 357 a 24; Aet. iii. 16, 3 (R. P. 170 b). Cf. - the clear reference in Arist. _Meteor._ Β, 1. 353 b 11. - -[Sidenote: Organic combinations.] - -114. Empedokles went on to show how the four elements, mingled in -different proportions, gave rise to perishable things, such as bones, -flesh, and the like. These, of course, are the work of Love; but this in -no way contradicts the view taken above as to the period of evolution to -which this world belongs. Love is by no means banished from the world -yet, though one day it will be. At present, it is still able to form -combinations of elements; but, just because Strife is ever increasing, -they are all perishable. - -The possibility of organic combinations depends upon the fact that there -is still water in the earth, and even fire (fr. 52). The warm springs of -Sicily were a proof of this, not to speak of Etna. These springs -Empedokles appears to have explained by one of his characteristic -images, drawn this time from the heating of warm baths.[615] It will be -noted that his similes are nearly all drawn from human inventions and -manufactures. - -Footnote 615: - - Seneca, _Q. Nat._ iii. 24: “facere solemus dracones et miliaria et - complures formas in quibus aere tenui fistulas struimus per declive - circumdatas, ut saepe eundem ignem ambiens aqua per tantum fluat - spatii quantum efficiendo calori sat est. frigida itaque intrat, - effluit calida. idem sub terra Empedocles existimat fieri.” - -[Sidenote: Plants.] - -115. Plants and animals were formed from the four elements under the -influence of Love and Strife. The fragments which deal with trees and -plants are 77-81; and these, taken along with certain Aristotelian -statements and the doxographical tradition, enable us to make out pretty -fully what the theory was. The text of Aetios is very corrupt here; but -it may, perhaps, be rendered as follows:— - - Empedokles says that trees were the first living creatures to grow up - out of the earth, before the sun was spread out, and before day and - night were distinguished; that, from the symmetry of their mixture, - they contain the proportion of male and female; that they grow, rising - up owing to the heat which is in the earth, so that they are parts of - the earth just as embryos are parts of the uterus; that fruits are - excretions of the water and fire in plants, and that those which have - a deficiency of moisture shed their leaves when that is evaporated by - the summer heat, while those which have more moisture remain - evergreen, as in the case of the laurel, the olive, and the palm; that - the differences in taste are due to variations in the particles - contained in the earth and to the plants drawing different particles - from it, as in the case of vines; for it is not the difference of the - vines that makes wine good, but that of the soil which nourishes them. - Aet. v. 26, 4 (R. P. 172). - -Aristotle finds fault with Empedokles for explaining the double growth -of plants, upwards and downwards, by the opposite natural motions of the -earth and fire contained in them.[616] For “natural motions” we must, of -course, substitute the attraction of like for like (§ 109). Theophrastos -says much the same thing.[617] The growth of plants, then, is to be -regarded as an incident in that separation of the elements which Strife -is bringing about. Some of the fire which is still beneath the earth -(fr. 52) meeting in its upward course with earth, still moist with water -and “running” down so as to “reach its own kind,” unites with it, under -the influence of the Love still left in the world, to form a temporary -combination, which we call a tree or a plant. - -Footnote 616: - - Arist. _de An._ Β, 4. 415 b 28. - -Footnote 617: - - Theophr. _de causis plantarum_, i. 12, 5. - -At the beginning of the pseudo-Aristotelian _Treatise on Plants_,[618] -we are told that Empedokles attributed desire, sensation, and the -capacity for pleasure and pain to plants, and he rightly saw that the -two sexes are combined in them. This is mentioned by Aetios, and -discussed in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise. If we may so far trust -that Byzantine translation from a Latin version of the Arabic,[619] we -get a most valuable hint as to the reason. Plants, we are there told, -came into being “in an imperfect state of the world,”[620] in fact, at a -time when Strife had not so far prevailed as to differentiate the sexes. -We shall see that the same thing applies to the original race of animals -in this world. It is strange that Empedokles never observed the actual -process of generation in plants, but confined himself to the statement -that they spontaneously “bore eggs” (fr. 79), that is to say, fruit. - -Footnote 618: - - [Arist.] _de plantis_, Α, 1. 815 a 15. - -Footnote 619: - - Alfred the Englishman translated the Arabic version into Latin in the - reign of Henry III. It was retranslated from this version into Greek - at the Renaissance by a Greek resident in Italy. - -Footnote 620: - - Α, 2. 817 b 35, “mundo ... diminuto et non perfecto in complemento - suo” (Alfred). - -[Sidenote: Evolution of animals.] - -116. The fragments which deal with the evolution of animals (57-62) must -be understood in the light of the statement (fr. 17) that there is a -double coming into being and a double passing away of mortal things. -Empedokles describes two processes of evolution, which take exactly -opposite courses, one of them belonging to the period of Love and the -other to that of Strife. The four stages of this double evolution are -accurately distinguished in a passage of Aetios,[621] and we shall see -that there is evidence for referring two of them to the second period of -the world’s history and two to the fourth. - -Footnote 621: - - Aet. v. 19, 5 (R. P. 173). Plato has made use of the idea of reversed - evolution in the _Politicus_ myth. - -The first stage is that in which the various parts of animals arise -separately. It is that of heads without necks, arms without shoulders, -and eyes without foreheads (fr. 57). It is clear that this must be the -first stage in what we have called the fourth period of the world’s -history, that in which Love is coming in and Strife passing out. -Aristotle distinctly refers it to the period of Love, by which, as we -have seen, he means the period when Love is increasing.[622] It is in -accordance with this that he also says these scattered members were -subsequently put together by Love.[623] - -Footnote 622: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Γ, 2. 300 b 29 (R. P. 173 a). Cf. _de Gen. An._ Α, - 17. 722 b 17, where fr. 57 is introduced by the words καθάπερ - Ἐμπεδοκλῆς γεννᾷ ἐπὶ τῆς Φιλότητος. Simplicius, _de Caelo_, p. 587, - 18, expresses the same thing by saying μουνομελῆ ἔτι τὰ γυῖα ἀπὸ τῆς - τοῦ Νείκους διακρίσεως ὄντα ἐπλανᾶτο. - -Footnote 623: - - Arist. _de An._ Γ, 6. 430 a 30 (R. P. 173 a). - -The second stage is that in which the scattered limbs are united. At -first, they were combined in all possible ways (fr. 59). There were oxen -with human heads, creatures with double faces and double breasts, and -all manner of monsters (fr. 61). Those of them that were fitted to -survive did so, while the rest perished. That is how the evolution of -animals took place in the period of Love.[624] - -Footnote 624: - - This is well put by Simplicius, _de Caelo_, p. 587, 20. It is ὅτε τοῦ - Νείκους ἐπεκράτει λοιπὸν ἡ Φιλότης ... ἐπὶ τῆς Φιλότητος οὖν ὁ - Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐκεῖνα εἶπεν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπικρατούσης ἤδη τῆς Φιλότητος, ἀλλ’ - ὡς μελλούσης ἐπικρατεῖν. In _Phys._ p. 371, 33, he says the oxen with - human heads were κατὰ τῆν τῆς Φιλίας ἀρχήν. - -The third stage belongs to the period when the unity of the Sphere is -being destroyed by Strife. It is, therefore, the first stage in the -evolution of our present world. It begins with “whole-natured forms” in -which there is not as yet any distinction of sex or species.[625] They -are composed of earth and water, and are produced by the upward motion -of fire which is seeking to reach its like. - -Footnote 625: - - Cf. Plato, _Symp._ 189 e. - -In the fourth stage, the sexes and species have been separated, and new -animals no longer arise from the elements, but are produced by -generation. We shall see presently how Empedokles conceived this to -operate. - -In both these processes of evolution, Empedokles was guided by the idea -of the survival of the fittest. Aristotle severely criticises this. “We -may suppose,” he says, “that all things have fallen out accidentally -just as they would have done if they had been produced for some end. -Certain things have been preserved because they had spontaneously -acquired a fitting structure, while those which were not so put together -have perished and are perishing, as Empedokles says of the oxen with -human faces.”[626] This, according to Aristotle, leaves too much to -chance. One curious instance has been preserved. Vertebration was -explained by saying that an early invertebrate animal tried to turn -round and broke its back in so doing. This was a favourable variation -and so survived.[627] It should be noted that it clearly belongs to the -period of Strife, and not, like the oxen with human heads, to that of -Love. The survival of the fittest was the law of both processes of -evolution. - -Footnote 626: - - Arist. _Phys._ Β, 8. 198 b 29 (R. P. 173 a). - -Footnote 627: - - Arist. _de Part. An._ Α, 1. 640 a 19. - -117. The distinction of the sexes was an important result of the gradual -differentiation brought about by the entrance of Strife into the world. -Empedokles differed from the theory given by Parmenides in his Second -Part (§ 95) in holding that the warm element preponderated in the male -sex, and that males were conceived in the warmer part of the uterus (fr. -65). The fœtus was formed partly from the male and partly from the -female semen (fr. 63); and it was just the fact that the substance of a -new being’s body was divided between the male and the female that -produced desire when the two were brought together by sight (fr. 64). A -certain symmetry of the pores in the male and female semen is, of -course, necessary for procreation, and from its absence Empedokles -explained the sterility of mules. The children most resemble that parent -who contributed most to their formation. The influence of statues and -pictures was also noted, however, as modifying the appearance of the -offspring. Twins and triplets were due to a superabundance and division -of the semen.[628] - -Footnote 628: - - Aet. v. 10, 1; 11, 1; 12, 2; 14, 2. Cf. Fredrich, _Hippokratische - Untersuchungen_, pp. 126 sqq. - -As to the growth of the fœtus in the uterus, Empedokles held that it was -enveloped in a membrane, and that its formation began on the -thirty-sixth day and was completed on the forty-ninth. The heart was -formed first, the nails and such things last. Respiration did not begin -till the time of birth, when the fluids round the fœtus were withdrawn. -Birth took place in the ninth or seventh month, because the day had been -originally nine months long, and afterwards seven. Milk arises on the -tenth day of the eighth month (fr. 68).[629] - -Death was the final separation by Strife of the fire and earth in the -body, each of which had all along been striving to “reach its own kind.” -Sleep was a temporary separation to a certain extent of the fiery -element.[630] At death the animal is resolved into its elements, which -perhaps enter into fresh combinations, perhaps become permanently united -with “their own kind.” There can be no question here of an immortal -soul. - -Even in life, we may see the attraction of like to like operating in -animals just as it did in the upward and downward growth of plants. Hair -is the same thing as foliage (fr. 82); and, generally speaking, the -fiery part of animals tends upwards and the earthy part downwards, -though there are exceptions, as may be seen in the case of certain -shell-fish (fr. 76), where the earthy part is above. These exceptions -are only possible because there is still a great deal of Love in the -world. We also see the attraction of like for like in the different -habits of the various species of animals. Those that have most fire in -them fly up into the air; those in which earth preponderates take to the -earth, as did the dog which always sat upon a tile.[631] Aquatic animals -are those in which water predominates. This does not, however, apply to -fishes, which are very fiery, and take to the water to cool -themselves.[632] - -Footnote 629: - - Aet. v. 15, 3; 21, 1 (_Dox._ p. 190). - -Footnote 630: - - Aet. v. 25, 4 (_Dox._ p. 437). - -Footnote 631: - - Aet. v. 19, 5 (_Dox._ p. 431). Cf. _Eth. Eud._ Η, 1. 1235 a 11. - -Footnote 632: - - Arist. _de Respir._ 14. 477 a 32; Theophr. _de causis plant._ i. 21. - -Empedokles paid great attention to the subject of respiration, and his -very ingenious explanation of it has been preserved in a continuous form -(fr. 100). We breathe, he held, through all the pores of the skin, not -merely through the organs of respiration. The cause of the alternate -inspiration and expiration of the breath was the movement of the blood -from the heart to the surface of the body and back again, which was -explained by the _klepsydra_. - -The nutrition and growth of animals is, of course, to be explained from -the attraction of like to like. Each part of the body has pores into -which the appropriate food will fit. Pleasure and pain were derived from -the absence or presence of like elements, that is, of nourishment which -would fit the pores. Tears and sweat arose from a disturbance which -curdled the blood; they were, so to say, the whey of the blood.[633] - -Footnote 633: - - Nutrition, Aet. v. 27, 1; pleasure and pain, Aet. iv. 9, 15; v. 28, 1; - tears and sweat, v. 22, 1. - -[Sidenote: Perception.] - -118. For the theory of perception held by Empedokles we have the -original words of Theophrastos:— - - Empedokles speaks in the same way of all the senses, and says that - perception is due to the “effluences” fitting into the passages of - each sense. And that is why one cannot judge the objects of another; - for the passages of some of them are too wide and those of others too - narrow for the sensible object, so that the latter either goes through - without touching or cannot enter at all. R. P. 177 b. - - He tries, too, to explain the nature of sight. He says that the - interior of the eye consists of fire, while round about it is earth - and air,[634] through which its rarity enables the fire to pass like - the light in lanterns (fr. 84). The passages of the fire and water are - arranged alternately; through those of the fire we perceive light - objects, through those of the water, dark; each class of objects fits - into each class of passages, and the colours are carried to the sight - by effluence. R. P. _ib._ - - But eyes are not all composed in the same way; some are composed of - like elements and some of opposite; some have the fire in the centre - and some on the outside. That is why some animals are keen-sighted by - day and others by night. Those which have less fire are keen-sighted - in the daytime, for the fire within is brought up to an equality by - that without; those which have less of the opposite (_i.e._ water), by - night, for then their deficiency is supplemented. But, in the opposite - case, each will behave in the opposite manner. Those eyes in which - fire predominates will be dazzled in the daytime, since the fire being - still further increased will stop up and occupy the pores of the - water. Those in which water predominates will, he says, suffer the - same at night, for the fire will be obstructed by the water. And this - goes on till the water is separated off by the air, for in each case - it is the opposite which is a remedy. The best tempered and the most - excellent vision is one composed of both in equal proportions. This is - practically what he says about sight. - - Hearing, he holds, is produced by sound outside, when the air moved by - the voice sounds inside the ear; for the sense of hearing is a sort of - bell sounding inside the ear, which he calls a “fleshy sprout.” When - the air is set in motion it strikes upon the solid parts and produces - a sound.[635] Smell, he holds, arises from respiration, and that is - why those smell most keenly whose breath has the most violent motion, - and why most smell comes from subtle and light bodies.[636] As to - touch and taste, he does not lay down how nor by means of what they - arise, except that he gives us an explanation applicable to all, that - sensation is produced by adaptation to the pores. Pleasure is produced - by what is like in its elements and their mixture; pain, by what is - opposite. R. P. _ib._ - - And he gives a precisely similar account of thought and ignorance. - Thought arises from what is like and ignorance from what is unlike, - thus implying that thought is the same, or nearly the same, as - perception. For after enumerating how we know each thing by means of - itself, he adds, “for all things are fashioned and fitted together out - of these, and it is by these men think and feel pleasure and pain” - (fr. 107). And for this reason we think chiefly with our blood, for in - it of all parts of the body all the elements are most completely - mingled. R. P. 178. - - All, then, in whom the mixture is equal or nearly so, and in whom the - elements are neither at too great intervals nor too small or too - large, are the wisest and have the most exact perceptions; and those - who come next to them are wise in proportion. Those who are in the - opposite condition are the most foolish. Those whose elements are - separated by intervals and rare are dull and laborious; those in whom - they are closely packed and broken into minute particles are - impulsive, they attempt many things and finish few because of the - rapidity with which their blood moves. Those who have a - well-proportioned mixture in some one part of their bodies will be - clever in that respect. That is why some are good orators and some - good artificers. The latter have a good mixture in their hands, and - the former in their tongues, and so with all other special capacities. - R. P. _ib._ - -Footnote 634: - - That is, watery vapour, not the elemental air or αἰθήρ (§ 107). It is - identical with the “water” mentioned below. It is unnecessary, - therefore, to insert καὶ ὕδωρ after πῦρ with Karsten and Diels. - -Footnote 635: - - Beare, p. 96, n. 1. - -Footnote 636: - - _Ibid._ p. 133. - -Perception, then, is due to the meeting of an element in us with the -same element outside. This takes place when the pores of the organ of -sense are neither too large nor too small for the “effluences” which all -things are constantly giving off (fr. 89). Smell was explained by -respiration. The breath drew in along with it the small particles which -fit into the pores. From Aetios[637] we learn that Empedokles proved -this by the example of people with a cold in their head, who cannot -smell, just because they have a difficulty in breathing. We also see -from fr. 101 that the scent of dogs was referred to in support of the -theory. Empedokles seems to have given no detailed account of smell, and -did not refer to touch at all.[638] Hearing was explained by the motion -of the air which struck upon the cartilage inside the ear and made it -swing and sound like a bell.[639] - -Footnote 637: - - Aet. iv. 17, 2 (_Dox._ p. 407). Beare, p. 133. - -Footnote 638: - - Beare, pp. 161-3, 180-81. - -Footnote 639: - - _Ibid._ pp. 95 sqq. - -The theory of vision[640] is more complicated; and, as Plato adopted -most of it, it is of great importance in the history of philosophy. The -eye was conceived, as by Alkmaion (§ 96),[641] to be composed of fire -and water. Just as in a lantern the flame is protected from the wind by -horn (fr. 84), so the fire in the iris is protected from the water which -surrounds it in the pupil by membranes with very fine pores, so that, -while the fire can pass out, the water cannot get in. Sight is produced -by the fire inside the eye going forth to meet the object. This seems -strange to us, because we are accustomed to the idea of images being -impressed upon the retina. But _looking_ at a thing no doubt seemed much -more like an action proceeding from the eye than a mere passive state. - -Footnote 640: - - _Ibid._ pp. 14 sqq. - -Footnote 641: - - Theophr. _de sens._ 26. - -He was quite aware, too, that “effluences,” as he called them, came from -things to the eyes as well; for he defined colours as “effluences from -forms (or ‘things’) fitting into the pores and perceived.”[642] It is -not quite clear how these two accounts of vision were reconciled, or how -far we are entitled to credit Empedokles with the Platonic theory. The -statements which have been quoted seem to imply something very like -it.[643] - -Footnote 642: - - The definition is quoted from Gorgias in Plato, _Men._ 76 d 4. All our - MSS. have ἀπορραοὶ σχημάτων, but Ven. T has in the margin γρ. - χρημάτων, which may well be an old tradition. The Ionic for “things” - is χρήματα. See Diels, _Empedokles und Gorgias_, p. 439. - -Footnote 643: - - See Beare, _Elementary Cognition_, p. 18. - -Theophrastos tells us that Empedokles made no distinction between -thought and perception, a remark already made by Aristotle.[644] The -chief seat of perception was the blood, in which the four elements are -most evenly mixed, and especially the blood near the heart (fr. -105).[645] This does not, however, exclude the idea that other parts of -the body may perceive also; indeed, Empedokles held that all things have -their share of thought (fr. 103). But the blood was specially sensitive -because of its finer mixture.[646] From this it naturally follows that -Empedokles adopted the view, already maintained in the Second Part of -the poem of Parmenides (fr. 16), that our knowledge varies with the -varying constitution of our bodies (fr. 106). This consideration became -very important later on as one of the foundations of scepticism; but -Empedokles himself only drew from it the conclusion that we must make -the best use we can of our senses, and check one by the other (fr. 4). - -Footnote 644: - - Arist. _de An._ Γ, 3. 427 a 21. - -Footnote 645: - - R. P. 178 a. This was the characteristic doctrine of the Sicilian - school, from whom it passed to Aristotle and the Stoics. Plato and - Hippokrates, on the other hand, adopted the view of Alkmaion (§ 97) - that the brain was the seat of consciousness. Kritias (Arist. _de An._ - Α, 2. 405 b 6) probably got the Sicilian doctrine from Gorgias. At a - later date, Philistion of Syracuse, Plato’s friend, substituted the - ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα (“animal spirits”) which circulated along with the - blood. - -Footnote 646: - - Beare, p. 253. - -[Sidenote: Theology and religion.] - -119. The theoretical theology of Empedokles reminds us of Xenophanes, -his practical religious teaching of Pythagoras and the Orphics. We are -told in the earlier part of the poem that certain “gods” are composed of -the elements; and that therefore though they “live long lives” they must -pass away (fr. 21). We have seen that the elements and the Sphere are -also called gods, but that is in quite another sense of the word. - -If we turn to the religious teaching of the _Purifications_, we find -that everything turns on the doctrine of transmigration. On the general -significance of this enough has been said above (§ 42); the details -given by Empedokles are peculiar. According to a decree of Necessity, -“daemons” who have sinned are forced to wander from their home in heaven -for three times ten thousand seasons (fr. 115). He himself is such an -exiled divinity, and has fallen from his high estate because he put his -trust in raving Strife. The four elements toss him from one to the other -with loathing; and so he has not only been a human being and a plant, -but even a fish. The only way to purify oneself from the taint of -original sin was by the cultivation of ceremonial holiness, by -purifications, and abstinence from animal flesh. For the animals are our -kinsmen (fr. 137), and it is parricide to lay hands on them. In all this -there are, no doubt, certain points of contact with the cosmology. We -have the “mighty oath” (fr. 115; cf. fr. 30), the four elements, Hate as -the source of original sin, and Kypris as queen in the Golden Age (fr. -128). But these points are neither fundamental nor of great importance. -And it cannot be denied that there are really contradictions between the -two poems. That, however, is just what we should expect to find. All -through this period, there seems to have been a gulf between men’s -religious beliefs, if they had any, and their cosmological views. The -few points of contact which we have mentioned may have been sufficient -to hide this from Empedokles himself. - - - - - CHAPTER VI - ANAXAGORAS OF KLAZOMENAI - - -[Sidenote: Date.] - -120. All that Apollodoros tells us with regard to the date of Anaxagoras -seems to rest upon the authority of Demetrios Phalereus, who said of -him, in the _Register of Archons_, that he began to study philosophy, at -the age of twenty, in the archonship of Kallias or Kalliades at Athens -(480-79 B.C.).[647] This date was probably derived from a calculation -based upon the philosopher’s age at the time of his trial, which -Demetrios had every opportunity of learning from sources no longer -extant. Apollodoros inferred that Anaxagoras was born in Ol. LXX. -(500-496 B.C.), and he adds that he died at the age of seventy-two in -Ol. LXXXVIII. 1 (428-27 B.C.).[648] He doubtless thought it natural that -he should not survive Perikles, and still more natural that he should -die the year Plato was born.[649] We have a further statement, of -doubtful origin, but probably due to Demetrios also, that Anaxagoras -lived at Athens for thirty years. This may be a genuine tradition;[650] -and if so, we get from about 462 to 432 B.C. as the time he lived there. - -Footnote 647: - - Diog. ii. 7 (R. P. 148), with the perfectly certain emendation - referred to _ib._ 148 c. The Athens of 480 B.C. would hardly be a - suitable place to “begin philosophising”! For the variation in the - archon’s name, see Jacoby, p. 244, n. 1. - -Footnote 648: - - We must read ὀγδοηκοστῆς with Meursius to make the figures come right. - -Footnote 649: - - On the statements of Apollodoros, see Jacoby, pp. 244 sqq. - -Footnote 650: - - Diog., _loc. cit._ In any case, it is not a mere calculation of - Apollodoros’s; for he would certainly have made Anaxagoras forty years - old at the date of his arrival in Athens, and this would give _at - most_ twenty-eight years for his residence there. The trial cannot - have been later than 432 B.C., and may have been earlier. - -There can be no doubt that these dates are very nearly right. Aristotle -tells us[651] that Anaxagoras was older than Empedokles, who was born -about 490 B.C. (§ 98); and Theophrastos said[652] that Empedokles was -born “not long after Anaxagoras.” Demokritos, too, said that he himself -was a young man in the old age of Anaxagoras, and he must have been born -about 460 B.C.[653] - -Footnote 651: - - Arist. Met. Α, 3. 984 a 11 (R. P. 150 a). - -Footnote 652: - - _Phys. Op._ fr. 3 (_Dox._ p. 477), _ap._ Simpl. _Phys._ p. 25, 19 (R. - P. 162 e). - -Footnote 653: - - Diog. ix. 41 (R. P. 187). On the date of Demokritos, see Chap. IX. § - 171. - -[Sidenote: Early life.] - -121. Anaxagoras was born at Klazomenai, and Theophrastos tells us that -his father’s name was Hegesiboulos.[654] The names of both father and -son have an aristocratic sound, and we may assume they belonged to a -family which had won distinction in the State. Nor need we reject the -tradition that Anaxagoras neglected his possessions to follow -science.[655] It is certain, at any rate, that in the fourth century he -was already regarded as the type of the man who leads the “theoretic -life.”[656] Of course the story of his contempt for worldly goods was -seized on later by the historical novelist and tricked out with the -usual apophthegms. These do not concern us here. - -Footnote 654: - - _Phys. Op._ fr. 4 (_Dox._ p. 478), repeated by the doxographers. - -Footnote 655: - - Plato, _Hipp. ma._ 283 a, τοὐναντίον γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ φασὶ συμβῆναι ἢ - ὑμῖν· καταλειφθέντων γὰρ αὐτῷ παλλῶν χρημάτων καταμελῆσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι - πάντα· οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀνόητα σοφίζεσθαι. Cf. Plut. _Per._ 16. - -Footnote 656: - - Arist. _Eth. Nic._ Κ, 9. 1179 a 13. Cf. _Eth. Eud._ Α, 4. 1215 b 6 and - 15, 1216 a 10. - -One incident belonging to the early manhood of Anaxagoras is recorded, -namely, his observation of the huge meteoric stone which fell into the -Aigospotamos in 468-67 B.C.[657] Our authorities tell us that he -predicted this phenomenon, which is plainly absurd. But we shall see -reason to believe that it may have occasioned one of his most striking -departures from the earlier cosmology, and led to his adoption of the -very view for which he was condemned at Athens. At all events, the fall -of the stone made a profound impression at the time, and it was still -shown to tourists in the days of Pliny and Plutarch.[658] - -Footnote 657: - - Diog. ii. 10 (R. P. 149 a). Pliny, _N.H._ ii. 149, gives the date as - Ol. LXXVIII. 2; and Eusebios gives it under Ol. LXXVIII. 3. But cf. - _Marm. Par. 57_, ἀφ’ οὗ ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς ὁ λίθος ἔπεσε ... ἔτη ΗΗΠ, - ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Θεαγενίδου, which is 468-67 B.C. The text of Diog. - ii. 11 is corrupt. For suggested restorations, see Jacoby, p. 244, n. - 2; and Diels, _Vors._ p. 294, 28. - -Footnote 658: - - Pliny, _loc. cit._, “qui lapis etiam nunc ostenditur magnitudine vehis - colore adusto.” Cf. Plut. _Lys._ 12, καὶ δείκνυται ... ἔτι νῦν. - -[Sidenote: Relation to the Ionic school.] - -122. The doxographers speak of Anaxagoras as the pupil of -Anaximenes.[659] This is, of course, out of the question; Anaximenes -most probably died before Anaxagoras was born. But it is not enough to -say that the statement arose from the fact that the name of Anaxagoras -followed that of Anaximenes in the _Successions_. That is true, no -doubt; but it is not the whole truth. We have its original source in a -fragment of Theophrastos himself, which states that Anaxagoras had been -“an associate of the philosophy of Anaximenes.”[660] Now this expression -has a very distinct meaning if we accept the view as to “schools” of -science set forth in the Introduction (§ XIV.). It means that the old -Ionic school survived the destruction of Miletos in 494 B.C., and -continued to flourish in the other cities of Asia. It means, further, -that it produced no man of distinction after its third great -representative, and that “the philosophy of Anaximenes” was still taught -by whoever was now at the head of the society. - -Footnote 659: - - Cicero, _de nat. D._ i. 26 (after Philodemos), “Anaxagoras qui accepit - ab Anaximene disciplinam (_i.e._ διήκουσε)”; Diog. i. 13 (R. P. 4) and - ii. 6; Strabo, xiv. p. 645, Κλαζομένιος δ’ ἦν ἀνὴρ ἐπιφανὴς Ἀναξαγόρας - ὁ φυσικός Ἀναξιμένους ὁμιλητής; Euseb. _P.E._ p. 504; [Galen] _Hist. - Phil._ 3; Augustine, _de Civ. Dei_, viii. 2. - -Footnote 660: - - _Phys. Op._ fr. 4 (_Dox._ p. 478), Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν γὰρ Ἡγησιβούλου - Κλαζομένιος κοινωνήσας τῆς Ἀναξιμένους φιλοσοφίας κ.τ.λ. In his fifth - edition (p. 973, n. 2) Zeller adopts the view given in the text, and - confirms it by comparing the very similar statement as to Leukippos, - κοινωνήσας Παρμενίδῃ τὴς φιλοσοφίας. See below, Chap. IX. § 172. - -At this point, it may be well to indicate briefly the conclusions to -which we shall come in the next few chapters with regard to the -development of philosophy during the first half of the fifth century -B.C. We shall find that, while the old Ionic school was still capable of -training great men, it was now powerless to keep them. Anaxagoras went -his own way; Melissos and Leukippos, though they still retained enough -of the old views to bear witness to the source of their inspiration, -were too strongly influenced by the Eleatic dialectic to remain content -with the theories of Anaximenes. It was left to second-rate minds like -Diogenes to champion the orthodox system, while third-rate minds like -Hippon of Samos even went back to the cruder theory of Thales. The -details of this anticipatory sketch will become clearer as we go on; for -the present, it is only necessary to call the reader’s attention to the -fact that the old Ionic Philosophy now forms a sort of background to our -story, just as Orphic and Pythagorean religious ideas have done in the -preceding chapters. - -[Sidenote: Anaxagoras at Athens.] - -123. Anaxagoras was the first philosopher to take up his abode at -Athens. We are not to suppose, however, that he was attracted thither by -anything in the character of the Athenians. No doubt Athens had now -become the political centre of the Hellenic world; but it had not yet -produced a single scientific man. On the contrary, the temper of the -citizen body was and remained hostile to free inquiry of any kind. -Sokrates, Anaxagoras, and Aristotle fell victims in different degrees to -the bigotry of the democracy, though, of course, their offence was -political rather than religious. They were condemned not as heretics, -but as innovators in the _state_ religion. Still, as a recent historian -observes, “Athens in its flourishing period was far from being a place -for free inquiry to thrive unchecked.”[661] It is this, no doubt, that -has been in the minds of those writers who have represented philosophy -as something un-Greek. It was in reality thoroughly Greek, though it was -thoroughly un-Athenian. - -Footnote 661: - - Holm, _Gr. Gesch._ ii. 334. The whole chapter is well worth reading in - this connexion. - -It seems most reasonable to suppose that Perikles himself brought -Anaxagoras to Athens, just as he brought everything else he could. Holm -has shown with much skill how the aim of that great statesman was, so to -say, to Ionise his fellow-citizens, to impart to them something of the -flexibility and openness of mind which characterised their kinsmen -across the sea. It is possible that it was Aspasia of Miletos who -introduced the Ionian philosopher to the Periklean circle, of which he -was henceforth a chief ornament. The Athenians in derision gave him the -nickname of Nous.[662] - -Footnote 662: - - Plut. _Per._ 4 (R. P. 148 c). I follow Zeller, p. 975, n. 1 (Eng. - trans. ii. p. 327, n. 4), in regarding the sobriquet as derisive. - -The close relation in which Anaxagoras stood to Perikles is placed -beyond the reach of doubt by the testimony of Plato. In the -_Phaedrus_[663] he makes Sokrates say: “For all arts that are great, -there is need of talk and discussion on the parts of natural science -that deal with things on high; for that seems to be the source which -inspires high-mindedness and effectiveness in every direction. Perikles -added this very acquirement to his original gifts. He fell in, it seems, -with Anaxagoras, who was a scientific man; and, satiating himself with -the theory of things on high, and having attained to a knowledge of the -true nature of intellect and folly, which were just what the discourses -of Anaxagoras were mainly about, he drew from that source whatever was -of a nature to further him in the art of speech.” - -Footnote 663: - - 270 a (R. P. 148 c). - -A more difficult question is the alleged relation of Euripides to -Anaxagoras. The oldest authority for it is Alexander of Aitolia, poet -and librarian, who lived at the court of Ptolemy Philadelphos (_c._ 280 -B.C.). He referred to Euripides as the “nursling of brave -Anaxagoras.”[664] A great deal of ingenuity has been expended in trying -to find the system of Anaxagoras in the choruses of Euripides; but, it -must now be admitted, without result.[665] The famous fragment on the -blessedness of the scientific life might just as well refer to any other -cosmologist as to Anaxagoras, and indeed suggests more naturally a -thinker of a more primitive type.[666] On the other hand, there is one -fragment which distinctly expounds the central thought of Anaxagoras, -and could hardly be referred to any one else.[667] We may conclude, -then, that Euripides knew the philosopher and his views, but it is not -safe to go further. - -Footnote 664: - - Gell. xv. 20, “Alexander autem Aetolus hos de Euripide versus - composuit”; ὁ δ’ Ἀναξαγόρου τρόφιμος χαιοῦ (so Valckenaer for ἀρχαίου) - κ.τ.λ. - -Footnote 665: - - The question was first raised by Valckenaer (_Diatribe_, p. 26). Cf. - also Wilamowitz, _Analecta Euripidea_, pp. 162 sqq. - -Footnote 666: - - See Introd. p. 12, _n._ 14. The fragment is quoted R. P. 148 c. The - words ἀθανάτου φύσεως and κόσμον ἀγήρω carry us back rather to the - older Milesians. - -Footnote 667: - - R. P. 150 b. - -[Sidenote: The trial.] - -124. Shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the enemies -of Perikles began a series of attacks upon him through his friends.[668] -Pheidias was the first to suffer, and Anaxagoras was the next. That he -was an object of special hatred to the religious party need not surprise -us, even though the charge made against him does not suggest that he -went out of his way to hurt their susceptibilities. The details of the -trial are somewhat obscure, but we can make out a few points. The first -step taken was the introduction of a psephism by Diopeithes—the same -whom Aristophanes laughs at in _The Birds_[669]—enacting that an -impeachment should be brought against those who did not practise -religion, and taught theories about “the things on high.”[670] What -happened at the actual trial is very differently related. Our -authorities give hopelessly conflicting accounts.[671] It is no use -attempting to reconcile these; it is enough to insist upon what is -certain. Now we know from Plato what the accusation was.[672] It was -that Anaxagoras taught the sun was a red-hot stone, and the moon earth; -and we shall see that he certainly did hold these views (§ 133). For the -rest, the most plausible account is that he was got out of prison and -sent away by Perikles.[673] We know that such things were possible at -Athens. - -Footnote 668: - - Both Ephoros (represented by Diod. xii. 38) and the source of Plut. - _Per._ 32 made these attacks immediately precede the war. This may, - however, be pragmatic; they perhaps occurred earlier. - -Footnote 669: - - _Birds_, 988. Aristophanes had no respect for orthodoxy when combined - with democratic opinions. - -Footnote 670: - - Plut. _Per._ 32 (R. P. 148), where some of the original words have - been preserved. The phrase τὰ θεῖα and the word μετάρσια are archaisms - from the ψήφισμα. - -Footnote 671: - - These accounts are repeated by Diog. ii. 12-14. It is worth while to - put the statements of Satyros and Sotion side by side in order to show - the unsatisfactory character of the biographical tradition:— - - │ _Sotion._ │ _Satyros._ - _Accuser._ │Kleon. │Thoukydides s. of Melesias. - _Charge._ │Calling the sun a red-hot │Impiety and Medism. - │mass. │ - _Sentence._ │Fined five talents. │Sentenced to death in absence. - - Hermippos represents Anaxagoras as already in prison under sentence of - death when Perikles shamed the people into letting him off. Lastly, - Hieronymos says he never was condemned at all. Perikles brought him - into court thin and wasted by disease, and the judges acquitted him - out of compassion! The Medism alleged by Satyros no doubt comes from - Stesimbrotos, who made Anaxagoras the friend of Themistokles instead - of Perikles. This, too, explains the accuser’s name (Busolt, _Gr. - Gesch._ p. 306, n. 3). - -Footnote 672: - - _Apol._ 26 d. - -Footnote 673: - - Plut. _Nic._ 23 (R. P. 148 c). Cf. _Per._ 32 (R. P. 148). - -Driven from his adopted home, Anaxagoras naturally went back to Ionia, -where at least he would be free to teach what he pleased. He settled at -Lampsakos, and we shall see reason to believe that he founded a school -there.[674] Probably he did not live long after his exile. The -Lampsakenes erected an altar to his memory in their market-place, -dedicated to Mind and Truth; and the anniversary of his death was long -kept as a holiday for school-children, it was said at his own -request.[675] - -Footnote 674: - - See the account of Archelaos in Chap. X. § 191. - -Footnote 675: - - The oldest authority for the honours paid to Anaxagoras is Alkidamas, - the pupil of Gorgias, who said these were still kept up in his own - time. Arist. _Rhet._ Β, 23. 1398 b 15. - -[Sidenote: Writings.] - -125. Diogenes includes Anaxagoras in his list of philosophers who left -only a single book, and he has also preserved the accepted criticism of -it, namely, that it was written “in a lofty and agreeable style.”[676] -There is no evidence of any weight to set against this testimony, which -comes ultimately from the librarians of Alexandria.[677] The story that -Anaxagoras wrote a treatise on perspective as applied to scene-painting -is most improbable;[678] and the statement that he composed a -mathematical work dealing with the quadrature of the circle is due to -misunderstanding of an expression in Plutarch.