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<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 67006 ***</div>
<div class='figcenter' style='width:80%'>
<img src='images/cover.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0000' style='width:100%;height:auto;'/>
</div>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div class='lgc' style=''> <!-- rend=';' -->
<p class='line' style='margin-top:2em;font-size:1.5em;'>TRIAL</p>
<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;margin-bottom:.2em;font-size:.7em;'>OF</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:1.5em;'>THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS</p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'>BEFORE</p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>THE INTERNATIONAL</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>MILITARY TRIBUNAL</p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>NUREMBERG</span></p>
<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:.7em;'>14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946</p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<div class='figcenter'>
<img src='images/title.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0001' style='width:80px;height:auto;'/>
</div>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<p class='line' style='margin-top:4em;font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY</span></p>
<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>1948</span></p>
</div> <!-- end rend -->

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div class='literal-container' style='margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:20em;'><div class='literal'> <!-- rend=';fs:.8em;' -->
<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>This volume is published in accordance with the</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>direction of the International Military Tribunal by</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.</p>
</div></div> <!-- end rend -->

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div class='lgc' style='margin-top:8em;margin-bottom:4em;'> <!-- rend=';' -->
<p class='line'>VOLUME XIV</p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'><span class='gesp'>OFFICIAL TEXT</span></p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'><span class='gesp'>IN THE</span></p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>ENGLISH LANGUAGE</p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<hr class='tbk100'/>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'><span class='gesp'>PROCEEDINGS</span></p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>16 May 1946—28 May 1946</p>
</div> <!-- end rend -->

<hr class='pbk'/>

<table id='tab1' summary='' class='center'>
<colgroup>
<col span='1' style='width: 6em;'/>
<col span='1' style='width: 22.5em;'/>
<col span='1' style='width: 2.5em;'/>
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<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col2 tdStyle0'  colspan='2'><span style='font-size:larger'>CONTENTS</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2'  colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-first Day, Thursday, 16 May 1946,</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_1'>1</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_32'>32</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>&nbsp;</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2'  colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-second Day, Friday, 17 May 1946,</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_63'>63</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_82'>82</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>&nbsp;</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2'  colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-third Day, Saturday, 18 May 1946,</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_107'>107</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>&nbsp;</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2'  colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-fourth Day, Monday, 20 May 1946,</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_143'>143</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_181'>181</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>&nbsp;</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2'  colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-fifth Day, Tuesday, 21 May 1946,</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_228'>228</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_261'>261</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>&nbsp;</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2'  colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-sixth Day, Wednesday, 22 May 1946,</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_287'>287</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_320'>320</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>&nbsp;</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2'  colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-seventh Day, Thursday, 23 May 1946,</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_357'>357</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_386'>386</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>&nbsp;</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2'  colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-eighth Day, Friday, 24 May 1946,</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_418'>418</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_450'>450</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>&nbsp;</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2'  colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Day, Monday, 27 May 1946,</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_494'>494</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_533'>533</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>&nbsp;</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'>&nbsp;</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2'  colspan='3'>One Hundred and Fortieth Day, Tuesday, 28 May 1946,</td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_567'>567</a></td></tr>
<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_601'>601</a></td></tr>
</table>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div><span class='pageno' title='1' id='Page_1'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST DAY</span><br/> Thursday, 16 May 1946</h1></div>

<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL (Col. Charles W. Mays): If it please the Tribunal,
the Defendants Sauckel and Von Papen are absent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Admiral,
yesterday we finished with the somewhat involved Document
C-32, and we had got as far as Point 11. We now come to Point 12,
“Ammunition stocks in excess of the armament permissible.” May
I remind the Tribunal that this is Document C-32, Exhibit USA-50,
in Document Book 10 a, Page 8, Point 12, which contains three
columns.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Defendant, may I ask what you have to say to the accusation
that you exceeded the permissible amount of ammunition?</p>

<p class='pindent'>ERICH RAEDER (Defendant): Certain ammunition stocks were
in excess of the permissible amount and some were below it.
I cannot tell you at this date what the reason was in each particular
case. I assume that this depended to a considerable extent on the
amounts left over from the last World War.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the case of the first two items, the 17- and 15-centimeter
shells, the actual stocks rather exceeded the quantity permitted,
whereas the third item, the 10.5-centimeter, falls very far short of
it—instead of 134,000 there were 87,000. In the case of the 8.8-centimeter
shells there was an excess, then again a deficit, and the same
thing applies to the last item. But they are all very insignificant
amounts.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the copy before the Tribunal there appears
to be a note in the third column—on the next page in yours,
Defendant—saying that quantities of ammunition are partly manufactured
and partly in course of delivery, and that the total amount
permissible will soon be exceeded.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I only wanted to ask you: The list was made out in September
1933. Then are the figures stated correct for September 1933 or
autumn 1933?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not quite understand you.
<span class='pageno' title='2' id='Page_2'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If it says in this document that measures to be
taken later will bring the totals above the quantities permissible,
which—according to this statement—they had not yet reached, then
that is calculated as from autumn 1933.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That may be assumed, yes. Because new ammunition
as well as new guns were being manufactured, and old ammunition
then had to be scrapped.</p>

<p class='pindent'>It also must be noted that ammunition for heavy artillery, which
is not listed here, was in every case short of the permissible
amount. A comparatively large amount of heavy artillery ammunition
had been granted us for heavy coastal guns, and we had by
no means as much as we were allowed to have.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: For the assistance of the Tribunal, I may point
out that this last point is proved by the actual documents in the
hands of the Tribunal. In the Tribunal’s copy under the Figure 12,
Column 2, just beside the separate figures, there is a sentence which
says, “... that the whole quantity permitted for heavy artillery
has not been reached.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>We now come to Number 13: “Exceeding the permissible stocks
of machine guns, rifles, pistols, and gas masks.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Here, too, it must be admitted that in isolated cases
stocks were a little higher than permitted. There were, for instance,
43,000 gas masks instead of the 22,500 permitted. Large numbers of
rifles and machine guns were taken away even by individuals after
the World War to farms, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. They were later collected, and
for that reason there was a comparatively large stock of them.
But we are not dealing here with any considerable quantities.
Similarly ammunition, bayonets, hand grenades, searchlights, fog
equipment, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, also exceeded the prescribed limits but not
to any great extent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, Figure 14: “Obtaining 337 M.G. C/30’s
without scrapping equally serviceable weapons.” As I did not ...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Surely,
Dr. Siemers, it would be possible to deal with all these various
points in the documents in one statement as to why there were
these excesses. We have a statement here which contains 30 different
items, and you have only got as far as 13, and you are dealing
with each one.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, personally I agree entirely. I am
sorry that I caused the Tribunal so much trouble in connection with
this document. As I am not a naval expert, I had a great deal of
trouble finding my way through it; but I do not think that I was
the cause of the trouble. The Prosecution, you see, have made use
of the single points in evidence.
<span class='pageno' title='3' id='Page_3'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the question is—I am not
blaming you, but we want to get on. We are not blaming you. Can’t
it be done in one explanatory statement, one short statement?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I will try, Mr. President, and I will shorten it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>There is no need to say anything more about Numbers 15 to 17.
I think these were the most important points. The points planned
for a later date were not to be effective until the years ’33 and ’34.
I may perhaps just point out to the Tribunal that Number 17 refers
to the intended construction of reserve destroyers. The Versailles
Treaty permitted the construction of these.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I pass over Number 18 because we have already dealt with that.
Number 19, again, refers only to intended construction. Number 20
I may consider irrelevant; it concerns only the arming of fishing
vessels. Numbers 21 to 29 ...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think, perhaps, you should ask the Defendant
to explain some of these observations in the third column.
I mean in Number 18, for instance: “Difficult to detect. If necessary
can be denied.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: These were explanations given to our League of
Nations representative at the Disarmament Conference by the
competent expert. It does not refer to local conditions. Construction
of submarine spare parts, for instance, took place abroad or
was to be prepared. It was actually carried out in 1934 and ’35, and
the first submarine was launched at the end of June 1935.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I may take it, Defendant, that only the construction
and purchase of submarines was prohibited.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, the construction in Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I cannot prove until a later stage that no violation
of the Treaty was involved by the construction of these spare
parts; but I think you will have to give some indication of your
reason for wishing to conceal it, in view of the fact that spare parts
were not forbidden. I may remind you that this took place in
September 1933 at a time when negotiations had already been
planned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that period, before the German-English Naval
Agreement was concluded on the basis of 35 to 100, Hitler was
particularly eager to avoid everything which might embarrass the
negotiations in any way. The construction and preparation of submarine
parts came under this heading as being a subject on which
England was peculiarly sensitive.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an additional reason for this
appendix and other remarks in this second column—namely, the
unfortunate experiences which the Navy had caused in home
<span class='pageno' title='4' id='Page_4'></span>
politics, the fact that whenever the slightest action was taken a
quarrel immediately ensued on the home political front?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; and that went so far that the Reichswehrminister
was attacked on occasions by Prussian ministers who disagreed
with the Reich Government—for instance, Müller, Severing,
Stresemann and later Brüning, who alleged to the Reich Chancellor
that he took steps which he was not authorized to take. In reality,
however, the Reich Government itself had sanctioned these things
already and had accepted the responsibility for them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So these things were kept secret for reasons of
home policy, so that they should not be apparent...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: With the approval of the Reich Government?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: With the approval of the Reich Government. As
regards the firms, a number of firms...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I would prefer now to refer back to Column 2,
Number 20, as I see from the record that the Prosecution have also
expressly raised this point in connection with the arming of fishing
craft, emphasized it, and made it the basis of a charge, “Warning
shots, play it down.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The two fishing boats were quite small vessels and
were normally unarmed. They served to supervise the fishing boats
in the North Sea right up to Iceland, to help them in case of
emergency, to take sick men aboard and to afford protection against
fishermen of other nations. We thought it advisable to mount at
least a 5-centimeter gun on these ships since they were actually
warships. “Warning shots” means that they fired a salute when
they wanted to draw the fishermen’s attention to something; so it
was quite an insignificant affair and had no need to be artificially
reduced to a bagatelle but was in fact a bagatelle.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Numbers 21 to 28. This is a
list of various firms, including industrial firms working on armament
contracts. The Versailles Treaty admitted certain firms for
this type of work while it excluded others. In actual fact, other
firms had received contracts. Perhaps you can make a general
statement on this point.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: This was at a time when we had strong hopes that
progress would be made at the Disarmament Conference. The
Macdonald Plan, which brought about a certain improvement, had
already been accepted; and we might have expected, in consequence,
that the few factories still left to us would have to increase their
output during the next few years. I may refer you to the shipping
replacement scheme. Consequently, factories producing specialized
<span class='pageno' title='5' id='Page_5'></span>
articles were better equipped and supplied. There was, however,
never any question of heavy guns or anything of that kind but of
automatic fuse-igniters, explosives—for instance, mine containers,
<span class='it'>et cetera</span>, small items but special items which could be made only
by certain firms. But, apart from the firms admitted, other firms
which had been excluded were also employed. Thus, for instance,
the Friedrich Krupp Grusenwerke A.G. at Magdeburg, Number 25,
was equipped to manufacture antiaircraft guns and antiaircraft
barrels from 2-centimeters to 10.5-centimeters; similarly Number 26,
a firm manufacturing antiaircraft ammunition, explosives; Number
27...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I do not think we need the details.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. And then engines for which there was also a
great demand.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have some questions which apply to all these
figures. Is this not offset to a certain extent by the fact that
some of the firms admitted had already dropped out for economic
reasons?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, you can certainly say that. These firms had
comparatively few deliveries which were not sufficient to keep
them going.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Defendant, I think one not only can—I think one
must—say so. May I draw your attention to Point 22, Column 3,
which reads, “The list in any case is out of date, as some firms have
dropped out.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That leaves us with Numbers 29 and 30. Number
29, “Preparations in the field of experiments with motorboats.”
I think that these were preparations in a very small field.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At the moment I cannot tell you exactly what this
means.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I do not believe in any case that the Prosecution
will attach any importance to it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then I only want you to make a final statement on Number 30,
“Probable further concrete violations becoming necessary in the
near future” up to 1934 inclusively. To all intents and purposes
you have already answered the question by your reference to the
negotiations planned with the British Government, some of which
were already in progress.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that was the point.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: These are matters, therefore, which were in any
case due to be discussed in the course of the negotiations with the
British Government, or rather the Admiralty.
<span class='pageno' title='6' id='Page_6'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: You cannot say that of them all. For instance,
Points 1 to 3 deal with mines. The number of mines was to be
increased and modern material was to replace the old. It goes on
in the same way with the transfer of guns from the North Sea to
the Baltic “A” batteries, not with the scrapping of guns.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: To conclude the whole matter, may I ask you
to say what impression the whole thing made on a naval expert
like yourself. All things considered, would you say that these are
minor violations, and how far are these violations of an aggressive
nature?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As I said yesterday, most of them are very inadequate
improvements in defense of an almost entirely defenseless position.
The separate items, as I explained yesterday, are so insignificant
that it is really impossible to spend very much time on them. I
believe that the Control Commission also had the impression that
very little weight need be attached to all these matters; for in 1925
when the Control Commission left its station at Kiel where it had
worked with the organizations of the Naval Command, Commander
Fenshow, Admiral Charlton’s chief of staff and head of the Commission,
whose main interest was guns and who had worked with
a Captain Raenkel, a gunner and a specialist in these matters, said:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“We must leave now, and you are glad that we are going.
You did not have a pleasant task, and neither did we. I must
tell you one thing. You need not think that we believed what
you have said. You did not say a single word of truth, but
you have given your information so skillfully that we were
able to accept it, and for that I am grateful to you.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-29, which is Exhibit
USA-46. Mr. President, it is in Raeder’s Document Book 10, Page 8
of the Prosecution’s document book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean 10a?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Number 10, Page 8. This document, too, was
submitted during the general Indictment made by the Prosecution
at the beginning of the Trial on 27 November. It consists of a
speech, a document signed by Raeder, dated 31 January 1933,
“General Directives for the Support of the German Armaments
Industry by the Navy.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution pointed this out;
and they have thought fit to conclude from it that on the day after
Hitler’s nomination as Chancellor of the Reich, you were already
acting positively in his support through this letter. Will you define
your attitude, please?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: There is no connection whatsoever between this letter
and Hitler’s accession to power. You must admit that it would be
<span class='pageno' title='7' id='Page_7'></span>
impossible to compile so long and complicated a document—which
was, after all, carefully prepared—between the evening of 30 and
the morning of 31 January. This document results from the hope,
which I mentioned before, that already under the Papen and Von
Schleicher Government the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and
the Disarmament Conference might be gradually relaxed, since the
British Delegation had repeatedly said that they favored the gradual
restoration of equal rights. We had, therefore, to get our industries
into the best possible condition, as far as the manufacture of armaments
was concerned, by increasing their output and enabling them
to overcome competition.</p>

<p class='pindent'>As I say in Paragraph c of this letter, almost every country was
at that time making efforts in the same direction, even those which,
unlike Germany, had no restrictions imposed on them. Great Britain,
France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy made the
most determined efforts to gain markets for their armaments
industry; and I wanted to follow them in this particular sphere. In
order to do this, there had to be an understanding between the
various departments of the Naval Command Staff to the effect
that industry must be given support in a way which avoided
the secrecy of technical matters and developments to too petty a
degree. That is why I explain in Paragraph c that secrecy in small
matters is less important than maintaining a high standard and
keeping the lead.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I state in the final sentence:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“To sum up, I attach particular importance to the continued
support of the industry in question by the Navy, even after
the expected relaxation of the present restrictions, so that
the industry would command confidence abroad and would
find a market.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>This has nothing at all to do with Hitler nor with any independent
rearmament on my own behalf.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us when, approximately, you drafted
these directives?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: During the month of January. I may say that we had
a conference—perhaps at the beginning of January—and after that
I had it put in writing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That would be certainly 2 to 3 weeks before this
letter was written?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, certainly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think it happens rarely that one receives a
letter from a government office one day after its being conceived
by the head of that office.
<span class='pageno' title='8' id='Page_8'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>May I ask you now to tell me one thing more in connection
with the “relaxation of the present restrictions.” That means the
relaxation of the Versailles Treaty, I presume, through the Disarmament
Conference. You have mentioned that four times in this
document, so that I assume that was your basis.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it was. The whole atmosphere at that time,
under both the governments I mentioned, was such that one could
expect an improvement.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And this was the basis for which, to quote a
few names only, Stresemann, Brüning, fought.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As they felt it their duty to take certain advance
precautions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think there is no need for me to go into further
details. I have read this document again and again, and have been
unable to find any point on which the Prosecution could base the
conclusion that you had National Socialist ideas.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I now come to Document C-140. It is Exhibit USA-51, and is
in the Document Book 10a, Page 104.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I interrupt you, please? Would it not be appropriate
that I should say now what I wanted to say to supplement
the statement in C-156 regarding aircraft?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It might be practicable to finish with
the infringements of the Versailles Treaty before going on to
another subject. I had forgotten that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have submitted Document C-156. It is Captain
Schüssler’s book from the year 1937 and contains almost the same
list of infringements as Document C-32, so that that document
can be disposed of at the same time. In addition, it deals with
the case of the designing office for submarines in Holland, with
which we have already dealt. But there is still one point on which
I should like to have your comments, and that concerns certain
preparations in connection with navy aircraft which might be
permitted later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: All sorts of preparations had been made in the field
of aviation long before I came into office. A number of aircraft
had been purchased, as I see from this book. They were stored
with a firm called “Severa G.m.b.H.,” which was known to the
Reichswehrminister. The Versailles Treaty had permitted us antiaircraft
guns both on ships and on the coast, as was mentioned
yesterday; and for these antiaircraft, firing practice had to be
arranged. The Control Commission had allowed us a certain number
<span class='pageno' title='9' id='Page_9'></span>
of aircraft to tow the necessary targets. These aircraft were flown
by ex-naval pilots employed by this company. The company, in
turn, was managed by an old naval pilot.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Since we were not allowed to train naval pilots or were not
allowed to have any naval air force, we gave a year’s training in
the civil aviation school to a number of prospective naval officers
before they joined the Navy, so that through this 1-year training
they developed into very good pilots. Then they joined the Navy
and went through their ordinary naval training. The aircraft purchased
in this way was temporarily in the possession of the “Severa,”
which also had a good deal to do with the Lohmann affairs and
for that reason was dissolved by Reichswehrminister Gröner in the
summer of 1928. Reichswehrminister Gröner established a new
company with similar assignments in the autumn of 1928, soon
after I assumed office. But he had signed the agreement himself
in order to control the correct management of the whole affair.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In this company, in addition to their ordinary work, the Navy
pilots carried out experiments in connection with the development
of aircraft for a later Navy air force. We had the Government’s
permission to manufacture a model of every type likely to be of
use, but we were not allowed to accumulate aircraft. The Government
had expressly forbidden that. The result was that in the
course of years the company developed a number of aircraft types
which would be useful at a later date when we were once more
allowed to have aircraft.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the early period exercises in the Navy were carried out by
the old naval pilots—that is to say, it was demanded that exercises
in observation be taken and that the crews of ships learn how
to act against aircraft. When these young naval pilots were assigned
to such exercises, they were discharged from the Navy for that
time. It was an awkward affair, but it was always carried out
punctiliously.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I may now turn to Document C-140, which is
in Document Book 10a, Page 104. It is a letter from Reich Defense
Minister Von Blomberg dated 25 October 1933. It is addressed to
the Chief of the Army, the Chief of the Navy, and the Reich
Minister for Aviation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On this document the Prosecution based their accusations that
you, Witness, prepared military plans for an armed resistance which
might become necessary in consequence of Germany’s withdrawal
from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Perhaps
you can briefly state your view.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I had no previous knowledge of our imminent withdrawal
from the League of Nations. This directive came out 11 days
after we had left the League of Nations, and it merely provides
<span class='pageno' title='10' id='Page_10'></span>
defensive measures in the event of sanctions being applied against
Germany by other powers in consequence of her departure from
the League of Nations. It says under 2c: “I prohibit any practical
preparations in the meantime.” So, at first, nothing was done in
consequence of this directive, and the Reich Defense Minister
merely asked for a report from me as to what should be done.</p>

<p class='pindent'>As far as I remember, no practical preparations of any kind
were carried out by the Navy at the time, because the situation
remained absolutely quiet and there was no reason to assume that
there would be any need for defense.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That is probably indicated by the words under
Point 2a, “Preparation for defense against sanctions.” It concerns
the defense only.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The defense only.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That the withdrawal from the League of Nations
occurred 14 October 1933, 11 days before the document was written,
is a well-known fact and has been mentioned by the Prosecution
on Page 257 of the record (Volume II, Page 304).</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now we come to Document C-166. This is Exhibit USA-48.
Mr. President, this is in Document Book 10, on Page 36. It is a
document dated 12 March 1934. It emanates from the Command
Office of the Navy and refers to the preparation of auxiliary
cruisers for action. The Prosecution have quoted only the first two
paragraphs of this document and have pointed out that it shows
that auxiliary cruisers were to be built and describes transport
ships “O” for camouflage purposes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The two paragraphs sound incriminating, but they can very easily
be explained. May I refer to Lohmann’s affidavit, Document Number
Raeder-2, my Document Book 1, Page 5. I refer to Paragraph II.
I quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Document C-166, submitted to me, a communication
from the Office of the Naval Command of 12 March 1934,
deals with the ‘availability of auxiliary cruisers’ which, as
stated in the document, were marked as ‘Transport Ships O.’
These ships were not to be newly constructed but were to
be selected from the stock of the German merchant marine
in accordance with the demands enumerated in the document
and were to be examined as to their suitability for the tasks
to be assigned them. Then plans were made for reconstruction
in case of necessity, but the boats remained in the
merchant marine.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>May I state at this point that in the English translation the
word “Umbau” has been translated by the word “reconstruction.”
I have my doubts as to whether this is quite correct. I presume
<span class='pageno' title='11' id='Page_11'></span>
that the interpreter has now translated it as “Umbau” accordingly.
As far as I know, the German word “Umbau” only means much
the same thing as the English word “changes”—that is, “Veränderung.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>I continue to quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The order to select such boats from German shipyards was
received, among others, by the Hamburg Office of the Naval
Command where I was serving at the time.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Thus far Admiral Lohmann.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, is Lohmann’s statement correct? Have you anything
to add?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I can only emphasize again that there was no
question of immediate construction but only of selecting suitable
ships and examining them with a view to ascertaining the alterations
necessary to enable them to function as auxiliary cruisers
in the case of a general mobilization. The preparation of the plans
and the plans themselves were to be ready by 1 April 1935, as
laid down in Number 12. They were to be submitted to the naval
administration so that in the case of mobilization the ship concerned
could be taken from the stock of the merchant marine and
converted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>All these proposals for mobilization were, of course, kept secret.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, that the
whole misunderstanding would not have arisen if the Prosecution
had translated two further sentences. The English version is very
short and Point 11 is missing. I quote the text of Point 11:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“ ‘B’ is requested in co-operation with ‘K,’ first of all, to select
suitable vessels and to ascertain how many 15-centimeter guns
have to be mounted to achieve the required broadside...”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>The word “selected” is used here so that the intention is not—as
the Prosecution assert—the building of auxiliary cruisers but the
making of a selection from merchant vessels.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; and the ships continued to sail in the service
of the merchant marine.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The second sentence, which I find has been
unfortunately omitted from the English translation of the Prosecution,
reads as follows:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“As long as only a restricted number of guns—at present 24—can
be placed at our disposal for this purpose, preparations
are to be made for only four transport ships (O). An increase
of this number, presumably to six, will be postponed to a
date when more guns are available. Until then we must
await the results of the preparations for the first auxiliary
cruisers.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='12' id='Page_12'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>The fact that only four, or at the most six, merchant navy
vessels were involved shows the insignificance of the whole matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I now come to Document C-189, USA-44. It is in Document
Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, Page 66.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should like your comments.—I beg your pardon. I should
remind you that this concerns the conversation between Grossadmiral
Raeder and the Führer aboard the <span class='it'>Karlsruhe</span> in June 1934.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Grossadmiral, will you please state your views on the three
points mentioned in this brief document and which you discussed
with Hitler in June 1934.</p>

<p class='pindent'>First question: Why was Hitler unwilling to reveal the increase
in displacement of D and E—that is, the <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> and the
<span class='it'>Gneisenau</span>—when, according to this document, these were defensive
weapons and every expert would notice the increased tonnage of
these ships and, as far as I know, did notice it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that time we were considering what we could do
with the two armored ships D and E, after the signing of the
impending naval pact with England—that is, the two ships which
Hitler had granted me for the Navy in the 1934 budget. We had
definitely decided not to continue building these armored ships as
such, since we could make better use of the material at our disposal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But surely you realized that every expert in the
British or American or any other Admiralty would see on a
voyage, as soon as he had sighted the ship, that the 10,000 tons
had now become 26,000?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that there was merely the intention...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, when you are examining a
witness directly, you are not to ask leading questions which put
into his mouth the very answer that you desire. You are stating
all sorts of things to this witness and then asking him “isn’t
that so?”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. I shall make every effort to
put my questions differently.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: My answer is different anyway.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: We are dealing here, in the first place, with plans:
I asked permission to revise the plans for these two armored ships;
first, by strengthening their defensive weapons—that is, the armor-plating
and underwater compartments—and then by increasing
their offensive armaments—namely, by adding a third 28-centimeter
instead of 26-centimeter tower. The Führer was not yet willing
<span class='pageno' title='13' id='Page_13'></span>
to sanction, a new 28-centimeter tower because, as I said before,
he did not in any circumstances want to prejudice the negotiations
going on with Great Britain. To begin with, therefore, he sanctioned
only a medium displacement of 18,000 to 19,000 tons; and we knew
that when matters reached the stage where a third 28-centimeter
tower could be mounted, the displacement would be about 25,000
to 26,000 tons.</p>

<p class='pindent'>We saw no cause to announce it at this stage, however, because
it is customary in the Navy that new construction plans and
especially new types of ships should be announced at the latest
possible moment. That was the principal reason; and apart from
that, Hitler did not want to draw the attention of other countries
to these constructions by giving the figures mentioned or stating
the very high speed. There was no other reason for not announcing
these things.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like your comments on Number 2 of
the document. That has been specially held against you by the
Prosecution, because there you state the view that the fleet must
be developed to oppose England later on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At first—as I intended to explain later—we had taken
the new French ships as our model. The French Navy was developing
at that time the <span class='it'>Dunkerque</span> class with eight 33-centimeter
guns and a high speed, and we took that for our model, especially
since, in Hitler’s opinion—as you will hear later—there was no
question of arming against England. We intended to reconstruct
these two armored ships on this pattern as battleships with nine
28-centimeter guns and capable of a high speed. But then we heard
that the <span class='it'>King George</span> class was being designed in England with
35.6-centimeter guns and, therefore, stronger than the French type;
and so I said that we would in any case have to depart from the
French type eventually and follow the English model which is
now being built with 35-centimeter guns.</p>

<p class='pindent'>There is an error in the translation—namely, “oppose England.”
It says in my text that developments should follow the lines of
British developments—in other words, that we should design vessels
similar in type to the English ships. But they were out of date,
too, shortly afterwards, because France was then building ships of
the <span class='it'>Richelieu</span> class with 38-centimeter guns. Therefore, we decided
that we too would build ships with 38-centimeter guns. That was
how the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> came to be built. The word “oppose” would have
been quite senseless at a time when we intended to come to an
agreement with Britain on terms under which we could in no way
vie with her.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now we come to Point 3 of this document,
which the Prosecution regard as equally important. I quote:
<span class='pageno' title='14' id='Page_14'></span></p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Führer demands complete secrecy with regard to the
construction of U-boats—in consideration, also, of the Saar
plebiscite.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already referred to the Führer’s wish for
secrecy in connection with both the construction of submarines
and the preparations for that construction. This is one of the
points on which he was most sensitive, because in no circumstances
did he wish to prejudice the negotiations. He himself was generally
extremely cautious during this period and would not in any
circumstances do anything which might sabotage the naval pact
which he was so eager to conclude.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I do not quite understand the reference to secrecy
in connection with the construction of submarines. These were as
yet not under construction, were they?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I said secrecy in connection with the preparations
for the construction of submarines; that is just a short way of
expressing it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Document C-190, Exhibit
USA-45. It is in Document Book Number 10 of the British Delegation,
Page 67. This is a conversation which took place between
Hitler and Raeder on 2 November 1934 aboard the <span class='it'>Emden</span>. In
the document before you Hitler informs you that he considers it
necessary to enlarge and improve the Navy by 1938 and that, if
necessary, he would instruct Dr. Ley to place at the disposal of
the Navy 120 to 150 million marks from the Labor Front.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Did you have anything at all to do with raising funds for
rearmament?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not actually with the raising of funds. I applied
for funds to the Reich Defense Minister, who allocated them to me
for the purpose of this rearmament. I presume that this statement
was made because the allocation sanctioned for the Navy appeared
too small to me, and for this reason the Führer said that if necessary
he would get Ley to act. This did not actually happen.
I received my funds only through the Reich Defense Minister.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Although the charge made by the Prosecution
is not quite clear to me, since it is based on Hitler’s views—which
have nothing to do with you—I want to come back to this sum
once more. I may remind you that an armored cruiser of the old
10,000-ton class, which after all was small, cost 75 to 80 million.
Could this figure of 120 to 150 million be large enough to put the
Navy in a position to carry out rearmament on a large scale?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, certainly not. Two battleships were also under
construction, apart from those two armored cruisers. You can
imagine that the costs continually increased.
<span class='pageno' title='15' id='Page_15'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that this sum was not final?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it was not final.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Will you please go on, then, to Point 2. According
to Point 2 of the document, you pointed out to Hitler during this
conference that it might be necessary to assemble six submarines
during the first quarter of 1935.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I said this because I knew that at the beginning of
1935 we were going to aim at the re-establishment of the Armed
Forces; and I thought that this might create a critical situation
in respect to sanctions, which Hitler always expected, too. I assume
that we were talking about this and that is why I suggested that
if the necessity for any special preparations should arise out of
the re-establishment of the Armed Forces then six submarines
should be assembled, at a date previous to their proper date of
assemblage, from those parts which were obtained from abroad.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler actually give the order?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, the order was not given.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We might break off now.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-159, Exhibit USA-54.
This document may be found in the British Delegation’s Document
Book 10a, Page 110. This document is a letter written by
Von Blomberg on 2 March 1936, dealing with the demilitarized
zone. Did you, Witness, make lengthy military preparations for
the action which took place on 7 March 1936?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I made no lengthy preparations; I heard of the
plan only through this document of 2 March. I may refer you to
Point 6 which says, “To preserve the peaceful character of the
operation, no military security or advance measures are to be taken
without my express orders.” It was made clear, therefore, that
the entire action was to have a peaceful character.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You knew nothing at all about this entire action
until the beginning of March?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I believe that this action was kept especially
secret.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I will turn to Document C-194, Exhibit
USA-55, in the British Delegation’s Document Book 10a, Page 128.
This document is a communication from the High Command of the
Wehrmacht to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy dating from
<span class='pageno' title='16' id='Page_16'></span>
1936—the wording seems to indicate 6 March 1936. It deals, therefore,
with the same subject as the last document. May I have
your comments.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Reich Defense Minister had sanctioned a certain
air reconnaissance to take place over the North Sea on 6 March—that
is to say, the day before the occupation of the Rhineland. He
intended to withhold his decision as to whether U-boats were also
to be sent out on reconnaissance assignments in the West as far
as the Texel until the next day. I thereupon issued an order on
6 March 1936 and gave special instructions...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Tribunal.</span>] I would like to point out that
Raeder’s order of 6 March 1936 is appended to the same document
and that the text is therefore before the Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Defendant.</span>] Please go on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I prepared this decree of 6 March concerning the
planning of the U-boat line and the reconnaissance to take place
in the German bay on 7 March. I pointed out especially that
everything must be avoided which might create a false impression
of the Führer’s intentions and thus put difficulties in the way of
this peaceful action.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I would like to add to your statement that these
words taken from the decree of 6 March 1936 are to be found
under Point 5. They are in the last two lines.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Those were all precautionary measures in case of a
hostile counteraction.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were there any preparations on a large scale?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the two last documents dealing
with the topic of the Versailles Treaty and rearmament, Document
C-135, Exhibit GB-213, Document Book 10, Page 20—that is the
British Delegation’s Document Book 10—which is headed, “History
of the War Organization”—that is, the “War Organization and
Mobilization Scheme.” This dates from 1938. This document was
read in its entirety by the Prosecution and a very grave charge
was based upon it, because the document contains a statement to
the effect that Hitler had demanded that in 5 years—that is, by
1 April 1938—a Wehrmacht should be created which he could
employ as a political instrument of power and also because the
document mentions the Establishment Organization Plan 1938 and
the Combat Organization Plan.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Considering the significance of this point, I asked Vice Admiral
Lohmann for his comments on this rather technical question. We
<span class='pageno' title='17' id='Page_17'></span>
are dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-2, in my Document Book 2,
under part III, on Page 5. I think the Prosecution have misunderstood
the meaning of certain terms. The terms “Kriegsgliederung”
(Combat Organization Plan) and “Aufstellungsgliederung” (Establishment
Organization Plan) have been misunderstood.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I ask permission, therefore, to read this affidavit in conjunction
with the documents I have submitted in evidence. I quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“III. Referring to Documents C-135 and C-153, Armament
Plan, Mobilization Plan, Establishment Organization Plan—Aufstellungsgliederung,
A.G.—and Combat Organization
Plan—Kriegsgliederung, K.G....”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I would like to add that C-153 and C-135 are connected. I have
taken them together for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, I would
like to state for the record that 153 is Exhibit USA-43 and may be
found in British Document Book 10a, Page 107. It is headed,
“Armament Plan (A.P.) for the Third Armament Period.” It is a
rather long document and is dated 12 May 1934.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I quote Lohmann’s affidavit on these two documents:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The above-named documents submitted to me deal with
the Establishment Organization Plan, the Combat Organization
Plan, the Mobilization Plan, and the Armament Plan.
The first three plans, or orders of distribution, deal with the
same matters and differ only in manner of composition. The
Armament Plan differs from the other plans inasmuch as it
deals with new construction and the required new materials
and is hence less extensive.</p>

<p>“The German Navy, like the Armed Forces as a whole—and,
no doubt, the Armed Forces of every nation—made such
plans in order to be able, in the case of a conflict or of
military complications, to prepare in time and use efficiently
the means of combat available. Owing to changing conditions,
military developments, changes in personnel, and advances
in technique, such plans were revised every year. An essential
part of these preparations, self-evident in the case of any
Armed Forces, consisted of the establishment, mobilization,
or combat organization, which provided a survey of all naval
installations on land and sea, their local defenses, and tactical
subordination—as well as of all combat material on hand or
to be secured, increased, or reorganized by a specified date.
All operations envisaged by the military command were
based on this Combat Organization Plan, and it also served
the political leaders as an indication of the possibilities
according to the strength and number of the military resources
available.
<span class='pageno' title='18' id='Page_18'></span></p>

<p>“The Combat Organization Plan always had to be prepared
with great foresight and was issued by the High Command
of the Navy generally 1½ years before it was to go into
effect, in order to enable the responsible offices to attend in
time to such necessary preliminaries, such as applying to the
Navy Budget Office for funds and materials—such as iron,
steel, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>—and for the preparation of accommodation
insofar as all this was not already covered by the peacetime
development of the Navy.</p>

<p>“In 1933, when Hitler in his Five Year Plan demanded that
by 1 April 1938 an armed force should be created which he
could throw into the balance as an instrument of political
power, the Combat Organization Plan for 1938 was worked
out independently of the scheduled yearly Combat Organization
Plan, and up to 1935 it dealt mostly with the possibilities
of the Treaty of Versailles which had not yet been exhausted
and with the question of supplementing the naval strength
with craft not subject to limitation in type or number. After
the Naval Pact of 1935, the Combat Organization Plan 1938
was replaced by a “Combat Organization Plan Ultimate
Goal” (K.G. Endziel), which regulated the number of warships
of all types existing or to be built in the proportion of
35:100 measured by the tonnage actually existing in the
English Fleet. In consideration of monetary and material
resources, the capacity of the shipyards, and the length of
time required to build large warships, this ultimate goal was
in the meanwhile fixed for the year 1944-45.</p>

<p>“There remained always the possibility of postponing it
further, in accordance with the building program of the
English Fleet.</p>

<p>“The various terminologies have only a naval technical
significance and do not permit conclusions as to political plans.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I would like to indicate a slight error in translation in the
English text. The translation of the word “Terminierungen” by
“terminology” is, in my opinion, not correct. It should probably be
“dates” or “deadlines.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, are Vice Admiral Lohmann’s statements correct? Can
you add anything to this basic point of view?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: These statements contain everything which can be
said on this matter. All these arrangements are, in my opinion,
preparations which must be made by every navy if it is to be
systematically equipped and made ready for operation.</p>

<div class='figcenter' style='width:80%'>
<img src='images/png25.png' alt='' id='iid-0002' style='width:100%;height:auto;'/>
</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='19' id='Page_19'></span>
It says somewhere—in Document Number C-135, Page 1, under
Point 2—that, “The growing tension between Germany and Poland
forced us to make practical instead of theoretical preparations for
a purely German-Polish conflict.” That was interpreted to mean
that at some time—I believe in 1930—we planned a war of
aggression against Poland.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I testified yesterday that our main object was and had to be,
nor could it have gone any further than, to oppose with force any
aggression committed by Poland against East Prussia. That was the
object of our work—to protect Germany from an invasion by the
Poles. At that time, it would have been madness for German
forces, which were still very inadequately armed, to invade Poland
or any other country.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then too, since the dates 1938 and 1944-45 constantly recur,
I would like to point out again that the year 1938 first came into
question as the final date for the first phase of the Shipping Replacement
Plan. The last ship of this Shipping Replacement Plan was
to be built from 1936 to 1938.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Tribunal.</span>] I would like to call your attention to
the fact that this is Document Number Raeder-7.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: [<span class='it'>Continuing.</span>] Then Hitler decreed a Five Year Plan,
which happened also to cover the years 1933 to 1938 and in
accordance with which the Combat Organization Plan was to be
fixed for the year 1938. The Combat Organization Plan Ultimate
Goal was fixed for 1944-45; and the reason for fixing this date, as
stated in the document which you have just read, was the fact that
in fixing our program we had to take into consideration the funds
and material at our disposal, the capacity of our shipbuilding yards,
and the length of time needed to build big warships. A reasonably
strong fighting force could not be created before that date. Later
on the Combat Organization Plan appears again in several of my
letters. But there was no date given which, on our part, was
intended as the appointed time of attack.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The statements in Document C-135 are in accordance
with the German-English Naval Agreement. Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>Perhaps I did not formulate my question clearly. The statement
that a new program was set up implies then that it was done in
accordance with the German-English Naval Agreement?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In any case, the reference to Document C-135,
Point 8, is probably to be interpreted in that way since it says,
“...A modern fleet, bound only by the clauses of the German-British
Naval Agreement.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course.
<span class='pageno' title='20' id='Page_20'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I turn to another topic and go back to the
year 1933.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Grossadmiral, when did you meet Hitler, and did you have any
connection with National Socialism before 1933?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I met Hitler on 2 February 1933 when I saw him and
talked to him for the first time. It was at an evening party arranged
by General Von Blomberg at the home of General Von Hammerstein,
the Chief of the Army Command Staff, at which Reich
Defense Minister Von Blomberg intended to present to Hitler senior
generals and admirals. I shall describe the proceedings later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Up to that time, I had had no connection whatsoever with
National Socialism. I knew Admiral Von Levetzow only from the
first World War. He was on the staff of Admiral Scheer whom I
knew well and who had obviously met Hitler at a comparatively
early date. It was through him, however, that I heard that Hitler
took a very active interest in naval matters and was surprisingly
well-informed about them. On the other hand, I believe that
Von Levetzow had also spoken to Hitler about the reputation of the
Navy and his own opinion of the Navy at that time. But I had
no connections beyond that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What were your reasons for remaining in office in
1933, Grossadmiral, when you had no connection with National
Socialism?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Reich President, Field Marshal Von Hindenburg,
at the same time Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, had
appointed the leader of the largest party as Chancellor of the
Reich. I think that, if I had gone to him and told him I wanted to
resign—or intended to resign—because he had appointed a new
Chancellor, he would quite certainly have taken it as an insult
and would then really have dismissed me. I had not the slightest
reason to ask my Supreme Commander to release me from my
military post because he, in his capacity of Reich President, had
appointed a new Reich Chancellor of whom I, perhaps, might not
approve.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When and where did you first hear Hitler state
his basic political principles?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I heard him for the first time on the afore-mentioned
2 February, after the dinner at General Von Hammerstein’s home.
I was introduced to him before dinner, and after dinner he made
a speech. He was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Herr Von Neurath. There were no other members of the Party
present.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In his speech, he first of all spoke of his career and of his social
and national aims. He said that he wanted to regain equal rights
<span class='pageno' title='21' id='Page_21'></span>
for the German Reich and that he would try to rid the country of
the shackles of the Versailles Treaty and restore to Germany her
internal sovereignty; and he also discussed his social aims: the
establishment of true community among the people, the raising of
the workers’ standard of living, assistance to be given to the
farmers, and the promotion of agriculture, the establishment of a
labor service, and the elimination of unemployment. He specially
emphasized—and this was really the main point—that both domestic
and foreign policy were to be left entirely in his hands, that the
Wehrmacht was to have nothing at all to do with this, that the
Wehrmacht was not to be used even to deal with unrest at home,
and that he had other forces to deal with these affairs. He wanted
to insure an undisturbed period of development for the Wehrmacht
so that it could become the factor necessary to prevent the Reich
from becoming the sport of other nations; and for that reason it
would be necessary in the next few years for the Wehrmacht to
devote its entire attention to the preparation of its main objective,
training for the defense of the fatherland in the case of aggression.
The Wehrmacht would be the sole bearer of arms, and its structure
would remain unaltered. He spoke of no details.</p>

<p class='pindent'>There was a comparatively large party assembled. As far as
schemes for war were concerned—none was mentioned, and all
those present were uncommonly pleased with this speech. He spoke
with particular respect of Reich President Von Hindenburg, the
Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and we had the impression
that he would respect this much-revered personality.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This speech was the only account of his basic principles which
he gave me as Chief of the Naval Command Staff, as well as to the
Chief of the Army Command Staff and others.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, when did you report to Hitler for
the first time on the Navy; and what was Hitler’s general attitude
on this occasion—toward the Navy in particular?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The first naval report I gave was a few days later in
the presence of General Von Blomberg, who in his capacity of
Reich Defense Minister was my superior. I cannot give the exact
date, but it was shortly afterwards.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On this occasion, Hitler gave me a further account of the
principles on which I was to command the Navy. I reported to
Hitler first of all on the state of the Navy; on the rather slight
degree to which the provisions of the Versailles Treaty had been
carried out by the Navy, its inferior strength, the Shipping Replacement
Plan, and incidents concerned with naval policy, such as the
Treaty of Washington, the Treaty of London, 1930, the position of
the Disarmament Conference. He had already been fully informed
on all these matters.
<span class='pageno' title='22' id='Page_22'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>He said he wanted to make clear to me the principles on which
his policy was based and that this policy was to serve as the basis
of long-term naval policy. I still remember these words quite
clearly, as well as those which followed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>He did not under any circumstances wish to have complications
with England, Japan, or Italy—above all not with England. And
he wanted to prove this by fixing an agreement with England as to
the strength to be allotted to the German Fleet in comparison
with that of the English Navy. By so doing, he wanted to show
that he was prepared to acknowledge, once and for all, England’s
right to maintain a navy commensurate with the vastness of her
interests all over the world. The German Navy required expansion
only to the extent demanded by a continental European policy.
I took this as the second main principle on which to base my
leadership of the Navy. The actual ratio of strength between the
two navies was not discussed at the time; it was discussed later on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This decision of Hitler’s afforded extreme satisfaction both to
myself and to the whole of the Navy, for it meant that we no
longer had to compete senselessly with the first sea power; and
I saw the possibility of gradually building up our Navy on a solid
foundation. I believe that this decision was hailed by the whole
Navy with joy and that they understood its significance. The
Russian Pact was later greeted with the same appreciation, since
the combination of the Russian Pact and the naval agreement
would have been a guarantee of wonderful development. There
were people—but not in the Navy—who believed that this amounted
to yielding ground, but this limitation was accepted by the majority
of Germans with considerable understanding.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, what were your personal relations
with Hitler? How did you judge him in the course of the years,
and what was Hitler’s attitude toward you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I welcomed this vigorous personality who was
obviously most intelligent, had tremendous will power, was a
master in handling people, and—as I myself observed in the early
years—a great and very skillful politician whose national and
social aims were already well known and accepted in their entirety
by the Armed Forces and the German people...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this might be taken
more shortly. We have heard it from so many of the others.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Is the defendant not to describe his relations
with Hitler? Do the Tribunal consider them irrelevant?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He might do it shortly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Good. Grossadmiral, please do it shortly.
<span class='pageno' title='23' id='Page_23'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I would just like to say what I thought of Hitler in
order to make clear my reasons for not at any time leaving him,
which fact the Prosecution have raised very strongly against me.
His first steps in both domestic and foreign policy undoubtedly
called forth admiration for his political ability and awakened the
hope that, since he had taken these first steps without bloodshed
or political complications, he would be able to solve in the same
way any problems, which might arise later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have heard this as I have pointed out—this
quality or power of Hitler’s ability from nearly every one of
the defendants and it is very cumulative, and if this defendant
wishes to say he was greatly impressed by Hitler’s qualities, that
is quite sufficient. All of the rest is cumulative.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Very well. Then I shall only say that during the
early years I had no reason to wonder whether I should remain in
my position or not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, we shall automatically come to
the later complications at a later stage of the hearing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I come now to the German-British Naval Agreement and would
like to ask you briefly how this Naval Agreement of 1935 came
about. I am referring to Document Number Raeder-11, Document
Book 1, Page 59, which contains the Naval Agreement in the form
of a communication from the German Foreign Minister to the
British Government. The actual content was fixed by the British,
as the first few words show:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Your Excellency, I have the honour to acknowledge the
receipt of your Excellency’s note of to-day’s date, in
which you were so good as to communicate to me on
behalf of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom
the following”:</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then come the following statements by the British:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“1. During the last few days the representatives of the German
Government and His Majesty’s Government in the
United Kingdom have been engaged in conversations, the
primary purpose of which has been to prepare the way for
the holding of a general conference on the subject of the
limitation of naval armaments. It now gives me great
pleasure to notify your Excellency of the formal acceptance
by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of the
proposal of the German Government discussed at those conversations,
that the future strength of the German Navy in
relation to the aggregate naval strength of the Members of
the British Commonwealth of Nations should be in the proportion
of 35:100. His Majesty’s Government in the United
<span class='pageno' title='24' id='Page_24'></span>
Kingdom regard this proposal as a contribution of the greatest
importance to the cause of future naval limitation. They
further believe that the agreement which they have now
reached with the German Government and which they regard
as a permanent and definite agreement as from to-day
between the two Governments...”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This is a well-known document, and the
Tribunal will take judicial notice of it, of course. It is not necessary
to read it all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well. I should nevertheless like to point out
that, according to Point 2f of this document, the British Government
recognized that, as far as submarines were concerned, Germany
should be allowed the same number as Britain. At that time
that amounted to about 52,000 tons, or rather more than 100 U-boats.
The Government of the German Reich, however, voluntarily undertook
to restrict itself to 45 percent of the total submarine tonnage
of the British Empire.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Did you and the Navy regard such
considerable restrictions as the basis for Germany’s peaceful
development, and was it received favorably by the Navy in general?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, as I have already said, it was received with
greatest satisfaction.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Since a judgment formed some years ago carries
more weight than a declaration made now in the course of the
Trial, I wish to submit Document Number Raeder-12, Document
Book 1, Page 64. This document deals with a communication made
by Grossadmiral Raeder for the information of the Officers’ Corps.
It is dated 15 July 1935, a month after the signing of the naval
agreement. Raeder says—and I quote the second paragraph:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The agreement resulted from the Führer’s decision to fix the
ratio of the fleets of Germany and the British Empire at
35:100. This decision, which was based on considerations of
European politics, formed the starting point of the London
conferences. In spite of initial opposition from England, we
held inflexibly to our decision; and our demands were granted
in their entirety. The Führer’s decision was based on the
desire to exclude the possibility of antagonism between Germany
and England in the future and so to exclude forever
the possibility of naval rivalry between the two countries.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>A sentence on Page 66 is also important. I wish to ask the High
Tribunal to take judicial notice of the rest of it:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“By this agreement, the building-up of the German Navy to
the extent fixed by the Führer was formally approved by
England.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='25' id='Page_25'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>This is followed by individual statements as to tonnage.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then I should like to call attention to the final sentence, which
is indicative of Raeder’s attitude at the time:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“This agreement represents a signal success in the political
sphere since it is the first step towards a practical understanding
and signifies the first relaxation of the inflexible
front so far maintained against Germany by our former
opponents and implacably demonstrated again at Stresa.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, were the lines of peaceful development
laid down by you at that time followed in the next years?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I should like to submit Document
Raeder-13. This is a document which enables me—in order
to save time—to dispense with the testimony here in Court of
Vice Admiral Lohmann. This document will be found in Document
Book 1, Page 68, and is entitled, “The New Plan for the Development
of the German Navy,” and is a standard work. It is a speech
made by Vice Admiral Lohmann in the summer of 1935 at the
Hanseatic University in Hamburg. I ask the High Tribunal to take
judicial notice of the essential points of this document; and as this
is an authoritative work done at the request of the High Command,
I may perhaps just quote the following. Admiral Lohmann sets
forth first of all that since we now had the liberty to recruit and
arm troops, the Navy was then free of restrictions, but that that
was not Hitler’s view. I now quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Führer, however, chose another way. He preferred to
negotiate on German naval armament direct with Britain
which, as our former adversary”—I beg your pardon; I am
quoting from Page 70—“has tried for years to show understanding
for our difficult position.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And on Page 71 Lohmann speaks about misleading reports
published in the press, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and continues literally:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“All the more surprising, then, was the ratification of the
treaty which expressed the full agreement of both governments
and did not, like some armament treaties of former
time, leave more embitterment than understanding in its
wake. The sense of fairness which British statesmen have
retained, despite the frequently dirty ways of higher politics,
came through when confronted with the unreserved sincerity
of the German declarations, the dignified firmness of the
German representatives, and the passionate desire for peace
inspiring the speeches and acts of our Führer. Unlike former
times, the speeches of the British leaders expressed respect
and recognition. We have acknowledged this as a sign of
<span class='pageno' title='26' id='Page_26'></span>
honest willingness to understand. The voices from the circles
of British war veterans are hardly less valuable than the
attitude of the official leaders. In November 1918, for instance,
when the German Fleet was taken by British squadrons to be
interned in Scapa Flow, the British Commander-in-Chief,
Lord Beatty, the great foe of our Admiral Hipper, sent the
famous signal, ‘Do not forget that the enemy is a contemptible
beast.’ This Grand Admiral expressed his dislike for Germany
on many occasions, but on 26 June this same Lord Beatty
stated in the House of Lords, ‘I am of the opinion that we
should be grateful to the Germans. They came to us with
hands outstretched, announcing that they agreed to the ratio
of 35:100.’ If they had submitted other proposals, we could
not have prevented them. We may be truly grateful for the
fact that there is at least one country in the world whose
competition in regard to armament we do not need to fear.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then I should like to refer to Page 73, which limits battleships
to 35,000 tons. This limitation plays a part in the Prosecution
Document C-23. The fact that in this document next to the words
“Panama Canal” are placed the words “battleships 35,000 tons” has
a certain significance. The limitation to 35,000 tons is not so
decisive and important as the Prosecution would like us to believe.
This is the origin: The United States of America at that time wanted
to limit the tonnage to 35,000 tons on account of the width and
depth of the Panama Canal, for the Panama Canal would have
had to be enlarged in order to admit ships of greater tonnage.
I shall return to this point later since this limit of 35,000 tons
was not maintained.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then as evidence of the basis for comparison with German
U-boats, I should like to point to Page 76 where the figure
mentioned is 52,700 tons. It is a historical fact—which is set down
here—that France took no part in this limitation and at that time
was the strongest U-boat power with her 96,000 tons, 96 ready
and 15 under construction. It is also a historical fact that Germany—and
this is shown on the same page—had agreed to abolish
submarines, having had to destroy 315 after the first World War.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Grossadmiral, did this accord with the British Fleet apparent
in these documents show itself on another, or on any particular
occasion?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I tried to maintain this good understanding and to
express these sentiments to the British Navy as, for instance, when
I was informed of the death of Admiral Jellicoe through a phone
call from an English news agency. He stood against us as the
head of the English Fleet in the first World War, and we always
<span class='pageno' title='27' id='Page_27'></span>
considered him a very chivalrous opponent. Through this agency
I gave a message to the English Fleet.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I doubt if this really has any effect on the
issues we have to consider.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In any event, I tried to bring about a good understanding
with the British Navy for the future and to maintain
this good understanding.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On 17 July 1937 a further German-English Naval
Agreement was signed. I am submitting this document as Document
Raeder-14, Document Book 1, Page 81. This is a rather
lengthy document only part of which has been translated and
printed in the document book; and in order to understand the
violation with which the Prosecution charge us, I must refer to
several of the points contained in this document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The agreement concerns the limitation of naval armaments and
particularly the exchange of information on naval construction. In
Article 4 we find the limitation of battleships to 35,000 tons, which
has already been mentioned; and in Articles 11 and 12—which I will
not read because of their technical nature but would ask the Tribunal
to take note of—both governments are bound to report
annually the naval construction program. This must be done during
the first 4 months of each calendar year, and details about certain
ships—big ships in particular—4 months before they are laid down.
For a better understanding of the whole matter, which has been
made the basis of a charge against the defendants in connection
with the naval agreement, I may refer to Articles 24 to 26. The
three articles show...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Can you summarize these articles?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I did not intend to read them, Your Honor.
I just want to quote a point or two from them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>These articles enumerate the conditions under which either
partner to the agreement could deviate from it. From the start,
therefore, it was considered permissible under certain conditions
to deviate from the agreement, if, for instance, (Article 24) one
of the partners became involved in war, or (Article 25) if another
power, such as the United States or France or Japan, were to build
or purchase a vessel larger than those provided for in the agreement.
In this article express reference is made to Article 4—that
is, to battleships of 35,000 tons—in the case of deviation, the only
obligation was to notify one’s partner. Article 26 states a very
general basis for deviation from the agreement—namely, in cases
where the security of the nation demands it such deviation is held
to be justified. No further details are necessary at this point.
<span class='pageno' title='28' id='Page_28'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the
United Kingdom): My Lord, the deviation is subject to notification
of the other party under Subarticle 2. It was just relevant in
Article 26—any deviation is subject to notification to the other
party of the deviation to be embarked on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it, Dr. Siemers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, of course. I believe...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution say that this agreement
was broken?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. With reference to the remarks just made
by Sir David, I would like to say that I pointed out that such
deviation was permitted under these conditions, but that there
was an obligation to notify the other partners. Perhaps that did
not come through before.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Was this agreement concluded, Admiral,
in 1937, from the same point of view which you have already
stated? Are there any other noteworthy facts which led to the
agreement?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In 1936, as well as I remember, the treaties so far
made by England with other powers expired, and England was
therefore eager to renew these treaties in the course of 1936. The
fact that we were invited in 1937 to join in a new agreement by
all powers meant that Germany would henceforth be completely
included in these treaties.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have accused you of violating
this German-English Naval Agreement, and this charge is based
on Document C-23, Exhibit USA-49, in the British Delegation’s
Document Book 10, Page 3. This document is dated 18 February
1938. It has been mentioned repeatedly in these proceedings and
begins as follows, “The actual displacement of the battleships
<span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span>, <span class='it'>Gneisenau</span> and <span class='it'>F/G</span> is in both cases 20 percent greater
than the displacement stated to the British.” Then we find a list
which shows that the displacement of the <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> was given
as 26,000 tons but was actually 31,300 tons, and that the draught
stated one meter less than was actually the case. And the “F” class,
that is, the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> and <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>, were listed as 35,000 tons but
had an actual displacement of 41,700 and a difference of 80 centimeters
in draught. Therefore, according to what we have seen,
there is an evident infringement of the treaty. Grossadmiral, I am
assuming that you do not dispute this violation of the treaty?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, in no way.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Certainly, at the time of this document there
were only four battleships in question: <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span>, <span class='it'>Gneisenau</span>,
<span class='it'>Bismarck</span>, and <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>...
<span class='pageno' title='29' id='Page_29'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It seems you are again stating these things
to the Tribunal, making statements instead of asking questions
of the witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Mr. President, that I was incorporating
my documentary evidence in order to show the connection, so as
to make clear what we are dealing with. I was about to put the
question: Were the four battleships mentioned actually in commission
when this document was drawn up?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, they had not yet been commissioned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: None of these four battleships?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If I am permitted to do so, I may say that the
exact dates on which these ships were commissioned—dates which
the defendant can hardly repeat from memory—can be seen from
Point IV of Lohmann’s affidavit, Document Number Raeder-2.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think you must prove them. You cannot
state them without proving them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, certainly, Your Honor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am referring to Document Number Raeder-2, which has been
submitted to the Tribunal already. This is the affidavit by Lohmann,
on Page 5. I quote from Document Book 1, Page 8:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Within the limits defined by the German-English Naval
Agreement, the German Navy commissioned four battleships.
I append the dates of laying down the keel, launching, and
commissioning, as far as I can still determine them. <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span>:
laid down keel, exact date cannot be determined;
launched, 3 October 1936; commissioned, 7 January 1939.
<span class='it'>Gneisenau</span>: laid down keel, date cannot be determined;
launched, 8 December 1936; commissioned, 31 May 1938.
<span class='it'>Bismarck</span>: laid down keel, 1936; launched, 14 February 1939;
commissioned, 2 August 1940. <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>: laid down keel, 1936;
launched, 1 April 1939; commissioned, 1941.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Admiral Lohmann was unable to ascertain the exact date. The
“H”—I may add that the other ships mentioned under Document
C-23 were planned but were broken up later. They had already
been broken up in the summer of 1939, and this applies only to
the first “H.” So far there is no question of final preparation or
construction. Since an obvious violation of the treaty exists, we
now have to consider in what light this violation should be regarded.
The Prosecution have said that this violation of the treaty is
criminal since it implies intended aggression. In order to save
time, especially since technical problems are involved, I should like,
before questioning the defendant further, to submit Document
<span class='pageno' title='30' id='Page_30'></span>
Number Raeder-15, within the scope of the documentary evidence
which I have submitted with the Tribunal’s permission. In my
opinion, this document proves that there was no intention of
aggression.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document Number Raeder-15 is an affidavit—I beg your pardon—it
is in Document Book 1, Page 94. This document deals
with an affidavit deposed before a notary at Hamburg by Dr. Ing.
h.c. Wilhelm Süchting and is important for the refutation of Document
C-23, and for that purpose I should like to quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I am the former Director of the shipbuilding yard of Blohm
&amp; Voss in Hamburg. I was with this firm from 1937 to
1945”—pardon me—“from 1907 to 1945 and I am conversant
with all questions concerning the construction of warships
and merchant ships. In particular, as an engineer I had
detailed information about the building of battleships for
the German Navy. Dr. Walter Siemers, attorney at law of
Hamburg, presented to me the Document C-23, dated 18 February
1938, and asked me to comment on it. This document
shows that the Navy, contrary to the previous agreement,
informed the British that the battleships <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> and
<span class='it'>Gneisenau</span>—as well as other intended constructions—had a
displacement and draught of about 20 percent less than was
actually the case.</p>

<p>“I can give some details to explain why this information was
given. I assume that the information given to the British—information
which according to naval agreement 4 had to
be supplied 4 months before the keel was laid down—was
based on the fact that the battleships <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> and
<span class='it'>Gneisenau</span> were originally intended to have a displacement of
26,000 tons and a draught of 7.50 meters and the battleship
“F” (<span class='it'>Bismarck</span>) a displacement of 35,000 tons and a draught
of 7.90 meters, as stated.</p>

<p>“If these battleships were afterwards built with a greater
displacement and a greater draught, the changes were the
result of orders given or requests made by the Navy while
the plans were being drafted and which the construction
office had to carry out. The changes were based upon the
viewpoint repeatedly expressed by the Navy—namely, to
build the battleships in such a way that they would be as
nearly unsinkable as possible. The increase of the tonnage
was not meant to increase the offensive power of the
ship”—I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I shall be finished
in a moment—“The increase of the tonnage was not meant
to increase the offensive power of the ship but was done for
defensive and protective purposes.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='31' id='Page_31'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>I may perhaps point out that in the English text there is a
mistake in translation. In this text the word “not” is missing. It
should read, “was not meant,” and not “meant.”</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“As time went on, the Navy attached more and more
importance to dividing the hull of the battleship into a
greater number of compartments in order to make the ship
as unsinkable as possible and to afford the maximum protection
in case of leakage. The new battleships were therefore
built broad in the beam with many bulkheads, only
about ten meters apart, and many longitudinal and latitudinal
bulkheads outside the torpedo bulkhead. At the same time,
both the vertical and the horizontal armor-plating were, as
far as my information goes, heavier and composed of larger
plates than those used by other navies. In order...”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: In other words, his explanation is that they
were altered in the course of construction for technical reasons. It
does not matter what the technical reasons are.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, but I do
believe that when we are dealing with a clearly-established violation
of a treaty, the manner of this violation is of some importance.
I do not believe that each and every violation of a treaty can be
described as a war crime. The point is whether this violation of
the treaty was a war crime in the sense of the Charter—in other
words, whether it was motivated by the intention of waging a
war of aggression. An insignificant violation of a kind which, after
all, is found in every commercial lawsuit cannot be a crime.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The affidavit is before us. We shall read it.
In fact, you have already read the material parts of it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I think we had better adjourn. How long do you expect
to be?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is very difficult for me to judge
that accurately, but I imagine I shall be able to conclude sometime
tomorrow. I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be able to conclude
at noon; but I am asking Your Honor to take into consideration
the fact that I am incorporating my documentary proof in the
interrogation and that this documentary proof, which in many other
cases has taken hours to present, is thus dealt with simultaneously.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope that you will make your
presentation as short as you possibly can. We have already been
so long a time over this defendant.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<h2><span class='pageno' title='32' id='Page_32'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I must first make a formal request,
namely, that in addition to my own secretary I may have another
here in Court. She was here this morning but has just been told
that she may not come into the courtroom, and she is now standing
outside the door.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Grossadmiral, you just saw the affidavit
of Dr. Süchting. I ask you: Is it true, or rather—not to confuse you
I will ask—on what did the Navy base its ideas about enlarging
the battleships by about 20 percent?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Originally there was no intention to enlarge the
ships by 20 percent. But at the time when we resumed battleship
construction, when we could see that we would have a very small
number of battleships in any case, it occurred to us that the
resistance to sinking of ships should be increased as much as
possible to render the few we had as impregnable as possible. It
had nothing to do with stronger armament or anything like that,
but merely with increasing the resistance to sinking and to enemy
guns. For this reason a new system was worked out at that time
in order to increase and strengthen the subdivision of the space
within the ship. This meant that a great deal of new iron had
to be built into the ships. Thereby the draught and the displacement
were enlarged. This was unfortunate from my point of view,
for we had designed the ships with a comparatively shallow
draught. The mouths of our rivers, the Elbe, Weser, Jade, are so
shallow that ships with a deep draught cannot navigate all stages
of the rivers. Therefore, we had these ships built broad, intending
to give them a shallow draught; but by building in these many
new latitudinal and longitudinal bulkheads, we increased the
draught and also the displacement.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were these disadvantageous changes, which took
place during construction, due in part to a comparatively limited
experience in battleship construction?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Since the designers in the High Command of
the Navy and the designers and engineers in the big shipyards had
not built any heavy warships for a very long time, they lacked
experience. As a result, the High Command of the Navy had to
issue supplementary orders to the shipyards. This in itself was a
drawback which I tried hard to overcome.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did the construction of these four battleships
surpass the total tonnage accorded by the naval agreement?
<span class='pageno' title='33' id='Page_33'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, the total tonnage was not overstepped until the
beginning of the war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Your Honors, in this connection I should like to
refer to Document Raeder-8, which has already been submitted in
Raeder Document Book 1, Page 40, under II. In this affidavit
Lohmann gives comparative figures which show how much battleship
tonnage Germany was allowed under the naval agreement.
Please take notice of it without my reading all the figures. What
is important is that, according to comparison with the British
figures, Germany was allowed to have 183,750 tons. At that time
she had three completed armored cruisers with 30,000 tons—which
is shown here—so that according to this affidavit 153,750 tons still
remained.</p>

<p class='pindent'>With reference to Document Raeder-127, I should like to submit
a short correction, because Grossadmiral Raeder, in looking through
the affidavit, observed that Vice Admiral Lohmann made a mistake
in one figure. The mistake is unimportant in terms of the whole,
but in order to be absolutely fair and correct I thought it necessary
to point it out to Vice Admiral Lohmann. Instead of 30,000 it
should actually read about 34,000 tons, so that there is a difference,
not of 153,750 tons but of 149,750. According to the naval agreement,
we were allowed to build 146,000, the final figure, so that
the result is not changed. Admiral Lohmann’s mistake—as the
Tribunal know—can be attributed to the fact that we were very
limited in our material resources.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I add a remark to what I said before? The
statement of these displacements deviated from the terms of the
treaty insofar as only the original construction displacement or
draught was reported and not the draught and displacement which
gradually resulted through these changes in the course of the
planning of the construction.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In addition, may I refer the honorable Court to
the following: The Naval Agreement of 1937 was changed by the
London Protocol of 30 June 1938. I refer to Exhibit Raeder-16.
My secretary just tells me it is not here at the moment; I will
bring it up later. It is the last document in Raeder Document
Book 1, Page 97.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May I remind the Court that Document C-23 is of February 1938.
By this London Protocol, at the suggestion of the British Government,
the limitation on battleship tonnage to 35,000 tons was
changed because the British Government, as well as the German
Government, realized that 35,000 tons was too low. As the protocol
shows, effective 30 June 1938, the battleship tonnage was raised
to 45,000 tons. Thereby this difference in the battleships, referred
to in Document C-23, was settled a few months later.
<span class='pageno' title='34' id='Page_34'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I shall take up a new subject, the question of your
participation in the planning and conspiracy to wage wars of
aggression. This is the question of the so-called key documents
which the Prosecution presented. Since you, Admiral, were present
during these speeches of Hitler’s to the commanders-in-chief,
I must ask you to comment on these documents. The first document
is Document 386-PS, the so-called Hossbach Document,
Exhibit USA-25, in the Document Book of the British Delegation,
Number 10, Page 81. It is Hitler’s speech of 5 November 1937.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Herr Grossadmiral, did you ever see this document of Hossbach
before the Trial began?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I saw no document and no protocol of any
speeches which Hitler made. No minutes were taken officially.
Only in later years—I believe since 1941—were stenographers
present who wrote down every word. These are really not minutes
at all, since the document is written in indirect discourse. It was
written down by the author 5 days after the speech itself, as we
have heard.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Although it is a very important document,
I have noted that in contrast to other documents it has no distribution
list; it was written down 5 days after the speech and is not
even marked “secret.” Can you explain where these minutes were
set down?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot recollect in detail the conditions that
prevailed. I can only imagine that the adjutant in question kept
the minutes in his safe.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then you have only an over-all impression of
this speech, after 8 or 9 years?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The document was read in full here by the
Prosecution and, as cannot be denied at all, it contains serious
references to a war of aggression. It mentions, for instance,
something bequeathed by will, the problem of space, the hatred
against England and France; it says that, armament now being
completed, the first goal is the overthrow of Czechoslovakia and
Austria.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Please explain to the Court what effect the speech had on you
at that time, and how it happened that you ascribed no such
importance to the speech as did Herr Von Neurath, for example,
who was also present? And in spite of the speech how did you
retain your opinion that Hitler would hold the old line and not
seek a solution by force?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: By way of introduction I may say that the assertion
contained in the trial brief, that an influential group of Nazis met
<span class='pageno' title='35' id='Page_35'></span>
in order to examine the situation, does not give a correct picture
of the situation at all. Hitler called together the persons mentioned
in the document to explain to them the possibilities for political
development and in order to give them any instructions he
might have.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And here I should like to say something in general—since there
are quite a number of Hitler’s speeches coming—about the nature
of his speeches. Hitler spoke at great length, going very far in
retrospect. Above all, in every speech he had a special purpose
depending on the audience. Just as he was a master of dialectics,
so he was also a master of bluff. He used strong expressions again
according to the objective he was pursuing. He afforded his
imagination full play. He also contradicted himself frequently in
successive speeches. One never knew what his final goals and
intentions were. At the end of such a speech it was very difficult
to determine them. As a rule, his speeches made a greater impression
on people who heard him infrequently than on those already
acquainted with his whole manner of speaking on such occasions.
It was never a question of taking counsel but, as has been said,
always of giving undisputed orders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The purpose of the speech on 5 November 1937 was, as Reich
Marshal Göring said at the beginning...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is at the beginning of this
speech of 5 November?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, at the beginning of the speech.</p>

<p class='pindent'>He told me he had spoken with the Führer beforehand. The
Führer wanted to spur on the Army to carry out its rearmament
somewhat faster. It was going too slowly for the Führer. The
subject of the speech was Austria and Czechoslovakia, which he
said in one place he wanted to overthrow. He said that the latest
date would be 1943-1945, because after that our situation would
become worse. But the case could come up earlier due to two
conditions: In the first place, if internal unrest occurred in France;
in the second place, in the event of the outbreak of a Mediterranean
war in which England, France, Italy, and probably Spain, would
participate, which in my opinion was fantastic.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The assertion that the arming of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
was as good as completed in November 1937, I could not understand.
The Navy still had not a single battleship in service. The
situation was similar in the Air Force and Army. In no way were
we armed for war, and a war against England, for example, would
have been sheer madness. For me, the decisive sentences in his
speech were that first, England and France—I believe—had already
written off Czechoslovakia, and secondly, that he was convinced
<span class='pageno' title='36' id='Page_36'></span>
that France and England would not interfere. In the third place
was the fact that just a few months before, in July 1937, the second
naval agreement had been signed. These three facts seemed to
me to make it certain that Hitler would not seek a warlike solution
to these problems of Austria and Czechoslovakia. At that time it
was a question of the Sudetenland under any circumstances and it
seemed he would strive for a peaceful solution. For that reason
the speech did not impress me with the fact that Hitler at that
time wanted to change his policy—that he wanted to turn from a
policy of peace to one of war. I can imagine that Herr Von Neurath,
not knowing the purpose of this speech, received a different
impression. But, as I now think back over the matter, I can imagine
that the exaggerated character of the speech was specifically
intended to force Von Neurath out of the Cabinet, because I have
learned that at that time the Führer was already inclined to replace
Von Neurath by Von Ribbentrop. That was only an assumption
which I made afterwards.</p>

<p class='pindent'>For me the conclusions to be drawn from the speech were none
other than these: The construction of the fleet in the ratio of one
to three, relative to England, was to be continued, and a friendly
relationship with England was still to be striven for. The ratio
agreement which had just been reached was to be observed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And, it is obvious at the end of the document—namely
in the fourth paragraph from the end—that Field Marshal
Von Blomberg and Colonel General Von Fritsch, in giving their
estimate of the situation, repeatedly pointed out the necessity of
England and France not playing the role of our enemies. This is
commented on further, and one sees that Blomberg and Fritsch
were disturbed and for once opposed Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>After the speech you talked to Blomberg. Is it true that Blomberg,
who can unfortunately not be examined and Fritsch, who is
also dead, saw through this exaggeration of Hitler’s and therefore
pointed out their misgivings and in this way intended to intervene?
About what did you talk to Blomberg after this speech?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In the first place, Blomberg and Fritsch...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You must try not to put leading questions,
Dr. Siemers. You are putting into the witness’ mouth what you
want him to answer. If you want to...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry if I did so. It is a little difficult when
the two men who were there, Blomberg and Fritsch, are dead.
I can only point out that they are not alive now. My final
question is...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That cannot be helped, the fact that they
are dead. But, if you want to get anything in about that, you must
get it from the witness, not from yourself.
<span class='pageno' title='37' id='Page_37'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What impression did Blomberg have after this
speech? What did he say to you afterwards?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I believe Blomberg himself in a questionnaire stated
to Field Marshal Keitel that when we military men left the room
Blomberg, who was with the Führer frequently, said that this
again had not been meant so earnestly and was not to be judged
so seriously. He believed that the Führer would settle these
questions peacefully, too. And as Dr. Siemers said, Blomberg and
Fritsch had both already called the attention of the Führer to the
fact that under no circumstances should England and France be
allowed to intervene, since the German Wehrmacht would not be
able to cope with them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I may add that in this case I intentionally did not make any
such objections because it was, after all, a daily occurrence that
whenever I met the Führer, I told him, “<span class='it'>Ceterum censeo</span>, we must
stay on the course in order to avoid entanglements with England.”
And the Führer repeatedly confirmed this intention of his. It is
typical that as soon as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
Colonel General Von Fritsch, said that after these remarks he
would not be able to take the vacation in Egypt in the winter of
1937-38 which he had planned for his health, the Führer immediately
retracted his statement and said that the affair was not so urgent,
that he could go ahead on his vacation undisturbed, which he
then did.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This shows that it was again a question of exerting pressure.
That was the speech of 5 November 1937. In fact he did not crush
either Austria or Czechoslovakia at that time; but in 1938 the
question was settled peacefully without bloodshed, and even with
the agreement of the other powers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection may I submit the document
dating from the following year, Exhibit Raeder-23, Raeder Document
Book 2, Page 127. On 30 September 1938—I need not say
anything further about Munich, because the defendant was not
directly participating—Hitler and Chamberlain jointly declared that
the agreement signed the previous night and the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement were considered symbols of the desires of both
nations never again to wage war against each other. The rest of
the contents is well known.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then I come to the second key document which the Prosecution
submitted—namely, Document L-79, the so-called “Little Schmundt.”
It is Exhibit USA-27, Number 10 in the document book of the
British Delegation, Page 24. The document in spite of its
astonishing length was also presented in full by the Prosecution, so
that I shall not read from it. May I remind the Court that it states
that further successes could not be achieved without bloodshed, and
<span class='pageno' title='38' id='Page_38'></span>
on 23 May 1939 with reference to Poland it states that not Danzig
but the readjustment of Lebensraum was the issue at stake.</p>

<p class='pindent'>It speaks of the readjustment of Lebensraum and of the fact
that the Polish problem could not be separated from the conflict
with the West. Thereupon Hitler said that the only way out was
to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. Unfortunately,
this is again a document which is undated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you know when Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt prepared this
report?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, unfortunately I cannot say that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say it is undated?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, there is no date stating when the
document was prepared. There is only the date referring to the
minutes of the conference of 23 May. In the case of the Hossbach
Document the conference was on 5 November, but it was written
down by Hossbach 5 days later from memory, on 10 November. In
the case of Schmundt, we do not know whether it was written
down after 1 day, 5 days, or 4 weeks.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it in evidence that the document of
5 November was written down 5 days later?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No. The document of 5 November shows that
it was prepared 5 days later. The document is dated at the top,
“Berlin, 10 November 1937; Notes of the Conference in the Reich
Chancellery on 5 November 1937....”</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is right, then there is evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In the case of
Schmundt, there is no indication?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You do not know when it was written down?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I never heard when.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you ever see this document before this Trial?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Does this document contain a correct reproduction
in all points of Hitler’s speech, or does what you said about
the Hossbach Document apply here also?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It applies even more here. In my opinion it is the
most abstruse document concerning a Hitler speech in existence,
for a large part of the statements in my opinion makes no sense
whatsoever, as I have tried to show. The adjutant stated that he
was only paraphrasing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: This is on the first page in the center where it is
written, “Reproduced in Substance.”
<span class='pageno' title='39' id='Page_39'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Please explain to the Court what impression this speech made
on you at the time and why you believed, in spite of this speech,
that Hitler was not planning any war of aggression.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should like to point out again here that the trial
brief makes the comment that consultation took place regarding
the scale on which the plan should be executed. Particularly in this
case this does not at all represent the character of the speech
correctly. The meaning of the whole first part of the speech, as
I said, is extremely vague. Whereas in the 1937 speech he gave
1943 to 1945 as the latest deadline and the possibility of an earlier
date under certain improbable circumstances, here Hitler speaks
of a solution as being possible in 15 to 20 years. He says that
Poland is always on the side of the enemy, in spite of the treaty
of friendship, that her secret intention is to take advantage of any
opportunity to act against us, and that he, therefore, wants to attack
Poland at the first opportunity. The Polish problem cannot be
separated from the conflict in the West, but a conflict in the West
must not be permitted to arise simultaneously. If it is uncertain
as to whether a war with the West will or will not take place in
the wake of the German-Polish conflict, then a line of battle first
against England and France is perhaps of greater importance. Then
again, he says that we cannot allow ourselves to be drawn into a
war with England on account of Poland, a war on two fronts such
as the incapable men of 1914 had brought about.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then again, England—and that is comparatively new here—is
the driving force against Germany. We must prepare for a long
war in addition to a surprise attack, obviously against England. It
is astonishing that we were to endeavor, at the beginning of such
a war, to strike a destructive blow against England. The goal is
to force England to her knees. Then follows quite a new part...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the defendant appears to be
reading from a document an argument about this document. That
is not giving evidence. If he can tell us anything about what
happened at this meeting, it is open to him to do so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: He is repeating, with the aid of this document,
the involved thoughts which Hitler expressed at that time, and he
is pointing out the contradictions contained in Hitler’s speech at
that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of argument, to point out
that there are conflicts between one part of the document and
another. That is not the subject of evidence. He has already told
us that Hitler’s speeches generally were—that one speech generally
contradicted another, but we can see for ourselves from the document
if one part of it conflicts with another.
<span class='pageno' title='40' id='Page_40'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is it not of importance, Mr. President, that the
abstruse statements of Hitler at that time had such an effect on the
witness that he says so and so many points are false? Then the
whole tendency which we read out of it cannot be true. As I understand
the witness, Hitler must have had mental reservations back
of such conflicting remarks to commanders. But I believe we can
shorten this.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Herr Grossadmiral, according to the wish of the Court, just
explain what the effect was on you and what in your opinion were
the special designs connected with this document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: By contrasting these sentences, I wanted only to
show how muddled the speech was. At the end there is a second
part in which a number of doctrinaire, academic opinions on warfare
are expressed and a conclusion to the effect that it was also
a wish of Hitler to have formed in the OKW a research staff to
work out all these plans for war preparation, evaluation of individual
weapons, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, without the participation of the general staffs,
with which he did not like to collaborate. He wanted these things
to be in his own hands. Thus it was the formation of a research
staff which motivated this speech.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemens, I have already told you that
the Tribunal thinks that argument is not evidence. This seems to
be purely argument upon this document. If there is anything in
the shape of recollection as to what passed at this meeting, that
would be evidence; but merely to argue upon the document is not
in evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may the witness not say what
effect Hitler’s processes of thought had on him? The Prosecution
say that Hitler and Raeder entered upon a conspiracy together.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He can say he did not understand it or did
not think it was sincere.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I should like to point out that
the witness referred to this point because this is the only passage
from this document which the Prosecution have not read. In this
document the sentences about the research staff, as I noticed immediately,
were not read. This research staff was what Hitler
wanted to obtain.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Herr Grossadmiral, after this speech, was anything changed in
your department?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. The conclusion drawn was: First, that the ship
construction program was to be continued in the same way as in
the past—so Hitler himself said—and in the second place, he said
that the armament programs were to be geared for the year
<span class='pageno' title='41' id='Page_41'></span>
1943-1944. That was the positive thing which I could conclude
for myself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>At that time, moreover, I was strongly impressed by the speech
which Hitler himself made at the launching of the battleship
<span class='it'>Bismarck</span> in Hamburg. There he said that the Wehrmacht, as the
keenest instrument of war, had to protect and help to preserve the
peace founded on true justice. That made the greatest impression
on me at that time with regard to Hitler’s intentions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was the fleet at that time in a position to do this?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. It was completely incapable.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, if there are any passages in this
document which have not been read and to which you attach
importance, you may read them now; and for the rest, all that
the Tribunal thinks you ought to do is to ask the defendant, what
his recollection was or what happened at that meeting, and if he
can supplement the document as to what happened at the meeting,
he is entitled to do so. The Tribunal does not intend to prevent
your reading anything from the document which has not yet been
read nor from getting from the witness anything which he says
happened at the meeting.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I understood the witness to mean
that he recalled the research staff which the Prosecution had not
mentioned. Thus it came about that the witness, since he too knows
the document, at the same time pointed out that the research staff
was also mentioned in the document. I believe that can explain
the misunderstanding. The situation is clear to me, and perhaps
I may read this sentence in that connection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Under Number 3, toward the end of the Document
L-79, it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“To study weak points of the enemy.</p>

<p>“These studies must not be left to the general staffs. Secrecy
would no longer be guaranteed. The Führer has, therefore,
decided to order the formation of a small research staff within
the OKW composed of representatives of the three branches
of the Wehrmacht and, as occasion arises, the three commanders-in-chief—that
is to say, general staff chiefs.</p>

<p>“The staff shall keep the Führer constantly informed.</p>

<p>“The research staff shall undertake the planning of operations
from the theoretical side and the preparations which of
necessity arise therefrom...”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. A passage is left out in the
English translation. The copy I have before me says, “These studies
<span class='pageno' title='42' id='Page_42'></span>
must not be left to the general staffs; secrecy would no longer
be guaranteed.” And then it goes on, “This staff shall keep the
Führer informed and shall report to him.” I do not think it is
very important. Go on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Apparently the paragraph about the research
staff in the Armed Forces High Command was left out in the
English. Continuing the document:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The purpose of certain regulations concerns no one outside
the staff; however great the increase in armament of our
adversaries may be, they must at some time come to the end
of their resources and ours will be greater. The French have
120,000 men in each class! We shall not be forced into a war,
but we shall not be able to avoid one.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>This research staff, in effect, eliminated the commanders-in-chief
and that was what Hitler wanted to achieve.</p>

<p class='pindent'>If I am correctly informed, the rest has been read by the Prosecution—namely,
the subsequent aim and the principle, to be specific,
the well-known order to keep everything secret and, at the end,
that which the witness remembered, that the shipbuilding program
should not be changed and the armament program should be fixed
for 1943-1944.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Had Hitler at this time intended a
war of aggression, would he have had to speed up any particular
part of the Navy’s armament?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, indeed. He would have had to speed up all naval
construction.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Would not the construction of submarines especially
have had to be speeded up?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course, particularly because they could be
built most quickly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: How many submarines did you have at this time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot say exactly. I think about 26.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If I remember rightly, Admiral Dönitz has already
answered that there were 15 capable of sailing in the Atlantic—by
the way, there were altogether 26.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, in the winter of 1938-1939, did you
have a talk with Sir Nevile Henderson on relations between Germany
and England?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, a very short talk at an evening reception in the
Führer’s house, where I stood near Ambassador Henderson and
Herr Von Neurath, and wherein the question was discussed—it was
<span class='pageno' title='43' id='Page_43'></span>
brought up by me—as to whether England had not welcomed Germany’s
offer to set the proportion of strength at 1 to 4 and would not
draw certain conclusions from this reciprocal relationship. Ambassador
Henderson answered, without anyone else having brought
up this question, “Yes, that would be shown in the future when the
colonial question was settled.” I later reported this answer to the
Führer in order to use it to maintain a friendly policy toward
England.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We are now at the summer of 1939. Admiral, in
the course of the summer, after the speech of 23 May 1939, did
you talk to Hitler in view of the generally known danger of war,
and what did he tell you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Whenever I talked to the Führer, I always brought up
the question of England, whereby I annoyed him to a certain extent.
I tried to convince him that it would be possible to carry out the
peace policy with England which he himself had urged at the
beginning of his regime. Then he always reassured me that it
remained his intention to steer a policy of peace with England,
always leaving me in the belief that there was no danger of a
clash with England—in any case, that at this time there was no
such danger.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the third key document—namely,
Hitler’s speech before the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939,
at Obersalzberg. There are two documents: Document 1014-PS and
Document 798-PS. Document 1014-PS is Exhibit USA-30, in Raeder
Document Book 10a, Page 269; and Document 798-PS is Exhibit
USA-29, in Document Book 10a, Page 266. In regard to this
Document 1014-PS, which I have here in the original in the form
submitted by the Prosecution, I should like to make a formal
request. This Number 1014-PS was read into the record in the
afternoon session of 26 November 1945 (Volume II, Page 286).
I object to the use of this document. I request that this document
be stricken from the trial record for the following reason...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What document are you speaking about now,
1014-PS?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In Raeder Document Book 10a, Page 269, Exhibit
USA-30.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, what are your reasons?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The deficiencies which were already mentioned
in the other transcripts are much greater here. This document is
nothing but two pieces of paper headed “Second Speech by the
Führer, on 22 August 1939.” The original has no heading, has no
file number, no diary number, and no notice that it is secret; no
signature, no date, no...
<span class='pageno' title='44' id='Page_44'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the
original. Yes, Dr. Siemers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It has no date, no signature—in the original in
the folder, it has no indication of where the document comes from.
It is headed “Second Speech...” although it is certain that on this
date Hitler made only one speech, and it is hardly 1½ pages long,
although...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you say it has no date, it is part of
the document itself which says that it is the second speech of the
Führer on the 22d of August 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I said, Mr. President, it has a heading but no date.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But you said it has no date.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It has no date as to when these notes were put
in writing. It has only the date of when the speech is supposed to
have been made. On all documents which the Prosecution submitted,
also in the case of minutes, you will find the date of the
session and the date on which the minutes were set up; also the
place where the minutes were set up, the name of the person who
set it up, an indication that it is secret or something like that.
Furthermore, it is certain that Hitler spoke for 2½ hours. I believe
it is generally known that Hitler spoke very fast. It is quite out
of the question that the minutes could be 1½ pages long if they
are to give the meaning and the content, at least to some extent,
of a speech which lasted 2½ hours. It is important—I may then
refer to still another point. I will submit the original of Document
798-PS afterwards. I am no expert on handwriting or typewriters,
but I notice that this document, which is also not signed,
whose origin we do not know, is written on the same paper with
the same typewriter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You say we do not know where it has come
from—it is a captured document covered by the affidavit which was
made with reference to all other captured documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Well, but I would be grateful to the Prosecution
if, in the case of such an important document, the Prosecution
would be kind enough in order to determine the actual historical
facts to indicate more exactly where it originates. Because it is
not signed by Schmundt or Hossbach or anyone and has no number,
it is only loose pages.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether the Prosecution can
do that, but it seems to me to be rather late in the day to ask for it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United
States): Mr. President, I do not know what the exact origin of this
document is offhand, but I expect that we could probably get some
<span class='pageno' title='45' id='Page_45'></span>
information before the Tribunal if the Tribunal wishes us to do so.
But as the President pointed out, it is a captured document and
everything that counsel says about it seems to go to its weight
rather than to its admissibility.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know where the
document was found, if that is possible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I will make an effort to find that out.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd just pointed out that
my objection comes rather late. I believe I recall correctly that
repeated objections were raised...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it was I who pointed it out, not
Mr. Dodd.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. I believe I recall correctly that the
Defense on several occasions raised objection during the Prosecution’s
case, and it was said that all statements could be made
during the Defense’s case at a later time—namely, when it is the
defense counsel’s turn to speak.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I only meant that it might not be possible
at this stage to find out exactly where the document came from,
whereas, if the question had been asked very much earlier in the
Trial, it might have been very much easier. That is all I meant.
Have you anything more to add upon why, in your opinion, this
document should be stricken from the record?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like to point out, Mr. President, that
I do not do it for formal reasons but rather for a very substantial
reason. Most important words in this document have constantly
been repeated by the Prosecution during these 5 or 6 months—namely,
the words “Destruction of Poland, main objective... Aim:
elimination of vital forces, not arrival at a certain line.” These
words were not spoken, and such a war aim the German commanders-in-chief
would not have agreed to. For that reason it is
important to ascertain whether this document is genuine.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In this connection, may I remind the Court that there is a third
version of this speech as mentioned in this courtroom—namely,
Document L-3, which is even worse than these and which was
published by the press of the whole world. Wherever one spoke
to anyone, this grotesque and brutal speech was brought up. For
that reason it is in the interest of historical truth to ascertain
whether Hitler spoke in this shocking way at this time. Actually,
I admit he used many expressions which were severe, but he did
not use such words, and this is of tremendous significance for the
reputation of all the commanders who were present.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Let me point out the next words. They say expressly, “close
your hearts against pity, brutal measures.” Such words were not
<span class='pageno' title='46' id='Page_46'></span>
used. I will be in a position to prove this by another witness,
Generaladmiral Böhm.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I therefore request the Court to decide on my request for striking
this document from the record. I should like to point out that the
document is mentioned in the record at many points. Should the
honorable Court so wish, I would have to look for all the points.
I have found only four or five in the German record. If necessary,
I would give all the points in the English record. It was submitted
on 26 November 1945, afternoon session (Volume II, Page 286).</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need bother to do that.
You are now only upon the question of whether the document
should be stricken from the record. If it were to be stricken from
the record, we could find out where it is. Is that all you wish
to say?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: One question to Admiral Raeder.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The words which I just read, “brutal measures, elimination of
vital forces”—were these words used in Hitler’s speech at that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In my opinion, no. I believe that the version submitted
by Admiral Böhm, which he wrote down on the afternoon
of the same day on the basis of his notes, is the version nearest
to the truth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to achieve clarity on this
question, I submit as Exhibit Raeder-27, in Raeder Document Book 2,
Page 144, an orderly reproduction of this speech.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I also have Document Book 2?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: This is the speech according to the manuscript of
Generaladmiral Hermann Böhm. Generaladmiral Böhm was present
at Hitler’s speech on 22 August 1939 at Obersalzberg. He made
the notes during the speech. He transcribed them in the present
form on the same evening—that is, on 22 August 1939—in the Vier
Jahreszeiten Hotel in Munich. I have certified the correctness of the
copy. The original is in the handwriting of Generaladmiral Böhm.
Böhm has been called by me as a witness for various other questions.
He will confirm that the speech was made in this form as I
have submitted here. A comparison of the two documents shows
that all terms, such as “brutal measures,” are not contained in this
speech. It shows further...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Surely this part of Dr. Siemers’
argument must go to weight. He has said that a comparison of
the two documents shows such and such. I have just looked at the
end of Admiral Böhm’s affidavit and it contains, I should argue,
every vital thought that is contained in Document 1014-PS. But
whether it does or not, that is a matter of weight, surely. We
<span class='pageno' title='47' id='Page_47'></span>
cannot, in my respectful submission, go into intrinsic comparisons to
decide the admissibility of the document. As I say, on that I should
have a great deal to say by comparing the documents in detail.
That is not before the Tribunal now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal was only wanting to hear
whatever Dr. Siemers has got to say upon the subject.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: A comparison of the document with Document
798-PS, in the longer and better version, as the Prosecution submitted...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, as Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has
just pointed out, a mere comparison of the documents—of the two
or three documents does not help us as to its admissibility. We
know the facts about the document. It is a document in German,
captured among German documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I understand. I made the statement only in order
to show that I am not raising objections for formal reasons, but
because the thing is actually of great importance. In proof of my...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you will be able to urge that
when you make your speech in criticism of the document as to
its weight. You will be able to point out that it does not bear
comparison with a fuller document taken down by Admiral Böhm
or with the other document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Absolutely right. To explain my formal request,
I refer to my statement on the formal character of the document
which I submitted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The application to strike out Document 1014-PS is denied.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has Counsel for the Prosecution understood
that the Tribunal wishes to have information as to where that
document was found?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord; we will do our
best to get it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and also the other, Document 798-PS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, if Your Lordship pleases.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I submitted Document Raeder-27, which
is the Böhm version, to you. You have read the speech in this
version. Is this reproduction correct on the whole, in your recollection?
<span class='pageno' title='48' id='Page_48'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. In my opinion, this version is that one which
corresponds most closely to reality. I remember especially that
Hitler devoted a large portion of his remarks to the point that
England and France would not intervene, giving reasons why they
would not. He mentioned a number of reasons, and I missed just
that portion, in its elaboration, in the other reproductions of
the speech.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the version of the speech Document 798-PS
or Exhibit USA-29 it says verbatim: “I am only afraid that at the
last moment some swine will offer me some plan of arbitration.”
Were those words used in the speech at that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In my recollection, certainly not. The Führer was not
accustomed to using expressions like that in speeches which he
made to the generals.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On the other hand, the version put forth by
Böhm shows that Hitler had, by this time, decided to attack
Poland. I am asking you to give us briefly the impression, which
the speech made on you at the time. Tell me also why, despite
this speech which even in this version is severe, you retained your
office as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Without doubt, I had the impression that the situation
was serious and tremendously tense. The fact, however, that Hitler
in his speech put too great a stress on proving that France and
England would not intervene, and the second fact that Herr Von
Ribbentrop, the Reich Foreign Minister, left for Moscow on the
same day to sign a pact there, as we were told—these things filled
not only me but all listeners as well with the strong hope that
here again was a case of a clever move by Hitler, which in the
end he would successfully solve in a peaceful way.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Therefore I saw no reason to resign my office at that moment.
I would have considered that pure desertion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection
I would like, because of their chronological correspondence, to
submit the two documents Exhibits Raeder-28 and 29, and I ask
that the Tribunal only take judicial notice without my making
further reference to them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have cited Document C-155 and have accused
you, through this document...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, of the documents to
which Dr. Siemers has just referred—Documents Raeder-28 and 29—the
first is a memorandum of General Gamelin and the second
is a letter from General Weygand to General Gamelin of 9 September
1939.
<span class='pageno' title='49' id='Page_49'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Your Lordship will remember that the Prosecution objected to
these documents as being irrelevant, and, My Lord, the Prosecution
maintain that objection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I do not wish to interrupt Dr. Siemers’ examination any more
than is necessary. If at the moment he is merely asking the Tribunal
to take judicial notice of the documents and does not intend
to use them, it would probably be convenient—in order not to
interrupt the examination-in-chief—that I merely indicate formally
that we are maintaining our objection to the document. Of course,
I am at the disposal of the Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is this the position, that they were allowed
to be translated and put in the document book but that no further
order of the Tribunal has been given?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No further order has been given
and therefore, My Lord, it is still open to us to object, as I understand
the position.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better deal with it
now, then.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I make a few remarks on this point?
I believe...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But we had better hear the objection first,
had we not? And then we will hear you afterwards.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, as you wish. This is a purely
formal point. I believe that Sir David erred slightly in referring
to Document Raeder-28. There was no objection to this document
by the Prosecution, but only against Document Raeder-29.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My friend is quite right; we did
not object to the translation of 28. However, My Lord, it falls
into the same category as 29, and I would still raise an objection.
I apologize to Your Lordship if I conveyed the impression that
we had made an objection before.</p>

<p class='pindent'>My Lord, the Number 28 is a letter from General Gamelin to
M. Daladier on the 1st of September 1939, in which General Gamelin
gives his views as to the problem of the neutrality of Belgium
and Luxembourg and contrasts that view with the view of the
French Government.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, My Lord, I submit that that expression of opinion on the
part of General Gamelin is in itself intrinsically too remote from
the issues of this Trial to be of any relevance or probative value.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then, apart from its intrinsic nature, the position is that this
was a document which, as I understand from Dr. Siemers’ verification
on Page 158, is taken from the <span class='it'>White Book of the German
<span class='pageno' title='50' id='Page_50'></span>
Foreign Office</span>, from the secret files of the French General Staff,
which could not have been captured until sometime after June 1940.
Therefore, as a secondary reason, it can have no relevance to any
opinion formed by the Defendant Raeder in September of 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>My Lord, the second document is, as I said to the Tribunal,
a letter to General Gamelin from General Weygand, who was then
the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army in the Levant. It
describes a plan which General Weygand had in mind with regard
to possible operations in Greece. Nothing came of these operations
before June 1940 when an armistice was made by Marshal Pétain
on behalf of part of the French people—although not, of course, of
the whole—and it can have no relevance to October 1940 when
Greece was invaded by Italy, or to the position at the end of 1940
and the beginning of 1941 when the invasion of Greece begins to
be considered in the German directives and operational orders
which have been put in before the Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is the first point. And the same secondary point applies,
that it was also a captured document which could not have been
captured before June 1940; therefore, it can have no relevance to
this defendant’s state of mind in August or September of 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>My Lord, as a matter of convenience, I have just made a list of
the documents to which objections will be made and, My Lord,
there are one or two additions which my French and Soviet
colleagues have asked me to make, and I will deal with them
when they arise.</p>

<p class='pindent'>My Lord, I would just like the Tribunal to have in mind that
there are four geographical groups of documents as opposed to the
groups under which they are arranged here, which the Tribunal
will have to consider. One is formed by documents relating to
the Low Countries, the second, which is Group G on the list which
I have just put before the Tribunal, deals with Norway; a third
deals with Greece, of which Document Raeder-29 is an example;
and a fourth is Group E in the list which I have just put in, dealing
with tentative proposals and suggestions made by various military
figures with regard to the oil field in the Caucasus or operations
on the Danube.</p>

<p class='pindent'>My Lord, the same objections which I have made particularly
with regard to Documents Raeder-28 and 29 will apply generally
to these groups, and I thought that I ought to draw the Tribunal’s
attention to that fact. In addition, my friend Colonel Pokrovsky has
intimated to me some special objections which we will have to
certain documents on which he can assist the Tribunal himself
when they arise.</p>

<p class='pindent'>But, My Lord, I do take these specific cases, 28 and 29, as
objectionable in themselves, and I draw the Tribunal’s attention
<span class='pageno' title='51' id='Page_51'></span>
to the fact that they are also typically objectionable as belonging
to certain groups.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The decision of the Tribunal, Your Lordship, is given in the
morning session of 2 May 1946. Your Lordship said, “The question
of their admissibility will be decided after they have been
translated.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French
Republic): May it please the Tribunal, I would ask the Tribunal
for an opportunity to associate myself publicly with the declaration
just made by Sir David and to propose a few examples which will
show the degree of importance which should be attached to the
documents in question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Defense is asking that the Tribunal take into account a
document published in the German <span class='it'>White Book</span> Number 5, under
Number 8. This document reports a statement by a French prisoner
of war who is supposed to have said that he had been in Belgium
since 15 April. However, the German <span class='it'>White Book</span> gives neither
the name of this prisoner nor any indication of his unit. We have
none of the information which we need in order to judge whether
the statement is relevant. We are therefore faced with a document
which is not authentic and which has no value as evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Defense is asking that Document Raeder-102 of the same
document book be admitted by the Tribunal. I ask the Tribunal
to let me make a few observations to show the one-sided manner
in which these documents have been assembled by the German
authorities in the <span class='it'>White Book</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I would say, first of all, that this Document Raeder-102 has not
been quoted at length. The French Delegation has referred to the
text of the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>. We have read it carefully. This
document is only a preparatory order in view of defensive preparations
organized by the Belgians on the French-Belgian frontier
facing France. We have consulted the Belgian military authorities.
This order was a manifestation of the Belgian Government’s determination
to defend Belgium’s neutrality on all its frontiers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>It is therefore contrary to the truth to try to prove by means
of this document the existence of staff contacts between Brussels,
London, and Paris, which, if they had existed, would have been
contrary to the policy of neutrality.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The commentary made by the German Minister for Foreign
Affairs in the introduction to the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>, Page 11 of
the French text, took the counsel by surprise and certainly did not
mislead Admiral Raeder, who is a serviceman. In fact, it is at
the price of a lie that the official commentator affirms, on the one
hand, that the expression “les forces amies” (friendly forces) used
<span class='pageno' title='52' id='Page_52'></span>
in this document means French and British troops, whereas in
reality it is a regular expression used in the Belgian Army to describe
Belgian units in the immediate vicinity of those actually fighting.
On the other hand, the German commentator claims, and I quote,
“The general line Tournai-Antoing, of the canal from Mons to
Condé, Saint Ghislain and Binche, is partly in Belgian and partly
in French territory.” It is sufficient to look at a map to see that
all those localities are in Belgian territory and they are all at
least some dozens of kilometers distant from the French-Belgian
frontier, and in places, 60 kilometers from the French frontier.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to excuse this interruption. I thought it was
advisable to enlighten them by giving a convincing example of
the value of the evidence furnished by the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks the most
convenient course would be to hear your argument now upon these
documents, not only upon 28 to 29, but upon the other documents
specified in Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe’s list, and then the Tribunal
would consider these documents after the adjournment and would
give its decision tomorrow morning.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I should be very
grateful if it would be possible to proceed in a somewhat different
manner. I should like to call attention to the fact that a rather
lengthy debate regarding documents has already taken place, and
the decision of the Court followed. I believe that if I comment
upon all the documents at this point a great deal of time will be
lost, since the coherence of the documents will emerge of itself
later during my presentation of evidence. If I now deal with the
list submitted by Sir David, I would, in order to show my reasons,
have to set forth all that which will appear again in the regular
course of testimony later on. I thought that the decision of the
Tribunal first to present the documents in the document book was
specifically to save time, and then objections could be made one by
one as individual documents are presented.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I know; but there are a very great number
of documents. The Tribunal will have to hear an argument upon
each document if we do what you suggest, reading the list of Sir
David. There are 30 or 40 documents, I suppose.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has already stated that
he will be guided according to different geographical groups. Therefore,
there will not be objections with regard to each document but
rather with regard to each group of documents and each group of
questions—for instance, an objection in the Norway case against
all Norwegian documents or in the Greek case against all Greek
documents. It would be easier to deal with matters that way, since
<span class='pageno' title='53' id='Page_53'></span>
in my testimony I shall be dealing with Greece and Norway
anyway, whereas if I do so now I shall have to say everything
twice. But I shall of course be guided by the decision of the
honorable Tribunal. I only fear that an unnecessary amount of
time will be lost that way.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I only want to say
one word on procedure. I did hope that Dr. Siemers and I had
already occupied sufficient of the Tribunal’s time in arguing this
point because, of course, the arguments as to relevancy must be
the same. Whether they are so obviously irrelevant as not to be
translatable, or whether they are inadmissible, at any rate my
arguments were the same, and I did not intend to repeat the argument
which I had made before the Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Dr. Siemers already assisted the Tribunal for an hour and a half
on this point, which we discussed before, and I hoped that if I stated
as I did state that I have maintained the points which I put before
the Tribunal in my previous argument, that Dr. Siemers might be
able on this occasion to shorten matters and to say that he relied
on the—if I may say so—very full argument which the Tribunal
had on the other occasion. That is why I thought it might be
convenient if we dealt with them now and put this problem out of
the need for further consideration.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks that you
must argue these questions now, and it hopes that you will argue
them shortly, as your arguments have already been heard in favor
of them. But we think that you must argue them now and not
argue each individual document as it comes up, and it will consider
the matter. It already has these documents, but it will consider
the matter again and decide the matter tonight.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for
the U.S.S.R.): My Lord, inasmuch as the Tribunal decided to have
Dr. Siemers argue the point which was expressed by Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe and other prosecutors, I think it is my duty to name
three documents to which our Prosecution object.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Soviet Prosecution would like to object altogether to five
documents. Two of them—I have in mind Documents Raeder-70
and 88—have already been included by my friend Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe
in the list which has been given to the Tribunal. So all
I have to do now is to name the three remaining numbers, so that
Dr. Siemers would have it easier in answering all together. I name
Documents Raeder-13, 27, and 83.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document Raeder-13 is a record of a report of Captain Lohmann.
There is an idea expressed in this report which I cannot call other
than a mad and propagandist idea of a typical Nazi. The idea
<span class='pageno' title='54' id='Page_54'></span>
is that the aim of the Red Army is world revolution, and that the
Red Army is really trying to incite world revolution. I consider
that it would not be proper if such nightmares and politically
harmful ideas were reflected in the documents which are to be
admitted by the Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>My second objection is in connection with the Document
Raeder-27. This is a record which was made by a voluntary
reporter, Böhm, of an address of Hitler’s at Obersalzberg. The
Tribunal already rejected Dr. Siemers’ application to include two
documents pertaining to the same questions and emphasized the
fact that the Tribunal does not wish to compare the authenticity
of different documents pertaining to or dealing with the same
question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I consider that inasmuch as the Tribunal already has at its
disposal among documents which were admitted two records
dealing with Hitler’s address at Obersalzberg, therefore, there is
no necessity to admit the third record of his speech, especially
since in this third version there are altogether shameless,
slanderous, and calumnious remarks against the Armed Forces of
the Soviet Union and the leaders of the Soviet Government. Neither
the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union nor we as representatives
of the Soviet State would ever agree to have such remarks included
in the record.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The third document is Document Raeder-83. Document 83 is
an excerpt from the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>. Since the authenticity
of this <span class='it'>White Book</span> has already been questioned by Dr. Dubost,
I consider it material which cannot be relied upon, and in particular
with regard to the Document Raeder-83. There are several remarks,
harmful to the Soviet Union, which have absolutely no political
basis—that is, the passage pertaining to the relations between the
Soviet Union and Finland. So on the grounds of such general
political motives, I would ask the High Tribunal to exclude as
evidence Document Raeder-83 from the list of documents which
were presented to the Tribunal by Defense Counsel Siemers.
Furthermore, strictly speaking, it is absolutely clear that this document
is irrelevant. That is all I want to say.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I note to my regret
that we are back at the beginning again in our debate about documents;
for we are disputing about documents now which were not
mentioned at all in the original debate concerning documents,
which took place on 1 May. I had believed, however, that I could
rely on this one principle, that at least those documents which at
that time were not objected to would be considered granted. Now,
however, I find that those documents which were not discussed at
that time at all are under dispute. It is extremely difficult...
<span class='pageno' title='55' id='Page_55'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks you are
entirely in error in that, because it is obvious that a document
which has not been translated cannot be finally passed on by the
Prosecution or by the Tribunal, and the fact that the Prosecution
does not object to it at that stage does not prevent it from objecting
at a later stage when it has been translated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: There were some documents to which I was
told that the Prosecution did not object, and with regard to them
I believed at any rate that that was final, just as with reference
to some documents...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought I had made myself clear. What
I said was this: The Prosecution in objecting or not objecting to
a document before it is translated does not in any way bind them
not to object to it after it is translated. Is that clear?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall take these documents one by one.
First of all, I would like to start with those documents which
Colonel Pokrovsky...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, no, Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal will not
listen to these documents taken one by one. If they can be treated
in groups they must be treated in groups. They have been treated
in groups by Sir David, and I am not saying you must adhere
exactly to the same groups, that the Tribunal is not proposing to
hear each document one by one.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Then it is a misunderstanding.
I wanted to discuss those documents at the beginning, because
there are some things which are not clear and which were objected
to by Colonel Pokrovsky. I did not realize that Colonel Pokrovsky
mentioned the documents in groups. I believe he mentioned five
documents—three of them individually—and I believe that, though
I have not understood everything, I can deal with these individually
mentioned documents one by one. However, I shall be glad to start
with the group laid down by Sir David if that is to be dealt with
first. Shall I first...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you said you were going to deal with
the documents one by one, you meant all the documents one by
one? I am not suggesting that you...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Honor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You can deal with Colonel Pokrovsky first
if you like.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Colonel Pokrovsky has as his first objection
Document Raeder-13. This deals with a document dated 1935.
Certainly Colonel Pokrovsky can offer some objection to the
contents of this document, but how a document can be classed as
<span class='pageno' title='56' id='Page_56'></span>
irrelevant just because a certain sentence allegedly contains propaganda
is not quite clear to me. I believe I could find sentences in
other documents which have been submitted during these past
6 months which might be interpreted in some way as propaganda.
I cannot quite imagine that that is an objection, and I would like
to remind the Tribunal that right at the beginning of the proceedings,
when we were dealing with Austria, the Tribunal rejected an
objection made by the Defense regarding a letter. The Defense
objected because the author of the letter was available as a witness.
Thereupon, the Tribunal, and justly so, decided that the letter was
evidence. The only matter for debate is the probative value. The
Tribunal admitted this document. And in connection with this I
should like to mention that a lecture at a university which is set
down in writing is a document. The lecture deals with the naval
agreement, and I believe that therewith the relevancy...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, have you not made your point
on Number 13? You said the majority of the thing is clearly
relevant, though there is one sentence which may be alleged to be
propaganda, and, therefore, the document ought not be struck out.
Is that not your point?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, I am saying that it is a document which has
a bearing on the evidence used in this Trial, and the Soviet Prosecution
cannot dispute it because it was a lecture given in 1935.
I cannot at all understand the use of the word “propaganda” by
Colonel Pokrovsky in connection with this document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I do not understand what you say in
the least. I thought I put the point you had made. I thought you
made it clear that the document in itself was relevant and could
not be rejected because it contained one sentence which was
alleged propaganda. That is your point, and I shall want it stated
in one or two sentences, and the Tribunal will consider it. I do
not see why the time of the Tribunal should be taken up with a
long argument about something else.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Colonel Pokrovsky secondly, if I understood the
interpreter, objected to Document Number Raeder-27. In this
instance we are concerned with the speech of Hitler at Obersalzberg
on 22 August 1932. It is Exhibit Raeder-27. It is very hard
for me to comment on this document since I do not understand the
objections of Colonel Pokrovsky. It deals...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The objection was that there was no necessity
for a third record of the speech. There were two records which
you objected to, and he said there was no necessity for a third.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I would like to add to that then, Your Honor,
that the Soviet Delegation does not agree with the Delegation of
<span class='pageno' title='57' id='Page_57'></span>
the United States. In the record at that time the representative of
the American Delegation said that if any one had a better version
of that speech, he should present it. Therefore, I agree with the
opinion of the American Prosecution and I believe, aside from that,
that not a word about the relevancy of a speech which was made
shortly before the outbreak of the war is necessary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document Raeder-83 is the third document objected to by
Colonel Pokrovsky. This contains the sixth session of the Supreme
Council on 28 March 1940, the drafting of a resolution with the
heading “Strictly Secret.” In this document the Supreme Council—that
is, the constituents of the Allied leadership—agreed that the
French and British Governments on Monday, 1 April, would tender
a note to the Norwegian and Swedish Governments. The contents
of this note is then given, and there is a reference to the point of
view of vital interests, and it says there then the position of the
neutrals would be considered by the Allies as one contrary to their
vital interests, and that it would evoke an appropriate reaction.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Under Figure 1c of this document, it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Any attempt by the Soviet Union which aimed at obtaining
from Norway a position on the Atlantic Coast would be
contrary to the vital interests of the Allies and would provoke
the appropriate reaction.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You do not need to read the document, do
you? I mean you can tell us what the substance of it is. It appears
to be an objection to any further attack upon Finland, which would
be considered by the Allies to be contrary to their vital interests.
That is all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, just this expression “vital interests”
is the decisive one. I do not wish, as the Prosecution always seem
to think, to bring up some sort of objection from the point of view
of <span class='it'>tu quoque</span>. I want to show only what the situation was according
to international law, and that at the same time when Admiral
Raeder was entertaining certain thoughts regarding Norway,
Greece, and so forth, the Allied agencies had the same thoughts
and were basing these thoughts on the same concept of international
law which, as I recently said, was upheld by Kellogg—namely
that the right of self-preservation still exists. Now I can
prove my point through these documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The point made against you by Sir David
was that the document could not have come into the hands of the
German authorities until after the fall of France.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall deal with the groupings designated
by Sir David.
<span class='pageno' title='58' id='Page_58'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Sir David made certain fundamental statements. Regarding
Document Numbers Raeder-28 and 29, he pointed out specifically
that in one case they were the thoughts of General Gamelin and
in the other case those of General Weygand, and that these ideas
were not known to the Germans at that time since these documents
were not yet in our hands. The latter point is correct. The concept
and the plan of occupying Greece, of destroying Romanian oil
wells, those thoughts were known to the Germans—namely, through
their intelligence service. The Prosecution did not present the
data of the German High Command which show these reports.
Since I do not have these documents, I believe it would be just
if I am given the possibility of presenting the actual facts which
were known to Germany and in this way prove them. I have no
other proofs. That it is agreeable to the Prosecution to deprive
me of the documents which I need for the defense, I can understand;
but the Prosecution must also understand the fact that I
consider it important that those documents which are definite proof
of certain plans remain at my disposal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The charge has been made against Admiral Raeder that it was
an aggressive war—a criminal war of aggression—to formulate
plans for the occupation of Greece. Document Raeder-29 shows
that General Weygand and General Gamelin on 9 September 1939
concern themselves with planning the occupation of neutral
Salonika. So if this is the case, I cannot understand how one can
point an accusing finger at Admiral Raeder, on the German side, for
having concerned himself with such plans a year and half later.
I believe, therefore, that these and similar documents must be
granted me, for only from them can the military planning and the
value of the military planning, or the objectionable side—that is
the criminal side of the planning, be understood. The strategic
thinking of the defendant can be understood only if one knows
approximately what strategic thinking prevailed at the same time
with the enemy. The strategic reasoning of Admiral Raeder was
shut up in an airtight compartment but depended on the reports
received about the strategic planning of the opposition. It is a
reciprocal activity. This reciprocal activity is necessary for an
understanding. Therefore, in view of this very essential point, I ask
to be granted this kind of document since, as I have recently stated,
I do not know how I can carry on my defense at all in the face
of these grave accusations regarding Greece and Norway if all of
my documents are stricken. I believe that I am understood correctly
when I do not assert that we were cognizant of these documents.
But Germany knew the contents of these documents, and I believe
that is sufficient.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May it please the Tribunal, we are once again at Document
Raeder-66 in Group A. This Document Raeder-66 is the opinion
<span class='pageno' title='59' id='Page_59'></span>
of Dr. Mosler, an expert in international law, about the Norwegian
operation as judged from the standpoint of international law.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Since we are always talking about saving time in this courtroom,
I would have my doubts about rejecting this article, for a refusal
would force me to set forth the trend of thought point by point in
detail, and I believe that it is much easier for the Tribunal, for the
Prosecution and for me, if I submit general legal arguments in this
connection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this is a document
which is a matter of legal argument. If the Tribunal thinks it
would be of any assistance to have the argument in documentary
form, I willingly withdraw my objection to that. That is on quite a
different project than the other one, and I want to help in any
way I can.</p>

<p class='pindent'>While I am before the microphone: I did mention that there
were two other documents that fall into the same group. Document
Raeder-34 falls into Group B, and Document Raeder-48 into
the Group E.</p>

<p class='pindent'>My Lord, I did mention 28 when I was addressing the Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I do not wish to
dispute Document Raeder-66, I have really done this just to ease
the situation for everyone. The additional documents in this group
are Raeder-101 to 107. I cannot say that this is a homogeneous
group. One document deals with Norway, another deals with
Belgium, a third deals with the Danube. The unity of this group
escapes me. Basically these documents have this point in common:
that, as I have already stated, a plan existed in the Allied General
Staff, as well as in the German, and all were based on the tenet
of international law regarding the right of self-preservation and
vital interests.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In order to be brief at this point I should like to refer to Document
Raeder-66 particularly, and to save time I ask that the
quotations from this document be considered the basis for my
remarks today on the right of self-preservation. I am referring
to the quotations on Page 3 and Page 4 of this expert opinion. The
legal situation is made very clear therein, and it is set forth very
clearly in this expert opinion that, with regard to the question of
the occupation of Norway, we are not concerned with whether the
Allies had actually landed in Norway but only whether such a plan
existed, that we are not concerned with the fact whether Norway
agreed or did not agree. The danger of a change of neutrality
according to international law gives one the right to use some
compensating measure or to attack on one’s own accord; and this
basic tenet has been maintained in the entire literature which is
<span class='pageno' title='60' id='Page_60'></span>
quoted in this document, and to which I shall refer later in my
defense speech.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Out of group 101 to 107, I have to mention Document Raeder-107
especially. Document Raeder-107 is not concerned at all with the
<span class='it'>White Books</span> as the other documents are. 107 is an affidavit by
Schreiber. Schreiber was naval attaché at Oslo from October 1939
onward. From the beginning I have said that I needed Schreiber
as a witness. In the meantime, I dispensed with Schreiber because
even though we tried for weeks, we could not find him. I discussed
this matter with Sir David and with Colonel Phillimore. I was
advised that there would be no objection on this formal point since
Schreiber suddenly and of his own accord reappeared again.</p>

<p class='pindent'>If, as the Prosecution wish, this piece of evidence is taken from
me—namely, the affidavit of Schreiber about the reports which
Admiral Raeder received from Oslo and, in addition to that, the
documents from which the authenticity of these reports may be
shown—then I have no evidence for this entire question at all.
Besides, Schreiber was in Oslo during the occupation and he has
commented in his affidavit with regard to the behavior of the Navy
and the efforts of Admiral Raeder in connection with the regrettable
civil administration of Terboven. Therefore, I am asking the High
Tribunal to grant this affidavit to me or to grant Schreiber as a
witness so that he can testify personally. This latter course,
however, would take up more time. I have limited my evidence
through witnesses to such a degree that I believe that, in view of
the entire span of 15 years with which we are dealing, in the case
of the Defendant Raeder at least, such an affidavit should be
granted me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>With regard to Group B, I should like to refer to the remarks
which I have already made. As far as I can see, the group seems
to be thoroughly heterogeneous, but I believe they are all documents
taken from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>. The same ideas should be
applied which I have recently expressed to the Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think Sir David recognized that there was
a certain degree of lack of identity in these groups, but he suggested
that they all fall into geographical groups: one group, the Low
Countries; one group, Norway; one group, Greece; and one group,
the Caucasus and the Danube—which agrees with “E.” That is
what he said. Could you not deal with them in those geographical
groups?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have already talked about Norway and in that connection
I therefore refer to the remarks I have already made. I have
already briefly mentioned Greece. I would like to say that there
<span class='pageno' title='61' id='Page_61'></span>
was a double accusation made: One, that neutral ships were sunk—namely,
neutral Greek ships, and secondly, the accusation of an
aggressive war against Greece—that is, the occupation of all Greece.</p>

<p class='pindent'>With regard to the last point, I have already made a few statements.
Dealing with the Greek merchantmen I would like to say
only that in this case the action and attitude of the defendant
appears justified in that he received reports which coincided with
the documents which were found a month later in France. The
same reports were received by Raeder when he expressed his views
to Hitler. I would like to prove that these reports which came to
him through the intelligence service were not invented by the
intelligence service but were actual facts. The same applies to the
oil regions. Plans existed to destroy the Romanian oil wells and
furthermore there was a plan to destroy the Caucasian oil wells;
both had the object of hurting the enemy; in the one case Germany
alone—as far as Romania was concerned—and in the second case
Germany and Russia, because at that time Russia was on friendly
terms with Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>These plans are—and this is shown by the documents—in the
same form as all other documents presented by the Prosecution.
These documents as well, in their entirety, are “top secret,”
“personal,” “confidential.” Just as the Prosecution have always said,
“Why did you do everything secretly? That is suspicious.” These
documents contain ideas based on strategic planning just as do the
documents presented by the Prosecution. That is something which
arises from the nature of war and which is not meant to be an
accusation on my part, nor should it be construed as an accusation
against Admiral Raeder by the Prosecution.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then the group of Ribbentrop documents follows. I can say
only what I said recently. And as I glance at it cursorily now, the
documents in the Ribbentrop document book are not as complete
as they are here. Therefore, I believe it is important to take the
documents and to investigate their complete content from the point
of view of Raeder rather than the point of view of Ribbentrop.
That perhaps may have taken place, as the High Tribunal
suggested the other day. Then I believe, however, it is not an
objection which can be used by the Prosecution to say that in the
case of Ribbentrop they were partially admitted and partially
rejected. For some documents which were granted Ribbentrop were
refused me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then we turn to Group “E,” and that is <span class='it'>tu quoque</span>. I believe
I have already spoken sufficiently on that point just recently.
I dispute it again and I cannot understand why the Prosecution
will not agree with me on that. I do not wish to object. I am not
saying <span class='it'>tu quoque</span>; I am only saying that there is strategic planning
<span class='pageno' title='62' id='Page_62'></span>
which is carried on in every army and there are tenets in international
law which applied to the Allies exactly in the same way
as to us, and I beg to be granted these possibilities of comparison in
foreign politics.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I believe herewith that I have dealt with all points so far as it
is possible for me to define my position in such a brief period of
time with regard to about 50 documents, and I am asking the High
Tribunal not to make my work more difficult by refusing these
documents to me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will carefully consider these
documents and your arguments.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 17 May 1946, at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div><span class='pageno' title='63' id='Page_63'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND DAY</span><br/> Friday, 17 May 1946</h1></div>

<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have given careful and prolonged
attention to the consideration of the documents offered by
Dr. Siemers on behalf of the Defendant Raeder; and they, therefore,
do not wish the documents which they propose to admit to be read
because they have already read them all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I will now deal with the documents individually.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document 66 is admitted for the purposes of argument, and not
as evidence; Document 101 is denied; Documents 102 to 105 are
admitted; Document 106 is denied; Document 107 is admitted; Document
39 is denied; Document 63 is admitted; Document 64 is denied;
Document 99 is denied; Document 100 is admitted; Documents 102
to 107 are admitted; Document 38 is denied; Document 50 is denied;
Document 55 is denied; Document 58 is denied; Documents 29, 56,
57, 60, and 62 are denied. I should have included in that group
Document 28, which is also denied. Documents 31, 32, 36, 37, and 39
are denied; Document 41 is admitted; Document 99 has already been
denied, and Document 101 has already been denied; Document 59
is admitted; Document 68 is denied; Document 70 is denied; Document
72 is denied; Document 74 is denied; Document 75 is admitted;
Document 77 is admitted; Document 79 is admitted; Document 80
is admitted; Document 84 is admitted; Document 85, which is on
Page 82 of Volume V, is admitted; Document 87 is denied; Document
88 is admitted; Document 91 is admitted; Document 13 is
admitted; Document 27 is admitted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution may, if they wish it, apply to cross-examine the
witness who made that document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United
States): That is Admiral Böhm.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Admiral Böhm, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document 83 is admitted; Document 34 is admitted; Document 48
is denied.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Have I gone too quickly for you, Dr. Siemers? You have the
last few?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I heard everything.
<span class='pageno' title='64' id='Page_64'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, yesterday afternoon the Tribunal
asked that we ascertain the origins, if possible, of Document 1014-PS.
Some question was raised about it by Dr. Siemers. It is Exhibit
USA-30.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have had a search made, and I have some information that
we are prepared to submit concerning this document. I should
like to point out that 1014-PS and 798-PS and L-3 are documents
all concerning this same speech made at Obersalzberg on 22 August
1939. They were offered in evidence by Mr. Alderman of the
American staff on the 26th day of November 1945.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should like to point out that L-3, to which Dr. Siemers made
reference yesterday, was offered only for identification, as the
record shows for the proceedings of that day on the 26th of November,
and has received the mark Exhibit Number USA-28 for
identification only. Mr. Alderman pointed out, as appears in the
record, that he was not offering it in evidence, that it was a paper
which came into our hands originally through the services of a
newspaperman, and that later on the Documents 798-PS and
1014-PS were found among captured documents. They referred to
the same speech in Obersalzberg. Mr. Alderman offered these two
at that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now Document 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29, and Document
1014-PS, Exhibit Number USA-30, were both found by the
forces of the United States in this fashion:</p>

<p class='pindent'>They had been taken from the OKW headquarters in Berlin,
and in the course of various journeys in those days they finally
arrived at one place and were stored, it now appears, at various
places by the OKW under the control of a General Winter of the
German forces; and they were transported in three railway trains
to Saalfelden in the Austrian Tyrol. Subsequently, General Winter
ordered that all documents in his possession be turned over to the
Allied forces and they were. These particular documents, together
with some other papers, were turned over by General Winter and
members of his staff at that time; and on the 21st day of May 1945,
they were removed from Saalfelden where they were under the
control of General Winter and taken to the Third U.S. Army Document
Center at Munich. While at Munich they were sorted and
cataloged by Department G-2 Supreme Headquarters of the
American Expeditionary Force with the assistance of clerks from
the OKW and OKH. On the 16th of June 1945 these documents,
together with others, were removed on six trucks from the headquarters
of the Third Army at Munich and were taken to the U.S.
Group Control Council Number 32 at Seckenheim, Germany, which
was located in the former offices of the I.G. Farben Company, and
were placed on shelves on the third floor of the building and kept
<span class='pageno' title='65' id='Page_65'></span>
under guard. Between the 16th of June 1945 and the 30th of August
1945, the task of collecting, sorting, assembling and cataloging these
documents was carried out under the supervision of the British
Colonel Austin, with personnel of the Supreme Headquarters and
the G-2 Document Center of the G-2 Operational Intelligence
Section, 6889 Berlin Document Section, and the British Enemy
Document Unit, and the British Military Intelligence Research
Section. Beginning on the 5th day of July 1945, and continuing
until the 30th of August 1945, these documents were screened at
that place by members of the staff of the United States Chief
Counsel. Lieutenant Margolies, who is here in the courtroom and
a member of our staff, personally picked these documents out of
your file 798-PS and 1014-PS from the OKW captured files, brought
them to Nuremberg, and lodged them in the document room where
they have been kept under strict security ever since.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, that is the history of these two documents about which
Dr. Siemers raised some question yesterday—a considerable question
I might say—and inferred there was something strange about
their contents. I think the story which I have given in the form
of a statement over the signature of Lieutenant Commander Hopper
clearly establishes the source and where they have been ever since;
and I think it is only fair to say that, since Dr. Siemers saw fit
to point out that this language sounded extremely harsh and was
attributed to Hitler, these documents were offered to show these
people were actually talking about aggressive war. The reading
of the three documents by the Tribunal will clearly show they are
all in agreement in substance; of course, there are differences in
phraseology, but the important thing and purpose for which they
were offered was to show that these people were talking aggressive
war. I might say I am not surprised to find my friend is sensitive
about the remark, but I think the unanswered proof in the case
thus far shows that not only were these things said but they
were done.</p>

<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: May it please the Court. No doubt it is a mistake
in translation. We understood 106 had been rejected the first time
and admitted the second time in the Group 102 to 107.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was my mistake. I did say
that the Group 102 to 107 were admitted; but I have also said 106
was rejected, and it is rejected. It is entirely my mistake. 106 is
rejected.</p>

<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: 106 is thrown out and 102 to 107 are also rejected,
are they?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, I will state the exact numbers: 102, 103,
104, 105, and 107 are admitted.
<span class='pageno' title='66' id='Page_66'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: Very good. Mr. President, we want to offer further
explanations on 102 to 107 during the course of the proceedings.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I say a few words concerning
the statement made by Mr. Dodd?</p>

<p class='pindent'>I had no doubts, and I certainly have no doubt now, that since
these documents were found they have been handled very correctly
and Mr. Dodd spoke only about that. I believe it is important to
establish: Whether one can determine the connection these documents
had with other documents, because in that way one can see
whether these were documents belonging to a certain adjutant. For
instance, were they together with the Hossbach papers or together
with the Schmundt file? If, for instance, the documents were with
the Schmundt documents it is probable that they belonged to the
adjutant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That all goes to the weight of the document,
does it not? No doubt, a document which is signed has more weight
than a document which is not signed. All those matters the Tribunal
will take into account when considering the documents, but
the admissibility of the document depends upon its being a German
document found and captured.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I wanted to say this only because
it is unpleasant to have the American Delegation misunderstand
my motion concerning the document. I make no charges concerning
the manner in which the document was found, I merely say that
it is undecided among which papers it was found. It came to my
attention that Mr. Dodd treated the three documents concerned in
quite the same way, whereas Mr. Alderman on Page 188 of the
record (Volume II, Page 286), states that one of these three documents,
L-3, was evidently not in order because of its doubtful
origin. And therefore he withdrew the document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May I then, if it please the Court, continue with the examination
of the Defendant Raeder?</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, we have a few final questions
concerning the conspiracy. I believe it will not take much time.
I ask you to look at the Document C-155. That is Exhibit GB-214,
in Document Book 10, Page 24—Document Book 10 of the British
Delegation, Page 24.</p>

<p class='pindent'>It is your letter of 11 June 1940, which was sent to 74 Navy
offices and which the Prosecution has called a letter of justification.
The Prosecution wants to deduce from this that you knew that a war
was to be expected as early as the summer of 1939. I should like
you to answer this charge very briefly.
<span class='pageno' title='67' id='Page_67'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: There is manifold proof to show that I was not
expecting a war in the fall at all, and in view of the small extent
of rearmament of the German Navy this was quite natural. I have
stated quite clearly in my speech before the U-boat officers in
Swinemünde that we could not count on it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And what was the reason for that letter, C-155?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The reason was that a number of torpedo boats had
misfired and this could be traced to the fact that torpedoes had
not yet been as perfectly developed as they should have been at
the beginning of a war. An additional reason was that, now that
the war had so suddenly broken out, many officers believed that
it would have been better to have developed the submarine weapon
as much as possible first, so that at least this weapon would be
ready in large numbers in the event of a war. I objected to that
opinion precisely because such a war was not to be expected. And
on Page 6, 8th paragraph, I emphasize again—in the second line—that
the Führer hoped until the end to postpone the imminent
dispute with England until 1944 or 1945. I am speaking here of
an imminent dispute. An imminent dispute is not exactly something
to strive for, it is rather to be feared.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: There is another key document, that is, Document
789-PS, Exhibit USA-23, the very long speech made by Hitler
on 23 November 1939 before the commanders-in-chief.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The document, Mr. President, is in Document Book 10a on
Page 261. This is again a Hitler speech where there is no indication
of who recorded it. Signature and date are missing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Since this is similar to the other
documents I do not have to question you on that point. I would
merely like to know, Admiral, did that speech also betray a
definite background, a certain mental reservation on the part of
Hitler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. There was at that time a rather severe conflict
between Hitler and the commanders-in-chief of the Army, and also
a difference of opinion with the leading generals concerning the
offensive in the West. The Führer assembled all the leaders in
order to give them his opinion about this whole matter. He stated—and
I was present myself—that up to that time he had always
been right in his decisions and that he would also be right in the
opinion that the western offensive had to be undertaken in the
fall if possible. Toward the end he used very harsh words; in the
third from the last paragraph of the document he states: “I shall not
be afraid of anything and I shall destroy everyone who is against
me.” That was directed against the generals. Actually the western
offensive did not take place until the spring because the weather
conditions delayed them.
<span class='pageno' title='68' id='Page_68'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We have heard details of that during previous
proceedings, and I believe we do not have to go into that now.
In this connection we come to the last document, that is C-126,
which you also have in front of you, GB-45. It is in Document
Book 10a on Page 92.</p>

<p class='pindent'>With regard to the preparation of the war against Poland, the
Prosecution has submitted this document of the High Command
of the Armed Forces dated 22 June 1939 and signed by Keitel,
because that document contained a timetable for “Case White”;
that is, the case of Poland. Did that document or that directive
indicate to you a definite aggressive intention?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. Not a definite intention of aggression at all. In
all cases certain long-range questions had to be cleared up, such
as, for instance, whether our training ships which used to put to
sea in summer should leave, or whether they should wait. This
decision, however, was only to be made in the beginning of August.
In connection with that order I issued the order of 2 August also
pertaining to that document, to the individual higher Naval offices,
namely, an operational directive for the use of Atlantic submarines
in the Case White. May I be permitted to read the first lines,
because the wording is important:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Attached is an operational directive for the employment of
U-boats which are to be sent out into the Atlantic by the
way of precaution in the event that the intention to carry
out Case White should remain unchanged. F.d.U. (Commander
of the U-boat fleet) is to hand in his operation orders to SKL
by 12 August. The decision regarding the sailing of U-boats
for the Atlantic will probably be made before the middle
of August.</p>