[679] We learn from the -passage in the _Apology_, referred to above, that the works of -Anaxagoras could be bought at Athens for a single drachma; and that the -book was of some length may be gathered from the way in which Plato goes -on to speak of it.[680] In the sixth century A.D. Simplicius had access -to a copy, doubtless in the library of the Academy;[681] and it is to -him we owe the preservation of all our fragments, with one or two very -doubtful exceptions. Unfortunately his quotations seem to be confined to -the First Book, that dealing with general principles, so that we are -left somewhat in the dark with regard to the treatment of details. This -is the more unfortunate, as it was Anaxagoras who first gave the true -theory of the moon’s light and, therefore, the true theory of eclipses. - -Footnote 676: - - Diog. i. 16; ii. 6 (R. P. 5; 153). - -Footnote 677: - - Schaubach (_An. Claz. Fragm._ p. 57) fabricated a work entitled τὸ - πρὸς Λεχίνεον out of the pseudo-Aristotelian _de plantis_, 817 a 27. - But the Latin version of Alfred, which is the original of the Greek, - has simply _et ideo dicit lechineon_; and this appears to be due to a - failure to make out the Arabic text from which the Latin version was - derived. Cf. Meyer, _Gesch. d. Bot._ i. 60. - -Footnote 678: - - It comes from Vitruvius, vii. pr. 11. A forger, seeking to decorate - his production with a great name, would think naturally of the - philosopher who was said to have taught Euripides. - -Footnote 679: - - Plut. _de Exilio_, 607 f. The words merely mean that he used to draw - mathematical figures relating to the quadrature of the circle on the - prison floor. - -Footnote 680: - - _Apol._ 26 d-e. The expression βιβλία perhaps implies that it filled - more than one roll. - -Footnote 681: - - Simplicius also speaks of βιβλία. - -[Sidenote: The Fragments.] - -126. I give the fragments according to the text and arrangement of -Diels, who has made some of them completely intelligible for the first -time. - - (1) All things were together infinite both in number and in smallness; - for the small too was infinite. And, when all things were together, - none of them could be distinguished for their smallness. For air and - aether prevailed over all things, being both of them infinite; for - amongst all things these are the greatest both in quantity and - size.[682] R. P. 151. - - (2) For air and aether are separated off from the mass that surrounds - the world, and the surrounding mass is infinite in quantity. R. P. - _ib._ - - (3) Nor is there a least of what is small, but there is always a - smaller; for it cannot be that what is should cease to be by being - cut.[683] But there is also always something greater than what is - great, and it is equal to the small in amount, and, compared with - itself, each thing is both great and small. R. P. 159 a. - - (4) And since these things are so, we must suppose that there are - contained many things and of all sorts in the things that are uniting, - seeds of all things, with all sorts of shapes and colours and savours - (R. P. _ib._), and that men have been formed in them, and the other - animals that have life, and that these men have inhabited cities and - cultivated fields as with us; and that they have a sun and a moon and - the rest as with us; and that their earth brings forth for them many - things of all kinds of which they gather the best together into their - dwellings, and use them (R. P. 160 b). Thus much have I said with - regard to separating off, to show that it will not be only with us - that things are separated off, but elsewhere too. - - But before they were separated off, when all things were together, not - even was any colour distinguishable; for the mixture of all things - prevented it—of the moist and the dry, and the warm and the cold, and - the light and the dark, and of much earth that was in it, and of a - multitude of innumerable seeds in no way like each other. For none of - the other things either is like any other. And these things being so, - we must hold that all things are in the whole. R. P. 151.[684] - - (5) And those things having been thus decided, we must know that all - of them are neither more nor less; for it is not possible for them to - be more than all, and all are always equal. R. P. 151. - - (6) And since the portions of the great and of the small are equal in - amount, for this reason, too, all things will be in everything; nor is - it possible for them to be apart, but all things have a portion of - everything. Since it is impossible for there to be a least thing, they - cannot be separated, nor come to be by themselves; but they must be - now, just as they were in the beginning, all together. And in all - things many things are contained, and an equal number both in the - greater and in the smaller of the things that are separated off. - - (7) ... So that we cannot know the number of the things that are - separated off, either in word or deed. - - (8) The things that are in one world are not divided nor cut off from - one another with a hatchet, neither the warm from the cold nor the - cold from the warm. R. P. 155 e. - - (9) ... as these things revolve and are separated out by the force and - swiftness. And the swiftness makes the force. Their swiftness is not - like the swiftness of any of the things that are now among men, but in - every way many times as swift. - - (10) How can hair come from what is not hair, or flesh from what is - not flesh? R. P. 155 f, n. 1. - - (11) In everything there is a portion of everything except Nous, and - there are some things in which there is Nous also. R. P. 160 b. - - (12) All other things partake in a portion of everything, while Nous - is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing, but is alone, - itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with - anything else, it would partake in all things if it were mixed with - any; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as has been - said by me in what goes before, and the things mixed with it would - hinder it, so that it would have power over nothing in the same way - that it has now being alone by itself. For it is the thinnest of all - things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and - the greatest strength; and Nous has power over all things, both - greater and smaller, that have life. And Nous had power over the whole - revolution, so that it began to revolve in the beginning. And it began - to revolve first from a small beginning; but the revolution now - extends over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And - all the things that are mingled together and separated off and - distinguished are all known by Nous. And Nous set in order all things - that were to be, and all things that were and are not now and that - are, and this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun - and the moon, and the air and the aether that are separated off. And - this revolution caused the separating off, and the rare is separated - off from the dense, the warm from the cold, the light from the dark, - and the dry from the moist. And there are many portions in many - things. But no thing is altogether separated off nor distinguished - from anything else except Nous. And all Nous is alike, both the - greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but - each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it - has most in it R. P. 155. - - (13) And when Nous began to move things, separating off took place - from all that was moved, and so far as Nous set in motion all was - separated. And as things were set in motion and separated, the - revolution caused them to be separated much more. - - (14) And Nous, which ever is, is certainly there, where everything - else is, in the surrounding mass, and in what has been united with it - and separated off from it.[685] - - (15) The dense and the moist and the cold and the dark came together - where the earth is now, while the rare and the warm and the dry (and - the bright) went out towards the further part of the aether.[686] R. - P. 156. - - (16) From these as they are separated off earth is solidified; for - from mists water is separated off, and from water earth. From the - earth stones are solidified by the cold, and these rush outwards more - than water. R. P. 156. - - (17) The Hellenes follow a wrong usage in speaking of coming into - being and passing away; for nothing comes into being or passes away, - but there is mingling and separation of things that are. So they would - be right to call coming into being mixture, and passing away - separation. R. P. 150. - - (18) It is the sun that puts brightness into the moon. - - (19) We call rainbow the reflexion of the sun in the clouds. Now it is - a sign of storm; for the water that flows round the cloud causes wind - or pours down in rain. - - (20) With the rise of the Dogstar men begin the harvest; with its - setting they begin to till the fields. It is hidden for forty days and - nights. - - (21) From the weakness of our senses we are not able to judge the - truth. - - (21_a_) What appears is a vision of the unseen. - - (21_b_) (We can make use of the lower animals) because we use our own - experience and memory and wisdom and art. - - (22) What is called “birds’ milk” is the white of the egg. - -Footnote 682: - - Simplicius tells us that this fragment was at the beginning of Book I. - The familiar sentence quoted by Diog. ii. 6 (R. P. 153) is not a - fragment of Anaxagoras, but a summary, like the πάντα ῥεῖ ascribed to - Herakleitos (Chap. III. p. 162). - -Footnote 683: - - Zeller’s τομῇ still seems to me a convincing correction of the MS. τὸ - μή, which Diels retains. - -Footnote 684: - - I had already pointed out in the first edition that Simplicius quotes - this three times as a continuous fragment, and that we are not - entitled to break it up. Diels now prints it as a single passage. - -Footnote 685: - - Simplicius gives fr. 14 thus (p. 157, 5): ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὅσα ἐστί τε κάρτα - καὶ νῦν ἐστιν. Diels now reads ὁ δὲ νοῦς, ὃς ἀ<εί> ἐστί, τὸ κάρτα καὶ - νῦν ἐστιν. The correspondence of ἀεὶ ... καὶ νῦν is strongly in favour - of this. - -Footnote 686: - - On the text of fr. 15, see R. P. 156 a. I have followed Schorn in - adding καὶ τὸ λαμπρόν from Hippolytos. - -[Sidenote: Anaxagoras and his predecessors.] - -127. The system of Anaxagoras, like that of Empedokles, aimed at -reconciling the Eleatic doctrine that corporeal substance is -unchangeable with the existence of a world which everywhere presents the -appearance of coming into being and passing away. The conclusions of -Parmenides are frankly accepted and restated. Nothing can be added to -all things; for there cannot be more than all, and all is always equal -(fr. 5). Nor can anything pass away. What men commonly call coming into -being and passing away is really mixture and separation (fr. 17). - -This last fragment reads almost like a prose paraphrase of Empedokles -(fr. 9); and it is in every way probable that Anaxagoras derived his -theory of mixture from his younger contemporary, whose poem was most -likely published before his own treatise.[687] We have seen how -Empedokles sought to save the world of appearance by maintaining that -the opposites—hot and cold, moist and dry—were _things_, each one of -which was real in the Parmenidean sense. Anaxagoras regarded this as -inadequate. Everything changes into everything else,[688] the things of -which the world is made are not “cut off with a hatchet” (fr. 8) in this -way. On the contrary, the true formula must be: _There is a portion of -everything in everything_ (fr. 11). - -Footnote 687: - - This is doubtless the meaning of the words τοῖς ἔργοις ὕστερος in - Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 984 a 12 (R. P. 150 a); though ἔργα certainly does - not mean “writings” or _opera omnia_, but simply “achievements.” The - other possible interpretations are “more advanced in his views” and - “inferior in his teaching” (Zeller, p. 1023, n. 2). - -Footnote 688: - - Arist. _Phys._ Α, 4. 187 b 1 (R. P. 155 a). - -[Sidenote: “Everything in everything.”] - -128. A part of the argument by which Anaxagoras sought to prove this -point has been preserved in a corrupt form by Aetios, and Diels has -recovered some of the original words from the scholiast on St. Gregory -Nazianzene. “We use a simple nourishment,” he said, “when we eat the -fruit of Demeter or drink water. But how can hair be made of what is not -hair, or flesh of what is not flesh?” (fr. 10).[689] That is just the -sort of question the early Milesians must have asked, only the -physiological interest has now definitely replaced the meteorological. -We shall find a similar train of reasoning in Diogenes of Apollonia (fr. -2). - -Footnote 689: - - Aet. i. 3, 5 (_Dox._ p. 279). See R. P. 155 f and n. 1. I read καρπὸν - with Usener. - -The statement that there is a portion of everything in everything, is -not to be understood as referring simply to the original mixture of -things before the formation of the worlds (fr. 1). On the contrary, even -now “all things are together,” and everything, however small and however -great, has an equal number of “portions” (fr. 6). A smaller particle of -matter could only contain a smaller number of portions, if one of those -portions ceased to be; but if anything _is_, in the full Parmenidean -sense, it is impossible that mere division should make it cease to be -(fr. 3). Matter is infinitely divisible; for there is no least thing, -any more than there is a greatest. But however great or small a body may -be, it contains just the same number of “portions,” that is, a portion -of everything. - -[Sidenote: The portions.] - -129. What are these “things” of which everything contains a portion? It -once was usual to represent the theory of Anaxagoras as if he had said -that wheat, for instance, contained small particles of flesh, blood, -bones, and the like; but we have just seen that matter is infinitely -divisible (fr. 3), and that there are as many “portions” in the smallest -particle as in the greatest (fr. 6). This is fatal to the old view. If -everything were made up of minute particles of everything else, we could -certainly arrive at a point where everything was “unmixed,” if only we -carried division far enough. - -This difficulty can only be solved in one way.[690] In fr. 8 the -examples given of things which are not “cut off from one another with a -hatchet” are the hot and the cold; and elsewhere (frs. 4, 15), mention -is made of the other traditional “opposites.” Aristotle says that, if we -suppose the first principles to be infinite, they may either be one in -kind, as with Demokritos, or opposite.[691] Simplicius, following -Porphyry and Themistios, refers the latter view to Anaxagoras;[692] and -Aristotle himself implies that the opposites of Anaxagoras had as much -right to be called first principles as the “homoeomeries.”[693] - -Footnote 690: - - See Tannery, _Science hellène_, pp. 283 sqq. I still think that - Tannery’s interpretation is substantially right, though his statement - of it requires some modification. - -Footnote 691: - - Arist. _Phys._ Α, 2. 184 b 21, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἔν, - σχήματι δὲ ἢ εἴδει διαφερούσας, ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας. - -Footnote 692: - - _Phys._ p. 44, 1. He goes on to refer to θερμότητας ... καὶ ψυχρότητας - ξηρότητάς τε καὶ ὑγρότητας μανότητάς τε καὶ πυκνότητας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας - κατὰ ποιότητα ἐναντιότητας. He observes, however, that Alexander - rejected this interpretation and took διαφερούσας ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας - closely together as both referring to Demokritos. - -Footnote 693: - - _Phys._ Α, 4. 187 a 25, τὸν μὲν (Ἀναξαγόραν) ἄπειρα ποιεῖν τά τε - ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τἀναντία. Aristotle’s own theory only differs from this - in so far as he makes ὕλη prior to the ἐναντία. - -It is of those opposites, then, and not of the different forms of -matter, that everything contains a portion. Every particle, however -large or however small, contains every one of those opposite qualities. -That which is hot is also to a certain extent cold. Even snow, -Anaxagoras affirmed, was black;[694] that is, even the white contains a -certain portion of the opposite quality. It is enough to indicate the -connexion of this with the views of Herakleitos (§ 80).[695] - -Footnote 694: - - Sext. _Pyrrh._ i. 33 (R. P. 161 b). - -Footnote 695: - - The connexion was already noted by the eclectic Herakleitean to whom I - attribute Περὶ διαίτης, i. 3-4 (see above, Chap. III. p. 167, _n._ - 383). Cf. the words ἔχει δὲ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ - ὑγρόν· ἔνι γὰρ ἐν πυρὶ ὑγρότης· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ ξηρόν· ἔνι - γὰρ καὶ ἐν ὕδατι ξηρόν. - -[Sidenote: Seeds.] - -130. The difference, then, between the theory of Anaxagoras and that of -Empedokles is this. Empedokles had taught that, if you divide the -various things which make up this world, and in particular the parts of -the body, such as flesh, bones, and the like, far enough, you come to -the four “roots” or elements, which are, accordingly, the ultimate -reality. Anaxagoras held that, however far you may divide any of these -things—and they are infinitely divisible—you never come to a part so -small that it does not contain portions of all the opposites. The -smallest portion of bone is still bone. On the other hand, everything -can pass into everything else just because the “seeds,” as he called -them, of each form of matter contain a portion of everything, that is, -of all the opposites, though in different proportions. If we are to use -the word “element” at all, it is these seeds that are the elements in -the system of Anaxagoras. - -Aristotle expresses this by saying that Anaxagoras regards the ὁμοιομερῆ -as στοιχεῖα.[696] We have seen that the term στοιχεῖον is of later date -than Anaxagoras, and it is natural to suppose that the word ὁμοιομερῆ is -also only Aristotle’s name for the “seeds.” In his own system, the -ὁμοιομερῆ are intermediate between the elements (στοιχεῖα), of which -they are composed, and the organs (ὄργανα), which are composed of them. -The heart cannot be divided into hearts, but the parts of flesh are -flesh. That being so, Aristotle’s statement is quite intelligible from -his own point of view, but there is no reason for supposing that -Anaxagoras expressed himself in that particular way. All we are entitled -to infer is that he said the “seeds,” which he had substituted for the -“roots” of Empedokles, were not the opposites in a state of separation, -but each contained a portion of them all. If Anaxagoras had used the -term “homoeomeries”[697] himself, it would be strange that Simplicius -should quote no fragment containing it. - -Footnote 696: - - Arist. _de Gen. Corr._ Α, 1, 314 a 18, ὁ μὲν γὰρ (Anaxagoras) τὰ - ὁμοιομερῆ στοιχεῖα τίθησιν, οἷον ὀστοῦν καὶ σάρκα καὶ μυελόν, καὶ τῶν - ἄλλων ὧν ἑκάστῳ συνώνυμον τὸ μέρος ἐστίν. This was, of course, - repeated by Theophrastos and the doxographers; but it is to be noted - that Aetios, supposing as he does that Anaxagoras himself used the - term, gives it an entirely wrong meaning. He says that the - ὁμοιομέρειαι were so called from the likeness of the particles of the - τροφή to those of the body (_Dox._ 279 a 21; R. P. 155 f). Lucretius, - i. 830 sqq. (R. P. 150 a) has a similar account of the matter, derived - from Epicurean sources. Obviously, it cannot be reconciled with what - Aristotle says. - -Footnote 697: - - It is more likely that we have a trace of the terminology of - Anaxagoras himself in Περὶ διαίτης, 3, μέρεα μερέων, ὅλα ὅλων. - -The difference between the two systems may also be regarded from another -point of view. Anaxagoras was not obliged by his theory to regard the -elements of Empedokles as primary, a view to which there were obvious -objections, especially in the case of earth. He explained them in quite -another way. Though everything has a portion of everything in it, things -appear to be that of which there is most in them (fr. 12 _sub fin._). We -may say, then, that Air is that in which there is most cold, Fire that -in which there is most heat, and so on, without giving up the view that -there is a portion of cold in the fire and a portion of heat in the -air.[698] The great masses which Empedokles had taken for elements are -really vast collections of all manner of “seeds.” Each of them is, in -fact, a πανσπερμία.[699] - -Footnote 698: - - Cf. above, p. 305. - -Footnote 699: - - Arist. _de Gen. Corr._ Α, 1. 314 a 29. The word πανσπερμία was used by - Demokritos (Arist. _de An._ 404 a 8; R. P. 200), and it occurs in the - Περὶ διαίτης (_loc. cit._). It seems natural to suppose that it was - used by Anaxagoras himself, as he used the term σπέρματα. Much - difficulty has been caused by the apparent inclusion of Water and Fire - among the ὁμοιομερῆ in Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 984 a 11 (R. P. 150 a). - Bonitz understands the words καθάπερ ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ to mean “as we have - just seen that Fire and Water do in the system of Empedokles.” In any - case, καθάπερ goes closely with οὕτω, and the general sense is that - Anaxagoras applies to the ὁμοιομερῆ what is really true of the - στοιχεῖα. It would be better to delete the comma after πῦρ and add one - after φησι, for συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει μόνον is explanatory of οὕτω - ... καθάπερ. In the next sentence, I read ἁπλῶς for ἄλλως with Zeller - (_Arch._ ii. p. 261). See also Arist. _de Caelo_, Γ, 3. 302 b 1 (R. P. - 150 a), where the matter is very clearly put. - -[Sidenote: “All things together.”] - -131. From all this it follows that, when “all things were together,” and -when the different seeds of things were mixed together in infinitely -small particles (fr. 1), the appearance presented would be that of one -of what had hitherto been regarded as the primary substances. As a -matter of fact, they did present the appearance of “air and aether”; for -the qualities (things) which belong to these prevail in quantity over -all other things in the universe, and everything is most obviously that -of which it has most in it (fr. 12 _sub fin._). Here, then, Anaxagoras -attaches himself to Anaximenes. The primary condition of things, before -the formation of the worlds, is much the same in both; only, with -Anaxagoras, the original mass is no longer the primary substance, but a -mixture of innumerable seeds divided into infinitely small parts. - -This mass is infinite, like the air of Anaximenes, and it supports -itself, since there is nothing surrounding it.[700] Further, the “seeds” -of all things which it contains are infinite in number (fr. 1). But, as -the innumerable seeds may be divided into those in which the portions of -cold, moist, dense, and dark prevail, and those which have most of the -warm, dry, rare, and light in them, we may say that the original mass -was a mixture of infinite Air and of infinite Fire. The seeds of Air, of -course, contain “portions” of the “things” that predominate in Fire, and -_vice versa_; but we regard everything as being that of which it has -most in it. Lastly, there is no void in this mixture, an addition to the -theory made necessary by the arguments of Parmenides. It is, however, -worthy of note that Anaxagoras added an experimental proof of this to -the purely dialectical one of the Eleatics. He used the _klepsydra_ -experiment as Empedokles had done (fr. 100), and also showed the -corporeal nature of air by means of inflated skins.[701] - -Footnote 700: - - Arist. _Phys._ Γ, 5. 205 b 1 (R. P. 154 a). - -Footnote 701: - - _Phys._ Ζ, 6. 213 a 22 (R. P. 159). We have a full discussion of the - experiments with the _klepsydra_ in _Probl._ 914 b 9 sqq., a passage - which we have already used to illustrate Empedokles, fr. 100. See - above, p. 253, _n._ 565. - -[Sidenote: Nous.] - -132. Like Empedokles, Anaxagoras required some external cause to produce -motion in the mixture. Body, Parmenides had shown, would never move -itself, as the Milesians had supposed. Anaxagoras called the cause of -motion by the name of Nous. It was this which made Aristotle say that he -“stood out like a sober man from the random talkers that had preceded -him,”[702] and he has often been credited with the introduction of the -spiritual into philosophy. The disappointment expressed both by Plato -and Aristotle as to the way in which Anaxagoras worked out the theory -should, however, make us pause to reflect before accepting too exalted a -view of it. Plato[703] makes Sokrates say: “I once heard a man reading a -book, as he said, of Anaxagoras, and saying it was Mind that ordered the -world and was the cause of all things. I was delighted to hear of this -cause, and I thought he really was right.... But my extravagant -expectations were all dashed to the ground when I went on and found that -the man made no use of Mind at all. He ascribed no causal power whatever -to it in the ordering of things, but to airs, and aethers, and waters, -and a host of other strange things.” Aristotle, probably with this -passage in mind, says:[704] “Anaxagoras uses Mind as a _deus ex machina_ -to account for the formation of the world; and whenever he is at a loss -to explain why anything necessarily is, he drags it in. But in other -cases he makes anything rather than Mind the cause.” These utterances -may well suggest that the Nous of Anaxagoras did not really stand on a -higher level than the Love and Strife of Empedokles, and this will only -be confirmed when we look at what he himself has to say about it. - -Footnote 702: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 984 b 15 (R. P. 152). - -Footnote 703: - - Plato, _Phd._ 97 b 8 (R. P. 155 d). - -Footnote 704: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 4. 985 a 18 (R. P. 155 d). - -In the first place, Nous is unmixed (fr. 12), and does not, like other -things, contain a portion of everything. This would hardly be worth -saying of an immaterial mind; no one would suppose that to be hot or -cold. The result of its being unmixed is that it “has power over” -everything, that is to say, in the language of Anaxagoras, it causes -things to move.[705] Herakleitos had said as much of Fire, and -Empedokles of Strife. Further, it is the “thinnest” of all things, so -that it can penetrate everywhere, and it would be meaningless to say -that the immaterial is “thinner” than the material. It is true that Nous -also “knows all things”; but so, perhaps, did the Fire of -Herakleitos,[706] and certainly the Air of Diogenes.[707] Zeller holds, -indeed, that Anaxagoras meant to speak of something incorporeal; but he -admits that he did not succeed in doing so,[708] and that is -historically the important point. Nous is certainly imagined as -occupying space; for we hear of greater and smaller parts of it (fr. -12). - -Footnote 705: - - Arist. _Phys._ Θ, 5. 256 b 24, διὸ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὀρθῶς λέγει, τὸν - νοῦν ἀπαθῆ φάσκων καὶ ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ κινήσεως ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν - ποιεῖ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως κινοίη ἀκίνητος ὢν καὶ κρατοίη ἀμιγῆς - ὤν. This is only quoted for the meaning of κρατεῖν. Of course, the - words ἀκίνητος ὤν are not meant to be historical, and still less is - the interpretation in _de An._ Γ, 4. 429 a 18. Diogenes of Apollonia - (fr. 5) couples ὑπὸ τούτου πάντα κυβερνᾶσθαι (the old Milesian word) - with πάντων κρατεῖν. - -Footnote 706: - - If we retain the MS. εἰδέναι in fr. 1. In any case, the name τὸ σοφόν - implies as much. - -Footnote 707: - - See fr. 3, 5. - -Footnote 708: - - Zeller, p. 993. - -The truth probably is that Anaxagoras substituted Nous for the Love and -Strife of Empedokles, because he wished to retain the old Ionic doctrine -of a substance that “knows” all things, and to identify this with the -new theory of a substance that “moves” all things. Perhaps, too, it was -his increased interest in physiological as distinguished from purely -cosmological matters that led him to speak of Mind rather than Soul. The -former word certainly suggests design more clearly than the latter. But, -in any case, the originality of Anaxagoras lies far more in the theory -of matter than in that of Nous. - -[Sidenote: Formation of the worlds.] - -133. The formation of a world starts with a rotatory motion which Nous -imparts to a portion of the mixed mass in which “all things are -together” (fr. 13), and this rotatory motion gradually extends over a -wider and wider space. Its rapidity (fr. 9) produced a separation of the -rare and the dense, the cold and the hot, the dark and the light, the -moist and the dry (fr. 15). This separation produces two great masses, -the one consisting of the rare, hot, light, and dry, called the -“Aether”; the other, in which the opposite qualities predominate, called -“Air” (fr. 1). Of these the Aether or Fire[709] took the outside while -the Air occupied the centre (fr. 15). - -Footnote 709: - - Note that Anaxagoras says “air” where Empedokles usually said - “aether,” and that “aether” is with him equivalent to fire. Cf. Arist. - _de Caelo_, Γ, 3. 302 b 4, τὸ γὰρ πῦρ καὶ τὸν αἰθέρα προσαγορεύει - ταὐτό; and _ib._ Α, 3. 270 b 24, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ καταχρῆται τῷ ὀνόματι - τούτῳ οὐ καλῶς· ὀνομάζει γὰρ αἰθέρα ἀντὶ πυρός. - -The next stage is the separation of the air into clouds, water, earth, -and stones (fr. 16). In this Anaxagoras follows Anaximenes closely. In -his account of the origin of the heavenly bodies, however, he showed -himself more original. We read at the end of fr. 16 that stones “rush -outwards more than water,” and we learn from the doxographers that the -heavenly bodies were explained as stones torn from the earth by the -rapidity of its revolution and made red-hot by the speed of their own -motion.[710] Perhaps the fall of the meteoric stone at Aigospotamoi had -something to do with the origin of this theory. It may also be observed -that, while in the earlier stages of the world-formation we are guided -chiefly by the analogy of water rotating with light and heavy bodies -floating in it, we are here reminded rather of a sling. - -Footnote 710: - - Aet. ii. 13, 3 (_Dox._ p. 341; R. P. 157 c). - -[Sidenote: Innumerable worlds.] - -134. That Anaxagoras adopted the ordinary Ionian theory of innumerable -worlds is perfectly clear from fr. 4, which we have no right to regard -as other than continuous.[711] The words “that it was not only with us -that things were separated off, but elsewhere too” can only mean that -Nous has caused a rotatory movement in more parts of the boundless -mixture than one. Aetios certainly includes Anaxagoras among those who -held there was only one world; but this testimony cannot be considered -of the same weight as that of the fragments.[712] Zeller’s reference of -the words “elsewhere, as with us” to the moon is very improbable. Is it -likely that any one would say that the inhabitants of the moon “have a -sun and moon as with us”?[713] - -Footnote 711: - - See above, p. 300, _n._ 684. - -Footnote 712: - - Aet. ii. 1, 3. See above, Chap. I. p. 63. - -Footnote 713: - - Further, it can be proved that this passage (fr. 4) occurred quite - near the beginning of the work. Cf. Simpl. _Phys._ p. 34, 28, μετ’ - ὀλίγα τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ πρώτου Περὶ φυσέως, p. 156, 1, καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγα - (after fr. 2), which itself occurred, μετ’ ὀλίγον (after fr. 1), which - was the beginning of the book. A reference to other “worlds” would be - quite in place here, but not a reference to the moon. - -135. The cosmology of Anaxagoras is clearly based upon that of -Anaximenes, as will be obvious from a comparison of the following -passage of Hippolytos[714] with the quotations given in Chap. I. (§ -29):— - - (3) The earth is flat in shape, and remains suspended because of its - size and because there is no vacuum.[715] For this reason the air is - very strong, and supports the earth which is borne up by it. - - (4) Of the moisture on the surface of the earth, the sea arose from - the waters in the earth (for when these were evaporated the remainder - turned salt),[716] and from the rivers which flow into it. - - (5) Rivers take their being both from the rains and from the waters in - the earth; for the earth is hollow and has waters in its cavities. And - the Nile rises in summer owing to the water that comes down from the - snows in Ethiopia.[717] - - (6) The sun and the moon and all the stars are fiery stones carried - round by the rotation of the aether. Under the stars are the sun and - moon, and also certain bodies which revolve with them, but are - invisible to us. - - (7) We do not feel the heat of the stars because of the greatness of - their distance from the earth; and, further, they are not so warm as - the sun, because they occupy a colder region. The moon is below the - sun, and nearer us. - - (8) The sun surpasses the Peloponnesos in size. The moon has not a - light of her own, but gets it from the sun. The course of the stars - goes under the earth. - - (9) The moon is eclipsed by the earth screening the sun’s light from - it, and sometimes, too, by the bodies below the moon coming before it. - The sun is eclipsed at the new moon, when the moon screens it from us. - Both the sun and the moon turn in their courses owing to the repulsion - of the air. The moon turns frequently, because it cannot prevail over - the cold. - - (10) Anaxagoras was the first to determine what concerns the eclipses - and the illumination of the sun and moon. And he said the moon was of - earth, and had plains and ravines in it. The Milky Way was the - reflexion of the light of the stars that were not illuminated by the - sun. Shooting stars were sparks, as it were, which leapt out owing to - the motion of the heavenly vault. - - (11) Winds arose when the air was rarefied by the sun, and when things - were burned and made their way to the vault of heaven and were carried - off. Thunder and lightning were produced by heat striking upon clouds. - - (12) Earthquakes were caused by the air above striking on that beneath - the earth; for the movement of the latter caused the earth which - floats on it to rock. - -Footnote 714: - - _Ref._ i. 8, 3 (_Dox._ p. 562). - -Footnote 715: - - This is an addition to the older view occasioned by the Eleatic denial - of the void. - -Footnote 716: - - The text here is very corrupt, but the general sense can be got from - Aet. iii. 16. 2. - -Footnote 717: - - The MS. reading is ἐν τοῖς ἄρκτοις, for which Diels adopts Fredrichs’ - ἐν τοῖς ἀνταρκτικοῖς. I have thought it safer to translate the ἐν τῇ - Αἰθιοπίᾳ which Aetios gives (iv. 1, 3). This view is mentioned and - rejected by Herodotos (ii. 22). Seneca (_N. Q._ iv. 2, 17) points out - that it was adopted by Aischylos (_Suppl._ 559, fr. 300, Nauck), - Sophokles (fr. 797), and Euripides (_Hel._ 3, fr. 228). - -All this confirms in the most striking way the statement of -Theophrastos, that Anaxagoras had belonged to the school of Anaximenes. -The flat earth floating on the air, the dark bodies below the moon, the -explanation of the solstices and the “turnings” of the moon by the -resistance of air, the explanations given of wind and of thunder and -lightning, are all derived from the earlier inquirer. - -[Sidenote: Biology.] - -136. “There is a portion of everything in everything except Nous, and -there are some things in which there is Nous also” (fr. 11). In these -words Anaxagoras laid down the distinction between animate and inanimate -things. He tells us that it is the same Nous that “has power over,” that -is, sets in motion, all things that have life, both the greater and the -smaller (fr. 12). The Nous in living creatures is the same in all (fr. -12), and from this it followed that the different grades of intelligence -which we observe in the animal and vegetable worlds depend entirely on -the structure of the body. The Nous was the same, but it had more -opportunities in one body than another. Man was the wisest of animals, -not because he had a better sort of Nous, but simply because he had -hands.[718] This view is quite in accordance with the previous -development of thought upon the subject. Parmenides, in the Second Part -of his poem (fr. 16), had already made the thought of men depend upon -the constitution of their limbs. - -As all Nous is the same, we are not surprised to find that plants were -regarded as living creatures. If we may trust the pseudo-Aristotelian -_Treatise on Plants_[719] so far, Anaxagoras argued that they must feel -pleasure and pain in connexion with their growth and with the fall of -their leaves. Plutarch says[720] that he called plants “animals fixed in -the earth.” - -Footnote 718: - - Arist. _de Part. An._ Δ, 10. 687 a 7 (R. P. 160 b). - -Footnote 719: - - [Arist.] _de plant._ Α, 1. 815 a 15 (R. P. 160). - -Footnote 720: - - Plut. _Q.N._ 1 (R. P. 160), ζῷον ... ἐγγεῖον. - -Both plants and animals originated in the first instance from the -πανσπερμία. Plants first arose when the seeds of them which the air -contained were brought down by the rain-water,[721] and animals -originated in a similar way.[722] Like Anaximander, Anaxagoras held that -animals first arose in the moist element.[723] - -Footnote 721: - - Theophr. _Hist. Plant._ iii. 1, 4 (R. P. 160). - -Footnote 722: - - Irenaeus, _adv. Haer._ ii. 14, 2 (R. P. 160 a). - -Footnote 723: - - Hipp. _Ref._ i. 8, 12 (_Dox._ p. 563). - -137. In these scanty notices we seem to see traces of a polemical -attitude towards Empedokles, and the same may be observed in what we are -told of the theory of perception adopted by Anaxagoras, especially in -the view that perception is of contraries.[724] The account which -Theophrastos gives of this[725] is as follows:— - - But Anaxagoras says that perception is produced by opposites; for like - things cannot be affected by like. He attempts to give a detailed - enumeration of the particular senses. We see by means of the image in - the pupil; but no image is cast upon what is of the same colour, but - only on what is different. With most living creatures things are of a - different colour to the pupil by day, though with some this is so by - night, and these are accordingly keen-sighted at that time. Speaking - generally, however, night is more of the same colour with the eyes - than day. And an image is cast on the pupil by day, because light is a - concomitant cause of the image, and because the prevailing colour - casts an image more readily upon its opposite.[726] - - It is in the same way that touch and taste discern their objects. That - which is just as warm or just as cold as we are neither warms us nor - cools us by its contact; and, in the same way, we do not apprehend the - sweet and the sour by means of themselves. We know cold by warm, fresh - by salt, and sweet by sour, in virtue of our deficiency in each; for - all these are in us to begin with. And we smell and hear in the same - manner; the former by means of the accompanying respiration, the - latter by the sound penetrating to the brain, for the bone which - surrounds this is hollow, and it is upon it that the sound falls.[727] - - And all sensation implies pain, a view which would seem to be the - consequence of the first assumption, for all unlike things produce - pain by their contact. And this pain is made perceptible by the long - continuance or by the excess of a sensation. Brilliant colours and - excessive noises produce pain, and we cannot dwell long on the same - things. The larger animals are the more sensitive, and, generally, - sensation is proportionate to the size of the organs of sense. Those - animals which have large, pure, and bright eyes, see large objects and - from a great distance, and contrariwise.[728] - - And it is the same with hearing. Large animals can hear great and - distant sounds, while less sounds pass unperceived; small animals - perceive small sounds and those near at hand.[729] It is the same too - with smell. Rarefied air has more smell; for, when air is heated and - rarefied, it smells. A large animal when it breathes draws in the - condensed air along with the rarefied, while a small one draws in the - rarefied by itself; so the large one perceives more. For smell is - better perceived when it is near than when it is far by reason of its - being more condensed, while when dispersed it is weak. But, roughly - speaking, large animals do not perceive a rarefied smell, nor small - animals a condensed one.[730] - -Footnote 724: - - Beare, p. 37. - -Footnote 725: - - Theophr. _de Sensu_, 27 sqq. (_Dox._ p. 507). - -Footnote 726: - - Beare, p. 38. - -Footnote 727: - - Beare, p. 208. - -Footnote 728: - - _Ibid._ p. 209. - -Footnote 729: - - _Ibid._ p. 103. - -Footnote 730: - - _Ibid._ p. 137. - -This theory marks in some respects an advance upon that of Empedokles. -It was a happy thought of Anaxagoras to make sensation depend upon -irritation by opposites, and to connect it with pain. Many modern -theories are based upon a similar idea. - -That Anaxagoras regarded the senses as incapable of reaching the truth -of things is shown by the fragments preserved by Sextus. But we must -not, for all that, turn him into a sceptic. The saying preserved by -Aristotle[731] that “things are as we suppose them to be,” has no value -at all as evidence. It comes from some collection of apophthegms, not -from the treatise of Anaxagoras himself; and it had, as likely as not, a -moral application. He did say (fr. 21) that “the weakness of our senses -prevents our discerning the truth,” but this meant simply that we do not -see the “portions” of everything which are in everything; for instance, -the portions of black which are in the white. Our senses simply show us -the portions that prevail. He also said that the things which are seen -give us the power of seeing the invisible, which is the very opposite of -scepticism (fr. 21_a_). - -Footnote 731: - - _Met._ Δ, 5. 1009 b 25 (R. P. 161 a). - - - - - CHAPTER VII - THE PYTHAGOREANS - - -[Sidenote: The Pythagorean school.] - -138. We have seen (§ 40) how the Pythagoreans, after losing their -supremacy at Kroton, concentrated themselves at Rhegion; but the school -founded there was soon broken up. Archippos stayed behind in Italy; but -Philolaos and Lysis, the latter of whom had escaped as a young man from -the massacre of Kroton, betook themselves to continental Hellas, -settling finally at Thebes. We know from Plato that Philolaos was there -some time during the latter part of the fifth century, and Lysis was -afterwards the teacher of Epameinondas.[732] Some of the Pythagoreans, -however, were able to return to Italy later on. Philolaos certainly did -so, and Plato implies that he had left Thebes some time before 399 B.C., -the year in which Sokrates was put to death. In the fourth century, the -chief seat of the school is at Taras, and we find the Pythagoreans -heading the opposition to Dionysios of Syracuse. It is to this period -that Archytas belongs. He was the friend of Plato, and almost realised, -if he did not suggest, the ideal of the philosopher king. He ruled Taras -for years, and Aristoxenos tells us that he was never defeated in the -field of battle.[733] He was also the inventor of mathematical -mechanics. At the same time, Pythagoreanism had taken root in Hellas. -Lysis, we have seen, remained at Thebes, where Simmias and Kebes had -heard Philolaos, and there was an important community of Pythagoreans at -Phleious. Aristoxenos was personally acquainted with the last generation -of the school, and mentioned by name Xenophilos the Chalkidian from -Thrace, with Phanton, Echekrates, Diokles, and Polymnestos of Phleious. -They were all, he said, disciples of Philolaos and Eurytos.[734] Plato -was on friendly terms with these men, and dedicated the _Phaedo_ to -them.[735] Xenophilos was the teacher of Aristoxenos, and lived in -perfect health at Athens till the age of a hundred and five.[736] - -Footnote 732: - - For Philolaos, see Plato, _Phd._ 61 d 7; e 7; and for Lysis, - Aristoxenos in Iambl. _V. Pyth._ 250 (R. P. 59 b). - -Footnote 733: - - Diog. viii. 79-83 (R. P. 61). Aristoxenos himself came from Taras. For - the political activity of the Tarentine Pythagoreans, see Meyer, - _Gesch. des Alterth._ v. § 824. The story of Damon and Phintias (told - by Aristoxenos) belongs to this time. - -Footnote 734: - - Diog. viii. 46 (R. P. 62). - -Footnote 735: - - Compare the way in which the _Theaetetus_ is dedicated to the school - of Megara. - -Footnote 736: - - See Aristoxenos _ap._ Val. Max. viii. 13, ext. 3; and Souidas _s.v._ - -[Sidenote: Philolaos.] - -139. This generation of the school really belongs, however, to a later -period, and cannot be profitably studied apart from Plato; it is with -their master Philolaos we have now to deal. The facts we know about his -teaching from external sources are few in number. The doxographers, -indeed, ascribe to him an elaborate theory of the planetary system, but -Aristotle never mentions his name in connexion with this. He gives it as -the theory of “the Pythagoreans” or of “some Pythagoreans.”[737] It -seems natural to suppose, however, that the Pythagorean elements of -Plato’s _Phaedo_ and _Gorgias_ come mainly from Philolaos. Plato makes -Sokrates express surprise that Simmias and Kebes had not learnt from him -why it is unlawful for a man to take his life,[738] and it seems to be -implied that the Pythagoreans at Thebes used the word “philosopher” in -the special sense of a man who is seeking to find a way of release from -the burden of this life.[739] It is extremely probable that Philolaos -spoke of the body (σῶμα) as the tomb (σῆμα) of the soul.[740] In any -case, we seem to be justified in holding that he taught the old -Pythagorean religious doctrine in some form, and it is likely that he -laid special stress upon knowledge as a means of release. That is the -impression we get from Plato, and he is by far the best authority we -have on the subject. - -Footnote 737: - - See below, § 150–152. - -Footnote 738: - - Plato, _Phd._ 61 d 6. - -Footnote 739: - - This appears to follow at once from the remark of Simmias in _Phd._ 64 - b. The whole passage would be pointless if the words φιλόσοφος, - φιλοσοφεῖν, φιλοσοφία had not in some way become familiar to the - ordinary Theban of the fifth century. Now Herakleides Pontikos made - Pythagoras invent the word, and expound it in a conversation with - Leon, tyrant of Sikyon _or Phleious_. Cf. Diog. i. 12 (R. P. 3), viii. - 8; Cic. _Tusc._ v. 3. 8; Döring in _Arch._ v. pp. 505 sqq. It seems to - me that the way in which the term is introduced in the _Phaedo_ is - fatal to the view that this is a Sokratic idea transferred by - Herakleides to the Pythagoreans. Cf. also the remark of Alkidamas - quoted by Arist. _Rhet._ Β, 23. 1398 b 18, Θήβησιν ἅμα οἱ προστάται - φιλόσοφοι ἐγένοντο καὶ εὐδαιμόνησεν ἡ πόλις. - -Footnote 740: - - For reasons which will appear, I do not attach importance in this - connexion to Philolaos, fr. 14 Diels = 23 Mullach (R. P. 89), but it - does seem likely that the μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ of _Gorg._ 493 a 5 (R. - P. 89 b) is responsible for the whole theory there given. He is - certainly, in any case, the author of the τετρημένος πίθος, which - implies the same general view. Now he is called ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ - Ἰταλικός, which means he was an Italian; for the Σικελός τις is merely - an allusion to the Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ ποτὶ τὰν ματέρ’ ἔφα of - Timokreon. We do not know of any Italian from whom Plato could have - learnt these views except Philolaos or one of his disciples. They may, - however, be originally Orphic for all that (cf. R. P. 89 a). - -We know further that Philolaos wrote on “numbers”; for Speusippos -followed him in the account he gave of the Pythagorean theories on that -subject.[741] It is probable that he busied himself mainly with -arithmetic, and we can hardly doubt that his geometry was of the -primitive type described in an earlier chapter. Eurytos was his -disciple, and we have seen (§ 47) that his views were still very crude. - -Footnote 741: - - See above, Chap. II. p. 113, _n._ 236. - -We also know now that Philolaos wrote on medicine,[742] and that, while -apparently influenced by the theories of the Sicilian school, he opposed -them from the Pythagorean standpoint. In particular, he said that our -bodies were composed only of the warm, and did not participate in the -cold. It was only after birth that the cold was introduced by -respiration. The connexion of this with the old Pythagorean theory is -obvious. Just as the Fire in the macrocosm draws in and limits the cold -dark breath which surrounds the world (§ 53), so do our bodies inhale -cold breath from outside. Philolaos made bile, blood, and phlegm the -causes of disease; and, in accordance with the theory just mentioned, he -had to deny that the phlegm was cold, as the Sicilian school held it -was. Its etymology proved that it was warm. As Diels says, Philolaos -strikes us as an “uninteresting eclectic” so far as his medical views -are concerned.[743] We shall see, however, that it was just this -preoccupation with the medicine of the Sicilian school that gave rise to -some of the most striking developments of later Pythagoreanism. - -Footnote 742: - - It is a good illustration of the defective character of our tradition - (Introd. § XIII.) that this was quite unknown till the publication of - the extracts from Menon’s _Iatrika_ contained in the Anonymus - Londinensis. The extract referring to Philolaos is given and discussed - by Diels in _Hermes_, xxviii. pp. 417 sqq. - -Footnote 743: - - _Hermes_, _loc. cit._ - -[Sidenote: Plato and the Pythagoreans.] - -140. Such, so far as we can see, was the historical Philolaos, and he is -a sufficiently remarkable figure. He is usually, however, represented in -a different light, and has even been spoken of as a “precursor of -Copernicus.” To understand this, we shall have to consider for a little -the story of what can only be called a literary conspiracy. Not till -this has been exposed will it be possible to estimate the real -importance of Philolaos and his immediate disciples. - -As we can see from the _Phaedo_ and the _Gorgias_, Plato was intimate -with these men and was deeply impressed by their religious teaching, -though it is plain too that he did not adopt it as his own faith. He was -still more attracted by the scientific side of Pythagoreanism, and to -the last this exercised a great influence on him. His own system in its -final form had many points of contact with it, as he is careful to mark -in the _Philebus_.[744] But, just because he stood so near it, he is apt -to develop Pythagoreanism on lines of his own, which may or may not have -commended themselves to Archytas, but are no guide to the views of -Philolaos and Eurytos. He is not careful, however, to claim the -authorship of his own improvements in the system. He did not believe -that cosmology could be an exact science, and he is therefore quite -willing to credit Timaios the Lokrian, or “ancient sages” generally, -with theories which certainly had their birth in the Academy. - -Footnote 744: - - Plato, _Phileb._ 16 c sqq. - -Now Plato had many enemies and detractors, and this literary device -enabled them to bring against him the charge of plagiarism. Aristoxenos -was one of these enemies, and we know he made the extraordinary -statement that most of the _Republic_ was to be found in a work by -Protagoras.[745] He seems also to be the original source of the story -that Plato bought “three Pythagorean books” from Philolaos and copied -the _Timaeus_ out of them. According to this, the “three books” had come -into the possession of Philolaos; and, as he had fallen into great -poverty, Dion was able to buy them from him, or from his relatives, at -Plato’s request, for a hundred _minae_.[746] It is certain, at any rate, -that this story was already current in the third century; for the -sillographer Timon of Phleious addresses Plato thus: “And of thee too, -Plato, did the desire of discipleship lay hold. For many pieces of -silver thou didst get in exchange a small book, and starting from it -didst learn to write _Timaeus_.”[747] Hermippos, the pupil of -Kallimachos, said that “some writer” said that Plato himself bought the -books from the relatives of Philolaos for forty Alexandrian _minae_ and -copied the _Timaeus_ out of it; while Satyros, the Aristarchean, says he -got it through Dion for a hundred _minae_.[748] There is no suggestion -in any of these accounts that the book was by Philolaos himself; they -imply rather that what Plato bought was either a book by Pythagoras, or -at any rate authentic notes of his teaching, which had come into the -hands of Philolaos. In later times, it was generally supposed that the -work entitled _The Soul of the World_, by Timaios the Lokrian, was -meant;[749] but it has now been proved beyond a doubt that this cannot -have existed earlier than the first century A.D. We know nothing of -Timaios except what Plato tells us himself, and he may even be a -fictitious character like the Eleatic Stranger. His name does not occur -among the Lokrians in the Catalogue of Pythagoreans preserved by -Iamblichos.[750] Besides this, the work does not fulfil the most -important requirement, that of being in three books, which is always an -essential feature of the story.[751] - -Footnote 745: - - Diog. iii. 37. For similar charges, cf. Zeller, _Plato_, p. 429, n. 7. - -Footnote 746: - - Iambl. _V. Pyth._ 199. Diels is clearly right in ascribing the story - to Aristoxenos (_Arch._ iii. p. 461, n. 26). - -Footnote 747: - - Timon _ap._ Gell. iii. 17 (R. P. 60 a). - -Footnote 748: - - For Hermippos and Satyros, see Diog. iii. 9; viii. 84, 85. - -Footnote 749: - - So Iambl. _in Nicom._ p. 105, 11; Proclus, _in Tim._ p. 1, Diehl. - -Footnote 750: - - Diels, _Vors._ p. 269. - -Footnote 751: - - They are τὰ θρυλούμενα τρία βιβλία (Iambl. _V. Pyth._ 199), τὰ - διαβόητα τρία βιβλία (Diog. viii. 15). - -Not one of the writers just mentioned professes to have seen the famous -“three books”;[752] but at a later date there were at least two works -which claimed to represent them. Diels has shown how a treatise in three -sections, entitled Παιδευτικόν, πολιτικόν, φυσικόν, was composed in the -Ionic dialect and attributed to Pythagoras. It was largely based on the -Πυθαγορικαὶ ἀποφάσεις of Aristoxenos, but its date is uncertain.[753] In -the first century B.C., Demetrios Magnes was able to quote the opening -words of the work published by Philolaos.[754] That, however, was -written in Doric. Demetrios does not actually say it was by Philolaos -himself, though it is no doubt the same work from which a number of -extracts are preserved under his name in Stobaios and later writers. If -it professed to be by Philolaos, that was not quite in accordance with -the original story; but it is easy to see how his name may have become -attached to it. We are told that the other book which passed under the -name of Pythagoras was really by Lysis.[755] Boeckh has shown that the -work ascribed to Philolaos probably consisted of three books also, and -Proclus referred to it as the _Bakchai_,[756] a fanciful title which -recalls the “Muses” of Herodotos. Two of the extracts in Stobaios bear -it. It must be confessed that the whole story is very suspicious; but, -as some of the best authorities still regard the fragments as partly -genuine, it is necessary to look at them more closely. - -Footnote 752: - - As Mr. Bywater says (_J. Phil._ i. p. 29), the history of this work - “reads like the history, not so much of a book, as of a literary - _ignis fatuus_ floating before the minds of imaginative writers.” - -Footnote 753: - - Diels, “Ein gefälschtes Pythagorasbuch” (_Arch._ iii. pp. 451 sqq.). - -Footnote 754: - - Diog. viii. 85 (R. P. 63 b). Diels reads πρῶτον ἐκδοῦναι τῶν - Πυθαγορικῶν <βιβλία καὶ ἐπιγράψαι Περὶ> Φύσεως. - -Footnote 755: - - Diog. viii. 7. - -Footnote 756: - - Proclus, _in Eucl._ p. 22, 15 (Friedlein). Cf. Boeckh, _Philolaos_, - pp. 36 sqq. Boeckh refers to a sculptured group of _three_ Bakchai, - whom he supposes to be Ino, Agaue, and Autonoe. - -[Sidenote: The “Fragments of Philolaos.”] - -141. Boeckh argued with great learning and skill that all the fragments -preserved under the name of Philolaos were genuine; but no one will now -go so far as this. The lengthy extract on the soul is given up even by -those who maintain the genuineness of the rest.[757] It cannot be said -that this position is plausible on the face of it. Boeckh saw there was -no ground for supposing that there ever was more than a single work, and -he drew the conclusion that we must accept all the remains as genuine or -reject all as spurious.[758] As, however, Zeller and Diels still -maintain the genuineness of most of the fragments, we cannot ignore them -altogether. Arguments based, on the doctrine contained in them would, it -is true, present the appearance of a vicious circle at this stage. It is -only in connexion with our other evidence that these can be introduced. -But there are two serious objections to the fragments which may be -mentioned at once. They are sufficiently strong to justify us in -refusing to use them till we have ascertained from other sources what -doctrines may fairly be attributed to the Pythagoreans of this date. - -Footnote 757: - - The passage is given in R. P. 68. For a full discussion of this and - the other fragments, see Bywater, “On the Fragments attributed to - Philolaus the Pythagorean” (_J. Phil._ i. pp. 21 sqq.). - -Footnote 758: - - Boeckh, _Philolaos_, p. 38. Diels (_Vors._ p. 246) distinguishes the - _Bakchai_ from the three books Περὶ φύσιος (_ib._ p. 239). As, - however, he identifies the latter with the “three books” bought from - Philolaos, and regards it as genuine, this does not seriously affect - the argument. - -In the first place, we must ask a question which has not yet been faced. -Is it likely that Philolaos should have written in Doric? Ionic was the -dialect of all science and philosophy till the time of the Peloponnesian -War, and there is no reason to suppose that the early Pythagoreans used -any other.[759] Pythagoras was himself an Ionian, and it is by no means -clear that in his time the Achaian states in which he founded his Order -had already adopted the Dorian dialect.[760] Alkmaion of Kroton seems to -have written in Ionic.[761] Diels says, it is true, that Philolaos and -then Archytas were the first Pythagoreans to use the dialect of their -homes;[762] but Philolaos can hardly be said to have had a home,[763] -and the fragments of Archytas are not written in the dialect of Taras, -but in what may be called “common Doric.” Archytas may have found it -convenient to use that dialect; but he is at least a generation later -than Philolaos, which makes a great difference. There is evidence that, -in the time of Philolaos and later, Ionic was still used even by the -citizens of Dorian states for scientific purposes. Diogenes of Apollonia -in Crete and the Syracusan historian Antiochos wrote in Ionic, while the -medical writers of Dorian, Kos and Knidos, continue to use the same -dialect. The forged work of Pythagoras referred to above, which some -ascribed to Lysis, was in Ionic; and so was the work on the _Akousmata_ -attributed to Androkydes,[764] which shows that, even down to -Alexandrian times, it was still believed that Ionic was the proper -dialect for Pythagorean writings. - -Footnote 759: - - See Diels in _Arch._ iii. pp. 460 sqq. - -Footnote 760: - - On the Achaian dialect, see O. Hoffmann in Collitz and Bechtel, - _Dialekt-Inschriften_, vol. ii. p. 151. How slowly Doric penetrated - into the Chalkidian states may be seen from the mixed dialect of the - inscription of Mikythos of Rhegion (_Dial.-Inschr._ iii. 2, p. 498), - which is later than 468-67 B.C. There is no reason to suppose that the - Achaian dialect of Kroton was less tenacious of life. - -Footnote 761: - - The scanty fragments contain one Doric form, ἔχοντι (fr. 1), but - Alkmaion calls himself Κροτωνιήτης, which is very significant; for - Κροτωνιάτας is the Achaian as well as the Doric form. He did not, - therefore, write a mixed dialect like that referred to in the last - note. It seems safest to assume with Wachtler, _De Alcmaeone - Crotoniata_, pp. 21 sqq., that he used Ionic. - -Footnote 762: - - _Arch._ iii. p. 460. - -Footnote 763: - - He is distinctly called a Krotoniate in the extracts from Menon’s - Ἰατρικά (cf. Diog. viii. 84). It is true that Aristoxenos called him - and Eurytos Tarentines (Diog. viii. 46), but this only means that he - settled at Taras after leaving Thebes. These variations are common in - the case of migratory philosophers. Eurytos is also called a - Krotoniate and a Metapontine (Iambl. _V. Pyth._ 148, 266). Cf. also p. - 380, _n._ 921 on Leukippos, and p. 406, _n._ 988 on Hippon. - -Footnote 764: - - For Androkydes, see Diels, _Vors._ p. 281. As Diels points out - (_Arch._ iii. p. 461), even Lucian has sufficient sense of style to - make Pythagoras speak Ionic. - -In the second place, there can be no doubt that one of the fragments -refers to the five regular solids, four of which are identified with the -elements of Empedokles.[765] Now Plato gives us to understand, in a -well-known passage of the _Republic_, that stereometry had not been -adequately investigated at the time he wrote,[766] and we have express -testimony that the five “Platonic figures,” as they were called, were -discovered in the Academy. In the Scholia to Euclid we read that the -Pythagoreans only knew the cube, the pyramid (tetrahedron), and the -dodecahedron, while the octahedron and the icosahedron were discovered -by Theaitetos.[767] This sufficiently justifies us in regarding the -“fragments of Philolaos” with something more than suspicion. We shall -find more anachronisms as we go on. - -Footnote 765: - - Cf. fr. 12 = 20 M. (R. P. 79), τὰ ἐν τᾷ σφαίρᾳ σώματα πέντε ἐντί. - -Footnote 766: - - Plato, _Rep._ 528 b. - -Footnote 767: - - Heiberg’s Euclid, vol. v. p. 654, 1, Ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ, τουτέστι τῷ - ιγ’, γράφεται τὰ λεγόμενα Πλάτωνος ε̄ σχήματα, ἃ αὐτοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, - τρία δὲ τῶν προειρημένων ε̄ σχημάτων τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἐστίν, ὅ τε κύβος - καὶ ἡ πυραμὶς καὶ τὸ δωδεκάεδρον, Θεαιτήτου δὲ τό τε ὀκτάεδρον καὶ τὸ - εἰκοσάεδρον. It is no objection to this that, as Newbold points out - (_Arch._ xix. p. 204), the inscription of the dodecahedron is more - difficult than that of the octahedron and icosahedron. The - Pythagoreans were not confined to strict Euclidean methods. It may - further be noted that Tannery comes to a similar conclusion with - regard to the musical scale described in the fragment of Philolaos. He - says: “Il n’y a jamais eu, pour la division du tétracorde, une - tradition pythagoricienne; on ne peut pas avec sûreté remonter plus - haut que Platon ou qu’Archytas” (_Rev. de Philologie_, 1904, p. 244). - -[Sidenote: The Problem.] - -142. We must look, then, for other evidence. From what has been said, it -will be clear that we cannot safely take Plato as our guide to the -original meaning of the Pythagorean theory, though it is certainly from -him alone that we can learn to regard it sympathetically. Aristotle, on -the other hand, was quite out of sympathy with Pythagorean ways of -thinking, but took a great deal of pains to understand them. This was -just because they played so great a part in the philosophy of Plato and -his successors, and he had to make the relation of the two doctrines as -clear as he could to himself and his disciples. What we have to do, -then, is to interpret what Aristotle tells us in the spirit of Plato, -and then to consider how the doctrine we arrive at in this way is -related to the systems which had preceded it. It is a delicate -operation, no doubt, but it has been made much safer by recent -discoveries in the early history of mathematics and medicine. - -Zeller has cleared the ground by eliminating the purely Platonic -elements which have crept into later accounts of the system. These are -of two kinds. First of all, we have genuine Academic formulae, such as -the identification of the Limit and the Unlimited with the One and the -Indeterminate Dyad;[768] and secondly, there is the Neoplatonic doctrine -which represents it as an opposition between God and Matter.[769] It is -not necessary to repeat Zeller’s arguments here, as no one will any -longer attribute these doctrines to the Pythagoreans of the fifth -century. - -Footnote 768: - - Aristotle says distinctly (_Met._ Α, 6. 987 b 25) that “to set up a - dyad instead of the unlimited regarded as one, and to make the - unlimited consist of the great and small, is distinctive of Plato.” - Zeller seems to make an unnecessary concession with regard to this - passage (p. 368, n. 2; Eng. trans. p. 396, n. 1). - -Footnote 769: - - Zeller, p. 369 sqq. (Eng. trans. p. 397 sqq.). - -This simplifies the problem very considerably, but it is still extremely -difficult. According to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans said _Things are -numbers_, though that does not appear to be the doctrine of the -fragments of “Philolaos.” According to them, things _have_ number, which -make them knowable, while their real essence is something -unknowable.[770] That would be intelligible enough, but the formula that -things _are_ numbers seems meaningless. We have seen reason for -believing that it is due to Pythagoras himself (§ 52), though we did not -feel able to say very clearly what he meant by it. There is no such -doubt as to his school. Aristotle says they used the formula in a -cosmological sense. The world, according to them, was made of numbers in -the same sense as others had said it was made of “four roots” or -“innumerable seeds.” It will not do to dismiss this as mysticism. -Whatever we may think of Pythagoras, the Pythagoreans of the fifth -century were scientific men, and they must have meant something quite -definite. We shall, no doubt, have to say that they used the words -_Things are numbers_ in a somewhat non-natural sense, but there is no -difficulty in such a supposition. We have seen already how the friends -of Aristoxenos reinterpreted the old _Akousmata_ (§ 44). The -Pythagoreans had certainly a great veneration for the actual words of -the Master (αὐτὸς ἔφα); but such veneration is often accompanied by a -singular licence of interpretation. We shall start, then, from what -Aristotle tells us about the numbers. - -Footnote 770: - - For the doctrine of “Philolaos,” cf. fr. 1 = 2 Ch. (R. P. 64); and for - the unknowable ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων, see fr. 3 = 4 Ch. (R. P. 67). It - has a suspicious resemblance to the later ὕλη, which Aristotle would - hardly have failed to note if he had ever seen the passage. He is - always on the lookout for anticipations of ὕλη. - -[Sidenote: Aristotle on the Numbers.] - -143. In the first place, Aristotle is quite decided in his opinion that -Pythagoreanism was intended to be a cosmological system like the others. -“Though the Pythagoreans,” he tells us, “made use of less obvious first -principles and elements than the rest, seeing that they did not derive -them from sensible objects, yet all their discussions and studies had -reference to nature alone. They describe the origin of the heavens, and -they observe the phenomena of its parts, all that happens to it and all -it does.”[771] They apply their first principles entirely to these -things, “agreeing apparently with the other natural philosophers in -holding that reality was just what could be perceived by the senses, and -is contained within the compass of the heavens,”[772] though “the first -principles and causes of which they made use were really adequate to -explain realities of a higher order than the sensible.”[773] - -Footnote 771: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 8. 989 b 29 (R. P. 92 a). - -Footnote 772: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 8. 990 a 3, ὁμολογοῦντες τοῖς ἄλλοις φυσιολόγοις ὅτι - τό γ’ ὂν τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὅσον αἰσθητόν ἐστὶ καὶ περιείληφεν ὁ καλούμενος - οὐρανός. - -Footnote 773: - - _Met. ib._ 990 a 5, τὰς δ’ αἰτίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἱκανὰς - λέγουσιν ἐπαναβῆναι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνωτέρω τῶν ὄντων, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς - περὶ φύσεως λόγοις ἁρμοττούσας. - -The doctrine is more precisely stated by Aristotle to be that the -elements of numbers are the elements of things, and that therefore -things are numbers.[774] He is equally positive that these “things” are -sensible things,[775] and indeed that they are bodies,[776] the bodies -of which the world is constructed.[777] This construction of the world -out of numbers was a real process in time, which the Pythagoreans -described in detail.[778] - -Footnote 774: - - _Met._ Α, 5. 986 a 1, τὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα - πάντων ὑπέλαβον εἶναι; Ν, 3. 1090 a 22, εἶναι μὲν ἀριθμοὺς ἐποίησαν τὰ - ὄντα, οὐ χωριστοὺς δέ, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τὰ ὄντα. - -Footnote 775: - - _Met._ Μ, 6. 1080 b 2, ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐνυπαρχόντων ὄντα τὰ αἰσθητά; - _ib._ 1080 b 17, ἐκ τούτου (τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ) τὰς αἰσθητὰς - οὐσίας συνεστάναι φασίν. - -Footnote 776: - - _Met._ Μ, 8. 1083 b 11, τὰ σώματα ἐξ ἀριθμῶν εἶναι συγκείμενα; _ib._ b - 17, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ὄντα λέγουσιν· τὰ γοῦν θεωρήματα - προσάπτουσι τοῖς σώμασιν ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνων ὄντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν; Ν, 3. 1090 a - 32, κατὰ μέντοι τὸ ποιεῖν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα, ἐκ μὴ ἐχόντων - βάρος μηδὲ κουφότητα ἔχοντα κουφότητα καὶ βάρος. - -Footnote 777: - - _Met._ Α, 5. 986 a 2, τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀριθμόν; Α, - 8. 990 a 21, τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦτον ἐξ οὗ συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος; Μ, 6. 1080 - b 18, τὸν γὰρ ὅλον οὐρανὸν κατασκευάζουσιν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν; _de Caelo_, Γ, - 1. 300 a 15, τοῖς ἐξ ἀριθμῶν συνιστᾶσι τὸν οὐρανόν· ἔνιοι γὰρ τὴν - φύσιν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν συνιστᾶσιν, ὥσπερ τῶν Πυθαγορείων τινές. - -Footnote 778: - - _Met._ Ν, 3. 1091 a 18, κοσμοποιοῦσι καὶ φυσικῶς βούλονται λέγειν. - -Further, the numbers were intended to be mathematical numbers, though -they were not separated from the things of sense.[779] On the other -hand, they were not mere predicates of something else, but had an -independent reality of their own. “They did not hold that the limited -and the unlimited and the one were certain other substances, such as -fire, water, or anything else of that sort; but that the unlimited -itself and the one itself were the reality of the things of which they -are predicated, and that is why they said that number was the reality of -everything.”[780] Accordingly the numbers are, in Aristotle’s own -language, not only the formal, but also the material, cause of -things.[781] According to the Pythagoreans, things are made of numbers -in the same sense as they were made of fire, air, or water in the -theories of their predecessors. - -Footnote 779: - - _Met._ Μ, 6. 1080 b 16; Ν, 3. 1090 a 20. - -Lastly, Aristotle notes that the point in which the Pythagoreans agreed -with Plato was in giving numbers an independent reality of their own; -while Plato differed from the Pythagoreans in holding that this reality -was distinguishable from that of sensible things.[782] Let us consider -these statements in detail. - -Footnote 780: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 5. 987 a 15. - -Footnote 781: - - _Met. ib._ 986 a 15 (R. P. 66). - -Footnote 782: - - _Met._ Α, 6. 987 b 27, ὁ μὲν (Πλάτων) τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, - οἱ δ’ (οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι) ἀριθμοὺς εἶναί φασιν αὐτὰ τὰ αἰσθητά. - -[Sidenote: The elements of numbers.] - -144. Aristotle speaks of certain “elements” (στοιχεῖα) of numbers, which -were also the elements of things. That, of course, is only his own way -of putting the matter; but it is clearly the key to the problem, if we -can discover what it means. Primarily, the “elements of number” are the -Odd and the Even, but that does not seem to help us much. We find, -however, that the Odd and Even were identified in a somewhat violent way -with the Limit and the Unlimited, which we have seen reason to regard as -the original principles of the Pythagorean cosmology. Aristotle tells us -that it is the Even which gives things their unlimited character when it -is contained in them and limited by the Odd,[783] and the commentators -are at one in understanding this to mean that the Even is in some way -the cause of infinite divisibility. They get into great difficulties, -however, when they try to show how this can be. Simplicius has preserved -an explanation, in all probability Alexander’s, to the effect that they -called the even number unlimited “because every even is divided into -equal parts, and what is divided into equal parts is unlimited in -respect of bipartition; for division into equals and halves goes on _ad -infinitum_. But, when the odd is added, it limits it; for it prevents -its division into equal parts.”[784] Now it is plain that we must not -impute to the Pythagoreans the view that even numbers can be halved -indefinitely. They had carefully studied the properties of the decad, -and they must have known that the even numbers 6 and 10 do not admit of -this. The explanation is really to be found in a fragment of -Aristoxenos, where we read that “even numbers are those which are -divided into equal parts, while odd numbers are divided into unequal -parts and have a middle term.”[785] This is still further elucidated by -a passage which is quoted in Stobaios and ultimately goes back to -Poseidonios. It runs: “When the odd is divided into two equal parts, a -unit is left over in the middle; but when the even is so divided, an -empty field is left, without a master and without a number, showing that -it is defective and incomplete.”[786] Again, Plutarch says: “In the -division of numbers, the even, when parted in any direction, leaves as -it were within itself ... a field; but, when the same thing is done to -the odd, there is always a middle left over from the division.”[787] It -is clear that all these passages refer to the same thing, and that can -hardly be anything else than those arrangements of “terms” in patterns -with which we are already familiar (§ 47). If we think of these, we -shall see in what sense it is true that bipartition goes on _ad -infinitum_. However high the number may be, the number of ways in which -it can be equally divided will also increase. - -Footnote 783: - - __Met.__ Α, 5. 986 a 17 (R. P. 66); _Phys._ Γ, 4. 203 a 10 (R. P. 66 - a). - -Footnote 784: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 455, 20 (R. P. 66 a). I owe the passages which I - have used in illustration of this subject to W. A. Heidel, “Πέρας and - ἄπειρον in the Pythagorean Philosophy” (_Arch._ xiv. pp. 384 sqq.). - The general principle of my interpretation is also the same as his, - though I think that, by bringing the passage into connexion with the - numerical figures, I have avoided the necessity of regarding the words - ἡ γὰρ εἰς ἴσα καὶ ἡμίση διαίρεσις ἐπ’ ἄπειρον as “an attempted - elucidation added by Simplicius.” - -Footnote 785: - - Aristoxenos, fr. 81, _ap._ Stob. i. p. 20, 1, ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοξένου Περὶ - ἀριθμητικῆς ... τῶν δὲ ἀριθμῶν ἄρτιοι μέν εἰσιν οἱ εἰς ἴσα - διαιρούμενοι, περισσοὶ δὲ οἱ εἰς ἄνισα καὶ μέσον ἔχοντες. - -Footnote 786: - - [Plut.] _ap._ Stob. i. p. 22, 19, καὶ μὴν εἰς δύο διαιρουμένων ἴσα τοῦ - μὲν περισσοῦ μονὰς ἐν μέσῳ περιέστι, τοῦ δὲ ἀρτίου κενὴ λείπεται χώρα - καὶ ἀδέσποτος καὶ ἀνάριθμος, ὡς ἂν ἐνδεοῦς καὶ ἀτελοῦς ὄντος. - -Footnote 787: - - Plut. _de E apud Delphos_, 388 a, ταῖς γὰρ εἰς ἴσα τομαῖς τῶν ἀριθμῶν, - ὁ μὲν ἄρτιος πάντῃ διϊστάμενος ὑπολείπει τινὰ δεκτικὴν ἀρχὴν οἷον ἐν - ἑαυτῷ καὶ χώραν, ἐν δὲ τῷ περιττῷ ταὐτὸ παθόντι μέσον ἀεὶ περίεστι τῆς - νεμήσεως γόνιμον. The words which I have omitted in translating refer - to the further identification of Odd and Even with Male and Female. - The passages quoted by Heidel might be added to. Cf., for instance, - what Nikomachos says (p. 13, 10, Hoche), ἔστι δὲ ἄρτιον μὲν ὃ οἷόν τε - εἰς δύο ἴσα διαιρεθῆναι μονάδος μέσον μὴ παρεμπιπτούσης, περιττὸν δὲ - τὸ μὴ δυνάμενον εἰς δύο ἴσα μερισθῆναι διὰ τὴν προειρημένην τῆς - μονάδος μεσιτείαν. He significantly adds that this definition is ἐκ - τῆς δημώδους ὑπολήψεως. - -145. In this way, then, the Odd and the Even were identified with the -Limit and the Unlimited, and it is possible, though by no means certain, -that Pythagoras himself had taken this step. In any case, there can be -no doubt that by his Unlimited he meant something spatially extended, -and we have seen that he identified it with air, night, or the void, so -we are prepared to find that his followers also thought of the Unlimited -as extended. Aristotle certainly regarded it so. He argues that, if the -Unlimited is itself a reality, and not merely the predicate of some -other reality, then every part of it must be unlimited too, just as -every part of air is air.[788] The same thing is implied in his -statement that the Pythagorean Unlimited was outside the heavens.[789] -Further than this, it is hardly safe to go. Philolaos and his followers -cannot have regarded the Unlimited in the old Pythagorean way as Air; -for, as we shall see, they adopted the theory of Empedokles as to that -“element,” and accounted for it otherwise. On the other hand, they can -hardly have regarded it as an absolute void; for that conception was -introduced by the Atomists. It is enough to say that they meant by the -Unlimited the _res extensa_, without analysing that conception any -further. - -Footnote 788: - - Arist. _Phys._ Γ, 4. 204 a 20 sqq., especially a 26, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὥσπερ - ἀέρος ἀὴρ μέρος, οὕτω καὶ ἄπειρον ἀπείρου, εἴ γε οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀρχή. - -Footnote 789: - - See Chap. II. § 53. - -As the Unlimited is spatial, the Limit must be spatial too, and we -should naturally expect to find that the point, the line, and the -surface were regarded as all forms of the Limit. That was the later -doctrine; but the characteristic feature of Pythagoreanism is just that -the point was not regarded as a limit, but as the first product of the -Limit and the Unlimited, and was identified with the arithmetical unit. -According to this view, then, the point has one dimension, the line two, -the surface three, and the solid four.[790] In other words, the -Pythagorean points have magnitude, their lines breadth, and their -surfaces thickness. The whole theory, in short, turns on the definition -of the point as a unit “having position.”[791] It was out of such -elements that it seemed possible to construct a world. - -Footnote 790: - - Cf. Speusippos in the extract preserved in the _Theologumena - arithmetica_, p. 61 (Diels, _Vors._ p. 235), τὸ μὴν γὰρ ᾱ στιγμή, τὸ - δὲ β̄ γραμμή, τὸ δὲ τρία τρίγωνον, τὸ δὲ δ̄ πυραμίς. We know that - Speusippos is following Philolaos here. Arist. _Met._ Ζ, 11. 1036 b - 12, καὶ ἀνάγουσι πάντα εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμούς, καὶ γραμμῆς τὸν λόγον τὸν - τῶν δύο εἶναί φασιν. The matter is clearly put in the Scholia on - Euclid (p. 78, 19, Heiberg), οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸ μὲν σημεῖον ἀνάλογον - ἐλάμβανον μονάδι, δυάδι δὲ τὴν γραμμήν, καὶ τριάδι τὸ ἐπίπεδον, - τετράδι δὲ τὸ σῶμα. καίτοι Ἀριστοτέλης τριαδικῶς προσεληλυθέναι φησὶ - τὸ σῶμα, ὡς διάστημα πρῶτον λαμβάνων τὴν γραμμήν. - -Footnote 791: - - The identification of the point with the unit is referred to by - Aristotle, _Phys._ Ε, 3. 227 a 27. - -[Sidenote: The numbers as magnitudes.] - -146. It is clear that this way of regarding the point, the line, and the -surface is closely bound up with the practice of representing numbers by -dots arranged in symmetrical patterns, which we have seen reason for -attributing to the Pythagoreans (§ 47). The science of geometry had -already made considerable advances, but the old view of quantity as a -sum of units had not been revised, and so a doctrine such as we have -indicated was inevitable. This is the true answer to Zeller’s contention -that to regard the Pythagorean numbers as spatial is to ignore the fact -that the doctrine was originally arithmetical rather than geometrical. -Our interpretation takes full account of that fact, and indeed makes the -peculiarities of the whole system depend upon it. Aristotle is very -decided as to the Pythagorean points having magnitude. “They construct -the whole world out of numbers,” he tells us, “but they suppose the -units have magnitude. As to how the first unit with magnitude arose, -they appear to be at a loss.”[792] Zeller holds that this is only an -inference of Aristotle’s,[793] and he is probably right in this sense, -that the Pythagoreans never felt the need of saying in so many words -that points had magnitude. It does seem probable, however, that they -called them ὄγκοι.[794] - -Footnote 792: - - Arist. _Met._ Μ, 6. 