<p>“If the operations are not carried out, this directive must be
destroyed by 1 October 1939 at the latest.” (Document C-126,
Exhibit GB-45)</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Thus it was not definite that such operations would take place.
It was rather a precautionary measure which had to be taken under
all circumstances in connection with the Case White.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have said that Hitler assured you
repeatedly, particularly when you spoke to him personally, that
there would not be a war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Particularly there would be no war against
England?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.
<span class='pageno' title='69' id='Page_69'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, then, on 3 September 1939 war did start
with England. In connection with this did you speak to Hitler
about that question—and if so, when?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: On the 3 September in the morning, I believe between
10 and 11 o’clock—I cannot remember the exact hour—I was called
into the Reich Chancellery. The SKL had already informed me
that the ultimatum had been received from England and France.
I came into the study of the Führer where a number of persons
were assembled. I only remember that Deputy of the Führer
Hess was present. I could not say who else was there. I noticed
that Hitler was particularly embarrassed when he told me that
despite all his hopes, war with England was imminent, and that
the ultimatum had been received. It was an expression of embarrassment
such as I had never noticed on Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the charge made by the Prosecution
that you, Admiral, agreed with National Socialism and
strongly supported it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal to look at Document
D-481, which is GB-215 in Document Book 10a, Page 101. This deals
with the oath of civil servants and the oath of soldiers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution, with reference to
this document, has stated that on 2 August 1934, in a special
ceremony, you took an oath to Adolf Hitler, and not to the
fatherland. In the transcript, of 15 January 1946, Page 2719
(Volume V, Page 262), we read, “The Tribunal will see that Raeder”—in
his oath—“put Führer in the place of fatherland.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>I do not understand this and I will ask you to explain, whether
it is correct that you had any part in changing the oath from
“fatherland” to “Hitler.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I cannot understand that accusation at all. The
entire matter was not particularly a ceremony. I do not know who
is supposed to have observed it so that he could make such a
statement. The Commander-in-Chief, Von Blomberg, and the three
commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces were called to Hitler
on the morning of 2 August. We were in his study and Hitler
asked us to come to his desk without ceremony or staging. There
we took the oath which he, as Chief of State and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces, read to us. We repeated that oath.
None of us participated in the writing of that oath and no one
had asked us to do so. That would have been quite unusual. The
oath referred to the person of Hitler. No previous oath had ever
been rendered to the fatherland as far as the words were concerned.
Once I took an oath to the Kaiser as Supreme War Lord, once to
the Weimar Constitution, and the third oath to the person of the
<span class='pageno' title='70' id='Page_70'></span>
Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces—Hitler.
In all three cases I took the oath to my people, my fatherland.
That is a matter of course.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when you were ordered to that meeting
on 2 August, did you know before what it was to deal with?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Well, I would assume that his adjutant informed my
adjutant that I was to come in connection with the taking of the
oath. I could not speak with certainty now, but I assume so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It was the morning after the death of Hindenburg?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On the day after the death of Hindenburg?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you know about the wording of the oath?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, but the oath was written on a piece of paper
and I assume that we were informed of the wording before, at the
desk, there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I say at this time, Mr. President, that the
wording is contained in the document that I have mentioned and
represents a Reich law.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution asserts that on
30 January 1937 you became a Party member by virtue of the
fact that you received the Golden Party Badge. Will you answer
briefly to this point, which has been discussed previously in other
cases?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: When the Führer gave me the Golden Party Badge
he said, specifically, that this was the highest decoration which
he could give at the time. I could not become a Party member at
all because it had been stated that soldiers could not be members
of the Party. That was generally known, and for this reason that
assertion likewise is incomprehensible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The membership of soldiers was prohibited by
the Constitution?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, prohibited. May I say one more thing to prevent
any misunderstanding? It was prohibited both by the Weimar
Constitution and the decrees which Hitler had issued.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were you in opposition to the Party because of
your staunch Christian and Church attitude, which was generally
known? Briefly, how did it work out? Did you have any difficulties
with the Party because of it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In general I had no great difficulties with the Party,
which I think is best explained by the fact that the Navy had
<span class='pageno' title='71' id='Page_71'></span>
considerable prestige in the Party, as it did in all Germany. I always
had the higher officers, at least the chiefs of bases and fleet commanders,
settle any friction which occurred in the lower echelons,
through the proper authorities. If they were more important they
were brought to my attention and I took care of them; if they
dealt with matters of principle I passed them on to the OKW.
Since I never let anything slip through, in case of incitement by
the Party, the entire relations soon became very smooth and
I could prevent all sorts of friction, so that before long they rarely
occurred. In that respect we had the advantage in the Navy because
there were no territorial matters to administer. We were concerned
with the sea and only worked in the coastal cities where actually
everything concerned the Navy. I did have difficulties because of
Heydrich, whom I had removed from the Navy in 1928 or 1929
after a court of honor had sentenced him for unscrupulous treatment
of a young girl. He was very resentful toward me for a long
time and he tried on various occasions to denounce me to the
leadership of the Party or to Bormann and even to the Führer.
However, I was always able to counteract these attacks so that
they had no effect on my situation in general.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This attitude of Heydrich communicated itself in some way to
Himmler, so that here also, from time to time, I had to write a
strongly worded letter; but it was precisely the strong wording
of those letters which was of help in most cases.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should not like to waste any time by mentioning various
instances, such as the one with the SD; however, there were no
direct attacks because of my position in regard to the Church.
There was only the statement made by Goebbels, which I learned
of through my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche, that I was in disfavor
with the Party on account of my attitude toward the Church; but,
as I have said, I was not made to feel it in a disagreeable way.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe I do not need to ask you to waste any
time in explaining the importance which you placed on religious
matters in the Navy. I will submit an affidavit to this effect without
reading it. It was made by Chief Navy Chaplain Ronneberger,
whom you have known for many years and who described the
situation and thus clarified everything. In that connection, however,
may I put one question: Did you emphasize repeatedly to Hitler
that a religious attitude was necessary for the soldiers and the
Navy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that happened frequently, and I kept to this
course in the Navy until the end without hesitation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, Mr. President, I might submit
Exhibit Number Raeder-121 (Document Raeder-121). It is in my
<span class='pageno' title='72' id='Page_72'></span>
Document Book Raeder Number 6, Page 523. I should not like to
take the time of the Tribunal by asking questions about the
contrasting views between the Party and the Navy in matters of
the Church. I believe that this document makes it sufficiently clear
that a bond between Church and National Socialism was not
possible. In this field Bormann is the most outstanding figure, and
I should like to read only the first paragraph of the exposé which
I have submitted:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“National Socialistic and Christian concepts are incompatible.
Christian churches are built on the ignorance of man and
are at pains to sustain the ignorance of as large a part of
the population as possible, for only in this way can the
Christian churches maintain their power. In contrast to this,
National Socialism rests on scientific foundations.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>In the second paragraph, the last sentence:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“If therefore in the future our young people do not learn
anything more about Christianity, the teachings of which
are far inferior to our own, then Christianity will disappear
of itself.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And, on the second page at the end:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Just as the harmful influence of astrologers, soothsayers,
and other swindlers are eliminated and suppressed by the
State, so the possibilities for the Church to exert its influence
must also be entirely removed. Only when this has happened
will the State leadership have full influence over the individual
citizen. Only then will the existence of the people and
the Reich be guaranteed for all time.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Since the religious and Christian attitude of the defendant is
generally known, I believe this is enough to show the contrast
between the Party and the defendant in these matters.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Concerning the conspiracy, the Prosecution
has also accused you of being a member of the Secret
Cabinet Council and the Defense Council. Will you please answer
quite briefly, because these questions have been discussed so often
that I assume that no one in this Court wishes to hear anything
further about these things. Were you a member of the Reich
Government?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: According to Document 2098-PS, which is GB-206,
Document Book 10, Page 39, a decree of the Führer of 25 February
1938, you and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army were made
equal in rank to the Reich Ministers. The Prosecution asserts that
therefore you were a member of the Cabinet and were permitted
to and did participate in the meetings. Is that correct?
<span class='pageno' title='73' id='Page_73'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I was not a Reich Minister but only equivalent
in rank. The reason for that was, I believe, that General Keitel
was made equal in rank with the Reich Ministers because, in
administering the affairs of the War Ministry, he was frequently
in contact with them and had to be on the same level in order
to negotiate with them. And since Brauchitsch and myself had
seniority over General Keitel we also received the same rank.
I was not a member of the Cabinet at all, but the decree states
that on the order of the Führer I could participate in a Cabinet
meeting. It was probably intended that I was to come to the
Cabinet when technical matters had to be explained. However, that
never occurred, since after that time there were no Cabinet
meetings.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that in Paragraph 2 of that
decree by Hitler it states: “The commanders-in-chief... on my
orders shall participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. And as far as the Secret Cabinet Council is
concerned I need only confirm that, as Hitler told me himself the
Secret Cabinet Council had only been formed in order to honor
the retiring Foreign Minister, Von Neurath, in order to give the
impression abroad and at home that Von Neurath would still be
consulted on foreign policy in the future. However, that Secret
Cabinet Council never met.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has made the charge that on
12 March 1939, on the day commemorating the heroes, you made
a speech and that in that speech you came forth with a ruthless
challenge to fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May I state, if it please the Court, that unfortunately the speech
was entered in the document book by the Prosecution only from
an excerpt which was selected from a certain point of view; and
I believe that it would be well to know the context of the entire
speech. Of course, I shall not read it, but I should like to submit
it as Exhibit Number Raeder-46. The sentence is in my Document
Book Number 3, Page 235, the page from which the Prosecution
took the quotation. Will you please briefly express your opinion
of that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I in doing so read a few short sentences which
will characterize the entire speech?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have no doubt that the Tribunal will permit
that. I only ask you to use only a few significant sentences, just
as the Prosecution have done.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: On Page 7, Line 6, it says...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is on Page 235, the same page
which contains the quotation of the Prosecution.
<span class='pageno' title='74' id='Page_74'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Shortly before the quotation of the Prosecution we
read on Line 6:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“He has given back self-confidence and confidence in their
own ability to the German people, and thereby enabled them
to retake, by their own strength, their sacred right refused
to them during the time of their weakness and, beyond that,
to approach the tremendous problems of the times with
courage, and to solve them. Thus the German people and
the Führer have done more for the peace of Europe and the
world than some of our neighbors are able to realize today.”
(Document Number Raeder-46)</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then we come to the sentence where I speak about the announcement
of the fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry which
has been quoted by the Prosecution. I should like to state briefly
in connection with it that after the experiences of the years 1917
to 1919, communism and international Jewry had destroyed the
resistance of the German people to a considerable degree and had
gained an excessively large and oppressive influence in German
affairs, in affairs of state as well as in economic affairs, as for
example also in the legal field. Therefore, in my opinion, one could
not be surprised that the National Socialist Government tried to
loosen and, as far as possible, remove this large and oppressive
influence. Although in pursuing this course the National Socialist
Government took rather severe steps which led to the Nuremberg
Laws—the exaggerations of which I regretted, of course—nevertheless,
in the course of the speech which I made in public at the
orders of the Reich Government, I could not find it compatible with
my conscience to express my personal opinions, which were basically
different. It must also be considered that such a speech had to fit
into a general framework. That, however, was only one short
sentence, whereas other points were considerably more in the
foreground. In that connection I ask for permission to read two
more short sentences:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“And this is the reason for the demand for equal rights and
equal respect with all other nations which alone can guarantee
that the nations will live peacefully together on this earth.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then the last sentence, on Page 235:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Within the bounds of German national community the
Führer has assigned us our tasks as soldiers to protect our
homeland and our peaceful national reconstruction and to
train the young manhood, fit for military service, which was
entrusted to us and which has to pass entirely through our
hands.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>The next sentence was quoted by the Prosecution, because there
I spoke of the fact that we should not only train these young people
<span class='pageno' title='75' id='Page_75'></span>
technically in the sense of the technical use of arms but also
educate them in the sense of National Socialist ideology and
philosophy, and I stated that we had to march shoulder to shoulder
with the Party.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have always taken the view that the Armed Forces should not
be a completely extraneous body in the State. It would be impossible
to have a republican armed force in a monarchist state or an armed
force with monarchist tendencies in a democratic state. Thus our
Armed Forces would have to be incorporated into the National
Socialist State to the extent necessary to create a real people’s
community, and it would be the task of the commanders of the
Armed Forces to educate their branches of the forces in such a way
that they would recognize and live up to the good national and
socialist ideals of the National Socialist State. This would be done
in the same way as I did it as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
In this way it was possible to incorporate the Armed Forces in an
orderly manner, to keep them from all exaggeration and excesses,
and at the same time to form a people’s community within the State.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And then on the bottom of Page 236:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“This nation needed a new, a true peace, the peace of justice
and honor, peace without hatred. The world also needs
peace. Because a weak Germany could not obtain peace,
a strong one has won it for herself. It is the proud task
of the German Wehrmacht, to secure this peace for the
German nation against everybody.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And quite at the end of the document, the 11th or 12th line from
the bottom of the page:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“But the soldier over there, whom we respect as the valiant
representative of his country, may accept a soldier’s word:
What Germany needs and wants is peace. These are not
just words but it has been proved by practical examples.
The construction work of Germany requires many years of
quiet development.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I think that this is sufficient...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May I point out to the High Tribunal that in the English translation,
on Page 236, as far as I remember, one sentence was underlined.
That is: “The Wehrmacht and Party are one indivisible
entity.” The Prosecution has submitted that. Apart from that,
nothing is underlined.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I wish to say in passing that in reality, in the original, many
other passages are underlined, particularly those sentences which
Admiral Raeder has just read which deal with peace.
<span class='pageno' title='76' id='Page_76'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, the Prosecution has accused
you with having connections with all the political activities of
National Socialism. Therefore I am compelled to ask you briefly
concerning your participation in actions in those countries where
participation by the Navy is certainly surprising.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In what way were you connected with the measures concerning
the annexation of Austria?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Navy had nothing to do with the Anschluss of
Austria at all and did not take part in any way.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you make any preparations?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. In the case of Austria, no preparations were
needed. The case of Austria was mentioned in Document C-175,
but that dealt only with the directive of 1 July 1937 for the unified
preparation of the Armed Forces for war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that C-175 is USA-69, in the
Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 117.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution considers this
document important and therefore I should like you to say a few
words about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It deals with a statement, which, according to my
knowledge, is made in every state for every year and in which,
according to the political situation, such cases are mentioned which
may arise in the course of the year and for which, of course, certain
preparations have to be made. For the Navy, however, that document
had no sequel as far as Austria was concerned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So it is a document which numerous...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we have the reference
to that right. It came through, I thought, C-157, USA-69, 10a, and
then I did not get the page.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Page 117.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that C-157 or 175?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: C-175.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Does this concern strategic preparations
for various eventualities?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; various cases are mentioned here, for instance,
the “Case Red” and the special “Case Extension Red-Green.” All
these had to be dealt with but they did not necessarily lead to any
consequences.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection I wanted to
submit various documents, Raeder exhibits, from which it can be
seen that the same type of preparations, since they are necessary
for military and strategic reasons, were also undertaken by the
<span class='pageno' title='77' id='Page_77'></span>
Allies—only to show their necessity. At this moment I should like
to forego that because I cannot determine so quickly which of these
documents are admitted and which have been rejected. Perhaps
I may therefore submit the connected documents at the end in
order that no misunderstanding may occur now by my quoting the
wrong figures.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In what way did you and the Navy
participate in measures concerning the Sudetenland?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In a directive...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. May I ask you to look at the
document of the Prosecution 388-PS. It is USA-126—no, excuse
me—USA-26. It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation,
10a, Page 147. It is a draft for the new directive “Grün” of
20 May 1938.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have the directive here. It is of 20 May 1938
and says with regard to the Navy:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Navy participates in the operations of the Army by
employing the Danube flotilla. That flotilla is put under the
command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In regard
to the conduct of naval warfare, at first only those measures
are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful
protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden
intervention in the conflict by other states. Those measures
must be confined to what is absolutely necessary, and must
be carried out inconspicuously.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>The entire course of action at the end of September and
beginning of October made the special measures unnecessary, so
the Danube flotilla which we had taken over from Austria was
put under the command of the Army.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What was the size of the Danube flotilla?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It consisted of some small river craft, one small gunboat
and minesweepers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That is the total extent to which the Navy
participated?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, in which the Navy participated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In what way did you and the Navy participate
in the preparations for the occupation of what the document calls
the “remainder of Czechoslovakia”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>This concerns Document C-136, USA-104 in the Document Book
of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 101. It is of 21 October 1938.
The Prosecution points out that according to that you had already
been informed in October that Czechoslovakia was to be occupied
<span class='pageno' title='78' id='Page_78'></span>
after some time, that is in March, as actually happened. Will you
please tell us something about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That directive looks suspicious at first but the way
in which it is drafted shows that this again refers to possible cases.
Point 1 deals with the securing of the borders of the German Reich
and protection against surprise air attacks.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Points 2 and 3 are “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia,”
“Occupation of the Memel Country.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Number 2, “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia”:
The first sentence reads, “It must be possible to shatter the
remainder of Czechoslovakia at any time if her policy should
become hostile toward Germany.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is the prerequisite in case of any action against Czechoslovakia;
that did not mean that it was certain that any action
would be taken.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the same manner, under Number 3, mention is made of the
occupation of the Memel country, where it says: “The political
situation, particularly warlike complications between Poland and
Lithuania, may make it necessary for the German Armed Forces
to occupy the Memel country.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. May I point out that, according to
my document, the part which the witness has just read is
missing in the English translation—so that you will not look for it
unnecessarily.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] So here again this is a possible
eventuality?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On 3 September 1939, at the beginning of the
war, the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was sunk. From the military point of view that
case has already been clarified by Herr Kranzbühler, but I should
like you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to state your position
and give an explanation of the incident with special consideration
of the fact that the Prosecution, especially in this case, has raised
a very severe and insulting accusation. They have made the
accusation that you, purposely and in violation of the truth, held
England and Churchill responsible for the sinking of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>,
although you knew perfectly well that the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> had been sunk
by a German U-boat. As proof, the Prosecution has submitted the
article of 23 October 1939 from the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, that is Document Number 3260-PS, GB-218.
Document Book 10 of the British Delegation on Page 97.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I would like you to explain that
point.
<span class='pageno' title='79' id='Page_79'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The fact is that on 3 September at dusk the young
submarine commander of the submarine <span class='it'>U-30</span> met an English
passenger ship which had its lights dimmed and torpedoed it
because he assumed, by mistake, that it was an auxiliary cruiser.
In order to avoid misunderstanding I should like to state here that
the deliberations of Kapitänleutnant Fresdorf, which have been
mentioned here concerning the torpedoing of dimmed ships in the
Channel, did not yet play any part in the Naval Operations Staff
at that time and that this commanding officer could not have
known anything about these deliberations. He knew only that
auxiliary cruisers had their lights blacked out, and he assumed that
this was an auxiliary cruiser at the entrance of the northwest
channel, England-Scotland. He did not make a report since it was
not necessary. The information that a German U-boat had torpedoed
the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was broadcast by the British radio, and we probably
received the news during the night of the 3d to the 4th, and
transmitted it to the various news services.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the morning of 4 September we received that news at the
offices of the Naval Operations Staff, and I requested information
as to how far our nearest submarine was from the place of the
torpedoing. I was told, 75 nautical miles. At about the same time,
State Secretary Von Weizsäcker in the Foreign Office, who had
been a naval officer in the first World War, learned of this situation
and made a telephone call to the Naval Operations Staff,
asking whether it was true. He did not call me personally. He
received the answer that, according to our information, it could
not be right. Thereupon he sent for the American Chargé d’Affaires—I
believe Mr. Kirk—in order to speak to him about the matter
because the radio broadcast had also mentioned that several Americans
had been killed in that accident. From his experiences in the
first World War it was clear to him how important it was that
there should be no incident involving America. Therefore, he told
him what he had heard from the Naval Operations Staff. I personally
told the same thing to the American Naval Attaché,
Mr. Schrader, and that certainly in good faith. I believed that I could
tell him that in good faith because we had no other information.
State Secretary Von Weizsäcker then came to see me personally, if
I remember correctly. We were very close friends, and he told me
what he had told the American Chargé d’Affaires. He apologized,
I believe, for not having spoken to me personally and that
concluded the case for the time being.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The matter was such that, if it had been reported in a normal
way, we would not have hesitated to admit and to explain the
reason. We would not have hesitated to apologize to the nations
concerned. Disciplinary measures would have been taken against
<span class='pageno' title='80' id='Page_80'></span>
the officer. I also reported the incident to the Führer himself in
his headquarters and told him that we were convinced such was
not the case, and the Führer ordered that it should be denied. This
was done by the Propaganda Ministry, which had been informed
of the order by my press department.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The submarine returned on 27 September...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me if I interrupt. That date, Mr. President,
is identified by Document D-659, which was submitted by the
Prosecution, it is Exhibit GB-221 in Document Book 10 on Page 110.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The submarine commander returned on 27 September
to Wilhelmshaven. Admiral Dönitz has already described how he
received him and how he immediately sent him to me to Berlin by air.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The U-boat commander reported the entire incident to me and
confirmed that it was a sheer mistake, that it was only through all
these messages he had heard that he himself discovered that it was
not an auxiliary cruiser that was concerned but a passenger steamer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I reported the facts to the Führer because they could have had
severe political consequences. He decided that, as it had been
denied once, we had to keep it utterly secret, not only abroad but
also within official circles and government circles. Consequently,
I was not in a position to tell State Secretary Von Weizsäcker or
the Propaganda Ministry that the facts were different. My order to
the Commander of the U-boat fleet reads:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“1. The affair is to be kept strictly secret upon orders of the
Führer.</p>

<p>“2. On my part, no court-martial will be ordered because
the commanding officer acted in good faith and it was a
mistake.</p>

<p>“3. The further political handling of the matter is to be
attended to by the High Command of the Navy, as far as
anything has to be done.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>With that the commander returned to Wilhelmshaven and
Admiral Dönitz has already reported that he was punished by
disciplinary procedure. To our great surprise, about one month
later that article appeared in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> in which
Churchill was accused of being the author of that incident. I knew
absolutely nothing about that article beforehand. I would certainly
have prevented its appearance because, knowing that our submarine
had torpedoed that ship, it was out of the question to lay
the blame on the enemy, on the First Lord of the Admiralty of
all people.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I found out later that the order to publish such an article was
issued by Hitler and reached the Propaganda Ministry through the
Reich Press Chief. As far as I remember I was told that the
<span class='pageno' title='81' id='Page_81'></span>
Propaganda Minister had himself drafted that article. Later I could
not prevent it. I did not see the article nor did any of my officers
of the High Command of the Navy see it. They would certainly
have come to me at once so that I could have prevented its publication.
We had no reason to expect such an article 4 weeks after the
torpedoing of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>. That is the case of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You just said that you had discovered that Hitler
knew about the article. When did you discover this?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Here, from my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Not at that time then?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, by no means.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit again at a quarter
past two.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<h2><span class='pageno' title='82' id='Page_82'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the meantime I have perused my documents
and I am therefore in a position to carry out the original plan, that
is, of submitting the documents during the examination.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In connection with the documents which we dealt with last,
Document C-126, “Strategic Preparations,” I should like to submit
the following documents which are contained in the <span class='it'>White Books</span>,
documents which have been granted me for my use and which also
concern strategic preparations on the part of the Allies. We are
dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-33. It is the document dated
9 November 1939; and also Exhibit Number Raeder-34, General
Gamelin to General Lelong, 13 November 1939; and also Exhibit
Number Raeder-35, two extracts from the Diary of Jodl, 1809-PS,
which concern the measures taken by the Luftwaffe regarding the
Caucasus. It is not necessary for me to comment on this. I would
just like to call your attention to the questions which I put to the
witness Reich Marshal Göring on 18 March; he has already testified
regarding the plans of the Allies for the destruction of the Caucasian
oil fields. And finally in this connection, Exhibit Number Raeder-41,
to be found in the Document Book 3, Page 205, and the following
pages, a report of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army,
General Gamelin, dated 16 March 1940, it deals with the war plans
for the year 1940 concerning the tightening of the blockade, the
plans regarding the Scandinavian countries and, in addition, the
plans for the destruction of the Russian oil wells in the Caucasus.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, before I deal with the
separate campaigns of Greece, Norway, and so forth, I would like to
ask you to answer a question which relates to you personally. What
decorations did you receive from Hitler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I received from Hitler in the autumn of 1939 in addition
to the Golden Emblem, which I have already mentioned, the
Knight’s Order to the Iron Cross. Furthermore, in the year 1941 on
the occasion of my 65th birthday I received a donation of 250,000
marks. This donation was given to me by Hitler through an adjutant
and in connection with that he sent a document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>When I thanked him on the very first occasion, he told me that
he was giving me this donation as a means of decoration in the same
manner as the former rulers of Prussia had given their generals
similar donations, whether as sums of money or as a country estate;
then he emphasized that Field Marshals Von Hindenburg and Von
Mackensen had received donations from him as well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the passage “Greece.” With
regard to Greece, the Prosecution has quoted Document C-12, which
<span class='pageno' title='83' id='Page_83'></span>
is GB-226. This is to be found in Document Book Number 10, Page 1.
This document deals with the decision on the part of Hitler which
was transmitted through the OKW, dated 30 December 1939, signed
by Jodl, and we read under Number 1.:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Greek merchant ships in the area around England, declared
by the United States to be a barred zone, are to be treated
as enemy vessels.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>This decision on the part of Hitler was made on the basis of
a report by the SKL. What caused you to make this report even
though Greece was neutral at the time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that time we had received a large number of intelligence
reports from our intelligence service that Greek shipping
companies apparently with the knowledge of the Greek Government
were allowing Greek ships to be chartered by England under favorable
conditions. Therefore, these Greek ships were in the service of
England and thus were to be treated in the same way as we were
treating the English merchantmen. These intelligence reports were
confirmed later on to an even greater degree than had been the case
in the beginning.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I would like to submit to the
High Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-53, to be found in my Document
Book 3, Page 258. This document deals with the War Diary kept
by the SKL in the month of December 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On Page 259, under the date of 19 December, the following entry
is made:</p>

<p class='pindent'>“Greece has hired out about 20 vessels to ply between the United
States, Le Havre and Liverpool.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>This is confirmed by the reports just mentioned by the defendant.
The next entry, on the same page under the date 30 December:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Justified by the sales and chartering of numerous Greek ships
to England it has been decreed, with the agreement of the
Führer, that Greek ships in the zone from 20 degrees West
to 2 degrees East and from 44 degrees North to 62 degrees
North shall be considered as hostile craft by U-boats. Attacks
to be made invisibly as far as possible.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I also submit the following document, Number Raeder-54. This
document is taken from the <span class='it'>White Books</span>. It is dated 23 January
1940, and it is a report from the German Embassy at the Hague to
the Foreign Office. The heading is: “The Contemplated Chartering
of 50 to 60 Greek Ships to the British Government.” It is not necessary
for me to read it. I should like merely to quote the beginning
of the first sentence:</p>

<p class='pindent'>“After the British press brought reports at the end of November
last year”—that is, 1939—“about the alleged charterings of Greek
<span class='pageno' title='84' id='Page_84'></span>
vessels to British companies”—and so forth—then follows the statement
that these 50 to 60 ships are now chartered by British companies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Even though it is not quite accurate historically, I would now
like first of all to conclude the question of Greece. In historical
sequence Norway should follow now first, but for the sake of
coherence I should like to deal with Greece and the occupation of
Greece first.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the Document C-152, identical with C-167 or Exhibit GB-122,
in the Document Book of the British Delegation Number 10, Page 23,
the Prosecution has charged you with the Figure 9 of this lengthy
document, specifically Figure 9.)B.)f.). It says there:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy requests confirmation
of the fact that the whole of Greece is to be occupied even in
the case of a peaceful solution. The Führer: Complete occupation
is a stipulation for any settlement.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>This document concerns your report to Hitler of 18 March 1941.
What were the reasons for your making this proposal?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In the beginning I had but little knowledge of the
political intentions of the Führer as far as Greece was concerned,
but I did know of his Directive Number 20, dated 13 December 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, I would like to mention for
the assistance of the Court that we are dealing with Document
1541-PS, that is GB-117, Document Book of the British Delegation
10a, Page 270. This directive is dated 13 December 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In this directive the Führer, for the reasons given in
Paragraph 1, said that his intention was, as set forth in Paragraph 2:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“b.) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in
March, to employ this group of forces to occupy the north
coast of the Aegean by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to
occupy the entire Greek mainland (‘Operation Marita’). The
support of Bulgaria is to be expected.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>The next time I heard about these things again was when I heard
that the British had landed in southern Greece on 3 March. We
learned that on about 5 or 6 March. For this reason I asked the
Führer that he occupy all of Greece in order to prevent the British
from attacking us from the rear, by air, and from erecting air bases,
all of which would hamper the conduct of our war not only in
Greece but also in the eastern Mediterranean.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The fact was that when a political decision had been made by
Hitler of his own accord and without having consulted anyone, I,
as Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, always had to draw my
strategic conclusions from this political decision and then had to
<span class='pageno' title='85' id='Page_85'></span>
make to him my proposals on naval and on other warfare as far as
they concerned me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Since in December he had already considered the possibility that
all of Greece would have to be occupied, the case had now actually
arisen for me to make this proposal to him for the reason I have
already mentioned. When I said “all of Greece,” that implied to me
and the Naval Command the entire Greek coast, where the British
forces might land.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Your proposal was made about 2 weeks after
British troops had landed in Greece?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection I would like to submit
Exhibit Raeder-58, in my Document Book 3, Page 271. This is a
document contained in the <span class='it'>White Book</span>, according to which on 4 January—I
beg the Tribunal’s pardon. Sir David is right. Document
58 has been rejected and I withdraw it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In this connection I would like to submit Exhibit Number
Raeder-59. It is to be found in Document Book 3, Page 273 and is
an extract from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>: It is the minutes of the French
War Committee of 26 April 1940. This document deals with the
decision of the War Committee regarding Norway, the Caucasus,
Romania, and Greece.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I also submit Exhibit Number Raeder-63, in Document Book 3,
Page 285, which is an address by the British Secretary of State for
India, Amery, dated 1 December 1940. This document also shows
plans regarding Greece, a year and a quarter before the time just
mentioned by the witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now I shall turn to the topic of Norway.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The British prosecutor, Major Elwyn
Jones, considers the attack against Norway a special case in the
series of aggressive wars waged by the Nazi conspirators. In this
connection he pointed out that, in this case, Hitler did not think of
this himself but rather was persuaded by you. Since his point is
very important, I should like to ask you to describe this event
exactly, and therefore I ask you first of all: When was the first conversation
about this matter between you and Hitler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The first conversation between Hitler and myself
concerning the question of Norway was on 10 October 1939, and that
was at my request. The reason for this was that we had received
reports at various times during the last week of September through
our intelligence service of the offices of Admiral Canaris that the
British intended to occupy bases in Norway.
<span class='pageno' title='86' id='Page_86'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>I recall that after reports to this effect had reached me several
times Admiral Canaris visited me himself on one occasion—something
he did in very important cases only. And, in the presence of
my chief of staff, he gave me a coherent explanation concerning the
intelligence reports which had been received. In this connection air
bases were constantly mentioned, as well as bases in the south of
Norway. Stavanger was mentioned constantly with the airport Sola,
and Trondheim was usually mentioned and occasionally Christiansand.</p>

<p class='pindent'>During the last days of September I had a telephone conversation
with Admiral Carls who was the commander of Navy
Group North and was therefore in charge of operations in the
Skagerrak, the Kattegat and in the North Sea. This man had
obviously received similar reports. He informed me that he had
composed a private letter addressed to me, in which he dealt with
the question of the danger of Norway’s being occupied by British
forces and in which he was in a general way dealing with the
question as to what disadvantages such a step would have for us, and
whether we should have to forestall such an attempt, and also what
advantages or disadvantages the occupation of Norway—that is, of
the Norwegian coast and the Norwegian bases—by our forces would
have.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Up until that point I had not concerned myself with the Norwegian
question at all, except for the fact I had received these
reports. The arrival of this letter at the end of September or the
beginning of October, it must have been about then, impelled me to
show it to the Chief of Staff of the SKL and to instruct him to deal
with all dispatch with the question of the occupation of Norwegian
bases by England, and the other questions which Admiral Carls had
dealt with, and to have the questions discussed in the SKL. The
advantages and disadvantages of an expansion of the war towards
the North had to be considered, not only of an expansion on our part
but, above all, an expansion on the part of England; what value,
what advantage would accrue to us if we acted first; what disadvantages
would result if we had to defend the Norwegian coast?</p>

<p class='pindent'>The result of this was the questionnaire mentioned in C-122,
GB-82, where the questions were asked: What places were to be
used as bases; what the possibility of defense by us would be;
whether these ports would have to be developed further; and also,
what advantages would result so far as our U-boats were concerned?</p>

<p class='pindent'>These questions, as I have already stated, were put to Admiral
Dönitz as well, but his answers arrived only after I had made the
report on 10 October. I would like to say, by way of introduction,
that it was entirely clear to me that if we undertook to occupy these
bases we would violate neutrality. But I also knew of the agreement
<span class='pageno' title='87' id='Page_87'></span>
which existed between the German and Norwegian Governments of
2 September regarding neutrality, and I knew the concluding
sentence, in this <span class='it'>aide memoire</span>, which is Document TC-31, GB-79,
dated 2 September 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, but I should like to point out,
Mr. President, that this document is found in the Document Book of
the British Delegation 10a, at Page 330.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You have that document before you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have it before me, and I would like to quote
the concluding sentence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It is the last document in the book, Your Honor,
at Page 329.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: [<span class='it'>Continuing.</span>] The last sentence:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government
change so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party
recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled
to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way
as would be forced upon the Reich Cabinet by the resulting
situation.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then, within the next few days, I asked the Chief of Staff of the
SKL to submit to me the data which the SKL had prepared during
the preceding days and I reported to Hitler on 10 October, because I
considered this problem particularly important. It was entirely
clear to me that the best possible solution for us would be that
Norway should maintain a steadfast neutrality, and I expressed my
opinion, as may be seen in Document C-21, GB-194.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This is an extract from the War Diary of the SKL.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation
10a, Page 6.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It says here, on Page 3 of the German version, the next
but last paragraph, under the date of 13 January: “Situation discussion
with the Chief of the SKL.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. C-21 was not
entirely translated by the Prosecution. This document may be found
in my document book under Exhibit Number Raeder-69, and I
should like to submit it herewith. It is in Document Book 3, Page 62.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Document Book 3 only goes to 64, is that not
right? It must be Document Book 4.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: There must be a mistake in the document book
then. At first, due to an oversight, the table of contents was only
completed as far as 64 by the Translation Section, but since that
<span class='pageno' title='88' id='Page_88'></span>
time it has been corrected and supplemented. It is in Document
Book 4, Page 317.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Page 317, at the top.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Please comment on
this document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In the next but last paragraph, it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“In complete agreement with this point of view, the Chief
of the Naval Operations Staff is therefore also of the opinion
that the most favorable solution would doubtless be the maintenance
of the present situation which, if strictest neutrality
is exercised by Norway, will permit the safe use of Norwegian
territorial waters for the shipping vital to Germany’s war
effort without the attempt being made on the part of England
to seriously endanger this sea lane.” (Document Number
Raeder-69)</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I maintained this point of view when reporting to Hitler. In that
report I first mentioned the intelligence reports which we had at
hand. Then I described the dangers which might result to us from a
British occupation of bases on the Norwegian coast and might affect
our entire warfare, dangers which I considered tremendous. I had
the feeling that such an occupation would gravely prejudice and
imperil the whole conduct of our war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>If the British occupied bases in Norway, especially in the South
of Norway, they would be able to dominate the entrance to the Baltic
Sea from those points, and also flank our naval operations from the
Helgoland Bight and from the Elbe, Jade and Weser. The second
outlet which we had was also gravely imperiled, affecting the
operations of battleships as well as the courses of our merchantmen.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In addition to that, from their air bases in Norway, they might
endanger our air operations, the operations of our pilots for reconnaissance
in the North Sea or for attacks against England.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Furthermore, from Norway they could exert strong pressure on
Sweden, and that pressure would have been felt in this respect, that
the supplies of ore from Sweden would have been hindered or
stopped by purely political pressure. Finally, the export of ore from
Narvik to Germany could have been stopped entirely, and it is
known how much Germany depended on supplies of ore from
Sweden and Norway. They might even have gone so far—and we
learned about this subsequently that such plans were discussed—as
to attack and destroy the ore deposits at Lulea, or to seize them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>All of these dangers might become decisive factors in the outcome
of the war. Aside from the fact that I told Hitler that the best
thing for us would be to have strict neutrality on the part of
Norway, I also called his attention to the dangers which would
<span class='pageno' title='89' id='Page_89'></span>
result to us from an occupation of the Norwegian coast and Norwegian
bases, for there would have been lively naval operations
near the Norwegian coast in which the British, even after our
occupation of bases, would try to hamper our ore traffic from
Narvik. A struggle might ensue which we, with our inadequate
supply of surface vessels, would be unable to cope with in the
long run.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Therefore, at that time I did not make any proposal that we
should occupy Norway or that we should obtain bases in Norway.
I only did my duty in telling the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
about this grave danger which was threatening us, and against
which we might have to use emergency measures for our defense.
I also pointed out to him that possible operations for the occupation
of Norwegian bases might be very expensive for us. In the course
of later discussions I told him that we might even lose our entire
fleet. I would consider it a favorable case if we were to lose only
one-third, something which actually did happen later on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>There was, therefore, no reason for me to expect that I would
gain prestige by such an enterprise—I have been accused of this
ambition by the Prosecution. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite
might easily result.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal
to the fact that these things may be seen in documents which date
from the time of the war, one of which is Exhibit Number Raeder-69,
of 13 January 1940, which has just been handed over. This document
is a study, and it is claimed that this study is based on the
consideration that if England were to have the bases in Norway, the
situation would be impossible for the conduct of the war by Germany
and such a situation could be prevented only if we forestalled
England by occupying Norway ourselves. What the witness has just
said is stated in exactly the same way in the War Diary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the same connection, I should like to refer to the document of
the Prosecution, Document C-66, GB-81, which may be found in
British Document Book 10a, Page 35. This document is dated
10 January 1944. May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
the fact that there, under the code name “Weserübung” (Weser
Maneuver)—that was the name covering this action—the substance
of the statements the witness has just made is to be found. I do not
wish to read all of them since we would lose valuable time thereby.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean C-66? That is about the Plan
Barbarossa. Is that the one you mean?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The last page, under the heading “Weserübung,”
Page 39 of the English document book. Mention is made there of
the letter by Admiral Carls, spoken of by the witness, and of his
<span class='pageno' title='90' id='Page_90'></span>
thoughts in connection with this matter. In the German original
there is the heading, “Appendix 2.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>A clearer version is found in Document Raeder-69, since that
dates from January 1940, 3 months later, and in the meantime new
reports had come in. This, on the other hand, is a description dating
from October 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, I must once more refer to
Document C-122, which you have already mentioned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution, in that document, accuses you of saying:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Chief of SKL deems it necessary to tell the Führer as
soon as possible of the ideas of the SKL on the possibility of
expanding the sphere of operations in the North.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>They think they may conclude therefrom that your primary
thought was to expand the operational sphere of the Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already said that by the possibility of expansion
of the operational zone to the North I meant an expansion of
British operations and its consequences, and also the possibility of
our forestalling this, thus gaining bases which would be of certain
importance to us.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Hitler reply at this discussion on 10 October
1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Hitler had not yet concerned himself with this question.
The question was very far from his mind, for he knew very
little about matters of naval warfare. He always remarked that he
did not have an over-all picture of these things, and therefore felt
somewhat uncertain. He said that he would deal with this question
and that I should leave the notes with him, which I had worked out
on the basis of statements made by the SKL, so that he might use
them as a basis for his deliberations on this problem.</p>

<p class='pindent'>It was typical and really speaks very much against the character
of the conspiracy, that on this occasion Hitler, when confronted with
the problem of Norway, did not say a single word about the fact
that previously, the last time evidently in the summer of that year,
he had already dealt with Norwegian questions prompted by Rosenberg.
I gather from a document which I saw for the first time here
that on 20 June 1939, Rosenberg had submitted to the Führer a
comprehensive report about his connections with Norwegian political
circles, but I heard of these connections for the first time on
11 December.</p>

<p class='pindent'>It would have been a matter of course for me if the Führer, who
was dealing with Norwegian strategical matters, had told me on this
occasion: “I have such and such information about Norwegian
matters.” But he did not do that—there was always a considerable
lack of collaboration. The Führer told me that we should await the
<span class='pageno' title='91' id='Page_91'></span>
arrival of further reports and that he would deal with these questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the subsequent period of October and November,
up until 11 December, did you discuss this question with Hitler
again?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, the question was not discussed at all during those
months, but in September Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, who had first
been appointed assistant attaché in Oslo and later, naval attaché,
gave me further reports at that time about conditions in Norway,
and so did the intelligence service. He told me of reports which
were circulating there about a possible British landing. Later on
Kapitän Schreiber was actually my chief collaborator in these Norwegian
problems, and he showed a particular understanding of the
whole situation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to submit to the
Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-107, an affidavit of the naval attaché who
has just been mentioned, Richard Schreiber. This may be found in
my Document Book 5, Page 464.</p>

<p class='pindent'>According to that document, Schreiber was drafted on 7 September
1939 as a reserve officer and was sent to Oslo as a naval attaché.
He states that he held that post there since the autumn of 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read a
portion of this, under I, on Page 465, at the bottom.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We told you that we had read all these documents
which were objected to. We let in this document, so it is not
necessary for you to read it again.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then in this connection, may I refer
to the first part of this affidavit, Part I?</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, I should like to point out a small but misleading
error in translation on Page 466. In the second paragraph, second
line, the word “deutsch,” (German) is missing: “...there were clear
directives of the German Foreign Office that Norwegian neutrality
should be particularly respected by the Germans...” In the English
text it says: “of the Foreign Office.” It should read “of the German
Foreign Office.” I should be very grateful if this mistake would be
rectified.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, you know the affidavit
given by Schreiber?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Different reports are contained therein. You have
already referred to them in part. Did any additional special reports
come in during those 2 months? Was Narvik mentioned in addition
to the other ports already mentioned?
<span class='pageno' title='92' id='Page_92'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as I remember it was Kapitän Schreiber who
expressly mentioned Narvik for the first time. Kapitän Schreiber
had very quickly made himself acquainted with conditions there.
He had established good connections in Norwegian circles. A confirmation
of all that I had known up to that point came on 11 December.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, would you please describe your meeting
with Quisling on 11 December 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I first ask whether the Documents 004-PS and
007-PS, which I believe were submitted by the Prosecution, may be
used in this connection? For example, the minutes of the conference
of 11 and 12 December, an accompanying letter by Rosenberg
referring to these minutes, and similar matters?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I believe that you will be permitted to
use these documents. But since they are known you only need to
mention the points that you remember.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On this occasion I should merely like to ask
whether you did not know the documents by Rosenberg, 004-PS
and 007-PS?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I did not know those documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you see them for the first time here?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I saw them for the first time here. But the reports
contained in these documents were already known to us at that time
as is proved by the dates of the documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Please tell us only what you heard at that time
from Quisling.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Up until 11 December I had neither connections with
Herr Rosenberg—except for the fact that I had seen him on occasion—nor,
above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about
whom I had heard nothing up to that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On 11 December my Chief of Staff, Schulte-Mönting, reported to
me that Major Quisling, a former Norwegian Minister of War, had
arrived from Oslo. He was asking for an interview with me through
a Herr Hagelin, because he wished to tell me about Norwegian
conditions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Herr Hagelin had been sent to my chief of staff by Herr Rosenberg.
Rosenberg had already known Hagelin for some time as I
have mentioned before. Since reports from such a source on Norwegian
conditions seemed to be of great value to me, I declared
myself ready to receive Herr Quisling.
<span class='pageno' title='93' id='Page_93'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>He arrived on the same morning and reported to me at length
about the conditions in Norway, with special reference to the relations
of the Norwegian Government to England and the reports
on the intention of England to land in Norway, and he characterized
the whole situation as especially critical for, according to his reports,
the danger seemed to be imminent. He tried to fix a date. He
thought it should occur before 10 January, because then a favorable
political situation would arise.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I told him that I was not really concerned with the political
situation, but I would try to arrange to have him give his
information to the Führer. I would be concerned only with the
military and strategic situation, and in that connection I could tell
him right away that it would not be possible to take any measures
from 11 December until 10 January, first because the time was too
short and secondly because it was winter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I considered his expositions to be of such importance that I told
him I would try to arrange for him to report to the Führer personally,
so that these reports would reach and influence him directly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then on the 12th—that is on the next day—I went to Hitler and
informed him of the conversation between Quisling and me, and I
asked him to receive Quisling personally so that he might have a
personal impression of Quisling. On this occasion I told him—and
this is written down in one of the documents—that in cases of this
kind one would have to be especially cautious, since one could not
know to what degree such a party leader would try to further the
interest of his party. Therefore our investigations would have to be
especially careful. And I again called the attention of the Führer to
the fact that an attempt to occupy Norway would bring with it
greatest risks as well as certain disadvantages for the future situation.
In other words, I carefully presented both sides of the picture
in a neutral manner.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Hitler then decided to receive Quisling together with Hagelin
on one of the following days. The two gentlemen then were obviously
in touch with Rosenberg. I believe they stayed with him,
and Rosenberg sent me, by letter, a record of a meeting which had
apparently been drawn up by Quisling and Hagelin and also a
description of Quisling’s personality.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In this letter, which is here as a document but which was not
read by the Prosecution, it says specifically that Rosenberg knew
what the political conditions were but that, of course, he would
have to leave the military side entirely to me since I was the competent
authority on that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If it please the High Tribunal, in this connection
I would like to submit Exhibit Raeder-67, to be found in my Document
Book 4, Page 309. That is the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder
<span class='pageno' title='94' id='Page_94'></span>
dated 13 December 1939, which was not mentioned by the Prosecution.
The Prosecution merely mentioned the appendix mentioned
in the letter—that is, a note by Rosenberg, under Number C-65, the
same as GB-85. According to its contents C-65 belongs to Exhibit
Raeder-67.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You say there was another besides Raeder-67
which you were referring to?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes; I am referring to Raeder-67.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I got that. But you said some other document
as well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the document submitted by the Prosecution,
C-65, and that is an appendix to this letter; the two belong together.
The latter document, C-65, is to be found in the Document Book of
the British Delegation 10a, Page 33. If these two documents are
taken together, it can be seen that the political side is not mentioned
in either document; and this explains what the witness meant when
he said that he was not concerned with the political side of the
question but only with the military side. It is for that reason that
Rosenberg had sent it to him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it would be a good time to break off.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the case of the
Defendant Seyss-Inquart, counsel and representatives of the Prosecution
have been conferring with respect to his application for documents.
We have agreed on a great number, but there are 20 upon
which we are unable to agree.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 20?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: 20. I think we could do it in 30 minutes if the Tribunal
will set some time aside; it might take a little more. Sir David
has reminded me that the translators are waiting on us to go ahead
with their translation work.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think the best thing would be
to take it tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. It has been suggested also
that the case of Seyss-Inquart precede that of Defendant Von Papen.
I understand that is the wish of the counsel, and it is very satisfactory
to us as well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
<span class='pageno' title='95' id='Page_95'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We have to refer briefly to Document 1809-PS,
the Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. It is GB-88 in the Document Book
of the British Delegation 10a, Page 289.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May I first ask when were the plans for the occupation of
Norway drafted?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I may say that on the basis of the conference which
Quisling had with the Führer in my presence on 14 December the
Führer ordered the OKW to deal with the matter and study it. The
Führer had two more conferences with Quisling on 16 and 18 December
at which I was not present. The matter was then handled
by the OKW according to the directives and an initial plan known
as “North” was drafted. Document C-21, which I have mentioned
before, shows that this Plan North was received by SKL on 13 January
and then, in the course of January, the date 27 January was
mentioned, the draft of a directive for the Plan North was made.
That draft was made in the OKW in the usual way. Kapitän zur
See Krancke as expert for the Navy took part in it. The directive
was completed on 1 March 1940, and was issued to the three branches
of the Armed Forces. In the meantime, a large number of reports
had been received, and it was possible to use these as a basis for the
drafting of the directive. These reports besides coming from Kapitän
Schreiber now also came direct from Quisling, who sent them to the
Führer. They mentioned the preparatory work carried out by the
English and the French—special mention was made of the Navy
Attaché Kermarrec—in Norwegian ports for finding out the possibilities
of landing, measurements of quays, and the height of the
bridges between Narvik and the Swedish border and similar things.</p>

<p class='pindent'>These reports which reached us showed clearly that within a
reasonable time a landing was intended. Also political reports
reached us which Hagelin received through his connections in Norwegian
circles, reports which in part came directly from members
of the Storting—and from members of the Government and their
entourage.</p>

<p class='pindent'>All of these reports confirmed that the pretext of aid for Finland
in the dispute between Finland and Russia played a certain role.
The danger was discussed that England under pretext of aid for
Finland would proceed to a bloodless occupation of Norway. The
directive for the case Norway, therefore, was issued on 1 March. In
the further course of the month of March more reports were received.
In the meantime, the <span class='it'>Altmark</span> incident had occurred, and it was observed
by Hagelin too that the behavior of the Norwegian commander
was a pretense, and it was clear that in the case of any
encroachment on the part of Great Britain, the Norwegian Government
would protest only on paper.
<span class='pageno' title='96' id='Page_96'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You said just now the directive is dated 1 March.
This is correct. The Prosecution submitted a quotation of 5 March
from Document 1809-PS. That is an entry in Jodl’s Diary: “1500
hours big conference with the three commanders-in-chief regarding
Weserübung. Field Marshal, having no knowledge about plans, is
furious.” How is it possible, Admiral, that Reich Marshal Göring
had not been consulted at a time when the directive was already
issued?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot explain that at all. I had no authority to
speak about it and I cannot say why he was not consulted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It is in the nature of conspiracy that the second
man in the Reich would be informed about it from the beginning.
Has he not ever spoken to you about that matter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not that I remember, but that shows how little,
especially in the Führer’s entourage, one can speak of a conspiracy.
The Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, also was not present during
any of the Quisling conferences or receptions and I had no authority,
to speak to him about these matters.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to know your position regarding
Jodl’s entry of 13 March, in which he stated: “Führer does not
give the order for ‘W’ (Weserübung). He is still trying to find a
justification.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>I ask you to explain these words to us as you understand them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. The English translation as far as I can remember
says “Looking for an excuse.” But he needed neither justification
nor excuse, because in the first paragraph of the directive of 1 March—that
is to say, 2 weeks before that—he had stated what circumstances
made it necessary to occupy Norway and Denmark with
certain forces of the Wehrmacht. British encroachments in Scandinavia
and the Baltic were to be prevented thereby, our ore deposits
in Sweden safeguarded, and the bases against England for the Navy
and the Air Force were to be expanded.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that is the Document
C-174; that is, GB-89, Document Book of the British Delegation
10a, Page 113. That is the directive for case “Weserübung”
of 1 March 1940, which as the witness has mentioned, already contains
the justification for it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May it please the Tribunal, to prove that the information received
by the witness through the intelligence service of Admiral
Canaris, through Kapitän Schreiber and so on, is objective and in
agreement with facts, may I be permitted to submit several documents—and
that Exhibit Number Raeder-75 from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>
dated 17 February 1940, which mentions the landing of British troops
<span class='pageno' title='97' id='Page_97'></span>
in Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik, and several appendices to it,
which show the trends of thoughts at that time in regard to the
Swedish ore; Document Exhibit Raeder-77...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This is 75, Pages 43 and 44?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Not page, but Exhibit
Raeder-75. It is Page 340. Document Book 4.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then Exhibit Number Raeder-77, also from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>:
“The French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs Daladier to
the French Ambassador in London, Corbin.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>In Document Book 4, Page 352. I have seen that there is a
mistake in the English document book. On Page 353 the heading
is missing or rather on Page 354. I may point out that this document
bears the date 21 February 1940. That is contained in the
original document under the heading “Intervention in Scandinavia.”
It concerns the occupation of the most important Norwegian ports,
<span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and mentions again the question of the Swedish ore.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then I come to the Document Exhibit Raeder-78; Document
Book 4, Page 357, an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval
Operations Staff of 4 March in which in connection with the case
of the <span class='it'>Altmark</span> it is explained that a defense by Norway against
British military action is not possible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then Exhibit Raeder-79, Document Book 4, Page 359, note by the
Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin. Here
also there is a mistake in the translation. The heading of the document
was omitted on Page 360. I would be grateful if the Tribunal
would note that the original document bears the date 10 March
1940. It is top secret and is based on the fact that the general plan
for armed intervention in Finland existed since 16 January and
therefore as a precautionary measure the ports and airfields on the
Norwegian coast should be occupied. I refer to the remaining contents
of document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then may I submit Exhibit Number Raeder-80, a report about
negotiations of the Scandinavian Commission of the Inter-Allied
Military Study Commission of 11 March 1940, top secret, concerning
landing at Narvik.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Then, Admiral, we are finished with
Norway. I believe you said already that the reports increased considerably
in the month of March. When did Hitler give the final
order for the occupation?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At the end of March or beginning of April. I cannot
recall the exact date.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient.
<span class='pageno' title='98' id='Page_98'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I also mention a particularly important report
which I remember now. Quisling reported in February that Lord
Halifax had told the Norwegian Ambassador in London that an
operation on the part of the British for the acquisition of bases in
Norway was planned for the near future. That report also reached
us at that time. I should like to add, as I emphasized before, that
being fully conscious of my responsibility I always tried to show
the Führer both sides of the picture and that the Führer would have
to be guided by my documentary proof when deciding, to take or
refrain from taking that tremendous step. But that does not mean
to say that because I pointed out to my Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces that particular danger, I in any way decline to accept
responsibility. Of course, I am in some measure responsible for the
whole thing. Moreover, I have been accused because in a letter submitted
here under C-155 I had told my officers’ corps that I was
proud of the way in which this extraordinarily dangerous enterprise
had been executed. I should like to confirm this, because I believe
I was entitled to be proud that the Navy had carried out that operation
with such limited means and in the face of the entire British
fleet; I still stick to that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did reports reach the SKL in March about violations
of the neutrality of Norway? That is incidents in territorial
waters?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. In the second half of March repeated attacks
were made by British planes and naval forces against our merchant
ships bringing the Swedish ore down from Narvik.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection may I submit
some more documents? Exhibit Raeder-81, Document Book 5,
Page 372, War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff which contains
several entries showing that towards the end these incidents became
more and more frequent and that the Norwegian neutrality was
violated by British air and naval forces. As that document is known
there is no need to read anything from it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then Exhibit Raeder-82 in Document Book 5, Page 377, also War
Diary of 27 March, also concerning violations of neutrality. Furthermore,
Exhibit Raeder-83, Page 379, a draft resolution of the sixth
session of the Supreme Council, dated 28 March 1940, which was
already mentioned yesterday. It deals with vital interests from the
standpoint of international law and with the laying of mines in
territorial waters on 5 April.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then Exhibit Raeder-84, Page 384, and Exhibit Raeder-85,
Page 386, both of which are documents from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>. May
I only point out that it mentions that the first transport is to leave
on J.1. day, that is actually on 5 April; in other words, 4 days before
the occupation by Germany.
<span class='pageno' title='99' id='Page_99'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Raeder-86 is an excerpt from the War Diary, of which
I ask you to take official notice and which concerns the chartering
by England of 90 percent of the Norwegian tankers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>To conclude Norway, may I ask you to look at two Documents,
C-151 and C-115. Those are Exhibits GB-91 and GB-90, respectively,
Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, on Pages 106 and 62.
The dates are 30 March 1940 and 4 April 1940. The documents show
that the ships which were to carry out the landing should carry the
British flag for camouflage reasons. The Prosecution uses that document
also to support its accusation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] What do you say about it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is quite a regular ruse of war, that warships
carry a foreign flag. A requisite for the legality of that act, however,
is that at the moment of an enemy action, the moment fire is
opened, their own flag must be hoisted in time. That has always
been done in the German Navy, especially in the case of our auxiliary
cruisers, which frequently sailed under a foreign flag in order
to avoid being reported by merchant ships, but which always
lowered that flag in time. That is a matter of honor. It must be
added that in this case, as the War Diary shows...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: 8 April.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: ...that on 8 April, on account of certain considerations,
we rescinded that order, because we had the report that an
English action was under way, and we feared that complications
would arise from that. So this order was not carried out in the long
run. I believe the document can be found which contains that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I submit, in this connection, Exhibit
Number Raeder-89 (Document Raeder-89), Document Book 5,
Page 400, where we find under 8 April: “The previous order is
rescinded, the British flag is not to be used.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: You also asked about Document C-115, which says
that the blockade runners camouflaged as merchant ships with
dimmed lights should enter Oslo Fjord unobtrusively. This too is
quite a regular ruse of war against which, from the legal point of
view, no objection can be made. Likewise there is nothing to be
said against English names given in answer to signals of identity.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I did not finish answering one question because I was interrupted.
That was the question concerning the expression “justification”
or “excuse” in the War Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. As I
have shown, it was not a question of the justification, which had
been expressed a long time before by Hitler, but I believe that I
am right in saying that the question was that the diplomatic note
which, at the moment of the execution of the enterprise, had to be
presented to the Norwegian and Danish governments, giving the
<span class='pageno' title='100' id='Page_100'></span>
reason for his action, had not yet been drafted, especially as he had
not yet spoken to the Foreign Minister at that time at all. The
Foreign Minister received the information, as he has said himself,
only on 3 April.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: With this I should like to conclude the question
of the occupation of Norway. May I still submit the approved document,
Exhibit Raeder-66, which was approved for the purpose of
argument? It is an opinion expressed by Dr. Mosler, and it can be
found in Document Book 4, Page 291; and in this connection, concerning
the use of flags, may I draw special attention to Figure 7,
Page 304, from which we may see the legal reasoning. Furthermore,
may I submit Exhibit Raeder-90, Document Book 5, Page 402, and
the series of documents as far as they are approved: Exhibit
Raeder-91, Admiral Darlan to the French War Minister Daladier on
12 April 1940; Exhibit Raeder-92, Page 412. This document contains
the English-French note to the Norwegian Government of 8 April
1940. I have submitted that document because this note expresses
the same legal points of view as expressed in the legal opinion of
Dr. Mosler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Number Raeder-97 and Exhibit Number Raeder-98:
Number 97 concerns the <span class='it'>White Book</span> and the planning of 7 February
1940, concerning the Allied bases in Norway; and Number 98 is an
excerpt from the War Diary concerning the orders which, at the
time of the occupation of Norway, were found and from which it
could be seen that an English landing was imminent and the so-called
plan under the camouflage name “Stratford Plan,” which was
prepared by the British Admiralty.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Concerning Norway, may I ask you
the following: During and after the occupation did you intervene to
see that the Norwegian population was treated decently, and what
was your view of the political question in Norway with regard to
the attitude of Germany to Norway?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: From the very beginning I was for good treatment of
the Norwegian population. I knew that Hitler had given Gauleiter
Terboven, whom he had unfortunately appointed Reich Commissioner
for Norway and to whom he had entrusted the civil administration,
instructions that he, Terboven, should bring the Norwegian
people to him; that is to say, make them favorably disposed, and
that he had the intention, finally, to maintain Norway as a sovereign
state in a North Germanic Empire.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Terboven was opposed to that. He treated the Norwegian population
in a very unfriendly manner, and by his treatment he actually
sabotaged the aims of Hitler. In close understanding with
Admiral Böhm, who became the naval commander in Norway and
<span class='pageno' title='101' id='Page_101'></span>
who had taken Kapitän Schreiber, the former attaché, on his staff
as liaison officer to the Norwegian population, I tried to counteract
these intentions of Terboven. On the basis of the reports of Admiral
Böhm I repeatedly approached the Führer and told him that with
Terboven he would never achieve his purpose. The Führer designated
Quisling chief of the Government. I cannot remember exactly
when he became Minister President, but Terboven also sabotaged
Quisling in his activities by making it extremely difficult for him,
and even discredited him among the population. Terboven’s chief
reason was, in my opinion, that he wanted to remain Gauleiter of
Norway. All our endeavors were unsuccessful, in spite of the fact
that Admiral Böhm tried very hard to achieve with the help of the
Navy what Hitler had expected, that is, to win over the Norwegian
people.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I did not understand how on the one side one wanted to gain the
sympathy of the Norwegians and on the other hand one sabotaged
Hitler’s intentions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That went on until 1942, at which time Böhm made a final report
to me, in which he explained that things could not go on like that,
and that Hitler’s intentions would never be realized. I submitted
that report to Hitler, but since it did not bring about any change—it
was in the late autumn of 1942—this failure of mine became one
of the reasons which finally led to my retirement.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you ask Hitler specifically to dismiss
Terboven?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Several times. And I suggested that he should
appoint General Admiral Böhm as commander of the armed
forces for Norway and give him far-reaching powers so that he
could carry out his—Hitler’s—aims. I suggested that the Führer
should as soon as possible conclude a peace with Norway because
only in that way could he bring about co-operation between Norway
and Germany and make the population turn to him. I told him the
attempts of sabotage by the Norwegian emigrants would lose their
meaning and cease and that possibly the Norwegian emigrants who
were leaning toward England at that time could be induced to
return, because they might be afraid that they might “miss the bus”;
especially from the point of view of economic advantages. The task
of defending Norway would be considerably easier if a state of
peace could be brought about.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In conclusion, may I refer to Exhibit Raeder-107
which is already known to the Tribunal. It is the affidavit by
Schreiber under Roman Numeral II. There Schreiber has mentioned
in detail the utmost endeavors of the Navy to prevent the regrettable
terror regime of Terboven and explained that Raeder, for the last
<span class='pageno' title='102' id='Page_102'></span>
time in 1942, used all his efforts to get Hitler to conclude a peace
between Norway and Germany. I believe that the Navy had a good
reputation in Norway, that I can assume this is historically known
without my having to prove it. To be on the safe side I applied for
a witness, but consent was not given.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May I also submit Exhibit Raeder-108 (Document Raeder-108),
Document Book 6, Page 473, a letter from Raeder to Admiral Böhm
of 23 October 1942. Raeder writes:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“To my regret I have to send you enclosed, for your personal
information, a letter from Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to
Prime Minister Quisling.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>On Page 476 there is the letter from Lammers to Quisling which
says—I quote only one sentence:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Führer, therefore, desires that during the war there
shall be no conferences or discussions concerning a final or a
preliminary peace between the Greater German Reich and
Norway, or concerning other measures fixing or anticipating
Norway’s position to the Reich after the end of the war.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>This is the letter which the witness mentioned, which finally
brought to nought all his endeavors and those of Admiral Böhm.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Admiral, you had little to do with France, and therefore we can
be very brief. May I merely ask you, did you attempt at any time
to influence the political relations between Germany and France?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: This influence, when there was any, was in the first
place directed as much as possible towards improving the defense of
the country. In the second place, there were above all humanitarian
reasons. I often visited naval and submarine bases in France. During
these journeys I got some knowledge of conditions in France. I saw
that in 1940 and still in 1941 the population lived just as if it were
at peace, completely undisturbed. Consequently I believed, since the
Führer had shown so much moderation on the occasion of the
Armistice, that a basis could be found which would draw France—whose
government was after all collaborationist—closer to us.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I was informed that Laval was really sincere in his opinion that
only co-operation between France and Germany could guarantee a
lasting peace in Europe for the future. Therefore I suggested to him
whether he himself could not try to do something in that direction.
He did not intend to do this, and I referred to it again when I heard
that Admiral Darlan was trying to work more closely with our
naval commander in France, Admiral Schultze. That was first
achieved in the field of intelligence, where his services were very
useful to us.</p>

<p class='pindent'>At the end of the year 1941 he mentioned that he would like to
speak to me. Admiral Schultze reported that to me and I told Hitler
<span class='pageno' title='103' id='Page_103'></span>
about it and recommended such a conversation because I thought Lt
would do some good.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It would do what?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That it might bring some advantage. The Führer
approved this meeting and instructed me as to his views. The
meeting took place near Paris on the occasion of an official trip
which I made to the French bases at the end of January or beginning
of February 1942. I had the impression that the meeting
was very satisfactory, inasmuch as Darlan was of the opinion that
a peace would be of advantage to both nations and he also appeared
to be inclined to co-operate. He stressed, however, that the whole
political situation would have to be settled before peace could be
concluded. I also showed that I was prepared to meet him concerning
the negotiations with the Armistice Commission with respect
to heavy guns for big French ships. I reported to the Führer on the
results of the meeting. But in this case too the Führer was again
hesitant and did not want to make a decision. He said he had to see
first how the war went before he could decide upon his final attitude
toward France. Besides, that would be a precedent which might
have an effect on other nations. So that also was a failure. I did not
obtain the relief in the defense of France which I had hoped for and
so, in the case of France, this failure was the second reason which
contributed later to my asking for my release, because I could not
carry my plans through.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the next subject where accusations
are made against you, and that is Russia. When did you hear for
the first time that Hitler intended to wage war against Russia,
although he had concluded a Nonaggression Pact with Russia?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I first remind you that in the summer of 1940,
that is to say, July, August, and September, we in the Navy were
very much occupied with preparations for a landing in England;
therefore it never entered our heads that there could be any plans
for action in another direction. In August I heard from some Army
office, possibly that of the Commander-in-Chief, that considerable
troop transports were going to the East. I asked Hitler what that
meant and he told me it was a grandiose camouflage for his intentions
to invade England. He knew that I would be against it right
away if he were to speak about an enterprise against Russia. In
September—I cannot recall the date exactly—he finally admitted to
me that he had certain intentions against Russia. In September I
reported to him at least twice, my more important report was
26 September, when I did everything I could to dissuade him from
any undertaking against Russia. In that report which I made in the
presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl I emphasized
particularly the strategic military side; first, because I could do
<span class='pageno' title='104' id='Page_104'></span>
that in all clarity in the presence of other people, and then because
I assumed that such military reasons, that is, the possibility of
failure of an operation against Russia at a time when the struggle
was on against England, would impress him and dissuade him from
that plan. On 26 September, after making this official report, I asked
for a personal conference alone with Hitler. Keitel and Jodl can
testify that I always did this when I wanted to discuss something
particularly important with the Führer, where I had to go beyond
the conventional procedure and which I could only do if nobody else
was present. One could tell Hitler a lot of things if one was alone
with him, but one could not make any such statements in a larger
group. Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl know that
very well, particularly well, because they were the ones who in such
cases always had to leave the room. On that occasion I gave Hitler
my views in detail; first, that it was not possible to break the pact
with Russia, that it would be morally wrong, that it would serve no
purpose because the pact gave us great advantages and was a basis
for a sound policy for Germany later on. Then I told him that under
no circumstances could he start a two-front war, as it was he who
had always emphasized that he would not repeat the stupidity of
the government of 1914 and that, in my opinion, it could never be
justified. Then I put to him again the difference of the forces on
each side, the absolute necessity for the Navy to concentrate on the
war against England and particularly at that moment when all
resources were strained to the utmost to carry out the invasion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On that day I had the impression that Hitler was inclined to listen
to my argument because later, or the next day, the naval adjutant,
Kapitän Von Puttkamer, reported to me that Hitler had spoken in
very much the same vein as I had spoken, and had appreciated my
argument.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That went on for several months. I presented many such reports,
returning always with the same arguments. I believed again in
November that I had been successful. To my utter surprise, however,
on 18 December, Directive Number 21 (Barbarossa) came out, which
dealt with the case of a war with the Soviet Union before the termination
of the war against England. It is true, of course, that it
was a directive for an eventuality. It is Document 446-PS, USA-31,
of 18 December 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is in Document Book 10a,
Page 247.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, the Prosecution asserted
that the Navy and you assisted in drawing up this directive. Is
that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is in no way correct. Such directives were
drafted in the OKW after the Führer had taken his political decision,
<span class='pageno' title='105' id='Page_105'></span>
in the Armed Forces Operations Staff; and in that Armed Forces
Operations Staff there was also one naval officer and one or more
Air Force officers who, under the Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff, dealt with matters concerning the Navy and Air
Force when such directives were being drafted. The directive then
went to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and they
were ordered, for their part, to work out and present suggestions for
the execution of the orders of the Führer. They had no influence on
the directive itself and did not see it at all beforehand.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May I add one more thing? I have been accused by the Prosecution
that I used my influence with the Führer not for moral and
ethical reasons but that I tried in a cynical way first to settle the
account with England and then to assail Russia. I have said before
that I told all my reasons to the Führer whenever I had the chance,
but that I could not do that in a public meeting or in the presence
of other people, nor could I write it down in my war diary, because
the sharp words which fell there must not become known to
other people by means of the war diary. I want to point to Document
C-170, Exhibit USA-136, which dates from 23 August 1939 to
22 June 1941. It is a compilation of many excerpts from the War
Diary of the Naval Operations Staff—and from my minutes of conferences
with Hitler in which the Russian question was dealt with.
This is not a literal reproduction of my statements or word for word
excerpts from the War Diary, but it is a summary of excerpts by the
naval archivist, Admiral Assmann. I will not read details from
these many entries, but I should like to point out that precisely this
document, C-170, shows in a large number of entries contained
therein that, since the beginning of the war in 1939, I continuously
used my influence with the Führer to maintain good relations with
Russia for the reasons which I have previously mentioned. It would
lead us too far if I were to start quoting several entries here. But
the document, I would like to emphasize, is entirely convincing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You had nothing to do with the Directive 21,
which is signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Absolutely nothing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But following that, you made some preparations
in accordance with the directive? As they concerned the Navy they
were in any case not so important here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. We had the first conference in January, as can be
seen from one of these entries in C-170. I had reported to the Führer
on 4 February about our intentions and in March the Navy began
with certain preparations. I have said already that the Navy
throughout the first period was hardly concerned with major
operations, but only with the cutting off of the Gulf of Finland by
<span class='pageno' title='106' id='Page_106'></span>
mines and light naval forces. I do not know whether that is in
Directive 21 or somewhere else but the Führer, at my urgent
request, had ordered that the center of gravity of the naval warfare
should still be in the direction of England. Consequently, we could
use only relatively small forces for the war against Russia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we had better break off now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal rather understood that you hoped to finish by
midday today. We realize that you had 2 hours of today taken up
with your documents, but when do you think you will be able to
finish now?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe I will need only about three-quarters of
an hour, between half an hour and an hour.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Tomorrow at 10 o’clock we shall deal with
the documents of Seyss-Inquart, and we are told that will only last
30 minutes.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 18 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div><span class='pageno' title='107' id='Page_107'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD DAY</span><br/> Saturday, 18 May 1946</h1></div>

<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the application for
documents of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, 87 documents altogether
have been submitted to the Prosecution, and we have gone over
them in the German. After numerous conferences with counsel for
the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, we find we are unable to agree now
on 17 of these documents. As of yesterday the number was 20, as
I so stated, but we have now reduced it to 17.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document Number 5 in the defendant’s list is a copy of a resolution
of the German National Assembly on the 21st of February
1919, advocating Anschluss between Austria and Germany. We have
told counsel we object to it as being really irrelevant here and immaterial.
It is a resolution of a German parliamentary body, and
it doesn’t seem to us to make any difference what they were thinking
of Anschluss in 1919.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document Number 10 is an extract from a newspaper article
published in October 1945 and written by a man named Walford
Selby. It is a critical article criticizing the Treaty of St. Germain
for not avoiding the obliteration of the Austro-Hungarian economic
entity, and it discusses what it describes as the mistakes of 1919,
and so on. We understand that it is intended to explain, with other
documents, the economic background of the Anschluss movement.
Whatever may be said for that type of proof, there are at least five
other documents on the same basis and we made no objection to
them. But we did feel that somewhere this sort of thing, even if
relevant, certainly became cumulative. Documents 7, 12, 26, and 33
are all on the same subject, the economic background of Anschluss,
and this is a long one. Therefore, we feel that it certainly is not
necessary, doesn’t add very much, merely creates a lot of paper
work, and is cumulative.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document Number 11 is a speech delivered by a Dr. Schober,
giving the area and population of the Republic of Austria. We
haven’t any very serious objection to this type of thing excepting
that there probably are better sources if the defendant wishes to
establish the area and population of Austria in 1921. Further, it
<span class='pageno' title='108' id='Page_108'></span>
seems to us that the Tribunal could very well take judicial knowledge
of the area and population of Austria as of that date from
reliable publications.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document Number 14 is a statement by the former Chancellor
of Austria in 1922 to the effect that Austria belongs to Germany.
Our objection is again based on the cumulative feature of this document,
because there are at least three other documents with almost
identical statements by Dr. Renner to which we have made no
objection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document 19 is an extract from a book written by a man called
Kleinschmied, and the extract purports to show that a number of
politicians lived or prospered on the Anschluss movement in Austria.
That doesn’t seem to us to be very important here or likely to help
the Tribunal very much.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, what exactly does “lived from the
propaganda” mean? That they made their living by reason of propaganda,
or what?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. It purports to show that they made it a vehicle
for carrying on political activities, and made an issue of it and
sustained themselves politically.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Number 21 is an extract from Kunschak’s book <span class='it'>Austria 1918-1934</span>,
and it gives the increase in the National Socialist votes in Austria
between 1930 and 1932. That didn’t seem to us to be very
material or very helpful or likely to be helpful to the Tribunal. We
objected to it on the grounds that it was irrelevant and immaterial.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document Number 22 is an extract from an article in the <span class='it'>New
Free Press</span> of August 1932, opposing the League of Nations loan.
This again is submitted to prove the flow or the continuity of the
Anschluss movement. There is at least one other document, Number
23, which purports to establish the same principle on the same
kind of proof.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Number 27 is an extract from an article written by Martin Fuchs,
“Un Pacte avec Hitler,” and it discusses the Yugoslav policy with
respect to Anschluss between Germany and Austria. Again that
doesn’t seem to the Prosecution to have any direct bearing or any
helpful bearing upon the issues here, whatever the Yugoslavs thought
about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Number 31 is an extract from the <span class='it'>Neue Zeitung</span> of the 11th of
January of this year wherein Gordon Walker states that the celebration
in Austria after the Anschluss was genuine. Well, that is
Mr. Walker’s opinion, and there is some other substantial opinion on
the other side. We doubt very much that his opinion is material
here or competent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Who is he?
<span class='pageno' title='109' id='Page_109'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I understand he is a member of the Labor Party in
Great Britain, and a writer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Number 39 is an extract from the <span class='it'>Archiv</span> of 1938. This sets forth
a statement made by Senator Borah, of the United States, that the
Anschluss was a natural and inevitable affair and had nothing to
do with the United States. This was not a speech made by the late
Senator Borah in the Senate; it was his own opinion, and it does
not seem to us that it would be very helpful. Some later opinions
of Senator Borah were not so helpful, and this doesn’t seem to be
very likely to be helpful to the Tribunal with respect to this issue.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Number 47 is an extract from Zernatto’s book <span class='it'>The Truth about
Austria</span>. Zernatto was one of the State Under Secretaries of Austria,
as the Tribunal knows. He left the country after the Anschluss
and went to the United States and wrote this book. He makes a
number of statements, I might say, about the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.
The Tribunal would be interested in knowing that this
Document 47, and Documents 48, 50, 54, 55, 60, and 61 are all
extracts from the same book. Now, we felt that wherever he reports
a conversation with Seyss-Inquart, that would have bearing and
relevancy before the Court; but where he expresses his opinion, we
have more doubt about its relevancy. This one statement, Number
47, seems to be his opinion. He doesn’t cite any conversation or
anything other than what appears to be his impression that Seyss-Inquart
disassociated himself from Leopold’s efforts.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, we do not object to 48, and to 50, or to 54, because although
we originally thought we would object, on reviewing them they
appeared to set out actual conversations between Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart,
and it might be helpful to the Tribunal. Therefore, we do
not object to the next three.</p>

<p class='pindent'>But 55, again, is a statement in Zernatto’s book that, in Zernatto’s
opinion, Seyss-Inquart was a figure on the chess board and
was double-crossed by the Nazi or new Party leadership. We object
to that for the reason that I have stated; it is the author’s opinion.
He is deceased, by the way, and is certainly not available. In any
event, we do not think his opinion can be very helpful.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Number 60 is also a statement from Zernatto’s book and it sets
out a conversation with an unnamed Austrian Nazi. We felt that
was altogether too vague and would not be of value or helpful. In
Number 61, again, the author Zernatto expresses his opinion that
Seyss-Inquart was afraid of shouldering responsibility. I don’t want
to stress our objections too heavily to these extracts. I don’t think
they are very harmful, certainly, but I rather object because we
would like to cut down some of this printing, and I do not think
they will be very helpful to Seyss-Inquart.
<span class='pageno' title='110' id='Page_110'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Number 68 is the first document on anti-Semitism, and it is an
excerpt from the publication entitled <span class='it'>The Elements of National
Socialism</span> by Bishop Alois Hudal. It explains anti-Semitism in Germany
and Austria; and it goes on to discuss matters that the Tribunal
has heard very much about through other defendants, the
disproportionate position of the Jewish population in Germany, and
so on. We object to it as not being helpful and not material.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Again 69 is another extract from Zernatto’s book on the causes,
as some of these people see it, of anti-Semitism. It is his opinion
and does not to us seem to be helpful or material here. Number 71
is on the Slovak question. I doubt that there has been any serious
claim made anywhere in this case that at various times the Slovaks
have not claimed autonomy. This extract from the <span class='it'>Archiv</span> of 1938,
insofar as we can discover, seeks to establish that they did want
autonomy. Well, we don’t think that is very important here, and
it will not be helpful to the Tribunal or to Seyss-Inquart.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it a document of state?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it is a document from the <span class='it'>Archiv</span>, and in that
sense it is a public document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: After Slovakia had been taken over by the
Reich?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, not afterwards, it’s in 1938, and it preceded the
taking over.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: These are our objections, Mr. President. I do think
we have tried to be rather...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Of course, Mr. Dodd, we are only considering
now the question of objections to translation. We are not considering
the question of admissibility, nor are we binding you not to
object to them after they have been translated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I am aware of that, Mr. President. We tried to
be, I think, fairly generous about this list. The excerpts, or most
of them, are not too long. We did think we would have to call a
halt somewhere, and I do not think our 17 objections out of the
87 listed are very strict or are pinching, really, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart):
Your Lordship, High Tribunal, I know that you value my
small country, Austria, not only because of its ancient culture and
its scenic beauty, but also because it was the first country which
lost its freedom through Hitler. However, with all respect which
you have for this country, I cannot expect of you that, as representative
of great powers, you know the history of my country to
<span class='pageno' title='111' id='Page_111'></span>
the last detail. I do believe that it is of the utmost importance for
the defense of Seyss-Inquart that you understand fully on the basis
of what background and what motives this man acted the way
he did.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I myself can see three reasons which led to the Anschluss.</p>

<p class='pindent'>First of all, the desperate economic situation which runs like a
red thread from 1918 right up to—I am sorry to say—and through
the year 1946.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The second reason, and I shall be very brief with regard to the
documents...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, will you come to the actual
documents as soon as possible, because you will remember we are
only discussing the question of whether they should be translated
or not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. The second reason was the disunity of
the democratic parties. The third reason was the attitude of the
surrounding powers. From these points of view I have assembled
my documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The first document is a resolution of the Weimar National
Assembly, and I am of the point of view that it is important in
respect to a final judgment that the Anschluss was not only a wish
of the Austrian population, but an all-German postulate. It is very
short and I request that it be admitted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The second document is by Selby, who for many years was the
British Ambassador in Vienna, a genuine friend of our country. In
this article he refers to the economic background and conditions in
Austria, which led to the Anschluss. That was the reason for my
including this document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The next document is a speech delivered by Federal Chancellor
Schober who was held in great esteem by the world. In this speech
he refers to the fact that the burdens imposed on Austria are too
great for her to carry. He described the situation as a whole as a
case of bankruptcy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The next document is a statement by the present Federal Minister,
Dr. Karl Renner, in 1922. At that time Dr. Seipel went to
Geneva and with great difficulty put through a loan at the League
of Nations which was of great importance to us because at the same
time it was demanded of Austria that we should forego independence
for 10 years’ duration. That meant that we were not to take any
steps to change the conditions for an Anschluss. Renner opposed
Seipel in Parliament at that time. This document is in no way
cumulative to Document 33, since in Document 33 I want merely
to describe the economic situation as it obtained in the year 1938.
<span class='pageno' title='112' id='Page_112'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>The next document is Point 2 of my evidence; namely, the strong
political propaganda for the Anschluss. In any event, I must dispute
most strongly the assertion that Document Number 21, which is very
short, is irrelevant. I consider it extremely important to prove that
this new, very young party, which grew in the fertile soil of a desperate
economic situation, increased tenfold, as far as the number
of votes was concerned, in the years 1930 to 1932; thus all the time
there existed a recognized political opposition to the government.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The next Document, Number 22, is an article which again illustrates
the economic situation in Austria at a very essential period
of history, namely, the moment when Federal Chancellor Dollfuss
went to Lausanne in order to negotiate another loan from the
League of Nations, and we again were forced to suppress thoughts
of an Anschluss for another 10 years. This Document, Number 22,
as well as the next one, Number 23, is not cumulative, since the
one shows the political and the other the economic position of the
members of Parliament with respect to the League of Nations’ loan
of the year 1932.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The next document is only an extract from the views taken by
the various surrounding states to the Anschluss question. I selected
only Yugoslavia, for Yugoslavia was the country which most strongly
supported the idea of Anschluss in her foreign policy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>As far as Document 31 is concerned, I should like to remark,
supplementing the remarks made by the Prosecution, that Gordon
Walker is not only a member of the Labor Party, but—and this
point is much more important—during the entire war years he was
head of the British Radio Division Austria, and he was himself in
Austria in the year 1938 and he witnessed the Anschluss. His judgment
therefore is of extraordinary importance since it is the judgment
of a prominent foreigner.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The same remark also applies to the following document, the
statement by Senator Borah who for 25 years was the Chairman of
the American Committee on Foreign Affairs. His opinion is surely
deserving of notice.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The next documents concern statements made by Dr. Zernatto.
I should like to add that Dr. Zernatto was Federal Minister, General.
Secretary of the Fatherland Front and Schuschnigg’s right-hand
man during the period of the Anschluss. He was one of the spiritual
fathers of the Schuschnigg plebiscite. I am sorry to say that
he died an emigrant in 1940, and I cannot produce him as a witness
here; but his book is a document and actually tells what this man
experienced in those critical days.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I urgently request that the remaining three documents, which are
very brief, be left in the book.
<span class='pageno' title='113' id='Page_113'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>The next two documents, which concern anti-Semitism, I included
very unwillingly in order to avoid any accusation of anti-Semitic
propaganda. I included them because in the trial brief my client is
accused of being a member of an anti-Semitic organization. This
accusation is unjustifiable insofar as more importance is attached to
this organization than it actually deserves. If this matter is not
further emphasized by the Prosecution, I shall not attach any particular
importance to these two documents myself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The last document which is being objected to, Number 71, contains
the Agreement of Pittsburgh which was concluded between
Masaryk and Hlinka, the Slovak leader, at which occasion Masaryk
solemnly promised autonomy to the Slovaks, a promise which was
not kept according to the letter of the agreement and which gave
rise to a strong demand for autonomy in Slovakia, which was supported
by Hitler. For these reasons I ask that this document also
be approved.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal will consider
the question of these documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, Dr. Siemers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday in connection
with Norway I submitted on one occasion Documents 81,
82, 83, 84, 85, and 86. I beg the Tribunal’s pardon, but I forgot
to submit one document pertinent to this matter, and I should like
to remedy this omission.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The document, which has already been granted me, is Exhibit
Number Raeder-88, which likewise is an extract from the <span class='it'>White
Book</span> and is printed in my Document Book Number 5, on Pages 392
and following. This document shows the British order of 6 April
1940, regarding the plans for the occupation of northern Swedish
ore fields, proceeding from Narvik.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Since the Tribunal is familiar with this document, it will not
be necessary for me to read from it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, yesterday we had arrived
at the topic of Russia. You had answered my question regarding
Directive Number 21, Document 446-PS, of 18 December 1940, to the
effect that the Navy had not worked on this directive. You further
stated that the Navy undertook preparations in January in accordance
with the command.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I make a brief remark on this directive to the
effect that yesterday I believe you made a mistake when you said
that this directive was signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl. This was
the copy of the operational staff which Hitler had signed; but
Keitel and Jodl only countersigned. Thus there is no question of
<span class='pageno' title='114' id='Page_114'></span>
a signature of these two; when such directives were issued they
were signed only by Hitler, and the others could merely countersign.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, and I thank you for the
correction.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In this connection, I should like to ask the Tribunal to consider
Document C-35, USA-132. This document is found in the Document
Book of the British Delegation, Number 10a, on Page 16. It
is an extract from the War Diary with the date of 30 January 1941.
It describes the preparations by the Navy, in accordance with
Hitler’s command of 18 December, where Hitler under Number IV
of the directive commanded that precautionary measures be taken
in case Russia should alter her previous attitude toward Germany,
that is, only in case of this possibility.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, in connection with your
representation of the Russian situation, the Prosecution has submitted
Document C-66, which corresponds to GB-81. This is your
report of 10 January 1944 to Admiral Assmann for the historical
archives of the Navy. The document will be found in the Document
Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, Page 13. There you
will find the basic position taken by Raeder with respect to “Fall
Barbarossa.” This is set forth under “a” of the document under
Number 1...</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have just heard that this document is also to be found in the
Document Book 10a, on Page 35. There you wrote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“At this time the Führer had made known his ‘unalterable
decision’ to conduct the eastern campaign in spite of all
remonstrances. Accordingly, further warnings, as long as
completely new situations had not arisen, were completely
without purpose, as one knew from experience. As Chief
of the Naval Operations Staff I was never convinced of the
‘compelling necessity’ for Barbarossa.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Do you have anything to add to these statements which you
made at that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should like to say in this connection that despite
the fact that the directive had been issued on 18 December, I made
a comprehensive report at the end of December, as can be seen
from Document C-170, which I mentioned yesterday on several
occasions, in order to convince the Führer of the wrongness of this
decision. This shows that I have gone very far, for when the
Führer had issued a directive, even if it applied only to a hypothetical
case, it was generally impossible to approach him with
basic considerations against this directive. Everything else I mentioned
already yesterday.
<span class='pageno' title='115' id='Page_115'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday, in connection with your
counterproposals made to Hitler with respect to Russia, you mentioned
that in the autumn the plan was still to carry through the
action “Seelöwe,” that is, to land in England.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When, according to your strategic opinion, or
the opinion of the Navy, did this possibility cease to exist? When
did you have to dispense with this plan?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In the course of the month of September we still
believed that the landing could be carried through. As a necessary
condition the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and I, too, always
insisted—and he realized this fully—that for a landing air superiority
would have to be on our side; and therefore we were waiting
to see whether we could actually produce this air superiority in
time for the landing, which due to weather conditions could not be
carried out later than the beginning of October. If it were not
possible by then, it would have to be postponed until May of the
following year. It developed that air superiority could not be
produced to the necessary extent; consequently it was said that the
landing was to be postponed until the spring of the following year.
Further preparations were to be taken and they actually were
taken. But in the course of the winter the idea of a landing was
completely abandoned, and Hitler decreed that preparations in the
harbors along the Channel should be carried on only to such an
extent as would give the British the impression that this landing
actually was to take place. In September I had the impression that
Hitler no longer had any great interest in this landing and that in
his own mind he was completely committed to the Russian campaign
in conjunction with which he, of course, could not carry out
the landing in England.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, I turn to the accusation raised against you
by the Prosecution that you demanded that war be waged against
America. The Prosecution has submitted in this connection Document
C-152, or GB-122, which is to be found in the Document Book
of the British Delegation, Number 10, Page 23. This is an extract
from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff dealing with a
report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy—that is, you—to
the Führer on 18 March 1941. Under Figure 11 of this document,
it is stated, and I quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Japan must proceed to take Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be so favorable (preoccupation
of the entire British fleet elsewhere; the unreadiness
of the United States to carry on a war against Japan;
the inferiority of the United States fleet to the Japanese
<span class='pageno' title='116' id='Page_116'></span>
fleet). Japan is, indeed, preparing for this action but will
carry it out, according to statements of Japanese officers, only
at the moment when Germany proceeds with the landing in
England. All efforts on Germany’s part must therefore aim
to incite Japan to immediate action. If Japan captures Singapore,
then all other Eastern Asiatic problems relating to the
United States and England will be solved (Guam, Philippines,
Borneo, and Dutch East Indies).</p>

<p>“Japan wants to avoid a war against the United States of
America, if at all possible, and can do so if she takes Singapore
promptly.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution has construed this statement of yours to mean
that you wanted to lead Japan into a war against America. Is that
correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It is one of the most incorrect assertions contained in
the Indictment against me. It is entirely clear that, since I was
involved in a naval war with England with my small German Navy,
I did not want, under any circumstances, to have America on my
neck as well; and it has been discussed here repeatedly that my
most urgent effort during the entire first few years of the war was
to avoid, under all circumstances, being involved with the United
States. Admiral Wagner described here in detail the limitations
which I had imposed on the German Navy in order to prevent any
clashes with the United States. I imposed limitations which actually
I could hardly justify when I carried on U-boat warfare with such
relatively small means. On the other hand, the United States from
the end of 1940 on, at the latest, and during the entire year of 1941,
exerted pressure on us in our naval warfare wherever possible and
committed actions which could be interpreted as definitely not neutral.
I remind you merely of the repairing of British warships in
the United States, something which up until that time was completely
impossible and unheard of; and Roosevelt’s orders to shoot
given in July and in September 1941; attacks by the American
destroyers <span class='it'>Greer</span> and <span class='it'>Kearney</span> in the Atlantic on our U-boats. In
two cases U-boats were pursued with depth charges for 2 hours
until finally they surfaced and fired, in one case damaging one
destroyer. Despite all this, in June 1941 I reported to Hitler that
we were continuing not to disturb the merchantmen of the United
States in any way—with the result that United States merchantmen
were crossing the Atlantic completely unmolested on sea lanes of
their own choosing, were in a position to give reports about our
U-boats and our sea warfare without our preventing them from doing
so; because of this the British were in a position to camouflage their
ships as American ships. That they did. The first time our pocket
battleship <span class='it'>Admiral Scheer</span>, while crossing the Atlantic, searched a
<span class='pageno' title='117' id='Page_117'></span>
ship flying the American flag it turned out to be the British ship
<span class='it'>Canadian Cruiser</span>. Despite all this I recommended to the Führer,
and he fully approved my suggestion, that we should take no measures
against American ships. That we did not go to Halifax to lay
mines Admiral Wagner has already mentioned. I need not mention
that any further.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was this proposal that Japan capture Singapore
only for the purpose of having assistance and an ally against England,
with whom we were already at war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is actually the case, and I should like to picture
very briefly the development which led to this proposal. This was
not anything that I did on my own initiative, but rather at the
beginning of the year 1941 political negotiations were carried on
with Japan partly by the Führer and partly by the Foreign Minister.
I was not even called into these negotiations, and I must say
regrettably so, for at these negotiations many things were discussed
which were not correct. However on the other hand this shows
again that there can be no talk about a conspiracy. Contact was
made, and then the visit of the Foreign Minister Matsuoka took
place, I believe, in March.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On the basis of this entire development the Führer, on 5 March
1941, issued Directive Number 24. That is Document C-75, USA-151,
of 5 March.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the High
Tribunal to Document C-75, which is the same as USA-151, to be
found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10a,
Page 58. In this Directive, Number 24, it says under Figure 3a:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“As the joint object in the war it is important to defeat England
quickly and in that way keep the United States out of
the war.”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>And three paragraphs farther down, under “d,” it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The capture of Singapore...”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That on Page 58 is Instruction Number 54,
concerning collaboration with Japan.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised—to my surprise—that
only a part of this directive is to be found in the English translation.
I ask that the Tribunal grant me permission, under these
circumstances, to submit the complete directive later as a Raeder
document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your Raeder book,
Dr. Siemers?
<span class='pageno' title='118' id='Page_118'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, not up until now; for I did not know that
only a part had been translated. I am asking for permission to
submit this whole document later as a Raeder document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. This may be found under Figure 3a,
and the next quotation will be found under Figure 3d, and it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The capture of Singapore, which is the key position of England
in the Far East, would be a decisive achievement in the
war effort of the three powers. Beyond that, attacks on other
bases of British and American sea power, if the entry of the
United States into the war cannot be prevented, will serve to
shatter the might of the enemy in that zone....”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to note the fact that already on 5 March, which
is the date of this directive, Hitler decreed the capture of Singapore.
Consequently, the suggestion made by Admiral Raeder in Document
C-152, dated 18 March, cannot be considered decisive, since a Hitler
decree was already in existence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I make a brief remark about that? The same
thing seems to apply to all the cases which are being mentioned
here: First of all, the political decision by Hitler, the head of the
State; then the directive of the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces to the Armed Forces; then the conclusions drawn by the
commanders-in-chief of the separate branches of the Wehrmacht.
So, after I received the directive of 5 March, I had to contemplate
how Japan, after entering the war, could strategically be used with
the best results. And that depended on how we could most effectively
wound our main opponent, England, on the sea. In this connection
I had to insist most urgently that Japan move against Singapore
since there were also circles who were of the opinion that Japan
should attack Vladivostok, which would have been a grave mistake.</p>

<p class='pindent'>England’s power center in East Asia had to be attacked. But the
very fact that I believed that the capture of Singapore would cause
the United States of America to shy away from the war occasioned
this proposal of mine, and not the opposite.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection, I refer to Document
1877-PS which was submitted in the special Indictment against you.
It is USA-152 and may be found in the Document Book of the British
Delegation, Number 10, Page 320. It is a conversation between
the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka—I am just told now
that 320 is incorrect. It should be 319.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And it should be 10a, I think.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: 10a, I beg your pardon.
<span class='pageno' title='119' id='Page_119'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>It is a conversation between Matsuoka and Von Ribbentrop on
29 March 1941. We have already discussed this matter. On Page 8
of this document, the following is said:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Reich Foreign Minister again referred to the problem of
Singapore. Because of the fear expressed by Japan that there
might be U-boat attacks from the Philippines and that the
British Mediterranean Fleet and Home Fleet would join the
attack he had discussed the situation once more with Admiral
Raeder. The latter told him that the British fleet would be so
completely occupied in the home waters and in the Mediterranean
this year that she would not be able to dispatch even
a single ship to the Far East.</p>

<p>“The American U-boats were described by Admiral Raeder
as being so inferior that Japan would not have to concern
herself about them at all.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Herr Von Ribbentrop, in reply to
my question on 1 April 1946, declared that he had been mistaken,
that the statement was probably made by Hitler. Will you please
clarify this statement once and for all?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I can only confirm that I never discussed such questions
with Herr Von Ribbentrop, for unfortunately there was no
connection between the Foreign Office and the High Command of
the Navy especially since the Führer had forbidden that any information
be given by the Foreign Office to the military authorities.
I would never have made such statements since they were in direct
opposition to my own opinion, and especially since in this case I had
no basis for any such statements.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, were not, on the other hand, questions
frequently dealt with in the Naval Operations Staff as to the industrial
and military strength of the United States, and that for these
reasons any entrance of the United States was to be feared?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: This was fully clear to us, even to the last detail.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you at any time during the war see this
Document 1877-PS, which is before you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were you advised about these discussions between
Herr Von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Minister Matsuoka or the discussion
with Oshima?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No; I was merely told by the Führer, and that is
shown in the Document C-170, dealing with the results of this
discussion with Matsuoka. But I had no discussions with Herr
Von Ribbentrop.
<span class='pageno' title='120' id='Page_120'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I have just been
asked to correct a word which I have just used; in order to be fair,
I should like to do so. I said that Hitler, in his directive of 5 March
1941, “decreed” that Singapore be taken. The expression is not correct.
He naturally could not give any orders to Japan. The mistake
arises because the directive starts with the words: “The Führer has
commanded the following for our co-operation.” And under Figure 3
it says: “The following directives apply in this case.” And among
these directives the taking of Singapore is mentioned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Admiral, in any conversation did you suggest to anyone at any
time that Japan attack Pearl Harbor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, we never talked about that at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear anything about this plan before
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Never. It was a complete surprise for me and the
Naval Operations Staff that this attack took place; and it is a complete
mistake in judging the mentality of the Japanese to assume
that they would have spoken of such a plan to anyone, even inside
Japan, who was not directly connected with it. In 1904 they likewise
attacked Russian ships “out of the blue” without anyone suspecting
anything at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I
should like to submit three documents which have been granted me,
first Exhibit Number Raeder-19, to be found in Document Book 2,
Page 108. This document deals with the report by the American
General Marshall which has been placed at my disposal through the
help of the Court.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In this report, dated 1 September 1945, General Marshall stated
the following; and I refer to Page 116:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“In order to establish for the historical record where and how
Germany and Japan failed I asked General Eisenhower to
have his Intelligence officers promptly interrogate the ranking
members of the German High Command who are now our
prisoners of war. The results of these interviews are of
remarkable interest. They give a picture of dissension among
the enemy nations and lack of long-range planning that may
well have been decisive factors of this world struggle at its
most critical moments.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And two paragraphs further:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command
had any over-all strategic plan. Although the High
Command approved Hitler’s policies in principle, his impetuous
strategy outran German military capabilities and ultimately
led to Germany’s defeat. The history of the German
<span class='pageno' title='121' id='Page_121'></span>
High Command from 1938 on is one of constant conflict of
personalities in which military judgment was increasingly
subordinated to Hitler’s personal dictates. The first clash
occurred in 1938 and resulted in the removal of Blomberg,
Von Fritsch, and Beck and of the last effective conservative
influence on German foreign policy.</p>

<p>“The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, and the Low
Countries developed serious diversions between Hitler and
the General Staff as to the details of execution of strategic
plans. In each case the General Staff favored the orthodox
offensive, Hitler an unorthodox attack with objectives deep
in enemy territory. In each case Hitler’s views prevailed and
the astounding success of each succeeding campaign raised
Hitler’s military prestige to the point where his opinions were
no longer challenged. His military self-confidence became
unassailable after the victory in France, and he began to disparage
substantially the ideas of his generals, even in the
presence of junior officers. Thus no General Staff objection
was expressed when Hitler made the fatal decision to invade
Soviet Russia.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And on Page 118, there is an extract dealing with Germany and
Japan. I quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Nor is there evidence of close strategic co-ordination between
Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized
that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but
hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and
American land, sea, and air forces in the Far East.</p>

<p>“In the absence of any evidence so far to the contrary, it is
believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance
with a unified strategic plan.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And further, in the documents which were also granted me,
Exhibit Raeder-113 and 114, in the Document Book 6, Page 491 and
Page 497...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think you should ask the witness
whether he agrees with General Marshall’s appreciation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you agree with the opinions of the
American General Marshall?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have not completely absorbed these statements. In
general they are the lines of thought which we also had pursued,
but I cannot vouch for each single point. In order to speak with
certainty I would have to look at them or they would have to be
read to me again.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe the general confirmation is sufficient.
In Document Raeder-113 I should like to refer to the heading:
<span class='pageno' title='122' id='Page_122'></span></p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Army Foresaw Japan’s Move, Marshall Says:</p>

<p>“Washington, December 11 (AP)—General George C. Marshall,
formerly Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged last night that
the Army knew more than 10 days before December 7, 1941,
that a Japanese move toward Pearl Harbor might take them
past the deadline where the American chiefs believed the U.S.
should fight.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>In order to save time I shall not read the particulars; but it can
be gathered from the report by Marshall that the American Army
knew about it and later the date of November 25 and 26 is mentioned.
In addition Marshall testifies that preparations had been
worked out in the United States before the war for the construction
of landing strips for American bombers in Rabaul, Port Moresby,
and Singapore.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In Exhibit Number Raeder-114, which I am also submitting,
Henry L. Stimson, the former United States Secretary of War, made
a statement under date of 21 March.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Henry L. Stimson, former U.S. Secretary of War, disclosed
that the late President Roosevelt’s War Cabinet had discussed
and rejected—9 days before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor—an
American attack on the Japanese forces without further
warning...</p>

<p>“Stimson related that he had received on November 28, 1941
information of Japanese movements along the Asiatic coast.
On the same day, he said, the Cabinet met and discussed the
possible meaning of the Japanese move.”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>He further said that:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“...if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British
would fight, and that if the British fought we would have to
fight.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>According to this, Admiral, did the United States know about
these Japanese plans before you did?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Apparently, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall turn to the last accusation by the
Prosecution, and that concerns Brazil. In this connection, the Prosecution
has submitted Document 1807-PS, GB-227, to be found in the
Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 288. This is
Jodl’s diary, the entry of 16 June 1942. I have to beg your pardon,
I am told it is Page 287, not 288. This entry reads:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Naval Operations Staff applied on 29 May for permission
to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. It considers
that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant
ships is expedient at this moment when defensive measures
are still incomplete and there is the possibility of surprise,
<span class='pageno' title='123' id='Page_123'></span>
since Brazil is to all intents and purposes waging naval warfare
against Germany.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution is accusing you of
violating neutrality and violating international law because you
made that proposal at a time when Brazil was neutral. I call your
attention to the fact that the war with Brazil broke out 2 months
later on 22 August 1942. Please tell me briefly from memory just
how you came to make this proposal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The relations between Brazil and Germany at this
time could not have been worse. The Germans were very much
persecuted and treated very badly. Germany’s economic interests
were heavily impaired. The Brazilians were already completely on
the side of the United States. They had allowed United States air
bases to be established along the Brazilian coast, and also intelligence
stations. They themselves confirmed that they had destroyed
a German U-boat; and, on the other side, the German U-boats had
also attacked Brazilian ships, for the Brazilian ships were not illuminated
according to regulations and consequently could not be
recognized as Brazilian ships. Germany had previously asked all of
the South American countries to illuminate their ships in such a
way that their nationality could be distinguished at night. Then
there were air attacks on U-boats of the Axis Powers, and they
could have been carried out only from Brazilian bases. At this
request of the Naval Operations Staff to the Führer, the Führer
decreed that once again we should ask the Italians what intelligence
reports they had received; and Italy in turn confirmed that some
weeks before Italian U-boats, which had been operating together
with ours, had been attacked near the Brazilian coast. Likewise the
Brazilian Air Ministry had made known the fact that Brazilian aircraft
or United States aircraft coming from Brazilian air bases had
attacked Axis U-boats.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On the basis of that confirmation the Führer permitted the use
of weapons against Brazilian ships along the Brazilian coast. A plan
was worked out, according to which a certain wave of U-boats,
which left the French coast in June to proceed into the Atlantic,
was to go to the Brazilian coast. The Führer had ordered in particular
that this was not to be mere pin-pricks but rather a serious
enterprise. This operation was later stopped and not carried through.
I am sorry that I am not able to say for what reason. But it can
be seen from our document which gives the statements made in the
War Diary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I believe that the
entire accusation of the Prosecution regarding this planning would
not have been raised if Document 1807-PS, Jodl’s diary entry of
<span class='pageno' title='124' id='Page_124'></span>
16 June, had been submitted <span class='it'>in toto</span>. Only the first part was submitted.
Therefore, I submit this entry as Exhibit Number Raeder-115,
to be found in Document Book 6, Page 500. From the further statements
made by General Jodl in his diary we may conclude that the
situation was correctly investigated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The first part, which was submitted by the Prosecution, that is,
the first two sentences, I have already read. The rest of the entry
is as follows:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office declares that an
aggravation of the conflict with Brazil is undesirable in view
of the attitude of Argentina and Chile and that, previous to
measures of war against Brazil, consultations must be held
with Italy and Japan. Acting on the report of the Chief of
the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Führer has ordered
on 30 May, that the Naval Operations Staff is to ascertain, by
inquiring in Rome, whether the Brazilian reports about warlike
actions against Axis U-boats are correct. The inquiry by
the Naval Operations Staff shows that Italian U-boats were
attacked on 22 and 26 May at the northeast corner of Brazil
by airplanes which beyond a doubt had started from a Brazilian
air base. The Naval Operations Staff transmit, moreover,
the text of the official communiqué of the Brazilian Air
Ministry about the fighting and propose to put into action
near the main Brazilian harbors during the period from
3-8 August 10 U-boats to sail from 22 June to 4 July from
ports in western France, along with the tanker <span class='it'>U-460</span>. The
order for execution must be given to the U-boats by 15 June
at the latest. After the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had
reported this to the Führer at the Berghof on the afternoon of
15 June, the Führer declared himself in agreement with the
intentions of the Naval Operations Staff but ordered, however,
that before any final decision is made, the political situation
be examined once again by the Foreign Office.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I believe that this proves that we were careful enough; and I
refer further to Exhibit Number Raeder-116 which I should like to
submit herewith, in the same document book, Page 503, which is an
extract from the War Diary. Under date 6 June there is an entry
which states that the development has gone so far that:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“...a latent state of war is practically already in existence,
(Brazil entirely on the side of USA; most severe damage to all
German interests; individual Brazilian steamers not properly
illuminated sunk by U-boats; increasing agitation in Brazil;
Brazilians claim they have already sunk German U-boat
while patrolling the coast).”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='125' id='Page_125'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>And a further extract from the War Diary, Exhibit Raeder-117,
which I should like to submit herewith, to be found in the same
document book, Page 509. I ask the High Tribunal to take notice of
this document and its contents and I refer only to Figures 3 and 4
in detail. Under Figure 3 it reads:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“When Brazilian ships began to provide themselves with
camouflage paint and to arm, the order was given on 15 May
1942 to use arms at once against recognizable armed South
Americans.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And under Figure 4 it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“On the basis of the fact that Axis submarines were attacked
by vessels along the Brazilian coast and that the Brazilian Air
Ministry officially made known that attacks had been made
by the Brazilian Air Force, the Naval Operations Staff on
29 May 1942, in Document 12938/42, Top Secret, asked the
Armed Forces Operations Staff for permission to use arms
against Brazilian military forces and merchant ships.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I submit also Exhibit Number Raeder-118, Document Book 6,
Page 510. I ask the High Tribunal to take notice of this document.
I do not wish to quote it, since it repeats the facts we have already
heard. I believe that Figure 4 of Document 117 which I have just
read clarifies the matter completely and refutes every accusation
against the Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, do you have anything to
add to these extracts from the War Diary?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I have nothing to add. It is entirely clear.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I ask you now to describe to the
High Tribunal—and with this I am coming to the conclusion, of my
examination—how it came about that you resigned in January 1943?</p>

<p class='pindent'>Your Honors, shall we have a recess first?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It depends on whether you hope to finish in a
few minutes. If you hope to finish in a few minutes we will sit on
so that you may finish your examination.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe it will take perhaps 10 minutes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Please describe how
it came about that you resigned in January of 1943; but first I should
like to ask you one more question: Did you, even before this, have
the idea of resigning?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should like to say briefly that on several occasions
before the war I asked the Führer to relieve me of my post, or I
presented him with an ultimatum. I should like briefly to cite two
cases as examples. In November 1938 in the presence of General
<span class='pageno' title='126' id='Page_126'></span>
Keitel I made a report to the Führer about the type of ships and our
plans as to how the ships should be developed further. On this occasion
the Führer, in a manner defying explanation, began to attack
everything that we had built and were building, including the plans
for the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span>, and to declare them wrong. Later I found out
that things like that happened whenever some persons of his entourage,
who knew very little about such things, gave him their
opinion, that he always followed it up, probably wanting—as I told
myself later—to check whether the things he had been told were
actually correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This case, however, was so extreme that I could not do anything
else but simply pick up my plans, put them in my brief case, and
leave the room. General Keitel was present. The Führer followed
me to the door, asked me to come in again, softened his accusations,
and asked me not to resign now under any circumstances.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The second case was a purely personal one, but it is rather
typical. His naval adjutant, who had just been appointed, wanted
to marry a young girl who had a very unsavory reputation at the
University of Kiel. I told him I would never consent to the marriage.
The Führer had the girl introduced to him and decided he had
nothing against the marriage; I left the Berghof and sent the Führer
a letter via a staff officer in which I told him that I would refuse
my consent, that the officer would not remain in the Navy should
he marry, or else I would not remain. I asked the officer who acted
as my courier to bring back the answer since I wanted to reach a
decision at once. The Führer had the officer wait 2 days at the
Berghof and then sent him back to me with a letter saying:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Very well, the officer cannot marry and remain in the Navy
and he will not be used further as a naval adjutant; someone
else will be put in his place. He will become some sort of
leader in my National Socialist Motor Corps and will then
serve as one of my Party adjutants.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>It was also typical of the Führer that, to a certain degree, he
wanted to see his will carried through; but this man was out of
the Navy, and I could make my conviction felt in this case.
Under these circumstances I declared myself ready to continue in
office. That was at the beginning of 1939; in the course of the
spring, however, I asked again whether I could not be relieved of
my position now, since I had served for many years in the Navy and
I did not believe I would be able to maintain the dignity of the office
much longer. I suggested to him that perhaps in October 1939
I should leave my post. The Führer refused at the time, and on
1 October we were at war, and in time of war I did not believe that
I could leave the Navy under any circumstances unless it was very
urgent, especially since I considered myself totally responsible for
<span class='pageno' title='127' id='Page_127'></span>
all preparations and for the training of the Navy. In the course of
the war our co-operating which up until then, aside from such
incidents, had been quite congenial, since the Führer had always
made an effort to show me respect, our connection gradually became
very strained during the war. The Führer became more nervous
when I made reports, flared up in rage when there were divergences
of opinion or if there had been any incidents, as, for instance, a
technical defect or poor performance by a ship. It happened again
and again that his entourage influenced him before I could actually
explain matters to him, and I was called in subsequently to set him
straight on these matters. In that way unpleasant scenes ensued
which wore me out.</p>

<p class='pindent'>One point about which the Führer was especially sensitive was
the large ships. He was always uneasy when our large ships were
out on the high seas and were carrying on raids against shipping.
The loss of a ship, such as the <span class='it'>Graf Spee</span> or later the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span>, he
considered a tremendous loss of prestige; and matters like that,
therefore, excited him tremendously. That went on until the end of
1942. Then there came—and this particularly impressed me—my
defeat in the consultation with the Führer on questions dealing with
Norway, France, and above all, Russia. In the final analysis he
always listened more to the Party people as, for example, Terboven,
than to an old officer. That led to a situation which could not be
tolerated for any length of time. One of the basic characteristics of
the Führer was a tremendous suspicion toward anyone and everyone,
but especially directed against old officers who had come from the
old Wehrmacht and of whom he always assumed—despite all well-intentioned
treatment—that in their hearts they did not share these
feelings which he had to demand of them. Especially the case of
Russia had led me to so many conflicts with him that our relations
were strongly influenced thereby. Indeed, the man who compiled all
these war diaries and minutes, Admiral Assmann, summed it up on
one occasion at the conclusion of such a discussion with the words:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, therefore, is in complete
opposition to the Führer in this matter.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>At the end of 1942, just after I had had to put an end to the
entire Norwegian question, an incident occurred which led to the
end. There was to have been an attack on a convoy which was going
to Murmansk or Archangel from England. It was in December at
a time when in those northern regions there are just 1 or 2 hours
of light and hence no favorable weather for fighting by large ships
when up against large numbers of destroyers. The ships, together
with the destroyers, had started on their journey and had reached
the convoy while it was still light. But since daylight soon disappeared
and darkness fell and since the convoy was guarded by
<span class='pageno' title='128' id='Page_128'></span>
many destroyers, the admiral considered it expedient to withdraw
the big ships from the battle. That was the only correct decision
for he might have lost them all by torpedo attack. This fact, and
secondly the fact that unfortunately the radio connection between
this admiral and the Naval Operations Staff was made difficult
and at times completely broken off by static, caused the Führer
to become extremely excited in his headquarters where I reported
to him everything I found out myself. The whole day was spent
with questions back and forth, and even in the evening I could
not give him a clear picture. This excited him extremely. Through
Admiral Krancke he had all sorts of insults transmitted to me
and demanded that I report to him immediately; and I could see
that very strong friction would result. I arranged it so that I did
not need to report to him until 6 days later on 6 January so that
the atmosphere could first cool off a little. On 6 January I could
go to him with a complete report; and in the evening, at a discussion
at which Field Marshal Keitel was also present, he made a speech
of about an hour’s duration in which he made derogatory remarks
about everything that the Navy had done so far, in direct contrast
to every judgment passed on the Navy up until this time. From this
I saw that he was anxious to bring about a break.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I personally was firmly prepared to seize this opportunity to
resign, especially as it became ever clearer that the war was becoming
a pure U-boat war, and I could therefore feel that I could
leave at this moment with a clear conscience.</p>

<p class='pindent'>After the Führer had concluded his speech I asked to be permitted
to speak with him alone. Field Marshal Keitel and the
stenographers left and I told him that I was asking for my resignation
as I could see from his words that he was entirely dissatisfied
with me and therefore this was the proper moment for me
to leave. As always, he tried at first to dissuade me but I remained
adamant and told him that a new Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy who would have complete responsibility would definitely
have to be appointed. He said that it would be a great burden for
him if I were to leave now since for one thing the situation was
very critical—Stalingrad was impending—and secondly, since he
had already been accused of dismissing so many generals. In the
eyes of the outside world it would incriminate him if I were to
leave at this point. I told him that I would do everything I could
to prevent that happening. If he wanted to give the appearance as
far as the outside world was concerned that I had not resigned
because of a clash, then he could make me a general inspector
with some sort of nominal title, which would create the impression
that I was still with the Navy and that my name was still connected
with the Navy. This appealed to him at once and I told
<span class='pageno' title='129' id='Page_129'></span>
him on 6 January that I wanted to be dismissed on 30 January. At
this point I had concluded 10 years of service as Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy under him. He agreed to this proposal and asked
me to suggest two successors so that he could make a choice.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On 30 January he then personally dismissed me by appointing
me Admiral Inspector of the Navy. He said that he would still
on occasion ask me for advice; but that never happened. I was
merely sent out twice, once to Bulgaria when the King of Bulgaria
was buried and once to Hungary, to the Hungarian Regent Horthy
to bring him a gift from the Führer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you otherwise performed no tasks as
Admiral Inspector?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I had no functions and received no orders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then my last question: Did you have the impression,
on the occasion of your conversation of 6 January 1943
with Hitler, that he in a way was glad to get rid of you in view
of the many differences of opinion and the fact that you contradicted
him frequently on technical naval and political matters concerning
Norway, France, Russia?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do believe that he wanted to get rid of me at this
time, for I was in a certain way an inconvenience for him. This
one case which I described, where I had my way in the end, he had
never forgotten.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This concludes my examination of Admiral Raeder.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit today until half past
one. It will adjourn now for 10 minutes.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to
ask questions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant
Dönitz): Admiral, you recall the memorandum of the Naval
Operations Staff of 15 October concerning possibilities for an intensification
of the economic war. That is in the Document Book of
the British Delegation, Number 10, on Pages 96 and 97 of the
English text. Admiral Wagner has already testified about it here.
Can you add anything to that statement concerning the purpose
and the meaning of that memorandum?
<span class='pageno' title='130' id='Page_130'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Since the war against England came as a complete
surprise to us, we had up until then dealt very little with detailed
questions of submarine warfare. Among other things we had not
yet discussed the question of so-called unrestricted submarine warfare
which had played such a very important part in the previous
war. And from that fact it developed that on 3 September that
officer who was recently mentioned here was sent to the Foreign
Office with some points for discussion on the question of unrestricted
submarine warfare, so that we could clarify with the
Foreign Office the question as to just how far we could go. And
that is the document which recently played a role here, D-851,
GB-451, of 3 November.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: 3 September, you mean.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, 3 September. This touches upon all these questions.
Then discussions with the Foreign Office took place and
this U-boat memorandum mentioned by you was worked out in the
High Command of the Navy on the basis of these discussions and
released on 15 October. I believe that on 15 October I presented
it to the Führer who in principle agreed to the contents. But the
very fact that a memorandum about submarine warfare concerning
possibilities for an intensification of submarine warfare was issued
only on 15 October shows how little we were prepared for that
eventuality.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That memorandum contains near the beginning that sentence
which has been quoted by the Prosecution concerning our position
with respect to international law, where reference is made to
highest ethics of warfare, adherence to international law, and the
desire to base all military measures on existing laws wherever
possible. But if this is not possible or when by deviation it is possible
to achieve decisive military results, and we could take the
responsibility for this deviation, then in case of necessity we must
depart from existing international law. That means that also a
new international law may have to be developed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>However, this entire memorandum represents merely a constant
search for possibilities for conducting submarine warfare with the
least damage to neutrals and the greatest possible adherence to
international law and in such a way that it would become a decisive
factor in the outcome of the war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Various cases are discussed as to how an intensification can be
reached, but it always was a question of finding countermeasures
against enemy measures. Such possibilities as blockade or the new
concept to lay siege to England by submarine warfare are examined
in all directions; but the draft always states the conclusion that in
view of the number of submarines and other misgivings it is not
yet possible to conduct such operations.
<span class='pageno' title='131' id='Page_131'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>And the final result of that entire memorandum, as set down
in that document, can be found in the two last pages. Unfortunately
I have only the German copy in front of me where under
the last Paragraph D the final opinion, the following sentences
which I should like to quote, are worthy of notice...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where is the extract?</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On Pages 99 and 100 in
the Document Book 10, GB-224.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, another excerpt from the same document has
already been mentioned and that is in the Document Book Dönitz 3,
on Pages 199 to 203; but I do not believe that it is necessary to
refer to it because the witness will only read one or two sentences.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: [<span class='it'>Continuing.</span>] Now, the last paragraph “Conclusions”
reads:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“1.) The manner in which economic warfare has been conducted
until now, in accordance with Prize Regulations, does
not meet with military demands for ruthless severity.</p>

<p>“A large part of enemy mercantile trade including all exports
in neutral ships is not covered.</p>

<p>“The requirements of naval law that neutral merchantmen
be stopped and searched can no longer be fulfilled, in view
of the strength of aerial reconnaissance and U-boat countermeasures
in the enemy’s coastal approaches. Economic warfare
according to Prize Regulations has therefore to be limited
and in the North Sea and the Baltic must be left to surface
craft only. In the Atlantic the U-boats in enemy coastal
waters will limit their activities to attacks without warning
on convoys, troop transports, and once it has been approved,
armed and all enemy merchantmen, and will conduct economic
warfare according to the law governing prizes only in
exceptional cases. The use of the Operational Air Force for
economic warfare is not possible. Economic warfare is conducted
within the framework of international law. A possibility
of controversy with neutral states is ruled out.”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>Then one more sentence:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“If the Supreme War Command for political reasons should
not be able at present to decide to wage the economic war in
the most vigorous form possible by having recourse to a siege,
it will be possible to increase the effectiveness of the policy
of stopping enemy trade by a ruthless increase in the use of
mines and by air attacks on enemy port installations. One
cannot, however, expect a decisive result from the economic
war in its present form.” (Document C-157, Exhibit GB-224)</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='132' id='Page_132'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The immediate result of
that memorandum and of your report to the Führer was the order
of 17 October?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, and that provided: Firstly, that all enemy merchantmen
could be torpedoed; and secondly, as a severer measure,
that passenger ships in convoys could be torpedoed a short time
after an announcement to that effect had been made. That was all
done in connection with the intensification, measure for measure,
which we had brought about in answer to individual acts of the
enemy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, that long passage that the
defendant has just read, if it has not been put in evidence yet,
must be offered in evidence by you. I understand it is not in evidence
at present.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I can help. I shall
be using this document and I shall put it in.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has it been offered in evidence?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Only part of it, not the part
that the defendant has referred to. But, in view of that I shall
refer to it later on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you mentioned
that before 1935 certain preparations were made for the construction
of a German submarine weapon. Did Admiral Dönitz participate
in any way in these preparations?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. As was said before, he was
abroad during the last year; but even before that he had nothing
to do with it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You have reported about
your dismissal as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Would you
please tell me how it came about that Admiral Dönitz became your
successor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Führer had ordered that I propose two admirals
as successors. I suggested in writing first, as the elder...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, how does this arise? I
mean, what relevancy has it to anything we have to decide as to
how Admiral Dönitz became head of the Navy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That has significance,
Mr. President, in view of the Prosecution’s assertion that Admiral
Dönitz became the successor of Admiral Raeder on the basis of
political relations or services rendered.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.
<span class='pageno' title='133' id='Page_133'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please continue, Admiral.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I’ll be very brief. I suggested, first, Admiral Carls,
who was the senior and has vast knowledge of the entire conduct
of naval policy. In the event that the Führer should want to manifest
that he now was placing U-boat warfare in the foreground
I suggested Admiral Dönitz, who was the greatest authority in that
field. Political considerations of any kind were not mentioned at
all; it was purely an official, technical appointment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no more questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President,
the Tribunal, through its letter of 26 March, has consented that an
affidavit be submitted by the Codefendant Raeder for the Defendant
Keitel, provided the Prosecution has an opportunity to question
Admiral Raeder on his statements in cross-examination.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have sent the affidavit to the Prosecution, and the Prosecution
has raised no objection. I ask to be permitted to submit this
affidavit which is concerned with the functions and position of the
Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, as Exhibit Number Keitel-19,
after Admiral Raeder has confirmed that he signed this affidavit
and that he agrees to its being submitted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, you are acquainted with the
questions which I put to you and which, after a conference with
your counsel, you answered and signed on 19 March?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is about the position of Field Marshal Keitel
in the OKW?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am quite familiar with that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Then, may I submit this affidavit? The Prosecution
has a copy of it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have a few more questions for Admiral Raeder, the answers
to which can be greatly simplified with the permission of the Court.
These are the same questions which on 9 May, a week ago, I put to
Admiral Dönitz and which refer to the assertion made by the witness
Dr. Gisevius about Keitel’s tremendous influence and the
circle of silence which Keitel is said to have drawn around Hitler.
I merely want to ask the witness Admiral Raeder, with the permission
of the Tribunal, whether he can confirm as correct for the
period before 1943 as well—that is, for the period during which
Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy—the answers to my
questions given by Admiral Dönitz in Raeder’s presence. I ask for
the decision of the Tribunal whether I may put this general question
in order to save time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
<span class='pageno' title='134' id='Page_134'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You heard what I said, and I ask you, can you
confirm the answers given by Admiral Dönitz to my questions on
9 May for the period before 1943 as well?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that I can do.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Now, I have one final question. During your testimony
Document L-79, the “Little Schmundt” file, was treated. You
objected to this document as inaccurate and not of probative value?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Dr. Siemers then quoted a part of that document
which the Prosecution, at the time when it submitted the document,
had not read. In that part of the document there is mention of a
research staff in the OKW.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I ask you now to tell me whether such a research
staff in the OKW was ever actually created.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Not to my knowledge. The work was done by the
Armed Forces Operations Staff in which there were officers representing
all three branches of the Armed Forces.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: So there was no change in the scope of tasks and
in the division of jurisdiction?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, definitely not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: That also concerns the question of working out
strategic and operational matters between the OKW and the Armed
Forces Operations Staff on one hand and the general staffs of the
Armed Forces branches, including the Naval Operations Staff, on
the other?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as the Naval Operations Staff is concerned, yes,
there was no change.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: And as far as the other branches of the Armed
Forces are concerned do you know of no change or...?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That I cannot say. I do not know about that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and Halder have
testified about that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Thank you. I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, is the affidavit that you referred
to contained in your document book?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: No, not yet. It will be Number Keitel-19.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Will you have translations supplied to
the Tribunal?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yes.
<span class='pageno' title='135' id='Page_135'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High
Command of the German Armed Forces): Admiral, you are the
senior member of the group of the General Staff of the OKW, and
you belonged to this so-called group for the longest time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: In what manner did you become a member of
this so-called group?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I was appointed Chief of the Naval Command Staff
by Reich President Field Marshal Von Hindenburg. I did not join
that group by doing so; rather I became Chief of the Navy. One
was not aware of any group.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Joining and remaining in this group the Prosecution
maintains was voluntary. Was there any possibility at all
for military leaders to apply for any vacant posts?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, there was nothing of the sort.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: In other words, military accomplishments
were the decisive factor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It was a military order. There was no question, of
it being voluntary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did you know the various members of the
group at the time when you belonged to it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I certainly did not know all individuals from the
other branches. Of course, I knew a large number.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Within the purely military leadership was
there ever a conference about a plan which had as its purpose the
launching of aggressive wars?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, there was never such a conference. Frequently
it has been mentioned here how the various enterprises came
about—the political decision of the Führer, a directive issued by
him, and then the working out of the final order.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Admiral, I do not mean now by this question
the meetings which took place under Hitler’s leadership. I mean
meetings of purely military officers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Do you mean within the various branches of the
Armed Forces?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, within the various branches.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, within the Naval Operations Staff there
were meetings about various questions, but not about aggressive
wars.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, my questions referred only to that. The
Prosecution asserts, furthermore, that this indicted group was first
established by the National Socialist Regime. Is that correct?
<span class='pageno' title='136' id='Page_136'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. There was no group at all,
but the organization was such as has frequently been described.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: And such as has always existed in all armies
of the world?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, as has always existed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has furthermore asserted
that, after the seizure of power by Hitler, the high military leaders
had the choice either of co-operating or of accepting the consequence
that the new regime would establish new armed forces,
that is armed forces of their own, and that on the basis of this
situation the generals decided to co-operate. Is that assertion by
the Prosecution correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. It is not true that thereupon any joining of forces
took place. I know that such tendencies existed. For instance, once
in 1934 I reported to the Führer that I had been informed that
SA Gruppenführer Killinger, who had formerly been in the Navy
and had advanced to prominence (in the SA), had the intention of
becoming the Chief of Naval Operations Staff. But I was not aware
of any further efforts. But above all, there was no coalition of
the generals for defensive action against such an intention.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: So the assertion made by the Prosecution is
not correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not correct. That was not in the least a method
which would have been in accordance with the sentiments of the
soldier—that such a coalition be formed to avert something.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution furthermore asserts that the
group, above all, the generals, let themselves be won over by the
regime because of the chance of conquest. Is that assertion correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is an absolutely incorrect and farfetched assertion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Was the effort of the Party to acquire for
itself supreme authority ever supported or promoted by the
military?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do not know that that ever happened. Do you
mean the seizure of power?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: After the seizure of power was the Party
supported by military leaders, as far as you know, in its efforts to
attain sole domination in Germany?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday, in reply to the question of your
counsel, you described how you came to swear your oath to Hitler.
<span class='pageno' title='137' id='Page_137'></span>
If such an intention had existed in the mind of one of the commanders-in-chief,
would it have been possible for him to refuse
the oath?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That I cannot say, but I believe that not one of us
saw any necessity for refusing that oath.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has further asserted that
the high military chiefs agreed completely with the principles and
aims of National Socialism. Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I explained here yesterday how far one could agree
with the principles of National Socialism and to what extent one
trained one’s soldiers according to these principles. Anything that
went beyond that was rejected and found no acceptance in the
Navy. Here I can speak only for the Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did the officers who were subordinate to you
and who were in the group ever have an insight into the political
situation and Hitler’s intention so that one could speak about participation
or membership in the plan?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. There was an absolute prohibition on speaking
to anyone about speeches in which Hitler mentioned intentions and
possible developments. The officers below the rank of Armed Forces
commander were informed only when things had gone so far that
the directive was to be issued.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution further asserts...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have to qualify that. That directive was first worked
out by the High Command of the Army and the Navy. Thus they
received information as soon as the directive of the individual
branches of the Armed Forces was issued and that always happened
sometime later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution also asserts that the high
military leaders were not military experts but that they knew
Hitler’s intentions of aggression and willingly co-operated. Can you
name any military leaders who, before they had received orders,
took a positive attitude toward any aggressive action?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot answer that. I explained yesterday how
Admiral Carls pointed out to me the danger imminent in Norway;
but he did not do anything more than give me the information,
point out the danger, and elucidate the situation there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The attitude of the former Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces, Von Fritsch, and of the Chief of the
General Staff Beck to the question of a war is known. I just wanted
to ask you, did the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal
Von Brauchitsch, have the same attitude concerning the war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I believe so, yes.
<span class='pageno' title='138' id='Page_138'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Concerning the conference on 5 November
1937, you have already made detailed statements yesterday. I would
like...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you have been putting this
class of question to every naval and military witness who has been
called, and what the Tribunal desires me to point out to you is that
there has been no cross-examination by any member of the Prosecution
challenging any of these points, so this evidence is entirely
repetitive and cumulative and is not bound to be put by you to
every military and naval witness who comes into the witness box,
and it is simply a waste of time to the Tribunal. When questions
are answered by a witness and are not cross-examined to by the
other side, it is the practice to assume that the answers are accepted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for me this is an extremely
important question which has just been touched upon, namely, the
question of whether a question is inadmissible because in the opinion
of the Court it is cumulative. I should like to make a few
statements concerning whether or not a question is cumulative.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Laternser, you can understand
what the Tribunal has said to you, that it is now desired, in view
of the directives of the Charter, that this Trial should be as expeditious
as it can reasonably be; and it does not desire to have the
same evidence adduced to it over and over again. Is that not clear?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I can assume that the Tribunal
accepts as true these proofs which I want to bring by means
of my question, then I can of course forego these questions. But I
cannot determine whether that is the case unless I know that I
have succeeded in bringing definite proof...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What I wanted to point out to you was that
you asked the same question of a great number of witnesses and
that those questions have not been cross-examined, and in such circumstances
you can assume that answers given by the witnesses
are accepted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: If I am justified in drawing this conclusion,
then of course I shall dispense with such questions in the future.
I have only a few more questions, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In support of the Indictment of the
group of the General Staff and the OKW two affidavits have been
presented by the Prosecution, one by Field Marshal Von Blomberg
and one by Generaloberst Blaskowitz. In these two affidavits both
generals state that as a whole, within the circle of generals before
the war, the opinion existed that the question of the Corridor
would have to be decided unconditionally and, if necessary, with
<span class='pageno' title='139' id='Page_139'></span>
force. Is that opinion stated by the two generals correct? Was that
the general attitude at that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I never heard of such an opinion. In my presence
General Von Blomberg never made any statement of that kind.
The Polish question was discussed by us in the Navy only to the
extent already mentioned here during the last few days, namely
that an attack on Poland by Germany would have to be prevented
under all circumstances. The political treatment of this question...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The defendant says he has never heard of
this suggestion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: That was the reason why I put the question
to the witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: After 1933 political questions were handled and decided
by Hitler exclusively, and he said that he made all policies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: It is therefore correct that this opinion which
Blomberg and Blaskowitz have mentioned does not apply for the
circle of generals?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Well, at any rate, I have never heard it expressed by
the generals. It did not exist in the Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: You were present at the conferences of
23 November 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put one supplementary question
concerning those conferences. Admiral, do you remember that
in the course of these conferences Hitler reproached the generals
because they still had old-fashioned ideas of chivalry and that these
ideas had to be rejected?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That I cannot say with certainty. I believe that I can
recall having once heard it said that Hitler was of that opinion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question concerning the
document which your defense counsel already put to you in the
course of your examination. It is Document C-66 submitted by the
British Prosecution under GB-81. It is in Document Book 10, on
Page 13, or 10a, Page 35. On Page 5, in the last paragraph of that
page, you said the following and I quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“It can be seen from my statements and plans that the Führer
reckoned with a definite conclusion of the eastern campaign
in the fall of 1941, whereas the High Command of the Army
(General Staff) was very skeptical.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Admiral, I wanted to ask you of what this skepticism consisted?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as I know, the High Command of the Army
was of the opinion that it was impossible to conclude such a
<span class='pageno' title='140' id='Page_140'></span>
tremendous campaign in so short a time; and many others shared
that opinion, whereas the Führer believed that because of the new
weapons and his strategy he could conclude that campaign very
quickly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about whether the
High Command of the Army had any fundamental objections before
the beginning of the Russian campaign?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as I know, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army was very much against it; but that too, I cannot say definitely.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no more questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Representing Dr. Von
Lüdinghausen, Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Admiral, in
the course of the proceedings it has been testified, I believe by the
Codefendant Göring, that Field Marshal Von Hindenburg had expressly
desired that Herr Von Neurath become Foreign Minister.
Do you know anything about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I learned at the time that Hindenburg had expressed
that wish, and it caught my attention because Field Marshal
Von Hindenburg until that time had always considered merely the
appointment of the Minister of Defense and the Chiefs of Staff of
the Army and Navy as his privilege in the Reich Government. This
was the first time that he expressed such a wish in the case of a
Foreign Minister.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: So it was not the practice of the Field Marshal to
make any suggestions regarding the appointments of Ministers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. He had merely acted according to his own wish
to appoint the Defense Minister, even in the previous Social Democratic,
Democratic, and other cabinets.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: What may have been the reason for Field Marshal
Von Hindenburg’s making that exception in the case of Neurath?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He probably wanted to make sure under all circumstances
that the peaceful policies which had prevailed in Germany
up to that time would be continued. He was sure that Herr Von Neurath
would continue these policies in the same direction.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: So he had particular confidence in Herr Von Neurath’s
attitude up to that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, beyond a doubt.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: You knew Von Neurath very well, and you were
informed about his political principles, weren’t you? What were
the main lines of his policies?
<span class='pageno' title='141' id='Page_141'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Herr Von Neurath wanted to see the gradual recovery
of the German people to normal conditions and he wanted to strive
with peaceful means for equal rights for the German Reich. Above
all, he wanted to have good relations with England, which was also
in conformity with Hindenburg’s intentions, and on this very point
both of us agreed completely.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: So one can say that you considered Von Neurath
an exponent of a policy of understanding with England and a peaceful
policy of compromise.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: Then I have a second question for you, Admiral.
A Fritz Wiedemann, who was Hitler’s adjutant from 1935 to 1939,
has submitted an affidavit. The Prosecution has submitted that affidavit
under 3037-PS. In this affidavit Herr Wiedemann states that
on 28 May 1938 a conference took place in the winter garden of the
Reich Chancellery with all important people of the Foreign Office,
the Army, and the Operational Staffs present, a meeting so large
that one almost doubts whether all these people could get into the
winter garden.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And here, he says, in addition to Göring, General Beck, General
Keitel, and Von Brauchitsch, there were also present Von Neurath,
Von Ribbentrop, and yourself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In this meeting Hitler spoke among other things about Czechoslovakia
and stated that it was his unshakeable intention that
Czechoslovakia must disappear from the map. Do you know anything
about that meeting?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Although I can otherwise recall every large or more
important meeting, I do not have the slightest recollection of this
meeting at that time. The list of those present also seems very unlikely.
I have never seen Herr Von Neurath and Herr Von Ribbentrop
together at the same meeting. I should also doubt whether
Herr Von Neurath at that time was in Berlin at all. He was quite
definitely not present at that meeting. But I also do not remember
any meeting at which Von Ribbentrop was present as Foreign Minister
when military matters were discussed. I think this Herr
Wiedemann is mistaken because I believe also that I have never
seen him at a meeting in which such matters are supposed to have
been discussed. The Führer always sent this personal adjutant of
his out of the room beforehand. I believe there is some mistake.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: Such an important statement by the Führer you
would doubtless have remembered.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. During that summer the Führer’s opinions fluctuated
greatly. I believe that at the end of May a mobilization took
<span class='pageno' title='142' id='Page_142'></span>
place in Czechoslovakia, or something of the sort—I do not remember
exactly what. But I attended no meeting, as far as I know, at
which such a statement was made.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: Thank you. I have no more questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendants’ counsel wish to
ask any questions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>Sir David, it seems scarcely worthwhile starting the cross-examination.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please,
I entirely agree.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 20 May 1946, at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div><span class='pageno' title='143' id='Page_143'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH DAY</span><br/> Monday, 20 May 1946</h1></div>

<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dr. Horn wishes to ask some
questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop):
With the permission of the Tribunal I should like to put a few more
questions to the witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Admiral, is it true that on 24 April 1941 the so-called neutrality
patrol of North American warships was extended past the 300-mile
limit to a distance of at least 1,000 miles?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot remember the date, but such an extension
did take place at some time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that at the beginning of June 1941 a law
was passed in the United States confiscating foreign ships immobilized
in North American harbors as a result of the war and
including 26 Italian and 2 German ships?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Here again I cannot tell you the date for certain. It
happened in the summer of 1941. The ships were mostly Italian,
with a few German ships. I cannot swear to the exact figures.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In June 1941 the United States publicly declared its
willingness to give the Soviet Union every possible aid. Did you
discuss this with Hitler, and what was his attitude towards it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is correct. There were some questions of
a loan without interest, or some such thing. Very probably I did
speak to Hitler about it, but I cannot tell you what his attitude
was. I can say only that all these measures at that time in no way
deterred us from the course we had pursued until then. In June
I had the conversation with Hitler at which I explained to him
that up to that time we had allowed American warships to go
completely unmolested, and that we would continue to do so in
spite of the considerable disadvantages entailed which I mentioned
recently.
<span class='pageno' title='144' id='Page_144'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In 1941 the American Secretary of War Mr. Stimson
and the Secretary of the Navy Mr. Knox, as well as Secretary of
State Mr. Hull, repeatedly advocated in public the use of the United
States fleet to safeguard English transports of war material to Great
Britain. On 12 July 1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox informed
the representatives of the press of Roosevelt’s order to shoot at
German ships. How did Hitler and you react to these actions, which
were contrary to neutrality?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Your facts are correct. They will go down in the
annals of history. Hitler did subsequently issue an express order
that we were in no circumstances to open fire of our own accord,
but only in self-defense. This situation actually did arise later in
the case of the two destroyers <span class='it'>Greer</span> and <span class='it'>Kearny</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: Your Honor, the report is made that Defendant
Göring is absent this morning.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you had read at the
time of its publication the book by Captain Schüssler, <span class='it'>The Fight
of the Navy against Versailles</span>, had you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at it on Page 26
of Document Book 10, Page 123 of the German document book?
Captain Schüssler had told you that he was going to write such a
work, had he not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. And I might add that this book was written
because we in the Navy had been accused by National Socialist
circles of not having done enough to strengthen the Navy in the
period previous to 1933. That is why all these things were mentioned
in that book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the book was circulated
among senior officers in the Navy, was it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; at any rate, any of the senior officers who
wanted it could have it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you just turn to
Page 127, or to Page 27 of the English book, which gives the
preface? You will see at the end of the first paragraph it says that
it is to give a reliable picture of the fight of the Navy against the
unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And in the third paragraph:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“This memorandum is also meant to distinguish more clearly
the services of those men who, without being known to wide
<span class='pageno' title='145' id='Page_145'></span>
circles, were ready to accept extraordinary responsibility in
the service of the fight against the peace treaty.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree, Defendant, that
that preface represents generally but accurately the feeling of the
Navy with regard to invading the provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, as regarding circumventing the Versailles Treaty
as far as necessary to improve our defenseless position, for reasons
which I explained recently here. To do this was a matter of honor
for every man.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just turn over—it is
Page 28, My Lord, and it is Page 126 of your copy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] It gives a summary of contents. You
see, it is in four sections. The first section deals with the first
defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles,
and then enumerates what they were. Don’t trouble about that.
The second is independent armament measures behind the back of
the Reich Government and legislative bodies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In both cases it says: From the end of the war until
taking over the Ruhr in 1923; from 1923 until the Lohmann case
in 1927. I had nothing to do with either case.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see. From 1922 to
1924 you were inspector of naval training at Kiel, were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Inspector of the training system; the schools, the
further training of officer candidates, the complete training of
assistants of the Chief of Staff, that is, chief-of-staff assistants, a
sort of general staff officer, and similar matters. I had nothing
to do with affairs of the front.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is what you were asked. You were
asked whether you were inspector of training. The answer was
“yes,” was it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As inspector of training, are
you telling the Tribunal that you did not have a very complete
knowledge of the weapons available for your service?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no. It was not a question of weapons visible for
all to see. As I explained to you recently, that was a matter of
setting up gun platforms and transferring guns from the North Sea to
the Baltic. This was done by a special command, which worked
under the direct order of the Chief of Navy; among others, there
was this Kapitänleutnant Raenkel, for instance, who was the
specialist dealing with all gunnery questions at the time. I myself
<span class='pageno' title='146' id='Page_146'></span>
was in Kiel, and there were no guns or anything of the kind in
Kiel and its neighborhood.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Take the next period from 1923
to 1927. From 1925 to 1928 you were Chef der Marine Station der
Ostsee, were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal
that you did not know about the independent armament measures
taken behind the back of the Reich Government?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No; I had nothing at all to do with these affairs.
I have already said that was done by the Chief of the Naval
Command Staff. I knew in a general way...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you whether
you ever had to do with them, I am asking you whether you are
saying that you did not know about them. You knew all about
them, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I knew it in a general way, that such measures were
being taken.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, take the next, Number III:
“Planned armament works tolerated by the Reichskabinet, but
behind the back of the legislative bodies.” The legislative bodies
would be the Reichstag and the Reichsrat, would they not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. But I already said recently that it was not the
military commander-in-chief’s business to negotiate these matters
with the Reichstag. This was a matter for the Government. Herr
Severing will also testify to that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will hear Herr Severing
when he comes. At the moment I want you to tell the Tribunal
this...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] I say the same...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just wait a minute; you have
not heard my question yet. What did you say to Captain Schüssler?
Did you tell him you are giving an entirely false picture in suggesting
that the Navy had anything to do with going behind the
back of the Reichstag? Did you make any effort to correct what
Captain Schüssler was saying?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No; I did not correct his book. I had no time for that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just before we come to
Number IV, if you just look, it’s page—</p>