1080 b 18 sqq., 1083 b 8 sqq.; _de Caelo_, Γ, 1. - 300 a 16 (R. P. 76 a). - -Footnote 793: - - Zeller, p. 381. - -Footnote 794: - - We learn from Plato, _Theaet._ 148 b 1, that Theaitetos called surds, - what Euclid calls δυνάμει σύμμετρα, by the name of δυνάμεις, while - rational square roots were called μήκη. Now in _Tim._ 31 c 4 we find a - division of numbers into ὄγκοι and δυνάμεις, which seem to mean - rational and irrational quantities. Cf. also the use of ὄγκοι in - _Parm._ 164 d. Zeno in his fourth argument about motion, which, we - shall see (§ 163), was directed against the Pythagoreans, used ὄγκοι - for points. Aetios, i. 3, 19 (R. P. 76 b), says that Ekphantos of - Syracuse was the first of the Pythagoreans to say that their units - were corporeal. Probably, however, “Ekphantos” was a personage in a - dialogue of Herakleides (Tannery, _Arch._ xi. pp. 263 sqq.), and - Herakleides called the monads ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι (Galen, _Hist. Phil._ 18; - _Dox._ p. 610). - -Nor is Zeller’s other argument against the view that the Pythagorean -numbers were spatial any more inconsistent with the way in which we have -now stated it. He himself allows, and indeed insists, that in the -Pythagorean cosmology the numbers were spatial, but he raises -difficulties about the other parts of the system. There are other -things, such as the Soul and Justice and Opportunity, which are said to -be numbers, and which cannot be regarded as constructed of points, -lines, and surfaces.[795] Now it appears to me that this is just the -meaning of a passage in which Aristotle criticises the Pythagoreans. -They held, he says, that in one part of the world Opinion prevailed, -while a little above it or below it were to be found Injustice or -Separation or Mixture, each of which was, according to them, a number. -But in the very same regions of the heavens were to be found things -having magnitude which were also numbers. How can this be, since Justice -has no magnitude?[796] This means surely that the Pythagoreans had -failed to give any clear account of the relation between these more or -less fanciful analogies and their quasi-geometrical construction of the -universe. And this is, after all, really Zeller’s own view. He has shown -that in the Pythagorean cosmology the numbers were regarded as -spatial,[797] and he has also shown that the cosmology was the whole of -the system.[798] We have only to bring these two things together to -arrive at the interpretation given above. - -Footnote 795: - - Zeller, p. 382. - -Footnote 796: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 8. 990 a 22 (R. P. 81 e). I read and interpret thus: - “For, seeing that, according to them, Opinion and Opportunity are in a - given part of the world, and a little above or below them Injustice - and Separation and Mixture,—in proof of which they allege that each of - these is a number,—and seeing that it is also the case (reading - συμβαίνῃ with Bonitz) that there is already in that part of the world - a number of composite magnitudes (_i.e._ composed of the Limit and the - Unlimited), because those affections (of number) are attached to their - respective regions;—(seeing that they hold these two things), the - question arises whether the number which we are to understand each of - these things (Opinion, etc.) to be is the same as the number in the - world (_i.e._ the cosmological number) or a different one.” I cannot - doubt that these are the extended numbers which are composed - (συνίσταται) of the elements of number, the limited and the unlimited, - or, as Aristotle here says, the “affections of number,” the odd and - the even. Zeller’s view that “celestial bodies” are meant comes near - this, but the application is too narrow. Nor is it the number (πλῆθος) - of those bodies that is in question, but their magnitude (μέγεθος). - For other views of the passage, see Zeller, p. 391, n. 1. - -Footnote 797: - - Zeller, p. 404. - -Footnote 798: - - _Ibid._ pp. 467 sqq. - -[Sidenote: The numbers and the elements.] - -147. When we come to details, we seem to see that what distinguished the -Pythagoreanism of this period from its earlier form was that it sought -to adapt itself to the new theory of “elements.” It is just this which -makes it necessary for us to take up the consideration of the system -once more in connexion with the pluralists. When the Pythagoreans -returned to Southern Italy, they must have found views prevalent there -which imperatively demanded a partial reconstruction of their own -system. We do not know that Empedokles founded a philosophical society, -but there can be no doubt of his influence on the medical school of -these regions; and we also know now that Philolaos played a part in the -history of medicine.[799] This discovery gives us the clue to the -historical connexion, which formerly seemed obscure. The tradition is -that the Pythagoreans explained the elements as built up of geometrical -figures, a theory which we can study for ourselves in the more developed -form which it attained in Plato’s _Timaeus_.[800] If they were to retain -their position as the leaders of medical study in Italy, they were bound -to account for the elements. - -Footnote 799: - - All this has been put in its true light by the publication of the - extract from Menon’s Ἰατρικά, on which see p. 322, _n._ 742. - -Footnote 800: - - In Aet. ii. 6, 5 (R. P. 80) the theory is ascribed to Pythagoras, - which is an anachronism, as the mention of “elements” shows it must be - later than Empedokles. In his extract from the same source, Achilles - says οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, which doubtless represents Theophrastos better. - There is a fragment of “Philolaos” bearing on the subject (R. P. 79), - where the regular solids must be meant by τὰ ἐν τᾷ σφαίρᾳ σώματα. - -We must not take it for granted, however, that the Pythagorean -construction of the elements was exactly the same as that which we find -in Plato’s _Timaeus_. It has been mentioned already that there is good -reason for believing they only knew three of the regular solids, the -cube, the pyramid (tetrahedron), and the dodecahedron.[801] Now it is -very significant that Plato starts from fire and earth,[802] and in the -construction of the elements proceeds in such a way that the octahedron -and the icosahedron can easily be transformed into pyramids, while the -cube and the dodecahedron cannot. From this it follows that, while air -and water pass readily into fire, earth cannot do so,[803] and the -dodecahedron is reserved for another purpose, which we shall consider -presently. This would exactly suit the Pythagorean system; for it would -leave room for a dualism of the kind outlined in the Second Part of the -poem of Parmenides. We know that Hippasos made Fire the first principle, -and we see from the _Timaeus_ how it would be possible to represent air -and water as forms of fire. The other element is, however, earth, not -air, as we have seen reason to believe that it was in early -Pythagoreanism. That would be a natural result of the discovery of -atmospheric air by Empedokles and of his general theory of the elements. -It would also explain the puzzling fact, which we had to leave -unexplained above, that Aristotle identifies the two “forms” spoken of -by Parmenides with Fire and Earth.[804] All this is, of course, -problematical; but it will not be found easy to account otherwise for -the facts. - -Footnote 801: - - See above, p. 329, _n._ 767. - -Footnote 802: - - Plato, _Tim._ 31 b 5. - -Footnote 803: - - Plato, _Tim._ 54 c 4. It is to be observed that in _Tim._ 48 b 5 Plato - says of the construction of the elements οὐδείς πω γένεσιν αὐτῶν - μεμήνυκεν, which implies that there is some novelty in the theory as - he makes Timaios state it. If we read the passage in the light of what - has been said in § 141, we shall be inclined to believe that Plato is - working out the Pythagorean doctrine on the lines of the discovery of - Theaitetos. There is another indication of the same thing in Arist. - _Gen. Corr._ Β, 3. 330 b 16, where we are told that, in the - Διαιρέσεις, Plato assumed three elements, but made the middle one a - mixture. This is stated in close connexion with the ascription of Fire - and Earth to Parmenides. - -Footnote 804: - - See above, Chap. IV. p. 213, _n._ 462. - -[Sidenote: The dodecahedron.] - -148. The most interesting point in the theory is, perhaps, the use made -of the dodecahedron. It was identified, we are told, with the “sphere of -the universe,” or, as it is put in the Philolaic fragment, with the -“hull of the sphere.”[805] Whatever we may think of the authenticity of -the fragments, there is no reason to doubt that this is a genuine -Pythagorean expression, and it must be taken in close connexion with the -word “keel” applied to the central fire.[806] The structure of the world -was compared to the building of a ship, an idea of which there are other -traces.[807] The key to what we are told of the dodecahedron is given by -Plato. In the _Phaedo_ we read that the “true earth,” if looked at from -above, is “many-coloured like the balls that are made of twelve pieces -of leather.”[808] In the _Timaeus_ the same thing is referred to in -these words: “Further, as there is still one construction left, the -fifth, God made use of it for the universe when he painted it.”[809] The -point is that the dodecahedron approaches more nearly to the sphere than -any other of the regular solids. The twelve pieces of leather used to -make a ball would all be regular pentagons; and, if the material were -not flexible like leather, we should have a dodecahedron instead of a -sphere. This points to the Pythagoreans having had at least the -rudiments of the “method of exhaustion” formulated later by Eudoxos. -They must have studied the properties of circles by means of inscribed -polygons and those of spheres by means of inscribed solids.[810] That -gives us a high idea of their mathematical attainments; but that it is -not too high, is shown by the fact that the famous lunules of -Hippokrates date from the middle of the fifth century. The inclusion of -_straight_ and _curved_ in the “table of opposites” under the head of -Limit and Unlimited points in the same direction.[811] - -Footnote 805: - - Aet. ii. 6, 5 (R. P. 80); “Philolaos,” fr. 12 (= 20 M.; R. P. 79). On - the ὁλκάς, see Gundermann in _Rhein. Mus._ 1904, pp. 145 sqq. I agree - with him in holding that the reading is sound, and that the word means - “ship,” but I think that it is the structure, not the motion, of a - ship which is the point of comparison. - -Footnote 806: - - Aet. ii. 4, 15, ὅπερ τρόπεως δίκην προϋπεβάλετο τῇ τοῦ παντὸς <σφαίρᾳ> - ὁ δημιουργὸς θεός. - -Footnote 807: - - Cf. the ὑποζώματα of Plato, _Rep._ 616 c 3. As ὕλη generally means - “timber” for shipbuilding (when it does not mean firewood), I suggest - that we should look in this direction for an explanation of the - technical use of the word in later philosophy. Cf. Plato, _Phileb._ 54 - c 1, γενέσεως ... ἕνεκα ... πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, which is - part of the answer to the question πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἕνεκα φῂς - γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα ἕνεκα ναυπηγίας; (_ib._ b 2); _Tim._ 69 a 6, - οἷα τέκτοσιν ἡμῖν ὕλη παράκειται. - -Footnote 808: - - Plato, _Phd._ 110 b 6, ὥσπερ οἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι with Wyttenbach’s - note. - -Footnote 809: - - Plato, _Tim._ 55 c 4. Neither this passage nor the last can refer to - the Zodiac, which would be described by a dodecagon, not a - dodecahedron. What is implied is the division of the heavens into - twelve pentagonal fields. - -Footnote 810: - - Gow, _Short History of Greek Mathematics_, pp. 164 sqq. - -Footnote 811: - - This is pointed out by Kinkel, _Gesch. der Phil._ vol. i. p. 121. - -The tradition confirms in an interesting way the importance of the -dodecahedron in the Pythagorean system. According to one account, -Hippasos was drowned at sea for revealing its construction and claiming -the discovery as his own.[812] What that construction was, we may -partially infer from the fact that the Pythagoreans adopted the -pentagram or _pentalpha_ as their symbol. The use of this figure in -later magic is well known; and Paracelsus still employed it as a symbol -of health, which is exactly what the Pythagoreans called it.[813] - -Footnote 812: - - Iambl. _V. Pyth._ 247. Cf. above, Chap. II. p. 117, _n._ 247. - -Footnote 813: - - See Gow, _Short History of Greek Mathematics_, p. 151, and the - passages there referred to, adding Schol. Luc. p. 234, 21, Rabe, τὸ - πεντάγραμμον] ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῇ συνθείᾳ λεγόμενον πένταλφα σύμβολον ἦν πρὸς - ἀλλήλους Πυθαγορείων ἀναγνωριστικὸν καὶ τούτῳ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς - ἐχρῶντο. - -[Sidenote: The Soul a “Harmony.”] - -149. The view that the soul is a “harmony,” or rather an attunement, is -intimately connected with the theory of the four elements. It cannot -have belonged to the earliest form of Pythagoreanism; for, as shown in -Plato’s _Phaedo_, it is quite inconsistent with the idea that the soul -can exist independently of the body. It is the very opposite of the -belief that “any soul can enter any body.”[814] On the other hand, we -know also from the _Phaedo_ that it was accepted by Simmias and Kebes, -who had heard Philolaos at Thebes, and by Echekrates of Phleious, who -was the disciple of Philolaos and Eurytos.[815] The account of the -doctrine given by Plato is quite in accordance with the view that it was -of medical origin. Simmias says: “Our body being, as it were, strung and -held together by the warm and the cold, the dry and the moist, and -things of that sort, our soul is a sort of temperament and attunement of -these, when they are mingled with one another well and in due -proportion. If, then, our soul is an attunement, it is clear that, when -the body has been relaxed or strung up out of measure by diseases and -other ills, the soul must necessarily perish at once.”[816] This is -clearly an application of the theory of Alkmaion (§ 96), and is in -accordance with the views of the Sicilian school of medicine. It -completes the evidence that the Pythagoreanism of the end of the fifth -century was an adaptation of the old doctrine to the new principles -introduced by Empedokles. - -Footnote 814: - - Arist. _de An._ Α, 3. 407 b 20 (R. P. 86 c). - -Footnote 815: - - Plato, _Phd._ 85 e sqq.; and for Echekrates, _ib._ 88 d. - -Footnote 816: - - Plato, _Phd._ 86 b 7-c 5. - -[Sidenote: The central fire.] - -150. The planetary system which Aristotle attributes to “the -Pythagoreans” and Aetios to Philolaos is sufficiently remarkable.[817] -The earth is no longer in the middle of the world; its place is taken by -a central fire, which is not to be identified with the sun. Round this -fire revolve ten bodies. First comes the _Antichthon_ or Counter-earth, -and next the earth, which thus becomes one of the planets. After the -earth comes the moon, then the sun, the five planets, and the heaven of -the fixed stars. We do not see the central fire and the _antichthon_ -because the side of the earth on which we live is always turned away -from them. This is to be explained by the analogy of the moon. That body -always presents the same face to us; and men living on the other side of -it would never see the earth. This implies, of course, that all these -bodies rotate on their axes in the same time as they revolve round the -central fire.[818] - -Footnote 817: - - For the authorities, see R. P. 81-83. The attribution of the theory to - Philolaos is perhaps due to Poseidonios. The “three books” were - doubtless in existence by his time. - -Footnote 818: - - Plato attributes an axial rotation to the heavenly bodies (_Tim._ 40 a - 7), which must be of this kind. It is quite likely that the - Pythagoreans already did so, though Aristotle was unable to see the - point. He says (_de Caelo_, Β, 8. 290 a 24), ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι οὐδὲ - κυλίεται τὰ ἄστρα, φανερόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κυλιόμενον στρέφεσθαι ἀνάγκη, - τῆς δὲ σελήνης ἀεὶ δηλόν ἐστι τὸ καλούμενον πρόσωπον. This, of course, - is just what proves it does rotate. - -It is not very easy to accept the view that this system was taught by -Philolaos. Aristotle nowhere mentions him in connexion with it, and in -the _Phaedo_ Plato gives a description of the earth and its position in -the world which is entirely opposed to it, but is accepted without demur -by Simmias the disciple of Philolaos.[819] It is undoubtedly a -Pythagorean theory, however, and marks a noticeable advance on the -Ionian views then current at Athens. It is clear too that Plato states -it as something of a novelty that the earth does not require the support -of air or anything of the sort to keep it in its place. Even Anaxagoras -had not been able to shake himself free of that idea, and Demokritos -still held it.[820] The natural inference from the _Phaedo_ would -certainly be that the theory of a spherical earth, kept in the middle of -the world by its equilibrium, was that of Philolaos himself. If so, the -doctrine of the central fire would belong to a somewhat later generation -of the school, and Plato may have learnt it from Archytas and his -friends after he had written the _Phaedo_. However that may be, it is of -such importance that it cannot be omitted here. - -Footnote 819: - - Plato, _Phd._ 108 e 4 sqq. Simmias assents to this doctrine in the - emphatic words Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε. - -Footnote 820: - - The primitive character of the astronomy taught by Demokritos as - compared with that of Plato is the best evidence of the value of the - Pythagorean researches. - -It is commonly supposed that the revolution of the earth round the -central fire was intended to account for the alternation of day and -night, and it is clear that an orbital motion of the kind just described -would have the same effect as the rotation of the earth on its axis. As -the same side of the earth is always turned to the central fire, the -side upon which we live will be turned towards the sun when the earth is -on the same side of the central fire, and turned away from it when the -earth and sun are on opposite sides. This view appears to derive some -support from the statement of Aristotle that the earth “being in motion -round the centre, produces day and night.”[821] That remark, however, -would prove too much; for in the _Timaeus_ Plato calls the earth “the -guardian and artificer of night and day,” while at the same time he -declares that the alternation of day and night is caused by the diurnal -revolution of the heavens.[822] That is explained, no doubt quite -rightly, by saying that, even if the earth were regarded as at rest, it -could still be said to produce day and night; for night is due to the -intervention of the earth between the sun and the hemisphere opposite to -it. If we remember how recent was the discovery that night was the -shadow of the earth, we shall see how it may have been worth while to -say this explicitly. - -Footnote 821: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Β, 13. 293 a 18 sqq. (R. P. 83). - -Footnote 822: - - Plato, _Tim._ 40 c 1, (γῆν) φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας - ἐμηχανήσατο. On the other hand, νὺξ μὲν οὖν ἡμέρα τε γέγονεν οὕτως καὶ - διὰ ταῦτα, ἡ τῆς μιᾶς καὶ φρονιμωτάτης κυκλήσεως περίοδος (39 c 1). - -In any case, it is wholly incredible that the heaven of the fixed stars -should have been regarded as stationary. That would have been the most -startling paradox that any scientific man had yet propounded, and we -should have expected the comic poets and popular literature generally to -raise the cry of atheism at once. Above all, we should have expected -Aristotle to say something about it. He made the circular motion of the -heavens the very keystone of his system, and would have regarded the -theory of a stationary heaven as blasphemous. Now he argues against -those who, like the Pythagoreans and Plato, regarded the earth as in -motion;[823] but he does not attribute the view that the heavens are -stationary to any one. There is no necessary connexion between the two -ideas. All the heavenly bodies may be moving as rapidly as we please, -provided that their relative motions are such as to account for the -phenomena.[824] - -Footnote 823: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Β, 13. 293 b 15 sqq. - -Footnote 824: - - Boeckh admitted a very slow motion of the heaven of the fixed stars, - which he at first supposed to account for the precession of the - equinoxes, though he afterwards abandoned that hypothesis - (_Untersuchungen_, p. 93). But, as Dreyer admits (_Planetary Systems_, - p. 49), it is “not ... necessary with Boeckh to suppose the motion of - the starry sphere to have been an exceedingly slow one, as it might in - any case escape direct observation.” - -It seems probable that the theory of the earth’s revolution round the -central fire really originated in the account given by Empedokles of the -sun’s light. The two things are brought into close connexion by Aetios, -who says that Empedokles believed in two suns, while Philolaos believed -in two or even in three.[825] The theory of Empedokles is unsatisfactory -in so far as it gives two inconsistent explanations of night. It is, we -have seen, the shadow of the earth; but at the same time Empedokles -recognised a fiery diurnal hemisphere and a nocturnal hemisphere with -only a little fire in it.[826] All this could be simplified by the -hypothesis of a central fire which is the true source of light. Such a -theory would, in fact, be the natural issue of the recent discoveries as -to the moon’s light and the cause of eclipses, if that theory were -extended so as to include the sun. - -Footnote 825: - - Aet. ii. 20, 13 (Chap. IV. p. 275, _n._ 609); cf. _ib._ 12 (of - Philolaos), ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ διττοὺς ἡλίους γίγνεσθαι, τό τε ἐν τῷ - οὐρανῷ πυρῶδες καὶ τὸ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ πυροειδὲς κατὰ τὸ ἐσοπτροειδές· εἰ μή - τις καὶ τρίτον λέξει τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνόπτρου κατ’ ἀνάκλασιν - διασπειρομένην πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐγήν. Here τὸ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ πυρῶδες is the - central fire, in accordance with the use of the word οὐρανός explained - in another passage of Aetios, Stob. _Ecl._ i. p. 196, 18 (R. P. 81). - It seems to me that these strange notices must be fragments of an - attempt to show how the heliocentric hypothesis arose from the theory - of Empedokles as to the sun’s light. The meaning is that the central - fire really was the sun, but that Philolaos unnecessarily duplicated - it by supposing the visible sun to be its reflexion. - -Footnote 826: - - Chap. VI. § 113. - -The central fire received a number of mythological names. It was called -the Hestia or “hearth of the universe,” the “house” or “watch-tower” of -Zeus, and the “mother of the gods.”[827] That was in the manner of the -school; but these names must not blind us to the fact that we are -dealing with a real scientific hypothesis. It was a great thing to see -that the phenomena could best be “saved” by a central luminary, and that -the earth must therefore be a revolving sphere like the planets. Indeed, -we are almost tempted to say that the identification of the central fire -with the sun, which was suggested for the first time in the Academy, is -a mere detail in comparison. The great thing was that the earth should -definitely take its place among the planets; for once it has done so, we -can proceed to search for the true “hearth” of the planetary system at -our leisure. It is probable, at any rate, that it was this theory which -made it possible for Herakleides of Pontos and Aristarchos of Samos to -reach the heliocentric hypothesis,[828] and it was certainly Aristotle’s -reversion to the geocentric theory which made it necessary for -Copernicus to discover the truth afresh. We have his own word for it -that the Pythagorean theory put him on the right track.[829] - -Footnote 827: - - Aet. i. 7, 7 (R. P. 81). Procl. _in Tim._ p. 106, 22, Diehl (R. P. 83 - e). - -Footnote 828: - - On these points, see Staigmüller, _Beiträge zur Gesch. der - Naturwissenschaften im klassichen Altertume_ (Progr., Stuttgart, - 1899); and “Herakleides Pontikos und das heliokentrische System” - (_Arch._ xv. pp. 141 sqq.). Though, for reasons which will partly - appear from the following pages, I should not put the matter exactly - as Staigmüller does, I have no doubt that he is substantially right. - Diels had already expressed his adhesion to the view that Herakleides - was the real author of the heliocentric hypothesis (_Berl. Sitzb._, - 1893, P. 18). - -Footnote 829: - - In his letter to Pope Paul III., Copernicus quotes Plut. _Plac._ iii. - 13, 2-3 (R. P. 83 a), and adds “Inde igitur occasionem nactus, coepi - et ego de terrae mobilitate cogitare.” The whole passage is - paraphrased by Dreyer, _Planetary Systems_, p. 311. Cf. also the - passage from the original MS., which was first printed in the edition - of 1873, translated by Dreyer, _ib._ pp. 314 sqq. - -[Sidenote: The _antichthon_.] - -151. The existence of the _antichthon_ was also a hypothesis intended to -account for the phenomena of eclipses. In one place, indeed, Aristotle -says that the Pythagoreans invented it in order to bring the number of -revolving bodies up to ten;[830] but that is a mere sally, and Aristotle -really knew better. In his work on the Pythagoreans, we are told, he -said that eclipses of the moon were caused sometimes by the intervention -of the earth and sometimes by that of the _antichthon_; and the same -statement was made by Philip of Opous, a very competent authority on the -matter.[831] Indeed, Aristotle shows in another passage exactly how the -theory originated. He tells us that some thought there might be a -considerable number of bodies revolving round the centre, though -invisible to us because of the intervention of the earth, and that they -accounted in this way for there being more eclipses of the moon than of -the sun.[832] This is mentioned in close connexion with the -_antichthon_, so there is no doubt that Aristotle regarded the two -hypotheses as of the same nature. The history of the theory seems to be -this. Anaximenes had assumed the existence of dark planets to account -for the frequency of lunar eclipses (§ 29), and Anaxagoras had revived -that view (§ 135). Certain Pythagoreans[833] had placed these dark -planets between the earth and the central fire in order to account for -their invisibility, and the next stage was to reduce them to a single -body. Here again we see how the Pythagoreans tried to simplify the -hypotheses of their predecessors. - -Footnote 830: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 5. 986 a 3 (R. P. 83 b). - -Footnote 831: - - Aet. ii. 29, 4, τῶν Πυθαγορείων τινὲς κατὰ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλειον ἱστορίαν - καὶ τὴν Φιλίππου τοῦ Ὀπουντίου ἀπόφασιν ἀνταυγείᾳ καὶ ἀντιφράξει τοτὲ - μὲν τῆς γῆς, τοτὲ δὲ τῆς ἀντίχθονος (ἐκλείπειν τὴν σελήνην). - -Footnote 832: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Β, 13. 293 b 21, ἐνίοις δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ πλείω σώματα - τοιαῦτα ἐνδέχεσθαι φέρεσθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον ἡμῖν ἄδηλα διὰ τὴν - ἐπιπρόσθησιν τῆς γῆς. διὸ καὶ τὰς τῆς σελήνης ἐκλείψεις πλείους ἢ τὰς - τοῦ ἡλίου γίγνεσθαί φασιν· τῶν γὰρ φερομένων ἕκαστον ἀντιφράττειν - αὐτήν, ἀλλ’ οὐ μόνον τὴν γῆν. - -Footnote 833: - - It is not expressly stated that they were Pythagoreans, but it is - natural to suppose so. Such, at least, was Alexander’s opinion (Simpl. - _de Caelo_, P. 515, 25). - -[Sidenote: Planetary motions.] - -152. We must not assume that even the later Pythagoreans made the sun, -moon, and planets, including the earth, revolve in the opposite -direction to the heaven of the fixed stars. It is true that Alkmaion is -said to have agreed with “some of the mathematicians”[834] in holding -this view, but it is never ascribed to Pythagoras or even to Philolaos. -The old theory was, as we have seen (§ 54), that all the heavenly bodies -revolved in the same direction, from east to west, but that the planets -revolved more slowly the further they were removed from the heavens, so -that those which are nearest the earth are “overtaken” by those that are -further away. This view was still maintained by Demokritos, and that it -was also Pythagorean, seems to follow from what we are told about the -“harmony of the spheres.” We have seen (§ 54) that we cannot attribute -this theory in its later form to the Pythagoreans of the fifth century, -but we have the express testimony of Aristotle to the fact that those -Pythagoreans whose doctrine he knew believed that the heavenly bodies -produced musical notes in their courses. Further, the velocities of -these bodies depended on the distances between them, and these -corresponded to the intervals of the octave. He distinctly implies that -the heaven of the fixed stars takes part in the concert; for he mentions -“the sun, the moon, and the stars, so great in magnitude and in number -as they are,” a phrase which cannot refer solely or chiefly to the -remaining five planets.[835] Further, we are told that the slower bodies -give out a deep note and the swifter a high note.[836] Now the -prevailing tradition gives the high note of the octave to the heaven of -the fixed stars,[837] from which it follows that all the heavenly bodies -revolve in the same direction, and that their velocity increases in -proportion to their distance from the centre. - -Footnote 834: - - The term οἱ μαθηματικοί is that used by Poseidonios for the Chaldæan - astrologers (Berossos). Diels, _Elementum_, p. 11, n. 3. As we have - seen, the Babylonians knew the planets better than the Greeks. - -Footnote 835: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Β, 9. 290 b 12 sqq. (R. P. 82). - -Footnote 836: - - Alexander, _in Met._ p. 39, 24 (from Aristotle’s work on the - Pythagoreans), τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τῶν περὶ τὸ μέσον φερομένων ἐν ἀναλογίᾳ - τὰς ἀποστάσεις ἐχόντων ... ποιούντων δὲ καὶ ψόφον ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τῶν - μὲν βραδυτέρων βαρύν, τῶν δὲ ταχυτέρων ὀξύν. We must not attribute the - identification of the seven planets with the seven strings of the - heptachord to the Pythagoreans of this date. Mercury and Venus have in - the long run the same velocity as the sun, and we must take in the - earth and the fixed stars. We can even find room for the _antichthon_ - as προσλαμβανόμενος. - -Footnote 837: - - For the various systems, see Boeckh, _Kleine Schriften_, vol. iii. pp. - 169 sqq., and Carl v. Jan, “Die Harmonie der Sphären” (_Philol._ 1893, - pp. 13 sqq.). They vary with the astronomy of their authors, but they - bear witness to the fact stated in the text. Many give the highest - note to Saturn and the lowest to the Moon, while others reverse this. - The system which corresponds best, however, with the Pythagorean - planetary system must include the heaven of the fixed stars and the - earth. It is that upon which the verses of Alexander of Ephesos quoted - by Theon of Smyrna, p. 140, 4, are based: - - γαῖα μὲν οὖν ὑπάτη τε βαρεῖά τε μέσσοθι ναίει· - ἀπλανέων δὲ σφαῖρα συνημμένη ἔπλετο νήτη, κ.τ.λ. - - The “base of Heaven’s deep Organ” in Milton’s “ninefold harmony” - (_Hymn on the Nativity_, xiii.) implies the reverse of this. - -The theory that the proper motion of the sun, moon, and planets is from -west to east, and that they also share in the motion from east to west -of the heaven of the fixed stars, makes its first appearance in the Myth -of Er in Plato’s _Republic_, and is fully worked out in the _Timaeus_. -In the _Republic_ it is still associated with the “harmony of the -spheres,” though we are not told how it is reconciled with that theory -in detail.[838] In the _Timaeus_ we read that the slowest of the -heavenly bodies appear the fastest and _vice versa_; and, as this -statement is put into the mouth of a Pythagorean, we might suppose the -theory of a composite movement to have been anticipated by some members -at least of that school.[839] That is, of course, possible; for the -Pythagoreans were singularly open to new ideas. At the same time, we -must note that the theory is even more emphatically expressed by the -Athenian Stranger in the _Laws_, who is in a special sense Plato -himself. If we were to praise the runners who come in last in the race, -we should not do what is pleasing to the competitors; and in the same -way it cannot be pleasing to the gods when we suppose the slowest of the -heavenly bodies to be the fastest. The passage undoubtedly conveys the -impression that Plato is expounding a novel theory.[840] - -Footnote 838: - - The difficulty appears clearly in Adam’s note on _Republic_, 617 b - (vol. ii. p. 452). There the ἀπλανής appears rightly as the νήτη, - while Saturn, which comes next to it, is the ὑπάτη. It is - inconceivable that this should have been the original scale. Aristotle - touches upon the point (_de Caelo_, Β, 10. 291 a 29 sqq.); and - Simplicius sensibly observes (_de Caelo_, p. 476, 11), οἱ δὲ πάσας τὰς - σφαίρας τὴν αὐτὴν λέγοντες κίνησιν τὴν ἀπ’ ἀνατολῶν κινεῖσθαι καθ’ - ὑπόληψιν (ought not the reading to be ὑπόλειψιν?), ὥστε τὴν μὲν - Κρονίαν σφαῖραν συναποκαθίστασθαι καθ’ ἡμέραν τῇ ἀπλανεῖ παρ’ ὀλίγον, - τὴν δὲ τοῦ Διὸς παρὰ πλέον καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως, οὗτοι πολλὰς μὲν ἄλλας - ἀπορίας ἐκφεύγουσι, but their ὑπόθεσις is ἀδύνατος. This is what led - to the return to the geocentric hypothesis and the exclusion of earth - and ἀπλανὴς from the ἁρμονία. The only solution would have been to - make the earth rotate on its axis or revolve round the central fire in - twenty-four hours, leaving only precession for the ἀπλανής. As we have - seen, Boeckh attributed this to Philolaos, but without evidence. If he - had thought of it, these difficulties would not have arisen. - -Footnote 839: - - _Tim._ 39 a 5-b 2, especially the words τὰ τάχιστα περιιόντα ὑπὸ τῶν - βραδυτέρων ἐφαίνετο καταλαμβάνοντα καταλαμβάνεσθαι (“they appear to be - overtaken, though they overtake”). - -Footnote 840: - - Plato, _Laws_, 822 a 4 sqq. The Athenian says of the theory that he - had not heard of it in his youth nor long before (821 e 3). If so, it - can hardly have been taught by Philolaos, though it may have been by - Archytas. - -[Sidenote: Things likenesses of numbers.] - -153. We have still to consider a view, which Aristotle sometimes -attributes to the Pythagoreans, that things were “like numbers.” He does -not appear to regard this as inconsistent with the doctrine that things -_are_ numbers, though it is hard to see how he could reconcile the -two.[841] There is no doubt, however, that Aristoxenos represented the -Pythagoreans as teaching that things were _like_ numbers,[842] and there -are other traces of an attempt to make out that this was the original -doctrine. A letter was produced, purporting to be by Theano, the wife of -Pythagoras, in which she says that she hears many of the Hellenes think -Pythagoras said things were made _of_ number, whereas he really said -they were made _according to_ number.[843] It is amusing to notice that -this fourth-century theory had to be explained away in its turn later -on, and Iamblichos actually tells us that it was Hippasos who said -number was the exemplar of things.[844] - -Footnote 841: - - Cf. especially _Met._ Α, 6. 787 b 10 (R. P. 65 d). It is not quite the - same thing when he says, as in Α, 5. 985 b 23 sqq. (R. P. _ib._), that - they perceived many likenesses in things to numbers. That refers to - the numerical analogies of Justice, Opportunity, etc. - -Footnote 842: - - Aristoxenos _ap._ Stob. i. pr. 6 (p. 20), Πυθαγόρας ... πάντα τὰ - πράγματα ἀπεικάζων τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς. - -Footnote 843: - - Stob. _Ecl._ i. p. 125, 19 (R. P. 65 d). - -Footnote 844: - - Iambl. _in Nicom._ p. 10, 20 (R. P. 56 c). - -When this view is uppermost in his mind, Aristotle seems to find only a -verbal difference between Plato and the Pythagoreans. The metaphor of -“participation” was merely substituted for that of “imitation.” This is -not the place to discuss the meaning of Plato’s so-called “theory of -ideas”; but it must be pointed out that Aristotle’s ascription of the -doctrine of “imitation” to the Pythagoreans is abundantly justified by -the _Phaedo_. The arguments for immortality given in the early part of -that dialogue come from various sources. Those derived from the doctrine -of Reminiscence, which has sometimes been supposed to be Pythagorean, -are only known to the Pythagoreans by hearsay, and Simmias requires to -have the whole psychology of the subject explained to him.[845] When, -however, we come to the question what it is that our sensations remind -us of, his attitude changes. The view that the equal itself is alone -real, and that what we call equal things are imperfect imitations of it, -is quite familiar to him.[846] He requires no proof of it, and is -finally convinced of the immortality of the soul just because Sokrates -makes him see that the theory of forms implies it. - -Footnote 845: - - Plato, _Phd._ 73 a sqq. - -Footnote 846: - - _Ibid._ 74 a sqq. - -It is also to be observed that Sokrates does not introduce the theory as -a novelty. The reality of the “ideas” is the sort of reality “we are -always talking about,” and they are explained in a peculiar vocabulary -which is represented as that of a school. The technical terms are -introduced by such formulas as “we say.”[847] Whose theory is it? It is -usually supposed to be Plato’s own, though nowadays it is the fashion to -call it his “early theory of ideas,” and to say that he modified it -profoundly in later life. But there are serious difficulties in this -view. Plato is very careful to tell us that he was not present at the -conversation recorded in the _Phaedo_. Did any philosopher ever propound -a new theory of his own by representing it as already familiar to a -number of distinguished living contemporaries? It is not easy to believe -that. It would be rash, on the other hand, to ascribe the theory to -Sokrates, and there seems nothing for it but to suppose that the -doctrine of “forms” (εἴδη, ἰδέαι) originally took shape in Pythagorean -circles, perhaps under Sokratic influence. There is nothing startling in -this. It is a historical fact that Simmias and Kebes were not only -Pythagoreans but disciples of Sokrates; for, by a happy chance, the good -Xenophon has included them in his list of true Sokratics.[848] We have -also sufficient ground for believing that the Megarians had adopted a -like theory under similar influences, and Plato states expressly that -Eukleides and Terpsion of Megara were present at the conversation -recorded in the _Phaedo_. There were, no doubt, more “friends of the -ideas”[849] than we generally recognise. It is certain, in any case, -that the use of the words εἴδη and ἰδέαι to express ultimate realities -is pre-Platonic, and it seems most natural to regard it as of -Pythagorean origin.[850] - -Footnote 847: - - Cf. especially the words ὃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί (76 d 8). The phrases αὐτὸ ὃ - ἔστιν, αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό, and the like are assumed to be familiar. “We” - define reality by means of question and answer, in the course of which - “we” give an account of its being (ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι, 78 d 1, - where λόγον ... τοῦ εἶναι is equivalent to λόγον τῆς οὐσίας). When we - have done this, “we” set the seal or stamp of αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν upon it (75 - d 2). Technical terminology implies a school. As Diels puts it - (_Elementum_, p. 20), it is in a school that “the simile concentrates - into a metaphor, and the metaphor condenses into a term.” - -Footnote 848: - - Xen. _Mem._ i. 2, 48. - -Footnote 849: - - Plato, _Soph._ 248 a 4. - -Footnote 850: - - See Diels, _Elementum_, pp. 16 sqq. Parmenides had already called the - original Pythagorean “elements” μορφαί (§ 91), and Philistion called - the “elements” of Empedokles ἰδέαι. If the ascription of this - terminology to the Pythagoreans is correct, we may say that the - Pythagorean “forms” developed into the atoms of Leukippos and - Demokritos on the one hand (§ 174), and into the “ideas” of Plato on - the other. - -We have really exceeded the limits of this work by tracing the history -of Pythagoreanism down to a point where it becomes practically -indistinguishable from the earliest form of Platonism; but it was -necessary to do so in order to put the statements of our authorities in -their true light. Aristoxenos is not likely to have been mistaken with -regard to the opinions of the men he had known personally, and -Aristotle’s statements must have had some foundation. We must assume, -then, a later form of Pythagoreanism which was closely akin to early -Platonism. That, however, is not the form of it which concerns us here, -and we shall see in the next chapter that the fifth-century doctrine was -of the more primitive type already described. - - - - - CHAPTER VIII - THE YOUNGER ELEATICS - - -[Sidenote: Relation to predecessors.] - -154. The systems we have just been studying were all fundamentally -pluralist, and they were so because Parmenides had shown that, if we -take a corporeal monism seriously, we must ascribe to reality a number -of predicates which are inconsistent with our experience of a world -which everywhere displays multiplicity, motion, and change (§ 97). The -four “roots” of Empedokles and the innumerable “seeds” of Anaxagoras -were both of them conscious attempts to solve the problem which -Parmenides had raised (§§ 106, 127). There is no evidence, indeed, that -the Pythagoreans were directly influenced by Parmenides, but it has been -shown (§ 147) how the later form of their system was based on the theory -of Empedokles. Now it was just this prevailing pluralism that Zeno -criticised from the Eleatic standpoint; and his arguments were -especially directed against Pythagoreanism. Melissos, too, criticises -Pythagoreanism; but he tries to find a common ground with his -adversaries by maintaining the old Ionian thesis that reality is -infinite. - - - I. ZENO OF ELEA - -[Sidenote: Life.] - -155. According to Apollodoros,[851] Zeno flourished in Ol. LXXIX. -(464-460 B.C.). This date is arrived at by making him forty years -younger than his master Parmenides. We have seen already (§ 84) that the -meeting of Parmenides and Zeno with the young Sokrates cannot well have -occurred before 449 B.C., and Plato tells us that Zeno was at that time -“nearly forty years old.”[852] He must, then, have been born about 489 -B.C., some twenty-five years after Parmenides. He was the son of -Teleutagoras, and the statement of Apollodoros that he had been adopted -by Parmenides is only a misunderstanding of an expression of Plato’s -_Sophist_.[853] He was, Plato further tells us,[854] tall and of a -graceful appearance. - -Footnote 851: - - Diog. ix. 29 (R. P. 130 a). Apollodoros is not expressly referred to - for Zeno’s date; but, as he is quoted for his father’s name (ix. 25; - R. P. 130), there can be no doubt that he is also the source of the - _floruit_. - -Footnote 852: - - Plato, _Parm._ 127 b (R. P. 111 d). The visit of Zeno to Athens is - confirmed by Plut. _Per._ 4 (R. P. 130 e), where we are told that - Perikles “heard” him as well as Anaxagoras. It is also alluded to in - _Alc._ I. 119 a, where we are told that Pythodoros, son of Isolochos, - and Kallias, son of Kalliades, each paid him 100 minae for - instruction. - -Footnote 853: - - Plato, _Soph._ 241 d (R. P. 130 a). - -Footnote 854: - - Plato, _Parm._, _loc. cit._ - -Like Parmenides and most other early philosophers, Zeno seems to have -played a part in the politics of his native city. Strabo ascribes to him -some share of the credit for the good government of Elea, and says that -he was a Pythagorean.[855] This statement can easily be explained. -Parmenides, we have seen, was originally a Pythagorean, and the school -of Elea was no doubt popularly regarded as a mere branch of the larger -society. We hear also that Zeno conspired against a tyrant, whose name -is differently given, and the story of his courage under torture is -often repeated, though with varying details.[856] - -Footnote 855: - - Strabo, vi. p. 252 (R. P. 111 c). - -Footnote 856: - - Diog. ix. 26, 27, and the other passages referred to in R. P. 130 c. - -[Sidenote: Writings.] - -156. Diogenes speaks of Zeno’s “books,” and Souidas gives some titles -which probably come from the Alexandrian librarians through Hesychios of -Miletos.[857] In the _Parmenides_, Plato makes Zeno say that the work by -which he is best known was written in his youth and published against -his will.[858] As he is supposed to be forty years old at the time of -the dialogue, this must mean that the book was written before 460 B.C. -(§ 84), and it is very possible that he wrote others after it. The most -remarkable title which has come down to us is that of the -_Interpretation of Empedokles_. It is not to be supposed, of course, -that Zeno wrote a commentary on the Poem of Empedokles; but, as Diels -has pointed out,[859] it is quite credible that he should have written -an attack on it, which was afterwards called by that name. If he wrote a -work against the “philosophers,” that must mean the Pythagoreans, who, -as we have seen, made use of the term in a sense of their own.[860] The -_Disputations_ and the _Treatise on Nature_ may, or may not, be the same -as the book described in Plato’s _Parmenides_. - -Footnote 857: - - Diog. ix. 26 (R. P. 130); Suidas _s.v._ (R. P. 130 d). - -Footnote 858: - - Plato, _Parm._ 128 d 6 (R. P. 130 d). - -Footnote 859: - - _Berl. Sitzb._, 1884, p. 359. - -Footnote 860: - - See above, p. 321, _n._ 740. It hardly seems likely that a later - writer would make Zeno argue πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσόφους, and the title given - to the book at Alexandria must be based on something contained in it. - -It is not likely that Zeno wrote dialogues, though certain references in -Aristotle have been supposed to imply this. In the _Physics_[861] we -hear of an argument of Zeno’s, that any part of a heap of millet makes a -sound, and Simplicius illustrates this by quoting a passage from a -dialogue between Zeno and Protagoras.[862] If our chronology is right, -there is nothing impossible in the idea that the two men may have met; -but it is most unlikely that Zeno should have made himself a personage -in a dialogue of his own. That was a later fashion. In another place -Aristotle refers to a passage where “the answerer and Zeno the -questioner” occurred,[863] a reference which is most easily to be -understood in the same way. Alkidamas seems to have written a dialogue -in which Gorgias figured,[864] and the exposition of Zeno’s arguments in -dialogue form must always have been a tempting exercise. It appears also -that Aristotle made Alexamenos the first writer of dialogues.[865] - -Footnote 861: - - Arist. _Phys._ Η, 5. 250 a 20 (R. P. 131 a). - -Footnote 862: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 1108, 18 (R. P. 131). If this is what Aristotle - refers to, it is hardly safe to attribute the κεγχρίτης λόγος to Zeno - himself. It is worth noting that the existence of this dialogue is - another indication of Zeno’s visit to Athens at an age when he could - converse with Protagoras, which agrees very well with Plato’s - representation of the matter. - -Footnote 863: - - Arist. _Soph. El._ 170 b 22 (R. P. 130 b). - -Footnote 864: - - Chap. V. p. 231, _n._ 512. - -Footnote 865: - - Diog. iii. 48. It is certain that the authority whom Diogenes follows - here took the statement of Aristotle to mean that Alexamenos was the - first writer of prose dialogues. - -Plato gives us a clear idea of what Zeno’s youthful work was like. It -contained more than one “discourse,” and these discourses were -subdivided into sections, each dealing with some one presupposition of -his adversaries.[866] We owe the preservation of Zeno’s arguments on the -one and many to Simplicius.[867] Those relating to motion have been -preserved by Aristotle himself;[868] but, as usual, he has restated them -in his own language. - -Footnote 866: - - Plato, _Parm._ 127 d. Plato speaks of the first ὑπόθεσις of the first - λόγος, which shows that the book was really divided into separate - sections. Proclus (_in loc._) says there were forty of these λόγοι - altogether. - -Footnote 867: - - Simplicius expressly says in one place (p. 140, 30; R. P. 133) that he - is quoting κατὰ λέξιν. I now see no reason to doubt this, as the - Academy would certainly have a copy of the work. If so, the fact that - the fragments are not written in Ionic is another confirmation of - Zeno’s residence at Athens. - -Footnote 868: - - Arist. _Phys._ Ζ, 9. 239 b 9 sqq. - -[Sidenote: Dialectic.] - -157. Aristotle in his _Sophist_[869] called Zeno the inventor of -dialectic, and this, no doubt, is substantially true, though the -beginnings at least of that method of arguing were contemporary with the -foundation of the Eleatic school. Plato[870] gives us a spirited account -of the style and purpose of Zeno’s book, which he puts into his own -mouth:— - - In reality, this writing is a sort of reinforcement for the argument - of Parmenides against those who try to turn it into ridicule on the - ground that, if reality is one, the argument becomes involved in many - absurdities and contradictions. This writing argues against those who - uphold a Many, and gives them back as good and better than they gave; - its aim is to show that their assumption of multiplicity will be - involved in still more absurdities than the assumption of unity, if it - is sufficiently worked out. - -Footnote 869: - - Cf. Diog. ix. 25 (R. P. 130). - -Footnote 870: - - Plato, _Parm._ 128 c (R. P. 130 d). - -The method of Zeno was, in fact, to take one of his adversaries’ -fundamental postulates and deduce from it two contradictory -conclusions.[871] This is what Aristotle meant by calling him the -inventor of dialectic, which is just the art of arguing, not from true -premisses, but from premisses admitted by the other side. The theory of -Parmenides had led to conclusions which contradicted the evidence of the -senses, and Zeno’s object was not to bring fresh proofs of the theory -itself, but simply to show that his opponents’ view led to -contradictions of a precisely similar nature. - -Footnote 871: - - The technical terms used in Plato’s _Parmenides_ seem to be as old as - Zeno himself. The ὑπόθεσις is the provisional assumption of the truth - of a certain statement, and takes the form εἰ πολλά ἐστι or the like. - The word does not mean the assumption of something as a foundation, - but the setting before one’s self of a statement as a problem to be - solved (Ionic ὑποθέσθαι, Attic προθέσθαι). If the conclusions which - necessarily follow from the ὑπόθεσις (τὰ συμβαίνοντα) are impossible, - the ὑπόθεσις is “destroyed” (cf. Plato, _Rep._ 533 c 8, τὰς ὑποθέσεις - ἀναιροῦσα). The author of the Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰατρικῆς (c 1) knows the - word ὑπόθεσις in a similar sense. - -[Sidenote: Zeno and Pythagoreanism.] - -158. That Zeno’s dialectic was mainly directed against the Pythagoreans -is certainly suggested by Plato’s statement, that it was addressed to -the adversaries of Parmenides, who held that things were “a many.”[872] -Zeller holds, indeed, that it was merely the popular form of the belief -that things are many that Zeno set himself to confute;[873] but it is -surely not true that ordinary people believe things to be “a many” in -the sense required. Plato tells us that the premisses of Zeno’s -arguments were the beliefs of the adversaries of Parmenides, and the -postulate from which all his contradictions are derived is the view that -space, and therefore body, is made up of a number of discrete units, -which is just the Pythagorean doctrine. Nor is it at all probable that -Anaxagoras is aimed at.[874] We know from Plato that Zeno’s book was the -work of his youth.[875] Suppose even that it was written when he was -thirty, that is to say, about 459 B.C., Anaxagoras had just taken up his -abode at Athens at that time,[876] and it is very unlikely that Zeno had -ever heard of him. There is, on the other hand, a great deal to be said -for the view that Anaxagoras had read the work of Zeno, and that his -emphatic adhesion to the doctrine of infinite divisibility was due to -the criticism of his younger contemporary.[877] - -Footnote 872: - - The view that Zeno’s arguments were directed against Pythagoreanism - has been maintained in recent times by Tannery (_Science hellène_, pp. - 249 sqq.), and Bäumker (_Das Problem der Materie_, pp. 60 sqq.). - -Footnote 873: - - Zeller, p. 589 (Eng. trans. p. 612). - -Footnote 874: - - This is the view of Stallbaum in his edition of the _Parmenides_ (pp. - 25 sqq.). - -Footnote 875: - - _Parm._, _loc. cit._ - -Footnote 876: - - Chap. VI. § 120. - -Footnote 877: - - Cf. for instance Anaxagoras, fr. 3, with Zeno, fr. 2; and Anaxagoras, - fr. 5, with Zeno, fr. 3. - -It will be noted how much clearer the historical position of Zeno -becomes if we follow Plato in assigning him to a somewhat later date -than is usual. We have first Parmenides, then the pluralists, and then -the criticism of Zeno. This, at any rate, seems to have been the view -which Aristotle took of the historical development.[878] - -Footnote 878: - - Arist. _Phys._ Α, 3. 187 a 1 (R. P. 134 b). See below, § 173. - -[Sidenote: What is the unit?] - -159. The polemic of Zeno is clearly directed in the first instance -against a certain view of the unit. Eudemos, in his _Physics_,[879] -quoted from him the saying that “if any one could tell him what the one -was, he would be able to say what things are.” The commentary of -Alexander on this, preserved by Simplicius,[880] is quite satisfactory. -“As Eudemos relates,” he says, “Zeno the disciple of Parmenides tried to -show that it was impossible that things could be a many, seeing that -there was no unit in things, whereas ‘many’ means a number of units.” -Here we have a clear reference to the Pythagorean view that everything -may be reduced to a sum of units, which is what Zeno denied.[881] - -Footnote 879: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 138, 32 (R. P. 134 a). - -Footnote 880: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 99, 13, ὡς γὰρ ἰστορεῖ, φησίν (Ἀλέξανδρος), Εὔδημος, - Ζήνων ὁ Παρμενίδου γνώριμος ἐπειρᾶτο δεικνύναι ὅτι μὴ οἷόν τε τὰ ὄντα - πολλὰ εἶναι τῷ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἕν, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ πλῆθος εἶναι - ἐνάδων. This is the meaning of the statement that Zeno ἀνῄρει τὸ ἕν, - which is not Alexander’s (as implied in R. P. 134 a), but goes back to - no less an authority than Eudemos. It is perfectly correct when read - in connexion with the words τὴν γὰρ στιγμὴν ὡς τὸ ἓν λέγει (Simpl. - _Phys._ p. 99, 11). - -Footnote 881: - - It is quite in order that Mr. Bertrand Russell, from the standpoint of - pluralism, should accept Zeno’s arguments as “immeasurably subtle and - profound” (_Principles of Mathematics_, p. 347). We know from Plato, - however, that Zeno meant them as a _reductio ad absurdum_ of - pluralism. - -[Sidenote: The Fragments.] - -160. The fragments of Zeno himself also show that this was his line of -argument. I give them according to the arrangement of Diels. - - (1) - - If the one had no magnitude, it would not even be.... But, if it is, - each one must have a certain magnitude and a certain thickness, and - must be at a certain distance from another, and the same may be said - of what is in front of it; for it, too, will have magnitude, and - something will be in front of it.[882] It is all the same to say this - once and to say it always; for no such part of it will be the last, - nor will one thing not be compared with another.[883] So, if things - are a many, they must be both small and great, so small as not to have - any magnitude at all, and so great as to be infinite. R. P. 134. - -Footnote 882: - - I formerly rendered “the same may be said of what surpasses it in - smallness; for it too will have magnitude, and something will - surpass it in smallness.” This is Tannery’s rendering, but I now - agree with Diels in thinking that ἀπέχειν refers to μέγεθος and - προεχειν to πάχος. Zeno is showing that the Pythagorean point has - really three dimensions. - -Footnote 883: - - Reading, with Diels and the MSS., οὔτε ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον οὐκ ἔσται. - Gomperz’s conjecture (adopted in R. P.) seems to me arbitrary. - - (2) - - For if it were added to any other thing it would not make it any - larger; for nothing can gain in magnitude by the addition of what has - no magnitude, and thus it follows at once that what was added was - nothing.[884] But if, when this is taken away from another thing, that - thing is no less; and again, if, when it is added to another thing, - that does not increase, it is plain that what was added was nothing, - and what was taken away was nothing. R. P. 132. - -Footnote 884: - - Zeller marks a lacuna here. Zeno must certainly have shown that the - subtraction of a point does not make a thing less; but he may have - done so before the beginning of our present fragment. - - (3) - - If things are a many, they must be just as many as they are, and - neither more nor less. Now, if they are as many as they are, they will - be finite in number. - - If things are a many, they will be infinite in number; for there will - always be other things between them, and others again between these. - And so things are infinite in number. R. P. 133.[885] - -Footnote 885: - - This is what Aristotle calls “the argument from dichotomy” (_Phys._ Α, - 3. 187 a 1; R. P. 134 b). If a line is made up of points, we ought to - be able to answer the question, “How many points are there in a given - line?” On the other hand, you can always divide a line or any part of - it into two halves; so that, if a line is made up of points, there - will always be more of them than any number you assign. - -[Sidenote: The unit.] - -161. If we hold that the unit has no magnitude—and this is required by -what Aristotle calls the argument from dichotomy,[886]—then everything -must be infinitely small. Nothing made up of units without magnitude can -itself have any magnitude. On the other hand, if we insist that the -units of which things are built up are something and not nothing, we -must hold that everything is infinitely great. The line is infinitely -divisible; and, according to this view, it will be made up of an -infinite number of units, each of which has some magnitude. - -Footnote 886: - - See last note. - -That this argument refers to points is proved by an instructive passage -from Aristotle’s _Metaphysics_.[887] We read there— - - If the unit is indivisible, it will, according to the proposition of - Zeno, be nothing. That which neither makes anything larger by its - addition to it, nor smaller by its subtraction from it, is not, he - says, a real thing at all; for clearly what is real must be a - magnitude. And, if it is a magnitude, it is corporeal; for that is - corporeal which is in every dimension. The other things, _i.e._ the - plane and the line, if added in one way will make things larger, added - in another they will produce no effect; but the point and the unit - cannot make things larger in any way. - -Footnote 887: - - Arist. _Met._ Β, 4. 1001 b 7. - -From all this it seems impossible to draw any other conclusion than that -the “one” against which Zeno argued was the “one” of which a number -constitute a “many,” and that is just the Pythagorean unit. - -[Sidenote: Space.] - -162. Aristotle refers to an argument which seems to be directed against -the Pythagorean doctrine of space,[888] and Simplicius quotes it in this -form:[889] - - If there is space, it will be in something; for all that is is in - something, and what is in something is in space. So space will be in - space, and this goes on _ad infinitum_, therefore there is no space. - R. P. 135. - -Footnote 888: - - Arist. _Phys._ Δ, 1. 209 a 23; 3. 210 b 22 (R. P. 135 a). - -Footnote 889: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 562, 3 (R. P. 135). The version of Eudemos is given - in Simpl. _Phys._ p. 563, 26, ἀξιοῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ποῦ εἷναι· εἱ δὲ ὁ - τόπος τῶν ὄντων, ποῦ ἂν εἴη· οὐκοῦν ἐν ἄλλῳ τόπῳ κἀκεῖνος δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ - καὶ οὕτως εἰς τὸ πρόσω. - -What Zeno is really arguing against here is the attempt to distinguish -space from the body that occupies it. If we insist that body must be -_in_ space, then we must go on to ask what space itself is in. This is a -“reinforcement” of the Parmenidean denial of the void. Possibly the -argument that everything must be “in” something, or must have something -beyond it, had been used against the Parmenidean theory of a finite -sphere with nothing outside it. - -[Sidenote: Motion.] - -163. Zeno’s arguments on the subject of motion have been preserved by -Aristotle himself. The system of Parmenides made all motion impossible, -and his successors had been driven to abandon the monistic hypothesis in -order to avoid this very consequence. Zeno does not bring any fresh -proofs of the impossibility of motion; all he does is to show that a -pluralist theory, such as the Pythagorean, is just as unable to explain -it as was that of Parmenides. Looked at in this way, Zeno’s arguments -are no mere quibbles, but mark a great advance in the conception of -quantity. They are as follows:— - - (1) You cannot get to the end of a race-course.[890] You cannot - traverse an infinite number of points in a finite time. You must - traverse the half of any given distance before you traverse the whole, - and the half of that again before you can traverse it. This goes on - _ad infinitum_, so that there are an infinite number of points in any - given space, and you cannot touch an infinite number one by one in a - finite time.[891] - - (2) Achilles will never overtake the tortoise. He must first reach the - place from which the tortoise started. By that time the tortoise will - have got some way ahead. Achilles must then make up that, and again - the tortoise will be ahead. He is always coming nearer, but he never - makes up to it.[892] - -Footnote 890: - - Arist. _Top._ Θ, 8. 160 b 8, Ζήνωνος (λόγος), ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται - κινεῖσθαι οὐδὲ τὸ στάδιον διελθεῖν. - -Footnote 891: - - Arist. _Phys._ Ζ, 9. 239 b 11 (R. P. 136). Cf. Ζ, 2. 233 a 11; a 21 - (R. P. 136 a). - -Footnote 892: - - Arist. _Phys._ Ζ, 9. 239 b 14 (R. P. 137). - -The “hypothesis” of the second argument is the same as that in the -first, namely, that the line is a series of points; but the reasoning is -complicated by the introduction of another moving object. The -difference, accordingly, is not a half every time, but diminishes in a -constant ratio. Again, the first argument shows that no moving object -can ever traverse any distance at all, however fast it may move; the -second emphasises the fact that, however slowly it moves, it will -traverse an infinite distance. - - (3) The arrow in flight is at rest. For, if everything is at rest when - it occupies a space equal to itself, and what is in flight at any - given moment always occupies a space equal to itself, it cannot - move.[893] - -Footnote 893: - - _Phys._ Ζ, 9. 239 b 30 (R. P. 138); _ib._ 239 b 5 (R. P. 138 a). The - latter passage is corrupt, though the meaning is plain. I have - translated Zeller’s version of it εἰ γάρ, φησίν, ἠρεμεῖ πᾶν ὅταν ᾖ - κατὰ τὸ ἴσον, ἔστι δ’ ἀεὶ τὸ φερόμενον ἐν τῷ νῦν κατὰ τὸ ἴσον, - ἀκίνητον, κ.τ.λ. Of course ἀεί means “at any time,” not “always,” and - κατὰ τὸ ἴσον is, literally, “on a level with a space equal (to - itself).” For other readings, see Zeller, p. 598, n. 3; and Diels, - _Vors._ p. 131, 44. - -Here a further complication is introduced. The moving object itself has -length, and its successive positions are not points but lines. The -successive moments in which it occupies them are still, however, points -of time. It may help to make this clear if we remember that the flight -of the arrow as represented by the cinematograph would be exactly of -this nature. - - (4) Half the time may be equal to double the time. Let us suppose - three rows of bodies,[894] one of which (A) is at rest while the other - two (B, C) are moving with equal velocity in opposite directions (Fig. - 1). By the time they are all in the same part of the course, B will - have passed twice as many of the bodies in C as in A (Fig. 2). - - FIG. 1 - - A. ● ● ● ● - - B. ● ● ● ● → - - C. ← ● ● ● ● - - FIG. 2 - - A. ● ● ● ● - - B. ● ● ● ● - - C. ● ● ● ● - - Therefore the time which it takes to pass C is twice as long as the - time it takes to pass A. But the time which B and C take to reach the - position of A is the same. Therefore double the time is equal to the - half.[895] - -Footnote 894: - - The word is ὄγκοι; cf. Chap. VII. p. 338, _n._ 794. The name is very - appropriate for the Pythagorean units, which Zeno had shown to have - length, breadth, and thickness (fr. 1). - -Footnote 895: - - Arist. _Phys._ Ζ, 9. 239 b 33 (R. P. 139). I have had to express the - argument in my own way, as it is not fully given by any of the - authorities. The figure is practically Alexander’s (Simpl. _Phys._ p. - 1016, 14), except that he represents the ὄγκοι by letters instead of - dots. The conclusion is plainly stated by Aristotle (_loc. cit._), - συμβαίνειν οἴεται ἴσον εἶναι χρόνον τῷ διπλασίῳ τὸν ἥμισυν, and, - however we explain the reasoning, it must be so represented as to lead - to this conclusion. - -According to Aristotle, the paralogism here depends upon the assumption -that an equal magnitude moving with equal velocity must move for an -equal time, whether the magnitude with which it is equal is at rest or -in motion. That is certainly so, but we are not to suppose that this -assumption is Zeno’s own. The fourth argument is, in fact, related to -the third just as the second is to the first. The Achilles adds a second -moving point to the single moving point of the first argument; this -argument adds a second moving line to the single moving line of the -arrow in flight. The lines, however, are represented as a series of -units, which is just how the Pythagoreans represented them; and it is -quite true that, if lines are a sum of discrete units, and time is -similarly a series of discrete moments, there is no other measure of -motion possible than the number of units which each unit passes. - -This argument, like the others, is intended to bring out the absurd -conclusions which follow from the assumption that all quantity is -discrete, and what Zeno has really done is to establish the conception -of continuous quantity by a _reductio ad absurdum_ of the other -hypothesis. If we remember that Parmenides had asserted the one to be -continuous (fr. 8, 25), we shall see how accurate is the account of -Zeno’s method which Plato puts into the mouth of Sokrates. - - - II. MELISSOS OF SAMOS - -[Sidenote: Life.] - -164. In his Life of Perikles, Plutarch tells us, on the authority of -Aristotle, that the philosopher Melissos, son of Ithagenes, was the -Samian general who defeated the Athenian fleet in 441/0 B.C.:[896] and -it was no doubt for this reason that Apollodoros fixed his _floruit_ in -Ol. LXXXIV. (444-41 B.C.).[897] Beyond this, we really know nothing -about his life. He is said to have been, like Zeno, a disciple of -Parmenides;[898] but, as he was a Samian, it is possible that he was -originally a member of the Ionic school, and we shall see that certain -features of his doctrine tend to bear out this view. On the other hand, -he was certainly convinced by the Eleatic dialectic, and renounced the -Ionic doctrine in so far as it was inconsistent with that. We note here -the effect of the increased facility of intercourse between East and -West, which was secured by the supremacy of Athens. - -Footnote 896: - - Plut. _Per._ 26 (R. P. 141 b), from Aristotle’s Σαμίων πολιτεία. - -[Sidenote: The Fragments.] - -165. The fragments which we have come from Simplicius, and are given, -with the exception of the first, from the text of Diels.[899] - -Footnote 897: - - Diog. ix. 24 (R. P. 141). It is possible, of course, that Apollodoros - meant the first and not the fourth year of the Olympiad. That is his - usual era, the foundation of Thourioi. But, on the whole, it is more - likely that he meant the fourth; for the date of the ναυαρχία would be - given with precision. See Jacoby, p. 270. - -Footnote 898: - - Diog. ix. 24 (R. P. 141). - -Footnote 899: - - It is no longer necessary to discuss the passages which used to appear - as frs. 1-5 of Melissos, as it has been proved by A. Pabst that they - are merely a paraphrase of the genuine fragments (_De Melissi Samii - fragmentis_, Bonn, 1889). Almost simultaneously I had independently - come to the same conclusion (see the first edition, § 138). Zeller and - Diels have both accepted Pabst’s demonstration, and the supposed - fragments have been relegated to the notes in the last edition of R. - P. I still believe, however, that the fragment which I have numbered - 1_a_ is genuine. See next note. - - (1_a_) If nothing is, what can be said of it as of something - real?[900] - - (1) What was was ever, and ever shall be. For, if it had come into - being, it needs must have been nothing before it came into being. Now, - if it were nothing, in no wise could anything have arisen out of - nothing. R. P. 142. - - (2) Since, then, it has not come into being, and since it is, was - ever, and ever shall be, it has no beginning or end, but is without - limit. For, if it had come into being, it would have had a beginning - (for it would have begun to come into being at some time or other) and - an end (for it would have ceased to come into being at some time or - other); but, if it neither began nor ended, and ever was and ever - shall be, it has no beginning or end; for it is not possible for - anything to be ever without all being. R. P. 143. - - (3) Further, just as it ever is, so it must ever be infinite in - magnitude. R. P. 143. - - (4) But nothing which has a beginning or end is either eternal or - infinite. R. P. 143. - - (5) If it were not one, it would be bounded by something else. R. P. - 144 a. - - (6) For if it is (infinite), it must be one; for if it were two, it - could not be infinite; for then they would be bounded by one - another.[901] R. P. 144. - - (6_a_) (And, since it is one, it is alike throughout; for if it were - unlike, it would be many and not one.)[902] - - (7) So then it is eternal and infinite and one and all alike. And it - cannot perish nor become greater, nor does it suffer pain or grief. - For, if any of these things happened to it, it would no longer be one. - For if it is altered, then the real must needs not be all alike, but - what was before must pass away, and what was not must come into being. - Now, if it changed by so much as a single hair in ten thousand years, - it would all perish in the whole of time. - - Further, it is not possible either that its order should be changed; - for the order which it had before does not perish, nor does that which - was not come into being. But, since nothing is either added to it or - passes away or is altered, how can any real thing have had its order - changed? For if anything became different, that would amount to a - change in its order. - - Nor does it suffer pain; for a thing in pain could not all be. For a - thing in pain could not be ever, nor has it the same power as what is - whole. Nor would it be alike, if it were in pain; for it is only from - the addition or subtraction of something that it could feel pain, and - then it would no longer be alike. Nor could what is whole feel pain; - for then what was whole and what was real would pass away, and what - was not would come into being. And the same argument applies to grief - as to pain. - - Nor is anything empty. For what is empty is nothing. What is nothing - cannot be. - - Nor does it move; for it has nowhere to betake itself to, but is full. - For if there were aught empty, it would betake itself to the empty. - But, since there is naught empty, it has nowhere to betake itself to. - - And it cannot be dense and rare; for it is not possible for what is - rare to be as full as what is dense, but what is rare is at once - emptier than what is dense. - - This is the way in which we must distinguish between what is full and - what is not full. If a thing has room for anything else, and takes it - in, it is not full; but if it has no room for anything and does not - take it in, it is full. - - Now, it must needs be full if there is naught empty, and if it is - full, it does not move. R. P. 145. - - (8) This argument, then, is the greatest proof that it is one alone; - but the following are proofs of it also. If there were a many, these - would have to be of the same kind as I say that the one is. For if - there is earth and water, and air and iron, and gold and fire, and if - one thing is living and another dead, and if things are black and - white and all that men say they really are,—if that is so, and if we - see and hear aright, each one of these must be such as we first - decided, and they cannot be changed or altered, but each must be just - as it is. But, as it is, we say that we see and hear and understand - aright, and yet we believe that what is warm becomes cold, and what is - cold warm; that what is hard turns soft, and what is soft hard; that - what is living dies, and that things are born from what lives not; and - that all those things are changed, and that what they were and what - they are now are in no way alike. We think that iron, which is hard, - is rubbed away by contact with the finger;[903] and so with gold and - stone and everything which we fancy to be strong, and that earth and - stone are made out of water; so that it turns out that we neither see - nor know realities. Now these things do not agree with one another. We - said that there were many things that were eternal and had forms and - strength of their own, and yet we fancy that they all suffer - alteration, and that they change from what we see each time. It is - clear, then, that we did not see aright after all, nor are we right in - believing that all these things are many. They would not change if - they were real, but each thing would be just what we believed it to - be; for nothing is stronger than true reality. But if it has changed, - what was has passed away, and what was not is come into being. So - then, if there were many things, they would have to be just of the - same nature as the one. R. P. 147. - - (9) Now, if it were to exist, it must needs be one; but if it is one, - it cannot have body; for, if it had body it would have parts, and - would no longer be one. R. P. 146.[904] - - (10) If what is real is divided, it moves; but if it moves, it cannot - be. R. P. 144 a.[905] - -Footnote 900: - - These words come from the beginning of the paraphrase which was so - long mistaken for the actual words of Melissos (Simpl. _Phys._ p. 103, - 18; R. P. 142 a), and Diels has accordingly removed them along with - the rest. I believe them to be genuine because Simplicius, who had - access to the complete work, introduces them by the words ἄρχεται τοῦ - συγγράμματος οὕτως, and because they are thoroughly Eleatic in - character. It is quite natural that the first words of the book should - be prefixed to the paraphrase. - -Footnote 901: - - This fragment is quoted by Simpl. _de Caelo_, p. 557, 16 (R. P. 144). - The insertion of the word “infinite” is justified by the paraphrase - (R. P. 144 a) and by _M.X.G._ 974 a 11, πᾶν δὲ ἄπειρον ὂν <ἓν> εἶναι· - εἰ γὰρ δύο ἢ πλείω εἴη, πέρατ’ ἂν εἶναι ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα. - -Footnote 902: - - I have ventured to insert this, though the actual words are nowhere - quoted, and it is not in Diels. It is represented in the paraphrase - (R. P. 145 a) and in _M.X.G._ 974 a 13 (R. P. 144 a). - -Footnote 903: - - Reading ὁμουρέων with Bergk. Diels keeps the MS. ὀμοῦ ῥέων; Zeller (p. - 613, n. 1) conjectures ὑπ’ ἰοῦ ῥέων. - -Footnote 904: - - I read εἰ μὲν οὖν εἴη with E F for the εἰ μὲν ὂν εἴη of D. The ἐὸν - which still stands in R. P. is a piece of local colour due to the - editors. Diels also now reads οὖν (_Vors._ p. 149, 2). - -Footnote 905: - - Diels now reads ἀλλὰ with E for the ἅμα of F, and attaches the word to - the next sentence. - -[Sidenote: Theory of reality.] - -166. It has been pointed out that Melissos was perhaps not originally a -member of the Eleatic school; but he certainly adopted all the views of -Parmenides as to the true nature of reality with one remarkable -exception. He appears to have opened his treatise with a reassertion of -the Parmenidean “Nothing is not” (fr. 1 _a_), and the arguments by which -he supported this view are those with which we are already familiar (fr. -1). Reality, as with Parmenides, is eternal, an attribute which Melissos -expressed in a way of his own. He argued that since everything that has -come into being has a beginning and an end, everything that has not come -into being has no beginning or end. Aristotle is very severe upon him -for this simple conversion of a universal affirmative proposition;[906] -but, of course, his belief was not founded on that. His whole conception -of reality made it necessary for him to regard it as eternal.[907] It -would be a more serious matter if Aristotle were right in believing, as -he seems to have done,[908] that Melissos inferred that what is must be -infinite in space, because it had neither beginning nor end in time. -This, however, seems quite incredible. As we have the fragment which -Aristotle interprets in this way (fr. 2), we are quite entitled to -understand it for ourselves, and I cannot see anything to justify -Aristotle’s assumption that the expression “without limit” means without -limit in space.[909] - -Footnote 906: - - Arist. _Phys._ Α, 3. 186 a 7 (R. P. 143 a). Aristotle finds two flaws - in the Eleatic reasoning: (1) ψευδῆ λαμβάνουσιν; (2) ἀσυλλόγιστοί - εἰσιν αὐτῶν οἱ λόγοι. This is the first of these flaws. It is also - mentioned in _Soph. El._ 168 b 35 (R. P. _ib._). So Eudemos _ap._ - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 105, 24, οὐ γὰρ, εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἀρχὴν ἔχει, τὸ μὴ - γενόμενον ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἐγένετο. - -Footnote 907: - - The real reason is given in the paraphrase in Simpl. _Phys._ p. 103, - 21 (R. P. 142 a), συγχωρεῖται γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν, though of - course Melissos himself would not have put it in that way. He regarded - himself as a φυσικός like the rest; but, from the time of Aristotle, - it was a commonplace that the Eleatics were not φυσικοί, since they - denied motion. - -Footnote 908: - - This has been denied by Offner, “Zur Beurtheilung des Melissos” - (_Arch._ iv. pp. 12 sqq.), but I now think he goes too far. Cf. - especially _Top._ ix. 6, ὡς ἄμφω ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, τό τε - γεγονὸς καὶ τὸ πεπερασμένον. The same point is made in _Soph. El._ 167 - b 13 and 181 a 27. - -Footnote 909: - - The words ἀλλ’ ἄπειρόν ἐστι mean simply “but it is without limit,” and - this is simply a repetition of the statement that it has no beginning - or end. The nature of the limit can only be determined by the context, - and accordingly, when Melissos does introduce the subject of spatial - infinity, he is careful to say τὸ μέγεθος ἄπειρον (fr. 3). - -[Sidenote: Reality spatially infinite.] - -167. Melissos did indeed differ from Parmenides in holding that reality -was spatially as well as temporally infinite; but he gave an excellent -reason for this belief, and had no need to support it by the -extraordinary argument just alluded to. What he said was that, if it -were limited, it would be limited by empty space. This we know from -Aristotle himself,[910] and it marks a real advance upon Parmenides. He -had thought it possible to regard reality as a finite sphere, but it -would have been difficult for him to work out this view in detail. He -would have had to say there was nothing outside the sphere; but no one -knew better than he that there is no such thing as nothing. Melissos saw -that you cannot imagine a finite sphere without regarding it as -surrounded by an infinite empty space;[911] and as, in common with the -rest of the school, he denied the void (fr. 7), he was forced to say -reality was spatially infinite (fr. 3). It is possible that he was -influenced in this by his association with the Ionic school. - -Footnote 910: - - Arist. _Gen. Corr._ i. 8. 325 a 14, ἓν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ πᾶν εἶναί φασι - καὶ ἄπειρον ἔνιοι· τὸ γὰρ πέρας περαίνειν ἂν πρὸς τὸ κενόν. That this - refers to Melissos has been proved by Zeller (p. 612, n. 2). - -Footnote 911: - - Note the disagreement with Zeno (§ 162). - -From the infinity of reality, it follows that it must be one; for, if it -were not one, it would be bounded by something else (fr. 5). And, being -one, it must be homogeneous throughout (fr. 6_a_), for that is what we -mean by one. Reality, then, is a single, homogeneous, corporeal -_plenum_, stretching out to infinity in space, and going backwards and -forwards to infinity in time. - -[Sidenote: Opposition to Ionians.] - -168. Eleaticism was always critical, and we are not without indications -of the attitude taken up by Melissos towards contemporary systems. The -flaw which he found in the Ionian theories was that they all assumed -some want of homogeneity in the One, which is a real inconsistency. -Further, they all allowed the possibility of change; but, if all things -are one, change must be a form of coming into being and passing away. If -you admit that a thing can change, you cannot maintain that it is -eternal. Nor can the arrangement of the parts of reality alter, as -Anaximander, for instance, had held; any such change necessarily -involves a coming into being and passing away. - -The next point made by Melissos is somewhat peculiar. Reality, he says, -cannot feel sorrow or pain; for that is always due to the addition or -subtraction of something, which is impossible. It is not easy to be sure -what this refers to. Perhaps it is to the theory of Herakleitos with its -Want and Surfeit, perhaps to something of which no record has been -preserved. - -Motion in general[912] and rarefaction and condensation in particular -are impossible; for both imply the existence of empty space. -Divisibility is excluded for the same reason. These are the same -arguments as Parmenides employed. - -Footnote 912: - - The view of Bäumker that Melissos admitted ἀντιπερίστασις or motion - _in pleno_ (_Jahrb. f. kl. Phil._, 1886, p. 541; _Das Problem der - Materie_, p. 59) depends upon some words of Simplicius (_Phys._ p. - 104, 13), οὐχ ὅτι μὴ δυνατὸν διὰ πλήρους κινεῖσθαι, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων - λέγομεν κ.