<p class='pindent'>My Lord, it is Page 32 of the English book, and Page 186 of your
book. This is part of Captain Schüssler’s description of Section II
<span class='pageno' title='147' id='Page_147'></span>
dealing with economic rearmament; it comes under the heading,
“Difficult Working Conditions.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Do you see that? It begins: “There
were often difficult working conditions.” Do you see that? The
heading is “Difficult Working Conditions.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes I see, “Difficult Working Conditions.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to look at the
last part of it. Now, I want it quite clear, Defendant. This is
dealing with the period from 1923 to 1927, before you were head
of the Navy; so I want to ask you about it.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“There were often many external difficulties besides these
for the Tebeg—the camouflaging of the task and the work,
the distance separating them, the impossibility of settling any
questions even of minor importance by telephone, and the
necessity of avoiding if possible any written correspondence,
and of carrying it out in any case as private correspondence
with false names and disguised expressions.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Did you not know that that was the method by which it was
being carried on?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No; I really knew very little about the Tebeg—the
Tebeg, the Navis—any of these things. But I think it was quite
right for these people to work like that, because at that time the
attitude of a large percentage of the German people was unreliable,
and there was great danger if these things leaked out. In any
case, the Tebeg had been dissolved when I arrived.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you kindly turn
back to Page 126, in Book 4, Page 28 of the English book, and
just look at Captain Schüssler’s description of the fourth period:
“Armament under the direction of the Reich Government in
camouflaged form (from 1933 to 1935 when we were free to recruit
on an unrestricted basis.)”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you agree that Captain Schüssler was giving an accurate
description of your methods from 1933 to 1935?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: How does he describe it? Where is that passage?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Number 4.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: “Armament under the leadership of the Reich Government
in camouflaged form”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that it is a correct
description of your activities from 1933 to 1935?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course. I did that on orders from the head of the
State; and before all the head of the State was very anxious to
see that no exaggerated measures should be taken, so that it would
<span class='pageno' title='148' id='Page_148'></span>
not interfere in any way with his plans for making an agreement
with Great Britain. He allowed very little to be done with regard
to the Navy. He could at once have built eight armored ships, so
many destroyers, and so many torpedo boats, none of which had
yet been built, but he did none of these things because he said,
“We do not want to create the impression that we are arming on
a large scale.” He approved only two...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have explained that; so
note, Defendant, the point is this—the “camouflaged form” when
you were negotiating the naval agreement. You did not want
anyone to know what steps you had taken contrary to the treaty
and how far you had gone. That is the plain fact of it—you wanted
to get the naval agreement without disclosing what you had done,
isn’t that so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that distorts the sense of what I said. We did not
want the announcement of these measures to cause strained relations
between Germany and Britain. The measures as such were
completely justifiable and were extremely minor ones.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will come to that in a moment.
I only do want, before we leave these naval works, to ask you
one question about another book. You know that Oberst Scherff
projected a history of the German Navy. I don’t want any misunderstanding
about it. As I understand the position, you permitted
Oberst Scherff to have recourse to the archives of the Navy but
beyond that you hadn’t seen anything of his work, isn’t that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not see his book at all. I saw the table of
contents here the first time I was interrogated. I did not give him
the order, either; he received it from the Führer; and for that
reason I allowed the Chief of the Navy Archives to assist him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is exactly what I put
to you. I want you to turn to Book 10a. It starts at Page 1 in the
English version and also Page 1 in the German. And if you would
look at Page 3 you will find the proposed table of contents of
Oberst Scherff’s book, Page 3 in the English version. I think it must
be about Page 3 in the German version, too. Now would you look
at the heading of Section 2. It is: “Incorporation of the Navy in
the National Socialist State.” And then he describes, “(a) National
Socialism in the Navy before 1933”...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Where is that? I have not found it yet.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Section 2 of the table of contents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that must be something quite different. I have
not got it here...</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have got it now.
<span class='pageno' title='149' id='Page_149'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Section 2,
which is: “Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist
State.” And you can see the proposed headings which were to cover
some 30 pages: “National Socialism in the Navy before 1933.” Then:
“The oath of the Navy to the Führer; the taking over of the National
Insignia; the first alteration of the flag and the New War flag.” Do you
agree with Oberst Scherff’s description? You agree that this is a
correct description, that the proceedings could be described as the
incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course—I explained that here recently—the Navy—the
Armed Forces—had to have some connection with the National
Socialist State. A democratic Navy in a monarchy is impossible. The
basic principles must agree. But I myself decided the extent to
which these principles were adopted—that is to the degree where
the Navy maintained its internal independence and yet occupied
its appropriate position with regard to the National Socialist State.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Apart from that, I do not see any text here; I can only see the
headings.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that doesn’t offend you
as a description. That is all I wanted to get clear. I do not want
to spend a great deal of time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But the headings mean nothing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>For instance, it might say in the actual text that the Navy did
not fit into the National Socialist State properly. I do not know.
The same holds good of the fleet. Of course...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to waste time
on it. There were three matters which you dealt with in your
examination-in-chief, and I am not going to deal with them in
detail; but I just want to remind you of them and put one general
question. You can put that document away; I am not going to
pursue it further. Would you mind putting that document away
and giving me your attention for the next question?</p>

<p class='pindent'>You were asked about the E-boats, your survey list, that long
document, in September 1933, and the question of disguised auxiliary
cruisers as transport ships O. Is this a fair summary of your
answer: That you admitted that these breaches of the Treaty took
place, but said in each case that the breach was only a little one. Is
that a fair summary of your answer? Is it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s take it in bits, then.
Are you disputing that any of these matters with regard to the
E-boats, the matters on the survey lists or the transport ships
O—are you disputing that any of these matters took place? I understood,
you admitted they all did take place...
<span class='pageno' title='150' id='Page_150'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, they took place in the way I described. For
instance, these auxiliary cruisers were not built. We were not
allowed to do that. But we were allowed to make plans and we
were allowed to select those ships which, in the event of war—if
a war had broken out in which Germany was attacked by another
state—could have been used as auxiliary cruisers. That was not
a violation. If it were I would admit it. The U-boat designing
office in Holland was not a violation of the Versailles Treaty either.
The wording was quite different; I do not remember the third case
which you mentioned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember there was
a long list in a document, from yourself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I understood, maybe
wrongly, that you admitted these things took place, but you said
“it is only a little one.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course. Those were small things, but they
were urgently necessary in Germany’s defense interests.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about
an officer of yours, Vice Admiral Assmann. Was he an officer in
whom you had confidence?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He was a very able historian.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you answer my question?
Was he an officer in whom you had confidence?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I had confidence that he would write history correctly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all I wanted. Now, would
you have a look at a new document, which is Document Number
D-854, which, My Lord, will be Exhibit Number GB-460. Now, that
is an extract from one of a series of essays on the operational and
tactical considerations of the German Navy and consequent measures
taken for its expansion between 1919 and 1939, contained among
the files of Vice Admirals Assmann and Gladisch, who were in the
historical section of the German Admiralty.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, would you mind not looking at it for a moment, Defendant?
I want to ask you some questions and then you can look at it with
pleasure afterwards. Do you agree that in nearly all spheres of
armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles
was violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit? Do you
agree with that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, by no means in every sphere. In the most important
sphere we were far behind the Versailles Treaty, as I explained
to you very clearly. Possibly we infringed on it the other way
round, by not doing as much as we could have done.
<span class='pageno' title='151' id='Page_151'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you just look at this document.
At the beginning of the first quotation your officers say:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“But if—as was stated—in nearly all spheres of armament
where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was
violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit—or at
least its violation was prepared—a long time before the
16th of March 1935...”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Are your admirals wrong in stating that? Is that what you are
telling the Tribunal?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I please see which page this is on? I have not
seen it yet. Yes, he says, “in nearly all spheres of naval armament...”</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is not the case, for in the sphere of...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That’s what I put to you; is
that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it is not right. We had not even built as many
ships as we could have built, but—as I have explained repeatedly,
the violations were concerned with...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You’ve explained that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: ...violations were...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, we do know the position
of your shipbuilding yards. You’ve given that explanation and it’s
a matter of discussion whether it’s of any value. I am not going
to argue with you. I am asking you this question: Are you saying
that the admirals of your historical section are wrong in that
sentence that I read out to you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I am stating that. It is wrong as it stands.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now let’s pass on—the
Tribunal will judge that—to the statement of Admiral Assmann.
It goes on:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“This probably took place in no other sphere, on the one
hand so early, and on the other hand under such difficult
circumstances, as in the construction of a new submarine
arm. The Treaty of Versailles had only been in force a few
months (since 10 January 1920) when it was already violated
in this point.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Do you agree with Admiral Assmann on that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, he is wrong. It was not violated at all in this
point, and the reason it started so early was because all the
ex-U-boat commanders and U-boat officers and technicians were
out of a job and offered their services to maintain technical developments
in U-boats abroad; that is why it was so early. But that has
<span class='pageno' title='152' id='Page_152'></span>
nothing to do with me because I had no say in these matters then.
At that time I was working on the Navy Archives.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, how are you able to be so
confident today that Admiral Assmann is wrong? I thought you
said that he was a good historian. He had not to go back very
far. He only goes back 20 years.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: A good historian can make mistakes too if his information
is wrong. I merely said I had confidence in him...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say quite in detail—the first
paragraph is about Japan.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; what he says about the building of U-boats is
wrong.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let’s just see how far he
was wrong. We needn’t go into the first paragraph which deals
with shipbuilding for Japan, but take the second one: “In 1922...”
Do you see the paragraph which begins:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“As early as 1922, three German shipbuilding yards established
a German U-boat designing office in Holland under a Dutch
cover name with about 30 engineers and designers. In 1925
a Dutch shipbuilding yard built two 500-ton U-boats for
Turkey according to the plans of this bureau, which enjoyed
the financial and personal support of the Naval Command.
In the solution of this question, too, Kapitän zur See Lohmann
was concerned decisively.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: We have admitted that. That was in no way a
violation of the Versailles Treaty.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We’ll not argue that, but it’s
right anyway. Admiral Assmann’s right about that. Then he deals
with Finland and with Spain. And, if you look at the end of the
paragraph after dealing with Spain, he says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Already in the autumn of 1927 the Naval Designing Department
was commissioned to carry out construction in Spain by
the Chief of the Naval Command Staff, Admiral Zenker,
who accepted the responsibility despite all the difficulties
in the field of home politics. The working out of the project
and the drawing up of the construction plans took place in
the Dutch Bureau. After completion in 1931, the ship carried
out trial runs and diving exercises from Cadiz to Cartagena,
under German direction and with German personnel, consisting
of officers, engineers, naval construction students
and foremen.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>That’s all. That’s quite right, isn’t it?
<span class='pageno' title='153' id='Page_153'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but the shipbuilding designer from our designing
office, in particular, as well as the above-named other persons
employed on U-boat construction, were discharged from the Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at the last
sentence: “This boat which is now the Turkish submarine <span class='it'>Gür</span>
became the prototype for the <span class='it'>U-25</span> and <span class='it'>U-26</span>.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the 250-ton submarines
which were made in Finland. And, if you look at the last sentence
of the next paragraph:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Finnish U-boat was the first U-boat plan to be worked
out in Germany and successfully carried out; the Dutch
bureau was called upon only to work out the details.</p>

<p>“The Finnish 250-ton vessel became the prototype for <span class='it'>U-1</span>
to <span class='it'>U-24.</span>”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And now the next paragraph:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The building and the thorough trial of the prototype vessel
made it possible to obtain the parts for <span class='it'>U-1</span> to <span class='it'>U-24</span> in 1933
to 1935, long before the order for the assembly of the vessels;
and the latter was prepared beforehand as far as was possible
without endangering secrecy.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you turn on to
Page 156. You see where the next quotation is from:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“At the beginning of 1935”—that is 6 months before the
Anglo-German Treaty—“there were probably six 250-ton
boats ready for assembly, six 275-ton and two 750-ton boats
on which preparatory work was being done. About 4 months
were needed for assembling the small ships and about
10 months for the big ones, dating from 1 February 1935,
but everything else was still quite uncertain.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, look at the next words:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction
that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the German-British
Treaty.</p>

<p>“Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been
ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up
to 1938. In reality 118 were completed and under construction.</p>

<p>“The preparations for the new U-boat arm were made so
early, so thoroughly and so carefully, that already 11 days
after the conclusion of the German-British Naval Treaty,
<span class='pageno' title='154' id='Page_154'></span>
which permitted the construction of U-boats, the first German
U-boat could be put into commission on 29 June 1935.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, take that sentence, which is written by Admiral Assmann,
and we’ve seen what your connections with Assmann were through
about 100 documents. He said: “It is probably in this very sphere
of submarine construction that Germany adhered least to the
restrictions of the German-British Treaty.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, you’ve told this Tribunal for about several hours of your
evidence that that was a freely negotiated treaty of which you
were very proud and which you were ready to support. Are you
telling the Tribunal that your admirals are wrong in saying that
in submarine construction Germany adhered the least to the
restrictions of that freely negotiated treaty?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is a completely false judgment. I have stated
here that, as long as no negotiations with Great Britain had taken
place with regard to the pending agreement, all the preparations
which we did make were exclusively attended to abroad—that in
the proportion which probably...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you can make your
explanation...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Will you please stop interrupting me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We’ll take it in this order, and
don’t get cross about it. You answer my question, and then you
make your explanation. Now answer my question first. Are you
saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong in saying in that first
sentence that it was just in the “sphere of submarine construction
that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the German-British
Treaty.” Is Admiral Assmann wrong when he says that, is
that what you’re telling the Tribunal? Well, that is my question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He is wrong. I said so; I have already said so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe these are not questions
relating to facts. They are questions for legal decisions. It is a
legal argument as to just how Article 191 of the Versailles Treaty
is to be interpreted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the question is
quite proper. In his explanation, of course, he can explain that in
his view it was not a breach of the Treaty and he has already
explained that. He can give us his opinion about it. He was the
head of the German Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you take the
second sentence...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But I should like to finish if I may. I can give an
explanation of that.
<span class='pageno' title='155' id='Page_155'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>All these things were only preparations made outside Germany.
The point under discussion is whether the Finnish U-boats were
constructed with the help of German designers. That is true.
German designers were not forbidden to help Finnish designers to
draft designs for U-boats. It is also true that this U-boat later...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m awfully sorry to interrupt
you, but you know this isn’t dealing—this sentence isn’t dealing
with this early period. This is dealing with the period after the
Anglo-German Treaty in 1935 and that’s what I want you to
answer me about. This Finnish matter was long before that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am still speaking of the period preceding the agreement,
for I was accused of manufacturing U-boat parts abroad.
And the fact is that...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I know, but don’t you
see that...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have not given my answer yet. No...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you about that.
I like you to answer the right question. I’m not asking you about
the question of Versailles any longer. I’m asking you about
Admiral Assmann’s assertion that you did not adhere to the restrictions
of the German-British Treaty in 1935, and what you did in
Finland in the 20’s has nothing to do with that. Now, that’s all.
You can give your explanation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is entirely wrong. We particularly restricted
ourselves with regard to the construction of U-boats; and in 1938
we had still not built the 45 percent which we were entitled to
build, so we made an application for permission to build up to
100 percent; and this was agreed on, and came into effect, as appears
from the text of the English treaty, after a friendly discussion with
the British Admiralty at the end of 1938. At the beginning of the
war we still did not have 100 percent. We were always behind
with the construction of submarines.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Admiral Assmann, who probably had no up-to-date knowledge
of these matters, is quite wrong. I can swear to that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next sentences.
This is dealing...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: What page are you speaking of?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 156. I will read it very
slowly again:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been
ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for
up to 1938. In reality 118 were completed and under
construction.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='156' id='Page_156'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong when he
states that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am awfully sorry; I still have not got the passage
from which you are reading, that is quite—which line...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the sentence,
Defendant?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have found it now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you see what Admiral
Assmann says, that:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been
ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up
to 1938.” That is before there was any mention of going from
45 to 100. “In reality 118 were completed and under construction.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong in giving these
figures?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Certainly. In 1939 we entered the war with 40 submarines—I
do not know the exact number. This is either a
misprint or quite an incredible figure. As you know, we started
the war with—I think—26 U-boats capable of sailing the Atlantic,
and in addition a number of smaller boats. I cannot tell you for
certain now what was under construction at the beginning of the
war but there was no intention of this kind. That was precisely
the accusation made against me—that I did not have sufficient
U-boats built in good time. I dispute the whole of that sentence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree then, Defendant, that
Admiral Assmann’s figures are quite incompatible with what you
have told the Tribunal about the number of U-boats with which
you started the war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should be grateful to Sir David if he would
read the entire sentence; that is, if he would also read Note 6, which
appears after the Number 118 and after the word “ordered.” Note 6
which, as I have just observed, is not included in the English translation
is worded as follows: “Chief of the Naval Budget Department,
B. Number E 311/42, Top Secret, of 19 November 1942.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>The figure, Mr. President, refers to a much later period, not
1938 at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should be extremely grateful if, after the experience we have
just had, I could in future have not only the German document but
also the English translation from Sir David. I should be very
grateful to Sir David if he could have this done.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Could you not have the passage you want
translated from the German into English by the time you want
<span class='pageno' title='157' id='Page_157'></span>
to re-examine? As I understand it, you are referring to some note
which is an addition to what has been translated into English. Will
you read it again, would you read the passage again?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Sir David has been reading the following: “In
reality 118 were completed and under construction.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is as far as Sir David has read. After the word “ordered”
there is the figure 6. This refers to Note 6. Note 6 is worded as
follows: “Chief of the Naval Budget Department, B. Number E 311/42,
Top Secret, of 19 November 1942. (Page 19).”</p>

<p class='pindent'>In other words, this shows that the Number 118 must have been
mentioned on Page 19 of this document of the Naval Budget
Department in 1942. The figure therefore does not refer to the year
1938 but to a later date.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I can add another explanation to that which is quite
possible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will look into that,
but the text says—and there is no difference in the German text—exactly
what I read—that “about 55 could have been provided up
to 1938 and that in reality 118 were ready and ordered.” That is
Admiral Assmann’s text.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But not 1938.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, My Lord, my friend,
Dr. Siemers, will have ample opportunity—if there is any point,
I shall consider it, but there is the text, and the text includes that.
What the footnote says, Dr. Siemers, can be put in re-examination.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Sir David, will you look at the
note and see if the report was made in 1942, rather than the
construction? I suggest that you ask him whether or not the note
doesn’t show that the report was made in 1942.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, my translation of this
note is “Chief of the Naval Budget Department.” Then it gives
the reference to his note, dated 19 November 1942. It seems
entirely to bear out the suggestion of the learned American Judge,
that this is the reference to the report, nothing more. It is only
suggesting that the date of construction was 1942, and I think it
really would be a matter of convenience that, unless Dr. Siemers
has got something to say on the text that I am putting, if he
reserved these argumentative points to re-examination.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you can raise it all in re-examination.
You can have a translation of this note laid before us by
that time.
<span class='pageno' title='158' id='Page_158'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I am perfectly agreeable. I have
merely requested that one copy of the English translation of the
newly submitted documents should be given to me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, you will admit that it is a considerable handicap
to me to ascertain during the cross-examination what passages are
missing from the translation and translate them myself when the
British Delegation have an English translation on hand. I think it
might be easier if Sir David would be good enough to let me have
an English translation for my own use.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you will be able to let him have
an English translation of any new document?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. The Tribunal has
ordered that. That is prepared. Surely you got the English translation?
Certainly, My Lord. As I put each document, a translation
will be given to Dr. Siemers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There may have been some mistake.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will certainly get it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, we will pass to another gentleman
on your staff. You told us a good deal about the naval budgets.
Do you remember a Flottenintendant in your department, Secretary
Flottenintendant Thiele, of the OKM Department E, the Budget
Department of the German Admiralty? Do you remember?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Mr. Prosecutor, may I just say one more thing
about the question of 118? I have just remembered something in
connection with this Number 6, Chief of the Naval Budget Department.
It is perfectly possible that in this case Admiral Assmann
has taken two things together. All U-boats and ships were, of
course, included in the budget and in this way sanctioned. This
budget was drafted at the end of the year and published before
the year to which it applied. As this large figure suddenly appears
in this document, it is perfectly possible that here the Figure 118
originates on the basis of the agreement with England made on
30 or 31 December. It is perfectly natural that we should include
in the budget all the other U-boats which we were allowed to
build to complete the 100 percent. This does not necessarily mean
that we started to build the U-boats in 1938. Incidentally I think
we might have perhaps begun, because one can only build so and
so many U-boats in any one year.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I think that this explanation, which occurred to me when I saw
the words “Naval Budget Department,” is a perfectly correct one.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal has the wording;
that is, “up to 1938,” and I am not going to argue the point with
you. The words speak for themselves.
<span class='pageno' title='159' id='Page_159'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>I would like you to look at Document Number D-855, which
becomes Exhibit Number GB-461, and it is an extract from a lecture
by the gentleman I have just mentioned, Herr Thiele, which was
given at the German Naval Training Center for Administrative
Officers in Prague on 12 July 1944. The extract I want to put to
you is on Page 22, and it is headed “Ship Construction Plan.” Have
you got that—Page 22, and the heading is “Ship Construction
Plan”? You see the paragraph beginning:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The era of the very large development of the Navy had
therefore come at the moment of the seizure of power.
Already in the first year after this, in March 1935, the construction
of battle cruisers with a displacement of 27,000 tons
was undertaken. Such a vessel was ordered to be constructed.
Thus one of the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which was
the most important for us was at once violated in the naval
sphere in a manner which in a short time could no longer
be camouflaged.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right when he says that in his
lecture?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course it was a violation, but I have explained
here at length that there was no question of building new battle
cruisers but of utilizing the two armored ships which had already
been granted us; and I said that in 1934 Hitler had only given me
permission to enlarge somewhat the plans for these ships, so that
the armor might be heavier. I see from this that it was not until
March 1935, when it was certain that the treaty would be concluded
and also that England would allow us to build such ships through
this treaty in a few months’ time that the Führer sanctioned the
plans projected for the 26,500 ton ships which were to be the first
of the battleships in the new program; and they were then begun.
So that the three 28 cm turrets—that is, the offensive weapons
which he had not yet approved in 1934—were thrown in.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This gentleman seems to agree
with you more than the other. Just look at what he says about
U-boats two sentences further on. He says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The U-boats were completed in separate parts, as their
construction was under no circumstances to be apparent to
the outside world. These parts were stored in sheds for the
time being and needed only to be assembled after the declaration
of freedom to rearm.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that point?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, he is right. We have admitted that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at his next point.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Perhaps I can complete my explanation? We...
<span class='pageno' title='160' id='Page_160'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do try to keep it as short as
you can. I don’t want to cut you out, but keep it as short as you can.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, but I must complete my defense.</p>

<p class='pindent'>We had U-boat parts manufactured abroad and only at the
beginning of 1935 did we bring them in and assemble them, when
the naval treaty was certain.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You say you were anticipating
the treaty; well now, just look at what he says after that:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The third also of those clauses of the Treaty of Versailles
that was most disadvantageous for us, the limitation of
personnel to 15,000 men, was immediately ignored after the
seizure of power. The total personnel of the Navy was
already 25,000 in 1934, and in 1935, the year of the London
Naval Agreement, 34,000 men.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that? Is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is admitted. It was clear that we had to
train personnel in good time so that crews might be available for
our increased naval forces.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now I just want you to
look for a moment at the document which is on Page 3 of Document
Book 10, which you did refer to in your examination-in-chief. That
is Document C-23, about the displacement of the <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> and
the <span class='it'>Gneisenau</span> and the <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span> and the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> and the other ships.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, you are familiar with that document; we have discussed it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I know the documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, that is dated the
18th of February, 1938. Germany didn’t denounce the Anglo-German
Naval Treaty until after the British guarantee to Poland
in April 1939, which is 14 months later. Why didn’t you simply
send a notification to Great Britain that the displacements had
come out 20 percent bigger because of defensive matters in
construction? Why didn’t you do it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot tell you that today. We explained recently
how the displacements gradually increased through quite insignificant
changes to our own detriment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Really, Defendant, I have
got that well in mind. We have got the reason why the displacements
came out bigger, and I don’t think you are prejudicing
yourself if you don’t repeat it, but just look at the bottom of that
page, because I think you will find the reason which you can’t
remember there; won’t you?</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“In the opinion of A IV, it would be quite wrong to report
a larger tonnage than that which will probably be published
<span class='pageno' title='161' id='Page_161'></span>
shortly, for instance, by England, Russia, or Japan, so as not
to bring upon ourselves the odium of an armament race.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Isn’t that the reason?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that was intended for a future date. We wished
in no circumstance to create the impression that we were increasing
the offensive power of our ships.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I am going to pass
to another subject, and I want to put quite shortly and bluntly,
as you will appreciate, the point the Prosecution puts to you, that
for 20 years, from 1918 to 1938, you and the German Navy had
been involved in a course of complete, cold and deliberate deception
of your treaty obligations. That is what I am putting to you. Do
you understand? After these documents, do you deny that
that is so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course. It was not a cold-blooded affair. All our
evasions of the Versailles Treaty were due to our desire to be able
to defend our country more efficiently than we had been allowed
to. I have proved here that in the Versailles regulations the only
points restricted were those unfavorable to the defense of our
country and favoring aggression from without. As regards the ships,
I may add that we could never complete any very great number
of ships, and consequently we were interested in increasing as far
as possible the power of resistance, that is, their seagoing security,
<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. At no time did we increase the offensive power above
the strength which was permitted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I want you to understand
what my next series of questions is directed to. I don’t want
there to be any misapprehension. I am now going to suggest to
you that these breaches of treaty and your naval plans were
directed toward the possibility, and then the probability of war.
I would just like you to take the same document that I have been
dealing with, C-23. We will use that to pass from one to the other.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Would you turn to Page 5 of Document Book 10, and there you
will see that there is a memorandum, I think of the Planning Committee
to the Flottenchef, Admiral Carls. We have heard your view
of Admiral Carls, that you thought he was a very good officer, and
in fact he was your first choice for your successor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, that is in September 1938, and it is a top secret opinion
on the strategic study of naval warfare against England, and you
see “A” says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, look at Paragraph 1:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to acquire
a position as a world power, she needs not only sufficient
<span class='pageno' title='162' id='Page_162'></span>
colonial possessions, but also secure naval communications
and secure access to the oceans.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Do you agree with that, Defendant?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is correct. I know the whole document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at 2:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Both these requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition
to Anglo-French interests, and would limit their position as
world powers. It is unlikely that this can be achieved by
peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world
power, therefore, forces upon us the necessity of making
corresponding preparations for war.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Do you agree with that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is all quite correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s take 3:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“War against England means at the same time war against
the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well,
and a large number of countries overseas—in fact, against
half to two-thirds of the whole world.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I needn’t ask you about that, because the facts have shown it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, look at the next: “It can only be justified....”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but I must be allowed to comment on that
document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh certainly, I’m sorry. We got
on so quickly I thought we were not going to have any explanation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In 1938, as has been stated here quite often, the
Führer’s attitude towards Great Britain became more difficult in
spite of all the efforts of General Von Blomberg and myself to tell
him that it was not so on England’s side, and that it was possible
to live in peace with England. In spite of that the Führer ordered
us to prepare for possible opposition by England to his plans. He
for his part never contemplated a war of aggression against Great
Britain; and we in the Navy still much less; in fact, I have proved
that I did nothing but try to dissuade him from that. In 1938 he
ordered us to make a study similar to those we had already made
in the case of other possibilities of war—which it was the duty
of the Wehrmacht Command to do—but dealing with the course
which a war against England might take and what we would
require for it. This study was prepared, and I reported to the
Führer that we could never increase our fighting forces to such
an extent that we could undertake a war against England with
any prospect of success—it would have been madness for me to
say such a thing. I told him—that has repeatedly been mentioned—that
by 1944 or 1945 we might build up a small naval force with
<span class='pageno' title='163' id='Page_163'></span>
which we could start an economic war against England or seize
her commercial shipping routes, but that we would never really be
in a position to defeat England with that force. I sent this study,
which was compiled under my guidance in the Naval Operations
Staff, to Generaladmiral Carls who was very clear-sighted in all
such questions. He thought it his duty to explain in this introduction
of his reply, which agreed with our opinion, the consequences
which such a war against Great Britain would have for ourselves,
namely, that it would bring about a new world war, which neither
he nor we in the Navy nor anyone in the Armed Forces wanted—in
my opinion, not even Hitler himself, as I proved the other
day—hence this statement. He said that if we must have war with
England, it was essential that we should first of all have access to
the ocean and, secondly, that we should attack English trade on
the sea route of the Atlantic. Not that he proposed that we, on our
part, should embark on such a venture. He was only thinking of
the case of such a war breaking out very much against our will.
It was our duty to go thoroughly into the matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He says that, “The war against
it”—that is the war against England—“can only be justified and
have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as
politically and militarily.” Then you go on to say “waged with the
aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I just want to see how you prepared.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is quite clear and quite correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s just look how you had
begun to prepare economically. Let’s take that first, as you put
it first.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Would you look at Document C-29, which is Page 8.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, hadn’t we better break off now
before going into this?</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I told you, Defendant, that I was
next going to ask you a question about Document C-29, which is
on Page 8 of the English Document Book 10 and on Pages 13 and 14
of the German document book. You will remember, this document
gives general directions for export given by the German Navy to
the German armament industry...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...and you told us when you
were dealing with the document that you wanted your service not
<span class='pageno' title='164' id='Page_164'></span>
to be small-minded about matters of a not very high secrecy but,
in addition to that, your general policy was that the German
armament firms should develop a foreign trade so that they would
have the capacity to deal with the increased demands of the
German Navy as soon as possible. Is that right, is that a fair
summary, or shall I repeat it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but it must be added that I said in two places
that we hoped at that time that the Treaty of Versailles would be
relaxed, because it was a comparatively favorable period for
negotiations for disarmament and we already had the governments
headed by Von Papen and Von Schleicher, both of whom showed
great understanding for the needs of the Armed Forces and therefore
fought hard for that at the disarmament conference. So a
definitely legal development might be hoped for in this direction;
and on the other hand, our entire industry was unable to cope with
armaments production except on an insignificant scale and had
therefore to be increased. I again stress the fact that it had nothing
to do with the Hitler regime. That decree just happened to come out
on 31 January.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think you are really disagreeing
with me that your policy, your broad economic policy for
the German armament industry, was to develop its export trade
so as to be able to deal with increased home requirements in future
years; that is what you advocated, isn’t it, that the German
armament industry should at once increase its export trade so as
to be able to deal with increased home requirements when these
requirements arose? Isn’t that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is correct but I do not quite understand that
expression. Did you say “Eigenhandel” or “Eisenhandel”—internal
trade or iron trade? I did not quite hear the expression—“Eigenhandel”
or “Eisenhandel”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Aussenhandel” (Foreign Trade).</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: “Aussenhandel”—yes, undoubtedly we wanted to be
able to compete industrially with other nations, so that our industry
would be in favorable position, and would gain strength.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I will ask you to turn to
Document Number C-135, which is Page 21 of the—sorry My Lord,
Page 20 of the English document book and Page 73 of the German
document book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Book 10.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Book 10, My Lord, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, you remember that document,
you dealt with it? You said...
<span class='pageno' title='165' id='Page_165'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it was dealt with in the Lohmann affidavit.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is a document of the—I
think, in April 1933, judging by the dates which I put to you
a moment ago, and you said to the Tribunal in giving your evidence
that it was mere chance that the year 1938 was mentioned; that
that was the same period as has been dealt with.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It has already been stated several times that the year
1938 was mentioned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Has it been mentioned in some
Weimar Republic document? Will you just look at the second last
paragraph; that will be on your Page 74, Page 21 of the English
document. It is in the middle paragraph of Paragraph 3:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Now Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler had made the clear political
request to build up for him in 5 years, that is, by the first
of April 1938, armed forces which he could place in the
balance as an instrument of political power.”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>Is that sure, that Hitler had made a clear political request?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, as far as I remember, he demanded a sort of
five year plan in 1933 the last year of which, 1938, happened to
coincide with the 1938 mentioned in our substitute plan for
subsurface construction, and that directive had obviously been given
for the whole of the Armed Forces; since the naval agreement,
which gave us the right to arm only in the proportion of 1:3 and
not in accordance with any special plans, had become the basis
for the Navy as early as 1935.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The point that I want to deal
with is this: Did Hitler tell you that he wanted these forces to
place in the balance as an instrument of political power, did he
tell you that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I can no longer tell you that; but I believe that it is
a perfectly ordinary expression to say that one uses one’s armed
forces as an instrument which could also be thrown into the scales at
political negotiations, so that we need no longer be kicked around
by the different nations, as had so far been the case. In my opinion,
no suspicion attaches to the expression.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To put it bluntly, Hitler was
telling you, “by 1938 I want armed forces that I can use in war,
if war should become necessary.” That is what it means, isn’t it?
That is what you understood it to mean, isn’t that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. There was no word about a war, only about the
fact that we had to keep our position among the other nations so
that we could no longer be tossed aside, as had hitherto been
the case.
<span class='pageno' title='166' id='Page_166'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If anyone tried to push you over,
you could fight; that is it, wasn’t it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is obvious. That would be the case, of course,
if we were attacked. We wanted to be in a position to defend
ourselves if we were attacked. Up till that point we were unable
to do this.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let us take the first
example, when you contemplated fighting. If you look at Document
Book 10a, Document Number C-140, Page 104 of the English translation
and Page 157 of the German version, you remember that is
the directive of Field Marshal Von Blomberg on Germany leaving
the disarmament conference and League of Nations. And there,
there is a pretty full general directive as to what military measures
you would take if the members of the League of Nations applied
sanctions against you; in other words you were quite prepared...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...for a war happening on that
peace policy; that is so, isn’t it, and that is what it says, it gives
all preparations ready for fighting?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: These preparations were made, if I remember correctly,
11 days after we had left the League of Nations, and it was
quite natural that, if the Führer believed that in consequence of
our leaving the League of Nations, which was quite a peaceful
action in itself, warlike measures or sanctions would be applied
against us, we would have to defend ourselves; and if such an
attack was probable we had to take these preparatory steps.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you realized, Defendant, that
as early as October 1933 the course of Hitler’s foreign policy might
have brought about an immediate war, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I did not expect at all that such a measure as the
secession from the League of Nations, where we had always been
treated unjustly because we had no power behind us, would result
in a war with any other power. Nevertheless, it was right to take
such eventualities into consideration.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is good enough
for me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, just let us look at the same document book, Document
Number C-153, on Page 107 of the English version and Page 164
to 167 of the German version. That is, you will remember, your
armament plan for the third armament phase, and I would just
like you first of all to look at Paragraph 3.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In (a) and (b) of Paragraph 3 you give the general basis for
your arrangements:
<span class='pageno' title='167' id='Page_167'></span></p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“(a) For the military leaders a sound basis for their strategic
considerations, and</p>

<p>“(b) For the political leaders a clear picture of what may be
achieved with the military means available at a given time.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it is quite obvious that such a plan would have
this purpose.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that your political leaders
were to make their plans on what armed forces you had available
for war, if necessary. That was what you were contemplating
then, was it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is a matter of course; I reported to the
Führer that I could put a certain military strength at his disposal
during that year. The Chief of State must know that in order
to know what he can count on. But that has nothing to do with
plans for war. That is the case in every state. On the other hand,
I cannot influence the political leader as to what he wants. I can
only report what I could have. Therefore, I had nothing to do
with political matters. I only did what is necessary and what is
done in every state.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at Paragraph 7.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am not going to argue with you as to whether states base
their foreign politics on things other than war as a matter of
argument, but look at Paragraph 7: “All theoretical and practical
R-preparations (armament) are to be drawn up with a primary
view to readiness for a sudden war.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is that you, as far as the Navy was concerned, you had
to be ready then for an immediate war footing, have the Navy on
an immediate war footing, isn’t that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no. This concerns the sequence of the things to
be taken for granted. The armament plan listed the most important
immediate requirements of the Navy and at that point I say here
that this applied to weapons to be used in a war where there was
no time to prepare and that is, in plain language, the mobile fleet,
which must be in a state of constant readiness. It had to be kept
ready for action at a moment’s notice and it had to receive priority.
All other matters, such as quarters, and things that had nothing
to do with direct combat, were attended to afterwards.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought that is what I put to
you, that the fleet had to be ready and ready for war. However,
you have given your account of it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Just turn over, if you will be so good, to Page 66 of Document
Book 10, Page 285 of the German document book; Document
Number C-189, My Lord.
<span class='pageno' title='168' id='Page_168'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, I want to raise just this one
point on which you made a point in your examination and which
I must challenge. You say in Paragraph 2:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy expresses the opinion
that later on”—and I ask you to note the words “later on”—“the
fleet must anyhow be developed against England and
that therefore from 1936 onwards the large ships must be
armed with 35 centimeter guns.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, are you telling the Tribunal, that “gegen England” does
not mean “against” in the sense of in antagonism to, directed
against, in opposition to—that it merely means in comparison to?
Are you seriously saying that, are you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I explained the other day that we are dealing here
with the question of keeping up with other navies. Up to that
time we were keeping up with the French Navy which had 33 cm
guns. Then England went beyond that in mounting 35.6 cm guns
on her ships and then, as I said before, France went beyond
England in using 38 cm guns. Thus I said to the Führer that our
28 cm guns which we believed we could use against the French
<span class='it'>Dunkerque</span> class would not be heavy enough, and that we would
have to take the next bigger caliber, that is 35.6 like those of the
English ships. That was never done because the French began to
use 38 cm guns and our <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> class followed the French lines.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That comparison of calibers and classes of vessels was at that
time quite customary and was also...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told us all that before and
my question is a perfectly simple one; that this document in the
original German, when you say “gegen England” is exactly the
same as in your song <span class='it'>Wir fahren gegen England</span>. It means against,
in antagonism and directed against, and not in comparison. That
is what I am putting to you and it is a perfectly short point.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Are you telling this Tribunal that “gegen England” means in
comparison with England?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is what I want to say; because it says “develop
gegen England” and at that time we had not even signed the Naval
Agreement. It is hardly likely that I would consider following an
anti-British policy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look to the next page, Document
Number C-190, Page 67 of the English document book,
Page 284 of the German document book. That is your conversation
with Hitler, on the 2nd November 1934, when you are discussing
bigger naval estimates and the availability of more money. I want
you to look at the end of the first paragraph which gives Hitler’s
reasons.
<span class='pageno' title='169' id='Page_169'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>“He considers it vital that the Navy be increased as planned”—now
look—“as no war could be carried on if the Navy were not
able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Are you still telling the Tribunal you were not from 1934
onwards contemplating war? Well, if so, why does Hitler say that?
That is one of the most vital points of German naval strategy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>“No war could be carried on if the Navy were not able to safeguard
the ore imports from Sweden.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Were you not contemplating war in November? Were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Hitler said that a navy is built so that, if war becomes
necessary, the navy can use its weapons to defend the country.
A navy is established for no other purpose, and that was definitely
one of the general reasons for the existence of a German Navy.
There were many people who thought a navy was unnecessary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, what I am putting to
you is this. You have told the Tribunal that the Navy was purely
defensive, all your preparations were purely defensive. I am
suggesting to you that Hitler there is contemplating a war and
contemplating the task of a navy during a war, a few months
before he intended to denounce the military clauses of Versailles.</p>

<p class='pindent'>You were all set for a war if it should become necessary, and
you knew that. Was that not the position?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is a complete misrepresentation of the facts,
Mr. Prosecutor. Of course it is necessary during peacetime to
contemplate the circumstances which might arise to make it
necessary to call on the Armed Forces for defense. At that time
nobody thought of a war of aggression, and the individual tasks
must be understood. One of the Navy’s tasks was undoubtedly to
secure the Swedish and Norwegian ore exports in case of war;
and it had to be developed with a view to that end.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you just look at the next
sentence in Paragraph-2: “When I pointed out that in the critical
political situation in the first quarter of 1935, it would be desirable
to have six U-boats already assembled....”</p>

<p class='pindent'>You were preparing for the critical political situation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s look at what you were
doing in 1936. Would you give the defendant and Dr. Siemers
Document Number D-806.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is a report of yours dated the 11th of November 1936,
dealing with the U-boat construction program, and after the first
paragraph you say this in the second paragraph:
<span class='pageno' title='170' id='Page_170'></span></p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The military and political situation urgently demands that
the extension of our U-boat fleet should be taken in hand
immediately and completed with the greatest energy and
dispatch, as it is a particularly valuable part of our armament
at sea and possesses special striking power.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Are you saying that what you were urging there was purely
defensive and that you had no idea of the special striking powers
that would be needed in a war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The entire political situation, or so I seem to remember,
made me consider it necessary to put the construction of
submarines in the foreground. But I never expected that we would
start a war on our own account. Hitler himself had told me that
again and again, but he had made his political moves which could
undoubtedly lead us into war if the other powers intervened
against such a political move. The charge made against me was that
I did not push the construction of U-boats sufficiently far ahead.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are stressing it sufficiently
there, aren’t you? “On the military and political situation”—you
were kept fully informed of the political situation and were
adjusting your naval armament accordingly; isn’t that so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that time I not only knew nothing about what was
going to happen, but I knew that we had occupied the Rhineland
during that year, and that in consequence of the clouds which
appeared on the horizon as a result of the occupation of the Rhineland
Hitler maintained an attitude of greatest caution and said
that we must be prepared for further complications. For that reason
a special directive was issued in 1936, and I took precautions along
the lines suggested by these considerations. My main duty was
to watch; and on the basis of my observations and the conclusions
which I drew from them, I had to strengthen myself as much as
possible. This document, about which you did not question me,
had the same connotation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I asked whether—should political tension develop at the beginning
of 1935, before the signing of the Naval Agreement, and that would
not be done till June—we should perhaps assemble six U-boats.
That was also in the case of tension arising; and I knew at that
time that the declaration of freedom of territorial defense was
intended to be made in 1935.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, you have told us
what you knew in 1936. Now, just let’s pass on to 1937. I want
to know exactly what you say. That of course, as you remember,
turns on the Hossbach Document, 386-PS, which is at Page 81 of
Document Book 10, Page 314 of the German document book.
<span class='pageno' title='171' id='Page_171'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, did you give the number of that
last document?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful, My Lord. It
is Exhibit GB-462.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, I want you just—have you got
that, Page 314 of the German document book?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Can you tell me the paragraph? I have...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, the first thing I want to ask
you about is the third paragraph, the last sentence, where Hitler
is reported as saying: “The German future is therefore dependent
exclusively on the solution of the need for living space.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>And then I wanted you, if you would be so good, to turn over two
pages to 316. My Lord, it is Page 83 of the English document book.
That is repeated. My Lord, it is about seven lines down. Where
Hitler says: “The only way out, and one which may appear
imaginary, is the securing of greater living space.” And then he
says that: “The history of all times has proved that every space
expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance.” And then
in a separate paragraph he says: “The question for Germany is
where the greatest possible conquest could be made at the
lowest cost.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you see that, on Page 316?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I begin with the last one? It is wrongly translated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that’s what I’m really going
to ask you. I want you to just tell us, did you hear Hitler say
that that was the general problem, “the greatest possible conquest
to be made at the lowest cost.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. The English document has the word “conquest”
(Eroberung), but that is not in the German document. The German
text reads: “the highest possible gain (Gewinn) with the smallest
risk.” That is a phrase borrowed from sport. There is no mention
of conquest.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m quite prepared to accept that
it comes after the passage which I have referred to you in quite
some detail, because I don’t want to select anything out of the
context. Did you appreciate that Hitler there was saying, “The
only possibility for Germany is to get extra living space,” and that
had to be got at the expense of other nations? He said that,
didn’t he?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He did say that; and I explained recently how that
is to be understood. He was speaking of Austria and Czechoslovakia,
<span class='pageno' title='172' id='Page_172'></span>
of the Sudetenland. We were of the opinion that no change was
intended in that policy; nor did one take place later. War was not
waged against Austria or Czechoslovakia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>We were all convinced that he would solve that question peacefully,
like all other political questions. I explained that in great
detail.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what I was
going to ask you about. You have taken my second point yourself.
The rest of the document deals with action against Austria and
Czechoslovakia. Would you look at Page 86?</p>

<p class='pindent'>I think you will agree with me that Field Marshal Von Blomberg
and General Von Fritsch rather poured cold water on Hitler’s ideas.
Isn’t that a fair way of putting it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They rather thus showed a certain
antipathy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was in November 1937.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: We all of us told him constantly that in no circumstances
might he start a war with England and France, and he
always agreed. But I explained that this entire speech had a
definite purpose; and that for this purpose he exaggerated a great
deal and at once withdrew that exaggeration when a hint was
given to him about the danger of a war with France and England.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was what I was going to
ask you. That was in November. By January, Field Marshal Von
Blomberg had made his unfortunate marriage, hadn’t he?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I believe it was in January. I do not know exactly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took the view, didn’t
you, that he had been encouraged to do that by the Defendant
Göring?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I never said that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, didn’t you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not that I know of. I never thought that at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember making a statement
in Moscow on this point? Let me read it to you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: To whom, please?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In Moscow to the Russians.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“At the beginning of the year 1938 I had experiences of a
personal nature, which although they did not concern the
<span class='pageno' title='173' id='Page_173'></span>
Navy directly caused me to lose confidence, not only in
Göring but also in the sincerity of the Führer. The situation
in which Field Marshal Von Blomberg found himself as a
result of his unfortunate marriage made his position as a
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces impossible. I came
to the belated conclusion that Göring was making every
effort to obtain the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht
in place of Blomberg.</p>

<p>“He favored the marriage because it made Blomberg ineligible
for this post, while Blomberg believed—and even stated
repeatedly—that such a marriage was possible under the
present system. Göring had already had him shadowed in
the past, as I learned from later remarks.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Didn’t you say that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In Moscow, immediately after the collapse, I made
a note of the causes of the collapse as seen in the light of my own
experience. I wrote this document under the conditions there—where
I was treated very chivalrously—and I had no hesitation in
informing the highest general of the Commissariat of the Interior
of this when I was asked what I was doing there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All I want to know is, is that
true, what you said?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I wrote these notes, and it is also true that it
occurred to me afterwards that Göring might have favored the
marriage. I believe that he himself told me that here. He had
assisted Blomberg in such a way that, I think, he did not know
what the true state of affairs was or how serious the matter was.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you see, your view at that
time was that Göring was encouraging the marriage because he
knew that it would put Blomberg off the map as Commander-in-Chief
because he, Göring, wanted the position. Was that the view
that you held last summer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I believed that last summer, yes. And it is also true
that Göring certainly wanted to become Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces, but the Führer himself thwarted him in that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was Von Blomberg.
We know what happened to him. Your second choice, after Von
Blomberg, was Von Fritsch, was it not? You thought that Von
Fritsch would have been the best Commander-in-Chief if Von
Blomberg went, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mentioned that to Hitler?
And...
<span class='pageno' title='174' id='Page_174'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He asked me, and I said that if I were consulted,
I would suggest Baron von Fritsch. But the Führer said that that
was out of the question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. But there were some of
them bringing a charge of homosexuality against Von Fritsch; isn’t
that right? That was why it could not be done?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. He said, in general terms, that some kind of
moral crime existed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were one of the court who
inquired into that charge, were you not? Göring, as president, you
and General Von Brauchitsch?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you came to the conclusion
that the charge of homosexuality against Von Fritsch was a frame-up
by the Gestapo, did you not? Do you know what I mean?
I am afraid “frame-up” is rather difficult to translate.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The whole thing gave me that impression. Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is because the denunciation
had been by some shady character who you thought was a “hang-around”
of the Gestapo; and at the trial, the co-operation of the
Gestapo with the accuser was brought to light; that is right, is
it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>You were satisfied, from sitting at the trial?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you agree that there had
been—not a confusion—but that the guilty party was a cavalry
captain, Rittmeister Von Fritsch, and not this general at all; isn’t
that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I agree absolutely. We acquitted Baron von Fritsch
because his innocence was proved. There was no suspicion of any
kind remaining against him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You acquitted him, but his
reinstatement did not follow? His reinstatement in command did
not follow?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I went to him, as I knew him very well, and
asked him if he would agree to my going to Hitler and suggesting
that he, Baron von Fritsch, be reinstated. But Fritsch replied that
he considered that quite impossible. He thought that his authority
was so much impaired that he would no longer care to resume his
position as Commander-in-Chief of the Army.</p>

<p class='pindent'>After that, unfortunately, I could do no more about it. I reported
this to the Führer, but there were no further developments. All
<span class='pageno' title='175' id='Page_175'></span>
that happened was that the Führer confirmed the absolute innocence
of Baron von Fritsch in a large assembly of generals and admirals.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you say this with
regard to the Von Fritsch incident:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I was convinced that Göring had a hand in this well-prepared
situation, since in order to attain his goal it was
necessary to eliminate every possible successor to Von
Blomberg”?</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Do you remember saying that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do not remember that now; but I believe that I held
that opinion. To be quite just, I must say that Baron von Fritsch’s
acquittal was due principally to the way in which Göring conducted
the proceedings. The witness who was brought up told so
many lies and made so many contradictory statements every
few minutes, that only Göring could cope with him. After seeing
that, I was very thankful that I had not been appointed president,
as suggested by the Minister of Justice. I could not have coped
with those people. It was entirely due to Göring’s intervention
that he was acquitted without any difficulties.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But of course, I think you have
said, Witness, that whether he was acquitted or not, the authority
of Von Fritsch in the German Army was in his own view destroyed
by the fact that this charge had been brought against him. That
was the result of it, was it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Herr Von Fritsch thought so. I would have insisted
on being reinstated after I had been acquitted in that manner.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did it not strike you as curious
that the two people who on the 5th of November had tried to head
Hitler off from a course that might have meant war were both
disgraced in 2 months? Didn’t it strike you as curious?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That did not strike me as curious at all; and there
is certainly no connection. If Hitler had thought it necessary to
remove the men in high positions who opposed him in such matters,
he would have had to remove me long ago. But he never said
anything about it to me, and I have never noticed that he said
anything like that because I contradicted him. I have frequently
pointed out, with regard to that very question of England and
France, that no war should be caused there; and I never had the
impression that he ever took it amiss.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let us take it very
shortly. Within 6 weeks of the disgrace of Blomberg and the
removal of Von Fritsch, the Anschluss with Austria took place.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not know that there
were pretended military preparations for the Anschluss with
<span class='pageno' title='176' id='Page_176'></span>
Austria, the ones described by General Jodl in his diary and also
described by Field Marshal Keitel? Did you know that these threats
of military action would have been made?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do not believe that I ever took part in a military
discussion concerning the Austrian Anschluss, because actually
I had nothing to do with it. But I should like to emphasize here,
once and for all, that I learned of such enterprises as, for instance,
the annexation of Austria through a directive issued by the Führer,
and not before, because one copy of these directives, regardless of
whether or not they concerned the Navy, was always sent to me
as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. So, of course, I must have
received a directive in this case, too. Unfortunately, I cannot tell
you the date of it; but I confirm that a directive came to my
knowledge.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, the point that I am
putting—and I do not want to waste time on it—is this: That on
the 5th of November Hitler said that he was going to get Austria
in 1943 to 1945 at the latest, and earlier if an opportunity arises.
Four months later, in March 1938, he takes Austria after having
got rid of the people who threw cold water on his plans. But if
you did not know about it, we shall not waste time, but shall look
at Czechoslovakia, because there you did get the decree.</p>

<p class='pindent'>You will find that on Page 163 of Document Book 10a, Page 276
of the German document book. That is the distribution of the
directive for operations against Czechoslovakia. It is bringing up
to date the one of the 24th of June, and you will see that its
execution must be assured as from the 1st of October 1938, at the
latest, and Copy Number 2 goes to you as Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, if you will turn over the page to the actual directive,
146 of the English document book, 277 to 278, you see the first
sentence of Paragraph 1, “Political Prerequisites”:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by
military action in the near future. It is the job of the
political leaders to await or bring about the politically or
militarily suitable moment.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I ask where it is? I do not seem able to find it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The first sentence in the directive,
Paragraph 1, Political Prerequisites—Sentence 1: “It is my
unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in
the near future.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The numbering is confused here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very sorry. Page 277, 278.
<span class='pageno' title='177' id='Page_177'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Now I have found it. What was the date?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 28th of May 1938, that is
approximately six months after the meeting which you had attended
at which Hitler had said he would attack Czechoslovakia at the
earliest opportunity that he could. Didn’t that make you think
that Hitler’s speech in November was not merely froth but was
stating his plans?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, because he kept on changing his decisions all the
summer. He made a fresh decision every month. That can be seen
from Document 388-PS. And it was like this, I believe: on 10 September
troops began to assemble and on the same day negotiations
were started. On 1 October the peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland
took place, after the other powers had agreed to that at
Munich. After the Munich negotiations...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We all know that. The point is
perfectly clear...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should like to finish.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In May, here were the plans,
and the Führer had mentioned—in his speeches he had expressed
this: that it was his determination at the end of May to smash
Czechoslovakia by military action. Are you telling the Tribunal
that you read that directive and still took the view that Hitler
had not got aggressive intentions? That is the question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, at the end of May.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why, what more proof could
you want than his own determination to smash it? What clearer
proof could you want?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He frequently said that he intended to smash something
and then did not do it. The question was peacefully solved
then. I should like to add that on 30 May—I believe that was the
date—after mobilization had just been carried out in Czechoslovakia,
and that had led him to use such stern words then, and from
this—I think he was justified in doing so, for this mobilization
could only be directed against Germany, and as I said, he changed
his opinion at least three or four times in the course of the summer,
saying again and again that he would reserve his decision and—or
that he did not wish to use military force.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Tribunal have gotten
the whole of the 388-PS document in mind. I won’t argue it. You
say that didn’t convince you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>When Hitler went into Prague on the 15th of March 1939, did
it then occur to you that there might be something in what he said
in the interview on the 5th of November 1937 when he occupied
<span class='pageno' title='178' id='Page_178'></span>
the Slav part of Bohemia and Moravia and broke his own rule
about keeping Germany for the Germans? Did it then occur to
you that he might not then have been joking or merely talking
froth in November? Did it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He had issued a directive saying that the aims for
that year were:</p>

<p class='pindent'>1) The defense of Germany against outside attack.</p>

<p class='pindent'>2) The settlement of the rest of Czechoslovakia in case she
adopted a line of policy hostile to Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I heard nothing at all about his negotiations with Hacha and
his decision following them to occupy Czechoslovakia. I only knew
that he wanted to take action against Czechoslovakia according to
his directive, in case Czechoslovakia should adopt a line of policy
hostile to Germany; and according to the propaganda at that period,
that actually did occur. I had nothing at all to do with the occupation
of Czechoslovakia; nor with the occupation of the Sudeten
area, because the only service which we could have rendered in
these operations was our small Danube Flotilla which was subordinated
to the Army for this purpose so that I had nothing at
all to do with it. There were no other military orders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your answer that even
when Hitler went into Prague on the 15th of March 1939, you still
thought he had no aggressive intentions? Is that what you want
the Tribunal to believe from you? Is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I ask the Tribunal to do so because I believe that
he did not want to fight a war, to conduct a campaign against
Czechoslovakia. By means of his political measures with Hacha he
succeeded so far that war did not break out.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, you heard the Defendant
Göring give his evidence that he told President Hacha that his
armed forces would bomb Prague if he didn’t agree. If that is not
war, it is next door to it, isn’t it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It is very close to it. Yes, a threat.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let’s go further on for
another 2 months. If you didn’t see it, on March—on the 23rd of
May—when you came to the Reich Chancellery there were six
high-ranking officers, of which you were one. And Hitler said that
he would give you an indoctrination on the political situation. And
his indoctrination was that, “We are left with a decision to attack
Poland at the first opportunity.” When you heard him say that
on the 25th of May, did you still think he had no aggressive
intentions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I thought so for a long time after that. Just as
Generaloberst Jodl said, since he had solved the Czech problem
<span class='pageno' title='179' id='Page_179'></span>
by purely political means, it was to be hoped that he would be
able to solve the Polish question also without bloodshed; and
I believed that up to the last moment, up to 22 August.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just take one glance—I shan’t
keep you long—at Document L-79, which you will find on Page 74,
I think it is, of Document Book 10. I am sorry. Page 298 of the
German document book. I beg your pardon. I am not going to ask
you about the document because the Tribunal has dealt with that.
I want you to look at the people who were there—298 in the
German document book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I know the people who were there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s look: Lieutenant Colonel
Schmundt; he was afterwards General, Hitler’s principal adjutant,
and killed on the 20th of July, 1944, isn’t that right? Then the
Defendant Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; yourself
as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; Colonel General Von
Brauchitsch who was Commander-in-Chief of the Army; General
Keitel who was head of the OKW; General Milch who was Göring’s
Deputy; Halder who was Chief of Staff; Schniewind who was your
Chief of Staff; and Jeschonnek who was I think a Chief of Staff
or a high...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. And Colonel Warlimont,
who was General Jodl’s assistant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, what do you think Hitler got these high-ranking generals
for, and told them, “We are left with a decision to attack Poland
at the first opportunity,” if he hadn’t any aggressive intentions?
What were these people there for if it wasn’t to develop a war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already explained that the main purpose of
that speech, as may be seen from the last part of it, was to give
a purely academic lecture on the conduct of war, and on the basis
of that lecture to create a special study staff, a project which the
chiefs of the Armed Forces had so far strongly opposed. I also
explained at the start that his explanations were at first the most
confused that I have ever heard regarding the matter, and that
he issued no directives in regard to them but that the last lines
read: “The branches of the Wehrmacht determine what will be
built. There will be no alteration in the shipbuilding program. The
armament programs are to be fixed for 1943 or 1944.” When he
said that, he could certainly not have intended to solve the Polish
question by a war in the near future.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal
that when he said, “We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech
affair; further successes cannot be obtained without the shedding
<span class='pageno' title='180' id='Page_180'></span>
of blood,” you paid no attention to it at all? You are seriously
telling the Tribunal that you paid no attention to that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I certainly did not at all, because by this time
I was getting to know Hitler and was familiar with the exaggerations
contained in his speeches.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At this time you had already
had the directives for a surprise attack on Danzig, in November
1938. You had had the directive on the 3rd of April for the Fall
Weiss, and you know this whole matter was <span class='it'>en train</span>. Are you
seriously, Defendant, telling the Tribunal that you had any doubt
after the 23rd of May that Hitler intended war against Poland and
was quite prepared to fight England and France, if they carried out
their guarantee? I mean, seriously, I give you this chance before
we adjourn: Do you say that you had any doubt at all?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course; I have surely explained that even in August
I was still doubtful. For instance, in estimating this speech,
I must compare it, as has already been done here, with the speech
which Hitler had made a few weeks earlier at the launching of
the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span>, where he spoke only of the peace of true justice.
Those speeches were decisive for me. I did not base my conclusions
on this particular speech which is reproduced in such an extremely
confused manner; and that I proved by the fact that during the
whole of the summer I never said a word to the Navy to suggest
that war might break out in the autumn. Confirmation of that was
given here; and anybody can give further confirmation. I thought
very highly of Hitler’s political ability and even on 22 August,
when we were informed of the pact with Russia, I was still
convinced that we should again be able to find a peaceful solution
of the problem. That was my definite conviction. I may be accused
of faulty judgment, but I thought I had formed a correct estimate
of Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I understand you to say
that even on the 22nd of August you didn’t think that Hitler had
any aggressive intentions. Do you really mean that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, and there is a perfectly good reason for it,
because there was every prospect of our forming an alliance with
Russia. He had given all sorts of reasons why England and France
would not intervene; and all those who were assembled there drew
from that the sincere hope that he would again be successful in
getting out of the affair without fighting.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will this be a convenient time
to adjourn, My Lord?</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<h2><span class='pageno' title='181' id='Page_181'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am most anxious not
to take up unnecessary time. With regard to the meeting of the 22d
of August, Your Lordship may remember that Dr. Siemers raised a
point as to the two accounts of the meeting, one in Documents
1014-PS and 798-PS and the other in the account by Admiral Böhm.
I have had a comparison made out in English and German showing
the points which are similar to both, and I thought it would be more
convenient just to put that in. Let Dr. Siemers see the German copy
and make any suggestion at the appropriate time rather than spend
any time in cross-examining the witness as to any differences in the
accounts. My Lord, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will put
that in now and hand Dr. Siemers a copy so that he can draw the
Tribunal’s attention to any points at a convenient stage.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did not Admiral Böhm make the accounts?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution’s
account is in two documents, 798-PS and 1014-PS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There was another document
which was mentioned by my friend, Mr. Alderman, but not put in.
It was an account by a journalist which was the first account the
Prosecution had had, but when they got the two accounts from the
OKW files, they did not use their first one; so I had only taken the
two accounts from the OKW files and Admiral Böhm’s account.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But does not that make three documents
in all, apart from the one which has been left out?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, and I have taken
each of the two and compared it with Admiral Böhm’s.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So, on that I shall not pursue
this interview. I thought that it would save time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I’d like you, therefore,
Defendant, to look at Document Number 789-PS, which is at
Page 261 of Book 10a and Pages 438 to 440 of the German book—438
to 440. This is the note, Defendant, of a conference on the 23d
of November 1939 with Hitler, to which all Supreme Commanders
were ordered. Do you see that at the beginning, Pages 438 to 440?
Do you see what it says, “to which all Supreme Commanders are
ordered”? Were you present?
<span class='pageno' title='182' id='Page_182'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it is the conference during the war on 23 November
1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Were you present?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I was present.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who were the other commanders-in-chief
who were present?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The commanders-in-chief of the Army, the Air Force,
and a considerable number of generals of the Army.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The “Oberbefehlshaber”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but in the Army...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, I want you to look at
a passage. The paragraph begins: “One year later, Austria came.
This step also was considered very hazardous.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you see that? Do you see that paragraph?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have got it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Much obliged. Now, I just want
you to look at the next few sentences.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“It brought about a considerable strengthening of the Reich.
The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. But this
step was not to be accomplished in one move. First of all, the
West Wall had to be finished in the West. It was not possible
to reach the goal in one bound. It was clear to me from the
first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German
territory. It was only a partial solution. The decision
to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the establishment
of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the
conquest of Poland was laid, but I was not yet clear at that
time whether I should start first against the East and then
against the West or vice-versa. Moltke often had to ponder
over the same things in his time. Of necessity it came to a
fight with Poland first. I shall be accused of wanting to fight
and fight again; in struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody
can avoid a struggle if he does not want to go under. The increasing
population requires a larger living space. My goal
was to create a logical relation between the population and
the living space.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Whatever you had understood up to that time, you appreciated
then, that Hitler himself had had a consistent and clear aim of
aggression throughout these matters that I put to you this morning;
did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but now we were already in the middle of a war
and he was looking at these things retrospectively. Also, he wanted
<span class='pageno' title='183' id='Page_183'></span>
to make it clear to the generals, with whom he had a conflict at that
time, that he had always been right in his political conceptions. That
is the reason why he quoted all these detailed points again.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you turn over
to Pages 445-448, which is Page 264 of the English document book,
German document book Pages 445-448. Have you got that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Perhaps you would be good enough to read, I have
here a...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the paragraph that begins:
“We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look about halfway
down that paragraph. You will see: “England cannot live without
its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines
off the English coasts will bring England to her knees.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Have you got that passage?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. Now, if you would
just listen.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“However, this”—that is bringing England to her knees—“can
only occur when we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It
is a difficult decision for me. Nobody has ever achieved what
I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have
led the German people to a great height, even if the world
does hate us now. I am setting this work at stake. I have to
choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory, the
greatest historical choice—to be compared with the decision
of Frederick the Great before the first Silesian War. Prussia
owes its rise to the heroism of one man.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And there is some more about Frederick the Great and Bismarck:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England
at the most favorable and quickest moment. Violation of
the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is unimportant. No one
will question that when we have won. We shall not give such
idiotic reasons for the violation of neutrality as were given
in 1914. If we do not violate the neutrality, then England and
France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended
victoriously.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, do you remember, Defendant, that this was just 3 weeks
after the plans for “Fall Gelb,” that is plans for the attack on
Holland and Belgium, had been issued on 10 November? Do you
remember that?
<span class='pageno' title='184' id='Page_184'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I know that this was discussed here. But we were
already at war with England, therefore at that stage it was no
longer necessary to discuss an attack against England and France
and...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR. DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were not at war with
Holland and Belgium, were you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Please, I would like to finish.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, I thought you had
finished.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Here it says: “If the French Army marches into Belgium
to attack us, then it will be too late for us. We must be first.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Hitler at that time stated that he had received definite news that
Belgium would not respect her neutrality and that he also had news
already that certain preparations for the reception of French and
British troops <span class='it'>et cetera</span> had already been made. For that reason, he
wanted to forestall an attack from Belgium against us. Apart from
that, in his speech of 22 August 1939, he had made a statement
entirely to the opposite effect. He had said that Belgium and
Holland would not break their neutrality.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with what he
said, that the “Violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland
is unimportant. No one will question that when we have won.”
Did you agree with that view?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it is not exactly my opinion, but I had no cause
on my part to raise any objection against that statement of his at
that moment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The view of the Naval War
Command was put up to him a month later with regard to U-boat
warfare, was it not? Do you remember that on 30th December you
had a meeting with Hitler, at which Colonel General Keitel and
Fregattenkapitän Von Puttkamer were present?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I was with him on 30 December.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like you to look at the
new document, which is Document Number C-100, Exhibit Number
GB-463.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought not this document be identified?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship, of course, is
right. I think we had perhaps better give them two numbers, one
for each of the original PS documents. My Lord, the comparison...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 1014-PS has a number already, has it not?
<span class='pageno' title='185' id='Page_185'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. That has a
number.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought perhaps the comparative document
ought to have a number.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. Shall we call one
comparison Exhibit Number GB-464, the comparison of Document
Number 798-PS; and the comparison of Document Number 1014-PS,
Exhibit Number GB-465?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have only got one here, as far as I can see.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am going to get
some more done. I am afraid I have passed out only a limited
number at the moment, but I will have some more run off.</p>

<p class='pindent'>464, 798; GB-465 will be 1014-PS. It will be the comparison of
Document Number 798-PS with the Raeder Document, and Exhibit
Number GB-465 will be the comparison of Document Number
1014-PS in the Raeder document book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now you are going to give us Document
Number C-100?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: C-100, My Lord, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Defendant, I will be grateful if you will turn over a few pages
to where it comes to a report, the date of 30 December 1939, and
then after that there is an enclosure to the report to the Führer of
30 December 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Would you look at Paragraph IV, which says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“With regard to the form and the moment for the commencement
of further intensification of the war at sea, the decision
of the supreme war command to begin the general intensification
of the war with an offensive in the West is of decisive
importance.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Have you got that, Paragraph IV?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Page?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am afraid the paging is different.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: “With regard to the form”—yes.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “With regard to the form
and the moment for the commencement of further intensification
of the war at sea, the decision of the supreme war
command to begin the general intensification of the war with
an offensive in the West is of decisive importance.
<span class='pageno' title='186' id='Page_186'></span></p>

<p>“I. Possibility: The decision of the Führer is made in favor
of a Western offensive, beginning very shortly, within the
framework of the instructions issued for this to date, by
violating the neutrality of other states:</p>

<p>“In this case the intensified measures for the war at sea will
in their political effect only represent a small part of the
entire intensification of the war. The gradual change-over to
the intensified form of waging the war at sea within the
American restricted zone, with the ultimate aim of a ruthless
employment of all means of warfare to interrupt all commerce
with England, is therefore proposed with the start of the
offensive.</p>

<p>“Immediate anticipation of individual intensified measures for
the war at sea is not necessary and may be postponed until
the start of the general intensification of the war. The benevolent
neutrals Italy, Spain, Japan and Russia as well as
America, are to be spared as far as possible.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Isn’t that right, that you contemplated that Hitler’s violation of
the neutrality of the Low Countries would cover, by being a more
important matter, your adopting the most ruthless methods of war
at sea? Isn’t that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What does that mean if it does
not mean that? What does that mean if it does not mean what I
have put to you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: With the beginning of the offensive in the West, Hitler
also wanted a certain more energetic pursuit of the war at sea. For
that reason, he asked me to introduce only at this point the intensified
measures which I considered already justified because of the
attitude of the British forces. These intensifications were very
carefully considered in that memorandum, and they followed step
by step the different steps taken by Britain.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal with the memorandum.
You need not be afraid that I will omit that, but what I
am putting to you at the moment is this: That so far from disapproving
of the violation of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium,
you on behalf of the Navy were quite prepared to accompany it by
the intensification of submarine warfare; isn’t that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is twisting my words. I had nothing to do with
this violation of neutrality for we were not there when they marched
into these two countries. The only thing I was interested in was to
intensify the submarine war step by step, so as to meet the measures
introduced by the British, which also violated international law.
<span class='pageno' title='187' id='Page_187'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to come to submarine
warfare, but at the moment I want to try to keep in compartments.
There are only two more points on this aggressive war.
I am now going to pass—you can leave that document for the
moment. I will come back to it, Defendant; you need not be afraid,
and I want you to help me on one or two points in Norway.</p>

<p class='pindent'>With regard to Norway, you were quite content to leave Norway
neutral, not occupied, so long as you had a protected channel up the
Norwegian coast in neutral waters, is that right? That was an important
point for you, to have a channel in neutral waters so that
not only your ships, but also your submarines, could go up and
start out from neutral waters, is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I have very clearly explained the origin of the
Norwegian campaign in documents. There was the danger that the
British might occupy Norway, and information of all sorts indicated
that. Of course, if we were forced to occupy the Norwegian coast,
then, apart from all the numerous disadvantages which I have explained,
we had the advantage that we would gain this or that base
for our Atlantic submarines.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal
that the Navy seriously thought that the British wanted to occupy
Norway?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I most certainly thought that. We had so much information
about it that I could have no doubt whatever, and it was
fully confirmed later on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just ask you, then, to look at
just one or two typical Navy reports. We won’t refer to the document
again, but we will start from there, just to get the time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>You remember, on the 13th of March 1940, General Jodl entered
in his diary that the Führer was still looking for justification; do
you remember that? You remember that, don’t you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already explained once that the expression just
used, “justification,” is wrong, wrongly translated, Jodl wrote “Begründung,”
“reason.” But that is also wrong—please will you let
me finish—even that is incorrect, because the Führer had an abundance
of reasons, which he laid down in the instruction issued on the
1st of March, and it was known to all of us. I have said that by
the expression “Begründung,” “reason,” he probably meant that he
had not yet had a diplomatic note compiled. He had not told the
Foreign Minister anything about it at that stage. I told you that
recently under oath and I repeat it under oath today.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is the meaning that
you have given to it. Well now, will you look at your own Raeder
Exhibit Number 81, in Raeder Document Book 5, Page 376.
<span class='pageno' title='188' id='Page_188'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I have Document Book 5?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, you have not got it. I’m
sorry. I will get you one.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, that is dealing with the first point, encroachment by the
English into Norwegian territorial waters, and it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“An examination of the question as to whether a mass encroachment
by the English into the Norwegian territorial
waters was so immediately imminent that it might represent
a danger to present German shipping produces the opinion
that this is not to be expected at the present time. The ore
transports are to be continued, as no losses have yet occurred.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Was that your information, that no mass encroachment of Norwegian
territorial waters was to be expected on the 22d of March?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That was not at all my conception. It was the view of
Kapitän zur See Fricke, who was at that time the Chief of the
Operations Department. He did not quite agree with me about the
whole of this question. He was of the opinion that the British should
be allowed to enter Norway first, and then we should throw them
out through Sweden, a completely distorted idea which I could not
approve of in any way. I had such clear information from Quisling
and Hagelin, particularly at that time, the second half of March,
that there was no longer any doubt whatever that within a reasonable
time the British would intervene on a big scale.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that that was Admiral
Fricke’s view, and you didn’t pay attention to it. Well, now, let me
look...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not concern myself with it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know, Admiral Assmann,
whom you have described as a sound historian, kept a headline
diary, and on the next day he gives an account of a meeting between
you and Hitler, and he says this. This is the same day. You may
have read it, because he turns down your proposal to use U-boats
off Halifax. It is the same day, the 23d of February. Then, at
that date, you are quoted as saying that to insure the supply of ore
from Narvik, it would be best to preserve the neutrality of Norway.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then, on the 26th of March, Admiral Assmann in his report of
the meeting between you and Hitler records your answers as
follows. It is quite short: “British landing in Norway not considered
imminent—Raeder suggests action by us at the next new moon—to
which Hitler agrees.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is Admiral Assmann’s report of the meeting between you
and Hitler on the 26th of March: “British landing in Norway not
<span class='pageno' title='189' id='Page_189'></span>
considered imminent—Raeder suggests action by us at the next new
moon, the 7th of April—to which Hitler agrees.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you remember that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I mean, it is quite improbable that at that moment
I should not have been fully convinced of the imminent landing
about which the whole of Documents 004-PS and 007-PS gave me
reliable information. I did not see the documents, but the information
contained in them was fully available.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Admiral Assmann compiled his notes from all sorts of war
diaries and records. I most certainly never said that because at that
time I reported to Hitler again and again that our preparations
which had already been started a time ago would be complete at
the end of January, and that that would be the time when the
landings had to be carried out for the reasons I always put forward.
It is completely wrong to assume that at that time I had the slightest
doubt. Later everything was proved right...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now really we must...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: And later on, it all turned out to be correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must get down to this
matter. You have told us that Admiral Assmann was a trustworthy
officer and good at naval history.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He is not a deceiver, but he compiled the document
from all sorts of papers and I cannot imagine how he could have
arrived at that statement, I certainly never made it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, but the second part of it,
the second sentence, is right, isn’t it? “Raeder suggests action by us
at the next new moon, the 7th of April.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is right; that is when you did invade. That was when your
armada started off to arrive there on the 9th, wasn’t it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But yes, of course. I was in favor of carrying out the
landings in Norway at the earliest possible time, after ice conditions
had improved, as we had previously decided and as had been ordered
by Hitler. For that I assume full responsibility. There was every
reason for that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well. Again I mustn’t argue
with you, but the point comes to this, that you are saying that
Admiral Assmann, who is right in his second sentence, is not only
wrong but entirely wrong—I mean, stating the opposite of the truth—when
he says that the British landing in Norway was not considered
imminent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Well now, we will just pursue that a little.
<span class='pageno' title='190' id='Page_190'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I only submitted to the Führer this matter of landing
in Norway on the supposition that this information was available
and would continue to be available.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, what was that document of the
26th of March 1940?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was an extract from the
Assmann Diary which I have used before, and I will have one made
up and put in for identification. I haven’t got it copied yet, My
Lord, I am sorry. I shall have it done.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should be grateful if perhaps you could show me the
document. You have shown me all the others, but not this one, the
one I contest.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is such
a short extract I thought you would take it from me, but the last
thing I want is not to show you any documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>You see the entry for the 26th of March:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“British landing in Norway not considered imminent. Raeder
suggests action by us at next new moon, 7th of April, to which
Hitler agrees. Further discussions about laying of mines at
Scapa before German invasion of Norway. Hitler agrees with
Raeder and will issue instructions accordingly.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I come back to it now. Here it says, the 26th of
March 1940: “Occupation of Norway by British was imminent when
the Russian-Finnish peace was concluded.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>That very Russian-Finnish affair was making it particularly
urgent for us to carry out a landing because the danger existed that
the British, under the pretext of supporting the Finns, would carry
out a bloodless occupation of Norway.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then I go on to the question of the Führer, whether a landing
by the British in Norway might be imminent. One must consider
that Assmann had summarized all that from war diaries, and this
question is explained by the fact that the Führer wanted to know
whether the situation had changed in any way, because the peace
had been signed. However, the situation had not changed at all,
because we knew in reality that the landings by the British were
not to be carried out to help the Finns, but for other reasons. That
question, therefore, whether at the time, because of the peace treaty,
the British landings might be particularly imminent, was answered
by me in the negative. Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action
by us at next new moon, 7th April—Führer agrees. Everything
remained as before. Only the question whether because of this
peace treaty we ought to land at once, I answered “no.” That is
completely different from what you have been telling me.
<span class='pageno' title='191' id='Page_191'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You read out the entry for the
26th of March. What is the entry for the 26th of March? You read
it out in German and we can translate it.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>RAEDER: “Occupation of Norway by the British was imminent
when the Russian-Finnish peace treaty was signed.
Apparently, because of the treaty, it was postponed. Question
by the Führer, whether at that moment a landing by the
British in Norway was imminent, was answered in the
negative by the Commander-in-Chief Navy....”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Yes, that did not mean that because of that we had to renounce
the idea.</p>

<p class='pindent'>“Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action by us at next new
moon.” The reasons for our landing remained the same as before;
only the Finnish business could no longer be used by the British.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The peace treaty, the end of
the war with Finland, had taken place in the middle of March. That
was off the map at that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, it was no longer important for us, but our
reasons remained as before.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, will you look at
Document Number D-843. This will be Exhibit Number GB-466.
This is a report from your diplomatic representative in Norway,
dated the 29th of March, and at the end of the first paragraph you
will see:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The British apparently did not want to take upon themselves
the responsibility for openly violating Norwegian territory
and Norwegian territorial waters without cause, and for
carrying out warlike operations in them.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>That is a quotation from the Norwegian Foreign Minister. Then
your diplomatic representative takes it up:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees
things quite right. It definitely appears, however, as I”—that’s
the German Foreign Minister’s representative—“have
frequently pointed out, that the British have no intentions of
landing, but that they want to disturb shipping in Norwegian
territorial waters perhaps, as Koht thinks, in order to provoke
Germany. Of course, it is also possible that the British behavior
of last week, which I have pointed out as well, will
grow into more or less regular and increasing interference
in territorial waters to attack our ore traffic off the Norwegian
coast.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And then Paragraph 3:
<span class='pageno' title='192' id='Page_192'></span></p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The firm intention of Norway to maintain her neutrality and
to insure that Norway’s neutrality rules be respected can be
accepted as a fact.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Were you told that your diplomatic representative in Oslo was
reporting that the British had no intentions of landing?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Dr. Breuer, the Minister to Norway, held a
completely wrong view. He believed Foreign Minister Koht’s assurances
even though our naval attaché kept reporting that Koht was
completely on the side of the British and his assurances were not to
be believed. At the same time, information had been received from
Hagelin that the Norwegians were giving assurances on paper but
they themselves had said that they were doing that only as subterfuge
and that they would continue to co-operate with the British.
That is contained in the documents which we have submitted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at another document.
Look at Document Number D-844. This is what your diplomatic
representative in Sweden was saying at the same time. That will
be Exhibit Number GB-467, that is from your representative in
Sweden and you will notice that he quotes Foreign Minister
Guenther of Sweden, as first of all—about ten lines down, just
after the name of “Weizsäcker,” you will see:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Swedish Government had no reason at all to believe in
an impending action by the Western Powers against Scandinavia.
On the contrary, on the strength of all official reports
and other information, they considered the situation lately to
be much calmer.”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>And then he says there is no prospect of a coup against Swedish ore.
Then he goes on to deal with Norway. Without being Anglophile,
Guenther did not believe in a British act of war against Norway
either, but, of course, he could not speak of this with as much certainty
as with regard to Sweden. At any rate, however, the Norwegian
Government, with whom he was in close contact, was of the
same opinion. And if you look two paragraphs farther on, it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“In conclusion, Guenther requested me to report his statements
to my government, and repeated that the Swedish
Government attached the greatest value to the German
Government not erroneously getting the impression of the
existence of circumstances which might evoke the possibility—he
would not use the word necessity at all—of special
measures by Germany with regard to Scandinavia.”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>And then he says in the last paragraph that the Swedish Foreign
Minister had probably heard of the German preparations.
<span class='pageno' title='193' id='Page_193'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, would you look at Document Number D-845 which will be
Exhibit Number GB-468—that is the next day—from your diplomatic
representative in Stockholm:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Serious anxiety exists in Swedish military and government
circles regarding possible German military preventive measures
in Scandinavia against the announced intensification of
war measures by the Western Powers. Swedish and Norwegian
military and government authorities consider it
unlikely that military measures will be taken against Scandinavia
by the Western Powers. Press reports on this subject
by the Western Powers are attempting to provoke Germany.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>That is from your military attaché in Stockholm. Were you told
about these reports from Stockholm, were you told of that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I assume the Führer told me this. But we had no
reason at all to believe these assurances because obviously, quite
obviously, Sweden had considerable interest in our not going to
Norway, because Sweden believed that by so doing we would be
able to exercise pressure on Sweden also. That was what the
British wanted, according to the information we received later. Our
minister was completely misinformed and as a result was not informed
by us because it was known that he sided with Foreign
Minister Koht. Our information was so clear, so frequent and so
unequivocal, that we could certainly carry out our landing with a
clear conscience and in fact this proved to be true. Therefore, there
is no point in discussing whether the order on the part of the
British to land in Norway—it was Trondheim, Stavanger and, I
believed, Kristiansand—whether this order was given on 5 April.
On the 7th, during the night of the 7th to 8th, as the British
reported in a wireless message, the mine-laying in Norwegian
waters was completed by British ships and on the 7th, troops were
shipped on cruisers, the names of which I forget.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Therefore, this actually took place and my conception was correct
and not Herr Breuer’s who was dismissed immediately after this
because he was a failure. Thereupon, we carried out the landings
on the strength of quite positive information which we can prove
in detail. Sweden’s action is thoroughly understandable.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with
you although you ought to know and I think you do know that
there was no British order for an invasion at all; there was an order
for laying mines; but you took this course as I suggested, you, knowing
quite well that no British invasion was imminent, contrary to
your own Chief of Operations, Captain Fricke, and contrary to all
the information from your diplomatic representatives in Norway.
Now, I want to come to another point with regard to Norway and
<span class='pageno' title='194' id='Page_194'></span>
then I am finished with that. You told the Tribunal that in your
view, using the enemy’s colors was a permissible <span class='it'>ruse de guerre</span> so
long as you stopped before you went into action. Do you remember
saying that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not understand.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember telling the
Tribunal that morning that using the enemy’s colors on a warship
was a permissible <span class='it'>ruse de guerre</span> so long as you stopped before you
went into action. Do you remember saying that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; of course, that is the principle which is absolutely
recognized in naval warfare, that at the moment of firing you have
to raise your own flag.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal
that it is a recognized procedure in naval warfare to use another
country’s colors in making an attack on a neutral country, an unannounced
attack on a neutral country? There was no war between
you and Norway and there was no reason for there to be any ruse.
You were at peace with Norway. Are you saying that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It was all a question of pulling down the flag and
raising the German flag if we met the British. We did not want to
fight with the Norwegians at all. It says somewhere that we should
first of all try to effect a peaceful occupation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you give me a precedent
even where the German Navy, before this operation, had ever
attacked a neutral country with which it was at peace, using enemy
colors? You tell me when you did it before?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do not know. I cannot tell you whether any other
navy did it. I have...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can assume any other
navy—I even ask—have you ever done it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, we have not done it and apart from that, we did
not do it because on 8 April, we gave the order by wireless—and
you know from our War Diary—that this should not be done, so it
is quite useless to talk here about what might have been done if it
has not been done.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to get clear on what
your views on the permissibility of naval warfare were. I want to
come to one other point, and then I am finished with this section
of the case. With regard to the attack on the Soviet Union, I am
not going to ask you about all your own views and what you said
to Hitler, because you told us that at length; but I would just like
you to look at Document Book 10a, Page 252 of the English book
and Page 424 of the German book.
<span class='pageno' title='195' id='Page_195'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Which document is it, please?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The big one.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have not got that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Document Number 447-PS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am so sorry, My Lord, this is entirely my fault. I beg the
Tribunal’s pardon. I have given the wrong reference. I really
wanted him to look at Page 59 in Document Book 10, Document
Number C-170. I am very sorry, My Lord.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, that is the extract from the
Naval War Diary, the one that I want you to look at is on Page 59,
for the 15th of June. “On the proposal of the Naval Operations Staff
(SKL) the use of arms against Russian submarines south of the
northern boundary of Öland warning area...”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Have you got it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “...is permitted immediately,
and ruthless destruction is to be aimed at.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, would you mind, before I ask you a question, turning back
to Document Number C-38, which is on Page 11, which is Page 19 of
your own document book, German document book, Document Number
C-38; Page 11 of the British document book, and Page 19 of the
German. That is an order of the same date, signed by Defendant
Keitel, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel
to the southern tip of Öland is authorized if the boats cannot
be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by
German naval forces. The reason to be given up to ‘B’ Day”—that
is Barbarossa—“is that our naval forces are believed to
be dealing with penetrating British submarines.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Why did you suggest that you should attack the Soviet submarines
6 days before your own invasion when they wouldn’t be
expecting any attack and there was no question of any war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As it has already been explained once here, it had
happened just before, that is before the 15th of June, that a submarine
had penetrated into the area of Bornholm, which is a long
way to the west, and then had given wrong recognition signals
when the patrol boat near Bornholm called it. If the wrong recognition
signals are given, then it means that it could not be a German
submarine but it must be a foreign one. In this case, the course of
the ship and the location would bring us to the conclusion that it
must be a Russian boat. Apart from that, Russian submarines at
that time had repeatedly been located and reported off German
ports—Memel, for instance, and others. Consequently, we had the
<span class='pageno' title='196' id='Page_196'></span>
impression that Russian submarines were already occupying positions
outside German ports, either to lay mines or to attack merchant
or warships. For that reason, as a precaution, I had to report this
and I had to propose that we should take action against non-German
submarines in these areas outside German ports. That suggestion
was passed on the same day and this additional statement was made,
which, in my opinion, was not necessary at all, but which prevented
complications from arising.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is still not an answer to my
question. I will put it this way. You considered it right to attack
and urge the ruthless destruction of Soviet submarines 6 days before
you attacked the Soviet Union? You consider that right? And then,
to blame it on penetrating British submarines—this is Keitel’s
suggestion—is that your view of proper warfare?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Well, I consider the first point right because it is
always important to get in before one’s opponent, and this was
happening under certain definite conditions. The second point was
ordered by the Führer. Neither of the two points was ever carried
out, and therefore it is useless, in my opinion, to discuss this matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is something for the
Tribunal, and I will decide what is useful to discuss.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do I take it, then, that you entirely approve of attacking Soviet
submarines and ruthlessly destroying them 6 days before you start
the war? That is what the Tribunal is to understand, is it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, if they appeared in our waters to reconnoiter or
to carry out some other war action, then I considered it right. I considered
that better than that our ships should run into Russian mines.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, let us just come, for
a short time, to your views on U-boat warfare. Do you remember
the document which I put to the Defendant Dönitz about the memorandum
of the Foreign Office, Document Number D-851, which
became Exhibit Number GB-451?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have it before me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Right. Well, I will ask about
that in a moment. This is what you said about it when you were
answering Dr. Kranzbühler, I think on Saturday. You said:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Since the war against England came as a complete surprise
to us, we had up until then dealt very little with detailed
questions of submarine warfare. Among other things, we had
not yet discussed the question of so-called unrestricted submarine
warfare which had played such a very important part
in the previous war. And from that fact it developed that on
3 September, that officer who was recently mentioned here
<span class='pageno' title='197' id='Page_197'></span>
was sent to the Foreign Office with some points for discussion
on the question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that
we could clarify with the Foreign Office the question as to
how far we could go.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, do you think that is...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: So far as I can recollect, that is the way it happened.
Unrestricted warfare had not been considered.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the document in
front of you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: You mean the one regarding the Foreign Office, Document
Number D-851?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dönitz 851, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think this is in any copy,
My Lord. Has Your Lordship a copy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, I don’t think so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did put it in when
I was cross-examining the Defendant Dönitz.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is very likely with our Dönitz papers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps Your Lordship will
allow me to just read it slowly, for the moment. The document
says this:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The question of an unrestricted U-boat warfare against
England is discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the
High Command of the Navy.</p>

<p>“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum
damage to England which can be achieved with the forces
available can only be attained if the U-boats are permitted
an unrestricted use of arms without warning against enemy
and neutral shipping in the prohibited area indicated on the
enclosed map. The Navy does not fail to realize that:</p>

<p>“(a) Germany would thereby publicly disregard the agreement
of 1936 regarding the conduct of economic war.</p>

<p>“(b) Conduct of the war on these lines could not be justified
on the basis of the hitherto generally accepted principles of
international law.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then, I ought to read this, or point it out. I have dealt with it
before, it is the second last paragraph:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using
the method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England
<span class='pageno' title='198' id='Page_198'></span>
gives us a justification by her method of waging war to order
this form of warfare as a reprisal.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, I want you to take it by
stages. You see the paragraph that says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum
damage to England which can be achieved with the forces
available can only be attained if U-boats are permitted an
unrestricted use of arms without warning in the area...”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Is that your view? Was that your view on the 3d of September?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it is not my view; it is a conditional view. We
had given submarines the order to wage economic war according to
the Prize Ordinance, and we had provided in our War Diary that if
the British were to arm merchant ships or something like that, then
certain intensifications...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please give me an
answer to the question I asked you? It is a perfectly easy question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, isn’t it your view?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In theory, of course, considering the small resources
that we had, the greatest possible damage to England could only be
achieved through—we had to discuss with the Foreign Office just
how far we could go with this intensification. For this reason, this
officer was sent there. The discussions with the Foreign Office resulted
in the submarine memorandum which shows, from beginning
to end, that we were trying to adhere to the existing law as far as
possible. The whole memorandum is nothing more than just that
sort of discussion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you answer my question?
When this document says “the Navy has arrived at the conclusion,”
is it true that the Navy had arrived at that conclusion?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true or not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But of course, everybody would arrive at that conclusion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is much easier to say “yes”
than to give a long explanation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, let us come to another point. Is it true that you had arrived
at that conclusion without consulting the Flag Officer, U-boats, as
the Defendant Dönitz said when he gave evidence?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Regarding these matters? We only agreed before the
submarines put to sea that they should wage war according to the
Prize Ordinance. I did not ask him whether he wanted to carry out
<span class='pageno' title='199' id='Page_199'></span>
unrestricted U-boat warfare, because I did not want that. First of
all I had to discuss it with the Foreign Office to find out how far
we could go. That was the purpose of this affair, which was to give
individual orders, such orders which we were entitled to give, step
by step, in accordance with the behavior of the British. This was a
question of international law, which I had to discuss with the expert
on international law in the Foreign Office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Isn’t it correct that you continued
to press this point of view, the conclusion of which you had
arrived at, with the Foreign Office for the next 3 months? Isn’t it
correct that you continued to press for an unrestricted U-boat warfare
within the area for the next 3 months?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I hardly think so; otherwise I would not have issued
the memorandum of 3 September. Maybe we did go to the Foreign
Office and put on pressure, but what we did is contained in the
memorandum and our measures were intensified step by step,
following steps taken by the British.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the next step with
the Foreign Office was a conference with Baron Von Weizsäcker, on
the 25th of September, which you will see in Document Number
D-852, Exhibit Number GB-469. You see Paragraph 3 of that document:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The High Command of the Navy will submit to the Foreign
Office a proposal, as a basis for a communication to the
neutral powers, in which those intensifications of naval warfare
will be communicated, the ordering of which has already
taken place or is impending in the near future. This includes,
particularly, a warning not to use wireless on being stopped,
not to sail in convoy, and not to black-out.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>That was your first step, was it not? That was put up to the
Foreign Office, with a number of other proposals?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course! The first measure was that armed merchant
ships could be attacked because as early as 6 or 8 September, a
submarine had stopped a merchant ship, the <span class='it'>Manar</span>, had fired a
warning shot, and had at once been fired on by the British steamer.
Thereupon the submarine started firing at the merchant ship. Such
cases were known. And since one cannot recognize in every case
whether the ship is armed or not, we assumed that it would lead to
all ships being fired at. However, at that time it was ordered that
only armed British merchant ships should be fired at. Secondly,
that ships which sent a wireless message when stopped could also
be shot at, because this use of wireless which was done by order of
the Admiralty would immediately bring to the spot both naval and
air forces, especially the latter which would shoot at the U-boat.
<span class='pageno' title='200' id='Page_200'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>The first step, therefore, was firing on armed merchant ships—the
passenger steamers were still excepted—and secondly, firing on
blacked-out vessels and firing on those who made use of wireless.
Blacked-out vessels are...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you look at
Document Number D-853. I only want you to look at the next document,
which will be Exhibit Number GB-470. I want you to come as
soon as possible to this memorandum of which you talked.</p>

<p class='pindent'>D-853, if you will look at Section II, is a report by the Under
Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, dated the 27th of September,
which goes through these matters which you talked about just
now, the sinking at sight of French and British ships, under the
assumption that they are armed. In Paragraph II it is said:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Naval Operations Staff indicated anew that the Führer
will probably order ruthless U-boat warfare in the restricted
area in the very near future. The previous participation of
the Foreign Office remains guaranteed.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Were you still pressing for absolutely unrestricted warfare within
a large area to the west of Britain and around Britain?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Insofar as we took intensification actions step by
step on the basis of our observations regarding the attitude of
enemy forces, and that is in those cases where intensification was
perfectly justified and was legally proved.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Baron
Weizsäcker’s minutes of the 14th of October which is Document
Number D-857, which will be Exhibit Number GB-471.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, you see, this is after these measures have been taken, which
you have just explained to the Tribunal. Baron von Weizsäcker
reports to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“According to my information, the decision on unrestricted
U-boat warfare against England is imminent. This is at least
as much a political decision as it is a technicality of war.</p>

<p>“A short while ago I submitted my personal view in writing,
that unrestricted U-boat warfare would bring new enemies
upon us at a time when we still lack the necessary U-boats
to defeat England. On the other hand, the Navy’s attitude of
insisting on the opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare is
backed by every convincing reason.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then he says that it is necessary to ask for certain information.
On that you put in—on that point you put in your memorandum
of the 15th of October, which, My Lord, is Document Number C-157,
and Exhibit Number GB-224.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: First of all, may I say something about the previous
document? This expression “unrestricted U-boat warfare...”
<span class='pageno' title='201' id='Page_201'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can do it later on, because
we have got a lot of ground to cover here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks he ought to
be allowed to say what he wants to say on that document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, if Your
Lordship pleases. Please go on, Defendant, my fault.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Now the two documents are gone. What I wanted to
say was that the expression “unrestricted submarine warfare” on
the part of the Foreign Office originated from the previous World
War. In reality, and during the entire war, we did not wage unrestricted
U-boat war in the sense of the unrestricted submarine
warfare of the first World War. Even there, where he says “unrestricted
submarine warfare might be imminent”—are only ordered
very restricted measures, which always were based on the fact that
the British had ordered something on their part. The chief action
on the part of the British was that of militarizing the entire merchant
fleet to a certain extent. That is to say, the merchant fleet was being
armed, and they received the order to use these arms.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t see how that arises out
of the last document at all. Unless the Tribunal wants to go into it,
I think we might pass on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Doesn’t Your Lordship think so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Out of both documents. Not out of one only...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have put that point, I
should think, at least seven times this afternoon. I am going to
suggest to you that your real object of the submarine war was set
out in the first paragraph of the memorandum. Would you just look
at it? You see “Berlin, 15 October...”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I must still say that there was not any unrestricted
U-boat warfare but merely an intensification of measures, step by
step, as I have repeatedly said, and these were always taken only
after the British took some measure. The British...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest that that is an entire
untruth, and that I will show you out of this document. Look at
your own document, this memorandum. In the first paragraph:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Führer’s proposal for the restoration...”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am not telling untruths, I would not think of doing
it. I do not do that sort of thing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is what I am suggesting
to you, and I will show it out of this document.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Führer’s proposal for the restoration of a just, honorable
peace and the new adjustment of the political order in Central
<span class='pageno' title='202' id='Page_202'></span>
Europe had been turned down. The enemy powers want the
war, with the aim of destroying Germany. In this fight, in
which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and
her rights, she must use her weapons with the utmost ruthlessness,
at the same time fully respecting the laws of military
ethics.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, let’s see what you were suggesting.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Germany’s principal enemy in this war is Britain. Her most
vulnerable spot is her maritime trade. The war at sea against
Britain must therefore be conducted as an economic war, with
the aim of destroying Britain’s fighting spirit within the
shortest possible time and forcing her to accept peace.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, miss one paragraph and look at the next.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The principal target of our naval strategy is the merchant
ship”—now, let’s look—“not only the enemy’s, but in general
every merchant ship sails the seas in order to supply the
enemy’s war industry, both by way of imports and exports.
Side by side with this the enemy warship also remains an
objective.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, wasn’t that the object which you in the Naval Command
were putting up to Hitler and to the Foreign Office, to use utmost
ruthlessness to destroy Britain’s fighting spirit, and to attack every
merchant ship coming in or going out of Britain? Wasn’t that your
object?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, but attacks on neutrals only insofar as they
were warned and advised not to enter certain zones. Throughout the
centuries in economic warfare the enemy merchant ship as well as
the neutral merchant ship has been the object of attack.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are not telling the Tribunal
that you were suggesting use of warnings. Are you seriously
suggesting to the Tribunal that what you meant by that paragraph
was that neutral ships were only to be attacked with warning?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, and that happened. Afterwards we issued
the warning to neutral ships, after our blockade zone was established
in accordance with the American blockade zone. We warned them
that they should not enter this zone because they would run into
most serious danger. That I am saying, and I can prove it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest to you that that is
untrue, and I will show it out of the document. Now, just turn
to page...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: On 24 November that warning was issued.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you will turn to Section C of
the document, “Military requirements for the decisive struggle
against Great Britain.”
<span class='pageno' title='203' id='Page_203'></span></p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Our naval strategy will have to employ to the utmost advantage
every weapon at our disposal. Military success can
be most confidently expected if we attack British sea communications
where they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness;
the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports
into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the
interest of neutrals, insofar as this is possible without detriment
to military requirements. It is desirable to base all
military measures taken on existing international law; however,
measures which are considered necessary from a military
point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected
from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not
covered by existing international law.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Wasn’t that the view you were putting up to the Foreign Office
and the Führer, “Use international law as long as you can, but if
international law conflicts with what is necessary for military
success, throw international law overboard.” Wasn’t that your
view?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that is quite incorrectly expressed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then explain these words.
Explain these words:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“We should try to consider the interest of neutrals insofar as
this is possible without detriment to military requirements.
However, measures which are considered necessary from a
military point of view, provided a decisive success can be
expected from them, will have to be carried out even if they
are not covered by international law.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>What did you mean by that if you didn’t mean to throw international
law overboard?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It says “If the existing rules of land warfare cannot
be applied to them.” It is generally known that international law
had not yet been co-ordinated with submarine warfare, just as the
use of aircraft at that time. It says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective
in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some
legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new
code of naval warfare”—that is, a new code of naval warfare
on the basis of actual developments.</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Throughout the war a new code of naval warfare was developing,
starting with the neutrals themselves. For instance, the Pan-American
Security Conference defined a safety zone 300 miles around
the American coast, thereby barring a tremendous sea area for
overseas trade.
<span class='pageno' title='204' id='Page_204'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Likewise, the United States fixed a fighting zone around the
British Isles which was not at all to our liking, and on 4 November
1939, the United States themselves maintained that it would be
extremely dangerous for neutral ships to enter it, and they prohibited
their own ships and their own citizens to enter this area.</p>

<p class='pindent'>We followed that up by asking the neutrals that they too should
proceed in the same way as the United States, and then they would
not be harmed. Then only those neutrals sailed to Great Britain
which had contraband on board and made a lot of money out of it,
or which were forced by the British through their ports of control
to enter that area and nevertheless submit themselves to those
dangers. Of course, they were quite free to discontinue doing that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now tell me, what changes had
taken place in the development of either airplanes or submarines
from the time that Germany signed the Submarine Protocol of 1936
to the beginning of the war? You say that international law had
to adapt itself to changes in weapons of war. What changes had
taken place between 1936 and 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The following changes took place: The Submarine
Protocol of 1936 was signed by us because we assumed that it concerned
peaceful actions...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not an answer to my
question. My question is quite clear. It is: What changes in weapons
of war, either in the air or in the submarines, had taken place
between 1936 and 1939? Now, there is a question. You are a naval
officer of 50 years’ experience. Tell me, what were the changes?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It turned out that because of the airplane the submarine
was no longer in a position to surface and to investigate
enemy ships or any other merchant ships, particularly near the
enemy coast where the U-boats carried on their activities at first.
There was no regulation at all issued about airplanes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is not an answer to the question.
The question you were asked was, what changes had taken
place in the weapons of war, either airplanes or submarines.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But Mr. President, the changes took place in the airplane.
The ever-increasing efficiency of the airplanes and the extension
of their activities also over the seas led to the situation
where it became impossible to examine any merchant vessel without
aircraft being called to threaten the submarine. That got worse
and worse, so that later on even rescuing had to be restricted
because of enemy aircraft, and the entire submarine warfare was
completely turned upside down in that manner.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the only change that you
can say in order to justify your statement that international law
<span class='pageno' title='205' id='Page_205'></span>
was to be thrown overboard where it didn’t fit in with military
necessities? Is that the only change, the increase in the power of
aircraft between 1936 and 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already said once it was not thrown overboard.
It was to be limited and changed and that was done by others too.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you just look
at the next paragraph. You talked about your consideration for
neutrals. At the top of Page 5 in the English text; it is the paragraph
that follows the one that I have just read. You say:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective
in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some
legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new
code of naval warfare.</p>

<p>“The Supreme War Command, after considering the political,
military and economic consequences within the framework of
the general conduct of the war, will have to decide what
measures of a military nature are to be taken, and what our
attitude to the usage of war is to be. Once it has been decided
to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in
fulfillment of military requirements, this decision is definitely
to be adhered to under all circumstances. On no account may
such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare,
once it has been made, be dropped or subsequently relaxed
under political pressure from neutral powers, as took place in
the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by
neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats from
other countries, especially the United States, to come into the
war, which can be expected with certainty should the war
last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of
economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly
economic warfare is waged, the earlier will it show results and
the sooner will the war come to an end.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now agree with that
suggestion and that point of view expressed in the paragraph which
I have just read to you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It has to be understood quite differently from the way
you are trying to present it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite differently from what it
says...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not what it says. This is the point. We had the
experience during the first World War that, as soon as the order for
intensification had been given and communicated, as soon as the first
<span class='pageno' title='206' id='Page_206'></span>
neutral had raised a finger to object, these measures were immediately
cancelled, particularly when the United States had a hand
in it. And here I am saying that under all circumstances it must be
avoided that we always withdraw our measures at once; and I give
a warning to the effect that we should consider our measures as
carefully as possible. That is the reason for the discussion with the
Foreign Office and others, namely, to avoid the situation where later
on they might be withdrawn, which would mean a considerable loss
of prestige and the results would not be achieved.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is the reason. Numerous protests were received by Britain
too, and in most cases they were unanswered. I can quote from the
Document Number C-170, Exhibit Number USA-136, where there
are a lot of figures, Number 14, where it says: “Sharp Russian note
against the British blockade warfare on 20 October 1939;” and
Number 17, on 31 October, where it states: “Political Speech of
Molotov.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All that I ask is, was that a
proper procedure?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I must give an explanation on that matter, and I was
just about to do that. Sharp attacks on the British blockade, in
violation of international law—these attacks were made by
M. Molotov. Here too, protests were made which were turned down.
But I wanted to prevent protests and the entire document shows
that our deliberations always aimed at taking measures in such a
way that they could not be objected to, but were always legally
justified.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you tell me, Defendant,
how it was going to prevent protests if you suggest in this
paragraph to use the most ruthless measures and disregard every
protest that neutrals made? How is that going to prevent protests?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: These measures were to be taken in such a way that
no objection was possible. If I tell the neutrals: “This is a dangerous
area in every way,” and nevertheless they go there because they
want to make money or because they are being forced by the
British, then I need not accept any protest. They are acting for
egotistical reasons, and they must pay the bill if they die. I must
also add...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is true. They must pay
the bill if they die. That was what it came to, was it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: They received large premiums for exposing themselves
to that risk, and it was their business to decide about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we might break off now for
10 minutes.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='207' id='Page_207'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to be much longer, Sir David?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought about half an hour,
My Lord.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Defendant, in this document the
Naval Command suggests that it calls for a siege of England, that
is, the sinking without warning of all ships that come into a big
area around England.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Didn’t you hear? Sorry. In this document the Naval Command
suggests what is called the siege of England, on Pages 10 to 13.
And that is, the sinking of all merchant ships, including neutrals
and tankers, which come into an area around England. Isn’t that so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that is not true. The Navy Command does not
suggest that, but discusses the idea of a siege after the blockade
had been discussed and rejected. It likewise comes to a conclusion
why the siege, which until that time had not been accepted as a
recognized idea by international law, should not be undertaken;
and it draws the inference from all these discussions by setting
out on the last page, the last page but one, what shall now be
considered the final conclusion. These are only those measures
which can be justified by the actions already taken by the British.
And during the entire discussion about blockading, the consideration
was always in the foreground as to whether the neutrals would
not suffer too much damage by that. And the whole idea of a siege
is based on the fact that Prime Minister Chamberlain had already
said—on 26 September—that there would not be any difference
between a blockade on the seas and a siege on land, and the commander
of a land siege would try to prevent with all means the
entry of anything into the fortress. Also, the French press had
mentioned that Germany was in the same situation as a fortress
under siege.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am suggesting is that
you come down in favor of a siege, but you do not want any siege
area declared. Will you look at Paragraph 2 of the conclusions,
and then I will leave the document to the Tribunal. That is the
point I suggest. In paragraph 2 of the conclusions you say:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“For the future conduct of economic war, the basic military
requirements demand the utmost ruthlessness. The employment
of the siege by sea as the most intensified form of economic
warfare meets this demand. Even without the public
announcement of a state of siege, after it has been clearly
defined as a concept, a declaration which would have drawbacks
militarily and from the point of view of international
law, and even without the declaration of a prohibited zone,
<span class='pageno' title='208' id='Page_208'></span>
it seems perfectly possible at the moment, as has been explained
in this memorandum, to take military measures to
introduce the most intensive form of economic warfare, and
to achieve what are at present the greatest possible results
in the interruption of enemy trade”—now the last words—“without
the Naval Operations Staff being tied in all cases,
to special forms and areas.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>That is your final conclusion, that you should have as effective
a siege as possible without proclaiming any area. Isn’t that so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that is not the conclusion. The conclusion is that
we cannot carry out a siege, and that it would be a matter for
the political leadership of the State to decide. The political leadership
of the State has never suggested to decree a siege, and it
can be seen here quite clearly what, on the basis of the memorandum,
is suggested for the time being, and then how the intensification
gradually took place.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must not take time arguing
about it, I want you to make clear...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me finish. My suggestion
to you is—and there I leave it—that you rejected a formal siege,
but you claimed the right to sink at sight, without warning, all
neutral vessels in an area which the High Command may choose.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I want to pass on to another subject, because I am afraid
time is getting on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is no siege, however. That was a directive issued
after neutral ships did not heed our warning and continued to
enter the sea around Britain in order to support Britain in the
economic warfare which she, with the greatest ruthlessness and
severity, was conducting against us. It was a measure of self-defense.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it that the document
speaks for itself, now that the attention of the Tribunal has been
drawn to it. I want to come to another point. You have mentioned
certain matters, in answer to Dr. Horn this morning, with regard
to the treatment of American ships in the summer of 1941. In
April 1941 you were pressing for German naval forces to operate
freely up to three miles of the American coast instead of the
300-mile safety limit which the Americans were suggesting, were
you not? Well to save time I will give the witness Document
Number D-849, Exhibit Number GB-472.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was handed to the defendant.</span>]
<span class='pageno' title='209' id='Page_209'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>That says you couldn’t get in touch with the Defendant Von
Ribbentrop and therefore you asked Baron Von Weizsäcker to get
a decision on these points:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“1) Authorization for the German naval forces in the western
part of the Atlantic Ocean to operate freely as far as the
international customary 3-mile boundary.</p>

<p>“2) The cancellation of the preferential treatment which
American merchant vessels have been enjoying so far in our
warfare at sea.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I hand you Document Number 850, that will be Exhibit
Number GB-473. Your suggestion, which had been made in April,
was turned down by Hitler in June. It is a memorandum from
Ritter in the Foreign Office and it reads:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“General Jodl informs me that at the recent report of Grossadmiral
Raeder to the Führer, the more far-reaching orders
to the naval forces, as they were discussed in connection
with the Raeder interview, have been postponed until further
notice.</p>

<p>“In the same way, permission to attack United States’
merchant vessels within the framework of the prize law
has not been granted.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Your suggestion was to abandon the policy then existing and
attack up to the 3-mile limit. Now, I want you to come to another
point...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, please may I make a statement concerning that?
I should like to say something, even if you do not put a question
to me. It is not right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>At that time, in March 1941, and on the 1st of April and the
following dates in 1941, a whole number of intensifications were
introduced by the United States, which I mentioned this morning,
from the document which I had before me. Therefore, it was
clear that I, on behalf of the Naval Operations Staff, which was
supposed to conduct the most effective naval war, urged that also
with respect to the United States those steps should be taken which
were permissible according to international law, and that we should
start slowly. Those steps included:</p>

<p class='pindent'>First: that we should no longer respect that 300-mile limit,
but go as far as the 3-mile limit, where according to existing
international law, it was possible to attack. That is to say, not
against international law, but it was just discontinuing certain
favorable conditions which we had granted the United States. And
Point 2: The cancellation of the preferential treatment...
<span class='pageno' title='210' id='Page_210'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That’s exactly what I suggest
to you. There is no dispute between us. I was just establishing
that point.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes—no...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want you to come...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I only wanted to say that during the hearing of
Grossadmiral Dönitz the Prosecution demanded of us that we
should not treat certain neutrals better than others, but we should
treat them all alike; that is to say in plain language, we must
sink them all, no matter whether we wanted to do so or not, and
of course we were not bound to do that. The second thing: it
was a matter of course that a thoroughly justified suggestion on my
part from the point of view of the Naval Operations Staff had
been rejected by the Führer if, with regard to the political situation,
he decided that at that time he did not desire to adopt a
more severe attitude towards the United States.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to
quite a different point. Do you say that you did not know anything
about the extermination of Jews in the Eastern Territories?</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you say that you did not know about the extermination of
Jews in the Eastern Territories?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I say clearly under oath that I had not the slightest
inkling about it. I might add in explanation that on no account
would Hitler have spoken about such things to a man like myself,
whose opinion he knew, especially because he was afraid that on
my part there would be very serious objections. I explained the
other day why I used the word “Jews” in my memorial speech. In
my opinion, I was obliged to do so. But that had nothing at all
to do with an extermination of Jews. About the Jewish matter
I have only learned...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Excuse me, please, one moment. I only learned
something about the Jewish matter when Jews who were known
to me, mostly friends of my old parents, approached me and told
me that they were about to be evacuated from Berlin. And then
I intervened for them. That was the only thing I knew. On
occasions I was told in answer to my questions that they were to
be evacuated to cities where ghettos had been established. I always
understood that a ghetto was a district in a city where all the Jews
lived together, so that they would not have to mingle with the
rest of the population.
<span class='pageno' title='211' id='Page_211'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you know, my question
was only: Did you know or did you not, and you could have answered
that yes or no. I want you now to answer about that
point...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but I must—so many questions have been asked
about this very point and as every man in my position who held
the same views says the same, that he does not know anything
about it, I should like to explain once for all that one did not
hear about these things, because civilians certainly did not talk
to us about that, because they were always afraid that they would
get into difficulties. The Führer did not speak about it. I had no
connection with Himmler nor with other agents of the Gestapo. I
did not know anything about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you just to
tell the Tribunal your chain of command for the Baltic coast. Is
this right that you had the naval chief command, and then the
Flag Officer of the East Baltic coast Tallinn and, under him, you
had a command at Libau; is that right? Was that your chain of
command?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not understand that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was your chain of command
for the East Baltic coast, Kiel, Flag Officer Tallinn, and a detachment
under him at Libau? You had...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I assume, so—that depends on various things. If
they were operational matters, then it had to do with the Naval
Group Commander East or North; and as far as matters of organization
were concerned, then it might have gone through the Station
Chief of the Baltic Sea.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, at any rate, you
had got in 1941 a naval command at Libau, had you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like you
just to look at Document Number D-841, which is a deposition on
oath by one of the naval employees at Libau.</p>

<p class='pindent'>My Lord, that will be Exhibit Number GB-474.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This witness says: “Deposition on oath of Walter Kurt Dittmann.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>And then it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I was Naval Administration Inspector and officer in charge
of the Naval Clothing Depot at Libau in Latvia.</p>

<p>“I held this position from the beginning of August 1941 to
the end of March 1942.
<span class='pageno' title='212' id='Page_212'></span></p>

<p>“The Jewish population of Libau at that time was supposed
to be about 7,000 people.</p>

<p>“Up to the end of March 1942 many thousands of them had
already been ‘evacuated’ by the Gestapo and the Latvian
Police.</p>

<p>“ ‘Evacuated’ was the local expression for the annihilation
of these people.</p>

<p>“All Jews were registered. When a new lot was to be evacuated
it happened in the following way:</p>

<p>“The Latvian Police fetched the Jews out of their houses,
put them on lorries and drove them to the Naval Port about
six to seven kilometers outside the town. Later on these
people had to march and were not taken there in lorries.</p>

<p>“In the Naval Port these people were then shot with machine
guns. This was done by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police.
The police, of course, got their orders from the German
Gestapo.</p>

<p>“I personally did not witness these incidents, but comrades
told me all about them.</p>

<p>“Some of the Jews before they were shot worked for the
Navy.</p>

<p>“About 80-100 people worked in the Clothing Depot every
day.</p>

<p>“About 100-150 people worked in the Garrison Administration
every day.</p>

<p>“About 50 people worked in the Garrison Building Office
(Navy) every day.</p>

<p>“Through these contacts and through personal visits to the
houses of Jews I heard a lot regarding the terrible happenings
in Libau during these months.</p>

<p>“I personally went to my superior, Festungs-Intendant
Dr. Lancelle, and before that I also went to another superior,
the officer in charge of the Hospital Administration, named
Müller, both were Naval Administration Officials. I pointed
out to them these abuses which have already been described.
The answer I got was that they could not do anything and
that things like that were best overlooked.</p>

<p>“The Marineverwaltungsassistent Kurt Traunecker accompanied
a consignment of clothing from Kiel to Libau. He
stayed a few weeks in Libau and he expressed his displeasure
at the conditions there regarding the annihilation of the
Jews.</p>

<p>“He then went back to Kiel to the local clothing office. There
again he expressed his displeasure and was ordered to appear
<span class='pageno' title='213' id='Page_213'></span>
at the Naval Administration Headquarters (Marine-Intendantur).
Whom he saw there, I do not know, but it was made
clear to him that these occurrences were not true, and therefore
he should not talk about them any more, otherwise he
would get into most serious trouble.</p>

<p>“My personal opinion is that the higher offices of the Navy
in Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had
knowledge of these terrible conditions.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Are you saying, Defendant, that with your naval detachments
on the East coast of the Baltic and with these things happening,
that nobody reported to you that the Jews were being slaughtered
by the thousands in the Eastern Territories, you are still saying it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I knew nothing about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your staff doing, if
they were not telling you about this? Had you an efficient staff?
Do you say you had an efficient staff?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is a question which is not relevant here. Of
course I had only efficient officers around me. But here we are
dealing with things which were not done at all by the Navy. It
says here in all places that it was the police and so on. I even
was in Libau once and I was told—and this is the only thing in
connection with this matter—that the peculiar thing was that the
Jews in Libau, contrary to their custom, were craftsmen and
therefore they were doing useful work there. That was the only
thing I heard about it. As regards any extermination...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When were you in Libau?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot say that now. It was after it was occupied,
probably immediately afterwards.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were you there in 1941 or 1942?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I said just now that I do not know exactly when;
I have to look it up somewhere. It does not say here that
anything was reported, only that it was apparently discussed in
the Navy Headquarters and with the Navy Quartermaster (Marine-Intendantur),
who does not report to me. Of course I would have
intervened if I had heard about such happenings.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You think you would? Well,
I’ll leave that. Now, tell me about the Commando Order of the
18th of October 1942. You received Hitler’s Commando Order and
passed it on to your various divisions of the Navy, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I passed it on through the Naval Operations
Staff.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you approve of it?
<span class='pageno' title='214' id='Page_214'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not recommend it, but I passed it on. I have
to make a statement if you want to know what I thought about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that’s not what I’m asking
you. I’m asking you—first answer my question—did you approve
of an order to shoot Commandos or to hand them over to the SD
to be shot, did you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not recommend the order, but I received it as
drafted by the Führer, and as it came into my hands, I passed it
on as ordered with the same remark as to how far it has to be
passed on and how it has to be returned. It was all ordered by
Hitler in detail. It was decisive for me that in one of the first
paragraphs the reason for this order was given, and the reasons
why Hitler considered a deviation from international law justified.
Moreover, a short time before I had been in Dieppe in France,
and there I was informed that on the occasion of the Commando
action of the British in France, the prisoners, I believe they were
from the Labor Service, who were working along the coast, had
been shackled with a noose around their neck and the other end
of the noose around the bent-back lower leg, so that when the
leg weakened, the noose tightened and the man choked.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you answer
my question: Did you approve of the order or not? You haven’t
answered it yet. Did you approve of the order?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I always said—yes, I did—no, I do not want to say—I
said that twice already. I passed it on because it was an order
from my Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, in one of the last paragraphs
it said that that order should not be applied for the treatment
of prisoners taken after a naval action or after large scale
landing operations and I, as well as many others in the Navy,
concentrated our attention on this point because that was our
main activity. But I saw no reason to raise objections to the
Führer on account of this order which I thought justified in this
way. And I would like to state very clearly that I, as a soldier,
was not in a position to go to my Supreme Commander and Chief
of State to tell him, “Show me your reasons for this order,” that
would have been mutiny and could not have been done under
any circumstances.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, do you remember that one
example which we have discussed a great deal in this Trial, which
you must have listened to, was the case of naval men coming in
with a two-man torpedo, trying to sink the <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>. Do you
remember that case? Surely you can answer that “yes” or “no,”
because either you remember or you do not. We have discussed
it about six times.
<span class='pageno' title='215' id='Page_215'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I remember. If I remember I will say “yes.”
The contrary does not have to be assumed at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that during the
time that you were Inspector General, or Admiral Inspector of
the German Navy, that there was started a “Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände,”
under Vice Admiral Helmut Heye, which included
in its command one-man torpedoes, one-man U-boats, explosive
motor boats, and had personnel, starting at about 5,000 and rising,
I think, as far as 16,000? Did you know that there was that Kommando
in the Navy, “Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände”? Did
you know that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I knew that of course and that it operated quite
openly on the French coast and later on, I believe, also on the
North coast.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you have approved if
the Allies had shot any one of your thousands of personnel in that
Kommando that was dealing with one-man and two-man torpedoes
and explosive motor boats? Would you have approved if we had
shot them out of hand?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: First, I cannot give any information about what I
would have done in a particular case with which I had nothing
to do any more. Secondly, here it is...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, if you don’t want to
answer, it is good enough for me. I will point it out in due course
to the Tribunal with...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But you interrupted me again. I should like to make
a second point after what I said first. Secondly, these units fought
quite openly, just below the coast, and had no civilians on board
and also no murderous instruments or instruments for sabotage
with them, so they were fighters just like the fighters in a submarine.
I know...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly the point that I
have put with our Commandos, so I will not argue.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I want to pass to one other point. Was it under your orders
that the log on the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was falsified? Was it by your direct
order?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not at all. I have explained the other day here
that my order was, “First: absolute secrecy upon the order of the
Führer. Secondly: politically it will be dealt with by the High
Command of the Navy. Thirdly”—there was a third point—I will
find it in a second—“I do not intend to punish the commander
because he acted in good faith and committed an error.” That is
what I ordered. I did not order anything further concerning that.
<span class='pageno' title='216' id='Page_216'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you know under whose
orders the log was falsified? I am very anxious to know. The log
was falsified. I have asked the Defendant Dönitz. He cannot tell
me. He has put in an affidavit that the matter was to be left
to you, and now I am asking you whether you can tell me. I think
the commander is dead, as far as I remember, so he cannot tell
me. Do you say that you cannot tell me under whose orders the
log of the Submarine <span class='it'>U-30</span>, that sank the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, was falsified?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already said that I had nothing to do with
it, because in fact I did not have anything to do with such details.
I did not order such details. The other day—I do not know whether
Admiral Wagner said it—it was discussed who did it. I assumed
that it was within the flotilla.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me just this about the
<span class='it'>Athenia</span>. You told us the other day that you gave these orders,
and then washed your hands of the matter. Nearly a month later...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already said I had nothing further to do with
it, for you know...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had nothing to do with it.
Nearly a month later the Propaganda Ministry put out this suggestion,
I think you said on Hitler’s orders—that the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> had
been sunk by Churchill. Did you not feel that it was your duty
as Grand Admiral and head of the German Navy to make any
protests against this disgraceful, lying suggestion, that the First
Lord of the British Admiralty had deliberately sent to their deaths
a lot of British and American subjects? Did you not think it was
your duty to do that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I spoke to Hitler about it—but it had happened without
our having any idea about it. I was extremely embarrassed
about it when the First Lord of the Admiralty was attacked in that,
one can say, boorish manner but I could not change anything subsequently
and Hitler did not admit that he...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you did not bother about
that, as I understand it, you didn’t bother at all...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I had misgivings about it, and I was very indignant
about it. Please do not keep twisting what I say...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you translate your indignation
into actions? That is what I am asking.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Into what kind of action?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Any action.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that Hitler should get Goebbels to contradict
that article? That Hitler would not do if he himself had been the
author of the article.
<span class='pageno' title='217' id='Page_217'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to get it clear.
You did nothing when you knew that Von Blomberg and
Von Fritsch, who were old friends and comrades of yours, had been
framed up by sections of these Nazi plotters; you did nothing about
that? You did nothing to protest against the treatment meted out
to Von Blomberg or Von Fritsch? You did nothing, did you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, but at that time I did not know anything about
the background, as you yourself said this morning. I knew nothing
about the background. Later when I became acquainted with the
details I gradually put the whole picture together. At that time
I was not in a position to assume that such methods would be at
all possible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I put to you your own
statement that you made a year ago. I just want to get it quite
clear that the first time in your life that you were moved to protest
was, I think, in March 1945, when you saw the actual marks of
torture on the hands of your friend, Herr Gessler, and at that
time the Soviet troops were over the Oder and the Allies were
over the Rhine, and that was the first time that you made any
protest when you took off your Party Golden Emblem, wasn’t it?
That was the first protest you ever made in your naval, military,
political career; is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Not a bit of it. I did not really know what was
going on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then—I put it again. In
March 1945 you took off the Party Golden Emblem when you saw
the marks of torture on your friend Gessler’s hands. Isn’t that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: When Dr. Gessler, who in spite of my objections had
been kept for several months in a concentration camp, returned
from the concentration camp and informed me that he was in
extremely pitiful condition, and that in spite of my request in
August, when he was sent to the concentration camp and when
I had asked the Führer through Admiral Wagner for Dr. Gessler
to be questioned quickly because he was certainly innocent in
connection with the assassination attempt, so that he could be
released as soon as possible, then...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, my question is, was it then
that you took off the Party Emblem. You can answer that. You
can give your explanation later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but wait a moment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But up to then you did not
make any protest against anything that Hitler did, except the
purely military one on the invasion of the Soviet Union?
<span class='pageno' title='218' id='Page_218'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I always made serious protests, and that I have proved
here, and the adjutant, General Schmundt, told me, “You will
be most successful if you try to influence the Führer personally
when you are alone with him and tell him quite openly what you
think.” This is important enough to mention and I must say it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Well, Dr. Gessler came back from the concentration camp and
told me that during his first interrogation—at that time I had not yet
had a chance to intervene—he had been tortured. That was the
first time that I heard that anywhere in Germany anybody was
tortured. There is a letter from Dr. Gessler about that—that I told
him immediately, “I am going to the Führer at once to tell him
about this because I cannot imagine that he knows about that.”
Gessler begged me—when he confirmed that letter—for goodness
sake not to go to the Führer then, because that would endanger
his, Gessler’s, life. I said I would answer for it that nothing would
happen to him, and that I would still try to approach the Führer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>During the whole of the ensuing period I attempted to approach
the Führer, who was not at headquarters. When I was informed in
April that he was in Berlin, which was already under heavy attack,
I tried to approach the Führer day after day by calling Admiral
Voss over the telephone. That was no longer possible, and after I
received that information the first thing I did was that I went,
together with my wife, to the lake which was behind our house and
tore off my Party Emblem and threw it into the lake. I told that
to Admiral Voss but unfortunately I could not tell it to the Führer
any more. That can be seen from the letter which Dr. Gessler
wrote, and we would have liked to have him as a witness, but his
state of health did not permit it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was your first protest.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It was not my first protest. That is twisting my words.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross-examination?</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: On 18 May 1946, during the morning session
of the Tribunal you testified that during your service as Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy you twice made application to resign. The
first time you tried to resign was in November 1938 when you were
dealing with the building up of the Navy, and Hitler was not pleased
with your plans, and the second time was when Hitler, without your
knowledge, permitted his adjutant who was a naval officer to marry
a certain young girl. Is that not so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but I put in further applications for resignation
which were not so sensational, once in 1937, and I believe even in
1935, when I was not in good health. But these were two typical
examples which show how such things came about.
<span class='pageno' title='219' id='Page_219'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I understood that in the first of these two
cases Hitler finally persuaded you not to resign.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: And in the second case, he complied with
your wish but he never forgot it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In fact, you resigned only in January 1943,
is that not so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In actual fact, yes. But I must add that during the
war I felt I could not leave the Navy, which was already in such a
difficult situation, and I believed I enjoyed its confidence to a certain
extent so that I could be useful.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: On the morning of 18 May you said here in
the Court in regard to your resignation, that it seemed to you then
that Hitler, at that particular moment, wanted to get rid of you.
Is that so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that moment I had the impression, when he made
such serious accusations and when he considerably contradicted his
previous judgments, that maybe he wanted to get rid of me, and I
therefore considered that that was a particularly favorable moment
to leave.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: The question of successors was solved by
your naming a few people to Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: And among them was the Defendant Dönitz.
Did you mention his name?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I mentioned his name. I informed the Führer of
that in writing, first Carls, second, in case he wanted to concentrate
on submarine warfare, Grossadmiral Dönitz, who was the highest
authority in that field.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: And does it not seem to you, after your
answer to my questions, that the answer which you gave to
Dr. Laternser on 18 May, when you mentioned the absolute impossibility
of resigning from the general staff, was not a proper answer?
It was possible to resign, was it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but in this case, of course, there were two prerequisites.
The first was that Hitler himself did not like me any more
and I knew it, so that it would not be insubordination if I threw
up my post for some reason or other.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Secondly, because it was possible, as I pointed out in that conversation,
for the change to take place under peaceful conditions so
<span class='pageno' title='220' id='Page_220'></span>
that the Navy would not suffer by it. If I had left because of a
quarrel, then that would have had a very bad effect on the Navy
because it might have meant a certain split between the Navy and
Hitler, and I had particularly to preserve unity, at that critical
moment of the war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to understand my question
correctly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I understand...</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I am not asking you about the prerequisites
which might have been required for granting an application for
resignation. I am asking you a question in principle:</p>

<p class='pindent'>Was it possible or was it not possible to resign? After all, you
did resign. You resigned from your post as Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but I had been in the service for 15 years, and I
could tell him, “If that is the way you yourself judge me, then there
is no sense in your continuing to work with me.” That was a favorable
opportunity which made it permissible for me to ask him to
release me. But what one could not do was to throw up the job
and give the impression of being insubordinate. That had to be
avoided at all costs, I would never have done that. I was too much
of a soldier for that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I have already heard what I wanted to
hear from you in reply to my question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I will pass on to the next question. You maintain that all
the time you were striving towards normalizing relations with the
Soviet Union, is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am sorry; I could not understand what you said.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: You maintain that during your service you
always strove to make the relations between Germany and the
Soviet Union quite normal, is that not so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I was always in favor of the Bismarck policy, that we
should have a common policy with Russia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: If I understood your testimony correctly
the day before yesterday and on Friday, in 1940, already, you had
knowledge of the fact that Hitler intended to attack the Soviet Union.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In September 1940 for the first time I heard certain
statements from Hitler himself that he was thinking of a war with
Russia, given certain circumstances. Even in the directive he
mentioned one of these prerequisites, one of these circumstances.
He did not say to me at that time that in any circumstances he
wanted to wage war, but that we had to be prepared, as it says in
<span class='pageno' title='221' id='Page_221'></span>
Paragraph 1, that before crushing England we might have to fight
against Russia. And from September on I began to make objections
to him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Was there not a case of an incident when
you maintained that the explanations which had been given by
official governmental organs or agencies for an attack on the Soviet
Union gave you and the others the impression that it was a
deliberate propaganda, and in fact they were quite repulsive in
their effect? Do you remember that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The propaganda made by Hitler made an impression?
I did not quite get it...</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I believe that you once expressed in writing
the view that the OKW and the Foreign Ministry explained to the
German people the reasons for attacking the Soviet Union in such a
way as to give the impression that it was deliberate propaganda,
and the total effect was repulsive. Do you not remember it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Oh, you mean the broadcasts emanating from the
Foreign Office when the war started? Yes, that was Hitler’s propaganda
to make the German people understand the reason for this
war. That is right. As regards breaking the Pact...</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to take a look at one document.
This is a document written by you, and I would like you to
tell us whether this document contains the precise subject matter
of my question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Where is it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: “The propagandistic...”</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: “The propagandistic”—shall I read it?</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The propagandistic, political and military announcements
given out at the beginning of the war by the Foreign Office
and the High Command of the Armed Forces, which were to
justify the breaking of the Pact because of breaches by the
Soviet Union, found very little credence among the people as
well as among the Armed Forces. They showed too clearly
that they were propaganda for a certain purpose and had a
repulsive effect.” (USSR-460.)</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I know that at that time Hitler himself drafted these documents,
together with Goebbels.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In connection with this question I have
another question for you. Am I to understand you in this way; that
your divergence of opinion with Hitler over foreign policy, and in
particular in regard to aggressive wars, was less strongly defined
than your difference of opinion about the question of the marriage
of a naval officer with a certain girl? Did you understand me?
<span class='pageno' title='222' id='Page_222'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, they were two quite different things. Those were
military questions where the political decisions remained with the
Führer. I was very insistent about the moral issues also, where
they concerned the Pact, but I did not send him any written ultimatum
because in this matter it would have been unsoldierly. I did
not have the final decision, he had it; whereas in the case of Albrecht,
it was up to me to decide—to say yes or no—and not to sign that
which I was supposed to sign.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: You are saying now that this is a question
of morals. Does it not seem to you that an unprovoked attack
on a country with which Germany had a nonaggression treaty—do
you not think that such a question is always connected with the
question of morals?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course; that is what I said myself, that in this case
too I laid special stress on the moral issue. But in spite of that, as
the highest man of the Navy, I was not in a position to hold out the
threat of resignation at that moment. I was too much of a soldier to
be able to do that, to be able to leave the Navy at a moment like that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In answer to questions put to you by your
counsel here in this courtroom you testified that your speech, which
was delivered by you on 12 March 1939—that is Page 169 of the
Russian text in the Raeder document book, My Lord—the speech
where you praised Hitler and Hitler’s policies—you mentioned that
this speech was not in accord with your true opinion. Is it so or
is it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that is not correct. I said that we had had the
experience that the Communists and Jews, from 1917 to 1920, had
strongly undermined our power of resistance, and that for this
reason it could be understood, if a National Socialist government
took certain measures against both of them in order to stem their
influence, which was excessive. That was the sense of my statements
and I made absolutely no mention of any further steps which
might come into question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In short, you are saying now that when
you delivered that speech on 12 March 1939, that this speech was
fully in accord with your ideas and your views. Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it was, or I would not have made it. It was in
accord insofar as I had to recognize that the National Socialist Government
had in some way to stem that influence which was generally
recognized to be excessive, and as I said yesterday, the National
Socialist Government had issued the Nuremberg Laws, which I did
not entirely approve of where they went to extremes. But if the
Government was so disposed, it was not possible for me in an official
public speech, which I gave on the orders of that Government, to
<span class='pageno' title='223' id='Page_223'></span>
express my personal views which were different. That had to be
considered within this address to the nation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish in a very few
moments? It is now five minutes past five.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I think, My Lord, that only about 10 minutes
will be sufficient for me. I have only about three or four more
questions left.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In order to save
time I am not going to argue with you in regard to the motives
which made you deliver the speech. It was important for me that
you should confirm what you said, and that is, that this speech
was in accord with your views and ideas. Now I will pass on to
the next question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On 29 September 1941, your Chief of Staff, Admiral Fricke—do I
pronounce his name correctly? Is it Fricke or Fricker?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Fricke, yes, Chief of the Staff of the Naval Operations
Staff.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Admiral Fricke published a directive in
regard to the future fate of Leningrad. Do you know what document
I mean, or must this document be shown to you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I know that document very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: This directive was published with your
consent?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not give a specific order for it because there was
no necessity for passing it on. May I just explain briefly how it was.
I had...</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, and I would like you to be brief.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Quite briefly, yes. I had requested Hitler when I heard
that he intended in the course of the war to bombard Leningrad,
that he should spare the port and dock installations because they
would be useful for us later, as we had to keep moving our bases
back to the East on account of the British air attacks in the Baltic.
Shortly before the date which you have mentioned Admiral Fricke
had been at the Führer’s headquarters—I do not know for what
reason—and had there spoken with the Führer in my absence, and
the Führer had explained to him that plan to bombard Leningrad,
especially with aircraft, and he used those very exaggerated words
which were then written down in the document. The Navy had
absolutely nothing to do with the shelling of Leningrad. We received
no orders for that. We were only interested in that one thing which
I mentioned before, that the shipyards and port installations should
<span class='pageno' title='224' id='Page_224'></span>
be spared. The Führer had informed Fricke that unfortunately he was
not in a position to do that because the attack, especially if made
with aircraft, could not be directed quite so precisely. All we could
do was to inform Generaladmiral Carls that Leningrad, in case it
should be taken, could not be used as a base, and Generaladmiral
Carls had to stop the preparations which he had already begun by
allocating German workers and probably also machinery which was
intended to be used in Leningrad later on. Carls had to know of that
and, as the document says, the so-called Quartermaster Department
of the Navy had to know about it, and that was why Admiral Fricke
passed on that paper. Unfortunately he included in this paper the
expressions used by Hitler, which had nothing to do with the whole
affair as far as we were concerned, because we had nothing to do
with the shelling. By so doing he did not assume in any way the
responsibility, in the sense that he approved it. He only believed
that he had to pass on Hitler’s wording of the order.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Navy had nothing to do with the matter. It would not have
been necessary to pass it on, and unfortunately and very clumsily
that expression used by Hitler was entered in that document. However,
nothing happened and that document was not passed on from
Generaladmiral Carls to our Finland Commander. That is the
whole story.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me the question is becoming
more complicated. I asked you a simple question. Your Chief of
Staff, Chief of Operations, published a directive. Did you know
about the directive?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. That is not a directive—that can be seen also
from the photostat—because the letter had not been submitted to
me for passing on, and that shows that it was not considered to be
very important. It was not a directive to undertake any operation
or anything important. It was just a directive to stop anything that
might have been done with regard to bases; so that really nothing
happened. Thus, when that document was passed on by Admiral
Fricke, nothing happened at all. It was quite superfluous.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: You are talking about the destruction of
one of the biggest cities of the Soviet Union. You are talking in
this document about razing the city to the ground, and you maintain
now that it is a more or less trifling question, that this question
was not important enough to be reported to you, as Fricke’s Chief?
Do you want us to believe that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course. It is not a question of the shelling of
Leningrad, with which we had nothing to do at all. It was the minor
question which concerned us, the question as to whether we would
later be able to establish a naval base there, and whether we could
<span class='pageno' title='225' id='Page_225'></span>
bring workers and machines and such things to Leningrad. That
was a minor issue. The shelling of Leningrad was a major issue.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I think that the Tribunal will be able to
understand you correctly and to draw the necessary conclusions,
both from this document and from your testimony.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I have one last question for you. On 28 August 1945, in
Moscow, did you not write an affidavit as to the reasons for Germany’s
defeat?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I took special pains with that after the collapse.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, we submit this document to the
Tribunal in the form of excerpts, Document Number USSR-460. In
order to save time I would like you to hear several excerpts from
this affidavit.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You will be shown where they can
be found on the original, and you can say whether it was correctly
read into the record and whether you acknowledge and confirm it.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“My Attitude Towards Adolf Hitler and the Party. Disastrous
influence on the fate of the German State...”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Did you find this place?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable...”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Would you be kind enough to give me a copy so
that I can follow?</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable
ambition were his main peculiarities; running after popularity
and showing off, untruthfulness, vagueness, and selfishness,
which were not restrained for the sake of State or People. He
was outstanding in his greed, wastefulness, and effeminate
unsoldierly manner.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then, a little further on:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“It is my conviction that Hitler very soon realized his character,
but made use of him where it suited his purpose, and
burdened him perpetually with new tasks in order to avoid
his becoming dangerous to himself.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>On Page 24 of your document you give another characteristic:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Führer continued to attach importance to the fact that
from the outside his relations to me seemed normal and good.
He knew I was well thought of in all the really respectable
circles of the German people, and that in general everybody
had great faith in me. This cannot be said of Göring, Von
Ribbentrop, Dr. Goebbels, Himmler and Dr. Ley.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now I will ask you to find Page 27.
<span class='pageno' title='226' id='Page_226'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But there is something missing. “In the same way,
as for instance, Baron Von Neurath, Count Schwerin von Krosigk,
Schacht, Dorpmüller and others,” who were on the other side.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Evidently it was not correctly translated to
you. I will read this passage into the record. Now, on Page 27,
this place is underlined in red pencil: “Dönitz’ strong political inclination
to the Party...”</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] I think the Tribunal could
read this themselves if the defendant says that it is true that he
wrote it. Probably Dr. Siemers could check it over and see that
there are no inaccuracies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, My Lord. Then I shall have the
opportunity to put a very brief question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I will ask you to take a look at a
place on Page 29, which is marked with pencil, where the paragraph
deals with Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Will you confirm that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: What am I supposed to do? Yes, well...</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I am asking you with regard to everything
that I read into the record and what you say just now in this paragraph.
I would like to have an answer from you. Do you confirm
all that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I quite agree with the suggestion
by the Tribunal. However, I should like to ask that the entire document
be submitted. I have only short excerpts before me, and I
would be grateful if I could see the entire document. I assume that
Colonel Pokrovsky agrees to that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Siemers, one part of the document
having been put in evidence, you can refer to the remainder
of the document. You can put the remainder of the document in,
if you want to.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I said that at the time I tried to find an explanation
for the cause of our collapse.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: First, I ask you to give the answer, yes or no.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. On the whole, I agree entirely with this judgment.
But I should like to add that I wrote those things under
entirely different conditions. I do not wish to go into details, and I
never expected that that would ever become public. These were
notes for myself to help me form my judgment later on. I also want
to ask especially that what I said about Generaloberst Jodl should
also be read into the record, or where it belongs, that is, right after
the statement about Field Marshal Keitel. With regard to Field
Marshal Keitel, I should like to emphasize that I intended to convey
<span class='pageno' title='227' id='Page_227'></span>
that it was his manner towards the Führer which made it possible
for him to get along with him for a long time, because if anybody
else had been in that position, who had a quarrel with the Führer
every day or every other day, then the work of the whole of the
Armed Forces would have been impossible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is the reason and the explanation of what I wanted to
express by that statement.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution has no further questions
to ask the defendant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, have you got the whole document
before you? Was that the original document you had before you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: In your writing?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it is typewritten. But it is signed by me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the document can be handed to
Dr. Siemers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Dr. Siemers, do you want to re-examine beyond putting in that
document? Have you any questions you want to ask in addition to
putting in that document?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, on account of the cross-examination made
by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, I should like to re-examine, and I should
like to ask for permission to do that after I have read this document,
so that I can also cover the document tomorrow in this connection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, the thought occurs to me with
respect to this document—do I understand that the Tribunal
will order copies to be distributed to all of the Defense Counsel?
There are matters with respect to the defendants on which the
Counsel might want to examine. They might be surprised.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought it was fair that Dr. Siemers should
see the document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. I have no objection to that. But my point is,
that in the document there is reference to defendants other than the
defendant represented by Dr. Siemers. And at a later date, if this
document is not made known to the others by the reading of it or
by the turning over to them in translated form, they may claim
surprise, and lack of opportunity to examine on it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think some photostatic copies of the document
should be made so that all the defendants referred to therein
may be acquainted with the terms of the document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I just thought I would make that suggestion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 21 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div><span class='pageno' title='228' id='Page_228'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH DAY</span><br/> Tuesday, 21 May 1946</h1></div>

<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with reference to your examination
yesterday, I have to put the following questions to you in
re-examination. Sir David was talking about the fact that before
1933 you had carried out rearmament behind the backs of the law-making
bodies. I think that question, as such, has been clarified;
but there is one supplementary question. On whom did it depend
just what was submitted to the Reichstag?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: On the Reichswehrminister.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And who was the Reichswehrminister at that
time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He was a member of the government and my direct
superior. I had to submit everything to him which I wished to get.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And his name was Gröner, wasn’t it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I draw the Tribunal’s attention to the
extract from the Constitution which I have recently submitted as
Exhibit Number Raeder-3, according to which Article 50 lays down
that the Reich President gives all orders and decrees even where
the Armed Forces are concerned. For their validity decrees
require to be countersigned by the Chancellor or the Minister
concerned. By the act of countersigning responsibility is accepted.
In this, our case, the Reichswehrminister was the competent Reich
Minister; and anything that was done afterwards with reference to
the law-making bodies was a matter for the government to decide.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Sir David has submitted to you
Document C-17. It is the index of a book written by Colonel
Scherff, called <span class='it'>The History of the German Navy from 1919 to 1939</span>.
Was this book ever written?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as I know, only the index was compiled.
I assume that if anything had been written, then it would have
been submitted to me a long time ago, but I never heard of that
at all.
<span class='pageno' title='229' id='Page_229'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that the American
Prosecution, at the time when they submitted the document,
pointed out that as far as they knew the book was not written.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I believe that it is very difficult to
base accusations on an index, but I want you to tell me, Defendant,
when did you learn of this index?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It became known to me during my first interrogation
by an American prosecutor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Furthermore, Document D-854, which is GB-460,
was put to you yesterday. May I come back to one question put by
Sir David. On Page 1 Sir David had been reading as follows:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“But if—as was stated—in nearly all spheres of armament
where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was
violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit—or at
least its violation was prepared—a long time before the
16th of March 1935....”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then Sir David asked you: “Do you want to say that this is
untrue?” You answered but you did not quite finish your reply, at
least it never became quite clear what you said in the German or
the English record. I want you to tell me why you are of the
opinion that Assmann was not quite right in this respect?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It is an utter exaggeration. First of all, violations—as
have been proved here in detail—were mostly of a very minor
nature; and only the number of deviations may have given the
impression that there were many violations. Secondly, in its essential
points, we never actually filled the quotas allowed by the Versailles
Treaty; in fact, we remained below the figures granted. Besides,
only defense measures are involved, very primitive defense
measures—Assmann’s representations are just a great exaggeration.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What you are trying to say, therefore, is that
Assmann’s way of putting it “in practically every sphere of rearmament”
is wrong?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, probably Document C-32 will have led him to
that conclusion because there were so many points. However, on
closer examination they turn out to be very minor points.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: With regard to the important points of rearmament,
that is to say construction of large ships, the Navy did not
violate the Treaty, did it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: By repeating it three times, Sir David emphasized
the fact that you had a great deal of confidence in Assmann. I have
nothing to say against it, but beyond that I would like to put a
supplementary question to you: Did you have that much confidence
<span class='pageno' title='230' id='Page_230'></span>
in him, that in your opinion Assmann could pass a proper legal
judgment? Was he a lawyer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. Assmann was a naval officer who was not used
at the front any more. He was a very clever writer who had
written a few volumes about the first World War. He wrote very
well, but even the volumes on the naval warfare during the first
World War were corrected a great deal by the persons concerned;
but against him and his ability to write history nothing can be said.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think you remember this document from
yesterday. Is it a final historical work? Is it a final and corrected
edition?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. So far as I know, he had not got that far. He
was making summaries and extracts from war diaries and records.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Assmann has written (Document D-854, GB-460):</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“If, in this light, there were plans for ‘preparing the construction’
in 1935 of twelve 275-ton submarines, six 550-ton
submarines, and four 900-ton submarines, then one will have
to consider the strategic points of view valid at that time.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Added together 22 were planned, and for the following year
14 submarines—by no means built, just planned. Are these figures
correct in your opinion?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: They are correct in my opinion. The only thing I am
not sure about is the 900-ton type; I cannot quite explain that.
I cannot remember that at that time we were building 900-ton
boats. Apart from the 250-ton type, our first types were 550-tons,
and only then did the 740-ton boats come. Perhaps he is thinking
of those when he says 900-tons. We did not actually build
900-ton boats.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On Page 158, Sir David has read to you the
following sentence, which I want to repeat because it needs
clarification.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction
that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the
German-British Treaty. Considering the size of U-boats
which had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have
been provided for up to 1938. In reality, 118 were completed
and constructed.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I want to remind you that in the original there is the Note
Number 6 referring to a letter of the Chief of the Naval Budget
Department...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.
<span class='pageno' title='231' id='Page_231'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: ...from the year 1942, presumably containing
statistics on the construction of submarines as the years went by.
I believe that these figures need to be clarified.</p>

<p class='pindent'>According to material at my disposal, it appears that these 55
U-boats were in accordance with the London Agreement; that is to
say, in accordance with the 45 percent agreed on in 1935. You
probably have not got the exact figure in mind, but is that roughly
correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is probably right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And now, the Figure 118. That, according to
material at my disposal, is also well-founded. That is the figure
which corresponds to the 100 percent equality in regard to the
tonnage of submarines. If we had 118 submarines, then our
submarine equipment corresponded to that of Britain at that time.
Is that so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it is correct; and it is also correct that we
included these later boats in the budget and had ordered them
after we had seen Admiral Cunningham and his staff in Berlin on
30 December and had reached a friendly understanding in accordance
with the agreement, allowing us to build 100 percent. The
remark read at the beginning, saying that we had committed most
violations in this sphere, is a complete untruth. Until the beginning
of the war we only built such U-boats as we were allowed to build;
that is to say, first 45 percent and later 100 percent. It was a great
mistake, of course, that we did it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have just said that it was a
complete untruth. I think that, even if Sir David used that word
against you, one ought not to pass such sharp judgment against
Assmann. Do you not think, Admiral, that there was possibly a
legal error on his part when...</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that may be.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: ...he wrote these details and that he was not
really thinking of what you have just told us had happened;
namely, that in 1938 there had been an agreement between England
and Germany, according to which Germany could now build
100 percent?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is quite probable. When I said “untruth,”
I meant incorrectness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that in the Naval
Agreement of 1935, 100 percent was planned from the beginning
and that Germany at first renounced that but had the right at any
time to increase to 100 percent, provided that Great Britain was
notified. The notification is presumably what you described,
Witness; that is the negotiation with Admiral Cunningham?
<span class='pageno' title='232' id='Page_232'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that was on 30 December 1938, or it may have
been 31 December.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant saying that there was a
notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938?
Is that what you said; that there was notification to Admiral
Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Admiral Cunningham came to Berlin, to this friendly
negotiation which had been provided for in the agreement. On that
30 December we arranged with him that from now on, instead of
45 percent, 100 percent would be built.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Was that an oral arrangement or a written one?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It was a conference between the Chief of Staff of the
Naval Operations Staff and Admiral Cunningham, and certain other
individuals, but I cannot remember the details. However, I am
pretty certain that minutes were taken.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, unfortunately, I have not been
able to trace any written evidence. I only know from Exhibit
Number Raeder-11, that is the agreement of 1935, that Germany
could increase the tonnage, and the agreement of ’37, that Germany
had the duty to give notification. Generally, notification is only in
writing in diplomatic relations, although, in my opinion, it was
not necessarily a duty in this case. Negotiations, as the witness said,
did take place.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I, perhaps, add that apart from the submarine
problem, the question of two heavy cruisers, which we had
originally dropped, was also settled. We only wanted to build three
for the time being; and now we were asking for assent to build
the other two, to which we were entitled. That was also agreed
upon in accordance with the agreement.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Document C-140 was put before you yesterday;
it is USA-51. You will find it in the British Document Book 10a on
Page 104. I want to put one sentence from that document to you
again, which has not been quoted by the Prosecution, neither in
November nor yesterday. It appears under Figure 2-c. There is
the following statement—I want to add that this is the question of
sanctions and the possible preparation of a defense against sanctions
in 1935. I quote from 2-c: “For the time being I prohibit any
practical preparations.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, I want to ask you...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is not 10a, 104.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. Elwyn Jones has just been kind enough to
point out to me the English translation. It appears from it that—as
<span class='pageno' title='233' id='Page_233'></span>
I have also the English translation before me—that there are two
documents C-140; one has one page and the other has two. One
has not got a heading and is dated, Berlin, 25 October 1933. In my
opinion it is the document...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is the one on Page 104?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, on Page 104 there is, as I just heard from
Major Elwyn Jones, the other document, C-140, which has the
heading, “Directive for the Armed Forces in Case of Sanctions.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and the date of it is 25 January 1933?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: 25 October 1935, but that is a clerical error. It
is 1933.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United
Kingdom): There appears to be another document which is not in
the document book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, perhaps I may point out that the
Document C-140, USA-51, presented by the Prosecution, must be the
one I have referred to, because it tallies with the record; I mean
the record of the session of 27 November. That is the document
to which I have just now referred.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it C-140 or C-141?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: C-140, the same number, and that is the same
as USA-51.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, perhaps to simplify matters, I may later, after
today’s session or tomorrow submit the Document C-140 in the,
here presented, English and German text.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Read the document now and you can settle
with Mr. Elwyn Jones about the proper notation of the document,
whether it should be C-140 or whatever the exhibit number
ought to be.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In the version
submitted by the Prosecution, preparation for the defense against
sanctions is mentioned. I shall now read a further sentence to you,
and I quote, “For the time being, I prohibit all practical preparations.”
Would it be right, therefore, that in 1933 nothing whatever
was prepared by you in the Navy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. Apart from the ordinary state of preparedness,
nothing was allowed to be done, in accordance with this order.
This was merely a precaution on the Führer’s part in order to take
preparative measures in case the opponent might do something.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You see, the reason why I am asking you this
is that yesterday in the cross-examination the preparations that
you were supposed to have made in this connection were held
against you.
<span class='pageno' title='234' id='Page_234'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>I now come to Document C-189, which is USA-44. I beg to
apologize for troubling the Tribunal in that I am asking them, if
possible, to look at the document again. It is contained in Document
Book Raeder 10, Page 14; and, incidentally, Sir David
re-submitted it yesterday. Sir David attached great importance to
the two words “against England.” There under Figure 2 it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Ob.d.M. expresses the opinion that later on the fleet
must anyhow be developed against England and that, therefore,
from 1936 onward, the large ships must be armed with
35 centimeter guns like those of the <span class='it'>King George</span> class.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Would this mean that you were using the plans of the English
for building ships of the <span class='it'>King George</span> class?</p>

<p class='pindent'>The only reason, therefore, why you were pointing this out was
that you were considering the 35 centimeter guns used in the
<span class='it'>King George</span> class by the British Admiralty?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it was the aim of every navy at that time to
know as early as possible which was the largest caliber of guns
being used by other navies. I said yesterday that, to start with,
we had chosen as a model the French <span class='it'>Dunkerque</span> type, but later
on we discovered that the British used up to 35.6 centimeters. Ships
have to be used, if war breaks out, in their actual state; their gun
caliber cannot be changed any more. Therefore we always went as
high as possible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Would I be right, therefore—please excuse me—if
I said that the expression “against Britain” in this connection is
not correct grammatically, that according to German language
usage it should have said “with reference to England”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it should have said “developing with regard to
England.” I said yesterday that it would have been quite senseless
if I were to do something against Great Britain before the conclusion
of the pact.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that was fully gone into in
cross-examination, and the defendant stated his explanation of the
words used.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: From Document C-190, which is the conversation
on 2 November 1934 aboard the <span class='it'>Emden</span> between you and Hitler,
Sir David has held up to you that Hitler, in a discussion with you
and Göring, said that he considered the expansion of the Navy in
the planned manner an absolutely vital necessity, since war could
not be conducted unless the Navy safeguarded the ore imports from
Scandinavia. It was said that this would have to be understood to
mean that the Navy was planned in view of a war and in view of
safeguarding the ore imports, which really meant aggressive intentions.
Are you of the opinion that the British Navy was not planned
<span class='pageno' title='235' id='Page_235'></span>
to safeguard imports to England or for the event of war and was
not equipped accordingly?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, there is not the slightest doubt about that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Six submarines are mentioned in this document.
Considering that figure, may I ask you to tell me the number of
submarines that Germany would have needed in order to conduct
an aggressive war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Well, at any rate, many more than we had in October
1939, a multiple of that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: From a document, Mr. President, which was
submitted yesterday, D-806, I want to quote, in addition to the
second paragraph which has been quoted, the first paragraph and
put it to the witness. It is D-806, GB-462, submitted yesterday
at noon.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] There it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“1.) Reference: Submarine Construction Program. On 27 October
1936 I made decision regarding the full utilization of the
still available U-boat tonnage according to the Naval Agreement
of 1935 and regarding the immediate ordering of the
construction of <span class='it'>U-41</span> to <span class='it'>U-51</span>.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Were these the rest of the submarines within the 45 percent
limit to which we were entitled according to the Naval Agreement
of 1935?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is right, judging from the figures.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And then, Admiral, you have been very
thoroughly questioned about Austria and Czechoslovakia. Since
that subject has been gone into in detail, I shall confine myself to
just one question: Did you, at any time, receive any tasks or orders
of a foreign political nature from Hitler? And did he ask you for
your advice especially in foreign political matters?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I was never asked for advice, and I had no foreign
political tasks, unless you consider the duties which I had to fulfill
in Bulgaria and Hungary after my resignation of a foreign political
nature.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Regarding Czechoslovakia, that is, concerning
the document about the “Rest Tschechei,” you were asked whether
Hitler had aggressive intentions against Prague at that time. I think
the question ought to have been whether his intentions were for
an aggressive war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In connection with that, you have been asked about Göring’s
threat to bombard Prague, and you quite rightly admitted to Sir
David that such a bombing would be a threat. Sir David commented
on it as being near to aggressive war; but in order to be
<span class='pageno' title='236' id='Page_236'></span>
quite clear, I want you to tell the Tribunal when you learned of
this planned bombing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Only after the whole matter had been settled, and
only by way of conversation. I heard no announcement and
I knew nothing else of it beforehand.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So you knew nothing of it before the occupation
of Prague?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, because military undertakings against Prague
were altogether unknown to me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then there is the Document C-100. Mr. President,
it was presented yesterday under the Number GB-464.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 463, I’ve got it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; 463.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] From that document I want to
quote to you from Page 10. It is Page 3 of the attached document.
I want to put the following sentence to you. I quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Führer asked Ob.d.M. whether there were any special
wishes of the Navy with reference to bases on Dutch-Belgian
coast. Ob.d.M. says no, since bases are within reach of the
British coast and are therefore useless as submarine bases.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>According to this, Witness, you were not in favor of an
occupation of Belgian and Dutch bases, nor did you in any way
occupy yourself with this question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: This was always my point of view, that from the
experience of the first World War Belgium and Holland, as far as
the Navy was concerned, could not offer any useful bases, since all
forces were under the control of the British Air Force. In the first
World War serious fighting occurred between the submarines
leaving their ports and destroyers stationed nearby. Therefore
I declared myself not to be interested in Belgium and Holland.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Skipping various documents, I now come to
D-843, GB-466. This is a document in which Dr. Breuer from the
Oslo Embassy expresses the view that the danger of a British
occupation of Norway was not really very great and that certain
actions were only taken in order to provoke Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have one more question on that. Did the Embassy in Oslo,
that is to say Breuer, know about the information that Admiral
Canaris was supplying to you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot tell you that, as far as I am concerned.
I was never in direct contact with Dr. Breuer, only with the naval
attaché; but I must add that Dr. Breuer had only been in Oslo
for a comparatively short period and that apparently he was not
<span class='pageno' title='237' id='Page_237'></span>
particularly well informed. The statements made by Norwegian
Ministers were certainly not properly judged by him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an order from Hitler that the
Foreign Office should not be informed about probable plans concerning
Norway?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, he expressly ordered that, and it is obvious that
for that reason the Reich Foreign Minister himself was informed
very late.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In other words, as far as you can see, the
ambassador could not have had Canaris’ information through
military sources.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, hardly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then there were several documents, D-844 and
D-845. It was put to you from those that there was no danger in
Scandinavia. Was the information that you received at the time
different?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I had continual information...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All this was gone into yesterday, and the
witness gave the same answer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that the following has never been
mentioned before. Did you know whether as early as 5 April
mines had been laid in the territorial waters off Norway?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Allies had announced it on 7 April, but the
actual operations must have taken place a few days earlier.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>Interposing</span>] Dr. Siemers, the only purpose
of re-examination is to bring out matters which are favorable to
your client which have not been raised in cross-examination, that
is to say, to explain anything which has not been given in cross-examination.
When he has given this account in cross-examination
it is no good putting it to him again in re-examination. We have
heard it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think that on this particular point one explanation
is missing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Yesterday you were asked, rather
unexpectedly, what had been the technical changes since 1936 and
how the legal situation regarding submarine warfare would have
been influenced thereby.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It is a somewhat difficult question to answer in
two seconds. You have mentioned aircraft. Can you not supplement
your statement?
<span class='pageno' title='238' id='Page_238'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I forgot the most important point due to the fact
that there was a rather lively controversy. The important point
is that the spotting of vessels at sea by aircraft was something
quite new and had been developed very efficiently. That development
continued very rapidly during the war, until submarines could
very quickly be located and pursued.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Regarding D-841, which is the affidavit from
Dietmann, may I, with the Tribunal’s permission, make a formal
application? In this affidavit, there is the following sentence:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“It is my personal opinion that the higher authorities of the
Navy in Kiel and other places in Germany had knowledge of
these dreadful things.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It isn’t “had knowledge” but “must have had
knowledge.” It seems to me it is in the translation “must have
had knowledge.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I have not got the German and I do not
know how the original is worded. I only have the English translation.
It is not quite clear to me how the German version was
worded. May I ask the Tribunal...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is the document put in in the original German
or is it put in in the English? The deposition is in German
presumably.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I presume that originally the statement was in
German. The copy I have states that this is a translation and that
is English, but I have not seen the German original.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there must have been
a German copy for the witness yesterday. I don’t know whether
or not it is the original. I didn’t see it but I assume it was.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It isn’t the case that the deposition was made
in German, then translated into English, and then translated back
into German, was it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is why I assume
it was the original. I am sorry this was done. I haven’t got the
original document in front of me but I assume that was so. I will
find out in a moment for you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What is the point, Dr. Siemers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this sentence should be struck from
the document. It does not record a fact.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean you are asking to have it struck
out or...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What do you say, Sir David?
<span class='pageno' title='239' id='Page_239'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the witness sets out
fully the facts in the preceding paragraphs of the affidavit and
then it is true that he introduces the sentence “By my personal
opinion....” but the gist of the statement is that from these facts
which I have stated the higher formations of the Navy in Kiel
and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of these
terrible conditions. A man who has been working in that detachment
of the German Navy and knows the communications between
that detachment and the headquarters is in a position to say
whether headquarters would have knowledge from the facts he
has stated. His inference has a greater probative value than the
inference which the Court can draw. The objection to the statement
of a matter of opinion is where the witness gives his opinion
on a matter on which the Court is equally capable of drawing an
opinion from the same facts, but the importance of that statement
is that he is saying “working in the bow and being familiar with
the chain of command and communications.” I say that anyone at
Kiel must have been able to learn from these facts what was going
on at these places—so that is the narrow point, whether his special
knowledge entitles him to express a view which the Court, without
that special knowledge, would not be in a position to draw.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But ought he not theoretically to state all
the facts; and if he does state all the facts, then the Tribunal will
be in the same position as he is to form a judgment; and it is for
the Tribunal to form the judgment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is exactly the
point to which I was addressing my argument, that there is the
additional fact, that because he was working there, was part of
the chain of naval command and he is speaking of the knowledge
of the naval command from the point of view of somebody who
was working in it, and, therefore, he has on that point his opinion
as to the sources of knowledge; and the necessity of constructive
knowledge is an additional fact. My Lord, the state of a man’s
mind and the expression of his knowledge may be a fact in certain
circumstances, just as much a fact as that stated, as Lord Bowen
once put it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if the state of his knowledge is directly
relevant to an issue.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the
point here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is a form of expert evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, in a sense, it is not
as Your Lordship says, in a form, it is not in a usual form, but
it is the evidence of somebody who has special knowledge. My
<span class='pageno' title='240' id='Page_240'></span>
Lord, it is a well-known distinction, for example, in the laws of
libel between the persons who have expert knowledge and the
public at large; and, My Lord, the opinion of someone with a
special knowledge of the facts must have probative value within
Article 19 of the Charter. My Lord, if the provision that this
Tribunal is not bound by the technical rules of evidence is to mean
anything at all, I submit it should cover the expression of opinion
on a point such as this; that is the ability to have knowledge,
which is given by somebody who is in a special position to state
such an opinion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is a very small point, Sir David, and we
have got to decide the matter and form our own opinion about it;
and this man isn’t here for the purpose of being cross-examined
for anything of that sort.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is so, My Lord, but,
of course that, with respect, cuts both ways. I mean here he gives
an affidavit and part of it as the basis leads up to that conclusion.
I should respectfully submit that that conclusion is a statement
of fact—but, if Your Lordship says so, the time will come when
we can ask Your Lordship to draw that conclusion as a matter
of argument ourselves; but, My Lord, on the general position, the
only reason that I have occupied even this much of the Tribunal’s
time is that Article 19 is an important matter in the view of the
Prosecution and, therefore, we have to argue against its being
whittled down. It is the only reason that I’ve taken up the Tribunal’s
time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I just draw your attention to
one point. Sir David has just been mentioning the well-known
legal difference. That is just what I want to base my argument
on, the difference between facts and opinions. Here it is a question
of opinion and please note the following sentence does even go
further; there, the witness is coming to a legal opinion and he is
stating who is responsible; therefore, he is passing some sort of
judgment. Furthermore, I beg you to consider that this is quite
a minor official who, after all, cannot possibly make statements of
such portent to the effect that higher formations in Kiel and some
other places in Germany—he is quite vague—had some sort of
knowledge.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, before the Tribunal
adjourn, might I make a correction and an apology? My Lord,
I thought that a copy in German had been put to the witness
yesterday—of this affidavit; and apparently it was a copy in English.
The original affidavit was sent off on the 6th of May; it was verified
<span class='pageno' title='241' id='Page_241'></span>
over the telephone by Colonel Phillimore and it has not yet arrived.
An English copy was sent and has been processed and the original
will be put in as soon as it arrives. My Lord, I thought that we had
got the original but apparently it has not yet arrived, but it is
an English document put to the defendant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you let Dr. Siemers see the original as
soon as it arrives?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered
Dr. Siemers’ application and it has decided that the passage to
which he objects and which he asks the Tribunal to strike out in the
affidavit of Walter Kurt Dietmann shall not be struck out in view
of Article 19 of the Charter. The passage contains an opinion only,
and the Tribunal will consider that opinion in relation to the whole
of the evidence when it is before the Tribunal and will decide at
that time the probative value of this opinion as well as the probative
value of the other evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I just have...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, may I remind you that you told
us that your re-examination would take, you hoped, about half
an hour?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, I shall conclude very shortly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, in connection with this
Commando decree which we discussed a good deal, Sir David
yesterday put a case to you regarding the attack on the ship <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>.
In this connection I should like to ask you: Do you recall that in
the testimony of Wagner there was the question of a British sailor
named Evans?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And do you recall also that, according to the
affidavit of Flesch, Number D-864, GB-457, Flesch declared, “I am
unaware of the fact that Evans wore a uniform”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I do not need to submit the document
to you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I recall it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall further that it is said in Document
UK-57, submitted on the same day as Wagner’s testimony:
“The British sailor Evans was captured wearing civilian clothing”?
<span class='pageno' title='242' id='Page_242'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I have the document here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And that was one case where the SD, obeying
the Commando order, committed a murder without the knowledge
of the Navy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. This man had been apprehended by the SD or
the Police, not by the Navy. He had only been interrogated in the
meantime by the admiral.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The second case of which you are accused is the
sabotage attack on German ships near Bordeaux. I clarified this
situation in Wagner’s testimony the other day.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you recall that his document also states that these men
tried to escape to Spain in civilian clothes?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is true.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when using the small fighter craft mentioned
yesterday under the command of Vice Admiral Heye, did
our soldiers ever wear civilian clothing?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, never.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Always in uniform?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, always in uniform. These craft were a weapon
just like submarines, speed boats, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As my last point, Mr. President, I should like to
point out that yesterday Colonel Pokrovsky submitted a document,
USSR-460, which deals with the Moscow notes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, the point is that yesterday the
Tribunal made a decision about submitting to the attorneys for
the Defense extracts from USSR-460. Today the prosecutors have
exchanged opinions among themselves; and the Prosecution of the
United States, represented by Mr. Dodd; Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe
for Great Britain; and myself for Russia, have agreed that it is
necessary for us to request you to permit us to read into the record
here today the three brief extracts referring to Dönitz, to Keitel,
and to Jodl so that they will be included in the record. These
are the excerpts which yesterday the Tribunal did not allow to
have read into the record as evidence. If we understood the Tribunal
rightly it was due to lack of time as the session was dragging
on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Due to these circumstances these three extremely important
excerpts—important from our point of view—the accuracy of which
was confirmed yesterday by the Defendant Dönitz, have not been
included in the transcript of the session. For that reason I am
requesting just about 5 minutes time to read these excerpts into
the record today, on behalf of the Prosecution of the three countries.
<span class='pageno' title='243' id='Page_243'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What would be the most convenient course,
Dr. Siemers? Would you like to have them read now so that you
can put any questions upon them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I make some remarks about
this document? The Soviet Delegation has been kind enough to put
the original at my disposal. I perused the original yesterday, and
I looked at the extracts. The Soviet Delegation desires to retain
the original but has also been kind enough to put instead a photostatic
copy of the extracts involved at the disposal of the High
Tribunal. I am completely in agreement with the suggestion, but
I personally do not have the intention of putting any questions
on this document, which is clear to me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And so I would like to ask that the resolution
put forth by the High Tribunal yesterday be upheld, that this
should not be read, just as other documents were not read out
either.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the document was originally
in German. Presumably it has been translated into Russian;
it has certainly been translated into English. Unless the French
members of the French Prosecution want it read if it hasn’t been
translated into French there doesn’t seem to be any use in taking
up the time of the Tribunal by reading it into the record. We have
got the document in English, and we have all read it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I think there is one reason. Even if
it is read into the record, it will at least be tomorrow before the
transcript is available for the defendants who are referred to, and
this witness, or this defendant, will be off the stand. If they want
to cross-examine about what he has said about them, then we will
have, I suppose, to bring this defendant back on the stand. I think
we will lose far more time by doing that, rather than now having
Colonel Pokrovsky take 5 minutes to read it. They will all hear
it, and then if they want to examine about it, they can do so
promptly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Dr. Siemers, if you don’t want to ask any questions about it,
you can conclude your re-examination now, and then Colonel
Pokrovsky can read the document. Then any of the other defendants
can question the witness if they want to, upon it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would that not be the best way, Colonel
Pokrovsky?</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, certainly.
<span class='pageno' title='244' id='Page_244'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I agree, Mr. President, but I do believe that this
document need not be read, because Mr. Dodd was somewhat
mistaken when he said that the defendants are not familiar with
this document. They and their counsel are thoroughly familiar
with it. I believe everyone knows it, and I do not think that it
needs to be read. However, in the final analysis, it really makes
very little difference to me personally.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If the defendants’ counsel do not want it
read then the Tribunal does not want to have it read unless defendants’
counsel want to ask questions upon it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I, as defense
counsel for Admiral Dönitz, am not interested in having the
document read. I know the document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised that the Defense Counsel
know the document and do not put any value on having it read
nor do they wish to put any questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well then, Mr. Dodd and Colonel Pokrovsky,
it does not seem that it serves any useful purpose to have it read.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, I am satisfied, Your Honor. I have not heard
from Keitel’s attorney; I assume he is satisfied. I am just concerned
that at some later date—a very interesting document to us, of
course—and I am just concerned some question may be raised and
I am also sympathetic to the desires of these defendants not to have
it read publicly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Schacht’s counsel has not spoken either. I think
it might be well, Mr. President, if we had a careful statement from
counsel for each of these men that they do not want to question
or, if so, that we can be completely sure that it will not be
raised again.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the defendants’ counsel are all
here or all the defendants are represented and they must clearly
understand what I am saying and I take it from their silence that
they acquiesce in what Dr. Siemers has said, that they do not
wish the document to be read and they do not wish to ask any
questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I have not understood your decision, My
Lord. Are you permitting me to read into the record these few
excerpts or are you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, Colonel Pokrovsky; I am saying that as
the defendants’ counsel do not wish the document to be read it
need not be read.</p>

<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: We do give a great deal of importance and
significance to this document as it involves not only the interests
<span class='pageno' title='245' id='Page_245'></span>
of the Defense but also the interests of the Prosecution. The document
was accepted by the Tribunal yesterday but for some reason
only a very small part of the characterization given therein by
Admiral Raeder was included in the stenographic record for the
day. I do not see any reason why these excerpts should not be
read into the record now, and why the witness Raeder, who
intimately knew the Defendants Dönitz, Keitel, and Jodl, should
not hear the excerpts here and now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky and Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal
ruled yesterday that it was unnecessary that the document
should be read and the Tribunal adheres to that decision in view
of the fact that the defendants’ counsel do not wish it to be read
and have no questions to put upon it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Yes, Dr. Siemers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I will now conclude my examination
of Admiral Raeder. I do not know whether other questions
will be put to Admiral Raeder.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is there any question which has arisen out
of the cross-examination which the defendants’ counsel want to put?</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to put two
questions, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, in cross-examination you
were confronted with orders and memoranda as to the U-boat
warfare.</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider yourself
responsible for these decrees dealing with the U-boat warfare which
you issued during your term as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I consider myself fully responsible for all decrees
issued as to the U-boat warfare which took place under my
responsibility as well as every naval operation which I ordered. In
the Naval Operations Staff and together with the officers of the
Naval Operations Staff I worked out these directives; I approved
memoranda and in accordance therewith I gave my orders. The
Commander of the U-boat fleet was solely the tactical commander
of U-boats. He transmitted the orders and he carried through the
details of the operations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, yesterday Sir
David charged you that he could not determine who actually gave
the orders to change the log book of the U-boat which sank the
<span class='it'>Athenia</span>. Admiral Godt testified in answer to my question that he
had issued this order at the request of Admiral Dönitz. Do you
know of any facts which would show this testimony of Admiral
Godt to be incorrect?
<span class='pageno' title='246' id='Page_246'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Actually I was never concerned with this case. I only
decreed the three points which have come up here several times.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Therefore, you consider
Admiral Godt’s testimony as being correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I assume that it is correct since everything else he
said was very reliable.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions,
Your Honor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the High Tribunal
I should like to call my first witness, the former Reich Minister
of the Interior, Severing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Severing took the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.</p>

<p class='pindent'>KARL SEVERING (Witness): Karl Severing. I am 70 years old
and I live at Bielefeld.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait one minute. Will you repeat this oath
after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that
I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>You may sit down.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, please tell the High Tribunal what
role you played in the Social Democratic Party up until the year
1933 and the principal ministerial posts you held up until the
year 1933.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: At the age of 16½ I entered the labor union movement
and when I was 18 years old I entered the Social Democratic
Party and as a result of that fact I held honorary positions in the
Party at a relatively early age.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the year 1905 I became councillor in the city of Bielefeld.
I was member of the Reichstag from 1907 until 1912; and I again
became a member of the Reichstag and at the same time a member
of the Prussian Diet in 1919. I was in the Reichstag and in the
Prussian Diet until 1933. I was Minister in Prussia from 1920
until 1921; then again from 1921 to 1926, and from 1930 until 1933;
from 1928 until 1930 I was Reich Minister of the Interior.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When and why did you leave public life?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I retired from official public life in July 1932, and
from political life when the Social Democratic Party was prohibited.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were you arrested when leaving public life in
1933, or perhaps at a later date and, if so, at whose order?
<span class='pageno' title='247' id='Page_247'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I was arrested on the very same day on which the
Enabling Act was scheduled to be read and passed in the Reichstag.
The order for my arrest was signed by the then Minister of the
Interior, Herr Göring, who at that time was also President of the
Reichstag and, if I may utter an opinion, who would have had
the obligation, as President of the Reichstag, to protect the
immunity of the members of the Reichstag. Under breach of this
immunity I was arrested the moment I entered the Reichstag
building.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But you participated in the vote on the Enabling
Act?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The Chairman of the Social Democratic Reichstag
faction had complained to Göring against the treatment to which
I was subjected with the result that I was given leave to vote. But
the voting had already come to a close. However, Reichstag
President Göring still permitted me to give my “no” vote for the
Enabling Act.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You were arrested thereafter but only for a very
short time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: On the next day I had to appear for further interrogations.
I was permitted to leave Berlin on the second day and
was given the order to hold myself ready at my home in Bielefeld
for further interrogations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Despite your well-known anti-Nazi attitude, you
were not arrested later and put in a concentration camp, if I am
not mistaken.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I was never in a concentration camp, thanks to the
respect—and I say this with all modesty—which the old Prussian
officials, my previous subordinates, had for me. At the end of
October 1933 I heard from the Police Chief in Bielefeld that
trouble was brewing for me. The police notified me that they
would not be able to give me any protection and advised me, therefore,
to leave Bielefeld for several months. I followed this advice
and, from October 1933 until the end of March 1934, I lived in
Berlin using a false name. I first stayed with friends, and then
I went to a small Jewish sanatorium at Wannsee. I feared another
arrest in August 1944; according to someone whom I knew in the
police my name was on a list of people who were to be arrested
summarily—men and women who were suspected of having plotted
against Hitler in July 1944.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did you say ’44 or ’34?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: ’44. After the attempted assassination of Hitler
of July 1944.
<span class='pageno' title='248' id='Page_248'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: May I continue?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Please do.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: After the attempted assassination of Hitler orders
were given to the police to arrest certain people. My name was
on the Bielefeld list. Then a police official whom I knew from
the past pointed out that I was close to my seventieth year and
had lost my son in the war. Thus he succeeded in having my name
struck off the list.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Aside from what you have told us now, did
you suffer any further disadvantage at the hands of the National
Socialists?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Well, I was considerably hindered in my movements.
I was not especially surprised that my mail was censored
and my telephone tapped. I considered that as a matter of course.
But I could not even take a trip without being followed and
watched by the police.</p>

<p class='pindent'>If you do not mind, I should like to call your attention to the
fact that in addition to material damages there is also harm to one’s
ideals (ideelle Schädigungen), and in this respect I suffered a great
deal at the hands of the National Socialist Party after it assumed
power. A political measure, taken in connection with the polls of
1932, was used against me, I might say, in a criminal way. They
talked about me and my friend Braun as the “thieves of millions,”
and this epithet was also applied to the members of my family.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, is this witness going to give
any evidence which has relevancy to the defendant’s case?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, bring him to it then as quick as possible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Herr Minister, try to be as brief as
possible in this connection. It is of course true that with respect to
your ideals you suffered harm as well, but as the basis of my
examination and your testimony I would like to ascertain whether
serious harm was caused to you and I would like to have you tell
us, but briefly, whether National Socialism...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, what relevancy has this got to
Raeder’s case?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, my intention is to show that
Minister Severing, after a brief description of his life during Nazism
can, without bias, give entirely impartial answers in reference to
Raeder. Since he had no advantages but rather disadvantages at
the hands of the Nazis and on the other side...
<span class='pageno' title='249' id='Page_249'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have dealt sufficiently with the
disadvantages now. Go to the matter which relates to Raeder. He
has given us, from 1933 to 1944, a fairly general account of his life
and that ought to be sufficient.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses the Defendant Raeder,
that in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he violated
the Treaty of Versailles, in the intention of carrying on aggressive
wars, and that behind the back of the Reich Government. In order
to shorten the testimony, I would like to point out to you that it is
an undisputed historical fact that Germany, in developing her
Navy within the framework of the Versailles Treaty, violated the
stipulations of the Versailles Treaty. All that is known to the
Tribunal. Even before this time, the government applied for the
construction of armored cruiser A within the compass of the Versailles
Treaty. A great inner political conflict arose over the
construction of this cruiser and, in connection with a debate before
the Reichstag on this cruiser, the witness made a speech. I have a
brief excerpt from this speech which I should like to submit to you
and which I should like to read. Mr. President, this is Exhibit
Number Raeder-5, to be found in Document Book 1, Page 13. This
is an extract from a speech by the former Reichsminister Karl
Severing before the German Reichstag on 20 January 1928.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Herr Minister, at this period of time
you were not a Minister; rather, you gave this speech as a deputy
of the Social Democratic Party?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, that is correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The extract reads:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Now the armored cruiser. The fact that a government, which
knows precisely what gigantic sums we must raise during
the coming year, should make such demands, is, to say the
least, quite surprising. It says, the Peace Treaty permits it—yes,
but the Peace Treaty also decrees the payment of
reparations. The 9,300,000 marks demanded for this year
will play their decisive part only in the consequences entailed
which would require the raising of several hundred million
marks, which during the next few years seems to me
absolutely impossible. Considering the development of weapons
for naval warfare, I am not convinced of the military value
of armored cruisers. It may be that armored cruisers are the
backbone of the defense at sea, as the government says. But,
to form an active fighting unit (Gefechtskörper), the backbone
must also be made up of other elements, of U-boats
and airplanes; and as long as we are not allowed to build
these, armored cruisers are of very little value even for
defense.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='250' id='Page_250'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Is that extract from the speech correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, that, extract is reproduced correctly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is it right to conclude here that the Social
Democratic Party and you, personally, at that time, were of the
opinion that the Wehrmacht which was granted Germany by the
Versailles Treaty might not be sufficient for a defensive war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That is correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Will you please comment on that a little more
extensively.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That the 100,000-man army granted to Germany
was not sufficient even for a defensive war was and is known
today possibly to everyone in Germany concerned with politics.
Germany got into a very bad situation with regard to her eastern
neighbors since the establishment of the Corridor. The insular
position of East Prussia forced Germany even at that time to take
measures which I reluctantly helped to carry out; but the population
of East Prussia had a right to be protected against attacks
which were threatening from the East. I am not speaking about an
aggressive war and I am not speaking of any plans of the Polish
Government; but I would like to refer you to the fact that in the
years 1919, 1920, and 1921, there were aggressive groups in Poland
who set foot on German soil, possibly with the idea of establishing
a <span class='it'>fait accompli</span>...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, this evidence is all a matter
of argument. Not only is it a matter of argument, but we have had
it over and over again from nearly all the defendants and a good
many of their witnesses; and, surely, it is not assisting the Tribunal
in the very least to know what this witness said in 1928 or what
view he took in 1928.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I believe this
will become clear in the following. Minister Severing was a
member of the government that held this cabinet meeting of
18 October 1928. I agree with the High Tribunal that the matters
have been heard frequently—these things only once, however—but
I should like to point out that Sir David even yesterday in cross-examination
accused the defendant, despite his testimony, that,
against the will of the Reich Government and against the wish of
the Parliament, he had violated the Treaty of Versailles. If, therefore,
after the testimony of Raeder, the Prosecution persists in
their opinion, I have no other possibility to prove the incorrectness
of the opinion of the Prosecution than by questioning a
witness who...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The question whether the Treaty of Versailles
was violated is a question of fact and, of course, upon that
<span class='pageno' title='251' id='Page_251'></span>
you can give evidence and you did give evidence through the
Defendant Raeder; but this witness is not talking about the question
of fact. He is arguing that Germany was entitled to defend herself
in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. That is what I understood
his evidence to be and that is a question of argument, not a question
of fact.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, as far as I know juridically...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the class of evidence which has
just been given by this witness will not be listened to by the
Tribunal. If you want to prove facts by him, you can prove them,
but you cannot prove arguments or his views upon arguments.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Could Germany with her Wehrmacht protect
herself against the incursions in Silesia by Poland?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In the year 1920 the Wehrmacht would not have
been able to protect Germany in East Prussia; therefore, it was
necessary to protect the population of East Prussia, and this was
achieved in that I, personally, agreed that all weapons which were
found in East Prussia were to be given to the population. Under
conditions which applied at that time, it was, even for purposes of
inspection, very hard to pass through the Corridor by rail; so that
in 1920, I had to make a tour of inspection by way of water from
Stolpmünde to Pillau. I am mentioning this fact to show the
difficulties of transportation through the Corridor. In 1920 and ’21,
it was not possible for the German Wehrmacht to prevent attacks
of Polish insurgents in Upper Silesia and, I am sorry to say, and
I emphasize “I am sorry” that a certain self-defense had to be
created in order to protect and defend German life and German
property.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, were the measures with regard
to rearmament as they were wanted and accounted for since
January 1928 by Reichswehrminister Gröner based on defensive or
offensive ideas as far as you know Gröner?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: As far as I am acquainted with Gröner and his
own personal way of carrying on his office, everything that he
conceived and carried out was in view of defense.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then this should also apply to the armored
cruiser A. I should like to know why the Social Democratic Party,
which was interested in the idea of defense, was against the
building of this armored cruiser.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In 1928 the Social Democratic Party was against
the building of the armored cruiser as the economic situation did
not warrant expenses which were not absolutely necessary. And
the Social Democratic Party wanted to prove and to show that
<span class='pageno' title='252' id='Page_252'></span>
they did everything within their power in order to make the much-discussed
disarmament a reality. They did not believe that the
building of an armored cruiser would be a favorable gesture for the
bringing about of appropriate negotiations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On 28 June 1928 a new Reich Government was
formed. Müller was Reich Chancellor; Stresemann was Foreign
Minister, and you were Minister of the Interior. What position
did your government take to the then pending problem of universal
disarmament stipulated in Versailles, or to the then pending
problem of rearmament by Germany?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have just made a reference to this problem. We
were of the opinion in the Social Democratic Party, even after
entering the Müller government, that we would have to use all
our efforts in order to solve just this problem. In September of
1928 the then Reich Chancellor Müller, replacing the Foreign
Minister Stresemann who was ill, went to Geneva in order to
bring this problem up before the League of Nations. Müller made
a very resolute speech which, if I remember correctly, was received
very coolly by Allied statesmen; so that any practical suggestions
for the realization of disarmament could not be hoped for in the
near future.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, in July 1928 you spoke with
Reichswehrminister Gröner about the budget and specifically about
the fact that secret budgets of the Wehrmacht, on the armored
cruiser and so forth, had become known. What attitude did you
take in this connection and what were the results following your
agreement with Gröner?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In order to answer this question I would like to
touch again on the extract from my speech, which you just submitted
to the High Tribunal. In the same Reichstag session in which
I gave this speech, the Reichswehrminister Gröner appeared for
the first time as successor of Gessler. I had said a few farewell
words in honor of Gessler who was leaving. I greeted the new
Minister with the remark that my political friends would show
him respect, but that he would have to earn our confidence first.
It was probably while thinking of this remark that Gröner came
up to me in the first session of the Müller Government and said
that he was looking forward to a sincere collaboration with me.
I quoted a passage from <span class='it'>Iphigenie</span> on that occasion, “May there be
truth between us.” Only complete sincerity would make possible
fruitful co-operation, I said.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks that this
is an absolute waste of time and this speech of the witness is
entirely irrelevant. Why do you not ask him some questions which
have some bearings on the case of Raeder?
<span class='pageno' title='253' id='Page_253'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that the Prosecution
has made the accusation that the rebuilding was undertaken
by means of a secret budget and that a secret rearmament was
carried on with the idea of starting wars of aggression. It is not
quite clear to me how I can cross-examine the witness in any
other way than by asking him how these secret budgets, which to
a certain extent are practically identical with violations of the
Versailles Treaty, were dealt with in his government. That is
exactly what I just questioned the witness on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This speech that you have drawn our attention
to is simply a speech in which he said that he did not think that
armored cruisers were of any use. That is the only meaning of
the speech, except insofar as it refers to the fact that reparations
had not been paid. For the rest it simply says that armored
cruisers, in his opinion, are of no use.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I may not and do not wish to
make a plea here. In the speech which I read something else is said.
It says there that the Social Democratic Party was against the
building of this armored cruiser, because of economic reasons and
not because of strategic reasons, and that if an armored...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What has that got to do with a charge of
making an aggressive war in 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I did not raise the accusation of
an aggressive war; the Prosecution did that, but I have to protect
my client against the accusation that in 1928 he had intentions of
carrying on an aggressive war; I assert that he had no intention of
that sort, that the Reich Government knew about the violations of
the Treaty, that the Reich Government took the responsibility for
them, and the testimony of the Minister will show that these are
actual facts which were challenged only yesterday.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Ask him some direct questions on issues of
fact. Then the Tribunal will listen to them if they are relevant, but
the Tribunal considers that the evidence of his speech that you
have been dealing with is an utter waste of time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I shall try to be brief. As a result I shall put
questions to the witness which he will answer one by one.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] You just said that you demanded of
Gröner confidence and absolute truthfulness. Did you ask him in
this connection for enlightenment on the secret budgets and the
violations of the Treaty of Versailles which had taken place up to
that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I specifically asked him for enlightenment since,
in January of 1928, the then Reich Chancellor Marx had frankly
admitted that under Kapitän Lohmann in the Navy Department
<span class='pageno' title='254' id='Page_254'></span>
there had been misrepresentations in the budget which could not
be in accordance with good bookkeeping and political honesty.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Gröner reply?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Gröner then told me that he had the intention of
discussing these matters at a cabinet meeting and of clarifying all
these matters.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were the commanders-in-chief of the two
branches of the Wehrmacht to be present at this meeting?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: On 18 October they were to appear and did appear.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, when did you meet Admiral
Raeder for the first time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The first official contact, according to my recollection,
was made the beginning of October 1928, probably on the day
when he paid me an official visit on my assuming office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-6, I submitted to the
High Tribunal, as the High Tribunal will probably recall, a speech
by Raeder dated 23 January 1928. There was a covering letter with
this document. This letter will now be submitted to the witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] According to this document, did your
meeting with Raeder take place on 5 October 1928, 5 days after the
appointment of Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: This discussion probably took place on that day.
May I mention...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Just a moment, Herr Minister. I think it will be
safer if you look at the letter. There it says: “Following our discussion
of 5 October...” May I ask you to confirm to the High Tribunal
that this report made by Raeder was saved by you and that it is
a true and authentic copy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The letter which I put at your disposal is the
original of the letter by Raeder. It is in accordance with the
incidents which you just mentioned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then, on 5 October this conversation with Raeder
did take place. Were the conversations between you and Raeder
basically in accordance with the ideas expressed in this speech?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall that in this speech Raeder declared
emphatically that a war of aggression was a crime?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I remember that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you on the occasion of this conversation tell
Raeder that you had agreed with Gröner that the actual violations
of the Treaty of Versailles would have to be discussed and
clarified and that a cabinet meeting would have to be held?
<span class='pageno' title='255' id='Page_255'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not recall this detail, but it was quite probable.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you demand of Raeder that between yourself
and him there should be absolute sincerity and truthfulness?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Of Raeder, too, but especially of the chiefs of
the Army.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As a result of this discussion with Raeder, did
you have the impression that you could work with Raeder in a
satisfactory manner and that he would tell you the truth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I had that impression.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On 18 October 1928 the cabinet meeting which
we have already mentioned took place. May I ask you to describe
briefly that cabinet meeting, provided it is agreeable to the High
Tribunal to have the witness picture this session. I believe that a
description of this session would save time, rather than to have
me ask single questions. Therefore, Herr Minister, be brief in
telling us what happened.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: At this session, members of the cabinet were
familiarized with the details of what might be considered a concealment
of the budget or violations of the Versailles Treaty. Both
gentlemen, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy, spoke, if I remember rightly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did the entire cabinet attend?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, perhaps with the exception of one or two
members who were ill, but it was a session which in general might
be called a plenary session.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The principal members were present?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were Müller, Stresemann present?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot tell you whether Stresemann was present.
He was still ill in September and whether he had recovered by
18 October, I cannot say. But I might add, that if Herr Stresemann
was not present, certainly someone else was present as an
authorized deputy from the Foreign Office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Admiral Raeder and General Heye at this
meeting expressly give the assurance to the cabinet—as I remember,
in form of an affidavit—that only those violations had occurred
which were mentioned by them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Whether that was proclaimed in a solemn manner
by affidavit or by word of honor, I cannot say; but, in any event,
at the request of the Reich Chancellor and especially at my own
request, they said that no further violations would take place.
<span class='pageno' title='256' id='Page_256'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: They assured you specifically that there would
be no further violations without the knowledge of the Reich
Government?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, exactly that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And over and above that, they stated that now
the Cabinet knew about everything?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: A declaration to that effect was made?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, such a declaration was made.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were important matters connected with these
secret budgets or violations of the Treaty of Versailles?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I may state here and have to admit even that
since I was used to violations of the Versailles Treaty, I was
especially interested in the extent of the violations with regard to
the sum. I wanted to know what I could do in my new capacity
against secret arms-bearers and against illegal organizations; and
I asked what was the total sum involved. I was thereupon told—and
I believe that this was set down and confirmed in writing later—that
perhaps 5½ to 6 million marks was the amount involved in
these secret budgets.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you remember the budget figures
of those days better than I do. What can we gather from these
figures? Must we conclude that they were grave violations involving
aggressive intentions or may we gather that in the final analysis
they were just trifles?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not have the figures as they apply to the
budget plans of the Navy and the Army. I cannot quote the figures
from memory. But the impression I gained from the reports of
the two Wehrmacht leaders was that only trifles were involved.
It was this impression which caused me to assume a certain political
responsibility for these things, and especially in view of the fact
that we were assured that further concealment of budget items or
other violations were not to occur in future.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember that Gröner at this session
declared that the small infringements of the Treaty dealt purely
with defense measures, with antiaircraft guns, coastal fortifications,
<span class='it'>et cetera</span>?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot give you the details today, but I might
remind you that all the speeches which Gröner made at the time
when he was Defense Minister were along these general lines. In
all of his speeches in the Reichstag, Herr Gröner expressly declared
that he was an advocate of sound pacifism. In answer to your
<span class='pageno' title='257' id='Page_257'></span>
question I reply that Gröner’s statements, and also my own, were
based on defense and defensive measures.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In other words at the end of this session, the
Reich Government expressly accepted the responsibility for these
infringements and the small secret budget items?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: To the extent that we have mentioned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder in the future adhere to the clear
directives of the Reich Government?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot answer that in a positive manner, but
I can say that I did not observe any violations on the part of the
Navy in respect to the agreements during my term of office as
Minister of the Interior.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Are you personally of the opinion, since you
know Raeder sufficiently well, that he kept the promise he made to
you not to resort to secret violations?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Raeder gave me the impression that he was an
honest man and I believed that he would keep his word.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Just one more question, Herr Minister. Of
course, you cannot remember the details, but do you perhaps recall
that on the occasion of the cabinet meeting of 18 October there
was discussion about a Dutch firm which was designing U-boats?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, I cannot give you details of the discussion; but
I do know that at that period of time, there was much talk—either
in another cabinet meeting or by a subcommittee of the Reichstag
or by a different parliamentarian body—of experimental workshops
which had been established for the Army and the Navy in Russia,
Sweden, and Holland.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Purely experimental workshops?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I can say only that there was talk to this effect.
Whether these experimental workshops had been established I
cannot tell you from my own experience.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, could Germany, by reason of
governmental discussions going on at the time, hope that some
day, despite the Versailles Treaty, she would be permitted to
build U-boats?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The leading statesmen...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, how can he answer that there
was a hope that they would be allowed to build U-boats? That is
what your question was, was it not; was there a hope?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I know, Mr. President, these questions were
already dealt with by the governments which obtained through the
years 1928 to 1932; and I believe that Stresemann carried on these
<span class='pageno' title='258' id='Page_258'></span>
discussions. Since Stresemann is no longer alive, I would like to
ask Herr Severing on this point.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It seems to the Tribunal that it is mere
political gossip.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, on whom did it depend what was
brought up in the Reichstag? Raeder is accused of acting behind
the back of the Reichstag. Who submitted this to the Reichstag?
Did Raeder do that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not quite follow you. Who submitted the
budget, you mean?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The budget went through the hands of the experts
of the various Ministries and the entire Cabinet, and the budget
was submitted to the Reichstag by the Cabinet.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The matter of dealing with the budget before
the Reichstag was a matter for the Reich Government and not for
the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Inasmuch as a budget item was submitted to the
Reichstag, the competent Reich Minister took care of it in the main
committee and the plenary session of the Reichstag, but the political
responsibility was assumed by the entire Reich Cabinet.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It was never alleged as to the Defendant
Raeder that he had submitted the budget to the Reichstag; it was
never put to him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, yesterday it was asserted...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Don’t argue! Go on with any other questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall whether at the end of 1929 you
talked with a member of the government with regard to the
various leading personalities in the Wehrmacht, and that you made
a comment which subsequently became known concerning certain
personalities?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, it is correct that on one occasion I had been
asked to give a personal estimate of certain military personalities.
I named Gröner and Raeder in this connection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, how many concentration camps
do you know of?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: How many do I know of now?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry; not now. How many did you know
of before the collapse of Germany?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Perhaps 6 to 8.
<span class='pageno' title='259' id='Page_259'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you know before the collapse
of Germany or rather did you know in 1944 already about the mass
murders which have been dealt with so frequently in this
proceeding?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I gained knowledge of concentration camps when
murder, if I may say so, became professional and when I heard of
a few cases which affected me personally very deeply. First of all,
I was told that the Police President of Altona, a member of the
Reichstag and a Social Democrat of the right wing of the Party,
had been murdered in the concentration camp at Papenburg.
Another friend of mine, the chairman of the Miners Union, Fritz
Husemann, is said to have been murdered shortly after his being
committed to the same concentration camp. Another friend of
mine, Ernst Heimann, was beaten to death in the Oranienburg
Camp according to the reports received by his family.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Dachau was known even in the north of Germany as a concentration
camp. Some Jewish inmates returned from Buchenwald
in the spring of 1939, and in that way I learned of this camp.
Columbia House at Berlin I figured to be a concentration camp also.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That was my only knowledge of camps and their horrors up
until the time when the London radio started to report about concentration
camps. I perhaps might mention another case. In 1944
a friend of mine, a member of the Reichstag, Stefan Meier, who
had served 3 years in the penitentiary, was put into a concentration
camp in or near Linz. After a brief stay there he was murdered,
according to reports received by his family.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you just heard of these and similar
individual cases?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You were not familiar with the fact that thousands
were murdered every day in gas chambers or otherwise in the
East?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I believed I should tell the High Tribunal only of
those cases which were, so to say, authentically reported to me.
Everything I learned of later through indirect reports, from my
friend Seger or from the book of the now Generalintendant Langhoff,
had been told me but I had no possibility of checking up on
their accuracy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you and your Party friends
have the possibility...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, are you going to finish this
examination, or are you going on? Do you see the clock?
<span class='pageno' title='260' id='Page_260'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I should like to leave the decision to the
High Tribunal as to whether we shall have a recess now. I understand
there will be a cross-interrogation so that...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but presumably you know what
questions you are going to ask; I don’t.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I cannot say exactly what answer the witness is
going to give. It might take perhaps another 10 minutes, Your Honor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn now till a quarter
past 2 o’clock.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<h2><span class='pageno' title='261' id='Page_261'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Saturday
morning.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, Mr. Dodd, could you tell us what the position is with
reference to the documents of the Defendants Von Schirach, Sauckel,
and Jodl?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: As far as Von Schirach is concerned, we are waiting
for a ruling on those documents concerning which we were heard on
Saturday. I’m sorry, that was on Seyss-Inquart. I wasn’t sure the
documents were ready.</p>

<p class='pindent'>These documents are all ready; they are all translated and in
book form.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will it be necessary to have any further
discussion of them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I believe not, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then, we can take it that we
needn’t have another argument about those documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, Sir, I comprehend no need for any further argument
on Von Schirach’s documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>With reference to Sauckel, I have asked our French colleagues
what the situation is, since they have the primary responsibility.
And so far as the Prosecution is concerned, I am told that Mr. Herzog
of the French Prosecution staff is on his way here and he will
be able to report more accurately.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, we can mention that at a later stage
then. Schirach at any rate then is ready to go on?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: He is ready to go on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Sir David has the information about the Defendant
Jodl.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Roberts.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the position with regard to Jodl’s
documents is that Dr. Jahrreiss produced for me a draft book, just
before Easter, which had a certain number of documents, all except
four of which had already been exhibited, and therefore no objection
could be taken to them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>My Lord, the other four were all short. Two, I thought, were
objectionable on the ground that they referred to alleged war crimes
by one of the Allies. But, My Lord, they were so short that I thought
the best course would be for them to be translated—they were only
<span class='pageno' title='262' id='Page_262'></span>
a page or so, each of them—so that when the books had been translated
any objection could be taken, and then the Tribunal could
shortly decide the matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, as there are only four of them and only
two which might be objected to, that can be dealt with when we
come to hear the case.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there are only two.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We needn’t have any special hearing for it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: No, My Lord, certainly not. It could be disposed
of in a very few minutes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl):
Mr. President, I should like to say one more word about these Jodl
documents. We are having difficulties over one document. It is the
affidavit of Lohmann, which we submitted in German, but which
was not translated into English for us on the grounds that only such
documents could be translated which the Prosecution had already
accepted; and the Prosecution had adopted the standpoint that it
cannot express any opinion on that document as it has not been
translated into English.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have mentioned this in a brief petition to the Tribunal, and I
hope that the Tribunal will settle the matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Lohmann’s affidavit which is very
short—it goes principally to character—and it is really not objectionable,
but I had to point out that it hadn’t actually been allowed
by the Tribunal in their order. The Tribunal ordered it in
regard to...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If it is accepted in the translation, that is all
that is necessary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I entirely agree, and it is all on one
page.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Let it be translated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, it may be convenient
for me to indicate to the Tribunal at this stage of Raeder’s
case that with regard to the witness Lohmann, the Prosecution does
not now desire to cross-examine that witness in view of the documents
which are before the Court, and the fact that the matters his
affidavit dealt with were dealt with yesterday by my learned friend
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in his cross-examination of Raeder, and
finally, in view of the passages of time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the Prosecution
want to cross-examine Lohmann?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord.
<span class='pageno' title='263' id='Page_263'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to
ask any questions of Lohmann?</p>

<p class='pindent'>Very well, then I understand that the witness Lohmann is being
kept here and perhaps a message could be given to the Marshal
that he needn’t remain.</p>

<p class='pindent'>M. JACQUES B. HERZOG (Assistant Prosecutor for the French
Republic): Mr. President, in the name of the French Prosecution
I should like to say a word about the documents presented by
Sauckel’s defense. I have no objection to the presentation of these
documents with the reservation, of course, that a ruling on them
be made after they are presented. We have no objection to the
documents being translated or presented.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary or desirable for
there to be a special hearing with reference to the admissibility,
or can that be done in the course of the Defendant Sauckel’s case?
At the moment I apprehend that the documents have been looked
at for the purpose of translation. They have now been translated.
If you think it necessary that there should be any special hearing
before the case begins, as to admissibility, we should like to know.
Otherwise they would be dealt with in the course of the case,
in the course of Sauckel’s case.</p>

<p class='pindent'>M. HERZOG: I think, Mr. President, it will be sufficient if the
Tribunal deals with these documents during the course of the
defendant’s case. I do not think we need a special hearing as far
as these documents are concerned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, as far as I have been able to
ascertain, you have inadvertently not yet answered one of my
questions clearly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>With reference to the concentration camps you said that you
had heard of certain individual cases, and you named the individual
cases. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I just want to ask
you in conclusion: did you hear of the mass murders which have
been mentioned in this Trial, whereby at Auschwitz, for instance,
an average of about 2,000 persons a day were exterminated in
the gas chambers? Were you in possession of this knowledge before
the collapse, or did you not know anything about that either?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I knew nothing whatsoever about these mass
murders, which only became known in Germany after the collapse
of the Hitler regime, partly through announcements in the press
and partly through trials.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, what could you and your
friends in the Party do during the National Socialist regime, against
<span class='pageno' title='264' id='Page_264'></span>
the National Socialist terror which you have partly mentioned, and
did anyone abroad support you in any way in this respect?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: If you will limit the question to asking what I and
my political friends could do and did do after 30 January to combat
the Hitler regime, then I can only say—but little. If there was any
question of resistance against the Hitler regime, then that resistance
was not a centrally organized one. It was restricted to the extent
that in various cities the opponents of the Nazis met to consider
how one might, at least by propaganda, overcome the mental terror.
No open resistance was possible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>But perhaps I should here draw your attention to the following:
On 30 January I personally made a decisive attempt—or rather an
attempt which, in my opinion, might have proved decisive—to
oppose the Hitler regime. In the autumn of 1931 I had an interview
with the Chief of the Army Command, Von Hammerstein, during
which Von Hammerstein explained to me that the Reichswehr
would not allow Hitler to usurp the seat of the President of the
State. I remembered that conference, and on 30 January 1933
I inquired whether Von Hammerstein would be prepared to grant
me an interview. I wanted to ask him, during that interview,
whether he was still of the opinion that the Reichswehr would not
only declare itself to be against the Hitler regime, but would
oppose such a regime by force of arms.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Hammerstein replied to the effect that, in principle,
he would be prepared to have such an interview with me, but
that the moment was not a propitious one. The interview never
took place.</p>

<p class='pindent'>If you were to ask me whether in their efforts to fight the Hitler
regime, at least by propaganda, my political friends had received
any support from foreign personalities whom one might have called
anti-Fascists, then I must say—unfortunately no. On the contrary,
we quite often noticed, with much sorrow, that members of the
English Labor Party, not officials but private individuals, were
Hitler’s guests and that they returned to England to praise the then
Chancellor Hitler as a friend of peace. I mention Philipp Snowden
in that connection and the <span class='it'>doyen</span> of the Labor Party, Lansbury. In
this connection I would like to draw your attention to the following
facts: In the year...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The attitude of political parties in other
countries has nothing to do with any question we have to decide,
absolutely nothing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this is sufficient. I have no further
questions to ask, Herr Minister, and I thank you.
<span class='pageno' title='265' id='Page_265'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Minister Severing, during your term of office
was the figure of 100,000 men, conceded by the Peace Treaty of
Versailles for a normal army, ever exceeded?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have no official knowledge of that. I would
assume, however, that that was not the case.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Do you know at all whether, at the end of
1932, the League of Nations made a promise or held out prospects
that this Army of 100,000 could be increased to 300,000 men?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Here too I am unable to give you any official
information. I can, however, give the following explanation: In
1932 I received a letter from a party friend of mine, Dr. Rudolf
Breitscheid, who was a member of the League of Nations Delegation
and in which he mentioned rumors of that kind; but he also added
other information...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we don’t think that rumors
are relevant in the Trial. He says he can’t give us any official
information. He then begins to give us rumors. Well, we don’t
want to hear rumors.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, what the witness is now saying
is rather more than a rumor and I think you will probably be able
to judge for yourself when he has entirely answered the question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He is speaking of rumors. If you have any
fresh question to ask him, you can ask him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did the increase of the Army from 100,000
to 300,000 men ever assume any palpable shape in the sense that
the question was discussed elsewhere, too?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have just told you that Dr. Breitscheid was a
member of the League of Nations Delegation and that his information
to me was not a fabric of his own invention. That information
stated that an extension of the Army had been envisioned but
that this extension would probably be made at the expense of the
police. Dr. Breitscheid informed me accordingly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much, I have no further
questions to ask.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: You have just told us that you had no knowledge
of the Jewish mass murders in Auschwitz before the collapse.
Did you have any knowledge of other measures or deeds perpetrated
against Jews which you could define as criminal?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I experienced one such case personally. In 1944 a
friend of mine in Bielefeld, Karl Henkel, was arrested and transferred
to a labor camp near Emden, and he was shot on the
third day.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you know who arrested him, what authority?
<span class='pageno' title='266' id='Page_266'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: He was arrested by the Bielefeld Gestapo.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did that occur in connection with some large scale
action or was it an individual case?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: It appeared to me to be an individual case.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did you hear of a number of such individual
cases at that time, that is in 1944?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In 1944 I did not hear of any individual cases of
murder, but I did hear of deportations from Westphalian towns to
unknown destinations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: What authorities dealt with these deportations?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot say for certain, but I assume that it was
the Gestapo.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Are you of the opinion that considerable sections
of the population knew of these occurrences?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: You mean, of the deportations?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: They usually took place quite publicly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Are you of the opinion that the people were
generally just as well acquainted with these events as the members
of the organizations as, for instance, the ordinary SS man, or would
you say that the ordinary SS man knew more than other people?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Oh yes. He was informed of the places of destination
of these transports.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: But I understood you to say, that the convoys
were not escorted by the SS; you said it was the Gestapo.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I have just stated that I assumed that the
Gestapo had conducted the arrests and the lootings, but I did not
receive any assurances that this was exclusively the work of the
Gestapo.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And as to the other measures—apart from such
deportations—which might be called a kind of local pogrom, have
I understood you to say that you did not hear of them often?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Local pogroms occurred in November 1938.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did you, during the execution of such measures,
of which we have frequently heard, make your own observations
or did you remain at home?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I remained at home. I only saw the results of these
pogroms afterwards in the shape of destroyed Jewish firms, and
in the remains of the synagogues.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And to which organizations or groups do you
attribute these events of November 1938?
<span class='pageno' title='267' id='Page_267'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: My own judgment would not have any decisive
value, but I tell you quite frankly, it was the SA or the SS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And what makes you think that it was precisely
these two groups?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Because the members of these groups, in my home
town of Bielefeld, were called the instigators of the synagogue fires.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: By whom?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: They were indicated by name by the population in
general.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: You knew about the concentration camps. Can
you still remember when you heard about them for the first time?
It is important at least to determine the year.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No. I cannot tell you that at the present moment.
I can only reply to your question by referring to individual dates.
The first murder in a concentration camp became known to me
when I heard that, in the Papenburg Concentration Camp, the
former member of the German Reichstag and Police President of
Altona had been shot. That could have been either in 1935 or 1936,
I am no longer sure when.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And later, did you hear of many other such
cases, or did you have personal knowledge of them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: From personal knowledge which is so certain that
I could give it with a clear conscience to the Tribunal only in the
cases I mentioned this morning.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Were you told that concentration camps were
places in which the political opponents of the regime were to be
interned without anything worse happening to them than loss of
liberty?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Whether I was told that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Whether you were told that, whether you heard
that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No. On the contrary, I heard that concentration
camps meant to the population the very incarnation of all that is
terrible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: What do you mean by “population”? Do you
also mean those sections of the population who had some official
connection with the Party: small Party members, small SA men
and small members of the SS?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot say anything about that since I conversed
nearly exclusively with opponents of the system.
<span class='pageno' title='268' id='Page_268'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that these opponents with whom
you conversed presented a united front against anyone who wore
a party emblem or a badge of some organization?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No. This question upon which you are dwelling
affects wide sections of the population, their general humanitarian
feeling, and their feeling of indignation about conditions in the
camps, as and when the facts became known.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: I asked my question with the intention of
hearing whether this feeling of indignation was noticeable even in
people who actually wore the emblem of the Party.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I assume so, but I cannot offer it to the Tribunal
as a fact.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: But were even these people exposed to the considerable
pressure which you have alluded to?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: They probably felt that their Party membership
rendered them, in a certain sense, immune.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that many people became members
in order to benefit by this immunization?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I believe so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: I heard that you yourself were a member of the
NSV; is that true?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Is it true that you were arrested after 20 July
1944?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have already answered that question this morning.
I was not arrested.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: You were never arrested at all?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, with the exception of the one case which
I also mentioned this morning.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did you at any time express the opinion that
what had been achieved in Germany in the social sphere after
1933 did, to a considerable extent, represent the ideal of previous
governments?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I expressed this as follows: “What was new
was not good, and what was good was not new.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that any German, be he a Party
member, a member of the SS or not, must have had any knowledge
of events at Auschwitz of which you yourself knew nothing at all?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No. He would not necessarily have to possess this
knowledge. I would not go so far as to say that. But he might,
perhaps, have known about it.
<span class='pageno' title='269' id='Page_269'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And what exactly do you mean by “He might,
perhaps, have known about it”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Through guards escorting the transport echelons.
They did not always remain in the area of the concentration camps;
they usually returned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And if they were sworn to the strictest secrecy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Then they could not tell anything.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you know of cases where people were condemned
for speaking of such matters?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did you ever hear anything about the activities
of the “special courts”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, in any case I heard nothing in connection with
these particular activities of the “special courts.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: But the sentences pronounced against people
who listened to foreign broadcasts (Schwarzhörer) and to people
accused of spreading so-called false rumors, were published very
often in the papers. Did you never read them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I have only one question to ask
you. You told us this morning that in 1919 you were a member
of the Weimar National Assembly. May I ask what the attitude
of the National Assembly was—particularly of the faction of the
Social Democrats of whom you too were a leader—towards the
problem of the Austrian “Anschluss”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: During the time of the sessions of the Weimar
National Assembly I was Reich and State Commissioner for the
Rhineland and Westphalia, and was seldom able to participate in
the debates of the Weimar National Assembly. I therefore have
no detailed knowledge as to how these matters were formulated or
expressed. But one thing I do know and that is, that it was practically
the unanimous wish of the Assembly to include a paragraph, or
an article in the Constitution, ratifying the “Anschluss” of Austria
to Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Herr Minister, you have told the Tribunal that
in 1928 the Defendant Raeder assured you solemnly that there
would be no further violations of the Treaty of Versailles without
the knowledge of the Reich Cabinet. Did Raeder fulfill that
assurance?
<span class='pageno' title='270' id='Page_270'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have already stated this morning that I cannot
answer that in any positive sense. I can only state that violations
of the agreement of 18 October 1928 by the Naval Command did
not come to my knowledge.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did you know, for instance, of the construction
in Cadiz, in Spain, of a 750-ton U-boat under German direction
between the years 1927 and 1931?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, no.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the authority for that statement of
fact is the Document D-854.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And, Herr Minister, did you know that after its completion in
1931 that U-boat carried out trial runs under German direction
and with German personnel?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, I did not know anything about that either.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think he said he didn’t know of any
violations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I am putting to you certain matters, and I suggest
to you, Herr Minister, that it may well be that you were being
deceived during this time. Do you agree with me about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I would not deny the possibility of deception, but
I must very definitely declare that I did not know anything of the
construction of a submarine.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at the Document C-156.
This is a new extract from Captain Schüssler’s <span class='it'>Fight of the Navy
against Versailles</span>. You will see that the following entry appears
on Pages 43 and 44.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“In 1930 Bartenbach succeeded, in Finland also, in making
preparations for the construction of a U-boat answering to
the military demands of the German Navy. The Naval Chief
of Staff, Admiral Dr.h.c. Raeder, decided, as a result of the
reports of the Chief of the General Naval Office, Konteradmiral
Heusinger Von Waldegg, and of Captain Bartenbach,
to supply the means required for the construction of the
vessel in Finland. A 250-ton plan was chosen for this U-boat,
so that the amount of 1½ million Reichsmark was sufficient
for carrying out the project.</p>

<p>“The fundamental intention was to create a type of U-boat
which would permit the inconspicuous preparation of the
largest possible number of units which could be assembled at
shortest possible notice.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Herr Minister, did you know that 1½ million Reichsmark were
spent in 1930 in connection with this U-boat construction?
<span class='pageno' title='271' id='Page_271'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have stated this morning that I was Minister in
the Reich Ministry of the Interior from 1928 to 1930. I consider it
necessary to determine these dates a bit more precisely. I resigned
on 30 March 1930. If the year 1930 is mentioned in a general way,
then it is not impossible that everything mentioned here was
carried out after 30 March 1930.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You have said that the rearmament that went
on when you were connected with the Government of Germany
was purely defensive. When did you realize that the Nazi Government’s
rearmament was not defensive but aggressive? At what
date did you come to that conclusion?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: From 30 January 1933 on. That both the choice and
the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of the Reich meant war,
was not in the least doubted by me and my political friends.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: So that you realized from the first day of Nazi
power that the Nazi Government intended to use force or the threat
of force to achieve its political aims; is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not know if knowledge and conviction are
identical. I was convinced of it, and so were my political friends.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about
the Defendant Von Papen. Did Papen use force in carrying out the
Putsch which brought him to power in July 1932?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Von Papen did not personally exercise such force,
but he did order it. When, on the morning of 20 July 1932, I refused
to surrender voluntarily the office of the Prussian Ministry of the
Interior to the man who had been appointed by Von Papen as my
successor, I explained to him that I had no intention of doing so
and in order to make my protest more emphatic, I pointed out
that I would only give way to force. And then force was used in
the evening of 20 July in my office. The newly appointed police
president of Berlin appeared in my office, accompanied by two
police officers. I asked these gentlemen whether they were authorized
by the President of the Reich or by the Reich Chancellor to carry
out this mission. When they answered “yes,” I stated that I would
leave my office rather than cause the shedding of blood.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did the Defendant Papen, when he secured
power, purge the police and the government of anti-Nazis?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes. There are numerous indications that the intention
existed to purge the police of all republican elements and to
replace them with men who were first devoted to Von Papen and
then to the National Socialists.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about
the Defendant Göring.
<span class='pageno' title='272' id='Page_272'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Göring has stated, and the entry is on Page 5837
of the transcript of the proceedings (Volume IX, Page 258), that
the institution of protective custody existed in Germany before the
Nazis came into power. Is that true?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I would say that the institution of protective custody
did exist, theoretically, and it was last formulated in the Prussian
Police Administrative Law, in Paragraph 15. During my term of
office protective custody was never applied in normal civilian life.
The regulations in Paragraph 15 of the Police Administrative Law
stipulated quite definitely that if anybody was taken into protective
custody the police administration was obliged to bring him before
the courts within 24 hours. This procedure is in no way identical
with that protective custody, the threat of which for decades
remained suspended over the peaceful citizens of the State.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And, of course, there were no concentration
camps in pre-Nazi Germany, I take it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Never.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: How many of your political associates and colleagues
of the Social Democratic Party were murdered in concentration
camps while Göring was still Chief of the Gestapo?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: It is very difficult to make an estimate. You might
say 500, you might also say 2,000. Reliable information is now
being collected. My estimate is that at least 1,500 Social Democrats,
or trade-union officials, or editors were murdered.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And how many Communist leaders do you
think were murdered during Göring’s period of power over the
Gestapo?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I would assume that if you include among the Communist
leaders also such trade union officials, who considered
themselves members of the Communist Party, then approximately
the same figure would be reached.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did Göring personally have any knowledge of
these murders?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That I cannot say. If I were to answer that question,
then I should have to ask myself what I would have done
in case it had been one of my functions to administer camps in
which the fate of tens of thousands was being decided.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am not sure whether it is of any interest to the Tribunal if
I were to give you one or two examples from my own experience.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In 1925 I had to create a camp for refugees from Poland.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You need not trouble to go into that, Herr
Minister.
<span class='pageno' title='273' id='Page_273'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No? At any rate I would have considered it my
first and foremost task to inquire whether, in the camps which
I had installed, the principles of humanitarianism were being
adhered to. I was under the impression that this was not being
done. I always reminded my police officials that they were servants
of the people and that everyone in those camps should be humanely
treated. I told them that never again should the call resound in
Germany, “Protect us from the police.” (“Schutz vor Schutzleuten”).
I myself demanded punishment for police or other officials when
I was under the impression that defenseless prisoners were being
ill-treated by members of the police.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: As Minister of the Interior, did you become
familiar with the organized terror of the SA against the non-Nazi
population of Germany in the years after 1921?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Oh yes. Keeping an eye on the so-called armed
organizations was one of my most important tasks during my term
of office in Prussia. The roughest of all the armed organizations
proved to be the SA. They sang songs such as: “Clear the streets
for the Brown Battalions” and with the same arrogance with which
they sang these songs, they forcibly became masters of the streets,
wherever they encountered no adversary worth mentioning. Another
rowdy song of theirs seemingly illustrated their program: “Hang
the Jews and shoot the bigwigs.” Wherever the SA could exercise
terror unhindered, they raged and blustered in such style. They
waged beer-hall battles with people of different opinion. These
were not the customary skirmishes between political opponents
during election fights. No, this was organized terror. During the
first Jewish boycott in 1933, they stood on guard to frighten those
customers from buying in department stores who were accustomed
to buy in these stores. As the Tribunal already know, they organized
the terror actions of 8 November 1938. In 1930 they also damaged
numerous Jewish shops in Berlin, possibly as a worthy prelude to
the convening of the Reichstag into which 107 National Socialists
entered at the time, as we know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Finally, I want to ask you one or two questions
about the Defendant Schacht.</p>

<p class='pindent'>When did you first hear of Schacht’s relations with the Nazi
leaders?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In 1931 I received information from the police
administration in Berlin, that interviews had been taking place
between Mr. Schacht and the leaders of the National Socialist
German Workers Party.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did you have any connections with Schacht
in 1944?
<span class='pageno' title='274' id='Page_274'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: If the matter is of any interest here to anybody,
I actually refused these connections. Schacht—although I held him
in high esteem as an economic expert—was known to me as a
rather unreliable person in political matters. By joining the Harzburg
Front, Schacht betrayed the cause of democracy. This was not
only an act of ingratitude, for it was only through the Democrats
that he ever reached the post of President of the Reichsbank, but it
was also a great mistake since he and others of the same social
standing by joining the Harzburg Front first made the National
Socialists—so to speak—socially acceptable.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I could not, for this very reason, agree to any co-operation with
Schacht on 20 July 1944, and when in March 1943 I was asked to
join a government which was to overthrow Hitler, I categorically
refused to do so, giving Schacht’s machinations and sundry other
circumstances as my excuse.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: What was your reason for that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have just indicated these reasons. My friend
Leuschner, who was hanged, together with other young Social
Democrats—Von Harnack, Weber, Maas—my friend Leuschner and
I discussed the composition of such a government. Leuschner
informed me that a general would probably be the President of
the Reich, and another general would be the Minister for War.
I pointed out that Schacht in all probability would become financial
or economic dictator, since Schacht was suitable for such a post
through his actual or alleged connections with American business
circles. But these connections between Schacht and—in National
Socialist parlance—between plutocracy and militarism, this connection,
I say, appeared to me so compromising to the cause of
democracy, especially to the cause of Social Democracy, that I was
under no circumstances prepared to become a member of any
cabinet in which Schacht would be the financial dictator.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Thank you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, the Prosecutor has just talked
about the construction of a U-boat in Finland and of a U-boat in
Cadiz. With regard to the construction of the U-boat in Cadiz,
he has referred to D-854. I presume that this document is
unknown to you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, the witness said he knew
nothing about either of those instances.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Do you not remember that during that
discussion Admiral Raeder and Reichswehrminister Gröner mentioned
the Finland U-boat?
<span class='pageno' title='275' id='Page_275'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not remember.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You do not know about it? And now—a leading
question: Is it true that the agreement made on 18 October 1928
stipulated that the Chief of the Naval Command Staff was obligated
to keep the Reichswehrminister informed and the Minister of the
Reichswehr, in his turn, would inform the other Ministers of the
Cabinet?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: As far as I can remember, the agreement or the
promise of the two Chiefs of the Command Staffs was that the
Cabinet should, generally speaking, be kept informed about all
questions. That was technically possible only in the manner in
which you have just indicated, that is to say, that the Reichswehrminister
would be the first to be informed and that he, in turn,
would pass this information on to the Cabinet.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that there was no obligation, on Raeder’s part,
currently to report to you or to appear before the Cabinet?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That would have been quite an unusual measure,
just as the meeting of 18 October was in itself unusual; the members
of the Cabinet consisted either of the Ministers or of their official
representatives.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that the further management of the matter
would technically be handled by the Reichswehrminister?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Technically by the Reichswehrminister and politically
by the Cabinet.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. I have no further questions
to put to the witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen):
On what legal regulation was your exemption from the duties of
Minister of the Interior in Prussia, on 20 July 1932, based?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The release from my duties?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. The release from your duties.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: It was based on Article 48.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Who, on the strength of Article 48, issued
emergency decrees?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: This emergency decree was issued by the Reich
President, who alone was entitled to do so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the fact that you were removed from
office on 20 July, under the circumstances which you have just
described, based on the fact that Von Papen and Hindenburg, who
issued the decree, were of the opinion that the emergency decree
was legal, whereas it was your point of view that the legal basis
<span class='pageno' title='276' id='Page_276'></span>
for the emergency decree did not exist and in consequence you
remained in your office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I was of the opinion, and it was later confirmed by
the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) that the President of the Reich
was authorized on the strength of Article 48 to issue directives for
the maintenance of peace and order; and if he did not see in the
Prussian Ministers, and particularly in myself as Minister of Police,
sufficient guarantee that this peace and order would be insured
in Prussia, he had the right to relieve us of our police functions,
and especially to exclude us from all other executive measures. But
he did not have the right to discharge us as ministers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it known to you that the highest court in
Germany, the State Court of Justice, on 25 October 1932 issued a
statement to the effect that the decree of the Reich President of
20 July 1932 was compatible with the Constitution insofar as it
had appointed the Reich Chancellor as Reich Commissioner for
Prussia and authorized him temporarily to deprive Prussian Ministers
of their official functions and to assume these functions
personally.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have just explained the meaning of that decision
of the High Court of Justice.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: One more question: Did Von Papen, then
Reich Commissioner, in carrying out certain changes in personnel,
bring National Socialists into the police force?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot say. The political character of the police
officials was not outwardly recognizable. That might be the case
with Oberpräsidenten, Regierungspräsidenten and police presidents,
but not with every simple police official.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it true that Von Papen gave the key
position of police president in Berlin to the former police president
of Essen, Melcher, who in your time was already police president
of a large city?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That is correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now then, the witness can retire and the
Tribunal will now adjourn.</p>

<p class='pindent'>How many more witnesses have you got?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I now have the witnesses, Freiherr Von Weizsäcker
and Vice Admiral Schulte-Mönting, the Chief of Staff. The examination
of Schulte-Mönting will take up some time, whereas I shall
be through with Freiherr Von Weizsäcker in a short while.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='277' id='Page_277'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If it please Your Honors, may the Witness Freiherr
Von Weizsäcker, be called?</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Von Weizsäcker took the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?</p>

<p class='pindent'>ERNST VON WEIZSÄCKER (Witness): Ernst von Weizsäcker.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear
by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Baron Von Weizsäcker, at the beginning of the
war you were State Secretary in the Foreign Office, is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You will recollect that on 3 September 1939,
that is on the first day of the war between Germany and England—the
English passenger ship <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was torpedoed northwest
of Scotland. There were American passengers on board. The
sinking of the ship naturally caused a great sensation. Please tell
the Tribunal how this matter was treated politically, that is, by you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I remember this incident, but I am not
certain whether it was a British or an American ship. In any case,
the incident alarmed me very greatly at the time. I inquired of
the Naval Operations Staff whether a German naval unit could
have sunk the ship. After this was denied, I begged the American
Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Alexander Kirk, to call on me and told him
that no German naval unit could have participated in the sinking
of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>. I asked the Chargé d’Affaires to take cognizance of
this fact and to cable this information to Washington without
delay, adding that it was most important in the interests of our two
nations—Germany and America.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you had contacted the
Navy before taking these steps?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you, at this first conversation, talk to
Admiral Raeder personally or did you speak with some other
officer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I could not say that now, but I did get
definite information. I am sorry I cannot give you the full details.
But I did receive a definite answer that no German naval unit was
involved. That satisfied me.
<span class='pageno' title='278' id='Page_278'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In connection with this subject did you, on the
same day or shortly after, visit Admiral Raeder and discuss this
matter further with him?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that is true. I can recall. Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you on this occasion that it
could not have been a German U-boat, since reports coming in
from the U-boats said that the distance from the nearest U-boat
was too great, that is—about 75 nautical miles?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Raeder informed me that no German
U-boat could have been involved. He may also have mentioned
details, concerning the distance of the U-boats from the point where
the ship went down, but I cannot today tell you about this with
any certainty.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: During this conversation with Raeder, did you
declare that everything should be done to avoid war with the
United States, referring particularly to incidents like the sinking
of the Lusitania in the previous war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I certainly and emphatically did, for
at that time the recollections of similar past incidents during the
first World War were still very vivid in my mind. I am sure I
drew his attention to the urgent necessity of avoiding all naval
operations which might cause a spreading of the war and—as I
used to say in those days—decrease the “neutral substance.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder share your opinion?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: To the best of my recollections—yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Are you convinced, Herr Von Weizsäcker, that
Raeder gave you truthful answers in this report about the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Of course.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now U-boat Number <span class='it'>30</span> returned from her
combat mission on 27 September 1939, that is—about three weeks
after the sinking of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, and her commander reported
that he had inadvertently sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>. He had not noticed
the fact at the time but was apprised of the incident later by
various wireless messages. Raeder heard about it at the end of
September, and discussed the matter with Hitler in order to decide
what attitude should be adopted. Hitler issued an order enjoining
silence. All this has already been discussed here. I would like
you to tell me if you were informed of the fact, subsequently
established, of the sinking by a German U-boat.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No, certainly not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear of Hitler’s order enjoining silence?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I naturally did not hear of that either.
<span class='pageno' title='279' id='Page_279'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I shall now have Document Number 3260-PS
handed to you and I must ask you to have a look at it. It is an
article entitled “Churchill Sinks the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>,” taken from the
<span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> of 23 October 1939. Do you remember this
article?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. Perhaps I may look through it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I inform you, in order to
assist the Tribunal, that this is GB-218 in the British Document
Book Number 10a, Page 97, to be correct—Page 99.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Herr Von Weizsäcker, you have read
this article. May I ask you to tell me whether you recall having
read this article at the time of its appearance?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do recall that such an article did appear
at that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you further what your attitude
was at the time when you heard about this article?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I considered it a perverted fantasy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then you condemned this article?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Naturally.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Even though at the time you did not know yet
that it was a German U-Boat?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: The question of whether it was a German
U-boat or not could in no wise influence my opinion of the article.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then you considered this article objectionable,
even if it had not been a German U-boat?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Of course.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now the Prosecution asserts that Admiral Raeder
had instigated this article and is reproaching him very gravely on
moral grounds for this very reason, and the reproach is all the
graver since, as we have seen, Raeder at this time—unlike yourself—knew
that it was a German U-boat which had sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>.
Do you consider such an action possible on Raeder’s part? That
he could have instigated this article?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Siemers, you can only
ask the witness what he knew and what he did. You cannot ask
him to speculate about what Raeder has done.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I believed
that, according to this morning’s affidavit, it would be possible to
voice an opinion; but I shall, of course, retract my question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What affidavit are you talking about?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The affidavit in which I suggested the expunging
of any expression of opinion, Dietmann’s affidavit.
<span class='pageno' title='280' id='Page_280'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is a perfectly different matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you at that time hear
that Raeder had instigated this article?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No, I did not hear that; I would never
have believed it either. I consider it entirely out of the question
that he could have instigated an article of that sort or that he
could have written it himself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: To your knowledge, could this article be traced
exclusively to the Propaganda Ministry?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only answer this question in the
negative; not to Raeder and not to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, are you in a position to
judge whether grave points were involved in the historically-known
violations committed by the Navy against the Treaty of Versailles?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only answer that question indirectly.
The details are unknown to me. But I can scarcely consider it
possible that grave or important violations could have occurred,
for it is precisely in naval matters that the observance of contract
agreements is particularly easy to control. Ships cannot be built
without being seen. I must therefore assume that these infringements
were of an insignificant nature.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in your opinion, did the
Defendant Raeder prepare a war of aggression or do you know of
any case from which Raeder’s attitude...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is the very charge against
the Defendant Raeder which the Tribunal has got to decide.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in February 1939, when
you traveled by train from Hamburg to Berlin with Admiral
Raeder, did you converse with him? And what was the occasion
and what did you discuss?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. It is quite true that I met Admiral
Raeder on the train from Hamburg to Berlin, after the launching
of a ship at Hamburg. On this occasion the Admiral told me that
he had just made a report to Hitler in which he said he had made
it quite clear that the size of the Navy would preclude any war
against England for years to come. I presume that this is the reply
to the question which you wished to receive from me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That was in February 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was the launching of the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then it is known to the Tribunal, for the launching
of the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> is entered in the records.
<span class='pageno' title='281' id='Page_281'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It must have been in the spring—in
February or March.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder’s declaration at that time have a
calming influence on you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I heard Raeder’s declaration on the subject
with very great pleasure because there could be no other...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do not care whether it had a
calming influence on him or not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, and to the best of your knowledge,
did Raeder—either as a politician or as a naval expert—exercise
any influence over Hitler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the witness can tell us what
Raeder said, but he really cannot tell us in what capacity he was
speaking, whether as a politician or an admiral. If you want to
know whether he had his uniform on...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you have any conversations
with Raeder or with any other high-ranking personages?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: About what?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: About Raeder’s influence on Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was a well-known fact that political
arguments expressed by soldiers scarcely influenced Hitler at all,
although military arguments of a technical nature certainly did
carry weight with him, and in this sense Raeder may have exercised
some influence over Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in the winter of 1938 to
1939, the usual large diplomatic dinner party took place in Berlin
and you, as far as I know, were present at this dinner. On this
occasion Raeder spoke to Sir Nevile Henderson about the probable
return of Germany’s colonies...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, why do you not ask him
instead of telling him. You are telling him what happened.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you are.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; this was a conversation
between Raeder and Sir Nevile Henderson, not between Herr
Von Weizsäcker and Henderson.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am now asking you, Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you have a
conversation to this effect with Sir Nevile Henderson or with other
British diplomats? And do you know anything about their attitude?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I cannot recall having spoken personally
with any British diplomats about the question of the colonies. On
<span class='pageno' title='282' id='Page_282'></span>
the other hand, I do know that between 1934 and 1939 the question
of the colonies was repeatedly handled by the British Government
either officially, unofficially or semiofficially, and their attitude
was expressed in a friendly and conciliatory manner. I believe
I can remember reading a report on the visit of two British ministers
to Berlin and that on this occasion the question of the colonies was
also discussed in a conciliatory manner.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, can you tell us anything
about the behavior or the reputation of the Navy during the
Norwegian occupation?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: An occupational force always finds it
difficult to be popular anywhere. But with this one reservation
I should like to state that the Navy, as far as I heard, enjoyed a
good, even a very good, reputation in Norway. This was repeatedly
confirmed to me during the war by my Norwegian friends.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You made these Norwegian friendships at the
time you were Minister in Oslo? When was that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was Minister in Oslo from 1931 to 1933.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question. A document, D-843, was
submitted yesterday, signed by Breuer who was with the Oslo
Legation in March 1940. May I submit this document to you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Am I to read the entire document?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think it would suffice if you were just to
glance through it, especially over the middle part of the document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the President.</span>] Mr. President, it is GB-466 and the
document was submitted yesterday.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] According to this document Breuer
stated that the danger of a British landing in Norway was not so
great as was assumed by the other side, and he speaks of measures
only by which Germany might be provoked. What can you tell us
about these statements of Breuer’s? Are these statements correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Breuer was not with the Legation—he
was the Minister himself—and I take it for granted that he reported
correctly on the subject from an objective or rather, if I may say
so, subjective point of view. Whether this was really correct from
an objective point of view or not, is quite another question. To
put it in plain German, whether Breuer was correctly informed of
the intentions of the enemy forces is another question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, according to the information
you subsequently received from the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, were Raeder’s misgivings justified or was the picture, as
painted by Breuer, correct?
<span class='pageno' title='283' id='Page_283'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I must confess that my personal opinion
tallied with the opinion of Breuer, although both our opinions
subsequently proved to be incorrect and the conjectures of the
Navy were justified, or—at least—more justified than the opinion
voiced by the Minister.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much indeed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to
ask any questions of this witness?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hess): Witness, on
23 August 1939, a nonaggression pact was concluded between Germany
and the Soviet Union. Were any other agreements concluded
on that day by the two governments, outside of this pact of nonaggression?</p>

<p class='pindent'>GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the USSR):
Mr. President, the witness is called upon to answer certain definite
questions which are set forth in the application of counsel for the
defendant, Dr. Siemers. I consider that the question which is being
put to him at this moment by the defense counsel Seidl has no
connection with the examination of the case in hand and should
be ruled out.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the question, Dr. Seidl, that
you were going to ask.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I ask you again, Herr Von Weizsäcker, whether on
23 August 1939, other agreements had been reached between the
two governments, which were not contained in the nonaggression
pact?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Where were these agreements contained?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: These agreements were contained in a
secret protocol.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself read this secret protocol in your
capacity of State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have before me a text and Ambassador Gaus
harbors no doubt at all that the agreements in question are correctly
set out in this text. I shall have it put to you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One moment, what document are you putting
to him?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The secret addenda to the protocol of 23 August 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that not the document—what is this document
that you are presenting to the witness? There is a document
<span class='pageno' title='284' id='Page_284'></span>
which you have already presented to the Tribunal and which has
been ruled out. Is that the same document?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: It is the document which I submitted to the Tribunal
in my documentary evidence and which was refused by the Tribunal,
presumably because I refused to divulge the origin and
source of this document. But the Tribunal granted me permission
to produce a new sworn affidavit by Ambassador Gaus on the subject
in question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have not done it? You have not done it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: No, but I should, Your Honor, like to read this text
in order to stimulate the memory of the witness, and to ask him
whether in connection therewith, as far as he can remember, the
secret agreements are correctly reproduced in this document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors! I would like to protest against
these questions for two reasons.</p>

<p class='pindent'>First of all, we are examining the matter of the crimes of the
major German war criminals. We are not investigating the foreign
policies of other states. Secondly, the document which defense
counsel Seidl is attempting to put to the witness has been rejected
by the Tribunal, since it is—in substance—a forged document and
cannot have any probative value whatsoever.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: May I in this connection say the following, Mr. President.
This document is an essential component of the nonaggression
pact, submitted by the Prosecution in evidence as GB-145. If I now
submit the text to the witness...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The only question is whether it is the document
which has been rejected by the Tribunal. Is it the document
which has been rejected by the Tribunal?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: It was rebutted as documentary evidence <span class='it'>per se</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, then the answer is “yes.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: But it seems to me that there is a difference as to
whether this document may be put to the witness during the hearing
of his testimony. I should like to answer this question in the
affirmative since the Prosecution when cross-examining can put the
document in their possession to the witness, and on the basis of his
testimony we should then see which is the correct text or whether
these two texts harmonize at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where does the document which you are
presenting come from?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I received this document a few weeks ago from a
man on the Allied side who appeared absolutely reliable. I received
it only on condition that I would not divulge its origin, a condition
which seemed to me perfectly reasonable.
<span class='pageno' title='285' id='Page_285'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you say that you received it a few
moments ago?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Weeks ago.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is the same document that you say just
now that you presented to the Tribunal and the Tribunal rejected?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the Tribunal also decided that I might
submit another sworn affidavit from Ambassador Gaus on this
subject, and this decision only makes sense...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but you have not done so. We
do not know what affidavit Dr. Gaus has made.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Ambassador Gaus’ sworn affidavit, the new one, is
already in my possession, but it has not yet been translated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I certainly join General Rudenko in
objecting to the use of this document. We now know that it comes
from some anonymous source. We do not know the source at all,
and anyway it is not established that this witness does not remember
himself what this purported agreement amounted to. I do not
know why he can not ask him, if that is what he wants to do.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you may ask the witness what his
recollection is of the treaty without putting the document to him.
Ask him what he remembers of the treaty, or the protocol.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, please describe the contents of the agreement
insofar as you can remember them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It is about a very incisive, a very far-reaching
secret addendum to the nonaggression pact concluded at
that time. The scope of this document was very extensive since it
concerned the partition of the spheres of influence and drew a
demarcation line between areas which, under given conditions, belonged
to the sphere of Soviet Russia and those which would fall
in the German sphere of interest. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Eastern
Poland and, as far as I can remember, certain areas of Romania
were to be included in the sphere of the Soviet Union. Anything
west of this area fell into the German sphere of interest. It is true
that this secret agreement did not maintain its original form. Later
on, either in September or October of the same year, a certain
change, an amendment was made. As far as I can recall the essential
difference in the two documents consisted in the fact that Lithuania,
or—at least—the greater part of Lithuania, fell into the sphere of
interest of the Soviet Union, while in the Polish territory the line
of demarcation between the two spheres of interest was moved very
considerably westwards.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I believe that I have herewith given you the gist of the secret
agreement and of the subsequent addendum.
<span class='pageno' title='286' id='Page_286'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it true that in case of a subsequent territorial
reorganization, a line of demarcation was agreed upon in the territory
of the Polish State?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I cannot tell you exactly whether the
expression “line of demarcation” was contained in this protocol or
whether “line of separation of spheres of interest” was the actual
term.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: But a line was drawn.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Precisely the line which I have just mentioned,
and I believe I can recall that this line, once the agreement
became effective, was adhered to as a general rule with possible
slight fluctuations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Can you recall—this is my last question—if this
secret addendum of 23 August 1939 also contained an agreement on
the future destiny of Poland?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: This secret agreement included a complete
redirection of Poland’s destiny. It may very well have been that
explicitly or implicitly such a redirection had been provided for in
the agreement. I would not, however, like to commit myself as to
the exact wording.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Witness, did you see the original of the secret
treaty?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I saw a photostat of the original, possibly
the original as well. In any case I had the photostatic copy in my
possession, I had a photostatic copy locked up in my personal safe.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would you recognize a copy of it if it was
shown to you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Oh, yes, I definitely think so. The original
signatures were attached and they could be recognized immediately.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has been considering whether
it ought to put to the witness the document in the possession of
Dr. Seidl, but in view of the fact that the contents of the original
have been stated by the witness and by other witnesses and that it
does not appear what is the origin of the document which is in
Dr. Seidl’s possession, the Tribunal has decided not to put the document
to the witness. The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 22 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div><span class='pageno' title='287' id='Page_287'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH DAY</span><br/> Wednesday, 22 May 1946</h1></div>

<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Von Weizsäcker resumed the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think yesterday we got to the
stage whether any of the other defendants’ counsel wished to ask
any questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, indeed; I believe Dr. Von Lüdinghausen
wishes to examine the witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath):
Witness, I should like to put a few questions to you about
the activity of Herr Von Neurath in his capacity as Foreign Minister.
You were at that time Director of the Political Department
of the Foreign Office. What were the dates?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe from late autumn of 1936, as a
deputy, and from the spring of 1937 until the spring of 1938 with
full capacity.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But before then you had already
had occasion to work with Herr Von Neurath? In the autumn of
1932 were you not together now and then at the Disarmament Conference
at Geneva?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What tendencies did Herr Von
Neurath follow, and what attitude did Von Neurath adopt at the
Disarmament Conference?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: The attitude of Herr Von Neurath was
dictated by the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations
which provided for disarmament. He followed those lines.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that he followed the same policy
which his predecessors had followed at the Disarmament Conference?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was always the same.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, all the previous governments
pursued a policy aimed at peace and unity, or understanding; and
Herr Von Neurath continued this policy wholeheartedly, is that not
correct?
<span class='pageno' title='288' id='Page_288'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I never noticed anything to the contrary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you at that time—that is in
1932—notice in any way that he had National Socialist tendencies
or that he was at all in sympathy with the National Socialists?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that there was no
common ground between him and National Socialism.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you quite briefly summarize
Herr Von Neurath’s views with respect to foreign politics? Could he
have been at that time in favor of belligerent action, or was he
the representative, the acknowledged representative, of a policy of
understanding and peace?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should say that Herr Von Neurath pursued
a policy of peaceful revision, the same policy that had been
carried on by his predecessors. His aim was good neighborliness
with all, without binding himself politically in any special direction.
I never noticed any bellicose tendencies in his policies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was there any change in Herr
Von Neurath’s views in the year 1936, when you became one of
his closest collaborators, or did they always remain the same?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: They were always the same.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He was especially interested in
bringing about an understanding with England, but also with
France; is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath
wanted to bring about an understanding with all sides.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put a few more
questions to you which more or less concern his relations with
Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>According to your knowledge of the circumstances, as his collaborator,
can it be said that he had the confidence of Adolf Hitler
at all times when he was Foreign Minister, and also that Hitler let
himself be advised and led by him altogether?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I am in a position to judge, he
was the adviser but not the confidant of Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But there was a certain contact
between those gentlemen; is that not right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was hardly ever a witness of such contacts.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you observe, when Von Neurath
and Hitler met, whether they frequently discussed the political
situation, what had to be done, and what should be done?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only say that we of the Foreign Office
regretted that the contact was not closer; all the more so as Hitler
<span class='pageno' title='289' id='Page_289'></span>
was frequently absent from Berlin. We considered the contact
too loose.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then, one cannot speak of close
relations or of very close collaboration with Hitler in the case of
Von Neurath?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: In my opinion, no.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And, in your opinion and according
to your observation, how did the activity of Von Neurath affect
foreign policy? Was he the leading man, or was he not perhaps
a retarding element, that is a brake, so to speak, where matters
contrary to his convictions were concerned?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I have no actual proof that important foreign
political actions of this period were influenced by Von Neurath.
But I can well imagine that certain actions in the sphere of
foreign politics were prevented...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think we can have
the witness imagine. We cannot have the witness telling us what
he can imagine. I think the question is too vague, and not a proper
question to ask.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During the time when Herr Von Neurath
was Foreign Minister, did any authority in the Party also have
an influence on the foreign policy which in effect was contrary to
the tendencies of Von Neurath or at least was not shared by him?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe there was not only one but many
who acted in that way and had connection and influence with Hitler
of course. That could not be verified, but it could be concluded from
the results.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know why, for what reason,
the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in November 1935 was not
signed by Von Neurath but by the then Ambassador Von Ribbentrop
in London?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Was not that in 1936?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 1936; yes that is right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I assume for the reason that Hitler always
liked to put several persons on to certain work, and he would then
select from among them the one he considered best suited to carry
the work through.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was Von Neurath at all in agreement
with this Anti-Comintern Pact?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know.
<span class='pageno' title='290' id='Page_290'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Von Neurath’s policy
regarding personnel? Did he try to keep old officials in office, or
did he bring in National Socialist officials?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was very anxious to
retain the old and familiar Foreign Office staff, in the Foreign Office,
as well as in positions abroad.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But that changed the moment he
resigned?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Not immediately, but later on to an increasing
extent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, just two more questions. What
was the attitude of Herr Von Neurath when he was no longer Foreign
Minister and the Sudeten questions became acute, in the autumn
of 1938; and what part did he play at the Munich Conference?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I recall a scene in the Reich Chancellery,
a day before the Munich Agreement, when Herr Von Neurath very
strongly recommended pursuing a policy of appeasement and following
the suggestion of Mussolini to hold a four-power conference.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that after Von Neurath
had left the Foreign Office that office was forbidden to give
him any information about foreign politics?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I think I remember that the successor of
Herr Von Neurath kept to himself information his predecessor
received about foreign political matters.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you were German Ambassador
to the Holy See in Rome from the summer of 1943?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: At the same time the commander-in-chief in
the Italian theater of war was Field Marshal Kesselring?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes; that is, he was the commander-in-chief
in that theater from 25 September 1943. Before that time an
Italian general held the post.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Were you frequently called upon by Kesselring
to settle differences between the German Army on one hand
and the civil authorities on the other?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: There was constant communication between
Field Marshal Kesselring and my own office, not only in
order to straighten out differences, but above all to prevent differences.
<span class='pageno' title='291' id='Page_291'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did you, through your frequent contacts with
Field Marshal Kesselring, gain a personal impression with regard
to the attitude of the military...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we are not trying Kesselring.
What relevance has this question got?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: This question is relevant because in the cross-examination
of Field Marshal Kesselring the Prosecution produced
incriminating material to the effect that the military leadership in
Italy did not observe the usages of war and the laws of humanity.
I distinctly remember that you, Mr. President—and this may be seen
on Pages 5803 and 5805 (Volume IX, Pages 234, 235)—said in reply
to an objection by Dr. Stahmer that it was material incriminating
the General Staff. I should like to ask the witness now present a
few questions about this incriminating material.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you wish to ask him anything that he
knows about accusations which have been made by the Prosecution
against Kesselring as a member of the General Staff, then you may
do that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. I started and that was to
be a preparatory question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Weizsäcker, were the objects of art of Italy in the
Italian theater of war spared and put in safekeeping?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Wehrmacht, under the leadership
of Field Marshal Kesselring, made the greatest efforts to spare
and protect edifices, property, and objects of art belonging to the
Church. This was a large chapter in the activities of the staff of
Field Marshal Kesselring, and success was not wanting.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Can you give us one or two especially significant
examples on this point?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes, there are a lot of examples. I would
like to mention that 6 months or a year ago an exhibition of
manuscripts, incunabula, and similar things, was held in the Vatican.
The German Wehrmacht is to be thanked for having saved a large
part, if not the greater part of these objects.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: That is sufficient, Herr Von Weizsäcker. The
high military command in Italy is accused of having treated the
Italian population with especial harshness and cruelty. Can you
tell us anything about the fact that precisely on the part of the high
military command in Italy special measures were taken for the
feeding of the population at a period when the food problem was
difficult?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Does this question refer especially to the
food problem?
<span class='pageno' title='292' id='Page_292'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, the food problem in Rome.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, my field of observation was only
Rome. But there I can say that Field Marshal Kesselring told me
one day that half his time was taken up with the question of feeding
Rome. And I knew one of the higher military officials—I believe
his name was Seifert or something like that—who with great devotion
concerned himself with this task and carried it through with
success.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Now my last question, Herr Von Weizsäcker:
Through your observations of the activities of the high military
leaders in Italy you must have gained a personal impression of
these people. Did you get the impression that there was a sincere
effort on the part of these military leaders to observe the laws of
war and the laws of humanity?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is a matter of course, for otherwise
certain results could not have come about. Perhaps it is not known
here that in the autumn of 1943 the Holy See published a communiqué,
an official communiqué, which especially praised the
behavior of the German soldiers in Rome. Besides that, the sparing
of the Eternal City could not have been realized if the German
Wehrmacht had not behaved as it did.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: And that was a special merit of Field Marshal
Kesselring in particular?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I would say that when the history of this
time comes to be written first in the list of merit will be Pope
Pius XII. Then praise will be accorded, in the second place to the
German Wehrmacht under the leadership of Kesselring.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further
questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: It has been asserted once that the Defendant
Von Papen, who in the summer of 1934 had been appointed ambassador
to Vienna, directed from that office a policy of aggressive
expansion taking in the entire southeast up to Turkey; and that he,
among other things, had offered neighboring states like Hungary
and Poland territory to be gained from the intended partitioning of
Czechoslovakia. Did this policy actually exist?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry. I did not quite understand
your question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy, which I just outlined, actually
exist?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: My observation dates only from the late
summer of 1936, as before that time I was abroad. I did not notice
later that Herr Von Papen had carried on a southeastern policy for
<span class='pageno' title='293' id='Page_293'></span>
Vienna, or that he was commissioned to do so. The Foreign Office
could not entrust him with such a mission, for he did not come
under the Foreign Office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: And this policy, as just outlined, did that
exist at all when you entered the Foreign Office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Please repeat the question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy of expansion on the part of
Germany...</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Which policy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: The aggressive policy of expansion on the
part of Germany to the southeast as far as Turkey, the partitioning
of Czechoslovakia, and the cession of parts of Czechoslovakia to
Poland and Hungary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. In 1939, no doubt?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: 1936—in 1936.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you one or two questions
about the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> matter. You have told the Tribunal that
you, yourself, saw the American chargé d’affaires and informed
him, about the middle of September, that the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> could not
have been sunk by a German U-boat. That is so, is it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not see the American chargé d’affaires
in the middle of September, but on the day on which I heard
of the sinking, and that must have been, perhaps, 3, 4, or 5 of September.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Were you already assuring the American representatives
as early as that that a U-boat could not have been responsible?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And did you recommend, or rather, did the
German Foreign Office recommend that the Commander-in-Chief
of the German Navy should receive the American naval attaché and
tell him the same thing, namely, that a U-boat could not have sunk
the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know. I only dealt with the
chargé d’affaires.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I would like you to look at a new document,
Document. Number D-804, which will be Exhibit GB-477, which is
an extract from the SKL on the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> case. You will see that
<span class='pageno' title='294' id='Page_294'></span>
that is a report from Neubauer to the naval attaché and it reads
as follows:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Foreign Office has had a report of the meeting between
the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and the American
naval attaché, on 13 September 1939, passed on to it by
telephone. It is worded as follows:</p>

<p>“ ‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief
of...’ ”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry; I have not found the place
as yet.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Perhaps you would like to follow the English
copy, Witness, if you would like.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I read the second paragraph:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“ ‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy received the American naval
attaché on the advice of the Reich Foreign Minister and told
him more or less the following: He had intended for some
days already—as he knew—to write him that he should visit
him in order to tell him his opinion about the sinking of the
<span class='it'>Athenia</span>, in view of the continued agitation about it. However,
he had waited for the return of those of the submarines
that had been employed in waging war against merchant
ships at the time in question and which might possibly be
concerned, in order to receive reports about their activity personally.
He repeated most emphatically that the sinking of
the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was not caused by a German submarine. The
ship nearest to the place of the incident was at the time
actually situated about 170 sea miles away from the place of
the sinking. Besides this, the instructions as to how the commanders
were to wage war against merchant shipping, had
after all been published. Up to date, in no case had these
instructions been even slightly disregarded. On the contrary,
an American captain reported a short time before about the
particularly courteous and chivalrous behavior of the submarine
commanders.’ ”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Well, now, it is clear from that, is it not, that the German Foreign
Office was most anxious to cover up this matter of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>
as best it could; was it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No; there was nothing to be covered up.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: When you discovered at the end of September
that in fact it was the <span class='it'>U-30</span> that had sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, there was
then a good deal to be covered, was there not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that I stated already yesterday
that I had heard nothing to that effect.
<span class='pageno' title='295' id='Page_295'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you did not know at the
end of September, on the return of the <span class='it'>U-30</span>, that the <span class='it'>U-30</span> had
in fact sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not remember that in any way at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: When did you first discover that the <span class='it'>U-30</span> had
sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I remember, not at all during
the war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But I understood you to say yesterday that you
thought that the publication in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, accusing
Mr. Winston Churchill of sinking the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, was a piece of perverse
imagination; is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Completely.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Are you really saying to the Tribunal that—though
you were in a responsible job—are you saying to the Tribunal
that you did not discover the true facts about the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>
until the end of the war, when you were directly concerned in the
Foreign Office with this matter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I told you already yesterday what I know
about this. It seems, does it not, that it was realized later by the
Navy that the sinking of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was due to the action of a German
submarine, but I cannot at all remember that I or the Foreign
Office were informed of this fact.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder took no
steps to correct the information that had been passed to the American
diplomatic representatives, did he?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder
advised me or the Foreign Office of the fact.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Now, with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath.</p>

<p class='pindent'>If it please the Tribunal, I am not proposing to question the
witness as to the earlier diplomatic history, as this Tribunal has
indicated that it is desirable to reserve the matter for the defendants
as they go into the witness box later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] But I want to ask you a general question.
What was the earliest date at which responsible officials of
the Foreign Office, like yourself, first realized that Hitler intended
to wage aggressive war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That the foreign policy of Hitler’s Government
was a dangerous one I realized clearly for the first time in
May 1933; the fact that an aggressive war was planned, perhaps,
in the summer of 1938, or at least that the course pursued in foreign
policy might very easily lead to war.
<span class='pageno' title='296' id='Page_296'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Already in April 1938, the foreign political
situation was so tense that you sent a special memorandum to all
German diplomatic representatives dealing with the situation—the
critical situation of Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That may be. May I be permitted to read
the document?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at Document Number
3572-PS, which is a memorandum of the 25th of April 1938, signed
by yourself, and a copy of which was sent to all the German diplomatic
representatives. It will be Exhibit GB-478. That document
reads:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Since the work in the field of preparation for the mobilization
has made further progress within Germany in the
Armed Forces and in all civil administrations including the
Foreign Office, it is necessary now that in the case of government
offices abroad corresponding measures also be taken in
their area of jurisdiction without delay.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And then there follows a series of instructions as to the actions
that are to be taken on the commencement of the period of crisis,
or of actual mobilization, and there is an insistence in the last
paragraph but one:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I request the heads of offices, without waiting for further
instructions, to start considering now the measures to be
taken in their sphere of activity in the case of an emergency.
In the interest of absolute secrecy it must be observed strictly
that the number of people informed remains as restricted as
possible.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>That suggests, does it not, that as early as April 1938 you were
conscious of the imminent approach of actual mobilization; is that so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: May I ask, is this document really dated
the year 1938, or is it 1939? I cannot quite distinguish the date.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: It is dated the 25th of April 1938.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, that may be.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Now, you yourself were opposed to Hitler’s
aggressive foreign policy, were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not quite understand your question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You yourself were opposed to Hitler’s aggressive
foreign policy, were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I personally, completely.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did you endeavor to persuade the Defendant
Von Neurath also to oppose Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy?
<span class='pageno' title='297' id='Page_297'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was not Foreign Minister
at that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But he continued to be a very important functionary
of the Nazi State, did he not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that his influence in that period
was even smaller than before; but I kept in touch with him, and I
think I agreed with his opinion and he with mine.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And yet he continued to serve the Nazi State,
in particular, in a territory which was acquired as a result of this
policy of aggression; is that not so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should be grateful if this question would
be put to Herr Von Neurath rather than to me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: If you please. Now, you were in Italy and in
Rome, were you not, in March of 1944?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You have given me some evidence as to the
behavior of the German forces in Italy. Were you in Rome at the
time of the massacres in the Hadrian Cave? You remember the
incident, Witness, do you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: When 325 Italians were murdered and 57 Jews
were thrown in as a bit of makeweight. You were there when that
happened, were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe it was 320 prisoners who were
murdered in this cave which you just mentioned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Yes. Were you consulted about that matter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That was an action by German forces, was
it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe by the German Police, and not
by the German Armed Forces.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And you know, Witness, that there were many
murders of that kind carried out by the SS during the period of
German activity in Italy, do you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not know about many murders having
taken place, but I believe that the German Police were quite capable
of such things.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You know that they left a record of terror and
brutality wherever they left their mark upon Italy; is that not so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Police, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions.
<span class='pageno' title='298' id='Page_298'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have no more questions, Your Honor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I now call the witness Vice
Admiral Schulte-Mönting.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go ahead.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Schulte-Mönting took the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p>

<p class='pindent'>ERICH SCHULTE-MÖNTING (Witness): Erich Schulte-Mönting.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear
by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, please tell us briefly what positions you
held from 1925 to 1945, particularly in what positions you served
immediately under Admiral Raeder.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1925 to 1928 I was naval adjutant
to Reichspräsident Hindenburg and, as such, simultaneously second
adjutant to the Chief of the Naval Command Staff. Consequently
my first collaboration with Raeder dates back to 1928.</p>

<p class='pindent'>From 1929 until 1933 I had several front commands. From 1933
to 1937 I was first adjutant to Raeder. From 1937 to 1939 I had
several front commands. From 1939 to 1943 I was Admiral Raeder’s
Chief of Staff; and up to 1944 I remained Admiral Dönitz’ Chief
of Staff. In January 1944 I was naval commander in southern
France until the invasion; subsequently commanding general in
North Trondheim. After the collapse I was employed for some
months with the British Navy in winding up activities. Then in
the autumn I was interned in a camp for generals in England.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Please tell me, if you can remember, in which
month of 1939 you started to work with Raeder.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The first of January 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us briefly anything about Raeder’s
prestige as a navy expert, especially abroad? I mean only with
regard to technical naval questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I believe that through the many
years of service I had with Raeder, and the many conversations I
had with foreigners, I have been able to form some idea. After all,
Raeder was head of the Navy for 15 years. He was known, or
rather had a name, as a naval officer and as Chief of Staff of the
<span class='pageno' title='299' id='Page_299'></span>
last Commander-in-Chief of the German Imperial Navy, Admiral
Hipper, the opponent of the famous British Admiral Beatty in the
Skagerrak battle. He was known...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you kindly observe that light.
When the yellow light goes on, you are talking too fast. When the
red light goes on, you must stop.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was known through his literary activity
at the time of the “Tirpitz Era,” when he edited the <span class='it'>Nautikus</span>, and
later, after the first World War, through his two works on cruiser
warfare in the last World War, for which he received an honorary
doctor’s degree and which, I should say, gained him a reputation
among experts.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The defendant is accused of building up the Navy
with the intention of carrying on an aggressive war, and this even
after the Treaty of Versailles was already in force.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. Never in all my conversations
which I had with Raeder was the thought—much less the
word—of an aggressive war mentioned. I believe that all his actions
and his directives contradict this.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were there possibly any ideas of a strategic
nature under consideration, while the Versailles Treaty was in force,
with a view to an aggressive war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Never.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What was the basic reason for the maneuvers
held by the Navy from the years 1932 until 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: They were held exclusively with a view
to the security, protection, and defense of the coastal waters and
the coast itself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was a war with England taken as a basis for
any of these maneuvers between 1932 and 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that was never made a basis, and
I believe that would have appeared impossible and unreasonable
to every naval officer. I remember that even at the beginning of
the year 1939 Raeder issued a directive to the front commanders
to hold maneuvers, in which he excluded a maneuver directed
against England as an impossibility. It was forbidden to carry out
that maneuver at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, it is now confirmed, as you know, that
the Navy in the twenties, with the knowledge of the then parliamentary
government, violated the Treaty of Versailles. These questions
have been discussed a great deal here, therefore, we can
be brief.
<span class='pageno' title='300' id='Page_300'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>I should like to ask you generally: Is it possible from these violations,
which are known to you, to deduce aggressive intentions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I consider that is completely out of
the question. The violations were so insignificant and were based
so exclusively on protection and defense that I think it is impossible
to construe them as aggressive intentions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Can you give us briefly a few instances or name
a few cases where violations took place?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, they were limited to the
installation of coastal batteries, antiaircraft batteries, the procuring
of mines and similar things, all of which were exclusively for the
purpose of defense or protection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did these violations of the Treaty of Versailles—or,
shall we say, the slight deviations—become known to the Inter-Allied
Commission in whole or in part, and did that commission
partly overlook these things because they were really trifles?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I would say it was an open secret.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you, Admiral, to pause between question
and answer so that the interpreters can keep up. Just pause
a moment after my questions before you reply. May I ask you to
repeat the answer to my question with regard to the commission?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I would say that it was an open secret.
It was just passed by.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As proof that these violations of the treaty were
made with the intention of waging aggressive war the Prosecution
has several times presented the book by Post Captain Schüssler
entitled <span class='it'>The Navy’s Fight against Versailles</span>. It is Document C-156.
I will have this document submitted to you in the original. In order
to save time and not to burden the Tribunal again with details—I
do not want to go into details—I shall just ask you: What do you
know about this book, and what caused it to be written at all?
When was it written and what is your general opinion about it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I know this book. It came about as a result
of the attacks of the National Socialist regime in the years 1934 and
1935, which blamed the preceding government and the Navy for
not having done enough in the past to arm the nation and for not
even having exhausted the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles.
Consequently, the idea arose at that time of publishing a sort of
justification. This brochure is to be considered in that light; a sort
of justification for, I might say, sins of omission.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This booklet was later never actually published, or rather it was
withdrawn from circulation because it was, I might say, a rather
<span class='pageno' title='301' id='Page_301'></span>
poor attempt, for, after all, it contains no challenging points which
might be classified as rearmament.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was this booklet distributed within the Navy
later on?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. As I said, it was withdrawn from the
circles which had already had it and it was also severely criticized.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was the book withdrawn on Raeder’s orders?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe so, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Through this book and another document, by
Assmann, a charge has been brought concerning the known endeavors
made with a construction firm in Holland. And it was also said
yesterday that, by order of Admiral Raeder, U-boats were built for
Germany in Finland and in Spain. Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. The U-boats which
were designed by the Dutch firm, and which were built abroad,
were not built for the German Navy, but for foreign countries.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know for whom they were built? Who
received the boat which was built in Finland?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe Turkey received one, and one
went to Finland.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then the ships were constructed for foreign
orders and for a foreign country?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What advantages at all did the Navy have from
their collaboration in the construction?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We were only interested in keeping alive
the experiences gained in U-boat warfare during the last World
War. Consequently the Navy was interested in seeing that constructors
of U-boats continued along those lines.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, was that prohibited according
to the Treaty of Versailles?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I know of no paragraph which prohibits
our activity in foreign countries along those lines.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the beginning of February 1933 Admiral
Raeder made his first naval report to Hitler. Do you know what
Hitler, on that occasion, gave Raeder as the basis for rebuilding
the Navy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I remember it exactly, because it
was the first report which the then Chief of the Naval Command
Staff, Admiral Raeder, made to the Reich Chancellor Hitler.
<span class='pageno' title='302' id='Page_302'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Hitler said to Raeder that the basis of his future policy was to
live in peace with England and that he intended to demonstrate
that by trying to conclude a naval agreement with England. In
this he wanted the German Navy to be kept relatively small. He
wished to recognize Britain’s naval superiority because of her position
as a world power. He would accordingly suggest an appropriate
ratio of strength. He wanted an understanding with regard to the
construction of our Navy; and we should take these, his political
points of view, into consideration. Raeder was impressed with the
statements, for they were completely in accordance with his own
basic attitude.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Within the framework of this policy the German-British
Naval Agreement was then concluded in 1935. Was the
Navy as a whole and Raeder in particular pleased with this agreement,
or did they see certain disadvantages in it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder and the Navy were very pleased
with this agreement, although we had to impose voluntarily upon
ourselves severe limitations for a certain length of time. By this
agreement, in comparison with the Washington conference, I should
say we ranged among the smallest sea powers. In spite of that, this
agreement was generally welcomed, because friendly relations with
the British Navy were desired, and it was believed that if we followed
a wise and moderate policy, England in return would show
her appreciation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know whether at that time Hitler as well
approved of the agreement in that form and was pleased about it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I can affirm that. Raeder and I
happened to be together with Hitler in Hamburg the day this agreement
was concluded, and Hitler said to Raeder when this fact was
reported to him:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“This is the happiest day of my life. This morning I received
word from my doctor that my throat trouble is insignificant,
and now this afternoon I receive this very gratifying political
news.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You have already stated, Admiral, that the naval
agreement was welcomed by the Navy. You will recall that in the
year 1937 a modified naval agreement was concluded with England.
Was the attitude of the Navy to that question still the same at
that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The Naval Agreement of
1937 brought merely one, I might say, additional clause. This was
for an exchange of information; and we had also reached an agreement
with the British Navy with regard to a fixed U-boat tonnage.
We had no reason...
<span class='pageno' title='303' id='Page_303'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, referring to the U-boat tonnage, I
remember the 1935 agreement: 100 percent of the British U-boat
tonnage; Germany limited herself to 45 percent, but reserved the
right to increase the tonnage up to possibly 100 percent, in which
case she must, however, notify England and discuss it with the
British Admiralty.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Was this notification about the increase to 100 percent given, and
if so, when and in what way?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After we had reached 100 percent, Admiral
Cunningham was in Berlin and on that occasion the fact was
discussed once more. Whether a written confirmation was made in
addition I no longer recall. I take it for granted because that was
the purpose of the agreement of 1937. On the occasion of his visit
in December 1938, Admiral Cunningham explicitly gave Britain’s
agreement to the final 100 percent equality in U-boats. That is the
way I, or rather all of us, interpreted his visit.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember whether there was a special
conversation, or a conversation between Admiral Cunningham and
Raeder, on the occasion of this visit, in which Admiral Cunningham
discussed generally the relations between the German and the British
Navy, and between Germany and England?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I had the personal impression that Cunningham
and Raeder parted on very friendly terms. At Cunningham’s
departure there was a breakfast for a rather limited circle,
and on that occasion Cunningham expressed his pleasure at the
conclusion of the naval agreement, concluding his speech with a
toast to the effect that now all these questions had been settled at
last, and it was to be hoped that in the future there would be
no war between our navies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this incident?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: December 1938. I believe that is correct, Admiral?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As far as I remember, December 1938.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I remember the date from the testimony given
by Admiral Raeder. I myself knew only that it took place in 1938.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What Admiral Cunningham is it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I do not know, I am not a naval expert. Perhaps
Admiral Schulte-Mönting can tell us.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not understand the question,
Doctor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Which Admiral Cunningham is that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The present Lord Cunningham. The elder
of the two.
<span class='pageno' title='304' id='Page_304'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that it must have
been on 30 or 31 December 1938, as far as we, or rather as far as
Raeder recalls.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] From 1933 until 1939 was Raeder confident
that Hitler would not start a war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. Raeder was completely confident of
that. As proof of this I may say that actually nothing was changed
in our building program within that period. That would have been
necessary if one had had to prepare oneself, at least mentally, for
an armed conflict.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In what respect would the building program
have had to be changed if one had wanted to wage an aggressive
war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It would have been necessary to give
priority at least to the U-boat building program.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was it clear to you and to the leading naval
officers that a real aggressive war started by Germany would perforce
result in a war with England?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. The knowledge of this fact is proof
in my opinion that a war of aggression was not planned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, now in 1938 and 1939 incidents took
place which perhaps justified a certain amount of skepticism. I
should like to remind you of the crisis in the autumn of 1938 concerning
the Sudetenland which almost led to war, which was then
prevented only at the last moment through the Munich Agreement.
I should like to call your attention specifically to the occupation
of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, which was contradictory
to the Munich Agreement.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, what was the attitude of Raeder to this incident, which
you must know as you spoke to him practically every day.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As Hitler had stated expressly at Munich
that he was interested only in the German areas of Czechoslovakia;
and, even though perhaps he seemed exceedingly determined
to the outside world, was actually willing to negotiate,
Raeder and the leading circles in the Navy believed that these
things would be adjusted politically.</p>

<p class='pindent'>With the occupation of Czechoslovakia a great disquiet certainly
did arise among us. But we were firmly convinced that Hitler
would not make any exaggerated demands, and that he would be
prepared to settle these matters politically, because we could not
imagine that he would expose the German people to the danger
of a second world war.
<span class='pageno' title='305' id='Page_305'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you know that before the agreement with
Hacha was made, under rather strange circumstances, a bombardment
of Prague had allegedly been threatened; or did Raeder know
anything about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Raeder knew anything
about this. I am hearing about it for the first time now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the Document L-79. This
is a speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939; that is the so-called
“Little Schmundt File.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, this is Exhibit USA-27, and is to be found in
Document Book Number 10, Page 74, of the British Delegation.
I am submitting this document to the witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] This speech delivered by Hitler on
23 May 1939 was recorded by the adjutant on duty, Lieutenant
Colonel Schmundt. As far as I know, Raeder, on the same day,
discussed this speech with you in detail. At that time you had
been Chief of Staff for a period of about 6 months. From your
later activity are you familiar with the type of recording which
was customary for military speeches?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This record can really not be considered
a true account. I have from this record...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, in the first place, your question
was very much leading. You did not ask him a question. You put
into his mouth what had happened. That is altogether wrong. You
ought to have asked him, if you wanted to prove a conversation
he had with Raeder, whether he did have a conversation with
Raeder. You have told him that he had a conversation with Raeder.
The purpose of examination is to ask questions, and then he could
tell us if he had a conversation with Raeder. He cannot tell us
whether this is a true account or a true form of the account when
he was not at the meeting himself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I wish to thank the High Tribunal, and I shall
try to put the questions properly. The witness...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Not only that, but the Tribunal cannot listen
to this witness’ account, or his opinion as to whether this is a
true account of a meeting at which he was not present.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, the witness, as Chief of Staff,
has always seen the exact minutes on important meetings. They
were delivered to him in accordance with the distribution list.
Therefore, as this document is of a decisive nature, I should like
to determine whether Schulte-Mönting, as Chief of Staff, received
the minutes or whether he just received knowledge of the contents
<span class='pageno' title='306' id='Page_306'></span>
through Admiral Raeder’s immediate reporting. That was the purpose
of my question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, you mean you want to
ask him whether he ever saw this document. Yes, you may certainly
ask him that. Ask him if he saw the document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Your Honor, but I believe
the answer of the witness was lost in the interpretation, and if
I am correct...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Never mind about his answer; the question
is what question you are to put to him, and he can answer whether
he ever saw the document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I shall put that question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Admiral, did you get to see this document at the time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I am just seeing it now for the first
time, here in Nuremberg.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: How did you hear about the contents of the
speech of 23 May?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, as a matter
of principle, after every speech or conference, confidential or
otherwise. Immediately after the speech, Raeder gave me his
impressions which are in contradiction to these so-called minutes.
Raeder did not have this, I might say, exaggerated bellicose impression
which is apparent in this document. But, on the other
hand...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness must tell us what Raeder said
to him. That is what I told you before. He may tell us what Raeder
said to him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I should like you to tell us just what
Raeder said to you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder told me that Hitler in his speech
said there was a prospect of a future conflict with Poland, and
that this was in contradiction to those things which he had discussed
with him alone. That the speech in itself was contradictory,
was the impression he expressed to me at that time. He also told
me that after the speech he had had a conversation with Hitler
alone during which he called his attention to the contradictions
contained in the speech. At the same time he reminded Hitler of
what he had told him previously, namely that he would settle
the Polish case under all circumstances in a peaceful way; and now
he was considering a warlike solution possible. Hitler, he said,
had reassured him and had told him that politically he had things
firmly in hand. Then when Raeder asked him, or rather called
<span class='pageno' title='307' id='Page_307'></span>
his attention to this contradiction and asked him just what he
really intended to do, Hitler had answered, Raeder told me, the
following:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I, Hitler, have three ways of keeping secrets. The first,
when we two speak alone; the second, when I, Hitler, keep
them to myself; the third, for problems of the future, which
I do not think out to an end.”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>Raeder called his attention to the impossibility of a warlike conflict.
To that, according to Raeder, Hitler replied:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“It is as if you and I had agreed on a settlement of one
mark. Now, I, Hitler, have already paid you 99 pfennig. Do
you think that because of this last 1 pfennig you would
take me to court?”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And Raeder said “No.”</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“You see”—Hitler said to Raeder—“I have got what I want
by political means, and I do not believe that because of this
last political question”—the solution of the Polish Corridor,
as we called it—“we will have to anticipate a war with England.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And that was in a conversation between Hitler
and Raeder after this speech had been made?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That took place after this speech.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with regard to the minutes which I have
shown you, I have one final question: Did you personally, as Chief
of Staff, also receive and read all minutes which were sent to
Raeder?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, as a rule I saw all minutes and
reports before they were given to Raeder.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was Admiral Reader of the opinion—excuse me,
I should like to put the question differently.</p>