τ.λ. These words were formerly turned into Ionic and passed - off as a fragment of Melissos. They are, however, part of Simplicius’s - own argument against Alexander, and have nothing to do with Melissos - at all. - -[Sidenote: Opposition to Pythagoreans.] - -169. In nearly all accounts of the system of Melissos, we find it stated -that he denied the corporeality of what is real,—an opinion which is -supported by a reference to fr. 9, which is certainly quoted by -Simplicius to prove this very point.[913] If, however, our general view -as to the character of early Greek Philosophy is correct, the statement -must seem incredible. And it will seem even more surprising when we find -that in the _Metaphysics_ Aristotle says that, while the unity of -Parmenides seemed to be ideal, that of Melissos was material.[914] Now -the fragment, as it stands in the MSS. of Simplicius,[915] puts a purely -hypothetical case, and would most naturally be understood as a disproof -of the existence of something on the ground that, if it existed, it -would have to be both corporeal and one. This cannot refer to the -Eleatic One, in which Melissos himself believed; and, as the argument is -almost verbally the same as one of Zeno’s,[916] it is natural to suppose -that it also was directed against the Pythagorean assumption of ultimate -units. The only possible objection is that Simplicius, who twice quotes -the fragment, certainly took it in the sense usually given to it.[917] -But it was very natural for him to make this mistake. “The One” was an -expression that had two senses in the middle of the fifth century B.C.; -it meant either the whole of reality or the point as a spatial unit. To -maintain it in the first sense, the Eleatics were obliged to disprove it -in the second; and so it sometimes seemed that they were speaking of -their own “One” when they really meant the other. We have seen that the -very same difficulty was felt about Zeno’s denial of the “one.”[918] - -Footnote 913: - - See, however, Bäumker, _Das Problem der Materie_, pp. 57 sqq., who - remarks that ἐόν (or ὄν) in fr. 9 must be the predicate, as it has no - article. In his fifth edition (p. 611, n. 2) Zeller has adopted the - view here taken. He rightly observes that the hypothetical form εἰ μὲν - ὂν εἴη speaks for it, and that the subject to εἴη must be ἕκαστον τῶν - πολλῶν, as with Zeno. - -Footnote 914: - - _Met._ Α, 5. 986 b 18 (R. P. 101). - -Footnote 915: - - Brandis changed the εἴη to ἔστι, but there is no warrant for this. - -Footnote 916: - - Cf. Zeno, fr. 1, especially the words εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη ἕκαστον - μέγεθός τι ἔχειν καὶ πάχος. - -Footnote 917: - - Simpl. _Phys._ pp. 87, 6, and 110, 1. - -Footnote 918: - - See above, § 159, p. 363, _n._ 880. - -[Sidenote: Opposition to Anaxagoras.] - -170. The most remarkable fragment of Melissos is, perhaps, the last (fr. -8). It seems to be directed against Anaxagoras; at least the language -used seems more applicable to him than to any one else. Anaxagoras had -admitted (§ 137, _fin._) that, so far as our perceptions go, they do not -entirely agree with his theory, though he held this was due solely to -their weakness. Melissos, taking advantage of this admission, urges -that, if we give up the senses as the ultimate test of reality, we are -not entitled to reject the Eleatic theory. With wonderful penetration he -points out that if we are to say, with Anaxagoras, that things are a -many, we are bound also to say that each one of them is such as the -Eleatics declared the One to be. In other words, the only consistent -pluralism is the atomic theory. - -Melissos has long been unduly depreciated owing to the criticisms of -Aristotle; but these, we have seen, are based mainly on a somewhat -pedantic objection to the false conversion in the early part of the -argument. Melissos knew nothing about the rules of conversion; and if he -had, he could easily have made his reasoning formally correct without -modifying his system. His greatness consisted in this, that not only was -he the real systematiser of Eleaticism, but he was also able to see, -before the pluralists saw it themselves, the only way in which the -theory that things are a many could be consistently worked out.[919] It -is significant that Polybos, the nephew of Hippokrates, reproaches those -“sophists” who taught there was only one primary substance with “putting -the doctrine of Melissos on its feet.”[920] - -Footnote 919: - - Bäumker, _op. cit._ p. 58, n. 3: “That Melissos was a weakling is a - _fable convenue_ that people repeat after Aristotle, who was unable to - appreciate the Eleatics in general, and in particular misunderstood - Melissos not inconsiderably.” - -Footnote 920: - - Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου, c. 1, ἀλλ’ ἔμοιγε δοκέουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνθρωποι - αὐτοὶ ἑωυτοὺς καταβάλλειν ἐν τοῖσιν ὀνόμασι τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ὑπὸ - ἀσυνεσίης, τὸν δὲ Μελίσσου λόγον ὀρθοῦν. The metaphors are taken from - wrestling, and were current at this date (cf. the καταβάλλοντες of - Protagoras). Plato implies a more generous appreciation of Melissos - than Aristotle’s. In _Theaet._ 180 e 2, he refers to the Eleatics as - Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι, and in 183 e 4 he almost apologises for - giving the pre-eminence to Parmenides. - - - - - CHAPTER IX - LEUKIPPOS OF MILETOS - - -[Sidenote: Leukippos and Demokritos.] - -171. We have seen (§§ 31, 122) that the school of Miletos did not come -to an end with Anaximenes, and it is a striking fact that the man who -gave the most complete answer to the question first asked by Thales was -a Milesian.[921] It is true that the very existence of Leukippos has -been called in question. Epicurus said there never was such a -philosopher, and the same thing has been maintained in quite recent -times.[922] On the other hand, Aristotle and Theophrastos certainly made -him the originator of the atomic theory, and it still seems possible to -show they were right. Incidentally we shall see how later writers came -to ignore him, and thus made possible the sally of Epicurus. - -Footnote 921: - - Theophrastos said he was an Eleate or a Milesian (R. P. 185), while - Diogenes (ix. 30) says he was an Eleate or, according to some, an - Abderite. These statements are exactly parallel to the discrepancies - about the native cities of the Pythagoreans already noted (Chap. VII. - p. 327, _n._ 763). Diogenes adds that, according to others, Leukippos - was a Melian, which is a common confusion. Aetios (i. 7. 1) calls - Diagoras of Melos a Milesian (cf. _Dox._ p. 14). Demokritos was called - by some a Milesian (R. P. 186) for the same reason that Leukippos is - called an Eleate. We may also compare the doubt as to whether - Herodotos called himself a Halikarnassian or a Thourian. - -Footnote 922: - - Diog. x. 13 (R. P. 185 b). The theory was revived by E. Rohde. For the - literature of the controversy, see R. P. 185 b. Diels’s refutation of - Rohde has convinced most competent judges. Brieger’s attempt to - unsettle the question again (_Hermes_, xxxvi. pp. 166 sqq.) is only - half-hearted, and quite unconvincing. As will be seen, however, I - agree with his main contention that atomism comes after the systems of - Empedokles and Anaxagoras. - -The question is intimately bound up with that of the date of Demokritos, -who said that he was a young man in the old age of Anaxagoras, a -statement which makes it unlikely that he founded his school at Abdera -before 420 B.C., the date given by Apollodoros for his _floruit_.[923] -Now Theophrastos stated that Diogenes of Apollonia borrowed some of his -views from Anaxagoras and some from Leukippos,[924] which can only mean -that there were traces of the atomic theory in his work. Further, -Apollonios is parodied in the _Clouds_ of Aristophanes, which was -produced in 423 B.C., from which it follows that the work of Leukippos -must have become known considerably before that date. What that work -was, Theophrastos also tells us. It was the _Great Diakosmos_ usually -attributed to Demokritos.[925] This means further that what were known -later as the works of Demokritos were really the writings of the school -of Abdera, and included, as was natural, the works of its founder. They -formed, in fact, a _corpus_ comparable to that which has come down to us -under the name of Hippokrates, and it was no more possible to -distinguish the authors of the different treatises in the one case than -it is in the other. We need not hesitate, for all that, to believe that -Aristotle and Theophrastos were better informed on this point than later -writers, who naturally regarded the whole mass as equally the work of -Demokritos. - -Footnote 923: - - Diog. ix. 41 (R. P. 187). As Diels points out, the statement suggests - that Anaxagoras was dead when Demokritos wrote. It is probable, too, - that it was this which made Apollodoros fix the _floruit_ of - Demokritos just forty years after that of Anaxagoras (Jacoby, p. 290). - We cannot make much of the other statement of Demokritos that he wrote - the Μικρὸς διάκοσμος 750 years after the fall of Troy; for we cannot - be sure what era he used (Jacoby, p. 292). - -Footnote 924: - - Theophr. _ap._ Simpl. _Phys._ p. 25, 1 (R. P. 206 a). - -Footnote 925: - - This was stated by Thrasylos in his list of the tetralogies in which - he arranged the works of Demokritos, as he did those of Plato. He - gives Tetr. iii. thus: (1) Μέγας διάκοσμος (ὃν οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον - Λευκίππου φασὶν εἶναι); (2) Μικρὸς διάκοσμος; (3) Κοσμογραφίη; (4) - Περὶ τῶν πλανήτων. The two διάκοσμοι would only be distinguished as - μέγας and μικρός when they came to be included in the same _corpus_. A - quotation purporting to be from the Περὶ νοῦ of Leukippos is preserved - in Stob. i. 160. The phrase ἐν τοῖς Λευκίππου καλουμένοις λόγοις in - _M.X.G._ 980 a 8 seems to refer to Arist. _de Gen. Corr._ 325 a 24, - Λεύκιππος δ’ ἔχειν ᾠήθη λόγους κ.τ.λ., and would prove nothing in any - case. Cf. Chap. II. p. 138, _n._ 305. - -Theophrastos found Leukippos described as an Eleate in some of his -authorities, and, if we may trust analogy, that means he had settled at -Elea.[926] It is possible that his emigration to the west was connected -with the revolution at Miletos in 450-49 B.C.[927] In any case, -Theophrastos says distinctly that he had been a member of the school of -Parmenides, and the way in which he speaks suggests that the founder of -that school was still at its head.[928] He may very well have been so, -if we accept Plato’s chronology.[929] Theophrastos also appears to have -said that Leukippos “heard” Zeno, which is very credible. We shall see, -at any rate, that the influence of Zeno on his thinking is -unmistakable.[930] - -Footnote 926: - - See above, p. 380, _n._ 921. - -Footnote 927: - - The aristocrats had massacred the democrats, and were overthrown in - their turn by the Athenians. Cf. [Xen.] Ἀθ. πολ. 3, 11. The date is - fixed by _C.I.A._ i. 22 a. - -Footnote 928: - - Theophr. _ap._ Simpl. _Phys._ p. 28, 4 (R. P. 185). Note the - difference of case in κοινωνήσας Παρμενίδῃ τῆς φιλοσοφίας and - κοινωνήσας τῆς Ἀναξιμένους φιλοσοφίας which is the phrase used by - Theophrastos of Anaxagoras (p. 293, _n._ 660). The dative seems to - imply a personal relationship. It is quite inadmissible to render “was - familiar with the doctrine of Parmenides,” as is done in Gomperz, - _Greek Thinkers_, vol. i. p. 345. - -Footnote 929: - - See § 84. - -Footnote 930: - - Cf. Diog. ix. 30, οὕτος ἤκουσε Ζήνωνος (R. P. 185 b); and Hipp. _Ref._ - i. 12, 1, Λεύκιππος ... Ζήνωνος ἑταῖρος. Diels conjectured that the - name of Zeno had been dropped in the extract from Theophrastos - preserved by Simplicius (_Dox._ 483 a 11). - -The relations of Leukippos to Empedokles and Anaxagoras are more -difficult to determine. It has become part of the case for the -historical reality of Leukippos that there are traces of atomism in the -systems of these men; but the case is strong enough without that -assumption. Besides, it lands us in serious difficulties, not the least -of which is that it would require us to regard Empedokles and Anaxagoras -as mere eclectics like Diogenes of Apollonia.[931] The strongest -argument for the view that Leukippos influenced Empedokles is that drawn -from the doctrine of “pores”; but we have seen that this originated with -Alkmaion, and it is therefore more probable that Leukippos derived it -from Empedokles.[932] We have seen too that Zeno probably wrote against -Empedokles, and we know that he influenced Leukippos.[933] Nor, is it at -all probable that Anaxagoras knew anything of the theory of Leukippos. -It is true that he denied the existence of the void; but it does not -follow that any one had already maintained that doctrine in the atomist -sense. The early Pythagoreans had spoken of a void too, though they had -confused it with atmospheric air; and the experiments of Anaxagoras with -the _klepsydra_ and the inflated skins would only have had any point if -they were directed against the Pythagorean theory.[934] If he had really -wished to refute Leukippos, he would have had to use arguments of a very -different kind. - -Footnote 931: - - This point is important, though the argument is weakened by Brieger’s - overstatement of it in _Hermes_, xxxvi. p. 183. He says that to assume - such a reaction as Anaxagoreanism after the atomic system had once - been discovered would be something unexampled in the history of Greek - philosophy. Diogenes of Apollonia proves the contrary. The real point - is that Empedokles and Anaxagoras were men of a different stamp. So - far as Empedokles is concerned, Gomperz states the case rightly - (_Greek Thinkers_, vol. i. p. 560). - -Footnote 932: - - See above, Chap. V. p. 224, _n._ 492; and Brieger in _Hermes_, xxxvi. - p. 171. - -Footnote 933: - - Diels (formerly at least) maintained both these things. See above, p. - 359, _n._ 859; and p. 382, _n._ 930. If, as seems probable (§ 158), - Zeno wrote his book some time between 470 and 460 B.C., Leukippos can - hardly have written his before 450 B.C., and even that is too late for - him to have influenced Empedokles. It may well have been later still. - -Footnote 934: - - See above, Chap. VI. § 131; and Chap. VII. § 145. - -[Sidenote: Theophrastos on the atomic theory.] - -172. Theophrastos wrote of Leukippos as follows in the First Book of his -_Opinions_:— - - Leukippos of Elea or Miletos (for both accounts are given of him) had - associated with Parmenides in philosophy. He did not, however, follow - the same path in his explanation of things as Parmenides and - Xenophanes did, but, as is believed, the very opposite (R. P. 185). - They made the All one, immovable, uncreated, and finite, and did not - even permit us to search for _what is not_; he assumed innumerable and - ever-moving elements, namely, the atoms. And he made their forms - infinite in number, since there was no reason why they should be of - one kind rather than another, and because he saw that there was - unceasing becoming and change in things. He held, further, that _what - is_ is no more real than _what is not_, and that both are alike causes - of the things that come into being; for he laid down that the - substance of the atoms was compact and full, and he called them _what - is_, while they moved in the void which he called _what is not_, but - affirmed to be just as real as _what is_. R. P. 194. - -[Sidenote: Leukippos and the Eleatics.] - -173. It will be observed that Theophrastos, while noting the affiliation -of Leukippos to the Eleatic school, points out that his theory is, -_prima facie_,[935] just the opposite of that maintained by Parmenides. -Some have been led by this to deny the Eleaticism of Leukippos -altogether; but this denial is really based on the view that the system -of Parmenides was “metaphysical,” coupled with a great reluctance to -admit that so scientific a hypothesis as the atomic theory can have had -a “metaphysical” origin. It is really due to prejudice, and we must not -suppose Theophrastos himself believed the two theories to be so far -apart as they seem.[936] As this is really the most important point in -the history of early Greek philosophy, and as, rightly understood, it -furnishes the key to the whole development, it is worth while to -transcribe a passage of Aristotle[937] which explains the historical -connexion in a way that leaves nothing to be desired. - -Footnote 935: - - The words ὡς δοκεῖ do not imply assent to the view introduced by them; - indeed they are used, far more often than not, in reference to beliefs - which the writer does not accept. The translation “methinks” in - Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, vol. i. p. 345, is therefore most - misleading, and there is no justification for Brieger’s statement - (_Hermes_, xxxvi. p. 165) that Theophrastos dissents from Aristotle’s - view as given in the passage about to be quoted. We should be saved - from many errors if we accustomed ourselves to translate δοκεῖ by “is - thought” or “is believed” instead of by “seems.” - - Leukippos and Demokritos have decided about all things practically by - the same method and on the same theory, taking as their starting-point - what naturally comes first. Some of the ancients had held that the - real must necessarily be one and immovable; for, said they, empty - space is not real, and motion would be impossible without empty space - separated from matter; nor, further, could reality be a many, if there - were nothing to separate things. And it makes no difference if any one - holds that the All is not continuous, but discrete, with its parts in - contact (_the Pythagorean view_), instead of holding that reality is - many, not one, and that there is empty space. For, if it is divisible - at every point there is no one, and therefore no many, and the Whole - is empty (_Zeno_); while, if we say it is divisible in one place and - not in another, this looks like an arbitrary fiction; for up to what - point and for what reason will part of the Whole be in this state and - be full, while the rest is discrete? And, on the same grounds, they - further say that there can be no motion. In consequence of these - reasonings, then, going beyond perception and overlooking it in the - belief that we ought to follow the argument, they say that the All is - one and immovable (_Parmenides_), and some of them that it is infinite - (_Melissos_), for any limit would be bounded by empty space. This, - then, is the opinion they expressed about the truth, and these are the - reasons which led them to do so. Now, so far as arguments go, this - conclusion does seem to follow; but, if we appeal to facts, to hold - such a view looks like madness. No one who is mad is so far out of his - senses that fire and ice appear to him to be one; it is only things - that are right, and things that appear right from habit, in which - madness makes some people see no difference. - - Leukippos, however, thought he had a theory which was in harmony with - sense-perception, and did not do away with coming into being and - passing away, nor motion, nor the multiplicity of things. He made this - concession to experience, while he conceded, on the other hand, to - those who invented the One that motion was impossible without the - void, that the void was not real, and that nothing of what was real - was not real. “For,” said he, “that which is strictly speaking real is - an absolute _plenum_; but the _plenum_ is not one. On the contrary, - there are an infinite number of them, and they are invisible owing to - the smallness of their bulk. They move in the void (for there is a - void); and by their coming together they effect coming into being; by - their separation, passing away.” - -Footnote 936: - - This prejudice is apparent all through Gomperz’s _Greek Thinkers_, and - seriously impairs the value of that fascinating, though somewhat - imaginative work. It is amusing to notice that Brieger, from the same - point of view, regards the custom of making Anaxagoras the last of the - Presocratics as due to theological prepossessions (_Hermes_, xxxvi. p. - 185). I am sorry that I cannot agree with either side; but the - bitterness of the disputants bears witness to the fundamental - importance of the questions raised by the early Greek philosophers. - -Footnote 937: - - Arist. _de Gen. Corr._ Α, 8. 324 b 35 (R. P. 193). - -It is true that in this passage Zeno and Melissos are not named, but the -reference to them is unmistakable. The argument of Zeno against the -Pythagoreans is clearly given; and Melissos was the only Eleatic who -made reality infinite, a point which is distinctly mentioned. We are -therefore justified by Aristotle’s words in explaining the genesis of -Atomism and its relation to Eleaticism as follows. Zeno had shown that -all pluralist systems yet known, and especially Pythagoreanism, were -unable to stand before the arguments from infinite divisibility which he -adduced. Melissos had used the same argument against Anaxagoras, and had -added, by way of _reductio ad absurdum_, that, if there were many -things, each one of them must be such as the Eleatics held the One to -be. To this Leukippos answers, “Why not?” He admitted the force of -Zeno’s arguments by setting a limit to divisibility, and to each of the -atoms which he thus arrived at he ascribed all the predicates of the -Eleatic One; for Parmenides had shown that if _it is_, it must have -these predicates somehow. The same view is implied in a passage of -Aristotle’s _Physics_.[938] “Some,” we are there told, “surrendered to -both arguments, to the first, the argument that all things are one, if -the word _is_ is used in one sense only (_Parmenides_), by affirming the -reality of what is not; to the second, that based on dichotomy (_Zeno_), -by introducing indivisible magnitudes.” Finally, it is only by regarding -the matter in this way that we can attach any meaning to another -statement of Aristotle’s to the effect that Leukippos and Demokritos, as -well as the Pythagoreans, virtually make all things out of numbers.[939] -Leukippos, in fact, gave the Pythagorean monads the character of the -Parmenidean One. - -Footnote 938: - - Arist. _Phys._ Α, 3. 187 a 1 (R. P. 134 b). - -Footnote 939: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Γ, 4. 303 a 8, τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ οὕτοι (Λεύκιππος - καὶ Δημόκριτος) πάντα τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἀριθμοὺς καὶ ἐξ ἀριθμῶν. This - also serves to explain what Herakleides may have meant by attributing - the theory of corporeal ὄγκοι to the Pythagorean Ekphantos of Syracuse - (above, p. 338, _n._ 794). - -[Sidenote: Atoms.] - -174. We must observe that the atom is not mathematically indivisible, -for it has magnitude; it is, however, physically indivisible, because, -like the One of Parmenides, it contains in it no empty space.[940] Each -atom has extension, and all the atoms are exactly alike in -substance.[941] Therefore all differences in things must be accounted -for either by the shape of the atoms or by their arrangement. It seems -probable that the three ways in which differences arise, namely, shape, -position, and arrangement, were already distinguished by Leukippos; for -Aristotle mentions his name in connexion with them.[942] This explains, -too, why the atoms are called “forms” or “figures,” a way of speaking -which seems to be of Pythagorean origin.[943] That they are also called -φύσις[944] is quite intelligible if we remember what was said of that -word in the Introduction (§ VII.). The differences in shape, order, and -position just referred to account for the “opposites,” the “elements” -being regarded rather as aggregates of these (πανσπερμίαι), as by -Anaxagoras.[945] - -Footnote 940: - - The Epicureans misunderstood this point, or misrepresented it in order - to magnify their own originality (see Zeller, p. 857, n. 3; Eng. - trans. ii. p. 225, n. 2). - -Footnote 941: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Α, 7. 275 b 32, τὴν δὲ φύσιν εἶναί φασιν αὐτῶν - μίαν; _Phys._ Γ, 4. 203 a 34, αὐτῷ (Δημοκρίτῳ) τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα πάντων - ἐστὶν ἀρχή. - -Footnote 942: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 4. 985 b 13 (R. P. 192); cf. _de Gen. Corr._ 315 b 6. - As Diels suggests, the illustration from the letters of the alphabet - is probably due to Demokritos. It shows, in any case, how the word - στοιχεῖον came to be used later for “element.” We must read, with - Wilamowitz, τὸ δὲ Ζ τοῦ Η θέσει for τὸ δὲ Ζ τοῦ Ν θέσει, the older - form of the letter Ζ being just an Η laid upon its side (Diels, - _Elementum_, p. 13, n. 1). - -Footnote 943: - - Demokritos wrote a work, Περὶ ἰδεῶν (Sext. _Math._ vii. 137; R. P. - 204), which Diels identifies with the Περὶ τῶν διαφερόντων ῥυσμῶν of - Thrasylos, _Tetr._ v. 3. Theophrastos refers to Demokritos, ἐν τοῖς - περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν (_de Sensibus_, § 51). Plut. _adv. Col._ 1111 a, εἶναι - δὲ πάντα τὰς ἀτόμους, ἰδέας ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καλουμένας (so the MSS.: ἰδίως, - Wyttenbach; <ἢ> ἰδέας, Diels). Arist. Phys. Γ, 4. 203 a 21, - (Δημόκριτος) ἐκ τῆς πανσπερμίας τῶν σχημάτων (ἄπειρα ποιεῖ τὰ - στοιχεῖα). Cf. _de Gen. Corr._ Α, 2. 315 b 7 (R. P. 196). - -Footnote 944: - - Arist. _Phys._ Θ, 9. 265 b 25; Simpl. _Phys._ p. 1318, 33, ταῦτα γὰρ - (τὰ ἄτομα σώματα) ἐκεῖνοι φύσιν ἐκάλουν. - -Footnote 945: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 36, 1 (Diels, _Vors._ p. 346), and R. P. 196 a. - -[Sidenote: The void.] - -175. Leukippos affirmed the existence both of the Full and the Empty, -terms which he may have borrowed from Melissos.[946] As we have seen, he -had to assume the existence of empty space, which the Eleatics had -denied, in order to make his explanation of the nature of body possible. -Here again he is developing a Pythagorean view. The Pythagoreans had -spoken of the void, which kept the units apart; but they had not -distinguished it from atmospheric air (§ 53), which Empedokles had shown -to be a corporeal substance (§ 107). Parmenides, indeed, had formed a -clearer conception of space, but only to deny its reality. Leukippos -started from this. He admitted, indeed, that space was not real, that is -to say, corporeal; but he maintained that it existed all the same. He -hardly, it is true, had words to express his discovery in; for the verb -“to be” had hitherto been used by philosophers only of body. But he did -his best to make his meaning clear by saying that “what is not” (in the -old corporealist sense) “is” (in another sense) just as much as “what -is.” The void is as real as body. - -Footnote 946: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 4. 985 b 4 (R. P. 192). Cf. Melissos, fr. 7 _sub - fin._ - -It is a curious fact that the Atomists, who are commonly regarded as the -great materialists of antiquity, were actually the first to say -distinctly that a thing might be real without being a body. - -[Sidenote: Cosmology.] - -176. It might seem a hopeless task to disentangle the cosmology of -Leukippos from that of Demokritos, with which it is generally -identified; but that very fact affords an invaluable clue. So far as we -know, no one after Theophrastos was able to distinguish the doctrines of -the two men, and it follows from this that all definite statements about -Leukippos in later writers must, in the long run, go back to him. If we -follow this up, we shall be able to give a fairly clear account of the -system, and we shall even come across some views which are peculiar to -Leukippos and were not adopted by Demokritos.[947] - -Footnote 947: - - Cf. Zeller, “Zu Leukippus” (_Arch._ xv. p. 138). - -We shall start from the fuller of the two doxographies in Diogenes, -which comes from an epitome of Theophrastos.[948] It is as follows:— - - He says that the All is infinite, and that it is part full, and part - empty. These (the full and the empty), he says, are the elements. From - them arise innumerable worlds and are resolved into them. The worlds - come into being thus. There were borne along by “abscision from the - infinite” many bodies of all sorts of figures “into a mighty void,” - and they being gathered together produce a single vortex. In it, as - they came into collision with one another and were whirled round in - all manner of ways, those which were alike were separated apart and - came to their likes. But, as they were no longer able to revolve in - equilibrium owing to their multitude, those of them that were fine - went out to the external void, as if passed through a sieve; the rest - stayed together, and becoming entangled with one another, ran down - together, and made a first spherical structure. This was in substance - like a membrane or skin containing in itself all kinds of bodies. And, - as these bodies were borne round in a vortex, in virtue of the - resistance of the middle, the surrounding membrane became thin, as the - contiguous bodies kept flowing together from contact with the vortex. - And in this way the earth came into being, those things which had been - borne towards the middle abiding there. Moreover, the containing - membrane was increased by the further separating out of bodies from - outside; and, being itself carried round in a vortex, it further got - possession of all with which it had come in contact. Some of these - becoming entangled, produce a structure, which was at first moist and - muddy; but, when they had been dried and were revolving along with the - vortex of the whole, they were then ignited and produced the substance - of the heavenly bodies. The circle of the sun is the outermost, that - of the moon is nearest to the earth, and those of the others are - between these. And all the heavenly bodies are ignited because of the - swiftness of their motion; while the sun is also ignited by the stars. - But the moon only receives a small portion of fire. The sun and the - moon are eclipsed.... (And the obliquity of the zodiac is produced) by - the earth being inclined towards the south; and the northern parts of - it have constant snow and are cold and frozen. And the sun is eclipsed - rarely, and the moon continually, because their circles are unequal. - And just as there are comings into being of the world, so there are - growths and decays and passings away in virtue of a certain necessity, - of the nature of which he gives no clear account. - -Footnote 948: - - Diog. ix. 31 sqq. (R. P. 197, 197 c). This passage deals expressly - with Leukippos, not with Demokritos or even “Leukippos and - Demokritos.” For the distinction between the “summary” and “detailed” - doxographies in Diogenes, see Appendix, § 15. - -As it comes substantially from Theophrastos, this passage is to be -regarded as good evidence for the cosmology of Leukippos, and it is -confirmed in an interesting way by certain Epicurean extracts from the -_Great Diakosmos_.[949] These, however, as is natural, give a specially -Epicurean turn to some of the doctrines, and must therefore be used with -caution. - -Footnote 949: - - These are to be found in Aet. i. 4 (_Dox._ p. 289; _Vors._ p. 347; - Usener, _Epicurea_, fr. 308). Epicurus himself in the second epistle - (Diog. x. 88; Usener, p. 37, 7) quotes the phrase ἀποτομὴν ἔχουσα ἀπὸ - τοῦ ἀπείρου. - -[Sidenote: Relation to Ionic cosmology.] - -177. The general impression which we get from the cosmology of Leukippos -is that he either ignored or had never heard of the great advance in the -general view of the world which was due to the later Pythagoreans. He is -as reactionary in his detailed cosmology as he was daring in his general -physical theory. We seem to be reading once more of the speculations of -Anaximenes or even of Anaximander, though there are traces of Empedokles -and Anaxagoras too. The explanation is not hard to see. Leukippos would -not learn a cosmology from his Eleatic teachers; and, even when he found -it possible to construct one without giving up the Parmenidean view of -reality, he was necessarily thrown back upon the older systems of Ionia. -The result was unfortunate. The astronomy of Demokritos, so far as we -know it, was still of this childish character. There is no reason to -doubt the statement of Seneca that he did not venture to say how many -planets there were.[950] - -Footnote 950: - - Seneca, _Q. Nat._ vii. 3. - -This, I take it, is what gives plausibility to Gomperz’s statement that -Atomism was “the ripe fruit on the tree of the old Ionic doctrine of -matter which had been tended by the Ionian physiologists.”[951] The -detailed cosmology was certainly such a fruit, and it was possibly -over-ripe; but the atomic theory proper, in which the real greatness of -Leukippos comes out, was wholly Eleatic in its origin. Nevertheless, it -will repay us to examine the cosmology too; for such an examination will -serve better than anything else to bring out the true nature of the -historical development of which it was the outcome. - -Footnote 951: - - Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, vol. i. p. 323. - -[Sidenote: The eternal motion.] - -178. Leukippos represented the atoms as having been always in motion. -Aristotle puts this in his own way. The atomists, he says, “indolently” -left it unexplained what was the source of motion, and they did not say -what sort of motion it was. In other words, they did not decide whether -it was a “natural motion” or one impressed on them “contrary to their -nature.”[952] He even went so far as to say that they made it -“spontaneous,” a remark which has given rise to the erroneous view that -they held it was due to chance.[953] Aristotle does not say that, -however; but only that the atomists did not explain the motion of the -atoms in any of the ways in which he himself explained the motion of the -elements. They neither ascribed to them a natural motion like the -circular motion of the heavens and the rectilinear motion of the four -elements in the sublunary region, nor did they give them a forced motion -contrary to their own nature, like the upward motion which may be given -to the heavy elements and the downward which may be given to the light. -The only fragment of Leukippos which has survived is an express denial -of chance. “Naught happens for nothing,” he said “but everything from a -ground and of necessity.”[954] - -Footnote 952: - - Arist. _Phys._ Θ, 1. 252 a 32 (R. P. 195 a); _de Caelo_, Γ, 2. 300 b 8 - (R. P. 195); _Met._ Α, 4. 985 b 19 (R. P. _ib._). - -Footnote 953: - - Arist. _Phys._ Β, 4. 196 a 24 (R. P. 195 d). Cicero, _de nat. D._ i. - 66 (R. P. _ib._). The latter passage is the source of the phrase - “fortuitous concourse” (_concurrere_ = συντρέχειν). - -Footnote 954: - - Aet. i. 25, 4 (_Dox._ p. 321), Λεύκιππος πάντα κατ’ ἀνάγκην, τὴν δ’ - αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν εἱμαρμένην. λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ νοῦ· Οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην - γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης. - -If we put the matter historically, all this means that Leukippos did -not, like Empedokles and Anaxagoras, find it necessary to assume a force -to originate motion. He had no need of Love and Strife or Mind, and the -reason is clear. Though Empedokles and Anaxagoras had tried to explain -multiplicity and motion, they had not broken so radically as Leukippos -did with the Parmenidean One. Both of them started with a condition of -matter in which the “roots” or “seeds” were mixed so as to be “all -together,” and they therefore required something to break up this unity. -Leukippos, who started with an infinite number of Parmenidean “Ones,” so -to speak, required no external agency to separate them. What he had to -do was just the opposite. He had to give an explanation of their coming -together, and there was nothing so far to prevent his return to the old -and natural idea that motion does not require any explanation at -all.[955] - -Footnote 955: - - Introd. § VIII. - -This, then, is what seems to follow from the criticisms of Aristotle and -from the nature of the case; but it will be observed that it is not -consistent with Zeller’s opinion that the original motion of the atoms -is a fall through infinite space, as in the system of Epicurus. Zeller’s -view depends, of course, on the further belief that the atoms have -weight, and that weight is the tendency of bodies to fall, so we must go -on to consider whether and in what sense weight is a property of the -atoms. - -[Sidenote: The weight of the atoms.] - -179. As is well known, Epicurus held that the atoms were naturally -heavy, and therefore fell continually in the infinite void. The school -tradition is, however, that the “natural weight” of the atoms was an -addition made by Epicurus himself to the original atomic system. -Demokritos, we are told, assigned two properties to atoms, magnitude and -form, to which Epicurus added a third, weight.[956] On the other hand, -Aristotle distinctly says in one place that Demokritos held the atoms -were heavier “in proportion to their excess,” and this seems to be -explained by the statement of Theophrastos that, according to him, -weight depended on magnitude.[957] It will be observed that, even so, it -is not represented as a primary property of the atoms in the same sense -as magnitude. - -Footnote 956: - - Aet. i. 3, 18 (of Epicurus), συμβεβηκέναι δὲ τοῖς σώμασι τρία ταῦτα, - σχῆμα, μέγεθος, βάρος. Δημόκριτος μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγε δύο, μέγεθός τε καὶ - σχῆμα, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος τούτοις καὶ τρίτον βάρος προσέθηκεν· ἀνάγκη γάρ, - φησί, κινεῖσθαι τὰ σώματα τῇ τοῦ βάρους πληγῇ· ἐπεὶ (“or else”) οὐ - κινηθήσεται; _ib._ 12, 6, Δημόκριτος τὰ πρῶτά φησι σώματα, ταῦτα δ’ ἦν - τὰ ναστά, βάρος μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν, κινεῖσθαι δὲ κατ’ ἀλληλοτυπίαν ἐν τῷ - ἀπείρῳ. Cic. _de fato_, 20, “vim motus habebant (atomi) a Democrito - impulsionis quam plagam ille appellat, a te, Epicure, gravitatis et - ponderis.” These passages represent the Epicurean school tradition, - which would hardly venture to misrepresent Demokritos on so important - a point. His works were still accessible. It is confirmed by the - Academic tradition in _de Fin._ i. 17 that Demokritos taught the atoms - moved “in infinito inani, in quo nihil nec summum nec infimum nec - medium nec extremum sit.” This doctrine, we are told, was “depraved” - by Epicurus. - -Footnote 957: - - Arist. _de Gen. Corr._ 326 a 9, καίτοι βαρύτερόν γε κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν - φησιν εἶναι Δημόκριτος ἕκαστον τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων. I cannot believe this - means anything else than what Theophrastos says in his fragment on - sensation, § 61 (R. P. 199), βαρὺ μὲν οὖν καὶ κοῦφον τῷ μεγέθει - διαιρεῖ Δημόκριτος. - -It is impossible to solve this apparent contradiction without referring -briefly to the history of Greek ideas about weight. It is clear that -lightness and weight would be among the very first properties of body to -be distinctly recognised as such. The necessity of lifting burdens must -very soon have led men to distinguish them, though no doubt in some -primitive and more or less animistic form. Both weight and lightness -would be thought of as _things_ that were _in_ bodies. Now it is a -remarkable feature of early Greek philosophy that from the first it was -able to shake itself free from this idea. Weight is never spoken of as a -“thing” as, for instance, warmth and cold are; and, so far as we can -see, not one of the thinkers we have studied hitherto thought it -necessary to give any explanation of it at all, or even to say anything -about it.[958] The motions and resistances which popular theory ascribes -to weight are all explained in some other way. Aristotle distinctly -declares that none of his predecessors had said anything of absolute -weight and lightness. They had only treated of the relatively light and -heavy.[959] - -Footnote 958: - - In Aet. i. 12, where the _placita_ regarding the heavy and light are - given, no philosopher earlier than Plato is referred to. Parmenides - (fr. 8, 59) speaks of the dark element as ἐμβριθές. I do not think - that there is any other place where weight is even mentioned in the - fragments of the early philosophers. - -Footnote 959: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, 308 a 9, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἁπλῶς λεγομένων (βαρέων - καὶ κούφων) οὐδὲν εἴρηται παρὰ τῶν πρότερον. - -This way of regarding the popular notions of weight and lightness is -clearly formulated for the first time in Plato’s _Timaeus_.