<p class='pindent'>What was Raeder’s point of view concerning the Navy and
politics?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder’s opinion was that we, the Navy,
had nothing to do with politics. He adopted that attitude as
an order and a trust received from the old Reich President,
Von Hindenburg, who, when appointing Raeder to be head of the
Navy, imposed that as a duty upon him.
<span class='pageno' title='308' id='Page_308'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Norway. What were the reasons
which induced Raeder, in September and October 1939, to consider
a possible occupation of Norway?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The reasons were the reports which came
from various sources about alleged intentions of an occupation of
Norway by the Allies. These reports came from the following
sources: First, Admiral Canaris, who was the chief of our intelligence
service. He reported to Raeder, in my presence, once a week,
the information that had come in. Secondly, the reports that came
from the naval attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, which
indicated that rumors were increasing that the Allies intended to
drag Scandinavia into the war in order to prevent, if possible, the
iron ore exports from Sweden to Germany. We did not consider
these reports altogether impossible, because, as documentary
evidence from the last World War proves, Churchill had seriously
considered the occupation of Norway.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was there a further source for reports of that
kind?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Admiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief
of Group North, had received similar reports which he passed on
orally and in writing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember any details from these reports
which you could give us quite briefly?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. There were reports concerning the
presence of British air crews in Oslo, allegedly posing as civilians.
There were reports about Allied officers making surveys of Norwegian
bridges, viaducts, and tunnels all the way to the Swedish
border, which was taken as an indication that the transportation
of heavy material and equipment was planned. And last but not
least there were reports about a secret mobilization of Swedish
troops because of the alleged danger to the ore areas.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What danger arose for Germany on account of
that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If Norway were to have been actually
occupied, the conduct of the war in the North Sea would have
become almost impossible, and it would have been very difficult
in the Baltic Sea. The ore imports most probably would have been
stopped. The danger from the air would have become terrible for
north Germany and the eastern territories. In the long run the North
Sea and the Baltic would have been blocked completely, which
eventually would have led to the total loss of the war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Admiral Raeder do on the basis of
these considerations?
<span class='pageno' title='309' id='Page_309'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He reported to Hitler about his misgivings
and called his attention to the dangers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When was that report made?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If I remember correctly, in the autumn
of ’39.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, until the adjournment, will you
go very slowly because, owing to the power of the electrical
recording being off, what is happening here in Court is impossible
to take and therefore we have to rely solely upon the shorthand
notes which cannot be checked back against the electrical recording.
Do you understand? Therefore I want you to go rather more
slowly than usual.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When was the conference between Hitler and
Raeder in which Raeder for the first time pointed out these dangers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In October 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: According to the War Diary that conference took
place, which of course you cannot remember offhand, on 10 October.
At any rate you probably mean that conference.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler then, as a result of that conference,
make a final decision?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, in no way at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did discussions about that subject then take
place continually between Hitler and Raeder?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. No further discussions along that
line took place then until perhaps the end of the year. Only when
the reports which I mentioned before were received in increasing
numbers was that subject taken up again.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is it known to you that in December 1939 Quisling
came to Berlin and also talked with Raeder?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is known to me, and I took part
in that meeting.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Quisling tell Raeder?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Quisling came on a recommendation
from Rosenberg and said he had important news of a military
and political nature. He confirmed, more or less, the things which
we knew already.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were only the military dangers discussed in this
conference?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Only these things were discussed; the
conference was very short.
<span class='pageno' title='310' id='Page_310'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No political questions were discussed?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Raeder met Quisling for the
first time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the occasion of that visit.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have at that time any close connections
with Rosenberg?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, he knew him casually, having just
seen him a few times.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Had Rosenberg informed Raeder before about
the relations between Rosenberg and Quisling?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not to my knowledge.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Raeder do when Quisling confirmed
the reports received from Canaris and other sources?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As the things we suspected were confirmed
from Norway, Raeder considered this so serious that he went
immediately to Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you also know what he suggested to Hitler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Hitler wanted to talk to Quisling himself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And that took place?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it did.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was a final decision made then concerning Norway,
in December 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Hitler directed that as a countermeasure,
theoretical preparations should be made for a German
landing in Norway. The order, the final order, as far as I know
was not given until March.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was the landing in Norway an undertaking which
you and Raeder considered a risky one or was it considered absolutely
safe to do so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Raeder and the gentlemen from the
Naval Operations Staff and also the front commanders considered
that undertaking very risky. I remember Churchill’s speech in
Parliament when he said, after he had been questioned about that
matter, that he did not believe the German Navy would undertake
that risk in face of the British Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Churchill made that statement,
approximately?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe it was between 7 and 9 April.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: 1940?
<span class='pageno' title='311' id='Page_311'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What was your estimate at the Naval Operations
Staff of the risks of losses?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder had told Hitler that he would
have to reckon on the possible complete loss of the fleet, and that
if the operations were carried out successfully he would have to
be prepared for the loss of about 30 percent of the forces used.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And how much was lost?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: About 30 percent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In view of the risk of losing the entire fleet,
was Raeder at first in favor of that operation?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. He considered a neutral attitude on
the part of Norway as much better than having to take this risk.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder and
the Naval Operations Staff recommended the occupation of Norway
out of the desire for fame and conquest. What do you say
about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The desire for fame was not in Raeder’s
character. The plans for operations which came from his desk
bore the mark of bold daring, but also of thorough planning. One
does not work out plans to the minutest detail covering the distance
from German ports up to Narvik, which is about that from Nuremberg
to Madrid, and one does not use the Navy against a superior
British fleet for the sake of fame.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Raeder had told the Naval Operations Staff and the front commanders
that he had to carry out that operation against all the
rules of warfare because there was a compelling necessity to do so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When did the actual drafting of the military
operation take place at the Naval Operations Staff?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: February 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: During the period from December 1939 until
March 1940 did you continue to receive reports from the sources
you have mentioned?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did these later reports contain a clearer indication
as to the place of the landings, or did you not see the details
about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, they covered the areas between
Narvik via Bergen to Trondheim, from Bergen to Oslo.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder—excuse me, I want to put the
question differently: What was the basis which Raeder suggested
to Hitler for the relations between Germany and Norway?
<span class='pageno' title='312' id='Page_312'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To that I would like to...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, I mean in the period after the
operation was carried out and Germany had occupied Norway.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder in speaking to Hitler advocated
a policy of peace. He suggested repeatedly that attempts should
be made for peace with Norway. He was in agreement in that
respect with the German Commander-in-Chief in Norway, Generaladmiral
Böhm, while Terboven, who was directing political matters,
was of a somewhat different opinion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did serious conflicts arise in that respect
between Terboven and his civil administration on the one side,
and Raeder and Böhm and his colleague, Korvettenkapitän
Schreiber, on the other?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, there were serious differences and
quarrels all the way up the line to Hitler. Hitler at that time
told Raeder that he could not make peace with Norway because
of France.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said, “because of France.” Was it
not possible to make peace with France also, and what was Raeder’s
attitude in that regard?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder advocated the same thing concerning
France.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And what did he say?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He tried to arrange a conference with
Admiral Darlan in an effort to forward these matters. He had
pointed out to Hitler, when the Atlantic Coast was fortified, that
it would be better and more practical to make peace with France
than to make great though inadequate sacrifices for defense. Hitler
replied that he fully agreed but out of consideration for Italy he
could not conclude a peace treaty with France.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did the conversations between Raeder and
Darlan take place?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, near Paris.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were you present?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Admiral Schultze, the Commanding
Admiral in France.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you whether the results of the
conversation were favorable?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he told me about the very favorable
results.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder report on that to Hitler?
<span class='pageno' title='313' id='Page_313'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And in spite of that, Hitler refused?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Out of consideration for Mussolini.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: According to your knowledge, did the Party or
the leadership of the SS through Heydrich attempt to fight Raeder?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Heydrich repeatedly attempted to bring
Raeder and the Navy into discredit with Hitler through defamatory
remarks and by spying, either by posting spies in the officers corps
or the casinos, or by misrepresenting or distorting news. Against
these attacks, Raeder defended himself tenaciously and successfully.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Why was the Party against Raeder?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a question which is very difficult
to answer. I believe mainly because, first of all, there were
differences in the religious field. Many commanders before they
put to sea for combat turned to Raeder for help so that during
their absence their relatives would not have their religious freedom
curtailed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When did the first differences occur between
Raeder and Hitler, and during what period did Raeder ask for his
dismissal?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have had that from that defendant himself,
have we not? Raeder told us when he asked for it. No cross-examination
about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you for what reasons Raeder
remained?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First, because Hitler himself had asked
him to stay, and gave him assurances for the integrity of the Navy.
Furthermore, at that time, there were discussions about combining
the Navy and the merchant marine into one ministry and
putting Party people into that ministry. In that event we did not
see a strengthening but a weakening of our fighting force. Besides,
during that period there occurred a gap in the line of successors,
due to illness and losses.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And last but not least, Raeder remained in the war out of a
sense of responsibility and patriotism.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you yourself ask Raeder to remain in office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I had to ask Raeder frequently and
very seriously. I myself was once ordered by Hitler to come to the
Reich Chancellery.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When was that?
<span class='pageno' title='314' id='Page_314'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the beginning of 1939, when he explained
his standpoint to me in a long conversation and asked me
to convince Raeder that he had to stay. Moreover, he enjoyed the
confidence of the Navy. The senior officers and officials of the
Navy had asked me orally and in writing to try to persuade Raeder
not to leave his office prematurely. Since 1928 he had led the Navy
with a firm hand through all political vicissitudes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I return again to your conversation
with Hitler in the beginning of 1939? Did you speak with
Hitler alone?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that was a private conversation of
about an hour and a half.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler tell you anything about his political
plans on that occasion?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; not about political plans in the sense
of what is called politics, but he tried once more to bridge political
differences with Raeder. He told me one should not weigh each
individual word of his. His visitors were right, but only after they
had left; he would put forward records and witnesses; all he wanted
was to appeal to the emotions of his listeners and to stir them up
to do their utmost, but not to commit himself with words. In the
future he promised he would try to give the Navy independence
in all technical questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You just said “not to weigh each individual
word.” Admiral, were the speeches of Hitler ever taken down accurately,
that is, by stenographers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, but as far as I know only in the
later part of the war. Hitler was against having his words put on
record, because everyone who listened to him returned home with
his own opinion. He himself did not stick to his text; he thought
out loud and wanted to carry his listeners away, but he did not
want his individual words to be taken literally. I spoke about that
to Raeder very frequently. We always knew what was expected of
us, but we never knew what Hitler himself thought or wanted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If Hitler did not want to be taken at his word,
how did it come about that he agreed in the war to have his speeches
taken down by stenographers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I told you before that too many misunderstandings
had occurred, and that Hitler as well as those who
reported to him believed that everyone had convinced the other of
his opinion. Thereupon they started keeping minutes. The minutes
kept up to then were personal impressions of those who were not
instructed to keep them but who did so on their initiative.
<span class='pageno' title='315' id='Page_315'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What time is the witness speaking of? He
said up to then the minutes had been kept on the personal initiative
of the person who took them. What time is he speaking of?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: From what time, according to your recollection,
were these minutes taken by the stenographers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1942, I believe.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: From 1942?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It might also be 1941. During the war,
at any rate.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But your conversation with Hitler was in January
1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, January 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what did the stenographic minutes look
like later on? Did you ever see them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We repeatedly asked for excerpts from
the minutes and tried to compare them with the prepared text and
they too contained contradictions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, I come to the period when Hitler prepared
for war against Russia, and I am going to show you the Directive
Number 21, of 18 December 1940, concerning the Case Barbarossa.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, that is Document Number 446-PS, Exhibit USA-31,
in the Document Book of the British Prosecution Number 10a,
Page 247.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] The Prosecution have asserted that
Raeder or the Naval Operations Staff had taken part in the drafting
of that directive; is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. The Navy had
nothing to do with the drafting of that directive.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have any previous knowledge of
Hitler’s plan to attack Russia, before he received that directive?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, by an oral communication from
Hitler to Raeder, about the middle of August 1940—or October 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: October 1940. Did Raeder inform you about his
conferences with Hitler concerning Russia, and what attitude did
he adopt in these conferences?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, because the
prospect of war with Russia was much too serious to be taken
lightly. Raeder opposed most energetically any plan for a war
against Russia; and, I should like to say, for moral reasons because
Raeder was of the opinion that the pact with Russia should not be
broken as long as the other side gave no cause for it. That, as far
<span class='pageno' title='316' id='Page_316'></span>
as Raeder knew, was not the case in October. That economic treaty—as
we called it at that time—to our knowledge was about 90 percent
at the expense of the Navy. We gave Russia one heavy cruiser,
heavy artillery for battleships, artillery installations, submarine
engines, submarine installations, and valuable optical instruments
for use on submarines. Besides, Raeder was of the opinion that the
theater of operations should not be allowed to be carried into the
Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea was our drill field, I might say. All our
recruits were trained there; all our submarine training took place
in the Baltic Sea.</p>

<p class='pindent'>We had already partly stripped the Baltic coast of batteries and
personnel for the purpose of protecting the Norwegian and the
French coasts. We had very small oil reserves at our disposal, the
synthetic oil production was not yet in full swing. The Navy had
to turn over some of its reserves to industry and agriculture. Consequently,
Raeder was strongly opposed to waging war against Russia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution believe that Raeder was
only opposed to the date set for the war against Russia and concludes
this from the War Diary in which actually the entries refer
to the date. Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. After the receipt
of Directive 21, called Barbarossa, Raeder approached Hitler again
with reference to the war against Russia, and also put down his
thoughts in a memorandum. He tried to convince Hitler of the following:
Poland had been crushed, France had been occupied, and,
for military reasons, an invasion of England was out of the question.
He said clearly that now the time had arrived when the further
conduct of the war could not be decisive on the Continent, but
in the Atlantic. Therefore, he told him that he had to concentrate
all forces at his disposal on one objective: To hit the strategic points
of the Empire, especially the supply lines to the British Isles in
order to compel England to sue for negotiations or, if possible, to
make peace. He suggested, as has been mentioned before, that the
policy of peace with Norway should be pursued, peace with France,
and closer co-operation with the Russian Navy, such as was provided
for in the economic treaty, and the repurchase of submarine equipment
or submarines. He said that the decision or the date for a
decision no longer rested with us because we did not have the necessary
sea power and that in case of a long duration of the war the
danger of the participation of the United States had also to be considered;
that therefore the war could not be decided on the European
continent and least of all in the vastnesses of the Russian steppes.
That point of view he continued to present to Hitler as long as he
was in office.
<span class='pageno' title='317' id='Page_317'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said at first that Raeder had protested,
in principle as you have expressed it, for moral reasons, that
is, for reasons of international law.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Why was not that entered into the War Diary
when the other reasons that you have mentioned can be found in
the War Diary? At least they are alluded to.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I can answer, or at least give you
an explanation. Raeder, as a matter of principle, never criticized
the political leadership in the presence of the gentlemen of the
Naval Operations Staff or the front commanders. Therefore, he did
not speak to me and the others about the private conversations
which he had with Hitler, except when it was necessary for military
reasons.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When were the preparations by the Navy, on the
basis of Directive 21 that you have in front of you, made? Do you
remember that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe about 3 months later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, certainly after the directive?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, after the directive.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were they made on the basis of that directive?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the basis of that, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was that directive already a final order or was
it just a precautionary strategic measure?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my estimation it should not be considered
as an order, and that can be seen from Points IV and V.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In what way?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Point V says that Hitler was still waiting
for reports from commanders-in-chief. And Raeder still reported
to Hitler after he had received the directive.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is Point IV, if you will look at it once more, also
in accordance with your opinion?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The words “precautionary
measures” are underlined.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Precautionary measures for what?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In case of war against Russia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Well, I think, Admiral, since you have mentioned
it yourself, you should read the sentence which follows the words
“precautionary measures.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: “In case Russia should change her attitude,
she is...”
<span class='pageno' title='318' id='Page_318'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You cannot argue with your own witness
about the meaning of the words. He has given his answer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Was Raeder of the opinion, at any
time, that he had succeeded in dissuading Hitler from the unfortunate
plans against Russia?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. After he had made his report at
that time, he returned and said, “I believe I have talked him out
of his plan.” And at first we did have that impression because in
the following months there were no more conferences about it, to
my knowledge, not even with the General Staff.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you quite briefly then about Greece.
According to Document C-152, which I will have shown to you,
Raeder made a report to Hitler on 18 March 1941, in which he asked
that the whole of Greece should be occupied. What were the reasons
that caused the High Command, that is, Raeder and you, to make
that suggestion?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: When Raeder asked for authorization, as
it says here in the War Diary, for the occupation of the whole of
Greece, even in the event of a peaceful settlement, we, according to
my recollection, had already been for 3 months in possession of the
directive which was concerned with the occupation of Greece, and
when...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. Was that Directive Number 20? I
will have it shown to you. Is that the one you mean?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, “Marita,” that is the one.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is Document Number 1541-PS,
Exhibit GB-13, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution 10a,
Page 270. That is Directive Number 20, Case Marita of 13 December
1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Admiral, what caused Raeder, apart
from that point which Hitler had already explained, to ask that
specific question again in the month of March, that is to say, on
18 March?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: A British landing had already occurred
in the south of Greece a few days before.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did this landing make it necessary to occupy the
whole of Greece?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, for strategic reasons, absolutely.
The menace of an occupation from the sea or from the air, or the
formation of a Balkan front against Germany, or the menace from
the air to the oil fields, had to be eliminated under all circumstances.
May I only remind you of the Salonika operation in the
first World War. I believe that was a similar situation.
<span class='pageno' title='319' id='Page_319'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Here again the Prosecution say this was governed
by the desire for conquest and fame. Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to answer that fame requires
achievements, and I do not know what the Navy could have conquered
in the Mediterranean. We did not have a single man or a
single ship down there; but Raeder, of course, for the strategic
reasons I have mentioned, had to advise Hitler in that direction.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were breaches of neutrality on the part of Greece
known to you before this time, before we occupied Greece?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We had been informed that in 1939, certain
Greek political and military circles had been in the closest
connection with the Allied General Staff. We knew that Greek
merchantmen were in British service. Therefore we were compelled
to consider the Greek merchantmen which sailed through the prohibited
zone to England as enemy ships. And, I believe, in the
beginning of 1940, or the middle of 1940, we received information
that the Allies intended to land in Greece or to establish a Balkan
front against Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<h2><span class='pageno' title='320' id='Page_320'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, as the last point in my questions dealing
with Russia, I should like to show you the document submitted by
the Soviet Prosecution, Document USSR-113. This document is a
communication from the Naval Operations Staff of 29 September
1941 to Group North, that is, Generaladmiral Carls. Under II it
states as to the result of a conversation between Admiral Fricke and
Hitler: “The Führer is determined to make the city of St. Petersburg
disappear from the face of the earth.” Raeder has been accused
of not having done anything to oppose such a monstrous intention
and has been accused because the Naval Operations Staff passed on
this communication. I ask you, Admiral, did you know of this communication
in 1941?</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the President.</span>] I beg your pardon, Mr. President, I
should like to remark that at this moment, I am sorry to say, I have
no photostatic copy of this document. I tried to procure it. I have
this very moment received it, and I should like to submit the photostatic
copy at this point, instead of the written copy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This seems to be the original which I have
before me?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, Admiral, it is a copy, an exact copy of the
photostatic copy with all paragraphs and names, made for my own
special use.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Were you acquainted with this piece of writing in 1941?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not know it in 1941, it is submitted
to me at this moment for the first time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe that Admiral Raeder saw this
communication before it was sent off, even though you yourself had
not seen it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That would have been a miracle. Communications
which were submitted to Admiral Raeder all went
through my hands. They always had the notation, either “the
Commander-in-Chief has taken due note,” and were initialed by
me personally in order to certify this notation, or “this order or this
directive is to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief,” and in this
case too my initials were affixed. This order and this copy which
you have just shown to me I have never seen before; I am not
acquainted with it; and I consider it impossible that Admiral Raeder
should have seen it, because on 29 September 1941 I was in good
health and exercising my duties in Berlin.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what do you know about this question
of Leningrad and the Navy?
<span class='pageno' title='321' id='Page_321'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I recall that at the so-called daily discussions
regarding the general situation one of the officers of the Naval
Operations Staff reported on the intentions of the Army regarding
the future of Leningrad—not Petersburg. Whereupon Raeder expressed
the desire that it be kept in mind during the operations that
Leningrad should, under all circumstances, fall intact into our hands,
for he needed shipyards and adjoining territory for naval construction;
and he wished that the Army be informed of the urgency of
this desire, because in view of the ever-increasing danger of air
attacks, we intended to shift part of our shipyard facilities to
the East.</p>

<p class='pindent'>At that time we had already begun, if I remember correctly, to
move installations from Emden to the East and wanted, furthermore,
as Raeder wished, to evacuate Wilhelmshaven subsequently and
move the installations there as far to the East as possible. He
emphasized expressly that the city should also be left as undamaged
as possible because otherwise there would be no place for the
workers to live. This is all I can truthfully tell you about the case
of Leningrad.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know that this wish of Raeder’s was
rejected by Hitler because he said it was not possible?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not recall that this case was
taken up again. For the operations in the North soon came to a
standstill, I believe.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did other high officers tell you anything at all
about this document?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I never heard anything about this
document, nor did I see any reason to discuss it with anyone.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, if it is agreeable to the Tribunal,
I should like to submit a document which was granted me, Exhibit
Raeder-111, because of its connection with this problem. It is to be
found in my Document Book 6, Page 435. It is an affidavit by Rear
Admiral Hans Bütow, dated 21 March 1946. I should like to read
this document since it is very brief.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What page is this?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Page 435 in Document Book 6, Exhibit Number
Raeder-111. It reads as follows:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“During the period from 20 June 1941 to 20 October 1941,
namely, the period to which Document USSR-113, (1), UK-45,
refers, I was stationed in Finland as Naval Commander. I was
under Generaladmiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of
Group North. I declare that the document in question,
USSR-113, (1), UK-45, a communication of 29 September 1941
<span class='pageno' title='322' id='Page_322'></span>
sent by the Naval Operations Staff to Group North, and its
contents have never come to my knowledge, as it doubtless
would have if Generaladmiral Carls had passed on the letter
to the offices subordinate to him. As far as I know, no one
else in my command received this communication.</p>

<p>“I myself first obtained knowledge of this order of Hitler’s
in November 1945 on the occasion of a conversation with
Dr. Siemers, the defense counsel for Admiral Raeder.</p>

<p>“Other officers, especially other naval commanders, have
never spoken to me about this order. It is thus clear that the
other commanders likewise had no knowledge of this order.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then there is the certification and the signature of the senior
naval judge before whom this affidavit was made.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Admiral, then I should like to turn to a new topic, the alleged
war of aggression which Raeder is supposed to have planned against
America. Did Raeder at any time try to instigate Japan to a war
against America?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, never. We never had any military
discussions with Japan at all before her entry into the war. Quite
on the contrary, he warned Hitler against war with America in
view of England’s naval superiority and her co-operation with
America.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: For what reasons did you, Raeder, and the High
Command especially, warn Hitler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, for the reasons which I outlined
before, reasons of over-all strategy which motivated Raeder
during the entire course of the war. Raeder considered the enemy
on the sea primarily, and not on land. If the largest sea power
in the world were added to England, which was already superior,
then the war would have taken on unbearable proportions for us.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Besides, through the reports of our naval attaché in Washington,
Vice Admiral Witthöft, Raeder was very well informed about the
tremendous potential at the disposal of the United States.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I might also say with reference to the conversion of the normal
economy into a war economy, that the tremendous outlay of shipyards
and installations, as Witthöft stated a few months before the
war, permitted the construction of a million tons of shipping each
month. These figures were very eloquent and were naturally at the
same time a terrible warning to us not to underestimate the armament
potential of the United States.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution believes it must draw a contrary
conclusion from the fact that Raeder on 18 March 1941, according
to the War Diary, proposed that Japan should attack Singapore.
<span class='pageno' title='323' id='Page_323'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, that was an absolutely
correct measure and a correct proposal, which was in line with
Raeder’s reasoning. He was interested in dealing blows to England’s
important strategic centers. That he tried to ease our situation is
understandable and self-evident. But at no time did he propose that
Japan should enter into a war against America, but rather against
England.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were there any discussions about these strategic
questions at that time between you and Raeder on the one hand
and Japanese military authorities on the other?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I have already stated that before
Japan’s entry into the war no military discussions with Japan had
ever taken place. The Japanese attitude was very reserved.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder ever discuss the fact that Japan
should attack Pearl Harbor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. We heard about this for the first time
over the radio.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, during the time of your activity in the
High Command of the Navy or during your activity as a commanding
admiral at Trondheim did you have any knowledge about
the treatment of Allied prisoners of war by the German Navy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might reply that I know of no case in
which Allied prisoners of war, as long as they were under the control
of the Navy, were treated other than properly and chivalrously. I
could refer to the testimony given by the English commander of the
midget U-boat, which attacked the <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span> in the Alta Fjord, who
after his return to England from imprisonment, gave a press interview
on the occasion of his being awarded the Victoria Cross. In
this interview he mentioned the particularly chivalrous and correct
treatment he had received at the hands of the commander of the
<span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>From my own command in Norway I could mention a case in
which members of the Norwegian resistance movement dressed in
civilian clothing were treated just as chivalrously and correctly. I
had to investigate these cases in the presence of British authorities,
and the correctness of the treatment became evident.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When did you have to investigate this at the
order of the British Military Government?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After the capitulation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, not the Military Government,
but the British Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The British Navy at Trondheim, while I
was a commanding admiral.
<span class='pageno' title='324' id='Page_324'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And the cases which were investigated there,
first by you and then by the competent British admiral, were not
contested?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Were not contested. The naval officer
handed them over to me for safekeeping, and I had to present the
findings of the courts of inquiry in writing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And the result...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The result was good, proper, and occasioned
no protests.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And the result was presented to the competent
British officer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it was on his very order that I had
to do it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the case of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> has been dealt
with here in detail and is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, in
order to save time, I should like merely to touch this case in
passing. I should like you to tell me: Did the High Command know,
did you and Raeder know, at the beginning of September 1939 that
the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> had been sunk by a German U-boat?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. The Commander of U-boats reported
on the 3d that the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> could not have been sunk by a German
U-boat since, if I remember correctly, the nearest boat was about
70 nautical miles away.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When did you learn that a German U-boat had
sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe 2 or 3 weeks afterwards, after
this U-boat returned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I should like to refer to a document,
according to which the date was 27 September.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Do you know that a declaration had
been made by State Secretary Von Weizsäcker on 3, 4, or 5 September
to the effect that it was not a German U-boat? When it was
established that it actually had been a German U-boat, what did
Raeder do about it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The assumption that it had not been a
German U-boat was at first justified and State Secretary Von Weizsäcker
therefore acted in the best of faith, as did we. After this
regrettable mistake became known, Raeder reported this fact to
Hitler. Hitler then gave the order that he did not want the statement
which had been made by the Foreign Office denied. He ordered
that the participants, that is those who knew, should give their oath
to remain silent until, I believe, the end of the war.
<span class='pageno' title='325' id='Page_325'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you give your oath of silence?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I personally did not give my oath of
silence, and neither did Admiral Raeder. In the High Command we
were the only ones, I believe, with the exception of Admiral Fricke
who had knowledge of that, and we should probably have taken
the oath.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: At Hitler’s order you were obliged to administer
an oath to the others who knew about this?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I am of the opinion that it was the
crew of the U-boat, insofar as they knew about this mistake.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not
having gone to Freiherr Von Weizsäcker to tell him that it actually
was a German U-boat and of not having said to the American naval
attaché, “I am sorry; it was a German U-boat after all.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Such thoughts occurred to us as well, but
we thought that any discrepancies which might arise and lead to
political ill-humor in America were to be avoided as much as possible.
Stirring up this case once more would have greatly aroused
public feeling. I remember, for instance, the <span class='it'>Lusitania</span> case during
the first World War. To have stirred up this case again after a few
weeks and to arouse public opinion, and then to force entry into
the war would have had little sense.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And that was the train of thought which caused
Hitler to issue this decree?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It was the train of thought which we also
shared.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You said it was not to be stirred up again but
regrettably, as you know, this case was stirred up again. On 23 October
1939 in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> a very unfortunate article
appeared with the heading “Churchill Sinks the Athenia.” Do you
remember that article?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. That article was published
without Raeder’s knowledge and without the knowledge or
complicity of the Navy. Even today I do not know yet who the
author of the article was. It originated in the Propaganda Ministry,
and Raeder and the rest of us in the High Command of the Navy
were most indignant, not so much because this topic was being
stirred up again, but rather because of the tenor of the article for
whether deliberately or unintentionally—we did not know which it
was—there was a misrepresentation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>We were obliged to keep silence. To what extent the Propaganda
Ministry had been informed about this matter by Hitler, we
<span class='pageno' title='326' id='Page_326'></span>
did not know. We also had no opportunity to speak with the Propaganda
Ministry about this case and we were completely surprised
when this article appeared several weeks later in the <span class='it'>Völkischer
Beobachter</span>. We were therefore deeply indignant, especially Raeder,
because it was fundamentally against his principles that leading
foreign statesmen be attacked in a caustic manner; and, in addition,
the facts were completely distorted. And besides—this may also be
important—this involved Raeder’s opponent whom Raeder did not
in the least wish to disparage before the German public, for Raeder
took him only too seriously; and this was, I believe, no other than
Churchill.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question: Did the Propaganda
Ministry call you or Raeder up before this article appeared?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, no.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to turn to the last question
of my examination. This is the last point.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is about the sixth final
question you have asked.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, the translation
must have been wrong. The previous question was the final question
on the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> problem. Now, this is actually the final question
which I wish to put.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] The Prosecution accuses Admiral
Raeder of not supporting Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch after
the latter had been exonerated and acquitted in court and accuses
Raeder of not having used his influence to reinstate Fritsch in office
and restore his dignity. Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. Raeder gave me
all the files of the legal proceedings against Generaloberst Von
Fritsch sometime in the beginning of 1939 to be kept in the safe. At
that time he told me how the course of the proceedings had impressed
him and also of the fact that he had made Generaloberst
Von Fritsch the offer of a complete reinstatement, going so far as to
have him reinstated in his previous office. Von Fritsch thanked him
for that and told him personally that he would never assume his
former office again, that he would not even consider returning after
what had happened, for which reason he was requesting Raeder not
to make any efforts in this direction.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Besides, Fritsch and Raeder were on good personal terms—to say
that they were friends is going perhaps too far, but I have often
seen Fritsch at Raeder’s house even after his dismissal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you, Admiral.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, I have no further questions.
<span class='pageno' title='327' id='Page_327'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’
counsel want to ask any questions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Schulte-Mönting,
you just spoke about the correct treatment of prisoners in connection
with a U-boat attack on the <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>. Do you mean by that the
attack in November 1943 in the Alta Fjord?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is the one I mean.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it a two-man
U-boat?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Whether it was a two-man or three-man
U-boat, I do not know, but it was a midget U-boat. Several U-boats
attacked simultaneously. Some of them were sunk, and the commander
who successfully, I believe, placed his magnetic mine was
taken prisoner.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And this commander
was treated according to the Geneva convention?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Absolutely.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you first about the
<span class='it'>Athenia</span> episode. I take it you agree that the article in the <span class='it'>Völkischer
Beobachter</span> was thoroughly dishonorable, lying, and discreditable.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I heard nothing at all in German.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I will repeat my question. With regard to the
<span class='it'>Athenia</span>—do you hear me now?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: With regard to the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>
article on the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, do you agree that it was a thoroughly dishonorable
publication?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I agree that it was a dishonorable
publication, untrue and dishonorable.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Perhaps if you keep your headphones on—I
have a number of questions to ask you, I am afraid—it might be
more convenient for the work we have to do.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And you say that the Defendant Raeder thought it was dishonorable?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he did as well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: What action did he take to manifest his displeasure?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In this case he valued the interests of the
State more than a newspaper article. The interests of the State
<span class='pageno' title='328' id='Page_328'></span>
required that in any event all complications with the United States
were to be avoided.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That appears to be a characteristic on the part
of Raeder that runs throughout the history from 1928 to 1943, that
throughout he put what he thought were the interests of the Nazi
State before conditions of morality, honor, and public decency, is
that not so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I do not believe. I believe that in
this he acted consistently as a good patriot would act.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You see, with regard to the invasion of Russia,
for example, you said to the Tribunal that on both moral and
strategic grounds, Raeder was against the invasion of Russia. Why
did he not resign?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: By way of reply I must mention first
Hitler’s answer to Raeder’s statements against a war with Russia.
This answer was to the effect that he saw no possibility of avoiding
a conflict for the following reasons:</p>

<p class='pindent'>First, because of the personal impression which he, Hitler, had
received from Molotov’s visit, which had taken place in the meantime.
By “in the meantime” I mean between the directive and the
carrying through of the directive.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Secondly, the fact that allegedly the economic negotiations had
not only been dragged out by the Russians but, as Hitler expressed
it, had been conducted with blackmail methods.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Thirdly, as he had been informed by the German General Staff.
Russian troop deployment had taken on such threatening proportions
that he, Hitler, could not wait for the first blow from the other
side because of the air threat to Brandenburg and the capital and to
the Silesian industry. Raeder then, of course, had to realize that he
could not refute these arguments or prove the opposite.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You are not suggesting that you thought that
the war between Germany and Russia was a defensive war so far
as Germany was concerned, are you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, we were of the opinion that the
deployment of troops on both sides had reached such an extreme
point that it would not take long for the storm to burst, and that
from the military point of view anyone who sees that a conflict is
inevitable, naturally likes to have the advantages which result from
dealing the first blow.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: The invasion of Russia was a brutal aggression
on the part of Nazi Germany, you admit that now, do you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I do admit that.
<span class='pageno' title='329' id='Page_329'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want you to turn your mind for a moment, if
you will, to Document L-79, which is in the British Document
Book 10, Page 74. Those are the minutes of the Hitler conference
on 23 May 1939 which you discussed in your evidence-in-chief this
morning. I take it that you have read those minutes, Witness?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I look at them now? I have never
seen these minutes before. If I were to be asked about them, I
would first have to read them in toto.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Well, you need not trouble to do that, Witness.
You gave evidence this morning as to Raeder’s discussion with you
about this conference. Did Raeder tell you that Hitler had said on
23 May 1939, for instance:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with
the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.
We cannot expect a repetition of the Czechoslovakian
affair. There will be war.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then further, Page 76 of the report:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement
with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict...
England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England
will be a life and death struggle.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And then the next paragraph but one:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I am suggesting to you that those statements of Hitler’s
represented Hitler’s considered policy, and that that policy was in
fact carried out in the field of action. Is that not so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, I must correct a mistake. I
thought that you had shown me a record on Russia and not the one
on Poland. I saw it in different writing, and I thought it was another
record. If it is the same record which I mentioned this morning,
then I must state again that Raeder did not agree with the belligerent
wording of these minutes as written down by Schmundt.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Just one moment, Witness, if you please. I have
read out certain extracts from that document, which I take it that
you heard interpreted. Do you agree with me that those extracts
represented Hitler’s considered policy at the time and that that
policy was in fact carried out in the field of action?</p>

<p class='pindent'>If you keep your headphones on—I know it is difficult. Just
move them back if you wish to talk. Now, see if you can answer my
question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to remark in this connection
that Hitler in his speeches pursued a certain purpose. In preparations
<span class='pageno' title='330' id='Page_330'></span>
for war he saw a means of political pressure, and in the phrase
“war of nerves” (which was not used in Germany only, but went
everywhere through the ether far beyond Europe’s boundaries) he
tried to find a means of preventing war as well as a means of
exerting pressure. This document itself contains contradictions
which lead to the conclusion that he himself could not seriously
have thought that a war would develop. I can prove this by saying,
for example, that he states that the General Staff or the general
staffs are not to concern themselves with this question; but toward
the end he says that all the branches of the Wehrmacht must get
together to study the problem. He says that a war with Poland must
in no event result in war with England; politics must see to that.
But in the next paragraph one reads: “But if a war actually does
arise, I shall deal short sharp blows for a quick decision.” In the
next paragraph it says again, “But I need 10 to 15 years to prepare,”
and in the concluding paragraph it says: “The construction program
of the Navy will in no wise be changed.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>If, therefore, Hitler at that time had really been serious in his
speech, that is, that an armed conflict with Poland would result
shortly, then he would not have exclaimed first that we would have
time until 1943 and, secondly, that there were to be no changes as
far as the Navy was concerned. Rather he would have said to
Raeder, privately at least: “In all haste prepare a strong U-boat
program because I do not know what course events will take.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But it is a fact that at about this time, the
Fall Weiss operation was being prepared to the very last detail, was
it not? That is the operation against Poland.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The operation was prepared to such a
stage that when it was canceled at the last minute we thought that
we would not be able to reach our forces at sea by wireless. We
considered this an extreme policy of exerting pressure in the form
of a war of nerves. Since at the last minute everything was canceled
we believed without doubt that it was only a means of pressure and
not an entry into war. Not until we heard the cannons were we
convinced that the war was no longer to be prevented. I personally
believe...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: If you would shorten your answers as best you
can, it would be very convenient.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I want to go from Poland to Norway. The first conference of
the Defendant Raeder with regard to Norway took place on 10 October,
you have told us. I want you to hear the record of that conference,
which is found in Admiral Assmann’s headline diary. It
is dated 10 October 1939:
<span class='pageno' title='331' id='Page_331'></span></p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states conquering the
Belgian coast no advantage for U-boat warfare; refers to
value of Norwegian bases.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I suggest to you that the interests of the German Navy in Norway
from the point of view of requiring submarine bases was manifesting
itself at that time; is that not so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I look at this document first? It is
unknown to me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You shall see the original diary, if you want to
reassure yourself that I am reading it correctly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was handed to the witness.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In this sentence, I do not see any belligerent
intentions. It says expressly that he attaches importance to
the winning of Norwegian bases.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That is all I am putting to you at the moment.
And do you know that on 3 October the Defendant Raeder was
sending out a questionnaire upon the possibility of extending the
operational base to the north, and upon the bases that it would be
desirable for German power to acquire?</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am referring to Document C-122, My Lord. The document
C-122 is in Document Book 10a at Page 91.</p>

<p class='pindent'>If you will look at that document, Witness, you will see in the
second sentence:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases
in Norway with the combined pressure of Russia and Germany,
with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic
and operational position. The following questions are to be
examined...”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And then there follow these questions:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“What places in Norway can be considered as bases?</p>

<p>“Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s will,
if it is impossible to achieve this without fighting?</p>

<p>“What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?</p>

<p>“Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases,
or do they possibly have decisive advantages simply as supply
centers? (The Commander of U-boats considers such harbors
extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic
U-boats on temporary stops.)”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And then finally:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“What decisive advantages would there be for the conduct of
the war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, for
instance, Skagen?”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='332' id='Page_332'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I suggest to you that those documents are the clue to the
German invasion of Norway. Do you not agree with that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not see any aggressive intentions
in these purely operational plans and considerations when thinking
of what bases might come into consideration for the conduct of the
war. This morning I said that, to the best of my knowledge, Generaladmiral
Carls as early as September sent a letter to this effect
to Raeder in which he expressed his concern and stated his
strategical ideas and plans in case of an Allied occupation of Norway.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: The source of the information which the Defendant
Raeder was receiving you discussed this morning, but one
source that you did not give wets the Norwegian traitor Quisling.
The relations between the Defendant Raeder and him were very
close, were they not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: There was no contact at all between
Raeder and Quisling until December 1939; then Raeder met Quisling
for the first time in his life and never saw him again.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But after December Quisling’s agent Hagelin
was a very frequent visitor of the Defendant Raeder, was he not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Hagelin ever went
to Raeder before Quisling’s visit, unless I am very mistaken. I think
he visited Raeder for the first time when he accompanied Quisling.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Yes, but thereafter Raeder was in very close
touch with the Quisling movement, the Quisling treachery, was
he not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. Raeder had nothing at all to do with
the Quisling movement.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Do you know a man, Erich Giese, Walter Georg
Erich Giese, who was an administrative employee of the adjutancy
of the supreme commander of the Navy in Berlin?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not quite catch the name.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Giese, G-i-e-s-e. He was a—part of his
duties were to receive the visitors of the supreme commander. He
was an assistant of the supreme commander’s adjutant and he was
dismissed from his post in April 1942. And no doubt you recollect
the man.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Will you please tell me the name again?
Although it was spelled to me I did not catch it. Is this a Norwegian?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: This is a German subject, an employee of the
supreme command of the Navy. Part of his duties were to receive
all the supreme commander’s visitors, to accept applications for
<span class='pageno' title='333' id='Page_333'></span>
interviews, and draw up the list of callers for the supreme commander.
Now you are looking at an affidavit from this man, Document
D-722, to be Exhibit GB-479.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness answered the question yet?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Not yet, My Lord.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Now I have the name. The man of whom
you are talking was in the reception room of the adjutant’s office.
It was not up to this man, who was to be admitted to the Admiral;
that was up to me. I asked the callers for what reason they had
come. Mr. Hagelin did not visit Raeder before Quisling’s visit, that
is, not before December 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I am not suggesting that but what I am suggesting
is that after December 1939 there was a very close link
between Raeder and the Quisling movement. I just read out to you
this extract from the affidavit of this man. From Page 3, My Lord,
of the English text:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I can state the following about the preparations which led up
to the action against Denmark and Norway: An appointment
with the Commander-in-Chief was frequently made for a
Mr. Hagelin and another gentleman, whose name I cannot
recall at present, by a party official of Rosenberg’s Foreign
Political Office; as a rule they were received immediately.
I also had received instructions that if a Mr. Hagelin should
announce himself personally, I should always take him to the
Commander-in-Chief at once. Shortly afterwards I learned
from the minute book and from conversations in my room
that he was a Norwegian confidential agent. The gentleman
from the Foreign Political Office who frequently accompanied
him and whose name I do not remember at the moment also
conversed with me and confided in me, so that I learned
about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and about the preparations
for the Norway campaign. According to all I heard
I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from
Raeder and met with Hitler’s heartiest approval. The whole
enterprise was disguised by the pretense of an enterprise
against Holland and England. One day Quisling, too, was
announced at the Commander-in-Chief’s by Hagelin and was
received immediately. Korvettenkapitän Schreiber of the
Naval Reserve, who was later naval attaché in Oslo and
knew the conditions in Norway very well, also played a role
in all these negotiations. He collaborated with the Quisling
party and its agents in Oslo.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It is not true that Mr. Hagelin was
received by Admiral Raeder. Herr Giese cannot possibly have any
<span class='pageno' title='334' id='Page_334'></span>
information about that because he was stationed two rooms away.
If he had perhaps noted down that he was received by me, that
would in a certain sense be correct. The fact is that at the time,
after the Quisling-Hagelin visit, I had said that if he were to pass
through Berlin again and he had any naval political information in
this connection, I should like him to make this information available
to me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that Defendant Raeder never
met Hagelin?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He did not meet him before Quisling’s
visit in December. Later he did not receive him any more.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But he in fact received Hagelin and took him
to Hitler on 14 December 1939, did he not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was accompanied by Quisling, that is
correct. But he did not have any special discussion with Raeder
alone.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You said—you spoke this morning as to a conference
between Quisling and Raeder on 12 December 1939 and
suggested that politics were not discussed at that conference.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: By the word “politics” I mean politics in
the National Socialistic sense, that is, National Socialistic politics
on the Norwegian side and on our side. The matters discussed were
only naval political questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But I will not go into a discussion of the
question of politics with you. I will consider the familiar German
definition that politics is a continuation of war by other means.
But if you look at the Document C-64 you will see that political
problems were discussed on 12 December. You see that is a report
of Raeder to Hitler. It is found on Page 31 of the Document
Book 10a, in which Raeder writes in Paragraph 2:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling
in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England’s influence
is very great, especially because of Hambro, the President of
the Storting (a Jew and a friend of Hore-Belisha) who is all-powerful
in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there
is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible
occupation of Norway, in which case Sweden would also stand
against Germany. Danger of Norway’s occupation by England
is very great—possibly very shortly. From 11 January 1940
on, the Storting and thereby the Norwegian Government is
unconstitutional since the Storting, in defiance of the constitution,
has prolonged its term for a year.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Politics was very much under discussion at that conference, was
it not? You have said that the Defendant Raeder was anxious for
<span class='pageno' title='335' id='Page_335'></span>
peace with Norway. Was it for peace with a Norway ruled by the
traitor Quisling?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In reply to your first question I should
like to say that in the minutes it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out that in connection
with such offers we can never know to what extent the
persons involved want to further their own party aims, and to
what extent they are concerned about German interests.
Hence caution is required.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>This entry in the document which you have just presented to
me corroborates what I was trying to say, that is, that no party
matters or matters depending on agreement along ideological lines
were to be settled between Admiral Raeder and Quisling. For this
reason I said that Raeder did not discuss politics with him, but
merely factual matters. That Quisling, at the time of his introduction,
should mention certain things as a sort of preamble is self-evident.
But he points out the factor of caution and asks: “What
does this man want? Does he want to work with the Party or does
he really want to remain aloof?”</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder was preferring
the reports of Quisling to the reports of the German
Ambassador in Oslo which were entirely different from the reports
of the traitor Quisling. That is so, is it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe that Raeder never saw the
reports from the German Ambassador in Oslo. I at any rate do not
know these reports.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Now the Tribunal has the documents with
regard to that matter. I will not pursue it. I want to ask you next
about the relations with the United States of America. When did
the German Admiralty first know of Japan’s intention to attack the
United States?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I can speak only for Raeder and myself.
As far as I know, it was not until the moment of the attack on
Pearl Harbor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But you had received a communication from
your German naval attaché at Tokyo before the attack on Pearl
Harbor, indicating that an attack against the United States was
pending, had you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Pearl Harbor? No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But against the United States forces. Just look
at the Document D-872, which will be Exhibit GB-480. You see
that those are extracts from the war diary of the German naval
attaché in Tokyo. The first entry is dated 3 December 1941:
<span class='pageno' title='336' id='Page_336'></span></p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“1800 hours. The naval attaché extended an invitation to
several officers of the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires
from the conversation that the negotiations in Washington
must be regarded as having broken down completely and that,
quite obviously, the beginning of actions to the south by the
Japanese Armed Forces is to be expected in the near future.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And then on 6 December 1941:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Conversation with Fregattenkapitän Shiba.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the
following telegram:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Naval Attaché, 1251. Military Secret:</p>

<p>“1. Last week America offered a nonaggression pact between
the United States, England, Russia and Japan. In view of the
Tripartite Pact and the high counterdemands, Japan rejected
this offer. Negotiations have therefore completely broken
down.</p>

<p>“2. The Armed Forces foresaw this development and consented
to Kurusu’s being sent only to impress the people with
the fact that all means had been exhausted.</p>

<p>“3. The Armed Forces have already decided 3 weeks ago that
war is inevitable, even if the United States at the last minute
should make substantial concessions. Appropriate measures
are under way.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And then—I will not read the whole document, and at the end
it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“A state of war with Britain and America would certainly
exist by Christmas.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Assuming that signal reached you before 8 December, you
became familiar with the plans of the perfidious Japanese attack
upon the United States, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not quite grasp it. I have already
said that we had no contact with the Japanese experts or attachés in
Berlin. I asserted that we first learned of the Pearl Harbor incident
by radio, and I cannot quite see what difference it makes whether
on 6 December the attaché in Tokyo told us his predictions, or
whether he was drawing conclusions about a future conflict from
information sources which we could not control. That has nothing
to do with our having advised the Japanese in Berlin to attack
America.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you had no conversations
in Berlin with the Japanese attaché?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To my knowledge there were no official
conferences between the two admiralty staffs, that is, official
<span class='pageno' title='337' id='Page_337'></span>
operational conferences between the Naval Operations Staff and the
Japanese admiralty staff.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, before you part from that
document, I think you ought to read Paragraph 5.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Paragraph 5, My Lord, reads:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“5. Addition—Naval Attaché.</p>

<p>“No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the
commencement of the southern offensive. All the evidence,
however, indicates that it may be expected to start within
3 weeks, with simultaneous attacks on Siam, the Philippines
and Borneo.</p>

<p>“6. The Ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of
the telegram, but is acquainted with its contents.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now I want to...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: With reference to what the witness has just
said, I do not know whether I understood him right before, but
what I took down he said was that the German Admiralty first
knew of Japan’s intention to attack, after Pearl Harbor, not that it
first knew of Pearl Harbor by radio. It was the first indication they
had of an intention to attack.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That is so, My Lord.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] I am suggesting to you, Witness, that
you knew perfectly well of the Japanese intention to attack the
United States before the incident of Pearl Harbor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not know whether you are stressing
Pearl Harbor, or the fact that 2 days before the attack on Pearl
Harbor we received a telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conflict
was to be counted on. I was asked whether we had known of
the fact of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and to that I said: “No.”
I said that we had had no conferences in Berlin between the Naval
Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff. What you are
presenting to me...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I just want to deal with that, but I want to
read out to you what your Commander-in-Chief said about that,
because it is not what you are saying, you know. On the interrogation
of Admiral Raeder on 10 November 1945 (Document
D-880, GB-483) he was asked:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Question: Would such matters be accomplished by Foreign
Office people alone, or would that be in collaboration with
the High Command of the Navy and OKW?”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And Defendant Raeder’s answer was:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“No, the negotiations were conducted by the Foreign Office
and on the part of the Japanese diplomats there was this
<span class='pageno' title='338' id='Page_338'></span>
delegate, Oshima, who was an officer. He negotiated with
the Foreign Office in his capacity as delegate, but apart
from that he was enough of an expert to look at this
thing from a military standpoint as well. Military authorities
had long before that carried on negotiations with military
and naval attachés about the needs and other things that
the Japanese needed... This was all talked about and
thrashed out with the military and naval attachés.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>That is a very different version of the fact from the version
you have given, Witness, is it not? Now, there are two more
matters which I want to deal with.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I do not know whether it will be convenient, My Lord, to have
a brief adjournment.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the
extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder which I
read I wanted to be clear that the defendant was then dealing
with the relationship generally between the German authorities
in Berlin and the Japanese representatives. I do not want to have
given the Court the impression it was a direct negotiation with
regard to intervention against America itself. I do not want to
mislead the Court in any way with regard to that matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Did you know of the shooting in
December 1942 by a naval unit belonging to the German naval
officer in command at Bordeaux of two British Royal Marines who
took part in a raid on shipping in the Gironde estuary?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I learned of that later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did you see the entry with regard to that
shooting in the SKL War Diary?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, here in Nuremberg the defendant’s
counsel showed me an entry, but I do not know whether it was the
War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: It has been suggested by both counsel for
the Defendant Dönitz and counsel for the Defendant Raeder that
the entry in D-658 which contained the sentence: “The measure
would be in accordance with the Führer’s special order, but is
nevertheless something new in international law since these soldiers
were in uniform,” that that entry was not from the SKL War
Diary. Now, you are familiar with the initial of the Defendant
Raeder, are you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>I want you now to look at the original of D-658, so that it may
be established beyond peradventure that this matter was entered
<span class='pageno' title='339' id='Page_339'></span>
in the SKL War Diary. I will put in a photostatic copy of the
original if the Tribunal will allow me, because the original is
required for other purposes. D-658 was GB-229, and it may be
convenient to call the photostats of the originals D-658(a) and
GB-229(a). That is the War Diary of the SKL, is it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I recognize it as such.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And the SKL was perfectly familiar with that
dreadful murder of the men at Bordeaux, was it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From the War Diary I can see—such is
my impression—that afterward on 9 December they were informed
about the fact of the shooting.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And their laconic comment was...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the Armed Forces communiqué it
says: “According to the Armed Forces communiqué, the two soldiers
have been shot in the meantime.” This can be seen in the War
Diary of the SKL and I acknowledged it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And the humane comment of the SKL is, “It
is something new in international law, since the soldiers were in
uniform.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>There is one final matter which I wish to ask you about: Is it
your contention that the German Navy fought a clean war at sea?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I contend that the German Navy fought
a very clean war and that has nothing to do with the fact that it
is said here in the Diary of the SKL, as taken from the Armed
Forces communiqué, that two soldiers were shot and that this was
in accordance with the special order given by the Führer which
has been cited but, as the Naval Operations Staff adds, was something
new in the history of naval warfare. This too...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I am turning to another matter, but you say
generally...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I just say in conclusion that this
postscript has been confirmed and that the Navy, in this case
Raeder, had no influence on these matters. If you ask me whether
I approved that order or something of the sort I would give you
my personal opinion of the matters which Raeder and I discussed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But you know Raeder was Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy, and who would have influence in Germany if
the commanders-in-chief did not have influence? Here was a matter
directly reflecting on the honor of German Armed Forces and
despite that deliberate denial of the protection of the Geneva Convention
for those British marines he continued in office, after they
were deliberately murdered.
<span class='pageno' title='340' id='Page_340'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a matter of opinion. I may take
the following stand: The fact is that in this war, for the first time,
a form of sabotage was applied, whether behind the lines by means
of air landings or otherwise.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Just a moment. These were marines in uniform.
Your own report in the SKL War Diary says so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have to comment on that order which
was issued earlier. The preamble of that order said that, since there
was knowledge of orders to the Allied soldiers or—I do not
remember the exact wording any more—since these soldiers were
given orders not to bother taking German prisoners but rather
to shoot them while carrying out their work in the so-called Commando
raids, the following directives had to be issued.</p>

<p class='pindent'>At that time I discussed this matter with Raeder, of course, and
I can merely state my personal opinion. I felt that I could believe
this preamble because I am of the opinion that if I resorted to, let
us say, sabotage behind the lines then of course I could not be
bothered with taking prisoners, because then the element of surprise
would be excluded. If, therefore, a troop of three to five
men, a so-called Commando undertaking, is sent behind the lines
in order to destroy enemy installations, then of course they cannot
burden themselves with prisoners without running the risk of being
killed themselves or of being recognized before they can carry out
their undertaking. Therefore I considered this preamble quite
credible and I expressly said so at that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And you think that that shooting of those two
marines was therefore perfectly justified? That is your position on
this matter, is it not? Just say “yes” or “no” on that; I will not
argue with you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have not asserted that in any way.
Rather I said, here is a fact of which we were informed only by
the Armed Forces communiqué, and that Raeder and the High
Command had not been heard on this point. That is what I stated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Now, the final matter I wanted to ask you
about, you have indicated that in your opinion Germany fought
a clean war at sea. I want you to look at the new Document D-873
which will be GB-481, which is the log book of U-boat <span class='it'>U-71</span>, under
the date line 21 June 1941, when the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief
of the German Navy. You see the entry reads:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Sighted lifeboat of the Norwegian motor tanker <span class='it'>John
P. Pederson</span> drifting under sail. Three survivors were lying
exhausted under a tarpaulin and only showed themselves as
the U-boat was moving away again. They stated that their
ship had been torpedoed 28 days before. I turned down their
<span class='pageno' title='341' id='Page_341'></span>
request to be taken aboard, provisioned the boat with food
and water and gave them the course and distance to the Icelandic
coast. Boat and crew were in a state that, in view of
the prevailing weather, offered hardly any prospects of
rescue.”—Signed: “Flachsenberg.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Is that your conception of a clean war at sea?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I observe that the commanding officer
did what he could, in view of the weather which he described
when he said that in view of the bad weather he could not rescue
them. He threw provisions to them in a sack and gave them the
course to the coast. I do not know what there is about that that
is inhumane. If he had left without giving them food and the
course, then you might make that accusation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But he could have taken them aboard, you
know. These were three men who did...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I believe you cannot judge that.
Only the commanding officer himself can judge that, the man in
charge of the U-boat. I would have to look at the weather, because
it says here “Medium swell.” That could also...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But you see here the U-boat commander must
have spoken to these people and physically it must have been possible
to take them aboard, but he left them to their fate, you know,
knowing quite well he was leaving them to die.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all. Then he would not have
needed to give them any food and to give them the course to the
coast. What makes you think that they had to die? By the way...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: The last sentence is a clear indication that the
U-boat captain knew he was leaving them to die. I am suggesting
to you that he could have taken them aboard and should have
done so if he had the elements of humanity in him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; I do not know the condition of the
U-boat, whether the boat was in a position to take prisoners on
board. I believe that you have never seen conditions on a U-boat;
otherwise you would not judge it like that. Considering that the
crew of a U-boat is under water for weeks and uses every last
bit of space and is exposed to the greatest dangers day and
night, one cannot simply say that it would have been a humane
act to take these additional men aboard. Besides, the commander
himself says there was hardly a chance of rescue in view of the
prevailing weather.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions, My Lord.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I have some questions concerning a
few points which Mr. Elwyn Jones put to you. An entry was shown
<span class='pageno' title='342' id='Page_342'></span>
to you from the document by Assmann of 10 October 1939 with
the assertion that from this it can be seen that Raeder wanted
to occupy Norway only in order to have Norwegian bases. I should
like to read to you the full entry and I should like you then to
take position to the entire document:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Führer agrees that full use of the only two battleships
which we have at the time should not be made for
the time being. Russia offered bases near Murmansk...</p>

<p>“Question of siege of England: Führer and Commander-in-Chief
of Navy agree that all objections by neutrals have
to be rejected, even in view of the danger of entry of U.S.A.
into the war which seems certain if the war keeps on.</p>

<p>“The more brutally the war is conducted the sooner the effect,
the shorter the war.</p>

<p>“Capacity for large U-boat production program. Führer
rejects suggestion to have submarines built by or bought
from Russia for political reasons. Commander-in-Chief of
Navy states no advantages to be won for the U-boat war by
conquest of Belgian coast; refers to the value of winning
Norwegian bases—Trondheim—with the help of Russian
pressure. Führer will consider the question.” (Document
D-879, Exhibit GB-482)</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Admiral, according to the entire contents, is this a complete
clarification of the Norwegian problem?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Am I right in concluding that here a great
number of questions are treated and only one strategic question
with reference to Norway...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship pleases, the translation came
through as, “no advantage of occupation of Norwegian bases” and
the translation which is in the document is “Raeder stresses importance
of obtaining Norwegian bases.” Perhaps if there might be
a careful—I am not saying this in any critical sense—a very careful
translation of the entry, it might be important.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the—did you give that an exhibit
number?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord. That is the entry from Assmann’s
headline diary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is. But I want to know the
exhibit number.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I will have an extract made and the exhibit
number given this evening, My Lord.
<span class='pageno' title='343' id='Page_343'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It would be GB-482, would it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Yes, My Lord, that is it; GB-482.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is the same date; I beg your
pardon if it does not agree; but the document from which I read
I received through the courtesy of Mr. Elwyn Jones.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You had better go into the question of translation
and get that settled.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Yes, Your Lordship.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, Admiral, both entries are 10 October,
that is, of the same conference. Am I right in saying that consequently
there were many strategic questions, not one of which
can be said to have been treated completely and conclusively?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I believe that this complex of
questions has nothing to do with the comprehensive discussion
between Hitler and Raeder concerning the occupation of Norway.
The Norwegian question was touched upon, the occupation of
Norway, and then a few points brought up for discussion which
Raeder usually jotted down in his notebook. Apart from the
question whether an occupation of Norway was necessary or not,
the possibility of conquering bases outside German territory was
accidentally touched on the same day.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Therefore, Murmansk which had been offered
by Russia was discussed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From Russia to Belgium—all along the
coast, wherever there were possibilities and advantages for our
submarine strategy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If in the War Diary a sentence in connection
with a conference between Raeder and Hitler is in quotation marks,
does that mean that these words were used by Hitler? Can one
assume that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If it says...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship please, the translation has
now been checked, and the original reading of “Raeder stresses
the importance of obtaining Norwegian bases” appears to be a perfectly
correct translation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Siemers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I understood, Dr. Siemers; shall I speak
about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, did you want to add something to that
point?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I understand that the other gentleman
just pointed out that Raeder allegedly called Hitler’s attention
<span class='pageno' title='344' id='Page_344'></span>
to the necessity of acquiring submarine bases and in that connection
once spoke about Russian assistance and also about the possibility
of acquiring bases from Norway. But that does not reveal
any aggressive intentions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to save time, I also asked
Dr. Kranzbühler to check the translation. The German text as I
should like to point out right now says: “The Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy points out the value of winning Norwegian bases.”
That is something different from the English translation. But I
should like to come back to this later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Admiral, Mr. Elwyn Jones then submitted
the affidavit of Walter Giese. I should be grateful if you
would look at it again. It is D-722. The first line reads:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I was born at Stettin on 24 November 1900, the son of a
bricklayer’s foreman, Ernst Giese.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I sat in the reception room of the Commander-in-Chief as
assistant to the adjutant.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then it says, in the same paragraph:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I received the minute book from the adjutant at midday
after the conferences had ended and locked it up in the
general safe.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then it says on the second page:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I did not have much contact with the Commander-in-Chief
personally. This consisted merely in my submitting to him
or fetching from him top-secret correspondence.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Admiral, am I right in assuming, therefore, that Giese was a
sort of messenger?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. In order to save officers we filled
a large number of unimportant positions with civilians, people who
we thought were worthy of our confidence. The care of a safe
or guarding the key was really the task of the second adjutant,
who later had to be used elsewhere.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Giese had been a sergeant in the Navy for many years and for
12 years had been a clerk in the Navy, and therefore had had a
certain amount of practice in keeping files.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All this is stated in the document. If there
is anything inaccurate in the document, you can put it to him. But
it all is set out in the document, exactly as the Admiral said. You
are wasting the time of the Tribunal by repeating it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe what Mr. Elwyn Jones
presented was also in the document. What matters is the question
of interpretation and the witness has been referred to very definite
<span class='pageno' title='345' id='Page_345'></span>
points. If I should be mistaken, I beg your pardon. I believed
that I also had the right in re-examination to refer to certain points
in the document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you want to, you can draw our attention
to the paragraphs.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHUJLTE-MÖNTING: I can be very brief.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Giese had no inside information about the facts, and even if he
had, without permission, looked into the minutes of the adjutant,
which were not a shorthand record but merely notes to aid the
memory of the adjutant, he could never have received the right
impression without having taken part in the conference. And it was
not up to him in the reception room to decide who should be
admitted to the Commander-in-Chief, but rather up to the adjutant
or to me. He did not even know who was to be admitted. And it
is a bold statement or assumption when he says that a man like
Hagelin saw Raeder each time instead of seeing me first. By the
way, Hagelin came to me perhaps four or five times.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe Giese was present when Raeder
talked to Hitler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Giese? No, never. Giese sat in the reception
room and took care of Raeder’s telephone calls.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, nobody here suggests that he
was. Mr. Elwyn Jones was not putting it that this man Giese was
present at talks between Raeder and the Führer or Raeder and
Hagelin.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is his affidavit, and in the
affidavit, it says, as I should like to point out now, on Page 5,
“According to all I heard, I can say that the idea of this undertaking
emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler’s joyous agreement.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>How could he know that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might stress that even I as chief of
staff was not present at these private conferences, and Herr Giese
had to stay with the telephone and had no other way of gaining
an insight than by giving his imagination free rein.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That is enough, thank you. I come now to Document
D-872. That is the war diary of the naval attaché in Japan,
in connection with which you were told that you must have known
that Japan would attack America on 7 December. The telegram
which is mentioned here is of 6 December. When could that telegram
have arrived in your office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean, when could I have received
it personally?
<span class='pageno' title='346' id='Page_346'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes; or Raeder.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Not before the next morning.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That would be 7 December.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: At the earliest. In this case, the Chief
of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff would decide whether for
operational reasons that telegram should be presented at once,
or not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you remember that document?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is Pearl Harbor mentioned in the document?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. I tried to explain that Pearl Harbor
had no connection with that telegram from Admiral Wennecker
at all and that Wennecker depended on sources of information and
on his assumptions or formulated his assumptions in a telegram on
the basis of his information without having any definite facts. Such
telegrams were received continuously. Sometimes these assumptions
were correct; sometimes they were incorrect.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted it to
prove that military negotiations had taken place with Japan. Am I
correct in saying that that was only a message concerning possible
developments?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. I have tried before to
explain that there were no military negotiations between the admiralty
staffs. Rather the naval attaché was charged with examining
and transmitting all information of value which came to him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then a document was shown you which was not
submitted, an interrogation of Raeder of 10 November 1945. May
I ask to look at the bottom of Page 5 of this document which I
am handing to you and the passage which was read on Page 6?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, that ought to have a
number, ought it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That will be GB-483, My Lord.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On that document, Page 5 at the bottom, is
Document C-75 mentioned?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe you are mistaken, Admiral, or else I
have made a mistake.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have an English copy—do you mean the
English one?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the English copy because it does not exist
in German.
<span class='pageno' title='347' id='Page_347'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean the last paragraph?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe the last line or the line before the last.
The page numbers are very hard to read. Maybe you have the
wrong page.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This interrogation, Mr. President, concerns Document C-75. I
believe the witness will find it soon. Mention has been made of
this document recently and in accordance with the wish recently
expressed by the Tribunal, I am submitting C-75; that is Directive
Number 24 about the co-operation with Japan, and the full text is
Document Number Raeder-128. The Tribunal will recall that the
British Delegation...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has it already been put in, C-75, has it
already been put in?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I submit it now, C-75.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, has it already been put in? Has it
already been offered in evidence?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You may recall that the Prosecution has submitted
Document C-75 as USA-151...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is all I wanted to know. If it
has already been put in, it does not need a new number, is that not
the position?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that it needs
a new number because only the first part was submitted by the
Prosecution.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: It has already been exhibited as USA-151,
My Lord.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we are not giving fresh numbers,
Dr. Siemers, to parts of documents which had already been
put in. If the document has been put in, then where you want to
use a fresh part of the document it has the same number as the
old number; that is all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But, Mr. President, if the Prosecution in their
document put in only the first three paragraphs then I cannot...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; I know that perfectly well, but
you are perfectly entitled to put in any part of the document. It
is only a question of what number is to be given to it and I think—I
may be wrong—that up to the present we have not given new
numbers to documents once that they have been put in, although
fresh parts of the documents are put in.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the position with regard to C-75 is
that the whole of the original has been put in as USA-151, but only
<span class='pageno' title='348' id='Page_348'></span>
an extract from the original was included in the English document
which was put before the Court.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. All I was concerned with was
the number of the thing. It has got the number USA-151 and I
thought our practice had been that it should continue to have that
number. You can put in any part of it you like, and if it is a
question of translation, no doubt the Prosecution will hand it to the
translation department and have it translated for you; but you
are attempting to give it a new number, that is all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, once more, but I was asked
recently to submit the document anew and that is where the misunderstanding
arose. Under these circumstances, now that I hear
that it has been submitted in its entirety, I can withdraw it; I
should be grateful if the Tribunal were also to receive the complete
translation of the document in English and not only the first two
paragraphs.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Admiral, have you found it in the
meantime?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it is on Page 7 as you thought and
not on Page 5. The document refers...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It is right then that the interrogation
refers to Document C-75?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Document C-75, Admiral, is Directive Number 24
concerning collaboration with Japan, and it says: “The following
rules apply: Our common war aim is to defeat England quickly and
thereby keep the U.S.A. out of the war.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Besides that the document also mentions the fact I referred to
recently, that Singapore should be occupied by Japan.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now Raeder, on 10 November ’45 stated his position in respect
to this and, according to the next page of the document, he said
that which Mr. Elwyn Jones has just put to you. May I ask you to
look at it again? It says there, on Page—I thought it was at the
top of Page 6, maybe it is at the top of Page 8...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The top of Page 8. I do not know English
as well as German, but I would translate it: “If that which Japan
needs...”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If I remember correctly, the word is “need.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he uses the word “need”—“and
other things, things that the Japanese need.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That is to say, Japan’s needs and other things
which Japan requires. Therefore, the conversations mentioned by
Raeder were not concerned with strategic points?
<span class='pageno' title='349' id='Page_349'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, these are two entirely different
things.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that Raeder’s answer is concerned purely
with questions of supplies and material.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, purely questions of supplies and
material...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: ...which we had with all the navies, not
only with the Japanese.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I come to the Commando Order about which
you testified already. I want to put to you the following: You have
been shown Document D-658, which says that according to the
Armed Forces communiqué the soldiers were executed, that the
soldiers wore uniforms and that the Führer’s Order was something
new in international law. I believe that the naval commander in
western France reported this and that this was contained in the
Armed Forces communiqué. The man who compiled the War Diary
wrote: “A new thing in international law.” I am not a military man,
but I should like to ask you, would you consider such a reference
a criticism of the order?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe that I have to answer the question
in the following manner: Normally, the fact of an execution
is not entered in a war diary on operational matters.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that is really a matter which
we can go into, whether he thinks this is an entry which is a
criticism of the order.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe he wanted to establish that it
was something new.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Never mind, Admiral. A factual question. The
Prosecution asserts again that it concerns soldiers in uniform. The
Wehrmacht communiqué announced the execution on 9 December.
The execution, as I have already shown in another connection, did
not take place until 11 December. I am presenting to you now
Document UK-57, and ask you to look at the second paragraph
under Figure 4. The heading Figure 4 reads: “Sabotage against
German ships near Bordeaux”; then it says: “December 12, 1942”;
and further on we read:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“From the submarine the participants went two by two in
paddle boats up the Gironde estuary. They wore special olive
gray uniforms. After carrying out the blastings they sank
their boats and tried, with the aid of French civilians, to
escape to Spain in civilian clothes.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='350' id='Page_350'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Did these soldiers behave correctly according to the provisions
of international law?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, no.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I have no more questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If they had had a clear conscience, they
would not have needed to wear civilian clothes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, just this final question:</p>

<p class='pindent'>Did you personally in the High Command receive an inquiry
or any information before this execution which was carried out at
the direct order of the Führer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, neither an inquiry nor any information.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, the question
as to whether a document concerning Norway had been translated
correctly was just discussed. I shall find out what number
it is. The English translation which I have before me is not identical
with the German original. It deviates considerably. It is Document
GB-482.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I shall read the German text which in my opinion differs from
the English translation.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states: Conquest of
Belgian coast provides no advantage for our submarine warfare;
points out value of winning Norwegian bases (Trondheim)
with the help of Russian pressure. The Führer will
consider the question.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, would it not save time,
really, if we have the sentence which is said to have been wrongly
translated referred to a committee of experts in the translating
division?</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It really is not a matter which it is worth
while wasting time over.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, I
did not know that it was to be examined again.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better have it examined and
then the translation certified to.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon,
Mr. President. I, myself, have a question to put to the witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Admiral, Document D-873 has been put to you before. That was
a war diary of <span class='it'>U-71</span> and concerned the supplying of three Norwegians
in a lifeboat. The entry was on 21 June. I have already
<span class='pageno' title='351' id='Page_351'></span>
submitted it to the Tribunal under Dönitz Number 13, on Page 23
of my document book, a statement by the above-mentioned commanding
officer Flachsenberg. According to that statement this
submarine put to sea on 14 June. It was west of Norway. Can
you tell me if that U-boat, therefore, on 21 June, was putting out
for operations or returning from operations?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean from memory?</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, considering the dates,
put out to sea on 14 June, this entry on 21 June.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Putting out.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Putting out. As you
know, this submarine was a 500-ton vessel. Is a boat of that size in
a position to carry out an operation over several weeks with three
additional people on board?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe not. I am not enough of an
expert to be able to judge definitely what the extra weight of additional
persons on board might mean as far as trimming experiments
and such things are concerned; but aside from that, I do not believe
that such a small boat, which is putting out to sea for an operation,
can load itself on the way with prisoners. I do not consider that
possible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the Court, the
witness may retire.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the President.</span>] Mr. President, in accordance with my
statement at the beginning of this case, I have already submitted
the majority of my documents during the examination. With the
permission of the Tribunal, may I proceed now to submit as quickly
as possible the remainder of the documents with a few accompanying
statements.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number Raeder-18, an excerpt
from the Document Book 2, Page 105, an excerpt from a book
which Churchill wrote in 1935 called <span class='it'>Great Contemporaries</span>. I ask
the Tribunal to take official notice of the contents. Churchill points
out that there are two possibilities, that one cannot say whether
Hitler will be the man who will start another world war or whether
he will be the man who will restore honor and peace of mind to
the great German nation and bring it back serene, helpful and
strong to a galaxy of the European family of nations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>As Exhibit Number Raeder-20 I submit a short excerpt from
Adolf Hitler’s <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> with reference to the fact that the Prosecution
has said that from that book one could see that Hitler
<span class='pageno' title='352' id='Page_352'></span>
intended to wage aggressive wars. I shall show in my final pleadings
how much one can see from that book. I ask that the Tribunal
take judicial notice of the short excerpt on Page 154: “For such a
policy there was but one ally in Europe, England.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Number Raeder-21, a speech made by Hitler to the
German Reichstag on 26 April 1942, is to show how rights were
increasingly limited in Germany and how the dictatorship became
more and more powerful.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document Book 4, Exhibit Number Raeder-65, intended to facilitate
my arguments, is the Hague Agreement about the rights and
duties of neutrals in naval warfare. I need that for my final pleadings
in connection with Exhibit Number Raeder-66, the statement
of opinion by Dr. Mosler in Document Book 4, Page 289, the first
document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Can you give us the pages?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Page 289, Mr. President. It is the first page of
the Document Book 4.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I ask the Tribunal to be kind enough to
take up Document Book 5, since the remaining documents have
already been submitted. I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-100,
Document Book 5, Page 437, a document from the <span class='it'>White Book</span> concerning
the “top-secret” meeting of the French War Commission
on 9 April 1940, with Reynaud, Daladier, Gamelin, General Georges,
the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of the Colonies and the Air
Minister present. It concerns the suggestion by Admiral Darlan
of moving into Belgium. The suggestion was supported by General
Gamelin and also by the Minister for National Defense and War.
On Page 442 there is mention of the march into Holland and finally
of Luxembourg. Since the High Tribunal has knowledge of the
contents from the discussion of the documents, I do not want to
read any details. I simply ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice
of it. I should also like to point out that on Page 443 of this very
long document mention is made of the occupation of the harbor of
Narvik and of the intention to get hold of the mines of Gallivare.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I now submit Exhibit Number Raeder 102, in the same document
book, Page 449. This is an order of the 2d Belgian Infantry
Regiment of 13 April 1940 concerning information about friendly
troops and the building of a fortified position. It can be seen from
the document that the friendly troops mentioned are the Allies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-103, Page 452, which is a French
document of 16 April 1940 from headquarters concerning measures
about the rail transportation of French troops in Belgium.
<span class='pageno' title='353' id='Page_353'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of all these documents,
which I shall not read in detail.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The same applies to Exhibit Number Raeder-104, Document
Book 5, Page 455, which is the order of 19 April 1940 of the 2d
British Division concerning security measures in Belgium. There
we find a directive similar to one in a document which has been
submitted by the Prosecution, a directive to establish contact with
Belgian civilian authorities.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Number Raeder-105, Document Book 5, Page 459, is the
statement of a Luxembourg citizen which shows that 200 men,
French soldiers in uniform, entered Belgium in armored cars 7 days
before the outbreak of the German-Belgian hostilities.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May it please the Tribunal, I originally intended not to submit
anything in this Trial concerning the character of my client because
I was of the opinion that Admiral Raeder, both at home and abroad,
enjoyed great respect. The first trial brief against Raeder did not
affect that intention. Shortly before the presentation of that trial
brief it was changed, becoming considerably more severe and containing
moral accusations which seriously injure and insult Raeder’s
honor. I have no doubt that the High Tribunal will understand
why under these circumstances I ask to be permitted to submit some
of the documents granted me which concern Raeder’s character. I
submit Exhibit Raeder-119, Document Book 6, Page 514. That is
a letter from Frau Von Poser addressed to me. It is not an affidavit
and quite purposely I have submitted the original because in my
opinion it will make a more immediate and direct impression than
an affidavit which I would first have to ask for in my capacity as
defendant’s counsel.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Similarly, there is a fairly long letter from Professor Dr. Seibt
who approached me on his own initiative. I submit Exhibit Number
Raeder-120, Document Book 6, Page 517. I would be grateful to the
Tribunal if it would take judicial notice of that letter. In order to
save time I refrain from reading it since it is six pages long.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-122, Document Book 6, Page 526,
a letter from Herr Erich Katz, which I submit with its appendices
and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. This presents
one of the cases in which Raeder intervened personally, using his
influence and position—he used the official stationery of the Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy to intervene on behalf of Herr Katz
who had been attacked as a Jew—and actually succeeded in protecting
him. Herr Katz has sent me these documents on his own
initiative in order to show his gratitude.</p>

<p class='pindent'>As Exhibit Raeder-123 I submit a letter from Günter Jacobsen
that concerns a similar case. Jacobsen also, without my asking it,
approached me in order to testify that Raeder rescued his father,
<span class='pageno' title='354' id='Page_354'></span>
who as a Jew had been accused of race defilement, from the concentration
camp Fuhlsbüttel—I believe it was still a prison at that
time—so that Jacobsen could emigrate to England where he is
living now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-124, an affidavit...</p>

<p class='pindent'>GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, I must make the following
statement. All four exhibits mentioned just now by Dr. Siemers
are personal letters from various persons to Dr. Siemers. They are
not sworn affidavits. They are not interrogations. Therefore these
documents have little probative value, and I hold the view that they
ought not to be admitted as evidence. Many letters are received,
and if they were all to be submitted to the Tribunal, the Tribunal
would have great difficulty in establishing the truth and how far
they are of probative value. In that connection, I personally object
to the fact that these documents should be accepted as evidence in
Raeder’s case.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: My Lord, may I...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that the matter
is of sufficient importance to insist upon evidence being upon oath.
The documents are admitted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-124 I submit an
affidavit by Konrad Lotter. The affidavit is very short and with
the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read this one page:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Grand Admiral Raeder has always appeared to me a man
who embodied the finest traditions of the old Imperial Navy.
This was true particularly in regard to his philosophy of life.
As a man and as an officer he was at all times the best
model imaginable.</p>

<p>“In 1941, when the anti-Christian policy of the Hitler regime
was in full force in Bavaria, when cloisters were closed and
in the education of the youth intolerance against every creed
became crassly manifest, I sent a memorandum of 12 pages
to the Admiral in which I presented to him my objections to
this policy. Admiral Raeder intervened at once. Through his
mediation, I was called to the Gauleiter and Minister of the
Interior, Wagner, in Munich. After a series of discussions
between the clerical, governmental, and Party authorities
an agreement was reached which had the following results:
The school prayer was retained, the crucifix was allowed to
remain in the schools, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>; furthermore, 59 clergymen
who had been fined 500 marks each were pardoned.</p>

<p>“The closing down of cloisters was also stopped at that time.
Gauleiter Wagner had to...”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='355' id='Page_355'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, all these documents have been
read by us very recently.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then I just ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of the remainder.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I submit also the two documents, Exhibit Number Raeder-125
and Exhibit Number Raeder-126. Number 125 is an affidavit by
the former Reich Defense Minister, Dr. Otto Gessler, and Number
Raeder-126 is an affidavit by the Navy Chaplain Ronneberger. I
ask you to take judicial notice of this latter document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should like to be permitted to read the short affidavit by
Dr. Gessler since it contains not only something of a purely personal
nature, but also remarks concerning the accusations against Raeder.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I, Gessler, have known the former Admiral Dr. Raeder
personally since about the middle of the 20’s when I was
Reichswehrminister. Raeder was then inspector of the educational
system in the Navy. I have always known Raeder
as a man of irreproachable, chivalrous character, as a man
fully conscious of his duty. As to the subject of the Indictment,
I know very little.</p>

<p>“Raeder visited me repeatedly after my release from imprisonment
by the Gestapo in March 1945 when I lay in the
Hedwig Hospital in Berlin and he also made arrangements
for me to get home, as I was ill and completely exhausted. I
told him then about the ill-treatment I had suffered, especially
the torture. He was obviously surprised and incensed
about this. He said he would report this to the Führer. I
asked him at once to refrain from that, for I had been told
before the torture, and officially, that all of this was taking
place at the explicit order of Hitler. Moreover, I knew definitely
that I would immediately be rearrested, since on my
release I had signed the well-known declaration and could
not even obtain a confirmation of my detention in order to
get a ticket for my trip home.</p>

<p>“I heard nothing about secret rearmament in the Navy,
neither during my term of office nor later. During my term
of office, until January 1928, Admiral Raeder would not have
been responsible either, for at that time he was not Chief
of the Naval Command.</p>

<p>“At the time of the National Socialist regime I was ignored
by my former department and snubbed. One of the few
exceptions was Dr. Raeder. Before 1939 among other things
he invited me three times to visit on the cruiser <span class='it'>Nürnberg</span>
although I had refused twice. During the visit in June 1939
he came to Kiel personally to pay his respects to me. At that
<span class='pageno' title='356' id='Page_356'></span>
time we also discussed the political situation. I expressed the
apprehension that an attack on Poland would mean a European
war. Raeder declared positively that he considered it
out of the question that Hitler would attack Poland. When
this did happen later, I explained this to myself on the
grounds that Hitler liked to place even the highest military
leaders face to face with accomplished facts.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then there is the statement “under oath” and the signature of
the notary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>As to the last Exhibit Number Raeder-126, from the Navy Chief
Chaplain Ronneberger, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
it since it is too late to read it. It is a factual description and survey
of church questions and of religious matters in the Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, with that, with the exception of three points, I
can conclude my case. There are still two interrogatories missing
which have not yet been returned. I ask permission to submit these
as soon as they are received.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then, there is the witness Generaladmiral Böhm, who has
already been approved, but who on account of illness has not yet
been able to appear. The British Delegation, through Sir David, has
been kind enough to agree that if necessary this witness can be
interrogated at a later date. May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal
to keep this open, and if possible to permit Admiral Böhm to be
questioned at a later date. I want to point out now that it will not
be so large a complex of questions as in the case of Admiral
Schulte-Mönting, which the Tribunal knows from the material I
have submitted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This concludes my case Raeder.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 23 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div><span class='pageno' title='357' id='Page_357'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH DAY</span><br/> Thursday, 23 May 1946</h1></div>

<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the documents of the
Defendant Seyss-Inquart, the Tribunal admits the following documents
which were objected to: Number 11, Number 47, Number 48,
Number 50, Number 54, and Number 71.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The remainder of the documents which were objected to are
rejected. I will enumerate them: Number 5, Number 10, Number 14,
Number 19b, Number 21, Number 22, Number 27, Number 31, Number
39, Number 55, Number 60, Number 61, Number 68, Number 69.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: Mr. President, last night at the end of the session
the counsel for Admiral Raeder submitted a certain number of
documents including Document Raeder-105 of Document Book 5.
This document is an excerpt from the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>, Number
5. It is the testimony of an old man of 72, a native of Luxembourg,
who had lived in Belgium for only 6 months, and who affirms
that in April 1940 he saw 200 French soldiers in Belgium. These
soldiers, who he said were French, were in armored cars.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I must ask the Tribunal to allow me to make objection to this
Document Number 7 of the <span class='it'>White Book</span> Number 5, the original of
which has never been submitted and has not even been reproduced
in the <span class='it'>White Book</span>, as is the case with a certain number of documents
in the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>. It is necessary that in the name
of France and of Belgium a protest—a formal, categorical protest—be
made against such an assertion. At no time before the invasion
of Belgium by the German forces did any French troops set foot on
Belgian soil. The reading of this document, Number Raeder-105 of
Document Book 5 of Admiral Raeder, enables us to understand how
there came to be the error in the testimony by Grandjenet that
is cited.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have already told the Tribunal that this man is 72 years old
and was from Luxembourg. To the question put to him by the
German authorities as to how he recognized the soldiers he had
seen as being of French nationality, he answered:
<span class='pageno' title='358' id='Page_358'></span></p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I was quite sure that they were French soldiers because I
know their uniform well. Moreover, I recognized the soldiers
because of the language they used when they spoke
to me.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, as far as the uniform is concerned, the Tribunal knows
that at the time when these events took place, the Belgian Army
had a uniform of the same color as the French Army and a helmet
of the same shape. As for the language, the Tribunal knows that
a great part of the Belgian population who live along the Luxembourg
frontier speak French, and the Belgian soldiers recruited in
these districts speak French.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will certainly remember that this witness, who is
a very old man, had only been living for 6 months in Belgium and
probably had only a limited experience with things Belgian—and
especially with the Belgian Army.</p>

<p class='pindent'>At any rate, we assert in the name of France and in the name
of Belgium that before 10 May 1940 no French troops, no organized
French troops, penetrated Belgium, and that the isolated individuals
who did go into Belgium were interned there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Siemers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If it please the Tribunal, may I reply very
briefly?</p>

<p class='pindent'>This matter concerns a document from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>, on which
a decision has already been handed down once and which was
granted me. I propose that the Prosecution be requested to submit
the original if they dispute the correctness of this document. In
this I am in agreement with a decision of the Tribunal according
to which the application is to be made for the presentation of the
original if it is available, or application should be made so that
whoever has the original should produce it. As far as I know the
Prosecution have the original, since all original documents were
located in the Foreign Office in Berlin, or in the alternative place
of safekeeping, and all the originals of these <span class='it'>White Books</span> fell into
the hands of the Allies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “original”? The original,
I suppose, is the original of the <span class='it'>White Book</span>. Is that what
you mean?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I mean now, Mr. President, the original of
this court record.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, this comes from a <span class='it'>White Book</span>. That
is a printed document, I suppose, I do not suppose it contains the
original of the statement of this Luxembourg man.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The <span class='it'>White Book</span> is a collection of numerous documents,
and the single original documents are in the possession of
<span class='pageno' title='359' id='Page_359'></span>
the Foreign Office; in part they were from the files of the French
General Staff, and partly they were records of court proceedings.
Regarding the contents of this document...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, you are not proposing that we
should strike the document out, but the Tribunal will certainly take
into account the facts to which you have drawn our notice.</p>

<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: This is an application that the Tribunal shall refuse
to admit that document, Mr. President. At the same time this is a
protest against the assertion made by the Defense that French soldiers
violated Belgian neutrality in the course of the month of April.
I hope the Tribunal will allow me to add a few words of explanation.
The <span class='it'>White Book</span>, which we have here, comprises two parts. The
first part reproduces texts and the second part gives photostatic
copies of these texts. In the first part, which simply reproduces the
texts, is found the document which I ask the Tribunal to strike from
the record. We have searched in the second part which gives the
photostatic copies of the documents in the first part, and we do not
find it. We state to the Tribunal that the original of the document,
which we ask the Tribunal to strike out, has not been reproduced
in the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>, since it is not to be found in the second
part.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe that M. Dubost’s entire
explanation refers to the question of the value of the document as
evidence and not to the question of the admissibility of the document.
That this document is in order appears to me to be quite
clear, since it is a record of court proceedings where a certain person,
namely Grandjenet, has been interrogated. Everything said by
M. Dubost referred more to the contents of the document than to
the question of its value as evidence. May I ask therefore that the
document be admitted, as has been done up to now, and ask that
consideration be given to the fact that the document has value in
connection with the other documents which have been granted to
me and to Dr. Horn in his document book with reference to Holland
and Belgium.</p>

<p class='pindent'>If, in the second part of the document book there is no photostatic
copy...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, and M. Dubost, the Tribunal
will consider the objection that has been made.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I merely mention, Mr. President, that if the
photostat is not in the book, as M. Dubost states, then this is due
to the fact that this court record in its original text was German,
and the facsimiles are those prepared from the original text in
French, that is to say, of those documents which in their original
version were in French. If necessary I would appeal to Geheimrat
<span class='pageno' title='360' id='Page_360'></span>
Von Schnieden as a witness regarding this record, since he at the
time was informed about all the records of this type and helped
in the work of compiling the book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will consider the
objection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, with the
permission of the Tribunal I should like to say that the interrogatory
put to the American Commander-in-Chief of the Navy,
Admiral Nimitz, is available. I received it the day before yesterday
and in the meantime it has gone in to the interpreters for translation.
With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to submit
it now, in connection with the cases of Admiral Dönitz and Admiral
Raeder.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution seen it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got copies for us?</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I had been informed that
the copies for the Tribunal would be handed on by the General
Secretary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Unless we have copies, the document must
not be read. It must be put off until we have copies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There are two copies in
English and one in French.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I present the document as Number Dönitz-100.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Soviet members of the
Tribunal do not have a copy of the document translated into their
language, so you will present it at a later date.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Will the counsel for the Defendant Von Schirach present his case?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for the Defendant Von Schirach):
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I propose first of all to conduct the
examination of the Defendant Schirach himself, and in the course
of this examination I will bring to your attention the passage of the
document book concerned, as the individual points come up. Following
the examination of the defendant I shall then call my four
witnesses, and at the end I intend to submit the remaining documents,
insofar as these documents have not by that time been
presented during the examination of the Defendant Von Schirach.
I presume, Mr. President, that you agree to this procedure.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I now call to the witness stand, first, Baldur von Schirach.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Baldur von Schirach took the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the following oath after me:
I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak
the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
<span class='pageno' title='361' id='Page_361'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The defendant repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what is the date of your birth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>BALDUR VON SCHIRACH (Defendant): 9 May 1907.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That means that a few days ago you were 39. You
have been married for 14 years; is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And you have four children, whose ages are...</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 4, 8, 11, and 13 years.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the Third Reich you were mainly active as
Youth Leader?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What offices did you fill in that connection, that
is, offices in the Party and in the Government—please state also how
long you held these various offices?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: To start with, in 1929 I was the leader of the
National Socialist Students’ Union. In 1931 I became Reich Youth
Leader of the NSDAP, at first on the staff of the SA Supreme Command;
in 1932, Reich Leader for Youth Education of the NSDAP;
in 1933, Youth Leader of the German Reich, at first under the Minister
of the Interior, Dr. Frick. In 1934, I held the same position
under the Reich Minister of Education, Rust. In 1936 the Reich
Youth Leader became a leading Reich official, and in that capacity
I came directly under the Führer and Reich Chancellor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Now, which of your offices were Party positions
and which of the ones you have mentioned were offices of the Reich?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Party positions were the office of Reich Youth
Leader of the NSDAP, and that of Reich Leader for Youth Education.
Government positions: The Youth Leader of the German
Reich, at first subordinate to the Minister of the Interior as I have
described or under the Minister for Education, and then in an independent
position.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you were removed from some of these
offices in 1940. What positions in Youth Leadership did you lose in
1940, and what positions did you still continue to fill to the end?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In 1940 I left the position as the leader of
Youth, that is, I left the office of the Reich Youth Leadership of
the NSDAP, but I retained the office of Reichsleiter for Youth
Education and with that the entire responsibility for German youth.
I received as an additional new post that of Gauleiter of Vienna,
<span class='pageno' title='362' id='Page_362'></span>
which was combined with the governmental post of Reichsstatthalter
of Vienna and also that of Reich Defense Commissioner for
Wehrkreis XVII.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we want now to come back to your activity
as Youth Leader. There is an affidavit by you here dated
4 December 1945, 3302-PS. In this affidavit you stated to the Prosecution
in December that you acknowledge yourself to be responsible
for all youth education in the Third Reich.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you, when you gave the statement of guilt,
under the impression that your successor, the late Reich Youth
Leader Axmann, was dead?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You thought that he died in the last battles of
the war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I was convinced that he had died in
Berlin.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the meantime, Witness, you have learned from
newspaper reports that your successor as Reich Youth Leader, this
man Axmann, is still alive. Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you want then, today, to support your affidavit
regarding your personal responsibility as Youth Leader without
reservation; or do you want to limit it in any respect today?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not want to limit this affidavit in any
way. Although during the last years of his life Hitler gave orders
to the Youth of which I do not know and also my successor, Axmann,
particularly in 1944, gave orders with which I am not acquainted
since the relationship between us had been broken off due to the
events of the war, I stand by the statement that I have made in the
expectation that the Tribunal will consider me the only person
responsible in Youth Leadership and that no other Youth Leader
will be summoned before a court for actions for which I have
assumed responsibility.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I would now be interested in knowing
whether possibly principles and directives which you received from
Hitler or from any Party office or from any governmental quarter
were the formula for your youth education; or whether, for your
youth education, the principles were derived from the experiences
which you had during your own youth and among the youth leaders
of that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The latter is correct. Of course, the education
of the Hitler Youth was an education on the basis of the National
<span class='pageno' title='363' id='Page_363'></span>
Socialist idea. But the specifically educational ideas did not originate
with Hitler, they also did not originate with other leaders
in the Party; they had their origin in youth itself, they originated
with me, and they originated with my assistants.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Perhaps you will be good enough now to explain
to the Tribunal somewhat more in detail how you, yourself, arrived
at those principles and that type of youth education, based on your
own education, your personal development, and so forth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the simplest way for me to do
this would be for me here, very briefly, to sketch the story of my
youth and describe also in that connection the youth organizations
with which I came in contact. I can in that way save much time
for my further statements.</p>

<p class='pindent'>My father was a professional officer in the Garde-Kürassier
Regiment of the Kaiser. I was born in Berlin and one year later
my father retired and moved to Weimar, where he took over the
management of the Court Theater there, which later became the
Weimar National Theater. Thus I grew up in Weimar, and that
town, which in a certain sense is the native city of all Germans,
I regard as my native city. My father was well off; our home
offered a great deal of intellectual and artistic stimulation, above
all in the literary and musical field, but apart from and beyond the
educational opportunities of our home, it was the atmosphere of the
town itself, that atmosphere of the classic and also the postclassic
Weimar which influenced my development. It was most of all the
genius loci, which early captured my imagination. It is directly
due to those experiences of my youth that later on I led the youth
back again, year after year, to Weimar and to Goethe.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And the first document which is important in this connection
for my case, which is Document Schirach-80, will prove just that.
There is a brief reference in that document to one of the many
speeches which I made in the course of my activity as Youth Leader
to the leaders of the young generation, and in which I directed the
youth to Goethe...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: May I interrupt you for a moment, Herr
Von Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>In this Document Number Schirach-80, Mr. President, there is—on
Page 133 of Schirach’s document book—a brief report on a
Reich Cultural Convention (Reichskulturtagung) of the Hitler Youth
in Weimar. This happens to be a report from 1937, but the defendant
has already told you that such cultural conventions of the Hitler
Youth took place every year in Weimar, the city of Schiller and
Goethe. In this report, Document 80 of document book Schirach,
there is, for instance, discussion of a speech of the defendant on
<span class='pageno' title='364' id='Page_364'></span>
the importance of Goethe for the National Socialist education of
youth. It is said, in this connection, that at that time Schirach
stated, and I quote...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You need not read it to us, Dr. Sauter. It
refers to Goethe, that is all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In that case, Herr Von Schirach, will you continue?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was not only the annual cultural convention
but the annual meeting of the leaders of the Hitler Youth which
took place in Weimar. Apart from that there were also what we
called the “Weimar Festivals of German Youth.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>What is important in this connection is that in this speech I
quoted a sentence of Goethe which, to a certain extent, became the
leitmotiv of all my educational work: “Youth fashions itself afresh
from youth.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Even my worst enemy cannot deny the fact that I was to the
young generation of the German people at all times not only the
propagandist of National Socialism but also the propagandist of
Goethe. A certain Herr Ziemer has submitted a lengthy affidavit
against me in which he quarrels with the youth education for which
I am responsible. I believe that Herr Ziemer did his work a little
too superficially. In his description of German national education
he should at least have taken into consideration my educational
efforts designed to guide youth toward the life work of Goethe.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I joined my first youth organization when I was 10 years old.
I was then just the age of the boys and girls who later on entered
the Jungvolk. That youth organization which I joined was the
so-called “Young German League,” (Jungdeutschland Bund), which
Count von der Goltz had founded, a Boy Scout organization. Count
von der Goltz and Haeseler, impressed by the British Boy Scout
movement, had formed Pathfinder units in Germany, and one of
these Pathfinder organizations was the Jungdeutschland Bund just
mentioned. It played an important part in the education of German
youth until about 1918 or 1919.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Much more significant in my development, however, was the
time which I spent in a country boarding school (Waldpädagogium).
This was an educational institution directed by an associate of the
well-known educator, Hermann Lietz. There I was educated in the
way which I later, on an entirely different basis...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, do you think the education of the
defendant himself is in any way material for the Tribunal to hear?
It is the education which he imparted which is the matter that is
material. What he imparted, not what he himself took in.
<span class='pageno' title='365' id='Page_365'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the defendant would nevertheless
ask you to allow him these statements, particularly, from the point
of view that with them he wants to show you that the principles
according to which he led youth education came to him not from
Hitler and not from any Party source, but that they resulted from
his own experiences in his own youth. It is, indeed, of some importance
for the Tribunal to examine the question: According to
what principles did the defendant direct youth education and how
did he arrive at these principles? The defendant is asking permission
to explain that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Sauter, the defendant has already
taken some considerable time in telling us about his early youth
and his education, and the Tribunal thinks that it ought to be cut
short, and that not much more time ought to be taken up in dealing
with the education of the defendant. As I have pointed out to you,
what is material for us is the education he imparted to German
youth and not the education which he received himself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: We shall, of course, comply with your wish,
Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Herr Von Schirach, will you please
make your statements as brief as possible?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I can be very brief.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please, go on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Lietz’ idea was to give youth an education
in which they have in the school an image of the state. The school
community was a miniature state and in this school community was
developed a self-administration of youth. I only want to point out
in passing that he, too, was applying ideas which long before him
had been developed by Pestalozzi and the great Jean Jacques. All
modern education, of course, goes back somehow to Rousseau, be it
a question of Hermann Lietz or the Boy Scouts, the Pathfinder
movement or the German Wandervogel movement. At any rate,
that idea of self-administration of youth in a school community gave
me my idea of the self-leadership of youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>My thought was to attract the younger generation in school to
ideas that Fröbel had originated 80 years before. Lietz wanted to
win over youth from early school days onward.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I may perhaps mention very briefly that when in 1898 Lietz
began his educational work, the British Major Baden-Powell was
being surrounded by rebels in a South African town, and was
training youngsters to scout in the woods and with this laid the
groundwork for his own Boy Scout movement, and that in that
same year, in 1898, Karl Fischer from Berlin-Steglitz founded the
Wandervogel movement.
<span class='pageno' title='366' id='Page_366'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I think that this chapter, which is merely
the historic background, might perhaps, in accordance with the
wish of the President, be terminated now. If I understand you
rightly then, you mean that those principles which you applied
later on as Reich Youth Leader had become familiar to you in
your own youth and in the youth movement of the time. Is that
right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes; basically, yes. The basic principles of
my later work originate there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: There is one more point I want to know in this
connection. Did this education at that time have any political or
anti-Semitic tendencies and how did you happen to get into politics?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that educational work had no political
and most certainly no anti-Semitic tendencies, because Lietz came
from the circles around the Democrat Naumann, from the Damaschke
circle.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But how did you get into politics?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the meantime the revolution had broken
out. My father...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The revolution of 1918-1919?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, the revolution of 1918-1919. My father
had been thrown out of his position by the Reds. The National
Assembly in Weimar had convened. The Weimar Republic had
been founded. We had a parliamentary system, we had a democracy,
or what we in Germany thought was a democracy—I doubt
that it was one. It was about 1923. I was at home at the time. It
was a period of general insecurity, want, and dissatisfaction; many
respectable families had become beggars through the inflation, and
the worker and the citizen had lost their savings. The name “Hitler”
made its appearance in connection with the events of 9 November
1923. I was not able at the time to gain any exact information
about him. This Trial has informed me and people of my generation
for the first time what Hitler actually wanted. At that time
I was not a National Socialist. Together with some boys of my age
I joined a youth organization which had the name “Knappenschaft.”
It was in some way connected with the people’s movement, but it
was not bound to any party. The principles of that organization
were simply comradeship, patriotism, and self-control. There were
about 100 boys from my city in it at the time who, in this youth
organization, fought against the shallow tendencies of youth in the
postwar period and against the dissipation indulged in by growing
youngsters.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In that circle, as a 16-year-old, I first came in contact with
socialism, for here I found youths from every level, working boys,
<span class='pageno' title='367' id='Page_367'></span>
craftsmen, young office employees, sons of farmers. But there were
some older ones among us too, who were already settled in life, and
some also who had been in the World War. From discussions with
these comrades I came to grasp for the first time the consequences
of the Versailles Treaty in their full import. The situation of the
youth at the time was this: The school boy had the prospect of
struggling through somehow or other as a working student, and
then he would in all probability become a member of the academic
proletariat for the possibility of an academic career practically did
not exist for him at all. The young worker had no prospect of finding
an apprenticeship. For him there was nothing other than the
grim misery of unemployment. It was a generation nobody would
help unless it helped itself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And that circle to which you belonged as a
16-year-old boy, then, gradually drifted into the currents of National
Socialism?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and in quite a natural way.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How did it happen?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In central Germany there were disturbances.
I need only mention the name of the Communist bandit leader,
Max Hölz, to indicate what conditions obtained at the time. And
even after outward calm had come, conditions still prevailed that
made it impossible to hold patriotic meetings because they were
usually broken up by Communists. There came an appeal to us
young people to furnish protection for these patriotic meetings,
and we did. Some of us were wounded in doing this. One of us,
a certain Garschar, was killed by Communists. In that manner a
large number of national meetings took place which otherwise could
not have been held in the Weimar Republic, National Socialist
meetings, too; and to an increasing degree it was exactly such
meetings that we had to protect because the Communist terror was
directed against them particularly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Through this protective activity I met leading National Socialists—at
first as speakers, naturally, not personally. I heard Count
Reventlow speak; I think I heard Rosenberg then too; I heard
Streicher speak and heard the first oratorical efforts of Sauckel,
who soon after became Gauleiter of the National Socialist Party
in Thuringia. In this way...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What date is he speaking of?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This is the period around 1924, that is, a year
after the Hitler Putsch.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In that way, Witness, the circle of which you were then a
member came under National Socialist influences. Was this also
supported with reading, reading of National Socialist literature?
<span class='pageno' title='368' id='Page_368'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course, I do not know what my comrades
read, with the exception of one book which I shall give you directly.
I know only what I read myself; I was interested at that time in
the writings of the Bayreuth thinker, Chamberlain, in <span class='it'>The Foundations
of the Nineteenth Century</span>, in the writings of Adolf Bartels,
in his <span class='it'>Introduction to World Literature</span> and <span class='it'>History of German
National Literature</span>. There were works...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that we do not want
to know the full story of the defendant’s education. He is now
giving us a series of the books which he has read, but we are not
interested.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I shall only say in one sentence that these
were works which had no definite anti-Semitic tendencies, but
through which anti-Semitism was drawn like a red thread. The
decisive anti-Semitic book which I read at that time and the book
which influenced my comrades...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please...</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: ...was Henry Ford’s book, <span class='it'>The International
Jew</span>; I read it and became anti-Semitic. In those days this book
made such a deep impression on my friends and myself because
we saw in Henry Ford the representative of success, also the exponent
of a progressive social policy. In the poverty-stricken and
wretched Germany of the time, youth looked toward America, and
apart from the great benefactor, Herbert Hoover, it was Henry Ford
who to us represented America.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks, as I have
said twice now, that the educational influences of the defendant
are quite irrelevant to us. I do not want to say it again and, unless
you can control the defendant and keep him to the point, I shall
have to stop his evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But, Mr. President, is it not of interest to the
Tribunal when judging this defendant and his personality that
they know how the defendant became a National Socialist and
how the defendant became anti-Semitic? I had thought...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, it is not of interest to the Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, how did you then meet Hitler and how
did you happen to join the Party?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I must say that I did not become a National
Socialist because of anti-Semitism but because of Socialism. I met
Hitler as early as 1925. He had just left Landsberg on the Lech,
his imprisonment was ended, and he came to Weimar and spoke
there. It was on that occasion that I was introduced to him. The
<span class='pageno' title='369' id='Page_369'></span>
program for the national community which he developed appealed
to me so enormously because in it I found on a large scale something
I had experienced in a small way in the camaraderie of my
youth organization. He appeared to me to be the man who would pave
the way into the future for our generation. I believed that through
him there could be offered to this younger generation the prospect
of work, of happiness. And in him I saw the man who would
liberate us from the shackles of Versailles. I am convinced that
without Versailles the rise to power of Hitler would never have
happened. That dictate led to dictatorship.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, when did you then become a member
of the Party?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I became a member of the Party in 1925.
I joined the SA at the same time, with all my comrades.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You were 18 at the time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why did you join the SA?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The SA furnished the protection for the
meetings, and we simply continued in the SA, as part of the Party,
the activities which we had carried out before in our youth organization.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In 1926, Witness, that is when you were 19 years
old, there was a Party rally in Weimar?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, you talked to Hitler personally
on that occasion; is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I was to have talked personally to
Hitler one year earlier. On this occasion there was another meeting.
He was making speeches at various mass meetings in Weimar,
and he came back to Weimar again during the same year to speak
before a smaller circle. Together with Rudolf Hess he paid a visit
to the home of my parents and on that occasion he suggested that
I should study in Munich.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He thought I ought to know the Party at its
very core and thought I would become acquainted with the Party
work in that way. But I want to say here that at that time I did
not have any intention at all of becoming a politician. Nevertheless,
I was very much interested, of course, in getting acquainted
with the Movement at the place where it had been founded.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You went, then, to Munich, and studied there?
<span class='pageno' title='370' id='Page_370'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I then went to Munich. At first I did
not concern myself with the Party. I was occupied with Germanic
studies, history, and the history of art; I wrote and I came into
contact with many people in Munich who were not actually National
Socialists but who belonged, I should say, to the periphery of the
National Socialist movement. At that time I lived in the house
of my friend, the publisher Bruckmann...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then in 1929 you became the head of the Movement
within the universities. I think you were elected, not nominated,
to that post?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The situation at the beginning was this: I
attended Party meetings in Munich; in Bruckmann’s salon I met
Hitler and Rosenberg and many other men who later played an
important role in Germany. And at the university I joined the
university group of the National Socialist German Students League.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Go on, Herr Von Schirach, you have just told us
that you joined this university group in Munich. Will you please
continue?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and I also started to take an active part
in this group. I spoke there before my comrades, at first about my
own work in the literary field, and then I began to give lectures
to the students also about the National Socialist movement. I
organized Hitler student meetings among the students in Munich,
and then I was elected a member of the General Students Committee,
the ASTA, and through this activity among the students
I came more and more into contact with the Party leadership.
In 1929, the man who was the then so-called Reich Leader of the
National Socialist Students Union retired, and the question arose
of who should be given the leadership of all the university groups.
At that time Rudolf Hess, on behalf of the Führer, questioned all
university groups of the National Socialist University Movement
and the majority of all these groups cast their vote for me to head
the National Socialist Students Union. This accounts for the curious
fact that I am the only Party leader who was elected into the
Party leadership. That is something which has otherwise never
occurred in the history of the Party.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You mean to say by that, that all the others were
nominated, and you alone were elected?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was elected, and then I was confirmed in
office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And if I am right, you were elected at the
students’ meeting at Graz in 1931.
<span class='pageno' title='371' id='Page_371'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. That is wrong. I am now
talking only of the National Socialist University Movement; I will
come back to this point later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now I was leader of the National Socialist University Movement,
and I reorganized this movement. I began my work as a
speaker. In 1931 I was...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely it is sufficient that he became the
leader. It really does not matter very much to us whether he was
elected or not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I am making every effort all the
time to abbreviate this speech. But perhaps I may ask just one
more question with reference to this subject.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, then in 1931 you were, as far as I know, elected to
the presidency of the General Congress of Austrian and German
Students, comprising all parties, and elected, I think, unanimously.
Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is not correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then explain briefly, Herr Von Schirach.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. At the meeting of the
General German Students Congress in 1931, at which all German
students and all Austrian students and Sudeten-German students
were represented, one of my collaborators whom I had suggested
as leader was unanimously elected head of the entire student
group. This was a very important affair for the youth and for the
Party. Two years before the seizure of power the entire academic
youth had unanimously given their vote to a National Socialist.
After this students’ rally at Graz, I had with Hitler a...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a convenient time to
adjourn.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, before the recess we stopped at the fact
that in 1929 you had been elected the leader of the academic youth.
Two years later, Hitler made you Reich Youth Leader. How did
that appointment come about?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: After the student meeting at Graz in 1931,
the success of which was very surprising to Hitler, I had a conference
with him. In the course of that meeting, Hitler mentioned
a conversation we had had previously. At that time he had asked
<span class='pageno' title='372' id='Page_372'></span>
me how it came about that the National Socialist University Movement
was developing so quickly, whereas the other National Socialist
organizations lagged behind in their development.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I told him at that time that one cannot lead youth organizations
as an appendix of a political party; youth has to be led by youth,
and I developed for him the idea of a youth state, that idea which
had come to me from experiencing the school community, the
school state. And thereupon in 1931 Hitler asked me whether I
would like to assume the leadership of the National Socialist Youth
Organization. This included youth cells, then the Hitler Youth
and the National Socialist Students Organization, which also was
in existence at that time. Several men had already tried their hand
at the leadership of these organizations: the former Oberstführer
SA Leader Pfeffer, the Reichsleiter Buch, actually without much
result.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I agreed and became then Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP,
temporarily a member of the staff of the Oberst SA Leader Röhm.
In that position, as Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP in the staff
of Röhm, I had the rank of an SA Gruppenführer and kept that
rank also when, half a year later, I became independent in my
position. That explains also the fact that I am an SA Obergruppenführer.
I got that rank many years later, <span class='it'>honoris causa</span>. However,
I did not possess an SA uniform—even after 1933.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then in 1931 you became Reich Youth Leader of
the NSDAP?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That, of course, was a Party office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then in 1932 you became Reichsleiter? At that
time you were 25 years old. How did that come about?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have already said that I had expressed the
opinion to Hitler that youth could not be the appendix of another
organization, but youth had to be independent; it had to lead itself;
it had to become independent; and it was in fulfillment of a promise
which Hitler had already given me that, half a year later, I became
an independent Reichsleiter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Independent Reichsleiter, so that you were subordinate
directly to the Party leader Hitler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: With what material means was that youth organization
created at that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: With the means furnished by the young
people themselves.
<span class='pageno' title='373' id='Page_373'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And how were those funds raised? By collections?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The boys and girls paid membership fees. A
part of these membership fees was kept at the so-called district
leadership offices, which corresponded to the Gauleitung in the
Party or to the SA Gruppenführung in the SA. Another part went
to the Reich Youth Leader. The Hitler Youth financed its organization
with its own means.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, I am interested in the following: Did the
Hitler Youth, which you created and which was given Hitler’s name,
get its importance only after the seizure of power and by the
seizure of power only, or what was the previous size of this youth
organization which you created?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Before the seizure of power, in 1932 the
Hitler Youth was already the largest youth movement of Germany.
I should like to add here that the individual National Socialist
youth organizations which I found when I took over my office as
Reich Youth Leader were merged by me into one large unified
youth movement. This youth movement was the strongest youth
movement of Germany, long before we came to power.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On 2 October 1932, the Hitler Youth held a meeting at Potsdam.
At that meeting more than 100,000 youth from all over the Reich
met without the Party’s providing a single pfennig. The means were
contributed by the young people themselves. Solely from the
number of the participants, it can be seen that that was the largest
youth movement.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That was, therefore, several months before the
seizure of power, and at that time already more than 100,000 participants
were at that rally at Potsdam?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution has made the accusation, Witness,
that later, after the seizure of power—I believe in February
1933—you took over the Reich Committee of German Youth
Organizations. Is that correct, and against whom was that action
directed?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. The Reich Committee of
Youth Organizations was practically no more than a statistical office
which was subordinate to the Reich Minister of the Interior. That
office was managed by a retired general, General Vogt, who later
became one of my ablest assistants. The taking over of that Reich
Committee was a revolutionary act, a measure which youth carried
out for youth, for from that day on dates the realization of the
idea of the Youth State within the State. I cannot say any more
about that.
<span class='pageno' title='374' id='Page_374'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution further accuses you, Witness, of
having dissolved the so-called “Grossdeutscher Bund” in 1933, that
is, after the seizure of power. What was the Grossdeutscher Bund,
and why did you dissolve it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Grossdeutscher Bund was a youth organization,
or rather a union of youth organizations, with pan-German
tendencies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am surprised, therefore, that the Prosecution has made the
dissolution of that organization an accusation at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Many members of this Grossdeutscher Bund were
National Socialists. There was no very essential difference between
some of the youth groups associated in that organization and the
Hitler Youth. Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I wanted youth to be united, and the Grossdeutscher
Bund wanted to continue a certain separate existence.
I objected to that, and there was agitated public controversy
between Admiral Von Trotha, the leader of the Grossdeutscher
Bund and me, and in the end the Grossdeutscher Bund was
incorporated into our youth organization. I do not recall exactly
whether I banned the organization formally; I know only that the
members came to me, and that between Admiral Von Trotha
and me a discussion took place, a reconciliation. Admiral Von
Trotha until his death was one of the warmest sponsors of my work.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How did the suppression of the Marxist youth
organization come about?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the suppression of the Marxist
youth organizations, if I remember correctly, came about in connection
with the suppression of trade unions. I have no exact
documents any more regarding that. But at any rate, from the
legal point of view, I was not authorized in 1933 to order a suppression
of that kind. The Minister of the Interior would have had
to do that. I had the right to ban youth organizations, <span class='it'>de jure</span>,
only after 1 December 1936. That the Marxist youth organizations
had to disappear was a foregone conclusion for me, and in speaking
about this suppression order as such, I can only say that the
German working youth found the realization of its socialistic ideas,
not under the Marxist governments of the Weimar Republic, but
in the community of the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, at first you were Reich Führer of the
NSDAP; that was a Party office. And after the seizure of power,
you became Youth Leader of the German Reich; that was a State
office. On the basis of this State or national office, did you also
have jurisdiction over and responsibility for the school system, for
the elementary schools, for instance?
<span class='pageno' title='375' id='Page_375'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: For the school system in Germany the Reich
Minister for Science, Education, and Culture was the only authority.
My field was education outside the schools, along with the home
and the school, as it says in the law of 1 December 1936. However,
I had some schools of my own, the so-called Adolf Hitler Schools,
which were not under national supervision. They were creations
of a later period. And during the war, through the Child Evacuation
Program that is, the organization by which we took care of
evacuating the young people from the big cities endangered by
bombing—I was in charge of education within the camps where
these children were housed. But on the whole I have to answer
the question about competence for the school system in Germany
in the negative.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This youth which you had to educate outside of
the schools was called the Hitler Youth, the HJ.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Was membership in the Hitler Youth compulsory or voluntary?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The membership in the Hitler Youth was
voluntary until 1936. In 1936 the law already mentioned concerning
the HJ was issued which made all the German youth members
of the HJ. The stipulations for the carrying out of that law, however,
were issued only in March 1939, and only during the war, in
May 1940, was the thought of carrying out a German youth draft
considered within the Reich Youth Leadership and discussed publicly.
May I point out that my Deputy Lauterbacher, at the time
when I was at the front, stated in a public meeting—I believe at
Frankfurt in 1940—that now, after 97 percent of the youngest age
group of youth had volunteered for the Hitler Youth, it would be
necessary to draft the remaining 3 percent by a youth draft.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In this connection, Mr. President, may I refer
to two documents of the document book Schirach. That is Number
Schirach-51.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I did not quite understand what the defendant
said. He said that the membership was voluntary until 1936,
that the HJ Law was then passed, and something to the effect that
the execution of the law was not published until 1939. Was that
what he said?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, that is correct. Until 1936—if I may explain
that, Mr. President—membership in the Hitler Youth was absolutely
voluntary. Then in 1936 the HJ Law was issued, which provided
that boys and girls had to belong to the Hitler Youth. But the stipulations
for its execution were issued by the defendant only in 1939
so that, in practice, until 1939 the membership was nevertheless on
a voluntary basis.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that right, Defendant?
<span class='pageno' title='376' id='Page_376'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And these facts which I have just presented,
Mr. President, can also be seen from two documents of the document
book Schirach, Number Schirach-51, on Page 91, and Number
Schirach-52 on Page 92. In the latter document...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Sauter, I accept it from you
and from the defendant. I only wanted to understand it. You
can go on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And in the second document mention is also made
of the 97 percent which the defendant has said had voluntarily
joined the HJ, so that now there were only 3 percent missing. May
I continue:</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Witness, what was the attitude of the
parents of the children on the question of whether the children
should join the HJ or not? What did the parents say?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: There were, of course, parents who did not
like to have their children join the HJ. Whenever I made one of
my radio speeches to the parents or to the youth, many hundreds
of parents sent me letters. Among these letters, there were many
in which the parents voiced their objections to the HJ, or expressed
their dislike for it. I always considered that a special proof of the
confidence which the parents had in me. I should like to say here
that never, when parents restrained their children from joining,
have I exerted any compulsion or put them under pressure of any
kind. In doing that I would have lost all the confidence placed in
me by the parents of Germany. That confidence was the basis of
my entire educational work.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I believe that on this occasion I have to say also that the concept
that any youth organization can be established and carried on,
and successfully carried on, by coercing youth, is absolutely false.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, did youngsters who did not join the
Hitler Youth suffer any disadvantage for that reason?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Youngsters who did not join the Hitler Youth
were at a disadvantage in that they could not take part in our
camping, in our trips, in our sporting meets. They were in a certain
sense outsiders of the youth life, and there was a danger that
they might become hypochondriacs.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But were there not certain professions in which
membership in the HJ was a prerequisite for working in those professions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What were the professions?
<span class='pageno' title='377' id='Page_377'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: For instance, the profession of teacher. It is
quite clear that a teacher cannot educate youth unless he himself
knows the life of that youth, and so we demanded that the young
teachers, that is those in training to teach, had to go through the
HJ. The junior teacher had to be familiar with the ways of life of
the pupils who were under his supervision.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But there were only a few such professions,
whereas for other professions membership in the HJ was not a
prerequisite for admission. Or what was the situation?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that in detail. I believe that
a discussion about that is not even possible, because the entire
youth was in the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you know that the Prosecution has also
accused the defendants of having advocated the Führer Principle.
Therefore, I ask you:</p>

<p class='pindent'>Was the Führer Principle also valid in the HJ, and in what form
was it carried out in the HJ? I should like to remind you that I
mean that kind of Führer Principle of which we have heard in the
testimony.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course, the HJ was built up on the Führer
Principle; only the entire form of leadership of youth differed
basically from that of other National Socialist organizations. For
instance, we had the custom in youth leadership of discussing
frankly all questions of interest to us. There were lively debates
at our district leader meetings. I myself educated my assistants
even in a spirit of contradiction. Of course, once we had debated
a measure and I had then given an order or a directive, that ended
the debate. The youth leaders—that is the young boy and girl
leaders—through years of working together and in serving the common
purpose, had become a unity of many thousands. They had
become friends. It is evident that in a group of that kind the carrying
out of orders and directives takes place in ways entirely
different from those in a military organization or in any other
political organization.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness...</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I add something?</p>

<p class='pindent'>Leadership based on natural authority such as we had in the
youth organization is something which is not alien to youth at all.
Such leadership in the youth organization never degenerated into
dictatorship.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have been accused of training the
youth in a military way, and in that connection, the fact has been
pointed out that your HJ wore a uniform. Is that correct, and why
did the HJ wear a uniform?
<span class='pageno' title='378' id='Page_378'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have stated my opinion about that in many
instances. I believe there are also documents to illustrate it. I have
always described the uniform of the HJ as the dress of comradeship.
The uniform was the symbol of a community without class
distinctions. The worker’s boy wore the same garb as the son of
the university professor. The girl from the wealthy family wore
the same garb as the child of the day laborer. Hence the uniform.
This uniform did not have any military significance whatsoever.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In that connection, Mr. President, may I ask you
to take judicial notice of Document Number Schirach-55 of the
document book Schirach, then of Numbers Schirach-55a and 117,
where the Defendant Von Schirach, many years ago, expressed in
writing and repeatedly the same trends of thought which he is
expressing today.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should only like to ask, Mr. President, for permission to correct
an error in Document 55, on Page 98. Rather far down, under
the heading “Page 77,” is a quotation from a book by Schirach.
There it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Even the son of the millionaire has no other power...”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I do not know whether you have found the passage. It is on
Page 77 of the book quoted, and Page 98 of the document book,
Number Schirach-55. There is a quotation near the bottom of
the page:</p>

<p class='pindent'>“Even the son of the millionaire has no other power...” It
should read “dress,” not “power.” The German word “Macht”, is
an error, and should be the word “Tracht.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>So I ask now to have the word “Macht” (power), changed to the
word “Tracht” (dress).</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, I shall then continue with the interrogation. You have
been accused of having prepared youth for the war, psychologically
and pedagogically. You are alleged to have participated in a conspiracy
for that purpose, a conspiracy by which the National Socialist
movement acquired total power in Germany, and finally
planned and carried out aggressive wars. What can you say about
that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not participate in any conspiracy. I cannot
consider it participation in a conspiracy if I joined the National
Socialist Party. The program of that party had been approved; it
had been published. The Party was authorized to take part in elections.
Hitler had not said—neither he nor any of his collaborators—“I
want to assume power by a <span class='it'>coup d’état</span>.” Again and again he
stated in public, not only once but a hundred times: “I want to
overcome this parliamentary system by legal means, because it is
leading us, year by year, deeper into misery.” And I myself as the
<span class='pageno' title='379' id='Page_379'></span>
youngest deputy of the Reichstag of the Republic told my 60,000
constituents similar things in electoral campaigns.</p>

<p class='pindent'>There was nothing there which could prove the fact of a conspiracy,
nothing which was discussed behind closed doors. What we
wanted we acknowledged frankly before the nation, and so far as
printed paper is read around the globe, everyone abroad could have
been informed also about our aims and purposes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>As far as preparation for war is concerned, I must state that I
did not take part in any conferences or issuing of orders which
would indicate preparation for an aggressive war. I believe that
can be seen from the proceedings in this Court up to now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I can state only that I did not participate in a conspiracy. I do
not believe either that there was a conspiracy; the thought of conspiracy
is in contradiction to the idea of dictatorship. A dictatorship
does not conspire; a dictatorship commands.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what did the leadership of the Hitler
Youth do to prepare the youth for war and to train it for warlike
purposes?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Before I answer that question, I believe I will
have to explain briefly the difference between military and premilitary
training.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Military training, in my opinion, is all training with weapons
of war, and all training which is conducted by military personnel,
that is, by officers, with and without weapons of war. Premilitary
education—premilitary training is, in the widest sense, all training
which comes before the time of military service; in particular cases
it is a special preparation for military service. We, in the Hitler
Youth, were opponents of any military drills for youth. We disliked
such drills as not youthful. I am not giving my personal opinion
here, but the opinion of thousands of my co-workers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>It is a fact that I rejected the Wehrjugend (the Youth Defense
Groups), which had formerly existed in Germany, and did not
allow any continuation of Wehrjugend work within the HJ. I had
always been strongly opposed to any soldier-playing in a youth
organization. With all my high esteem for the profession of an
officer, I still do not consider an officer capable of leading youth
because in some way or other, he will always apply the tone of
the drill field and the forms of military leadership to youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is the reason why I did not have any officers as my assistants
in the Hitler Youth. Just on account of my refusal to use
officers as youth leaders, I was severely criticized by the Wehrmacht
on occasion. I should like to stress that that did not come from the
OKW; Field Martial Keitel, especially, had a great deal of understanding
for my ideas. However, in the Wehrmacht, now and again,
<span class='pageno' title='380' id='Page_380'></span>
criticism was heard on account of the general attitude of opposition
of the Youth Leadership corps toward having officers used as leaders
of a youth organization. The principle of “youth leading youth” was
never broken in Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>If I am now to answer definitively the question of whether the
youth was prepared for the war and whether it was trained in a
military sense, I shall have to say, in conclusion, that the main
efforts of all youth work in Germany culminated in trade competition,
in the trade schools, in camping, and competition in sports.
Physical training, which perhaps in some way could be considered
a preparation for military service, took only a very small part of
our time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should like to give as an example here: A Gebiet, or district,
of the Hitler Youth, for instance the Gebiet of Hessen-Nassau which
is about the same as a Gau in the Party, contributed from its funds
in 1939 as follows: For hikes and camping, 9/20; for cultural work,
3/20; for sports and physical training, 3/20; for the Land Service
(Landdienst), and other tasks and for the offices, 5/20.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The same area spent, in 1944—that is, 1 year before the end
of the war—for cultural work, 4/20; for sports and defense training,
5/20; for Landdienst and other tasks, 6/20; and for the evacuation
of children to the country, 5/20.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In that connection I should like to mention briefly that the same
area, in the time from 1936 until 1943, made no expenditures for
racial-political education; in 1944 there was an entry of 20 marks
under the heading of racial-political education for the acquisition
of a picture book about hereditary and venereal diseases. However,
in that same district, in one single town, during the same time,
200,000 marks were given to have youth visit the theaters.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The question concerning premilitary or military education cannot
be answered by me without describing small-caliber shooting
practice. Small-caliber firing was a sport among the German youth.
It was practiced on the lines laid down in the international rules
for sport shooting. Small-caliber shooting, according to Article 177
of the Treaty of Versailles, was not prohibited. It states expressly
in that article of the treaty that rifle clubs, sporting, and hiking
organizations are forbidden to train their members in the handling
and use of war weapons. The small-caliber rifle, however, is not
a war weapon. For our sport shooting we used a rifle similar to
the American 22-caliber. It was used with the 22-caliber Flobert
cartridge for short or long distance.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should like to say here that our entire marksmanship training
and other so-called premilitary training have been collected in a
manual entitled “HJ Service.” That book was printed and sold not
only in Germany but was also available abroad.
<span class='pageno' title='381' id='Page_381'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>The British Board of Education in 1938 passed judgment on that
book, in the educational pamphlet, Number 109. With the permission
of the Tribunal, I should like to quote briefly what was said
about it in this educational pamphlet. I quote in English:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“It cannot fairly be said to be in essence a more militaristic
work than any thoroughgoing, exhaustive, and comprehensive
manual of Boy Scout training would be. Some forty pages
are, to be sure, devoted to the theory and practice of shooting
small-bore rifle and air gun, but there is nothing in them
to which exception can reasonably be taken, and the worst
that one can say of them is that they may be confidently
recommended to the notice of any Boy Scout wishing to
qualify for his marksmanship badge.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>As to the mental attitude of the Hitler Youth, I can only say
that it was definitely not militaristic.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: We will perhaps come back to that later with
another question. You say the Hitler Youth had been trained with
Flobert rifles, or small-caliber rifles, as they are also called. Was
the Hitler Youth also trained with infantry rifles, or even machine
guns or machine pistols?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Certainly not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Not at all?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not a single German boy, until the war, had
been trained with a war weapon, a military weapon, be it an
infantry rifle, machine gun, or infantry gun; nor with hand grenades
in any form.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in the document book Schirach are
several documents which will show that the attitude of the Defendant
Von Schirach concerning the question of military or premilitary
education of the Hitler Youth was exactly the same as he has
stated it today, particularly, that he expressed himself against any
military drill, barracks language, and all such things.</p>

<p class='pindent'>These are mainly documents in the document book Schirach: 55,
then 122, 123, 127, 127a, 128, and 131. I ask you to take judicial
notice of these documents. They contain, on the whole, the same
statements which Herr Schirach has made briefly already.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Schirach, in connection with the so-called military
training of the youth, I should like to know what influence the SA
had on the training of youth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: None at all. The SA tried to have an influence
on the education and training of youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In what way?
<span class='pageno' title='382' id='Page_382'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was in January of 1939. At that time I
was in Dresden, where I arranged a performance which presented
modern gymnastics for girls. I still remember it distinctly. While
I was there, a newspaper was shown to me which carried a decree
by Hitler, according to which the two oldest age groups of the
Hitler Youth were to receive premilitary training from the SA.
I protested against that at once and after my return to Berlin I
succeeded not in having the decree withdrawn for that could not
be done for reasons of prestige since Hitler’s name was on it—but
invalidated as far as the youth were concerned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, that incident is contained in a document
in the document book Schirach, Number Schirach-132. That
is a statement from <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>, a semiofficial news periodical. I
should like to refer to that as evidence; and in regard to the question
of training in shooting I should like to ask the defendant one
more question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>What part of the entire training did the shooting practice have
in the HJ? Was it a very essential part or the essential part?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Unfortunately, I do not have the documentary
material here which would enable me to answer that exactly. But
at any rate, it was not an essential part of the training in the HJ.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did that marksmanship training go any further,
according to your experiences and observations, than the marksmanship
training of youth in other nations?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The marksmanship training of youth in other
nations went much further, much beyond that which we had in
Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that from your own observation?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know that from many of my assistants who
constantly made a detailed study of the training in other countries,
and I know about it from my own observation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you think that is relevant, the fact that
other nations trained in marksmanship? I am not sure it is true
either, but anyhow, it is not relevant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then I come to another question, Witness. The
Prosecution have asserted and I quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“...that thousands of boys were trained militarily by the
HJ in the work of the Navy, of the naval aviation and of the
armored troops, and that over seven thousand teachers trained
over a million Hitler Youth in rifle marksmanship.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>That is the citation of the Prosecution referring to some meeting
of the year 1938. I should like to have you state your position with
<span class='pageno' title='383' id='Page_383'></span>
regard to the question here, the question of the special units of the
Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Prosecution refers, if I am not mistaken,
to a speech which Hitler made. How Hitler arrived at the figures
concerning training, I cannot say. Concerning training in the special
units I can only say, and prove with documents, the following:</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the year 1938 the motorized Hitler Youth—that is that special
unit of our youth organization which the Prosecution think received
preliminary training in the tank branch—in 1938 the motorized
Hitler Youth had 328 vehicles of their own.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In all Germany?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In all Germany. There were 3,270 private
cars of their family members which, of course, were at their disposal
for their work; and 2,000 cars of the NSKK (National Socialist
Motor Corps). In the year 1938 21,000 youth got their driving
licenses. I believe, but I cannot be sure about it, that that is twice
the number of youngsters that received a driving license in 1937—that
is, the driving license for a passenger car. These figures alone
show that the motorized Hitler Youth did not receive preliminary
training for our armored forces. The motorized Hitler Youth had
motorcycles; they made cross-country trips. That is correct. What
they learned in this way was, of course, useful for the Army too,
when these boys later were drafted into the motorized units; but
it was not true that the boy who had been in the motorized Hitler
Youth went to the Army. There was no compulsion in that respect
at all. The motorized Hitler Youth was not created upon the
request of the Wehrmacht, but it was already created in the
fighting years—long before the seizure of power, simply from the
natural desire of the boys who owned a motorcycle and wanted
to drive it. So we formed our motorized HJ; we used these boys
as messengers between tent camps and we used them as drivers
for our minor leaders, and later, in order to give them a regular
training, especially knowledge of motors, of engines, we made an
arrangement with the NSKK, which had motor schools and could
train the boys.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Other units were created in the same way. The Flieger HJ, for
example, never had any airplanes. We had only gliders. The entire
Hitler Youth had but one airplane and that was my own, a small
Klemm machine. Aside from that, the Hitler Youth had only model
airplanes and gliders. The Hitler Youth not only taught their own
members the use of gliders in the Rhön Hills and elsewhere, but
also thousands of youth from England and other countries. We had
glider camps where young Englishmen were our guests and we
even had camps in England.
<span class='pageno' title='384' id='Page_384'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Navy HJ, did they perhaps have warships?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Navy HJ, of course, had not a single
warship, but from time to time our former Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy, Raeder, kindly gave us an old cutter and with that
we put to sea.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The boys, for instance, who lived in a city like Berlin, near
the Wannsee, and did some rowing, became members of the Navy
HJ. When entering the Wehrmacht they did not, just because they
had been in the Navy HJ, go into the Navy, but just as many went
afterwards into the Army or the Air Force, and it was the same
with other special units.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you say therefore that in your opinion
the Hitler Youth was not educated in a military way for the war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to be quite precise about that.
The training in these special units was carried out in such a
manner that it really had a premilitary value. That is to say
that whatever the boy learned in the Navy Hitler Jugend, regardless
of whether he wanted to use it only as a sportsman later, or
whether he actually went into the Navy, the basic principles were
valuable as premilitary education. If one considers these special
units of the HJ, one can establish that here a premilitary education
actually took place, but not a military training. The youth were
not prepared for the war in any place in the HJ; they were not
even prepared for the military service, because the youth did not
go direct from the Hitler Youth into the Army. From the Hitler
Youth they went into the Labor Service.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And how long were they in the Labor Service?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Half a year.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And only then did they get to the Wehrmacht?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In that connection, however, the Prosecution has
used an agreement which was made between the HJ leadership
and the OKW in August 1939, and which has been submitted as
Document 2398-PS by the Prosecution. What are the facts about
that agreement between you and the OKW?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember any details. Between
Field Marshal Keitel and myself, according to my recollection,
there was no discussion concerning that agreement, but I believe
we arranged that by correspondence. And I should just like to
state that during the entire time from 1933 to 1945, only one or
two conversations of about half an hour took place between Field
Marshal Keitel and me. The agreement, however, resulted from
the following considerations: We endeavored in the Hitler Youth,
<span class='pageno' title='385' id='Page_385'></span>
and it was also the endeavor of the leading men in the Wehrmacht,
to take nothing into our training which belonged to the later
military training. However, in the course of time, the objection
was raised on the part of the military, that youth should not learn
anything in its training which later would have to be corrected
in the Wehrmacht. I am thinking, for instance, of the compass.
The Army used the infantry compass; the Hitler Youth, in cross-country
sports, used compasses of various kinds. It was, of course,
quite senseless that youth leaders should train their boys, for
instance, to march according to the Bèzar compass if later, in their
training as recruits, the boys had to learn something different. The
designation and the description of the terrain should also be given
according to the same principles in the Hitler Youth as in the
Army, and so this agreement was made by which, I believe, thirty
or sixty thousand HJ leaders were trained in cross-country sports.
In these cross-country sports no training with war weapons was
practiced.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, now I come to another chapter. It
may be that this is the best time to adjourn.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<h2><span class='pageno' title='386' id='Page_386'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Schirach resumed the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, before the adjournment we spoke about
the question of the military or premilitary education of the youth.
And now I come to a similar chapter; that is the question of whether
you, as Youth Leader, in your articles, speeches, and orders did in
any way attempt to influence young people psychologically towards
an aggressive war in order to make them war-minded by such
means.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, never in my speeches to German youth,
or in anything which I laid down for youth in the way of orders
and directives, did I prepare German youth for war; nor have I
ever, even in the smallest circle of my collaborators, expressed
myself in such terms. All my speeches are contained in the collection
<span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>, at least their essential contents. A considerable part
of my speeches is collected also in a book <span class='it'>Revolution der Erziehung</span>
(<span class='it'>The Revolution in Education</span>), which has been submitted to the
Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>All this evidence shows that I never spoke to the youth of the
country in that sense; it would have been in direct contradiction
to all my aims of co-operation with the youth of other nations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, perhaps I may draw your attention
in this connection to the document which is in the Schirach document
book under Number Schirach-125, I repeat 125—and also 126,
where Schirach expresses his opinion about the question of preserving
peace and rejecting war. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial
notice of these documents as evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, you have just spoken of co-operation between your
Reich Youth Leadership Office and the German Hitler Youth with
the youth of other nations. Could you give us a more detailed
statement on that, in particular which youth associations of other
nations you co-operated with, which you attempted to approach,
and in which way and to what degree?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Starting in 1933, and in an increasing degree
year by year, I made efforts to bring about exchange camps with
youth organizations in other countries. Here in Germany these
groups of English youth, French youth, Belgian youth, and the youth
of many other countries, particularly, of course, from Italy, often
came as our guests. I remember that in one year alone, I think
in 1936, there were approximately 200,000 foreign youths who
stayed overnight in our youth hostels.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Perhaps it is important in this connection to say that the youth
hostel system, which I took over in 1933, was developed by me and
<span class='pageno' title='387' id='Page_387'></span>
finally formed a part of an international youth hostel system, the
president of which was sometimes a German, sometimes an Englishman.
An international youth hostel agreement made it possible that
youngsters of our nations could stay overnight in youth hostels of
the guest nations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I myself took great pains to bring about an understanding with
the youth of France. I must say that this was a pet idea of mine.
I think that my former assistants will remember just how intensely
I worked towards the realization of that idea. I had my leaders’
periodical appear in the French language; I do not know whether
more than once, but certainly at least once, so that the understanding
between the French and the German youth could be
strengthened thereby.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I went to Paris and I invited the children of one thousand
veterans of the first World War to come to Germany. I very often
had young French guests as visitors in Germany. But over and
above this understanding with France, which eventually also led to
difficulties between the Führer and myself, I co-operated with
many, many other organizations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Perhaps I may add that German-French co-operation, as far as
youth was concerned, was supported particularly by Ambassador
Poncet in Berlin, Premier Chautemps, and other French personalities
who wrote in my leadership periodical on that particular
subject. I exchanged views with youth leaders all over the world,
and I myself undertook long journeys to visit youth organizations
in other countries and establish contact with them. The war terminated
that work. I do not want to omit mentioning here that for
one whole year I put the entire youth program under the slogan
“Understanding,” and that in all my speeches before the youth I
tried to direct and educate it toward a better understanding of
other nations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Is it true that, for instance, even during the last
years before the war, I think even in the winter of 1937-1938 and
again 1938-1939, you received large delegations of English youth in
skiing camps of the Hitler Youth and that vice versa also during
those years considerable delegations of Hitler Youth leaders and
Hitler Youth members were sent to England so that the people
could get to know and understand each other?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is correct. There were innumerable
encampments of foreign youth in Germany and very many camps
of German youth abroad, and I myself often visited such camps or
received delegations from them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I would like to add that as late as 1942 I made an attempt to
co-operate with the youth of France. At that time the difficulty lay
<span class='pageno' title='388' id='Page_388'></span>
in Mussolini’s attitude. I went to Rome and, through Count Ciano’s
intervention, had a long conversation with Mussolini and succeeded
in having him withdraw his objections to having our youth invite
all French groups to come to Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Unfortunately, when I reported this result to our Foreign
Minister, Hitler turned it down. At any rate, that is what Herr
Von Ribbentrop said.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: From an article in the paper <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span> of 1938 I
gather, for instance, that during that year you invited among others,
1,000 children of French war veterans to come into the Hitler Youth
camps in Germany and into the German-French youth skiing camps.
Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have already told you that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Another article shows me that, for instance, I
believe in 1939, you had a special memorial erected, I think in the
Black Forest, when some members of an English youth delegation
were accidentally killed there during games.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the defendant had mentioned
earlier that near Berlin he erected a special house for these purposes
under the name “The Foreign House of the Hitler Youth.” May I
present to the Tribunal in the original, pictures of this “Foreign
House,” as Document Number Schirach-120; and may I ask the
Tribunal to look at these pictures, because in them...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We are quite prepared to take it from you
without looking at the house. The particular style of architecture
will not affect us.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, but if you will not look at the pictures, then
you will not know how the house was furnished; and you will not
see that in the house, for instance, there was not a single swastika,
not a single picture of Hitler, or any such things. That, again shows
considerations for the views of the foreign guests.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In this connection, Mr. President, may I also ask you to take
judicial notice of a number of documents, all of which refer to the
efforts of the Defendant Von Schirach to bring about an understanding
between German youth and the youth of other nations.
These are the documents in Schirach’s document book which have
the Numbers Schirach-99 up to and including Schirach-107, then
Documents Schirach-108 through 113, and also Documents Schirach-114
up to and including 116, and then Documents Schirach-117, 119,
and 120. All these documents refer to the same subject.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, when you invited such delegations from foreign
youth organizations to Germany, was anything concerning German
<span class='pageno' title='389' id='Page_389'></span>
institutions and organizations, particularly with reference to the
Hitler Youth, ever kept secret from these delegations, or how was
that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, as a matter of principle, foreign youth
leaders who wished to get to know our institutions were shown
everything without any reservations whatever. There was, in fact,
no institution of German youth in the past which was not shown to
our foreign guests. Also the so-called premilitary education was
demonstrated to them in every detail.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then in 1939 the second World War broke
out. During the last months before that happened, did you seriously
expect a war; or with what did you occupy yourself at the time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was firmly convinced that Hitler would not
allow a war to break out. It was my opinion that he was in no
way deceived about the fact that the Western Powers were firmly
resolved to be serious. Until the day when war broke out, I firmly
believed that the war could be avoided.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you discuss with military leaders or political
personalities at that time the danger of war and the prospects of
maintaining the peace?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No; in fact, I want to say something here and
now about my discussions with military personalities.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have already stated that over a period of 12 years—that is
from 1933 to 1944 or 1945; that is, 13 years—I had perhaps one or
possibly two half-hour conversations with Field Marshal Keitel. I
remember that one of them dealt entirely with a personal matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>During the same period I had, I think, only one single discussion
with Admiral Raeder, and Admiral Dönitz I met for the first time
here in Nuremberg.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I never had any official discussions with Generaloberst Jodl at
all, and I talked to the late Field Marshal Von Blomberg, if I
remember rightly, possibly twice for half an hour. I had no official
discussions at all with the former Supreme Commander of the
Army, Von Fritsch. I was his guest on one occasion only, when
he was running skiing competitions for the army, and he kindly
invited me because he knew that I was interested in skiing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>With his successor, Von Brauchitsch, I had a general chat on
questions of education when I talked before the youth of Königsberg
in 1933. Later, I believe, I visited him once on official business;
and we discussed a question which was of no particular importance
for the education of youth. It was some technical matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>These are the discussions which I have had with military personalities.
In fact, altogether I must say that I did not have time for
conferences. I led an organization comprising 8 million people; and
<span class='pageno' title='390' id='Page_390'></span>
my duties in that organization were such that I did not possibly
have the time to participate in conferences and discussions in Berlin
regarding the situation, even if I had been admitted to them, which
was not the case.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, from 1932 you were a Reichsleiter. That
means that you belonged to the highest level of leaders in the
Party. Were you not, in that capacity as Reichsleiter, informed by
Hitler, his deputy, or other political personalities about the political
situation?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think that Hitler invited the Reichs- and
Gauleiter, on an average, twice a year to a conference, during
which he retrospectively discussed political events. Never at any
time did Hitler discuss before these men operations of the future,
whether of a political or military nature.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, if I understand your answer correctly, you
were always surprised by these foreign developments.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Does the same apply to the question of the
Austrian Anschluss?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I heard of the Anschluss of Austria,
which of course I hailed enthusiastically, through the radio, if I
remember rightly, during a trip by car from my Academy at
Brunswick to Berlin. I continued my journey to Berlin, boarded
a train at once, and arrived the following morning in Vienna. There
I greeted the young people: youth leaders, some of whom had
been in prisons or in a concentration camp at Wöllersdorf for a
long time, and also many women youth leaders, who had also
experienced great hardships.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what about the march into Czechoslovakia?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Like every other German citizen, I heard of
that through the radio, and did not learn any more than any other
citizen learned from the radio.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you, in any capacity, a participant in the
negotiations regarding the Munich Pact with Chamberlain and
Daladier in 1938?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what was your opinion?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I regarded that agreement as the basis for
peace, and it was my firm conviction that Hitler would keep that
agreement.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you know anything about the negotiations
with Poland in 1939?
<span class='pageno' title='391' id='Page_391'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I heard about the negotiations which led
to the war, only here in this courtroom. I was merely acquainted
with that version of the negotiations which was officially announced
through the radio or by the Ministry of Propaganda; and I know no
more, therefore, than what every other German citizen knows. The
version which Hitler announced before the Reichstag was considered
by me to be absolutely true; and I never doubted it, or at least I
did not doubt it until about 1943, and all I have heard about it
here is new to me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution, among other things,
have made the accusation against you that in your book, <span class='it'>Die Hitler-jugend—Idee
und Gestalt</span> (<span class='it'>Hitler Youth—Idea and Form</span>)—which,
Mr. President, is Number 1458-PS—you used the expression “Lebensraum”
(living space) and “Ostraum” (eastern space) and that by
doing so you welcomed or considered as a necessity German conquests
in the East, that is, at the expense of Soviet Russia and
Poland.</p>

<p class='pindent'>What do you have to say about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In this book of mine, <span class='it'>Die Hitler-jugend—Idee
und Gestalt</span>, the word “Lebensraum” (living space) is not used at all
to my knowledge. Only the word “Ostraum” (eastern space) is used,
and I think it is in connection with a press service in the East. In
a footnote, in connection with a description of the tasks of the
Colonial Advisory Board in the Reich Youth Leadership, there is
a statement to the effect that, as a result of the activities of this
Colonial Advisory Board the necessity of drawing the attention of
youth to the exploitation of the eastern territory—and by that is
meant the thinly populated eastern area of Germany—should not
be overlooked.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That was at a time when we in the youth organizations were
particularly concerned with the problem of the “flight from the
land,” that is to say, the migration of the second or third sons of
farmers to the cities. I formed a special movement of youth to
combat that trend, the Rural Service, which had the task of stopping
this flow of youth from the country to the towns and also of bringing
home to youth in towns the challenge of the country.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Of course I never thought of a conquest of Russian territory
because ever since I occupied myself with history it was always my
point of view politically that the policy regarding mutual security
with Russia, which broke off with Bismarck’s dismissal, should be
resumed. I considered the attack against the Soviet Union as the
suicide of the German nation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, did you, as the Youth Leader of the
German Reich, have the right to report to Hitler directly?
<span class='pageno' title='392' id='Page_392'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is true; but this right to make
reports was more or less only on paper. To picture that precisely,
before the seizure of power I frequently reported to Hitler in
person. In 1932 he quite often announced his intention to dine with
me in the evening, but it is clear that in the presence of my wife
and other guests political questions were not discussed, particularly
not the questions which fell into my special sphere. Only
now and then, perhaps, could I touch upon a subject which interested
me in connection with education.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In 1933, as far as I can remember, I reported twice to him personally,
once regarding the financing of the youth movement, and
the second time in connection with the Party Rally of 1933. During
the following years my reports averaged one or two a year whereby
I was treated in the same way as most people who reported to
Hitler. Of the 15 odd points on which I wanted to report to him,
I managed to deal with 3 or 4, and the others had to be dropped
because he interrupted me and very explicitly elaborated on the
things which interested him most.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I then tried to help myself by taking along models of youth
buildings, views of the big stadiums and of youth hostels, which I
had set up in a hall in the Reich Chancellery, and when he looked
at them I used the opportunity to put two or three questions to him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I must state here—I think I owe it to German youth—that Hitler
took very little interest in educational questions. As far as education
was concerned, I received next to no suggestions from him.
The only time when he did make a real suggestion as far as athletic
training was concerned was in 1935, I believe, when he told me that
I should see to it that boxing should become more widespread
among youth. I did so, but he never attended a youth boxing
match. My friend Von Tschammer-Osten, the Reich Sports
Leader, and I tried very often to persuade him to go to other
sporting events, particularly to skiing contests and ice hockey
championships in Garmisch, but apart from the Olympic Games,
it was impossible to get him to attend.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You have told us a little earlier about this so-called
military or premilitary education, stating that, as far as one
could talk about such education at all, it played only a minor part
in the training of the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May I ask you to tell us, though not at length but only in condensed
phrases, what, in your mind, were the chief aims of your
youth education program. Be very brief.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Tent encampments.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Tent encampments?
<span class='pageno' title='393' id='Page_393'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Trips, construction of youth hostels and
youth homes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What do you mean by “trips”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Youth hikes, individually and in groups; also
the construction of more and more youth hostels. In one year alone,
more than 1,000 homes and youth hostels were built by me in
Germany. Then there was additional professional training, and
then what I called the “Labor Olympics,” namely, the annual Reich
trade contests, voluntary competition between all youth of both
sexes who wanted to participate. In fact millions participated.
Then our great Reich sports contests, championships in every type
of sport, our cultural work, and the development of our singing
groups, our acting groups, youth concert choirs, and the development
of our youth libraries, and then something which I mentioned in
connection with combating the migration from the country, the
Rural Service with its rural help groups, those youths, who for
idealistic reasons were working in the country, even town boys—to
show the farmer boys that the country was really more beautiful
than the city, that even a city boy will give up his life in the city
temporarily to devote himself to the land and to tilling the soil.
Then, as a great communal accomplishment of youth, I must mention
the dental improvement and the regular medical examinations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>These, in a few summary words, were the main tasks which our
youth organizations had, but they are by no means all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, these ideas, these thoughts, and
these aims of the Defendant Von Schirach are contained in a
number of documents which are found in the Schirach document
book, and which are extracts from his works, speeches, and orders.
I am referring to Schirach document book, Numbers Schirach-32
through 39, 44 through 50, 66 through 74(a), 76 through 79, and,
finally, 80 through 83.</p>

<p class='pindent'>All these documents deal with the tasks which the Defendant
Schirach has just described to you, and I am asking the Tribunal
to take judicial notice of the details in these documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] There is only one point of that
Hitler Youth program, if I may call it that, with which I would
like to deal, because it has been particularly stressed against you
in the Indictment. That is your collaboration with the Lawyers’
League, that is to say, your occupation with law. In that connection
I would like to know why you, the Reich Youth Leader, were
interested in legal problems at all. What were you striving for,
and what did you achieve? Please, will you tell us that briefly,
because it has been emphasized in the Indictment.
<span class='pageno' title='394' id='Page_394'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I remind you that the youth of the
state was regarded by me as being a Youth State. In that Youth
State all professions and all tasks were represented. My collaboration
with the Lawyers’ League was due to the necessity of training
legal advisers for our working youth whom they could offer
the necessary legal protection. I was anxious that those Hitler
Youth leaders who were studying law should return to the organization
to deal with just such tasks within the organization.</p>

<p class='pindent'>From this type of training a large organization developed within
the ranks of youth which was equivalent to the organization of
doctors within the youth organization; our medical organization
comprised approximately 1,000 doctors, men and women. These
legal men assisted the staff, in the districts and other units of our
youth organization, putting into practice those demands which I had
first enunciated early in our fighting days, before the seizure of
power, and which I had championed in the State later on, namely,
the demand for free time and paid vacations for the young worker.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This legal work of our youth led to the founding of seminars
for Youth Law and Working Youth Law, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, attached to the
universities at Kiel and Bonn. In particular it had the result that
those demands which I voiced in a speech in 1936, before the Committee
for Juvenile Law of the Academy for German Law, could
be carried through.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Just one moment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Tribunal.</span>] This is the speech of which excerpts
are reproduced, in Schirach document book, Number Schirach-63.
It is copied from <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span> of October 1936.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Schirach, perhaps you can tell us very briefly which
social demands you, as Reich Youth Leader, made regarding youth.
You said earlier, “free time.” What did you mean by that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the first place, a shortening of working
hours for young people, the abolition of night work for young
people, a fundamental prohibition of child labor, extended weekends,
and 3 weeks’ paid vacation every year.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In 1937 at Liegnitz I noticed that at that time 50 percent of the
young workers had no holidays at all and that only 1 percent had
15 to 18 days per annum. In 1938, on the other hand, I had put
through the Youth Protection Law which prohibited child labor,
raised the age of protection for juveniles from 16 to 18 years, prohibited
night work, and realized my demand regarding the extended
weekend, at the same time stipulating at least 15 days’ vacation
annually for youngsters. That was all I could achieve. It was only
part of what I wanted to achieve.
<span class='pageno' title='395' id='Page_395'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: These are the demands which are contained in
the following documents in the document book: Schirach-40 to 41
and 60 to 64. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, I now come to another problem, and that is your
position within the Party. Some time ago we were shown a chart
here giving a clear picture of the organization of the Party. Was
that plan correct, or what was your position within the Party?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My position in the Party was not correctly
depicted in that chart, at least not as far as the channels of command
are concerned. According to the chart which was exhibited
here, the channel of command would have been from the Reich
Leader for Youth Education to the Chief of the Party Chancellery,
and from there to Hitler and from Hitler to the Reich Youth Leadership
Office of the Party. That, of course, is an erroneous picture.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I was not in the Party Directorate to give my orders via the
Gauleiter to the district leaders but as the representative and
head of the youth movement, so that if you want to describe my
position and the position of my organization in the framework of
the NSDAP correctly, you would actually have to draw a pyramid,
the apex of which, that is to say my position in the Party Directorate,
would be above the Reichsleiter. I was the only person in the youth
movement who was connected with the Party.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And the other leaders and subleaders of the youth
movement?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Some of them may have been Party members,
but not all. At any rate, they were not members of the
Gauleitung or Kreisleitung. The entire staff of the youth movement,
the entire youth organization, stood alongside the Party
as a unit.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, as the Youth Leader of the German
Reich, were you a civil servant?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And from 1 December 1936, I believe, you were
the chief of a high Reich office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was a civil servant only from 1 December
1936.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: With the title?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Youth Leader of the German Reich.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As the chief of a high Reich office, were you
actually independent of the Minister of the Interior and the Minister
for Education?
<span class='pageno' title='396' id='Page_396'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that was, after all, the purpose of creating
an independent Reich office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you thereby become a member of the Reich
Cabinet, as has been claimed?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I am sure I did not. I heard here for the
first time that I was supposed to have been a member of the Cabinet.
I never participated in a Cabinet meeting. I never received a decree
or anything of the sort which would have made me a member of
the Cabinet. I never received invitations to attend Cabinet meetings.
I never considered myself a member of the Cabinet, and I believe
that the Ministers did not consider me a member either.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you in any way informed of the resolutions
passed by the Reich Cabinet, for instance, by having the minutes of
the meetings sent to you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. Resolutions passed by the Reich Cabinet,
insofar as any were passed after 1 December 1936, only came to
my attention in the same way as they reached any other higher
official or employee of the Reich who read the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> or
the <span class='it'>Reichsministerialblatt</span>. Records and minutes: were never sent
to me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When you became a high Reich authority, did you
receive the staff which you needed through a ministry, or how did
you obtain that staff for yourself?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: A few youth leaders who had worked on
my staff for a number of years were made civil servants through
me. I did not receive a single official from any ministry to deal
with matters relating to the youth organization. The entire high
Reich office, if I remember correctly, consisted of no more than five
officials. It was the smallest of the high Reich offices, something I
was particularly proud of. We carried out a very large task with
a minimum of personnel.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And now, Witness, I want to come to a subject
which is going to be rather extensive and that is the affidavit by
Gregor Ziemer, which you have already mentioned. It is a very
lengthy affidavit which has been presented by the Prosecution under
Document Number 2441-PS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, what do you have to say in detail with regard to that
affidavit? Do you know it? Do you know this man Gregor Ziemer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Have you found out who he is and from where
he gathered his alleged knowledge?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I gather from the affidavit that Herr Ziemer
before the war was headmaster of the American school in Berlin
<span class='pageno' title='397' id='Page_397'></span>
and that he has written a book which apparently deals with youth
and school education in Germany. This affidavit is an extract from
that book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The affidavit as such, if you regard it in its entirety, has, I
believe, more importance as propaganda than as an impartial
judgment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I want to start by quoting something from the very first page,
which is the page containing Ziemer’s affidavit, and in the last
paragraph it says that street fights took place outside the American
school between the Jewish children going to this school and the
local youngsters. I need not deal with the difficulties which the
school itself had, because that was not part of my department. But
these street fights took place outside the school, and I think I
ought to say something about them. I never heard anything about
these clashes, but I should have heard about them under all circumstances,
because during most of 1938 I was in Berlin. I should have
heard of them first through the youth organization itself, because
the senior youth leaders would have been obliged to report to me
if such incidents had taken place.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Furthermore, I would have had to hear about it through the
Foreign Office, because if youngsters from the American colony
had been molested, protests would certainly have gone through the
Embassy to the Foreign Office, and these protests would without
fail have been passed on to me at once or reported to me by
telephone.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I can only imagine that the whole affair is a very gross exaggeration.
The American Ambassador Wilson even had breakfast
with me—I think in the spring of 1939, and I do not think I am
wrong about the date—in Gatow.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the Foreign House?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the Foreign House.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And we discussed a number of subjects privately. I believe that
on that occasion or afterwards he would most certainly have
mentioned such incidents if they had in reality occurred in the way
Herr Ziemer describes them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe I can go over to Page 2, where...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, how much of this document has
been read by the Prosecution? As far as I know, very little.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I beg your pardon?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How much of this affidavit has been read
and put in evidence by the Prosecution?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I cannot tell you that offhand, Mr. President. But
judging by practice, I must assume that if a document is submitted
<span class='pageno' title='398' id='Page_398'></span>
to the Tribunal, judicial notice of the entire document is taken by
the Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is not so. We have stated over and
over again that we take only judicial notice on documents which
have been read to the Tribunal, unless they are documents of
which full translations have been given. This document was,
I suppose, presented in the course of the Prosecution’s case, and
probably one sentence out of it was read at the time. I do not
know how much was read; but you and the defendant ought to
know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: There was only one paragraph read, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One paragraph?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: One full paragraph and perhaps one short one on
Page 21.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have it here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I think the Prosecution covered the part having
to do with the speech at Heidelberg.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And that is the only part of it that has been
read, and that is, therefore, the only part of it that is in evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Perhaps for the sake of credibility—and I
shall not deal in detail with the accusations contained in that affidavit—I
might be allowed to say, with one sole exception, all the
annual slogans of the Hitler Youth are reproduced falsely in this
affidavit and that Gregor Ziemer nevertheless swears to the correctness
of his statement.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be the best, if you want to reply
to his affidavit, that you should direct the defendant’s attention to
the part which has been read? Then he can make an answer to that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in Ziemer’s affidavit, which the
defendant has told me he regards as a clearly inflammatory piece
of writing, the annual slogans are mentioned which are supposed
to have been issued by the defendant, that is, the slogans for the
work for the following year.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One passage of this document has been put
in. If you want to put in the rest, you are entitled to do so. But I
should have thought that it would have been the best way for you
to answer the passage which has been put in. The rest of the affidavit
is not in evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in that case my client would get
the worst end of the bargain, because in other passages which have
not been used by the Prosecution...
<span class='pageno' title='399' id='Page_399'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I said you could use the other passages if
you want to.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Certainly, but I want to prove that Herr Ziemer’s
statements are not correct; that is why I have just been discussing
the question of annual slogans with the defendant. This is only
one example.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the defendant is apparently
saying that the affidavit is unreliable because of the slogans which
are referred to in it. Is that not sufficient for your purpose?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes; but I intend to prove that Herr Ziemer’s
statements are untrue. The defendant maintains that the statements
contained in that affidavit are not true. But I am trying to prove
to you that, in fact, Herr Ziemer has deliberately stated and sworn
to untruths.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Sauter, there being one passage
in this affidavit which is in evidence, you can deal very shortly
with the question of the credit of the person who made the affidavit.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, this Herr Ziemer, in his affidavit, has
made statements regarding the annual slogans...</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: ...which you issued for the Hitler Youth. How
these annual slogans were worded can be easily seen by the Tribunal
from the affidavit. I now ask you to tell us how the annual
slogans of the Hitler Youth were worded during your time; that
is, 1933 to 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Herr Ziemer mentions the slogan on Page 15
of the English document. Herr Ziemer says that in 1933 the motto
for German Youth had been “One Reich, One Nation, One Führer.”
He probably means “One People, One Reich, One Führer.” Actually,
the year 1933 was the year of “Unity.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What do you mean by “Unity”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The year in which German youth joined
ranks in one organization.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I want to skip a few years now and come to the
year 1938. What was your slogan for the Hitler Youth in 1938?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 1938 was the year of “Understanding.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The year of “Understanding”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Herr Ziemer says the slogan was “Every
Youth a Flyer.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then in 1939 what was your slogan?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was the year of “Duty Towards Health.”
<span class='pageno' title='400' id='Page_400'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The year of “Duty Towards Health”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: According to Herr Ziemer, it was “Hitler
Youth on the March.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And finally 1940, your last year?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was the year of “Instruction.” But he
called it “We March Against England.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>But I want to add that the first slogan, “One People, One Reich,
One Führer,” which Ziemer says was the official slogan of the year
1933 for German youth, arose first in 1938 when Hitler went into
Austria. Before that, that slogan did not exist at all. It was never
the annual slogan of German youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we must comply with the wish of the
Tribunal and not go into the affidavit of Ziemer any further, with
the exception of the one point which has been used by the Prosecution
in the Indictment against you in connection with the accusation
of anti-Semitism. I skip Herr Ziemer’s further statements
and come to this speech at Heidelberg. Will you tell me first of all,
what Ziemer said, and then make your own comments on that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Ziemer said that during a meeting of students
in Heidelberg—I think either at the end of 1938 or the beginning of
1939—I had made a speech against the Jews in connection with a
rally of the National Socialist Student Union. He says that on that
occasion I praised the students for the destruction of the Heidelberg
Synagogue, and that following that I had the students file past me
and gave them decorations and certificates of promotion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>First of all, I have already referred to my activity in the student
movement. Upon the request of the Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf
Hess, I handed the leadership of the student movement over to him
in 1934. He then appointed a Reich student leader; and after that
I did not speak at any student meetings.</p>

<p class='pindent'>As far as I can remember, I visited Heidelberg during the summer
of 1937; and there I spoke to the youth group. This was 1 or 1½
years before Ziemer’s date. And on one occasion I attended a
festival play at Heidelberg.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: All of this is irrelevant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no recollection of any meeting of this
sort with students, and I have no recollection of ever having
publicly stated my views about the Jewish pogrom of 1938. I will
state at another point what I said in my capacity as Youth Leader
regarding this.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Ziemer says—I am translating from the English text—he says
that “the day will come when the students of Heidelberg will take
<span class='pageno' title='401' id='Page_401'></span>
up their place side by side with the legions of other students to win
the world over to the National Socialist ideology.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have never spoken like that before youth, in public, or even
in a small circle. These are not my words; I did not say that. I
had no authority whatsoever to confer decorations or certificates,
<span class='it'>et cetera</span>, upon students. Medals of distinction for students did not
exist. All decorations were conferred by the head of the State.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I personally had the right to confer the golden youth decoration,
and I think it was conferred by me about 230 times in all, almost
entirely upon people who earned distinction in the field of education,
but not upon unknown students.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the important point in your testimony is
to tell us whether it is correct that the speech made at the end of
1938 before the students at Heidelberg, in which the speaker referred
to the wreckage of the synagogues, was not made by you,
because at that time you had not had anything to do with the
student movement for years. Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had nothing to do with the student movement,
and I do not remember having spoken before such a meeting.
I consider it quite out of the question that such a meeting of students
took place at all. I did not make those statements.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Have you got the affidavit before you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I cannot find that particular passage at
the moment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: It says something which I have translated into
German, namely, it mentions the “small, fat student leader.” Have
you got that passage? Does it not say so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, it says so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Well then, surely “small, fat student leader” cannot
be applied to you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May I, Mr. President, in this connection, draw your attention to
an affidavit which appears in Schirach’s document book under
Number Schirach-3, and which I herewith submit to the Tribunal.
It is an affidavit of a certain Hoepken, who, beginning with 1 May
1938, was the female secretary of the Defendant Von Schirach and
who, in this affidavit under the Figure 16—which is Page 22 of the
document book—mentioning exact details—states under oath that
during the time with which we are here concerned the defendant
was not at Heidelberg at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I do not suppose it is necessary for me to read that part of the
affidavit. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to break off.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='402' id='Page_402'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have spoken in another connection
about the fact that you did not consider officers suitable as youth
leaders. I would be interested to know how many members of the
leadership corps of the Hitler Youth in 1939 at the outbreak of
the war were reserve officers in the Armed Forces.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I would judge that the leadership corps of
the HJ had about 1,300 leaders. Those were leaders of the Banne,
leaders of the districts or regions, and the corresponding staff of
assistants. Of these 1,300 youth leaders, 5 to 10 men were reserve
officers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And how many active officers did you have at
that time on your staff or in the leadership corps?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Active officers were not youth leaders and
could not be youth leaders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why not? Was that contained in the regulations?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. An officer was not permitted to be a
member of the Party or any one of its organs or affiliated organizations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who was responsible to you for the physical
education and sports programs in the Hitler Youth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Obergebietsführer Von Tschammer-Osten,
who was also Reich Sports Leader. In the Olympic year he co-operated
very closely with me and voluntarily subordinated himself
to me in December or November 1936. He was responsible to me
for the entire physical education of the boys and girls.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This Herr Von Tschammer-Osten, who was
very well known in the international sports world, was he an officer
by profession?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: According to my recollection he had been an
officer during the first World War. Then he left the Army and was
a farmer by profession. Later on he concerned himself only with
questions of physical education and sport. One of his brothers was
an active officer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Von Tschammer-Osten become an officer
during the second World War?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, he did not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you remember that? A document has been
submitted here by the Soviet Prosecution, namely a report from
Lvov, in which it is stated that the Hitler Youth or the Reich
Youth Leadership had conducted courses for young people from
Poland, and these young people were to be trained as agents, spies,
<span class='pageno' title='403' id='Page_403'></span>
and parachutists. You have stated today that you take the complete
responsibility for the youth leadership. I ask you to tell us something
about that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: We had absolutely no possibilities for espionage
training in our youth organization. Whether Heydrich on his
part, without my knowledge and without the knowledge of my
assistants, had hired youthful agents in Poland and used them
within his intelligence service, it is not possible for me to say. I
myself did not conduct any espionage training; I had no courses for
agents, and courses for training parachutists were out of the question
because, after all, I had no air force. Training of that kind could
only have been conducted through the Air Force.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then you, as Reich Youth Leader or, as you were
called later, Reich Leader for Youth Education, have never known
anything about these things before this Trial? Can you state that
under oath?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I can state upon my oath. I should like
to add that shortly before the war young refugees from Poland
came to us in large numbers, but they of course could not return
to Poland. The persecution of the Germans in Poland is a historical
fact.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution has asserted that in the
Hitler Youth a song was sung, “Heute gehört uns Deutschland, und
morgen die ganze Welt” (Today Germany belongs to us, tomorrow
the whole world); that is the alleged title of that song, and that is
supposed to have expressed the will for conquest of the Hitler
Youth; is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The song says, in the original text which was
written by Hans Baumann and is also included in a document here:
“Heute da hört uns Deutschland und morgen die ganze Welt”
(Germany hears us today and tomorrow the whole world). But it
had come to my knowledge also that the song, from time to time,
was being sung in the form which has been mentioned here. For
that reason I issued a prohibition against singing the song which
differed from the original text. I also prohibited, years ago, the
song “Siegreich wollen wir Frankreich schlagen” (Victoriously we
will conquer France) from being sung by the German Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You prohibited the last mentioned song entirely?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Out of consideration for your French guests?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not out of consideration for guests but
because it was contrary to my political conceptions.
<span class='pageno' title='404' id='Page_404'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thus, Mr. President, I submit the correct text
which I got from a song book. It is Number Schirach-95 of the
Schirach document book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In connection with the question of whether the Hitler Youth
intended a premilitary training of youth, I should like to put the
following additional questions. Did the physical and sport training
of youth apply only to the boys, Herr Von Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. Of course all young people received
physical training.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Also the girls?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Is it correct that your efforts directed toward the
physical training and physical strengthening of youth also applied
to the physically handicapped and to the blind and other young
people who from the very outset could not be used for military
purposes?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Very early in our work I included the blind
and deaf and the cripples in the Hitler Youth. I had a periodical
especially issued for the blind and had books made for them in
Braille. I believe that the Hitler Youth was the only organization
in Germany which took care of these people, except for special
organizations of the NSV (National Socialist Welfare Organization)
and so on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I ask, in connection with that, Mr. President, that
you take notice of Document Schirach-27 of the Schirach document
book. That is a long article entitled “Admission of Physically
Handicapped Young People in the Hitler Youth,” where the deaf,
dumb, and blind are especially mentioned and their training to
enable them to take up a professional occupation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I have refrained all day from making any objection,
but I think this examination has gone very far afield. We have
made no charge against this defendant with respect to the blind,
the deaf, the lame, and halt. He keeps going way back to the Boy
Scouts and we haven’t gotten to any of the relevant issues that are
between us and this defendant. At the present rate I fear we will
never get through.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we have listened to this somewhat
long account of the training of the Hitler Youth. Don’t you
think you can go on to something more specific now? We have got
a very fair conception, I think, of what the training of the Hitler
Youth was; and we have got all these documents before us.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I shall try, Mr. President, to proceed according to
your wishes so far as it is at all possible.
<span class='pageno' title='405' id='Page_405'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, is it correct that you personally intervened with Hitler
to prevent the re-establishment of cadet academies as institutions
for purely military training?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is correct. I prevented the re-establishment
of cadet academies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I come now to another chapter. The defendant
has been accused of wrecking the Protestant and Catholic youth
organizations. What can you say in answer to that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First, the following: I wanted, as I have
already explained, the unification of all our youth. I also wanted
to bring the Protestant organizations, which were not very large
numerically, and the numerically very large Catholic organizations
into the Hitler Youth, particularly because some of the organizations
did not limit themselves to religious matters but competed with
the Hitler Youth in physical training, hikes, camping, and so on.
In this I saw a danger to the idea of unity in German national
education, and above all I felt that among young people themselves
there was a very strong tendency toward the Hitler Youth. The
desertion from the confessional organizations is a fact. There were
also many clergymen who were of the opinion that the development
should perhaps take the following direction: All youth into the
Hitler Youth; the religious care of the youth through clergymen;
sports and political work through youth leaders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In 1933 or 1934—but I think it was as early as 1933—Reich
Bishop Müller and the Protestant Bishop Oberheidt approached me
on their own initiative and proposed that I incorporate the Protestant
youth organizations into the Hitler Youth. Of course I was
very happy about that proposal and accepted it. At that time I
had no idea that there was opposition to Reich Bishop Müller within
the Protestant Church. I found out about that only much later. I
believed that I was acting with the authority and in the name of the
Evangelical Church, and the other bishop who accompanied him
further strengthened this belief of mine. Even today I still believe
that with the voluntary incorporation of the Protestant youth into
the Youth State, Müller acted in accordance with the will of the
majority of the Protestant youth themselves; and in my later
activity as Youth Leader I frequently met former leaders from the
Protestant youth organizations, who had leading positions with me
and worked in my youth organization with great enthusiasm and
devotion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Through that incorporation of Protestant youth—I should like to
stress this—spiritual ministration to youth was not limited or
hindered in any way; there never was a restriction of church
services for youth in Germany, either then or later. Since Protestant
<span class='pageno' title='406' id='Page_406'></span>
youth had been incorporated on the basis of an agreement between
the Church and the Hitler Youth, there was practically only a dispute
about youth education between the Catholic Church and the
Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In May or June 1934 I asked personally to participate in the
negotiations for the Reich Concordat because I wanted to eliminate
entirely the differences between the Catholic Church and the Hitler
Youth. I considered an agreement in this field to be very important
and in fact I was allowed to participate in these negotiations which
took place in June ’34 in the Reich Ministry of the Interior under
the chairmanship of Reich Minister for the Interior Frick. On the
Catholic side Archbishop Gröber and Bishop Berning took part in
the negotiations; and at that time I personally proposed a formula
for co-operation, which met with the approval of the Catholic side,
and I believed that I had found the basis for agreement in this
sphere.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The conferences were unfortunately interrupted on the evening
of 29 June; and on 30 June ’34 we experienced the so-called “Röhm
Putsch,” and the negotiations were never resumed. That is not my
fault, and I bear no responsibility for that. Hitler simply did not
want to accept the consequences of the Concordat. I personally
desired to conclude that agreement, and I believe that the representatives
of the Church saw from these negotiations and from certain
later conferences with me that the difficulties did not originate with
me. At any rate Bishop Berning came to me, I believe in 1939. We
discussed current questions between the youth leadership and the
Church. I believe that he also got the impression at that time that
it was not I who wanted to make difficulties.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The difficulties arose at that time from the increasingly strong
influence of Martin Bormann, who tried to prevent absolutely any
kind of agreement between the Party offices and the Church or
between the youth leadership and the Church.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the course of the dispute about the leadership of confessional
youth organizations and their incorporation, animated public discussions
arose. I myself spoke at various meetings. Statements were
issued by the Church also, which according to the state of affairs,
were more or less sharp. But I did not make statements inimical to
religion in connection with that subject, nor did I at any time
during my life.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, is it correct that in 1937 you concluded
an agreement with the Church to the effect that the Hitler Youth
should, in principle, not be on duty on Sundays during church time,
so that the children could attend religious services, and furthermore,
that on account of this agreement you ran into considerable
difficulties?
<span class='pageno' title='407' id='Page_407'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Will you tell us very briefly about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe one can say that it was an
agreement with the Church. If I remember correctly, I issued a
decree based on various letters I had received from clergymen—which
to a very great extent took into account the wishes expressed
in these letters. I then issued that decree and I gather from many
affidavits which have been sent by youth leaders to me recently that
that decree was very carefully obeyed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Difficulties arose in the Party Chancellery on account of my
attitude. Bormann, of course, was an energetic enemy of such a
basic concession to the Church, and Hitler himself—I don’t know
whether it was in connection with this decree, but, at any rate, in
connection with the regulation of the dispute between the youth
leadership and the Church—also reprimanded me once.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have a small book here, entitled
<span class='it'>A Good Year 1944</span>, with the sub-title “Christmas Gift of the War
Welfare Service of Reich Leader Von Schirach.” I submit that book
as Document Number Schirach-84 to the Tribunal for judicial notice.
On Page 55 is a picture of the Madonna. On Page 54 is a Christian
poem written by the defendant, with the title “Bavarian Christmas
Crib.” On the lower half of Page 54 there is the famous “Wessobrunner
Prayer,” the oldest prayer in the German language, dating
from the eighth century.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, is it also correct that on account of the Christian
content of that book you had difficulties with Reichsleiter Bormann;
and if so, what were they?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. I had that Christmas gift
made for, I believe, 80,000 to 100,000 soldiers and sent to them at
the front as late as 1944. I did not hear anything directly from
Bormann, but he suddenly asked for 10 copies of that book; and I
was informed by people who were near the Führer in his headquarters
that he used that book in some way in order to incite
Hitler against me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should like to add that at all times of my life, at any rate
insofar as I have written poetry, I have expressed myself in the
same way as in this poem. Also in the collection of poems, <span class='it'>The Flag
of the Persecuted</span>, which I do not have here unfortunately but which
was distributed among the youth in a very large edition, where my
revolutionary poems can be found, there are poems of a Christian
content which, however, were not reprinted by the Party press in
the newspapers and therefore did not become so well-known as
my other verses. But I should like to express quite clearly that I
was an opponent of confessional youth organizations, and I wish to
<span class='pageno' title='408' id='Page_408'></span>
make it just as clear that I was not an opponent of the Christian
religions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Not an opponent?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you leave the Church?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In spite of many hints by Bormann, I never
left the Church.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: May I, Mr. President, ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of Documents Schirach-85 to 93, inclusive, of the
Schirach document book. All of these are documents from the
period when he was Reich Youth Leader and show his attitude
toward the Church.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I add something to that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: If you please.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as my religious attitude is concerned,
I always identified myself with the thoughts expressed in <span class='it'>Wilhelm
Meisters Wanderjahre</span> about religions in general and the importance
of the Christian religion in particular. I should like to say here that
in my work as an educator I was mistaken in holding the opinion
that positive Christianity existed outside of the Church.</p>

<p class='pindent'>However, I never made any anti-Christian statements; and I
should like to say here for the first time in public that in the closest
circles of the Hitler Youth I have always expressed a very unequivocal
belief in the person and teachings of Christ. Before educators
of the Adolf Hitler School—a fact which naturally was never
allowed to come to the knowledge of the Party Chancellery—I spoke
about Christ as the greatest leader in world history and of the
commandment to “Love thy neighbor” as a universal idea of our
culture. I believe that there are also several testimonials by youth
leaders about that in your possession, Mr. Attorney.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, I shall refer to that later. I should like to
begin a new chapter now. In 1940 you were dismissed as Reich
Youth Leader?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And you were succeeded by Axmann who has
already been mentioned. But you remained connected with youth
education through what office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Through the office of the Reichsleiter of Youth
Education.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And in addition to that you received another title,
I believe?
<span class='pageno' title='409' id='Page_409'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I became Deputy of the Führer for the
Inspection of the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was that only a title, or was that some kind of
office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was an office to the extent that the
Reichsleiter office was concerned with youth work in the Party
sector. The Youth Leader of the German Reich—that was Axmann
as my successor—also had a field of activity in the State, and I too
became competent for that by my appointment as inspector.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How did your dismissal as Reich Youth Leader
come about, and why were you called specifically to Vienna as
Gauleiter? What can you tell us about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: At the end of the French campaign, in which I
participated as an infantryman, I was in Lyon when a wireless
message from the Führer’s headquarters was received, and the chief
of my company told me that I had to report to the Führer’s headquarters.
I went there at once; and at the Führer’s headquarters,
which was at that time situated in the Black Forest, I saw the
Führer standing in the open speaking to Reich Foreign Minister
Von Ribbentrop. I waited a while, maybe a quarter of an hour or
20 minutes, until the conversation had ended and then reported at
once to Hitler and there, outside, before the Casino building where
later we all had our meal together, he told me the following in
about 10 minutes:</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should propose to him a successor for the leadership of the
youth. He intended for me to take over the Reich Gau Vienna. I at
once suggested my assistant, Axmann, who was not a man who
advocated physical or military training but was concerned with
social work among the youth, and that was most important to me.
He accepted this proposal...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we need not go through Axmann’s
qualifications, need we? Is it material to the Tribunal to know what
his successor was like?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Axmann? Axmann was successor as Reich Youth
Leader.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What I was asking you was whether it was
material for the Tribunal to know the qualities of Axmann. We
have nothing to do with that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Von Schirach, you can be more brief about
that point, can you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Hitler then said that I should keep my job as
Reich Leader of Youth Education and that I should assume at the
same time the office of the Inspector of Youth and that I should
<span class='pageno' title='410' id='Page_410'></span>
go to Vienna as the successor to Bürckel. In Vienna, especially in
the cultural field, serious difficulties had arisen; and therefore I was
to direct my attention to the case of the institutions of culture,
particularly of theaters, art galleries, libraries, and so forth; and
I was to be especially concerned about the working class. I raised
the objection that I could carry out that cultural work only if
independent of Goebbels, and Hitler promised at that time that this
independence would be fully safeguarded; but he did not keep that
promise later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And lastly he said that he was sending the Jewish population
away from Vienna, that he had already informed Himmler or
Heydrich—I do not remember exactly what he said—of his intentions,
or at least would inform them. Vienna had to become a German
city, and in that connection he even spoke of an evacuation
of the Czech population.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That concluded that conversation. I received no other instructions
for this office, and then we dined together as usual. I took
my leave then and went to Berlin to talk to my assistants.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Vienna was considered at that time, if I am
correctly informed, the most difficult Gau of the Reich; is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Vienna was by far the most difficult political
problem which we had among the Gaue.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Because—I learned the details only from
other persons in Berlin, after I had received my mission from
Hitler—in Vienna the population had sobered considerably after
the first wave of enthusiasm over the Anschluss had subsided. Herr
Bürckel, my predecessor, had brought many officials to Vienna from
the outside; and the German system of administration, which was
in no wise more practicable or efficient than the Austrian, was
introduced there. This resulted in a certain over-organization in the
administrative field, and Bürckel had started on a Church policy
which was more than unsatisfactory. Demonstrations took place
under his administration. On one occasion the palace of the archbishop
was damaged. Theaters and other places of culture were not
taken care of as they should have been. Vienna was experiencing a
feeling of great disillusionment. Before I got there I was informed
that if one spoke in the streetcars with a North-German accent,
the Viennese took an unfriendly attitude.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what duties did you have or what offices
did you hold in Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In Vienna I had the office of Reich Governor
(Reichsstatthalter), which included two administrations, the municipal
administration and the national administration. In addition,
<span class='pageno' title='411' id='Page_411'></span>
I was Reich Defense Commissioner for Wehrkreis XVII, but only
until 1942. In 1942, the Wehrkreis was subdivided, and each Gauleiter
of the Wehrkreis became his own Reich Defense Commissioner.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then you also were Gauleiter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I was also Gauleiter, the highest official
of the Party.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In other words, you represented city, state, and
Party, all at once—the highest authority of city, state, and Party in
Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. Now the situation was such in the administration
that there was an official representative to take charge of
national affairs, namely, the Regierungspräsident; for the municipal
administration there was another representative, the mayor; in the
Party, the Deputy Gauleiter in Vienna had the title of Gauleiter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should not like to belittle my responsibility for the Gau by
explaining that, and I want to protect the exceptionally efficient
Deputy Gauleiter who was there. I just want to say that in order
to clarify my position.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What really was your position as Reich Defense
Commissioner, Witness? Was that a military position, or what
was it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was not a military position at all. The
Reich Defense Commissioner was simply the head of the civil administration,
in contrast to the situation prevailing during the first
World War, where the head of the civil administration was assigned
to and subordinated to the commanding general; in this war the
Reich Defense Commissioner was co-ordinate with him, not subordinate.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The tasks of the Reich Defense Commissioner—at least, that is
how I saw my tasks—were at certain intervals, to co-ordinate the
most pressing problems of food economy, transportation—that is,
local and distant transportation, coal supplies, and price regulation
for the Gaue of Vienna, Upper Danube, and Lower Danube, all of
which belonged to Wehrkreis XVII.</p>

<p class='pindent'>There were several meetings for that purpose—I believe three
all together. In 1942 the reorganization which I previously mentioned
took place. Bormann carried his point against the Reich Marshal.
The Reich Marshal was of the opinion that the Reich Defense Commissioner
had to be Defense Commissioner for the entire Wehrkreis.
Bormann wanted each Gauleiter to be Defense Commissioner, and
so that led to the division. From 1942 on I was only Reich Commissioner
for Vienna.
<span class='pageno' title='412' id='Page_412'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, it seems that a decree was issued at that
time—will you please tell me when you were informed about it—namely,
a decree by Reichsleiter Bormann, that not more than two
Gauleiter could meet.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not a decree by Bormann; that was an
order by Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What were its salient points?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I must explain that briefly. Because of the
fact that the Reich Commissariat was subdivided, I had to meet from
time to time with the Reichsstatthalter of other provinces in order
to discuss the most important questions, especially concerning our
food economy. However, I believe it was in 1943, Dr. Ley came to
me in Vienna and brought me an official order from the Führer,
according to which it was considered illegal—that was the way he
expressed it—for more than two Gauleiter to meet for a conference.</p>

<p class='pindent'>At that time I looked at Dr. Ley speechless; and he said:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Yes, that does not concern you alone. There is still another
Gauleiter who has called a conference of more than two, and
that fact alone is already considered as virtual mutiny or
conspiracy.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, when you were in Vienna, were you
given a further mission which took up much of your time? Please
tell us briefly about that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had just started to work in Vienna when, in
October 1940, I received an order to appear at the Reich Chancellery.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Will you please be very brief.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And there Hitler personally gave me the
mission of carrying out the evacuation of all German youth from
areas endangered by aerial attack, and simultaneously to carry out
the evacuation of mothers and infants; and he said that that should
begin in Berlin and then gradually take in the entire Reich. He said
that education was of secondary importance now; the main thing
was to maintain the nervous energy of the youth and to preserve
life. However, I asked at once that I be given the possibility of
establishing an educational organization, and I did so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I do not wish to speak about details, but one of the demands,
which I made at once—this is important in connection with the
Indictment—was that there should be no difficulties placed in the
way of young people’s participation in church services. That was
promised to me, and it was expressed very clearly in my first directives
for the children’s evacuation. The youth leaders who were
active in this field of my organizational work will confirm this.
<span class='pageno' title='413' id='Page_413'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This evacuation of children to the country was a
very extensive task, was it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was the most difficult, and from a psychological
point of view, the most complicated work which I ever
carried out. I transferred millions of people in this way; I supplied
them with food, with education, with medical aid, and so on. Of
course that work took up my time fully or to a large extent only
during the first years. After that I had trained my assistants for
that kind of work.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Later, as I have heard from you, you tried from
time to time to report to Hitler about your successes and about
problems requiring decision. How often during the entire years of
the war were you admitted to discuss that important field of work
with Hitler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Mr. Attorney, I am afraid I have to correct
you. I never tried to report to Hitler about my successes, but only
about my problems.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Problems, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: About that entire program of evacuation of
children I could only report to him twice; the first time in 1940,
after I had got the whole program under way, and the second time
in 1941, when the evacuation had reached very large proportions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And about Vienna I could only report on very rare occasions,
and in 1943 the possibility of reporting ceased altogether with the
breach of relations which I will describe later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, during your period in Vienna you became
the Chairman of the Würzburg Bibliophile Society.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is an honorary office, the Würzburg
Bibliophile Convention had appointed me Chairman of the German
Bibliophile Society.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Your Honor, Schirach—Number Schirach-1 of the
document book makes reference to that matter, and I submit it as
a piece of evidence. It it an affidavit by an old anti-Fascist, Karl
Klingspor, an honorary member of the society, who gives valuable
information about the character of the Defendant Von Schirach.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And in addition, Herr Von Schirach, I believe you were the
Chairman of the Southeast Europe Society, is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In brief, what was the mission of that society?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It had as its purpose the improvement of trade
relations, economic relations, with the southeast. Its functions were
essentially in the field of research and representation.
<span class='pageno' title='414' id='Page_414'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what were your main Viennese activities?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My principal activities in Vienna were social
work and cultural work, as I have already explained before.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Social work and cultural work?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: These were the two poles which dominated
my entire political life.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I come now to the particular accusations which
have been made against you by the Prosecution concerning that
period in Vienna. Among other things you have been accused of
participating in the so-called slave-labor program, and I ask you to
state your position concerning that, and in that connection also to
deal with Directive Number 1 of the Plenipotentiary General for
the Allocation of Labor, of 6 April 1942, which was presented, I
believe, as Document 3352-PS. Please go ahead.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Maybe I would do best to start with the decree
by which Gauleiter were appointed Plenipotentiaries for the
Allocation of Labor under the Plenipotentiary General.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: 6 April 1942.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the way of documentary material that
decree contains no more than that the Gauleiter could make suggestions
and submit requests to the competent offices for the allocation
of labor. But they were held responsible—I do not know whether
by this decree or another one—for the supervision of the feeding
and quartering, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, of foreign workers. This feeding and
quartering, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, of foreign workers was—in my Gau and I
believe also in all other Gaue of the Reich—mainly in the hands of
the German Labor Front.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Gauobmann of the German Labor Front in Vienna reported
to me very frequently about the conditions among German workers
and foreign workers in the Gau. He often accompanied me on
inspection tours of industries; and from my own observations I can
describe my impressions here of the life of foreign workers in
Vienna as far as I could watch it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I well remember, for instance, my visit to a large soap factory
where I saw barracks in which Russian and French women were
living. They had better quarters there than many Viennese families
which lived six or eight people in the usual one-room apartments
with kitchen. I remember another inspection where I saw a billet
of Russian workers. It was clean and neat, and among the Russian
women who were there I noticed that they were gay, well-nourished,
and apparently satisfied. I know about the treatment of
Russian domestic workers from the circle of my acquaintances and
from the acquaintances of many assistants; and here, also, I have
<span class='pageno' title='415' id='Page_415'></span>
heard, and in part observed myself, that they were extremely well
treated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Let me say something in general about Vienna as a place for
foreign workers. For centuries foreign workers have worked in
Vienna. To bring foreign workers from the southeast to Vienna is
no problem at all. One likes to go to Vienna, just as one likes to
go to Paris. I have seen very many Frenchmen and French women
working in Vienna, and at times I spoke with them. I also talked
to French foremen in the factories. They lived as tenants somewhere
in the city, just like any other private person. One saw them in
the Prater. They spent their free time just as our own native
workers did.</p>

<p class='pindent'>During the time I was in Vienna, I built more factory kitchens
than there are in any other Gau in Germany. The foreign workers
frequented these kitchens just as much as the native workers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>About treatment at the hands of the population, I can only say
that the population of a city which has been accustomed for centuries
to work together with foreign elements, will spontaneously
treat any worker well who comes from the outside.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Really bad conditions were never reported to me. From time to
time it was reported that something was not going well here or
there. It was the duty of the Gauobmann of the Labor Front to
report that to me. Then I immediately issued a directive from my
desk by telephone to the regional food office or the quota office for
the supply of material, for kitchens or heating installations, or
whatever it was. At any rate, I tried within 24 or 48 hours to take
care of all complaints that came to me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>While we are on the subject I would like to give my impression
of the use of manpower in general. I am not responsible for the
importation of labor. I can only say that what I saw in the way of
directives and orders from the Plenipotentiary General, namely the
Codefendant Sauckel, always followed the line of humane, decent,
just, and clean treatment of the workers who were entrusted to
us. Sauckel literally flooded his offices with such directives.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I considered it my duty to state that in my testimony.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: These foreign workers, who were in the Gau
Vienna and for whom you do not consider yourself responsible,
were they employed in the armament industry or elsewhere?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: A large portion was employed in agriculture,
some in the supply industry. Whether there were some directly in
the armament industry I could not say. The armament industry was
not accessible to me in all its ramifications, even in my functions as
Gauleiter, because there were war production processes which were
kept secret even from the Reichsstatthalter.
<span class='pageno' title='416' id='Page_416'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, in connection with the subject of Jewish
forced labor, a letter was read, Document 3803-PS. It is, I believe,
a handwritten letter from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner to Blaschke.
Blaschke, I believe, was the second mayor of Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He was the mayor of Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This is a letter of 30 June 1944. In that letter
Kaltenbrunner informs Blaschke that he had directed that several
evacuation transports should be sent to Vienna-Strasshof. “There
are four transports,” it says in the letter, “with about 12,000 Jews,
which will arrive in the next few days.” So much about the letter.
Its further content is only of importance because of what it says in
the end—and I quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I beg you to arrange further details with the State Police
Office, Vienna, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Ebner, and SS
Obersturmbannführer Krumey, of the Special Action Command
Hungary, who is at present in Vienna.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Did you have anything to do with that matter, and if so what?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know of the correspondence between
the Codefendant Kaltenbrunner and the mayor of Vienna. To my
knowledge Camp Strasshof is not within Gau Vienna at all. It is in
an altogether different Gau. The designation, “Vienna-Strasshof,”
is, therefore, an error. The border runs in between the two.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And were you informed of the matter itself at
that time, or only here in the courtroom?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know of that matter only from this courtroom,
but I remember that mention was made about the use of
Jewish workers in connection with the building of the Southeast
Wall or fortifications. The Southeast Wall, however, was not in the
area of Reich Gau Vienna. It was a project in the area of Gau
Lower Danube, Lower Austria, or Styria. I had nothing to do with
the construction of the Southeast Wall; that was in the hands of
Dr. Jury, that is, the O. T....</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: O. T. is the Organization Todt?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: ...the Organization Todt. And in the other
part of the border it was in the hands of Dr. Uiberreither, the Gauleiter
of Styria, and his technical assistants.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So I can sum up your statement to mean that you
had nothing to do with these things because they were matters
which did not concern your Gau.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I cannot understand what connection
there should be with Gau Vienna. Whether the mayor intended to
divert some of these workers for special tasks in Vienna is not
known to me. I do not know about that matter.
<span class='pageno' title='417' id='Page_417'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the same connection, Witness, another document
has been submitted, 1948-PS, a file note of 7 November 1940.
That was a date on which you had already been Gauleiter in Vienna
for several months and it, too, concerns forced labor of the Jews who
were capable of work. That file note was written on stationery with
the heading “The Reichsstatthalter in Vienna,” and apparently the
note in question was written by a Dr. Fischer. Who is Dr. Fischer?
What did you, as Reichsstatthalter, have to do with that matter?
What do you know about it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First of all, Dr. Fischer is not known to me
personally. I do not want to dispute the possibility that he may
have been introduced to me once and that I do not remember him;
but I do not know who Dr. Fischer is. At any rate, he was not an
expert working in my central office. I assume that he may have
been an official, because his name appears in connection with
another document also. He was probably the personal consultant
of the Regierungspräsident. The note shows that this official used
my stationery, and he was entitled to do that. I believe several
thousand people in Vienna were entitled to use that stationery,
according to the usage of German offices.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On this note he has put down a telephone conversation with the
Gestapo from which it can be seen that the Reich Security Main
Office—that is Heydrich—was the office which decided, by internal
directives to the Gestapo, on the use of Jewish manpower.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Regierungspräsident wanted to know more about that; but
I believe one cannot draw the conclusion from this that I was informed
about cruelties committed by the Gestapo, as the Prosecution
has concluded. It is doubtful whether I was in Vienna at all at that
time. I want to remind you of my other tasks, which I have described
before.</p>

<p class='pindent'>However, if I was there, I certainly did not concern myself with
the work of cleaning up the streets. But I should like to say that
the variety of my tasks caused me to establish an organizational
structure which did not exist in other Gaue, namely, the Central
Office of the Reich Leader.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Perhaps you will tell us, before concluding for
today, approximately how many officials in Vienna were subordinated
to you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I guess it may have been about 5,000 officials
and employees.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Shall I continue, Mr. President? It is 5:00 o’clock.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned, until 24 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div><span class='pageno' title='418' id='Page_418'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH DAY</span><br/> Friday, 24 May 1946</h1></div>

<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Schirach resumed the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is counsel for the Defendant Bormann
present?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann):
Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would it be convenient to you to present
your documents on Tuesday at 10 o’clock?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, agreed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would it be convenient to the Prosecution?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Quite convenient, would it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, indeed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Your Honors, we left off yesterday with Document
Number 1948-PS. That, as you will recall, is a memorandum
by a certain Dr. Fischer about a telephone conversation he had
held with an official of the Secret State Police, Standartenführer
Huber, from Vienna, and refers to forced labor of Jewish youth.
Special mention is made of the employment of Jews in the removal
of ruined synagogues. In connection with this memorandum I should
like to put just one more question to the Defendant Schirach.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] When were these synagogues
destroyed in Vienna? Was it in your time and on your responsibility,
or at another time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The synagogues in Vienna were destroyed
2 years before I assumed office in Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I now proceed to the chapter on anti-Semitism
which—according to your admission yesterday—you
followed in your youth. I should like to know what your attitude
was, when you joined the Party and when you became an official
in the Party, toward a practical solution of this anti-Semitism?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: According to my opinion—in 1924-1925—Jews
were to be entirely excluded from the civil service. Their
<span class='pageno' title='419' id='Page_419'></span>
influence in economic life was to be limited. I believed that Jewish
influence in cultural life should be restricted. But for artists of
the rank of, for instance, Max Reinhardt, I still envisioned the
possibility of a free participation in this cultural life. That, I
believe, exactly reflects the opinion which I and my comrades held
on the solution of the “Jewish Problem” in 1924-1925 and in the
following years.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Later, when I was leading the high-school youth movement, I
put forward the demand for the so-called <span class='it'>Numerus clausus</span>. It was
my wish that the Jews should be allowed to study only on a proportional
basis commensurate to their percentage of the total population.
I believe one can realize from this demand for the <span class='it'>Numerus
clausus</span>, known to the entire generation of students in that period,
that I did not believe in a total exclusion of the Jews from artistic,
economic, and scientific activities.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have submitted a document, Document
Schirach-136, in the Schirach document book, which contains
statements by an official of the Reich Youth Leadership about the
treatment of Jewish youth as contrasted with Christian youth.
Do you know what attitude the Reich Youth Leadership had
adopted at that time toward the Jewish youth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that we are dealing with the decree
of the year 1936.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Autumn 1936?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Autumn 1936. According to that, Jewish
youth organizations were to exist under the official supervision of
the Reich Youth Leader, who controlled all the youth of Germany,
and Jewish youth would be able to carry out their own youth
education autonomously.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: It says in that decree, <span class='it'>inter alia</span>—I quote one
sentence only from Document Schirach-136 of the Schirach document
book:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Today in its youth, Judaism already assumes that special,
isolated position, free within its own boundaries, which at
some future date Judaism will occupy within the German
State and in the economy of Germany and which it has
already occupied to a great extent.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, at about the same time, or shortly before then, the
so-called Nuremberg Laws had been promulgated, those racial laws
which we have frequently heard mentioned here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Did you help pass these laws, and how did you personally judge
these laws?
<span class='pageno' title='420' id='Page_420'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had no part in the drafting of these laws.
In my room at the Hotel Deutscher Hof, here in Nuremberg, I was
surprised to find a slip of paper stating that there would be a
Reichstag meeting on the next day and that it would take place
in Nuremberg. At that Reichstag meeting, at which I was present,
the Nuremberg Laws were promulgated. I do not know to this
day how they were drafted. I assume that Hitler himself determined
their contents. I can tell you no more about them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Can you state on your oath, and with a clear
conscience, that before these laws were published you had not
known of the plan for such laws, although you had been Reich
Youth Leader and Reichsleiter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: After these laws had been promulgated in Nuremberg,
how did you personally envisage the further development
of the Jewish problem?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I must say, first of all, that we had, as a
matter of fact, not expected these laws at all. I believe that the
entire youth of the country at that time considered the Jewish
problem as solved, since in 1935 there could be no more question
of any Jewish influence. After these laws had been published we
were of the opinion that now, definitely, the last word had been
spoken on the Jewish problem.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Briefly, Witness, you are accused of having incited
and influenced the youth of the country. I therefore ask you: As
Reich Youth Leader did you incite youth to anti-Semitic excesses,
or did you, as Reich Youth Leader, and particularly at meetings
of the Hitler Youth, make any inflammatory anti-Semitic speeches?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not make any inflammatory anti-Semitic
speeches, since I attempted, both as Reich Youth Leader and youth
educator, not to add fuel to the fire; for neither in my books nor in
my speeches—with the exception of one speech in Vienna, to which
I shall refer later on and which was not made at the time when
I was Reich Youth Leader—have I made any inflammatory statements
of an anti-Semitic nature.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I will not make myself ridiculous by stating here that I was not
an anti-Semite; I was—although I never addressed myself to the
youth in that sense.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The office of the Reich Youth Leader published
an official monthly entitled <span class='it'>Will and Power, Leadership Publication
of the National Socialist Youth</span>. Excerpts from this official publication
have previously been submitted to the Tribunal in the
document book.
<span class='pageno' title='421' id='Page_421'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Now I would be interested to know: Is it true that certain Party
authorities repeatedly demanded from you that you publish a special
anti-Semitic issue of this official Youth Leadership publication
in order to show the youth of the country the path to follow in the
future, and what was your attitude with regard to that demand?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is true that the Reich Minister for Propaganda
repeatedly demanded of my editor-in-chief that such an anti-Semitic
issue should be published. On receiving the report of the
editor-in-chief I invariably refused to comply with this request. I
believe that the editor-in-chief has already signed a sworn affidavit
to that effect.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the question of anti-Semitism would also
include your attitude to <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, the paper issued by your
fellow-Defendant, Streicher. Did you distribute this anti-Semitic
paper <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> within your youth organization, and did you
in any way further its distribution?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> was not distributed within the
youth organization. I believe that with the sole exception of those
of the young people who lived in this Gau...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Gau Franken?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, Gau Franken—that the rest of the German
youth organization never read <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> at all. The paper
was definitely rejected by all the youth leaders—both boys and
girls—in my organization.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, Witness, I must point out to you that the
Prosecution have accused you of having given, on one occasion, an
introduction to this paper, this anti-Jewish paper <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. Do
you know about it, and what have you got to say on the matter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can say the following in this respect. I was
always in close collaboration with the press; in fact, I came from
the press myself. In my press office, as Reich Youth Leader, I gave
definite instructions that all requests from Gau papers for an introduction,
or something else of the kind from me should be granted
on principle. Therefore, whenever a Gau paper celebrated a jubilee—perhaps
the tenth or twentieth anniversary of its existence, or published
some special issue—then the experts in my press office would
run up a draft and, together with the considerable volume of evening
mail presented to me for my signature, these drafts and elaborations
would be submitted to me. In this way it might have happened that
I signed that introduction for <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> which, of course, was
the paper of the local Gau. Otherwise I have no recollection of the
episode.
<span class='pageno' title='422' id='Page_422'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Consequently you cannot remember whether you
drafted that short introduction yourself, or whether it was drafted
by one of your experts and presented to you for signature?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I definitely believe that I did not draft it
myself, because such short introductions—as already stated—were
always submitted to me. I wrote my newspaper articles myself but
never introductions of this description.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, since we have just mentioned the name
of Streicher, I would remind you of a very ugly picture book which
was submitted here by the Prosecution. Was that picture book
distributed among the youth with your consent, or do you know
anything else about it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course this book was not distributed among
the young people. It is quite out of the question that an office of
the HJ (Hitler Jugend) would have transmitted that book to the
youth. Besides, the picture books of the Stürmer Publishing Firm
are unknown to me. I am, of course, not competent to speak on
education in the schools, but I should also like to say on behalf of
education in the schools that I do not believe this picture book was
ever introduced into any school outside of this Gau. At any rate,
that book and similar writings of the Stürmer Publishing Firm were
not, as a rule, distributed among the young people and the youth
organizations. What I have already said when judging <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>
also holds good for these books—namely, that the leadership corps of
the Hitler Youth categorically rejected writings of this description.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have also experienced how the anti-Semitic
question actually developed and how it eventually resulted
in the well-known anti-Jewish pogroms of November 1938. Did you
yourself, in any way, participate in these anti-Jewish pogroms of
November 1938?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I personally did not participate in any way,
but I did participate in the Munich session...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Which session?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The session which was traditionally held on
9 November of each year in memory of those who had fallen on
9 November 1923. I did not take part in all the discussions of that
day. But I do remember a speech by Goebbels in connection with
the murder of Herr Vom Rath. That speech was definitely of an
inflammatory nature, and one was free to assume from this speech
that Goebbels intended to start some action. He is alleged—but that
I only discovered later—to have given detailed instructions for this
action directly from his hotel in Munich to the Reich Propaganda
Ministry. I was present at the Munich session, as was my colleague
Lauterbacher, my chief of staff, and we both rejected the action.
<span class='pageno' title='423' id='Page_423'></span>
The HJ, as the largest National Socialist organization, was not
employed at all in the anti-Jewish pogroms, of 9, 10, and 11 November
1938. I remember one incident where a youth leader, without
referring to my Berlin office and carried away by some local propaganda,
took part in a demonstration and was later called to account
by me for so doing. After 10 November I was again in Munich for
a few days and visited, <span class='it'>inter alia</span>, a few of the destroyed business
houses and villas as well. It made a terrible impression on me at
the time, and under that impression I instructed the entire Youth
Leadership, the regional leaders if I remember rightly—in other
words, all the highest responsible youth leaders—to come to Berlin
and there, in an address to these youth leaders, I described the incidents
of the 9 and 10 November as a disgrace to our culture. I also
referred to it as a criminal action. I believe that all the colleagues
present on that occasion will clearly remember how agitated I was
and that I told them that my organization, both now and in the
future, would never have anything to do with acts of this sort.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You previously mentioned one individual case
where an HJ leader, subordinate to you, participated in some action.
Did you know of other cases, in November 1938 and after, where
units of the HJ were factually supposed to have participated in the
anti-Jewish pogroms?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I know of no other cases. The only thing
I did hear was that here and there individual lads, or groups of
youths, were called out into the streets by local authorities which
were not of the HJ. In the majority of cases these lads were
promptly sent home again by the youth leaders. The organization
was never employed, and I attach great importance to the statement
that the youth organization, which included more members than
the Party itself with all its affiliated organizations, was never involved
in these incidents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you saw at least, from the incidents in
November 1938, that developments in Germany were taking a different
trend to the course you had expected—if we are to judge
by your previous description. How did you, after November 1938,
envisage the further solution of the Jewish problem?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: After the events of 1938 I realized that
Jewry’s one chance lay in a state-supported emigration; for in view
of Goebbels’ temper, it seemed probable to me that overnight
similar actions could arise from time to time, and under such conditions
of legal insecurity I could not see how the Jews could continue
living in Germany. That is one of the reasons why Hitler’s
idea of a closed Jewish settlement in the Polish Government General,
of which he told me at his headquarters in 1940, was clear to
<span class='pageno' title='424' id='Page_424'></span>
me. I thought that the Jews would be better off in a closed settlement
in Poland than in Germany or Austria, where they would
remain exposed to the whims of the Propaganda Minister who was
the mainstay of anti-Semitism in Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Is it true that you yourself, whenever you had a
chance of approaching Hitler, gave him your own positive suggestions
for settling the Jews in some neutral country, under humane
conditions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is not true.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Well?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like fully to elucidate this matter.
I mentioned yesterday how I had reported to Hitler and how he had
told me that the Viennese Jews would be sent to the Government
General. Before that, I had never thought of an emigration of the
Jews from Austria and Germany for resettlement in the Government
General. I had only thought of a Jewish emigration to countries
where the Jews wanted to go. But Hitler’s plan, as it then
existed—and I believe that at that time the idea of exterminating
the Jews had not yet entered his mind—this plan of resettlement
sounded perfectly reasonable to me—reasonable at that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But I believe that in 1942 you are supposed to
have tried, through the kind offices of your friend, Dr. Colin Ross,
to suggest to Hitler that the Jews from Hungary and the Balkan
States be allowed to emigrate to some neutral country, taking their
goods and chattels with them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was at a later date. I no longer remember
exactly when, but in any case it was after the occupation of
Hungary. Among the innumerable suggestions which I made to the
Führer and to the Minister for Foreign Affairs through Colin Ross,
was one to the effect that the entire Jewish population of Hungary
be transferred to the neutral countries. If the witness Steengracht
has stated here that this idea had been discussed in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and that it had emanated from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, then he probably spoke in good faith. The idea originated
in discussions held between Colin Ross and myself, and Ross
then put it down in the form of a memorandum. But—and this is
specially important—it was reported verbally to the Reich Minister
for Foreign Affairs who, in turn, informed Colin Ross, on the occasion
of a further visit, that the Führer had definitely turned the
suggestion down.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The emigration to neutral countries abroad?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, to neutral countries abroad.
<span class='pageno' title='425' id='Page_425'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The majority of the Viennese Jews, Witness, were—as
you yourself know—deported from Vienna. In 1940, when you
became Gauleiter in Vienna—or later on—did you ever receive a
directive from Hitler to the effect that you yourself should carry
out this deportation of the Jews from Vienna or that you should
participate in the deportation?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I never received any such directive. The only
directive which I received in connection with the deportation of the
Jewish population from Vienna was a question from Hitler asking
about the number of Jews living in Vienna at the time. That number,
which I had forgotten, was recalled to my memory by a document
put to me by the Prosecution. According to that document
I reported to Hitler that 60,000 Jews were then living in Vienna.
That figure probably comes from the registration office. In former
times about 190,000 Jews, all told, lived in Vienna. That, I believe,
was the highest figure reached. When I came to Vienna there were
still 60,000 Jews left. The deportation of the Jews was a measure
immediately directed, on orders from Hitler, or by Himmler; and
there existed in Vienna an office of the Reich Security Main Office,
or local branch office under Himmler-Heydrich, which carried out
these measures.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who was in charge of that office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The head of that office was—that I found out
now; I did not know his name at the time—a certain Brunner.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: An SS Sturmführer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: An SS Sturmführer, Dr. Brunner.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The one who, a few days ago, is supposed to have
been condemned to death? Did you know that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I heard it yesterday.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you have to issue any orders to this Brunner
who was an SS leader, or could you give him any kind of instructions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was entirely impossible for me to stop the
deportation of the Jews or to have any influence thereupon. Once,
as early as 1940, I told the chief of my Regional Food Supply Office
that he should see to it that departing Jewish people be provided
with sufficient food. Frequently, when Jews wrote to me requesting
to be exempted from deportation, I charged my adjutant or some
assistant to intervene with Brunner so that possibly an exception
might be made for these persons. More I could not do. But I have
to admit frankly, here and now, that I was of the opinion that this
deportation was really in the interests of Jewry, for the reasons
which I have already stated in connection with the events of 1938.
<span class='pageno' title='426' id='Page_426'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did the SS, which in Vienna too was charged with
the evacuation of the Jews, send continuous reports as to how and
to what extent this evacuation of the Jews was carried out?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I am, therefore, also not in a position to
state when the deportation of the Jews was concluded and whether
the entire 60,000 were dragged out of Vienna or if only a part of
them was carried off.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did not the newspapers in Vienna report anything
at all about these deportations of the Jews, about the extent of the
deportations and the abuses occasioned in this connection?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Nothing? But, Witness, I must put a document
to you which has been submitted by the Prosecution. It is Document
Number 3048-PS, an excerpt from the Viennese edition of the
<span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, on a speech which you, Witness, made on
15 September 1942 in Vienna, and in which occurs the sentence—I
quote from the newspaper:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Every Jew who operates in Europe is a danger to European
culture. If I were to be accused of having deported tens of
thousands of Jews from this city, once the European metropolis
of Jewry, to the Eastern ghetto, I would have to reply,
‘I see in that an active contribution to European culture.’ ”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Thus runs the quotation from your speech which otherwise contains
no anti-Semitic declarations on your part. Considering your
previous statements, Witness, I am compelled to ask you: Did you
make that speech, and how did you come to make it despite your
basic attitude which you have previously described to us?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First, I want to say that I did make that
speech. The quotation is correct. I said that. I must stand by what
I have said. Although the plan of the deportation of the Jews was
Hitler’s plan and I was not charged with its execution, I did utter
those words, which I now sincerely regret; but I must say that I
identified myself morally with that action only out of a feeling of
misplaced loyalty to the Führer. That I have done, and that cannot
be undone. If I am to explain how I came to do this, I can only
reply that at that time I was already “between the Devil and the
deep sea.” I believe it will also become clear from my later statements
that from a certain moment on I had Hitler against me, the
Party Chancellery against me, and very many members of the Party
itself against me. Constantly I heard from officials of the Party
Chancellery who expressed that to the Gauleiter of Vienna, and from
statements made in Hitler’s entourage that one was under the impression—and
that this could be clearly recognized from my attitude
and my actions—that I was no longer expressing myself publicly
<span class='pageno' title='427' id='Page_427'></span>
in the usual anti-Semitic manner or in other ways, either; and I
just have no excuse. But it may perhaps serve as an explanation,
that I was trying to extricate myself from this painful situation by
speaking in a manner which today I can no longer justify to myself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I should like to ask you, in this connection—you
have just spoken of a painful situation in which you found
yourself in Vienna. Is it true that Hitler himself, on various occasions,
reproached you personally and severely because your attitude
in Vienna had not been sufficiently energetic, that you had become
too slack and too yielding; that you should concern yourself more
with the interests of the Party, and that you should adopt far
stricter methods? And what, Witness, did you then do?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, I assume that you realize that you
are putting questions in the most leading form, that you are putting
questions which suggest the answer to the defendant, and such questions
cannot possibly carry—the answers to such questions cannot
possibly carry the weight which answers given to questions not in
their leading form would carry.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, did Hitler personally reproach you for
your behavior in Vienna, and what attitude did you adopt?</p>

<p class='pindent'>I believe that is not a suggestive question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it is. I should have thought it is a
leading question. He says he was in a very difficult situation. You
could ask him if he would explain what was the difficulty of the
situation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well. Then will you answer this question,
Witness?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Counsel for the defense, I could not, in any
case, have accepted the question in the form in which you previously
presented it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The difference between Hitler and myself arose primarily over
an art exhibition, and the breach between Hitler and myself in 1943
was in the beginning the result of differences of opinion over the
cultural policy. In 1943 I was ordered to the Berghof where Hitler,
in the presence of Bormann, criticized me violently on account of
my cultural work and literally said that I was leading the cultural
opposition against him in Germany. And further, in the course of
the conversation he said that I was mobilizing the spiritual forces
of Vienna and Austria and the spiritual forces of the young people
against him in cultural spheres. He said he knew it very well
indeed. He had read some of my speeches, primarily the Düsseldorf
speech; he had discovered that I had authorized in Weimar and in
Vienna art exhibitions of a decadent nature; and he offered me the
<span class='pageno' title='428' id='Page_428'></span>
alternative, either to end this kind of oppositional work immediately—then
for the time being everything could remain as in the
past—or he would stop all Government subsidies for Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This scene made a frightful impression on me, for it represented
to me a breach of Hitler’s promised word, since he had granted me
absolute freedom of action when he appointed me to the Vienna
mission. I then recognized that he nourished an icy hatred toward
me, and that behind these statements on cultural policies something
else was concealed. Whether he was dissatisfied in every detail with
the way I conducted my office in Vienna at the time, I do not know.
He rarely expressed himself directly about such matters. From his
entourage I learned only of occasional happenings.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I then—and that led to the complete and final break between
Hitler and myself—a few weeks after I had received this order, if
I may call it so, received a strange invitation for myself and my
wife to spend some time on the Berghof. At that time I innocently
believed that Hitler wished to bridge the gap between us and to let
me know, in one way or another, that he had gone too far. In any
case, at the end of a 3 days’ visit—I cut my stay short—I discovered
that this was a fundamental error on my part. Here I will limit
myself to a few points only. I had intended—and I also carried out
my intention—to mention at least three points during my visit. One
was the policy toward Russia, the second was the Jewish question,
and the third was Hitler’s attitude toward Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I must state, to begin with, that Bormann had issued a decree
addressed to me, and probably to all the other Gauleiters, prohibiting
any intervention on our part in the Jewish question. That is
to say, we could not intervene with Hitler in favor of any Jew or
half-Jew. That too was stated in the decree. I have to mention
this, since it makes matters clearer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On the first evening of my stay at the Berghof, on what appeared
to me a propitious occasion, I told Hitler that I was of the opinion
that a free and autonomous Ukraine would serve the Reich better
than a Ukraine ruled by the violence of Herr Koch. That was all
I said, nothing more, nothing less. Knowing Hitler as I did, it was
extremely difficult even to hazard such a remark. Hitler answered
comparatively quietly but with pronounced sharpness. On the same
evening, or possibly the next one, the Jewish question was broached
according to a plan I made with my wife. Since I was forbidden
to mention these things even in conversation, my wife gave the
Führer a description of an experience she had had in Holland. She
had witnessed one night, from the bedroom of her hotel, the deportation
of Jewish women by the Gestapo. We were both of the
opinion that this experience during her journey and the description
of it might possibly result in a change of Hitler’s attitude toward
<span class='pageno' title='429' id='Page_429'></span>
the entire Jewish question and in the treatment of the Jews. My
wife gave a very drastic description, a description such as we can
now read in the papers. Hitler was silent. All the other witnesses
to this conversation, including my own father-in-law, Professor
Hoffmann, were also silent. The silence was icy, and after a short
time Hitler merely said, “This is pure sentimentality.” That was all.
No further conversation took place that evening. Hitler retired
earlier than usual. I was under the impression that a perfectly
untenable situation had now arisen. Then the men of Hitler’s
entourage told my father-in-law that from now on I would have
to fear for my safety. I endeavored to get away from the Berghof
as quickly as possible without letting matters come to an open break,
but I did not succeed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then Goebbels arrived on the next evening and there, in my
presence and without my starting it, the subject of Vienna was
broached. I was naturally compelled to protest against the statements
which Goebbels at first made about the Viennese. Then the
Führer began with, I might say, incredible and unlimited hatred
to speak against the people of Vienna. I have to admit, here and
now, that even if the people of Vienna are cursing me today, I have
always felt very friendly toward them. I have felt closely attached
to those people. I will not say more than that Joseph Weinheber
was one of my closest friends. During that discussion, I, in accordance
with my duty and my feelings, spoke in favor of the people
under my authority in Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>At 4 o’clock in the morning, among other things, Hitler suddenly
said, something which I should now like to repeat for historical
reasons. He said, “Vienna should never have been admitted into
the Union of Greater Germany.” Hitler never loved Vienna. He
hated its people. I believe that he had a liking for the city because
he appreciated the architectural design of the buildings on the Ring.
But everybody who knows Vienna knows that the true Vienna is
architecturally Gothic, and that the buildings on the Ring are not
really representative.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I consider that this subject has little to
do with the Indictment—please adhere to the Indictment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I shall now conclude. I only want to say that
so total a break resulted from that discussion—or, rather explosion—of
Hitler’s that on that very night at about 0430 I took my leave
and left the Berghof a few hours later. Since then I had no further
conversations with Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I must now refer to something else in this connection. Reich
Marshal Göring, in the witness box, mentioned a letter of mine
which Hitler had shown him, and Herr Von Ribbentrop has stated
<span class='pageno' title='430' id='Page_430'></span>
here that he was present at a conversation during which Himmler
suggested to Hitler that I be indicted before the People’s Court,
which meant in reality that I should be hanged. I must add one
thing more: What Göring said about this letter is mainly true. I
wrote in quite a proper manner about family relations in that letter.
I also wrote one sentence to the effect that I considered war with
America a disaster.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When was that letter written?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 1943, shortly after my stay at the Berghof.
That statement contained nothing special, since Hitler even without...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He hasn’t given the date of his stay at the
Berghof yet.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: He has said 1943, Mr. President. He has just
said 1943.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There are 12 months in 1943.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe you ought to give us the month.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the conversation on the Berghof
was in the spring, and that the letter, though I cannot tell you precisely
when, was written in the summer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Summer of 1943?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, 1943; but I could not say precisely when
the letter was written. The letter was correct. It was written by
hand, and no secretary read it. It went by courier to the head of
the State.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: To Hitler personally?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: To Hitler. It is also possible that it was
addressed in care of Bormann. I cannot remember exactly. It
went by courier, and that letter contained nothing else but the
clarification required for replying to questions put to me in a circular
which Göring mentioned in his statement here. That letter
caused Hitler to have an absolute loathing for me; and at about
the same time a file was started against me in the Reich Security
Main Office. That was due to the fact that I had described in a
small circle of political leaders—of high-ranking political leaders—the
foreign political situation such as I saw it, as I was accustomed
to do from the days of my youth. One of these leaders was an SS
intelligence officer and reported what I said, and then the file was
started. The material was compiled in order to eventually bring me
to trial. That I was never brought to trial I owe solely and exclusively
to the circumstance that both in the Army and at home my
comrades from the Youth Leadership stood solidly behind me, and
any proceedings against me would have led to trouble. After 20 July
<span class='pageno' title='431' id='Page_431'></span>
1944 my situation became very precarious. My friends in the Army,
therefore, placed a company of hand-picked men at my disposal.
They were under the orders of the former adjutant of Generaloberst
Fromm. The company was directly subordinate to me. It
took over the protection of my person and remained with me to
the end.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was that company of the Wehrmacht, which you
have just mentioned, placed at your disposal in place of the police
protection previously afforded you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have to refer once more to your Vienna
speech of September 1942. In that speech you speak of the deportation
of tens of thousands of Jews to the Eastern ghetto. You did
not speak about the extermination or the murder of the Jews.
When did you discover that Hitler’s plan aimed at extermination
or destruction?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Counsel, if I at that time had known anything
about the destruction—that is the extermination of the Jews—I
would not be sitting here today. As far as I can recall, I heard
about an extermination of the Jews for the first time through the
following incident.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Dr. Ross came to see me...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Dr. Colin Ross came to Vienna in 1944 and
told me that he had received information, via the foreign press, that
mass murders of Jews had been perpetrated on a large scale in the
East. I then attempted to find out all I could. What I did discover
was that in the Warthegau executions of Jews were carried out in
gas vans. These shootings in the East...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, what was the Gau that he spoke
of? The Wart Gau?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Warthegau, My Lord.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Warthegau.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That is a Gau, a district on the Polish border.
That is an area in the east of Germany,—W-a-r-t-h-e-g-a-u—in the
west of Poland, near Silesia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Please, Witness, will you continue briefly:</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The executions, the shootings on Russian territory,
mentioned in the documents submitted in the course of the
cross-examination in the Kaltenbrunner case, were not known to
me at that time. But at a later date—it was before 1944—I heard
about shootings in the ghettos of the Russian area and connected
<span class='pageno' title='432' id='Page_432'></span>
this with developments on the front, since I thought of possible
armed uprisings in the ghettos. I knew nothing of the organized
annihilation which has been described to us in the Trial.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, if I have heard you correctly, you were
informed about these events for the first time in 1944 by your friend,
Dr. Colin Ross, who knew it from reports in the foreign papers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you still remember the month?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I cannot say.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In any case it would be in 1944?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That again I cannot say. But I believe I have
to explain something more about it. I asked myself what can one
do to prevent it? And I still ask myself, day after day, what did I
do to prevent it? I can only answer practically nothing, since from
1943 on I was politically dead. Beyond what I had attempted in
1943 on the Berghof, I could do nothing at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Nothing?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Nothing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I should in this connection like to ask you
a question of principle. You admitted yesterday that you had become
an anti-Semite—and that is according to your conception—in
your very early youth. You have, in the interim, heard the testimony
of Hoess, the Auschwitz commander, who informed us that
in that camp alone, I believe, 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 innocent people,
mostly Jews, had been done to death. What, today, does the name
of Auschwitz convey to you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is the greatest, the most devilish mass murder
known to history. But that murder was not committed by
Hoess; Hoess was merely the executioner. The murder was ordered
by Adolf Hitler, as is obvious from his last will and testament. The
will is genuine. I have held the photostat copy of that will in my
hands. He and Himmler jointly committed that crime which, for
all time, will be a stain in the annals of our history. It is a crime
which fills every German with shame.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The youth of Germany is guiltless. Our youth was anti-Semitically
inclined, but it did not call for the extermination of Jewry.
It neither realized nor imagined that Hitler had carried out this
extermination by the daily murder of thousands of innocent people.
The youth of Germany who, today, stand perplexed among the ruins
of their native land, knew nothing of these crimes, nor did they
desire them. They are innocent of all that Hitler has done to the
Jewish and to the German people.
<span class='pageno' title='433' id='Page_433'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>I should like to say the following in connection with Hoess’ case.
I have educated this generation in faith and loyalty to Hitler. The
Youth Organization which I built up bore his name. I believed that
I was serving a leader who would make our people and the youth
of our country great and happy and free. Millions of young people
believed this, together with me, and saw their ultimate ideal in
National Socialism. Many died for it. Before God, before the German
nation, and before my German people I alone bear the guilt of
having trained our young people for a man whom I for many long
years had considered unimpeachable, both as a leader and as the
head of the State, of creating for him a generation who saw him as
I did. The guilt is mine in that I educated the youth of Germany
for a man who murdered by the millions. I believed in this man,
that is all I can say for my excuse and for the characterization of
my attitude. This is my own—my own personal guilt. I was responsible
for the youth of the country. I was placed in authority over
the young people, and the guilt is mine alone. The younger generation
is guiltless. It grew up in an anti-Semitic state, ruled by
anti-Semitic laws. Our youth was bound by these laws and saw
nothing criminal in racial politics. But if anti-Semitism and racial
laws could lead to an Auschwitz, then Auschwitz must mark the
end of racial politics and the death of anti-Semitism. Hitler is dead.
I never betrayed him; I never tried to overthrow him; I remained
true to my oath as an officer, a youth leader, and an official. I was
no blind collaborator of his; neither was I an opportunist. I was a
convinced National Socialist from my earliest days—as such, I was
also an anti-Semite. Hitler’s racial policy was a crime which led to
disaster for 5,000,000 Jews and for all the Germans. The younger
generation bears no guilt. But he who, after Auschwitz, still clings
to racial politics has rendered himself guilty.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is what I consider my duty to state in connection with the
Hoess case.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, is this perhaps a convenient moment
to break off?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How long is the defendant’s examination
going to continue, Dr. Sauter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe it will take about 1 hour.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe it will take about one more hour—an
hour at the most. Did you hear me, Mr. President?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I hear you now. We have been hearing
you for a very long time now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='434' id='Page_434'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, after this declaration by the
Defendant Von Schirach I would gladly dispense with all further
questions, but the Prosecution have brought definite accusations
against this defendant and I fear that, if he does not briefly voice
an opinion on the subject, these accusations would be considered as
tacitly accepted. I shall try to be as brief as possible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, you have just described the impressions you had
gathered from the proceedings of the Tribunal. Have you yourself
ever visited a concentration camp?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When, and for what reason?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As the witness Höllriegel has testified before
this Tribunal, I visited Mauthausen Concentration Camp in 1942.
The testimony given by another witness, Marsalek, to the effect
that this visit took place in 1944, is incorrect. I also mentioned it
when I was interned, in June 1945 and in the course of my preliminary
interrogation in Nuremberg.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Prior to Höllriegel’s testimony?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through “interned in
June 1940.” Is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: 1945, Herr Von Schirach, not 1940?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I went into voluntary internment in 1945.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then you can confidently state that you visited
Mauthausen in 1942?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: For what reason and how...</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: There had been a session...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Just one moment...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What does he mean by “voluntary internment”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Von Schirach was, at that time,
living in the Tyrol under an assumed name, and in the place where
he lived—perhaps Defendant Schirach can himself, but very briefly,
tell us how this voluntary internment came about.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was then still at liberty and I sent a letter,
through my adjutant, to the local American commander, stating that
I should like to surrender voluntarily in order to be tried by an
Allied court. That was in June 1945. The CIC officer who later discovered
where I lived told me that I might have stayed there a good
<span class='pageno' title='435' id='Page_435'></span>
time longer. I personally am convinced that I could have remained
in hiding there, and elsewhere, for years—as long as I wished.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Von Schirach, we shall now revert to your
visit to Mauthausen, which you said with certainty and under oath
took place in 1942. Is this right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe the date given by witness Höllriegel
is correct. I quite definitely know that the date given by Marsalek
is not correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then it was not in 1944?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Probably 1942. I therefore confirm Höllriegel’s
testimony. There was a meeting at Linz at which various departments
of the Ostmark participated. There were conferences on
economic or agrarian problems, and in the late afternoon we went
to Mauthausen Concentration Camp at the request of Gauleiter
Eigruber. At the time I was rather surprised that the Gauleiter was
even in a position to invite us there. I assumed that he had previously
been in touch with the SS offices, and that the reason for
Eigruber’s invitation was that he wished to erect a rifle factory or
something of the kind there. At any rate, though I can no longer
remember exactly, it was somehow connected with the production
of the Steyr Works.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who showed you about and what did you see?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: We were shown about by the camp commandant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Whose name was?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: His name—as has already been mentioned
here—was Ziereis, or something of the kind.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: SS leader?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: SS Camp Commandant. And I should now
like to give you my first impressions. The camp area was very
large. I immediately asked how many internees there were. I
believe I was told 15,000 or 20,000. At any rate, the figure varied
between 15,000 and 20,000. I asked what kind of internees were
imprisoned there and received the reply I was always given whenever
I inquired about concentration camps—namely, that two-thirds
of the inmates were dangerous criminals collected from the prisons
and penitentiaries and brought to work in the camp; that the
remaining third was allegedly composed of political prisoners and
people guilty of high treason and betrayal of their country, who, it
is a fact, are treated with exceptional severity in wartime.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you, in this camp, convince yourself as to the
nature of the treatment meted out to the prisoners, accommodations,
the food situation, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>?
<span class='pageno' title='436' id='Page_436'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I witnessed one food distribution and gained
the impression that, for camp conditions, the food ration was both
normal and adequate. I then visited the large quarry, once famous
and now notorious, where the construction stone for Vienna had
been quarried for centuries. There was no work going on at the
quarry since the working day had come to an end, but I did, however,
visit the works where the stone was cut. I saw a building
with an exceptionally well-equipped dental clinic. This clinic was
shown to me because I had questioned Ziereis about the medical
assistance afforded in the camp. I would add that, during this visit,
I asked in general the same questions which I had been used to
ask during all my visits to the camps of the youth organizations—that
is, questions pertaining to food, medical aid, the number
of people in the camp, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I was then taken to a large room in which music was being
played by the prisoners. They had gathered together quite a large
symphony orchestra, and I was told that on holiday evenings they
could amuse themselves, each man according to his own tastes. In
this case, for instance, the prisoners who wished to make music
assembled in that room. A tenor was singing on that occasion—I
remember that particularly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I then inquired about the mortality rate and was shown a room
with three corpses in it. I cannot tell you here and now, under
oath, whether I saw any crematorium or not. Marsalek has testified
to that effect. I would not, however, have been surprised if there
had been a crematorium or a cemetery in so large a place, so far
removed from the city. That would be a matter of course.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Von Schirach, during this official visit under
the guidance of Camp Commandant Ziereis, did you discover anything
at all about any ill-treatment, or atrocities, or of the tortures
which were allegedly inflicted in the camp? You can answer the
question briefly—possibly with “yes” or “no.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Had that been the case, I would of course
have endeavored to do something about it. But I was under the
impression that everything was in order. I looked at the inmates,
for instance, and I remember seeing, among others, the famous
middle-distance runner Peltzer, who was known as a sexual pervert.
He had been punished because he had, on innumerable occasions,
freely committed sexual offences against youths in his charge
in a country school.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I asked Ziereis, “How does one ever get out of these concentration
camps? Do you also release people continuously?” In reply
he had four or five inmates brought to me who, according, to him,
were to be released the very next day. He asked them in my
<span class='pageno' title='437' id='Page_437'></span>
presence, “Have you packed everything, and have you prepared
everything for your release?”—to which, beaming with joy, they
answered, “Yes.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, can you remember whether on this occasion
you also asked Camp Commander Ziereis whether political prisoners
from your Vienna district—that is, from the city of Vienna—were
interned in the camp? And did you then have a group of political
prisoners from Vienna brought before you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: You have already, Counsel, put this question
to me during an interview, and I can only tell you the following
under oath: I cannot remember, but you may take it for granted
that, on an occasion of this kind, I would certainly ask after prisoners
from my own Gau. But I cannot remember. Herr Marsalek
mentioned it in his testimony, and I consider it probable.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should, in connection with this visit, like to add the following:
I have always been rather hampered in my recollections of Mauthausen...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What hampered you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: After May 1945 I heard innumerable radio
reports on Mauthausen and other concentration camps, and I read
everything I could lay my hands on in the way of written reports
about Mauthausen—everything that appeared in the press—and I
always pondered on the question, “Did you see anything there which
might have pointed to a mass destruction of human beings?” I was,
for instance, reading the other day about running belts for the
conveyance of corpses. I did not see them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I must add that I also visited Dachau; I must not forget that.
In 1935, together with the entire Party leadership group, I paid a
visit to Dachau from Munich. This visit was a result of the objections
against existing preventive custody measures expressed by certain
political leaders to the Deputy of the Führer Hess who, in
turn, passed these objections on to Himmler who subsequently sent
out an invitation to inspect Dachau. I believe that there were, at
that time, 800 or 1,000 internees at Dachau.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I did not participate in the entire official visit for I was conversing
with some of the Gauleiter who were being shown about
the camp. I saw quite excellent living quarters at Dachau and,
because the subject interested me particularly, I was shown the
building which housed the camp library. I saw that there were also
good medical facilities. Then—and I believe this fact is worthy of
mention—after the visit I spoke with many Gau- and Reichsleiter
about the impression they had formed of Dachau. All impressions
gained were to the effect that all doubts as to Himmler’s preventive
custody measures were definitely dispersed, and everybody said that
<span class='pageno' title='438' id='Page_438'></span>
the internees in the camp were, on the whole, better accommodated
than they would have been in a state prison. Such was my impression
of Dachau in 1935, and I must say that ever since that visit my
mind was far more at ease regarding conditions in the concentration
camps. In conclusion, I feel I must add the following:</p>

<p class='pindent'>Up to the moment of the final collapse I firmly believed that we
had 20,000 people in the Mauthausen Camp, 10,000 at Oranienburg
and Dachau—two more large camps whose existence was known to
me and one of which I had visited—and possibly 10,000 more at
Buchenwald, near Weimar, a camp I knew by name but which I had
never visited. I therefore concluded that we had roughly 50,000
people in the German camps, of which I firmly believed that two-thirds
were habitual criminals, convicts, and sexual perverts, and
one-third consisted of political prisoners. And I had arrived at this
conclusion primarily because I myself have never sent a single
soul to the concentration camps and nourished the illusion that
others had acted as I did. I could not even imagine, when I heard
of it—immediately after the collapse—that hundreds of thousands
of people in Germany were considered political offenders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>There is something else to be said on the whole question of the
concentration camps. The poet Hans Carossa has deposed an affidavit
for me, and this affidavit contains a passage about a publisher
whom I had liberated from a concentration camp. I wish to
mention this because it is one of many typical cases where one
exerted one’s entire influence to have a man freed from a concentration
camp, but then he never tells you afterwards how he fared
in the camp. In the course of the years, I have received many
letters from people having relatives in the concentration camps.
By establishing, in Vienna, a fixed day on which audience was
granted to anybody from the population who wished to speak to
me, I was able to talk to thousands of people from every class and
standing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On one such occasion I was approached by someone who requested
me personally to free some friend or relative in a concentration
camp. In cases like that I usually wrote a letter to the
Reich Security Main Office—at first to Herr Heydrich and later to
Herr Kaltenbrunner—and after some time I would be informed
that the internee in question had or had not been released, according
to the gravity of the charges brought against him. But the
internees released never told me their experiences in the camp.
One never saw anybody who had been ill-treated in the camps, and
that is why I myself, and many others in Germany with me, was
never able to visualize conditions in the concentration camps at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, this affidavit of the poet Hans
Carossa, just mentioned by the defendant, is Document Number
<span class='pageno' title='439' id='Page_439'></span>
Schirach 3(a). I repeat, Schirach 3(a) of the Schirach document book.
It is a sworn affidavit by the poet Carossa, and I ask the Tribunal
to put the entire contents of the document into the evidence. In the
last paragraph, mention is made of the case about which the defendant
has just been speaking—that is, the liberation of a publisher
named Suhrkamp from a concentration camp.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the page of it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Page 25 of the document book, Document Number
Schirach 3(a)—Hans Carossa. The remainder of this document deals
with the humane impression Dr. Carossa received of the defendant,
and with Defendant Von Schirach’s solicitude for the victims of
political persecution.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, how many concentration camps did you know anything
about?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have just enumerated them: Oranienburg,
Dachau, Buchenwald, and Mauthausen.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was there a concentration camp in your own Gau?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In connection with this entire group of questions
on the treatment of the Jews, I turn to orders allegedly issued in
your presence to the camp commandant of Mauthausen in March
1945. It is Document Number 3870-PS, submitted by the Prosecution.
According to this document, Himmler in March 1945 is
supposed to have issued a directive to the effect that the Jews
from the Southeast Wall were to be sent on foot to Mauthausen.
Did you have anything at all to do with this?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can tell you exactly from memory what
Himmler said at that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Himmler came to Vienna towards the middle, or the end of
March, to talk to the Commander of Army Group South. On this
occasion—the Commander of Army Group South was, of course,
not stationed in Vienna, he had ordered all the Reichsstatthalter
of the Ostmark up to Vienna and granted them full authority to
enforce martial law in the future, since Vienna and some of the
other Ostmark Gaue had by that time become almost front-line
zones. At this conference Himmler told his adjutant to call Ziereis
in, while the papers for full powers were being typed in the next
room. That is how I came to meet Ziereis for the second time in
my life.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And now Himmler did not, as Marsalek said, tell Ziereis that
the Jews were to be marched on foot from the Southeast Wall to
Mauthausen, but he did say something else which surprised me
enormously. He said:
<span class='pageno' title='440' id='Page_440'></span></p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I want the Jews now employed in industry to be taken by
boat, or by bus if possible, under the most favorable food
conditions and with medical care, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, to Linz or Mauthausen.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I do not quite remember whether he said they should be taken
to Mauthausen, but he also said to Ziereis:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Please take care of these Jews and treat them well; they are
my most valuable assets.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>From this declaration I assumed, in the very beginning—it was
my very first, fleeting impression—that Himmler wished to deceive
me in some way or another, and then it became clear to me that
with these instructions he was following certain foreign political
intentions, in the last moments of the war, in emphasizing the excellent
treatment of the Jews.</p>

<p class='pindent'>What Marsalek therefore said about making them go on foot
is not correct. As I have already mentioned, Himmler, under all
circumstances, wanted the best possible treatment to be given to
the Jews. I gained the impression—and later on it was confirmed
by other things we heard—that he wished, at the last minute, to
somehow redeem himself with this treatment of the Jews.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That was the end of March 1945?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was the end of March 1945, on the
occasion when authority to apply martial law was granted to the
Statthalter of the Ostmark.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Therefore, immediately before the collapse?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In connection with your activities in Vienna there
is also an accusation, Witness, brought against you by the Prosecution,
to the effect that you participated in the persecution of the
Church. This accusation is supported exclusively as far as I can
see by Document Number R-146. I repeat, R-146, which has already
been submitted by the Prosecution.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This, Witness, is a letter addressed by the witness, Dr. Lammers,
who has been heard before the Tribunal, to the Reich Minister
of the Interior, dated 14 March 1941, and further, a circular from
Bormann, addressed to all the Gauleiter, dated 20 March 1941.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should like to hear your comments on both of these letters,
especially since Dr. Lammers’ letter speaks of property belonging
to enemies of the people and the state, whereas in Bormann’s
circular of 20 March 1941 mention is made of the confiscation of
Church property—monastic property—<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. Do you know what
led to these letters, and what part did you yourself play in the
matter?
<span class='pageno' title='441' id='Page_441'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The document written by Dr. Lammers is
correct. Bormann’s covering letter referred to Church property;
I referred to property belonging to enemies of the people and the
State, for that was a technical expression at the time. I should
like to mention in this matter that when I came to Vienna in 1940
the confiscation of such property was already in full swing; an
argument had arisen on the subject between the Gauleiter and the
Reich Minister for Finance. The Reich Minister for Finance wanted
the confiscated property taken over by the Reich, while I considered
that this property should remain fundamentally the possession
of the Gaue.</p>

<p class='pindent'>So far as I can remember, I was involved in this question only
through the following confiscations: Prince Schwarzenberg possessed
property, the greater part of which lay in the region of the
Upper Danube; the smaller part was the famous Vienna Palace. Now
this Prince Schwarzenberg had refused, in the presence of some German
consul general, or consul abroad, to return to Germany and serve
in the Army. Thereupon his property was confiscated. In the
interest of the Reich I endeavored to maintain this property for
the Vienna Reich Gau and to prevent it from passing over to the
Reich. I have no files before me, so I cannot from memory give
you any information about other, similar actions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am not responsible for confiscations in the other Austrian
Gaue. But I may state one thing here—namely, that I put an end
to all confiscations throughout the entire Reich. When, through an
intermediary, women from an Austrian convent appealed to me for
help, I asked my father-in-law to act behind Bormann’s back and
explain to Hitler the disastrous political effects which these confiscations
would have and to beg him to issue a direct order for their
suppression. This was achieved, and when the order was put
through, Bormann turned against my father-in-law as well. From
then on I never had any further opportunity to bring this question
to the Führer’s notice.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have not, so far, quite explained
your attitude toward Dr. Lammers’ letter of 14 March 1941. To
refresh your memory I should like to read out the first sentence
of that letter. This letter of Lammers’ dated 14 March 1941, Document
Number R-146, states, and I quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Von Schirach, together
with Dr. Jury and Eigruber, has recently complained to
the Führer that the Reich Minister for Finance is still of
the opinion that the seizure of property belonging to enemies
of the state and people should be effected in favor of the
Reich, and not in favor of the Reich Gau.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Thus runs the quotation.
<span class='pageno' title='442' id='Page_442'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>And because of this incident the Prosecution have accused you
of participating in the persecution of the Church in Vienna. I
must request you to tell us what you really did do in the matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Well, the Church in Vienna had actually been
persecuted under my predecessor, Bürckel, and this can be proved.
I mentioned yesterday the demonstrations before the Archbishop’s
Palace. But from the day of my arrival in Vienna, anti-Church
demonstrations in the nature of a political agitation no longer took
place. Immediately upon my arrival I gathered all the political
officials and all my other colleagues of the Gau and demanded that
they should never, either in writing or by word of mouth, express
anything likely to offend the religious sentiments of other people.
I believe that this is a fact which was gratefully noted by the entire
population of Vienna. From that day on there were no further
actions against the Church. Just how much Church property,
though, was called in in compliance with the law for special war
contributions, a law which likewise applied to other property—I
cannot tell you without documentary evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we can see from this document that you
must have spoken on the subject to Hitler personally...</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: ...because it states that the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter
Von Schirach complained to Hitler on the subject. You have
not said anything to us about that so far.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I myself, during a visit by Hitler to
Vienna where he signed a southeast pact, told him I was of the
opinion that the property confiscated belonged to the Gaue and
not to the Reich. That was my point of view and one which I
believed to be entirely correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Indictment further accuses you of
having had some kind of connection with the SS, thereby promoting
the SS, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. Were you yourself ever a member of the SS?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Himmler, the leader of the SS, have any
influence over the youth organizations and over the education of
the young people?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were the replacements in the SS, especially in
the SS Leadership Corps, recruited from the HJ, and if so, why?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The replacements in all the leadership corps
in Germany were recruited from the youth. Our youth organization
was a state institution. You now are probably referring to an
agreement which I had with Himmler on the patrol services?
<span class='pageno' title='443' id='Page_443'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, that too plays a part in this connection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Agreements of that sort...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Just one more moment, Herr Von Schirach.
This agreement is entered in the documents of the Prosecution as
Number 2396-PS. I repeat 2396-PS, in which a special statement
occurs—and I should appreciate your comments on the subject—to
the effect that the SS received their replacements from the patrol
service of the HJ, allegedly by an agreement of October 1938.
Please tell us about it and explain to us what actually was this
patrol service.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The patrol service was one of the special
units of the HJ which I forgot to mention yesterday. The patrol
service was a youth service for keeping order. It consisted of outstandingly
decent lads who had no police duties—I now refer to
documentary reports which I procured—but who had to supervise
the general behavior of the young people, examine their uniforms,
control the visits of the boys to the taverns; and it was their duty
to inspect the HJ hostels for cleanliness and neatness, to supervise
the hiking expeditions of the young people and the youth hostelries
in the country. They stood guard and were on order duty at mass
meetings and demonstrations. They watched over encampments
and accompanied the convoys. They were employed in the search
for youths who were lost. They gave advice to traveling youth,
attended to station service, were supposed to protect young people
from criminal elements, and, above all, to protect national property—that
is, woods, fields, for instance—and to see that they were
safe from fires, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Since Himmler might make trouble for this section of the youth
organization, I was interested in having the Police recognize my
patrol service; for in my idea of the State youth as a youth state,
the Police should not be employed against the youth, but these
young people should keep order among themselves. That this principle
was a sound one can be judged from the immense decline in
juvenile delinquency from 1933 up to the outbreak of the war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness...</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: One moment, I have not yet finished. After
this agreement...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Sauter, we have heard enough
about this unit. The whole point of the document was that they
were used for recruiting for the SS, wasn’t it? That is the complaint
of the Prosecution.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, the patrol service...
<span class='pageno' title='444' id='Page_444'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have heard, at considerable length the
description of what they did in the way of the protection of the
youth. Surely we have heard enough about that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, these so-called special units were
specially mentioned by the Prosecution as a means for preparation
for war—that is, as a means for the military training of the young
people. In this connection all these special units were mentioned,
and therefore we considered it necessary that the defendant inform
you what this patrol service really was. But I can, Mr. President,
set this topic aside immediately.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have heard what they were at some
considerable length.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, from which departments did the SS mainly recruit
its leader replacements?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In order to assure its leader replacements,
the SS founded its own training schools which were entirely outside
my influence. They were the so-called National Socialist Training
Institutes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In connection with the SS, the Prosecution, Witness,
mentioned a further agreement between you and Reichsführer
SS Himmler, an agreement of December 1938, submitted as
Document Number 2567-PS, the so-called “Landdienst” of the HJ.
Why was this agreement concluded with the Reichsführer SS?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is very hard to give a brief answer. The
Reichsführer SS was a farmer with an agronomical degree. In
his student days he had belonged to the so-called “Artaman Movement,”
whose program it was to prevent the flight from the land,
and he was particularly keen to collaborate within the SS with the
farm labor service groups of the HJ who were doing the same work
as the “Artaman” groups in the past.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In conclusion, I should like to say about the “Landdienst” and
the patrol service, that no coercion was ever brought to bear on
the young people to enter the SS. Any lad from the patrol service
was, of course, free to become a member of the SA or of the
NSKK—and frequently did so—or else become a political leader
just like any other boy from the farm labor service or the Hitler
Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Indictment states, <span class='it'>inter alia</span>, that
a directive was addressed to the political leaders demanding that
the Hitler Youth Leaders—that is, the leaders subordinate to you—be
employed on their staffs. What can you say to that?
<span class='pageno' title='445' id='Page_445'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can only say in reply that this is one of
many attempts by the Party Chancellery to bring the Youth
Leadership into the political leadership. The practical result of the
directive was that a number of youth leaders were given insignificant
duties as adjutants. They complained to me, and I withdrew
them from these posts. It is a historical fact that in Germany
there was no real flow of people from the youth organization
into the political leadership. I can personally name those
youth leaders who came into the political leadership, there were
so few of them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Soviet Prosecution have submitted
a document, Document Number USSR-6, which is a report from the
Lemberg Commission. Herein the following fact is mentioned. A
French woman, Ida Vasseau, the head of an asylum for old people
in Lemberg, testified in writing—I am only quoting the gist of
the affidavit—that ghetto children were handed over as presents
to the Hitler Youth and that these children were then used as
living targets by the HJ for their drill practice. In all the time
that you were active in the Reich Youth Leadership, did you
ever hear of such misdemeanors or excesses?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. We are dealing here with the first and,
so far, the only accusation of crimes committed by the HJ which
has been brought to my notice. There were no HJ commandos,
either in the East or in the West, capable of committing such
crimes. I consider the statements in this affidavit as absolutely
untrue, and that is all I can say on the matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, in the course of his examination your
fellow-Defendant, Dr. Schacht, mentioned that a suggestion had
been made in his time to Mr. Eden, to divest the SS, the SA, and
the HJ of their military character if the other powers would consent
to disarm. What do you know of such proposals or negotiations?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know of no such offer, as far as the Hitler
Youth is concerned. I consider it entirely out of the question that
any such offer could have been received by Mr. Eden regarding
the HJ; for Hitler himself did not consider the HJ as a military
or even a semimilitary organization. The disarming of the HJ
could factually never have taken place since the only weapon carried
by the Hitler Youth was the camping knife, the equivalent
of a Boy Scout’s bowie knife of the Jungvolk Pimpfe (boys of 10-14
years of age).</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution further charge that you,
in 1933, concluded an agreement with the VDA—an abbreviation
for the “Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland.” Is that true?
And what was your intention in concluding this agreement?
<span class='pageno' title='446' id='Page_446'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is true. I do not wish to express an
opinion on the aims and objects of the VDA. I believe that counsel
for the Defendant Frick has already done so. I refer to these statements
and merely state that it was my perfectly natural wish to
incorporate in the HJ the numerically powerful group of lads
belonging to the VDA. The majority of these youths, moreover,
had graduated from the public schools, and it was my second
intention to place some of my collaborators on the board of the
VDA so as to be currently informed about the young people abroad.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution further accuse you of having
founded the so-called Adolf Hitler Schools where the training of
young leaders for the National Socialist State and for the Party
was carried out. What have you to say to this accusation?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: There is a lot that I could say about that
accusation, but I shall limit myself to essential remarks only.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Adolf Hitler Schools were founded as scholastic units of the
HJ. They were founded with the means which Dr. Ley placed
at my disposal when I told him of my plans for the training I had
envisaged. These schools were not intended to train leaders for the
Party exclusively but served to prepare the youth for all the
professions. I myself often talked to these boys on their graduation
and I always told them “You can choose any profession
you like. Your training in this school carries no obligation, either
moral or otherwise, to become a political leader.” <span class='it'>De facto</span>, relatively
few political leaders emerged from the Adolf Hitler Schools.
Very many of the boys became doctors, officials, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. I
cannot quote any figures from memory, but the communications I
have received from the young people, including statements from
teachers in the Adolf Hitler Schools, show their attitude towards
this point of the Indictment. And I should like to ask that at
least 50 to 60 of these numerous affidavits, which confirm all that
I have said, be submitted in support of my declarations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, one more question on a different topic.
Did you ever receive any so-called endowment funds, or anything
of that kind, from Hitler or from other sources?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I never received any endowment funds.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you ever receive gifts in kind, such as
valuable paintings or other costly gifts?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The only thing Hitler ever gave me was
his photograph on the occasion of my thirtieth birthday.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: His photograph—presumably with a few words
of dedication?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.
<span class='pageno' title='447' id='Page_447'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Now I have a few final, very brief questions to
ask you—they refer to the last days of your activities in Vienna.
You have already mentioned, in connection with Himmler’s visit
to Vienna at the end of March 1945, that you had at that time
received from Himmler the so-called authority for the proclamation
of martial law. If I have understood you correctly, you, in
your function of Reich Defense Commissioner, were authorized to
convene a drumhead court martial?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and that made me lord of life and
death.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, this drumhead court martial
was only supposed to pass death sentences?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you ever convene this drumhead court
martial in Vienna, and did you appoint the members?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I appointed the members of the court
martial. An outstanding lawyer was the president. I never convened
the drumhead court martial and I never once imposed a
death sentence. If I remember rightly, the military court martial
of the local military commandant passed four death sentences on
four military traitors. My court martial never met and never
passed a death sentence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Had you any connection with the military drumhead
court martial?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. The Vienna commandant was, of course,
president of that particular court, and I was the head of court
martial “Schirach.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You said you had a distinguished lawyer as your
president?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was his profession?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think he was president of a district court,
of something of the kind. I cannot quite remember; I have
forgotten.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So he was an official Viennese judge?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you give the order, in Vienna, to have certain
vitally important factories either blown up or destroyed as so often
happened in other Gaue, as for instance, here in Nuremberg?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. It has escaped my knowledge, that much
I must admit, how far crippling and destructive measures were
<span class='pageno' title='448' id='Page_448'></span>
executed in the military and armament sectors, pursuant to direct
instructions from the Reich Government. For instance, the dynamiting
of bridges was a military precaution. The order could never
have emanated from me. Hitler reserved for himself the right
to issue the orders for blowing up the bridges over the Danube.
The Chief of Army Group South, Generaloberst Rendulic, prior
to giving the order for blowing up these bridges, had to consult the
Führer’s headquarters by telephone.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you yourself leave Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I left Gau Vienna after the withdrawal of
the last troops from the city and after the command post of the
2d corps of the 6th SS Panzer Army had been moved to the
region of the Lower Danube.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When was that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was—sorry, I cannot remember the
date offhand. It was toward the end of the battle for Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And now I have one last question to ask you.
You know that the order went out from the Party Leadership and
from circles of the Reich Chancellery to stage a “Werewolf” movement
for fighting the advancing troops. What was your attitude
towards this movement?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I prohibited any Werewolf organization in
my Gau, but to avoid misunderstandings I must tell you that there
was a youth battalion, a Volkssturm battalion, which bore the name
of “Werewolf,” but there was no Werewolf unit. I invariably refused,
both for the young people and the adults, permission to
participate in any form of combat contrary to the decrees of international
law.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’
counsel want to ask any questions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg):
Witness, what was the attitude of Rosenberg, as the Führer’s
Plenipotentiary for the Ideological Education of the Party, toward
the Reich Youth Leadership?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the Chief of the Department
for Ideological Education in the Reich Youth Leadership had to
attend, on an average, two, perhaps three, meetings per annum,
also attended by educational leaders from other Party organizations.
These meetings took place under the chairmanship of Reichsleiter
Rosenberg. On these occasions, as I have been told by the chief
of the department, Rosenberg was wont to lay down general
<span class='pageno' title='449' id='Page_449'></span>
instructions and directives and ask for reports on the educational
work of the individual organizations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg select specific subjects to be lectured
on at these meetings?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I do not know for certain. At these
meetings of the Youth Leadership representatives, at which Rosenberg
spoke once a year, he usually selected educational themes,
themes dealing with character training. He would, for instance,
speak about solitude and comradeship and, as far as I remember,
about personality, honor, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg at these meetings mention the
Jewish problem and the confessional question?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: During these Youth Leadership sessions he
never made any speeches against the Jews, nor did he, as far as
I can remember, ever touch on the subject of the confession—at
least, not in my presence. I usually heard him speak on subjects
such as I have just enumerated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Witness, did you read Rosenberg’s <span class='it'>Myth of the
Twentieth Century</span>? And if so, when?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I began to read it, but I did not read
the whole book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did this Rosenberg’s <span class='it'>Myth</span> make any impression
on the young people or did other leaders have experiences similar
to your own?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The youth leaders certainly did not read the
<span class='it'>Myth of the Twentieth Century</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: I have no more questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to
ask questions? Or perhaps we had better adjourn now.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<h2><span class='pageno' title='450' id='Page_450'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have already stated in connection
with Sauckel’s directive regarding employment of labor that you
were flooded with such directives. Were these directives carried out?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as my own information goes, I can confirm
that. I had the impression that the functionaries of the labor
employment administration felt that they had to keep strictly to
Sauckel’s orders, and in those industrial plants which I visited I was
able to ascertain that the requirements stated in the directives were
in fact fulfilled.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel himself take steps to insure that
these things were carried out?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I remember that Sauckel once came to
Vienna—I think in 1943—and that on that occasion he addressed all
his labor employment functionaries and repeated orally everything
which he had stated in his directives. He spoke of the foreign workers
in particular, demanding just treatment for them; and I remember
that on this occasion he even spoke of putting them on the same
footing as German workers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have a few more questions about the political
leaders. How were political leaders on the Gauleiter level informed?
Did the Gauleiter have individual interviews with the Führer, especially
in connection with the Gauleiter assemblies?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. After the Gauleiter assemblies the Führer
always held forth in a comparatively large circle just as he did in
his speeches. Interviews in the real sense of the word did not exist.
He always made speeches. Fixed dates on which Gauleiter could
have interviews with Hitler almost ceased to exist once the war
had begun.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could not a Gauleiter approach Hitler personally
and ask for an interview?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He could ask for an interview, but he did not
get it; he received an answer from Bormann, usually in the form
of a telegram. That happened to me very frequently, because I made
such requests; one was asked to submit in writing the points one
wanted to discuss, after which one either received an answer or did
not receive one.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, a letter has been submitted here as
Document D-728, signed or initialed by Gauleiter Sprenger. You were
here when it was submitted and you know the document. I have
two questions concerning it.
<span class='pageno' title='451' id='Page_451'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you know anything about a list, which was to be compiled,
containing the names of those suffering from heart and lung diseases,
who were to be removed from the population?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I know nothing about that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Or that you were to make suggestions for this
to the Führer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: In my opinion that document also contains an
error which has already been mentioned here, namely, the word
“Herr” as a form of address. This letter was addressed to the
“Herren Ortsgrüppenleiter,” and repeated mention is made of the
“Herren Kreisleiter and Ortsgrüppenleiter” in the text. I ask you
now if the expression “Herr” was customary in Party language?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I have never known a Party document
with the exception of this one, which I consider a fraud, in which
the term “Herr” was used.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You are therefore of the opinion that that
designation proves in itself that the document is false?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Herr Von Schirach, your predecessor as Gauleiter
was Josef Bürckel. What sort of relations existed between
Bürckel and Seyss-Inquart?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can only repeat what was generally known
in the Party about relations between them. They were extremely
bad, and all of us had the impression that from the very beginning
Bürckel worked hard to push Seyss-Inquart out.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Which one of the two really had the power
in his hands?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Bürckel, undoubtedly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Who, in your opinion and according to the
actual information you obtained from the files, is responsible for the
persecution of Jews in Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: All right. You say Hitler; but Hitler was not
in Vienna. Who carried out these orders in Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In my opinion, these orders were carried out—even
during Bürckel’s and Seyss-Inquart’s time—by the same man
who has already been mentioned here once today and who, in the
meantime, has been condemned to death in Vienna—Dr. Brunner.
<span class='pageno' title='452' id='Page_452'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Good. Are you aware that Seyss-Inquart
repeatedly protested to Bürckel about excessively severe measures
and quarreled with Bürckel on account of that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot say anything about that. I do not
know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: My client has been accused in a document of
presenting to Adolf Hitler tapestries, among them Gobelins, formerly
in the Emperor’s possession. Do you know anything about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know this: In the large collection of Gobelins
in Vienna, there were two sets depicting Alexander’s victory. The
inferior series was loaned by Reich Governor Seyss-Inquart to the
Reich Chancellery, where it hung in the lobby.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: So it was a loan and not a definite gift, which
would have entailed a loss for Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the catalog of the Gobelin collection this
set was marked as a loan.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Are you aware that other Gobelins were put
at the disposal of the Reich—that is to say, at Adolf Hitler’s disposal—by
Seyss-Inquart?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I was not aware of it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: But maybe you know who did take away
other such Gobelins and tapestries?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I assume that you allude to Bürckel.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know for certain whether Bürckel
took Gobelins. When I took up my appointment in Vienna, I found
that Bürckel had taken from the imperial furniture depot a number
of pieces of furniture including, I believe, some carpets, not for his
personal use but for a Viennese house which he intended to establish
in Gau Saarpfalz as a sort of clubhouse.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I therefore approached the competent office in Berlin—I do not
know whether it was the Reich Finance Ministry or the Reich Ministry
of Culture—and when I was not successful there, I approached
Hitler himself. In the end I succeeded in having Bürckel ordered
to return these objects to Vienna at once; I cannot say with certainty
whether these objects were in fact returned. I know that he
received injunctions to return them and I assume that these objects
were really returned later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: All right. You know from statements which
I have made to your defense counsel that we Austrians always hated
Bürckel intensely for a number of very good reasons and that
in fairness it must be admitted that many things, including, for
<span class='pageno' title='453' id='Page_453'></span>
instance, the city’s food supplies, improved after you took over.
For this reason it seems to me all the more important to clear up
completely the most serious charge against you. You have been
made responsible in your capacity of Reich Defense Commissioner
for the destruction of the most valuable monuments in Vienna. I
ask you: On 2 April, when your deputy Scharizer and Engineer
Blaschke, the National Socialist mayor, wanted to declare Vienna
an open city as the Red Army approached, did you oppose them
and give orders that Vienna must be defended to the last? Or who
gave that order?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Neither Blaschke nor Scharizer expressed the
view that Vienna should be declared an open city. There was...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal understands you
are appearing for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, because this is a War Crime and in the
light of conspiracy he is responsible for everything and the main
charge made against Herr Von Schirach must be clarified—that is,
we must find out who actually gave this order which did so
much harm.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, but you just said that you were not
asking the questions in defense of Seyss-Inquart, but in defense of
Von Schirach. I do not think that the Tribunal really ought to have
the defense of Von Schirach prolonged by questions by other counsel.
We have already had his defense for a considerable time presented
by Dr. Sauter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Then I shall not put this question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you also remember what attitude Seyss-Inquart adopted on
Church matters when dealing with Bürckel?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know only that Dr. Seyss-Inquart, generally
speaking, was considered a man with Church ties. That this brought
him into conflict with Bürckel is quite obvious to me. I cannot go
into details.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, we understood you this morning to
make a statement in the nature of a confession with respect to, at
least, the persecution of the Jews; and while that part of it that
you gave was perhaps bravely enough said, I think there is much
of it that you neglected to say, perhaps through oversight.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I wish you would tell the Tribunal whether or not it is a
fact that your responsibility for young people in Germany under
the National Socialists was fundamentally concerned with making
really good National Socialists out of them, in the sense of making
them fanatical political followers.
<span class='pageno' title='454' id='Page_454'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I considered it my task as educator to bring
up the young people to be good citizens of the National Socialist
State.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And ardent followers and believers in Hitler and his
political policies?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe I already said this morning that I
educated our youth to follow Hitler. I do not deny that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. And while you said to us that you did not
have the first responsibility for the educational system, I am sure
you would not deny that for all of the other activities with which
young people may be concerned you did have first responsibility?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Out-of-school education was my responsibility.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And, of course, in the schools the only people who
taught these young people were those who were politically reliable
in keeping with Hitler’s opinions and beliefs and the teachings of
National Socialism?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The teaching staffs of German schools were
definitely not homogeneous bodies. A large part of the teaching
body belonged to a generation which had not been educated on
National Socialist lines and did not adhere to National Socialism.
The young teachers had been educated on National Socialist principles.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, you are not saying, certainly,
that young people under the public educational system of Germany
were not, at all times, under the guidance of those who were politically
reliable, certainly after the first year or two of the administration
of Hitler and his followers, are you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Would you please repeat the question? I did
not quite understand.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What I am trying to say to you is that there is not
any doubt in your mind or in ours that the public school system
of Germany was supervised, for the most part at least, by people
who were politically sound insofar as National Socialism is concerned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should not care to say that. Educational
administration in Germany was supervised by Reich Minister Rust,
who—and this is a fact—for reasons of ill health took very little
interest in his official duties. Many thousands of older men were
employed in connection with educational administration. They had
received their appointments long before the days of the National
Socialist State and had retained them throughout.
<span class='pageno' title='455' id='Page_455'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not care whether they were old or young or
how long they had been in office. They all took an oath to Hitler,
did they not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct; inasmuch as they were civil
servants, they all took their oath as such.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Rosenberg had a very considerable influence on
young people in Germany, did he not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe that. I think you are estimating
my Codefendant Rosenberg’s influence on youth quite
wrongly—meaning that you are overestimating it. Rosenberg certainly
had some influence on many people who were interested in
philosophical problems and were in a position to understand his
works. But I must dispute the extent of the influence which you
are ascribing to him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You publicly said on one occasion that the way of
Rosenberg was the way of the Hitler Youth, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was, I believe, in 1934...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Never mind when it was. Did you say it or not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did say it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When was it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was in Berlin, at a youth function there.
But later I myself led youth along an entirely different path.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, we will get around to that a little later. But
in any event, on this occasion in Berlin, when you had a large group
of your youth leaders present, you were doing your best, at least,
to have them understand that the way of Rosenberg was the way
that they should follow?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But those were the same youth leaders who
later received different instructions from me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I dare say that may be so. We will get around
to those different instructions; but on this occasion and at that time,
insofar as you were concerned, you wanted them to understand that
they were to follow Rosenberg’s way, didn’t you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but this way only affected one quite
definite point, which was under discussion at that time, namely,
the question of denominational youth organizations. Rosenberg and
I agreed on this point, whereas we differed on many others; and it
was to this point that the statement referred.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Rosenberg’s way certainly wasn’t the way of young
people remaining faithful to their religious obligations or teachings,
was it?
<span class='pageno' title='456' id='Page_456'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I would not like to say that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What do you mean? You don’t know?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can say in so many words that I have never
heard Rosenberg make any statement to the effect that young people
should be disloyal to their religious convictions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I don’t know that he ever said it that way
either; but I think you do know perfectly well, as many other people
who were outside of Germany through all of these years, that
Rosenberg was a violent opponent of organized religious institutions.
You don’t deny that, do you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I certainly do not deny that in principle, but
I do not think that it can be expressed in these terms. Rosenberg
in no way tried to influence youth to withdraw from religious
societies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And later on, actually—aren’t you willing to now say
that later on, and perhaps at that time, in a secret and indirect sort
of way you played Rosenberg’s game by arranging youth affairs at
hours when Church ceremonies were going on?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I deny absolutely that I worked against the
Church in such a way. In the years 1933-34, I was concerned mainly
with the denominational youth organizations. I explained that here
yesterday.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know. You garbled them up, and they all had to
join your organization sooner or later. But I am not talking about
that now. What I am trying to say is—and I think you must agree—that
for a considerable period of time you made it really impossible
for young people of certain religious belief to attend their Church
services, because you scheduled your youth affairs at which attendance
was compulsory.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is not correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You say that is not so? Didn’t the Catholic bishops
publicly object to this very sort of thing, and don’t you know it as
well as I do?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot recall that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You do not recall any Catholic clerics objecting to
the fact that you were scheduling your youth affairs on Sunday
mornings when their clerics were holding services?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the course of time, as I explained yesterday,
many clergymen either approached me personally or complained
in public that they were hampered in their spiritual ministration
by the youth service and the forms which it took; and that
is why I adjusted matters in the way shown by the document which
my counsel submitted to the Court yesterday.
<span class='pageno' title='457' id='Page_457'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I don’t think that is altogether an answer; and
perhaps I can help your memory by recalling for you that your
organization specifically provided that these young people, who were
attending church on Sunday, could not go in uniform; and that was
a very purposeful thing, wasn’t it, because they could not get out
of church and get to their youth attendance places at all if they had
to go home and change their clothes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But in many parishes the Church authorities
forbade young people wearing uniform to enter the church.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to argue about it with you.
Your answer is that you don’t recall any frequent and strong criticism
and objection from churchmen about this particular Sunday
morning program. Is that the way you want to leave it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I certainly do not mean that. There were
periods of great tension, periods of heated argument, just as there
was a stormy period in youth organization generally. Later, all these
things were satisfactorily settled and put in order.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, I understood you also to say that, whatever
else you may have done with the young people of Germany during
the years over which you had control of them, you certainly did
not prepare them militarily in any sense, in any sense ordinarily
accepted as being military; is that so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, let’s see. What was the name of your
personal press expert, or consultant, if you prefer that term?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The press expert who worked with me longest
was a Herr Kaufmann.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you have asked him—as a matter of fact, you
do have an interrogatory from him, don’t you, which will be submitted.
I assume you know about that, don’t you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know that my counsel has applied for it,
but I do not know the answers which Kaufmann gave.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you know the questions he asked, don’t you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not remember them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, perhaps if I remind you of one or two you will
remember. You asked him if he ever put out any press releases
without your authority. You asked him if he wasn’t your personal
press consultant. And you asked him if it wasn’t true that you
personally gave him the directive for what you wanted published
in the press, and particularly in the youth press. Do you remember
those questions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]
<span class='pageno' title='458' id='Page_458'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But you don’t know the answers; is that it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, do you know that he published in the SS
official publication in September of 1942 an article about the young
people and the youth of Germany?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember that article.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I think that you had better have a look at it.
It is Document 3930-PS. That becomes USA-853, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, this document which I am showing you is a telegram, of
course, a teletype message, “Reich Governor in Vienna.” You will
see at the top that it was received by you on 10 September 1942,
and it sets out a copy of the subject for the body of this article
for the editorial staff of the <span class='it'>Schwarzes Korps</span>. That is the SS
magazine, as you recall.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, you will see from reading it, and in the very first part it
states that a high-ranking officer who had come back to Berlin from
Sevastopol said that the youngsters who had been seen some 4
years ago in short pants marching through German cities singing
“Yes, the flag is more than death,” were the 19-year-olds who took
that city of Sevastopol.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The article goes on to say that the lads are fulfilling in fighting
what they promised in singing and that the National Socialist movement
had brought up a young generation, filling them with faith
and self-denial, and so on. And then the rest of it goes on in substance
to say that there were people who objected to your program
at the time that you were trying to make these youngsters strong.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The clear meaning of it is that you are now claiming credit for
having had something to do with making them the good 19-year-old
fighters who took Sevastopol, isn’t that so? You are claiming credit,
I say, in this article for having produced this kind of 19-year-old
boy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had no knowledge of this article up to now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you do now. You can talk about it, certainly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is just what I want to do. Herr Kaufmann
at that time had just returned from the Eastern Front, and
under the impression of what he had experienced out there he
wrote down what appears in this article, which I cannot possibly
read now in its entirety.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it isn’t very long. Really I read what I think
are the most important parts of it insofar as you are concerned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That the youth was trained in a military
way I believe is not mentioned in one single sentence in that entire
article.
<span class='pageno' title='459' id='Page_459'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Oh, I know. I am simply asking if it isn’t a fact
that you were claiming credit in this article for having had something
considerable to do with the fact that these 19-year-old boys
were such good fighters in Russia. That is all I am asking you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have already told you that I wanted to
train the youth to become good citizens, and that I wanted to train
them to be good patriots, who did their duty in the field later on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And should also do their duty in the field.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, your answer then is, yes, you were claiming
credit for the fact that they were such good fighters. Now, there is
no trick in this question. It is merely preliminary, and I want to
get on, but I think you might say “yes.” And incidentally, this song,
“The flag is more than death,” was a song that you wrote, wasn’t it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The “Flag Song” which I based on the refrain
“The flag is more than death.” That is true.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, you have also published a number of other
songs for young people, in the formative days before the war
started, in a songbook.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: A great many songbooks for young people
were published. I do not know them all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, I don’t either, but I am asking you if it isn’t a
fact that you did publish songbooks for young people.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Both the Cultural Service of the Reich Youth
Leadership and the Press Service published such books. Of course,
I did not look at each single song in them myself; but on the whole
I believe that only songs which were sung by young people appeared
in these books.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. We have some extracts from one of your
songbooks, and there is only one that I wish to refer to. Do you
remember the one “Forward, Forward,” that you wrote, by the
way; another one that you wrote. Do you remember that song?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: “Forward, Forward” is the Flag Song of the
youth organization.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. Did you write it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, certainly that also contains, does it not,
highly inciting words and phrases for young people with respect to
their military duty?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Flag Song of the youth organization? I
cannot see that?
<span class='pageno' title='460' id='Page_460'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, words, like these: “We are the future soldiers.
Everything which opposes us will fall before our fists. Führer, we
belong to you,” and so on. Do you remember that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not say: “We are the future soldiers,”
as I hear now in English, but “We are the soldiers of the future.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The soldiers of the future, the bearers of a
future.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, but that is another one of your songs,
isn’t it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is a revolutionary song dating from the
fighting period; it does not refer to a war between, say, Germany
and other powers, but to the fight which we had to carry on inside
the country in order to achieve our revolution.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, we will see. Do you remember the one,
“Can you see the dawn in the East?” Do you remember that song?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not one of my songs.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is one of the songs in the Hitler Youth Songbook,
is it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is an old SA song dating from 1923-24.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, that may be. I am only asking you, isn’t it
a fact that it was in your official songbooks for your young people?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is in that song that you vilify the Jews, is it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not remember that. I would have to see
the song.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I can show it to you, but perhaps if you recall
it we can save a little time. Don’t you remember that the second
stanza says, “For many years the people were enslaved and misguided,
traitors and Jews had the upper hand?” Do you remember
those words in that song? “People to Arms” is the next one.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but I am not sure if that was published
in a youth songbook.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I can assure you that it was; and if you would like
to see it, we have it here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is a very well-known SA song, which was
sung by the young people, and was therefore included in the youth
songbook.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, that is all I wanted to find out. I don’t
care where it originated. It is the kind of song you had in your
songbook for young people.
<span class='pageno' title='461' id='Page_461'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say one more thing. The
songbook which I have here was published in 1933.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe that the youth organization
which I built up can be judged from the year 1933 only.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I don’t suggest that either, but we found it in 1945.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Later we published other songbooks, with
very different songs.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I am going to get around to these in a minute.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That songbook was 3764-PS, USA-854. It has just been called
to my attention that the last phrase in that fourth stanza says:
“Germany awake! Death to Jewry! People to arms!”</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: One moment, please; where is that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In the English text, in the fourth stanza. I don’t
know where it would be; it is on Page 19, I am told, of the German
text. Did you find it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, maybe it is the wrong document. In any
event, we will find it for you. However, you remember the song,
do you not? You don’t deny that it says “Death to the Jews,” and
so on, do you, in that song?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is the song that starts with the words,
“Can you see the dawn in the East?”</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is all I wanted to know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That song is not in this book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>A book was handed to the defendant.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: We have quite a few of your songbooks here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but there is a great difference between
them. This book, which does not contain the song, is an official
edition published by the Reich Youth Leadership. As I say, it does
not contain the song. It does appear, however, in a songbook published
by Tonners, a firm of music publishers in Cologne, under the
title of “Songs of the Hitler Youth.” This book is not, however, an
official collection issued by the Reich Youth Leadership. Any publishing
firm in Germany can publish such books.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, I will accept that, but certainly you won’t
deny that the book was used, will you? And that is all we are
trying to establish.
<span class='pageno' title='462' id='Page_462'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I do not know. I do not know whether
that book was used by the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know that the one which it is contained in
was published by you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>Well, in any event, I would like to point this out to you. I am
not claiming, or trying to suggest to you by questions, that any one
of these songs in themselves made young people in Germany fit for
war; but rather, what I am trying to show is that, as distinguished
from the testimony you gave here yesterday, you were doing something
more than just giving these boys and girls games to play.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My statements of yesterday certainly did not
imply that we only gave them games to play. For every song of
this kind there are innumerable others.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I know, but these are the ones we are concerned
with right now. “Unfurl the Blood-Soaked Banners,” you
remember that? “Drums Sound Throughout the Land”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: These are all songs of the “Wandervogel”
and the Youth League. They are songs which were sung at the
time of the Republic, songs which did not have anything to do with
our time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Just a minute.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: They are songs which had nothing to do with
our period.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you think that anybody, in the days of the Republic,
was singing Hitler Youth marches?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: What song is that? I do not know it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is the one, “Drums Sound Throughout the
Land.” Don’t you remember any of these songs, actually?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course, I know quite a number of these
songs; but the most important—the bulk of them—come from the
old “Zupfgeigenhansl” of the Wandervogel movement and from the
Youth League. That the SA also sang these songs goes without
saying.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I don’t doubt that they did; but wherever they
emanated from, you were using them with these young people.
And that one, “Drums Sound Throughout the Land,” you wrote
yourself; isn’t that so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: “Drums Sound Throughout the Land?” Yes,
I believe I did write some such song.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right; that certainly doesn’t have a very ancient
origin then, does it?
<span class='pageno' title='463' id='Page_463'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was long before the seizure of power.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, you also recall, perhaps, that on one occasion
Field Marshal Von Blomberg wrote an article for the Hitler Year
Book. Do you remember that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it wasn’t so very long ago. It was in 1938. I
suppose you read the Year Book of your organization for that year
at that time, anyway?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That may be taken for granted; but I really
cannot remember what Field Marshal Von Blomberg wrote for it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, all right. I would like you to look at this
document; it is 3755-PS. I think it is on Page 134 of the text that
you have, Mr. Witness; and on Pages 148 to 150 you will find an
article, “Education for War of German Youth,” or rather, it says,
“The work ‘Education for War of German Youth,’ by Dr. Stellrecht,
contains a slogan of Field Marshal Von Blomberg, in which the
following passage is quoted.” And then it goes on to give the
quotation. Do you find that? “The fighting spirit is the highest
virtue of the soldier.” And so on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Have you found the quotation of Blomberg’s? That is what I
want to know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And then the article by Stellrecht is also contained
there, after the quotation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now certainly, when you move down a few lines,
you will see this sentence: “Therefore, it is a stern and unalterable
demand which Field Marshal Von Blomberg makes of the young
men marching in the columns of the Hitler Youth,” and so on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In those days, in 1938, Mr. Witness, you were at least thinking
in terms of future military service and so was Field Marshal Von
Blomberg, with respect to the Hitler Youth. That is the point I am
trying to make.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: We had a State with compulsory military
training.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And it goes without saying that we as educators
were also anxious to train our youth to the highest degree
of physical fitness so that they would also make good soldiers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You weren’t doing any more than that? Is that
what you want this Court to understand?
<span class='pageno' title='464' id='Page_464'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I described to you yesterday what else we
did in the way of rifle training, cross-country sports, and the training
of special units.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is USA-856, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Yes, I know you told us yesterday that, whatever else it might
have been, it certainly was not any kind of military training.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This man Stellrecht was associated with you, was he not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Dr. Stellrecht had the “Office for Physical
Training” in the Hitler Youth under Reich Sport Leader Von
Tschammer-Osten. That office was one of 21 offices within the
Youth Leadership.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: He was associated with you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you have also used something from him as part
of your defense; it is in your document book. Do you know
about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, it is a statement made by Dr. Stellrecht,
in which he speaks of education for defense and physical training
for youth; and says that not a single boy in Germany is trained
with weapons of war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know that, and therefore I want you to look at
another statement that he made on another date.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is Document 1992-PS, Mr. President, and we offer it as
USA-439.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you remember when he made the speech to the military men
in January of 1937, while he was affiliated with your Hitler Youth
organization? Do you know the speech to which I refer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was not present on the occasion of that
speech and I do not consider myself responsible for any statement
which he may have made in it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, that is your statement, but perhaps others
feel differently. At any event, I ask you whether or not you were
aware of and knew about the speech, and will you tell us whether
you do know about it before you look at it? You know the speech
I am talking about, don’t you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember being informed of the fact
that he spoke at a national and political training course for the
Armed Forces; but I may have been informed of it. The speech,
itself...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it seems to me you were very anxious to deny
responsibility for it before you knew what he said.
<span class='pageno' title='465' id='Page_465'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not want to make a statement on that.
Disputes arose between Dr. Stellrecht and myself on account of a
certain tendency which he showed with regard to defense training,
because I felt that he insisted too much on his office. Disputes arose
also with the other offices of the Reich Youth Leadership which
finally led to his dismissal from the Reich Youth Leadership.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, he was on your staff when he
made this speech and I wish now you would look at page—well, I
have it Page 3 of the English, and it is Page 169 of the text that
you have; and it begins at the very bottom of the English page. The
paragraph reads:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“As far as purely military education is concerned this work
has already been done in years of co-operation, and very
extensively. The result has been set down in a book written
by myself, regulating future work in military education down
to the last detail of training and which, with our mutual
agreement, included a foreword and preface by the Reich
Defense Minister and the Reich Youth Leader.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And then the next paragraph:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The basic idea of this work is always to present to the boy
that which belongs to the particular stage of his development”—and
so on. And I want you to come to the sentence
that says:</p>

<p>“For that reason no boy is given a military weapon, simply
because it seems to serve no useful purpose for his development.
But, on the other hand, it seems sensible to give him
guns of small caliber for training. Just as there are certain
tasks occurring in military training which are only suitable
for grown men, so there are other training tasks more suited
to boys.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And then moving down further in the English text, next to the
last paragraph, Page 170 of your text, you will find in the next to
the last paragraph that Dr. Stellrecht says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“This picture is the goal of a comprehensive education which
starts with the training of the boy in outdoor games and ends
with his military training.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And then moving on again to the fifth page of the English text,
and I think it is Page 171 of your text, the next to the last paragraph,
in talking about the hiking trip, he says that:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“...has still a wider purpose...because it is the only way in
which the boy can get acquainted with the fatherland for
which he will have to fight one day.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Moving on through this article, finally, I want to direct your
attention to Page 6 of the English text and Pages 174 and 175 of
<span class='pageno' title='466' id='Page_466'></span>
your text. In the last paragraph of the English text, you will find
this sentence which says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“All training, therefore, culminates in rifle training. It can
scarcely be emphasized enough; and because shooting is a
matter of practice, one cannot start too early. The result we
want to achieve in the course of time is that a gun should
feel just as natural in the hands of a German boy as a pen.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, move over to the next page, Page 7 of the English text
and Page 176 of your text. Your Dr. Stellrecht says there more
about shooting and how it “meets with the boys’ desire”; and then
he goes on to say:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Along with the general training there is special training for
new replacements for Air Force, Navy, and motorized troops.
The training course for this has been established in conjunction
with the competent offices of the Armed Forces...
on as broad a basis as possible, and in the country cavalry
training is given.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And I suppose it is on the next page of your text, but it is the
next to the last paragraph of the English text—I want to call your
attention to this sentence—or it is two from the last paragraph in
the English text: “Military education and ideological education
belong together.” The English text says “philosophical,” but I think
that’s a mistranslation and actually in German it is “ideological.”
And you see the sentence that says in the next paragraph:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The education of youth has to take care that the knowledge
and the principles, according to which the State and the
Armed Forces of our time have been organized and on which
they base, enter so thoroughly into the thoughts of the individual
that they can never again be taken away and that
they remain guiding principles all through life.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And the last paragraph of that speech, Mr. Witness—I wish you
would look at it because I think you used the term “playful”
yesterday, if I am not mistaken, and Dr. Stellrecht, anyway, a little
earlier in his speech. Here is what he said to the military men
that day: “Gentlemen, you can see that the tasks of present youth
education have gone far beyond the ‘playful.’ ”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Are you sure, now, that you didn’t have any kind of a program
for military training in your youth organization?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can see from this document, which I should
really have to read in its entirety in order to be able to answer
correctly, that Dr. Stellrecht, to put it mildly, considered himself
very important. The importance of Dr. Stellrecht for the education
of youth and the importance of the office which he held in the
Youth Leadership were definitely not as great as implied by this
<span class='pageno' title='467' id='Page_467'></span>
training course for men of the Armed Forces. I have already said
before that disputes arose between Dr. Stellrecht and myself on
account of his exaggerations and especially because of the extent to
which he overestimated the value of rifle training and what he
called “military training” and that these differences of opinion
finally led to his dismissal and departure from the service of the
Reich Youth Leadership. He was one of many heads of offices, and
the importance of his special activity was not as great as he has
represented it to be in his statement here. I think I explained
yesterday what a large number of tasks confronted the Youth
Leadership. I was also able to indicate the approximate proportion
of premilitary training or military training, as Herr Stellrecht calls
it, as compared with other forms of training. But this document
also states clearly that there was no intention of anticipating military
training, as I said yesterday. When he says that every German
boy should learn to handle the gun as easily as the pen, that is an
expression of opinion with which I cannot identify myself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, of course, you have your view of him; but I
think it is well that we brought it out in view of the fact that you
have yourself offered before this Tribunal a statement by Stellrecht
in your own document book. You are aware of that, of course,
aren’t you? You want, of course, to have us understand that Stellrecht
is reliable when you quote him, but he is not reliable when
we quote him; is that it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not mean that at all. He is a specialist
in ballistics and outdoor sports and, of course, he represented his
tasks, as is natural to human nature, as being the most important
in youth training. Probably another office chief would have described
cultural work or occupational competition contests, as the
case might be, as being the most important aspects of youth training.
At any rate, the decisive pronouncement for the education of
German youth was not the remarks which Stellrecht made during
a course for soldiers but my own remarks to the youth leaders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I just want to remind you that a year after he made
this speech you wrote a preface for his book, didn’t you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe this preface was written for the
book “Hitler Youth on Service.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I say it was a year after he wrote this speech, which
was put out and published in Germany. He not only made the
speech; but it was put out in pamphlet form, wasn’t it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember exactly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I can tell you if you look at the document
that I handed you. I think you will see that. Well, in any event,
<span class='pageno' title='468' id='Page_468'></span>
we will pass along. You told the Tribunal yesterday that the statement
in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, attributed to Hitler, on 21 February
1938 was something of a mystery to you; you did not know
where he got his figures from. Did you understand what I said,
Mr. Witness?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And do you know to what I referred in your testimony
of yesterday, that quotation from Hitler in the <span class='it'>Völkischer
Beobachter</span>?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What is wrong with those figures?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think that these figures are exaggerated
and I think that there are errors in the text in my possession,
which is a translated text. He probably received these figures from
Dr. Stellrecht’s office, or so I assume. The statements regarding
armored troops were, I imagine, probably added by himself; for
the conclusion that some thousands or tens of thousands qualified
for driving licenses is really an incorrect one, just as it is incorrect
to draw from the fact that some tens of thousands of lads qualify
for driving licenses the conclusion that they were trained as tank
troops.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you see, we didn’t say so. You understand it
was your Führer who said so in February 1938, and what I asked
you was that I wish perhaps we can go through it and you can
tell the Tribunal where they are in error and to what extent. Now
Hitler said, according to the press, that your naval Hitler Youth
comprised 45,000 boys. Would you say that figure was too large
and altogether untrue?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: He then said, the motor Hitler Youth 60,000 boys.
What do you say about that figure?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And then he said that, as part of the campaign to
encourage aviation, 55,000 members of the Jungvolk were trained
in gliding for group activities. What do you say about that figure?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Glider training and model plane construction
in the youth organization with—may I have the figure again—50,000
youth airmen?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: 55,000.
<span class='pageno' title='469' id='Page_469'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 55,000—yes, that is correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That’s correct. Then he says, “74,000 of the Hitler
Youth are organized in its flying units.” Now, what do you say
about that figure?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: You say “flying units”; those are “Fliegereinheiten,”
groups of Hitler youth airmen, who—as I must emphasize
again—were concerned only with gliding and the construction of
model planes. There may have been such a large number at the
time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Is the figure correct, 74,000?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It may be.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, he lastly says, “15,000 boys passed their gliding
test in the year 1937 alone.” What do you say about that; is it
too big or too little or not true at all?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is probably correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, so far you haven’t disagreed with Hitler
on any of these, have you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Then, he lastly says, “Today, 1.2 million boys of
the Hitler Youth receive regular instruction in small-bore rifle
shooting from 7,000 instructors.” What’s wrong with that figure,
if anything?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It may be correct—of course, I have no documentary
proof that we had 7,000 young men who conducted training
in small-bore rifle shooting. I discussed this small-bore rifle
shooting yesterday. It is well known that we carried that out.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Actually you haven’t disputed any of these figures.
They are true, then, to the best of your knowledge, aren’t they?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My objection concerned a remark, which I
remember in connection with the speech, mentioning tank force.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, we don’t have it but, if you have it, we’d be
glad to see it. But this is the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> speech that
was put in by the Prosecution at the time that the case against
you was put in; there is nothing in that about the tanks.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe the reason is that the retranslation
of the document from English back into German is incorrect.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, we agree that Hitler wasn’t very
far off on his figures when he made this speech or gave them out?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No; I think the figures which you have just
mentioned are correct.
<span class='pageno' title='470' id='Page_470'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. Now, then, in the Year Book of your
Hitler Youth for 1939, Stellrecht, your man who had charge of
training, uses that same expression. Do you recall that? “To handle
a rifle should be just as natural for everybody as to handle a pen”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, sir.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I have the month?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it’s in the Year Book of the Hitler Youth for
the year 1939, at Page 227. If you’d like to see it, I’ll be glad to
show it to you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, thank you. I do not have to see it. If
he has already mentioned it before, it is possible that he will
repeat it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. You see, the importance of it to us is that this
is 2 years after he made this speech, 1 year after you wrote the
preface to his book, and I assume some time after you found him
to be—what did you say—unreliable?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I did not say that. On the contrary, he
was a reliable man, but differences of opinion arose between us
because I did not agree with him on the question of overemphasizing
premilitary training.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well...</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I considered the rifle training as constituting
only a part of our training, and not the most essential part; and
he pushed it too much into the foreground.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. But you let him write in the Year Book;
and 2 years, after he made the speech, he made this same kind
of a statement for young people to read, that they should be as
handy with a rifle as they were with a pen. Did you make any
objection when that book went to press? I assume you must have...</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not see the book before it went to
press...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not proofread it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: ...and I had no objections to raise in
particular.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you object when you read in the same book
and on the same page that the Wehrmacht had presented to your
Hitler Youth in 1937, 10,000 small-bore rifles?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I was very glad to have that gift from
the Armed Forces. As we in any case did small-bore shooting, I
was grateful for every rifle we received because we always had
less than we needed for training purposes.
<span class='pageno' title='471' id='Page_471'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And were you distressed when you also read in
that same Year Book that there was no shortage of shooting ranges:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Since organized rifle training was started in the autumn of
1936, 10,000 shooting instructors have acquired the green
shooting license in weekend courses and special courses; and
this figure increases by some thousands every year.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Do you remember that in your Year Book for 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not remember it, but I think you are
probably presenting the facts correctly; I will not dispute it.
Switzerland gave her young men a much more intensive rifle training
than we did and so did many other countries.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not deny that our young men were
trained in shooting.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I hope you’re not comparing yourself to Switzerland,
either.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: This document is 3769-PS, Mr. President; it becomes
USA-857.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, we’ve heard about this agreement that you and the Defendant
Keitel drew up in 1939, not very long before the war
against Poland started. It was in August of 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>It’s already in evidence, Mr. President, as USA-677.</p>

<p class='pindent'>It was the 8th day of August, wasn’t it—or 11th day; I’m sorry.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know the exact date. The fact that
the agreement was concluded in August 1939 is enough to show
that it did not have—and could not have had—any connection with
the war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You say it had no relation to the war, 3 weeks
before the attack on Poland?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: If that agreement had had any significance
for the war, it would have had to be concluded much earlier. The
fact that it was only concluded in August shows in itself that we
were not thinking of war. If we had wanted to train youth for the
war, we would have made an agreement of this kind in 1936
or 1937.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, will you agree to this: That this
agreement between you and Keitel certainly was related to your
shooting practice and related to the Army?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as I remember, the agreement referred
to training for outdoor sports.
<span class='pageno' title='472' id='Page_472'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, then I had better show it to you and read
from it to you, if you have forgotten insofar that you don’t remember
that it had something to do with your shooting practice.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that it says—and to that extent a
connection with rifle shooting does exist—that in future field sports
are to receive the same attention which has hitherto been given to
shooting. I do not know if I am giving that correctly from memory.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I’ll tell you what it says and you can look at it in
a minute. It says that you already have 30,000 Hitler Youth leaders
trained annually in field service. And in the whole sentence it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“In the Leadership Schools of the Hitler Youth, particularly
in the two Reich schools for shooting practice and field sports
and in the District Leadership Schools, 30,000 Hitler Youth
leaders are being trained every year in field service...”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>and that this agreement gives you the possibility of roughly doubling
that number.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And it goes on to say how you will quarter these
people and billet them, and so on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And it does have some relationship to your shooting
training program, doesn’t it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I explained that before I even saw it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I misunderstood you then. I thought that you
said that it didn’t have...</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, no, I explained that. I said that field
service should have the same prominence as rifle training in the
program; but, here again, we are not concerned with training youth
leaders to become officers. It was not a question of military training,
but of training in field sports for the youth leaders who, after
short courses—I believe they lasted 3 weeks—went back again to
their units. A young man of 16 cannot be trained along military
lines in that period of time, nor was that the purpose of the agreement.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Surely you are not asking us to believe that you
and Keitel were entering into an agreement over cross-country
sports, are you, in August of 1939? Are you serious about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I am perfectly serious when I say that at that
time I knew nothing about a war—the war to come. I said yesterday...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, but you...
<span class='pageno' title='473' id='Page_473'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And I do not believe either that Field
Marshal Keitel drafted that agreement; I think one of his assistants
worked it out along with Dr. Stellrecht. If it had had any
significance for the war, it would certainly not have been announced
in August in an official publication.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, listen. You just look at the first paragraph
of this and read what it says the purpose of this agreement
is, and perhaps we can put an end to this discussion.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“An agreement was made between the High Command of
the Wehrmacht and the Reich Youth Leadership representing
the result of close co-operation between the Chief of the High
Command of the Wehrmacht, General Keitel, and the Youth
Leader of the German Reich, Von Schirach, and promising
the co-operation of the Wehrmacht in the military education
of the Hitler Youth.”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>You don’t see anything there about cross-country running, do you,
or training?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to give an explanation as to
that. What you have just quoted is not part of the text of the
agreement, but represents a commentary by the editor of the collection
<span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I’m not going on; but I’ll leave it up to the
Tribunal to decide whether that has to do with sports or has any
relation to military education.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it is a convenient time to break off.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that
the Defendant Raeder is absent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, would you agree that from time to
time members of your Hitler Youth sang songs and otherwise conducted
themselves in a manner which certainly was hostile to
organized religious institutions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not intend to deny that isolated members
behaved in that way during the early years of the National Socialist
State, but I should like to add a short explanation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the early years I took into my movement millions of
young people from Marxist organizations and the atheist movement,
<span class='it'>et cetera</span>; and, of course, it was not possible in the space
of 2 or 3 or 4 years’ time to discipline all of them completely. But
I think I may say that after a certain date, say 1936, things of that
sort no longer happened.
<span class='pageno' title='474' id='Page_474'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I thought perhaps we could say, anyway, that
in 1935 this sort of thing was going on and perhaps save some time.
Would you agree to that? They were singing songs such as, “Pope
and Rabbi shall yield, we want to be pagans again” and that sort
of business. Are you familiar with that? Do you know that kind
of thing that came to the attention of the Minister of Justice from
the prosecuting authority in Baden.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know that they sang a song published in the
songbook “Blut und Ehre,” a song saying, “We want to kill the
priest, out with your spear, forward; set the red cock on the cloister
roof.” You know that old song?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is a song dating back to the Thirty Years’
War and sung by the youth movement for many, many years, even
before the first World War.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know, you have told me that before. I am trying
to cut that down. Will you agree that your people were singing it
in 1933, 1934, and 1935, to the extent that when clerics objected they
were subjected themselves to the prosecuting authorities for interfering
and criticizing? That is how important it was.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know, as I have already said, that this song
dates back to the Thirty Years’ War. It was sometimes sung by
young people in the years 1933-1934. I tried to abolish this song,
but I cannot give you any information as to special complaints
which were lodged about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not think that we have made clear that these
songs were put out in a book which you published for the Hitler
Youth to sing in these days. Do you agree to that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think it is possible, as for many years this
song was included in every collection. It is a song which appeared
in the first songbooks of the Wandervogel movement in 1898.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am not really interested in the history. All I am
trying to establish is that in your songbook for your young people
this song was present, that it was sung, that when the Church people
complained, they were subjected to the prosecuting authorities for
complaining.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I must dispute the last point.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I will have to put this document in.</p>

<p class='pindent'>It is Number 3751-PS. These are extracts from the diary of the
prosecuting authorities, the diary of the Minister of Justice. And
that becomes USA-858.
<span class='pageno' title='475' id='Page_475'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, the very first entry that is shown to you is a note from
the diary of the Minister of Justice on the Catholic Vicar Paul
Wasmer concerning criminal proceedings against him, and it is a
question of whether a penal sentence should be proposed by Rosenberg
because of libel. The vicar in his sermon cited a song being
sung by young people. I quoted a few words of it a moment ago
about “Pope and Rabbi shall yield, out with the Jews,” and so on.
The Minister of Justice in his diary goes on to say that this Catholic
vicar also quoted from “the little book of songs published by Baldur
von Schirach” a verse with the following text:</p>


          <div class='poetry-container' style=''>
          <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' -->
<div class='stanza-outer'>
<p class='line0'>“To the Lord in Heaven we’ll surely say</p>
<p class='line0'>That we his Priest would gladly slay.”</p>
</div>
</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend -->

<p class='noindent'>and so on:</p>


          <div class='poetry-container' style=''>
          <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' -->
<div class='stanza-outer'>
<p class='line0'>“Out with your spear, forward march.”</p>
</div>
</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend -->

<p class='pindent'>And he further quoted you as saying, “The path of German
youth is Rosenberg.” Now, that is what he got into trouble for
doing, and all I am asking you—and all I did ask—is if you won’t
admit that people who criticized the use of this kind of stuff by
your young people under your leadership were subjected to possible,
and in many cases actual, prosecution? You see, you told the Tribunal
yesterday that you never did anything directly to interfere
with the Church, Catholic or Protestant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The song quoted, which has the refrain “Kyrieleis,”
which in itself shows it is a very old song...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May I interrupt you to say...</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: ...may possibly be included in the songbook
“Blood and Honor.” I am, of course, unaware that a clergyman was
prosecuted for criticizing it. That is something new which I learn
for the first time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. Look at Page 192 of that same diary, and
you will see where the Archbishop of Paderborn reported the incident
of 12 May. In this case he was asking that something be done
to stop this sort of thing, and there is a rather nasty little song there
about a monk and a nun, and so on, which your young people were
singing; and then it goes on to say what happened to the Archbishop
when he came out into the square and what the Hitler Youth did,
what names they called him, and it says there were seven Hitler
Youth leaders from outside present in that city that day and they
were in civilian clothing. Do you mean to say you never heard of
these things?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know of this incident. I called the competent
leader of the area, Langanke by name, to account for this. I
had a good deal of trouble in connection with the incident. I shall
<span class='pageno' title='476' id='Page_476'></span>
therefore ask my counsel to question the witness Lauterbacher, who
then held the rank of Stabsführer and is acquainted with the details.
Some lines of the song you quoted just now caused a good deal of
violent feeling among the population at the time—some of those
lines are quoted here—on account of the foreign currency racketeering
indulged in by some clergymen. That is why this satirical
song was sung.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should like to say in conclusion that I thoroughly and obviously
disapproved of the attitude of these youth leaders. The whole affair
is, as I have already said, one of those incidents dating back to the
years when I had to take into my organization an enormous number
of youths from other organizations and with an entirely different
intellectual background.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, turn to Page 228 of that diary, and you
will see where a Chaplain Heinrich Müller and a town clergyman
Franz Rümmer were under suspicion because they said in a circle
of Catholic clergy that a certain song was sung by the Hitler Youth
at the Party Rally in 1934:</p>


          <div class='poetry-container' style=''>
          <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' -->
<div class='stanza-outer'>
<p class='line0'>“We are the rollicking Hitler Youth;</p>
<p class='line0'>We have no need of Christian truth;</p>
<p class='line0'>For Adolf Hitler is our Leader</p>
<p class='line0'>And our Interceder.</p>
<p class='line'>&#160;</p>
</div>
<div class='stanza-outer'>
<p class='line0'>“No evil old priest these ties can sever;</p>
<p class='line0'>We’re Hitler’s children now and ever.”</p>
</div>
</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend -->

<p class='pindent'>Wait until I get through.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have not found the place.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is Page 228, a and b, I’m sorry. Maybe you will
remember the song anyway if I read it to you. Do you remember
the lines that said, “We don’t follow Christ but instead Horst Wessel”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This is the first time I have seen this song. I
do not know this song.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right; I will not go on reading it. You noticed
that in an entry in the diary, the last paragraph, it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Advocate General notes that there is no doubt that the
song in question was sung or circulated in Hitler Youth circles;
he thinks that the statement that this song was sung at the
Party Rally, that is, to a certain extent under the eyes and
with the consent of the highest Party officials, can be refuted.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The third stanza reads:</p>


          <div class='poetry-container' style=''>
          <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' -->
<div class='stanza-outer'>
<p class='line0'>“I am no Christian, no Catholic;</p>
<p class='line0'>I follow the SA through thin and thick.”</p>
</div>
</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend -->

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='477' id='Page_477'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>We gather that it is not a youth song. If the young people sang
that song, I very much regret it. That song was certainly not sung
at a youth festival at the Party Rally in 1934, as stated here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I myself read through all the programs for
youth events at the Party Rally.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I do not know this song; I have never heard it; and I do not
know the text.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD; You will notice that the last line says: “Baldur
von Schirach, take me too!”</p>

<p class='pindent'>The only point to all this is that certainly it is a surprise to the
Prosecution to hear you say, as the Youth Leader, that you did not
know that there was a great difficulty between the churchmen of
all the churches in Germany and the youth organization in Germany,
certainly during these years.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The point that I should like to make clear to
the Tribunal is that in the youth movement there was a period of
storm and stress, a period of development, and that the organization
must not be judged by the actions of a few individuals or groups
in the same year in which these individuals or groups became members
of the organization. The result of educational work cannot be
judged until some years have elapsed. It is possible that a group of
youths who entered our ranks from the atheist movement in 1934
composed and sang these songs. In 1936 they would certainly no
longer have done it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, let’s see what you were doing in 1937. You
know the publication “Enjoyment, Discipline, Faith”? Do you know
that handbook for cultural work in your youth camps?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to see it, please.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I’ll show it to you, but I wanted to ask you, first of
all: Do you know the publication? Do you know what I am talking
about when I refer to it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know all our publications. We had
such an enormous number of publications that unless I have the
book in front of me I cannot make any statement on the subject.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right; I’ll take your answer that you don’t know
this one without seeing it. We’ll show it to you. This one, among
other things, has the program for a week in one of your camps, a
suggested series of programs. And again I’ll ask you a question and
maybe we can cut this down.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Isn’t it a fact that in your camps you tried to make Hitler and
God more than partners and particularly tried to direct the religious
<span class='pageno' title='478' id='Page_478'></span>
attitudes of young people to the belief that Hitler was sent to this
earth by God and was his divinely appointed in Germany?</p>

<p class='pindent'>Well, just answer that first of all, and then we can look at the
program.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I never made any comparison between
Hitler and God; and I consider it blasphemous and have always considered
such a comparison blasphemous.</p>

<p class='pindent'>It is true that during the long period of years in which I believed
in Hitler, I saw in him a man sent by God to lead the people. That
is true. I believe any great man in history—and in the past I considered
Hitler such a man—may be regarded as being sent by God.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: This is Document 2436-PS, USA-859.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am not going to go all through it with you, but I do want to
call your attention to some specific parts.</p>

<p class='pindent'>First of all, on Page 64 you have the names of people suggested
as mottoes, I guess you would say, for the day. They are all political
or military heroes of Germany, I expect, aren’t they?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Arminius, Geiserich, Braunschweig...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You don’t need to read them all. If they are not,
say they aren’t, and if they are, say “yes.” I merely asked you if
they were not all military or political heroes of Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know whether Prince Louis Ferdinand
of Prussia can be characterized simply as a war hero here. He was
certainly an artist as much as an officer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, I’ll pass that and take your answer that
they are not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Let’s move on to the Sunday morning celebration on Page 70 of
your text, near the end of it. I wanted particularly to direct your
attention to this in view of what you said about Rosenberg earlier
this afternoon:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“If there is no one who can make a short formal address—it
must be good and command attention—extracts from ‘Mein
Kampf’ or from the Führer’s speeches or Rosenberg’s works
should be read.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Do you find that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have found it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, do you still say that Rosenberg and his works
had nothing to do with your Hitler Youth? You were suggesting
that, for Sunday morning reading, they might listen to this benign
philosopher’s works, weren’t you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Nothing is proved by the fact that such a
reference is made in one of the numerous handbooks of cultural
<span class='pageno' title='479' id='Page_479'></span>
work to one of the training staff who attended those biannual discussions
of Rosenberg’s which I have already mentioned. I think
you will look a long time before you find this particular passage in
one of the many youth handbooks.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me ask you something about this. You find one
line in here for the Sunday morning celebration about a churchman,
a chaplain, Holy Scripture, or anything related to religious institutions
and tell the Tribunal where it is.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I take it as certain that nothing like that
occurs there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is your Sunday morning program?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Hitler Youth was a state youth organization,
and my aim was to separate religious and state education.
A young man who wanted to go to church could go after the morning
celebration—it was a camp function—or before it, according to
whether he wanted to attend mass or go to a Protestant service; and
on these Sundays on which he was not in camp—the whole camp
lasted 3 weeks at the outside—he was completely free to attend
church at home with his parents or other friends.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think it is fair to say that immediately
before the words “Page 71” there are three lines which
might be said to refer to religion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I intend to quote it. I was saving that for a
little later. I will be glad to do it now if Your Honor prefers to
have it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I want to call your attention to a historical moral
ballad that is suggested for the youth of this camp, on Page 89 of
your text or 90, and on Page 6 of the English text.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I am not going to read this whole ballad, but I think you
will agree that it ridicules, to put it mildly, the Jews, other political
parties in Germany. It refers to “Isidor, Isidor” in the opening
lines, and it goes on down, “Poor Michael was a wretched man; he
had to serve the Jewish clan.” In another line, “He gave the gang
and the Jew a kick.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>And then your Party youth leaders suggest that now they have
a—what is it—a shadow show:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The nose of Isidor must be strongly exaggerated; the German
Michael should be presented in the conventional manner; the
Communist as a wild stormer of barricades; the Social Democrat
with a balloon cap; the Center Party man with a Jesuit
cap, and the reactionary with top hat and monocle.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='480' id='Page_480'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Did you ever see one of those shows, by the way?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot find the text you have just quoted
on Page 89.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I probably have given you the wrong page. I have
just been told it is Page 154 of your text—155, rather.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I just want to know about this suggested part
of the program for these young people of yours.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say something about the whole
question as far as this book is concerned. I wrote the preface and
I accept responsibility for the contents. I did not read every detail
of this book beforehand; and I do not wish to dispute the fact that
in the camps forming part of the camp circus, as it was called, political
caricatures were presented in the form of shadow-shows.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You know one of your youngsters wrote Streicher
a letter telling him that he saw this kind of a show. Do you know
about that? I am going to show you that letter in a little while,
just to show you that it did happen, and that your young people
wrote to Streicher about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>And on the last page of the English text, for Sunday, 19 July—I
think it is Page 179 of your text—the motto for the day is “Our
service to Germany is divine service.” And that was a slogan you
used on other Sundays, and as the Tribunal has pointed out, on
Page 70 of your text you say:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“...that this Sunday morning ceremony does not aim at
presenting arguments or conflicts with confessional points of
view, but at imbuing life and men with courage and strength
to fulfill their greater and lesser tasks through unqualified
faith in the divine power and the ideology of the Führer and
his movement.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, in no place where you ever made any reference to God
did you ever fail also to mention Hitler or the leaders of the Party,
did you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Will you please indicate the passage that you
quoted just now?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is on Page 70, right at the bottom of your Page 70.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, it says here:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“It does not aim at presenting arguments or conflicts with
confessional points of view, but at imbuing life and men with
courage and strength to fulfill their greater and lesser tasks
through unqualified faith in the divine power and the ideology
of the Führer and his Party.</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='481' id='Page_481'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>That does not, after all, mean that Hitler is compared to God,
but I believe that in the answer I gave a few minutes ago I did
define my attitude.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let’s see if you don’t. In your book <span class='it'>Revolution of
Education</span>, on Page 148, do you remember this statement: “The flag
of the Third Reich”—we’ll begin the whole sentence:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“On the contrary, the service of Germany appears to us to
be...the service of God. The banner of the Third Reich
appears to us to be His banner; and the Führer of the people
is the savior whom he sent to save us from the calamity
and peril into which we were actually plunged by the most
pious parties of the defunct German Republic.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to see the original of this text,
please.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Here I write:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“We consider that we are serving the Almighty when with
our youthful strength we seek to make Germany once more
united and great. In acknowledging loyalty to our Homeland
we see nothing which could be construed as a contradiction
of His eternal will. On the contrary, the service of Germany
appears to us to be genuine and sincere service of God; the
banner of the Third Reich appears to us to be His banner;
and the Führer of the people is the savior whom He sent to
rescue us from the calamity and peril into which we were
actually plunged by the most pious parties of the defunct
German Republic.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>This is the Center Party of the old Republic and other similar
organizations of a confessional and political nature. I wrote this.
I really do not see anything in that which could be construed into
a deification of the Führer. For me, service to my country was
service to the Almighty.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, if that is your answer—I see it differently.
Let’s go on to something else so that we can get through. I don’t
want to neglect to show you, if you care to be shown, that communication
to Streicher. It has already been presented to the Tribunal
by the British Delegation, the British prosecutor. I think it
was read from, but not put in, I am told.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In any event, do you know about that, Mr. Witness? Do you
know about the letter that the boys and girls of the Youth Hostel
at Grossmöllen wrote to Streicher in April of 1936, when they told
him about seeing the Jews, “Every Sunday our leader shows a play
about the Jews with his puppet theater.”
<span class='pageno' title='482' id='Page_482'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>I just want to know if you are aware of it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say in this connection that
the National Socialist Youth Home at Grossmöllen, which is mentioned
here, was not a Hitler Youth institution but was, I believe,
a kindergarten run by the National Socialist Public Welfare Organization
or some other organization.</p>

<p class='pindent'>This is typical of the letters ordered by the publisher of <span class='it'>Der
Stürmer</span> for recruiting purposes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Just a moment. Didn’t you take over every youth
hostel in 1933?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, what do you mean by saying that in 1936 this
National Socialist Youth Hostel at Grossmöllen was not a part of
the Hitler Youth organization?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It says here youth home (Heimstätte), not
hostel (Herberge). I am not familiar with the expression “Heimstätte.”
That must refer to a home run by the National Socialist
Public Welfare Organization or the National Socialist Women’s
League. We had only “Jugendheime” and “Herbergen.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, doesn’t it strike you as being strangely coincidental
that in your program for one of your youth camps you
suggest a show which portrays a Jewish man with a great nose and
ridicules him and teaches children to dislike him and laugh at him
and that from a youth camp a youngster writes to Streicher saying
that she and boys and girls saw such a show?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This letter was not written from any youth
camp.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I accept it if that is your answer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not deny that this puppet play was
shown and that this letter was written; but I believe the connection
is pulled in by the hair, so to speak. The connection is a very
remote one.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You think the connection about the ridiculing of the
Jews is very far afield and pulled in by the hair.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I dispute the statement that this is a
Hitler Youth institution. I believe actually it is a day nursery run
by the National Socialist Public Welfare Organization or something
similar.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, maybe the explanation is that all the young
people in Germany saw one of those shows. But, in any event, I
want to take up the last matter on this subject with you.
<span class='pageno' title='483' id='Page_483'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>This morning your counsel examined you about the confiscation
of a monastery, I believe it was in Austria while you were there,
Klosterneuburg. Do you remember?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: We discussed Count Schwarzenberg’s palace
this morning. That was not a monastery. It was the property of a
private citizen.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, the document that Counsel Dr. Sauter referred
to was R-146, USA-678. It was a letter from Bormann to all Gauleiter,
and it began by saying that valuable Church properties had
to be seized in Italy and in Austria. It was signed by Bormann.
And then also on that document was a letter from Lammers saying
that there had been some dispute as to whether the seized Church
property should go back to the Reich or should remain in your Gau.
You remember that, don’t you? Well, now, you seized the monastery
down there, didn’t you, in 1941, at Klosterneuburg? Klosterneuburg,
you know what I am referring to. I may mispronounce it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. The well-known foundation Klosterneuburg,
the famous monastery, served as a receiving office for collections
of works of art taken from our art museum.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. Now, what excuse did you have for seizing the
monastery at that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can no longer give you exact details with
regard to this. I believe there were very few people in the monastery,
that the large building was not being used to the fullest
possible extent, and that we urgently needed more space for the
expansion of the experimental station run in conjunction with our
State School of Viniculture. I believe that is why this monastery
was confiscated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. I am going to ask that you look at Document
3927-PS, and I wish you would remember that this morning
you told the Tribunal that you stopped the confiscation of churches
and Church property in Austria. When you look at this document
I wish you to recall your testimony.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did you offer M-25 in evidence or not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I wish to do so, Mr. President. It is USA-861. And
this one, 3927-PS, becomes USA-862.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, the first page of this document shows that it is marked
secret. It is dated 22 January 1941. It is a letter addressed to Dellbrügge
in your organization in Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>He says that he hears there is a possibility of getting a Hitler
School, which the city of Hamburg is also trying to get, and that
he wants the monastery Klosterneuburg considered as the place for
the Hitler School in Vienna. This letter is written by Scharizer,
your deputy, as you described him yesterday.
<span class='pageno' title='484' id='Page_484'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, he enclosed a communication, a teletype letter, from Bormann;
and if you turn the page, you will see that it is dated 13 January.
Bormann says it is strictly confidential:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“It is learned that the population does not show any indignation
when monastery buildings are used to serve what appears
to be a generally appropriate purpose.”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>He goes on to say:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Their conversion into hospitals, convalescent homes, educational
institutes, Adolf Hitler Schools, may be considered as
serving a generally appropriate purpose.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, that communication was dated the 13th of January, and
your deputy wrote the letter on the 22d.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now turn another page, and you will find a Gestapo report on
the monastery, dated 23 January 1941, addressed to your assistant
Dellbrügge. I wish you would look where it says, “Oral order of
23 January 1941.” Apparently somebody in your organization, you
or your assistants, orally asked the Gestapo to get up a report on
this monastery the very day that you wrote to Berlin asking that
it be considered as a Hitler School.</p>

<p class='pindent'>There are some charges against the inhabitants of that monastery
in this Gestapo report, but I ask you to turn over further and you
will find where you wrote an order for the taking over of the
monastery as an Adolf Hitler School on 22 February 1941. I will
show it to you if you like to see it, but that order bears your
initials, the original does—Pages 15 to 17 of the photostat that
you have.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, you framed up an excuse to seize that monastery, didn’t
you, when you really wanted it for a Hitler School; and you didn’t
have any just grounds for seizing it. And you get the Gestapo to
write a report and then you never referred to the reason that the
Gestapo framed up for you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I myself as head of these schools was naturally
extremely anxious to have such a school established in Vienna. At
one time the idea expressed here of taking Klosterneuburg and
housing one of the Adolf Hitler Schools in it did occur to me, and
I probably did discuss it with Herr Scharizer; but I dropped the idea
completely. Klosterneuburg was never converted into an Adolf
Hitler School.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No. But it never was turned back to the Church
people, either, was it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. Since the museum space available in
Vienna was not sufficient for the very large collections, we wanted
to turn this monastery into an additional large museum which would
be open to the public. We began to carry out this plan, and a great
<span class='pageno' title='485' id='Page_485'></span>
part of the collections was transferred to the building. In addition,
we needed the strongly built cellars of this monastery for the safekeeping
of the many art treasures which we had to protect against
bombing attacks.</p>

<p class='pindent'>It occurred to me that we might house an Adolf Hitler School
in this building and I discussed the possibility with one or two of
my colleagues and then abandoned it: Firstly, because it would
have caused some ill-feeling if we had housed an Adolf Hitler School
in a building which had formerly been consecrated ground, and
secondly, because we badly needed the monastery for these other
purposes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have nothing to add to my explanation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You will notice the date of that whole transaction
and the communication from Bormann. When did you first discover
that Bormann was so antireligious and anti-Church as you told
the Tribunal he was?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Bormann...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Just tell us when you found that out.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was just about to. Bormann showed his
antireligious views most clearly in 1943; but they had already
begun to appear in 1937.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And this telegram from him was when? 1941?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 1941.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Witness, when did you first start to do business
with Himmler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I met Hitler...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Himmler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I met Himmler in 1929 when I visited the
offices of the Party Leadership. At that time he was the propaganda
chief of the Party. That was our first meeting.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not really want to know, although it’s of
interest, when you first met him. What I really wanted to know
was when you with your youth groups started really to do business
with him for the first time. And by “business” I mean arrangements
such as the recruitment of young men into the Death’s-Head
Brigade of the SS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think I explained that this morning. One
of the first agreements laid down was, I think, contained in the
agreement regarding the patrol service, the date of which I do not
recall. This was not, by the way, a guarantee of reinforcements
for Death’s-Head units, but for police units generally. These were
special troops to be at the disposal of the Police.
<span class='pageno' title='486' id='Page_486'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How long did you continue to channel or divert
young men from your Youth organization to the SS? When was the
last time that you remember this program being effective?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not artfully drive young people into
the SS. But I permitted the SS to recruit among young people like
any other organization.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not ask you that. I asked you when you
would say was the latest date when you were effectively helping,
at least, Himmler to get young candidates from the young people
of Germany through your Hitler Youth organization. I do not
expect an exact date. Approximately?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: From 1940 on I tried constantly to have
youth taken into Army units. The SS, the Waffen-SS, carried on
very active recruitment among youth up to the last day of the war.
I could not prevent this recruitment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you knew what use they were being put to
in the last days of the war and in the mid-days of the war, did
you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did know that all young people who were
drafted or who volunteered had to fight.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am talking about something other than fighting.
You knew what was going on in the East, and you knew who
the guards were in the concentration camps, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This morning I testified on what I knew
about events in the East. I did not know that young men who
volunteered to go into the Waffen-SS were used during the war
to guard concentration camps.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not know who were the guards there,
although you visited two of them yourself?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Those guards did not belong to the Waffen-SS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know, but your agreement with Himmler provides
specifically for recruitment for SS Death’s-Head troops.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: When I concluded that agreement, I did not
know that he effected the supervision of concentration camps
chiefly by means of Death’s-Head units. Besides, I thought at that
time that concentration camps were something quite normal. I
said so this morning.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal yesterday that it was in
1944, I think, that you found out about the extermination. And I
want to talk to you about that a little bit, and ask you some
questions. And the first one is, how did you find out? Was it only
through this man Colin Ross?
<span class='pageno' title='487' id='Page_487'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I said that I heard of it through Colin Ross...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And, furthermore, that I asked numerous
questions of everyone I could reach, in order to get definite information.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Really I asked you if, from any other source, you
found out? And you can answer that pretty simply. We know that
you found out through Ross. Was there anyone else from whom
you found out?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I could not obtain any really definite information.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Most people had no information. I only received
positive—that is, detailed—information by way of the
Warthegau.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, as a matter of fact, you got regular reports
about the extermination of the Jews, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: These...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Written reports, I mean.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: These reports, two of which have been submitted
in this Court, were sent to the Reich Defense Commissioner
for the attention of the expert in question. This expert passed
the copies on to the inspector—I believe—or the commander of the
regular Police.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have looked at the copy which was submitted here in Kaltenbrunner’s
case but I had never seen it before (Document 3876-PS).</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You mean you did not know that it was arriving
in your office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have never seen this text before.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My office was the Central Office; it was not
the office of the Reich Defense Commissioner. The affairs of the
Reich Defense Commissioner were officially in charge of the
Regierungspräsident, whose personal adviser took care of routine
matters. My mail was delivered at the Central Office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You were the Reich Defense Commissioner for that
district, were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: This was an SS report of a highly confidential
nature, was it not? They were not just peddling this all over
Germany?
<span class='pageno' title='488' id='Page_488'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know how many copies of this were
sent out, I cannot say.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: 100, and you got the sixty-seventh copy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And these copies, as I gathered from the
original which I saw, were not sent to me but to the competent
adviser, a Herr Fischer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And who was Herr Fischer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have already told you this morning that
I have no idea who this Herr Fischer was. I assume that he was
the expert attached to the Regierungspräsident, the expert on
defense matters.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, I am going to show you some documents from
your own files.</p>

<p class='pindent'>We don’t have a full translation, Mr. President, because some
of this we located too late (Document 3914-PS).</p>

<p class='pindent'>But I think you will readily recognize this original is from your
files. And in there you will find—and I will direct your attention
to the page—something that I think will recall to your mind who
Dr. Fischer is.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I think it is on Page 29, you will find the names of persons
to serve on the Reich Defense Council submitted; and you will
find the name of Fischer, together with General Stülpnagel, Major
General Gautier, Dr. Förster—do you find that? This was your
own Reich Defense Council, before which you appeared from time
to time, and with whom you met frequently. And I will show
you documents on that, if you care to deny it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Just a moment, please. Will you please repeat
the page to me?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Page 29; it is a memorandum dated 28 September
1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have it now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you find the name of Dr. Fischer? You found
Dr. Fischer’s name as one of those suggested to your defense council?
His is the last name, by the way, and his signature. He is the
one that suggested the others to you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, will you go a little bit more
slowly?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: His name is the twentieth name on the list:
“Regierungsrat Dr. Fischer, Expert for Reich Defense Matters”—in
other words, expert attached to the Regierungspräsident. I have
probably seen him at some meeting or other. I take it that he
<span class='pageno' title='489' id='Page_489'></span>
kept the minutes. However, I must admit that I have no personal
recollection of this gentleman. I cannot attach any owner to that
name; but it is clear to me now that he was the person who took
charge of incoming mail for the Reich Defense Commissioner and
probably kept the minutes as well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In view of his junior status—he is only a
Regierungsrat—he cannot have held any other appointment on
this council.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: On Page 31 of that same file you will find another
reference to him, and your initials on the paper this time. It is the
membership list of the Reich Defense Council. There are 20 persons
on there, and the last name is Fischer’s. And at the bottom of the
page are your initials, apparently approving the list. Do you
see that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes; I had to initial this list.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you approved the membership, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot swear that I would not recognize
Dr. Fischer again if I were confronted with him. He seems to have
been the official who kept the minutes. However, among the large
circle of people who attended meetings of this kind, he did not
come to my attention. Only very few Reich defense meetings of
this sort actually took place. What seems to me the decisive point
is that he did not report to me personally but to the Regierungspräsident.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How could you fail to meet him? You met regularly
in 1940 with this Reich Defense Council. We have some documents
here, and I will be glad to show them to you, showing exactly
what you said before that council.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, as I said, he probably kept the minutes
of the meetings.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well surely, then, you saw him certainly on some
occasions, between 1940, the date of these files, and 1942, the date
of the SS reports on the exterminations. He apparently was with
you for 2 years before the first report that we have, which is
dated 1942, and he was 1 of 20 on your council.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe I must describe the exact composition
of this Reich Defense Council. There were the leading commanding
generals of the Army and the Luftwaffe; there were
various Gauleiter; there were the people mentioned here; there
was Dr. Putt, the representative of the Economic Management Staff
and all the others who are listed here. In this large circle of people,
whom I had to welcome, there was an official who kept the minutes
<span class='pageno' title='490' id='Page_490'></span>
and who was one of many officials in my office. These meetings,
as you have probably ascertained, took place very infrequently.
Dr. Fischer did not report to me currently, nor did he submit to
me the minutes of these sessions; the Regierungspräsident reported
to me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you think that Heinrich Himmler or Reinhard
Heydrich were sending these reports to inferior people around
Germany in these Gaue about the exterminations in the East?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: If these reports had been meant for me,
they would have been sent to me directly. Moreover, I said today
that I do not dispute having been informed of the shooting of Jews
in the East, but at a later period. I mentioned that in connection
with the war. However, the reports themselves were not in my
hands. If these reports had been before me, they would have had
a certain note, which I would recognize immediately.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, let’s see. Of course they are addressed to you,
to the attention of Fischer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>But I am going to move on a little bit. Now I am going to tell
you that you got weekly reports. You haven’t seen these. What
do you say to that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Weekly reports?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I received innumerable weekly reports from
every possible office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, I am talking about one kind of report. I am
talking about the reports from Heydrich and Himmler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know what you mean.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you had better take a look (Document
3943-PS). We have 55 of them, for 55 weeks. They are all here,
and they run consecutively, and Dr. Fischer is not involved in these.
And each one bears the stamp of your office having received it
on it, and the date that it was received.</p>

<p class='pindent'>They tell, by the way—and you can look at them—what was
happening to the Jews in the East.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: All these probably—I cannot look at them
all just now. These reports went from the Chief of the Security
Police to the Office of the Reich Defense Commissioner. They
were not, as I can tell from the first document, initialed by myself,
but bear the initials of the Regierungspräsident. I did not receive
these reports; otherwise my initial would have to be there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Dr. Dellbrügge was the man who received them,
according to the note, and he was your chief assistant. Incidentally,
<span class='pageno' title='491' id='Page_491'></span>
I think we ought to make this clear to the Tribunal, both of your
chief assistants were SS Brigadeführer, were they not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should in any case have stated that
Dr. Dellbrügge was one of Himmler’s confidants; but I believe...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And he was your chief assistant, that is the point
I am making. And so was your other chief assistant, also an SS
Brigadeführer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that this statement proves the
opposite of what you want to prove against me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I am going to go on with these weekly reports
in a minute, but there is one thing I do want to ask you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Were you pretty friendly with Heydrich?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I knew Heydrich, and while he was Reich
Protector in Prague he extended an invitation to me as President
of the Southeastern Europe Society to hold a meeting there which
I accepted. However, I did not have close personal contact with
Heydrich.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you think he was a good public servant at the
time that he was terrorizing Czechoslovakia?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had the impression that Heydrich, as he said
himself during my stay in Prague, wanted to carry out a policy
of conciliation, especially in regard to Czech workers. I did not
see in him an exponent of a policy of terror. Of course, I have
no practical knowledge of the incidents which took place in Czechoslovakia.
I made only this one visit, or possibly one further visit.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You sent a telegram to “Dear Martin Bormann”
when Heydrich was assassinated; do you remember that—the man
who was, I understand, not in your good standing in 1942? Do you
remember when Heydrich was assassinated by some Czech patriots
in Prague?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you remember what you did when you heard
about it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not remember exactly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Perhaps if I read you this telegram you will
remember it.</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“To Reichsleiter Bormann, Berlin, Party Chancellery; Express.
Urgent. Immediate attention.</p>

<p>“Dear Martin Bormann:</p>

<p>“I request that the following be submitted to the Führer.</p>

<p>“Knowing the Czech population and its attitude in Vienna
as well as in the Protectorate, I would draw your attention
to the following:
<span class='pageno' title='492' id='Page_492'></span></p>

<p>“The enemy powers and the British cliques around Beneš
have for a long time felt bitter about the co-operation
generally found among the Czech workers and their contribution
to the German war economy. They are seeking for a
means to play off the Czech population and the Reich against
each other. The attack on Heydrich was undoubtedly planned
in London. The British arms of the assailant suggest parachuted
agents. London hopes by means of this murder to
induce the Reich to take extreme measures with the aim of
bringing about a resistance movement among Czech workers.
In order to prevent the world from thinking that the population
of the Protectorate is in opposition to Hitler, these acts
must immediately be branded as of British authorship. A
sudden and violent air attack on a British cultural town
would be most effective and the world would have learned of
this through the headline ‘Revenge for Heydrich.’ That alone
should induce Churchill to desist immediately from the procedure
begun in Prague of stirring up revolt. The Reich
replies to the attack at Prague by a counterattack on world
public opinion.</p>

<p>“It is suggested that the following information be given the
press tomorrow regarding the attempt on Heydrich’s life.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And then you go on to say that it was the work of British
agents and that it originated in Britain. You sign it, “Heil Hitler,
Dein Schirach.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you remember sending that telegram to Bormann?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have just been listening to the English
translation. I should like to see the German original, please.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you read, I thought, a British
“coastal” town, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, “cultural” I meant to say, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is what I have got.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, it is “cultural.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Incidentally, I call your attention, Mr. Witness, to the word
“cultural.” You have expressed such a great interest in culture.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would it be all right to break off now, or do
you want to go on?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I had hoped I could finish. I won’t be many minutes,
but I do have one or two rather important documents that I would
like to put to the witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, if we recess, may I ask that the witness not be
talked to by his counsel overnight? I think it is only fair, when
<span class='pageno' title='493' id='Page_493'></span>
a witness is under cross-examination, that he not have conversations
with his counsel.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say to this document...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I should like to have this question
clarified as to whether as defense counsel I am entitled to talk with
my client or not. Mr. Dodd forbade me to talk to my client some
time ago; and, of course, I acquiesced. But, if I am told that I
must not speak to my client until the end of the cross-examination
and the cross-examination is to be continued on Monday, that
means that I cannot speak with my client tomorrow or the day
after. But, in order to carry on his defense, I must have an opportunity
of discussing with my client all the points raised here today.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I will withdraw my request. I really
forgot we were going over until Monday. I do think it is the
ordinary rule, but I do think it might present some difficulty for
the counsel here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I want to be fair with the Tribunal. During the recess Dr. Sauter
approached the witness stand and I did tell him then that I did
not think he should talk to him during the recess while he was
under cross-examination.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is the British rule, but I think in
the circumstances we had better let Dr. Sauter...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I quite agree. I was thinking we would go on
tomorrow, but I do not want to interfere with his consultation
over the weekend.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 27 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div><span class='pageno' title='494' id='Page_494'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINTH DAY</span><br/> Monday, 27 May 1946</h1></div>

<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Schirach resumed the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I would like to make certain that I
did offer the following documents in evidence: 3914-PS, which
becomes USA-863; 3943-PS, USA-864; and 3877-PS, USA-865.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, at the close of the session on Friday we
had just handed to you a copy of the teletype message to Martin
Bormann. I had read it to you over this transmission system. I
wish to ask you now if you sent that message to Bormann.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I dispatched that teletype message, and
I should like to give an explanation in this connection. First...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May I interrupt you just for a minute and ask that
for the little while that we will be talking today, that you wait just
a minute after your answer. I think it would help a little bit with
the interpreting. I do not think we will have any trouble this
morning. I will try to do the same thing, and perhaps we will work
a little better together.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First of all, then, I want to explain why I
addressed Bormann with “Du,” in the friendly form. Bormann and
I come from the same town; I knew him from Weimar, but only
slightly. And when in 1928 or ’29 he came to Munich, he paid me a
visit, and because he was the elder of us he suggested to me that
we should call one another “Du.” We maintained that form until
1943, when on his own initiative he dropped it and addressed me
in his letters only with “Sie.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, the text of this teletype message: We were in the third
year of the war; the Czech population both in the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia and in Vienna had remained perfectly quiet;
in the Protectorate conditions were almost like those in peacetime.
I had a very large Czech population in Vienna, and as a result of
the attempt on Heydrich’s life I feared that in the Protectorate
there might be unrest which would no doubt have serious repercussions
in Vienna. This was the time when German troops were
advancing on the peninsula of Kerch; it was a time when we could
<span class='pageno' title='495' id='Page_495'></span>
not afford to have anything happen behind our front. And simultaneously
with the news of the murder of the Protector I received
official notification that the attempt, as is mentioned in this document,
had been carried out by British agents and with British
weapons.</p>

<p class='pindent'>During the same month we heard, and it was also mentioned in
the Wehrmacht communiqués, that British bombers had bombed
residential areas in Hamburg and Paris and had attacked German
cultural sites at Kiel. And so I suggested a reprisal measure to
establish before the world British guilt in this attempt and to
prevent serious unrest in Czechoslovakia. That is all I have to say.
This teletype message is genuine.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May I at this point also comment on a difficulty of translation
which occurred during the last cross-examination on Friday? The
German word “Retter” was at that time translated into the English
“savior.” It is an expression which I used in my book when I described
the Führer as a “Retter,” and the difficulty lies in the translation
of that word into English: it can only be translated into
English as “savior.” But retranslated into German, “savior” means
“Heiland.” In order to make quite clear what the German “Retter”
is meant to express in English, I should have to use an explanatory
phrase. If I say that the exact translation is “rescuer,” then the
real meaning of the word “Retter” is clearly set forth; and there is
nothing blasphemous in the comparison or the description of the
head of the State as a “rescuer.” But if I had written in German
that the head of the State was a “Heiland,” then, of course, that
would be blasphemy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This sort of explanation should be kept for
re-examination. It is not a matter which ought to interrupt the
cross-examination.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, I have only one or two questions to ask you
in addition about this message.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Were you thinking of some particular cultural city in Britain,
like Cambridge, Oxford, Stratford, Canterbury?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I had no definite plan in mind. I thought
that one ought to choose an objective corresponding to the sites hit
by British bombers in Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: As long as it was a cultural city. Were you thinking
of what happened in Germany or of what happened to Heydrich?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was thinking of the cultural buildings in
Germany which had been attacked, and I wanted to suggest this as
an opportunity to make clear unmistakably that the murder of
Heydrich had not been committed by the Czech population but by
<span class='pageno' title='496' id='Page_496'></span>
the Czech emigrants in London with British support. This retaliation
in the third year of the war was to be a reply both to the
attempt against Heydrich and to the attacks on German cultural
monuments.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not make any reference in this telegram
to any so-called or alleged bombings of cultural objects in Germany,
did you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Wehrmacht communiqués had already announced
them, and they were generally known.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is not what I asked you. I asked if it is not a
fact that in this teletype you made no reference at all to the alleged
bombing of cultural objects in Germany, nor did you relate your
suggestion for the bombing of a cultural town in England to any
alleged cultural bombing in Germany, but rather, you made it perfectly
clear that you wanted to strike at a cultural town in England
because of what had happened to Heydrich. That is so, is it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was not at all necessary for me to point
to the bombing of German cultural sites. It was a fact known to
the entire German population from the daily attacks of British
bombers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I suppose by this time you knew very well the
general reputation of Heydrich, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is not correct. I considered Heydrich
in this particular case as the representative of the Reich in Bohemia
and Moravia and not as the Chief of the Gestapo.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you know his general reputation in Germany at
least at that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I knew that he was the Chief of the Gestapo.
I did not know that he had committed the atrocities which have
meanwhile become known.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You had no knowledge that he was considered “the
terror of the Gestapo”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is an expression which enemy propaganda
used against him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You mean you still think it is propaganda?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, was it through enemy propaganda that you
heard that he was called a terror before he was killed in 1942?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not want to say that...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How did you know it?
<span class='pageno' title='497' id='Page_497'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I merely want to state here that for me the
Reich Protector Heydrich was during this third year of the war a
person other than the Chief of the Gestapo. This was a political
matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not content yourself with this suggestion to
bomb England, did you? Do you recall what else you suggested not
long afterwards?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you recall anything that you either suggested or
did by way of further so-called retaliation for the assassination of
Heydrich?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I have no recollection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You suggested evacuating all the Czechs out of
Vienna, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This is a suggestion which did not originate
with me personally, but which goes back to a remark about Vienna
which the Führer himself had made in 1940 while I was reporting
to him at his headquarters. I think I already mentioned during my
own testimony that he said, “Vienna must become a German city
and the Jews and Czechs must gradually be evacuated from
Vienna.” I already said that during my own testimony here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: My question is: Is it not a fact that a few days after
the assassination of Heydrich you suggested the evacuation of the
Czechs from Vienna as a retaliatory measure for the assassination of
Heydrich?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no recollection of it, but it is possible
that in the excitement of this event, which disquieted me greatly,
I said something like that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I suggest that you take a look at Document 3886-PS,
which becomes USA-866, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, this document consists of excerpts from the record of a
meeting of the Vienna City Council on 6 June 1942, as you will see
on Page 9 of the original. You were present, and according to these
notes, you spoke as Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach and, moving
down towards the bottom of that page, you will find this statement:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Finally, he”—meaning you—“disclosed that already in the
latter part of summer or in the fall of this year all Jews
would be removed from the city, and that the removal of the
Czechs would then get under way, since this is the necessary
and right answer to the crime committed against the Deputy
Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Do you remember saying that?
<span class='pageno' title='498' id='Page_498'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no exact recollection, but I consider
that these records here are genuine, and they probably represent
the sense of what I said at the time. I was very much perturbed by
Heydrich’s death. I was afraid of serious trouble in Bohemia and
Moravia, and I expressed my fears. The essential thing is that after
calm consideration of this plan I dropped it, and did nothing more
about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, I think it is perfectly clear—and
I ask you if you do not agree—that you made two suggestions
at least: one for the bombing of a cultural English town and the
other for the wholesale evacuation of the Czechs from Vienna,
because of the assassination of this man Heydrich.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is true that I put the idea of such an
evacuation of the Czechs into words. It is equally true, and a
historical fact, that I dropped the idea and that it was never carried
out. It is correct that I suggested the bombing of a British cultural
site as an answer to the attempt against Heydrich and to the
innumerable bombardments of German cultural places in the third
year of the war, at a time when vital interests of the German people
were at stake.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Incidentally, Hitler also suggested the wholesale
evacuation of the Czechs from Czechoslovakia as a punishment for
the murder of Heydrich, did he not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I do not know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now I want to turn to something else and see if we
can get through here rather soon this morning. You recall that on
Friday we talked a little bit about your relationship with the SS
and with Himmler, and I want to ask you this morning if it is not
a fact, Mr. Witness, that you worked very closely with Himmler
and his SS from almost the earliest days right down to almost the
last days of your regime in Vienna. I wish you would answer that
question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should very much like to answer that
question in great detail.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It does not require great detail in the first answer,
but later, if you feel that you have some necessary explanation, I
am sure you will be permitted to do so. Will you tell the Tribunal
first of all, rather, if it is not a fact that you did closely co-operate
with Himmler and his SS from the earliest days of your public
office to the very late days of your public office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Close collaboration in the sense that Himmler
had considerable influence upon education did not exist.
<span class='pageno' title='499' id='Page_499'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let us stop right there and inquire a little bit. Is it
not a fact that Himmler assigned his SS personnel to your youth
organization for the training purpose of your young people? You
can answer that very simply. Did he or did he not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: For training purposes?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I am not aware of anything like that. The
fact that there might have been liaison officers would not be
unusual, because practically all ministries and organizations had
liaison officers. What you have just suggested, however, I do not
recall.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I think we had better clear this up first, and I ask
you that you look at Document 3931-PS, which is a new document
which becomes USA-867, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, Mr. Witness, if you will look at this document, you will
observe that it is a message which you sent to “Dear Party Member
Bormann” in August of 1941. It is quite long, and there will not be
any necessity, I am sure, for reading all of it, but I want to direct
your attention to some parts of it that might help your memory
with respect to the SS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>By way of preliminary question, the SA apparently had suggested
that it take over some of the training of young people, had it not,
some time in the summer of 1941?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I said in my testimony—I think on Thursday—that
already in the spring of 1939, I believe, the SA had
attempted to take over the premilitary training of the youth of the
two older age classes, and such attempts were probably repeated
in 1941.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I knew you were complaining to Bormann
about it when you wrote this message. You recall now, do you not,
from just looking at the letter, that that is the whole substance of
the letter—a complaint about the attempt of the SA to directly
control the training of some young people in the Hitler Youth
organization.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot speak about this long teletype letter
without having read through it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, let us see. If you will turn to the second page
of the English text—you do not have any pages there; I think it is
all one. It is all a teletype, but it will be not too far down on the
first part of it. First of all, I want to have you see if you can find
the statement that “the Hitler Youth has considered it necessary
from the very beginning to make the Party itself the agency for the
<span class='pageno' title='500' id='Page_500'></span>
direction and administration of its military training.” Do you find
that passage?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you will find the paragraph numbered (1) on
your teletype, small Arabic number one. You will find they start to
be numbered (1), (2), (3), and so on. Do you find that, Mr. Witness?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have Roman numeral I.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. That is what I want to call your attention
to. If we hit some place that we agree on, then we can move on.
You found that Number (1) that says that “for more than one year
an agreement in draft form has been submitted to the SA which
requests that the SA cadre be furnished for the military training
of the youth,” and that the SA leadership did not comply with this
request.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, will you move down further, let me see, in Number (3),
and then following (3), probably down another whole length three
or four paragraphs, you will find—it is in capital letters, by the
way—what I want to call your attention to; I assume it is in capital
letters in the German:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I would be happy if the SA would put personnel at my
disposal for support for this purpose, similar to the way in
which the SS and the Police have been doing for a long time
already.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>In the English, Mr. President, that is at the bottom of Page 4
and the top of Page 5.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Did you find that sentence?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You say there that you would be happy if the SA
would put personnel at your disposal for support of this purpose,
similar to the way in which the SS and the Police have been doing
for a long time already, and you are referring—if you will read
back to the paragraph just ahead of that sentence—to the training
of the young people. You talk about Hitler Schools and the training
of Hitler Youth. Now, it is perfectly clear, is it not, that you did
have assistance from the SS, according to your own words, from
the SS and Police, for a long time before you sent this message?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: During the war, yes; since the beginning of
the war in 1939 we had premilitary training camps and I wanted
youth instructors for these camps. Neither the Army nor the SA
could supply sufficient instructors; the SS and the Police could
place a few young officers at my disposal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: So it was only from the beginning of the war that
you had personnel from the SS and Police for the training of young
people, was it?
<span class='pageno' title='501' id='Page_501'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not think that there would have been
need for SS instructors otherwise. As I have said, we selected youth
leaders from among youth itself.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I ask you again, do you want the Tribunal to understand
that it was only from the beginning of the war that you had
the assistance of SS and Police personnel assigned to your youth
organization for the training of young people?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that question definitely for
this reason: we had for example a training camp for skiing practice,
and it was quite possible that one of the instructors was an SA man
or an SS man only because by chance he happened to be one of the
best sportsmen in that field. But I cannot think where such collaboration
existed elsewhere.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Are you able to say that you did not have SS
personnel assigned for training purposes; and I am not talking
about some isolated skimaster, I am talking about a regular program
of assistance from the SS to you in your training of young
people.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as premilitary training is concerned,
it was only through this teletype message that I requested help for
training purposes. Apart from that, I do not recollect any collaboration.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know the term “Heuaktion”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Heuaktion? I do not remember it. I do not
know what is meant by that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you have been in the courtroom every day.
Do you not remember that there was proof offered here by the
Prosecution concerning the Defendant Rosenberg and an action
termed Heuaktion?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not remember it at the moment; I do
not know it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you not remember that there was some talk
here in the courtroom about the seizing of young people in the East
and forcing them to be brought to Germany, 40,000 or 50,000 youths
at the ages of 10 to 14? You remember that, don’t you, and that one
of the purposes was to destroy the biological potentiality of these
people? You do not know what I refer to?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is an action which I now remember
in connection with this Trial. The only thing I can say on this in
an official capacity is what Axmann told me during the war—I
cannot recall the exact year—namely, that he had placed a large
number of young Russians in apprentice hostels and apprentice
workshops at the Junkers works in Dessau, and that these youths
<span class='pageno' title='502' id='Page_502'></span>
were extremely well accommodated and looked after there. I had
not been in any way concerned with this action before, but as I
stated at the beginning of my testimony here, I assume responsibility
for the actions of youth in this war; I adhere to that statement.
I do not think, however, that youth is responsible in this case,
and I recall the Defendant Rosenberg’s statements that he was
complying with the wishes of the Army and an army group in this
affair.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, we have the document here. It is already in
evidence as USA-171—the Tribunal is familiar with it—and I would
like to call your attention to the fact that in this document, which
says that Rosenberg agreed to the program of seizing or apprehending
40,000 to 50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 and the transportation
of them to the Reich, it also said that this program can be
accomplished with the help of the officers of the Hitler Youth
through the Youth Bureau of Rosenberg’s Ministry; and it also said
that a number of these young people were to be detailed to the SS
and SS auxiliaries. Now, what I want to ask you particularly is
what you know about that program and how the Hitler Youth
co-operated in it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot add to what I have already said
about this program.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You were in charge of the war commitment of the
Hitler Youth, were you not, the “Kriegseinsatz”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The war commitment of German youth was
under immediate direction of the Reich Youth Leader. From my
own knowledge I can give only general but no detailed information.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, I ask you again, were you not appointed
and did you not serve as the person responsible for the war
commitment of youth in Germany? Now, I have got the document
to show your appointment if you want to see it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes; I do not want to deny it at all. In 1939
and 1940, as long as I was Reich Youth Leader, I myself directed
that war commitment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am talking about an appointment that was made
even later than 1939 or 1940. You were appointed the person in
charge of the war commitment of German youth by the Führer at
his headquarters in March of 1942, were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Will you be good enough to show me the
document. I consider it possible, but I have no exact recollection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. It is 3933-PS, which becomes USA-868.
But first of all: You do not know you were appointed in charge of
the war commitment for youth without being shown the document?
<span class='pageno' title='503' id='Page_503'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No; only I cannot tell you the exact date from
memory. I was under the impression that I had been responsible
for the war commitment beginning in 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, that is all I wanted to establish, that you
were in fact responsible for it and continued to be responsible for
it right up to the end of the war. I understood you to say a minute
ago that the Reich Youth Leader was the man responsible rather
than yourself?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I said that I could give you only general
but no special information, because the practical application of the
war commitment was a matter for Axmann; I do not, however,
want to minimize my own responsibility in any way.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well. I think we are sufficiently clear about
the fact that you were certainly named to the position no matter
how you now wish to “water” your responsibility. What do you say
is the date when you first became responsible for the war commitment
of youth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as I remember, I was responsible for it
beginning 1939, at the outbreak of war, but I now see that this
decree was not signed until 1942.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right; we will agree then that from that date,
March 1942, you were responsible. Now, I want to ask you to look
at another document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: One moment, may I explain something in
this connection? I do not know whether Hitler signed this decree in
March 1942; I do not know when it was signed. In this document
Axmann tells me: the draft of the decree is now going to the Chief
of the Reich Chancellery, who will request the official approval of
the higher Reich authorities concerned, and then Bormann...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You do not need to read it, really. What do you
want to say now? Are you saying that maybe it was not signed, or
maybe you were not appointed, or are you going to say that you
were appointed? Will you please give us an answer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not at all. But I really cannot say that the
date of the publication of this decree was March 1942. It may not
have been published until May.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am not attaching any great importance to the date.
I want you to look at 345-PS, which we offer as USA-869. This may
help you on this Heuaktion program; that is, with respect to your
memory.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, this is a telegram that the Defendant Rosenberg sent to
Dr. Lammers at the Reich Chancellery for the Führer’s headquarters
<span class='pageno' title='504' id='Page_504'></span>
on 20 July 1944. You will observe that in the first paragraph there
is stated:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“In accordance with an agreement between the Reich Marshal
as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, the Reichsführer
SS, the Youth Führer of the German Reich, and the Reich
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the recruiting
of young Russians, Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Lithuanians,
and Tartars, between 15 and 20 years of age, ‘will
take place on a volunteer basis for Kriegseinsatz in the
Reich’ ”—“Kriegseinsatz” being a program that you were
responsible for clearly at that time.</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Now, moving down, I want to call your attention to Paragraph 3,
and I want to remind you of the Heuaktion document that is
already in evidence. This telegram says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“On the basis of a suggestion by military offices, the seizing
and turning over of youths between the ages of 10 to 14 to
the Reich territories will take place (Heuaktion) in a part of
the operational territory, since the youths in the operational
territory present a not insignificant burden.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>It goes on to say:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The aim of the action is a further disposal of the youths by
placing them in the Reich Youth Movement, and the training
of apprentices for German economy in a form similar to that
which has been effected in agreement with the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor with White Russian
Youths, which already shows results.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I particularly call your attention to that last phrase, “which
already shows results.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then the last clause in the next sentence, which says, “...these
youths are to be used later in the Occupied Eastern Territories as
especially reliable construction forces.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>You will observe that the last paragraph says that “the actions
under Points 1 and 3”—which I have just been reading—“are known
to the Führer.” And there is something about SS help in regard to
this action. You had set a time limit on that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The next page of the document has the distribution, to the Reich
Marshal, the Reichsführer SS, the Reich Youth Führer, and the
Reich Minister of Interior, and down at the bottom, a Gauleiter
bureau, among others.</p>

<p class='pindent'>What do you know about this seizing of young people between
10 and 14 and the turning over of them to your youth organization
in Germany during these war years, and about how many thousands
of them were so kidnaped, if you know?
<span class='pageno' title='505' id='Page_505'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have already said that I do not wish to
minimize my responsibility in this connection. But it was not until
later that I was informed of this matter. Not I, but somebody else
was Youth Leader of the German Reich in that year; and he made
the agreement with the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and
the Reichsführer SS. But my own measures were...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Later you were the Youth Reichsleiter of Germany,
were you not? And you were also the war commitment officer of
Youth in Germany at this very time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was at Vienna, and the date was 20 July
1944. You will remember that the history-making events of that
time were occupying all officials in Germany to a very great extent.
Later I heard about this matter from Axmann, and I know that the
accommodation, training, feeding, and the whole treatment of these
Russian youths was actually excellent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You also know that even at this hour the Allied
forces are trying to find thousands of these young people to return
them to their proper place? Do you know that this morning’s press
carried an account of 10,000 people that are still unlocated?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe that those are these young
people who were accommodated in apprentice hostels and who
under exceptionally well-ordered conditions received very good
professional training.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You see, it is perfectly clear from this Document
345-PS that this program was in fact in operation. The letter from
Rosenberg says so. He says it had “already shown results.” And so
your youth organization must have had something to do with it
before this message was sent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have not at all denied that. Youth leaders
were active within the framework of the Reich Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern Territories. And on the basis of what I have
heard here during the Trial, I can perfectly well understand that
the generals in the East said that the young people must be taken
out of the combat zone. The point was that these youngsters from
10 to 14 years of age had to be taken away from the front.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: With the help of the SS?</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, I want to show you another document, 1137-PS, which will
give you some idea, if you do not recall, of what was done with
these young people, and how many of them are involved.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That will become USA-870.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, there is a paragraph at the bottom
of Page 1 of that document which relates to another defendant.
<span class='pageno' title='506' id='Page_506'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor, I am sorry; I overlooked that. I
will read it for the benefit of the record, if I may, at this time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. Witness, I direct your attention back, if I may, to this Document
345-PS, so that you will be aware of what I am reading. You
will observe that in the last paragraph of Rosenberg’s communication
to Dr. Lammers we find this sentence:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I have learned that Gauleiter Sauckel will be at the Führer’s
headquarters on 21 July 1944. I ask that this be taken up
with him there and then a report made to the Führer.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Sauckel was participating in this kidnaping of 10- to 14-year-olds
as well, was he? Do you know about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no knowledge of it. I cannot give any
information on that subject.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, this Document 1137-PS begins with a letter
from a general, a message rather, an interoffice memorandum,
dated 27 October 1944, and it closes with a report by the brigadier
general of the Hitler Youth, a man named Nickel.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you know Nickel, by the way? N-i-c-k-e-l?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The name is known to me, and probably I
know the man personally; but at the moment I do not recall more
than just the name. At any rate, he was not a brigadier general;
he was a Hauptbannführer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, all right. Whatever he was, he was an official
of the youth organization. That is all I am trying to establish.
I may have his title wrong. We have it brigadier general.</p>

<p class='pindent'>But in any event, if you look over this document, you will see
that he is reporting about the seizing of these youths in the
Occupied Eastern Territory. This is October 1944. And he begins by
saying that on 5 March he “received an order to open an office for
the recruitment of youths from 15 to 20 years of age from the
Occupied Eastern Territories for war employment in the Reich.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then he goes on to cite figures, and he tells where he began his
work: Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, the middle sector of the Eastern
front, the southern sector of the Eastern front. And then on the next
page of the English—and I imagine it is also on your next page—it
tells how they were classified, those that were brought back:</p>

<p class='pindent'>“1,383 Russian SS Auxiliaries, 5,953 Ukrainian SS Auxiliaries,
2,354 White Ruthenian SS Auxiliaries, 1,012 Lithuanian SS
Auxiliaries.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then he gets into the Air Force: “3,000 Estonian Air Force
Auxiliaries,” and so on. Some went to the Navy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am not going to read all of it; but it gives you an idea of what
distribution was made of these men, or young boys and girls rather
than men. You will notice that a considerable number went to the SS.
<span class='pageno' title='507' id='Page_507'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but Hauptbannführer Nickel’s letter bears
a stamp with the words “Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories.”
That means he was not acting on behalf of the Reich Youth
Leader’s department but on behalf of the Reich Ministry for
the East.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. I also want to ask you if you will look at
Page 6. I think it is Page 5 of the original of your German. You
will find what personnel Hauptbannführer Nickel had for the
purpose of carrying out his task. He had members of the Hitler
Youth, so he says: 5 leaders, 3 BDM leaders, 71 German youth
leaders as translators and assistant instructors, 26 SS leaders, 234
noncommissioned officers and troops, drivers, and translators of
the SS. And of the Air Force personnel, he had 37 officers, 221 non-coms,
and so on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Does that help your memory any with this program that your
youth people were engaging in? Do you recall any more of it now?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It does not help my memory at all, because I
hear this for the first time from this document. I was not informed
of the activities of the Eastern Ministry in Russia, and I do not
know what assignment the Eastern Ministry gave to Hitler Youth
Leader Nickel. I assume responsibility for what was done on my
orders, but anything done on the orders of others must be their
responsibility.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me show you something with respect to your
answer that you have just made. That personnel that I read out,
you know, was only in one part of the program. And on the last
page of the document you will see on how wide an area Nickel was
operating. He was operating in co-operation with the Netherlands
Hitler Youth Operational Command, the Adria Hitler Youth
Operational Command, the Southern Hitler Youth Operational
Command in Slovakia and Hungary, the Lieutenant Nagel Special
Command in refugee camps within the Reich, and then, interestingly
enough, the field offices in Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is where you were located at the time, is it not? And you
are telling the Tribunal you did not know anything about this
program and the participation of your Hitler Youth Leaders?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I received no written or verbal report from
Nickel. His report, as can be seen from the letter, went to the Reich
Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and to what extent
the Reich Youth Leader was being informed is not known to me.
I myself do not know what took place. What I do know of the entire
affair I very clearly stated in my testimony with reference to the
Junkers works and the professional training which these youngsters
<span class='pageno' title='508' id='Page_508'></span>
were given in Germany. Apart from that I have no further
knowledge.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Observe also, if you will, Mr. Witness, that your
Hitler Youth Operational Command was in Poland, and even in
northern Italy. And now I ask you once again, as the long-time
Hitler Youth Leader, as the leader for the War Commitment of
Youth, then Gauleiter in Vienna, with part of this program being
carried on in Vienna and the whole program being carried on on
this vast scale, do you want the Tribunal to believe that you knew
nothing about it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no knowledge of it, but I assume
responsibility for it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal in your direct examination
that you wrote the letter to Streicher’s <span class='it'>Stürmer</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I would like to submit this in evidence, Mr. President, so that the
Tribunal will have an idea of what it appeared like on the front
page of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Perhaps—if you would like to look at it, you may, of course,
Mr. Witness. It is USA-871. I just wanted you to have a look at it
before it was submitted. You know about it anyway.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I already made a statement about that the
other day.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I did not wish to go into it further. What I do
want to ask you, Mr. Witness, is: Do I understand you clearly when
I say that from your testimony we gathered that it was Hitler who
ordered the evacuation of the Jews from Vienna and that you really
did not suggest it or wish to see it carried out? Is that a fair understanding
of your testimony of a day or two ago?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I stated the other day, and I repeat this, that
the idea of evacuating the Jews from Vienna was Hitler’s idea
which he communicated to me in 1940 at his headquarters. Furthermore,
and I want to make this quite clear, I stated that after the
events of those November days in 1938 I was actually of the opinion
that it would be better for the Jewish population to be accommodated
in a closed settlement than to be regularly singled out by
Goebbels as a target for his propaganda and his organized actions.
I also said that I identified myself with that action suggested by
Hitler, but did not carry it out.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now you had a meeting at the Führer’s headquarters
in October 1940. Present was the Defendant Frank and the
now notorious Koch whom we have heard so much about. Do you
remember that meeting?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I no longer recall it exactly.
<span class='pageno' title='509' id='Page_509'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, you mean you do not recall that meeting at all?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In October 1940 I was in the Reich Chancellery
because that was the time when I was organizing the evacuation
of youth. It is possible that at lunch...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You were asked whether you recalled a
particular meeting in October 1940 with certain particular people.
Do you remember it or do you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no recollection of it. If I am shown
a document, then I can confirm it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well; that is what I wanted to know. I will
now show you the document USSR-172. A part of this document
was read over the system for the Tribunal by Colonel Pokrovsky.
Now you will observe that on 2 October—this is a memorandum, by
the way, made up of the meeting. Herr Martin Bormann compiled
these notes, so I assume he was there too. After a dinner at the
Führer’s apartment there developed a conversation on the nature of
the Government General:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The treatment of the Poles and the incorporation already
approved by the Führer for the districts Petrikau and
Tomassov.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Then it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The conversation began when Reich Minister Dr. Frank
informed the Führer that the activities in the Government
General could be termed very successful. The Jews in Warsaw
and other cities were now locked up in the ghettos and
Kraków would very shortly be cleared of them. Reichsleiter
Von Schirach, who had taken his seat at the Führer’s other
side, remarked that he still had more than 50,000 Jews in
Vienna whom Dr. Frank would have to take over. Party
Member Dr. Frank said this was impossible. Gauleiter Koch
then pointed out that he, too, had up to now not transferred
either Poles or Jews from the District of Ziechenau, but that
these Jews and Poles would now, of course, have to be
accepted by the Government General.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And it goes on to say that Dr. Frank protested against this also.
He said there were not housing facilities—I am not quoting directly,
I do not want to read all of it—and that there were not sufficient
other facilities. Do you remember that conference now?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have refreshed my memory now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. And you suggested that you wanted to get
50,000 Jews moved into Frank’s territory out of Vienna, didn’t you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. The Führer asked me
how many Jews were still in Vienna, and at that time—I mentioned
<span class='pageno' title='510' id='Page_510'></span>
this during my own testimony the other day and it is contained in
the files—there were still 60,000 Jews in Vienna. During that conversation,
in which the question of settling Jews in the Government
General was discussed, I also said that these 60,000 Jews from
Vienna were still to be transferred to the Government General. I
told you earlier that as a result of the events of November 1938 I
was in favor of the Führer’s plan to take the Jews to a closed
settlement.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well now, later on, as you know from USA-681
concerning which your own counsel inquired, Lammers sent you a
message in Vienna and he said the Führer had decided, after receipt
of one of the reports made by you, that the 60,000 Jews in Vienna
would be deported most rapidly, and that was just 2 months after
this conference that you had with Frank and Koch and Hitler,
wasn’t it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, since 1937—and I think that becomes
clear from the Hossbach minutes—the Führer had the idea of
expatriating the Jewish population. This plan, however, did not
become known to me until August 1940 when I took over the
Vienna district. I reported to Hitler on that occasion, and he asked
me how many Jews there were in Vienna. I answered his question,
and he told me that he actually wanted all of them to be settled in
the Government General.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How many Jews did you, in fact, deport out of
your district while you were the Gauleiter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First of all, the practical measures of that
action were not in my hands. I do not know how many of these
60,000 Jews were actually transported out of Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you have any idea where they went to?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was informed that the aged were being
taken to Theresienstadt and the others to Poland, to the Government
General. On one occasion—it was either when I took my oath
of office as Governor or when I made a speech about the evacuation
of children—I even asked Hitler how these Jews were being
employed, and he told me: in accordance with their professions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: We will get around to that. You remember, don’t
you, that they were sent, at least some of them were sent, to the
cities of Riga and Minsk, and you were so notified. Do you remember
receiving that information?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now take a look at Document 3921-PS, which
becomes USA-872. Now this is a communication concerning the
evacuation of Jews, and it shows that 50,000 Jews were to be sent
<span class='pageno' title='511' id='Page_511'></span>
to the Minsk-Riga area, and you got a copy of this report as the
Commissar for the Defense of the Reich, and if you will look on
the last page you will see an initial there of your chief assistant,
the SS man Dellbrügge, and also the stamp of your own office as
having received it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can only see that Dr. Dellbrügge marked the
matter for filing. It shows the letters “z. d. A.” to the files.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And he did not tell you about this report concerning
the Jews? Even though you had been talking to Hitler about it?
That they were being moved out of your area? I suppose your chief
assistant did not bother to tell you anything about it. Is that what
you want us to understand?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now then, take a look at another document which
will shed some light on this one. It is USA-808, already in evidence.
It tells you what happened to the Jews in Minsk and Riga, and this
was also received in your office if you recall. Maybe it is not
necessary to show it to you again. You remember the document—that
is one of those monthly reports from Heydrich wherein he said
that there were 29,000 Jews in Riga and they had been reduced to
2,500, and that 33,210 were shot by the special unit, and “Einsatz”
group. Do you remember that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: During the last 2 days I looked at these
monthly reports most carefully. The bottom right-hand corner of
the cover of these monthly reports—and I want to make this
categorically clear—bears initials something like “Dr. FSCH.,”
that is Dr. Fischer’s initials. At the top the reports are not initialed
by me, but by the Government President, with the notation that
they should be put into the files. If I had read them...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am not suggesting that you had your initials on any
document like this, but I am claiming that these documents came
into your organization and into the hands of your principal assistant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But I must point out that if they had been
submitted to me, then there would have been on them the notation,
“submitted to the Reichsleiter,” and the official submitting them
would have initialed this notation. If I myself had seen them, then
my own initials would be on them with the letters “K.g.,” noted.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. I want to remind you that the date of that
report is February 1942, and I also want to remind you that in
there as well Heydrich tells you how many Jews they had killed in
Minsk. Now you made a speech one time in Poland about the Polish
or the Eastern policy of Germany. Do you remember it, Mr.
Witness?
<span class='pageno' title='512' id='Page_512'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In Poland?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In Poland, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In 1939 I spent a short time in Poland, but I
do not think I was there again later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Your memory seems particularly poor this morning.
Don’t you remember speaking in Katowice on 20 January 1942?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is Upper Silesia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Upper Silesia, all right. Do you remember that
speech?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I made a speech at Katowice.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And did you talk about Hitler’s policy for the
Eastern Territories?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot say from memory what I spoke about
there. I have made many speeches.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I will ask that you be shown D-664, which
becomes USA-873. You were speaking to a group of Party leaders
and German youth leaders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In Paragraph 7, you dealt with the tasks of German
youth in the East. The Hitler Youth had carried out political
schooling along the line of the Führer’s Eastern policy and you
went on to say how grateful you were to the Führer for having
turned the German people toward the East, because the East was
the destiny of your people. What did you understand to be the
Führer’s Eastern policy, or did you have a good understanding of it
at that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I said this in Upper Silesia out of gratitude
for the return of that territory to us.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I didn’t ask you that, really. I asked you if
you then understood the Führer’s policy when you made that
speech?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: On the basis of our victory over Poland and
the recovery of German soil, I naturally affirmed Germany’s policy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You not only affirmed it, but I want to know if you
really understood it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not quite know how I should answer that
question. Probably Hitler’s conception of the term Eastern policy
was quite different from mine.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But my point is that he had told you about it, hadn’t
he, some time before you made this speech?
<span class='pageno' title='513' id='Page_513'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>You had better look back at that document you have in your
hands, USSR-172, and you will find that, after you and Frank and
Koch and Hitler finished talking about deporting the Jews from
Vienna, the Führer then told you what he intended to do with the
Polish people, and it is not a very pretty story, if you will look at it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Hitler says here:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The ideal picture would be that a Pole in the Government
General had only a small parcel of land sufficient to feed
himself and his family fairly well. Anything else he might
require in cash for clothing, additional food, and so on he
would have to earn by working in Germany. The Government
General would be the central office for providing untrained
workers, particularly agricultural workers. The livelihood
of these workers would be assured, for they could
always be used as cheap labor. There would be no question of
further agricultural labor for Poland.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me read a few excerpts that I think you have
missed:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Führer further emphasized that the Poles, in direct contrast
to our German Workmen, are born for hard labor...”
and so on. “The standard of living in Poland has to be and to
remain low.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Moving over to the next page:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“We, the Germans, had on one hand overpopulated industrial
districts, while there was also a shortage of manpower for
agriculture. That is where we could make use of Polish
laborers. For this reason, it would be right to have a large
surplus of manpower in the Government General so that
every year the laborers needed by the Reich could in fact be
procured from there. It is indispensable to keep in mind
that there must be no Polish land owners. However cruel this
may sound, wherever they are, they must be exterminated.
Of course, there must be no mixing of blood with the
Poles.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Further on, he had to stress once more that:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“There should be one master only for the Poles, the Germans.
Two masters side by side cannot exist. All representatives of
the Polish intelligentsia are to be exterminated. This sounds
cruel, but such is the law of life.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Stopping there for a minute, by the way, Mr. Witness—you are
a man of culture, so you have told the Tribunal—how did that
sentiment expressed by the Führer impress you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have never agreed with these opinions of
the Führer, and I said here that I approached him in 1943 on the
<span class='pageno' title='514' id='Page_514'></span>
subject of this policy in the Ukraine. When in 1942 I talked about
Eastern policy in Katowice, the German town of Katowice, to the
German population of Upper Silesia, then, of course, I did not mean
this brutal Polish policy of Hitler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But you knew about it when you made the speech,
did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not recollect it on that occasion 2 years
later, and my speech did not mean it either.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You forgot that Hitler said he must exterminate the
intelligentsia, that you must be masters of these people, that they
must remain at a low standard of living? Did that pass out of your
mind so easily?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I remember that speech in Katowice; I spoke
there about completely different matters. I assume that the Prosecution
even has the shorthand record of that speech and need only
submit it here. This is just a short extract.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But, you see, Mr. Witness, the point is, knowing
what the policy was, I would like to have you tell the Tribunal
how you could urge and praise that policy to a group of young
people and party leaders on the occasion of this speech in Katowice.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The policy which I was recommending to
youth leaders there was not the policy which Hitler developed in
his table talk.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Of course, you said it was the Führer’s policy in
your speech, and you know what it was, but I won’t press it further
if that is your answer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Very often probably—and I once said this
here—I supported the policy of the Führer out of erroneous loyalty
to him. I know that it was not right.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is what I want to know. You were, weren’t
you, acting under an impulse of loyalty to the Führer. Now you
recognize it to be erroneous, and that is all I am inquiring for, and
if you tell the Tribunal that, I shall be perfectly satisfied.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I am prepared to admit that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well. And, Mr. Witness, now we are getting to
it; that goes for all these things that went on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Don’t you have to say to the Tribunal, concerning
your letter to <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, and all these things you said about the
Jewish people to the young people, and this slow building up of
race hatred in them, the co-operation with the SS, your handling
<span class='pageno' title='515' id='Page_515'></span>
of the Jews in Vienna, that for all these things you are, and for all
of them, responsible?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Finally, I want to offer in evidence, Mr. President,
some excerpts from these weekly SS reports to which I referred
briefly on Friday, so that they shall be before the Tribunal. There
are 55 of them, Mr. President, and they run consecutively by weeks,
and they all bear the stamp of this defendant’s office as having been
received there, and they supplant the monthly report which was
received up to the time that weekly reports began arriving.</p>

<p class='pindent'>We have not had all of them translated or mimeographed, and
if the defendant wishes to put in any others, we will make them
available, of course. We have selected a few as samples to illustrate
the kind of report that was contained in these weekly reports, and
I wish to offer them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The first one is Number 1, beginning on 1 May 1942, and Numbers
4, 6, 7, 9, 38, 41, and 49.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now I want to make this clear to you, Mr. Witness, out of fairness.
Besides statements concerning what was happening to the
Jews, you will find in these weekly reports a number of statements
about the partisan affairs in the East as well. These excerpts have
mostly to do with what happened to the Jews, and we have not,
Mr. President, drawn out a great number that had to do with the
partisans. There are a number, however, that do have to do with
partisans and not with the Jews, so we wish there to be no doubt
about how we offer these weekly reports. I just want to ask you,
with respect to these weekly reports: Do you this morning recall
that you did receive them every week in your office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But that is not my office. My office is the
Central Office. That office was directed by the Government President,
and one of his officials initialed the files, as appears from the
marking on them, and as any official trained in German office
routine can confirm. They were then put before the Government
President who marked them “for the files” and initialed them. I
could not know these documents at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now just a minute. You were the Reich Commissioner
for the defense of that territory; weren’t you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And that is the stamp that is on these weekly reports,
isn’t it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, what do you mean by saying that it was not
your office?
<span class='pageno' title='516' id='Page_516'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Because the mail, by a procedure similar to
that in a ministry, where it goes to the office of the minister, reached
me in the Central Office; and a corresponding notation had to be
made on these files. I can understand perfectly well why the Government
President, since I was overburdened with work, did not
submit to me material which had no connection at all with Vienna
or my activities, but which was merely informatory and concerned
with events in Russia, mostly guerrilla fighting in Russia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am going to ask you again, as I have so many
times in the course of this examination: Dellbrügge, who initialed
these, was your principal assistant, wasn’t he? Yes or no?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, he was one of my three deputies.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And he was also an SS man, and so was your other
principal assistant, as we asked the other day.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Dellbrügge was a high SS leader. He was a
special confidant of the Reichsführer SS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How did he happen to be working for you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He was assigned to me there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I don’t think it is necessary to read
any excerpts from these weekly reports. They have been translated
into four languages, and—well, I am misinformed. I thought
they were translated. Then I think it would be better if we do
have them translated and submit them at a later date rather than
take the time to read them now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine? We had better
adjourn now.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor
for the U.S.S.R.): Do you admit that the Hitler Jugend had the task
of inculcating German youth and children, starting from 9 years of
age, with Fascist ideology?</p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you hear me?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I understood you to ask, whether, I
would admit having inculcated Fascist ideas into 10- to 14-year-old
children of the Hitler Youth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>As I said in my testimony a few days ago, I saw my mission
and my duty in educating German youth to be citizens of the
National Socialist State...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] That is not an answer to the
question. It is not necessary for you to tell us what you said in
<span class='pageno' title='517' id='Page_517'></span>
your previous evidence. Will you just answer the question: Do you
admit that you inculcated in the Hitler Youth Hitler’s ideology?
You can answer that “yes” or “no.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that question with “yes,”
because it referred to Fascism. There is a great difference between
Fascism and National Socialism. I cannot answer that question with
“yes.” I did educate German youth in the spirit of National
Socialism, that I can admit.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like you to confirm the evidence
which you gave on 16 November 1945, during your interrogation.
You defined your personal attitude to Hitler in the following way;
and I quote your evidence: “I was an enthusiastic adherent of Hitler
and I considered everything that he wrote and stated to be a manifestation
of truth.”<a href='#fa'><span style='font-size:smaller'><sup>[*]</sup></span></a> Do you confirm this statement?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not say that, and that is not a record
which was submitted to me. I never spoke of Hitler as a deity,
never. I remember exactly, General, that you interrogated me on
this point, and I was asked whether I had been an enthusiastic
follower. I confirmed that, and I spoke about the time when I
joined the Movement; but I never set up the comparison with which
I am now confronted in the translation; I never said that I believed
in Hitler as a deity, never.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You do not understand me correctly.
Nothing is said here about deity. Your evidence has been taken
down, and I will repeat it: “I was an enthusiastic adherent of Hitler,
and I considered everything that he wrote and stated to be a
manifestation of truth.”<a href='#fa'><span style='font-size:smaller'><sup>[*]</sup></span></a></p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you confirm this statement? Answer the question directly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The translation is quite inexact. May I ask
you to put the exact question again?</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will quote your statement again: “I was
an enthusiastic adherent of Hitler, and I considered everything that
he wrote and stated to be a manifestation of truth.”<a href='#fa'><span style='font-size:smaller'><sup>[*]</sup></span></a> Is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I am accused now of having said: “I was an
enthusiastic adherent of Hitler, and I considered everything that he
wrote and stated to be the personification of truth.” That is how I
understood it, and I must say I could never have uttered such
nonsense.</p>

<hr class='footnotemark'/>

<p class='pindent'><a id='fa'></a><span style='font-size:smaller'><sup>[*]</sup></span> The interpreter mistranslated this “and looked upon him as a deity.”</p>

<hr class='footnotemark'/>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: May I give an explanation of this translation?
I think the correct German would have to be: “I considered
what Hitler said to be a manifestation of truth,” and not “the
<span class='pageno' title='518' id='Page_518'></span>
personification of truth”; then it would be intelligible. There is a
mistake in the interpretation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel has perhaps helped
you to answer my question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: General, that was not my defense counsel,
but the defense counsel for the Defendant Sauckel. If it is translated
“manifestation of truth,” then of course the whole passage
makes sense, and also corresponds roughly to what I said to you
when I described the period of my youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In your book entitled the <span class='it'>Hitler Jugend</span> it said, and I quote
Page 17: “Hitler’s book, <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, is our bible.” Do you confirm
this? Did you write that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But I added something to that in my book
<span class='it'>The Hitler Youth, Its Faith and Organization</span>. I want to say, first
of all, that I did write this book. I wrote it...</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like to interrupt you. I do not
need such detailed explanations, and I would like you to answer the
question: Is that sentence contained in your book?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have just confirmed that, but I would like
to add an explanation. In this book—which I wrote in 1933, and
which was published in 1934—I said: “We could not yet offer
detailed reasons for our belief, we simply believed. But when
Hitler’s <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> appeared, it was like a bible, which we almost
learned by heart so as to answer the questions of doubtful and
deliberating critics.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is how I worded it at the time; that is correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like to put another more precise
question to you. Do you admit that the Hitler Jugend was a
political organization which, under the leadership of the NSDAP,
carried out the policy of this Party among German youth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Hitler Youth was a large educational
community on a political basis, but I cannot admit that it was led
by the Party; it was led by me. I was a member of the Executive
Committee of the Party, and in that sense one might speak of a
Party influence. But I can see no reason for having to confirm this,
since I have already testified to it. It is correct that the Hitler
Youth was the youth organization of the Party.</p>

<p class='pindent'>If that is the sense of your question, I will confirm it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, I just had that in view.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I would like to remind you of the tasks which Hitler had assigned
for the education of German youth. That is set out in Rauschning’s
<span class='pageno' title='519' id='Page_519'></span>
book, which has already been submitted as documentary evidence
before the Tribunal as USSR-378. I quote Page 252 of that book:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“In my schools we will bring up youth who will make the
world shudder with fear, youth that is hard, exigent, unafraid,
and cruel. That is my wish. Youth must have all these
qualities; they must be indifferent to sufferings; they must
have neither weakness nor softness. I would like to see in
their eyes the proud, self-sufficient glitter of a beast of prey.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>You educated German youth in accordance with these demands
of Hitler. Do you admit that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I will not admit what Herr Rauschning wrote.
Just by accident I was present at a conversation between Hitler
and Rauschning and, judging by it, I must say that the statements
in Rauschning’s book represent an unfaithful record of what Hitler
said. Just by accident I witnessed a conversation between them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Hitler did not give me the directives which Rauschning sets
forth here as the guiding principles laid down by Hitler himself for
the training of the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I did not ask you to give such a detailed
explanation. I would like you to answer the question I put to you
briefly in order to shorten the time of interrogation. You have
stated the Hitler Youth did not educate German youth in the militaristic
spirit and did not prepare German youth for future aggressive
wars. I would like to remind you of certain statements you
made in that very same book of yours, “Hitler Youth,” right here
on Page 83 of that book. Talking of the younger generation, the
so-called Jungvolk, you wrote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“They carry the National Socialist characteristics. The toy
merchants are worried because these children no longer need
toys; they are interested in camp tents, spears, compasses and
maps. It is a particular trait of our youth. Everything that
is against our unity must be thrown to the flames.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And these also were the directives which German soldiers, trained
in the Hitler Youth, followed when they set on fire houses of the
peaceful population in occupied territories, isn’t that true? Is that
contained in the book, the passage I have just read?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: What is in front of me now, is contained in
my book. What I heard from the interpreter is not in my book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Well, then make your corrections.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I read the correct passage?</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The toy merchants have complained to me that the boys”—they
mean the Jungvolk—“no longer want toys, but are
interested only in tents, spears, compasses, and maps. I cannot
help the toy merchants, for I agree with the boys that
<span class='pageno' title='520' id='Page_520'></span>
the times of the Indians are finally gone. What is ‘Old
Shatterhand,’ what is a trapper in the backwoods of America
compared to our troop leader? A miserable, dusty remnant
from the lumber chest of our fathers. Not only the toy
merchants are complaining but also the school-cap manufacturers.
Who wears a school cap nowadays? And who
nowadays is a high-school boy or girl? In some towns the
boys have banded together and publicly burned such school
caps. Burning is, in fact, a specialty of new youth. The
border fences of the minor states of the Reich have also been
reduced to ashes in the fires of your youth.</p>

<p>“It is a simple but heroic philosophy; everything that is
against our unity must be thrown to the flames.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>That, General, is the expression of the “storm and stress” of
youth which has found its special unity.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: According to your opinion, the philosophy
implies that children must no longer play with toys, but must do
other things. Did I understand you correctly? I do not see any
essential difference between my quotation and yours.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I say that I think the military training
of the youth of Germany falls much behind that of the Soviet Union.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This is an irrelevant comparison. On
Page 98 of your book, speaking of the Hitler Youth, you wrote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“They strive to be political soldiers. Their model is Adolf
Hitler.”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>Did you write that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have not found the place; is it Page 98?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness has admitted he wrote the whole
book, hasn’t he?</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: In order not to lengthen the proceedings
we will pass to the next question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>You have already spoken here of a specially created organization
of motorized Hitler Youth; you assert this organization had sport as
its aim; is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In connection with the training of the motorized
Hitler Youth I spoke also of ground and driving exercises, and
I admitted that the motorized Hitler Youth had premilitary significance.
I did not dispute this point at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd cross-examined the witness at very
considerable length on these matters about the special units of the
Hitler Youth, and it really is not any good to go over it all again.
<span class='pageno' title='521' id='Page_521'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, several points which are
still unexplained will be clarified through the following questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Did you have knowledge of the fact that at the end of 1938 the
organization of motorized Hitler Youth consisted of 92 detachments,
that is of 100,000 young men?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot tell you from memory whether there
were 92 detachments, because the word “Abteilung”—that was the
translation—was not a designation for any unit of the Hitler Youth.
I gave the exact strength of the motorized Hitler Youth for 1938
in one of my statements here either to my defense counsel or to
Mr. Dodd. I gave exact figures of its strength in 1938.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, I am speaking of 1938, and you give
the number of 100,000 Hitler Youths who formed the motorized youth
organization. Do you have knowledge of this?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot tell you from memory whether there
were 100,000 members of the motorized Hitler Youth in 1938. There
might have been 60,000 or 120,000. I cannot say; I do not know.
I have not the documents to prove it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, but I am quoting this number from
data given by the magazine <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>. I would like to recall to
you the tasks of these organizations as they were set out in this
magazine in November-December 1939. I quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The preliminary training of the motorized Hitler Youth must
be carried out in special training groups, and later in special
motorization schools of the National Socialist Motor Corps.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I quote this excerpt according to the document book of the
Defense, Document 20, Page 50 of the Russian text. I repeat:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The preliminary training of the motorized Hitler Youth must
be carried out in special training groups, and later in special
motorization schools of the National Socialist Motor Corps, but
this applies only to youths who have reached the age of 17 or
more. The course of instruction includes motor mechanics, a
driving license test, field driving exercises, and also ideological
schooling. Those who successfully participate in this course
of instruction will be admitted into the National Socialist
Motor Corps.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>This does not quite agree with your statement that the aim was
sport, does it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We heard a long commentary about these
special units, and we really do not want to hear it any more. If you
have any questions on new matters which have not been dealt with
by Mr. Dodd, we shall be glad to hear them, but we do not want
to hear about whether there are 60,000 or 70,000 or 100,000 or
120,000 Hitler Youths in the motorized units.
<span class='pageno' title='522' id='Page_522'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am only quoting what has not been mentioned
yet.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General, we do not want to hear it. We do
not want to hear it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will pass on to the next question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>You issued a directive for a nation-wide training scheme of the
members of the Hitler Youth, known as “Hitler Youth on Duty.”
This directive foresaw the following kind of education for the Hitler
Youth: the theory of weapons, the theory of firing, target shooting,
rifle practice, military drill, topography, and field exercises; also
instruction in the use of the field compass and the goniometer. Are
you acquainted with this directive? Do you consider that this also
did not constitute military training of German youth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I spoke in great detail about the training of
“Hitler Youth on Duty” in my testimony last Thursday, and I particularly
discussed rifle training which takes up 40 pages of this
book. I mentioned in that connection that this rifle training was
carried out according to the rules of international rifle sport and
that the British Board of Education recommended this rifle training,
and also the entire book, to all Boy Scouts. I do not dispute that
I published this book <span class='it'>Hitler Youth</span> and that it served as a guiding
directive for this training. But I already said that here the other day.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have denied that the Hitler Youth
played an important part in the Fifth Column in Poland. Similar
methods were carried out especially in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav
Government has put at the disposal of the Soviet Prosecution documents
which estimated the part of the “Hitler Youth on Duty,”
under the leadership of the Hitler Jugend, in the organization of the
Fifth Column on Yugoslav territory. Do you have any knowledge
of this? Do you know anything about this?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Hitler Youth was never active in the Fifth
Column either in Yugoslavia or anywhere else.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will then quote excerpts from the official
report of the Yugoslav Government. This has already been submitted
to the Tribunal as Exhibit USSR-36. I quote from Page 3
of the Russian text of this document:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The Reich Government and the Hitler Party have secretly
organized the German minority. From 1930 they had their
own organization, the ‘Union of Culture.’ Already in 1932
Dr. Jacob Awender held the view that the ‘Union of Culture’
should be Fascist in its outlook. In 1935 he was put at the
head of an active youth organization which shortly afterwards
received the name of ‘Organization of Revival.’ ”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='523' id='Page_523'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Do you know anything about this?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot comment on the information which
you have just mentioned. I heard that Bohle had some youth leaders
there as his representatives, but I do not know any details. On the
subject of Yugoslavia I can tell you from my previous activity that
my relations with Yugoslav youth were very amiable and friendly
in the period before the war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am not interested in that. I will try to
help your memory by quoting a few excerpts from a supplementary
report of the Yugoslav Government, which is submitted to the Tribunal
as Yugoslav Exhibit, Document Number USSR-357. On Page 5,
in the third line of the Russian text of this document, it says:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“In 1937 there began among the Volksdeutsche in our country
an orientation towards National Socialism, and the first groups
of youth started going to Germany for special courses of
instruction.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>Further down on Page 8, we read that later on, but before the
war with the Soviet Union, the greater part of these members became
officers of the German Army. In addition, a special SS division,
“Prinz Eugen,” was formed from among members of the youth
organizations. Do you deny these facts?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can admit some; others I must deny. May
I explain this? Since 1933 I tried to bring about good relations with
Yugoslav youth. Starting in 1936 or 1937 I extended invitations to
Yugoslav youth groups, as well as to youth groups of all European
countries, to visit and inspect German youth institutions. Yugoslav
youth groups actually came to Germany in reply to my invitation.
But I know nothing about the enlisting of Yugoslav youths in the
German Army; I do not believe that. I can only say that at the
time of the regency of Prince Regent Paul there was very close
collaboration with Yugoslav youth. During the war we maintained
good relations with both Serbian and Croatian youth. German youth
visited Serbia and Croatia, while Serbian and Croatian youth came
to German youth camps, German youth leader training schools, and
so on, and looked at our institutions. That, I think, is everything
I can say about this. But we had friendly relations not only with
Yugoslavia but also with many other countries.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You did not understand me correctly. I
was not speaking of Yugoslav or Croatian youth. I am speaking of
the youth of the German minority in Yugoslavia who are mentioned
in this report and who, with the help of the Hitler Youth, created
centers of Fifth Column activity to engage in subversive operations
and recruit for the SS units and the Wehrmacht. That is what I am
speaking about. Are these facts known to you?
<span class='pageno' title='524' id='Page_524'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know that there were young people among
the German minority in Yugoslavia, just as in Romania and Hungary.
I know that this German youth felt that it belonged to the
Hitler Youth, and I think it is perfectly natural that these young
people welcomed the German troops on their arrival. I cannot give
information on the extent to which collaboration existed between
the troops and the youth, but that it did exist is also quite natural.
Of course, it could not be considered military collaboration, but
rather the kind of co-operation which will always exist between an
occupying force and the youth of the same country or nationality
as the members of that force. But that has nothing to do with
espionage or the like.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: But the major part of the SS Division
“Prinz Eugen” which was formed on Yugoslav territory was made
up of Hitler Youth members from the German national minority in
Yugoslavia; and this was the result of the preparatory work of the
Hitler Youth. Do you admit that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know how the divisions of the
Waffen-SS, of which there were very many, were recruited. It is
possible that some members of the German minority were recruited
then and there, but I have no definite information on this.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will quote a few excerpts from two
German documents. They have not yet been submitted to the Tribunal.
The first excerpt is from a book by Dr. Sepp Janko who was
the youth leader in Yugoslavia, entitled <span class='it'>Speeches and Articles.</span> He
wrote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“All our national work before 1 September 1939 depended on
the help of the Reich. When on 1 September 1939 the war
began and it at first appeared impossible to receive further
aid, there was a danger that all our work would be interrupted....”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>And later:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The fact that in this cause, so decisive for a nation and its
worth, I put at the disposal of the Führer almost the entire
German national group in the former State of Yugoslavia and
gave him so many volunteers as soldiers, is to me a subject
of great pride....”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I submit this to the Tribunal as evidence; Exhibit USSR-459.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The next excerpt is from an article, “We in the Batchka,” written
in 1943 by Otto Kohler who was leader of German youth in that
territory. I submit this document to the Tribunal as Exhibit USSR-456.
Otto Kohler wrote in that article:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Ninety percent of our youth are members of the Hitler Youth,
the youth organization for Germans abroad.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='525' id='Page_525'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>The statements ought to convince you that the subversive activity
and organization of the Fifth Column, the “nazification” of the German
minority and its enlistment in military units were actually
carried out on Yugoslav territory through the Hitler Youth. Please
answer “yes” or “no.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. But I should like to comment on these
documents. This Dr. Sepp Janko who is said to have been the leader
of the Volksdeutsche in Yugoslavia is not known to me either by
name or personally. I have visited Yugoslavia several times in the
past, but neither in 1937, when I believe I was there for the first
time, nor later in 1938 when I visited Prince Regent Paul, did I concern
myself with the Volksdeutsche youth there or with their leaders.
On those visits I spoke only with youth of Yugoslav nationality.
That is all I have to say about the first document, which on the
whole does not refer to youth at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The second document, which is signed by one Otto Kohler, who
calls himself the “D. J. leader”—probably German youth leader—in
Subdivision 7, to that document I can only say that it was taken
from a book about German youth in Hungary which appeared in
1943. In the Batchka we had a very large settlement of Germans,
people who had been living there for 150 or 200 years, and this
youth leader organized the German youth there with the approval
of the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian Minister of Education
and in collaboration with other Hungarian authorities. It was
an entirely legal measure, and no controversy existed about it
between the two countries. These young people were not members
of the German Hitler Youth, but they belonged to Hungarian youth
groups of the German minority in Hungary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: And did the Reich Leadership of Hitler
Youth have no connection at all with such organizations abroad?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course we visited these youths. When, for
instance, I was a guest in Budapest, the Hungarians themselves
asked me whether I would like to visit the villages and the youth
of the German minority. Neither the Regent nor any other government
authority had any objections to this. There was no reason
why I should ask German youth leaders to engage in espionage in
Hungary. I could just as easily have asked Hungarian youth leaders
with whom I was on very good terms.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Who was the leader of the Hitler Youth
organizations abroad? There was a special foreign section in the
Reich Leadership of the Hitler Youth. Its task was the direction
of the German youth organizations abroad, was it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. The foreign office of the
Reich Youth Leadership was, if I may say so, the “foreign office”
<span class='pageno' title='526' id='Page_526'></span>
of the younger generation. It was the task of the foreign office to
maintain contact with other national youth organizations, to invite
youth leaders from abroad, to organize tours of foreign youth
organizations through Germany, and to arrange visits of German
youth to other countries, in co-operation with the foreign offices of
those countries; in a case like this, the foreign office of the Reich
Youth Leadership would approach the Foreign Office, and the Foreign
Office would approach the ambassador or representative of the
country involved. The Organization of Youth Abroad to which you
are referring was an organization subordinate to the Organization
of Germans Abroad, the head of which was Gauleiter Bohle, who
has already been heard in this court. This youth abroad consisted
of German nationals who formed units of the Hitler Youth in the
countries where they were living. For instance in Budapest the
children of the German colony, starting with the children of the
German Minister...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Defendant, it is not necessary to make
such a long speech about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You are giving too many details. The
next question:</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories, a special
youth department was created in the first main office. What do you
know about the work of this department and what was its relationship
to the Reich Leadership of the Hitler Youth? Please answer
briefly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: From my knowledge, I can say that when the
Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories was created,
Reichsleiter Rosenberg expressed a wish that the Reich Youth Leader
should put at his disposal an official for the youth department in
the new Ministry. This official was appointed; he was taken into
the Ministry and directed its youth department. He was, of course,
responsible to the Eastern Minister. I cannot say more about this
point. Reports from this department did not reach me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You mean that the Reich Leadership of
the Hitler Youth appointed a representative to a post in the Ministry
for Eastern Occupied Territories, and that this gentleman did
not send in any report to the Reich Youth Leadership; is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: General, I meant that the head of this department
or whatever he was, this official in the Eastern Ministry who
came from the Hitler Youth, did not report to me. He naturally
reported to his immediate superiors in the Reich Youth Leadership.
The Reich Youth Leadership was located in Berlin, and I assume
that the officials of its staff were in constant touch with him.
<span class='pageno' title='527' id='Page_527'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: As I understand it, the measures that
were carried out by the youth department in the Reich Ministry
for Eastern Occupied Territories were carried out with the knowledge
of the Reich Youth Leadership; is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The measures taken there were carried out
according to directions laid down by the Reich Minister, who was
the immediate superior of his officials. If actual youth measures, the
treatment of youth, and so on, were dealt with, I am sure that this
official or youth leader discussed the matter with the Reich Youth
Leadership and made a report to it. The Minister is always responsible
for the youth official in his Ministry, and not the organization
from which the youth official happens to come.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I understand. To the question put to you
by your defense counsel regarding the participation of the Hitler
Youth in the atrocities committed in Lvov, you answered that the
testimony of the French citizen, Ida Vasseau, supplied by the
Extraordinary State Commission, is not true.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, the Soviet Prosecution has had occasion to interrogate
the witness Ida Vasseau. The defense counsel for the Defendant
Schirach also requested an interrogation. I now submit to the
Tribunal excerpts from the testimony of the witness Vasseau, dated
16 May 1946, and I would like to submit it as Exhibit USSR-455.
I shall now read the excerpts into the record:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The atrocities against the Jewish and the Soviet population
of Lvov were perpetrated not only by adult Germans and old
Nazis, but also by the German youth of the Fascist youth
organization in Lvov. These youngsters, dressed in uniforms,
armed with heavy sticks, hunting knives, and often with
pistols, ran about the streets, broke into Jewish apartments
and destroyed everything in them. They killed all the inhabitants
of these apartments, including the children. Very often
they stopped children who looked suspicious to them in the
streets, shouted: “Stop, you damned Jew!” and shot them on
the spot. This Hitlerite youth was often active in locating
Jewish apartments, hunting Jews in hiding, setting traps, and
assaulting innocent people on the streets, killing them if they
were Jews and dragging others away to the Gestapo. Often
their victims were Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, and people of
other nationalities. This terror of adult and young Germans
continued until the last day of the German occupation of
Lvov. The intention of completely annihilating the Jews was
especially apparent in the “Ghetto actions” in which Jewish
children of various ages were systematically killed. They were
put into houses specially set up for Jewish children and when
<span class='pageno' title='528' id='Page_528'></span>
sufficient children had been assembled, the Gestapo accompanied
by the Hitler Youth broke in and killed them.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>I end the reading of the statement of Ida Vasseau.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Thus, the Hitler Youth in the service of the German army, SS
and the Gestapo took part in these atrocities. Do you admit that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe a word of what is contained
in this document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Well, that is your affair.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, I am submitting to the Tribunal another document,
USSR-454, excerpts from the testimony of the German prisoner of
war Gert Bruno Knittel.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Gert Bruno Knittel, a hatter by trade, was born in 1924 in
Saxony. After 1938 he was a member of the Hitler Youth. His sister
Ursula was also a member of the National Socialist League of German
Girls (BDM). In 1942, when he was 18 years old, he was called
up for the German Army. Thus, he is a typical representative of
the Hitler Youth, and his testimony is therefore of interest. This is
what he relates about his service in the German Army. I quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Not less than twice a week we were called upon to comb
out the forests.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I must object against the use of this
document of which we have just received a copy. It does not appear
from this copy whether the document was actually signed, whether
it was sworn or who drew up this document, which seems to be a
report. I must object to this document until these questions have
been clarified.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Perhaps in this connection, Mr. President, I might comment on
the other document which contains the testimony of Ida Vasseau—the
writing is difficult to read. I assume that this witness is identical
with the French national Ida Vasseau to whom a questionnaire was
sent a long time ago with the permission of the Tribunal. We have
been constantly waiting for the answers to this questionnaire, and
now today we receive this report dated 16 May 1946, which apparently
refers to the same witness. It is obvious that...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am not following quite what you are saying.
Are you saying that you have issued a questionnaire to the person
who is alleged to have made this document?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The High Tribunal approved a questionnaire to a
French woman, Ida Vasseau; I will spell the name, V-a-s-s-e-a-u.
This is the French woman, Ida Vasseau, who was working in an
establishment in Lvov, and who is mentioned in the Lvov Commission
report. Perhaps you remember, Mr. President, that one of these
reports says that children were taken from the ghetto and given to
<span class='pageno' title='529' id='Page_529'></span>
the Hitler Youth and that the Hitler Youth used these children as
live targets. That is the statement of the witness Ida Vasseau, and
I am sure that she is the same person who is now mentioned in the
report of 16 May 1946. The remarkable thing is that in the report
of 16 May 1946, she does not answer the questions which are set
down in the questionnaire, but makes further allegations which are
obviously not contained in the earlier Lvov Commission report. This
is a very mysterious matter, and I believe it would not be just to
the Defendant Von Schirach if I did not call your attention to these
contradictions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: May I give my explanation?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We would like to hear you in detail, General,
in answer to what Dr. Sauter has said.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Ida Vasseau, excerpts from whose statement
I have read, is certainly the person of whom Dr. Sauter is
speaking. I do not know to whom and through what channels the
interrogatory was sent; it was not sent through our office. Ida
Vasseau was interrogated on our own initiative and we could do
so only on 16 May. A special interrogatory was not received by
us, and we could not have sent it because the evidence was given
only...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have only got this document here in German
and it doesn’t appear to be a document signed or made by a
person called “Vasseau” at all. I don’t know whether it is dealing
with something that Ida Vasseau is alleged to have said.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This document is signed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I said it wasn’t signed by Vasseau.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This document is signed by Ida Vasseau-Thom
and also by the interrogating officials, namely the Chief of
the Investigation Branch, Public Prosecutor’s Department for the
Lvov Region, Kryzanovsky, and the public prosecutor for the Lvov
Region, Kornetov. The interrogation took place on 16 May 1946.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Look at this document and see if it is the
right document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, these are excerpts from the interrogation
of Ida Vasseau.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that the same document?</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, yes, that is the same document which
we are now submitting to the Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that the original you have got before you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, this is an excerpt from the record,
certified by the Chief of Documentation of the Soviet Delegation,
<span class='pageno' title='530' id='Page_530'></span>
Colonel Karev. This is not the original record of the interrogatory.
These are excerpts from it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that it is a document which
is admissible under Article 21 or what are you saying about it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: We are submitting it. If the Tribunal considers
that it is necessary to bring out the original of the record,
which at the present moment is at Lvov, we will be able to do so
in a short time. If the Tribunal is not satisfied with these excerpts,
we will very easily be able to submit the record in full.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell us what the document is? Is it
an affidavit? Is it sworn to? Is it made before an official of the
Soviet Union?</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: There is a note on the record referring to
the responsibility for false testimony, as set forth under Article 89
of the Penal Code of the Ukrainian S.S.R. This warning is in
accordance with the requirements for legal procedure in the Soviet
Union, and this warning was given to Ida Vasseau, as a special certification
on the record shows.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that it is a document which
falls within Article 21 of the Charter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, but if the Tribunal consider it necessary,
we will later be able to submit the complete original record.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am now asking the Tribunal to accept the excerpts from this
record which have been certified by the Chief of our Documentation
Division.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, what is the date on which your
interrogatory was allowed by the Tribunal and what was the date
on which it was sent out to this person?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the interrogatory bears the date of
11 April.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: The interrogatory could not be sent
because we did not know where the witness Vasseau was. We only
discovered it recently.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the interrogatory has not been
administered to the person who made this statement?</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This interrogatory could not have reached
its destination because, I repeat, until quite recently the whereabouts
of the witness Vasseau was unknown.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you did find out where the witness was,
the interrogatory could have been administered.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN; ALEXANDROV: Yes, yes, it can be sent to her. It can be
done now if it is necessary.
<span class='pageno' title='531' id='Page_531'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I point out the following: This
woman, Ida Vasseau, was in Lvov when this statement which is
mentioned in the Commission Report was made; that is clear from
the report. I believe it is USSR-6, but I am not quite certain. Now,
on 16 May of this year, this woman, Ida Vasseau, was also at Lvov;
and her whereabouts were not unknown, since she was interrogated
on that day. I had discussed the interrogatory which was sent to
Vasseau with the Prosecution; it was at first said that the questions
were suggestive or that something was not in order. But we came
to terms and I altered the questions which I submitted to the High
Tribunal according to the wishes of the Prosecution; so if the Soviet
Delegation were willing, Ida Vasseau could be interrogated at any
time. It is remarkable that in this later statement, this woman
testified on something entirely different from what is set forth in
her previous statement, and something entirely different from what
she was asked in the interrogatory. I think it would be useful if
Ida Vasseau were examined here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, what previous statement do
you mean? What previous statements do you mean?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The statement in the commission report of the
City of Lvov. This commission report was read here once and it
says that the Hitler Youth committed these outrages against the
children; my questionnaire, which the Tribunal approved, deals with
this point.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General, was the interrogatory submitted
by Dr. Sauter shown to the witness Vasseau?</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, it was not sent to her. May I, to
clarify the matter, come back to the history of this interrogatory?
The Soviet Prosecution submitted a document, the Report of the
Extraordinary State Commission on German Atrocities in the Lvov
Region, and this document contained a statement by the witness
Ida Vasseau; no one interrogated her at that time. In this statement
she said that she witnessed how the Hitler Youth used small
children as targets. That was her statement in the Report of the
Extraordinary State Commission. This document was accepted by
the Tribunal. Then, on our own initiative—Dr. Sauter’s interrogatory
did not come to us and we did not send it out—the whereabouts
of Ida Vasseau was established. She was examined by
interrogating officers and supplemented the testimony which she
had given before the Extraordinary State Commission. I am now
submitting to the Tribunal excerpts from her interrogatory on
16 May in which she dwelt on certain details of the treatment of
children by the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We all understand that, General, but the
question is: Why, if interrogatories had been allowed by the
<span class='pageno' title='532' id='Page_532'></span>
Tribunal and had been seen by the Prosecution and were dated
sometime in April, why was the witness interrogated in May
without having seen these interrogatories? This document is dated
16 May 1946, isn’t it, Dr. Sauter?—Dr. Sauter tells us that interrogatories
allowed by the Tribunal were dated in April.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not know where Dr. Sauter sent his
interrogatory. He did not send it through our office. I repeat that
we did not send this interrogatory and could not have sent it on,
for we did not know where Ida Vasseau lived. On our initiative
steps were taken to establish her whereabouts, and when we found
her she was interrogated, namely on 16 May.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<h2><span class='pageno' title='533' id='Page_533'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General, the Tribunal will not admit this
document at the present time, but it would wish that you should
present the original document and at the same time the answers
to the interrogatories which the Tribunal has ordered; and the
Tribunal will call upon the Secretary General for a report upon
the whole matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, during the recess I had a
chance to talk this over with Dr. Sauter. He will give me the
interrogatory and measures will be taken to get the necessary
replies from the witness in the shortest possible time. Besides this
the request of the Tribunal to get the original of the document
will be complied with as soon as possible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>May I continue now with my interrogation?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, please.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I stopped at the testimony of Gert Bruno
Knittel. Here is what he relates about his service in the German
Army:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Not less than twice a week we were sent to comb the forests,
to round up guerrillas and to look for discontent against the
German regime, so that these people could be arrested
and shot immediately. Our 3d Company, Field Depot
Battalion 375, caught and shot five persons in the woods.
Most possibly these persons were not even partisans or guerrillas,
but merely citizens who went into the woods for
personal matters. But we had orders to shoot all who crossed
our path in the woods. I did this together with the other
soldiers of my company.</p>

<p>“One day in June 1943, in a roundup in the village of
Lishaysk, we surrounded the whole place with three to four
companies so that no one could leave or enter the village.
Outside each house that had to be searched...”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are cross-examining the Defendant
Von Schirach who was in Vienna. What has this document got to
do with him?</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This is the testimony of one of the
members of the Hitler Jugend regarding his participation in atrocities
during his service in the German Army in the occupied territory.
This document is translated into German. I need not read
it. However, I would like the witness Von Schirach to familiarize
himself with this document. Did you read this document? I am
asking you this now, Witness, have you read that document?
<span class='pageno' title='534' id='Page_534'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have read the document. This man
Knittel who is testifying here was not a member of the Hitler
Youth, but belonged either to the Labor Service or to a unit of
the Army. Earlier in his life, just like all the other young Germans,
he had been a member of the Hitler Youth. He states that; but in
this case he was acting as a member of some unit of the Armed
Forces, not as a member of the Hitler Youth. The entire testimony
seems to be of little credibility. For example, he mentions a Hitler
Youth Party...</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you read all the testimony that is
given there?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you read all this testimony?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: In connection with this, do you admit
that participation of German youth in similar atrocities was the
effect of the special education and preparation of the Hitler Youth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not admit that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have two more questions, and that will
be all. Up to what time did you hold the post of Reichsstatthalter
of Vienna and Reichsleiter of Youth Education?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was head of Youth Education from 1931 and
Reich Governor of the city of Vienna since 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am interested in knowing to what date,
to what moment?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I held both of these offices until the collapse.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You were telling here in detail about
your break with Hitler in 1943. You stated that from that time on
you were politically dead. However, you continued to hold your
posts to the very end. Therefore your break with Hitler was only
theoretical, and in effect entailed no consequences for you. Is that
correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is wrong. I described the consequences
which it had for me in my statement either on Thursday or Friday,
and I also mentioned at that time that up to the very last moment
I kept my oath which I had given to Hitler as Youth Leader, as an
official, and as an officer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have no more questions, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in order to expedite the proceedings,
I should like to put two brief questions to Defendant
Von Schirach.
<span class='pageno' title='535' id='Page_535'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>The first question, Witness: in the course of the cross-examination
you were asked whether you gave the order to hold Vienna
until the very last moment and to defend the city to the last man.
As far as I remember, you answered that question in the negative.
Now, I am interested in knowing in this connection what orders
you gave to your subordinates during the last days in Vienna—I
mean to the Deputy Gauleiter Scharizer and the then Mayor
Blaschke?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The order for the defense of Vienna originated
with Hitler. The defense of Vienna was a matter for the
military authorities, that is, the commandant of the city of Vienna,
the military commander who was in charge of the 6th SS Panzer
Division....</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was his name?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Sepp Dietrich, and the officer commanding
the Army Group South, Generaloberst Rendulic.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did they give the orders?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In carrying out the order which Hitler had
given them regarding the defense of Vienna, they defended Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What orders did you, Witness, give your subordinates
in this connection?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: For the defense of Vienna I gave only such
orders as related to the Volkssturm, or those dealing with the food
supply of the city and similar matters with which I was charged.
I personally had nothing to do with the actual defense of the city.
For even the work of destruction which was necessary in the course
of the military defense of the city is to be traced back to orders
which originated from the Führer’s headquarters and had been
transmitted to the officer commanding the Army group, and to
the city commandant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: My second question, Witness: In your cross-examination
you were questioned about Document 3763-PS. This
is a document which deals with the songs of youth, into which the
Prosecution seems to read a different attitude from the one you
set forth. Do you wish to supplement your testimony on this point?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I must supplement it briefly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please do.</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Prosecution accuses me concerning a
certain song, a song which begins, “We are the black swarms of
Geyer, hey, ho”; the chorus of which goes, “Spear them, spike them,
put the red cock on the cloister roof,” and one verse runs, “We will
cry to Him on high that we want to kill the priest.”
<span class='pageno' title='536' id='Page_536'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>This is a Christian song.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How is that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This can be seen in the fourth and fifth
verses. It is the song of the Protestant peasants under the leadership
of Florian Geyer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The fourth verse goes: “No castle, abbey, and monastery matters.
Nothing but the Holy Scripture is of value to us.” The next verse
goes: “We want the same law from prince down to peasant.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>Protestantism, too, was once a revolution. The rebel peasants
sang this song; and it may serve as an example, this song of the
16th century, like some of the songs of the French revolution. This
song may be used as an example to show how, in the beginning,
revolutions are radical rather than tolerant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, with this point I should like to
conclude my direct examination of the Defendant Von Schirach.
Thank you very much. I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Who were your principal assistants in your
office at Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First of all, the chief of my Central Office,
Hoepken; secondly, the Regierungspräsident Dr. Dellbrügge; thirdly,
the Mayor, Blaschke; and fourthly, the Deputy Gauleiter, Scharizer.
They were my chief collaborators.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That makes four, does it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And did they occupy the whole of their time
working for you in your office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not all of them. The Deputy Gauleiter had
already been functioning under my predecessor, Bürckel. Mayor
Blaschke, as far as I recall, first became mayor in 1943. His predecessor
as mayor was a Herr Jung. The District President, Dr. Dellbrügge,
assumed his office in 1940, after my arrival in Vienna. He
was sent to me from the Reich.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well then, from the time that you took over
the office in Vienna these four men were working for you, is that
right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I should like to mention also that the
head of the Central Office, Hoepken, was first of all active under
me as adjutant and assumed his position as chief only when the
former chief of this office, Obergebietsführer Müller, lost his life in
an air raid.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which of the four was it who initialed those
weekly reports which were received in your office?
<span class='pageno' title='537' id='Page_537'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was the District President, Dr. Dellbrügge.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dellbrügge?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And at the time that he received them he
was working in your office as one of your principal assistants?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He was my deputy in the State Administration.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That was your office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was one of my offices.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, one department in your office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. May I add, by way of explanation, that
there were various branches: The State Administration, the Municipal
Administration, the Party Management and the Reich Defense
Commissariat. The Reich Defense Commissariat and the State
Administration were combined as far as their representation was
concerned. Everything was co-ordinated in the Central Office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, in which department was this principal
assistant who initialed these documents? Which department was he
head of?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He held a key position in the office of the
Reichsstatthalter as Chief of the State Administration.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Civil administration?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, Civil State Administration.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Was he the Deputy Reich Defense Commissioner?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And you were the Reich Defense Commissioner
for the Military District Number XVII, were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And he was your deputy in that military
district?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He received and initialed those reports in
that office, did he not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Schirach left the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, with your permission I should like
to call to the witness box the witness Lauterbacher.
<span class='pageno' title='538' id='Page_538'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Lauterbacher took the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HARTMANN LAUTERBACHER (Witness): Hartmann Lauterbacher.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that your full name?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Lauterbacher.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear
by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, I have already discussed this
matter with you in the prison; is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please pause after each question before you answer
so that the interpreters may keep up.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When were you born?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On 24 May 1909.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: 1909?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, 1909.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Are you married?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You have three children?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What is your profession?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Druggist.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Retail druggist?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You are in an American prison?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In an English prison.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Since when?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Since 29 May 1945.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Have you been interrogated by the Prosecution on
this matter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you become an official, that is to say,
a paid employee of the Hitler Youth?
<span class='pageno' title='539' id='Page_539'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I became a paid employee of the Hitler Youth
when appointed District Leader (Gebietsführer) of the Westphalia-Lower
Rhine area.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And when was that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In April 1932:</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: April 1932. That was at the age of 23?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, at the age of 23.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Before then had you been a member of the HJ?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. I was...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Slowly, please, and always wait until the question
has been completed before you answer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I was asking you if you were already a member
of the Hitler Youth when you took up your paid appointment in
the year 1932.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. When I was 13 years old, in the year
1922, I joined what was then known as the National Socialist Youth
Organization. Then, when I was 18 years old, in the year 1927, I
accepted the duties of an Unterführer in my home province of the
Tyrol...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And officially you were...</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: ...then I worked in an honorary capacity in
Brunswick from 1929 until 1932; and later on I had a paid appointment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That is to say from 1932?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was your status in the year 1932? What
position did you get then?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In the year 1932 I was entrusted with the
leadership of the area then known as Westphalia-Lower Rhine.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When were you assigned to the Defendant
Von Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On 22 May 1934.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was your position under him?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Stabsführer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How long did you remain a Stabsführer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Until August 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I suppose until the time he resigned his office as
Reich Youth Leader?
<span class='pageno' title='540' id='Page_540'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When you took up your paid appointment with
the HJ, had you already served with the Army?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then you had not been an officer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You told us, I believe, that since 1934 you had
been Stabsführer of the Reich Youth Leadership. What tasks did
the Stabsführer of the Reich Youth Leadership have? Please tell
us briefly, so we may have an idea of what your jurisdiction was.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: As the title of Stabsführer indicates, I was
in the first place the chief of the staff of the Reich Youth Leadership.
As such, I had the task of dealing with the general directives
of the Reich Youth Leader, particularly those concerning the Hitler
Youth offices and regions insofar as the Youth Leader did not do
that himself. I had to co-ordinate the various departments of the
Reich Youth Leadership and in particular to deal with matters of
an organizational and personal nature.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Furthermore, in the years 1935 to 1939 I made a number of journeys
abroad at Von Schirach’s request.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who was the deputy of the Reich Youth Leader
when he could not act personally?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was his deputy on occasions when he was
prevented from acting personally.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then apparently you were the first man in the
Reich Youth Leadership after Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were your relations with Von Schirach purely
official, or were you friends as well?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Our association was not limited only to official
matters; we were also personal friends, and so our personal
relationship was not interrupted by Schirach’s appointment in
Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you believe, Herr Lauterbacher—regarding this
friendly relationship that you had with Von Schirach—that he concealed
certain things from you; or are you of the conviction that so
far as official matters were concerned he had no secrets from you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I always have been, and still am today, convinced
of the fact that Von Schirach made all his intentions and
educational measures known to me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So he kept nothing from you?
<span class='pageno' title='541' id='Page_541'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, he kept nothing from me. If Schirach
had discussions with Adolf Hitler during the earlier years he always
informed me immediately afterwards.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, in the year 1939 the second World War
broke out. Did the Defendant Von Schirach, in the last few years
prior to the outbreak of the World War, have any discussions with
you in which he expressed the view that youth should be educated
for war—in other words—that in educating youth the necessities
and requirements of future war must be taken into account? What
transpired on this point between you and Von Schirach before
the war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The possibility of war was never discussed.
Occasionally I attended Party rallies in the company of Von Schirach;
and on these occasions, when Adolf Hitler delivered a speech, I
only—on the occasion of these rallies I had the definite and unalterable
impression that Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Reich
were determined to maintain peace and to allow matters to follow
a peaceful course. That is why it never occurred to me that youth
should be trained specifically for war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, in your capacity as Stabsführer of the
Reich Youth Leadership, did you have any knowledge about the
mail as a whole which either came to Schirach or was dispatched
by him?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I always saw all the official mail.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the mail which reached Schirach in his office,
did you see anything about directives for the Reich Youth Leadership
received from Hitler, from the Party leadership, from the OKW,
or from any other agency, either State or Party, regarding the preparations
for war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, neither open nor camouflaged.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we have already heard about the main
functions of youth education in the course of the last few days. I
do not believe, Mr. President, that I need go into these subjects in
detail. The witness is the person best qualified to give us information,
but I think I may take the subject of youth education as
clarified.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think so. I think the facts about it have
been sufficiently stated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thank you. Then I can pass on to another subject
immediately.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] You said that you had not been a
soldier. Did not Schirach attach importance to the inclusion among
his collaborators of a certain number of officers, or at least of men
<span class='pageno' title='542' id='Page_542'></span>
who had served their term of military service and who might be
enrolled as instructors? Please be brief.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, at first, that is, during the early years of
the period of development, Von Schirach rejected officers as youth
leaders on ideological and educational grounds. The aim and mission
of the Hitler Youth were those of a socialist community and
of a socialist state; and the old type of officer of the period, the
representative of a reactionary epoch, would have been absolutely
incompatible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Absolutely incompatible? Do you mean with the...</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: With the principles of education which
Schirach had laid down for the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, have you any idea whether Schirach
always rejected the proposal, or to put it the other way round, do
you know whether he agreed when any military authorities tried
to influence the character of the Youth Leadership? Perhaps you
could also answer this point briefly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Even in 1933 attempts were made to introduce
officers into the Hitler Youth as leaders. As far as my
information goes, two officers had been given appointments in the
Hitler Youth before my period of office as Stabsführer, under more
or less direct orders from Hitler. They were entirely unable to cope
with youth as such; and I think I am justified in saying that their
appearance was a complete failure.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What happened to them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Schirach went to Adolf Hitler and succeeded
in having these gentlemen dismissed; also through him, a directive
was drawn up by Hitler which said that officers were not to hold
positions in the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were no further attempts of the kind made to
force officers from somewhere or other upon him?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Oh, yes. In 1936 and 1937, and then again
in 1938, attempts were made to influence the education of the Hitler
Youth through so-called liaison officers. But these attempts also
failed; and up to the very end there were no officers working with
the Hitler Youth who were responsible to any other authority except
Schirach, apart from former Hitler Youth leaders who had served
in the Army and received officers’ commissions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: If I understand you correctly, Witness, you wish to
say—and please confirm whether I have understood you correctly—that
Schirach rejected these attempts. Is that correct?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.
<span class='pageno' title='543' id='Page_543'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, why did the Hitler Youth wear uniform—the
girls as well?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Uniform is perhaps not quite the correct term
for the clothing worn by the members of the Hitler Youth. It was
more in the nature of a national costume which was worn by members
of youth organizations before the existence of the Hitler Youth,
not only in Germany but in other countries as well. Moreover,
Schirach was anxious that all boys and girls should, as he expressed
himself, wear the dress of the socialist community.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Of the socialist community. Does that mean a
community of all—of all the boys and girls of every class of German
society without any distinction?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Without any distinction as to descent or creed
or anything else.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Or rich or poor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were the Hitler Youth in possession of weapons
and were they trained in the use of military weapons? You must
know that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, they were not trained in the use of military
weapons during the period in which Schirach and I held office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did the Hitler Youth have, in particular, tanks,
armored cars, and so forth, since reference was made to the training
of the young men in the so-called “motorized Hitler Youth” in connection
with the question of the special unit (Sonderformation)—tanks,
armored cars?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, to my knowledge the Hitler Youth never
received any training in armored cars, tanks, or anything of the
kind, even after Schirach’s term of office. At any rate...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the facts stated by the defendant
as to the weapons of the Hitler Youth and their formations were
not cross-examined. You need not go into that. Mr. Dodd did not
suggest that they had tanks.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thank you, Mr. President. Then I can perhaps be
more brief.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I now come, Herr Lauterbacher, to the Defendant Von Schirach’s
attitude toward the Jewish question. Was the Hitler Youth involved
in any way in the Jewish pogroms of November 1938?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I think I can answer your question with a
definite “no.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, you told me something about
a speech made by the Defendant Von Schirach a few days after
<span class='pageno' title='544' id='Page_544'></span>
9 November 1938, on the subject of these Jewish pogroms. Tell me
when and to whom he delivered this speech and what the contents
of the speech were.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Von Schirach was in Munich on 10 November
1938 and I was in Berlin. Schirach instructed me by telephone to
tell the district leaders of the Hitler Youth that their organizations
were in no circumstances to take part in these anti-Jewish demonstrations,
and to call a meeting of all these leaders to hear a specific
declaration on this point. This meeting took place about 15 November
1938.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Where?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In Berlin. Schirach asked these district leaders
to report to him and expressed his satisfaction at having in the
meantime received reports to the effect that the Hitler Youth had
not been involved in these excesses. He then described the said
excesses in his speech. I still remember this speech extraordinarily
well, for it was particularly impressive. He described these pogroms
as a disgrace to our culture and as amounting to self-defamation.
He said that such things might be expected of an uncivilized people
but not of the German people. He went on to say that we had
antagonized not only the world in general but also all decent people
in Germany itself by these demonstrations. He was afraid that
serious political difficulties would arise at home, as well as difficulties
within the Party itself. As we know, the Party was not at all
unanimous in its judgment of these happenings. A very large section
of the Party members and of the Party leadership condemned
these excesses.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please tell us more of what Schirach said at that
time. I should be more interested in that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Von Schirach then gave the Youth Leadership
special instructions to keep out of demonstrations of this or a
similar kind in the future, no matter what the circumstances might
be, and condemned every use of violence on educational grounds
alone. He concluded the proceedings by prohibiting the reading of
the newspaper <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> by the Hitler Youth at club evenings
or on any other occasions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: On this occasion, Herr Lauterbacher, did he say
anything about the needless destruction of so many cultural treasures,
art treasures, property belonging to the people, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and
did he not give certain instances of this?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. As an especially glaring instance, he
quoted the case of the attempt, which was at least partially carried
through, to loot the Jewish firm of Bernheimer, art dealers in
Munich.
<span class='pageno' title='545' id='Page_545'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Munich?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. He quoted this example to the Youth
Leadership to illustrate the dangerous and irreparable inroads made
on the reservoir of our culture and our cultural treasures by these
demonstrations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Is it true that immediately after this Berlin speech
about which you have just told us, the Defendant Von Schirach
caused definite directives to be issued by telephone from Berlin,
through your agency, to the individual Hitler Youth offices?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: This took place as early as 10 November, the
day after the Munich meeting. It had nothing to do with the district
leaders’ meeting, which only took place about 15 November.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, I assume that, as time went
on, you were present at a good many speeches made by the Defendant
Von Schirach to his subleaders, or to the Hitler Youth, and that
you listened to many of these speeches yourself. Did the Defendant
Von Schirach engage in Jew-baiting on these or other occasions?
Did he suggest that violence be used against the Jews? What was
his attitude?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes; I must have listened to all the important
speeches delivered by Von Schirach before the Leadership Corps
of the Hitler Youth, and on the occasion of these speeches I never
heard him urge the use of violence, which would in any case have
been completely foreign to his nature. At any rate, I cannot recall
that Von Schirach ever called upon the Youth Leadership, either
directly or indirectly, to take part in acts of violence of any kind
against anyone.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What did Schirach usually talk about in delivering
one of his many speeches addressed to youth? Just the main topic,
briefly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: One must certainly differentiate between the
long speeches which he delivered at public demonstrations and the
speeches which he made before the leaders of the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the speeches he addressed to the leaders he always discussed
the main political and ideological tasks and the tasks of social policy,
cultural policy, and professional training which he had assigned to
the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Now, we shall turn to a different topic, Herr
Lauterbacher. Did Schirach cause you to leave the Church?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you leave the Church?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I do not believe that Herr Von Schirach even
knew to what religious denomination I belonged or whether I left
<span class='pageno' title='546' id='Page_546'></span>
the Church or not. I left the Church in 1937 or 1938, without being
influenced or forced to do so by anyone.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Von Schirach urge his other collaborators to
leave the Church, as far as you know?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Schirach abuse Christianity or incite others to
attack it on the occasion of the numerous speeches made by him, to
which you have just told us that you listened?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On those occasions Schirach always told the
youth to respect religious convictions, and characterized atheism as
an evil, not only once but many times. In his speeches, Von Schirach
vigorously criticized, for instance, the athletic clubs existing both
before and after 1933 in connection with the various churches and
demanded the unity of youth; but on these occasions he did not
attack Christianity or the religious convictions of others either in
public or in private.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, during the time the Defendant
Von Schirach was Reich Youth Leader, negotiations were pending
with the Roman Catholic Church with a view to concluding a concordat,
so that relations between the State and the Church would
be regulated by an agreement. Do you know whether Von Schirach
took part in these concordat negotiations and whether he took
much trouble to effect an understanding with the Church on a basis
satisfactory to both sides?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. In 1933 and 1934 Schirach had numerous
discussions with representatives of the Church, Reich Bishop Müller
of the Protestant Church and the representative of the Fulda Conference
of Bishops, Bishop Berning of Osnabrück. I remember that
Schirach strove to draw a dividing line between their respective
powers and jurisdiction on some such basis as: “Render unto Caesar
the things which are Caesar’s and unto God the things which are
God’s.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I have another question, Witness: Do you know
whether Von Schirach actually tried to bring about an understanding
between the Hitler Youth, of which he was the leader,
and the youth of other countries, and can you tell us, for instance,
what he did and what steps he took to that end?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The establishment of a cordial understanding
between German youth and world youth generally was undoubtedly
one of those tasks the importance of which Schirach constantly
emphasized to his youth leaders, and I always had the impression
that this task was, as I might almost say, his particular passion. I
myself, on his orders—and perhaps I am a cardinal witness on
<span class='pageno' title='547' id='Page_547'></span>
precisely this point—visited the various European countries, from
1935 onwards, at least once a year and sometimes even two or three
times a year, so that I could get in touch with existing youth organizations
and with organizations of combatants of the first World War,
in order to establish contact with them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Which countries?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: It can truthfully be said that the Hitler Youth
sought contacts with all the countries of Europe; and I myself, at
the direct order of Von Schirach, visited England several times.
There I met the leader of the British Boy Scouts and his colleague,
but also...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think those facts are in dispute. It
is merely the inference that is to be drawn from the facts that
the Prosecution will rely upon. Therefore it is not necessary for
you to go into the facts again, as to the connection of the Hitler
Youth with the foreign youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, you have just heard that these facts are not in dispute.
We can therefore turn to another topic. You were the Stabsführer
of the Hitler Youth in the Reich Youth Leadership. Do you know
whether the Leadership of the Hitler Youth maintained spies or
agents abroad, or whether it trained people for the so-called Fifth
Column—and I take it you know what that is—in other countries,
or whether it brought young people over to be trained as parachutists
in Germany and then sent them back to their own countries.
During your whole period of office as Stabsführer, did you ever
learn of anything like that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The Hitler Youth did not have spies, agents,
or parachutists to operate in any country in Europe. I would have
been bound to learn of such a fact or such an arrangement in any
circumstances.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Even if Schirach had made such an arrangement
behind your back, do you believe that you would have been bound
to learn of it in any case through the channels of reports from
district leaders and similar channels?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I would inevitably have learned of this or
have observed it in these districts on some of my many official trips.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, Witness, I should like to turn to another
topic. The other day you told me about a certain discussion. After
the Polish campaign—that would be, presumably, at the end of September
or beginning of October 1939—and before the actual campaign
in France you had a meeting with the Defendant Von Schirach
<span class='pageno' title='548' id='Page_548'></span>
in your residence in Berlin-Dahlem, on which occasion the Defendant
Von Schirach voiced his attitude to the war. Will you describe
this conversation briefly to the Court?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. Von Schirach came to see me at the end
of September or beginning of October 1939. He visited me in the
house which I occupied at the time in Berlin. The conversation very
quickly turned to war, and Schirach said that, in his opinion, this
war should have been prevented. He held the Foreign Minister of
that time responsible for having given Hitler inadequate or false
information. He regretted the fact that Hitler and the leading men
of the State and the Party knew nothing about Europe and the
world generally and had steered Germany into this war without
having any idea of the consequences.</p>

<p class='pindent'>At that time he was of the opinion that if the war could not be
brought to an end in the shortest possible time, we should lose it.
In this connection he referred to the enormous war potential of the
United States and England. He said—and I remember the expression
very well—that this war was an unholy one and that if the
German people were not to be plunged into disaster as a result of
it, the Führer must be informed of the danger which would arise
for Germany if America were to intervene, either through deliveries
of goods or through actual entry into the war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>We considered at the time who could inform Hitler, who, in
fact, could even obtain access to him. Schirach suggested trying
in some way to introduce Colin Ross into Adolf Hitler’s presence.
Colin Ross was to call Hitler’s attention to the threatening catastrophe
and to inform Hitler of the facts. This was to be done
outside the competency of the Foreign Minister and without the
Foreign Minister being present. At that time Colin Ross was not
yet in Germany. I remember that when he returned he was
introduced into Hitler’s presence by way of Schirach.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, will you tell us more about the discussion
which you mentioned as having taken place in 1939. I should like
you to answer this question: How did he come to choose Dr. Colin
Ross in particular? How did you happen to think of him?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I have already mentioned that the leaders of
the National Socialist State and of the Party were almost totally
lacking in knowledge of the world and foreign countries generally,
and had consequently hit upon this man, who had seen so much of
the world. Colin Ross had occasionally attended meetings of the
Hitler Youth Leaders before 1939 and had addressed them...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What about?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: ...and thus he was known to Schirach and
the Hitler Youth.
<span class='pageno' title='549' id='Page_549'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What were the topics he discussed before the
Hitler Youth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Colin Ross spoke of his experiences in every
continent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How did Colin Ross become known to the Hitler
Youth? On this occasion did you also speak of whether an attempt
should be made to find a solution of the Jewish problem, so that
it would be easier to reach an understanding with other countries,
and if so, on what basis?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. In the course of this conversation
Schirach referred to the excesses of 9 November 1938 and to the
speech he made immediately afterwards, and said that in the
circumstances it would naturally be extremely difficult to start
discussions with America; that we might have to try beforehand—if
circumstances permitted—and he wished to suggest this to
Hitler during an interview...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal does not think it is
really sufficiently important to go into Schirach’s private discussions
with this witness. If he can say anything as to what Schirach did,
it may be different, but now the witness is simply reciting the discussions
which he had with Schirach, nothing more than private
discussion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what steps did Schirach actually take
towards peace, or to shorten the war, as a result of these discussions
with you? Did he take any steps; and what were
these steps?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, as he told me at a later discussion,
Schirach made use of every opportunity at the beginning of the
war to convince Hitler of the need for discussions with America,
and with this purpose in view, he actually brought Colin Ross to
Hitler, as he told me later. Colin Ross was with Hitler for several
hours. When Colin Ross visited me at Hanover he told me about
this discussion and on this occasion he said that Hitler was very
thoughtful. He did say also, however, that a second discussion which
had been planned with Hitler had not materialized, for, according
to his version, the Foreign Office had protested against this kind
of information.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks that this
witness is dealing in great detail with matters which are of very
<span class='pageno' title='550' id='Page_550'></span>
little importance and the Tribunal wishes you to bring his attention
to something which is of real importance.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have in any case only one more
question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>One last question, Witness. You have not been with Schirach
since 1940. I believe you became a Gauleiter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Schirach went to Vienna. But in 1943 you again
had a long talk with him, mainly about why Schirach did not
resign from his post. My reason for putting this question to you
is that one member of the Prosecution has already discussed the
question today. Will you tell us briefly what reasons Schirach gave
at the time for retaining his office or why he did not resign, and
what his views on the war were in 1943—at that time, I mean?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In March 1943, when I made an unofficial
visit to Vienna, a very long conversation took place between
Von Schirach and myself. At that time, Von Schirach talked very
pessimistically about the prospects of the war and told me that
we should soon be fighting outside Vienna, in the Alps and along
the Rhine. On that occasion he said that he had not been able to
see Adolf Hitler for a very long time; that he had had no further
opportunity of reporting to him, as had formerly been the case;
and that the Chief of the Party Chancellery, Bormann, had consistently
prevented him from seeing the Führer and talking to him
alone; and that he therefore no longer had any opportunity whatsoever
of discussing Viennese questions or general questions with
Hitler. In this connection he also stated that Bormann came to him
with objections and complaints every day, cancelling orders and
directives he had issued in his capacity of Gauleiter in Vienna,
and that in view of all this, it was no longer possible for him to
remain in office and to shoulder the responsibility.</p>

<p class='pindent'>At a later stage of that conversation, in the course of which we
considered all kinds of possibilities, he said that, as he had sworn
an oath of allegiance to Hitler, he felt bound to remain in office
whatever happened and that, above all, he could not take the
responsibility in the present military situation for abandoning the
population over which he had been appointed Gauleiter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>He saw the catastrophe coming but said that even his resignation
or any action that he might take would not have any influence on
the leaders of the State or on Hitler himself and that he would,
therefore, remain true to his oath, as a soldier would, and retain
his appointment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, that concludes my examination of
this witness.
<span class='pageno' title='551' id='Page_551'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defense counsel want to ask
him any questions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, were you Gauleiter in Hanover
from 1940?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, from December 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You were also Plenipotentiary for Labor in
that capacity?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were there many foreign laborers in your
Gau?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, there were a great many foreign
laborers in my district. This was mainly due to the Hermann
Göring Works, which had been established near Brunswick.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have to look after them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, my assignments as Plenipotentiary for
Labor were confined to looking after foreign civilian workers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive instructions from Sauckel on
that point?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I, like all other Gauleiter of the NSDAP,
constantly received instructions from Sauckel with regard to the
recruitment of labor; that is to say, regarding the welfare of these
civilian workers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What type of instructions were they?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The instructions which I received as Gauleiter
consisted almost exclusively of repeated demands to do everything
to satisfy the foreign workers in matters of accommodation,
food, clothing, and cultural welfare.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was that carried out in practice?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: It was naturally carried out within the limits
of existing possibilities.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you inspect camps or factories where these
workers were employed?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, I myself inspected such camps and
especially such factories on my official trips. Apart from that I had,
as my Gau supervisor of the German Labor Front, a man who
assisted me in this task on such occasions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you or your Gau supervisor discover the
existence of shocking conditions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. After the air raids from which Hanover
and Brunswick suffered particularly badly from 1943 onwards, I
<span class='pageno' title='552' id='Page_552'></span>
found conditions in foreign civilian labor camps—just as I did in
the living quarters of German people—to be what I would call, perhaps
not shocking, but certainly very serious; and after that I tried
as far as possible to have these destroyed dwellings repaired, for
instance, or to have new ones built.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you see any abuses for which these industrial
enterprises of the supervisory agencies were directly responsible?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, I do remember two such cases.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Several firms in Hanover had formed a kind of industrial association—a
kind of union—and had established a camp for their foreign
civilian workers. The trustees of these firms were responsible
for this camp. One day the Gau supervisor of the German Labor
Front reported to me that living conditions did not comply with
instructions received and asked my permission to intervene, that
is to say, to be allowed to assume responsibility through the German
Labor Front for that collective camp. I gave him this assignment;
and sometime afterwards he reported that these difficulties had
been overcome.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Hermann Göring Works constitute another example of this
kind. Since I am speaking under oath here, I must mention the fact
that that firm disregarded Sauckel’s instructions in many respects.
On one occasion they recruited workers independently, outside the
jurisdiction of the labor administration through their branches in
the Ukraine and other countries. These laborers came to Watenstedt,
in the area supervised by the Executive Board of the Party,
outside the quota fixed by the Plenipotentiary for Labor, and consequently
outside of his jurisdiction.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I myself had very considerable difficulty in obtaining entry to
the works and the camp. For although Gauleiter and Plenipotentiary,
I was not by any means in a position simply to...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What has this got to do with
the Defendant Sauckel?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I asked him about any abuses which he had
found, for as plenipotentiary for the recruitment of foreign workers
it was his duty to ascertain where such bad conditions existed and
to report them so that they would finally be brought to Sauckel’s
notice. He has digressed rather widely and has just been describing
the Hermann Göring Works.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You should stop him, Dr. Servatius. You know
the question you were asking.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you discover the existence of
abuses in the camp?
<span class='pageno' title='553' id='Page_553'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was unable to enter the camp, because
entry was forbidden.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel himself address the workers in
your Gau?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, not during my period of office. But he
frequently sent representatives.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have now got some questions to put on behalf
of the political leaders whom I represent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Did you receive special instructions from the Führer on your
appointment as Gauleiter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. When I was appointed Gauleiter I was
merely introduced by Herr Hess as Gauleiter, during an assembly
of Gauleiter. But I received no special instructions on the occasion
of that meeting, and during my...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Witness, the answer was “no” and you did
not need to add to it at all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you talk to the Führer later on? Did you
receive special or secret instructions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I only saw the Führer now and again at
Gauleiter meetings and I never had any official discussions with him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know anything about the activities of
block leaders? In particular, I want to ask you: Were they used
as spies?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: But there seems to be a widespread belief that
in fact block leaders did act as spies and informers and that has
been brought up by the Prosecution. Perhaps the SD used block
leaders for that purpose?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The SD had its own agents who were not
known to the Party. At any rate, the block leaders had no instructions
to work for the SD.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was no card index kept of Party opponents?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Not in the Party organizations. As far as I
know this card index was kept by the Secret Police, as was made
known in connection with the plot of 20 July 1944.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Party use agents for spying who may
not have been block leaders but who worked for you in your capacity
of Gauleiter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When did you join the SS, Witness?
<span class='pageno' title='554' id='Page_554'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was made an SS Brigadier General on
2 August 1940, on the occasion of my appointment as Deputy Gauleiter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not hear your answer as to when you first
joined the SS. Would you repeat it, please?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On 2 August 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You had not belonged before that date to the organization
at all?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was not a member of the SS before that
date; but I served in the Waffen-SS as a soldier, from 26 May 1940
to September 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And then you later became an SS Obergruppenführer,
did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On 20 April 1944.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And when did you join the staff of Himmler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was never a member of Himmler’s staff.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you not join it in January of 1944, or what would
you say that you did join in the Reichsführer SS Organization? Perhaps
I have used the wrong term “staff.” There is some other name
for it. Were you not affiliated in some way with Himmler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, I never had any SS assignments.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you have any connection with the Reichsführer
SS from January 1944 on?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In October 1944 the Reichsführer SS had
gone in his special train to Bad Pyrmont, on the occasion of a meeting
of West German Gauleiter and Higher SS and Police Leaders.
I had orders to be present at that function; and in the course of
the meeting I had a talk with him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is not what I asked; but I will pass it. Did you
become an SA Obergruppenführer in 1944, as well as SS Obergruppenführer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I became an SA Obergruppenführer, I think,
in 1944 or 1943.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You were also a member of the Reichstag in 1936,
were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And a member of the Party, I guess you said, since
1927; is that right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Since 1927.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And a member of the Hitler Youth, or NSDAP,
since 1923?
<span class='pageno' title='555' id='Page_555'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I joined the Hitler Youth in 1927. The Hitler
Youth was not established until 1927.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, whenever it was, the youth organization of the
Party, that is what I mean. How many people did you have hanged
publicly while you were the Gauleiter up in Hanover?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I did not understand the question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I said: How many people did you have hanged publicly
while you were the Gauleiter up in Hanover?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I never hanged anyone publicly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Are you sure about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How many people did you send to concentration
camps?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I might have handed over 5 or 10 persons
to ordinary courts for violating war economy regulations. And in
one case which I remember particularly well, there were two people
who refused...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I do not care about the details. Just tell me
how many you sent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: There were two. I do not know if they were
sent to concentration camps, because I myself could not intern them.
The internment was decided in Berlin.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know a man by the name of Huck, H-u-c-k,
Heinrich Huck?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Huck—no. At the moment I cannot remember
that name.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: The police commissar under your Gau, or in your
Gau?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, I do not know him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I want to ask: Did you not have a foreign worker
from one of the eastern countries hanged, publicly hanged in the
market square, and to remain there a whole day, at one time, while
you were the Gauleiter up there?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. Where is that supposed to have happened?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is supposed to have happened in Hildesheim.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In March of 1945, just before the war ended.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. That is unknown to me. I never gave
any such instructions.
<span class='pageno' title='556' id='Page_556'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you order 400 or 500 prisoners poisoned or shot
just before the city was taken by an Allied army?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, that was put to me in London, and I
think I cleared up the matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You know what I am talking about, then?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, the penitentiary at Hameln.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You know that your Kreisleiter says that you ordered
them poisoned with either prussic acid or strychnine, or else they
were to be shot?</p>

<p class='pindent'>You know about that, do you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was told about that in London.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And not only does your Kreisleiter say that but
Richard Rother, who was an inspector at the prison at Hameln, confirms
that the order was passed on, that either they were to be
poisoned or shot; do you know about that as well?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I never gave any such order.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am asking you if you know that these people
associated with you have sworn under oath that you did. You have
seen these affidavits, have you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was told of it in London; but I was also
told that the inmates of that penitentiary were neither poisoned nor
shot, but sent back.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, they were, but not because of you, but because
your people refused to carry out your orders, is not that so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I know nothing about that, because I was
no longer in Hameln and no longer a Gauleiter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You have seen these affidavits, so I do not think
there is any need to hand them to you, but I am going to offer them
in evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I received the statement of the commissioned
Kreisleiter, Dr. Krämer, in London, and I replied to it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well. You know what he says, then?</p>

<p class='pindent'>I offer this D-861 as Exhibit USA-874, Mr. President. It is a document
consisting of 7 affidavits from persons associated with this witness
when he was the Gauleiter, and having to do with his conduct
while he was Gauleiter there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How do you suggest that that evidence is
relevant?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I offer them in relation to this man’s credibility, or
rather lack of it. I do not think that they have anything to do
directly with the case, other than they show the kind of individual
<span class='pageno' title='557' id='Page_557'></span>
he is, as we claim, and that the Tribunal should have this information
before it when it considers the weight it will give to his
testimony.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I have also just been reminded by my friend, Mr. Elwyn Jones,
that of course it would have a bearing on the issue of the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party, of which he is a member. That had
not occurred to me, however. However, I do wish to claim it as a
ground, also, for this document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where are the people who made these affidavits?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I will have to inquire. I do not know.
They are in custody, some of them at least, in the British zone here
in Germany.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, you have just inquired where these
people are who made these affidavits. Perhaps I can assist you in
clarifying these questions. This Josef Krämer, whom the Prosecution
have just quoted as the leading witness against the witness
Lauterbacher, was sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment by an
English court some 8 or 10 days ago, and this for the very reason
which the prosecutor has just mentioned. Herr Lauterbacher knows
nothing about this matter, but quite accidentally I read a report of
this trial in a German newspaper and I have the report here. In
that article, dated 2 May of this year, it is stated that the former
Kreisleiter of Hameln, Dr. Josef Krämer, was sentenced by the court
of the 5th British Division to 7 years’ imprisonment. I quote from
that article:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“Upon the approach of the Allied troops Krämer had given
the order to liquidate the inmates of the penitentiary at
Hameln. ‘No dangerous prisoner and no foreigner is to be
allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy,’ was his order.
‘They must all be poisoned with prussic acid, or, if that is not
possible, they will have to be shot.’ ”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>That was the wording of the order given by ex-Kreisleiter Josef
Krämer; and he is now being used as a witness against my witness
here. The report goes on to say that officials at the penitentiary,
who appeared as witnesses, stated that in spite of this order from
Dr. Krämer they had refused to liquidate the prisoners. The rest is
of no interest but I thought that perhaps it might be important for
the Tribunal, when dealing with this question, to see from a document
how this former Kreisleiter behaved in reality. If you are
interested, Mr. President, the newspaper clipping, although it is in
German, can be admitted to you at once.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May I say, Mr. President, that perfectly substantiates
the document; that is, Krämer says in here that is what he did, that
<span class='pageno' title='558' id='Page_558'></span>
he passed orders on but that he got them from this man. If anything,
it supports us. It does not hurt us one whit insofar as the
value of this document is concerned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In looking them over, I think it is perhaps best if I only offer
the first one and the last one. There are some others in this group
that are not particularly helpful, I expect, for the Court. I shall
withdraw all but the first and last and offer only the affidavit of
Krämer and the affidavit of Huck.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal does not think that
these documents ought to be admitted. In the first place, so far as
the credit of the particular witness is concerned, they do not think
that his answers on questions of credit ought to be challenged by
other evidence. So far as the Leadership Corps is concerned, they
think that these documents are only evidence of one individual
crime.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, I understood you to say that you never heard the
Defendant Von Schirach say anything really derogatory of the
Jewish people, and, on the contrary, you heard him speak out
quite openly after the events of 9 November 1938. Did I understand
you correctly?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, he criticized the atrocities in no uncertain
terms at the meeting of Gauleiters. He had no doubt that...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do not go all through it again. I just wanted to be
sure that I understood you correctly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I suppose you read the Hitler Youth yearbook for the year 1938,
as the Deputy to the Reich Leader.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: At the moment I do not remember this book.
If I could have a look at it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Of course I do not expect you to. I merely wanted
to ascertain that you did read it. I suppose you always read your
yearbook?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What, you did not read it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I cannot remember, no.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, would it not be customary for you to read the
yearbook? Let us put it that way.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The yearbook was compiled by the Press
Department and I had no influence on the details of the journalistic
make-up of our newspapers, periodicals or yearbooks. I do not
remember this book, at least as far as it concerns demands for anti-Semitic
atrocities, or a policy of force.
<span class='pageno' title='559' id='Page_559'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I will show it to you in any event and call
your attention to an article in the yearbook concerning the Jewish
people. Do you know what I refer to? Where they were charged
with having spilled the blood of millions of dead in history. That
was put out, I assume, after the brave statements by the defendant
in November of 1938, since it is for the whole year of 1938. You
will find the article that I refer to on Page 192.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Have you seen that article before?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. That yearbook had no official character;
it was a private enterprise on the part of the publishers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. What do you mean, “it had no
official character”? It was the yearbook of the Hitler Youth, was
it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: This yearbook was not officially edited by
the Hitler Youth or by the Party. I never saw it until after it was
published.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It was published by the Central Publishing House
of the NSDAP, was it not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, that is correct; I see that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It was called <span class='it'>The Yearbook of the Hitler Youth</span>, and
you put it out for a good many years consecutively, did you not?
I do not mean you personally, but I mean the Party and the Hitler
Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. This yearbook was compiled and published
every year by the gentleman mentioned there, or by others, as
the case might be.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know that. I am simply trying to establish this,
that this was the yearbook of the Hitler Youth and the only one
that was put out, and it was put out each year. Now is that not so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: This book appeared every year, but I repeat
again that it had no official character, nor do I believe that...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, what would you say would give it an official
character?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: If it said here, “Published by the Reich Youth
Leader’s Office,” it would have an official character.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And the fact that it said, “Published by the Central
Publishing House of the NSDAP” would not give it one, is that it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Certainly not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not put out any other publications in the
nature of a yearbook, did you, except this one?
<span class='pageno' title='560' id='Page_560'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: A calendar was published every year.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I am certainly not talking about a calendar;
I am talking about a report or a book.</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you are still telling this Tribunal that this was
not the yearbook of the Hitler Youth and the only one that was
published in Germany?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I repeat that this yearbook did not have any
official character.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, after having read that quotation, do you still
think that Schirach, as leader of the Reich Youth, was not actively
speaking about the Jews in a derogatory sort of way, or that talk
of this kind was not going on under his leadership?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Von Schirach never left any doubt regarding
his anti-Semitic attitude as long as he was Reich Youth Leader.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know the speech he made in 1942 when he
took credit for deporting the Jews from Vienna? Are you familiar
with that speech?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, I do not know that speech. During that
time I was in Hanover, and Schirach was in Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. He was a fellow Gauleiter at that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Did you ever get any SS reports on what was happening to the
Jews in the East?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Never. I never had access to SS reports, SS
circulars, or orders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you deport any Jews from your Gau?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: When I came to the Gau in December 1940,
the Jews had already emigrated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: They were already out by the time you got there?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you ever hear of Gauleiters getting reports from
Heydrich or from Himmler about what was happening to the Jews
in the East? Did any of your fellow Gauleiter ever tell you that
they got reports regularly, say by the month or by the week?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. Himmler’s reports were no more accessible
to the Gauleiter than they were to the honorary leaders of the
SS. As Obergruppenführer of the SS I never received a report or
an instruction from Himmler.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Those Himmler reports were handled pretty carefully,
were they not?
<span class='pageno' title='561' id='Page_561'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>I am now asking you—as an SS Obergruppenführer I suppose
you know something about it—were those reports handled very
carefully, those Himmler and Heydrich reports?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: As an SS Obergruppenführer I never received
any of Himmler’s reports, and I know that Himmler sent all reports
dealing with confidential or internal SS matters only to SS and
Police, that is, SS leaders in the service of the SS, but never to the
honorary leaders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, what I really asked you was whether or not
the reports, when they were sent out, were very carefully handled.
Do you know the answer to that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I do not know. I do not know how these
reports were handled.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What was Heydrich’s reputation, so far as you were
concerned, in 1942? Did you think very well of him or did you
think very poorly of him before he was killed?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I only knew Heydrich from meeting him a
few times in the Reich Youth Leader’s Office, and I had a good
impression of him personally. I am forced to have a different
opinion of him now; but only because I now know of his measures.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What was he doing in the Reich Youth Leader’s
Office the few times that you met him? What business did he have
there?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: He had intervened on his own initiative and
through his own agencies in cases of homosexuality. Schirach forbade
that and told him that these matters too were first of all subject
to his own jurisdiction.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You sat in on all of these conferences with Heydrich,
no matter how many there were, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I participated in one conference on the question
of homosexuality in the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Tell us this: Did it appear to you, from what you
saw and heard there, that Heydrich and Schirach were very friendly,
or on a very friendly basis?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: That conference did not take place with Von
Schirach, but with one of the officials from the Reich Youth Leader’s
Office who, as Chief of the Hitler Youth Legal Administration,
conducted the discussion with Heydrich.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were you ever present when Heydrich talked to
Von Schirach? Were you ever present?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.
<span class='pageno' title='562' id='Page_562'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did Heydrich ever talk to you, or rather, did
Von Schirach ever talk to you about Heydrich?</p>

<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, I cannot remember that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: We have no further questions, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thank you, I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: With the permission of the President, I shall now
call my next witness, Gustav Hoepken.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Hoepken took the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?</p>

<p class='pindent'>GUSTAV DIETRICH HOEPKEN (Witness): Gustav Dietrich
Hoepken.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear
by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Hoepken, I have already examined you on
the case of Schirach when you were in prison?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, you have already examined me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How old are you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I am 36.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What is your father’s occupation?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: My father is a dock laborer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And yourself?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I was a newspaper boy, a dock laborer, a spare-time
student, and sports instructor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Sports instructor. You are now in American hands,
are you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I am a prisoner in American hands.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Since when?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Since 19 May 1945.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Has the Prosecution interrogated you on this
matter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Up to now the Prosecution has not interrogated me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you join the Hitler Youth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I joined the Hitler Youth in 1933.
<span class='pageno' title='563' id='Page_563'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You joined the Hitler Youth in 1933? How old
were you at that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I was 23.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And in what capacity did you join?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: First as an ordinary member. In September 1933
I became an Unterbannführer in the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Unterbannführer in 1933?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, in September 1933.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was that a salaried position or an honorary
appointment?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: From 1933 to 1935 I worked as a sports instructor
in the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And in 1935?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: In 1935 I joined the government offices at Potsdam
as an expert on PT in schools.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But that had nothing to do with the Hitler Youth,
had it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: At Potsdam I also commanded the Potsdam unit and
local headquarters of the Hitler Youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So you were a civil servant—or rather, an employee
of the State and apart from that an honorary leader of the
Hitler Youth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: From 1935 until 1939 I was a civil servant in the
government offices at Potsdam and I also commanded the Hitler
Youth unit and local headquarters at Potsdam in an honorary
capacity.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Therefore in the summer of 1939 you joined the
Reich Youth Leadership, did you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: In June 1939 I joined the Reich Youth Leadership
and became adjutant to Baldur von Schirach who was Reich Youth
Leader at the time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And how long did you hold that office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Until August 1939, and then I became a soldier.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Before you joined Schirach’s staff, had you not
served in the Armed Forces?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Up to joining Schirach in 1939 I had done 8 weeks’
obligatory training in the Air Force.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Apart from that, you had no training?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Apart from that I had no military training.
<span class='pageno' title='564' id='Page_564'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you an officer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I had not been an officer up to that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So far as his other collaborators were concerned,
did Schirach attach importance to their being officers or trained
soldiers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: So far as I know, Von Schirach did not care whether
his collaborators were soldiers or officers, on the contrary, it was
his view, as he told me repeatedly, that soldiers and officers, as
far as he could see, were less suitable as youth leaders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I do not want to go into the general question of
the training of the Hitler Youth, but I wish to ask you one single
question on this point, especially because you are a sports instructor
by profession. It is a question about the training of the Hitler
Youth in shooting. Were they trained with military weapons, or
how were they trained in firing?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The Hitler Youth were trained in shooting with air
guns or small arms. They did not shoot with military weapons.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In that case I will not put any further questions
to you on the subject of uniform as these questions have already
been clarified. But there is one other thing in which I am interested
and that is the relationship to the Church: Do you know, Witness,
whether the Defendant Von Schirach in 1937, that is in the issue of
the Berlin paper, the <span class='it'>Berliner Tageblatt</span> of 14 January 1937, published
an article written by his press adviser Günther Kaufmann,
headed “Can the Gap be Bridged”? That article, a copy of which I
have before me, deals with a problem in which I am interested, and
that is why I want to ask you: Do you know what Schirach made
his press adviser write in that article on the question of whether
the Hitler Youth leaders should consider the young people’s need
for church services or not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know the article.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You know it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I also know the order issued by the Reich Youth
Leader of that time stating that on Sundays there should be no
Hitler Youth duty for all those boys and girls who wanted to attend
church. Every boy and girl in the Hitler Youth at that time was
supposed to be able to attend religious services of his or her own
free will; and it was made part of the duty of the Hitler Youth
leaders at the time to refrain from entering into any arguments
or controversies about the Hitler Youth and the Church. He prohibited
that.
<span class='pageno' title='565' id='Page_565'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, that is the main point of that article of
14 January 1937. But you know that the Defendant Schirach had
certain difficulties with Hitler because of this article. Will you tell
us briefly what you know about it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: As soon as the agreement between the Church and
the Hitler Youth was made, the article mentioned appeared in the
<span class='it'>Berliner Tageblatt</span>. On the day that article appeared, Schirach
was at a meeting in Rosenberg’s office. Hitler called Schirach to
the telephone at that time. Hitler took Schirach sternly to task,
firstly, for making an agreement between the Church and the
Hitler Youth and, secondly, for publishing this article. His intention
was to cancel the agreement and to ban any further issue
of the newspapers. Neither of these things happened.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Schirach refuse to withdraw the article?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: So far as I know he did.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In 1940 you went to Vienna with Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I did not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you go?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I went to Vienna for the first time in September 1941.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Where had you been in the meantime?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I have already told you that I joined the Luftwaffe
in August 1939 and served during that time as a service flying
instructor in a Luftwaffe training school.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And you did not rejoin Schirach until 1941, and
then in Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes; I joined Schirach in Vienna in September 1941.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The highest dignitary of the Catholic Church in
Vienna is Cardinal Innitzer, right?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know what Von Schirach’s attitude to
Cardinal Innitzer was? I will tell you at once why I am asking
you this question; I want to know if it is true that Schirach objected
to Cardinal Innitzer’s being molested by the Hitler Youth, and what
steps he took, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Schirach told me repeatedly that he would like to
have a talk with Cardinal Innitzer, but that he was not allowed to
do so, firstly, because of a decree issued by the former head of the
Party Chancellery, Martin Bormann, prohibiting the Gauleiter from
contacting Church dignitaries and, secondly, because Schirach knew
that he himself was under surveillance.
<span class='pageno' title='566' id='Page_566'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who, Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: That Schirach was under surveillance and thought
that if he forced such a discussion, Bormann would be certain to
know of it on the next day, which would have had most unpleasant
consequences both for Schirach and Cardinal Innitzer. On the other
hand, it was Schirach’s view that Cardinal Innitzer also would
certainly have liked to have a talk with Schirach and Schirach
thought that certainly would not have been the case if Cardinal
Innitzer had not known of his tolerant attitude toward the Church
and the Christian religion. It is furthermore known to me—and I
think this happened in the winter of 1944 to 1945—that Cardinal
Innitzer was molested by youthful civilians while returning from
mass. Cardinal Innitzer had the police find out the names of these
youngsters, and they turned out to be Hitler Youth leaders.
Schirach ordered the competent district leader of the Hitler Youth
to him the same day, took him severely to task, and demanded that
the youth leaders in question be relieved of their duties at once. As
far as I know, this was actually done. I believe I also remember
that Schirach had a letter of apology sent to Cardinal Innitzer,
either personally or through one of his officials.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better break off now.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 28 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<div><span class='pageno' title='567' id='Page_567'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH DAY</span><br/> Tuesday, 28 May 1946</h1></div>

<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that
Defendant Göring is absent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We were going to deal with Defendant Bormann’s
documents, were we not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, two witnesses only have arrived
so far for the Defendant Sauckel. Three essential witnesses are still
missing. Perhaps the Court can help to bring these witnesses
quickly so that the case will not be delayed. They are the witnesses
Stothfang, Dr. Jäger, and Hildebrandt. I have repeatedly asked the
Prosecution to get them but they are not here yet. I have not yet
spoken to the witnesses.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have they been located?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. One is in a camp in Kassel, which is only
a few hours from here, and the other is in Neumünster. That is a
little farther, perhaps 6 or 7 hours from here. Dr. Jäger is free.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is not in accordance with the information
which the Tribunal has. The Tribunal has the information that
they cannot be found.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I received the information that their whereabouts
has been ascertained.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: From whom did you receive that information?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Officially, from the General Secretary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will make inquiries into it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, first, with regard to
the witnesses applied for for the Defendant Bormann. They are,
as I understand it, Fräulein Krüger, to whom we have no objection.
The witness Müller is no longer applied for?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, I have dispensed with that witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, Klopfer, and lastly,
Friedrich. These are with regard to Bormann’s law-making activities,
and the Prosecution have no objections.
<span class='pageno' title='568' id='Page_568'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Your Lordship, in place of the witness Müller,
whom I have withdrawn, I have an additional request for the
witness Gerta Christian on the same subject for which I had
requested the witness Müller.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The first witness, Miss Krüger, is going to
speak to exactly the same facts, is she not, to the death of Bormann?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, Your Lordship. The circumstances concerning
Bormann’s death are not very clear. It is very necessary to
hear all the available witnesses on this subject because only in this
way can one be convinced of the fact, which I am trying to establish,
that the Defendant Bormann is already dead.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It does not seem to be a very relevant fact.
It is very remotely relevant whether he is dead or whether he is
alive. The question is whether he is guilty or innocent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Your Lordship, my point of view is that sentence
cannot be passed against a dead man. That is not provided for in
the Charter. According to the Charter, the Court can only sentence
an absent person, but a dead person cannot be included under the
term “absent.” If the defendant is dead, the Charter does not
provide the possibility of continuing proceedings against him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you any objection to that
other witness?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, the Prosecution
does not make any objections.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, My Lord, with regard to
the documents, the first batch of documents is a series of treaties
and diplomatic pronouncements and documents to counteract the
statement of Sir Hartley Shawcross as to the position of international
law before the Charter, the statement that the law of
nations had constituted aggressive war an international crime before
this Tribunal was established and this Charter became part of the
public law of the world. The position of the Prosecution is that
evidence on that point is really irrelevant because after all, the
Tribunal is covered by the Charter, and it seems unnecessary to
translate and publish, by way of document books, all these matters
which the learned counsel has set out in his application. That is,
shortly, the position of the Prosecution with regard to that first
batch of documents. Especially, I do not want to discuss the problem
for the reason that I have given.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What are the numbers of them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are 1 to 11—no, 7, in the
application.
<span class='pageno' title='569' id='Page_569'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Are they long documents?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Your Lordship, I have not seen them yet. I
applied for these documents 3 months ago in order to look them
over, but unfortunately I have not received them yet and therefore
I cannot give the Court any information as to whether they are long
or not and what parts of them I will need for my defense.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Number 2 looks like a long document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: But I will not use all these documents if I
receive them. I shall probably take some of them, Your Lordship;
I shall only...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you say you applied for them 3 months
ago, you do not mean you applied to the Tribunal, do you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: I applied to the General Secretary, but perhaps
it was put aside when Your Lordship decided that my case should
be postponed to the end. Perhaps it was forgotten.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Was there any order on your application?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You applied, I think, for an adjournment,
did you not, in order that the matter might be brought up later?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, Your Lordship; I am in an especially
difficult situation. I have questioned many witnesses and have tried
very hard, but I can find nothing exonerating. All the witnesses are
filled with great hatred toward the Defendant Bormann, and they
want to incriminate him in order to exonerate themselves. That
makes my case especially difficult. The man himself is probably
dead and can give me no information. Any day now I might get
new information. For example, a few days ago one of Bormann’s
co-workers, a Dr. Von Hummeln, was arrested in Salzburg. I will
go to see him and perhaps I shall get fresh information—perhaps
none. I must also assume...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We need not bother about that now. We are
only inquiring about your application with reference to the documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Sir David, have you anything further you want to say about the
documents?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is my short point. I do
not want to discuss the merits of my points because that is the
issue, that I am saying is irrelevant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What about Number 11?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not disposed to object to
any of the other documents, My Lord.
<span class='pageno' title='570' id='Page_570'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are there any others besides...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Number 11—I can see a possible
argument on that, My Lord; therefore I am not going to object to
it. The other documents we certainly have no objection to; the
ordinances of the Führer’s Deputy and...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All under “B”?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The Prosecution makes no
objection to these.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Now, what do you say to Sir David’s objection to these documents,
1 to 7?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Well, Your Lordship, I have already made my
point of view clear in my application. In order to save the time of
the Court, I will merely refer to this written application. I will not
say any more at the moment on the subject, but if Your Lordship
wants me to explain it here now I am ready to do so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the matter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did Your Lordship wish to deal
with the other outstanding applications or would Your Lordship
prefer to deal with that later on at the end of the case of Von
Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we have the papers here. We
were only going to deal with Bormann this morning.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, we have got a document here,
D-880, said to be extracts from testimony of Admiral Raeder, taken
at Nuremberg on 10 November 1945 by Major John Monigan. Have
you offered that document in evidence or not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May I have just a minute to check it? I am not
certain.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we will give you the document.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I believe not, Mr. President; I do not believe it has
been offered in evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It seems to have been handed up yesterday
or the day before...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I think through a mistake.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: ...or last week. Yes. But you will find out
about that and let us know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Sir.
<span class='pageno' title='571' id='Page_571'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, you were still examining Gustav
Hoepken, were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I shall continue my examination of
the witness Hoepken.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Hoepken resumed the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Hoepken, we stopped yesterday when discussing
the question whether the Defendant Von Schirach during
his time in Vienna was opposed to the Church or was tolerant in
this connection. The last answer you gave me yesterday referred to
the relations of the Defendant Von Schirach to the Viennese Cardinal,
Innitzer. Is it correct, Witness, that at the suggestion and
with the knowledge of the Defendant Von Schirach during his time
in Vienna you periodically had talks with a Catholic priest there,
a Dean, Professor Ens, for the purpose of discussing Church
questions with him and removing any differences which might arise?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, that is true. Professor Ens was not, as you
assume, Catholic, but Protestant. He was Dean of the faculty of
theology of the University of Vienna. When he visited me he submitted
many Church and religious questions to me. I discussed
them with him. He then asked me to report on them to Herr Von
Schirach so that, if it were in his power, he could make redress.
This was done as far as possible.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know, Witness, that the Defendant Von
Schirach, for example, ordered that at the Party Christmas celebrations
new National Socialist Christmas songs were not to be
sung, but the old Christian Christmas hymns?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I know that at the Christmas celebrations of
the Party and of the Hitler Youth, and the Christmas celebration
for wounded soldiers, the old Christian Christmas carols, such as
“Es ist ein Ros’ entsprungen,” and “Silent Night, Holy Night...”</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This is surely not a matter which is worthy
to be given in evidence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know that the Defendant Von
Schirach, in the official magazine of the Hitler Youth, had a special
number published which was in favor of humane treatment of the
people of the Eastern Territories, and when was that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know that it was the quarterly number for April
to June 1943.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that in the same official magazine
of the Hitler Youth, at the request of the Defendant Bormann, a
special anti-Semitic number was to appear, but that Von Schirach
refused it?
<span class='pageno' title='572' id='Page_572'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know that it was requested at that time by the
Propaganda Ministry and also by the Party Chancellery. Von
Schirach refused each time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know that Von Schirach once inspected
a concentration camp?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I know that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Which one?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The concentration camp Mauthausen.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In regard to this point, which has already been
more or less cleared up by the testimony of other witnesses, I am
interested only in one question. When was this visit to Mauthausen?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I cannot say exactly. I can say with certainty, however,
that it was not after April 1943.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why can you say that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: In April 1943 I was discharged from hospital and
began my service in Vienna. From that day on until April 1945 I
knew every day where Von Schirach was. Moreover, immediately
after my arrival in Vienna in April 1943, when I asked him, as I
was rather run-down physically because of my wound and was also
a sports teacher, whether I might do some sports between 7 and
8 in the morning...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we do not want to know about
the witness’ health, do we?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you heard what the President just said.
I have already told you I am interested in when this visit to Mauthausen
was. You said, if I understood you correctly...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He said he could not say when it was and it
was after April 1943. He said he could not say when it was.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I believe you misunderstood the
witness. Witness, please pay attention as to whether this is correct.
I understood the witness to say that it was before April 1943. The
visit must have been before April 1943. It could not have been later.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, he also said, according to the
conversation I heard and took down, that he could not say when
the particular time was.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, but through the testimony of the witness I
should like to settle the fact that it was not later than April 1943.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He said that already. He said it. He said,
“I cannot say when it was, but it was not after April 1943.” He
said: “In April 1943 I was discharged from the hospital and began
my service in Vienna. I knew every day where Schirach was.” I
have got that all written down.
<span class='pageno' title='573' id='Page_573'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well. Witness, in this conversation about his
visit to Mauthausen did the Defendant Von Schirach tell you anything
to the effect that on this visit he got to hear of any atrocities,
ill-treatment, and such things?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, he said nothing about that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I now turn to the question of the deportation
of Jews from Vienna. As far as I know you were an ear-witness
of a conversation between the Reichsführer SS Himmler
and the Defendant Schirach. Will you tell us what was said in this
conversation on the question of the deportation of Jews?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I believe it was in November 1941; Himmler and
Schirach were motoring through East Prussia from Himmler’s
quarters to his special train. In the car Himmler asked Von
Schirach: “Tell me, Von Schirach, how many Jews are still in
Vienna?” Von Schirach answered, “I cannot say exactly. I estimate
40,000 to 50,000.” And Himmler said: “I must evacuate these Jews
as quickly as possible from Vienna.” And Schirach said: “The Jews
do not give me any trouble, especially as they are now wearing
the yellow star.” Then Himmler said: “The Führer is already
angry that Vienna, in this matter as in many others, is made an
exception, and I will have to instruct my SS agencies to carry this
out as speedily as possible.” That is what I remember of this conversation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know anything about the anti-Semitic
speech made by the Defendant Von Schirach in September 1942 at
a Congress in Vienna, which the Prosecution submitted to the Court?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, the contents of the speech are known to us.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I want to know whether you know anything
about it, especially whether Schirach said anything to you about
why he made this anti-Semitic speech?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know from the press officer Günther Kaufmann,
who was mentioned yesterday, that directly after this speech Von
Schirach instructed Kaufmann that every point in the speech should
be telephoned to the DNB (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro) in Berlin,
with the remark that he had every reason to make a concession to
Bormann on this point.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why a concession?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I assume that Schirach knew that his position in
Vienna was precarious, and that he constantly heard, especially
from the Party Chancellery, that he must take a stricter course in
Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You were Chief of the Central Bureau with
Schirach in Vienna. In this capacity, did all Schirach’s incoming
mail go through you?
<span class='pageno' title='574' id='Page_574'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Not all of his mail, but the great majority of it.
Mail stamped “only direct” and “personal” did not go through my
hands.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But the other mail?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: That went through my office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we have here a number of documents
which have been submitted to the Court. They are the activity and
situation reports which the Chief of the Security Police made, I
believe, monthly or weekly and which have been submitted to the
Court under Number 3943-PS. These reports came from Vienna,
and since you know the situation in the Central Bureau in Vienna
and are well-informed about its activity, I will now hand you
several of these documents. Please look at the documents and then
tell us whether from these documents, which are photostat copies,
you can determine whether these reports of the SS came to you or
to the Defendant Von Schirach, or whether they went to a different
office. I call your special attention to the manner in which these
documents are annotated. Please note on the individual documents
who initialed the document and what was done with the document
after that. And then please tell us who these officials are who figure
in the documents as officials of the Reich Defense Commission; for
instance, a Dr. Fischer, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Those are the documents, Mr. President, about which the Court
asked questions the other day.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know they are, but I do not know
what the question is exactly. It seems to me there are a great
number of questions. Well, let us get on, Dr. Sauter. We shall have
to consider these documents, you know, and the witness ought to
be able to give his answer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President. Of course, the witness has to
look at the documents first. He must especially note which officials
initialed the documents and what the officials did with them. That
is what I must ask the witness, in order to ascertain what the
documents...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought that he had seen these
documents before.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: No; they were just handed over in cross-examination.
I could not discuss them previously with the witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: They were certainly handed over before this
morning.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Not to the witness—to me, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, get on, Dr. Sauter, get on.
<span class='pageno' title='575' id='Page_575'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what do these documents tell you? Did
they come to the knowledge of the Defendant Von Schirach, or how
were they dealt with?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: These documents did not go through the Central
Bureau. I see here that they are initialed by a Dr. Felber. I know
him. He was the expert assigned to the Regierungspräsident in
Vienna for all matters concerning the Reich Defense Commissioner.</p>

<p class='pindent'>From the treatment given these documents, I must assume that
the Berlin SD agency sent them directly to the office of the Regierungspräsident,
and from there they were entered into the files,
as I see here. I do not see Von Schirach’s initials here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Regierungspräsident was a certain Dellbrügge?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Dr. Dellbrügge.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And this Dr. Felber whom you mentioned was an
official of the Regierungspräsident?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, an official of the Regierungspräsident.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And when such a document as you have there
arrived, where did the post office or any other agency deliver it?
Was it delivered to you or did the Regierungspräsident have his
own office for incoming mail, or how was it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I already said that they must have been sent directly
to the office of the Regierungspräsident, who had his own office for
incoming mail.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How can you tell that the Defendant Von Schirach
had no knowledge of these documents?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Because he did not initial these documents. If documents
were submitted to him, they were initialed “z.K.g.”—noted—“B.v.S.,”
and that does not appear on these documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, I do not think the Prosecution
suggested that they were initialed by Von Schirach. It was quite
clearly brought out in Von Schirach’s evidence that he had not
initialed them, and that fact was not challenged by Mr. Dodd.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I believe it is a decisive point
whether Defendant Von Schirach had any knowledge of these
documents.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Why do you keep asking whether they were
initialed by him or not? That fact, as I have pointed out, has already
been proved and not challenged.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have here an additional collection of
documents under Number 3876-PS. They are additional reports
from the Chief of the Security Police. There is another address
<span class='pageno' title='576' id='Page_576'></span>
on these. It says here, among other things: “To the Reich Defense
Commissioner for the Defense District XVII”—that was Vienna—“for
the attention of Oberregierungsrat Dr. Fischer in Vienna.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am interested in knowing who Dr. Fischer was. Was he in the
Central Bureau, or who was he?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I do not know a Dr. Fischer either in the Central
Bureau or in the Reichsstatthalterei.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then how do you explain the fact that in these
reports it always says, “To the Reich Defense Commissioner for the
Defense District XVII, for the attention of Oberregierungsrat
Dr. Fischer?”</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I assume he was a colleague of Oberregierungsrat
Dr. Felber, who specialized in these matters. Also I see they were
secret letters, and were therefore addressed to him personally.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As far as you know, did not the Regierungspräsident
Dellbrügge report to the Defendant Von Schirach on
these reports which reached him, or have one of his officials report
about them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The Regierungspräsident reported directly to Herr
Von Schirach about matters concerning the Reich Governor and the
Reich Defense Commissioner. I was not present at these conversations;
consequently I cannot say to what extent he reported to
Von Schirach on these matters.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: If the Regierungspräsident or one of his officials
reported to the Defendant Von Schirach on these reports, would
that be shown in the documents?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Probably yes. In that case the Regierungspräsident
or the officials would have had to write on them “To be filed after
being reported to the Reich Governor,” or “for further action.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: On the documents which I submitted to you there
is no such indication?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: On these documents, no.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And on the documents which I have here, there is
no such note either. Do you conclude from this that the Defendant
Von Schirach received no report on them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I must conclude that Von Schirach was not informed
on these matters.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Defendant Von Schirach was chief of
the state administration in Vienna in his capacity as Reich Governor,
as well as chief of the local administration to a certain extent
as mayor, and finally chief of the Party as Gauleiter. Now, we hear
that in each of these capacities he had a permanent representative.
<span class='pageno' title='577' id='Page_577'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>I should like to know who normally administered the affairs of
the Reich Defense Commissioner and the Reich Governor; that is,
the affairs of the state administration?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I have already said that it was the Regierungspräsident,
Dr. Dellbrügge.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then what did the Defendant Von Schirach do
in the field of state administration?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: He was given regular reports by the Regierungspräsident.
Von Schirach then made his decision, and these decisions
were then carried out by the officials or departments.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: If I understand you correctly, the Defendant
Von Schirach concerned himself only with such matters as were
reported to him by the Regierungspräsident or which were brought
to his special attention in writing; is that true?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, that is true.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, were you yourself a member of the SS?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I was never a member of the SS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Of the SA?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that these three permanent representatives,
whom the Defendant Von Schirach had in Vienna,
namely the Regierungspräsident, the Deputy Gauleiter, and the
Mayor, were all three SS Führer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I know that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How was that? Did the Defendant Von Schirach
select these men himself, or how do you explain the fact that all
three of his representatives were SS Führer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The Deputy Gauleiter, Scharizer, was an honorary
SS Führer and, as far as I recall, he was Oberbefehlsleiter of the
Party. When Von Schirach came to Vienna, Scharizer had already
been active for several years in Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As what?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: As Deputy Gauleiter. I do not know when the Regierungspräsident,
Dr. Dellbrügge, came to Vienna; but I assume
either before or at about the same time as Von Schirach. Moreover,
the Regierungspräsidenten were appointed by the Ministry of the
Interior, so that I think he could hardly have had sufficient influence
to refuse or select a particular Regierungspräsident.</p>

<p class='pindent'>As for the mayor, the situation was similar.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: He was a certain Blaschke?
<span class='pageno' title='578' id='Page_578'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes. He was SS Brigadeführer Blaschke, he was also
appointed by the Ministry of the Interior as acting mayor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: By the Ministry of the Interior?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When was that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I believe that was in 1944, in January or February
of 1944.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that this SS Brigadeführer, or
whatever he was, this Blaschke, before the time of the Defendant
Von Schirach, was active in Vienna as a town councillor, and I
believe also as vice mayor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: He was a town councillor before; and I believe he
was vice mayor before I came to Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that the Defendant Von Schirach
for a long time opposed this SS Oberführer or Brigadeführer
Blaschke being appointed mayor of Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I should say he opposed this for about 6 or 9 months,
and I believe later he refused to allow the Minister of the Interior
finally to confirm his appointment as mayor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what were the relations between the
Defendant Von Schirach and the SS and the SS officers? Were they
especially friendly and cordial or what were they like?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: As far as I know, Schirach associated with the SS
Führer as far as was officially necessary and no more.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was he friendly with SS men?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No; I do not know. In any case I knew of no such
friendship.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did he not express to you his attitude toward
the SS?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I have already said that he always had the feeling
that he was under a certain supervision from them and for that
reason he was rather distrustful.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Distrustful of...</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Of the SS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know how the Defendant
Von Schirach received his information about the foreign press and
foreign press reports?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: He received them from the Reich Propaganda Office
in Vienna. They were excerpts which the Propaganda Ministry
<span class='pageno' title='579' id='Page_579'></span>
issued in collaboration with the Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich. As
far as I know, however, they were selected and screened.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you live for a long time with Von Schirach in
Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: From 1944 on I lived in Schirach’s house.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You also took your meals with him?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I also took meals with him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did not the Defendant Von Schirach obtain information
from the foreign radio?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I am almost certain he did not, because after every
meal he listened to the official German news services with me and a
few other co-workers. Besides, if he had done so it would in my
opinion have become known very soon for, as I said already, he had
the feeling that he was being watched.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the witness can only tell us what
he knows. How could he know whether Von Schirach ever listened
to any foreign news? If he does not know, why do you not take him
on to something else?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The witness said, Mr. President, that during the
latter part of his time in Vienna, from the spring of 1944 I believe
he said, he lived in the house of the Defendant Von Schirach.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know he said that, and he said that he
did not think he heard foreign news. What more can he give? What
more evidence can he give on that subject?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I wanted to hear that, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But he said it already. I have taken it down.
Why do you not go on to something else?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know that in the last weeks of
the resistance an order came to Vienna from Berlin according to
which all defeatists, whether men or women, were to be hanged?
What attitude did Schirach take toward this order?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know that so-called courts martial were to be set
up with the purpose of speedily sentencing people who objected to
the conduct of the war or who showed themselves to be defeatists.
This court martial was set up in Vienna, or rather appointed, but
it did not meet once, and thus did not pronounce any sentences.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did the court martial of the Defendant Von
Schirach carry on any proceedings at all?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, not to my knowledge.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know anything about it?
<span class='pageno' title='580' id='Page_580'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, that fact, again, was given in
evidence by Von Schirach and was not cross-examined to—that that
court martial did not meet.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know anything about the fact that
in the last weeks an order came to form <span class='it'>franc-tireur</span> units? What
was Von Schirach’s attitude to that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I do not know that <span class='it'>franc-tireur</span> units were to be
formed, but I do know that a “Freikorps Hitler” was to be formed.
They were to be in civilian clothes. Schirach ordered that no people
from the Reichsgau Vienna were to be assigned to this “Freikorps.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Because at that time he considered resistance
senseless. Secondly, because he considered it contrary to international
law.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: My last question to you, Witness. You were with
Schirach to the last, until he left Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Schirach give an order to destroy bridges or
churches, residential quarters, and so forth, in Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not know of that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was the position he took?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: That orders to blow up bridges or to take any
defense measures were given only by the military authorities, as far
as I know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But not by Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no more questions to put to
this witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to
ask questions? The Prosecution?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Witness, would you see all of the files that were in
Von Schirach’s office during the time that you were his adjutant?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I have already told you, or I told the defense
counsel, that most of the mail went through the Central Bureau.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I want to show you a document that is in evidence
here and ask you if you can tell us whether or not you have seen
this before.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>A document was handed to the witness.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>Have you ever seen that document before?
<span class='pageno' title='581' id='Page_581'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I do not know this document officially, as I see it is
dated 28 May 1942, at which time I was an officer in the Luftwaffe.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I see, you did not mean the Tribunal to understand
that you were familiar with everything that was in Von Schirach’s
files, because certainly this document was there during the years
that you were his adjutant. You never saw it. It is marked “Central
Bureau,” and you had charge of these very files, yet you never saw
this teletype to Bormann? So you certainly did not know everything
that was in his files, did you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I said that the majority of the mail went through
my offices but, of course, since I was not in Vienna at this time but
only came to Vienna in April 1943, I was not able to look through
all the back documents and letters in the files of the Reich Governor.
That would have taken years.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me ask you something else. You were there in
the last days, I assume, when the city was taken by the Allied
Forces, were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I was in Vienna until April 1945.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What was done with Von Schirach’s files when the
end was very obviously coming? What did you do with all those
files over which you had control?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I was not in charge of any files. I was chief of the
bureau, and I...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you know what I mean—chief of the bureau
or of the office where these files were kept. What I want to know is
what did you do with the files?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I gave no orders in this connection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know what became of the files?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: They were taken out of the office sometime before
the city was captured; do you not know that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I did not know that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were the files there the last day that you were
there?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Probably, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not want a “probably.” I want to know if you
know and if you do, to tell us. Were they there or not the last day
that you were in the office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I gave no orders to destroy them or to remove them.
<span class='pageno' title='582' id='Page_582'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not ask you if you gave orders. I asked you
if you know what became of them and whether or not they were in
the office the last day that you were there?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I do not know what happened to them. Nor can I
say whether they were still there on the last day.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you not know that they were all moved to a salt
mine in Austria?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not know that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You have never heard that, or that they were taken
out of the office and were later found by the Allied Forces in a
salt mine?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not know that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not mean that you heard they were found
there, but you certainly knew that they were taken out of the office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not know. I also gave no orders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, let me put this proposition to you, and
then perhaps you can give an explanation of it to the Tribunal.
This document that I have just shown to you and these reports that
you examined for Dr. Sauter were all found in Schirach’s files in a
salt mine. Would you have any explanation for that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I cannot explain that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: They were found together. Would that mean
anything to you, or would you have any explanation for it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I have not. I can only explain that by saying
that probably the Chief of the Reich Governor’s office or one of his
officials who was in charge of these things gave the order to that
effect, of course without my knowledge and without any order
from me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Tell the Tribunal exactly what day you closed up
your office in Vienna, or the last day that you were in this office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: It might have been the 3d or 4th of April.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When was the city taken?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I read in the newspaper afterwards that the city
finally fell into the hands of the Allies on 13 April.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you all leave your office on the 3d or 4th of
April? Did Von Schirach leave as well, and all the clerical staff,
<span class='it'>et cetera</span>?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Schirach and I and his adjutant left the office on this
day, or rather, Schirach had previously set up his office at his home
and was working there.
<span class='pageno' title='583' id='Page_583'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Had he taken any files from his office to his home?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Only what he needed immediately to carry on his
business; that is, the matters which were being dealt with at the
moment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you leave someone in charge of the files when
you left there, you and Von Schirach on the 3d of April; and if
you did, who was it that you left in charge?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I did not leave anyone to supervise. The file clerks
did that of their own accord.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am trying to understand—and I think it would be
helpful to the Tribunal—whether or not you just walked out of this
office and left everything there, or whether just you and Von Schirach
left and left other people there, or whether the place was in such
chaos that nobody remained. I have not any accurate picture of it,
and I think it is of some importance. You ought to be able to tell us.
You left there with him. What was the situation on the 3d or 4th
of April? The city was practically to be taken in another 10 days.
It was under siege. There was much confusion. What were you
doing about your files and all of your other papers in your office
when you walked out of there that day? You certainly just did not
walk out and not give some directions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I believe that we are not clear about the character
of the Central Bureau. The Central Bureau, of which I was in
charge for the last few months, had no powers, no executive powers,
but all of these things were done by the competent Reich Governor,
that is, the Regierungspräsident, and he probably...</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not need any explanation of how your office
was set up. I want to know if the papers were left there or not,
or if anybody was left with them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The papers, as far as I know, were left there, and
the archivists were instructed to take care of them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you order any papers to be destroyed before you
walked out that day, the 3d or 4th of April, anything at all?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I gave no orders to destroy anything in the Reich
Governor’s Office; I had no authority to do that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did anybody to your knowledge order anything
destroyed, whether you did or not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Whether such an order was given and who gave it,
I do not know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the document you put to him?
<span class='pageno' title='584' id='Page_584'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Number USA-865. It is Document 3877-PS, a teletype
to Bormann from Von Schirach on 28 May 1942.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine the witness,
Dr. Sauter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I should like to go back to what the
Prosecution just asked you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The documents of the Reich Governor’s office apparently are
supposed to have been found in a salt mine. Did you have any
supervision over the documents of the Reich Governor’s office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I had no supervision over these documents. I
just explained that. For that reason, I could not give any order to
remove them. I know that valuable objects, pictures, and so on,
were removed, but much earlier.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And the other employees of the Central Bureau,
were they Viennese? Did they stay in the office, or what do you
know about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Most of them were Viennese, of course, and probably
remained behind. I shook hands and said goodbye to them, and
then we separated. I also asked whether I could do anything for
them, and then I left Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions, Mr. President.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Perhaps we had better adjourn now.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the application on behalf
of the Defendant Bormann the Tribunal allows witness Number 1,
Miss Else Krüger.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal allows witnesses Numbers 3 and 4, Dr. Klopfer and
Helmuth Friedrich.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal also allows the witness whose name I have got
inserted instead of Number 2, Christians, I think it was.</p>

<p class='pindent'>With reference to the documents applied for, Numbers 1 to 7,
the application is refused. But the Tribunal will consider any
application for documents which the defendants’ counsel, who may
be appointed to argue the general questions of law on behalf of all
the defendants, may wish to have translated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Document Number 11 may be translated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Counsel for the Defendant Bormann may see the documents
which are mentioned under Roman Number III in the application
<span class='pageno' title='585' id='Page_585'></span>
and counsel for the Defendant Bormann may also use the documents
contained under heading “B.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>The final decision upon the admissibility of all these documents
is, of course, a matter which will be decided at the time the documents
are presented.</p>

<p class='pindent'>There is one other thing that I want to announce, and it is in
answer to the application of Dr. Servatius on behalf of the Defendant
Sauckel.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I am told that the witness Timm is in Nuremberg prison. The
witness Biedemann is also in Nuremberg prison. The witness
Hildebrandt will probably arrive in Nuremberg today. His whereabouts
had been lost and he has only just been rediscovered. The
witness Jäger is in the British zone, and the British secretary is
trying through the military authorities to obtain his attendance;
The witness Stothfang has not been located. There appears to be
a mistake in the identity of the person who was reported to the
General Secretary previously. The witness Mitschke has never been
located, although every effort is now being made to locate him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I ask permission to call a further witness, Fritz
Wieshofer. I shall examine this witness only very briefly, because
most points have already been clarified through the other witnesses.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Wieshofer took the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p>

<p class='pindent'>FRITZ WIESHOFER (Witness): Fritz Wieshofer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear
by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Wieshofer, how old are you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: 31 years old.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Married?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Children?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: One son.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you a member of the Party?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I applied for membership in 1938.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You only applied for membership?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.
<span class='pageno' title='586' id='Page_586'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you a member of the SS or the SA?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was in the Waffen-SS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Since when?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Since June 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Are you Austrian by birth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I am Austrian.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you join the Reich Youth Leader’s
Office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I joined Herr Von Schirach on 3 October 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what did you do before that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Before that I had a temporary post in the Foreign
Office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: For how long?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Only from May until October 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And before that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Before that I was employed in the Gauleiter’s
office in Carinthia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you have anything to do with the Hitler Youth?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In October of 1940, then, you came to Vienna to
join Von Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes, to Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In what capacity did you go there?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I went there as Von Schirach’s adjutant.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what did your duties mostly consist of?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: As adjutant I was responsible for the handling of
the mail, engagements for conferences, seeing to it that files were
presented on time at conferences, travel arrangements, and so on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you only work for Schirach in his capacity as
Reich Governor, as Gauleiter, or did you act for him only as mayor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was adjutant for Herr Von Schirach in all his
capacities.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you also have access to the secret files?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I shall only have a very few brief
questions to put to you. First of all, I am interested in this: Who
was responsible for the forced evacuation of Jews from Vienna?
<span class='pageno' title='587' id='Page_587'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The forced evacuation of Jews from Vienna, as
far as I know, was handled by the RSHA. The representative in
Vienna was a certain Dr. Brunner, an Obersturmführer in the SS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you often visit Dr. Brunner officially in connection
with the forced evacuation of Jews, and for what reason?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: In some cases, Jews who were affected by this
forced evacuation made written applications to Von Schirach to be
left out of the transport. In such cases, Von Schirach, through the
Chief of his Central Bureau, took the matter up with Dr. Brunner’s
office and asked that the request of the applicant be granted. I
would say that generally this was done by the Chief of the Central
Bureau. I remember two cases where I myself received instructions
to intervene with Dr. Brunner, not by writing or telephoning, but
by going to see him personally.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what did this SS Sturmführer Dr. Brunner
tell you about what was actually going to happen to the Jews when
they were taken away from Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Dr. Brunner only told me, on the occasion of one
of these interventions, that the action of resettling the Jews would
be a resettlement from the district of Vienna into the zone of the
former Government General. He also told me in what way this was
being carried out. For instance he said that women and small
children would travel in second-class carriages; that sufficient
rations for the journey and milk for small children would be
provided. He also told me that these resettled persons, upon arrival
at their destination, insofar as they were capable of working, would
immediately be put to work. First of all, they would be put into
assembly camps, but that as soon as accommodation was available,
they would be given homes, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. He also told me that because
of the numerous interventions by Herr Von Schirach his work had
been made very difficult.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you, or have you—I will put my next question
this way: Did you ever see an order in which Gauleiter were
forbidden to intervene in any way on behalf of Jews, and did you
discuss that order with Von Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I recollect a written order which we received
either at the end of 1940 or at the beginning of 1941. It stated that
“There are reasons which make it necessary once more to point out,”
<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. It obviously was a repetition of an order which had
already been given. The purport of the order was that because of
certain reasons, Gauleiter were prohibited from intervening on
behalf of Jews in the future.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you talk about that with Schirach?
<span class='pageno' title='588' id='Page_588'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I talked to Herr Von Schirach about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What did he say?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: As far as I can recollect, Von Schirach wrote on
the order “To be filed.” He did not say anything more about it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I have another question, Witness. The Defendant
Von Schirach was once in the concentration camp at Mauthausen.
Can you tell us when that was?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I cannot tell you that exactly. All I can say on
that subject is that when I came back from the front—and this was
either in the autumn of 1942 or in June 1943—the adjutant who
was on duty at the time told me that he had accompanied Herr
Von Schirach to a concentration camp, Mauthausen Camp. Some
time afterwards—it must have been when I came back from the
front the second time, at the end of 1943—Herr Von Schirach also
told me that he had been to Mauthausen. I only recollect that he
said that he had heard a symphony concert there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Well, we are not interested in that; we have heard
that. I am only interested in one thing: Did he visit Mauthausen
or another concentration camp again later on? Can you give us
reliable information on that or not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I can give you reliable information on that. That
is quite out of the question, because from November 1943 until the
collapse I was continuously on duty and I knew where Von Schirach
was, day and night.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did he go to Mauthausen again in 1944?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No, certainly not, that is out of the question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you remember that toward the end of the
war there were orders coming from some source or other stating
that enemy airmen who had been forced to land were no longer to
be protected. Do you know of that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That somewhere such orders were issued?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was the attitude of Defendant Von Schirach
regarding such orders, and how do you know about it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I talked about these orders with Herr Von Schirach.
Von Schirach was always against the idea contained in the order,
and he always said that these airmen, too, should be treated as
prisoners of war. Once he said: “If we do not do that, then there
is the danger that our enemies, too, will treat their prisoners, that
is Germans, in the same manner.”
<span class='pageno' title='589' id='Page_589'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you yourself know of cases where Defendant
Von Schirach actually intervened on behalf of enemy airmen in
that way?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Will you please tell us about it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: During one of the last air attacks on Vienna, in
March 1945, an American plane was shot down and crashed near
the headquarters of the Gau command post. That command post
was on a wooded hill in Vienna to which part of the population
used to go during air attacks. Von Schirach was watching from a
32-meter high iron structure on which he would always stand
during air attacks, and he observed that a member of the American
crew bailed out of the aircraft. He immediately ordered the commander
in charge of this command post to drive to the place of the
landing so as to protect the American soldier against the crowd and
bring him to safety. The American soldier was brought to the
command post and after the air attack he was handed over to the
Air Force Command XVII as a prisoner of war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you leave Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I left Vienna with Herr Von Schirach on 13 April
1945.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: On 13 April together with the Defendant Von
Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Together with Herr Von Schirach.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Now, this is the last question I have to put to
you: Witness, have you ever heard from Schirach’s lips anything to
the effect that Vienna was to be held “to the last man” at all costs,
or that destruction should be carried out in Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have never heard him say either the one or
the other.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put
this witness.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, do you know the Prater in Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes, of course, I am Viennese.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of an institution is that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The Prater is, or at least was, a pleasure park.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was it closed during the war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The Prater was not closed during the war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of people used to go there?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: During the war you mean?
<span class='pageno' title='590' id='Page_590'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Workers, employees, civil servants, that is the
Viennese, the whole of Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you also see foreign workers there?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: A great many or just a few?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The situation in Vienna was such that we used to
say that if you wanted to go to the Prater then you would have to
be able to speak French and Russian, because with Viennese alone
you could not get along. The Prater was overcrowded with foreign
workers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How were these foreigners dressed, badly
or well?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: These foreigners were well dressed, so that you
could not distinguish them from the population. Only when they
talked could you recognize that they were foreigners.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How did they look otherwise? As regards
food, did they look starved?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: As far as I myself could see, the workers looked
perfectly well fed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did the people have money?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: They had lots of money. It was known that the
“black market” in Vienna was almost entirely dominated by foreign
workers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could foreigners be seen only in the Prater or
were they to be seen everywhere in the town?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Not only in the Prater, but also in the rest of the
town, in cafés, of which there are so many in Vienna, in restaurants,
and in hotels.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Whom, besides the Defendant Von Schirach, do you
know of these defendants? And by “know” I mean know personally,
or have some acquaintanceship with the person, or had something
to do with the person?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Personally, I only know Herr Funk.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know Sauckel?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, who else?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I know Herr Seyss-Inquart, but I did not have
any personal dealings with him. I was the adjutant of Von Schirach.
<span class='pageno' title='591' id='Page_591'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How do you know Funk?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was invited by Herr Funk a few times. Officially,
as adjutant of Herr Von Schirach, I had some dealings with
him, and apart from that, he invited me several times privately.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were you in the SS at that time, when you were
invited by Funk?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: At that time I was in the Waffen-SS as an officer.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: By the way, when did you first join the SS?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I joined the Waffen-SS on 26 June 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were you in any other branch of the SS besides the
Waffen-SS?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was also in the General SS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When did you join the General SS?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: In June or July 1939.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: So you were actually in the SS from as far back
as 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: In the General SS; yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, you also became an SS Obersturmführer at
one time, did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When was that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I became Obersturmführer about 21 June 1944.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When did you join the SA?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I joined the SA on 9 May 1932.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you know the Strasshof Camp, S-t-r-a-s-s-h-o-f?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: This is the first time I have heard that name.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it may have been mispronounced. It was a
camp located outside Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I do not know which camp you mean. I understood
Strasshof. I do not know of any such camp.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, something like that. You never heard of that
camp?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Never.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you were in Vienna from what year?—19...?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was born in Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I know you were, but I am talking about
your service with the Defendant Schirach. You were there with him
for how long?
<span class='pageno' title='592' id='Page_592'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: From the beginning of October 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you never heard of Strasshof?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you have much to do with the files of this
Defendant Von Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What would you say you had to do with them?
What was your responsibility?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I merely had to see to it that files were presented
in good time for the conference, and that after they had been used
they were returned to the Central Bureau.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Where would you go to get a file for Von Schirach
that had to do with the Reich Defense Commission for that district
or that defense district? Where would you go to get a file that had
to do with matters concerning the Reich Defense Commission? Now,
let us assume a situation—let me make it clear to you. Say that
Von Schirach tells you he wants a file about a certain matter that
has to do with the Reich Defense Commission. You had to have it
on his desk by a certain hour and see that it was there, as you say.
Tell the Tribunal just what you would do, where you would go,
who you would talk to, and how you would get that for him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: That would be simple for me. I would apply to
the Chief of the Central Bureau, knowing that he would probably
have to go to the Regierungspräsident to obtain that file. That is
what I assume. I myself would only have gone to the Central
Bureau.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You had a central filing place, did you not, for all
of your files, whether they were under the Reich Defense Commission
or the Gauleiter or the civil government of Vienna; is that not
so? They were all kept in one place?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: They were not all together in one place; only a
part of the files were in the Central Bureau. I cannot tell you
which part because I have never had anything to do with that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You left Vienna on 13 April, you say, with Von
Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I suppose, as his adjutant, you had to make considerable
preparations for leaving for some days previously, did
you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What did you pack up? What did you take with you?
<span class='pageno' title='593' id='Page_593'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: We did not take anything with us from Vienna.
Von Schirach went by car, and the gentlemen on his staff went in
two or three other cars. Nothing else was taken along from Vienna.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, what did you do in the office; how did you
leave it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: We had not used the office since, I think, the
spring or early summer of 1944, because the “Ballhausplatz,” that
is, the office of the Reich Governor, had a direct hit and Von Schirach
could no longer work there. He was working in his apartment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In his apartment? And did he have all his files in
his apartment or somewhere near at hand?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: He had no files whatever in his apartment. They
remained in the office, in that part of the Reich Governor’s building
which was still being used and in which one could still work.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were any files taken out of the filing department of
the Reich Governor’s Office when you left Vienna, or before you
left Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I do not know anything about that. I know that
an order existed, both for the State Administration as well as for
the Party, that files must be destroyed when the enemy approached.
Whether that was done or what actually happened to the files, I do
not know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Who got that order?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The order, as far as the Party channels were concerned,
went to the deputy Gauleiter, and as far as the State Administration
was concerned, to the Regierungspräsident.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you also receive an order to start moving your
files to places of safety some time in the spring of 1945 or even the
late winter of 1944?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have no recollection of such an order.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know that some 250 folders of your files
were moved to a salt mine outside Vienna? Do you know anything
about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No, I hear that for the first time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know that there is such a mine near Vienna?
You have lived there quite a while, I gather.</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. It is not near Vienna—if I may be permitted
to put this matter right—but near Salzburg; we never lived there.
I only know that this mine exists.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How far is it from Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Approximately 350 kilometers.
<span class='pageno' title='594' id='Page_594'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You do not know anything about any files being
taken there. You are sure about that, are you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I am absolutely certain; I do not know anything
about that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I have just one other question to ask. I suppose you
knew the defendant pretty well. He is a little older than you, but
you had worked for him for some time. Is that not so?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Why did you not join the Army instead of the SS
when you wanted to do something for your country?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: When I was called up, the Waffen-SS was considered
the elite unit and I preferred to serve in such a guards unit,
if I may say so, than in the general Armed Forces.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Was it partly due to the fact that you had been in
the General SS since 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. That had nothing to do with it. Many members
of the General SS went to the Forces.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you talk this matter over with your superior,
the Youth Leader Von Schirach, before you joined the SS in 1939,
and the Waffen-SS later on?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. Might I remind you that I did not join Von
Schirach until October 1940, whereas I joined the Waffen-SS on
26 June 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, but you were, I suppose, a young man and you
were in touch with the Reich Youth organization in 1939 when you
joined the General SS. Is that not a fact? Were you not a part of
the Youth organization in 1939?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. I was not taken into the Youth Officers Corps
until April 1944 when I became Bannführer. Before that I had
nothing to do with it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I do not think you understand me. It is not
too important, but how old were you in 1939? You were 24, approximately,
were you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And were you not then in some way affiliated with
the Hitler Youth or the Youth organization in Germany, either as
a member, or having something to do with it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. Neither as a member nor in any other way.
Of course I knew Youth Leaders in Carinthia, yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You were quite a speech maker for the Party, were
you not, during your lifetime?
<span class='pageno' title='595' id='Page_595'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I spoke at several meetings in Carinthia between
April 1938 and May 1940.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: At about how many meetings would you say you
spoke in that period of 2 years?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: During that time I spoke at about 80 meetings.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Before an average of about, say, 3,000 persons per
meeting?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I also spoke in very small villages. I would say
that the average attendance would be about 200.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is all I have.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: What were the subjects you talked about at these
meetings?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Our subject was given to us by the Reich Propaganda
Ministry. The meetings were conducted in such a way that
every speaker was able to talk on general matters. For instance
the subject might have been “With the Führer to Final Victory,”
or “Why Welfare for the Nation?” or “Why Winter Relief?” Such
subjects were always given.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did you spread Rosenberg’s <span class='it'>Myth of the 20th
Century</span>?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did you speak about such subjects?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Never; in view of my education I would not have
been in a position to do so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Have you ever read this <span class='it'>Myth</span>?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have not read the <span class='it'>Myth</span>.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did you speak to youth at these meetings?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I did not speak to youth—that is, not particularly
to youth.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Thank you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I do not wish to put any questions
to the witness; thank you very much.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Witness, did Schirach have any
authority to intervene in case of Jews who were being deported
from Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: He had no authority to do so, but he did it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many times did he intervene?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I cannot recollect a single case where Von Schirach
did not intervene when he received a petition.
<span class='pageno' title='596' id='Page_596'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask that; I asked how
many times he intervened.</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I cannot give you any figure without being inaccurate.
It is difficult to say.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did he intervene many times, or
a few?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. He intervened often.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you see the order to the
Police not to protect aviators? You said it was in writing, did
you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Who signed it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The order was signed by Bormann.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And was it distributed to the
Police in Vienna?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: By the Police? If I have understood you rightly,
you were talking about the order that Gauleiter must not intervene
on behalf of Jews.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No. This was the order about not
protecting aviators who had crashed. You said you saw that order,
did you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I did see the order, yes. I can no longer remember
whom it came from and to whom it was addressed. It was merely
sent to our office for our information. We were not called upon
to take any action.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you not know whether or not
the Police had a copy of it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Please, will you be good enough to repeat the
question?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know whether or not the
Police in Vienna had copies of the order?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: That I do not know.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you ever know Himmler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have seen him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did he give you any instructions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you get any instructions
from the SS?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: In which way do you mean?
<span class='pageno' title='597' id='Page_597'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Any instructions from the SS
directly when you were in Von Schirach’s office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): None at all?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: None at all. I cannot recollect any.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think you said once that
Schirach sent a command to save American aviators from the crowd,
did you not? Do you not understand?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes, I understand, and I did say that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And what other efforts did Von
Schirach make to protect aviators from the crowd? Did he make
any other efforts?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did he issue any orders to the
Police or take it up with the Police?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Von Schirach’s opinion was known. In the
circles...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you the opinion.
Did he issue any orders to the Police or talk to the Police?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have no recollection of that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you would know if he had,
would you not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: If I had been present when he gave the orders
then I would know it, but it is possible that he talked when I was
not there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you say you had access to
the secret files?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What was kept in the secret files?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I did not understand the question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I asked you what was kept, what
was put in the secret files, what sort of papers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: There were secret files which came from the
Supreme Party Headquarters, secret files which came from the
Minister of the Interior; there were things which made one wonder
why they were called “secret.” But as far as details of these files
are concerned, I cannot, of course, today remember them.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I suppose any documents,
any reports, that were marked “secret” would be put in those secret
files, would they not?
<span class='pageno' title='598' id='Page_598'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Reports from us to higher departments, or do you
mean from the top downwards?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Reports coming in to you.</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: They would then have been filed in the secret
archives.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And SS secret reports would go
in the secret files, would they not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: SS reports did not come to us, because we were
not a service department of the SS.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you have no questions yourself, Dr. Sauter,
then the witness may retire.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Wieshofer left the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in Schirach’s document book there
are still a few documents which, up to now, have not been expressly
presented; but I believe it is not necessary to read these documents
to you. To save time, I should like, if I may, to refer to the documents
and ask you to take judicial notice of them; for instance, of
the affidavit of Frau Hoepken, which is incorporated in the document
book under Number 3 and which has already been submitted
somewhere else.</p>

<p class='pindent'>There is only one document, Mr. President, about which I want
to give a very brief explanation. In the Schirach document book,
under Number 118(a), there is the farewell letter of the explorer
Dr. Colin Ross. With reference to this Dr. Colin Ross, when the documents
were dealt with, the Prosecutor said that the body of Dr. Ross
had not been discovered. My first reaction was of course surprise,
and I made inquiries as to what actually had been done with these
bodies and I discovered that in fact on 30 April 1945, the day before
the arrival of American troops, the bodies of Dr. Colin Ross and his
wife were found in the house of Defendant Von Schirach at Urfeld,
on Lake Walchen. They had both first taken poison and then, to be
quite sure, Dr. Ross shot his wife and then himself. German
soldiers who were still at Urfeld on Lake Walchen as patients at the
time then buried the bodies quite close to the house of the Defendant
Von Schirach.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the autumn the American Governor ordered that the bodies
were to be transferred to the cemetery, but eventually he rescinded
that order and permitted the bodies to remain where they had
originally been buried.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, can you indicate in what way
you will submit this document has any relevance at all? We have
<span class='pageno' title='599' id='Page_599'></span>
read the document. It does not appear to have any striking
relevance.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, we have submitted this document
because it is to prove, or at least indicate, that the Defendant Von
Schirach, together with this Dr. Colin Ross, continuously worked
to maintain peace, and later on to limit the war. Therefore it is
submitted only to show that the Defendant Von Schirach worked
for peace.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The document does not mention Von Schirach
or in any way indicate that he had worked for peace.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But it says in the document, “We have done everything
in our power to prevent this war, or...”</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the word “We” must mean the
people who “leave this world by our own will,” namely Dr. Colin
Ross and his wife. It does not refer to Von Schirach.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: We do not know that. Why should it not also
refer to Von Schirach?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, because there is such a thing as grammar.
The document begins “We leave this world by our own will.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As to that, Mr. President, may I remind you that
this name, Dr. Colin Ross, has been mentioned very often during
this trial in connection with the peace efforts of the Defendant Von
Schirach, and that Dr. Colin Ross, together with his wife, was
living in Schirach’s apartment when they committed suicide.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, very well, Dr. Sauter, if you wish to
draw our attention to it, you may do so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thank you. Mr. President, this letter was not
really meant for the public; the original of the letter was left
behind by Dr. Ross, and a number of carbon copies were sent to
personal friends. In this way we found this letter of Dr. Colin Ross.
I do not think there is anything else I have to say.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have not said anything critical of the letter.
If you want to read some sentences of it, read them; if you do not
we will take judicial notice of it. As I tell you, we have already
read this letter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am not stopping your reading a sentence of
it, if you want to read a sentence of it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: It is of course not necessary, Mr. President, if you
have taken cognizance of it. I have nothing else to say, and at this
point I can end my case for the Defendant Von Schirach.
<span class='pageno' title='600' id='Page_600'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, have you offered in evidence all
the documents which are in these books?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then they will be numbered with the numbers
which are in the books.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then we will take judicial notice
of them all.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, Mr. President, there is one here which the Tribunal
expressly ruled on—the affidavit of Uiberreither. The Defendant
Von Schirach was told he would have to present Uiberreither
if he were to use this affidavit. He has not been presented
here and now the affidavit is being offered. We expressly asked
that he be called here if this affidavit was to be submitted to the
Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I am not making any reference to Uiberreither’s
affidavit, and I will forego calling the witness Uiberreither.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Sauter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Then the affidavit is not offered?</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, it is not being offered.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is Page 135.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then it will not be admitted, and we will
adjourn now.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<h2><span class='pageno' title='601' id='Page_601'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, during the presentation of the case
involving the Defendant Funk, there was a number of documents
that we did not submit in evidence at the time; and I asked the
Tribunal’s permission to do so at a later time. I am prepared to
do so now if the Tribunal would care to have me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it would be quite convenient now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Sir.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The first one is a matter of clarifying the record with respect
to it. It is Document 2828-PS. It has already been offered in evidence
as Exhibit USA-654. But the excerpt, or the extract, which was
read will be found on Page 105 of the document. We cited another
page, which was in error. Reference to this Document USA-654
will be found on Page 9071 (Volume XIII, Page 141) of the record.</p>

<p class='pindent'>We also offered our Document EC-440, which consisted of a statement
made by the Defendant Funk, and we quoted a sentence from
Page 4 of that document. I wish to offer that as Exhibit USA-874.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then Document 3952-PS was an interrogation of the Defendant
Funk dated 19 October 1945. We wish to offer that as USA-875.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I might remind the Tribunal that the excerpt quoted from that
interrogation had to do with the statement made by Funk that the
Defendant Hess had notified him of the impending attack on the
Soviet Union. That excerpt has been translated into the four
languages, and therefore will be readily available to the Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then there is also another interrogation dated 22 October 1945.
We read from Pages 15 and 16 of that interrogation, as it appears
in the record at Page 9169 for 7 May (Volume XIII, Page 214). The
document is Number 3953-PS; we offer it as Exhibit USA-876.</p>

<p class='pindent'>We next referred to Document Number 3894-PS, the interrogation
of one Hans Posse. We offered it as Exhibit USA-843 at the
time, as appears on Page 9093 of the record for 6 May (Volume XIII,
Page 158). At that time I stated to the Tribunal that we would
submit the whole interrogation in French, Russian, German, and
English. We are now prepared to do that, and do so.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then we have Document 3954-PS. This is an affidavit by one
Franz B. Wolf, one of the editors of the <span class='it'>Frankfurter Zeitung</span>.
Reference to it will be found at Page 9082 of the transcript, where
we stated that we would have more to say about the reason for
the retention of the editorial staff of the <span class='it'>Frankfurter Zeitung</span> (Volume
XIII, Page 150). That Document, 3954-PS, is also now available
to the Tribunal in French, Russian, German, and English; and
we offer it as Exhibit USA-877.
<span class='pageno' title='602' id='Page_602'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Then, Mr. President, a motion picture film was shown during
this cross-examination of the Defendant Funk; and the Tribunal
inquired as to whether or not we would be prepared to submit
affidavits giving its source, and so on. We are now prepared to
do so; and we offer first an affidavit by Captain Sam Harris who
arranged to have the pictures taken, which becomes Exhibit
USA-878. The second affidavit is by the photographer who actually
took the picture. We offer that as Exhibit USA-879.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Finally, I should also like to clear up one other matter. On
March 25, during the cross-examination of the witness Bohle,
witness for the Defendant Hess, Colonel Amen quoted from the
interrogation of Von Strempel, as appears in the record beginning
at Page 6482 (Volume X, Page 40). We have had the pertinent
portions translated into the operating languages of the Tribunal,
and we ask that this interrogation, which bears our Document
Number 3800-PS, be admitted in evidence as Exhibit USA-880.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I believe, Mr. President, that clears up all of the documents that
we have not offered formally, up to this date.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now, counsel for the Defendant Sauckel.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I will
now call Defendant Sauckel to the witness stand.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Sauckel took the stand.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p>

<p class='pindent'>FRITZ SAUCKEL (Defendant): Ernst Friedrich Christoph Sauckel.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear
by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p>

<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The defendant repeated the oath.</span>]</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, please describe your career to the
Tribunal.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was the only child of the postman Friedrich
Sauckel, and was born at Hassfurt on the Main near Bamberg. I
attended the elementary school at Schweinfurt and the secondary
school.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How long were you at the secondary school?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: For 5 years. As my father held only a very humble
position, it was my mother, a seamstress, who made it possible for
me to go to that school. When she became very ill with heart
trouble, I saw that it would be impossible for my parents to
<span class='pageno' title='603' id='Page_603'></span>
provide for my studies, and I obtained their permission to go to
sea to make a career for myself there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you join the merchant marine, or where
did you go?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: First of all I joined the Norwegian and Swedish
merchant marine so that I could be thoroughly trained in seamanship
on the big sailing vessels and clippers.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How old were you at the time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: At that time I was 15½.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What were you earning?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As a cabin boy on a Norwegian sailing ship I earned
5 kronen in addition to my keep.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And then, in the course of your career at
sea, where did you go next?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the course of my career as a sailor, and during
my training which I continued afterwards on German sailing
vessels, I sailed on every sea and went to every part of the world.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you come into contact with foreign
families?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Through the Young Men’s Christian Association,
principally in Australia and North America, as well as in South
America, I came into contact with families of these countries.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Where were you when the first World War
started?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: It so happened that I was on a German sailing
vessel on the way to Australia when the ship was captured, and on
the high seas I was made prisoner by the French.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How long did you remain prisoner?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Five years, until November 1919.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And did you return home then?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes, I returned home then.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And then what did you do?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Although I had finished my training and studies
in seamanship required of me, I could not go to sea again and take
my examination, since my savings made during those years at sea
had become worthless because of the German inflation. There
were also few German ships and very many unemployed German
seamen, so I decided to take up work in a factory in my home
town of Schweinfurt.
<span class='pageno' title='604' id='Page_604'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you remain in your home town?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: At first I remained in my home town. I learned to
be a turner and engineer in the Fischer ball-bearing factory in
order to save money so that I later could attend a technical school,
an engineering college.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you already interested in politics at
that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Although as a sailor I despised politics—for I loved
my sailor’s life and still love it today—conditions forced me to
take up a definite attitude towards political problems. No one in
Germany at that time could do otherwise. Many years before I
had left a beautiful country and a rich nation and I returned to
that country 6 years later to find it fundamentally changed and
in a state of upheaval, and in great spiritual and material need.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you join any party?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. I worked in a factory which people in my home
town described as “ultra-Red.” I worked in the tool shop, and
right and left of me Social Democrats, Communists, Socialists, and
Anarchists were working—among others my present father-in-law—and
during all the rest periods discussions went on, so that whether
one wanted to or not one became involved in the social problems
of the time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You mention your father-in-law. Did you
marry then?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In 1923 I married the daughter of a German workman
I had met at that time. I am still happily married to her
today and we have 10 children.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: When did you join the Party?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I joined the Party definitely in 1923 after having
already been in sympathy with it before.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What made you do it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: One of those days I heard a speech of Hitler’s. In
this speech he said that the German factory worker and the German
laborer must make common cause with the German brain worker.
The controversies between the proletariat and the middle class must
be smoothed out and bridged over by each getting to know and
understand the other. Through this a new community of people
would grow up, and only such a community, not bound to middle
class or proletariat, could overcome the dire needs of those days
and the splitting up of the German nation into parties and creeds.
This statement took such hold of me and struck me so forcibly, that
<span class='pageno' title='605' id='Page_605'></span>
I dedicated my life to the idea of adjusting what seemed to be
almost irreconcilable contrasts. I did that all the more, if I may
say so, because I was aware of the fact that there is an inclination
to go to extremes in German people, and in the German
character generally. I had to examine myself very thoroughly to
find the right path for me personally. As I have already said, I had
hardly taken any interest in political questions. My good parents,
who are no longer alive, brought me up in a strictly Christian but
also in a very patriotic way. However, when I went to sea, I
lived a sailor’s life. I loaded saltpeter in Chile. I did heavy lumber
work in Canada, in Quebec. I trimmed coal on the equator, and I
sailed around Cape Horn several times. All of this was hard work;
I ask...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Please, come back to the question of the Party.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: This has to do with the question of the Party, for
we must all give some reasons as to how we got there. I myself...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I stated at the beginning of
the defendant’s case that we had heard this account from the
Defendant Göring and that we did not propose to hear it again
from 20 defendants. It seems to me that we are having it inflicted
upon us by nearly every one of the defendants.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I believe, Mr. President, that we are interested
in getting some sort of an impression of the defendant himself.
Seen from various points of view, the facts look different. I will
now briefly...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is quite true, Dr. Servatius, but we have
had half an hour, almost, of it now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I shall limit it now.</p>

<p class='pindent'>The Party was dissolved in 1923, and refounded in 1925. Did
you join it again?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you take an active part in the Party or
were you just a member?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: From 1925 on I took an active part in it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what position did you hold?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was then Gauleiter in Thuringia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you do that to get work, to earn your
living, or for what reason?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As Gauleiter in Thuringia I earned 150 marks. In
any other profession I would have had accommodations and earned
more money.
<span class='pageno' title='606' id='Page_606'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: When did you make Hitler’s acquaintance?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I met him briefly in 1925.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: When did you become Gauleiter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I became Gauleiter in 1927.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And how were you appointed?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was appointed by letter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any special instructions which
pointed to secret intentions of the Party?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: At that time we were very definitely told that under
no circumstances should there be any secret chapters or any other
secrecy in the life of the Party, but that everything should be
done publicly.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Who was your predecessor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Dr. Dinter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Why was he relieved of his post?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Dr. Dinter was dismissed because he wanted to
found a new religious movement within the Party.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: In 1929 you became a member of the
Thuringian Diet?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you elected to that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was elected to the Diet in the same way as at
every parliamentary election.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was dictatorship in power there already at
the time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: That was not possible; the province was governed
in accordance with the Thuringian constitution.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How long were you a member of the Diet?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was a member of the Diet as long as it existed,
until May 1933.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How was it dissolved?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Diet was dissolved by a Reich Government
decree.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Then in 1932, you were a member of the
Provincial Government of Thuringia. How did you get into that
position?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In 1932, in the month of June, new elections took
place for the Thuringian Diet, and the NSDAP obtained 26 out
of 60 seats.
<span class='pageno' title='607' id='Page_607'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was any mention made of a dictatorship which
was to be aimed at?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, a government was elected according to parliamentary
principles.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Well, you had a majority in the Thuringian
Government, had you not, and you could use your influence?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Together with the bourgeois parties, by an absolute
majority, a National Socialist government was elected.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What happened to the old officials? Were
they dismissed?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I myself became the President and Minister of the
Interior in that government; the old officials, without exception,
remained in their offices.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And with what did that first National Socialist
government concern itself in the field of domestic politics?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the field of domestic politics there was only one
question at that time, and that was the alleviation of an indescribable
distress which is only exceeded by that of today.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: In this connection, Mr. President, may I submit
two government reports from which I only wish to draw your
attention briefly to two passages. One is the report contained in
Document Number 96, which shows the activity of the government
and its fight against social distress. What is particularly important
when you run through it, is what is not mentioned, that is, there
is no mention of the question of war or other such matters, but
again and again the alleviation of distress is mentioned. And
important, too, is the work that was carried out. That is in Document
Number 97. In this book, on Page 45, there is a statement
of the work undertaken by the government—bridge-building, road-making,
and so on—and in no way had this work anything to do
with war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Then I am submitting Document Number 95 from the same
period. It is a book called <span class='it'>Sauckel’s Fighting Speeches</span>. Here, too,
the book is remarkable for what does not appear in it, namely
preparations for war. Instead it emphasizes the distress which must
be alleviated. It becomes clear from the individual articles that
these are speeches made during a number of years, which show
in a similar way what the preoccupations were of the Defendant
Sauckel. It begins in 1932 with a speech dealing with the misery
of the time, and ends with the final questions where reference is
made once again to the alleviation of social need and the preservation
of peace. The Tribunal will be able to read these articles in
the document book.
<span class='pageno' title='608' id='Page_608'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>In 1933 you also became Reich Regent of Thuringia. How did
you manage to get to that position?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was appointed Reich Regent of Thuringia by Field
Marshal Von Hindenburg, who was Reich President at that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What were the instructions you received when
you took up your offices?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When I took over my office as Reich Regent I
received instructions to form a new Thuringian Government, as
the Reich Regent was to keep out of the administrative affairs of
a German state...</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You need not tell us these technical details.
I mean what political task were you given?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was given the political task of administering
Thuringia as Reich Regent within the existing Reich law and
prevailing Constitution, and of guaranteeing the unity of the Reich.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And did the words “guarantee the unity of
the Reich” mean the overpowering of others, in particular the
authorities in Thuringia?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, the authorities remained.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Now, you held both the position of Gauleiter
and that of Reich Regent. What was the aim of that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Both positions were entirely separate in their organizations.
Under the Regent were officials in office, and under the
Gauleiter were employees of the Party. Both positions were administered
absolutely separately, as is the case in any other state
where members of a party are at the same time party officials or
leaders and exercise both these functions simultaneously.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: So you received no order that one position
should absorb the other?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, I had no such orders. The tasks were entirely
different.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you a member of the SA?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I myself was never an SA man. I was an honorary
Obergruppenführer in the SA.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How did you receive that appointment?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you. It was honorary.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you appointed SS Obergruppenführer by
Himmler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, the Führer made me honorary SS Obergruppenführer
for no special reason and without functions.
<span class='pageno' title='609' id='Page_609'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you a member of the Reichstag?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes, from 1933 on.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: As a member of the Reichstag, did you know
anything in advance about the beginning of the war? Were you
informed?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was never informed in advance about the start
of the war or about foreign political developments. I merely
remember that quite suddenly—it may have been during the days
between 24 August and the end of August—we were called to a
session of the Reichstag in Berlin. This session was canceled at
the time, and we were later ordered to go to the Führer, that is, the
Gauleiter and Reichsleiter. But a number had already left so that
the circle was not complete. The conference, or Hitler’s speech,
only lasted a short time. He said, roughly, that the meeting of the
Reichstag could not take place as things were still in the course
of development. He was convinced that there would not be a war.
He said he hoped there would be some settlement in a small way
and meant by that, as I had to conclude, a solution without the
parts of Upper Silesia lost in 1921. He said—and that I remember
exactly—that Danzig would become German, and apart from that
Germany would be given a railway line with several tracks, like a
Reichsautobahn, with a strip of ground to the right and left of it.
He told us to go home and prepare for the Reich Party Rally, where
we would meet again.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any close connections with the
Führer?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I personally, as far as I know the Führer, had a
great deal of admiration for him. But I had no close connection
with him that one could describe as personal. I had a number of
discussions with him about the administration of my Gau and in
particular about the care he wished to be given to cultural buildings
in Thuringia—in Weimar, Eisenach, and Meiningen; and later on
there were more frequent meetings because of my position as Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: We shall come to that later. What connections
did you have with the Reichsleiter?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My connections with the Reichsleiter were no different
from my connections with the Führer. They were of an official
and Party nature. As regards personal relationships I cannot say
that I had any particularly personal intercourse with anyone.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What about your connection with the Reich
Ministers?
<span class='pageno' title='610' id='Page_610'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My connection with the Reich Ministers was of a
purely official nature and was very infrequent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What about the Wehrmacht?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I could not have the honor of being a German
soldier because of my imprisonment in the first World War. And
in this World War the Führer refused to allow me to serve as a
soldier.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have held a number of high
positions and offices. You knew the Reich Ministers and Reichsleiter.
Will you please explain why you went aboard the submarine
at that time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had repeatedly made written requests to the
Führer that I might be allowed to join the Wehrmacht as an
ordinary soldier. He refused to give me this permission. So I
arranged in secret for someone to take my place and went aboard
Captain Salmann’s submarine with his agreement. As a former
sailor and now a politician in a high position I wanted to give
these brave submarine men a proof of my comradeship and understanding
and of my sense of duty. Apart from that I had 10 children
for whom, as their father, I had to do something too.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I should like now, in a number of questions,
to refer to your activities. Were you a member of a trade union?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know what the aims of German trade
unions were?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes, I do.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were they economic or political?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As I, as a worker, came to know them, the aims of
German trade unions were political, and there were a number of
different trade unions with varied political views. I considered
that a great misfortune. As workman in the workshop I had had
experience of the arguments among the trade unionists—between
the Christian Socialist trade unions and the Red trade unions, between
the syndicalist, the anarchist and the communist trade unions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The trade unions in your Gau were then
dissolved. Were the leaders arrested at the time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you approve of the dissolution of the
trade unions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The dissolution of the trade unions was in the air
then. The question was discussed in the Party for a long time and
<span class='pageno' title='611' id='Page_611'></span>
there was no agreement at all as to the position trade unions
should hold, nor as to their necessity, their usefulness and their
nature. But a solution had to be found because the trade unions
which we, or the Führer, or Dr. Ley, dissolved all held different
political views. From that time on, however, there was only one
party in Germany and it was necessary, I fully realize, to come to
a definite decision as to the actual duties of the trade unions, the
necessary duties indispensable to every calling and to workers
everywhere.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was not the purpose of removing the trade
unions to remove any opposition which might stand in the way of
an aggressive war?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I can say in all good conscience that during those
years not one of us ever thought about a war at all. We had to
overcome such terrible need that we should have been only too
glad if German economic life could have been started again in
peace and if the German worker, who had suffered the most during
that frightful depression, could have had work and food once more.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did members of trade unions suffer economically
through the dissolution?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In no way. My own father-in-law, who was a
member of a trade union and still is today, and whom I repeatedly
asked for information, whom I never persuaded to join the Party—he
was a Social Democrat and never joined the Party—confirmed
the fact that even when he was getting old and could no longer
work, the German Labor Front never denied him the rights due
to him as an old trade unionist and by virtue of his long trade-union
membership, but allowed him full benefits. On the other
hand, the German State—since in Germany old age and disability
insurance and the accident insurance, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, were paid and
organized by the State—the National Socialist State guaranteed him
all these rights and made full payment.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were all Communist leaders arrested in your
Gau after the Party came to power?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. In my Gau, as far as I know, only Communists
who had actually worked against the State were arrested.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what happened to them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The State Police arrested and interrogated them
and detained them according to the findings.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR.. SERVATIUS: Did you have Kreisleiter in your Gau who had
been members of a former opposition party?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Party’s activity was recruiting. Our most intensive
work was the winning over of political opponents. I am very
<span class='pageno' title='612' id='Page_612'></span>
proud of the fact that many workers in my Gau, numerous former
Communists and Social Democrats, were won over by us and
became local group leaders and Party functionaries.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: But were there not two Kreisleiter from the
extreme left appointed by you?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: One Kreisleiter from the extreme left was appointed.
Also, besides a number of other leaders, the Gau sectional manager
of the German Labor Front had belonged to the extreme left for
a long time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How did you personally deal with your
political opponents?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Political opponents who did not work against the
State were neither bothered nor harmed in my Gau.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the Socialist Deputy Fröhlich?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Socialist Deputy August Fröhlich was my
strongest and most important opponent. He was the leader of the
Thuringian Social Democrats and was for many years the Social
Democrat Prime Minister of Thuringia. I had great respect for him
as an opponent. He was an honorable and upright man. On 20 July
1944, through my own personal initiative, I had him released from
detention. He had been on the list of the conspirators of 20 July,
but I had so much respect for him personally that, in spite of that,
I asked for his release and obtained it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you treat other opponents similarly?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I also had a politician of the Center Party I knew
in my home town of Schweinfurt released from detention.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The Concentration Camp of Buchenwald was
in your Gau. Did you establish it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Buchenwald Camp originated in the following
manner: The Führer, who came to Weimar quite often because of
the theater there, suggested that a battalion of his SS Leibstandarte
should be stationed at Weimar. As the Leibstandarte was considered
a picked regiment I not only agreed to this but was very
pleased, because in a city like Weimar people are glad to have a
garrison. So the State of Thuringia, the Thuringian Government,
at the request of the Führer, prepared a site in the Ettersburg
Forest, north of the incline outside the town.</p>

<p class='pindent'>After some time Himmler informed me, however, that he could
not bring a battalion of the SS Leibstandarte to Weimar, as he
could not divide up the regiment, but that it would be a newly
established Death’s-Head unit, and Himmler said it would amount
to the same thing. It was only some time later, when the site had
<span class='pageno' title='613' id='Page_613'></span>
already been placed at the disposal of the Reich, that Himmler
declared that he now had to accommodate a kind of concentration
camp with the Death’s-Head units on this very suitable site. I
opposed this to begin with, because I did not consider a concentration
camp at all the right kind of thing for the town of Weimar
and its traditions. However, he—I mean Himmler—making use of
his position, refused to have any discussion about it. And so the
camp was set up neither to my satisfaction nor to that of the
population of Weimar.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the administration
of the camp later on?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I never had anything to do with the administration
of the camp. The Thuringian Government made an attempt at the
time to influence the planning of the building by saying that the
building police in Thuringia wished to give the orders for the
sanitary arrangements in the camp. Himmler rejected this on the
grounds of his position, saying that he had a construction office
of his own and the site now belonged to the Reich.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you visit the camp at any time?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As far as I can remember, on one single occasion at
the end of 1937 or at the beginning of 1938, I visited and inspected
the camp with an Italian commission.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you find anything wrong there?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I did not find anything wrong. I inspected the accommodations—I
myself had been a prisoner for 5 years, and so it interested
me. I must admit that at that time there was no cause for
any complaint as such. The accommodations had been divided into day
and night rooms. The beds were covered with blue and white sheets;
the kitchens, washrooms, and latrines were beyond reproach, so that
the Italian officer or officers who were inspecting the camp with me
said that in Italy they would not accommodate their own soldiers
any better.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Later on did you hear about the events in that
camp which have been alleged here?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I heard nothing about such events as have been
alleged here.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the evacuation
of the camp at the end of the war, before the American Army
approached?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When the mayor of Weimar informed me that they
intended to evacuate the camp at Buchenwald and to use the camp
guards to fight the American troops, I raised the strongest objections.
<span class='pageno' title='614' id='Page_614'></span>
As I had no authority over the camp, and since for various reasons
connected with my other office I had had considerable differences
with Himmler and did not care to speak to him, I telephoned the
Führer’s headquarters in Berlin and said that in any case an evacuation
or a transfer of prisoners into the territory east of the Saale
was impossible and madness, and could not be carried through from
the point of view of supplies. I demanded that the camp should be
handed over to the American occupation troops in an orderly manner.
I received the answer that the Führer would give instructions
to Himmler to comply with my request. I briefly reported this to
some of my colleagues and the mayor, and then I left Weimar.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The witness Dr. Blaha has stated that you had
also been to the concentration camp at Dachau on the occasion of
an inspection.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, I did not go to the Dachau Concentration Camp
and, as far as I recollect, I did not take part in the visit of the Gauleiter
to Dachau in 1935 either. In no circumstances did I take part
in an inspection in Dachau such as Dr. Blaha has described here; and
consequently, above all, I did not inspect workshops or anything of
the sort.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not, as Gauleiter, receive official
reports regarding the events in the concentration camp, that is to
say, orders which passed through the Gau administrative offices
both from and to the camp?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. I neither received instructions for the Buchenwald
Camp, nor reports. It was not only my personal opinion but
it was the opinion of old experienced Gauleiter that it was the
greatest misfortune, from the administrative point of view, when
Himmler as early as 1934-35 proceeded to separate the executive
from the general internal administration. There were continual
complaints from many Gauleiter and German provincial administrations.
They were unsuccessful, however, because in the end
Himmler incorporated even the communal fire brigades into the
Reich organization of his Police.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any personal relations with the
Police and the SS at Weimar?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had no personal relations with the SS and the
Police at all. I had official relations inasmuch as the trade police
and the local police of small boroughs still remained under the
internal administration of the State of Thuringia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did not the Police have their headquarters
near you, at Weimar?
<span class='pageno' title='615' id='Page_615'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, it was the ridiculous part of the development at
that time that, as I once explained to the Führer, we had been
changed from a Party state, and a state made up of provinces, into
a departmental state. The Reich ministries had greatly developed,
their departments being fairly well defined, and the individual
district departments of the various administrations did not agree
among one another. Until 1934 Thuringia had its own independent
police administration in its Ministry for Home Affairs. But from
that time the headquarters of the Higher SS and the Police Leader
were transferred to Kassel, so that Himmler, in contrast to the rest
of the State and Party organizations, obtained new spheres for his
Police. He demonstrated this in Central Germany where for example
the Higher SS and Police Leader for Weimar and the State of Thuringia
was stationed in Kassel, whereas for the Prussian part of the
Gau of Thuringia—that is to say the town of Erfurt which is 20 kilometers
away from Weimar—the Higher SS and Police Leader and
the provincial administration had their seat in Magdeburg. It is
obvious that we, as Gau authorities, did not in any way agree with
such a development and that there was great indignation among the
experienced administrators.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The question is: Did you co-operate with these
offices and did you have a friendly association with the officials in
the regime and therefore know what was going on in Buchenwald?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: On the contrary, it was a continual battle. Each
separate organization shut itself off from the others. At such a
period of world development this was most unfortunate. For the
people it was disadvantageous and it made things impossible for
any administration.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was there persecution of the Jews in your Gau?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What about the laws concerning the Jews and
the execution of those laws?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: These Jewish laws were proclaimed in Nuremberg.
There were actually very few Jews in Thuringia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were there no violations in connection with the
well-known events, following the murder of the Envoy Vom Rath in
Paris, which have repeatedly become the subject of discussion in
this Trial?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I cannot recollect in detail the events in Thuringia.
As I told you, there were only a few Jews in Thuringia. The Gauleiter
were in Munich at the time, and had no influence at all on
that development, for it happened during the night, when all the
Gauleiter were in Munich.
<span class='pageno' title='616' id='Page_616'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: My question is this: What happened in your
Gau of Thuringia, and what instructions did you give as a result?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There may have been a few towns in Thuringia
where a window was smashed or something of that sort. I cannot
tell you in detail. I cannot even tell you where or whether there
were synagogues in Thuringia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Now one question regarding your financial
position.</p>

<p class='pindent'>On the occasion of your fiftieth birthday the Führer made you a
donation. How much was it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: On my fiftieth birthday in October 1944 I was surprised
to get a letter from the Führer through one of his adjutants.
In that letter there was a check for 250,000 marks. I told the adjutant
that I could not possibly accept it—I was very surprised. The
Führer’s adjutant—it was little Bormann, the old Bormann, not
Reichsleiter Bormann—told me that the Führer knew quite well
that I had neither money nor any landed property and that this
would be a security for my children. He told me not to hurt the
Führer’s feelings. The adjutant left quickly and I sent for Demme
who was both a colleague and a friend of mine and the president
of the State Bank of Thuringia. He was unfortunately refused as
a witness as being irrelevant ...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it is enough if we know whether he
ultimately accepted it or not.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Let us drop that question. What happened to
the money?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Through the president of the State Bank in question
the money was placed into an account in the State Bank of Thuringia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What other income did you receive from your
official positions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The only income I had from my official positions was
the salary of a Reich Regent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How much was that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The salary of a Reich Minister; I cannot tell you
exactly what it was. I never bothered about it. It was something
like 30,000 marks.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what means have you today apart from
the donation in that bank account?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I have not saved any money and I never had any
property.
<span class='pageno' title='617' id='Page_617'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: That, Mr. President, brings me to the end of
those general questions and I am now coming to the questions
relating to the Allocation of Labor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: To aid the Court I have prepared a plan showing
how the direction of labor was managed, which should help to
explain how the individual authorities co-operated and how the
operation was put into motion.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I will concern myself mainly with the problem of meeting the
demand, that is with the question of how the labor was obtained.
I shall not concern myself much with the question of the use made
of the labor and the needs of industry. That is more a matter for
Speer’s defense, which does not quite fit in with my presentation of
things. But those are details which occurred in error because I did
not go into such matters thoroughly when the plan was being prepared.
Fundamentally there are no differences.</p>

<p class='pindent'>If I may explain the plan briefly: At the top there is the Führer,
in red; under him is the Four Year Plan; and under that, as part
of the Four Year Plan, there is the office of Sauckel, who was Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor and came directly
under the Four Year Plan. He received his instructions and orders
from the Führer through the Four Year Plan, or, as was the Führer’s
way, from him direct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Sauckel’s headquarters were at the Reich Ministry of Labor. It
is the big space outlined in yellow to the left, below Sauckel’s office
which is in brown. Sauckel only became included in the Reich Labor
Ministry by having a few offices put at his disposal. The Reich Minister
of Labor and the whole of the Labor Ministry remained.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In the course of time Sauckel’s position became somewhat
stronger, individual departments being necessarily incorporated
into his, over which, to a certain extent, he obtained personal
power; but the Reich Ministry of Labor remained until the end.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I should now like to explain how the “Arbeitseinsatz” was put
into operation. Owing to operations in Russia and the great losses
in the winter, there arose a need for 2 million soldiers. The
Wehrmacht, OKW, marked in green at the top next to the Führer,
demands soldiers from the industries. It is marked here in the green
spaces which run downwards below the OKW. The line then turns
left downwards to the industries which are marked as having
30 million workers. The Wehrmacht withdraws 2 million workers
but can only do so when new labor is there. It was at that
moment that Sauckel was put into office in order to obtain this labor.
<span class='pageno' title='618' id='Page_618'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>The number of men needed was determined by the higher
authorities through the so-called “Requirements Board,” marked at
the top in yellow, which represented the highest offices: the Armaments
and Production Ministries, the Ministry of Air, Agriculture,
Shipping, Traffic, and so on. They reported their requests to the
Führer and he decided what was needed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Sauckel’s task was carried out as follows: Let us go back to the
brown square. On the strength of the right of the Four Year Plan
to issue orders, he applied to the space on the right where the
squares are outlined in blue. They are the highest district offices
in the occupied territories, the Reich Ministry for the Eastern Territories,
that is, Rosenberg; then come the military authorities; and as
things were handled a little differently in each country, here are the
various countries, Belgium, Northern France, Holland, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>,
marked in yellow. These agencies received the order to make labor
available. Each through its own machinery referred the order to the
next agency below and so on down to the very last, the local labor
offices which are under the district authorities, and here the workers
were assigned to the factories. That is the reserve of foreigners.
Beside that there are two other sources of labor available, the main
reserve of German workers, which is marked in blue to the left at
the bottom, and the reserve of prisoners of war.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Sauckel had to deal with all these three agencies. I will now
put relevant questions to the witness. This is only to refresh our
memories and to check the explanation.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I will submit other charts later. There is a list of the witnesses
drawn up according to their offices so that we know where they
belong; and later there will be another chart showing the inspection
and controls which were set up.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you will no doubt be asking the
witness whether he is familiar with the chart and whether it is
correct.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have seen this chart. Is it correct?
Do you acknowledge it?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: To the best of my memory and belief it is correct,
and I acknowledge it.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: On 21 March 1942 you were made Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor. Why were you chosen for
this office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The reason why I was chosen for this office was
never known to me and I do not know it now. Because of my
engineering studies and my occupation I took an interest in questions
concerning labor systems, but I do not know whether that was
the reason.
<span class='pageno' title='619' id='Page_619'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was your appointment not made at Speer’s
suggestion?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Reichsleiter Bormann stated that in the preamble to
his official decree. I do not know the actual circumstances.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I beg to refer to Sauckel Document Number 7.
It is in Document Book 1, Page 5.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I should like to add that this appointment came as
a complete surprise to me, I did not apply for it in any way. I never
applied for any of my offices.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What number are you giving to this document?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number 7.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I mean the chart. What number are you
giving to the chart?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Document 1.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see, and Document Number 7, Page 5.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. This document is a preamble added by
Reichsleiter Bormann to the decree and which shows that it was
Speer who suggested Sauckel for this position.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Was it an entirely new office which you then entered?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. The Arbeitseinsatz had been directed by the
Four Year Plan before my appointment. A ministerial director,
Dr. Mansfeld, held the office then. I only learned here, during these
proceedings, that the office was already known before my time as
the office of the Plenipotentiary General.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: On taking up your office did you talk to
Dr. Mansfeld, your so-called predecessor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I neither saw Dr. Mansfeld nor spoke to him, nor did
I take over any records from him.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: To what extent was your office different from
that of the previous Plenipotentiary General?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My office was different to this extent: The department
in the Four Year Plan was given up and was no longer used
by me. I drew departments of the Reich Labor Ministry more and
more closely into this work as they had some of the outstanding
experts.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the reason for this reconstruction of
the office?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The reason was to be found in the many conflicting
interests which had been very prominent up to the third year of the
war in the political and state offices, internal administration offices,
<span class='pageno' title='620' id='Page_620'></span>
Party agencies and economic agencies, and which now for territorial
considerations opposed the interdistrict equalization of the labor
potential, which had become urgent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of task did you have then? What
was your sphere of work?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My chief sphere of work was in directing and regulating
German labor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What task were you given then?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had to replace with suitably skilled workers those
men who had to be freed from industry for drafting into the German
Wehrmacht, that is, into the different branches of the Wehrmacht.
Moreover, I also had to obtain new labor for the new war
industries which had been set up for food production as well as for
the production of armaments, of course.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was your task definitely defined?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: It was at first in no way definitely defined. There
were at that time about 23 or 24 million workers to be directed,
who were available in the Reich but who had not yet been fully
employed for war economy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you look on your appointment as a permanent
one?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. I could not consider it as permanent.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Why not?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Because in addition to me the Reich Labor Minister
and his state secretaries were in office and at the head of things;
and then there was the whole of the Labor Ministry.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What sources were at your disposal to obtain
this labor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: First, there were the workers who were already
present in the Reich from all sorts of callings who, as I have said,
had not yet been directed to war economy, not yet completely incorporated
in the way that was necessary for the conduct of the war.
Then further there were the prisoners of war as far as their labor
was made available by the army authorities.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: At first then, if I have understood you correctly,
proper distribution, and a thrifty management of German
labor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When my appointment ...</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I do not understand the German
language, but it appears to me that if you would not make pauses
between each word it would make your sentences shorter; and pause
<span class='pageno' title='621' id='Page_621'></span>
at the end of the sentence. It would be much more convenient for
the interpreter. I do not know whether I am right in that. That is
what it looks like. You are pausing between each word, and therefore
it is difficult, I imagine, to get the sense of the sentence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I beg your pardon, Your Lordship.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Servatius.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What did you do to carry out your task?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I will repeat. First, as I had received no specific
instructions I understood my task to mean that I was to fill up the
gaps and deficiencies by employing labor in the most rational and
economic way.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the order you received? How many
people were you to obtain?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: That question is very difficult to answer, for I
received the necessary orders only in the course of the development
of the war. Labor and economy are fluid, intangible things. However
I then received the order that if the war were to continue for
some time I was to find replacements in the German labor sector
for the Wehrmacht, whose soldiers were the potential of peacetime
economy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You drew up a program. What was provided
for in your program?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I drew up two programs, Doctor. At first, when I
took up my office, I drew up one program which included a <span class='it'>levée
en masse</span>, so to speak, of German women and young people, and,
another, as I already said, for the proper utilization of labor from
the economic and technical point of view.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was the program accepted?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The program was rejected by the Führer when I
submitted it to him and, as was my duty, to the Reich economic
authorities and ministries which were interested in the employment
of labor.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Why?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Führer sent for me and in a lengthy statement
explained the position of the German war production and also the
economic situation. He said that he had nothing against my program
as such if he had the time; but that in view of the situation,
he could not wait for such German women to become trained and
experienced. At that time 10 million German women were already
employed who had never done industrial or mechanical work.
Further, he said that the results of such a rationalization of working
methods as I had suggested, something like a mixture of Ford
and Taylor methods ...
<span class='pageno' title='622' id='Page_622'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: One moment. The interpreters cannot translate
your long sentences properly. You must make short sentences
and divide your phrases, otherwise no one can understand you and
your defense will suffer a great deal. Will you please be careful
about that.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In answer to my proposal the Führer said that he
could not wait for a rationalization of the working methods on the
lines of the Taylor and Ford systems.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what did he suggest?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: May I explain the motives which prompted the Führer’s
decision. He described the situation at that time, at the end
of the winter of 1941-42. Many hundreds of German locomotives,
almost all the mechanized armed units, tanks, planes, and mechanical
weapons had become useless as a result of the catastrophe of that
abnormally hard winter.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Hundreds of thousands of German soldiers had suffered terribly
from the cold; many divisions had lost their arms and supplies. The
Führer explained to me that if the race with the enemy for new
arms, new munitions, and new dispositions of forces was not won
now, the Soviets would be as far as the Channel by the next winter.
Appealing to my sense of duty and asking me to put into it all I
could, he gave me the task of obtaining new foreign labor for
employment in the German war economy.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have no scruples that this was against
international law?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Führer spoke to me in such detail about this
question and he explained the necessity so much as a matter of
course that, after he had withdrawn a suggestion which he had
made himself, there could be no misgivings on my part that the
employment of foreign workers was against international law.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You also negotiated with other agencies and
there were already workers within the Reich. What were you told
about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: None of the higher authorities, either military or
civilian, expressed any misgivings. Perhaps I may add some things
which the Führer mentioned as binding upon me. On the whole, the
Führer always treated me very kindly. On this question, he became
very severe and categorical and said that in the West he had left
half the French Army free and at home, and he had released the
greater part of the Belgian Army and the whole of the Dutch Army
from captivity. He told me that under certain circumstances he
would have to recall these prisoners of war for military reasons,
but that in the interests of the whole of Europe and the Occident,
<span class='pageno' title='623' id='Page_623'></span>
so he expressed himself, only a united Europe, where labor was
properly allocated, could hold out in the fight against Bolshevism.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you know the terms of the Hague land
warfare regulations?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: During the first World War I myself was taken prisoner
as a sailor. I knew what was required and what was laid down
with regard to the treatment and protection of prisoners of war and
prisoners generally.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did foreign authorities—I am thinking of the
French—ever raise the objection that what you planned with your
Arbeitseinsatz was an infringement of the Hague land warfare
regulations?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. In France, on questions of the Arbeitseinsatz,
I only negotiated with the French Government through the military
commander and under the presidency of the German Ambassador
in Paris. I was convinced that as far as the employment of labor in
France was concerned, agreements should be made with a proper
French Government. I negotiated in a similar manner with the General
Secretary in Belgium.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Now a large part—about a third—of the foreign
workers were so-called Eastern Workers. What were you told
about them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: With regard to the employment of workers from the
East I was told that Russia had not joined the Geneva Convention,
and so Germany for her part was not bound by it. And I was further
told that in the Baltic countries and in other regions, Soviet
Russia had also claimed workers or people, and that in addition
about 3 million Chinese were working in Soviet Russia.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what about Poland?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As regards Poland I had been told, just as in the
case of other countries, that it was a case of total capitulation, and
that on the grounds of this capitulation Germany was justified in
introducing German regulations.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you consider the employment of foreign
labor justifiable from the general point of view?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: On account of the necessities which I have mentioned,
I considered the employment of foreign workers justifiable
according to the principles which I enforced and advocated and to
which I also adhered in my field of work. I was, after all, a German
and I could feel only as a German.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Herr Sauckel, you must formulate your sentences
differently, the interpreters cannot translate them. You must
not insert one sentence into another.
<span class='pageno' title='624' id='Page_624'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>So you considered it justifiable, in view of the principles you
wished to apply and, which as you said, you enforced in your field
of work?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you also think of the hardships imposed
on the workers and their families through this employment?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I knew from my own life even if one goes to foreign
countries voluntarily, a separation is very sad and heartbreaking
and it is very hard for members of a family to be separated from
each other. But I also thought of the German families, of the German
soldiers, and of the hundreds of thousands of German workers
who also had to go away from home.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The suggestion has been made that the work
could have been carried out in the occupied territories themselves,
and it would not then have been necessary to fetch the workers
away. Why was that not done?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: That is, at first sight, an attractive suggestion. If it
had been possible, I would willingly have carried out the suggestion
which was made by Funk and other authorities, and later even by
Speer. It would have made my life and work much simpler. On the
other hand, there were large departments in this system which had
to provide for and maintain the different branches of German economy
and supply them with orders. As the Plenipotentiary General
for the Allocation of Labor I could not have German fields, German
farming, German mass-production with the most modern machinery
transferred to foreign territories—I had no authority for that—and
those offices insisted that I should find replacements for the agricultural
and industrial workers and the artisans whose places had
become vacant in German agriculture or industry because the men
had been called to the colors.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You said before that the manner in which you
had planned the employment of workers was such that it could have
been approved. What then were your leading principles in carrying
out your scheme for the employment of labor?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When the Führer described the situation so drastically,
and ordered me to bring foreign workers to Germany, I
clearly recognized the difficulties of the task and I asked him to
agree to the only way by which I considered it possible to do this,
for I had been a worker too.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was not your principal consideration the economic
exploitation of these foreign workers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Arbeitseinsatz has nothing to do with exploitation.
It is an economic process for supplying labor.
<span class='pageno' title='625' id='Page_625'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You said repeatedly in your speeches and on
other occasions that the important thing was to make the best possible
economic use of these workers. You speak of a machine which
must be properly handled. Did you want to express thereby the
thought of economic exploitation?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: At all times a regime of no matter what nature,
can only be successful in the production of goods if it uses labor
economically—not too much and not too little. That alone I consider
economically justifiable.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: It was stated here in a document which was
submitted, the French Document RF-22, a government report, that
the intention existed to bring about a demographic deterioration,
and in other government reports mention is made that one of the
aims was the biological destruction of other peoples. What do you
say about that?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I can say most definitely that biological destruction
was never mentioned to me. I was only too happy when I had
workers. I suspected that the war would last longer than was
expected, and the demands upon my office were so urgent and so
great that I was glad for people to be alive, not for them to be
destroyed.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the general attitude toward the
question of foreign workers before you took office? What did you
find when you came?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There was a controversy when I took up my office.
There were about two million foreign workers in Germany from
neutral and allied states and occupied territories of the East and
the West. They had been brought to the Reich without order or
system. Many industrial concerns avoided contacting the labor
authorities or found them troublesome and bureaucratic. The conflict
of interests, as I said before, was very great. The Police point
of view was most predominating, I think.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And propaganda? What was the propaganda
with regard to Eastern Workers, for example?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Propaganda was adapted to the war in the East. I
may point out now—you interrupted me before when I was speaking
of the order given me by the Führer—that I expressly asked
the Führer not to let workers working in Germany be treated
as enemies any longer, and I tried to influence propaganda to that
effect.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What else did you do with regard to the
situation which confronted you?
<span class='pageno' title='626' id='Page_626'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I finally received approval from the Führer for
my second program. That program has been submitted here as
a document. I must and will bear responsibility for that program.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: It has already been submitted as Document
016-PS. It is the Program for the Allocation of Labor of
20 April 1942, Exhibit USA-168.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In this program you made fundamental statements. I will hand
it to you and I ask you to comment on the general questions only,
not on the individual points.</p>

<p class='pindent'>There is a paragraph added to the last part, “Prisoners of War
and Foreign Workers.” Have you found the paragraph?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: If you will look at the third paragraph you
will find what you want to explain.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I should like to say that I drew up and worked out
this program independently in 1942 after I had been given that
difficult task by the Führer. It was absolutely clear to me what
the conditions would have to be if foreign workers were to be
employed in Germany at all. I wrote those sentences at that time
and the program went to all the German authorities which had to
deal with the matter. I quote:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“All these people must be fed, housed, and treated in such
a way that with the least possible effort”—here I refer to
economics as conceived by Taylor and Ford, whom I have
studied closely—“the greatest possible results will be achieved.
It has always been a matter of course for us Germans to
treat a conquered enemy correctly and humanely, even if
he were our most cruel and irreconcilable foe, and to abstain
from all cruelty and petty chicanery when expecting useful
service from him.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Will you put the document aside now, please.
What authority did you have to carry out your task?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had authority from the Four Year Plan to issue
instructions. I had at my disposal—not under me, but at my disposal—Sections
3 and 5 of the Reich Labor Ministry.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What departments did they represent?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The departments, “Employment of Labor” and
“Wages.”</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could you issue directives and orders?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I could issue directives and orders of a departmental
nature to those offices.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could you carry on negotiations with foreign
countries independently?
<span class='pageno' title='627' id='Page_627'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I could carry on negotiations with foreign countries
only through the Foreign Office or, when I had received permission,
with the ambassadors or ministers in question.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could you give your orders independently
or was agreement and consultation necessary?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My field of work, as in every large branch of an
administration, made it absolutely necessary for me to discuss the
questions and have consultations about them with neighboring
departments. I was obliged to do so according to instructions.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: With whom did you have to consult, apart
from the Four Year Plan under which you were placed?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had first of all to consult the departments themselves
from which I received the orders, and in addition the Party
Chancellery, the office of Reich Minister Lammers—the Reich
Chancellery, the Reich Railways, the Reich Food Ministry, the
Reich Defense Ministry.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did things go smoothly, or were there difficulties?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There were always great difficulties.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any dealings with Himmler?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had dealings with Himmler only insofar as he
gave instructions. He was Reich Minister and was responsible for
security, as he said.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was not that a question which was very
important for you in regard to the treatment of workers?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: During the first months or in the first weeks, I
believe, of my appointment I was called to see Heydrich. In a very
precise way, Heydrich told me that he considered my program
fantastic, such as it had been approved by the Führer, and that
I must realize that I was making his work very difficult in demanding
that barbed wire and similar fences should not and must not
be put around the labor camps, but rather taken down. He then said
curtly that I must realize that if it was I who was responsible for
the allocation of labor, it was he who was responsible for security.
That is what he told me.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you accept the fact that these strict police
measures now existed?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Through constant efforts I had these police measures
gradually reduced as far as they concerned the workers who were
employed in Germany through my agency and my office.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What did your authority to issue instructions
consist of? Could you issue orders or had you to negotiate, and how
was this carried out in practice?
<span class='pageno' title='628' id='Page_628'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The authority I had to issue instructions was doubtful
from the beginning because, owing to the necessities of war,
the lack of manpower, and so on, I was forbidden to establish
any office of my own or any other new office or organization. I
could only pass on instructions after negotiation with the supreme
authorities of the Reich and after detailed consultation. These
instructions were, of course, of a purely departmental nature. I
could not interfere in matters of administration.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How was this right to issue instructions exercised
with regard to the high authorities in the occupied territories?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: It was exactly the same, merely of a departmental
nature. In practice it was the passing on of the Führer’s
orders which were to be carried out there through the individual
machinery of each separate administration.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could you give binding instructions to military
authorities, to the Economic Inspectorate East, for example?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, there was a strict order from the Führer that
in the Army areas, the operational areas of the Commanders-in-Chief,
the latter only were competent, and when they had examined
military conditions and the situation, everything had to be
regulated according to the needs of these high military commands.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did that apply to the military commander
in France, or could you act directly there?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In France I could, of course, proceed only in the
same way, by informing the military commander of the instructions
which I myself had received. He then prepared for discussions
with the German Embassy and the French Government, so that
with the Ambassador presiding, and the military commander taking
an authoritative part, the discussion with the French Government
took place.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what happened as far as the Ministry
for the Occupied Eastern Territories was concerned?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the case of that Ministry I had to transmit my
orders to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
and had to consult with him. With Reich Minister Rosenberg we
always succeeded in arranging matters between ourselves in a way
that we considered right. But in the Ukraine there was the Reich
Commissioner who was on very intimate terms himself with headquarters,
and, as is generally known, he was very independent and
acted accordingly by asserting this independence.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How did these authorities in the occupied
territories take your activities at first?
<span class='pageno' title='629' id='Page_629'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the occupied territories there was naturally
much opposition at the start of my work, because I brought new
orders and new requirements and it was not always easy to reconcile
conflicting interests.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was there any apprehension that you would
intervene in the administration of the territories?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: From my own conviction I refrained entirely from
any such intervention and I always emphasized that in order to
dispel any such apprehensions, since I myself was not the administrator
there; but there were many selfish interests at work.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: We will discuss this on another occasion. Now
I should like to ask you: You had deputies for the Arbeitseinsatz—when
did you obtain them?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was given these deputies for the occupied territories
through a personal decree of the Führer on 30 September
1942, as far as I remember.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the reason?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The reason for appointing these deputies was to do
away more easily with the difficulties and the lack of direction
which prevailed to some extent in these areas.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I refer in this connection to Document 12,
“The Führer’s Decree Concerning the Execution of the Decree of
the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.” No, it is
Document 13. “Decree Concerning the Appointment of Deputies”—on
Page 13 of the English document book, and I also refer to
Document 12 which has already been submitted as 1903-PS, Exhibit
USA-206.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Did you not have two different kinds of deputies, I mean, were
there already some deputies previously?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There were previously deputies of the Reich Labor
Ministry who in allied or neutral countries were assigned to the
German diplomatic missions. They must be distinguished from
those deputies who were assigned to the chiefs of the German
military or civilian administration in the occupied territories.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What position did the deputies hold in the
occupied territories?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the occupied territories the deputies had a dual
position. They were the leaders of the labor sections in the local
government there—a considerable burden for me—and at the same
time my deputies who were responsible for the uniform direction
and execution of the principles of the allocation of labor as laid
down by me.
<span class='pageno' title='630' id='Page_630'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have your own organization with
the deputy at the head, or was that an organization of the local
government?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I did not have any organization of my own. The
local governments were independent separate administrations with
an administrative chief as head to whom the various departments
were subordinated.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How many such deputies were there in one
area?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the various countries I had one deputy in each
of the highest offices.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the task of the deputy?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The task of the deputy, as I have already said, was
to guarantee that German orders were carried out in a legal way
and, as member of the local administration, to regulate labor
questions which arose there.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What tasks did they have as regards the
interest of the Reich and the distribution of labor for local employment
and in the Reich?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: It was expressly pointed out that they were to
produce labor in reasonable proportions with consideration for local
conditions; they also had to see to it that my principles were
observed with respect to the treatment, feeding, and so forth of
workers from the occupied zones. That is laid down in the form
of a directive.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not have your own recruiting commissions?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There were no recruiting commissions in the sense
in which the expression is often used here and in our own documents.
It was a question of reinforcements of experts which were
requested by the local government, in order to carry out the tasks
in the countries concerned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions did these recruiting commissions
have?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: They received the instructions which are frequently
and clearly expressed in my orders and which, as they have been
laid down, I need not mention.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I refer here to Document 15 which has already
been submitted as 3044-PS; Exhibit Number USA-206, and also
USSR-384.</p>

<p class='pindent'>That is the Order Number 4 of 7 May 1942, which settles in
principle all the problems relating to this question, and gives the
necessary directives to the deputies regarding recruitment.
<span class='pageno' title='631' id='Page_631'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>Were those directives which you issued always adhered to?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The directives I issued were not always adhered
to as strictly as I had demanded. I made every effort to impose
them through constant orders, instructions, and punishment which,
however, I myself could not inflict.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were these orders meant seriously? The French
Prosecution has submitted in the government report one of your
speeches, which you made at that time in Posen. It was termed a
speech of apology. I ask you whether these principles were meant
seriously or whether they were only for the sake of appearances,
since you yourself believed, as the document stated, that they could
not be carried out?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I can only emphasize that in my life I had worked
so much myself under such difficult conditions that these instructions
expressed my full conviction as to their necessity. I ask to
have witnesses heard as to what I thought about it and what I
did in order to have these instructions carried out.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was there any noticeable opposition to your
principles?</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I have already said that to a certain extent my
principles were considered troublesome by some authorities and
injudicious as far as German security was concerned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>When I was attacked on that account, I took occasion, in addition
to a number of instructions to the German Gauleiter, to issue
a manifesto to all the highest German government offices concerned.</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: May I remark that this is Document S-84, in
Document Book 3, Page 215.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I submit the document once more in German because of the
form in which it is printed. It is in the form of an urgent warning
and was sent to all the authorities.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it Document Number 84?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Witness, did you, in a meeting of the Central Planning Board ...</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: May I be allowed to say a word with regard to
this manifesto?</p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.</p>

<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When I issued the manifesto, I was met with the
objection, mainly from Dr. Goebbels, that a manifesto should really
be issued only by the Führer and not by a subordinate authority
such as myself. Then I found that I was having difficulties in
getting the manifesto printed. After I had had 150,000 copies
printed for all the German economic offices, for all the works
<span class='pageno' title='632' id='Page_632'></span>
managers and all the other offices which were interested, I had it
printed again myself in this emphatic form and personally sent
it once more, with a covering letter, to all those offices.</p>

<p class='pindent'>In this manifesto, in spite of the difficulties which I encountered,
I especially advocated that in the occupied territories themselves
the workers should be treated in accordance with my principles
and according to my directives and orders.</p>

<p class='pindent'>I respectfully ask the Court to be allowed to read a few sentences
from it:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“I therefore order that for all the occupied territories, for
the treatment, feeding, billeting, and payment of foreign
workers, appropriate regulations and directives be issued
similar to those valid for foreigners in the Reich. They are
to be adjusted to the respective local conditions and applied
in accordance with prevailing conditions.</p>

<p>“In a number of the Eastern Territories indigenous male and
female civilian labor working for the German war industry
or the German Wehrmacht is undernourished. In the urgent
interests of the German war industry in this territory this
condition should be remedied. It is checking production and
is dangerous. And endeavor must therefore be made by all
means available to provide additional food for these workers
and their families. This additional food must be given only
in accordance with the output of work.</p>

<p>“It is only through the good care and treatment of the whole
of the available European labor on the one hand, and through
its most rigid concentration”—here I mean organizational—“leadership
and direction on the other hand, that the fluctuation
of labor in the Reich and in the occupied territories can
be limited to a minimum, and a generally stable, lasting and
reliable output be achieved.”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>May I read one more sentence:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“The foreign workers in the Reich and the population in the
occupied territories who are being employed for the German
war effort must be given the feeling that it is to their own
interests to work loyally for Germany and that therein alone
will they see and actually find their one real guarantee of
life.”</p>

</div>

<p class='noindent'>May I read still one sentence in the next paragraph:</p>

<div class='blockquote'>

<p>“They must be given absolute trust in the justness of the
German authorities and of their German employers.”</p>

</div>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better not go further in this
document. Can you indicate to us at all how long you are likely
to be with this defendant?
<span class='pageno' title='633' id='Page_633'></span></p>

<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I shall probably need the whole day tomorrow.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, would it be convenient for you
some time to deal with the documents of the remaining defendants?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, Mr. President, any time that you might set
aside.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know how far the negotiations
and agreements with reference to documents have gone.</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do with some, but not with all. I can ascertain
the facts tonight, or before the morning session, and advise you
at that time.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and you will let us know tomorrow what
time will be convenient?</p>

<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, Sir.</p>

<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p>

<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 29 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3>

<hr class='pbk'/>

<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:1.2em;'>TRANSCRIBER NOTES</p>

<p class='pindent'>Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for
periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document;
however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus
“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes
French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals:
hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout.</p>

<p class='pindent'>Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the
tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations
between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in the trial.</p>

<p class='pindent'>An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as
possible to the original document presentation and layout.</p>

<p class='line'>&#160;</p>

<p class='noindent'>[The end of <span class='it'>Trial of the Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 14</span>,
by Various.]</p>

<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 67006 ***</div>
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