[960] There -is no such thing in the world, we are told there, as “up” or “down.” The -middle of the world is not “down” but “just in the middle,” and there is -no reason why any point in the circumference should be said to be -“above” or “below” another. It is really the tendency of bodies towards -their kin that makes us call a falling body heavy and the place to which -it falls “below.” Here Plato is really giving the view which was taken -more or less consciously by his predecessors, and it is not till the -time of Aristotle that it is questioned.[961] For reasons which do not -concern us here, he definitely identified the circumference of the -heavens with “up” and the middle of the world with “down,” and equipped -the four elements with natural weight and lightness that they might -perform their rectilinear motions between them. As, however, Aristotle -believed there was only one world, and as he did not ascribe weight to -the heavens proper, the effect of this reactionary theory upon his -cosmical system was not great; it was only when Epicurus tried to -combine it with the infinite void that its true character emerged. It -seems to me that the nightmare of Epicurean atomism can only be -explained on the assumption that an Aristotelian doctrine was violently -adapted to a theory which really excluded it.[962] It is totally unlike -anything we meet with in earlier days. - -Footnote 960: - - Plato, _Tim._ 61 c 3 sqq. - -Footnote 961: - - Zeller says (p. 876) that in antiquity no one ever understood by - weight anything else than the property of bodies in virtue of which - they move downwards; except that in such systems as represent all - forms of matter as contained in a sphere, “above” is identified with - the circumference and “below” with the centre. As to that, I can only - say that no such theory of weight is to be found in the fragments of - the early philosophers or is anywhere ascribed to them, while Plato - expressly denies it. - -This brief historical survey suggests at once that it is only in the -vortex that the atoms acquire weight and lightness,[963] which are, -after all, only popular names for facts which can be further analysed. -We are told that Leukippos held that one effect of the vortex was that -like atoms were brought together with their likes.[964] In this way of -speaking we seem to see the influence of Empedokles, though the -“likeness” is of another kind. It is the finer atoms that are forced to -the circumference, while the larger tend to the centre. We may express -that by saying that the larger are heavy and the smaller light, and this -will amply account for everything Aristotle and Theophrastos say; for -there is no passage where the atoms outside the vortex are distinctly -said to be heavy or light.[965] - -Footnote 962: - - The Aristotelian criticisms which may have affected Epicurus are such - as we find in _de Caelo_, 275 b 29 sqq. Aristotle there argues that, - as Leukippos and Demokritos made the φύσις of the atoms one, they were - bound to give them a single motion. That is just what Epicurus did, - but Aristotle’s argument implies that Leukippos and Demokritos did - not. Though he gave the atoms weight, Epicurus could not accept - Aristotle’s view that some bodies are naturally light. The appearance - of lightness is due to ἔκθλιψις, the squeezing out of the smaller - atoms by the larger. - -Footnote 963: - - In dealing with Empedokles, Aristotle expressly makes this - distinction. Cf. _de Caelo_, Β, 13, especially 295 a 32 sqq., where he - points out that Empedokles does not account for the weight of bodies - on the earth (οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε δίνη πλησιάζει πρὸς ἡμᾶς), nor for the - weight of bodies before the vortex arose (πρὶν γενέσθαι τὴν δίνην). - -Footnote 964: - - Diog., _loc. cit._ (p. 390). - -Footnote 965: - - This seems to be in the main the view of Dyroff, _Demokritstudien_ - (1899), pp. 31 sqq., though I should not say that lightness and weight - only arose in connexion with the atoms of the _earth_ (p. 35). If we - substitute “world” for “earth,” we shall be nearer the truth. - -There is a striking confirmation of the view just given in the atomist -cosmology quoted above.[966] We are told there that the separation of -the larger and smaller atoms was due to the fact that they were “no -longer able to revolve in equilibrium owing to their number,” which -implies that they had previously been in a state of “equilibrium” or -“equipoise.” Now the word ἰσορροπία has no necessary implication of -weight in Greek. A ῥοπή is a mere leaning or inclination in a certain -direction, which may be caused by weight or anything else. The state of -ἰσορροπία is therefore that in which the tendency in one direction is -exactly equal to the tendency in any other, and such a state is more -naturally described as the absence of weight than as the presence of -opposite weights neutralising one another. That way of looking at it may -be useful from the point of view of later science, but it is not safe to -attribute it to the thinkers of the fifth century B.C. - -Footnote 966: - - See above, p. 390. - -If we no longer regard the “eternal motion” of the premundane and -extramundane atoms as due to their weight, there is no reason for -describing it as a fall. None of our authorities do as a matter of fact -so describe it, nor do they tell us in any way what it was. It is safest -to say that it is simply a confused motion this way and that.[967] It is -possible that the comparison of the motion of the atoms of the soul to -that of the motes in a sunbeam coming through a window, which Aristotle -attributes to Demokritos,[968] is really intended as an illustration of -the original motion of the atoms still surviving in the soul. The fact -that it is also a Pythagorean comparison[969] in no way tells against -this; for we have seen that there is a real connexion between the -Pythagorean monads and the atoms. It is also significant that the point -of the comparison appears to have been the fact that the motes in the -sunbeam move even when there is no wind, so that it would be a very apt -illustration indeed of the motion inherent in the atoms apart from the -secondary motions produced by impact and collision. That, however, is -problematical; it only serves to suggest the sort of motion which it is -natural to suppose that Leukippos gave his atoms. - -Footnote 967: - - This view was independently advocated by Brieger (_Die Urbewegung der - Atome und die Weltentstehung bei Leucipp und Demokrit_, 1884) and - Liepmann (_Die Mechanik der Leucipp-Demokritschen Atome_, 1885), both - of whom unnecessarily weakened their position by admitting that weight - is an original property of the atoms. On the other hand, Brieger - denies that the weight of the atoms is the cause of their original - motion, while Liepmann says that before and outside the vortex there - is only a latent weight, a _Pseudoschwere_, which only comes into - operation in the world. It is surely simpler to say that this weight, - since it produces no effect, does not yet exist. Zeller rightly argues - against Brieger and Liepmann that, if the atoms have weight, they must - fall; but, so far as I can see, nothing he says tells against their - theory as I have restated it. Gomperz adopts the Brieger-Liepmann - explanation. See also Lortzing, _Jahresber._, 1903, pp. 136 sqq. - -Footnote 968: - - Arist. _de An._ Α, 2. 403 b 28 sqq. (R. P. 200). - -Footnote 969: - - _Ibid._ Α, 2. 404 a 17 (R. P. 86 a). - -[Sidenote: The vortex.] - -180. But what are we to say of the vortex itself which produces these -effects? Gomperz observes that they seem to be “the precise contrary of -what they should have been by the laws of physics”; for, “as every -centrifugal machine would show, it is the heaviest substances which are -hurled to the greatest distance.”[970] Are we to suppose that Leukippos -was ignorant of this fact, which was known to Anaxagoras, though Gomperz -is wrong in supposing there is any reason to believe that Anaximander -took account of it?[971] Now we know from Aristotle that all those who -accounted for the earth being in the centre of the world by means of a -vortex appealed to the analogy of eddies in wind or water,[972] and -Gomperz supposes that the whole theory was an erroneous generalisation -of this observation. If we look at the matter more closely, we can see, -I think, that there is no error at all. - -Footnote 970: - - Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, i. p. 339. - -Footnote 971: - - For Empedokles, see Chap. V. p. 274; Anaxagoras, see Chap. VI. p. 312; - and for Anaximander, Chap. I. p. 69, _n._ 132. - -Footnote 972: - - Arist. _de Caelo_, Β, 13. 295 a 10, ταύτην γὰρ τὴν αἰτίαν (sc. τὴν - δίνησιν) πάντες λέγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὑγοῖς καὶ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα - συμβαινόντων· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀεὶ φέρεται τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ βαρύτερα πρὸς - τὸ μέσον τῆς δίνης. - -We must remember that all the parts of the vortex are in contact, and -that it is just this contact (ἐπίψαυσις) by which the motion of the -outermost parts is communicated to those within them. The larger bodies -are more able to resist this communicated motion than the smaller, and -in this way they make their way to the centre where the motion is least, -and force the smaller bodies out. This resistance is surely just the -ἀντέρεισις τοῦ μέσου which is mentioned in the doxography of -Leukippos,[973] and it is quite in accordance with this that, on the -atomist theory, the nearer a heavenly body is to the centre, the slower -is its revolution.[974] There is no question of “centrifugal force” at -all, and the analogy of eddies in air and water is quite satisfactory. - -Footnote 973: - - Diog. ix. 32. Cf. especially the phrases ὧν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μέσου - ἀντέρεισιν περιδινουμένων, συμμενόντων ἀεὶ τῶν συνεχῶν κατ’ ἐπίψαυσιν - τῆς δίνης, and συμμενόντων τῶν ἐνεχθέντων ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. - -Footnote 974: - - Cf. Lucr. v. 621 sqq. - -[Sidenote: The earth and the heavenly bodies.] - -181. When we come to details, the reactionary character of the atomist -cosmology is very manifest. The earth was shaped like a tambourine, and -floated on the air.[975] It was inclined towards the south because the -heat of that region made the air thinner, while the ice and cold of the -north made it denser and more able to support the earth.[976] This -accounts for the obliquity of the zodiac. Like Anaximander (§ 19), -Leukippos held that the sun was further away than the stars, though he -also held that these were further away than the moon.[977] This -certainly suggests that he made no clear distinction between the planets -and the fixed stars. He does, however, appear to have known the theory -of eclipses as given by Anaxagoras.[978] Such other pieces of -information as have come down to us are mainly of interest as showing -that, in some important respects, the doctrine of Leukippos was not the -same as that taught afterwards by Demokritos.[979] - -Footnote 975: - - Aet. iii. 3, 10, quoted above, p. 83, _n._ 168. - -Footnote 976: - - Aet. iii. 12, 1, Λεύκιππος παρεκπεσεῖν τὴν γῆν εἰς τὰ μεσημβρινὰ μέρη - διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς μεσημβρινοῖς ἀραιότητα, ἅτε δὴ πεπηγότων τῶν βορείων - διὰ τὸ κατεψῦχθαι τοῖς κρυμοῖς, τῶν δὲ ἀντιθέτων πεπυρωμένων. - -Footnote 977: - - Diog. ix. 33, εἶναι δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου κύκλον ἐξώτατον, τὸν δὲ τῆς - σελήνης προσγειότατον, <τοὺς δὲ> τῶν ἄλλων μεταξὺ τούτων. - -Footnote 978: - - From Diog., _loc. cit._ (_supra_, p. 391), it appears that he dealt - with the question of the greater frequency of lunar as compared with - solar eclipses. It seems to have been this which led him to make the - circle of the moon smaller than that of the stars. - -Footnote 979: - - Diels pointed out that Leukippos’s explanation of thunder (πυρὸς - ἐναποληφθέντος νέφεσι παχυτάτοις ἔκπτωσιν ἰσχυρὰν βροντὴν ἀποτελεῖν - ἀποφαίνεται, Aet. iii. 3, 10) is quite different from that of - Demokritos (Βροντὴν ... ἐκ συγκρίματος ἀνωμάλου τὸ περιειληφὸς αὐτὸ - νέφος πρὸς τὴν κάτω φορὰν ἐκβιαζομένου, _ib._ 11). The explanation - given by Leukippos is derived from that of Anaximander, while - Demokritos is influenced by Anaxagoras. See Diels, 35 _Philol.-Vers._ - 97, 7. - -[Sidenote: Perception.] - -182. Aetios expressly attributes to Leukippos the doctrine that the -objects of sense-perception exist “by law” and not by nature.[980] This -must come from Theophrastos; for, as we have seen, all later writers -quote Demokritos only. A further proof of the correctness of the -statement is that we also find it attributed to Diogenes of Apollonia, -who, as Theophrastos tells us, derived some of his views from Leukippos. -There is nothing surprising in this. Parmenides had already declared the -senses to be deceitful, and said that colour and the like were only -“names,”[981] and Empedokles had also spoken of coming into being and -passing away as only “names.”[982] It is not likely that Leukippos went -much further than this. It would probably be wrong to credit him with -Demokritos’s clear distinction between genuine and “bastard” knowledge, -or that between what are now called the primary and secondary qualities -of matter.[983] These distinctions imply a conscious epistemological -theory, and all we are entitled to say is that the germs of this were -already to be found in the writings of Leukippos and his predecessors. -Of course, these do not make Leukippos a sceptic any more than -Empedokles or Anaxagoras, whose remark on this subject (fr. 21_a_) -Demokritos is said to have quoted with approval.[984] - -Footnote 980: - - Aet. iv. 9, 8, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι φύσει τὰ αἰσθητα, Λεύκιππος δὲ Δημόκριτος - καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος νόμῳ. See Zeller, _Arch._ v. p. 444. - -Footnote 981: - - Chap. IV. p. 200, _n._ 443. The remarkable parallel quoted by Gomperz - (p. 321) from Galilei, to the effect that tastes, smells, and colours - _non sieno altro che puri nomi_ should, therefore, have been cited to - illustrate Parmenides rather than Demokritos. - -Footnote 982: - - See p. 240, fr. 8. - -Footnote 983: - - For these see Sext. _Math._ vii. 135 (R. P. 204). - -Footnote 984: - - Sext. vii. 140, “ὄψις γὰρ ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα,” ὥς φησιν Ἀναξαγόρας, - ὃν ἐπὶ τούτῳ Δημόκριτος ἐπαινεῖ. - -There appear to be sufficient grounds for ascribing the theory of -perception by means of _simulacra_ or εἴδωλα, which played such a part -in the systems of Demokritos and Epicurus, to Leukippos.[985] It is a -very natural development of the Empedoklean theory of “effluences” (§ -118). It hardly seems likely, however, that he went into great detail on -the subject, and it is safer to credit Demokritos with the elaboration -of the theory. - -[Sidenote: Importance of Leukippos.] - -183. We have seen incidentally that there is a wide divergence of -opinion among recent writers as to the place of Atomism in Greek -thought. The question at issue is really whether Leukippos reached his -theory on what are called “metaphysical grounds,” that is, from a -consideration of the Eleatic theory of reality, or whether, on the -contrary, it was a pure development of Ionian science. The foregoing -exposition will suggest the true answer. So far as his general theory of -the physical constitution of the world is concerned, it has been shown, -I think, that it was derived entirely from Eleatic and Pythagorean -sources, while the detailed cosmology was in the main a more or less -successful attempt to make the older Ionian beliefs fit into this new -physical theory. In any case, his greatness consisted in his having been -the first to see how body must be regarded if we take it to be ultimate -reality. The old Milesian theory had found its most adequate expression -in the system of Anaximenes (§ 31), but of course rarefaction and -condensation cannot be clearly represented except on the hypothesis of -molecules or atoms coming closer together or going further apart in -space. Parmenides had seen that very clearly (fr.2), and it was the -Eleatic criticism which forced Leukippos to formulate his system as he -did. Even Anaxagoras took account of Zeno’s arguments about divisibility -(§ 128), but his system of qualitatively different “seeds” was lacking -in that simplicity which has always been the chief attraction of -atomism. - -Footnote 985: - - See Zeller, “Zu Leukippus” (_Arch._ xv. p. 138). The doctrine is - attributed to him in Aet. iv. 13, 1 (_Dox._ p. 403); and Alexander, - _de Sensu_, pp. 24, 14 and 56, 10, also mentions his name in connexion - with it. This must come from Theophrastos. - - - - - CHAPTER X - ECLECTICISM AND REACTION - - -[Sidenote: The “bankruptcy of science.”] - -184. With Leukippos our story should properly come to an end; for he had -really answered the question first asked by Thales. We have seen, -however, that, though his theory of matter was of a most original and -daring kind, he was not equally successful in his attempt to construct a -cosmology, and this seems to have stood in the way of the recognition of -the atomic theory for what it really was. We have noted the growing -influence of medicine, and the consequent substitution of an interest in -detailed investigation for the larger cosmological views of an earlier -time, and there are several treatises in the Hippokratean _corpus_ which -give us a clear idea of the interest which now prevailed.[986] Leukippos -had shown that “the doctrine of Melissos,”[987] which seemed to make all -science impossible, was not the only conclusion that could be drawn from -the Eleatic premisses, and he had gone on to give a cosmology which was -substantially of the old Ionic type. The result at first was simply that -all the old schools revived and had a short period of renewed activity, -while at the same time some new schools arose which sought to -accommodate the older views to those of Leukippos, or to make them more -available for scientific purposes by combining them in an eclectic -fashion. None of these attempts had any lasting importance or influence, -and what we have to consider in this chapter is really one of the -periodical “bankruptcies of science” which mark the close of one chapter -in its history and announce the beginning of a new one. - -Footnote 986: - - Cf. what is said in Chap. IV. p. 167, _n._ 383, of the Περὶ διαίτης. - The Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσιος and the Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰατρικῆς are invaluable - documents for the attitude of scientific men to cosmological theories - at this date. - -Footnote 987: - - Cf. Chap. VIII. p. 379, _n._ 919. - - - I. HIPPON OF SAMOS - -185. Hippon of Samos or Kroton belonged to the Italian school of -medicine.[988] We know very little indeed of him except that he was a -contemporary of Perikles. From a scholiast on Aristophanes[989] we learn -that Kratinos satirised him in his _Panoptai_; and Aristotle mentions -him in the enumeration of early philosophers given in the First Book of -the _Metaphysics_,[990] though only to say that the inferiority of his -intellect deprives him of all claim to be reckoned among them. - -Footnote 988: - - Aristoxenos said he was a Samian (R. P. 219 a). In Menon’s _Iatrika_ - he is called a Krotoniate, while others assign him to Rhegion or - Metapontion. This probably means that he was affiliated to the - Pythagorean medical school. The evidence of Aristoxenos is, in that - case, all the more valuable. Hippon is mentioned along with Melissos - in Iamblichos’s Catalogue of Pythagoreans (_V. Pyth._ 267). - -Footnote 989: - - Schol. on _Clouds_, 94 sqq. - -Footnote 990: - - Arist. _Met._ Α, 3. 984 a 3 (R. P. 219 a). - -[Sidenote: Moisture.] - -With regard to his views, the most precise statement is that of -Alexander, who doubtless follows Theophrastos. It is to the effect that -he held the primary substance to be Moisture, without deciding whether -it was Water or Air.[991] We have the authority of Aristotle[992] and -Theophrastos, represented by Hippolytos,[993] for saying that this -theory was supported by physiological arguments of the kind common at -the time. His other views belong to the history of Medicine. - -Footnote 991: - - Alexander in _Met._ p. 26, 21 (R. P. 219). - -Footnote 992: - - Arist. _de An._ Α, 2. 405 b 2 (R. P. 220). - -Footnote 993: - - Hipp. _Ref._ i. 16 (R. P. 221). - -Till quite recently no fragment of Hippon was known to exist, but a -single one has now been recovered from the Geneva Scholia on Homer.[994] -It is directed against the old assumption that the “waters under the -earth” are an independent source of moisture, and runs thus: - - The waters we drink are all from the sea; for if wells were deeper - than the sea, then it would not, doubtless, be from the sea that we - drink, for then the water would not be from the sea, but from some - other source. But as it is, the sea is deeper than the waters, so all - the waters that are above the sea come from it. R. P. 219 b. - -We observe here the universal assumption that water tends to rise from -the earth, not to sink into it. - -Along with Hippon, Idaios of Himera[995] may just be mentioned. We -really know nothing of him except that he held air to be the primary -substance. The fact that he was of Sicilian origin is, however, -suggestive. - -Footnote 994: - - _Schol. Genav._ p. 197, 19. Cf. Diels in _Arch._ iv. p. 653. The - extract comes from the Ὁμηρικά of Krates of Mallos. - -Footnote 995: - - Sext. _adv. Math._ ix. 360. - - - II. DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA - -[Sidenote: Date.] - -186. After discussing the three great representatives of the Milesian -school, Theophrastos went on to say: - - And Diogenes of Apollonia, too, who was almost the latest of those who - gave themselves up to these studies, wrote most of his work in an - eclectic fashion, agreeing in some points with Anaxagoras and in - others with Leukippos. He, too, says that the primary substance of the - universe is Air infinite and eternal, from which by condensation, - rarefaction, and change of state, the form of everything else arises. - R. P. 206 a.[996] - -Footnote 996: - - On this passage see Diels, “Leukippos und Diogenes von Apollonia” - (_Rhein. Mus._ xlii. pp. 1 sqq.). Natorp’s view that the words are - merely those of Simplicius (_ib._ xli. pp. 349 sqq.) can hardly be - maintained. - -This passage shows that the Apolloniate was somewhat later in date than -the statement in Laertios Diogenes[997] that he was contemporary with -Anaxagoras would lead us to suppose, and the fact that he is satirised -in the _Clouds_ of Aristophanes points in the same direction.[998] Of -his life we know next to nothing. He was the son of Apollothemis, and -came from Apollonia in Crete.[999] The Ionic dialect in which he wrote -is no objection to this; it was the regular dialect for cosmological -works.[1000] - -Footnote 997: - - Diog. ix. 57 (R. P. 206). The statement of Antisthenes, the writer of - _Successions_, that he had “heard” Anaximenes is due to the usual - confusion. He was doubtless, like Anaxagoras, “an associate of the - philosophy of Anaximenes.” Cf. Chap. VI. § 122. - -Footnote 998: - - Aristoph. _Clouds_, 227 sqq., where Sokrates speaks of “mixing his - subtle thought with the kindred air,” and especially the words ἡ γῆ - βίᾳ | ἕλκει πρὸς αὑτὴν τὴν ἱκμάδα τῆς φροντίδος. For the ἱκμάς, see - Beare, p. 259. Cf. also Eur. _Tro._ 884, ὦ γῆς ὄχημα κἀπὶ γῆς ἕδραν - ἔχων κ.τ.λ. - -Footnote 999: - - Diog. ix. 57 (R. P. 206). - -Footnote 1000: - - Cf. Chap. VII. pp. 327 sqq. - -The fact that Diogenes was parodied in the _Clouds_ suggests that he had -found his way to Athens; and we have the excellent authority of -Demetrios Phalereus[1001] for saying that the Athenians treated him in -the usual way. He excited so great dislike as nearly to imperil his -life. - -Footnote 1001: - - Diog. ix. 57, τοῦτόν φησιν ὁ Φαληρεὺς Δημήτριος ἐν τῇ Σωκράτους - ἀπολογίᾳ διὰ μέγαν φθόνον μικροῦ κινδυνεῦσαι Ἀθήνησιν. Diels follows - Volkmann in holding that this is a note on Anaxagoras which has been - inserted in the wrong place. I do not think this is necessary, though - it is certainly possible. - -[Sidenote: Writings.] - -187. Simplicius affirms that Diogenes wrote several works, though he -allows that only one survived till his own day, namely, the Περὶ -φύσεως.[1002] This statement is based upon references in the surviving -work itself, and is not to be lightly rejected. In particular, it is -very credible that he wrote a tract _Against the Sophists_, that is to -say, the pluralist cosmologists of the day.[1003] That he wrote a -_Meteorology_ and a book called _The Nature of Man_ is also quite -probable. This would be a physiological or medical treatise, and perhaps -the famous fragment about the veins comes from it.[1004] - -Footnote 1002: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 151, 24 (R. P. 207 a). - -Footnote 1003: - - Simplicius says Πρὸς φυσιολόγους, but he adds that Diogenes called - them σοφισταί, which is the older word. This is, so far, in favour of - the genuineness of the work. - -Footnote 1004: - - Diels gives this as fr. 6 (_Vors._ p. 350). I have omitted it, as it - really belongs to the history of Medicine. - -[Sidenote: The Fragments.] - -188. The work of Diogenes seems to have been preserved in the Academy; -practically all the fairly extensive fragments which we still have are -derived from Simplicius. I give them as they are arranged by Diels:— - - (1) In beginning any discourse, it seems to me that one should make - one’s starting-point something indisputable, and one’s expression - simple and dignified. R. P. 207. - - (2) My view is, to sum it all up, that all things are differentiations - of the same thing, and are the same thing. And this is obvious; for, - if the things which are now in this world—earth, and water, and air - and fire, and the other things which we see existing in this world,—if - any one of these things, I say, were different from any other, - different, that is, by having a substance peculiar to itself; and if - it were not the same thing that is often changed and differentiated, - then things could not in any way mix with one another, nor could they - do one another good or harm. Neither could a plant grow out of the - earth, nor any animal nor anything else come into being unless things - were composed in such a way as to be the same. But all these things - arise from the same thing; they are differentiated and take different - forms at different times, and return again to the same thing. R. P. - 208. - - (3) For it would not be possible for it to be divided as it is without - intelligence, so as to keep the measures of all things, of winter and - summer, of day and night, of rains and winds and fair weather. And any - one who cares to reflect will find that everything else is disposed in - the best possible manner. R. P. 210. - - (4) And, further, there are still the following great proofs. Men and - all other animals live upon air by breathing it, and this is their - soul and their intelligence, as will be clearly shown in this work; - while, when this is taken away, they die, and their intelligence - fails. R. P. 210. - - (5) And my view is, that that which has intelligence is what men call - air, and that all things have their course steered by it, and that it - has power over all things. For this very thing I hold to be a - god,[1005] and to reach everywhere, and to dispose everything, and to - be in everything; and there is not anything which does not partake in - it. Yet no single thing partakes in it just in the same way as - another; but there are many modes both of air and of intelligence. For - it undergoes many transformations, warmer and colder, drier and - moister, more stable and in swifter motion, and it has many other - differentiations in it, and an infinite number of colours and savours. - And the soul of all living things is the same, namely, air warmer than - that outside us and in which we are, but much colder than that near - the sun. And this warmth is not alike in any two kinds of living - creatures, nor, for the matter of that, in any two men; but it does - not differ much, only so far as is compatible with their being alike. - At the same time, it is not possible for any of the things which are - differentiated to be exactly like one another till they all once more - become the same. - - (6) Since, then, differentiation is multiform, living creatures are - multiform and many, and they are like one another neither in - appearance nor in intelligence, because of the multitude of - differentiations. At the same time, they all live, and see, and hear - by the same thing, and they all have their intelligence from the same - source. R. P. 211. - - (7) And this itself is an eternal and undying body, but of those - things[1006] some come into being and some pass away. - - (8) But this, too, appears to me to be obvious, that it is both great, - and mighty, and eternal, and undying, and of great knowledge. R. P. - 209. - -Footnote 1005: - - The MSS. of Simplicius have ἔθος, not θεός; but I adopt Usener’s - certain correction. It is confirmed by the statement of Theophrastos, - that the air within us is “a small portion of the god” (_de Sens._ - 42); and by Philodemos (_Dox._ p. 536), where we read that Diogenes - praises Homer, τὸν ἀέρα γὰρ αὐτὸν Δία νομίζειν φησίν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν - εἰδέναι τὸν Δία λέγει (cf. Cic. _Nat. D._ i. 12, 29). - -Footnote 1006: - - The MSS. of Simplicius have τῷ δέ, but surely the Aldine τῶν δέ is - right. - -That the chief interest of Diogenes was a physiological one, is clear -from his elaborate account of the veins, preserved by Aristotle.[1007] -It is noticeable, too, that one of his arguments for the underlying -unity of all substances is that without this it would be impossible to -understand how one thing could do good or harm to another (fr. 2). In -fact, the writing of Diogenes is essentially of the same character as a -good deal of the pseudo-Hippokratean literature, and there is much to be -said for the view that the writers of these curious tracts made use of -him very much as they did of Anaxagoras and Herakleitos.[1008] - -Footnote 1007: - - Arist. _Hist. An._ Γ, 2. 511 b 30. - -Footnote 1008: - - See Weygoldt, “Zu Diogenes von Apollonia” (_Arch._ i. pp. 161 sqq.). - Hippokrates himself represented just the opposite tendency to that of - those writers. His great achievement was the separation of medicine - from philosophy, a separation most beneficial to both (Celsus, i. - pr.). This is why the Hippokratean corpus contains some works in which - the “sophists” are denounced and others in which their writings are - pillaged. To the latter class belong the Περὶ διαίτης and the Περὶ - φυσῶν; to the former, especially the Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰατρικῆς. - -[Sidenote: Cosmology.] - -189. Like Anaximenes, Diogenes regarded Air as the primary substance; -but we see from his arguments that he lived at a time when other views -had become prevalent. He speaks clearly of the four Empedoklean elements -(fr. 2), and he is careful to attribute to Air the attributes of Nous as -taught by Anaxagoras (fr. 4). The doxographical tradition as to his -cosmological views is fairly preserved:— - - Diogenes of Apollonia makes air the element, and holds that all things - are in motion, and that there are innumerable worlds. And he describes - the origin of the world thus. When the All moves and becomes rare in - one place and dense in another, where the dense met together it formed - a mass, and then the other things arose in the same way, the lightest - parts occupying the highest position and producing the sun. [Plut.] - _Strom._ fr. 12 (R. P. 215). - - Nothing arises from what is not nor passes away into what is not. The - earth is round, poised in the middle, having received its shape - through the revolution proceeding from the warm and its solidification - from the cold. Diog. ix. 57 (R. P. 215). - - The heavenly bodies were like pumice-stone. He thinks they are the - breathing-holes of the world, and that they are red-hot. Aet. ii. 13, - 5 = Stob. i. 508 (R. P. 215). - - The sun was like pumice-stone, and into it the rays from the aether - fix themselves. Aet. ii. 20, 10. The moon was a pumice-like - conflagration. _Ib._ ii. 25, 10. - - Along with the visible heavenly bodies revolve invisible stones, which - for that very reason are nameless; but they often fall and are - extinguished on the earth like the stone star which fell down flaming - at Aigospotamos.[1009] _Ib._ ii. 13, 9. - -Footnote 1009: - - See Chap. VI. p. 292, _n._ 657. - -We have here nothing more than the old Ionian doctrine with a few -additions from more recent sources. Rarefaction and condensation still -hold their place in the explanation of the opposites, warm and cold, dry -and moist, stable and mobile (fr. 5). The differentiations into -opposites which Air may undergo are, as Anaxagoras had taught, infinite -in number; but all may be reduced to the primary opposition of rare and -dense. We may gather, too, from Censorinus[1010] that Diogenes did not, -like Anaximenes, speak of earth and water as arising from Air by -condensation, but rather of blood, flesh, and bones. In this he followed -Anaxagoras (§ 130), as it was natural that he should. That portion of -Air, on the other hand, which was rarefied became fiery, and produced -the sun and heavenly bodies. The circular motion of the world is due to -the intelligence of the Air, as is also the division of all things into -different forms of body and the observance of the “measures” by these -forms.[1011] - -Footnote 1010: - - Censorinus, _de die natali_, 6, 1 (_Dox._ p. 190). - -Footnote 1011: - - On the “measures” see Chap. III. § 72. - -Like Anaximander (§ 20), Diogenes regarded the sea as the remainder of -the original moist state, which had been partially evaporated by the -sun, so as to separate out the remaining earth.[1012] The earth itself -is round, that is to say, it is a disc: for the language of the -doxographers does not point to the spherical form.[1013] Its -solidification by the cold is due to the fact that cold is a form of -condensation. - -Footnote 1012: - - Theophr. _ap._ Alex. in _Meteor._ p. 67, 1 (_Dox._ p. 494). - -Footnote 1013: - - Diog. ix. 57 (R. P. 215). - -Diogenes did not hold with the earlier cosmologists that the heavenly -bodies were made of air or fire, nor yet with Anaxagoras, that they were -stones. They were, he said, pumice-like, a view in which we may trace -the influence of Leukippos. They were earthy, indeed, but not solid, and -the celestial fire permeated their pores. And this explains why we do -not see the dark bodies which, in common with Anaxagoras, he held to -revolve along with the stars. They really are solid stones, and -therefore cannot be penetrated by the fire. It was one of these that -fell into the Aigospotamos. Like Anaxagoras, Diogenes affirmed that the -inclination of the earth happened subsequently to the rise of -animals.[1014] - -We are prepared to find that Diogenes held the doctrine of innumerable -worlds; for it was the old Milesian belief, and had just been revived -by Anaxagoras and Leukippos. He is mentioned with the rest in the -_Placita_; and if Simplicius classes him and Anaximenes with -Herakleitos as holding the Stoic doctrine of successive formations and -destructions of a single world, he has probably been misled by the -“accommodators.”[1015] - -Footnote 1014: - - Aet. ii. 8, 1 (R. P. 215). - -Footnote 1015: - - Simpl. _Phys._ p. 1121, 12. See Chap. I. p. 83, _n._ 123. - -[Sidenote: Animals and plants.] - -190. Living creatures arose from the earth, doubtless under the -influence of heat. Their souls, of course, were air, and their -differences were due to the various degrees in which it was rarefied or -condensed (fr. 5). No special seat, such as the heart or the brain, was -assigned to the soul; it was simply the warm air circulating with the -blood in the veins. - -The views of Diogenes as to generation, respiration, and the blood, -belong to the history of Medicine;[1016] his theory of sensation too, as -it is described by Theophrastos,[1017] need only be mentioned in -passing. Briefly stated, it amounts to this, that all sensation is due -to the action of air upon the brain and other organs, while pleasure is -aeration of the blood. But the details of the theory can only be studied -properly in connexion with the Hippokratean writings; for Diogenes does -not really represent the old cosmological tradition, but a fresh -development of reactionary philosophical views combined with an entirely -new enthusiasm for detailed investigation and accumulation of facts. - -Footnote 1016: - - See Censorinus, quoted in _Dox._ p. 191. - -Footnote 1017: - - Theophr. _de Sens._ 39 sqq. (R. P. 213, 214). For a full account, see - Beare, pp. 41 sqq., 105, 140, 169, 209, 258. As Prof. Beare remarks, - Diogenes “is one of the most interesting of the pre-Platonic - psychologists” (p. 258). - - - III. ARCHELAOS OF ATHENS - -[Sidenote: Anaxagoreans.] - -191. The last of the early cosmologists was Archelaos of Athens, who was -a disciple of Anaxagoras.[1018] He is also said to have been the teacher -of Sokrates, a statement by no means so improbable as is sometimes -supposed.[1019] There is no reason to doubt the tradition that Archelaos -succeeded Anaxagoras in the school at Lampsakos.[1020] We certainly hear -of Anaxagoreans,[1021] though their fame was soon obscured by the rise -of the Sophists, as we call them. - -Footnote 1018: - - Diog. ii. 16 (R. P. 216). - -Footnote 1019: - - See Chiapelli in _Arch._ iv. pp. 369 sqq. - -Footnote 1020: - - Euseb. _P. E._ p. 504, c 3, ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέλαος ἐν Λαμψάκῳ διεδέξατο τὴν - σχολὴν τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου. - -Footnote 1021: - - Ἀναξαγόρειοι are mentioned by Plato (_Crat._ 409 b 6), and often by - the Aristotelian commentators. - -[Sidenote: Cosmology.] - -192. On the cosmology of Archelaos, Hippolytos[1022] writes as follows:— - - Archelaos was by birth an Athenian, and the son of Apollodoros. He - spoke of the mixture of matter in a similar way to Anaxagoras, and of - the first principles likewise. He held, however, that there was a - certain mixture immanent even in Nous. And he held that there were two - efficient causes which were separated off from one another, namely, - the warm and the cold. The former was in motion, the latter at rest. - When the water was liquefied it flowed to the centre, and there being - burnt up it turned to earth and air, the latter of which was borne - upwards, while the former took up its position below. These, then, are - the reasons why the earth is at rest, and why it came into being. It - lies in the centre, being practically no appreciable part of the - universe. (But the air rules over all things),[1023] being produced by - the burning of the fire, and from its original combustion comes the - substance of the heavenly bodies. Of these the sun is the largest, and - the moon second; the rest are of various sizes. He says that the - heavens were inclined, and that then the sun made light upon the - earth, made the air transparent, and the earth dry; for it was - originally a pond, being high at the circumference and hollow in the - centre. He adduces as a proof of this hollowness that the sun does not - rise and set at the same time for all peoples, as it ought to do if - the earth were level. As to animals, he says that when the earth was - first being warmed in the lower part where the warm and the cold were - mingled together, many living creatures appeared, and especially men, - all having the same manner of life, and deriving their sustenance from - the slime; they did not live long, and later on generation from one - another began. And men were distinguished from the rest, and set up - leaders, and laws, and arts, and cities, and so forth. And he says - that Nous is implanted in all animals alike; for each of the animals, - as well as man, makes use of Nous, but some quicker and some slower. - -Footnote 1022: - - Hipp. _Ref._ i. 9 (R. P. 218). - -Footnote 1023: - - Inserting τὸν δ’ ἀέρα κρατεῖν τοῦ παντός, as suggested by Roeper. - -It is not necessary to say much with regard to this theory, which in -many respects contrasts unfavourably with its predecessors. It is clear -that, just as Diogenes had tried to introduce certain Anaxagorean ideas -into the philosophy of Anaximenes, so Archelaos sought to bring -Anaxagoreanism nearer to the old Ionic views by supplementing it with -the opposition of warm and cold, rare and dense, and by stripping Nous -of that simplicity which had marked it off from the other “things” in -his master’s system. It was probably for this reason, too, that Nous was -no longer regarded as the maker of the world.[1024] Leukippos had made -such a force unnecessary. It may be added that this twofold relation of -Archelaos to his predecessors makes it very credible that, as Aetios -tells us,[1025] he believed in innumerable worlds; both Anaxagoras and -the older Ionians upheld that doctrine. - -Footnote 1024: - - Aet. i. 7, 4 = Stob. i. 56 (R. P. 217 a). - -[Sidenote: Conclusion.] - -193. The cosmology of Archelaos, like that of Diogenes, has all the -characteristics of the age to which it belonged—an age of reaction, -eclecticism, and investigation of detail.[1026] Hippon of Samos and -Idaios of Himera represent nothing more than the feeling that philosophy -had run into a blind alley, from which it could only escape by trying -back. The Herakleiteans at Ephesos, impenetrably wrapped up as they were -in their own system, did little but exaggerate its paradoxes and develop -its more fanciful side.[1027] It was not enough for Kratylos to say with -Herakleitos (fr. 84) that you cannot step twice into the same river; you -could not do so even once.[1028] But in nothing was the total bankruptcy -of the early cosmology so clearly shown as in the work of Gorgias, -entitled _Substance or the Non-existent_, in which an absolute nihilism -was set forth and based upon the Eleatic dialectic.[1029] The fact is -that philosophy, so long as it clung to its old presuppositions, had -nothing more to say; for the answer of Leukippos to the question of -Thales was really final. Fresh life must be given to the speculative -impulse by the raising of new problems, those of knowledge and conduct, -before any further progress was possible; and this was done by the -“Sophists” and Sokrates. Then, in the hands of Demokritos and Plato, -philosophy took a new form, and started on a fresh course. - -Footnote 1025: - - Aet. ii. 1, 3. - -Footnote 1026: - - Windelband, § 25. The period is well described by Fredrich, - _Hippokratische Untersuchungen_, pp. 130 sqq. It can only be treated - fully in connexion with the Sophists. - -Footnote 1027: - - For an amusing picture of the Herakleiteans see Plato, _Tht._ 179 e. - The new interest in language, which the study of rhetoric had called - into life, took with them the form of fantastic and arbitrary - etymologising, such as is satirised in Plato’s _Cratylus_. - -Footnote 1028: - - Arist. _Met._ Γ, 5. 1010 a 12. He refused even to speak, we are told, - and only moved his finger. - -Footnote 1029: - - Sext. _adv. Math._ vii. 65 (R. P. 235); _M.X.G._ 979 a 13 (R. P. 236). - - - - - APPENDIX - THE SOURCES - - - _A._—PHILOSOPHERS - -[Sidenote: Plato.] - -1. It is not very often that Plato allows himself to dwell upon the -history of philosophy as it was before the rise of ethical and -epistemological inquiry; but when he does, his guidance is simply -invaluable. His artistic gift and his power of entering into the -thoughts of other men enabled him to describe the views of early -philosophers in a thoroughly objective manner, and he never, except in a -playful and ironical way, sought to read unthought-of meanings into the -words of his predecessors. Of special value for our purpose are his -contrast between Empedokles and Herakleitos (_Soph._ 242 d), and his -account of the relation between Zeno and Parmenides (_Parm._ 128 a). - -See Zeller, “Plato’s Mittheilungen über frühere und gleichzeitige -Philosophen” (_Arch._ v. pp. 165 sqq.); and Index, _s.v._ Plato. - - -[Sidenote: Aristotle.] - -2. As a rule, Aristotle’s statements about early philosophers are less -historical than Plato’s. Not that he failed to understand the facts, but -he nearly always discusses them from the point of view of his own -system. He is convinced that his own philosophy accomplishes what all -previous philosophers had aimed at, and their systems are therefore -regarded as “lisping” attempts to formulate it (_Met._ Α, 10. 993 a 15). -It is also to be noted that Aristotle regards some systems in a much -more sympathetic way than others. He is distinctly unfair to the -Eleatics, for instance. - -It is often forgotten that Aristotle derived much of his information -from Plato, and we must specially observe that he more than once takes -Plato’s irony too literally. - -See Emminger, _Die Vorsokratischen Philosophen nach den Berichten des -Aristoteles_, 1878. Index, _s.v._ Aristotle. - - * * * * * - -[Sidenote: Stoics.] - -3. The Stoics, and especially Chrysippos, paid great attention to early -philosophy, but their way of regarding it was simply an exaggeration of -Aristotle’s. They did not content themselves with criticising their -predecessors from their own point of view; they seem really to have -believed that the early poets and thinkers held views hardly -distinguishable from theirs. The word συνοικειοῦν, which Cicero renders -by _accommodare_, was used by Philodemos to denote this method of -interpretation,[1030] which has had serious results upon our tradition, -especially in the case of Herakleitos (p. 157). - -Footnote 1030: - - Cf. Cic. _De nat. D._ i. 15, 41: “Et haec quidem (Chrysippus) in primo - libro de natura deorum, in secundo autem vult Orphei, Musaei, Hesiodi - Homerique fabellas accommodare ad ea quae ipse primo libro de deis - immortalibus dixerat, ut etiam veterrimi poetae, qui haec ne suspicati - quidem sunt, Stoici fuisse videantur.” Cf. Philod. _de piet. fr._ c. - 13, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ τά τε εἰς Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον ἀναφερόμενα καὶ τὰ - παρ’ Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Εὐριπίδῃ καὶ ποιηταῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς καὶ - Κλεάνθης, πειρᾶται συνοικειοῦν ταῖς δόξαις αὐτῶν. - - -[Sidenote: Skeptics.] - -4. The same remarks apply _mutatis mutandis_ to the Skeptics. The -interest of such a writer as Sextus Empiricus in early philosophy is to -show that skepticism went back to an early date—as far as Xenophanes, in -fact. But what he tells us is often of value; for he frequently quotes -early views as to knowledge and sensation in support of his thesis. - - -[Sidenote: Neoplatonists.] - -5. Under this head we have chiefly to consider the commentators on -Aristotle in so far as they are independent of the Theophrastean -tradition. Their chief characteristic is what Simplicius calls -εὐγνωμοσύνη, that is, a liberal spirit of interpretation, which makes -all early philosophers agree with one another in upholding the doctrine -of a Sensible and an Intelligible World. It is, however, to Simplicius -more than any one else that we owe the preservation of the fragments. He -had, of course, the library of the Academy at his disposal. - - - _B._—DOXOGRAPHERS - -[Sidenote: The _Doxographi graeci_.] - -6. The _Doxographi graeci_ of Professor Hermann Diels (1879) threw an -entirely new light upon the filiation of the later sources; and we can -only estimate justly the value of statements derived from these if we -bear constantly in mind the results of his investigation. Here it will -only be possible to give an outline which may help the reader to find -his way in the _Doxographi graeci_ itself. - - * * * * * - -[Sidenote: The “Opinions” of Theophrastos] - -7. By the term _doxographers_ we understand all those writers who relate -the opinions of the Greek philosophers, and who derive their material, -directly or indirectly, from the great work of Theophrastos, Φυσικῶν -δοξῶν ιηʹ (Diog. v. 46). Of this work, one considerable chapter, that -entitled Περὶ αἰσθήσεων, has been preserved (_Dox._ pp. 499-527). And -Usener, following Brandis, further showed that there were important -fragments of it contained in the commentary of Simplicius (sixth cent. -A.D.) on the First Book of Aristotle’s Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις (Usener, -_Analecta Theophrastea_, pp. 25 sqq.). These extracts Simplicius seems -to have borrowed in turn from Alexander of Aphrodisias (_c._ 200 A.D.); -cf. _Dox._ p. 112 sqq. We thus possess a very considerable portion of -the First Book, which dealt with the ἀρχαί as well as practically the -whole of the last Book. - -From these remains it clearly appears that the method of Theophrastos -was to discuss in separate books the leading topics which had engaged -the attention of philosophers from Thales to Plato. The chronological -order was not observed; the philosophers were grouped according to the -affinity of their doctrine, the differences between those who appeared -to agree most closely being carefully noted. The First Book, however, -was in some degree exceptional; for in it the order was that of the -successive schools, and short historical and chronological notices were -inserted. - - * * * * * - -[Sidenote: Doxographers.] - -8. A work of this kind was, of course, a godsend to the epitomators and -compilers of handbooks, who flourished more and more as the Greek genius -declined. These either followed Theophrastos in arranging the -subject-matter under heads, or else they broke up his work, and -rearranged his statements under the names of the various philosophers to -whom they applied. This latter class form the natural transition between -the doxographers proper and the biographers, so I have ventured to -distinguish them by the name of _biographical doxographers_. - - I. DOXOGRAPHERS PROPER - -[Sidenote: The _Placita_ and Stobaios.] - -9. These are now represented by two works, viz. the _Placita -Philosophorum_, included among the writings ascribed to Plutarch, and -the _Eclogae Physicae_ of John Stobaios (_c._ 470 A.D.). The latter -originally formed one work with the _Florilegium_ of the same author, -and includes a transcript of some epitome substantially identical with -the pseudo-Plutarchean _Placita_. It is, however, demonstrable that -neither the _Placita_ nor the doxography of the _Eclogae_ is the -original of the other. The latter is usually the fuller of the two, and -yet the former must be earlier; for it was used by Athenagoras for his -defence of the Christians in 177 A.D. (_Dox._ p. 4). It was also the -source of the notices in Eusebios and Cyril, and of the _History of -Philosophy_ ascribed to Galen. From these writers many important -corrections of the text have been derived (_Dox._ pp. 5 sqq.). - -Another writer who made use of the _Placita_ is Achilles (_not_ Achilles -Tatius). Extracts from his Εἰσαγωγή to the _Phaenomena_ of Aratos are -included in the _Uranologion_ of Petavius, pp. 121-164. His date is -uncertain, but probably he belongs to the third century A.D. (_Dox._ p. -18). - - -[Sidenote: Aetios.] - -10. What, then, was the common source of the _Placita_ and the -_Eclogae_? Diels has shown that Theodoret (_c._ 445 A.D.) had access to -it; for in some cases he gives a fuller form of statements made in these -two works. Not only so, but he also names that source; for he refers us -(_Gr. aff. cur._ iv. 31) to Ἀετίου τὴν περὶ ἀρεσκόντων συναγωγήν. Diels -has accordingly printed the _Placita_ in parallel columns with the -relevant parts of the _Eclogae_, under the title of _Aetii Placita_. The -quotations from “Plutarch” by later writers, and the extracts of -Theodoret from Aetios, are also given at the foot of each page. - - -[Sidenote: The _Vetusta Placita_.] - -11. Diels has shown further, however, that Aetios did not draw directly -from Theophrastos, but from an intermediate epitome which he calls the -_Vetusta Placita_, traces of which may be found in Cicero (_infra_, § -12), and in Censorinus (_De die natali_), who follows Varro. The -_Vetusta Placita_ were composed in the school of Poseidonios, and Diels -now calls them the Poseidonian Ἀρέσκοντα (_Über das phys. System des -Straton_, p. 2). There are also traces of them in the “Homeric -Allegorists.” - -It is quite possible, by discounting the somewhat unintelligent -additions which Aetios made from Epicurean and other sources, to form a -pretty accurate table of the contents of the _Vetusta Placita_ (_Dox._ -pp. 181 sqq.), and this gives us a fair idea of the arrangement of the -original work by Theophrastos. - - -[Sidenote: Cicero.] - -12. So far as what he tells us of the earliest Greek philosophy goes, -Cicero must be classed with the doxographers, and not with the -philosophers; for he gives us nothing but extracts at second or third -hand from the work of Theophrastos. Two passages in his writings fall to -be considered under this head, namely, “Lucullus” (_Acad._ ii.), 118, -and _De natura Deorum_, i. 25-41. - -(_a_) _Doxography of the “Lucullus.”_—This contains a meagre and -inaccurately-rendered summary of the various opinions held by -philosophers with regard to the ἀρχή (_Dox._ pp. 119 sqq.), and would be -quite useless if it did not in one case enable us to verify the exact -words of Theophrastos (Chap. I. p. 52, _n._ 2). The doxography has come -through the hands of Kleitomachos, who succeeded Karneades in the -headship of the Academy (129 B.C.). - -(_b_) _Doxography of the “De natura Deorum.”_—A fresh light was thrown -upon this important passage by the discovery at Herculaneum of a roll -containing fragments of an Epicurean treatise, so like it as to be at -once regarded as its original. This treatise was at first ascribed to -Phaidros, on the ground of the reference in _Epp. ad Att._ xiii. 39. 2; -but the real title, Φιλοδήμου περὶ εὐσεβείας, was afterwards restored -(_Dox._ p. 530). Diels, however, has shown (_Dox._ pp. 122 sqq.) that -there is much to be said for the view that Cicero did not copy -Philodemos, but that both drew from a common source (no doubt Phaidros, -Περὶ θεῶν) which itself went back to a Stoic epitome of Theophrastos. -The passage of Cicero and the relevant fragments of Philodemos are -edited in parallel columns by Diels (_Dox._ pp. 531 sqq.). - - II. BIOGRAPHICAL DOXOGRAPHERS - -[Sidenote: Hippolytos.] - -13. Of the “biographical doxographies,” the most important is Book I. of -the _Refutation of all Heresies_ by Hippolytos. This had long been known -as the _Philosophoumena_ of Origen; but the discovery of the remaining -books, which were first published at Oxford in 1854, showed finally that -it could not belong to him. It is drawn mainly from some good epitome of -Theophrastos, in which the matter was already rearranged under the names -of the various philosophers. We must note, however, that the sections -dealing with Thales, Pythagoras, Herakleitos, and Empedokles come from -an inferior source, some merely biographical compendium full of -apocryphal anecdotes and doubtful statements. - - -[Sidenote: The _Stromateis_.] - -14. The fragments of the pseudo-Plutarchean _Stromateis_, quoted by -Eusebios in his _Praeparatio Evangelica_, come from a source similar to -that of the best portions of the _Philosophoumena_. So far as we can -judge, they differ chiefly in two points. In the first place, they are -mostly taken from the earliest sections of the work, and therefore most -of them deal with the primary substance, the heavenly bodies and the -earth. In the second place, the language is a much less faithful -transcript of the original. - - -[Sidenote: “Diogenes Laertios.”] - -15. The scrap-book which goes by the name of Diogenes Laertios, or -Laertios Diogenes (cf. Usener, _Epicurea_, pp. 1 sqq.), contains large -fragments of two distinct doxographies. One is of the merely -biographical, anecdotic, and apophthegmatic kind used by Hippolytos in -his first four chapters; the other is of a better class, more like the -source of Hippolytos’ remaining chapters. An attempt is made to disguise -this “contamination” by referring to the first doxography as a “summary” -(κεφαλαιωδής) account, while the second is called “particular” (ἐπὶ -μέρους). - - -[Sidenote: Patristic doxographies.] - -16. Short doxographical summaries are to be found in Eusebios (_P. E._ -x., xiv., xv.), Theodoret (_Gr. aff. cur._ ii. 9-11), Irenæus (_C. -haer._ ii. 14), Arnobius (_Adv. nat._ ii. 9), Augustine (_Civ. Dei_, -viii. 2). These depend mainly upon the writers of “Successions,” whom we -shall have to consider in the next section. - - - _C._—BIOGRAPHERS - -[Sidenote: Successions.] - -17. The first to write a work entitled _Successions of the Philosophers_ -was Sotion (Diog. ii. 12; R. P. 4 a), about 200 B.C. The arrangement of -his work is explained in _Dox._ p. 147. It was epitomised by Herakleides -Lembos. Other writers of Διαδοχαί were Antisthenes, Sosikrates, and -Alexander. All these compositions were accompanied by a very meagre -doxography, and made interesting by the addition of unauthentic -apophthegms and apocryphal anecdotes. - - -[Sidenote: Hermippos.] - -18. The peripatetic Hermippos of Smyrna, known as Καλλιμάχειος (_c._ 200 -B.C.), wrote several biographical works which are frequently quoted. The -biographical details are very untrustworthy indeed; but sometimes -bibliographical information is added, which doubtless rests upon the -Πίνακες of Kallimachos. - - -[Sidenote: Satyros.] - -19. Another peripatetic, Satyros, the pupil of Aristarchos, wrote (_c._ -160 B.C.) _Lives of Famous Men_. The same remarks apply to him as to -Hermippos. His work was epitomised by Herakleides Lembos. - - -[Sidenote: “Diogenes Laertios.”] - -20. The work which goes by the name of Laertios Diogenes is, in its -biographical parts, a mere patchwork of all earlier learning. It has not -been digested or composed by any single mind at all. It is little more -than a collection of extracts made at haphazard, possibly by more than -one successive possessor of the MS. But, of course, it contains much -that is of the greatest value. - - - _D._—CHRONOLOGISTS - -[Sidenote: Eratosthenes and Apollodoros.] - -21. The founder of ancient chronology was Eratosthenes of Kyrene -(275-194 B.C.); but his work was soon supplanted by the metrical version -of Apollodoros (_c._ 140 B.C.), from which most of our information as to -the dates of early philosophers is derived. See Diels’ paper on the -Χρονικά of Apollodoros in _Rhein. Mus._ xxxi.; and Jacoby, _Apollodors -Chronik_ (1902). - -The method adopted is as follows:—If the date of some striking event in -a philosopher’s life is known, that is taken as his _floruit_ (ἀκμή), -and he is assumed to have been forty years old at that date. In default -of this, some historical era is taken as the _floruit_. Of these the -chief are the eclipse of Thales 586/5 B.C., the taking of Sardeis in -546/5 B.C., the accession of Polykrates in 532/1 B.C., and the -foundation of Thourioi in 444/3 B.C. Further details will easily be -found by reference to the Index, _s.v._ Apollodoros. - - - - - INDEXES - - - I. ENGLISH - - Aahmes, 22, 46 - Abaris, 87, 97 _n._ 205 - Abdera, school of, 381 - Abstinence, Orphic and Pythagorean, 102 sq., 104 sq.; - Empedoklean, 289 - Academy, 35 - Achilles and the Tortoise, 367 - Aether. _See_ αἰθήρ - Aetios, App. § 10 - Aigospotamos, meteoric stone of, 292, 312, 413 sq. - Air, 77, 78, 79 _n._ 154, 120, 173, 214, 224, 263, 309, 336, 341, 411 - sq. See ἀήρ - Akousmata, 105 sq., 328 - Akousmatics, 96, 103 - Akragas, 228 sqq. - Akron, 231 - Alexander Aetolus, 295 - Alexander Aphrodisiensis, 139, 209 - Alkidamas, 229 _n._ 504, 231 _n._ 5, 235, 297 _n._ 675, 321 _n._ 739, - 360 - Alkmaion, 123 _n._ 263, 223 sq., 236, 327, 344, 350 - Amasis, 39 - Ameinias, 193 - Anaxagoras, 290 sqq.; - and Perikles, 294 sqq.; - and Euripides, 295; - relation to Ionic school, 292; - and Zeno, 362 - Anaxagoreans, 35 _n._ 50, 415 - Anaximander, 52 sqq. - Anaximenes, 75 sqq.; - School of, 83, 292, 408 _n._ 997 - Androkydes, 328 - Andron of Ephesos, 93 - Animals, Anaximander, 72 sqq.; - Empedokles, 279 sqq.; - Anaxagoras, 315 sqq.; - Diogenes of Apollonia, 414 - Antichthon, 344, 349 sqq. - Antonius Diogenes, 92 - Apollo Hyperboreios, 93 _n._ 189, 97 _n._ 205, 232 - Apollodoros, App. § 21, 43, 52, 75, 94 _n._ 192, 125, 143, 192 sq., 228 - sq., 290 sq., 358, 370 - Apollonios of Tyana, 90, 92 - Apophthegms, 51, 127 - Archelaos, 415 sqq. - Archippos, 99, 319 - Archytas, 110, 319, 328, 346 - Aristarchos of Samos, 349 - Aristeas of Prokonnesos, 87, 97 _n._ 205 - Aristophanes, 75, 296 _n._ 669, 381, 408 - Aristotle, App. § 2; - on Egypt, 18, 23; - on Thales, 47 sqq., 50; - on Anaximander, 57 sqq.; - on Pythagoras, 93 _n._ 189, 100, 107 _n._ 226; - on Xenophanes, 137 sq., 139 sq.; - on Herakleitos, 160 _n._ 373, 162, 177, 179; - on Parmenides, 193, 203, 207, 208, 213; - on Alkmaion, 223; - on Empedokles, 177 _n._ 401, 228 _n._ 502, 231 _n._ 511, 234, 237, - 253 _n._ 565, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 271, 272, 274 _n._ 606, - 278, 280, 281, 397 _n._ 962; - on Anaxagoras, 263 _n._ 582, 291, 303, 305, 306, 309, 310; - on the Pythagoreans, 100 _n._ 208, 110, 111 _n._ 232, 119, 331 sqq., - 353 sqq.; - on Zeno, 361, 365 sqq.; - on Melissos, 374 sq., 377, 378; - on Leukippos, 380, 385 sq., 387, 397 _n._ 962; - on Hippon, 49 _n._ 2, 406; - on the _galeus levis_, 74 _n._ 141; - on the theoretic life, 90, 108; - on the mysteries, 91 - [Aristotle] _de Mundo_, 185 - [Aristotle] _de Plantis_, 279 _n._ 618, 298 _n._ 677, 315 - Aristoxenos on Pythagoras, 92, 94 _n._ 191, 95, 96 _n._ 201, 3, 98 sq., - 102, 109 _n._ 231; - on the Pythagoreans, 107, 319, 334, 353; - Πυθαγορικαὶ ἀποφάσεις, 100 _n._ 209, 325; - on Hippon, 406 _n._ 988; - on Plato, 323 sqq. - Arithmetic, Egyptian, 22, 111 _n._ 233; - Pythagorean, 109 sq. - Arithmetical symbolism, 111 - Astronomy, Babylonian and Greek, 25 sqq. - _See_ Heavenly bodies, Sun, Moon, Planets, Stars, Earth, Eclipses, - Geocentric and Heliocentric hypothesis - Atheism, 51, 75, 141 - Athens, Parmenides and Zeno at, 192; - Anaxagoras at, 294 - Atomism. _See_ Leukippos - Atoms, 387 sqq. - - Babylonian language, 21 _n._ 29; - astronomy, 25 sqq.; - eclipse cycle, 41; - μαθηματικοί, 350 _n._ 834 - Beans, 102 - Biology. _See_ Animals, Plants - Blood, Empedokles, 286, 288; - Diogenes of Apollonia, 414 - Brain, Alkmaion, 224; - Empedokles, 235; - Sicilian school of medicine, 288 _n._ 645 - Breath. _See_ Respiration. - Breath of the World, 79, 120 - - Cave, Orphic, 257 _n._ 571 - Chaos, 8, 9 _n._ 7 - Chronos, 10 - Cicero, App. § 12; - on Thales, 50; - on Anaximander, 64; - on Anaximenes, 82; - on Parmenides, 220, 221 _n._ 482; - on Atomism, 393 _n._ 953, 394 _n._ 956 - Clement of Alexandria, 19 - Comic poets on Pythagoreans, 103 _n._ 218 - Condensation. _See_ Rarefaction - Conflagration. _See_ ἐκπύρωσις - Continuity, 369 - Copernicus, 349 - Corporealism, 15 sq., 206, 227, 357, 377 - Cosmogonies, 8 sqq. - Croesus, 28, 37, 38 - Çulvasūtras, 24 - - Damasias, 43 _n._ 68 - Damaskios, 9 _n._ 10, 232 - Darkness, 79, 121, 173, 214 - Death, Herakleitos, 171 sqq.; - Parmenides, 222; - Alkmaion, 225; - Empedokles, 283 - Dekad, 113 - Demetrios Phalereus, 290, 408 - Demokritos, 2 _n._ 1; - date, 381; - on Egyptian mathematics, 24; - on Anaxagoras, 291, 381; - primitive astronomy of, 345, 392; - and Leukippos, 381 - Diagonal and Square, 116 - Dialectic, 361 - Dikaiarchos on Pythagoras, 92, 96 _n._ 202, 100 - Diogenes of Apollonia, 381, 407 sqq. - Divisibility, 304, 306, 362, 365, 376 - Dodecahedron, 341 sqq. - Doric dialect, 325, 327 sq. - - Earth, a sphere, 26; - Thales, 47 sqq.; - Anaximander, 70, 72; - Anaximenes, 80, 81, 83 _n._ 167; - Xenophanes, 136; - Anaxagoras, 313; - Pythagoreans, 344 sqq.; - Leukippos, 401; - Diogenes of Apollonia, 413 - Echekrates, 343 - Eclipses, Thales, 40 sqq.; - Anaximander, 67; - Anaximenes, 82; - Herakleitos, 164; - Alkmaion, 224; - Empedokles, 276; - Anaxagoras, 299; - Pythagoreans, 349 sq.; - Leukippos, 401 - Ecliptic. _See_ Obliquity - Effluences. _See_ ἀπορροαί - Egypt, 39; - Thales in Egypt, 43; - Pythagoras and Egypt, 94 sq. - Egyptian arithmetic, 22 sq.; - geometry, 23 sq., 44 sq. - Ekphantos, 338 _n._ 794, 387 _n._ 939 - Elea, era of, 125 _n._ 270, 127, 192 - Eleatics (_see_ Parmenides, Zeno, Melissos), 35 _n._ 49; - Leukippos and, 382 sqq. - Elements (_see_ στοιχεῖα, Roots, Seeds, ἰδέα, εἶδος, μορφή), 56 _n._ - 103, 57, 59, 235, 263 sqq., 265 _n._ 586, 339 sqq. - Eleusinia, 86 - Embryology, Parmenides, 203 _n._ 448; - Empedokles, 282 - Empedokles, 227 sqq.; - relation to Leukippos, 236, 383, 392; - on Xenophanes, 138, 246 _n._ 555; - on Pythagoras, 232, 259 _n._ 577; - on Parmenides, 239, 261 - Ephesos, 143 sqq. - Epicurus and Leukippos, 380 sq., 388 _n._ 940, 391 _n._ 949, 394 sq. - Epimenides, 9, 87 - Equinoxes, precession of, 25, 347 _n._ 824 - Eratosthenes, App. § 21, 228 _n._ 502 - Eros, 9, 219 - Euclid, 116, 117 - Eudemos on Thales, 44 sq.; - on Pythagoras, 115 _n._ 241, 116 _n._ 243; - on Parmenides, 203 _n._ 449; - on Zeno, 363, 366 _n._ 889; - on the term στοιχεῖον, 263 _n._ 580 - Eudoxos, 118, 216, 342 - Eukleides of Megara, 355 - Euripides (fr. inc. 910), 12 _n._ 14, 14 _n._ 18; - and Anaxagoras, 295 sq. - Eurytos, 110 sq., 320, 322 - Eusebios, 19 - Euthymenes, 44 - Even and Odd, 333 sqq. - Evolution, Anaximander, 73 sq.; - Empedokles, 281; - Anaxagoras, 315 - Examyes, 40 - Experiment, 31 sq., 274 - - Figures, numerical, 110 sq., 337 - Fire, 121, 160 sq., 215 - Fire, central, 218, 344 sqq. - Forgeries, 46, 113 _n._ 235, 185 - Fossils, 136 - - Galen, 234 - _Galeus levis_, 74 _n._ 141 - Geocentric hypothesis, 31, 123, 218 - Geometry, Egyptian, 23 sq.; - of Thales, 45 sq.; - of Pythagoras, 115 sq. - Glaukos of Rhegion, 228 _n._ 503 - Gnomon (the instrument), 31 _n._ 4, 53 - Gnomon (in geometry and arithmetic), 114 _n._ 238 - Gods, Thales, 50; - Anaximander, 64, 74; - Anaximenes, 82; - Xenophanes, 140 sq.; - Herakleitos, 188 sq.; - Empedokles, 264, 272, 288 sq.; - Diogenes of Apollonia, 410 _n._ 1005 - Gorgias, 229 _n._ 504, 231, 234, 256 _n._ 569, 287 _n._ 642, 417 - Great Year, 25, 175 - - Harmonics, 118 - “Harmony of the Spheres,” 122, 351. - _See_ ἁρμονία and Soul - Harpedonapts, 24, 116 - Hearing, Empedokles, 285; - Anaxagoras, 317 - Heart, 235, 288 _n._ 645 - Heavenly bodies, Anaximander, 66 sqq.; - Anaximenes, 80, 81; - Pythagoras, 122 sq.; - Xenophanes, 133 sqq.; - Herakleitos, 165 sqq.; - Parmenides, 215; - Empedokles, 274 sq.; - Anaxagoras, 312; - Leukippos, 401; - Diogenes of Apollonia, 413 - Hekataios, 20, 44, 46, 53 - Heliocentric hypothesis, 27, 347 _n._ 825, 348 sq. - Herakleides of Pontos, on Pythagoras, 104, 105, 108, 321 _n._ 739, 387 - _n._ 939; - on Empedokles, 228 _n._ 502, 3, 233 _n._ 520, 236 _n._ 532; - heliocentric hypothesis of, 349 - Herakleiteans, 35 _n._ 48, 140, 417 - Herakleitos, 143 sqq.; - on Homer, 182, 185; - on Pythagoras, 94, 107, 143; - on Xenophanes, 143 - Hermodoros, 143 - Herodotos, on Homer and Hesiod, 8; - on Egyptian influence, 17; - on geometry, 23; - on Orphicism, 95 _n._ 195; - on Solon, 28; - on Lydian influence, 38; - on Thales, 38, 39, 40, 43 sq., 46; - on Pythagoras, 93, 94 _n._ 191, 95 _n._ 195, 2, 107 - Hesiod, 6 sqq. - Hieron, 125 - Hippasos, 103 _n._ 217, 117, 121, 156, 215, 341, 343, 354 - Hippokrates, 235 _n._ 528, 405 _n._ 987, 411 _n._ 1008; - Περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων, 79 _n._ 154 - [Hippokrates] Περὶ διαίτης, 167 _n._ 383, 183 _n._ 413, 305 _n._ 695, - 307 _n._ 699, 405 _n._ 986 - Hippokrates, lunules of, 343 - Hippolytos, App. § 13, 156 - Hippon of Samos, 49, 58 _n._ 109, 406 sqq. - Hippys of Rhegion, 121 _n._ 260 - Homer, 5 sqq. - Hylozoism, 15 - Hypotenuse, 116 - - Iamblichos, _V. Pyth._, 92 _n._ 186 - Ibykos, 220 _n._ 482 - Idaios of Himera, 58 _n._ 109, 407 - Ideas, theory of, 354 sqq. - Immortality, 91, 172 sq., 225 - Incommensurability, 116 sq. - Indian philosophy, 21. - _See_ Transmigration - Infinity, Anaximander, 59 sqq.; - Xenophanes, 137 sq.; - Parmenides, 207; - Melissos, 375. - _See_ Divisibility, ἄπειρον - Injustice, 56, 71, 160, 226 - Ionic dialect, 327 sq., 408 - - Justice, 32, 161 _n._ 374 - - Kebes and Simmias, 320, 343, 354, 355 - Kebes, Πίναξ, 194 - Kratinos, 406 - Kratylos, 417 - Kritias, 288 _n._ 645 - Kroton, 95 _n._ 198, 222 - Kylon, 97 _n._ 204, 98 - - Lampsakos, 297, 415 - Leukippos, 380 sqq.; - and the Eleatics, 382, 384 sqq.; - and Empedokles, 236, 383, 392; - and Anaxagoras, 383 sq., 392; - and the Pythagoreans, 387, 389, 392; - and Demokritos, 381, 389 sqq., 401 _n._ 979 - Light, Empedokles, 276. - _See_ Moon - Lightning and Thunder, 68, 70, 401 _n._ 979 - Limit, 121, 215, 333 sqq. - Lives, the three, 108, 109 _n._ 229, 154 _n._ 362 - Love. _See_ Eros, Love and Strife, 266 sqq. - Lucretius, on Empedokles, 237; - on Anaxagoras, 306 _n._ 696 - Lydia, 37 sqq. - Lysis, 99, 319, 326 - - Man, Anaximander, 73; - Herakleitos, 168 sqq. - Maoris, 9 - Map, Anaximander’s, 53 - Materialism, 208 - Matter. _See_ ὕλη - Measures, 167 sq., 181, 410, 413 - Medicine, history of, 222, 225, 226, 234, 236, 265 sq., 288 _n._ 645, - 322, 344, 405, 411, 414 - Megarians, 355 - Melissos, 369 sqq. - _Melissos, Xenophanes and Gorgias_, 138 sqq. - Menon, Ἰατρικά, 49 _n._ 85, 235 _n._ 527, 322 _n._ 742, 327 _n._ 763, - 340 _n._ 799, 406 _n._ 988 - Metapontion, 95 _n._ 199, 97 _n._ 205 - Metempsychosis. _See_ Transmigration - Meteorological interest, 49, 70 - Miletos, 37 sqq., 76, 380, 382 - Milky Way, 69, 220, 314 - Milo, 99, 222 - Mochos of Sidon, 19 _n._ 27 - Monism, 206, 227 - Monotheism, 141 sqq. - Moon, 68; - light of, 202 _n._ 446, 275, 276, 299, 314 - Motion, eternal, 15, 61; - denied by Parmenides, 207; - explained by Empedokles, 267; - Anaxagoras, 309; - criticised by Zeno, 366; - denied by Melissos, 376; - reaffirmed by Leukippos, 392 sq. - Mysteries, 90, 190 - - Necessity. _See_ Ἀνάγκη - Nikomachos, 92, 112 _n._ 234 - Nile, 43 sq., 313 - Noumenios, 19 - Nous, 309 sq. - Numbers, Pythagorean, 331 sqq.; - triangular, square, and oblong, 114 - - Obliquity of the ecliptic (zodiac), 52, 82, 401 - Observation, 29 sq., 73 sq. - Octave, 118 - Opposites, 56, 186 sq., 225, 235, 266, 305 - Oriental influences, 17 sqq. - Orphicism, 5, 9 sqq., 87 sq., 95 _n._ 195, 109 _n._ 229, 194, 221, 232, - 257 _n._ 571, 258 _n._ 573 - - Parmenides, 192 sqq.; - on Herakleitos, 143, 198 _n._ 438, 204 sq., 210; - and Pythagoreanism, 210 sqq. - Pausanias, 234 _n._ 523, 238 - Pentagram, 343 - Perception, Parmenides, 202 _n._ 447, 222; - Alkmaion, 223 sq.; - Empedokles, 284 sq.; - Anaxagoras, 316 sq.; - Leukippos, 401 sq.; - Diogenes of Apollonia, 414 - Perikles and Zeno, 193; - and Anaxagoras, 294 sq.; - and Melissos, 369 - Petron, 65, 121 - Pherekydes of Syros, 9, 87 - Philistion, 234 _n._ 523, 235 _n._ 526 and 527, 266 _n._ 587, 288 _n._ - 645, 356 _n._ 850 - Philo of Byblos, 19 _n._ 27 - Philo Judaeus, 18, 158, 185 - Philodemos, 50 _n._ 89, 64, 221 _n._ 483 - Philolaos, 319, 320 sqq. - Philosophy as κάθαρσις, 89; - Pythagorean use of the word, 89 sqq., 194, 321 _n._ 739, 359; - synonymous with asceticism, 18 - Phleious, 89 _n._ 178, 94 _n._ 191, 109 _n._ 229, 320 - Phoenician influence, 18, 19 _n._ 27, 39 - Physiology, Parmenides, 221 sq.; - Alkmaion, 223; - Empedokles, 282; - Diogenes of Apollonia, 411 - Pindar, 232 - Planets, names of, 26 _n._ 40, 220; - distinguished from fixed stars, 26, 82, 276, 392, 401; - motion of, 122 sq., 225, 350, 353; - system of, 344 sq. - Plants, Empedokles, 277 sq.; - Anaxagoras, 315 sq. - Plato, App. § 1; - on Egyptians and Phoenicians, 17, 20, 27 _n._ 41; - on Egyptian arithmetic, 22; - on schools of philosophy, 35; - on Pythagoras, 96 _n._ 202; - on Xenophanes, 140; - on Herakleitos, 140, 159, 162, 176, 178; - on Herakleiteans, 161 _n._ 373, 188 _n._ 418; - on Parmenides, 192, 207, 221; - on Empedokles, 159, 178, 269 _n._ 593; - on Anaxagoras, 291 _n._ 655, 295, 297 sq., 309; - on Philolaos, 319; - on Pythagoreans, 121, 124; - on incommensurables, 117 _n._ 245; - on Zeno, 192, 358, 360, 361; - on Melissos, 379 _n._ 919; - _Phaedo_, 89 _n._ 178, 91 _n._ 183, 108 _n._ 228, 109 _n._ 229, 172 - _n._ 391,182 _n._ 411, 320 sq., 342, 343, 345, 354; - _Cratylus_, 417 _n._ 1027; - _Theaetetus_, 117 _n._ 245, 263 _n._ 580, 338 _n._ 794, 417 _n._ - 1027; - _Sophist_, 356 _n._ 849, 358 _n._ 853; - _Politicus_, 280 _n._ 621; - _Parmenides_, 358 _n._ 852, 359, 360 sq.; - _Philebus_, 323; - _Symposium_, 221, 281 _n._ 625; - _Phaedrus_, 295; - _Gorgias_, 321; - _Meno_, 234 _n._ 524; - _Republic_, 25 _n._ 39, 90 _n._ 181, 177 _n._ 400, 216, 219 sq., 352; - _Timaeus_, 61 _n._ 115, 79 _n._ 154, 113 _n._ 237, 118 _n._ 248, 121, - 122, 225, 287, 340, 342, 345 _n._ 818, 346, 352, 396; - _Laws_, 107 _n._ 227, 117 _n._ 246, 353 - Pleasure and pain, Empedokles, 285; - Anaxagoras, 317 - Pliny, 42, 52 - Pluralism, 227 sqq., 357 - Political activity of philosophers, Thales, 46; - Pythagoras, 96 sq.; - Parmenides, 195; - Empedokles, 230 sq.; - Zeno, 358 - Polybios, 99 _n._ 206 - Polybos, 379 - Polykrates, era of, 53 _n._ 97, 94 - Pores. _See_ πόροι - Porphyry, 92 _n._ 187, 104 _n._ 219, 257 _n._ 571 - Poseidonios, 19 _n._ 27, 81 _n._ 159 - Precession. _See_ Equinoxes - Proclus, commentary on Euclid, 44, 115 _n._ 243 - Proportion, 117 sq. - Protagoras, 188, 360 - Purification. _See_ καθαρμός, κάθαρσις - Pyramids, measurement of, 45. - _See_ πυραμίς - Pythagoras, 91 sqq.; - forged writings, 325 - Pythagoreans, 212 sqq., 319 sqq. - - Rarefaction and condensation, 77 sqq., 163, 204, 403, 412 - Religion, 85 sqq., 189, 294. - _See_ Orphicism, Monotheism, Gods, Sacrifice - Respiration, 235, 253 _n._ 565, 284 - Rest. _See_ Motion - Revolution, diurnal, 61, 274, 346 sq. - Rhegion, 99, 220 _n._ 482, 319 - Rhetoric, 86, 234 - Rhind papyrus, 22 sqq. - Roots, 263 - - Sacrifice, mystic, 104 _n._ 220; - bloodless, 258 _n._ 576 - Salmoxis, 93 - Sanchuniathon, 19 _n._ 27 - Sardeis, era of, 43 _n._ 67, 53, 75 - Schools, 33 sqq., 293 - Sea, Anaximander, 66, 70 sq.; - Empedokles, 277; - Anaxagoras, 313; - Diogenes of Apollonia, 413 - Seeds, 306 - Seqt, 23, 46 - Seven Wise Men, 39, 46, 51 - Sight, Alkmaion, 224; - Empedokles, 284, 287 sq.; - Anaxagoras, 316 - Silloi, 129 - Sleep, Herakleitos, 169 sq.; - Empedokles, 283 - Smell, Empedokles, 285; - Anaxagoras, 316 - Sokrates, Parmenides and Zeno, 192 sq., 358; - and Archelaos, 415 - Solids, regular, 328 sq., 340 - Solon. _See_ Croesus - Soul, 86, 91, 168, 225, 343, 414 - Space, 204, 207, 366, 389 - Speusippos, 113 _n._ 236; - on Parmenides, 195; - on Pythagorean numbers, 321, 336 _n._ 790 - Sphere, Parmenides, 207 sq.; - Empedokles, 262. - _See_ Earth, Eudoxos, Harmony - Stars, fixed, 68, 80 - Stoics, App. § 3, 157, 179 sq. - Strabo, 19 _n._ 27, 194, 195 _n._ 430 - Strife, Herakleitos, 184; - Empedokles, 266 sqq. - Sun, Anaximander, 68; - Anaximenes, 80; - Xenophanes, 134 sq.; - Herakleitos, 165 sq., 174; - Empedokles, 274 sq., 347 sq.; - Anaxagoras, 314 - - Taras, 97 _n._ 204, 319 - Taste, Empedokles, 285; - Anaxagoras, 316 - Tetraktys, 113 sqq. - Thales, 39 sqq. - Theaitetos, 117, 329 - Theano, 353 - Thebes, Lysis at, 99, 320; - Philolaos at, 99 - Theodoros of Kyrene, 117 - Theogony, Hesiodic, 6 sqq.; - Rhapsodic, 9 _n._ 10, 232 - Theologians, 10 - Theology. _See_ Gods - Theon of Smyrna, 27 _n._ 41 - Theophrastos, App. § 7; - on schools, 33, 35, 52; - on Prometheus, 39 _n._ 55; - on Thales, 48; - Anaximander, 54 sqq., 66; - on Anaximenes, 76 sqq.; - on Xenophanes, 126, 136, 137; - on Herakleitos, 145, 156, 163 sqq.; - on Parmenides, 209, 213, 214, 218, 220; - on Empedokles, 229 _n._ 504, 236, 267 sq., 272 sqq., 278, 284; - on Anaxagoras, 291, 292, 293 _n._ 660, 313 sq., 316 sq.; - on Leukippos, 380 sq., 382, 384 sqq., 390 sqq., 402; - on Diogenes of Apollonia, 381, 407 sq., 412; - on Hippon of Samos, 406 - Theoretic life, 291 - Theron of Akragas, 229, 232 - Thourioi, era of, 228 - Timaios Lokros, 323 sqq. - Timaios of Tauromenion, 228 _n._ 508, 230, 233, 237 _n._ 534 - Timon of Phleious, 129, 324 - Touch, Empedokles, 285; - Anaxagoras, 316 - Transmigration, 95, 101 sqq., 124, 289 sq. - Triangle, Pythagorean, 24, 115 - - Unit, 337, 365 - - Void, Pythagorean, 120, 214, 224, 336, 383; - Parmenides, 204, 207; - Alkmaion, 224; - Atomist, 389 sq. - Vortex, Empedokles, 274; - Anaxagoras, 311; - Leukippos, 399 sqq. - - Water, 48 sqq., 407 - Weight, 394 sqq. - Wheels, Anaximander, 67 sq.; - Pythagoras, 122; - Parmenides, 215 - Worlds, innumerable, Anaximander, 62 sqq.; - Anaximenes, 82 sq.; - Pythagoras, 121; - Xenophanes, 136; - Anaxagoras, 312; - Diogenes of Apollonia, 414; - Archelaos, 417 - - Xenophanes, 124 sqq.; - on Thales, 41; - on Pythagoras, 124 - - Year. _See_ Great Year - - Zamolxis, 93 - Zankle, 127 _n._ 275 - Zeno, 358 sqq.; - on Empedokles, 359; - on Pythagoreans, 362 - - - II. GREEK - - ἀδικία, 56, 60, 71 - ἀήρ, 79 _n._ 154, 263, 264 _n._ 583, 284 _n._ 634. - _See_ Air - αἰθήρ, 263, 264 _n._ 583, 312 _n._ 709 - ἀκούσματα, 105 sq., 328 - ἀκουσματικοί, 96, 103 - Ἀνάγκη, 219, 256 _n._ 569, 269 - ἀναθυμίασις, 167 _n._ 382, 168 _n._ 385 - ἀντέρεισις, 400 - ἄντυξ, 216 - ἄπειρον, 57 _n._ 105, 60 _n._ 113 - ἄπνους, ἡ, 233 _n._ 520, 236 _n._ 533 - ἀπορροαί, 236, 287 _n._ 642 - ἀποτομή, 391 _n._ 949 - ἀριθμητική dist. λογιστική, 23, 111 _n._ 233 - ἁρμονία, 122, 158, 184 - ἁρπεδονάπται, 24 - ἀρχή, 13, 57 - αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν, 355 _n._ 847 - - γαλεοί, 73 sq. - γόητες, 106 - - δαίμων, 155 _n._ 364, 172 _n._ 391 - διαστήματα, 65 _n._ 126 - δίκη, 32, 161 _n._ 374 - δίνη. _See_ Vortex - διορίζω, 120 _n._ 254 - - εἶδος, 355, 388 _n._ 943 - εἴδωλα, 403 - εἶναι, 198 _n._ 435; - τὸ ἐόν, 204 _n._ 450 - ἔκθλιψις, 397 _n._ 962 - ἔκκρισις, 61 - ἐκπύρωσις, 178 sqq. - ἕν, τὸ, 140, 363 _n._ 880, 377 - ἐναντία. _See_ Opposites - ἑνίζειν, 139 _n._ 306 - ἐπίψαυσις, 400 - ἐστώ, 330 _n._ 770 - - θεός, 74. - _See_ Gods - θεωρία, 28, 108 - - ἰδέα, 235 _n._ 527, 263 _n._ 580, 355, 356 _n._ 850, 388 _n._ 943 - ἶδος, 243 _n._ 549, 249 _n._ 558 - ἰσονομία, 225 - ἰσορροπία, 398 - ἱστορία, 14 _n._ 18, 28, 107 _n._ 244 - - καθαρμός, κάθαρσις, 88, 107 sq. - κεγχρίτης λόγος, 1 _n._ 862 - κλεψύδρα, 253 _n._ 565, 254 _n._ 566, 263, 309, 384 - κληροῦχος, 219 - κόσμος, 32, 148 _n._ 336, 182 _n._ 412 - κρατέω, 310 - - λογιστική dist. ἀριθμητική, 23 - λόγος, 146 _n._ 332, 148 _n._ 339, 152 _n._ 355, 153 _n._ 358 and _n._ - 359, 157; - λόγος τοῦ εἶναι, 355 _n._ 847 - - μεσότης, 118 - μετάρσια, 296 _n._ 670 - μετεμψύχωσις, 101 _n._ 212 - μετενσωμάτωσις, 101 _n._ 212 - μετέωρα, 32 - μορφή, 263 _n._ 580, 356 _n._ 850 - - ὄγκοι, 338 _n._ 794, 368 _n._ 894, 387 _n._ 939 - ὁλκάς, 341 _n._ 805 - ὁμοιομερῆ, 306 - ὅμοιος, ὁμοιότης, 72 _n._ 138 - ὄργια, 88 _n._ 175 - ὅρος, 115 _n._ 240 - οὐρανός, 31, 140 _n._ 310; - Aristotle’s πρῶτος οὐρανός, 177 - - πάγος, 273 _n._ 603 - παλιγγενεσία, 101 _n._ 212 - παλίντονος, 150 _n._ 184 - παλίντροπος, 150 _n._ 347, 198 _n._ 438 - πανσπερμία, 307, 389 - περιαγωγή, 63 _n._ 119 - περιέχω, 60 _n._ 114, 170 _n._ 389 - περίστασις, 63 _n._ 119 - πίλησις, 77 _n._ 151 - πόροι, 224, 226 _n._ 500, 236, 269, 284 sq., 383 - πρηστήρ, 69 _n._ 133, 165 - πυραμίς, 25 _n._ 38 - - ῥαψῳδῶ, 127 _n._ 276 - ῥοπή, 398 - - σῆμα σῶμα, 321 - στασιῶται, 140 _n._ 307 - στέφαναι, 215 - στοιχεῖον, 54 _n._ 101, 56 _n._ 103, 263 _n._ 586, 265 _n._ 586, 306, - 333, 388 _n._ 942 - συνοικειῶ, 157 _n._ 370 - - τετρακτύς, 113 sq. - τροπαί, 67 _n._ 129, 174 - - ὕλη, 57, 330 _n._ 770, 342 _n._ 807 - ὑπόθεσις, 33 _n._ 46, 360 _n._ 866, 361 _n._ 871 - ὑποτείνουσα, 116 _n._ 242 - - φαινόμενα, σῴζειν τὰ, 33 _n._ 46 - φιλοσοφία, φιλόσοφος, φιλοσοφῶ, 28. - _See_ Philosophy - φύσις, 12 sq., 56, 388 _n._ 941 and _n._ 944 - - χώρα, 114 _n._ 238, 115 _n._ 240 - - _Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - Transcriber’s Note - -When Burnet gives the fragments of a Greek philosopher, he does so -selectively, resulting in gaps in the sequence. - -Some quoted and translated passages, printed as prose, also include line -numbers in the right margin. These now appear in the text delimited by -<< >> at the place in the text where they originally appeared. These -numbers should be regarded as approximate. - -In note 813, the Greek phrase includes an unmatched closing bracket. -This is a direct quotation from p. 234 of _Scholia in Lucianum_, edited -by Hugo Rabe. The bracket was used by Rabe to separate the topic (the -pentagram) from its gloss. - -Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and -are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original. - - 75.13 according to Theophra[s]tos Added. - - 197.21 Look stea[fd/df]astly with thy mind Transposed. - - 212.26 It seem[s] to me Added. - - 213.18 and Theoph[astros/rastos]certainly followed Misplaced. - him - - 249.21 meadows of Aph[h]rodite Removed. - - 292.34 διήκουσε)[”] Added. - - 331.19 Aristotle on the Number[s]. Added. - - 332.32 τὰ γοῦν θεωρήματα πρ[ό/ο]σάπτουσι Replaced. - - 402 οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι φύσει τὰ αἰσθητ[α/ά] Replaced. - - 415.6 Anaxagorea[ns] Presumed. - - 433.5 παλίντροπ[ὸ/ο]ς Replaced. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following -the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use -of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for -copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very -easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation -of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project -Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away--you may -do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected -by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark -license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country other than the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where - you are located before using this eBook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm website -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that: - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of -the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the Foundation as set -forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, -Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up -to date contact information can be found at the Foundation's website -and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without -widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our website which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This website includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |