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margin:0 0; } - .literal { display:inline-block; text-align:left; } - </style> - <style type="text/css"> - h1 {font-size:1.2em; text-align:center; line-height:150%; margin-top:4em; word-spacing:.2em;} - h2 {font-size:1.2em; text-align:center; word-spacing:.2em;} - h3 {font-size:.9em; text-align:center; margin-bottom:1em; margin-top:1em;} - .literal-container { margin-top:.5em; margin-bottom:.5em } - div.lgc { margin-top:.5em; margin-bottom:.5em } - p { text-indent:0; margin-top:0.5em; margin-bottom:0.5em; text-align: justify; } - div.blockquote { margin-top:.5em; margin-bottom:.5em; } - .pindent {margin-top: 0.2em; margin-bottom: 0em; text-indent:2em; } - body { margin-left:8%; margin-right:10%; max-width:40em;} - </style> - </head> - <body> -<p style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 14, by Various</p> -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 14</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:0; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1em;'>Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946</p> - <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Various</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: December 24, 2021 [eBook #67006]</p> -<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</p> - <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em; text-align:left'>Produced by: John Routh PM, Cindy Beyer, and the online Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net</p> -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOLUME 14 ***</div> -<div class='figcenter' style='width:80%'> -<img src='images/cover.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0000' style='width:100%;height:auto;'/> -</div> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='lgc' style=''> <!-- rend=';' --> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:2em;font-size:1.5em;'>TRIAL</p> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;margin-bottom:.2em;font-size:.7em;'>OF</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.5em;'>THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'>BEFORE</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>THE INTERNATIONAL</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>MILITARY TRIBUNAL</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>NUREMBERG</span></p> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:.7em;'>14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<div class='figcenter'> -<img src='images/title.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0001' style='width:80px;height:auto;'/> -</div> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:4em;font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY</span></p> -<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>1948</span></p> -</div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='literal-container' style='margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:20em;'><div class='literal'> <!-- rend=';fs:.8em;' --> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>This volume is published in accordance with the</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>direction of the International Military Tribunal by</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction</p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.</p> -</div></div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div class='lgc' style='margin-top:8em;margin-bottom:4em;'> <!-- rend=';' --> -<p class='line'>VOLUME XIV</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'><span class='gesp'>OFFICIAL TEXT</span></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'><span class='gesp'>IN THE</span></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>ENGLISH LANGUAGE</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<hr class='tbk100'/> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'><span class='gesp'>PROCEEDINGS</span></p> -<p class='line'> </p> -<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>16 May 1946—28 May 1946</p> -</div> <!-- end rend --> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<table id='tab1' summary='' class='center'> -<colgroup> -<col span='1' style='width: 6em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 22.5em;'/> -<col span='1' style='width: 2.5em;'/> -</colgroup> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col2 tdStyle0' colspan='2'><span style='font-size:larger'>CONTENTS</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-first Day, Thursday, 16 May 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_1'>1</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_32'>32</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-second Day, Friday, 17 May 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_63'>63</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_82'>82</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-third Day, Saturday, 18 May 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_107'>107</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-fourth Day, Monday, 20 May 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_143'>143</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_181'>181</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-fifth Day, Tuesday, 21 May 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_228'>228</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_261'>261</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-sixth Day, Wednesday, 22 May 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_287'>287</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_320'>320</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-seventh Day, Thursday, 23 May 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_357'>357</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_386'>386</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-eighth Day, Friday, 24 May 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_418'>418</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_450'>450</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Day, Monday, 27 May 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_494'>494</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_533'>533</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Fortieth Day, Tuesday, 28 May 1946,</td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_567'>567</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_601'>601</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='1' id='Page_1'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST DAY</span><br/> Thursday, 16 May 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL (Col. Charles W. Mays): If it please the Tribunal, -the Defendants Sauckel and Von Papen are absent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Admiral, -yesterday we finished with the somewhat involved Document -C-32, and we had got as far as Point 11. We now come to Point 12, -“Ammunition stocks in excess of the armament permissible.” May -I remind the Tribunal that this is Document C-32, Exhibit USA-50, -in Document Book 10 a, Page 8, Point 12, which contains three -columns.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Defendant, may I ask what you have to say to the accusation -that you exceeded the permissible amount of ammunition?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>ERICH RAEDER (Defendant): Certain ammunition stocks were -in excess of the permissible amount and some were below it. -I cannot tell you at this date what the reason was in each particular -case. I assume that this depended to a considerable extent on the -amounts left over from the last World War.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the case of the first two items, the 17- and 15-centimeter -shells, the actual stocks rather exceeded the quantity permitted, -whereas the third item, the 10.5-centimeter, falls very far short of -it—instead of 134,000 there were 87,000. In the case of the 8.8-centimeter -shells there was an excess, then again a deficit, and the same -thing applies to the last item. But they are all very insignificant -amounts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the copy before the Tribunal there appears -to be a note in the third column—on the next page in yours, -Defendant—saying that quantities of ammunition are partly manufactured -and partly in course of delivery, and that the total amount -permissible will soon be exceeded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I only wanted to ask you: The list was made out in September -1933. Then are the figures stated correct for September 1933 or -autumn 1933?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not quite understand you. -<span class='pageno' title='2' id='Page_2'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If it says in this document that measures to be -taken later will bring the totals above the quantities permissible, -which—according to this statement—they had not yet reached, then -that is calculated as from autumn 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That may be assumed, yes. Because new ammunition -as well as new guns were being manufactured, and old ammunition -then had to be scrapped.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It also must be noted that ammunition for heavy artillery, which -is not listed here, was in every case short of the permissible -amount. A comparatively large amount of heavy artillery ammunition -had been granted us for heavy coastal guns, and we had by -no means as much as we were allowed to have.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: For the assistance of the Tribunal, I may point -out that this last point is proved by the actual documents in the -hands of the Tribunal. In the Tribunal’s copy under the Figure 12, -Column 2, just beside the separate figures, there is a sentence which -says, “... that the whole quantity permitted for heavy artillery -has not been reached.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We now come to Number 13: “Exceeding the permissible stocks -of machine guns, rifles, pistols, and gas masks.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Here, too, it must be admitted that in isolated cases -stocks were a little higher than permitted. There were, for instance, -43,000 gas masks instead of the 22,500 permitted. Large numbers of -rifles and machine guns were taken away even by individuals after -the World War to farms, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. They were later collected, and -for that reason there was a comparatively large stock of them. -But we are not dealing here with any considerable quantities. -Similarly ammunition, bayonets, hand grenades, searchlights, fog -equipment, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, also exceeded the prescribed limits but not -to any great extent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, Figure 14: “Obtaining 337 M.G. C/30’s -without scrapping equally serviceable weapons.” As I did not ...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Surely, -Dr. Siemers, it would be possible to deal with all these various -points in the documents in one statement as to why there were -these excesses. We have a statement here which contains 30 different -items, and you have only got as far as 13, and you are dealing -with each one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, personally I agree entirely. I am -sorry that I caused the Tribunal so much trouble in connection with -this document. As I am not a naval expert, I had a great deal of -trouble finding my way through it; but I do not think that I was -the cause of the trouble. The Prosecution, you see, have made use -of the single points in evidence. -<span class='pageno' title='3' id='Page_3'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the question is—I am not -blaming you, but we want to get on. We are not blaming you. Can’t -it be done in one explanatory statement, one short statement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I will try, Mr. President, and I will shorten it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is no need to say anything more about Numbers 15 to 17. -I think these were the most important points. The points planned -for a later date were not to be effective until the years ’33 and ’34. -I may perhaps just point out to the Tribunal that Number 17 refers -to the intended construction of reserve destroyers. The Versailles -Treaty permitted the construction of these.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I pass over Number 18 because we have already dealt with that. -Number 19, again, refers only to intended construction. Number 20 -I may consider irrelevant; it concerns only the arming of fishing -vessels. Numbers 21 to 29 ...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think, perhaps, you should ask the Defendant -to explain some of these observations in the third column. -I mean in Number 18, for instance: “Difficult to detect. If necessary -can be denied.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: These were explanations given to our League of -Nations representative at the Disarmament Conference by the -competent expert. It does not refer to local conditions. Construction -of submarine spare parts, for instance, took place abroad or -was to be prepared. It was actually carried out in 1934 and ’35, and -the first submarine was launched at the end of June 1935.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I may take it, Defendant, that only the construction -and purchase of submarines was prohibited.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, the construction in Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I cannot prove until a later stage that no violation -of the Treaty was involved by the construction of these spare -parts; but I think you will have to give some indication of your -reason for wishing to conceal it, in view of the fact that spare parts -were not forbidden. I may remind you that this took place in -September 1933 at a time when negotiations had already been -planned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that period, before the German-English Naval -Agreement was concluded on the basis of 35 to 100, Hitler was -particularly eager to avoid everything which might embarrass the -negotiations in any way. The construction and preparation of submarine -parts came under this heading as being a subject on which -England was peculiarly sensitive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an additional reason for this -appendix and other remarks in this second column—namely, the -unfortunate experiences which the Navy had caused in home -<span class='pageno' title='4' id='Page_4'></span> -politics, the fact that whenever the slightest action was taken a -quarrel immediately ensued on the home political front?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; and that went so far that the Reichswehrminister -was attacked on occasions by Prussian ministers who disagreed -with the Reich Government—for instance, Müller, Severing, -Stresemann and later Brüning, who alleged to the Reich Chancellor -that he took steps which he was not authorized to take. In reality, -however, the Reich Government itself had sanctioned these things -already and had accepted the responsibility for them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So these things were kept secret for reasons of -home policy, so that they should not be apparent...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: With the approval of the Reich Government?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: With the approval of the Reich Government. As -regards the firms, a number of firms...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I would prefer now to refer back to Column 2, -Number 20, as I see from the record that the Prosecution have also -expressly raised this point in connection with the arming of fishing -craft, emphasized it, and made it the basis of a charge, “Warning -shots, play it down.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The two fishing boats were quite small vessels and -were normally unarmed. They served to supervise the fishing boats -in the North Sea right up to Iceland, to help them in case of -emergency, to take sick men aboard and to afford protection against -fishermen of other nations. We thought it advisable to mount at -least a 5-centimeter gun on these ships since they were actually -warships. “Warning shots” means that they fired a salute when -they wanted to draw the fishermen’s attention to something; so it -was quite an insignificant affair and had no need to be artificially -reduced to a bagatelle but was in fact a bagatelle.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Numbers 21 to 28. This is a -list of various firms, including industrial firms working on armament -contracts. The Versailles Treaty admitted certain firms for -this type of work while it excluded others. In actual fact, other -firms had received contracts. Perhaps you can make a general -statement on this point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: This was at a time when we had strong hopes that -progress would be made at the Disarmament Conference. The -Macdonald Plan, which brought about a certain improvement, had -already been accepted; and we might have expected, in consequence, -that the few factories still left to us would have to increase their -output during the next few years. I may refer you to the shipping -replacement scheme. Consequently, factories producing specialized -<span class='pageno' title='5' id='Page_5'></span> -articles were better equipped and supplied. There was, however, -never any question of heavy guns or anything of that kind but of -automatic fuse-igniters, explosives—for instance, mine containers, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>, small items but special items which could be made only -by certain firms. But, apart from the firms admitted, other firms -which had been excluded were also employed. Thus, for instance, -the Friedrich Krupp Grusenwerke A.G. at Magdeburg, Number 25, -was equipped to manufacture antiaircraft guns and antiaircraft -barrels from 2-centimeters to 10.5-centimeters; similarly Number 26, -a firm manufacturing antiaircraft ammunition, explosives; Number -27...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I do not think we need the details.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. And then engines for which there was also a -great demand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have some questions which apply to all these -figures. Is this not offset to a certain extent by the fact that -some of the firms admitted had already dropped out for economic -reasons?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, you can certainly say that. These firms had -comparatively few deliveries which were not sufficient to keep -them going.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Defendant, I think one not only can—I think one -must—say so. May I draw your attention to Point 22, Column 3, -which reads, “The list in any case is out of date, as some firms have -dropped out.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That leaves us with Numbers 29 and 30. Number -29, “Preparations in the field of experiments with motorboats.” -I think that these were preparations in a very small field.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At the moment I cannot tell you exactly what this -means.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I do not believe in any case that the Prosecution -will attach any importance to it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I only want you to make a final statement on Number 30, -“Probable further concrete violations becoming necessary in the -near future” up to 1934 inclusively. To all intents and purposes -you have already answered the question by your reference to the -negotiations planned with the British Government, some of which -were already in progress.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that was the point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: These are matters, therefore, which were in any -case due to be discussed in the course of the negotiations with the -British Government, or rather the Admiralty. -<span class='pageno' title='6' id='Page_6'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: You cannot say that of them all. For instance, -Points 1 to 3 deal with mines. The number of mines was to be -increased and modern material was to replace the old. It goes on -in the same way with the transfer of guns from the North Sea to -the Baltic “A” batteries, not with the scrapping of guns.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: To conclude the whole matter, may I ask you -to say what impression the whole thing made on a naval expert -like yourself. All things considered, would you say that these are -minor violations, and how far are these violations of an aggressive -nature?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As I said yesterday, most of them are very inadequate -improvements in defense of an almost entirely defenseless position. -The separate items, as I explained yesterday, are so insignificant -that it is really impossible to spend very much time on them. I -believe that the Control Commission also had the impression that -very little weight need be attached to all these matters; for in 1925 -when the Control Commission left its station at Kiel where it had -worked with the organizations of the Naval Command, Commander -Fenshow, Admiral Charlton’s chief of staff and head of the Commission, -whose main interest was guns and who had worked with -a Captain Raenkel, a gunner and a specialist in these matters, said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“We must leave now, and you are glad that we are going. -You did not have a pleasant task, and neither did we. I must -tell you one thing. You need not think that we believed what -you have said. You did not say a single word of truth, but -you have given your information so skillfully that we were -able to accept it, and for that I am grateful to you.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-29, which is Exhibit -USA-46. Mr. President, it is in Raeder’s Document Book 10, Page 8 -of the Prosecution’s document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean 10a?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Number 10, Page 8. This document, too, was -submitted during the general Indictment made by the Prosecution -at the beginning of the Trial on 27 November. It consists of a -speech, a document signed by Raeder, dated 31 January 1933, -“General Directives for the Support of the German Armaments -Industry by the Navy.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution pointed this out; -and they have thought fit to conclude from it that on the day after -Hitler’s nomination as Chancellor of the Reich, you were already -acting positively in his support through this letter. Will you define -your attitude, please?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: There is no connection whatsoever between this letter -and Hitler’s accession to power. You must admit that it would be -<span class='pageno' title='7' id='Page_7'></span> -impossible to compile so long and complicated a document—which -was, after all, carefully prepared—between the evening of 30 and -the morning of 31 January. This document results from the hope, -which I mentioned before, that already under the Papen and Von -Schleicher Government the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and -the Disarmament Conference might be gradually relaxed, since the -British Delegation had repeatedly said that they favored the gradual -restoration of equal rights. We had, therefore, to get our industries -into the best possible condition, as far as the manufacture of armaments -was concerned, by increasing their output and enabling them -to overcome competition.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As I say in Paragraph c of this letter, almost every country was -at that time making efforts in the same direction, even those which, -unlike Germany, had no restrictions imposed on them. Great Britain, -France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy made the -most determined efforts to gain markets for their armaments -industry; and I wanted to follow them in this particular sphere. In -order to do this, there had to be an understanding between the -various departments of the Naval Command Staff to the effect -that industry must be given support in a way which avoided -the secrecy of technical matters and developments to too petty a -degree. That is why I explain in Paragraph c that secrecy in small -matters is less important than maintaining a high standard and -keeping the lead.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I state in the final sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“To sum up, I attach particular importance to the continued -support of the industry in question by the Navy, even after -the expected relaxation of the present restrictions, so that -the industry would command confidence abroad and would -find a market.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This has nothing at all to do with Hitler nor with any independent -rearmament on my own behalf.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us when, approximately, you drafted -these directives?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: During the month of January. I may say that we had -a conference—perhaps at the beginning of January—and after that -I had it put in writing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That would be certainly 2 to 3 weeks before this -letter was written?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think it happens rarely that one receives a -letter from a government office one day after its being conceived -by the head of that office. -<span class='pageno' title='8' id='Page_8'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I ask you now to tell me one thing more in connection -with the “relaxation of the present restrictions.” That means the -relaxation of the Versailles Treaty, I presume, through the Disarmament -Conference. You have mentioned that four times in this -document, so that I assume that was your basis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it was. The whole atmosphere at that time, -under both the governments I mentioned, was such that one could -expect an improvement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And this was the basis for which, to quote a -few names only, Stresemann, Brüning, fought.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As they felt it their duty to take certain advance -precautions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think there is no need for me to go into further -details. I have read this document again and again, and have been -unable to find any point on which the Prosecution could base the -conclusion that you had National Socialist ideas.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now come to Document C-140. It is Exhibit USA-51, and is -in the Document Book 10a, Page 104.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I interrupt you, please? Would it not be appropriate -that I should say now what I wanted to say to supplement -the statement in C-156 regarding aircraft?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It might be practicable to finish with -the infringements of the Versailles Treaty before going on to -another subject. I had forgotten that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have submitted Document C-156. It is Captain -Schüssler’s book from the year 1937 and contains almost the same -list of infringements as Document C-32, so that that document -can be disposed of at the same time. In addition, it deals with -the case of the designing office for submarines in Holland, with -which we have already dealt. But there is still one point on which -I should like to have your comments, and that concerns certain -preparations in connection with navy aircraft which might be -permitted later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: All sorts of preparations had been made in the field -of aviation long before I came into office. A number of aircraft -had been purchased, as I see from this book. They were stored -with a firm called “Severa G.m.b.H.,” which was known to the -Reichswehrminister. The Versailles Treaty had permitted us antiaircraft -guns both on ships and on the coast, as was mentioned -yesterday; and for these antiaircraft, firing practice had to be -arranged. The Control Commission had allowed us a certain number -<span class='pageno' title='9' id='Page_9'></span> -of aircraft to tow the necessary targets. These aircraft were flown -by ex-naval pilots employed by this company. The company, in -turn, was managed by an old naval pilot.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Since we were not allowed to train naval pilots or were not -allowed to have any naval air force, we gave a year’s training in -the civil aviation school to a number of prospective naval officers -before they joined the Navy, so that through this 1-year training -they developed into very good pilots. Then they joined the Navy -and went through their ordinary naval training. The aircraft purchased -in this way was temporarily in the possession of the “Severa,” -which also had a good deal to do with the Lohmann affairs and -for that reason was dissolved by Reichswehrminister Gröner in the -summer of 1928. Reichswehrminister Gröner established a new -company with similar assignments in the autumn of 1928, soon -after I assumed office. But he had signed the agreement himself -in order to control the correct management of the whole affair.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this company, in addition to their ordinary work, the Navy -pilots carried out experiments in connection with the development -of aircraft for a later Navy air force. We had the Government’s -permission to manufacture a model of every type likely to be of -use, but we were not allowed to accumulate aircraft. The Government -had expressly forbidden that. The result was that in the -course of years the company developed a number of aircraft types -which would be useful at a later date when we were once more -allowed to have aircraft.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the early period exercises in the Navy were carried out by -the old naval pilots—that is to say, it was demanded that exercises -in observation be taken and that the crews of ships learn how -to act against aircraft. When these young naval pilots were assigned -to such exercises, they were discharged from the Navy for that -time. It was an awkward affair, but it was always carried out -punctiliously.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I may now turn to Document C-140, which is -in Document Book 10a, Page 104. It is a letter from Reich Defense -Minister Von Blomberg dated 25 October 1933. It is addressed to -the Chief of the Army, the Chief of the Navy, and the Reich -Minister for Aviation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On this document the Prosecution based their accusations that -you, Witness, prepared military plans for an armed resistance which -might become necessary in consequence of Germany’s withdrawal -from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Perhaps -you can briefly state your view.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I had no previous knowledge of our imminent withdrawal -from the League of Nations. This directive came out 11 days -after we had left the League of Nations, and it merely provides -<span class='pageno' title='10' id='Page_10'></span> -defensive measures in the event of sanctions being applied against -Germany by other powers in consequence of her departure from -the League of Nations. It says under 2c: “I prohibit any practical -preparations in the meantime.” So, at first, nothing was done in -consequence of this directive, and the Reich Defense Minister -merely asked for a report from me as to what should be done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As far as I remember, no practical preparations of any kind -were carried out by the Navy at the time, because the situation -remained absolutely quiet and there was no reason to assume that -there would be any need for defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That is probably indicated by the words under -Point 2a, “Preparation for defense against sanctions.” It concerns -the defense only.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The defense only.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That the withdrawal from the League of Nations -occurred 14 October 1933, 11 days before the document was written, -is a well-known fact and has been mentioned by the Prosecution -on Page 257 of the record (Volume II, Page 304).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now we come to Document C-166. This is Exhibit USA-48. -Mr. President, this is in Document Book 10, on Page 36. It is a -document dated 12 March 1934. It emanates from the Command -Office of the Navy and refers to the preparation of auxiliary -cruisers for action. The Prosecution have quoted only the first two -paragraphs of this document and have pointed out that it shows -that auxiliary cruisers were to be built and describes transport -ships “O” for camouflage purposes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The two paragraphs sound incriminating, but they can very easily -be explained. May I refer to Lohmann’s affidavit, Document Number -Raeder-2, my Document Book 1, Page 5. I refer to Paragraph II. -I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Document C-166, submitted to me, a communication -from the Office of the Naval Command of 12 March 1934, -deals with the ‘availability of auxiliary cruisers’ which, as -stated in the document, were marked as ‘Transport Ships O.’ -These ships were not to be newly constructed but were to -be selected from the stock of the German merchant marine -in accordance with the demands enumerated in the document -and were to be examined as to their suitability for the tasks -to be assigned them. Then plans were made for reconstruction -in case of necessity, but the boats remained in the -merchant marine.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>May I state at this point that in the English translation the -word “Umbau” has been translated by the word “reconstruction.” -I have my doubts as to whether this is quite correct. I presume -<span class='pageno' title='11' id='Page_11'></span> -that the interpreter has now translated it as “Umbau” accordingly. -As far as I know, the German word “Umbau” only means much -the same thing as the English word “changes”—that is, “Veränderung.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I continue to quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The order to select such boats from German shipyards was -received, among others, by the Hamburg Office of the Naval -Command where I was serving at the time.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus far Admiral Lohmann.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, is Lohmann’s statement correct? Have you anything -to add?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I can only emphasize again that there was no -question of immediate construction but only of selecting suitable -ships and examining them with a view to ascertaining the alterations -necessary to enable them to function as auxiliary cruisers -in the case of a general mobilization. The preparation of the plans -and the plans themselves were to be ready by 1 April 1935, as -laid down in Number 12. They were to be submitted to the naval -administration so that in the case of mobilization the ship concerned -could be taken from the stock of the merchant marine and -converted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All these proposals for mobilization were, of course, kept secret.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, that the -whole misunderstanding would not have arisen if the Prosecution -had translated two further sentences. The English version is very -short and Point 11 is missing. I quote the text of Point 11:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“ ‘B’ is requested in co-operation with ‘K,’ first of all, to select -suitable vessels and to ascertain how many 15-centimeter guns -have to be mounted to achieve the required broadside...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>The word “selected” is used here so that the intention is not—as -the Prosecution assert—the building of auxiliary cruisers but the -making of a selection from merchant vessels.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; and the ships continued to sail in the service -of the merchant marine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The second sentence, which I find has been -unfortunately omitted from the English translation of the Prosecution, -reads as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“As long as only a restricted number of guns—at present 24—can -be placed at our disposal for this purpose, preparations -are to be made for only four transport ships (O). An increase -of this number, presumably to six, will be postponed to a -date when more guns are available. Until then we must -await the results of the preparations for the first auxiliary -cruisers.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='12' id='Page_12'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The fact that only four, or at the most six, merchant navy -vessels were involved shows the insignificance of the whole matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now come to Document C-189, USA-44. It is in Document -Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, Page 66.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like your comments.—I beg your pardon. I should -remind you that this concerns the conversation between Grossadmiral -Raeder and the Führer aboard the <span class='it'>Karlsruhe</span> in June 1934.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Grossadmiral, will you please state your views on the three -points mentioned in this brief document and which you discussed -with Hitler in June 1934.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First question: Why was Hitler unwilling to reveal the increase -in displacement of D and E—that is, the <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> and the -<span class='it'>Gneisenau</span>—when, according to this document, these were defensive -weapons and every expert would notice the increased tonnage of -these ships and, as far as I know, did notice it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that time we were considering what we could do -with the two armored ships D and E, after the signing of the -impending naval pact with England—that is, the two ships which -Hitler had granted me for the Navy in the 1934 budget. We had -definitely decided not to continue building these armored ships as -such, since we could make better use of the material at our disposal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But surely you realized that every expert in the -British or American or any other Admiralty would see on a -voyage, as soon as he had sighted the ship, that the 10,000 tons -had now become 26,000?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that there was merely the intention...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, when you are examining a -witness directly, you are not to ask leading questions which put -into his mouth the very answer that you desire. You are stating -all sorts of things to this witness and then asking him “isn’t -that so?”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. I shall make every effort to -put my questions differently.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: My answer is different anyway.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: We are dealing here, in the first place, with plans: -I asked permission to revise the plans for these two armored ships; -first, by strengthening their defensive weapons—that is, the armor-plating -and underwater compartments—and then by increasing -their offensive armaments—namely, by adding a third 28-centimeter -instead of 26-centimeter tower. The Führer was not yet willing -<span class='pageno' title='13' id='Page_13'></span> -to sanction, a new 28-centimeter tower because, as I said before, -he did not in any circumstances want to prejudice the negotiations -going on with Great Britain. To begin with, therefore, he sanctioned -only a medium displacement of 18,000 to 19,000 tons; and we knew -that when matters reached the stage where a third 28-centimeter -tower could be mounted, the displacement would be about 25,000 -to 26,000 tons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We saw no cause to announce it at this stage, however, because -it is customary in the Navy that new construction plans and -especially new types of ships should be announced at the latest -possible moment. That was the principal reason; and apart from -that, Hitler did not want to draw the attention of other countries -to these constructions by giving the figures mentioned or stating -the very high speed. There was no other reason for not announcing -these things.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like your comments on Number 2 of -the document. That has been specially held against you by the -Prosecution, because there you state the view that the fleet must -be developed to oppose England later on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At first—as I intended to explain later—we had taken -the new French ships as our model. The French Navy was developing -at that time the <span class='it'>Dunkerque</span> class with eight 33-centimeter -guns and a high speed, and we took that for our model, especially -since, in Hitler’s opinion—as you will hear later—there was no -question of arming against England. We intended to reconstruct -these two armored ships on this pattern as battleships with nine -28-centimeter guns and capable of a high speed. But then we heard -that the <span class='it'>King George</span> class was being designed in England with -35.6-centimeter guns and, therefore, stronger than the French type; -and so I said that we would in any case have to depart from the -French type eventually and follow the English model which is -now being built with 35-centimeter guns.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is an error in the translation—namely, “oppose England.” -It says in my text that developments should follow the lines of -British developments—in other words, that we should design vessels -similar in type to the English ships. But they were out of date, -too, shortly afterwards, because France was then building ships of -the <span class='it'>Richelieu</span> class with 38-centimeter guns. Therefore, we decided -that we too would build ships with 38-centimeter guns. That was -how the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> came to be built. The word “oppose” would have -been quite senseless at a time when we intended to come to an -agreement with Britain on terms under which we could in no way -vie with her.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now we come to Point 3 of this document, -which the Prosecution regard as equally important. I quote: -<span class='pageno' title='14' id='Page_14'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Führer demands complete secrecy with regard to the -construction of U-boats—in consideration, also, of the Saar -plebiscite.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already referred to the Führer’s wish for -secrecy in connection with both the construction of submarines -and the preparations for that construction. This is one of the -points on which he was most sensitive, because in no circumstances -did he wish to prejudice the negotiations. He himself was generally -extremely cautious during this period and would not in any -circumstances do anything which might sabotage the naval pact -which he was so eager to conclude.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I do not quite understand the reference to secrecy -in connection with the construction of submarines. These were as -yet not under construction, were they?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I said secrecy in connection with the preparations -for the construction of submarines; that is just a short way of -expressing it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Document C-190, Exhibit -USA-45. It is in Document Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, -Page 67. This is a conversation which took place between -Hitler and Raeder on 2 November 1934 aboard the <span class='it'>Emden</span>. In -the document before you Hitler informs you that he considers it -necessary to enlarge and improve the Navy by 1938 and that, if -necessary, he would instruct Dr. Ley to place at the disposal of -the Navy 120 to 150 million marks from the Labor Front.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you have anything at all to do with raising funds for -rearmament?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not actually with the raising of funds. I applied -for funds to the Reich Defense Minister, who allocated them to me -for the purpose of this rearmament. I presume that this statement -was made because the allocation sanctioned for the Navy appeared -too small to me, and for this reason the Führer said that if necessary -he would get Ley to act. This did not actually happen. -I received my funds only through the Reich Defense Minister.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Although the charge made by the Prosecution -is not quite clear to me, since it is based on Hitler’s views—which -have nothing to do with you—I want to come back to this sum -once more. I may remind you that an armored cruiser of the old -10,000-ton class, which after all was small, cost 75 to 80 million. -Could this figure of 120 to 150 million be large enough to put the -Navy in a position to carry out rearmament on a large scale?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, certainly not. Two battleships were also under -construction, apart from those two armored cruisers. You can -imagine that the costs continually increased. -<span class='pageno' title='15' id='Page_15'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that this sum was not final?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it was not final.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Will you please go on, then, to Point 2. According -to Point 2 of the document, you pointed out to Hitler during this -conference that it might be necessary to assemble six submarines -during the first quarter of 1935.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I said this because I knew that at the beginning of -1935 we were going to aim at the re-establishment of the Armed -Forces; and I thought that this might create a critical situation -in respect to sanctions, which Hitler always expected, too. I assume -that we were talking about this and that is why I suggested that -if the necessity for any special preparations should arise out of -the re-establishment of the Armed Forces then six submarines -should be assembled, at a date previous to their proper date of -assemblage, from those parts which were obtained from abroad.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler actually give the order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, the order was not given.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We might break off now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-159, Exhibit USA-54. -This document may be found in the British Delegation’s Document -Book 10a, Page 110. This document is a letter written by -Von Blomberg on 2 March 1936, dealing with the demilitarized -zone. Did you, Witness, make lengthy military preparations for -the action which took place on 7 March 1936?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I made no lengthy preparations; I heard of the -plan only through this document of 2 March. I may refer you to -Point 6 which says, “To preserve the peaceful character of the -operation, no military security or advance measures are to be taken -without my express orders.” It was made clear, therefore, that -the entire action was to have a peaceful character.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You knew nothing at all about this entire action -until the beginning of March?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I believe that this action was kept especially -secret.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I will turn to Document C-194, Exhibit -USA-55, in the British Delegation’s Document Book 10a, Page 128. -This document is a communication from the High Command of the -Wehrmacht to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy dating from -<span class='pageno' title='16' id='Page_16'></span> -1936—the wording seems to indicate 6 March 1936. It deals, therefore, -with the same subject as the last document. May I have -your comments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Reich Defense Minister had sanctioned a certain -air reconnaissance to take place over the North Sea on 6 March—that -is to say, the day before the occupation of the Rhineland. He -intended to withhold his decision as to whether U-boats were also -to be sent out on reconnaissance assignments in the West as far -as the Texel until the next day. I thereupon issued an order on -6 March 1936 and gave special instructions...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Tribunal.</span>] I would like to point out that -Raeder’s order of 6 March 1936 is appended to the same document -and that the text is therefore before the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Defendant.</span>] Please go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I prepared this decree of 6 March concerning the -planning of the U-boat line and the reconnaissance to take place -in the German bay on 7 March. I pointed out especially that -everything must be avoided which might create a false impression -of the Führer’s intentions and thus put difficulties in the way of -this peaceful action.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I would like to add to your statement that these -words taken from the decree of 6 March 1936 are to be found -under Point 5. They are in the last two lines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Those were all precautionary measures in case of a -hostile counteraction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were there any preparations on a large scale?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the two last documents dealing -with the topic of the Versailles Treaty and rearmament, Document -C-135, Exhibit GB-213, Document Book 10, Page 20—that is the -British Delegation’s Document Book 10—which is headed, “History -of the War Organization”—that is, the “War Organization and -Mobilization Scheme.” This dates from 1938. This document was -read in its entirety by the Prosecution and a very grave charge -was based upon it, because the document contains a statement to -the effect that Hitler had demanded that in 5 years—that is, by -1 April 1938—a Wehrmacht should be created which he could -employ as a political instrument of power and also because the -document mentions the Establishment Organization Plan 1938 and -the Combat Organization Plan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Considering the significance of this point, I asked Vice Admiral -Lohmann for his comments on this rather technical question. We -<span class='pageno' title='17' id='Page_17'></span> -are dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-2, in my Document Book 2, -under part III, on Page 5. I think the Prosecution have misunderstood -the meaning of certain terms. The terms “Kriegsgliederung” -(Combat Organization Plan) and “Aufstellungsgliederung” (Establishment -Organization Plan) have been misunderstood.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask permission, therefore, to read this affidavit in conjunction -with the documents I have submitted in evidence. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“III. Referring to Documents C-135 and C-153, Armament -Plan, Mobilization Plan, Establishment Organization Plan—Aufstellungsgliederung, -A.G.—and Combat Organization -Plan—Kriegsgliederung, K.G....”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like to add that C-153 and C-135 are connected. I have -taken them together for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, I would -like to state for the record that 153 is Exhibit USA-43 and may be -found in British Document Book 10a, Page 107. It is headed, -“Armament Plan (A.P.) for the Third Armament Period.” It is a -rather long document and is dated 12 May 1934.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote Lohmann’s affidavit on these two documents:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The above-named documents submitted to me deal with -the Establishment Organization Plan, the Combat Organization -Plan, the Mobilization Plan, and the Armament Plan. -The first three plans, or orders of distribution, deal with the -same matters and differ only in manner of composition. The -Armament Plan differs from the other plans inasmuch as it -deals with new construction and the required new materials -and is hence less extensive.</p> - -<p>“The German Navy, like the Armed Forces as a whole—and, -no doubt, the Armed Forces of every nation—made such -plans in order to be able, in the case of a conflict or of -military complications, to prepare in time and use efficiently -the means of combat available. Owing to changing conditions, -military developments, changes in personnel, and advances -in technique, such plans were revised every year. An essential -part of these preparations, self-evident in the case of any -Armed Forces, consisted of the establishment, mobilization, -or combat organization, which provided a survey of all naval -installations on land and sea, their local defenses, and tactical -subordination—as well as of all combat material on hand or -to be secured, increased, or reorganized by a specified date. -All operations envisaged by the military command were -based on this Combat Organization Plan, and it also served -the political leaders as an indication of the possibilities -according to the strength and number of the military resources -available. -<span class='pageno' title='18' id='Page_18'></span></p> - -<p>“The Combat Organization Plan always had to be prepared -with great foresight and was issued by the High Command -of the Navy generally 1½ years before it was to go into -effect, in order to enable the responsible offices to attend in -time to such necessary preliminaries, such as applying to the -Navy Budget Office for funds and materials—such as iron, -steel, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>—and for the preparation of accommodation -insofar as all this was not already covered by the peacetime -development of the Navy.</p> - -<p>“In 1933, when Hitler in his Five Year Plan demanded that -by 1 April 1938 an armed force should be created which he -could throw into the balance as an instrument of political -power, the Combat Organization Plan for 1938 was worked -out independently of the scheduled yearly Combat Organization -Plan, and up to 1935 it dealt mostly with the possibilities -of the Treaty of Versailles which had not yet been exhausted -and with the question of supplementing the naval strength -with craft not subject to limitation in type or number. After -the Naval Pact of 1935, the Combat Organization Plan 1938 -was replaced by a “Combat Organization Plan Ultimate -Goal” (K.G. Endziel), which regulated the number of warships -of all types existing or to be built in the proportion of -35:100 measured by the tonnage actually existing in the -English Fleet. In consideration of monetary and material -resources, the capacity of the shipyards, and the length of -time required to build large warships, this ultimate goal was -in the meanwhile fixed for the year 1944-45.</p> - -<p>“There remained always the possibility of postponing it -further, in accordance with the building program of the -English Fleet.</p> - -<p>“The various terminologies have only a naval technical -significance and do not permit conclusions as to political plans.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like to indicate a slight error in translation in the -English text. The translation of the word “Terminierungen” by -“terminology” is, in my opinion, not correct. It should probably be -“dates” or “deadlines.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, are Vice Admiral Lohmann’s statements correct? Can -you add anything to this basic point of view?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: These statements contain everything which can be -said on this matter. All these arrangements are, in my opinion, -preparations which must be made by every navy if it is to be -systematically equipped and made ready for operation.</p> - -<div class='figcenter' style='width:80%'> -<img src='images/png25.png' alt='' id='iid-0002' style='width:100%;height:auto;'/> -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='19' id='Page_19'></span> -It says somewhere—in Document Number C-135, Page 1, under -Point 2—that, “The growing tension between Germany and Poland -forced us to make practical instead of theoretical preparations for -a purely German-Polish conflict.” That was interpreted to mean -that at some time—I believe in 1930—we planned a war of -aggression against Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I testified yesterday that our main object was and had to be, -nor could it have gone any further than, to oppose with force any -aggression committed by Poland against East Prussia. That was the -object of our work—to protect Germany from an invasion by the -Poles. At that time, it would have been madness for German -forces, which were still very inadequately armed, to invade Poland -or any other country.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then too, since the dates 1938 and 1944-45 constantly recur, -I would like to point out again that the year 1938 first came into -question as the final date for the first phase of the Shipping Replacement -Plan. The last ship of this Shipping Replacement Plan was -to be built from 1936 to 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Tribunal.</span>] I would like to call your attention to -the fact that this is Document Number Raeder-7.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: [<span class='it'>Continuing.</span>] Then Hitler decreed a Five Year Plan, -which happened also to cover the years 1933 to 1938 and in -accordance with which the Combat Organization Plan was to be -fixed for the year 1938. The Combat Organization Plan Ultimate -Goal was fixed for 1944-45; and the reason for fixing this date, as -stated in the document which you have just read, was the fact that -in fixing our program we had to take into consideration the funds -and material at our disposal, the capacity of our shipbuilding yards, -and the length of time needed to build big warships. A reasonably -strong fighting force could not be created before that date. Later -on the Combat Organization Plan appears again in several of my -letters. But there was no date given which, on our part, was -intended as the appointed time of attack.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The statements in Document C-135 are in accordance -with the German-English Naval Agreement. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps I did not formulate my question clearly. The statement -that a new program was set up implies then that it was done in -accordance with the German-English Naval Agreement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In any case, the reference to Document C-135, -Point 8, is probably to be interpreted in that way since it says, -“...A modern fleet, bound only by the clauses of the German-British -Naval Agreement.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course. -<span class='pageno' title='20' id='Page_20'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I turn to another topic and go back to the -year 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Grossadmiral, when did you meet Hitler, and did you have any -connection with National Socialism before 1933?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I met Hitler on 2 February 1933 when I saw him and -talked to him for the first time. It was at an evening party arranged -by General Von Blomberg at the home of General Von Hammerstein, -the Chief of the Army Command Staff, at which Reich -Defense Minister Von Blomberg intended to present to Hitler senior -generals and admirals. I shall describe the proceedings later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Up to that time, I had had no connection whatsoever with -National Socialism. I knew Admiral Von Levetzow only from the -first World War. He was on the staff of Admiral Scheer whom I -knew well and who had obviously met Hitler at a comparatively -early date. It was through him, however, that I heard that Hitler -took a very active interest in naval matters and was surprisingly -well-informed about them. On the other hand, I believe that -Von Levetzow had also spoken to Hitler about the reputation of the -Navy and his own opinion of the Navy at that time. But I had -no connections beyond that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What were your reasons for remaining in office in -1933, Grossadmiral, when you had no connection with National -Socialism?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Reich President, Field Marshal Von Hindenburg, -at the same time Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, had -appointed the leader of the largest party as Chancellor of the -Reich. I think that, if I had gone to him and told him I wanted to -resign—or intended to resign—because he had appointed a new -Chancellor, he would quite certainly have taken it as an insult -and would then really have dismissed me. I had not the slightest -reason to ask my Supreme Commander to release me from my -military post because he, in his capacity of Reich President, had -appointed a new Reich Chancellor of whom I, perhaps, might not -approve.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When and where did you first hear Hitler state -his basic political principles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I heard him for the first time on the afore-mentioned -2 February, after the dinner at General Von Hammerstein’s home. -I was introduced to him before dinner, and after dinner he made -a speech. He was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, -Herr Von Neurath. There were no other members of the Party -present.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In his speech, he first of all spoke of his career and of his social -and national aims. He said that he wanted to regain equal rights -<span class='pageno' title='21' id='Page_21'></span> -for the German Reich and that he would try to rid the country of -the shackles of the Versailles Treaty and restore to Germany her -internal sovereignty; and he also discussed his social aims: the -establishment of true community among the people, the raising of -the workers’ standard of living, assistance to be given to the -farmers, and the promotion of agriculture, the establishment of a -labor service, and the elimination of unemployment. He specially -emphasized—and this was really the main point—that both domestic -and foreign policy were to be left entirely in his hands, that the -Wehrmacht was to have nothing at all to do with this, that the -Wehrmacht was not to be used even to deal with unrest at home, -and that he had other forces to deal with these affairs. He wanted -to insure an undisturbed period of development for the Wehrmacht -so that it could become the factor necessary to prevent the Reich -from becoming the sport of other nations; and for that reason it -would be necessary in the next few years for the Wehrmacht to -devote its entire attention to the preparation of its main objective, -training for the defense of the fatherland in the case of aggression. -The Wehrmacht would be the sole bearer of arms, and its structure -would remain unaltered. He spoke of no details.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There was a comparatively large party assembled. As far as -schemes for war were concerned—none was mentioned, and all -those present were uncommonly pleased with this speech. He spoke -with particular respect of Reich President Von Hindenburg, the -Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and we had the impression -that he would respect this much-revered personality.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This speech was the only account of his basic principles which -he gave me as Chief of the Naval Command Staff, as well as to the -Chief of the Army Command Staff and others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, when did you report to Hitler for -the first time on the Navy; and what was Hitler’s general attitude -on this occasion—toward the Navy in particular?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The first naval report I gave was a few days later in -the presence of General Von Blomberg, who in his capacity of -Reich Defense Minister was my superior. I cannot give the exact -date, but it was shortly afterwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On this occasion, Hitler gave me a further account of the -principles on which I was to command the Navy. I reported to -Hitler first of all on the state of the Navy; on the rather slight -degree to which the provisions of the Versailles Treaty had been -carried out by the Navy, its inferior strength, the Shipping Replacement -Plan, and incidents concerned with naval policy, such as the -Treaty of Washington, the Treaty of London, 1930, the position of -the Disarmament Conference. He had already been fully informed -on all these matters. -<span class='pageno' title='22' id='Page_22'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>He said he wanted to make clear to me the principles on which -his policy was based and that this policy was to serve as the basis -of long-term naval policy. I still remember these words quite -clearly, as well as those which followed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He did not under any circumstances wish to have complications -with England, Japan, or Italy—above all not with England. And -he wanted to prove this by fixing an agreement with England as to -the strength to be allotted to the German Fleet in comparison -with that of the English Navy. By so doing, he wanted to show -that he was prepared to acknowledge, once and for all, England’s -right to maintain a navy commensurate with the vastness of her -interests all over the world. The German Navy required expansion -only to the extent demanded by a continental European policy. -I took this as the second main principle on which to base my -leadership of the Navy. The actual ratio of strength between the -two navies was not discussed at the time; it was discussed later on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This decision of Hitler’s afforded extreme satisfaction both to -myself and to the whole of the Navy, for it meant that we no -longer had to compete senselessly with the first sea power; and -I saw the possibility of gradually building up our Navy on a solid -foundation. I believe that this decision was hailed by the whole -Navy with joy and that they understood its significance. The -Russian Pact was later greeted with the same appreciation, since -the combination of the Russian Pact and the naval agreement -would have been a guarantee of wonderful development. There -were people—but not in the Navy—who believed that this amounted -to yielding ground, but this limitation was accepted by the majority -of Germans with considerable understanding.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, what were your personal relations -with Hitler? How did you judge him in the course of the years, -and what was Hitler’s attitude toward you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I welcomed this vigorous personality who was -obviously most intelligent, had tremendous will power, was a -master in handling people, and—as I myself observed in the early -years—a great and very skillful politician whose national and -social aims were already well known and accepted in their entirety -by the Armed Forces and the German people...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this might be taken -more shortly. We have heard it from so many of the others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Is the defendant not to describe his relations -with Hitler? Do the Tribunal consider them irrelevant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He might do it shortly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Good. Grossadmiral, please do it shortly. -<span class='pageno' title='23' id='Page_23'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I would just like to say what I thought of Hitler in -order to make clear my reasons for not at any time leaving him, -which fact the Prosecution have raised very strongly against me. -His first steps in both domestic and foreign policy undoubtedly -called forth admiration for his political ability and awakened the -hope that, since he had taken these first steps without bloodshed -or political complications, he would be able to solve in the same -way any problems, which might arise later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have heard this as I have pointed out—this -quality or power of Hitler’s ability from nearly every one of -the defendants and it is very cumulative, and if this defendant -wishes to say he was greatly impressed by Hitler’s qualities, that -is quite sufficient. All of the rest is cumulative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Very well. Then I shall only say that during the -early years I had no reason to wonder whether I should remain in -my position or not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, we shall automatically come to -the later complications at a later stage of the hearing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I come now to the German-British Naval Agreement and would -like to ask you briefly how this Naval Agreement of 1935 came -about. I am referring to Document Number Raeder-11, Document -Book 1, Page 59, which contains the Naval Agreement in the form -of a communication from the German Foreign Minister to the -British Government. The actual content was fixed by the British, -as the first few words show:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Your Excellency, I have the honour to acknowledge the -receipt of your Excellency’s note of to-day’s date, in -which you were so good as to communicate to me on -behalf of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom -the following”:</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then come the following statements by the British:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“1. During the last few days the representatives of the German -Government and His Majesty’s Government in the -United Kingdom have been engaged in conversations, the -primary purpose of which has been to prepare the way for -the holding of a general conference on the subject of the -limitation of naval armaments. It now gives me great -pleasure to notify your Excellency of the formal acceptance -by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of the -proposal of the German Government discussed at those conversations, -that the future strength of the German Navy in -relation to the aggregate naval strength of the Members of -the British Commonwealth of Nations should be in the proportion -of 35:100. His Majesty’s Government in the United -<span class='pageno' title='24' id='Page_24'></span> -Kingdom regard this proposal as a contribution of the greatest -importance to the cause of future naval limitation. They -further believe that the agreement which they have now -reached with the German Government and which they regard -as a permanent and definite agreement as from to-day -between the two Governments...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This is a well-known document, and the -Tribunal will take judicial notice of it, of course. It is not necessary -to read it all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well. I should nevertheless like to point out -that, according to Point 2f of this document, the British Government -recognized that, as far as submarines were concerned, Germany -should be allowed the same number as Britain. At that time -that amounted to about 52,000 tons, or rather more than 100 U-boats. -The Government of the German Reich, however, voluntarily undertook -to restrict itself to 45 percent of the total submarine tonnage -of the British Empire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Did you and the Navy regard such -considerable restrictions as the basis for Germany’s peaceful -development, and was it received favorably by the Navy in general?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, as I have already said, it was received with -greatest satisfaction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Since a judgment formed some years ago carries -more weight than a declaration made now in the course of the -Trial, I wish to submit Document Number Raeder-12, Document -Book 1, Page 64. This document deals with a communication made -by Grossadmiral Raeder for the information of the Officers’ Corps. -It is dated 15 July 1935, a month after the signing of the naval -agreement. Raeder says—and I quote the second paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The agreement resulted from the Führer’s decision to fix the -ratio of the fleets of Germany and the British Empire at -35:100. This decision, which was based on considerations of -European politics, formed the starting point of the London -conferences. In spite of initial opposition from England, we -held inflexibly to our decision; and our demands were granted -in their entirety. The Führer’s decision was based on the -desire to exclude the possibility of antagonism between Germany -and England in the future and so to exclude forever -the possibility of naval rivalry between the two countries.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>A sentence on Page 66 is also important. I wish to ask the High -Tribunal to take judicial notice of the rest of it:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“By this agreement, the building-up of the German Navy to -the extent fixed by the Führer was formally approved by -England.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='25' id='Page_25'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is followed by individual statements as to tonnage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I should like to call attention to the final sentence, which -is indicative of Raeder’s attitude at the time:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“This agreement represents a signal success in the political -sphere since it is the first step towards a practical understanding -and signifies the first relaxation of the inflexible -front so far maintained against Germany by our former -opponents and implacably demonstrated again at Stresa.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, were the lines of peaceful development -laid down by you at that time followed in the next years?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I should like to submit Document -Raeder-13. This is a document which enables me—in order -to save time—to dispense with the testimony here in Court of -Vice Admiral Lohmann. This document will be found in Document -Book 1, Page 68, and is entitled, “The New Plan for the Development -of the German Navy,” and is a standard work. It is a speech -made by Vice Admiral Lohmann in the summer of 1935 at the -Hanseatic University in Hamburg. I ask the High Tribunal to take -judicial notice of the essential points of this document; and as this -is an authoritative work done at the request of the High Command, -I may perhaps just quote the following. Admiral Lohmann sets -forth first of all that since we now had the liberty to recruit and -arm troops, the Navy was then free of restrictions, but that that -was not Hitler’s view. I now quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Führer, however, chose another way. He preferred to -negotiate on German naval armament direct with Britain -which, as our former adversary”—I beg your pardon; I am -quoting from Page 70—“has tried for years to show understanding -for our difficult position.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And on Page 71 Lohmann speaks about misleading reports -published in the press, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and continues literally:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“All the more surprising, then, was the ratification of the -treaty which expressed the full agreement of both governments -and did not, like some armament treaties of former -time, leave more embitterment than understanding in its -wake. The sense of fairness which British statesmen have -retained, despite the frequently dirty ways of higher politics, -came through when confronted with the unreserved sincerity -of the German declarations, the dignified firmness of the -German representatives, and the passionate desire for peace -inspiring the speeches and acts of our Führer. Unlike former -times, the speeches of the British leaders expressed respect -and recognition. We have acknowledged this as a sign of -<span class='pageno' title='26' id='Page_26'></span> -honest willingness to understand. The voices from the circles -of British war veterans are hardly less valuable than the -attitude of the official leaders. In November 1918, for instance, -when the German Fleet was taken by British squadrons to be -interned in Scapa Flow, the British Commander-in-Chief, -Lord Beatty, the great foe of our Admiral Hipper, sent the -famous signal, ‘Do not forget that the enemy is a contemptible -beast.’ This Grand Admiral expressed his dislike for Germany -on many occasions, but on 26 June this same Lord Beatty -stated in the House of Lords, ‘I am of the opinion that we -should be grateful to the Germans. They came to us with -hands outstretched, announcing that they agreed to the ratio -of 35:100.’ If they had submitted other proposals, we could -not have prevented them. We may be truly grateful for the -fact that there is at least one country in the world whose -competition in regard to armament we do not need to fear.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I should like to refer to Page 73, which limits battleships -to 35,000 tons. This limitation plays a part in the Prosecution -Document C-23. The fact that in this document next to the words -“Panama Canal” are placed the words “battleships 35,000 tons” has -a certain significance. The limitation to 35,000 tons is not so -decisive and important as the Prosecution would like us to believe. -This is the origin: The United States of America at that time wanted -to limit the tonnage to 35,000 tons on account of the width and -depth of the Panama Canal, for the Panama Canal would have -had to be enlarged in order to admit ships of greater tonnage. -I shall return to this point later since this limit of 35,000 tons -was not maintained.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then as evidence of the basis for comparison with German -U-boats, I should like to point to Page 76 where the figure -mentioned is 52,700 tons. It is a historical fact—which is set down -here—that France took no part in this limitation and at that time -was the strongest U-boat power with her 96,000 tons, 96 ready -and 15 under construction. It is also a historical fact that Germany—and -this is shown on the same page—had agreed to abolish -submarines, having had to destroy 315 after the first World War.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Grossadmiral, did this accord with the British Fleet apparent -in these documents show itself on another, or on any particular -occasion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I tried to maintain this good understanding and to -express these sentiments to the British Navy as, for instance, when -I was informed of the death of Admiral Jellicoe through a phone -call from an English news agency. He stood against us as the -head of the English Fleet in the first World War, and we always -<span class='pageno' title='27' id='Page_27'></span> -considered him a very chivalrous opponent. Through this agency -I gave a message to the English Fleet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I doubt if this really has any effect on the -issues we have to consider.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In any event, I tried to bring about a good understanding -with the British Navy for the future and to maintain -this good understanding.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On 17 July 1937 a further German-English Naval -Agreement was signed. I am submitting this document as Document -Raeder-14, Document Book 1, Page 81. This is a rather -lengthy document only part of which has been translated and -printed in the document book; and in order to understand the -violation with which the Prosecution charge us, I must refer to -several of the points contained in this document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The agreement concerns the limitation of naval armaments and -particularly the exchange of information on naval construction. In -Article 4 we find the limitation of battleships to 35,000 tons, which -has already been mentioned; and in Articles 11 and 12—which I will -not read because of their technical nature but would ask the Tribunal -to take note of—both governments are bound to report -annually the naval construction program. This must be done during -the first 4 months of each calendar year, and details about certain -ships—big ships in particular—4 months before they are laid down. -For a better understanding of the whole matter, which has been -made the basis of a charge against the defendants in connection -with the naval agreement, I may refer to Articles 24 to 26. The -three articles show...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Can you summarize these articles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I did not intend to read them, Your Honor. -I just want to quote a point or two from them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These articles enumerate the conditions under which either -partner to the agreement could deviate from it. From the start, -therefore, it was considered permissible under certain conditions -to deviate from the agreement, if, for instance, (Article 24) one -of the partners became involved in war, or (Article 25) if another -power, such as the United States or France or Japan, were to build -or purchase a vessel larger than those provided for in the agreement. -In this article express reference is made to Article 4—that -is, to battleships of 35,000 tons—in the case of deviation, the only -obligation was to notify one’s partner. Article 26 states a very -general basis for deviation from the agreement—namely, in cases -where the security of the nation demands it such deviation is held -to be justified. No further details are necessary at this point. -<span class='pageno' title='28' id='Page_28'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the -United Kingdom): My Lord, the deviation is subject to notification -of the other party under Subarticle 2. It was just relevant in -Article 26—any deviation is subject to notification to the other -party of the deviation to be embarked on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it, Dr. Siemers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, of course. I believe...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution say that this agreement -was broken?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. With reference to the remarks just made -by Sir David, I would like to say that I pointed out that such -deviation was permitted under these conditions, but that there -was an obligation to notify the other partners. Perhaps that did -not come through before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Was this agreement concluded, Admiral, -in 1937, from the same point of view which you have already -stated? Are there any other noteworthy facts which led to the -agreement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In 1936, as well as I remember, the treaties so far -made by England with other powers expired, and England was -therefore eager to renew these treaties in the course of 1936. The -fact that we were invited in 1937 to join in a new agreement by -all powers meant that Germany would henceforth be completely -included in these treaties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have accused you of violating -this German-English Naval Agreement, and this charge is based -on Document C-23, Exhibit USA-49, in the British Delegation’s -Document Book 10, Page 3. This document is dated 18 February -1938. It has been mentioned repeatedly in these proceedings and -begins as follows, “The actual displacement of the battleships -<span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span>, <span class='it'>Gneisenau</span> and <span class='it'>F/G</span> is in both cases 20 percent greater -than the displacement stated to the British.” Then we find a list -which shows that the displacement of the <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> was given -as 26,000 tons but was actually 31,300 tons, and that the draught -stated one meter less than was actually the case. And the “F” class, -that is, the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> and <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>, were listed as 35,000 tons but -had an actual displacement of 41,700 and a difference of 80 centimeters -in draught. Therefore, according to what we have seen, -there is an evident infringement of the treaty. Grossadmiral, I am -assuming that you do not dispute this violation of the treaty?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, in no way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Certainly, at the time of this document there -were only four battleships in question: <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span>, <span class='it'>Gneisenau</span>, -<span class='it'>Bismarck</span>, and <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>... -<span class='pageno' title='29' id='Page_29'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It seems you are again stating these things -to the Tribunal, making statements instead of asking questions -of the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Mr. President, that I was incorporating -my documentary evidence in order to show the connection, so as -to make clear what we are dealing with. I was about to put the -question: Were the four battleships mentioned actually in commission -when this document was drawn up?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, they had not yet been commissioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: None of these four battleships?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If I am permitted to do so, I may say that the -exact dates on which these ships were commissioned—dates which -the defendant can hardly repeat from memory—can be seen from -Point IV of Lohmann’s affidavit, Document Number Raeder-2.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think you must prove them. You cannot -state them without proving them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, certainly, Your Honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am referring to Document Number Raeder-2, which has been -submitted to the Tribunal already. This is the affidavit by Lohmann, -on Page 5. I quote from Document Book 1, Page 8:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Within the limits defined by the German-English Naval -Agreement, the German Navy commissioned four battleships. -I append the dates of laying down the keel, launching, and -commissioning, as far as I can still determine them. <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span>: -laid down keel, exact date cannot be determined; -launched, 3 October 1936; commissioned, 7 January 1939. -<span class='it'>Gneisenau</span>: laid down keel, date cannot be determined; -launched, 8 December 1936; commissioned, 31 May 1938. -<span class='it'>Bismarck</span>: laid down keel, 1936; launched, 14 February 1939; -commissioned, 2 August 1940. <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>: laid down keel, 1936; -launched, 1 April 1939; commissioned, 1941.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Admiral Lohmann was unable to ascertain the exact date. The -“H”—I may add that the other ships mentioned under Document -C-23 were planned but were broken up later. They had already -been broken up in the summer of 1939, and this applies only to -the first “H.” So far there is no question of final preparation or -construction. Since an obvious violation of the treaty exists, we -now have to consider in what light this violation should be regarded. -The Prosecution have said that this violation of the treaty is -criminal since it implies intended aggression. In order to save -time, especially since technical problems are involved, I should like, -before questioning the defendant further, to submit Document -<span class='pageno' title='30' id='Page_30'></span> -Number Raeder-15, within the scope of the documentary evidence -which I have submitted with the Tribunal’s permission. In my -opinion, this document proves that there was no intention of -aggression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Number Raeder-15 is an affidavit—I beg your pardon—it -is in Document Book 1, Page 94. This document deals -with an affidavit deposed before a notary at Hamburg by Dr. Ing. -h.c. Wilhelm Süchting and is important for the refutation of Document -C-23, and for that purpose I should like to quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I am the former Director of the shipbuilding yard of Blohm -& Voss in Hamburg. I was with this firm from 1937 to -1945”—pardon me—“from 1907 to 1945 and I am conversant -with all questions concerning the construction of warships -and merchant ships. In particular, as an engineer I had -detailed information about the building of battleships for -the German Navy. Dr. Walter Siemers, attorney at law of -Hamburg, presented to me the Document C-23, dated 18 February -1938, and asked me to comment on it. This document -shows that the Navy, contrary to the previous agreement, -informed the British that the battleships <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> and -<span class='it'>Gneisenau</span>—as well as other intended constructions—had a -displacement and draught of about 20 percent less than was -actually the case.</p> - -<p>“I can give some details to explain why this information was -given. I assume that the information given to the British—information -which according to naval agreement 4 had to -be supplied 4 months before the keel was laid down—was -based on the fact that the battleships <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> and -<span class='it'>Gneisenau</span> were originally intended to have a displacement of -26,000 tons and a draught of 7.50 meters and the battleship -“F” (<span class='it'>Bismarck</span>) a displacement of 35,000 tons and a draught -of 7.90 meters, as stated.</p> - -<p>“If these battleships were afterwards built with a greater -displacement and a greater draught, the changes were the -result of orders given or requests made by the Navy while -the plans were being drafted and which the construction -office had to carry out. The changes were based upon the -viewpoint repeatedly expressed by the Navy—namely, to -build the battleships in such a way that they would be as -nearly unsinkable as possible. The increase of the tonnage -was not meant to increase the offensive power of the -ship”—I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I shall be finished -in a moment—“The increase of the tonnage was not meant -to increase the offensive power of the ship but was done for -defensive and protective purposes.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='31' id='Page_31'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I may perhaps point out that in the English text there is a -mistake in translation. In this text the word “not” is missing. It -should read, “was not meant,” and not “meant.”</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“As time went on, the Navy attached more and more -importance to dividing the hull of the battleship into a -greater number of compartments in order to make the ship -as unsinkable as possible and to afford the maximum protection -in case of leakage. The new battleships were therefore -built broad in the beam with many bulkheads, only -about ten meters apart, and many longitudinal and latitudinal -bulkheads outside the torpedo bulkhead. At the same time, -both the vertical and the horizontal armor-plating were, as -far as my information goes, heavier and composed of larger -plates than those used by other navies. In order...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: In other words, his explanation is that they -were altered in the course of construction for technical reasons. It -does not matter what the technical reasons are.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, but I do -believe that when we are dealing with a clearly-established violation -of a treaty, the manner of this violation is of some importance. -I do not believe that each and every violation of a treaty can be -described as a war crime. The point is whether this violation of -the treaty was a war crime in the sense of the Charter—in other -words, whether it was motivated by the intention of waging a -war of aggression. An insignificant violation of a kind which, after -all, is found in every commercial lawsuit cannot be a crime.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The affidavit is before us. We shall read it. -In fact, you have already read the material parts of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I think we had better adjourn. How long do you expect -to be?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is very difficult for me to judge -that accurately, but I imagine I shall be able to conclude sometime -tomorrow. I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be able to conclude -at noon; but I am asking Your Honor to take into consideration -the fact that I am incorporating my documentary proof in the -interrogation and that this documentary proof, which in many other -cases has taken hours to present, is thus dealt with simultaneously.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope that you will make your -presentation as short as you possibly can. We have already been -so long a time over this defendant.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='32' id='Page_32'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I must first make a formal request, -namely, that in addition to my own secretary I may have another -here in Court. She was here this morning but has just been told -that she may not come into the courtroom, and she is now standing -outside the door.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Grossadmiral, you just saw the affidavit -of Dr. Süchting. I ask you: Is it true, or rather—not to confuse you -I will ask—on what did the Navy base its ideas about enlarging -the battleships by about 20 percent?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Originally there was no intention to enlarge the -ships by 20 percent. But at the time when we resumed battleship -construction, when we could see that we would have a very small -number of battleships in any case, it occurred to us that the -resistance to sinking of ships should be increased as much as -possible to render the few we had as impregnable as possible. It -had nothing to do with stronger armament or anything like that, -but merely with increasing the resistance to sinking and to enemy -guns. For this reason a new system was worked out at that time -in order to increase and strengthen the subdivision of the space -within the ship. This meant that a great deal of new iron had -to be built into the ships. Thereby the draught and the displacement -were enlarged. This was unfortunate from my point of view, -for we had designed the ships with a comparatively shallow -draught. The mouths of our rivers, the Elbe, Weser, Jade, are so -shallow that ships with a deep draught cannot navigate all stages -of the rivers. Therefore, we had these ships built broad, intending -to give them a shallow draught; but by building in these many -new latitudinal and longitudinal bulkheads, we increased the -draught and also the displacement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were these disadvantageous changes, which took -place during construction, due in part to a comparatively limited -experience in battleship construction?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Since the designers in the High Command of -the Navy and the designers and engineers in the big shipyards had -not built any heavy warships for a very long time, they lacked -experience. As a result, the High Command of the Navy had to -issue supplementary orders to the shipyards. This in itself was a -drawback which I tried hard to overcome.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did the construction of these four battleships -surpass the total tonnage accorded by the naval agreement? -<span class='pageno' title='33' id='Page_33'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, the total tonnage was not overstepped until the -beginning of the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Your Honors, in this connection I should like to -refer to Document Raeder-8, which has already been submitted in -Raeder Document Book 1, Page 40, under II. In this affidavit -Lohmann gives comparative figures which show how much battleship -tonnage Germany was allowed under the naval agreement. -Please take notice of it without my reading all the figures. What -is important is that, according to comparison with the British -figures, Germany was allowed to have 183,750 tons. At that time -she had three completed armored cruisers with 30,000 tons—which -is shown here—so that according to this affidavit 153,750 tons still -remained.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With reference to Document Raeder-127, I should like to submit -a short correction, because Grossadmiral Raeder, in looking through -the affidavit, observed that Vice Admiral Lohmann made a mistake -in one figure. The mistake is unimportant in terms of the whole, -but in order to be absolutely fair and correct I thought it necessary -to point it out to Vice Admiral Lohmann. Instead of 30,000 it -should actually read about 34,000 tons, so that there is a difference, -not of 153,750 tons but of 149,750. According to the naval agreement, -we were allowed to build 146,000, the final figure, so that -the result is not changed. Admiral Lohmann’s mistake—as the -Tribunal know—can be attributed to the fact that we were very -limited in our material resources.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I add a remark to what I said before? The -statement of these displacements deviated from the terms of the -treaty insofar as only the original construction displacement or -draught was reported and not the draught and displacement which -gradually resulted through these changes in the course of the -planning of the construction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In addition, may I refer the honorable Court to -the following: The Naval Agreement of 1937 was changed by the -London Protocol of 30 June 1938. I refer to Exhibit Raeder-16. -My secretary just tells me it is not here at the moment; I will -bring it up later. It is the last document in Raeder Document -Book 1, Page 97.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I remind the Court that Document C-23 is of February 1938. -By this London Protocol, at the suggestion of the British Government, -the limitation on battleship tonnage to 35,000 tons was -changed because the British Government, as well as the German -Government, realized that 35,000 tons was too low. As the protocol -shows, effective 30 June 1938, the battleship tonnage was raised -to 45,000 tons. Thereby this difference in the battleships, referred -to in Document C-23, was settled a few months later. -<span class='pageno' title='34' id='Page_34'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I shall take up a new subject, the question of your -participation in the planning and conspiracy to wage wars of -aggression. This is the question of the so-called key documents -which the Prosecution presented. Since you, Admiral, were present -during these speeches of Hitler’s to the commanders-in-chief, -I must ask you to comment on these documents. The first document -is Document 386-PS, the so-called Hossbach Document, -Exhibit USA-25, in the Document Book of the British Delegation, -Number 10, Page 81. It is Hitler’s speech of 5 November 1937.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Herr Grossadmiral, did you ever see this document of Hossbach -before the Trial began?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I saw no document and no protocol of any -speeches which Hitler made. No minutes were taken officially. -Only in later years—I believe since 1941—were stenographers -present who wrote down every word. These are really not minutes -at all, since the document is written in indirect discourse. It was -written down by the author 5 days after the speech itself, as we -have heard.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Although it is a very important document, -I have noted that in contrast to other documents it has no distribution -list; it was written down 5 days after the speech and is not -even marked “secret.” Can you explain where these minutes were -set down?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot recollect in detail the conditions that -prevailed. I can only imagine that the adjutant in question kept -the minutes in his safe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then you have only an over-all impression of -this speech, after 8 or 9 years?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The document was read in full here by the -Prosecution and, as cannot be denied at all, it contains serious -references to a war of aggression. It mentions, for instance, -something bequeathed by will, the problem of space, the hatred -against England and France; it says that, armament now being -completed, the first goal is the overthrow of Czechoslovakia and -Austria.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Please explain to the Court what effect the speech had on you -at that time, and how it happened that you ascribed no such -importance to the speech as did Herr Von Neurath, for example, -who was also present? And in spite of the speech how did you -retain your opinion that Hitler would hold the old line and not -seek a solution by force?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: By way of introduction I may say that the assertion -contained in the trial brief, that an influential group of Nazis met -<span class='pageno' title='35' id='Page_35'></span> -in order to examine the situation, does not give a correct picture -of the situation at all. Hitler called together the persons mentioned -in the document to explain to them the possibilities for political -development and in order to give them any instructions he -might have.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And here I should like to say something in general—since there -are quite a number of Hitler’s speeches coming—about the nature -of his speeches. Hitler spoke at great length, going very far in -retrospect. Above all, in every speech he had a special purpose -depending on the audience. Just as he was a master of dialectics, -so he was also a master of bluff. He used strong expressions again -according to the objective he was pursuing. He afforded his -imagination full play. He also contradicted himself frequently in -successive speeches. One never knew what his final goals and -intentions were. At the end of such a speech it was very difficult -to determine them. As a rule, his speeches made a greater impression -on people who heard him infrequently than on those already -acquainted with his whole manner of speaking on such occasions. -It was never a question of taking counsel but, as has been said, -always of giving undisputed orders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The purpose of the speech on 5 November 1937 was, as Reich -Marshal Göring said at the beginning...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is at the beginning of this -speech of 5 November?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, at the beginning of the speech.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He told me he had spoken with the Führer beforehand. The -Führer wanted to spur on the Army to carry out its rearmament -somewhat faster. It was going too slowly for the Führer. The -subject of the speech was Austria and Czechoslovakia, which he -said in one place he wanted to overthrow. He said that the latest -date would be 1943-1945, because after that our situation would -become worse. But the case could come up earlier due to two -conditions: In the first place, if internal unrest occurred in France; -in the second place, in the event of the outbreak of a Mediterranean -war in which England, France, Italy, and probably Spain, would -participate, which in my opinion was fantastic.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The assertion that the arming of the Army, Navy, and Air Force -was as good as completed in November 1937, I could not understand. -The Navy still had not a single battleship in service. The -situation was similar in the Air Force and Army. In no way were -we armed for war, and a war against England, for example, would -have been sheer madness. For me, the decisive sentences in his -speech were that first, England and France—I believe—had already -written off Czechoslovakia, and secondly, that he was convinced -<span class='pageno' title='36' id='Page_36'></span> -that France and England would not interfere. In the third place -was the fact that just a few months before, in July 1937, the second -naval agreement had been signed. These three facts seemed to -me to make it certain that Hitler would not seek a warlike solution -to these problems of Austria and Czechoslovakia. At that time it -was a question of the Sudetenland under any circumstances and it -seemed he would strive for a peaceful solution. For that reason -the speech did not impress me with the fact that Hitler at that -time wanted to change his policy—that he wanted to turn from a -policy of peace to one of war. I can imagine that Herr Von Neurath, -not knowing the purpose of this speech, received a different -impression. But, as I now think back over the matter, I can imagine -that the exaggerated character of the speech was specifically -intended to force Von Neurath out of the Cabinet, because I have -learned that at that time the Führer was already inclined to replace -Von Neurath by Von Ribbentrop. That was only an assumption -which I made afterwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For me the conclusions to be drawn from the speech were none -other than these: The construction of the fleet in the ratio of one -to three, relative to England, was to be continued, and a friendly -relationship with England was still to be striven for. The ratio -agreement which had just been reached was to be observed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And, it is obvious at the end of the document—namely -in the fourth paragraph from the end—that Field Marshal -Von Blomberg and Colonel General Von Fritsch, in giving their -estimate of the situation, repeatedly pointed out the necessity of -England and France not playing the role of our enemies. This is -commented on further, and one sees that Blomberg and Fritsch -were disturbed and for once opposed Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After the speech you talked to Blomberg. Is it true that Blomberg, -who can unfortunately not be examined and Fritsch, who is -also dead, saw through this exaggeration of Hitler’s and therefore -pointed out their misgivings and in this way intended to intervene? -About what did you talk to Blomberg after this speech?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In the first place, Blomberg and Fritsch...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You must try not to put leading questions, -Dr. Siemers. You are putting into the witness’ mouth what you -want him to answer. If you want to...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry if I did so. It is a little difficult when -the two men who were there, Blomberg and Fritsch, are dead. -I can only point out that they are not alive now. My final -question is...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That cannot be helped, the fact that they -are dead. But, if you want to get anything in about that, you must -get it from the witness, not from yourself. -<span class='pageno' title='37' id='Page_37'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What impression did Blomberg have after this -speech? What did he say to you afterwards?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I believe Blomberg himself in a questionnaire stated -to Field Marshal Keitel that when we military men left the room -Blomberg, who was with the Führer frequently, said that this -again had not been meant so earnestly and was not to be judged -so seriously. He believed that the Führer would settle these -questions peacefully, too. And as Dr. Siemers said, Blomberg and -Fritsch had both already called the attention of the Führer to the -fact that under no circumstances should England and France be -allowed to intervene, since the German Wehrmacht would not be -able to cope with them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I may add that in this case I intentionally did not make any -such objections because it was, after all, a daily occurrence that -whenever I met the Führer, I told him, “<span class='it'>Ceterum censeo</span>, we must -stay on the course in order to avoid entanglements with England.” -And the Führer repeatedly confirmed this intention of his. It is -typical that as soon as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, -Colonel General Von Fritsch, said that after these remarks he -would not be able to take the vacation in Egypt in the winter of -1937-38 which he had planned for his health, the Führer immediately -retracted his statement and said that the affair was not so urgent, -that he could go ahead on his vacation undisturbed, which he -then did.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This shows that it was again a question of exerting pressure. -That was the speech of 5 November 1937. In fact he did not crush -either Austria or Czechoslovakia at that time; but in 1938 the -question was settled peacefully without bloodshed, and even with -the agreement of the other powers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection may I submit the document -dating from the following year, Exhibit Raeder-23, Raeder Document -Book 2, Page 127. On 30 September 1938—I need not say -anything further about Munich, because the defendant was not -directly participating—Hitler and Chamberlain jointly declared that -the agreement signed the previous night and the Anglo-German -Naval Agreement were considered symbols of the desires of both -nations never again to wage war against each other. The rest of -the contents is well known.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I come to the second key document which the Prosecution -submitted—namely, Document L-79, the so-called “Little Schmundt.” -It is Exhibit USA-27, Number 10 in the document book of the -British Delegation, Page 24. The document in spite of its -astonishing length was also presented in full by the Prosecution, so -that I shall not read from it. May I remind the Court that it states -that further successes could not be achieved without bloodshed, and -<span class='pageno' title='38' id='Page_38'></span> -on 23 May 1939 with reference to Poland it states that not Danzig -but the readjustment of Lebensraum was the issue at stake.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It speaks of the readjustment of Lebensraum and of the fact -that the Polish problem could not be separated from the conflict -with the West. Thereupon Hitler said that the only way out was -to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. Unfortunately, -this is again a document which is undated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you know when Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt prepared this -report?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, unfortunately I cannot say that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say it is undated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, there is no date stating when the -document was prepared. There is only the date referring to the -minutes of the conference of 23 May. In the case of the Hossbach -Document the conference was on 5 November, but it was written -down by Hossbach 5 days later from memory, on 10 November. In -the case of Schmundt, we do not know whether it was written -down after 1 day, 5 days, or 4 weeks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it in evidence that the document of -5 November was written down 5 days later?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No. The document of 5 November shows that -it was prepared 5 days later. The document is dated at the top, -“Berlin, 10 November 1937; Notes of the Conference in the Reich -Chancellery on 5 November 1937....”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is right, then there is evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In the case of -Schmundt, there is no indication?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You do not know when it was written down?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I never heard when.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you ever see this document before this Trial?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Does this document contain a correct reproduction -in all points of Hitler’s speech, or does what you said about -the Hossbach Document apply here also?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It applies even more here. In my opinion it is the -most abstruse document concerning a Hitler speech in existence, -for a large part of the statements in my opinion makes no sense -whatsoever, as I have tried to show. The adjutant stated that he -was only paraphrasing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: This is on the first page in the center where it is -written, “Reproduced in Substance.” -<span class='pageno' title='39' id='Page_39'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Please explain to the Court what impression this speech made -on you at the time and why you believed, in spite of this speech, -that Hitler was not planning any war of aggression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should like to point out again here that the trial -brief makes the comment that consultation took place regarding -the scale on which the plan should be executed. Particularly in this -case this does not at all represent the character of the speech -correctly. The meaning of the whole first part of the speech, as -I said, is extremely vague. Whereas in the 1937 speech he gave -1943 to 1945 as the latest deadline and the possibility of an earlier -date under certain improbable circumstances, here Hitler speaks -of a solution as being possible in 15 to 20 years. He says that -Poland is always on the side of the enemy, in spite of the treaty -of friendship, that her secret intention is to take advantage of any -opportunity to act against us, and that he, therefore, wants to attack -Poland at the first opportunity. The Polish problem cannot be -separated from the conflict in the West, but a conflict in the West -must not be permitted to arise simultaneously. If it is uncertain -as to whether a war with the West will or will not take place in -the wake of the German-Polish conflict, then a line of battle first -against England and France is perhaps of greater importance. Then -again, he says that we cannot allow ourselves to be drawn into a -war with England on account of Poland, a war on two fronts such -as the incapable men of 1914 had brought about.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then again, England—and that is comparatively new here—is -the driving force against Germany. We must prepare for a long -war in addition to a surprise attack, obviously against England. It -is astonishing that we were to endeavor, at the beginning of such -a war, to strike a destructive blow against England. The goal is -to force England to her knees. Then follows quite a new part...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the defendant appears to be -reading from a document an argument about this document. That -is not giving evidence. If he can tell us anything about what -happened at this meeting, it is open to him to do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: He is repeating, with the aid of this document, -the involved thoughts which Hitler expressed at that time, and he -is pointing out the contradictions contained in Hitler’s speech at -that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of argument, to point out -that there are conflicts between one part of the document and -another. That is not the subject of evidence. He has already told -us that Hitler’s speeches generally were—that one speech generally -contradicted another, but we can see for ourselves from the document -if one part of it conflicts with another. -<span class='pageno' title='40' id='Page_40'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is it not of importance, Mr. President, that the -abstruse statements of Hitler at that time had such an effect on the -witness that he says so and so many points are false? Then the -whole tendency which we read out of it cannot be true. As I understand -the witness, Hitler must have had mental reservations back -of such conflicting remarks to commanders. But I believe we can -shorten this.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Herr Grossadmiral, according to the wish of the Court, just -explain what the effect was on you and what in your opinion were -the special designs connected with this document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: By contrasting these sentences, I wanted only to -show how muddled the speech was. At the end there is a second -part in which a number of doctrinaire, academic opinions on warfare -are expressed and a conclusion to the effect that it was also -a wish of Hitler to have formed in the OKW a research staff to -work out all these plans for war preparation, evaluation of individual -weapons, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, without the participation of the general staffs, -with which he did not like to collaborate. He wanted these things -to be in his own hands. Thus it was the formation of a research -staff which motivated this speech.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemens, I have already told you that -the Tribunal thinks that argument is not evidence. This seems to -be purely argument upon this document. If there is anything in -the shape of recollection as to what passed at this meeting, that -would be evidence; but merely to argue upon the document is not -in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may the witness not say what -effect Hitler’s processes of thought had on him? The Prosecution -say that Hitler and Raeder entered upon a conspiracy together.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He can say he did not understand it or did -not think it was sincere.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I should like to point out that -the witness referred to this point because this is the only passage -from this document which the Prosecution have not read. In this -document the sentences about the research staff, as I noticed immediately, -were not read. This research staff was what Hitler -wanted to obtain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Herr Grossadmiral, after this speech, was anything changed in -your department?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. The conclusion drawn was: First, that the ship -construction program was to be continued in the same way as in -the past—so Hitler himself said—and in the second place, he said -that the armament programs were to be geared for the year -<span class='pageno' title='41' id='Page_41'></span> -1943-1944. That was the positive thing which I could conclude -for myself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that time, moreover, I was strongly impressed by the speech -which Hitler himself made at the launching of the battleship -<span class='it'>Bismarck</span> in Hamburg. There he said that the Wehrmacht, as the -keenest instrument of war, had to protect and help to preserve the -peace founded on true justice. That made the greatest impression -on me at that time with regard to Hitler’s intentions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was the fleet at that time in a position to do this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. It was completely incapable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, if there are any passages in this -document which have not been read and to which you attach -importance, you may read them now; and for the rest, all that -the Tribunal thinks you ought to do is to ask the defendant, what -his recollection was or what happened at that meeting, and if he -can supplement the document as to what happened at the meeting, -he is entitled to do so. The Tribunal does not intend to prevent -your reading anything from the document which has not yet been -read nor from getting from the witness anything which he says -happened at the meeting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I understood the witness to mean -that he recalled the research staff which the Prosecution had not -mentioned. Thus it came about that the witness, since he too knows -the document, at the same time pointed out that the research staff -was also mentioned in the document. I believe that can explain -the misunderstanding. The situation is clear to me, and perhaps -I may read this sentence in that connection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Under Number 3, toward the end of the Document -L-79, it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“To study weak points of the enemy.</p> - -<p>“These studies must not be left to the general staffs. Secrecy -would no longer be guaranteed. The Führer has, therefore, -decided to order the formation of a small research staff within -the OKW composed of representatives of the three branches -of the Wehrmacht and, as occasion arises, the three commanders-in-chief—that -is to say, general staff chiefs.</p> - -<p>“The staff shall keep the Führer constantly informed.</p> - -<p>“The research staff shall undertake the planning of operations -from the theoretical side and the preparations which of -necessity arise therefrom...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. A passage is left out in the -English translation. The copy I have before me says, “These studies -<span class='pageno' title='42' id='Page_42'></span> -must not be left to the general staffs; secrecy would no longer -be guaranteed.” And then it goes on, “This staff shall keep the -Führer informed and shall report to him.” I do not think it is -very important. Go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Apparently the paragraph about the research -staff in the Armed Forces High Command was left out in the -English. Continuing the document:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The purpose of certain regulations concerns no one outside -the staff; however great the increase in armament of our -adversaries may be, they must at some time come to the end -of their resources and ours will be greater. The French have -120,000 men in each class! We shall not be forced into a war, -but we shall not be able to avoid one.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This research staff, in effect, eliminated the commanders-in-chief -and that was what Hitler wanted to achieve.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If I am correctly informed, the rest has been read by the Prosecution—namely, -the subsequent aim and the principle, to be specific, -the well-known order to keep everything secret and, at the end, -that which the witness remembered, that the shipbuilding program -should not be changed and the armament program should be fixed -for 1943-1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Had Hitler at this time intended a -war of aggression, would he have had to speed up any particular -part of the Navy’s armament?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, indeed. He would have had to speed up all naval -construction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Would not the construction of submarines especially -have had to be speeded up?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course, particularly because they could be -built most quickly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: How many submarines did you have at this time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot say exactly. I think about 26.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If I remember rightly, Admiral Dönitz has already -answered that there were 15 capable of sailing in the Atlantic—by -the way, there were altogether 26.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, in the winter of 1938-1939, did you -have a talk with Sir Nevile Henderson on relations between Germany -and England?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, a very short talk at an evening reception in the -Führer’s house, where I stood near Ambassador Henderson and -Herr Von Neurath, and wherein the question was discussed—it was -<span class='pageno' title='43' id='Page_43'></span> -brought up by me—as to whether England had not welcomed Germany’s -offer to set the proportion of strength at 1 to 4 and would not -draw certain conclusions from this reciprocal relationship. Ambassador -Henderson answered, without anyone else having brought -up this question, “Yes, that would be shown in the future when the -colonial question was settled.” I later reported this answer to the -Führer in order to use it to maintain a friendly policy toward -England.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We are now at the summer of 1939. Admiral, in -the course of the summer, after the speech of 23 May 1939, did -you talk to Hitler in view of the generally known danger of war, -and what did he tell you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Whenever I talked to the Führer, I always brought up -the question of England, whereby I annoyed him to a certain extent. -I tried to convince him that it would be possible to carry out the -peace policy with England which he himself had urged at the -beginning of his regime. Then he always reassured me that it -remained his intention to steer a policy of peace with England, -always leaving me in the belief that there was no danger of a -clash with England—in any case, that at this time there was no -such danger.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the third key document—namely, -Hitler’s speech before the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939, -at Obersalzberg. There are two documents: Document 1014-PS and -Document 798-PS. Document 1014-PS is Exhibit USA-30, in Raeder -Document Book 10a, Page 269; and Document 798-PS is Exhibit -USA-29, in Document Book 10a, Page 266. In regard to this -Document 1014-PS, which I have here in the original in the form -submitted by the Prosecution, I should like to make a formal -request. This Number 1014-PS was read into the record in the -afternoon session of 26 November 1945 (Volume II, Page 286). -I object to the use of this document. I request that this document -be stricken from the trial record for the following reason...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What document are you speaking about now, -1014-PS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In Raeder Document Book 10a, Page 269, Exhibit -USA-30.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, what are your reasons?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The deficiencies which were already mentioned -in the other transcripts are much greater here. This document is -nothing but two pieces of paper headed “Second Speech by the -Führer, on 22 August 1939.” The original has no heading, has no -file number, no diary number, and no notice that it is secret; no -signature, no date, no... -<span class='pageno' title='44' id='Page_44'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the -original. Yes, Dr. Siemers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It has no date, no signature—in the original in -the folder, it has no indication of where the document comes from. -It is headed “Second Speech...” although it is certain that on this -date Hitler made only one speech, and it is hardly 1½ pages long, -although...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you say it has no date, it is part of -the document itself which says that it is the second speech of the -Führer on the 22d of August 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I said, Mr. President, it has a heading but no date.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But you said it has no date.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It has no date as to when these notes were put -in writing. It has only the date of when the speech is supposed to -have been made. On all documents which the Prosecution submitted, -also in the case of minutes, you will find the date of the -session and the date on which the minutes were set up; also the -place where the minutes were set up, the name of the person who -set it up, an indication that it is secret or something like that. -Furthermore, it is certain that Hitler spoke for 2½ hours. I believe -it is generally known that Hitler spoke very fast. It is quite out -of the question that the minutes could be 1½ pages long if they -are to give the meaning and the content, at least to some extent, -of a speech which lasted 2½ hours. It is important—I may then -refer to still another point. I will submit the original of Document -798-PS afterwards. I am no expert on handwriting or typewriters, -but I notice that this document, which is also not signed, -whose origin we do not know, is written on the same paper with -the same typewriter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You say we do not know where it has come -from—it is a captured document covered by the affidavit which was -made with reference to all other captured documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Well, but I would be grateful to the Prosecution -if, in the case of such an important document, the Prosecution -would be kind enough in order to determine the actual historical -facts to indicate more exactly where it originates. Because it is -not signed by Schmundt or Hossbach or anyone and has no number, -it is only loose pages.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether the Prosecution can -do that, but it seems to me to be rather late in the day to ask for it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United -States): Mr. President, I do not know what the exact origin of this -document is offhand, but I expect that we could probably get some -<span class='pageno' title='45' id='Page_45'></span> -information before the Tribunal if the Tribunal wishes us to do so. -But as the President pointed out, it is a captured document and -everything that counsel says about it seems to go to its weight -rather than to its admissibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know where the -document was found, if that is possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I will make an effort to find that out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd just pointed out that -my objection comes rather late. I believe I recall correctly that -repeated objections were raised...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it was I who pointed it out, not -Mr. Dodd.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. I believe I recall correctly that the -Defense on several occasions raised objection during the Prosecution’s -case, and it was said that all statements could be made -during the Defense’s case at a later time—namely, when it is the -defense counsel’s turn to speak.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I only meant that it might not be possible -at this stage to find out exactly where the document came from, -whereas, if the question had been asked very much earlier in the -Trial, it might have been very much easier. That is all I meant. -Have you anything more to add upon why, in your opinion, this -document should be stricken from the record?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like to point out, Mr. President, that -I do not do it for formal reasons but rather for a very substantial -reason. Most important words in this document have constantly -been repeated by the Prosecution during these 5 or 6 months—namely, -the words “Destruction of Poland, main objective... Aim: -elimination of vital forces, not arrival at a certain line.” These -words were not spoken, and such a war aim the German commanders-in-chief -would not have agreed to. For that reason it is -important to ascertain whether this document is genuine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this connection, may I remind the Court that there is a third -version of this speech as mentioned in this courtroom—namely, -Document L-3, which is even worse than these and which was -published by the press of the whole world. Wherever one spoke -to anyone, this grotesque and brutal speech was brought up. For -that reason it is in the interest of historical truth to ascertain -whether Hitler spoke in this shocking way at this time. Actually, -I admit he used many expressions which were severe, but he did -not use such words, and this is of tremendous significance for the -reputation of all the commanders who were present.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Let me point out the next words. They say expressly, “close -your hearts against pity, brutal measures.” Such words were not -<span class='pageno' title='46' id='Page_46'></span> -used. I will be in a position to prove this by another witness, -Generaladmiral Böhm.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I therefore request the Court to decide on my request for striking -this document from the record. I should like to point out that the -document is mentioned in the record at many points. Should the -honorable Court so wish, I would have to look for all the points. -I have found only four or five in the German record. If necessary, -I would give all the points in the English record. It was submitted -on 26 November 1945, afternoon session (Volume II, Page 286).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need bother to do that. -You are now only upon the question of whether the document -should be stricken from the record. If it were to be stricken from -the record, we could find out where it is. Is that all you wish -to say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: One question to Admiral Raeder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The words which I just read, “brutal measures, elimination of -vital forces”—were these words used in Hitler’s speech at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In my opinion, no. I believe that the version submitted -by Admiral Böhm, which he wrote down on the afternoon -of the same day on the basis of his notes, is the version nearest -to the truth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to achieve clarity on this -question, I submit as Exhibit Raeder-27, in Raeder Document Book 2, -Page 144, an orderly reproduction of this speech.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I also have Document Book 2?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: This is the speech according to the manuscript of -Generaladmiral Hermann Böhm. Generaladmiral Böhm was present -at Hitler’s speech on 22 August 1939 at Obersalzberg. He made -the notes during the speech. He transcribed them in the present -form on the same evening—that is, on 22 August 1939—in the Vier -Jahreszeiten Hotel in Munich. I have certified the correctness of the -copy. The original is in the handwriting of Generaladmiral Böhm. -Böhm has been called by me as a witness for various other questions. -He will confirm that the speech was made in this form as I -have submitted here. A comparison of the two documents shows -that all terms, such as “brutal measures,” are not contained in this -speech. It shows further...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Surely this part of Dr. Siemers’ -argument must go to weight. He has said that a comparison of -the two documents shows such and such. I have just looked at the -end of Admiral Böhm’s affidavit and it contains, I should argue, -every vital thought that is contained in Document 1014-PS. But -whether it does or not, that is a matter of weight, surely. We -<span class='pageno' title='47' id='Page_47'></span> -cannot, in my respectful submission, go into intrinsic comparisons to -decide the admissibility of the document. As I say, on that I should -have a great deal to say by comparing the documents in detail. -That is not before the Tribunal now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal was only wanting to hear -whatever Dr. Siemers has got to say upon the subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: A comparison of the document with Document -798-PS, in the longer and better version, as the Prosecution submitted...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, as Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has -just pointed out, a mere comparison of the documents—of the two -or three documents does not help us as to its admissibility. We -know the facts about the document. It is a document in German, -captured among German documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I understand. I made the statement only in order -to show that I am not raising objections for formal reasons, but -because the thing is actually of great importance. In proof of my...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you will be able to urge that -when you make your speech in criticism of the document as to -its weight. You will be able to point out that it does not bear -comparison with a fuller document taken down by Admiral Böhm -or with the other document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Absolutely right. To explain my formal request, -I refer to my statement on the formal character of the document -which I submitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The application to strike out Document 1014-PS is denied.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has Counsel for the Prosecution understood -that the Tribunal wishes to have information as to where that -document was found?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord; we will do our -best to get it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and also the other, Document 798-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, if Your Lordship pleases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I submitted Document Raeder-27, which -is the Böhm version, to you. You have read the speech in this -version. Is this reproduction correct on the whole, in your recollection? -<span class='pageno' title='48' id='Page_48'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. In my opinion, this version is that one which -corresponds most closely to reality. I remember especially that -Hitler devoted a large portion of his remarks to the point that -England and France would not intervene, giving reasons why they -would not. He mentioned a number of reasons, and I missed just -that portion, in its elaboration, in the other reproductions of -the speech.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the version of the speech Document 798-PS -or Exhibit USA-29 it says verbatim: “I am only afraid that at the -last moment some swine will offer me some plan of arbitration.” -Were those words used in the speech at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In my recollection, certainly not. The Führer was not -accustomed to using expressions like that in speeches which he -made to the generals.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On the other hand, the version put forth by -Böhm shows that Hitler had, by this time, decided to attack -Poland. I am asking you to give us briefly the impression, which -the speech made on you at the time. Tell me also why, despite -this speech which even in this version is severe, you retained your -office as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Without doubt, I had the impression that the situation -was serious and tremendously tense. The fact, however, that Hitler -in his speech put too great a stress on proving that France and -England would not intervene, and the second fact that Herr Von -Ribbentrop, the Reich Foreign Minister, left for Moscow on the -same day to sign a pact there, as we were told—these things filled -not only me but all listeners as well with the strong hope that -here again was a case of a clever move by Hitler, which in the -end he would successfully solve in a peaceful way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore I saw no reason to resign my office at that moment. -I would have considered that pure desertion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection -I would like, because of their chronological correspondence, to -submit the two documents Exhibits Raeder-28 and 29, and I ask -that the Tribunal only take judicial notice without my making -further reference to them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have cited Document C-155 and have accused -you, through this document...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, of the documents to -which Dr. Siemers has just referred—Documents Raeder-28 and 29—the -first is a memorandum of General Gamelin and the second -is a letter from General Weygand to General Gamelin of 9 September -1939. -<span class='pageno' title='49' id='Page_49'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Your Lordship will remember that the Prosecution objected to -these documents as being irrelevant, and, My Lord, the Prosecution -maintain that objection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not wish to interrupt Dr. Siemers’ examination any more -than is necessary. If at the moment he is merely asking the Tribunal -to take judicial notice of the documents and does not intend -to use them, it would probably be convenient—in order not to -interrupt the examination-in-chief—that I merely indicate formally -that we are maintaining our objection to the document. Of course, -I am at the disposal of the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is this the position, that they were allowed -to be translated and put in the document book but that no further -order of the Tribunal has been given?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No further order has been given -and therefore, My Lord, it is still open to us to object, as I understand -the position.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better deal with it -now, then.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I make a few remarks on this point? -I believe...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But we had better hear the objection first, -had we not? And then we will hear you afterwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, as you wish. This is a purely -formal point. I believe that Sir David erred slightly in referring -to Document Raeder-28. There was no objection to this document -by the Prosecution, but only against Document Raeder-29.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My friend is quite right; we did -not object to the translation of 28. However, My Lord, it falls -into the same category as 29, and I would still raise an objection. -I apologize to Your Lordship if I conveyed the impression that -we had made an objection before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, the Number 28 is a letter from General Gamelin to -M. Daladier on the 1st of September 1939, in which General Gamelin -gives his views as to the problem of the neutrality of Belgium -and Luxembourg and contrasts that view with the view of the -French Government.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, My Lord, I submit that that expression of opinion on the -part of General Gamelin is in itself intrinsically too remote from -the issues of this Trial to be of any relevance or probative value.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, apart from its intrinsic nature, the position is that this -was a document which, as I understand from Dr. Siemers’ verification -on Page 158, is taken from the <span class='it'>White Book of the German -<span class='pageno' title='50' id='Page_50'></span> -Foreign Office</span>, from the secret files of the French General Staff, -which could not have been captured until sometime after June 1940. -Therefore, as a secondary reason, it can have no relevance to any -opinion formed by the Defendant Raeder in September of 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, the second document is, as I said to the Tribunal, -a letter to General Gamelin from General Weygand, who was then -the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army in the Levant. It -describes a plan which General Weygand had in mind with regard -to possible operations in Greece. Nothing came of these operations -before June 1940 when an armistice was made by Marshal Pétain -on behalf of part of the French people—although not, of course, of -the whole—and it can have no relevance to October 1940 when -Greece was invaded by Italy, or to the position at the end of 1940 -and the beginning of 1941 when the invasion of Greece begins to -be considered in the German directives and operational orders -which have been put in before the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the first point. And the same secondary point applies, -that it was also a captured document which could not have been -captured before June 1940; therefore, it can have no relevance to -this defendant’s state of mind in August or September of 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, as a matter of convenience, I have just made a list of -the documents to which objections will be made and, My Lord, -there are one or two additions which my French and Soviet -colleagues have asked me to make, and I will deal with them -when they arise.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, I would just like the Tribunal to have in mind that -there are four geographical groups of documents as opposed to the -groups under which they are arranged here, which the Tribunal -will have to consider. One is formed by documents relating to -the Low Countries, the second, which is Group G on the list which -I have just put before the Tribunal, deals with Norway; a third -deals with Greece, of which Document Raeder-29 is an example; -and a fourth is Group E in the list which I have just put in, dealing -with tentative proposals and suggestions made by various military -figures with regard to the oil field in the Caucasus or operations -on the Danube.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, the same objections which I have made particularly -with regard to Documents Raeder-28 and 29 will apply generally -to these groups, and I thought that I ought to draw the Tribunal’s -attention to that fact. In addition, my friend Colonel Pokrovsky has -intimated to me some special objections which we will have to -certain documents on which he can assist the Tribunal himself -when they arise.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But, My Lord, I do take these specific cases, 28 and 29, as -objectionable in themselves, and I draw the Tribunal’s attention -<span class='pageno' title='51' id='Page_51'></span> -to the fact that they are also typically objectionable as belonging -to certain groups.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The decision of the Tribunal, Your Lordship, is given in the -morning session of 2 May 1946. Your Lordship said, “The question -of their admissibility will be decided after they have been -translated.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French -Republic): May it please the Tribunal, I would ask the Tribunal -for an opportunity to associate myself publicly with the declaration -just made by Sir David and to propose a few examples which will -show the degree of importance which should be attached to the -documents in question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defense is asking that the Tribunal take into account a -document published in the German <span class='it'>White Book</span> Number 5, under -Number 8. This document reports a statement by a French prisoner -of war who is supposed to have said that he had been in Belgium -since 15 April. However, the German <span class='it'>White Book</span> gives neither -the name of this prisoner nor any indication of his unit. We have -none of the information which we need in order to judge whether -the statement is relevant. We are therefore faced with a document -which is not authentic and which has no value as evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defense is asking that Document Raeder-102 of the same -document book be admitted by the Tribunal. I ask the Tribunal -to let me make a few observations to show the one-sided manner -in which these documents have been assembled by the German -authorities in the <span class='it'>White Book</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would say, first of all, that this Document Raeder-102 has not -been quoted at length. The French Delegation has referred to the -text of the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>. We have read it carefully. This -document is only a preparatory order in view of defensive preparations -organized by the Belgians on the French-Belgian frontier -facing France. We have consulted the Belgian military authorities. -This order was a manifestation of the Belgian Government’s determination -to defend Belgium’s neutrality on all its frontiers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is therefore contrary to the truth to try to prove by means -of this document the existence of staff contacts between Brussels, -London, and Paris, which, if they had existed, would have been -contrary to the policy of neutrality.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The commentary made by the German Minister for Foreign -Affairs in the introduction to the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>, Page 11 of -the French text, took the counsel by surprise and certainly did not -mislead Admiral Raeder, who is a serviceman. In fact, it is at -the price of a lie that the official commentator affirms, on the one -hand, that the expression “les forces amies” (friendly forces) used -<span class='pageno' title='52' id='Page_52'></span> -in this document means French and British troops, whereas in -reality it is a regular expression used in the Belgian Army to describe -Belgian units in the immediate vicinity of those actually fighting. -On the other hand, the German commentator claims, and I quote, -“The general line Tournai-Antoing, of the canal from Mons to -Condé, Saint Ghislain and Binche, is partly in Belgian and partly -in French territory.” It is sufficient to look at a map to see that -all those localities are in Belgian territory and they are all at -least some dozens of kilometers distant from the French-Belgian -frontier, and in places, 60 kilometers from the French frontier.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to excuse this interruption. I thought it was -advisable to enlighten them by giving a convincing example of -the value of the evidence furnished by the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks the most -convenient course would be to hear your argument now upon these -documents, not only upon 28 to 29, but upon the other documents -specified in Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe’s list, and then the Tribunal -would consider these documents after the adjournment and would -give its decision tomorrow morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I should be very -grateful if it would be possible to proceed in a somewhat different -manner. I should like to call attention to the fact that a rather -lengthy debate regarding documents has already taken place, and -the decision of the Court followed. I believe that if I comment -upon all the documents at this point a great deal of time will be -lost, since the coherence of the documents will emerge of itself -later during my presentation of evidence. If I now deal with the -list submitted by Sir David, I would, in order to show my reasons, -have to set forth all that which will appear again in the regular -course of testimony later on. I thought that the decision of the -Tribunal first to present the documents in the document book was -specifically to save time, and then objections could be made one by -one as individual documents are presented.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I know; but there are a very great number -of documents. The Tribunal will have to hear an argument upon -each document if we do what you suggest, reading the list of Sir -David. There are 30 or 40 documents, I suppose.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has already stated that -he will be guided according to different geographical groups. Therefore, -there will not be objections with regard to each document but -rather with regard to each group of documents and each group of -questions—for instance, an objection in the Norway case against -all Norwegian documents or in the Greek case against all Greek -documents. It would be easier to deal with matters that way, since -<span class='pageno' title='53' id='Page_53'></span> -in my testimony I shall be dealing with Greece and Norway -anyway, whereas if I do so now I shall have to say everything -twice. But I shall of course be guided by the decision of the -honorable Tribunal. I only fear that an unnecessary amount of -time will be lost that way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I only want to say -one word on procedure. I did hope that Dr. Siemers and I had -already occupied sufficient of the Tribunal’s time in arguing this -point because, of course, the arguments as to relevancy must be -the same. Whether they are so obviously irrelevant as not to be -translatable, or whether they are inadmissible, at any rate my -arguments were the same, and I did not intend to repeat the argument -which I had made before the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Dr. Siemers already assisted the Tribunal for an hour and a half -on this point, which we discussed before, and I hoped that if I stated -as I did state that I have maintained the points which I put before -the Tribunal in my previous argument, that Dr. Siemers might be -able on this occasion to shorten matters and to say that he relied -on the—if I may say so—very full argument which the Tribunal -had on the other occasion. That is why I thought it might be -convenient if we dealt with them now and put this problem out of -the need for further consideration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks that you -must argue these questions now, and it hopes that you will argue -them shortly, as your arguments have already been heard in favor -of them. But we think that you must argue them now and not -argue each individual document as it comes up, and it will consider -the matter. It already has these documents, but it will consider -the matter again and decide the matter tonight.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for -the U.S.S.R.): My Lord, inasmuch as the Tribunal decided to have -Dr. Siemers argue the point which was expressed by Sir David -Maxwell-Fyfe and other prosecutors, I think it is my duty to name -three documents to which our Prosecution object.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Soviet Prosecution would like to object altogether to five -documents. Two of them—I have in mind Documents Raeder-70 -and 88—have already been included by my friend Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe -in the list which has been given to the Tribunal. So all -I have to do now is to name the three remaining numbers, so that -Dr. Siemers would have it easier in answering all together. I name -Documents Raeder-13, 27, and 83.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Raeder-13 is a record of a report of Captain Lohmann. -There is an idea expressed in this report which I cannot call other -than a mad and propagandist idea of a typical Nazi. The idea -<span class='pageno' title='54' id='Page_54'></span> -is that the aim of the Red Army is world revolution, and that the -Red Army is really trying to incite world revolution. I consider -that it would not be proper if such nightmares and politically -harmful ideas were reflected in the documents which are to be -admitted by the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My second objection is in connection with the Document -Raeder-27. This is a record which was made by a voluntary -reporter, Böhm, of an address of Hitler’s at Obersalzberg. The -Tribunal already rejected Dr. Siemers’ application to include two -documents pertaining to the same questions and emphasized the -fact that the Tribunal does not wish to compare the authenticity -of different documents pertaining to or dealing with the same -question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I consider that inasmuch as the Tribunal already has at its -disposal among documents which were admitted two records -dealing with Hitler’s address at Obersalzberg, therefore, there is -no necessity to admit the third record of his speech, especially -since in this third version there are altogether shameless, -slanderous, and calumnious remarks against the Armed Forces of -the Soviet Union and the leaders of the Soviet Government. Neither -the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union nor we as representatives -of the Soviet State would ever agree to have such remarks included -in the record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The third document is Document Raeder-83. Document 83 is -an excerpt from the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>. Since the authenticity -of this <span class='it'>White Book</span> has already been questioned by Dr. Dubost, -I consider it material which cannot be relied upon, and in particular -with regard to the Document Raeder-83. There are several remarks, -harmful to the Soviet Union, which have absolutely no political -basis—that is, the passage pertaining to the relations between the -Soviet Union and Finland. So on the grounds of such general -political motives, I would ask the High Tribunal to exclude as -evidence Document Raeder-83 from the list of documents which -were presented to the Tribunal by Defense Counsel Siemers. -Furthermore, strictly speaking, it is absolutely clear that this document -is irrelevant. That is all I want to say.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I note to my regret -that we are back at the beginning again in our debate about documents; -for we are disputing about documents now which were not -mentioned at all in the original debate concerning documents, -which took place on 1 May. I had believed, however, that I could -rely on this one principle, that at least those documents which at -that time were not objected to would be considered granted. Now, -however, I find that those documents which were not discussed at -that time at all are under dispute. It is extremely difficult... -<span class='pageno' title='55' id='Page_55'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks you are -entirely in error in that, because it is obvious that a document -which has not been translated cannot be finally passed on by the -Prosecution or by the Tribunal, and the fact that the Prosecution -does not object to it at that stage does not prevent it from objecting -at a later stage when it has been translated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: There were some documents to which I was -told that the Prosecution did not object, and with regard to them -I believed at any rate that that was final, just as with reference -to some documents...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought I had made myself clear. What -I said was this: The Prosecution in objecting or not objecting to -a document before it is translated does not in any way bind them -not to object to it after it is translated. Is that clear?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall take these documents one by one. -First of all, I would like to start with those documents which -Colonel Pokrovsky...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, no, Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal will not -listen to these documents taken one by one. If they can be treated -in groups they must be treated in groups. They have been treated -in groups by Sir David, and I am not saying you must adhere -exactly to the same groups, that the Tribunal is not proposing to -hear each document one by one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Then it is a misunderstanding. -I wanted to discuss those documents at the beginning, because -there are some things which are not clear and which were objected -to by Colonel Pokrovsky. I did not realize that Colonel Pokrovsky -mentioned the documents in groups. I believe he mentioned five -documents—three of them individually—and I believe that, though -I have not understood everything, I can deal with these individually -mentioned documents one by one. However, I shall be glad to start -with the group laid down by Sir David if that is to be dealt with -first. Shall I first...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you said you were going to deal with -the documents one by one, you meant all the documents one by -one? I am not suggesting that you...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You can deal with Colonel Pokrovsky first -if you like.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Colonel Pokrovsky has as his first objection -Document Raeder-13. This deals with a document dated 1935. -Certainly Colonel Pokrovsky can offer some objection to the -contents of this document, but how a document can be classed as -<span class='pageno' title='56' id='Page_56'></span> -irrelevant just because a certain sentence allegedly contains propaganda -is not quite clear to me. I believe I could find sentences in -other documents which have been submitted during these past -6 months which might be interpreted in some way as propaganda. -I cannot quite imagine that that is an objection, and I would like -to remind the Tribunal that right at the beginning of the proceedings, -when we were dealing with Austria, the Tribunal rejected an -objection made by the Defense regarding a letter. The Defense -objected because the author of the letter was available as a witness. -Thereupon, the Tribunal, and justly so, decided that the letter was -evidence. The only matter for debate is the probative value. The -Tribunal admitted this document. And in connection with this I -should like to mention that a lecture at a university which is set -down in writing is a document. The lecture deals with the naval -agreement, and I believe that therewith the relevancy...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, have you not made your point -on Number 13? You said the majority of the thing is clearly -relevant, though there is one sentence which may be alleged to be -propaganda, and, therefore, the document ought not be struck out. -Is that not your point?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, I am saying that it is a document which has -a bearing on the evidence used in this Trial, and the Soviet Prosecution -cannot dispute it because it was a lecture given in 1935. -I cannot at all understand the use of the word “propaganda” by -Colonel Pokrovsky in connection with this document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I do not understand what you say in -the least. I thought I put the point you had made. I thought you -made it clear that the document in itself was relevant and could -not be rejected because it contained one sentence which was -alleged propaganda. That is your point, and I shall want it stated -in one or two sentences, and the Tribunal will consider it. I do -not see why the time of the Tribunal should be taken up with a -long argument about something else.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Colonel Pokrovsky secondly, if I understood the -interpreter, objected to Document Number Raeder-27. In this -instance we are concerned with the speech of Hitler at Obersalzberg -on 22 August 1932. It is Exhibit Raeder-27. It is very hard -for me to comment on this document since I do not understand the -objections of Colonel Pokrovsky. It deals...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The objection was that there was no necessity -for a third record of the speech. There were two records which -you objected to, and he said there was no necessity for a third.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I would like to add to that then, Your Honor, -that the Soviet Delegation does not agree with the Delegation of -<span class='pageno' title='57' id='Page_57'></span> -the United States. In the record at that time the representative of -the American Delegation said that if any one had a better version -of that speech, he should present it. Therefore, I agree with the -opinion of the American Prosecution and I believe, aside from that, -that not a word about the relevancy of a speech which was made -shortly before the outbreak of the war is necessary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Raeder-83 is the third document objected to by -Colonel Pokrovsky. This contains the sixth session of the Supreme -Council on 28 March 1940, the drafting of a resolution with the -heading “Strictly Secret.” In this document the Supreme Council—that -is, the constituents of the Allied leadership—agreed that the -French and British Governments on Monday, 1 April, would tender -a note to the Norwegian and Swedish Governments. The contents -of this note is then given, and there is a reference to the point of -view of vital interests, and it says there then the position of the -neutrals would be considered by the Allies as one contrary to their -vital interests, and that it would evoke an appropriate reaction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Under Figure 1c of this document, it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Any attempt by the Soviet Union which aimed at obtaining -from Norway a position on the Atlantic Coast would be -contrary to the vital interests of the Allies and would provoke -the appropriate reaction.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You do not need to read the document, do -you? I mean you can tell us what the substance of it is. It appears -to be an objection to any further attack upon Finland, which would -be considered by the Allies to be contrary to their vital interests. -That is all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, just this expression “vital interests” -is the decisive one. I do not wish, as the Prosecution always seem -to think, to bring up some sort of objection from the point of view -of <span class='it'>tu quoque</span>. I want to show only what the situation was according -to international law, and that at the same time when Admiral -Raeder was entertaining certain thoughts regarding Norway, -Greece, and so forth, the Allied agencies had the same thoughts -and were basing these thoughts on the same concept of international -law which, as I recently said, was upheld by Kellogg—namely -that the right of self-preservation still exists. Now I can -prove my point through these documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The point made against you by Sir David -was that the document could not have come into the hands of the -German authorities until after the fall of France.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall deal with the groupings designated -by Sir David. -<span class='pageno' title='58' id='Page_58'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Sir David made certain fundamental statements. Regarding -Document Numbers Raeder-28 and 29, he pointed out specifically -that in one case they were the thoughts of General Gamelin and -in the other case those of General Weygand, and that these ideas -were not known to the Germans at that time since these documents -were not yet in our hands. The latter point is correct. The concept -and the plan of occupying Greece, of destroying Romanian oil -wells, those thoughts were known to the Germans—namely, through -their intelligence service. The Prosecution did not present the -data of the German High Command which show these reports. -Since I do not have these documents, I believe it would be just -if I am given the possibility of presenting the actual facts which -were known to Germany and in this way prove them. I have no -other proofs. That it is agreeable to the Prosecution to deprive -me of the documents which I need for the defense, I can understand; -but the Prosecution must also understand the fact that I -consider it important that those documents which are definite proof -of certain plans remain at my disposal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The charge has been made against Admiral Raeder that it was -an aggressive war—a criminal war of aggression—to formulate -plans for the occupation of Greece. Document Raeder-29 shows -that General Weygand and General Gamelin on 9 September 1939 -concern themselves with planning the occupation of neutral -Salonika. So if this is the case, I cannot understand how one can -point an accusing finger at Admiral Raeder, on the German side, for -having concerned himself with such plans a year and half later. -I believe, therefore, that these and similar documents must be -granted me, for only from them can the military planning and the -value of the military planning, or the objectionable side—that is -the criminal side of the planning, be understood. The strategic -thinking of the defendant can be understood only if one knows -approximately what strategic thinking prevailed at the same time -with the enemy. The strategic reasoning of Admiral Raeder was -shut up in an airtight compartment but depended on the reports -received about the strategic planning of the opposition. It is a -reciprocal activity. This reciprocal activity is necessary for an -understanding. Therefore, in view of this very essential point, I ask -to be granted this kind of document since, as I have recently stated, -I do not know how I can carry on my defense at all in the face -of these grave accusations regarding Greece and Norway if all of -my documents are stricken. I believe that I am understood correctly -when I do not assert that we were cognizant of these documents. -But Germany knew the contents of these documents, and I believe -that is sufficient.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May it please the Tribunal, we are once again at Document -Raeder-66 in Group A. This Document Raeder-66 is the opinion -<span class='pageno' title='59' id='Page_59'></span> -of Dr. Mosler, an expert in international law, about the Norwegian -operation as judged from the standpoint of international law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Since we are always talking about saving time in this courtroom, -I would have my doubts about rejecting this article, for a refusal -would force me to set forth the trend of thought point by point in -detail, and I believe that it is much easier for the Tribunal, for the -Prosecution and for me, if I submit general legal arguments in this -connection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this is a document -which is a matter of legal argument. If the Tribunal thinks it -would be of any assistance to have the argument in documentary -form, I willingly withdraw my objection to that. That is on quite a -different project than the other one, and I want to help in any -way I can.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>While I am before the microphone: I did mention that there -were two other documents that fall into the same group. Document -Raeder-34 falls into Group B, and Document Raeder-48 into -the Group E.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, I did mention 28 when I was addressing the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I do not wish to -dispute Document Raeder-66, I have really done this just to ease -the situation for everyone. The additional documents in this group -are Raeder-101 to 107. I cannot say that this is a homogeneous -group. One document deals with Norway, another deals with -Belgium, a third deals with the Danube. The unity of this group -escapes me. Basically these documents have this point in common: -that, as I have already stated, a plan existed in the Allied General -Staff, as well as in the German, and all were based on the tenet -of international law regarding the right of self-preservation and -vital interests.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In order to be brief at this point I should like to refer to Document -Raeder-66 particularly, and to save time I ask that the -quotations from this document be considered the basis for my -remarks today on the right of self-preservation. I am referring -to the quotations on Page 3 and Page 4 of this expert opinion. The -legal situation is made very clear therein, and it is set forth very -clearly in this expert opinion that, with regard to the question of -the occupation of Norway, we are not concerned with whether the -Allies had actually landed in Norway but only whether such a plan -existed, that we are not concerned with the fact whether Norway -agreed or did not agree. The danger of a change of neutrality -according to international law gives one the right to use some -compensating measure or to attack on one’s own accord; and this -basic tenet has been maintained in the entire literature which is -<span class='pageno' title='60' id='Page_60'></span> -quoted in this document, and to which I shall refer later in my -defense speech.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Out of group 101 to 107, I have to mention Document Raeder-107 -especially. Document Raeder-107 is not concerned at all with the -<span class='it'>White Books</span> as the other documents are. 107 is an affidavit by -Schreiber. Schreiber was naval attaché at Oslo from October 1939 -onward. From the beginning I have said that I needed Schreiber -as a witness. In the meantime, I dispensed with Schreiber because -even though we tried for weeks, we could not find him. I discussed -this matter with Sir David and with Colonel Phillimore. I was -advised that there would be no objection on this formal point since -Schreiber suddenly and of his own accord reappeared again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If, as the Prosecution wish, this piece of evidence is taken from -me—namely, the affidavit of Schreiber about the reports which -Admiral Raeder received from Oslo and, in addition to that, the -documents from which the authenticity of these reports may be -shown—then I have no evidence for this entire question at all. -Besides, Schreiber was in Oslo during the occupation and he has -commented in his affidavit with regard to the behavior of the Navy -and the efforts of Admiral Raeder in connection with the regrettable -civil administration of Terboven. Therefore, I am asking the High -Tribunal to grant this affidavit to me or to grant Schreiber as a -witness so that he can testify personally. This latter course, -however, would take up more time. I have limited my evidence -through witnesses to such a degree that I believe that, in view of -the entire span of 15 years with which we are dealing, in the case -of the Defendant Raeder at least, such an affidavit should be -granted me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With regard to Group B, I should like to refer to the remarks -which I have already made. As far as I can see, the group seems -to be thoroughly heterogeneous, but I believe they are all documents -taken from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>. The same ideas should be -applied which I have recently expressed to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think Sir David recognized that there was -a certain degree of lack of identity in these groups, but he suggested -that they all fall into geographical groups: one group, the Low -Countries; one group, Norway; one group, Greece; and one group, -the Caucasus and the Danube—which agrees with “E.” That is -what he said. Could you not deal with them in those geographical -groups?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have already talked about Norway and in that connection -I therefore refer to the remarks I have already made. I have -already briefly mentioned Greece. I would like to say that there -<span class='pageno' title='61' id='Page_61'></span> -was a double accusation made: One, that neutral ships were sunk—namely, -neutral Greek ships, and secondly, the accusation of an -aggressive war against Greece—that is, the occupation of all Greece.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With regard to the last point, I have already made a few statements. -Dealing with the Greek merchantmen I would like to say -only that in this case the action and attitude of the defendant -appears justified in that he received reports which coincided with -the documents which were found a month later in France. The -same reports were received by Raeder when he expressed his views -to Hitler. I would like to prove that these reports which came to -him through the intelligence service were not invented by the -intelligence service but were actual facts. The same applies to the -oil regions. Plans existed to destroy the Romanian oil wells and -furthermore there was a plan to destroy the Caucasian oil wells; -both had the object of hurting the enemy; in the one case Germany -alone—as far as Romania was concerned—and in the second case -Germany and Russia, because at that time Russia was on friendly -terms with Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These plans are—and this is shown by the documents—in the -same form as all other documents presented by the Prosecution. -These documents as well, in their entirety, are “top secret,” -“personal,” “confidential.” Just as the Prosecution have always said, -“Why did you do everything secretly? That is suspicious.” These -documents contain ideas based on strategic planning just as do the -documents presented by the Prosecution. That is something which -arises from the nature of war and which is not meant to be an -accusation on my part, nor should it be construed as an accusation -against Admiral Raeder by the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then the group of Ribbentrop documents follows. I can say -only what I said recently. And as I glance at it cursorily now, the -documents in the Ribbentrop document book are not as complete -as they are here. Therefore, I believe it is important to take the -documents and to investigate their complete content from the point -of view of Raeder rather than the point of view of Ribbentrop. -That perhaps may have taken place, as the High Tribunal -suggested the other day. Then I believe, however, it is not an -objection which can be used by the Prosecution to say that in the -case of Ribbentrop they were partially admitted and partially -rejected. For some documents which were granted Ribbentrop were -refused me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then we turn to Group “E,” and that is <span class='it'>tu quoque</span>. I believe -I have already spoken sufficiently on that point just recently. -I dispute it again and I cannot understand why the Prosecution -will not agree with me on that. I do not wish to object. I am not -saying <span class='it'>tu quoque</span>; I am only saying that there is strategic planning -<span class='pageno' title='62' id='Page_62'></span> -which is carried on in every army and there are tenets in international -law which applied to the Allies exactly in the same way -as to us, and I beg to be granted these possibilities of comparison in -foreign politics.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe herewith that I have dealt with all points so far as it -is possible for me to define my position in such a brief period of -time with regard to about 50 documents, and I am asking the High -Tribunal not to make my work more difficult by refusing these -documents to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will carefully consider these -documents and your arguments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 17 May 1946, at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='63' id='Page_63'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND DAY</span><br/> Friday, 17 May 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have given careful and prolonged -attention to the consideration of the documents offered by -Dr. Siemers on behalf of the Defendant Raeder; and they, therefore, -do not wish the documents which they propose to admit to be read -because they have already read them all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will now deal with the documents individually.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document 66 is admitted for the purposes of argument, and not -as evidence; Document 101 is denied; Documents 102 to 105 are -admitted; Document 106 is denied; Document 107 is admitted; Document -39 is denied; Document 63 is admitted; Document 64 is denied; -Document 99 is denied; Document 100 is admitted; Documents 102 -to 107 are admitted; Document 38 is denied; Document 50 is denied; -Document 55 is denied; Document 58 is denied; Documents 29, 56, -57, 60, and 62 are denied. I should have included in that group -Document 28, which is also denied. Documents 31, 32, 36, 37, and 39 -are denied; Document 41 is admitted; Document 99 has already been -denied, and Document 101 has already been denied; Document 59 -is admitted; Document 68 is denied; Document 70 is denied; Document -72 is denied; Document 74 is denied; Document 75 is admitted; -Document 77 is admitted; Document 79 is admitted; Document 80 -is admitted; Document 84 is admitted; Document 85, which is on -Page 82 of Volume V, is admitted; Document 87 is denied; Document -88 is admitted; Document 91 is admitted; Document 13 is -admitted; Document 27 is admitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution may, if they wish it, apply to cross-examine the -witness who made that document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United -States): That is Admiral Böhm.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Admiral Böhm, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document 83 is admitted; Document 34 is admitted; Document 48 -is denied.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Have I gone too quickly for you, Dr. Siemers? You have the -last few?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I heard everything. -<span class='pageno' title='64' id='Page_64'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, yesterday afternoon the Tribunal -asked that we ascertain the origins, if possible, of Document 1014-PS. -Some question was raised about it by Dr. Siemers. It is Exhibit -USA-30.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have had a search made, and I have some information that -we are prepared to submit concerning this document. I should -like to point out that 1014-PS and 798-PS and L-3 are documents -all concerning this same speech made at Obersalzberg on 22 August -1939. They were offered in evidence by Mr. Alderman of the -American staff on the 26th day of November 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to point out that L-3, to which Dr. Siemers made -reference yesterday, was offered only for identification, as the -record shows for the proceedings of that day on the 26th of November, -and has received the mark Exhibit Number USA-28 for -identification only. Mr. Alderman pointed out, as appears in the -record, that he was not offering it in evidence, that it was a paper -which came into our hands originally through the services of a -newspaperman, and that later on the Documents 798-PS and -1014-PS were found among captured documents. They referred to -the same speech in Obersalzberg. Mr. Alderman offered these two -at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now Document 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29, and Document -1014-PS, Exhibit Number USA-30, were both found by the -forces of the United States in this fashion:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>They had been taken from the OKW headquarters in Berlin, -and in the course of various journeys in those days they finally -arrived at one place and were stored, it now appears, at various -places by the OKW under the control of a General Winter of the -German forces; and they were transported in three railway trains -to Saalfelden in the Austrian Tyrol. Subsequently, General Winter -ordered that all documents in his possession be turned over to the -Allied forces and they were. These particular documents, together -with some other papers, were turned over by General Winter and -members of his staff at that time; and on the 21st day of May 1945, -they were removed from Saalfelden where they were under the -control of General Winter and taken to the Third U.S. Army Document -Center at Munich. While at Munich they were sorted and -cataloged by Department G-2 Supreme Headquarters of the -American Expeditionary Force with the assistance of clerks from -the OKW and OKH. On the 16th of June 1945 these documents, -together with others, were removed on six trucks from the headquarters -of the Third Army at Munich and were taken to the U.S. -Group Control Council Number 32 at Seckenheim, Germany, which -was located in the former offices of the I.G. Farben Company, and -were placed on shelves on the third floor of the building and kept -<span class='pageno' title='65' id='Page_65'></span> -under guard. Between the 16th of June 1945 and the 30th of August -1945, the task of collecting, sorting, assembling and cataloging these -documents was carried out under the supervision of the British -Colonel Austin, with personnel of the Supreme Headquarters and -the G-2 Document Center of the G-2 Operational Intelligence -Section, 6889 Berlin Document Section, and the British Enemy -Document Unit, and the British Military Intelligence Research -Section. Beginning on the 5th day of July 1945, and continuing -until the 30th of August 1945, these documents were screened at -that place by members of the staff of the United States Chief -Counsel. Lieutenant Margolies, who is here in the courtroom and -a member of our staff, personally picked these documents out of -your file 798-PS and 1014-PS from the OKW captured files, brought -them to Nuremberg, and lodged them in the document room where -they have been kept under strict security ever since.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, that is the history of these two documents about which -Dr. Siemers raised some question yesterday—a considerable question -I might say—and inferred there was something strange about -their contents. I think the story which I have given in the form -of a statement over the signature of Lieutenant Commander Hopper -clearly establishes the source and where they have been ever since; -and I think it is only fair to say that, since Dr. Siemers saw fit -to point out that this language sounded extremely harsh and was -attributed to Hitler, these documents were offered to show these -people were actually talking about aggressive war. The reading -of the three documents by the Tribunal will clearly show they are -all in agreement in substance; of course, there are differences in -phraseology, but the important thing and purpose for which they -were offered was to show that these people were talking aggressive -war. I might say I am not surprised to find my friend is sensitive -about the remark, but I think the unanswered proof in the case -thus far shows that not only were these things said but they -were done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: May it please the Court. No doubt it is a mistake -in translation. We understood 106 had been rejected the first time -and admitted the second time in the Group 102 to 107.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was my mistake. I did say -that the Group 102 to 107 were admitted; but I have also said 106 -was rejected, and it is rejected. It is entirely my mistake. 106 is -rejected.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: 106 is thrown out and 102 to 107 are also rejected, -are they?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, I will state the exact numbers: 102, 103, -104, 105, and 107 are admitted. -<span class='pageno' title='66' id='Page_66'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: Very good. Mr. President, we want to offer further -explanations on 102 to 107 during the course of the proceedings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I say a few words concerning -the statement made by Mr. Dodd?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I had no doubts, and I certainly have no doubt now, that since -these documents were found they have been handled very correctly -and Mr. Dodd spoke only about that. I believe it is important to -establish: Whether one can determine the connection these documents -had with other documents, because in that way one can see -whether these were documents belonging to a certain adjutant. For -instance, were they together with the Hossbach papers or together -with the Schmundt file? If, for instance, the documents were with -the Schmundt documents it is probable that they belonged to the -adjutant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That all goes to the weight of the document, -does it not? No doubt, a document which is signed has more weight -than a document which is not signed. All those matters the Tribunal -will take into account when considering the documents, but -the admissibility of the document depends upon its being a German -document found and captured.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I wanted to say this only because -it is unpleasant to have the American Delegation misunderstand -my motion concerning the document. I make no charges concerning -the manner in which the document was found, I merely say that -it is undecided among which papers it was found. It came to my -attention that Mr. Dodd treated the three documents concerned in -quite the same way, whereas Mr. Alderman on Page 188 of the -record (Volume II, Page 286), states that one of these three documents, -L-3, was evidently not in order because of its doubtful -origin. And therefore he withdrew the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I then, if it please the Court, continue with the examination -of the Defendant Raeder?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, we have a few final questions -concerning the conspiracy. I believe it will not take much time. -I ask you to look at the Document C-155. That is Exhibit GB-214, -in Document Book 10, Page 24—Document Book 10 of the British -Delegation, Page 24.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is your letter of 11 June 1940, which was sent to 74 Navy -offices and which the Prosecution has called a letter of justification. -The Prosecution wants to deduce from this that you knew that a war -was to be expected as early as the summer of 1939. I should like -you to answer this charge very briefly. -<span class='pageno' title='67' id='Page_67'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: There is manifold proof to show that I was not -expecting a war in the fall at all, and in view of the small extent -of rearmament of the German Navy this was quite natural. I have -stated quite clearly in my speech before the U-boat officers in -Swinemünde that we could not count on it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And what was the reason for that letter, C-155?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The reason was that a number of torpedo boats had -misfired and this could be traced to the fact that torpedoes had -not yet been as perfectly developed as they should have been at -the beginning of a war. An additional reason was that, now that -the war had so suddenly broken out, many officers believed that -it would have been better to have developed the submarine weapon -as much as possible first, so that at least this weapon would be -ready in large numbers in the event of a war. I objected to that -opinion precisely because such a war was not to be expected. And -on Page 6, 8th paragraph, I emphasize again—in the second line—that -the Führer hoped until the end to postpone the imminent -dispute with England until 1944 or 1945. I am speaking here of -an imminent dispute. An imminent dispute is not exactly something -to strive for, it is rather to be feared.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: There is another key document, that is, Document -789-PS, Exhibit USA-23, the very long speech made by Hitler -on 23 November 1939 before the commanders-in-chief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The document, Mr. President, is in Document Book 10a on -Page 261. This is again a Hitler speech where there is no indication -of who recorded it. Signature and date are missing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Since this is similar to the other -documents I do not have to question you on that point. I would -merely like to know, Admiral, did that speech also betray a -definite background, a certain mental reservation on the part of -Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. There was at that time a rather severe conflict -between Hitler and the commanders-in-chief of the Army, and also -a difference of opinion with the leading generals concerning the -offensive in the West. The Führer assembled all the leaders in -order to give them his opinion about this whole matter. He stated—and -I was present myself—that up to that time he had always -been right in his decisions and that he would also be right in the -opinion that the western offensive had to be undertaken in the -fall if possible. Toward the end he used very harsh words; in the -third from the last paragraph of the document he states: “I shall not -be afraid of anything and I shall destroy everyone who is against -me.” That was directed against the generals. Actually the western -offensive did not take place until the spring because the weather -conditions delayed them. -<span class='pageno' title='68' id='Page_68'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We have heard details of that during previous -proceedings, and I believe we do not have to go into that now. -In this connection we come to the last document, that is C-126, -which you also have in front of you, GB-45. It is in Document -Book 10a on Page 92.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With regard to the preparation of the war against Poland, the -Prosecution has submitted this document of the High Command -of the Armed Forces dated 22 June 1939 and signed by Keitel, -because that document contained a timetable for “Case White”; -that is, the case of Poland. Did that document or that directive -indicate to you a definite aggressive intention?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. Not a definite intention of aggression at all. In -all cases certain long-range questions had to be cleared up, such -as, for instance, whether our training ships which used to put to -sea in summer should leave, or whether they should wait. This -decision, however, was only to be made in the beginning of August. -In connection with that order I issued the order of 2 August also -pertaining to that document, to the individual higher Naval offices, -namely, an operational directive for the use of Atlantic submarines -in the Case White. May I be permitted to read the first lines, -because the wording is important:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Attached is an operational directive for the employment of -U-boats which are to be sent out into the Atlantic by the -way of precaution in the event that the intention to carry -out Case White should remain unchanged. F.d.U. (Commander -of the U-boat fleet) is to hand in his operation orders to SKL -by 12 August. The decision regarding the sailing of U-boats -for the Atlantic will probably be made before the middle -of August.</p> - -<p>“If the operations are not carried out, this directive must be -destroyed by 1 October 1939 at the latest.” (Document C-126, -Exhibit GB-45)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus it was not definite that such operations would take place. -It was rather a precautionary measure which had to be taken under -all circumstances in connection with the Case White.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have said that Hitler assured you -repeatedly, particularly when you spoke to him personally, that -there would not be a war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Particularly there would be no war against -England?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='69' id='Page_69'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, then, on 3 September 1939 war did start -with England. In connection with this did you speak to Hitler -about that question—and if so, when?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: On the 3 September in the morning, I believe between -10 and 11 o’clock—I cannot remember the exact hour—I was called -into the Reich Chancellery. The SKL had already informed me -that the ultimatum had been received from England and France. -I came into the study of the Führer where a number of persons -were assembled. I only remember that Deputy of the Führer -Hess was present. I could not say who else was there. I noticed -that Hitler was particularly embarrassed when he told me that -despite all his hopes, war with England was imminent, and that -the ultimatum had been received. It was an expression of embarrassment -such as I had never noticed on Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the charge made by the Prosecution -that you, Admiral, agreed with National Socialism and -strongly supported it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal to look at Document -D-481, which is GB-215 in Document Book 10a, Page 101. This deals -with the oath of civil servants and the oath of soldiers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution, with reference to -this document, has stated that on 2 August 1934, in a special -ceremony, you took an oath to Adolf Hitler, and not to the -fatherland. In the transcript, of 15 January 1946, Page 2719 -(Volume V, Page 262), we read, “The Tribunal will see that Raeder”—in -his oath—“put Führer in the place of fatherland.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not understand this and I will ask you to explain, whether -it is correct that you had any part in changing the oath from -“fatherland” to “Hitler.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I cannot understand that accusation at all. The -entire matter was not particularly a ceremony. I do not know who -is supposed to have observed it so that he could make such a -statement. The Commander-in-Chief, Von Blomberg, and the three -commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces were called to Hitler -on the morning of 2 August. We were in his study and Hitler -asked us to come to his desk without ceremony or staging. There -we took the oath which he, as Chief of State and Supreme Commander -of the Armed Forces, read to us. We repeated that oath. -None of us participated in the writing of that oath and no one -had asked us to do so. That would have been quite unusual. The -oath referred to the person of Hitler. No previous oath had ever -been rendered to the fatherland as far as the words were concerned. -Once I took an oath to the Kaiser as Supreme War Lord, once to -the Weimar Constitution, and the third oath to the person of the -<span class='pageno' title='70' id='Page_70'></span> -Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces—Hitler. -In all three cases I took the oath to my people, my fatherland. -That is a matter of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when you were ordered to that meeting -on 2 August, did you know before what it was to deal with?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Well, I would assume that his adjutant informed my -adjutant that I was to come in connection with the taking of the -oath. I could not speak with certainty now, but I assume so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It was the morning after the death of Hindenburg?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On the day after the death of Hindenburg?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you know about the wording of the oath?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, but the oath was written on a piece of paper -and I assume that we were informed of the wording before, at the -desk, there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I say at this time, Mr. President, that the -wording is contained in the document that I have mentioned and -represents a Reich law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution asserts that on -30 January 1937 you became a Party member by virtue of the -fact that you received the Golden Party Badge. Will you answer -briefly to this point, which has been discussed previously in other -cases?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: When the Führer gave me the Golden Party Badge -he said, specifically, that this was the highest decoration which -he could give at the time. I could not become a Party member at -all because it had been stated that soldiers could not be members -of the Party. That was generally known, and for this reason that -assertion likewise is incomprehensible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The membership of soldiers was prohibited by -the Constitution?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, prohibited. May I say one more thing to prevent -any misunderstanding? It was prohibited both by the Weimar -Constitution and the decrees which Hitler had issued.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were you in opposition to the Party because of -your staunch Christian and Church attitude, which was generally -known? Briefly, how did it work out? Did you have any difficulties -with the Party because of it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In general I had no great difficulties with the Party, -which I think is best explained by the fact that the Navy had -<span class='pageno' title='71' id='Page_71'></span> -considerable prestige in the Party, as it did in all Germany. I always -had the higher officers, at least the chiefs of bases and fleet commanders, -settle any friction which occurred in the lower echelons, -through the proper authorities. If they were more important they -were brought to my attention and I took care of them; if they -dealt with matters of principle I passed them on to the OKW. -Since I never let anything slip through, in case of incitement by -the Party, the entire relations soon became very smooth and -I could prevent all sorts of friction, so that before long they rarely -occurred. In that respect we had the advantage in the Navy because -there were no territorial matters to administer. We were concerned -with the sea and only worked in the coastal cities where actually -everything concerned the Navy. I did have difficulties because of -Heydrich, whom I had removed from the Navy in 1928 or 1929 -after a court of honor had sentenced him for unscrupulous treatment -of a young girl. He was very resentful toward me for a long -time and he tried on various occasions to denounce me to the -leadership of the Party or to Bormann and even to the Führer. -However, I was always able to counteract these attacks so that -they had no effect on my situation in general.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This attitude of Heydrich communicated itself in some way to -Himmler, so that here also, from time to time, I had to write a -strongly worded letter; but it was precisely the strong wording -of those letters which was of help in most cases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should not like to waste any time by mentioning various -instances, such as the one with the SD; however, there were no -direct attacks because of my position in regard to the Church. -There was only the statement made by Goebbels, which I learned -of through my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche, that I was in disfavor -with the Party on account of my attitude toward the Church; but, -as I have said, I was not made to feel it in a disagreeable way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe I do not need to ask you to waste any -time in explaining the importance which you placed on religious -matters in the Navy. I will submit an affidavit to this effect without -reading it. It was made by Chief Navy Chaplain Ronneberger, -whom you have known for many years and who described the -situation and thus clarified everything. In that connection, however, -may I put one question: Did you emphasize repeatedly to Hitler -that a religious attitude was necessary for the soldiers and the -Navy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that happened frequently, and I kept to this -course in the Navy until the end without hesitation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, Mr. President, I might submit -Exhibit Number Raeder-121 (Document Raeder-121). It is in my -<span class='pageno' title='72' id='Page_72'></span> -Document Book Raeder Number 6, Page 523. I should not like to -take the time of the Tribunal by asking questions about the -contrasting views between the Party and the Navy in matters of -the Church. I believe that this document makes it sufficiently clear -that a bond between Church and National Socialism was not -possible. In this field Bormann is the most outstanding figure, and -I should like to read only the first paragraph of the exposé which -I have submitted:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“National Socialistic and Christian concepts are incompatible. -Christian churches are built on the ignorance of man and -are at pains to sustain the ignorance of as large a part of -the population as possible, for only in this way can the -Christian churches maintain their power. In contrast to this, -National Socialism rests on scientific foundations.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In the second paragraph, the last sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“If therefore in the future our young people do not learn -anything more about Christianity, the teachings of which -are far inferior to our own, then Christianity will disappear -of itself.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And, on the second page at the end:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Just as the harmful influence of astrologers, soothsayers, -and other swindlers are eliminated and suppressed by the -State, so the possibilities for the Church to exert its influence -must also be entirely removed. Only when this has happened -will the State leadership have full influence over the individual -citizen. Only then will the existence of the people and -the Reich be guaranteed for all time.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Since the religious and Christian attitude of the defendant is -generally known, I believe this is enough to show the contrast -between the Party and the defendant in these matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Concerning the conspiracy, the Prosecution -has also accused you of being a member of the Secret -Cabinet Council and the Defense Council. Will you please answer -quite briefly, because these questions have been discussed so often -that I assume that no one in this Court wishes to hear anything -further about these things. Were you a member of the Reich -Government?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: According to Document 2098-PS, which is GB-206, -Document Book 10, Page 39, a decree of the Führer of 25 February -1938, you and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army were made -equal in rank to the Reich Ministers. The Prosecution asserts that -therefore you were a member of the Cabinet and were permitted -to and did participate in the meetings. Is that correct? -<span class='pageno' title='73' id='Page_73'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I was not a Reich Minister but only equivalent -in rank. The reason for that was, I believe, that General Keitel -was made equal in rank with the Reich Ministers because, in -administering the affairs of the War Ministry, he was frequently -in contact with them and had to be on the same level in order -to negotiate with them. And since Brauchitsch and myself had -seniority over General Keitel we also received the same rank. -I was not a member of the Cabinet at all, but the decree states -that on the order of the Führer I could participate in a Cabinet -meeting. It was probably intended that I was to come to the -Cabinet when technical matters had to be explained. However, that -never occurred, since after that time there were no Cabinet -meetings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that in Paragraph 2 of that -decree by Hitler it states: “The commanders-in-chief... on my -orders shall participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. And as far as the Secret Cabinet Council is -concerned I need only confirm that, as Hitler told me himself the -Secret Cabinet Council had only been formed in order to honor -the retiring Foreign Minister, Von Neurath, in order to give the -impression abroad and at home that Von Neurath would still be -consulted on foreign policy in the future. However, that Secret -Cabinet Council never met.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has made the charge that on -12 March 1939, on the day commemorating the heroes, you made -a speech and that in that speech you came forth with a ruthless -challenge to fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I state, if it please the Court, that unfortunately the speech -was entered in the document book by the Prosecution only from -an excerpt which was selected from a certain point of view; and -I believe that it would be well to know the context of the entire -speech. Of course, I shall not read it, but I should like to submit -it as Exhibit Number Raeder-46. The sentence is in my Document -Book Number 3, Page 235, the page from which the Prosecution -took the quotation. Will you please briefly express your opinion -of that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I in doing so read a few short sentences which -will characterize the entire speech?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have no doubt that the Tribunal will permit -that. I only ask you to use only a few significant sentences, just -as the Prosecution have done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: On Page 7, Line 6, it says...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is on Page 235, the same page -which contains the quotation of the Prosecution. -<span class='pageno' title='74' id='Page_74'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Shortly before the quotation of the Prosecution we -read on Line 6:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“He has given back self-confidence and confidence in their -own ability to the German people, and thereby enabled them -to retake, by their own strength, their sacred right refused -to them during the time of their weakness and, beyond that, -to approach the tremendous problems of the times with -courage, and to solve them. Thus the German people and -the Führer have done more for the peace of Europe and the -world than some of our neighbors are able to realize today.” -(Document Number Raeder-46)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then we come to the sentence where I speak about the announcement -of the fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry which -has been quoted by the Prosecution. I should like to state briefly -in connection with it that after the experiences of the years 1917 -to 1919, communism and international Jewry had destroyed the -resistance of the German people to a considerable degree and had -gained an excessively large and oppressive influence in German -affairs, in affairs of state as well as in economic affairs, as for -example also in the legal field. Therefore, in my opinion, one could -not be surprised that the National Socialist Government tried to -loosen and, as far as possible, remove this large and oppressive -influence. Although in pursuing this course the National Socialist -Government took rather severe steps which led to the Nuremberg -Laws—the exaggerations of which I regretted, of course—nevertheless, -in the course of the speech which I made in public at the -orders of the Reich Government, I could not find it compatible with -my conscience to express my personal opinions, which were basically -different. It must also be considered that such a speech had to fit -into a general framework. That, however, was only one short -sentence, whereas other points were considerably more in the -foreground. In that connection I ask for permission to read two -more short sentences:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“And this is the reason for the demand for equal rights and -equal respect with all other nations which alone can guarantee -that the nations will live peacefully together on this earth.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then the last sentence, on Page 235:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Within the bounds of German national community the -Führer has assigned us our tasks as soldiers to protect our -homeland and our peaceful national reconstruction and to -train the young manhood, fit for military service, which was -entrusted to us and which has to pass entirely through our -hands.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The next sentence was quoted by the Prosecution, because there -I spoke of the fact that we should not only train these young people -<span class='pageno' title='75' id='Page_75'></span> -technically in the sense of the technical use of arms but also -educate them in the sense of National Socialist ideology and -philosophy, and I stated that we had to march shoulder to shoulder -with the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have always taken the view that the Armed Forces should not -be a completely extraneous body in the State. It would be impossible -to have a republican armed force in a monarchist state or an armed -force with monarchist tendencies in a democratic state. Thus our -Armed Forces would have to be incorporated into the National -Socialist State to the extent necessary to create a real people’s -community, and it would be the task of the commanders of the -Armed Forces to educate their branches of the forces in such a way -that they would recognize and live up to the good national and -socialist ideals of the National Socialist State. This would be done -in the same way as I did it as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. -In this way it was possible to incorporate the Armed Forces in an -orderly manner, to keep them from all exaggeration and excesses, -and at the same time to form a people’s community within the State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And then on the bottom of Page 236:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“This nation needed a new, a true peace, the peace of justice -and honor, peace without hatred. The world also needs -peace. Because a weak Germany could not obtain peace, -a strong one has won it for herself. It is the proud task -of the German Wehrmacht, to secure this peace for the -German nation against everybody.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And quite at the end of the document, the 11th or 12th line from -the bottom of the page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“But the soldier over there, whom we respect as the valiant -representative of his country, may accept a soldier’s word: -What Germany needs and wants is peace. These are not -just words but it has been proved by practical examples. -The construction work of Germany requires many years of -quiet development.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I think that this is sufficient...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I point out to the High Tribunal that in the English translation, -on Page 236, as far as I remember, one sentence was underlined. -That is: “The Wehrmacht and Party are one indivisible -entity.” The Prosecution has submitted that. Apart from that, -nothing is underlined.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I wish to say in passing that in reality, in the original, many -other passages are underlined, particularly those sentences which -Admiral Raeder has just read which deal with peace. -<span class='pageno' title='76' id='Page_76'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, the Prosecution has accused -you with having connections with all the political activities of -National Socialism. Therefore I am compelled to ask you briefly -concerning your participation in actions in those countries where -participation by the Navy is certainly surprising.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In what way were you connected with the measures concerning -the annexation of Austria?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Navy had nothing to do with the Anschluss of -Austria at all and did not take part in any way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you make any preparations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. In the case of Austria, no preparations were -needed. The case of Austria was mentioned in Document C-175, -but that dealt only with the directive of 1 July 1937 for the unified -preparation of the Armed Forces for war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that C-175 is USA-69, in the -Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 117.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution considers this -document important and therefore I should like you to say a few -words about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It deals with a statement, which, according to my -knowledge, is made in every state for every year and in which, -according to the political situation, such cases are mentioned which -may arise in the course of the year and for which, of course, certain -preparations have to be made. For the Navy, however, that document -had no sequel as far as Austria was concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So it is a document which numerous...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we have the reference -to that right. It came through, I thought, C-157, USA-69, 10a, and -then I did not get the page.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Page 117.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that C-157 or 175?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: C-175.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Does this concern strategic preparations -for various eventualities?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; various cases are mentioned here, for instance, -the “Case Red” and the special “Case Extension Red-Green.” All -these had to be dealt with but they did not necessarily lead to any -consequences.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection I wanted to -submit various documents, Raeder exhibits, from which it can be -seen that the same type of preparations, since they are necessary -for military and strategic reasons, were also undertaken by the -<span class='pageno' title='77' id='Page_77'></span> -Allies—only to show their necessity. At this moment I should like -to forego that because I cannot determine so quickly which of these -documents are admitted and which have been rejected. Perhaps -I may therefore submit the connected documents at the end in -order that no misunderstanding may occur now by my quoting the -wrong figures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In what way did you and the Navy -participate in measures concerning the Sudetenland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In a directive...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. May I ask you to look at the -document of the Prosecution 388-PS. It is USA-126—no, excuse -me—USA-26. It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation, -10a, Page 147. It is a draft for the new directive “Grün” of -20 May 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have the directive here. It is of 20 May 1938 -and says with regard to the Navy:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Navy participates in the operations of the Army by -employing the Danube flotilla. That flotilla is put under the -command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In regard -to the conduct of naval warfare, at first only those measures -are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful -protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden -intervention in the conflict by other states. Those measures -must be confined to what is absolutely necessary, and must -be carried out inconspicuously.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The entire course of action at the end of September and -beginning of October made the special measures unnecessary, so -the Danube flotilla which we had taken over from Austria was -put under the command of the Army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What was the size of the Danube flotilla?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It consisted of some small river craft, one small gunboat -and minesweepers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That is the total extent to which the Navy -participated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, in which the Navy participated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In what way did you and the Navy participate -in the preparations for the occupation of what the document calls -the “remainder of Czechoslovakia”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This concerns Document C-136, USA-104 in the Document Book -of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 101. It is of 21 October 1938. -The Prosecution points out that according to that you had already -been informed in October that Czechoslovakia was to be occupied -<span class='pageno' title='78' id='Page_78'></span> -after some time, that is in March, as actually happened. Will you -please tell us something about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That directive looks suspicious at first but the way -in which it is drafted shows that this again refers to possible cases. -Point 1 deals with the securing of the borders of the German Reich -and protection against surprise air attacks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Points 2 and 3 are “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia,” -“Occupation of the Memel Country.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 2, “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia”: -The first sentence reads, “It must be possible to shatter the -remainder of Czechoslovakia at any time if her policy should -become hostile toward Germany.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the prerequisite in case of any action against Czechoslovakia; -that did not mean that it was certain that any action -would be taken.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the same manner, under Number 3, mention is made of the -occupation of the Memel country, where it says: “The political -situation, particularly warlike complications between Poland and -Lithuania, may make it necessary for the German Armed Forces -to occupy the Memel country.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. May I point out that, according to -my document, the part which the witness has just read is -missing in the English translation—so that you will not look for it -unnecessarily.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] So here again this is a possible -eventuality?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On 3 September 1939, at the beginning of the -war, the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was sunk. From the military point of view that -case has already been clarified by Herr Kranzbühler, but I should -like you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to state your position -and give an explanation of the incident with special consideration -of the fact that the Prosecution, especially in this case, has raised -a very severe and insulting accusation. They have made the -accusation that you, purposely and in violation of the truth, held -England and Churchill responsible for the sinking of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, -although you knew perfectly well that the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> had been sunk -by a German U-boat. As proof, the Prosecution has submitted the -article of 23 October 1939 from the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, that is Document Number 3260-PS, GB-218. -Document Book 10 of the British Delegation on Page 97.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I would like you to explain that -point. -<span class='pageno' title='79' id='Page_79'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The fact is that on 3 September at dusk the young -submarine commander of the submarine <span class='it'>U-30</span> met an English -passenger ship which had its lights dimmed and torpedoed it -because he assumed, by mistake, that it was an auxiliary cruiser. -In order to avoid misunderstanding I should like to state here that -the deliberations of Kapitänleutnant Fresdorf, which have been -mentioned here concerning the torpedoing of dimmed ships in the -Channel, did not yet play any part in the Naval Operations Staff -at that time and that this commanding officer could not have -known anything about these deliberations. He knew only that -auxiliary cruisers had their lights blacked out, and he assumed that -this was an auxiliary cruiser at the entrance of the northwest -channel, England-Scotland. He did not make a report since it was -not necessary. The information that a German U-boat had torpedoed -the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was broadcast by the British radio, and we probably -received the news during the night of the 3d to the 4th, and -transmitted it to the various news services.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the morning of 4 September we received that news at the -offices of the Naval Operations Staff, and I requested information -as to how far our nearest submarine was from the place of the -torpedoing. I was told, 75 nautical miles. At about the same time, -State Secretary Von Weizsäcker in the Foreign Office, who had -been a naval officer in the first World War, learned of this situation -and made a telephone call to the Naval Operations Staff, -asking whether it was true. He did not call me personally. He -received the answer that, according to our information, it could -not be right. Thereupon he sent for the American Chargé d’Affaires—I -believe Mr. Kirk—in order to speak to him about the matter -because the radio broadcast had also mentioned that several Americans -had been killed in that accident. From his experiences in the -first World War it was clear to him how important it was that -there should be no incident involving America. Therefore, he told -him what he had heard from the Naval Operations Staff. I personally -told the same thing to the American Naval Attaché, -Mr. Schrader, and that certainly in good faith. I believed that I could -tell him that in good faith because we had no other information. -State Secretary Von Weizsäcker then came to see me personally, if -I remember correctly. We were very close friends, and he told me -what he had told the American Chargé d’Affaires. He apologized, -I believe, for not having spoken to me personally and that -concluded the case for the time being.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The matter was such that, if it had been reported in a normal -way, we would not have hesitated to admit and to explain the -reason. We would not have hesitated to apologize to the nations -concerned. Disciplinary measures would have been taken against -<span class='pageno' title='80' id='Page_80'></span> -the officer. I also reported the incident to the Führer himself in -his headquarters and told him that we were convinced such was -not the case, and the Führer ordered that it should be denied. This -was done by the Propaganda Ministry, which had been informed -of the order by my press department.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The submarine returned on 27 September...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me if I interrupt. That date, Mr. President, -is identified by Document D-659, which was submitted by the -Prosecution, it is Exhibit GB-221 in Document Book 10 on Page 110.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The submarine commander returned on 27 September -to Wilhelmshaven. Admiral Dönitz has already described how he -received him and how he immediately sent him to me to Berlin by air.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The U-boat commander reported the entire incident to me and -confirmed that it was a sheer mistake, that it was only through all -these messages he had heard that he himself discovered that it was -not an auxiliary cruiser that was concerned but a passenger steamer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I reported the facts to the Führer because they could have had -severe political consequences. He decided that, as it had been -denied once, we had to keep it utterly secret, not only abroad but -also within official circles and government circles. Consequently, -I was not in a position to tell State Secretary Von Weizsäcker or -the Propaganda Ministry that the facts were different. My order to -the Commander of the U-boat fleet reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“1. The affair is to be kept strictly secret upon orders of the -Führer.</p> - -<p>“2. On my part, no court-martial will be ordered because -the commanding officer acted in good faith and it was a -mistake.</p> - -<p>“3. The further political handling of the matter is to be -attended to by the High Command of the Navy, as far as -anything has to be done.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>With that the commander returned to Wilhelmshaven and -Admiral Dönitz has already reported that he was punished by -disciplinary procedure. To our great surprise, about one month -later that article appeared in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> in which -Churchill was accused of being the author of that incident. I knew -absolutely nothing about that article beforehand. I would certainly -have prevented its appearance because, knowing that our submarine -had torpedoed that ship, it was out of the question to lay -the blame on the enemy, on the First Lord of the Admiralty of -all people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I found out later that the order to publish such an article was -issued by Hitler and reached the Propaganda Ministry through the -Reich Press Chief. As far as I remember I was told that the -<span class='pageno' title='81' id='Page_81'></span> -Propaganda Minister had himself drafted that article. Later I could -not prevent it. I did not see the article nor did any of my officers -of the High Command of the Navy see it. They would certainly -have come to me at once so that I could have prevented its publication. -We had no reason to expect such an article 4 weeks after the -torpedoing of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>. That is the case of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You just said that you had discovered that Hitler -knew about the article. When did you discover this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Here, from my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Not at that time then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, by no means.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit again at a quarter -past two.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='82' id='Page_82'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the meantime I have perused my documents -and I am therefore in a position to carry out the original plan, that -is, of submitting the documents during the examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In connection with the documents which we dealt with last, -Document C-126, “Strategic Preparations,” I should like to submit -the following documents which are contained in the <span class='it'>White Books</span>, -documents which have been granted me for my use and which also -concern strategic preparations on the part of the Allies. We are -dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-33. It is the document dated -9 November 1939; and also Exhibit Number Raeder-34, General -Gamelin to General Lelong, 13 November 1939; and also Exhibit -Number Raeder-35, two extracts from the Diary of Jodl, 1809-PS, -which concern the measures taken by the Luftwaffe regarding the -Caucasus. It is not necessary for me to comment on this. I would -just like to call your attention to the questions which I put to the -witness Reich Marshal Göring on 18 March; he has already testified -regarding the plans of the Allies for the destruction of the Caucasian -oil fields. And finally in this connection, Exhibit Number Raeder-41, -to be found in the Document Book 3, Page 205, and the following -pages, a report of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, -General Gamelin, dated 16 March 1940, it deals with the war plans -for the year 1940 concerning the tightening of the blockade, the -plans regarding the Scandinavian countries and, in addition, the -plans for the destruction of the Russian oil wells in the Caucasus.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, before I deal with the -separate campaigns of Greece, Norway, and so forth, I would like to -ask you to answer a question which relates to you personally. What -decorations did you receive from Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I received from Hitler in the autumn of 1939 in addition -to the Golden Emblem, which I have already mentioned, the -Knight’s Order to the Iron Cross. Furthermore, in the year 1941 on -the occasion of my 65th birthday I received a donation of 250,000 -marks. This donation was given to me by Hitler through an adjutant -and in connection with that he sent a document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When I thanked him on the very first occasion, he told me that -he was giving me this donation as a means of decoration in the same -manner as the former rulers of Prussia had given their generals -similar donations, whether as sums of money or as a country estate; -then he emphasized that Field Marshals Von Hindenburg and Von -Mackensen had received donations from him as well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the passage “Greece.” With -regard to Greece, the Prosecution has quoted Document C-12, which -<span class='pageno' title='83' id='Page_83'></span> -is GB-226. This is to be found in Document Book Number 10, Page 1. -This document deals with the decision on the part of Hitler which -was transmitted through the OKW, dated 30 December 1939, signed -by Jodl, and we read under Number 1.:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Greek merchant ships in the area around England, declared -by the United States to be a barred zone, are to be treated -as enemy vessels.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This decision on the part of Hitler was made on the basis of -a report by the SKL. What caused you to make this report even -though Greece was neutral at the time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that time we had received a large number of intelligence -reports from our intelligence service that Greek shipping -companies apparently with the knowledge of the Greek Government -were allowing Greek ships to be chartered by England under favorable -conditions. Therefore, these Greek ships were in the service of -England and thus were to be treated in the same way as we were -treating the English merchantmen. These intelligence reports were -confirmed later on to an even greater degree than had been the case -in the beginning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I would like to submit to the -High Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-53, to be found in my Document -Book 3, Page 258. This document deals with the War Diary kept -by the SKL in the month of December 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 259, under the date of 19 December, the following entry -is made:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Greece has hired out about 20 vessels to ply between the United -States, Le Havre and Liverpool.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is confirmed by the reports just mentioned by the defendant. -The next entry, on the same page under the date 30 December:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Justified by the sales and chartering of numerous Greek ships -to England it has been decreed, with the agreement of the -Führer, that Greek ships in the zone from 20 degrees West -to 2 degrees East and from 44 degrees North to 62 degrees -North shall be considered as hostile craft by U-boats. Attacks -to be made invisibly as far as possible.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I also submit the following document, Number Raeder-54. This -document is taken from the <span class='it'>White Books</span>. It is dated 23 January -1940, and it is a report from the German Embassy at the Hague to -the Foreign Office. The heading is: “The Contemplated Chartering -of 50 to 60 Greek Ships to the British Government.” It is not necessary -for me to read it. I should like merely to quote the beginning -of the first sentence:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“After the British press brought reports at the end of November -last year”—that is, 1939—“about the alleged charterings of Greek -<span class='pageno' title='84' id='Page_84'></span> -vessels to British companies”—and so forth—then follows the statement -that these 50 to 60 ships are now chartered by British companies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Even though it is not quite accurate historically, I would now -like first of all to conclude the question of Greece. In historical -sequence Norway should follow now first, but for the sake of -coherence I should like to deal with Greece and the occupation of -Greece first.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Document C-152, identical with C-167 or Exhibit GB-122, -in the Document Book of the British Delegation Number 10, Page 23, -the Prosecution has charged you with the Figure 9 of this lengthy -document, specifically Figure 9.)B.)f.). It says there:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy requests confirmation -of the fact that the whole of Greece is to be occupied even in -the case of a peaceful solution. The Führer: Complete occupation -is a stipulation for any settlement.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This document concerns your report to Hitler of 18 March 1941. -What were the reasons for your making this proposal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In the beginning I had but little knowledge of the -political intentions of the Führer as far as Greece was concerned, -but I did know of his Directive Number 20, dated 13 December 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, I would like to mention for -the assistance of the Court that we are dealing with Document -1541-PS, that is GB-117, Document Book of the British Delegation -10a, Page 270. This directive is dated 13 December 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In this directive the Führer, for the reasons given in -Paragraph 1, said that his intention was, as set forth in Paragraph 2:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“b.) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in -March, to employ this group of forces to occupy the north -coast of the Aegean by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to -occupy the entire Greek mainland (‘Operation Marita’). The -support of Bulgaria is to be expected.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The next time I heard about these things again was when I heard -that the British had landed in southern Greece on 3 March. We -learned that on about 5 or 6 March. For this reason I asked the -Führer that he occupy all of Greece in order to prevent the British -from attacking us from the rear, by air, and from erecting air bases, -all of which would hamper the conduct of our war not only in -Greece but also in the eastern Mediterranean.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The fact was that when a political decision had been made by -Hitler of his own accord and without having consulted anyone, I, -as Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, always had to draw my -strategic conclusions from this political decision and then had to -<span class='pageno' title='85' id='Page_85'></span> -make to him my proposals on naval and on other warfare as far as -they concerned me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Since in December he had already considered the possibility that -all of Greece would have to be occupied, the case had now actually -arisen for me to make this proposal to him for the reason I have -already mentioned. When I said “all of Greece,” that implied to me -and the Naval Command the entire Greek coast, where the British -forces might land.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Your proposal was made about 2 weeks after -British troops had landed in Greece?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection I would like to submit -Exhibit Raeder-58, in my Document Book 3, Page 271. This is a -document contained in the <span class='it'>White Book</span>, according to which on 4 January—I -beg the Tribunal’s pardon. Sir David is right. Document -58 has been rejected and I withdraw it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this connection I would like to submit Exhibit Number -Raeder-59. It is to be found in Document Book 3, Page 273 and is -an extract from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>: It is the minutes of the French -War Committee of 26 April 1940. This document deals with the -decision of the War Committee regarding Norway, the Caucasus, -Romania, and Greece.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I also submit Exhibit Number Raeder-63, in Document Book 3, -Page 285, which is an address by the British Secretary of State for -India, Amery, dated 1 December 1940. This document also shows -plans regarding Greece, a year and a quarter before the time just -mentioned by the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now I shall turn to the topic of Norway.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The British prosecutor, Major Elwyn -Jones, considers the attack against Norway a special case in the -series of aggressive wars waged by the Nazi conspirators. In this -connection he pointed out that, in this case, Hitler did not think of -this himself but rather was persuaded by you. Since his point is -very important, I should like to ask you to describe this event -exactly, and therefore I ask you first of all: When was the first conversation -about this matter between you and Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The first conversation between Hitler and myself -concerning the question of Norway was on 10 October 1939, and that -was at my request. The reason for this was that we had received -reports at various times during the last week of September through -our intelligence service of the offices of Admiral Canaris that the -British intended to occupy bases in Norway. -<span class='pageno' title='86' id='Page_86'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I recall that after reports to this effect had reached me several -times Admiral Canaris visited me himself on one occasion—something -he did in very important cases only. And, in the presence of -my chief of staff, he gave me a coherent explanation concerning the -intelligence reports which had been received. In this connection air -bases were constantly mentioned, as well as bases in the south of -Norway. Stavanger was mentioned constantly with the airport Sola, -and Trondheim was usually mentioned and occasionally Christiansand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the last days of September I had a telephone conversation -with Admiral Carls who was the commander of Navy -Group North and was therefore in charge of operations in the -Skagerrak, the Kattegat and in the North Sea. This man had -obviously received similar reports. He informed me that he had -composed a private letter addressed to me, in which he dealt with -the question of the danger of Norway’s being occupied by British -forces and in which he was in a general way dealing with the -question as to what disadvantages such a step would have for us, and -whether we should have to forestall such an attempt, and also what -advantages or disadvantages the occupation of Norway—that is, of -the Norwegian coast and the Norwegian bases—by our forces would -have.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Up until that point I had not concerned myself with the Norwegian -question at all, except for the fact I had received these -reports. The arrival of this letter at the end of September or the -beginning of October, it must have been about then, impelled me to -show it to the Chief of Staff of the SKL and to instruct him to deal -with all dispatch with the question of the occupation of Norwegian -bases by England, and the other questions which Admiral Carls had -dealt with, and to have the questions discussed in the SKL. The -advantages and disadvantages of an expansion of the war towards -the North had to be considered, not only of an expansion on our part -but, above all, an expansion on the part of England; what value, -what advantage would accrue to us if we acted first; what disadvantages -would result if we had to defend the Norwegian coast?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The result of this was the questionnaire mentioned in C-122, -GB-82, where the questions were asked: What places were to be -used as bases; what the possibility of defense by us would be; -whether these ports would have to be developed further; and also, -what advantages would result so far as our U-boats were concerned?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These questions, as I have already stated, were put to Admiral -Dönitz as well, but his answers arrived only after I had made the -report on 10 October. I would like to say, by way of introduction, -that it was entirely clear to me that if we undertook to occupy these -bases we would violate neutrality. But I also knew of the agreement -<span class='pageno' title='87' id='Page_87'></span> -which existed between the German and Norwegian Governments of -2 September regarding neutrality, and I knew the concluding -sentence, in this <span class='it'>aide memoire</span>, which is Document TC-31, GB-79, -dated 2 September 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, but I should like to point out, -Mr. President, that this document is found in the Document Book of -the British Delegation 10a, at Page 330.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You have that document before you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have it before me, and I would like to quote -the concluding sentence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It is the last document in the book, Your Honor, -at Page 329.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: [<span class='it'>Continuing.</span>] The last sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government -change so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party -recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled -to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way -as would be forced upon the Reich Cabinet by the resulting -situation.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, within the next few days, I asked the Chief of Staff of the -SKL to submit to me the data which the SKL had prepared during -the preceding days and I reported to Hitler on 10 October, because I -considered this problem particularly important. It was entirely -clear to me that the best possible solution for us would be that -Norway should maintain a steadfast neutrality, and I expressed my -opinion, as may be seen in Document C-21, GB-194.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is an extract from the War Diary of the SKL.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation -10a, Page 6.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It says here, on Page 3 of the German version, the next -but last paragraph, under the date of 13 January: “Situation discussion -with the Chief of the SKL.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. C-21 was not -entirely translated by the Prosecution. This document may be found -in my document book under Exhibit Number Raeder-69, and I -should like to submit it herewith. It is in Document Book 3, Page 62.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Document Book 3 only goes to 64, is that not -right? It must be Document Book 4.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: There must be a mistake in the document book -then. At first, due to an oversight, the table of contents was only -completed as far as 64 by the Translation Section, but since that -<span class='pageno' title='88' id='Page_88'></span> -time it has been corrected and supplemented. It is in Document -Book 4, Page 317.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Page 317, at the top.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Please comment on -this document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In the next but last paragraph, it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In complete agreement with this point of view, the Chief -of the Naval Operations Staff is therefore also of the opinion -that the most favorable solution would doubtless be the maintenance -of the present situation which, if strictest neutrality -is exercised by Norway, will permit the safe use of Norwegian -territorial waters for the shipping vital to Germany’s war -effort without the attempt being made on the part of England -to seriously endanger this sea lane.” (Document Number -Raeder-69)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I maintained this point of view when reporting to Hitler. In that -report I first mentioned the intelligence reports which we had at -hand. Then I described the dangers which might result to us from a -British occupation of bases on the Norwegian coast and might affect -our entire warfare, dangers which I considered tremendous. I had -the feeling that such an occupation would gravely prejudice and -imperil the whole conduct of our war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If the British occupied bases in Norway, especially in the South -of Norway, they would be able to dominate the entrance to the Baltic -Sea from those points, and also flank our naval operations from the -Helgoland Bight and from the Elbe, Jade and Weser. The second -outlet which we had was also gravely imperiled, affecting the -operations of battleships as well as the courses of our merchantmen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In addition to that, from their air bases in Norway, they might -endanger our air operations, the operations of our pilots for reconnaissance -in the North Sea or for attacks against England.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Furthermore, from Norway they could exert strong pressure on -Sweden, and that pressure would have been felt in this respect, that -the supplies of ore from Sweden would have been hindered or -stopped by purely political pressure. Finally, the export of ore from -Narvik to Germany could have been stopped entirely, and it is -known how much Germany depended on supplies of ore from -Sweden and Norway. They might even have gone so far—and we -learned about this subsequently that such plans were discussed—as -to attack and destroy the ore deposits at Lulea, or to seize them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All of these dangers might become decisive factors in the outcome -of the war. Aside from the fact that I told Hitler that the best -thing for us would be to have strict neutrality on the part of -Norway, I also called his attention to the dangers which would -<span class='pageno' title='89' id='Page_89'></span> -result to us from an occupation of the Norwegian coast and Norwegian -bases, for there would have been lively naval operations -near the Norwegian coast in which the British, even after our -occupation of bases, would try to hamper our ore traffic from -Narvik. A struggle might ensue which we, with our inadequate -supply of surface vessels, would be unable to cope with in the -long run.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore, at that time I did not make any proposal that we -should occupy Norway or that we should obtain bases in Norway. -I only did my duty in telling the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht -about this grave danger which was threatening us, and against -which we might have to use emergency measures for our defense. -I also pointed out to him that possible operations for the occupation -of Norwegian bases might be very expensive for us. In the course -of later discussions I told him that we might even lose our entire -fleet. I would consider it a favorable case if we were to lose only -one-third, something which actually did happen later on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There was, therefore, no reason for me to expect that I would -gain prestige by such an enterprise—I have been accused of this -ambition by the Prosecution. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite -might easily result.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal -to the fact that these things may be seen in documents which date -from the time of the war, one of which is Exhibit Number Raeder-69, -of 13 January 1940, which has just been handed over. This document -is a study, and it is claimed that this study is based on the -consideration that if England were to have the bases in Norway, the -situation would be impossible for the conduct of the war by Germany -and such a situation could be prevented only if we forestalled -England by occupying Norway ourselves. What the witness has just -said is stated in exactly the same way in the War Diary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the same connection, I should like to refer to the document of -the Prosecution, Document C-66, GB-81, which may be found in -British Document Book 10a, Page 35. This document is dated -10 January 1944. May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of -the fact that there, under the code name “Weserübung” (Weser -Maneuver)—that was the name covering this action—the substance -of the statements the witness has just made is to be found. I do not -wish to read all of them since we would lose valuable time thereby.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean C-66? That is about the Plan -Barbarossa. Is that the one you mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The last page, under the heading “Weserübung,” -Page 39 of the English document book. Mention is made there of -the letter by Admiral Carls, spoken of by the witness, and of his -<span class='pageno' title='90' id='Page_90'></span> -thoughts in connection with this matter. In the German original -there is the heading, “Appendix 2.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>A clearer version is found in Document Raeder-69, since that -dates from January 1940, 3 months later, and in the meantime new -reports had come in. This, on the other hand, is a description dating -from October 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, I must once more refer to -Document C-122, which you have already mentioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution, in that document, accuses you of saying:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Chief of SKL deems it necessary to tell the Führer as -soon as possible of the ideas of the SKL on the possibility of -expanding the sphere of operations in the North.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>They think they may conclude therefrom that your primary -thought was to expand the operational sphere of the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already said that by the possibility of expansion -of the operational zone to the North I meant an expansion of -British operations and its consequences, and also the possibility of -our forestalling this, thus gaining bases which would be of certain -importance to us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Hitler reply at this discussion on 10 October -1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Hitler had not yet concerned himself with this question. -The question was very far from his mind, for he knew very -little about matters of naval warfare. He always remarked that he -did not have an over-all picture of these things, and therefore felt -somewhat uncertain. He said that he would deal with this question -and that I should leave the notes with him, which I had worked out -on the basis of statements made by the SKL, so that he might use -them as a basis for his deliberations on this problem.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was typical and really speaks very much against the character -of the conspiracy, that on this occasion Hitler, when confronted with -the problem of Norway, did not say a single word about the fact -that previously, the last time evidently in the summer of that year, -he had already dealt with Norwegian questions prompted by Rosenberg. -I gather from a document which I saw for the first time here -that on 20 June 1939, Rosenberg had submitted to the Führer a -comprehensive report about his connections with Norwegian political -circles, but I heard of these connections for the first time on -11 December.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It would have been a matter of course for me if the Führer, who -was dealing with Norwegian strategical matters, had told me on this -occasion: “I have such and such information about Norwegian -matters.” But he did not do that—there was always a considerable -lack of collaboration. The Führer told me that we should await the -<span class='pageno' title='91' id='Page_91'></span> -arrival of further reports and that he would deal with these questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the subsequent period of October and November, -up until 11 December, did you discuss this question with Hitler -again?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, the question was not discussed at all during those -months, but in September Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, who had first -been appointed assistant attaché in Oslo and later, naval attaché, -gave me further reports at that time about conditions in Norway, -and so did the intelligence service. He told me of reports which -were circulating there about a possible British landing. Later on -Kapitän Schreiber was actually my chief collaborator in these Norwegian -problems, and he showed a particular understanding of the -whole situation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to submit to the -Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-107, an affidavit of the naval attaché who -has just been mentioned, Richard Schreiber. This may be found in -my Document Book 5, Page 464.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>According to that document, Schreiber was drafted on 7 September -1939 as a reserve officer and was sent to Oslo as a naval attaché. -He states that he held that post there since the autumn of 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read a -portion of this, under I, on Page 465, at the bottom.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We told you that we had read all these documents -which were objected to. We let in this document, so it is not -necessary for you to read it again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then in this connection, may I refer -to the first part of this affidavit, Part I?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, I should like to point out a small but misleading -error in translation on Page 466. In the second paragraph, second -line, the word “deutsch,” (German) is missing: “...there were clear -directives of the German Foreign Office that Norwegian neutrality -should be particularly respected by the Germans...” In the English -text it says: “of the Foreign Office.” It should read “of the German -Foreign Office.” I should be very grateful if this mistake would be -rectified.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, you know the affidavit -given by Schreiber?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Different reports are contained therein. You have -already referred to them in part. Did any additional special reports -come in during those 2 months? Was Narvik mentioned in addition -to the other ports already mentioned? -<span class='pageno' title='92' id='Page_92'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as I remember it was Kapitän Schreiber who -expressly mentioned Narvik for the first time. Kapitän Schreiber -had very quickly made himself acquainted with conditions there. -He had established good connections in Norwegian circles. A confirmation -of all that I had known up to that point came on 11 December.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, would you please describe your meeting -with Quisling on 11 December 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I first ask whether the Documents 004-PS and -007-PS, which I believe were submitted by the Prosecution, may be -used in this connection? For example, the minutes of the conference -of 11 and 12 December, an accompanying letter by Rosenberg -referring to these minutes, and similar matters?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I believe that you will be permitted to -use these documents. But since they are known you only need to -mention the points that you remember.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On this occasion I should merely like to ask -whether you did not know the documents by Rosenberg, 004-PS -and 007-PS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I did not know those documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you see them for the first time here?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I saw them for the first time here. But the reports -contained in these documents were already known to us at that time -as is proved by the dates of the documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Please tell us only what you heard at that time -from Quisling.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Up until 11 December I had neither connections with -Herr Rosenberg—except for the fact that I had seen him on occasion—nor, -above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about -whom I had heard nothing up to that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 11 December my Chief of Staff, Schulte-Mönting, reported to -me that Major Quisling, a former Norwegian Minister of War, had -arrived from Oslo. He was asking for an interview with me through -a Herr Hagelin, because he wished to tell me about Norwegian -conditions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Herr Hagelin had been sent to my chief of staff by Herr Rosenberg. -Rosenberg had already known Hagelin for some time as I -have mentioned before. Since reports from such a source on Norwegian -conditions seemed to be of great value to me, I declared -myself ready to receive Herr Quisling. -<span class='pageno' title='93' id='Page_93'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>He arrived on the same morning and reported to me at length -about the conditions in Norway, with special reference to the relations -of the Norwegian Government to England and the reports -on the intention of England to land in Norway, and he characterized -the whole situation as especially critical for, according to his reports, -the danger seemed to be imminent. He tried to fix a date. He -thought it should occur before 10 January, because then a favorable -political situation would arise.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I told him that I was not really concerned with the political -situation, but I would try to arrange to have him give his -information to the Führer. I would be concerned only with the -military and strategic situation, and in that connection I could tell -him right away that it would not be possible to take any measures -from 11 December until 10 January, first because the time was too -short and secondly because it was winter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I considered his expositions to be of such importance that I told -him I would try to arrange for him to report to the Führer personally, -so that these reports would reach and influence him directly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then on the 12th—that is on the next day—I went to Hitler and -informed him of the conversation between Quisling and me, and I -asked him to receive Quisling personally so that he might have a -personal impression of Quisling. On this occasion I told him—and -this is written down in one of the documents—that in cases of this -kind one would have to be especially cautious, since one could not -know to what degree such a party leader would try to further the -interest of his party. Therefore our investigations would have to be -especially careful. And I again called the attention of the Führer to -the fact that an attempt to occupy Norway would bring with it -greatest risks as well as certain disadvantages for the future situation. -In other words, I carefully presented both sides of the picture -in a neutral manner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler then decided to receive Quisling together with Hagelin -on one of the following days. The two gentlemen then were obviously -in touch with Rosenberg. I believe they stayed with him, -and Rosenberg sent me, by letter, a record of a meeting which had -apparently been drawn up by Quisling and Hagelin and also a -description of Quisling’s personality.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this letter, which is here as a document but which was not -read by the Prosecution, it says specifically that Rosenberg knew -what the political conditions were but that, of course, he would -have to leave the military side entirely to me since I was the competent -authority on that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If it please the High Tribunal, in this connection -I would like to submit Exhibit Raeder-67, to be found in my Document -Book 4, Page 309. That is the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder -<span class='pageno' title='94' id='Page_94'></span> -dated 13 December 1939, which was not mentioned by the Prosecution. -The Prosecution merely mentioned the appendix mentioned -in the letter—that is, a note by Rosenberg, under Number C-65, the -same as GB-85. According to its contents C-65 belongs to Exhibit -Raeder-67.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You say there was another besides Raeder-67 -which you were referring to?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes; I am referring to Raeder-67.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I got that. But you said some other document -as well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the document submitted by the Prosecution, -C-65, and that is an appendix to this letter; the two belong together. -The latter document, C-65, is to be found in the Document Book of -the British Delegation 10a, Page 33. If these two documents are -taken together, it can be seen that the political side is not mentioned -in either document; and this explains what the witness meant when -he said that he was not concerned with the political side of the -question but only with the military side. It is for that reason that -Rosenberg had sent it to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it would be a good time to break off.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the case of the -Defendant Seyss-Inquart, counsel and representatives of the Prosecution -have been conferring with respect to his application for documents. -We have agreed on a great number, but there are 20 upon -which we are unable to agree.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 20?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: 20. I think we could do it in 30 minutes if the Tribunal -will set some time aside; it might take a little more. Sir David -has reminded me that the translators are waiting on us to go ahead -with their translation work.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think the best thing would be -to take it tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. It has been suggested also -that the case of Seyss-Inquart precede that of Defendant Von Papen. -I understand that is the wish of the counsel, and it is very satisfactory -to us as well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. -<span class='pageno' title='95' id='Page_95'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We have to refer briefly to Document 1809-PS, -the Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. It is GB-88 in the Document Book -of the British Delegation 10a, Page 289.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I first ask when were the plans for the occupation of -Norway drafted?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I may say that on the basis of the conference which -Quisling had with the Führer in my presence on 14 December the -Führer ordered the OKW to deal with the matter and study it. The -Führer had two more conferences with Quisling on 16 and 18 December -at which I was not present. The matter was then handled -by the OKW according to the directives and an initial plan known -as “North” was drafted. Document C-21, which I have mentioned -before, shows that this Plan North was received by SKL on 13 January -and then, in the course of January, the date 27 January was -mentioned, the draft of a directive for the Plan North was made. -That draft was made in the OKW in the usual way. Kapitän zur -See Krancke as expert for the Navy took part in it. The directive -was completed on 1 March 1940, and was issued to the three branches -of the Armed Forces. In the meantime, a large number of reports -had been received, and it was possible to use these as a basis for the -drafting of the directive. These reports besides coming from Kapitän -Schreiber now also came direct from Quisling, who sent them to the -Führer. They mentioned the preparatory work carried out by the -English and the French—special mention was made of the Navy -Attaché Kermarrec—in Norwegian ports for finding out the possibilities -of landing, measurements of quays, and the height of the -bridges between Narvik and the Swedish border and similar things.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These reports which reached us showed clearly that within a -reasonable time a landing was intended. Also political reports -reached us which Hagelin received through his connections in Norwegian -circles, reports which in part came directly from members -of the Storting—and from members of the Government and their -entourage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All of these reports confirmed that the pretext of aid for Finland -in the dispute between Finland and Russia played a certain role. -The danger was discussed that England under pretext of aid for -Finland would proceed to a bloodless occupation of Norway. The -directive for the case Norway, therefore, was issued on 1 March. In -the further course of the month of March more reports were received. -In the meantime, the <span class='it'>Altmark</span> incident had occurred, and it was observed -by Hagelin too that the behavior of the Norwegian commander -was a pretense, and it was clear that in the case of any -encroachment on the part of Great Britain, the Norwegian Government -would protest only on paper. -<span class='pageno' title='96' id='Page_96'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You said just now the directive is dated 1 March. -This is correct. The Prosecution submitted a quotation of 5 March -from Document 1809-PS. That is an entry in Jodl’s Diary: “1500 -hours big conference with the three commanders-in-chief regarding -Weserübung. Field Marshal, having no knowledge about plans, is -furious.” How is it possible, Admiral, that Reich Marshal Göring -had not been consulted at a time when the directive was already -issued?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot explain that at all. I had no authority to -speak about it and I cannot say why he was not consulted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It is in the nature of conspiracy that the second -man in the Reich would be informed about it from the beginning. -Has he not ever spoken to you about that matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not that I remember, but that shows how little, -especially in the Führer’s entourage, one can speak of a conspiracy. -The Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, also was not present during -any of the Quisling conferences or receptions and I had no authority, -to speak to him about these matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to know your position regarding -Jodl’s entry of 13 March, in which he stated: “Führer does not -give the order for ‘W’ (Weserübung). He is still trying to find a -justification.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask you to explain these words to us as you understand them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. The English translation as far as I can remember -says “Looking for an excuse.” But he needed neither justification -nor excuse, because in the first paragraph of the directive of 1 March—that -is to say, 2 weeks before that—he had stated what circumstances -made it necessary to occupy Norway and Denmark with -certain forces of the Wehrmacht. British encroachments in Scandinavia -and the Baltic were to be prevented thereby, our ore deposits -in Sweden safeguarded, and the bases against England for the Navy -and the Air Force were to be expanded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that is the Document -C-174; that is, GB-89, Document Book of the British Delegation -10a, Page 113. That is the directive for case “Weserübung” -of 1 March 1940, which as the witness has mentioned, already contains -the justification for it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May it please the Tribunal, to prove that the information received -by the witness through the intelligence service of Admiral -Canaris, through Kapitän Schreiber and so on, is objective and in -agreement with facts, may I be permitted to submit several documents—and -that Exhibit Number Raeder-75 from the <span class='it'>White Book</span> -dated 17 February 1940, which mentions the landing of British troops -<span class='pageno' title='97' id='Page_97'></span> -in Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik, and several appendices to it, -which show the trends of thoughts at that time in regard to the -Swedish ore; Document Exhibit Raeder-77...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This is 75, Pages 43 and 44?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Not page, but Exhibit -Raeder-75. It is Page 340. Document Book 4.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then Exhibit Number Raeder-77, also from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>: -“The French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs Daladier to -the French Ambassador in London, Corbin.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Document Book 4, Page 352. I have seen that there is a -mistake in the English document book. On Page 353 the heading -is missing or rather on Page 354. I may point out that this document -bears the date 21 February 1940. That is contained in the -original document under the heading “Intervention in Scandinavia.” -It concerns the occupation of the most important Norwegian ports, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and mentions again the question of the Swedish ore.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I come to the Document Exhibit Raeder-78; Document -Book 4, Page 357, an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval -Operations Staff of 4 March in which in connection with the case -of the <span class='it'>Altmark</span> it is explained that a defense by Norway against -British military action is not possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then Exhibit Raeder-79, Document Book 4, Page 359, note by the -Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin. Here -also there is a mistake in the translation. The heading of the document -was omitted on Page 360. I would be grateful if the Tribunal -would note that the original document bears the date 10 March -1940. It is top secret and is based on the fact that the general plan -for armed intervention in Finland existed since 16 January and -therefore as a precautionary measure the ports and airfields on the -Norwegian coast should be occupied. I refer to the remaining contents -of document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then may I submit Exhibit Number Raeder-80, a report about -negotiations of the Scandinavian Commission of the Inter-Allied -Military Study Commission of 11 March 1940, top secret, concerning -landing at Narvik.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Then, Admiral, we are finished with -Norway. I believe you said already that the reports increased considerably -in the month of March. When did Hitler give the final -order for the occupation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At the end of March or beginning of April. I cannot -recall the exact date.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient. -<span class='pageno' title='98' id='Page_98'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I also mention a particularly important report -which I remember now. Quisling reported in February that Lord -Halifax had told the Norwegian Ambassador in London that an -operation on the part of the British for the acquisition of bases in -Norway was planned for the near future. That report also reached -us at that time. I should like to add, as I emphasized before, that -being fully conscious of my responsibility I always tried to show -the Führer both sides of the picture and that the Führer would have -to be guided by my documentary proof when deciding, to take or -refrain from taking that tremendous step. But that does not mean -to say that because I pointed out to my Supreme Commander of the -Armed Forces that particular danger, I in any way decline to accept -responsibility. Of course, I am in some measure responsible for the -whole thing. Moreover, I have been accused because in a letter submitted -here under C-155 I had told my officers’ corps that I was -proud of the way in which this extraordinarily dangerous enterprise -had been executed. I should like to confirm this, because I believe -I was entitled to be proud that the Navy had carried out that operation -with such limited means and in the face of the entire British -fleet; I still stick to that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did reports reach the SKL in March about violations -of the neutrality of Norway? That is incidents in territorial -waters?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. In the second half of March repeated attacks -were made by British planes and naval forces against our merchant -ships bringing the Swedish ore down from Narvik.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection may I submit -some more documents? Exhibit Raeder-81, Document Book 5, -Page 372, War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff which contains -several entries showing that towards the end these incidents became -more and more frequent and that the Norwegian neutrality was -violated by British air and naval forces. As that document is known -there is no need to read anything from it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then Exhibit Raeder-82 in Document Book 5, Page 377, also War -Diary of 27 March, also concerning violations of neutrality. Furthermore, -Exhibit Raeder-83, Page 379, a draft resolution of the sixth -session of the Supreme Council, dated 28 March 1940, which was -already mentioned yesterday. It deals with vital interests from the -standpoint of international law and with the laying of mines in -territorial waters on 5 April.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then Exhibit Raeder-84, Page 384, and Exhibit Raeder-85, -Page 386, both of which are documents from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>. May -I only point out that it mentions that the first transport is to leave -on J.1. day, that is actually on 5 April; in other words, 4 days before -the occupation by Germany. -<span class='pageno' title='99' id='Page_99'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Raeder-86 is an excerpt from the War Diary, of which -I ask you to take official notice and which concerns the chartering -by England of 90 percent of the Norwegian tankers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>To conclude Norway, may I ask you to look at two Documents, -C-151 and C-115. Those are Exhibits GB-91 and GB-90, respectively, -Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, on Pages 106 and 62. -The dates are 30 March 1940 and 4 April 1940. The documents show -that the ships which were to carry out the landing should carry the -British flag for camouflage reasons. The Prosecution uses that document -also to support its accusation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] What do you say about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is quite a regular ruse of war, that warships -carry a foreign flag. A requisite for the legality of that act, however, -is that at the moment of an enemy action, the moment fire is -opened, their own flag must be hoisted in time. That has always -been done in the German Navy, especially in the case of our auxiliary -cruisers, which frequently sailed under a foreign flag in order -to avoid being reported by merchant ships, but which always -lowered that flag in time. That is a matter of honor. It must be -added that in this case, as the War Diary shows...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: 8 April.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: ...that on 8 April, on account of certain considerations, -we rescinded that order, because we had the report that an -English action was under way, and we feared that complications -would arise from that. So this order was not carried out in the long -run. I believe the document can be found which contains that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I submit, in this connection, Exhibit -Number Raeder-89 (Document Raeder-89), Document Book 5, -Page 400, where we find under 8 April: “The previous order is -rescinded, the British flag is not to be used.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: You also asked about Document C-115, which says -that the blockade runners camouflaged as merchant ships with -dimmed lights should enter Oslo Fjord unobtrusively. This too is -quite a regular ruse of war against which, from the legal point of -view, no objection can be made. Likewise there is nothing to be -said against English names given in answer to signals of identity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I did not finish answering one question because I was interrupted. -That was the question concerning the expression “justification” -or “excuse” in the War Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. As I -have shown, it was not a question of the justification, which had -been expressed a long time before by Hitler, but I believe that I -am right in saying that the question was that the diplomatic note -which, at the moment of the execution of the enterprise, had to be -presented to the Norwegian and Danish governments, giving the -<span class='pageno' title='100' id='Page_100'></span> -reason for his action, had not yet been drafted, especially as he had -not yet spoken to the Foreign Minister at that time at all. The -Foreign Minister received the information, as he has said himself, -only on 3 April.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: With this I should like to conclude the question -of the occupation of Norway. May I still submit the approved document, -Exhibit Raeder-66, which was approved for the purpose of -argument? It is an opinion expressed by Dr. Mosler, and it can be -found in Document Book 4, Page 291; and in this connection, concerning -the use of flags, may I draw special attention to Figure 7, -Page 304, from which we may see the legal reasoning. Furthermore, -may I submit Exhibit Raeder-90, Document Book 5, Page 402, and -the series of documents as far as they are approved: Exhibit -Raeder-91, Admiral Darlan to the French War Minister Daladier on -12 April 1940; Exhibit Raeder-92, Page 412. This document contains -the English-French note to the Norwegian Government of 8 April -1940. I have submitted that document because this note expresses -the same legal points of view as expressed in the legal opinion of -Dr. Mosler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Number Raeder-97 and Exhibit Number Raeder-98: -Number 97 concerns the <span class='it'>White Book</span> and the planning of 7 February -1940, concerning the Allied bases in Norway; and Number 98 is an -excerpt from the War Diary concerning the orders which, at the -time of the occupation of Norway, were found and from which it -could be seen that an English landing was imminent and the so-called -plan under the camouflage name “Stratford Plan,” which was -prepared by the British Admiralty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Concerning Norway, may I ask you -the following: During and after the occupation did you intervene to -see that the Norwegian population was treated decently, and what -was your view of the political question in Norway with regard to -the attitude of Germany to Norway?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: From the very beginning I was for good treatment of -the Norwegian population. I knew that Hitler had given Gauleiter -Terboven, whom he had unfortunately appointed Reich Commissioner -for Norway and to whom he had entrusted the civil administration, -instructions that he, Terboven, should bring the Norwegian -people to him; that is to say, make them favorably disposed, and -that he had the intention, finally, to maintain Norway as a sovereign -state in a North Germanic Empire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Terboven was opposed to that. He treated the Norwegian population -in a very unfriendly manner, and by his treatment he actually -sabotaged the aims of Hitler. In close understanding with -Admiral Böhm, who became the naval commander in Norway and -<span class='pageno' title='101' id='Page_101'></span> -who had taken Kapitän Schreiber, the former attaché, on his staff -as liaison officer to the Norwegian population, I tried to counteract -these intentions of Terboven. On the basis of the reports of Admiral -Böhm I repeatedly approached the Führer and told him that with -Terboven he would never achieve his purpose. The Führer designated -Quisling chief of the Government. I cannot remember exactly -when he became Minister President, but Terboven also sabotaged -Quisling in his activities by making it extremely difficult for him, -and even discredited him among the population. Terboven’s chief -reason was, in my opinion, that he wanted to remain Gauleiter of -Norway. All our endeavors were unsuccessful, in spite of the fact -that Admiral Böhm tried very hard to achieve with the help of the -Navy what Hitler had expected, that is, to win over the Norwegian -people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I did not understand how on the one side one wanted to gain the -sympathy of the Norwegians and on the other hand one sabotaged -Hitler’s intentions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That went on until 1942, at which time Böhm made a final report -to me, in which he explained that things could not go on like that, -and that Hitler’s intentions would never be realized. I submitted -that report to Hitler, but since it did not bring about any change—it -was in the late autumn of 1942—this failure of mine became one -of the reasons which finally led to my retirement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you ask Hitler specifically to dismiss -Terboven?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Several times. And I suggested that he should -appoint General Admiral Böhm as commander of the armed -forces for Norway and give him far-reaching powers so that he -could carry out his—Hitler’s—aims. I suggested that the Führer -should as soon as possible conclude a peace with Norway because -only in that way could he bring about co-operation between Norway -and Germany and make the population turn to him. I told him the -attempts of sabotage by the Norwegian emigrants would lose their -meaning and cease and that possibly the Norwegian emigrants who -were leaning toward England at that time could be induced to -return, because they might be afraid that they might “miss the bus”; -especially from the point of view of economic advantages. The task -of defending Norway would be considerably easier if a state of -peace could be brought about.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In conclusion, may I refer to Exhibit Raeder-107 -which is already known to the Tribunal. It is the affidavit by -Schreiber under Roman Numeral II. There Schreiber has mentioned -in detail the utmost endeavors of the Navy to prevent the regrettable -terror regime of Terboven and explained that Raeder, for the last -<span class='pageno' title='102' id='Page_102'></span> -time in 1942, used all his efforts to get Hitler to conclude a peace -between Norway and Germany. I believe that the Navy had a good -reputation in Norway, that I can assume this is historically known -without my having to prove it. To be on the safe side I applied for -a witness, but consent was not given.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I also submit Exhibit Raeder-108 (Document Raeder-108), -Document Book 6, Page 473, a letter from Raeder to Admiral Böhm -of 23 October 1942. Raeder writes:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“To my regret I have to send you enclosed, for your personal -information, a letter from Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to -Prime Minister Quisling.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 476 there is the letter from Lammers to Quisling which -says—I quote only one sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Führer, therefore, desires that during the war there -shall be no conferences or discussions concerning a final or a -preliminary peace between the Greater German Reich and -Norway, or concerning other measures fixing or anticipating -Norway’s position to the Reich after the end of the war.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This is the letter which the witness mentioned, which finally -brought to nought all his endeavors and those of Admiral Böhm.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Admiral, you had little to do with France, and therefore we can -be very brief. May I merely ask you, did you attempt at any time -to influence the political relations between Germany and France?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: This influence, when there was any, was in the first -place directed as much as possible towards improving the defense of -the country. In the second place, there were above all humanitarian -reasons. I often visited naval and submarine bases in France. During -these journeys I got some knowledge of conditions in France. I saw -that in 1940 and still in 1941 the population lived just as if it were -at peace, completely undisturbed. Consequently I believed, since the -Führer had shown so much moderation on the occasion of the -Armistice, that a basis could be found which would draw France—whose -government was after all collaborationist—closer to us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I was informed that Laval was really sincere in his opinion that -only co-operation between France and Germany could guarantee a -lasting peace in Europe for the future. Therefore I suggested to him -whether he himself could not try to do something in that direction. -He did not intend to do this, and I referred to it again when I heard -that Admiral Darlan was trying to work more closely with our -naval commander in France, Admiral Schultze. That was first -achieved in the field of intelligence, where his services were very -useful to us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the end of the year 1941 he mentioned that he would like to -speak to me. Admiral Schultze reported that to me and I told Hitler -<span class='pageno' title='103' id='Page_103'></span> -about it and recommended such a conversation because I thought Lt -would do some good.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It would do what?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That it might bring some advantage. The Führer -approved this meeting and instructed me as to his views. The -meeting took place near Paris on the occasion of an official trip -which I made to the French bases at the end of January or beginning -of February 1942. I had the impression that the meeting -was very satisfactory, inasmuch as Darlan was of the opinion that -a peace would be of advantage to both nations and he also appeared -to be inclined to co-operate. He stressed, however, that the whole -political situation would have to be settled before peace could be -concluded. I also showed that I was prepared to meet him concerning -the negotiations with the Armistice Commission with respect -to heavy guns for big French ships. I reported to the Führer on the -results of the meeting. But in this case too the Führer was again -hesitant and did not want to make a decision. He said he had to see -first how the war went before he could decide upon his final attitude -toward France. Besides, that would be a precedent which might -have an effect on other nations. So that also was a failure. I did not -obtain the relief in the defense of France which I had hoped for and -so, in the case of France, this failure was the second reason which -contributed later to my asking for my release, because I could not -carry my plans through.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the next subject where accusations -are made against you, and that is Russia. When did you hear for -the first time that Hitler intended to wage war against Russia, -although he had concluded a Nonaggression Pact with Russia?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I first remind you that in the summer of 1940, -that is to say, July, August, and September, we in the Navy were -very much occupied with preparations for a landing in England; -therefore it never entered our heads that there could be any plans -for action in another direction. In August I heard from some Army -office, possibly that of the Commander-in-Chief, that considerable -troop transports were going to the East. I asked Hitler what that -meant and he told me it was a grandiose camouflage for his intentions -to invade England. He knew that I would be against it right -away if he were to speak about an enterprise against Russia. In -September—I cannot recall the date exactly—he finally admitted to -me that he had certain intentions against Russia. In September I -reported to him at least twice, my more important report was -26 September, when I did everything I could to dissuade him from -any undertaking against Russia. In that report which I made in the -presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl I emphasized -particularly the strategic military side; first, because I could do -<span class='pageno' title='104' id='Page_104'></span> -that in all clarity in the presence of other people, and then because -I assumed that such military reasons, that is, the possibility of -failure of an operation against Russia at a time when the struggle -was on against England, would impress him and dissuade him from -that plan. On 26 September, after making this official report, I asked -for a personal conference alone with Hitler. Keitel and Jodl can -testify that I always did this when I wanted to discuss something -particularly important with the Führer, where I had to go beyond -the conventional procedure and which I could only do if nobody else -was present. One could tell Hitler a lot of things if one was alone -with him, but one could not make any such statements in a larger -group. Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl know that -very well, particularly well, because they were the ones who in such -cases always had to leave the room. On that occasion I gave Hitler -my views in detail; first, that it was not possible to break the pact -with Russia, that it would be morally wrong, that it would serve no -purpose because the pact gave us great advantages and was a basis -for a sound policy for Germany later on. Then I told him that under -no circumstances could he start a two-front war, as it was he who -had always emphasized that he would not repeat the stupidity of -the government of 1914 and that, in my opinion, it could never be -justified. Then I put to him again the difference of the forces on -each side, the absolute necessity for the Navy to concentrate on the -war against England and particularly at that moment when all -resources were strained to the utmost to carry out the invasion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On that day I had the impression that Hitler was inclined to listen -to my argument because later, or the next day, the naval adjutant, -Kapitän Von Puttkamer, reported to me that Hitler had spoken in -very much the same vein as I had spoken, and had appreciated my -argument.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That went on for several months. I presented many such reports, -returning always with the same arguments. I believed again in -November that I had been successful. To my utter surprise, however, -on 18 December, Directive Number 21 (Barbarossa) came out, which -dealt with the case of a war with the Soviet Union before the termination -of the war against England. It is true, of course, that it -was a directive for an eventuality. It is Document 446-PS, USA-31, -of 18 December 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is in Document Book 10a, -Page 247.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, the Prosecution asserted -that the Navy and you assisted in drawing up this directive. Is -that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is in no way correct. Such directives were -drafted in the OKW after the Führer had taken his political decision, -<span class='pageno' title='105' id='Page_105'></span> -in the Armed Forces Operations Staff; and in that Armed Forces -Operations Staff there was also one naval officer and one or more -Air Force officers who, under the Chief of the Armed Forces -Operations Staff, dealt with matters concerning the Navy and Air -Force when such directives were being drafted. The directive then -went to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and they -were ordered, for their part, to work out and present suggestions for -the execution of the orders of the Führer. They had no influence on -the directive itself and did not see it at all beforehand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I add one more thing? I have been accused by the Prosecution -that I used my influence with the Führer not for moral and -ethical reasons but that I tried in a cynical way first to settle the -account with England and then to assail Russia. I have said before -that I told all my reasons to the Führer whenever I had the chance, -but that I could not do that in a public meeting or in the presence -of other people, nor could I write it down in my war diary, because -the sharp words which fell there must not become known to -other people by means of the war diary. I want to point to Document -C-170, Exhibit USA-136, which dates from 23 August 1939 to -22 June 1941. It is a compilation of many excerpts from the War -Diary of the Naval Operations Staff—and from my minutes of conferences -with Hitler in which the Russian question was dealt with. -This is not a literal reproduction of my statements or word for word -excerpts from the War Diary, but it is a summary of excerpts by the -naval archivist, Admiral Assmann. I will not read details from -these many entries, but I should like to point out that precisely this -document, C-170, shows in a large number of entries contained -therein that, since the beginning of the war in 1939, I continuously -used my influence with the Führer to maintain good relations with -Russia for the reasons which I have previously mentioned. It would -lead us too far if I were to start quoting several entries here. But -the document, I would like to emphasize, is entirely convincing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You had nothing to do with the Directive 21, -which is signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Absolutely nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But following that, you made some preparations -in accordance with the directive? As they concerned the Navy they -were in any case not so important here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. We had the first conference in January, as can be -seen from one of these entries in C-170. I had reported to the Führer -on 4 February about our intentions and in March the Navy began -with certain preparations. I have said already that the Navy -throughout the first period was hardly concerned with major -operations, but only with the cutting off of the Gulf of Finland by -<span class='pageno' title='106' id='Page_106'></span> -mines and light naval forces. I do not know whether that is in -Directive 21 or somewhere else but the Führer, at my urgent -request, had ordered that the center of gravity of the naval warfare -should still be in the direction of England. Consequently, we could -use only relatively small forces for the war against Russia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we had better break off now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal rather understood that you hoped to finish by -midday today. We realize that you had 2 hours of today taken up -with your documents, but when do you think you will be able to -finish now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe I will need only about three-quarters of -an hour, between half an hour and an hour.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Tomorrow at 10 o’clock we shall deal with -the documents of Seyss-Inquart, and we are told that will only last -30 minutes.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 18 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='107' id='Page_107'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD DAY</span><br/> Saturday, 18 May 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the application for -documents of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, 87 documents altogether -have been submitted to the Prosecution, and we have gone over -them in the German. After numerous conferences with counsel for -the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, we find we are unable to agree now -on 17 of these documents. As of yesterday the number was 20, as -I so stated, but we have now reduced it to 17.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Number 5 in the defendant’s list is a copy of a resolution -of the German National Assembly on the 21st of February -1919, advocating Anschluss between Austria and Germany. We have -told counsel we object to it as being really irrelevant here and immaterial. -It is a resolution of a German parliamentary body, and -it doesn’t seem to us to make any difference what they were thinking -of Anschluss in 1919.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Number 10 is an extract from a newspaper article -published in October 1945 and written by a man named Walford -Selby. It is a critical article criticizing the Treaty of St. Germain -for not avoiding the obliteration of the Austro-Hungarian economic -entity, and it discusses what it describes as the mistakes of 1919, -and so on. We understand that it is intended to explain, with other -documents, the economic background of the Anschluss movement. -Whatever may be said for that type of proof, there are at least five -other documents on the same basis and we made no objection to -them. But we did feel that somewhere this sort of thing, even if -relevant, certainly became cumulative. Documents 7, 12, 26, and 33 -are all on the same subject, the economic background of Anschluss, -and this is a long one. Therefore, we feel that it certainly is not -necessary, doesn’t add very much, merely creates a lot of paper -work, and is cumulative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Number 11 is a speech delivered by a Dr. Schober, -giving the area and population of the Republic of Austria. We -haven’t any very serious objection to this type of thing excepting -that there probably are better sources if the defendant wishes to -establish the area and population of Austria in 1921. Further, it -<span class='pageno' title='108' id='Page_108'></span> -seems to us that the Tribunal could very well take judicial knowledge -of the area and population of Austria as of that date from -reliable publications.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Number 14 is a statement by the former Chancellor -of Austria in 1922 to the effect that Austria belongs to Germany. -Our objection is again based on the cumulative feature of this document, -because there are at least three other documents with almost -identical statements by Dr. Renner to which we have made no -objection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document 19 is an extract from a book written by a man called -Kleinschmied, and the extract purports to show that a number of -politicians lived or prospered on the Anschluss movement in Austria. -That doesn’t seem to us to be very important here or likely to help -the Tribunal very much.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, what exactly does “lived from the -propaganda” mean? That they made their living by reason of propaganda, -or what?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. It purports to show that they made it a vehicle -for carrying on political activities, and made an issue of it and -sustained themselves politically.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 21 is an extract from Kunschak’s book <span class='it'>Austria 1918-1934</span>, -and it gives the increase in the National Socialist votes in Austria -between 1930 and 1932. That didn’t seem to us to be very -material or very helpful or likely to be helpful to the Tribunal. We -objected to it on the grounds that it was irrelevant and immaterial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Number 22 is an extract from an article in the <span class='it'>New -Free Press</span> of August 1932, opposing the League of Nations loan. -This again is submitted to prove the flow or the continuity of the -Anschluss movement. There is at least one other document, Number -23, which purports to establish the same principle on the same -kind of proof.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 27 is an extract from an article written by Martin Fuchs, -“Un Pacte avec Hitler,” and it discusses the Yugoslav policy with -respect to Anschluss between Germany and Austria. Again that -doesn’t seem to the Prosecution to have any direct bearing or any -helpful bearing upon the issues here, whatever the Yugoslavs thought -about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 31 is an extract from the <span class='it'>Neue Zeitung</span> of the 11th of -January of this year wherein Gordon Walker states that the celebration -in Austria after the Anschluss was genuine. Well, that is -Mr. Walker’s opinion, and there is some other substantial opinion on -the other side. We doubt very much that his opinion is material -here or competent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Who is he? -<span class='pageno' title='109' id='Page_109'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I understand he is a member of the Labor Party in -Great Britain, and a writer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 39 is an extract from the <span class='it'>Archiv</span> of 1938. This sets forth -a statement made by Senator Borah, of the United States, that the -Anschluss was a natural and inevitable affair and had nothing to -do with the United States. This was not a speech made by the late -Senator Borah in the Senate; it was his own opinion, and it does -not seem to us that it would be very helpful. Some later opinions -of Senator Borah were not so helpful, and this doesn’t seem to be -very likely to be helpful to the Tribunal with respect to this issue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 47 is an extract from Zernatto’s book <span class='it'>The Truth about -Austria</span>. Zernatto was one of the State Under Secretaries of Austria, -as the Tribunal knows. He left the country after the Anschluss -and went to the United States and wrote this book. He makes a -number of statements, I might say, about the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. -The Tribunal would be interested in knowing that this -Document 47, and Documents 48, 50, 54, 55, 60, and 61 are all -extracts from the same book. Now, we felt that wherever he reports -a conversation with Seyss-Inquart, that would have bearing and -relevancy before the Court; but where he expresses his opinion, we -have more doubt about its relevancy. This one statement, Number -47, seems to be his opinion. He doesn’t cite any conversation or -anything other than what appears to be his impression that Seyss-Inquart -disassociated himself from Leopold’s efforts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, we do not object to 48, and to 50, or to 54, because although -we originally thought we would object, on reviewing them they -appeared to set out actual conversations between Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart, -and it might be helpful to the Tribunal. Therefore, we do -not object to the next three.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But 55, again, is a statement in Zernatto’s book that, in Zernatto’s -opinion, Seyss-Inquart was a figure on the chess board and -was double-crossed by the Nazi or new Party leadership. We object -to that for the reason that I have stated; it is the author’s opinion. -He is deceased, by the way, and is certainly not available. In any -event, we do not think his opinion can be very helpful.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 60 is also a statement from Zernatto’s book and it sets -out a conversation with an unnamed Austrian Nazi. We felt that -was altogether too vague and would not be of value or helpful. In -Number 61, again, the author Zernatto expresses his opinion that -Seyss-Inquart was afraid of shouldering responsibility. I don’t want -to stress our objections too heavily to these extracts. I don’t think -they are very harmful, certainly, but I rather object because we -would like to cut down some of this printing, and I do not think -they will be very helpful to Seyss-Inquart. -<span class='pageno' title='110' id='Page_110'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Number 68 is the first document on anti-Semitism, and it is an -excerpt from the publication entitled <span class='it'>The Elements of National -Socialism</span> by Bishop Alois Hudal. It explains anti-Semitism in Germany -and Austria; and it goes on to discuss matters that the Tribunal -has heard very much about through other defendants, the -disproportionate position of the Jewish population in Germany, and -so on. We object to it as not being helpful and not material.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Again 69 is another extract from Zernatto’s book on the causes, -as some of these people see it, of anti-Semitism. It is his opinion -and does not to us seem to be helpful or material here. Number 71 -is on the Slovak question. I doubt that there has been any serious -claim made anywhere in this case that at various times the Slovaks -have not claimed autonomy. This extract from the <span class='it'>Archiv</span> of 1938, -insofar as we can discover, seeks to establish that they did want -autonomy. Well, we don’t think that is very important here, and -it will not be helpful to the Tribunal or to Seyss-Inquart.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it a document of state?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it is a document from the <span class='it'>Archiv</span>, and in that -sense it is a public document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: After Slovakia had been taken over by the -Reich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, not afterwards, it’s in 1938, and it preceded the -taking over.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: These are our objections, Mr. President. I do think -we have tried to be rather...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Of course, Mr. Dodd, we are only considering -now the question of objections to translation. We are not considering -the question of admissibility, nor are we binding you not to -object to them after they have been translated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I am aware of that, Mr. President. We tried to -be, I think, fairly generous about this list. The excerpts, or most -of them, are not too long. We did think we would have to call a -halt somewhere, and I do not think our 17 objections out of the -87 listed are very strict or are pinching, really, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): -Your Lordship, High Tribunal, I know that you value my -small country, Austria, not only because of its ancient culture and -its scenic beauty, but also because it was the first country which -lost its freedom through Hitler. However, with all respect which -you have for this country, I cannot expect of you that, as representative -of great powers, you know the history of my country to -<span class='pageno' title='111' id='Page_111'></span> -the last detail. I do believe that it is of the utmost importance for -the defense of Seyss-Inquart that you understand fully on the basis -of what background and what motives this man acted the way -he did.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I myself can see three reasons which led to the Anschluss.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First of all, the desperate economic situation which runs like a -red thread from 1918 right up to—I am sorry to say—and through -the year 1946.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second reason, and I shall be very brief with regard to the -documents...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, will you come to the actual -documents as soon as possible, because you will remember we are -only discussing the question of whether they should be translated -or not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. The second reason was the disunity of -the democratic parties. The third reason was the attitude of the -surrounding powers. From these points of view I have assembled -my documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first document is a resolution of the Weimar National -Assembly, and I am of the point of view that it is important in -respect to a final judgment that the Anschluss was not only a wish -of the Austrian population, but an all-German postulate. It is very -short and I request that it be admitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second document is by Selby, who for many years was the -British Ambassador in Vienna, a genuine friend of our country. In -this article he refers to the economic background and conditions in -Austria, which led to the Anschluss. That was the reason for my -including this document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next document is a speech delivered by Federal Chancellor -Schober who was held in great esteem by the world. In this speech -he refers to the fact that the burdens imposed on Austria are too -great for her to carry. He described the situation as a whole as a -case of bankruptcy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next document is a statement by the present Federal Minister, -Dr. Karl Renner, in 1922. At that time Dr. Seipel went to -Geneva and with great difficulty put through a loan at the League -of Nations which was of great importance to us because at the same -time it was demanded of Austria that we should forego independence -for 10 years’ duration. That meant that we were not to take any -steps to change the conditions for an Anschluss. Renner opposed -Seipel in Parliament at that time. This document is in no way -cumulative to Document 33, since in Document 33 I want merely -to describe the economic situation as it obtained in the year 1938. -<span class='pageno' title='112' id='Page_112'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next document is Point 2 of my evidence; namely, the strong -political propaganda for the Anschluss. In any event, I must dispute -most strongly the assertion that Document Number 21, which is very -short, is irrelevant. I consider it extremely important to prove that -this new, very young party, which grew in the fertile soil of a desperate -economic situation, increased tenfold, as far as the number -of votes was concerned, in the years 1930 to 1932; thus all the time -there existed a recognized political opposition to the government.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next Document, Number 22, is an article which again illustrates -the economic situation in Austria at a very essential period -of history, namely, the moment when Federal Chancellor Dollfuss -went to Lausanne in order to negotiate another loan from the -League of Nations, and we again were forced to suppress thoughts -of an Anschluss for another 10 years. This Document, Number 22, -as well as the next one, Number 23, is not cumulative, since the -one shows the political and the other the economic position of the -members of Parliament with respect to the League of Nations’ loan -of the year 1932.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next document is only an extract from the views taken by -the various surrounding states to the Anschluss question. I selected -only Yugoslavia, for Yugoslavia was the country which most strongly -supported the idea of Anschluss in her foreign policy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As far as Document 31 is concerned, I should like to remark, -supplementing the remarks made by the Prosecution, that Gordon -Walker is not only a member of the Labor Party, but—and this -point is much more important—during the entire war years he was -head of the British Radio Division Austria, and he was himself in -Austria in the year 1938 and he witnessed the Anschluss. His judgment -therefore is of extraordinary importance since it is the judgment -of a prominent foreigner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The same remark also applies to the following document, the -statement by Senator Borah who for 25 years was the Chairman of -the American Committee on Foreign Affairs. His opinion is surely -deserving of notice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next documents concern statements made by Dr. Zernatto. -I should like to add that Dr. Zernatto was Federal Minister, General. -Secretary of the Fatherland Front and Schuschnigg’s right-hand -man during the period of the Anschluss. He was one of the spiritual -fathers of the Schuschnigg plebiscite. I am sorry to say that -he died an emigrant in 1940, and I cannot produce him as a witness -here; but his book is a document and actually tells what this man -experienced in those critical days.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I urgently request that the remaining three documents, which are -very brief, be left in the book. -<span class='pageno' title='113' id='Page_113'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next two documents, which concern anti-Semitism, I included -very unwillingly in order to avoid any accusation of anti-Semitic -propaganda. I included them because in the trial brief my client is -accused of being a member of an anti-Semitic organization. This -accusation is unjustifiable insofar as more importance is attached to -this organization than it actually deserves. If this matter is not -further emphasized by the Prosecution, I shall not attach any particular -importance to these two documents myself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The last document which is being objected to, Number 71, contains -the Agreement of Pittsburgh which was concluded between -Masaryk and Hlinka, the Slovak leader, at which occasion Masaryk -solemnly promised autonomy to the Slovaks, a promise which was -not kept according to the letter of the agreement and which gave -rise to a strong demand for autonomy in Slovakia, which was supported -by Hitler. For these reasons I ask that this document also -be approved.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal will consider -the question of these documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, Dr. Siemers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday in connection -with Norway I submitted on one occasion Documents 81, -82, 83, 84, 85, and 86. I beg the Tribunal’s pardon, but I forgot -to submit one document pertinent to this matter, and I should like -to remedy this omission.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The document, which has already been granted me, is Exhibit -Number Raeder-88, which likewise is an extract from the <span class='it'>White -Book</span> and is printed in my Document Book Number 5, on Pages 392 -and following. This document shows the British order of 6 April -1940, regarding the plans for the occupation of northern Swedish -ore fields, proceeding from Narvik.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Since the Tribunal is familiar with this document, it will not -be necessary for me to read from it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, yesterday we had arrived -at the topic of Russia. You had answered my question regarding -Directive Number 21, Document 446-PS, of 18 December 1940, to the -effect that the Navy had not worked on this directive. You further -stated that the Navy undertook preparations in January in accordance -with the command.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I make a brief remark on this directive to the -effect that yesterday I believe you made a mistake when you said -that this directive was signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl. This was -the copy of the operational staff which Hitler had signed; but -Keitel and Jodl only countersigned. Thus there is no question of -<span class='pageno' title='114' id='Page_114'></span> -a signature of these two; when such directives were issued they -were signed only by Hitler, and the others could merely countersign.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, and I thank you for the -correction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this connection, I should like to ask the Tribunal to consider -Document C-35, USA-132. This document is found in the Document -Book of the British Delegation, Number 10a, on Page 16. It -is an extract from the War Diary with the date of 30 January 1941. -It describes the preparations by the Navy, in accordance with -Hitler’s command of 18 December, where Hitler under Number IV -of the directive commanded that precautionary measures be taken -in case Russia should alter her previous attitude toward Germany, -that is, only in case of this possibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, in connection with your -representation of the Russian situation, the Prosecution has submitted -Document C-66, which corresponds to GB-81. This is your -report of 10 January 1944 to Admiral Assmann for the historical -archives of the Navy. The document will be found in the Document -Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, Page 13. There you -will find the basic position taken by Raeder with respect to “Fall -Barbarossa.” This is set forth under “a” of the document under -Number 1...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have just heard that this document is also to be found in the -Document Book 10a, on Page 35. There you wrote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“At this time the Führer had made known his ‘unalterable -decision’ to conduct the eastern campaign in spite of all -remonstrances. Accordingly, further warnings, as long as -completely new situations had not arisen, were completely -without purpose, as one knew from experience. As Chief -of the Naval Operations Staff I was never convinced of the -‘compelling necessity’ for Barbarossa.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you have anything to add to these statements which you -made at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should like to say in this connection that despite -the fact that the directive had been issued on 18 December, I made -a comprehensive report at the end of December, as can be seen -from Document C-170, which I mentioned yesterday on several -occasions, in order to convince the Führer of the wrongness of this -decision. This shows that I have gone very far, for when the -Führer had issued a directive, even if it applied only to a hypothetical -case, it was generally impossible to approach him with -basic considerations against this directive. Everything else I mentioned -already yesterday. -<span class='pageno' title='115' id='Page_115'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday, in connection with your -counterproposals made to Hitler with respect to Russia, you mentioned -that in the autumn the plan was still to carry through the -action “Seelöwe,” that is, to land in England.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When, according to your strategic opinion, or -the opinion of the Navy, did this possibility cease to exist? When -did you have to dispense with this plan?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In the course of the month of September we still -believed that the landing could be carried through. As a necessary -condition the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and I, too, always -insisted—and he realized this fully—that for a landing air superiority -would have to be on our side; and therefore we were waiting -to see whether we could actually produce this air superiority in -time for the landing, which due to weather conditions could not be -carried out later than the beginning of October. If it were not -possible by then, it would have to be postponed until May of the -following year. It developed that air superiority could not be -produced to the necessary extent; consequently it was said that the -landing was to be postponed until the spring of the following year. -Further preparations were to be taken and they actually were -taken. But in the course of the winter the idea of a landing was -completely abandoned, and Hitler decreed that preparations in the -harbors along the Channel should be carried on only to such an -extent as would give the British the impression that this landing -actually was to take place. In September I had the impression that -Hitler no longer had any great interest in this landing and that in -his own mind he was completely committed to the Russian campaign -in conjunction with which he, of course, could not carry out -the landing in England.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, I turn to the accusation raised against you -by the Prosecution that you demanded that war be waged against -America. The Prosecution has submitted in this connection Document -C-152, or GB-122, which is to be found in the Document Book -of the British Delegation, Number 10, Page 23. This is an extract -from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff dealing with a -report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy—that is, you—to -the Führer on 18 March 1941. Under Figure 11 of this document, -it is stated, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Japan must proceed to take Singapore as soon as possible, -since the opportunity will never again be so favorable (preoccupation -of the entire British fleet elsewhere; the unreadiness -of the United States to carry on a war against Japan; -the inferiority of the United States fleet to the Japanese -<span class='pageno' title='116' id='Page_116'></span> -fleet). Japan is, indeed, preparing for this action but will -carry it out, according to statements of Japanese officers, only -at the moment when Germany proceeds with the landing in -England. All efforts on Germany’s part must therefore aim -to incite Japan to immediate action. If Japan captures Singapore, -then all other Eastern Asiatic problems relating to the -United States and England will be solved (Guam, Philippines, -Borneo, and Dutch East Indies).</p> - -<p>“Japan wants to avoid a war against the United States of -America, if at all possible, and can do so if she takes Singapore -promptly.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution has construed this statement of yours to mean -that you wanted to lead Japan into a war against America. Is that -correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It is one of the most incorrect assertions contained in -the Indictment against me. It is entirely clear that, since I was -involved in a naval war with England with my small German Navy, -I did not want, under any circumstances, to have America on my -neck as well; and it has been discussed here repeatedly that my -most urgent effort during the entire first few years of the war was -to avoid, under all circumstances, being involved with the United -States. Admiral Wagner described here in detail the limitations -which I had imposed on the German Navy in order to prevent any -clashes with the United States. I imposed limitations which actually -I could hardly justify when I carried on U-boat warfare with such -relatively small means. On the other hand, the United States from -the end of 1940 on, at the latest, and during the entire year of 1941, -exerted pressure on us in our naval warfare wherever possible and -committed actions which could be interpreted as definitely not neutral. -I remind you merely of the repairing of British warships in -the United States, something which up until that time was completely -impossible and unheard of; and Roosevelt’s orders to shoot -given in July and in September 1941; attacks by the American -destroyers <span class='it'>Greer</span> and <span class='it'>Kearney</span> in the Atlantic on our U-boats. In -two cases U-boats were pursued with depth charges for 2 hours -until finally they surfaced and fired, in one case damaging one -destroyer. Despite all this, in June 1941 I reported to Hitler that -we were continuing not to disturb the merchantmen of the United -States in any way—with the result that United States merchantmen -were crossing the Atlantic completely unmolested on sea lanes of -their own choosing, were in a position to give reports about our -U-boats and our sea warfare without our preventing them from doing -so; because of this the British were in a position to camouflage their -ships as American ships. That they did. The first time our pocket -battleship <span class='it'>Admiral Scheer</span>, while crossing the Atlantic, searched a -<span class='pageno' title='117' id='Page_117'></span> -ship flying the American flag it turned out to be the British ship -<span class='it'>Canadian Cruiser</span>. Despite all this I recommended to the Führer, -and he fully approved my suggestion, that we should take no measures -against American ships. That we did not go to Halifax to lay -mines Admiral Wagner has already mentioned. I need not mention -that any further.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was this proposal that Japan capture Singapore -only for the purpose of having assistance and an ally against England, -with whom we were already at war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is actually the case, and I should like to picture -very briefly the development which led to this proposal. This was -not anything that I did on my own initiative, but rather at the -beginning of the year 1941 political negotiations were carried on -with Japan partly by the Führer and partly by the Foreign Minister. -I was not even called into these negotiations, and I must say -regrettably so, for at these negotiations many things were discussed -which were not correct. However on the other hand this shows -again that there can be no talk about a conspiracy. Contact was -made, and then the visit of the Foreign Minister Matsuoka took -place, I believe, in March.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the basis of this entire development the Führer, on 5 March -1941, issued Directive Number 24. That is Document C-75, USA-151, -of 5 March.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the High -Tribunal to Document C-75, which is the same as USA-151, to be -found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10a, -Page 58. In this Directive, Number 24, it says under Figure 3a:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“As the joint object in the war it is important to defeat England -quickly and in that way keep the United States out of -the war.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>And three paragraphs farther down, under “d,” it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The capture of Singapore...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That on Page 58 is Instruction Number 54, -concerning collaboration with Japan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised—to my surprise—that -only a part of this directive is to be found in the English translation. -I ask that the Tribunal grant me permission, under these -circumstances, to submit the complete directive later as a Raeder -document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your Raeder book, -Dr. Siemers? -<span class='pageno' title='118' id='Page_118'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, not up until now; for I did not know that -only a part had been translated. I am asking for permission to -submit this whole document later as a Raeder document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. This may be found under Figure 3a, -and the next quotation will be found under Figure 3d, and it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The capture of Singapore, which is the key position of England -in the Far East, would be a decisive achievement in the -war effort of the three powers. Beyond that, attacks on other -bases of British and American sea power, if the entry of the -United States into the war cannot be prevented, will serve to -shatter the might of the enemy in that zone....”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to note the fact that already on 5 March, which -is the date of this directive, Hitler decreed the capture of Singapore. -Consequently, the suggestion made by Admiral Raeder in Document -C-152, dated 18 March, cannot be considered decisive, since a Hitler -decree was already in existence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I make a brief remark about that? The same -thing seems to apply to all the cases which are being mentioned -here: First of all, the political decision by Hitler, the head of the -State; then the directive of the Supreme Commander of the Armed -Forces to the Armed Forces; then the conclusions drawn by the -commanders-in-chief of the separate branches of the Wehrmacht. -So, after I received the directive of 5 March, I had to contemplate -how Japan, after entering the war, could strategically be used with -the best results. And that depended on how we could most effectively -wound our main opponent, England, on the sea. In this connection -I had to insist most urgently that Japan move against Singapore -since there were also circles who were of the opinion that Japan -should attack Vladivostok, which would have been a grave mistake.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>England’s power center in East Asia had to be attacked. But the -very fact that I believed that the capture of Singapore would cause -the United States of America to shy away from the war occasioned -this proposal of mine, and not the opposite.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection, I refer to Document -1877-PS which was submitted in the special Indictment against you. -It is USA-152 and may be found in the Document Book of the British -Delegation, Number 10, Page 320. It is a conversation between -the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka—I am just told now -that 320 is incorrect. It should be 319.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And it should be 10a, I think.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: 10a, I beg your pardon. -<span class='pageno' title='119' id='Page_119'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is a conversation between Matsuoka and Von Ribbentrop on -29 March 1941. We have already discussed this matter. On Page 8 -of this document, the following is said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Reich Foreign Minister again referred to the problem of -Singapore. Because of the fear expressed by Japan that there -might be U-boat attacks from the Philippines and that the -British Mediterranean Fleet and Home Fleet would join the -attack he had discussed the situation once more with Admiral -Raeder. The latter told him that the British fleet would be so -completely occupied in the home waters and in the Mediterranean -this year that she would not be able to dispatch even -a single ship to the Far East.</p> - -<p>“The American U-boats were described by Admiral Raeder -as being so inferior that Japan would not have to concern -herself about them at all.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Herr Von Ribbentrop, in reply to -my question on 1 April 1946, declared that he had been mistaken, -that the statement was probably made by Hitler. Will you please -clarify this statement once and for all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I can only confirm that I never discussed such questions -with Herr Von Ribbentrop, for unfortunately there was no -connection between the Foreign Office and the High Command of -the Navy especially since the Führer had forbidden that any information -be given by the Foreign Office to the military authorities. -I would never have made such statements since they were in direct -opposition to my own opinion, and especially since in this case I had -no basis for any such statements.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, were not, on the other hand, questions -frequently dealt with in the Naval Operations Staff as to the industrial -and military strength of the United States, and that for these -reasons any entrance of the United States was to be feared?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: This was fully clear to us, even to the last detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you at any time during the war see this -Document 1877-PS, which is before you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were you advised about these discussions between -Herr Von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Minister Matsuoka or the discussion -with Oshima?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No; I was merely told by the Führer, and that is -shown in the Document C-170, dealing with the results of this -discussion with Matsuoka. But I had no discussions with Herr -Von Ribbentrop. -<span class='pageno' title='120' id='Page_120'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I have just been -asked to correct a word which I have just used; in order to be fair, -I should like to do so. I said that Hitler, in his directive of 5 March -1941, “decreed” that Singapore be taken. The expression is not correct. -He naturally could not give any orders to Japan. The mistake -arises because the directive starts with the words: “The Führer has -commanded the following for our co-operation.” And under Figure 3 -it says: “The following directives apply in this case.” And among -these directives the taking of Singapore is mentioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Admiral, in any conversation did you suggest to anyone at any -time that Japan attack Pearl Harbor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, we never talked about that at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear anything about this plan before -Japan attacked Pearl Harbor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Never. It was a complete surprise for me and the -Naval Operations Staff that this attack took place; and it is a complete -mistake in judging the mentality of the Japanese to assume -that they would have spoken of such a plan to anyone, even inside -Japan, who was not directly connected with it. In 1904 they likewise -attacked Russian ships “out of the blue” without anyone suspecting -anything at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I -should like to submit three documents which have been granted me, -first Exhibit Number Raeder-19, to be found in Document Book 2, -Page 108. This document deals with the report by the American -General Marshall which has been placed at my disposal through the -help of the Court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this report, dated 1 September 1945, General Marshall stated -the following; and I refer to Page 116:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In order to establish for the historical record where and how -Germany and Japan failed I asked General Eisenhower to -have his Intelligence officers promptly interrogate the ranking -members of the German High Command who are now our -prisoners of war. The results of these interviews are of -remarkable interest. They give a picture of dissension among -the enemy nations and lack of long-range planning that may -well have been decisive factors of this world struggle at its -most critical moments.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And two paragraphs further:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command -had any over-all strategic plan. Although the High -Command approved Hitler’s policies in principle, his impetuous -strategy outran German military capabilities and ultimately -led to Germany’s defeat. The history of the German -<span class='pageno' title='121' id='Page_121'></span> -High Command from 1938 on is one of constant conflict of -personalities in which military judgment was increasingly -subordinated to Hitler’s personal dictates. The first clash -occurred in 1938 and resulted in the removal of Blomberg, -Von Fritsch, and Beck and of the last effective conservative -influence on German foreign policy.</p> - -<p>“The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, and the Low -Countries developed serious diversions between Hitler and -the General Staff as to the details of execution of strategic -plans. In each case the General Staff favored the orthodox -offensive, Hitler an unorthodox attack with objectives deep -in enemy territory. In each case Hitler’s views prevailed and -the astounding success of each succeeding campaign raised -Hitler’s military prestige to the point where his opinions were -no longer challenged. His military self-confidence became -unassailable after the victory in France, and he began to disparage -substantially the ideas of his generals, even in the -presence of junior officers. Thus no General Staff objection -was expressed when Hitler made the fatal decision to invade -Soviet Russia.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And on Page 118, there is an extract dealing with Germany and -Japan. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Nor is there evidence of close strategic co-ordination between -Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized -that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but -hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and -American land, sea, and air forces in the Far East.</p> - -<p>“In the absence of any evidence so far to the contrary, it is -believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance -with a unified strategic plan.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And further, in the documents which were also granted me, -Exhibit Raeder-113 and 114, in the Document Book 6, Page 491 and -Page 497...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think you should ask the witness -whether he agrees with General Marshall’s appreciation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you agree with the opinions of the -American General Marshall?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have not completely absorbed these statements. In -general they are the lines of thought which we also had pursued, -but I cannot vouch for each single point. In order to speak with -certainty I would have to look at them or they would have to be -read to me again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe the general confirmation is sufficient. -In Document Raeder-113 I should like to refer to the heading: -<span class='pageno' title='122' id='Page_122'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Army Foresaw Japan’s Move, Marshall Says:</p> - -<p>“Washington, December 11 (AP)—General George C. Marshall, -formerly Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged last night that -the Army knew more than 10 days before December 7, 1941, -that a Japanese move toward Pearl Harbor might take them -past the deadline where the American chiefs believed the U.S. -should fight.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In order to save time I shall not read the particulars; but it can -be gathered from the report by Marshall that the American Army -knew about it and later the date of November 25 and 26 is mentioned. -In addition Marshall testifies that preparations had been -worked out in the United States before the war for the construction -of landing strips for American bombers in Rabaul, Port Moresby, -and Singapore.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In Exhibit Number Raeder-114, which I am also submitting, -Henry L. Stimson, the former United States Secretary of War, made -a statement under date of 21 March.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Henry L. Stimson, former U.S. Secretary of War, disclosed -that the late President Roosevelt’s War Cabinet had discussed -and rejected—9 days before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor—an -American attack on the Japanese forces without further -warning...</p> - -<p>“Stimson related that he had received on November 28, 1941 -information of Japanese movements along the Asiatic coast. -On the same day, he said, the Cabinet met and discussed the -possible meaning of the Japanese move.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>He further said that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“...if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British -would fight, and that if the British fought we would have to -fight.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>According to this, Admiral, did the United States know about -these Japanese plans before you did?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Apparently, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall turn to the last accusation by the -Prosecution, and that concerns Brazil. In this connection, the Prosecution -has submitted Document 1807-PS, GB-227, to be found in the -Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 288. This is -Jodl’s diary, the entry of 16 June 1942. I have to beg your pardon, -I am told it is Page 287, not 288. This entry reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Naval Operations Staff applied on 29 May for permission -to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. It considers -that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant -ships is expedient at this moment when defensive measures -are still incomplete and there is the possibility of surprise, -<span class='pageno' title='123' id='Page_123'></span> -since Brazil is to all intents and purposes waging naval warfare -against Germany.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution is accusing you of -violating neutrality and violating international law because you -made that proposal at a time when Brazil was neutral. I call your -attention to the fact that the war with Brazil broke out 2 months -later on 22 August 1942. Please tell me briefly from memory just -how you came to make this proposal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The relations between Brazil and Germany at this -time could not have been worse. The Germans were very much -persecuted and treated very badly. Germany’s economic interests -were heavily impaired. The Brazilians were already completely on -the side of the United States. They had allowed United States air -bases to be established along the Brazilian coast, and also intelligence -stations. They themselves confirmed that they had destroyed -a German U-boat; and, on the other side, the German U-boats had -also attacked Brazilian ships, for the Brazilian ships were not illuminated -according to regulations and consequently could not be -recognized as Brazilian ships. Germany had previously asked all of -the South American countries to illuminate their ships in such a -way that their nationality could be distinguished at night. Then -there were air attacks on U-boats of the Axis Powers, and they -could have been carried out only from Brazilian bases. At this -request of the Naval Operations Staff to the Führer, the Führer -decreed that once again we should ask the Italians what intelligence -reports they had received; and Italy in turn confirmed that some -weeks before Italian U-boats, which had been operating together -with ours, had been attacked near the Brazilian coast. Likewise the -Brazilian Air Ministry had made known the fact that Brazilian aircraft -or United States aircraft coming from Brazilian air bases had -attacked Axis U-boats.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the basis of that confirmation the Führer permitted the use -of weapons against Brazilian ships along the Brazilian coast. A plan -was worked out, according to which a certain wave of U-boats, -which left the French coast in June to proceed into the Atlantic, -was to go to the Brazilian coast. The Führer had ordered in particular -that this was not to be mere pin-pricks but rather a serious -enterprise. This operation was later stopped and not carried through. -I am sorry that I am not able to say for what reason. But it can -be seen from our document which gives the statements made in the -War Diary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I believe that the -entire accusation of the Prosecution regarding this planning would -not have been raised if Document 1807-PS, Jodl’s diary entry of -<span class='pageno' title='124' id='Page_124'></span> -16 June, had been submitted <span class='it'>in toto</span>. Only the first part was submitted. -Therefore, I submit this entry as Exhibit Number Raeder-115, -to be found in Document Book 6, Page 500. From the further statements -made by General Jodl in his diary we may conclude that the -situation was correctly investigated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first part, which was submitted by the Prosecution, that is, -the first two sentences, I have already read. The rest of the entry -is as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office declares that an -aggravation of the conflict with Brazil is undesirable in view -of the attitude of Argentina and Chile and that, previous to -measures of war against Brazil, consultations must be held -with Italy and Japan. Acting on the report of the Chief of -the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Führer has ordered -on 30 May, that the Naval Operations Staff is to ascertain, by -inquiring in Rome, whether the Brazilian reports about warlike -actions against Axis U-boats are correct. The inquiry by -the Naval Operations Staff shows that Italian U-boats were -attacked on 22 and 26 May at the northeast corner of Brazil -by airplanes which beyond a doubt had started from a Brazilian -air base. The Naval Operations Staff transmit, moreover, -the text of the official communiqué of the Brazilian Air -Ministry about the fighting and propose to put into action -near the main Brazilian harbors during the period from -3-8 August 10 U-boats to sail from 22 June to 4 July from -ports in western France, along with the tanker <span class='it'>U-460</span>. The -order for execution must be given to the U-boats by 15 June -at the latest. After the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had -reported this to the Führer at the Berghof on the afternoon of -15 June, the Führer declared himself in agreement with the -intentions of the Naval Operations Staff but ordered, however, -that before any final decision is made, the political situation -be examined once again by the Foreign Office.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe that this proves that we were careful enough; and I -refer further to Exhibit Number Raeder-116 which I should like to -submit herewith, in the same document book, Page 503, which is an -extract from the War Diary. Under date 6 June there is an entry -which states that the development has gone so far that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“...a latent state of war is practically already in existence, -(Brazil entirely on the side of USA; most severe damage to all -German interests; individual Brazilian steamers not properly -illuminated sunk by U-boats; increasing agitation in Brazil; -Brazilians claim they have already sunk German U-boat -while patrolling the coast).”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='125' id='Page_125'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>And a further extract from the War Diary, Exhibit Raeder-117, -which I should like to submit herewith, to be found in the same -document book, Page 509. I ask the High Tribunal to take notice of -this document and its contents and I refer only to Figures 3 and 4 -in detail. Under Figure 3 it reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“When Brazilian ships began to provide themselves with -camouflage paint and to arm, the order was given on 15 May -1942 to use arms at once against recognizable armed South -Americans.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And under Figure 4 it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“On the basis of the fact that Axis submarines were attacked -by vessels along the Brazilian coast and that the Brazilian Air -Ministry officially made known that attacks had been made -by the Brazilian Air Force, the Naval Operations Staff on -29 May 1942, in Document 12938/42, Top Secret, asked the -Armed Forces Operations Staff for permission to use arms -against Brazilian military forces and merchant ships.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I submit also Exhibit Number Raeder-118, Document Book 6, -Page 510. I ask the High Tribunal to take notice of this document. -I do not wish to quote it, since it repeats the facts we have already -heard. I believe that Figure 4 of Document 117 which I have just -read clarifies the matter completely and refutes every accusation -against the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, do you have anything to -add to these extracts from the War Diary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I have nothing to add. It is entirely clear.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I ask you now to describe to the -High Tribunal—and with this I am coming to the conclusion, of my -examination—how it came about that you resigned in January 1943?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Your Honors, shall we have a recess first?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It depends on whether you hope to finish in a -few minutes. If you hope to finish in a few minutes we will sit on -so that you may finish your examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe it will take perhaps 10 minutes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Please describe how -it came about that you resigned in January of 1943; but first I should -like to ask you one more question: Did you, even before this, have -the idea of resigning?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should like to say briefly that on several occasions -before the war I asked the Führer to relieve me of my post, or I -presented him with an ultimatum. I should like briefly to cite two -cases as examples. In November 1938 in the presence of General -<span class='pageno' title='126' id='Page_126'></span> -Keitel I made a report to the Führer about the type of ships and our -plans as to how the ships should be developed further. On this occasion -the Führer, in a manner defying explanation, began to attack -everything that we had built and were building, including the plans -for the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span>, and to declare them wrong. Later I found out -that things like that happened whenever some persons of his entourage, -who knew very little about such things, gave him their -opinion, that he always followed it up, probably wanting—as I told -myself later—to check whether the things he had been told were -actually correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This case, however, was so extreme that I could not do anything -else but simply pick up my plans, put them in my brief case, and -leave the room. General Keitel was present. The Führer followed -me to the door, asked me to come in again, softened his accusations, -and asked me not to resign now under any circumstances.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second case was a purely personal one, but it is rather -typical. His naval adjutant, who had just been appointed, wanted -to marry a young girl who had a very unsavory reputation at the -University of Kiel. I told him I would never consent to the marriage. -The Führer had the girl introduced to him and decided he had -nothing against the marriage; I left the Berghof and sent the Führer -a letter via a staff officer in which I told him that I would refuse -my consent, that the officer would not remain in the Navy should -he marry, or else I would not remain. I asked the officer who acted -as my courier to bring back the answer since I wanted to reach a -decision at once. The Führer had the officer wait 2 days at the -Berghof and then sent him back to me with a letter saying:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Very well, the officer cannot marry and remain in the Navy -and he will not be used further as a naval adjutant; someone -else will be put in his place. He will become some sort of -leader in my National Socialist Motor Corps and will then -serve as one of my Party adjutants.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>It was also typical of the Führer that, to a certain degree, he -wanted to see his will carried through; but this man was out of -the Navy, and I could make my conviction felt in this case. -Under these circumstances I declared myself ready to continue in -office. That was at the beginning of 1939; in the course of the -spring, however, I asked again whether I could not be relieved of -my position now, since I had served for many years in the Navy and -I did not believe I would be able to maintain the dignity of the office -much longer. I suggested to him that perhaps in October 1939 -I should leave my post. The Führer refused at the time, and on -1 October we were at war, and in time of war I did not believe that -I could leave the Navy under any circumstances unless it was very -urgent, especially since I considered myself totally responsible for -<span class='pageno' title='127' id='Page_127'></span> -all preparations and for the training of the Navy. In the course of -the war our co-operating which up until then, aside from such -incidents, had been quite congenial, since the Führer had always -made an effort to show me respect, our connection gradually became -very strained during the war. The Führer became more nervous -when I made reports, flared up in rage when there were divergences -of opinion or if there had been any incidents, as, for instance, a -technical defect or poor performance by a ship. It happened again -and again that his entourage influenced him before I could actually -explain matters to him, and I was called in subsequently to set him -straight on these matters. In that way unpleasant scenes ensued -which wore me out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One point about which the Führer was especially sensitive was -the large ships. He was always uneasy when our large ships were -out on the high seas and were carrying on raids against shipping. -The loss of a ship, such as the <span class='it'>Graf Spee</span> or later the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span>, he -considered a tremendous loss of prestige; and matters like that, -therefore, excited him tremendously. That went on until the end of -1942. Then there came—and this particularly impressed me—my -defeat in the consultation with the Führer on questions dealing with -Norway, France, and above all, Russia. In the final analysis he -always listened more to the Party people as, for example, Terboven, -than to an old officer. That led to a situation which could not be -tolerated for any length of time. One of the basic characteristics of -the Führer was a tremendous suspicion toward anyone and everyone, -but especially directed against old officers who had come from the -old Wehrmacht and of whom he always assumed—despite all well-intentioned -treatment—that in their hearts they did not share these -feelings which he had to demand of them. Especially the case of -Russia had led me to so many conflicts with him that our relations -were strongly influenced thereby. Indeed, the man who compiled all -these war diaries and minutes, Admiral Assmann, summed it up on -one occasion at the conclusion of such a discussion with the words: -“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, therefore, is in complete -opposition to the Führer in this matter.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At the end of 1942, just after I had had to put an end to the -entire Norwegian question, an incident occurred which led to the -end. There was to have been an attack on a convoy which was going -to Murmansk or Archangel from England. It was in December at -a time when in those northern regions there are just 1 or 2 hours -of light and hence no favorable weather for fighting by large ships -when up against large numbers of destroyers. The ships, together -with the destroyers, had started on their journey and had reached -the convoy while it was still light. But since daylight soon disappeared -and darkness fell and since the convoy was guarded by -<span class='pageno' title='128' id='Page_128'></span> -many destroyers, the admiral considered it expedient to withdraw -the big ships from the battle. That was the only correct decision -for he might have lost them all by torpedo attack. This fact, and -secondly the fact that unfortunately the radio connection between -this admiral and the Naval Operations Staff was made difficult -and at times completely broken off by static, caused the Führer -to become extremely excited in his headquarters where I reported -to him everything I found out myself. The whole day was spent -with questions back and forth, and even in the evening I could -not give him a clear picture. This excited him extremely. Through -Admiral Krancke he had all sorts of insults transmitted to me -and demanded that I report to him immediately; and I could see -that very strong friction would result. I arranged it so that I did -not need to report to him until 6 days later on 6 January so that -the atmosphere could first cool off a little. On 6 January I could -go to him with a complete report; and in the evening, at a discussion -at which Field Marshal Keitel was also present, he made a speech -of about an hour’s duration in which he made derogatory remarks -about everything that the Navy had done so far, in direct contrast -to every judgment passed on the Navy up until this time. From this -I saw that he was anxious to bring about a break.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I personally was firmly prepared to seize this opportunity to -resign, especially as it became ever clearer that the war was becoming -a pure U-boat war, and I could therefore feel that I could -leave at this moment with a clear conscience.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After the Führer had concluded his speech I asked to be permitted -to speak with him alone. Field Marshal Keitel and the -stenographers left and I told him that I was asking for my resignation -as I could see from his words that he was entirely dissatisfied -with me and therefore this was the proper moment for me -to leave. As always, he tried at first to dissuade me but I remained -adamant and told him that a new Commander-in-Chief of the -Navy who would have complete responsibility would definitely -have to be appointed. He said that it would be a great burden for -him if I were to leave now since for one thing the situation was -very critical—Stalingrad was impending—and secondly, since he -had already been accused of dismissing so many generals. In the -eyes of the outside world it would incriminate him if I were to -leave at this point. I told him that I would do everything I could -to prevent that happening. If he wanted to give the appearance as -far as the outside world was concerned that I had not resigned -because of a clash, then he could make me a general inspector -with some sort of nominal title, which would create the impression -that I was still with the Navy and that my name was still connected -with the Navy. This appealed to him at once and I told -<span class='pageno' title='129' id='Page_129'></span> -him on 6 January that I wanted to be dismissed on 30 January. At -this point I had concluded 10 years of service as Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy under him. He agreed to this proposal and asked -me to suggest two successors so that he could make a choice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 30 January he then personally dismissed me by appointing -me Admiral Inspector of the Navy. He said that he would still -on occasion ask me for advice; but that never happened. I was -merely sent out twice, once to Bulgaria when the King of Bulgaria -was buried and once to Hungary, to the Hungarian Regent Horthy -to bring him a gift from the Führer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you otherwise performed no tasks as -Admiral Inspector?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I had no functions and received no orders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then my last question: Did you have the impression, -on the occasion of your conversation of 6 January 1943 -with Hitler, that he in a way was glad to get rid of you in view -of the many differences of opinion and the fact that you contradicted -him frequently on technical naval and political matters concerning -Norway, France, Russia?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do believe that he wanted to get rid of me at this -time, for I was in a certain way an inconvenience for him. This -one case which I described, where I had my way in the end, he had -never forgotten.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This concludes my examination of Admiral Raeder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit today until half past -one. It will adjourn now for 10 minutes.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to -ask questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant -Dönitz): Admiral, you recall the memorandum of the Naval -Operations Staff of 15 October concerning possibilities for an intensification -of the economic war. That is in the Document Book of -the British Delegation, Number 10, on Pages 96 and 97 of the -English text. Admiral Wagner has already testified about it here. -Can you add anything to that statement concerning the purpose -and the meaning of that memorandum? -<span class='pageno' title='130' id='Page_130'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Since the war against England came as a complete -surprise to us, we had up until then dealt very little with detailed -questions of submarine warfare. Among other things we had not -yet discussed the question of so-called unrestricted submarine warfare -which had played such a very important part in the previous -war. And from that fact it developed that on 3 September that -officer who was recently mentioned here was sent to the Foreign -Office with some points for discussion on the question of unrestricted -submarine warfare, so that we could clarify with the -Foreign Office the question as to just how far we could go. And -that is the document which recently played a role here, D-851, -GB-451, of 3 November.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: 3 September, you mean.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, 3 September. This touches upon all these questions. -Then discussions with the Foreign Office took place and -this U-boat memorandum mentioned by you was worked out in the -High Command of the Navy on the basis of these discussions and -released on 15 October. I believe that on 15 October I presented -it to the Führer who in principle agreed to the contents. But the -very fact that a memorandum about submarine warfare concerning -possibilities for an intensification of submarine warfare was issued -only on 15 October shows how little we were prepared for that -eventuality.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That memorandum contains near the beginning that sentence -which has been quoted by the Prosecution concerning our position -with respect to international law, where reference is made to -highest ethics of warfare, adherence to international law, and the -desire to base all military measures on existing laws wherever -possible. But if this is not possible or when by deviation it is possible -to achieve decisive military results, and we could take the -responsibility for this deviation, then in case of necessity we must -depart from existing international law. That means that also a -new international law may have to be developed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, this entire memorandum represents merely a constant -search for possibilities for conducting submarine warfare with the -least damage to neutrals and the greatest possible adherence to -international law and in such a way that it would become a decisive -factor in the outcome of the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Various cases are discussed as to how an intensification can be -reached, but it always was a question of finding countermeasures -against enemy measures. Such possibilities as blockade or the new -concept to lay siege to England by submarine warfare are examined -in all directions; but the draft always states the conclusion that in -view of the number of submarines and other misgivings it is not -yet possible to conduct such operations. -<span class='pageno' title='131' id='Page_131'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>And the final result of that entire memorandum, as set down -in that document, can be found in the two last pages. Unfortunately -I have only the German copy in front of me where under -the last Paragraph D the final opinion, the following sentences -which I should like to quote, are worthy of notice...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where is the extract?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On Pages 99 and 100 in -the Document Book 10, GB-224.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, another excerpt from the same document has -already been mentioned and that is in the Document Book Dönitz 3, -on Pages 199 to 203; but I do not believe that it is necessary to -refer to it because the witness will only read one or two sentences.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: [<span class='it'>Continuing.</span>] Now, the last paragraph “Conclusions” -reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“1.) The manner in which economic warfare has been conducted -until now, in accordance with Prize Regulations, does -not meet with military demands for ruthless severity.</p> - -<p>“A large part of enemy mercantile trade including all exports -in neutral ships is not covered.</p> - -<p>“The requirements of naval law that neutral merchantmen -be stopped and searched can no longer be fulfilled, in view -of the strength of aerial reconnaissance and U-boat countermeasures -in the enemy’s coastal approaches. Economic warfare -according to Prize Regulations has therefore to be limited -and in the North Sea and the Baltic must be left to surface -craft only. In the Atlantic the U-boats in enemy coastal -waters will limit their activities to attacks without warning -on convoys, troop transports, and once it has been approved, -armed and all enemy merchantmen, and will conduct economic -warfare according to the law governing prizes only in -exceptional cases. The use of the Operational Air Force for -economic warfare is not possible. Economic warfare is conducted -within the framework of international law. A possibility -of controversy with neutral states is ruled out.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>Then one more sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“If the Supreme War Command for political reasons should -not be able at present to decide to wage the economic war in -the most vigorous form possible by having recourse to a siege, -it will be possible to increase the effectiveness of the policy -of stopping enemy trade by a ruthless increase in the use of -mines and by air attacks on enemy port installations. One -cannot, however, expect a decisive result from the economic -war in its present form.” (Document C-157, Exhibit GB-224)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='132' id='Page_132'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The immediate result of -that memorandum and of your report to the Führer was the order -of 17 October?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, and that provided: Firstly, that all enemy merchantmen -could be torpedoed; and secondly, as a severer measure, -that passenger ships in convoys could be torpedoed a short time -after an announcement to that effect had been made. That was all -done in connection with the intensification, measure for measure, -which we had brought about in answer to individual acts of the -enemy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, that long passage that the -defendant has just read, if it has not been put in evidence yet, -must be offered in evidence by you. I understand it is not in evidence -at present.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I can help. I shall -be using this document and I shall put it in.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has it been offered in evidence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Only part of it, not the part -that the defendant has referred to. But, in view of that I shall -refer to it later on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you mentioned -that before 1935 certain preparations were made for the construction -of a German submarine weapon. Did Admiral Dönitz participate -in any way in these preparations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. As was said before, he was -abroad during the last year; but even before that he had nothing -to do with it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You have reported about -your dismissal as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Would you -please tell me how it came about that Admiral Dönitz became your -successor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Führer had ordered that I propose two admirals -as successors. I suggested in writing first, as the elder...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, how does this arise? I -mean, what relevancy has it to anything we have to decide as to -how Admiral Dönitz became head of the Navy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That has significance, -Mr. President, in view of the Prosecution’s assertion that Admiral -Dönitz became the successor of Admiral Raeder on the basis of -political relations or services rendered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right. -<span class='pageno' title='133' id='Page_133'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please continue, Admiral.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I’ll be very brief. I suggested, first, Admiral Carls, -who was the senior and has vast knowledge of the entire conduct -of naval policy. In the event that the Führer should want to manifest -that he now was placing U-boat warfare in the foreground -I suggested Admiral Dönitz, who was the greatest authority in that -field. Political considerations of any kind were not mentioned at -all; it was purely an official, technical appointment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no more questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, -the Tribunal, through its letter of 26 March, has consented that an -affidavit be submitted by the Codefendant Raeder for the Defendant -Keitel, provided the Prosecution has an opportunity to question -Admiral Raeder on his statements in cross-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have sent the affidavit to the Prosecution, and the Prosecution -has raised no objection. I ask to be permitted to submit this -affidavit which is concerned with the functions and position of the -Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, as Exhibit Number Keitel-19, -after Admiral Raeder has confirmed that he signed this affidavit -and that he agrees to its being submitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, you are acquainted with the -questions which I put to you and which, after a conference with -your counsel, you answered and signed on 19 March?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is about the position of Field Marshal Keitel -in the OKW?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am quite familiar with that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Then, may I submit this affidavit? The Prosecution -has a copy of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have a few more questions for Admiral Raeder, the answers -to which can be greatly simplified with the permission of the Court. -These are the same questions which on 9 May, a week ago, I put to -Admiral Dönitz and which refer to the assertion made by the witness -Dr. Gisevius about Keitel’s tremendous influence and the -circle of silence which Keitel is said to have drawn around Hitler. -I merely want to ask the witness Admiral Raeder, with the permission -of the Tribunal, whether he can confirm as correct for the -period before 1943 as well—that is, for the period during which -Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy—the answers to my -questions given by Admiral Dönitz in Raeder’s presence. I ask for -the decision of the Tribunal whether I may put this general question -in order to save time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. -<span class='pageno' title='134' id='Page_134'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You heard what I said, and I ask you, can you -confirm the answers given by Admiral Dönitz to my questions on -9 May for the period before 1943 as well?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that I can do.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Now, I have one final question. During your testimony -Document L-79, the “Little Schmundt” file, was treated. You -objected to this document as inaccurate and not of probative value?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Dr. Siemers then quoted a part of that document -which the Prosecution, at the time when it submitted the document, -had not read. In that part of the document there is mention of a -research staff in the OKW.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I ask you now to tell me whether such a research -staff in the OKW was ever actually created.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Not to my knowledge. The work was done by the -Armed Forces Operations Staff in which there were officers representing -all three branches of the Armed Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: So there was no change in the scope of tasks and -in the division of jurisdiction?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, definitely not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: That also concerns the question of working out -strategic and operational matters between the OKW and the Armed -Forces Operations Staff on one hand and the general staffs of the -Armed Forces branches, including the Naval Operations Staff, on -the other?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as the Naval Operations Staff is concerned, yes, -there was no change.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: And as far as the other branches of the Armed -Forces are concerned do you know of no change or...?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That I cannot say. I do not know about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and Halder have -testified about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thank you. I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, is the affidavit that you referred -to contained in your document book?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: No, not yet. It will be Number Keitel-19.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Will you have translations supplied to -the Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='135' id='Page_135'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High -Command of the German Armed Forces): Admiral, you are the -senior member of the group of the General Staff of the OKW, and -you belonged to this so-called group for the longest time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: In what manner did you become a member of -this so-called group?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I was appointed Chief of the Naval Command Staff -by Reich President Field Marshal Von Hindenburg. I did not join -that group by doing so; rather I became Chief of the Navy. One -was not aware of any group.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Joining and remaining in this group the Prosecution -maintains was voluntary. Was there any possibility at all -for military leaders to apply for any vacant posts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, there was nothing of the sort.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: In other words, military accomplishments -were the decisive factor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It was a military order. There was no question, of -it being voluntary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did you know the various members of the -group at the time when you belonged to it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I certainly did not know all individuals from the -other branches. Of course, I knew a large number.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Within the purely military leadership was -there ever a conference about a plan which had as its purpose the -launching of aggressive wars?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, there was never such a conference. Frequently -it has been mentioned here how the various enterprises came -about—the political decision of the Führer, a directive issued by -him, and then the working out of the final order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Admiral, I do not mean now by this question -the meetings which took place under Hitler’s leadership. I mean -meetings of purely military officers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Do you mean within the various branches of the -Armed Forces?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, within the various branches.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, within the Naval Operations Staff there -were meetings about various questions, but not about aggressive -wars.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, my questions referred only to that. The -Prosecution asserts, furthermore, that this indicted group was first -established by the National Socialist Regime. Is that correct? -<span class='pageno' title='136' id='Page_136'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. There was no group at all, -but the organization was such as has frequently been described.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: And such as has always existed in all armies -of the world?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, as has always existed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has furthermore asserted -that, after the seizure of power by Hitler, the high military leaders -had the choice either of co-operating or of accepting the consequence -that the new regime would establish new armed forces, -that is armed forces of their own, and that on the basis of this -situation the generals decided to co-operate. Is that assertion by -the Prosecution correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. It is not true that thereupon any joining of forces -took place. I know that such tendencies existed. For instance, once -in 1934 I reported to the Führer that I had been informed that -SA Gruppenführer Killinger, who had formerly been in the Navy -and had advanced to prominence (in the SA), had the intention of -becoming the Chief of Naval Operations Staff. But I was not aware -of any further efforts. But above all, there was no coalition of -the generals for defensive action against such an intention.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: So the assertion made by the Prosecution is -not correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not correct. That was not in the least a method -which would have been in accordance with the sentiments of the -soldier—that such a coalition be formed to avert something.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution furthermore asserts that the -group, above all, the generals, let themselves be won over by the -regime because of the chance of conquest. Is that assertion correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is an absolutely incorrect and farfetched assertion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Was the effort of the Party to acquire for -itself supreme authority ever supported or promoted by the -military?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do not know that that ever happened. Do you -mean the seizure of power?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: After the seizure of power was the Party -supported by military leaders, as far as you know, in its efforts to -attain sole domination in Germany?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday, in reply to the question of your -counsel, you described how you came to swear your oath to Hitler. -<span class='pageno' title='137' id='Page_137'></span> -If such an intention had existed in the mind of one of the commanders-in-chief, -would it have been possible for him to refuse -the oath?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That I cannot say, but I believe that not one of us -saw any necessity for refusing that oath.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has further asserted that -the high military chiefs agreed completely with the principles and -aims of National Socialism. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I explained here yesterday how far one could agree -with the principles of National Socialism and to what extent one -trained one’s soldiers according to these principles. Anything that -went beyond that was rejected and found no acceptance in the -Navy. Here I can speak only for the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did the officers who were subordinate to you -and who were in the group ever have an insight into the political -situation and Hitler’s intention so that one could speak about participation -or membership in the plan?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. There was an absolute prohibition on speaking -to anyone about speeches in which Hitler mentioned intentions and -possible developments. The officers below the rank of Armed Forces -commander were informed only when things had gone so far that -the directive was to be issued.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution further asserts...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have to qualify that. That directive was first worked -out by the High Command of the Army and the Navy. Thus they -received information as soon as the directive of the individual -branches of the Armed Forces was issued and that always happened -sometime later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution also asserts that the high -military leaders were not military experts but that they knew -Hitler’s intentions of aggression and willingly co-operated. Can you -name any military leaders who, before they had received orders, -took a positive attitude toward any aggressive action?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot answer that. I explained yesterday how -Admiral Carls pointed out to me the danger imminent in Norway; -but he did not do anything more than give me the information, -point out the danger, and elucidate the situation there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The attitude of the former Commander-in-Chief -of the Armed Forces, Von Fritsch, and of the Chief of the -General Staff Beck to the question of a war is known. I just wanted -to ask you, did the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal -Von Brauchitsch, have the same attitude concerning the war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I believe so, yes. -<span class='pageno' title='138' id='Page_138'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Concerning the conference on 5 November -1937, you have already made detailed statements yesterday. I would -like...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you have been putting this -class of question to every naval and military witness who has been -called, and what the Tribunal desires me to point out to you is that -there has been no cross-examination by any member of the Prosecution -challenging any of these points, so this evidence is entirely -repetitive and cumulative and is not bound to be put by you to -every military and naval witness who comes into the witness box, -and it is simply a waste of time to the Tribunal. When questions -are answered by a witness and are not cross-examined to by the -other side, it is the practice to assume that the answers are accepted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for me this is an extremely -important question which has just been touched upon, namely, the -question of whether a question is inadmissible because in the opinion -of the Court it is cumulative. I should like to make a few -statements concerning whether or not a question is cumulative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Laternser, you can understand -what the Tribunal has said to you, that it is now desired, in view -of the directives of the Charter, that this Trial should be as expeditious -as it can reasonably be; and it does not desire to have the -same evidence adduced to it over and over again. Is that not clear?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I can assume that the Tribunal -accepts as true these proofs which I want to bring by means -of my question, then I can of course forego these questions. But I -cannot determine whether that is the case unless I know that I -have succeeded in bringing definite proof...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What I wanted to point out to you was that -you asked the same question of a great number of witnesses and -that those questions have not been cross-examined, and in such circumstances -you can assume that answers given by the witnesses -are accepted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: If I am justified in drawing this conclusion, -then of course I shall dispense with such questions in the future. -I have only a few more questions, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In support of the Indictment of the -group of the General Staff and the OKW two affidavits have been -presented by the Prosecution, one by Field Marshal Von Blomberg -and one by Generaloberst Blaskowitz. In these two affidavits both -generals state that as a whole, within the circle of generals before -the war, the opinion existed that the question of the Corridor -would have to be decided unconditionally and, if necessary, with -<span class='pageno' title='139' id='Page_139'></span> -force. Is that opinion stated by the two generals correct? Was that -the general attitude at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I never heard of such an opinion. In my presence -General Von Blomberg never made any statement of that kind. -The Polish question was discussed by us in the Navy only to the -extent already mentioned here during the last few days, namely -that an attack on Poland by Germany would have to be prevented -under all circumstances. The political treatment of this question...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The defendant says he has never heard of -this suggestion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: That was the reason why I put the question -to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: After 1933 political questions were handled and decided -by Hitler exclusively, and he said that he made all policies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: It is therefore correct that this opinion which -Blomberg and Blaskowitz have mentioned does not apply for the -circle of generals?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Well, at any rate, I have never heard it expressed by -the generals. It did not exist in the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: You were present at the conferences of -23 November 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put one supplementary question -concerning those conferences. Admiral, do you remember that -in the course of these conferences Hitler reproached the generals -because they still had old-fashioned ideas of chivalry and that these -ideas had to be rejected?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That I cannot say with certainty. I believe that I can -recall having once heard it said that Hitler was of that opinion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question concerning the -document which your defense counsel already put to you in the -course of your examination. It is Document C-66 submitted by the -British Prosecution under GB-81. It is in Document Book 10, on -Page 13, or 10a, Page 35. On Page 5, in the last paragraph of that -page, you said the following and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It can be seen from my statements and plans that the Führer -reckoned with a definite conclusion of the eastern campaign -in the fall of 1941, whereas the High Command of the Army -(General Staff) was very skeptical.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Admiral, I wanted to ask you of what this skepticism consisted?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as I know, the High Command of the Army -was of the opinion that it was impossible to conclude such a -<span class='pageno' title='140' id='Page_140'></span> -tremendous campaign in so short a time; and many others shared -that opinion, whereas the Führer believed that because of the new -weapons and his strategy he could conclude that campaign very -quickly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about whether the -High Command of the Army had any fundamental objections before -the beginning of the Russian campaign?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as I know, the Commander-in-Chief of the -Army was very much against it; but that too, I cannot say definitely.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no more questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Representing Dr. Von -Lüdinghausen, Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Admiral, in -the course of the proceedings it has been testified, I believe by the -Codefendant Göring, that Field Marshal Von Hindenburg had expressly -desired that Herr Von Neurath become Foreign Minister. -Do you know anything about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I learned at the time that Hindenburg had expressed -that wish, and it caught my attention because Field Marshal -Von Hindenburg until that time had always considered merely the -appointment of the Minister of Defense and the Chiefs of Staff of -the Army and Navy as his privilege in the Reich Government. This -was the first time that he expressed such a wish in the case of a -Foreign Minister.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: So it was not the practice of the Field Marshal to -make any suggestions regarding the appointments of Ministers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. He had merely acted according to his own wish -to appoint the Defense Minister, even in the previous Social Democratic, -Democratic, and other cabinets.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: What may have been the reason for Field Marshal -Von Hindenburg’s making that exception in the case of Neurath?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He probably wanted to make sure under all circumstances -that the peaceful policies which had prevailed in Germany -up to that time would be continued. He was sure that Herr Von Neurath -would continue these policies in the same direction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: So he had particular confidence in Herr Von Neurath’s -attitude up to that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, beyond a doubt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: You knew Von Neurath very well, and you were -informed about his political principles, weren’t you? What were -the main lines of his policies? -<span class='pageno' title='141' id='Page_141'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Herr Von Neurath wanted to see the gradual recovery -of the German people to normal conditions and he wanted to strive -with peaceful means for equal rights for the German Reich. Above -all, he wanted to have good relations with England, which was also -in conformity with Hindenburg’s intentions, and on this very point -both of us agreed completely.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: So one can say that you considered Von Neurath -an exponent of a policy of understanding with England and a peaceful -policy of compromise.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: Then I have a second question for you, Admiral. -A Fritz Wiedemann, who was Hitler’s adjutant from 1935 to 1939, -has submitted an affidavit. The Prosecution has submitted that affidavit -under 3037-PS. In this affidavit Herr Wiedemann states that -on 28 May 1938 a conference took place in the winter garden of the -Reich Chancellery with all important people of the Foreign Office, -the Army, and the Operational Staffs present, a meeting so large -that one almost doubts whether all these people could get into the -winter garden.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And here, he says, in addition to Göring, General Beck, General -Keitel, and Von Brauchitsch, there were also present Von Neurath, -Von Ribbentrop, and yourself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this meeting Hitler spoke among other things about Czechoslovakia -and stated that it was his unshakeable intention that -Czechoslovakia must disappear from the map. Do you know anything -about that meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Although I can otherwise recall every large or more -important meeting, I do not have the slightest recollection of this -meeting at that time. The list of those present also seems very unlikely. -I have never seen Herr Von Neurath and Herr Von Ribbentrop -together at the same meeting. I should also doubt whether -Herr Von Neurath at that time was in Berlin at all. He was quite -definitely not present at that meeting. But I also do not remember -any meeting at which Von Ribbentrop was present as Foreign Minister -when military matters were discussed. I think this Herr -Wiedemann is mistaken because I believe also that I have never -seen him at a meeting in which such matters are supposed to have -been discussed. The Führer always sent this personal adjutant of -his out of the room beforehand. I believe there is some mistake.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: Such an important statement by the Führer you -would doubtless have remembered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. During that summer the Führer’s opinions fluctuated -greatly. I believe that at the end of May a mobilization took -<span class='pageno' title='142' id='Page_142'></span> -place in Czechoslovakia, or something of the sort—I do not remember -exactly what. But I attended no meeting, as far as I know, at -which such a statement was made.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: Thank you. I have no more questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendants’ counsel wish to -ask any questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Sir David, it seems scarcely worthwhile starting the cross-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, -I entirely agree.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 20 May 1946, at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='143' id='Page_143'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH DAY</span><br/> Monday, 20 May 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dr. Horn wishes to ask some -questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): -With the permission of the Tribunal I should like to put a few more -questions to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Admiral, is it true that on 24 April 1941 the so-called neutrality -patrol of North American warships was extended past the 300-mile -limit to a distance of at least 1,000 miles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot remember the date, but such an extension -did take place at some time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that at the beginning of June 1941 a law -was passed in the United States confiscating foreign ships immobilized -in North American harbors as a result of the war and -including 26 Italian and 2 German ships?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Here again I cannot tell you the date for certain. It -happened in the summer of 1941. The ships were mostly Italian, -with a few German ships. I cannot swear to the exact figures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In June 1941 the United States publicly declared its -willingness to give the Soviet Union every possible aid. Did you -discuss this with Hitler, and what was his attitude towards it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is correct. There were some questions of -a loan without interest, or some such thing. Very probably I did -speak to Hitler about it, but I cannot tell you what his attitude -was. I can say only that all these measures at that time in no way -deterred us from the course we had pursued until then. In June -I had the conversation with Hitler at which I explained to him -that up to that time we had allowed American warships to go -completely unmolested, and that we would continue to do so in -spite of the considerable disadvantages entailed which I mentioned -recently. -<span class='pageno' title='144' id='Page_144'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In 1941 the American Secretary of War Mr. Stimson -and the Secretary of the Navy Mr. Knox, as well as Secretary of -State Mr. Hull, repeatedly advocated in public the use of the United -States fleet to safeguard English transports of war material to Great -Britain. On 12 July 1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox informed -the representatives of the press of Roosevelt’s order to shoot at -German ships. How did Hitler and you react to these actions, which -were contrary to neutrality?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Your facts are correct. They will go down in the -annals of history. Hitler did subsequently issue an express order -that we were in no circumstances to open fire of our own accord, -but only in self-defense. This situation actually did arise later in -the case of the two destroyers <span class='it'>Greer</span> and <span class='it'>Kearny</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: Your Honor, the report is made that Defendant -Göring is absent this morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you had read at the -time of its publication the book by Captain Schüssler, <span class='it'>The Fight -of the Navy against Versailles</span>, had you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at it on Page 26 -of Document Book 10, Page 123 of the German document book? -Captain Schüssler had told you that he was going to write such a -work, had he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. And I might add that this book was written -because we in the Navy had been accused by National Socialist -circles of not having done enough to strengthen the Navy in the -period previous to 1933. That is why all these things were mentioned -in that book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the book was circulated -among senior officers in the Navy, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; at any rate, any of the senior officers who -wanted it could have it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you just turn to -Page 127, or to Page 27 of the English book, which gives the -preface? You will see at the end of the first paragraph it says that -it is to give a reliable picture of the fight of the Navy against the -unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And in the third paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“This memorandum is also meant to distinguish more clearly -the services of those men who, without being known to wide -<span class='pageno' title='145' id='Page_145'></span> -circles, were ready to accept extraordinary responsibility in -the service of the fight against the peace treaty.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree, Defendant, that -that preface represents generally but accurately the feeling of the -Navy with regard to invading the provisions of the Treaty of -Versailles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, as regarding circumventing the Versailles Treaty -as far as necessary to improve our defenseless position, for reasons -which I explained recently here. To do this was a matter of honor -for every man.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just turn over—it is -Page 28, My Lord, and it is Page 126 of your copy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] It gives a summary of contents. You -see, it is in four sections. The first section deals with the first -defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles, -and then enumerates what they were. Don’t trouble about that. -The second is independent armament measures behind the back of -the Reich Government and legislative bodies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In both cases it says: From the end of the war until -taking over the Ruhr in 1923; from 1923 until the Lohmann case -in 1927. I had nothing to do with either case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see. From 1922 to -1924 you were inspector of naval training at Kiel, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Inspector of the training system; the schools, the -further training of officer candidates, the complete training of -assistants of the Chief of Staff, that is, chief-of-staff assistants, a -sort of general staff officer, and similar matters. I had nothing -to do with affairs of the front.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is what you were asked. You were -asked whether you were inspector of training. The answer was -“yes,” was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As inspector of training, are -you telling the Tribunal that you did not have a very complete -knowledge of the weapons available for your service?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no. It was not a question of weapons visible for -all to see. As I explained to you recently, that was a matter of -setting up gun platforms and transferring guns from the North Sea to -the Baltic. This was done by a special command, which worked -under the direct order of the Chief of Navy; among others, there -was this Kapitänleutnant Raenkel, for instance, who was the -specialist dealing with all gunnery questions at the time. I myself -<span class='pageno' title='146' id='Page_146'></span> -was in Kiel, and there were no guns or anything of the kind in -Kiel and its neighborhood.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Take the next period from 1923 -to 1927. From 1925 to 1928 you were Chef der Marine Station der -Ostsee, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal -that you did not know about the independent armament measures -taken behind the back of the Reich Government?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No; I had nothing at all to do with these affairs. -I have already said that was done by the Chief of the Naval -Command Staff. I knew in a general way...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you whether -you ever had to do with them, I am asking you whether you are -saying that you did not know about them. You knew all about -them, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I knew it in a general way, that such measures were -being taken.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, take the next, Number III: -“Planned armament works tolerated by the Reichskabinet, but -behind the back of the legislative bodies.” The legislative bodies -would be the Reichstag and the Reichsrat, would they not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. But I already said recently that it was not the -military commander-in-chief’s business to negotiate these matters -with the Reichstag. This was a matter for the Government. Herr -Severing will also testify to that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will hear Herr Severing -when he comes. At the moment I want you to tell the Tribunal -this...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] I say the same...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just wait a minute; you have -not heard my question yet. What did you say to Captain Schüssler? -Did you tell him you are giving an entirely false picture in suggesting -that the Navy had anything to do with going behind the -back of the Reichstag? Did you make any effort to correct what -Captain Schüssler was saying?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No; I did not correct his book. I had no time for that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just before we come to -Number IV, if you just look, it’s page—</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, it is Page 32 of the English book, and Page 186 of your -book. This is part of Captain Schüssler’s description of Section II -<span class='pageno' title='147' id='Page_147'></span> -dealing with economic rearmament; it comes under the heading, -“Difficult Working Conditions.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Do you see that? It begins: “There -were often difficult working conditions.” Do you see that? The -heading is “Difficult Working Conditions.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes I see, “Difficult Working Conditions.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to look at the -last part of it. Now, I want it quite clear, Defendant. This is -dealing with the period from 1923 to 1927, before you were head -of the Navy; so I want to ask you about it.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“There were often many external difficulties besides these -for the Tebeg—the camouflaging of the task and the work, -the distance separating them, the impossibility of settling any -questions even of minor importance by telephone, and the -necessity of avoiding if possible any written correspondence, -and of carrying it out in any case as private correspondence -with false names and disguised expressions.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you not know that that was the method by which it was -being carried on?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No; I really knew very little about the Tebeg—the -Tebeg, the Navis—any of these things. But I think it was quite -right for these people to work like that, because at that time the -attitude of a large percentage of the German people was unreliable, -and there was great danger if these things leaked out. In any -case, the Tebeg had been dissolved when I arrived.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you kindly turn -back to Page 126, in Book 4, Page 28 of the English book, and -just look at Captain Schüssler’s description of the fourth period: -“Armament under the direction of the Reich Government in -camouflaged form (from 1933 to 1935 when we were free to recruit -on an unrestricted basis.)”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you agree that Captain Schüssler was giving an accurate -description of your methods from 1933 to 1935?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: How does he describe it? Where is that passage?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Number 4.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: “Armament under the leadership of the Reich Government -in camouflaged form”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that it is a correct -description of your activities from 1933 to 1935?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course. I did that on orders from the head of the -State; and before all the head of the State was very anxious to -see that no exaggerated measures should be taken, so that it would -<span class='pageno' title='148' id='Page_148'></span> -not interfere in any way with his plans for making an agreement -with Great Britain. He allowed very little to be done with regard -to the Navy. He could at once have built eight armored ships, so -many destroyers, and so many torpedo boats, none of which had -yet been built, but he did none of these things because he said, -“We do not want to create the impression that we are arming on -a large scale.” He approved only two...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have explained that; so -note, Defendant, the point is this—the “camouflaged form” when -you were negotiating the naval agreement. You did not want -anyone to know what steps you had taken contrary to the treaty -and how far you had gone. That is the plain fact of it—you wanted -to get the naval agreement without disclosing what you had done, -isn’t that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that distorts the sense of what I said. We did not -want the announcement of these measures to cause strained relations -between Germany and Britain. The measures as such were -completely justifiable and were extremely minor ones.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will come to that in a moment. -I only do want, before we leave these naval works, to ask you -one question about another book. You know that Oberst Scherff -projected a history of the German Navy. I don’t want any misunderstanding -about it. As I understand the position, you permitted -Oberst Scherff to have recourse to the archives of the Navy but -beyond that you hadn’t seen anything of his work, isn’t that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not see his book at all. I saw the table of -contents here the first time I was interrogated. I did not give him -the order, either; he received it from the Führer; and for that -reason I allowed the Chief of the Navy Archives to assist him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is exactly what I put -to you. I want you to turn to Book 10a. It starts at Page 1 in the -English version and also Page 1 in the German. And if you would -look at Page 3 you will find the proposed table of contents of -Oberst Scherff’s book, Page 3 in the English version. I think it must -be about Page 3 in the German version, too. Now would you look -at the heading of Section 2. It is: “Incorporation of the Navy in -the National Socialist State.” And then he describes, “(a) National -Socialism in the Navy before 1933”...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Where is that? I have not found it yet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Section 2 of the table of contents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that must be something quite different. I have -not got it here...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have got it now. -<span class='pageno' title='149' id='Page_149'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Section 2, -which is: “Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist -State.” And you can see the proposed headings which were to cover -some 30 pages: “National Socialism in the Navy before 1933.” Then: -“The oath of the Navy to the Führer; the taking over of the National -Insignia; the first alteration of the flag and the New War flag.” Do you -agree with Oberst Scherff’s description? You agree that this is a -correct description, that the proceedings could be described as the -incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course—I explained that here recently—the Navy—the -Armed Forces—had to have some connection with the National -Socialist State. A democratic Navy in a monarchy is impossible. The -basic principles must agree. But I myself decided the extent to -which these principles were adopted—that is to the degree where -the Navy maintained its internal independence and yet occupied -its appropriate position with regard to the National Socialist State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Apart from that, I do not see any text here; I can only see the -headings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that doesn’t offend you -as a description. That is all I wanted to get clear. I do not want -to spend a great deal of time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But the headings mean nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>For instance, it might say in the actual text that the Navy did -not fit into the National Socialist State properly. I do not know. -The same holds good of the fleet. Of course...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to waste time -on it. There were three matters which you dealt with in your -examination-in-chief, and I am not going to deal with them in -detail; but I just want to remind you of them and put one general -question. You can put that document away; I am not going to -pursue it further. Would you mind putting that document away -and giving me your attention for the next question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You were asked about the E-boats, your survey list, that long -document, in September 1933, and the question of disguised auxiliary -cruisers as transport ships O. Is this a fair summary of your -answer: That you admitted that these breaches of the Treaty took -place, but said in each case that the breach was only a little one. Is -that a fair summary of your answer? Is it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s take it in bits, then. -Are you disputing that any of these matters with regard to the -E-boats, the matters on the survey lists or the transport ships -O—are you disputing that any of these matters took place? I understood, -you admitted they all did take place... -<span class='pageno' title='150' id='Page_150'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, they took place in the way I described. For -instance, these auxiliary cruisers were not built. We were not -allowed to do that. But we were allowed to make plans and we -were allowed to select those ships which, in the event of war—if -a war had broken out in which Germany was attacked by another -state—could have been used as auxiliary cruisers. That was not -a violation. If it were I would admit it. The U-boat designing -office in Holland was not a violation of the Versailles Treaty either. -The wording was quite different; I do not remember the third case -which you mentioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember there was -a long list in a document, from yourself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I understood, maybe -wrongly, that you admitted these things took place, but you said -“it is only a little one.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course. Those were small things, but they -were urgently necessary in Germany’s defense interests.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about -an officer of yours, Vice Admiral Assmann. Was he an officer in -whom you had confidence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He was a very able historian.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you answer my question? -Was he an officer in whom you had confidence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I had confidence that he would write history correctly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all I wanted. Now, would -you have a look at a new document, which is Document Number -D-854, which, My Lord, will be Exhibit Number GB-460. Now, that -is an extract from one of a series of essays on the operational and -tactical considerations of the German Navy and consequent measures -taken for its expansion between 1919 and 1939, contained among -the files of Vice Admirals Assmann and Gladisch, who were in the -historical section of the German Admiralty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, would you mind not looking at it for a moment, Defendant? -I want to ask you some questions and then you can look at it with -pleasure afterwards. Do you agree that in nearly all spheres of -armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles -was violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit? Do you -agree with that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, by no means in every sphere. In the most important -sphere we were far behind the Versailles Treaty, as I explained -to you very clearly. Possibly we infringed on it the other way -round, by not doing as much as we could have done. -<span class='pageno' title='151' id='Page_151'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you just look at this document. -At the beginning of the first quotation your officers say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“But if—as was stated—in nearly all spheres of armament -where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was -violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit—or at -least its violation was prepared—a long time before the -16th of March 1935...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Are your admirals wrong in stating that? Is that what you are -telling the Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I please see which page this is on? I have not -seen it yet. Yes, he says, “in nearly all spheres of naval armament...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is not the case, for in the sphere of...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That’s what I put to you; is -that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it is not right. We had not even built as many -ships as we could have built, but—as I have explained repeatedly, -the violations were concerned with...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You’ve explained that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: ...violations were...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, we do know the position -of your shipbuilding yards. You’ve given that explanation and it’s -a matter of discussion whether it’s of any value. I am not going -to argue with you. I am asking you this question: Are you saying -that the admirals of your historical section are wrong in that -sentence that I read out to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I am stating that. It is wrong as it stands.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now let’s pass on—the -Tribunal will judge that—to the statement of Admiral Assmann. -It goes on:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“This probably took place in no other sphere, on the one -hand so early, and on the other hand under such difficult -circumstances, as in the construction of a new submarine -arm. The Treaty of Versailles had only been in force a few -months (since 10 January 1920) when it was already violated -in this point.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you agree with Admiral Assmann on that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, he is wrong. It was not violated at all in this -point, and the reason it started so early was because all the -ex-U-boat commanders and U-boat officers and technicians were -out of a job and offered their services to maintain technical developments -in U-boats abroad; that is why it was so early. But that has -<span class='pageno' title='152' id='Page_152'></span> -nothing to do with me because I had no say in these matters then. -At that time I was working on the Navy Archives.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, how are you able to be so -confident today that Admiral Assmann is wrong? I thought you -said that he was a good historian. He had not to go back very -far. He only goes back 20 years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: A good historian can make mistakes too if his information -is wrong. I merely said I had confidence in him...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say quite in detail—the first -paragraph is about Japan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; what he says about the building of U-boats is -wrong.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let’s just see how far he -was wrong. We needn’t go into the first paragraph which deals -with shipbuilding for Japan, but take the second one: “In 1922...” -Do you see the paragraph which begins:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“As early as 1922, three German shipbuilding yards established -a German U-boat designing office in Holland under a Dutch -cover name with about 30 engineers and designers. In 1925 -a Dutch shipbuilding yard built two 500-ton U-boats for -Turkey according to the plans of this bureau, which enjoyed -the financial and personal support of the Naval Command. -In the solution of this question, too, Kapitän zur See Lohmann -was concerned decisively.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: We have admitted that. That was in no way a -violation of the Versailles Treaty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We’ll not argue that, but it’s -right anyway. Admiral Assmann’s right about that. Then he deals -with Finland and with Spain. And, if you look at the end of the -paragraph after dealing with Spain, he says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Already in the autumn of 1927 the Naval Designing Department -was commissioned to carry out construction in Spain by -the Chief of the Naval Command Staff, Admiral Zenker, -who accepted the responsibility despite all the difficulties -in the field of home politics. The working out of the project -and the drawing up of the construction plans took place in -the Dutch Bureau. After completion in 1931, the ship carried -out trial runs and diving exercises from Cadiz to Cartagena, -under German direction and with German personnel, consisting -of officers, engineers, naval construction students -and foremen.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That’s all. That’s quite right, isn’t it? -<span class='pageno' title='153' id='Page_153'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but the shipbuilding designer from our designing -office, in particular, as well as the above-named other persons -employed on U-boat construction, were discharged from the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at the last -sentence: “This boat which is now the Turkish submarine <span class='it'>Gür</span> -became the prototype for the <span class='it'>U-25</span> and <span class='it'>U-26</span>.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the 250-ton submarines -which were made in Finland. And, if you look at the last sentence -of the next paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Finnish U-boat was the first U-boat plan to be worked -out in Germany and successfully carried out; the Dutch -bureau was called upon only to work out the details.</p> - -<p>“The Finnish 250-ton vessel became the prototype for <span class='it'>U-1</span> -to <span class='it'>U-24.</span>”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And now the next paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The building and the thorough trial of the prototype vessel -made it possible to obtain the parts for <span class='it'>U-1</span> to <span class='it'>U-24</span> in 1933 -to 1935, long before the order for the assembly of the vessels; -and the latter was prepared beforehand as far as was possible -without endangering secrecy.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you turn on to -Page 156. You see where the next quotation is from:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“At the beginning of 1935”—that is 6 months before the -Anglo-German Treaty—“there were probably six 250-ton -boats ready for assembly, six 275-ton and two 750-ton boats -on which preparatory work was being done. About 4 months -were needed for assembling the small ships and about -10 months for the big ones, dating from 1 February 1935, -but everything else was still quite uncertain.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, look at the next words:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction -that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the German-British -Treaty.</p> - -<p>“Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been -ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up -to 1938. In reality 118 were completed and under construction.</p> - -<p>“The preparations for the new U-boat arm were made so -early, so thoroughly and so carefully, that already 11 days -after the conclusion of the German-British Naval Treaty, -<span class='pageno' title='154' id='Page_154'></span> -which permitted the construction of U-boats, the first German -U-boat could be put into commission on 29 June 1935.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, take that sentence, which is written by Admiral Assmann, -and we’ve seen what your connections with Assmann were through -about 100 documents. He said: “It is probably in this very sphere -of submarine construction that Germany adhered least to the -restrictions of the German-British Treaty.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, you’ve told this Tribunal for about several hours of your -evidence that that was a freely negotiated treaty of which you -were very proud and which you were ready to support. Are you -telling the Tribunal that your admirals are wrong in saying that -in submarine construction Germany adhered the least to the -restrictions of that freely negotiated treaty?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is a completely false judgment. I have stated -here that, as long as no negotiations with Great Britain had taken -place with regard to the pending agreement, all the preparations -which we did make were exclusively attended to abroad—that in -the proportion which probably...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you can make your -explanation...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Will you please stop interrupting me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We’ll take it in this order, and -don’t get cross about it. You answer my question, and then you -make your explanation. Now answer my question first. Are you -saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong in saying in that first -sentence that it was just in the “sphere of submarine construction -that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the German-British -Treaty.” Is Admiral Assmann wrong when he says that, is -that what you’re telling the Tribunal? Well, that is my question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He is wrong. I said so; I have already said so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe these are not questions -relating to facts. They are questions for legal decisions. It is a -legal argument as to just how Article 191 of the Versailles Treaty -is to be interpreted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the question is -quite proper. In his explanation, of course, he can explain that in -his view it was not a breach of the Treaty and he has already -explained that. He can give us his opinion about it. He was the -head of the German Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you take the -second sentence...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But I should like to finish if I may. I can give an -explanation of that. -<span class='pageno' title='155' id='Page_155'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>All these things were only preparations made outside Germany. -The point under discussion is whether the Finnish U-boats were -constructed with the help of German designers. That is true. -German designers were not forbidden to help Finnish designers to -draft designs for U-boats. It is also true that this U-boat later...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m awfully sorry to interrupt -you, but you know this isn’t dealing—this sentence isn’t dealing -with this early period. This is dealing with the period after the -Anglo-German Treaty in 1935 and that’s what I want you to -answer me about. This Finnish matter was long before that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am still speaking of the period preceding the agreement, -for I was accused of manufacturing U-boat parts abroad. -And the fact is that...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I know, but don’t you -see that...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have not given my answer yet. No...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you about that. -I like you to answer the right question. I’m not asking you about -the question of Versailles any longer. I’m asking you about -Admiral Assmann’s assertion that you did not adhere to the restrictions -of the German-British Treaty in 1935, and what you did in -Finland in the 20’s has nothing to do with that. Now, that’s all. -You can give your explanation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is entirely wrong. We particularly restricted -ourselves with regard to the construction of U-boats; and in 1938 -we had still not built the 45 percent which we were entitled to -build, so we made an application for permission to build up to -100 percent; and this was agreed on, and came into effect, as appears -from the text of the English treaty, after a friendly discussion with -the British Admiralty at the end of 1938. At the beginning of the -war we still did not have 100 percent. We were always behind -with the construction of submarines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Admiral Assmann, who probably had no up-to-date knowledge -of these matters, is quite wrong. I can swear to that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next sentences. -This is dealing...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: What page are you speaking of?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 156. I will read it very -slowly again:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been -ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for -up to 1938. In reality 118 were completed and under -construction.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='156' id='Page_156'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong when he -states that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am awfully sorry; I still have not got the passage -from which you are reading, that is quite—which line...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the sentence, -Defendant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have found it now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you see what Admiral -Assmann says, that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been -ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up -to 1938.” That is before there was any mention of going from -45 to 100. “In reality 118 were completed and under construction.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong in giving these -figures?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Certainly. In 1939 we entered the war with 40 submarines—I -do not know the exact number. This is either a -misprint or quite an incredible figure. As you know, we started -the war with—I think—26 U-boats capable of sailing the Atlantic, -and in addition a number of smaller boats. I cannot tell you for -certain now what was under construction at the beginning of the -war but there was no intention of this kind. That was precisely -the accusation made against me—that I did not have sufficient -U-boats built in good time. I dispute the whole of that sentence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree then, Defendant, that -Admiral Assmann’s figures are quite incompatible with what you -have told the Tribunal about the number of U-boats with which -you started the war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should be grateful to Sir David if he would -read the entire sentence; that is, if he would also read Note 6, which -appears after the Number 118 and after the word “ordered.” Note 6 -which, as I have just observed, is not included in the English translation -is worded as follows: “Chief of the Naval Budget Department, -B. Number E 311/42, Top Secret, of 19 November 1942.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The figure, Mr. President, refers to a much later period, not -1938 at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should be extremely grateful if, after the experience we have -just had, I could in future have not only the German document but -also the English translation from Sir David. I should be very -grateful to Sir David if he could have this done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Could you not have the passage you want -translated from the German into English by the time you want -<span class='pageno' title='157' id='Page_157'></span> -to re-examine? As I understand it, you are referring to some note -which is an addition to what has been translated into English. Will -you read it again, would you read the passage again?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Sir David has been reading the following: “In -reality 118 were completed and under construction.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is as far as Sir David has read. After the word “ordered” -there is the figure 6. This refers to Note 6. Note 6 is worded as -follows: “Chief of the Naval Budget Department, B. Number E 311/42, -Top Secret, of 19 November 1942. (Page 19).”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In other words, this shows that the Number 118 must have been -mentioned on Page 19 of this document of the Naval Budget -Department in 1942. The figure therefore does not refer to the year -1938 but to a later date.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I can add another explanation to that which is quite -possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will look into that, -but the text says—and there is no difference in the German text—exactly -what I read—that “about 55 could have been provided up -to 1938 and that in reality 118 were ready and ordered.” That is -Admiral Assmann’s text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But not 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, My Lord, my friend, -Dr. Siemers, will have ample opportunity—if there is any point, -I shall consider it, but there is the text, and the text includes that. -What the footnote says, Dr. Siemers, can be put in re-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Sir David, will you look at the -note and see if the report was made in 1942, rather than the -construction? I suggest that you ask him whether or not the note -doesn’t show that the report was made in 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, my translation of this -note is “Chief of the Naval Budget Department.” Then it gives -the reference to his note, dated 19 November 1942. It seems -entirely to bear out the suggestion of the learned American Judge, -that this is the reference to the report, nothing more. It is only -suggesting that the date of construction was 1942, and I think it -really would be a matter of convenience that, unless Dr. Siemers -has got something to say on the text that I am putting, if he -reserved these argumentative points to re-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you can raise it all in re-examination. -You can have a translation of this note laid before us by -that time. -<span class='pageno' title='158' id='Page_158'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I am perfectly agreeable. I have -merely requested that one copy of the English translation of the -newly submitted documents should be given to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, you will admit that it is a considerable handicap -to me to ascertain during the cross-examination what passages are -missing from the translation and translate them myself when the -British Delegation have an English translation on hand. I think it -might be easier if Sir David would be good enough to let me have -an English translation for my own use.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you will be able to let him have -an English translation of any new document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. The Tribunal has -ordered that. That is prepared. Surely you got the English translation? -Certainly, My Lord. As I put each document, a translation -will be given to Dr. Siemers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There may have been some mistake.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will certainly get it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, we will pass to another gentleman -on your staff. You told us a good deal about the naval budgets. -Do you remember a Flottenintendant in your department, Secretary -Flottenintendant Thiele, of the OKM Department E, the Budget -Department of the German Admiralty? Do you remember?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Mr. Prosecutor, may I just say one more thing -about the question of 118? I have just remembered something in -connection with this Number 6, Chief of the Naval Budget Department. -It is perfectly possible that in this case Admiral Assmann -has taken two things together. All U-boats and ships were, of -course, included in the budget and in this way sanctioned. This -budget was drafted at the end of the year and published before -the year to which it applied. As this large figure suddenly appears -in this document, it is perfectly possible that here the Figure 118 -originates on the basis of the agreement with England made on -30 or 31 December. It is perfectly natural that we should include -in the budget all the other U-boats which we were allowed to -build to complete the 100 percent. This does not necessarily mean -that we started to build the U-boats in 1938. Incidentally I think -we might have perhaps begun, because one can only build so and -so many U-boats in any one year.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I think that this explanation, which occurred to me when I saw -the words “Naval Budget Department,” is a perfectly correct one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal has the wording; -that is, “up to 1938,” and I am not going to argue the point with -you. The words speak for themselves. -<span class='pageno' title='159' id='Page_159'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like you to look at Document Number D-855, which -becomes Exhibit Number GB-461, and it is an extract from a lecture -by the gentleman I have just mentioned, Herr Thiele, which was -given at the German Naval Training Center for Administrative -Officers in Prague on 12 July 1944. The extract I want to put to -you is on Page 22, and it is headed “Ship Construction Plan.” Have -you got that—Page 22, and the heading is “Ship Construction -Plan”? You see the paragraph beginning:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The era of the very large development of the Navy had -therefore come at the moment of the seizure of power. -Already in the first year after this, in March 1935, the construction -of battle cruisers with a displacement of 27,000 tons -was undertaken. Such a vessel was ordered to be constructed. -Thus one of the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which was -the most important for us was at once violated in the naval -sphere in a manner which in a short time could no longer -be camouflaged.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right when he says that in his -lecture?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course it was a violation, but I have explained -here at length that there was no question of building new battle -cruisers but of utilizing the two armored ships which had already -been granted us; and I said that in 1934 Hitler had only given me -permission to enlarge somewhat the plans for these ships, so that -the armor might be heavier. I see from this that it was not until -March 1935, when it was certain that the treaty would be concluded -and also that England would allow us to build such ships through -this treaty in a few months’ time that the Führer sanctioned the -plans projected for the 26,500 ton ships which were to be the first -of the battleships in the new program; and they were then begun. -So that the three 28 cm turrets—that is, the offensive weapons -which he had not yet approved in 1934—were thrown in.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This gentleman seems to agree -with you more than the other. Just look at what he says about -U-boats two sentences further on. He says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The U-boats were completed in separate parts, as their -construction was under no circumstances to be apparent to -the outside world. These parts were stored in sheds for the -time being and needed only to be assembled after the declaration -of freedom to rearm.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that point?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, he is right. We have admitted that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at his next point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Perhaps I can complete my explanation? We... -<span class='pageno' title='160' id='Page_160'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do try to keep it as short as -you can. I don’t want to cut you out, but keep it as short as you can.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, but I must complete my defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We had U-boat parts manufactured abroad and only at the -beginning of 1935 did we bring them in and assemble them, when -the naval treaty was certain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You say you were anticipating -the treaty; well now, just look at what he says after that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The third also of those clauses of the Treaty of Versailles -that was most disadvantageous for us, the limitation of -personnel to 15,000 men, was immediately ignored after the -seizure of power. The total personnel of the Navy was -already 25,000 in 1934, and in 1935, the year of the London -Naval Agreement, 34,000 men.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that? Is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is admitted. It was clear that we had to -train personnel in good time so that crews might be available for -our increased naval forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now I just want you to -look for a moment at the document which is on Page 3 of Document -Book 10, which you did refer to in your examination-in-chief. That -is Document C-23, about the displacement of the <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> and -the <span class='it'>Gneisenau</span> and the <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span> and the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> and the other ships.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, you are familiar with that document; we have discussed it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I know the documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, that is dated the -18th of February, 1938. Germany didn’t denounce the Anglo-German -Naval Treaty until after the British guarantee to Poland -in April 1939, which is 14 months later. Why didn’t you simply -send a notification to Great Britain that the displacements had -come out 20 percent bigger because of defensive matters in -construction? Why didn’t you do it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot tell you that today. We explained recently -how the displacements gradually increased through quite insignificant -changes to our own detriment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Really, Defendant, I have -got that well in mind. We have got the reason why the displacements -came out bigger, and I don’t think you are prejudicing -yourself if you don’t repeat it, but just look at the bottom of that -page, because I think you will find the reason which you can’t -remember there; won’t you?</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In the opinion of A IV, it would be quite wrong to report -a larger tonnage than that which will probably be published -<span class='pageno' title='161' id='Page_161'></span> -shortly, for instance, by England, Russia, or Japan, so as not -to bring upon ourselves the odium of an armament race.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Isn’t that the reason?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that was intended for a future date. We wished -in no circumstance to create the impression that we were increasing -the offensive power of our ships.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I am going to pass -to another subject, and I want to put quite shortly and bluntly, -as you will appreciate, the point the Prosecution puts to you, that -for 20 years, from 1918 to 1938, you and the German Navy had -been involved in a course of complete, cold and deliberate deception -of your treaty obligations. That is what I am putting to you. Do -you understand? After these documents, do you deny that -that is so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course. It was not a cold-blooded affair. All our -evasions of the Versailles Treaty were due to our desire to be able -to defend our country more efficiently than we had been allowed -to. I have proved here that in the Versailles regulations the only -points restricted were those unfavorable to the defense of our -country and favoring aggression from without. As regards the ships, -I may add that we could never complete any very great number -of ships, and consequently we were interested in increasing as far -as possible the power of resistance, that is, their seagoing security, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. At no time did we increase the offensive power above -the strength which was permitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I want you to understand -what my next series of questions is directed to. I don’t want -there to be any misapprehension. I am now going to suggest to -you that these breaches of treaty and your naval plans were -directed toward the possibility, and then the probability of war. -I would just like you to take the same document that I have been -dealing with, C-23. We will use that to pass from one to the other.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Would you turn to Page 5 of Document Book 10, and there you -will see that there is a memorandum, I think of the Planning Committee -to the Flottenchef, Admiral Carls. We have heard your view -of Admiral Carls, that you thought he was a very good officer, and -in fact he was your first choice for your successor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, that is in September 1938, and it is a top secret opinion -on the strategic study of naval warfare against England, and you -see “A” says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, look at Paragraph 1:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to acquire -a position as a world power, she needs not only sufficient -<span class='pageno' title='162' id='Page_162'></span> -colonial possessions, but also secure naval communications -and secure access to the oceans.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you agree with that, Defendant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is correct. I know the whole document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at 2:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Both these requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition -to Anglo-French interests, and would limit their position as -world powers. It is unlikely that this can be achieved by -peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world -power, therefore, forces upon us the necessity of making -corresponding preparations for war.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you agree with that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is all quite correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s take 3:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“War against England means at the same time war against -the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well, -and a large number of countries overseas—in fact, against -half to two-thirds of the whole world.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I needn’t ask you about that, because the facts have shown it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, look at the next: “It can only be justified....”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but I must be allowed to comment on that -document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh certainly, I’m sorry. We got -on so quickly I thought we were not going to have any explanation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In 1938, as has been stated here quite often, the -Führer’s attitude towards Great Britain became more difficult in -spite of all the efforts of General Von Blomberg and myself to tell -him that it was not so on England’s side, and that it was possible -to live in peace with England. In spite of that the Führer ordered -us to prepare for possible opposition by England to his plans. He -for his part never contemplated a war of aggression against Great -Britain; and we in the Navy still much less; in fact, I have proved -that I did nothing but try to dissuade him from that. In 1938 he -ordered us to make a study similar to those we had already made -in the case of other possibilities of war—which it was the duty -of the Wehrmacht Command to do—but dealing with the course -which a war against England might take and what we would -require for it. This study was prepared, and I reported to the -Führer that we could never increase our fighting forces to such -an extent that we could undertake a war against England with -any prospect of success—it would have been madness for me to -say such a thing. I told him—that has repeatedly been mentioned—that -by 1944 or 1945 we might build up a small naval force with -<span class='pageno' title='163' id='Page_163'></span> -which we could start an economic war against England or seize -her commercial shipping routes, but that we would never really be -in a position to defeat England with that force. I sent this study, -which was compiled under my guidance in the Naval Operations -Staff, to Generaladmiral Carls who was very clear-sighted in all -such questions. He thought it his duty to explain in this introduction -of his reply, which agreed with our opinion, the consequences -which such a war against Great Britain would have for ourselves, -namely, that it would bring about a new world war, which neither -he nor we in the Navy nor anyone in the Armed Forces wanted—in -my opinion, not even Hitler himself, as I proved the other -day—hence this statement. He said that if we must have war with -England, it was essential that we should first of all have access to -the ocean and, secondly, that we should attack English trade on -the sea route of the Atlantic. Not that he proposed that we, on our -part, should embark on such a venture. He was only thinking of -the case of such a war breaking out very much against our will. -It was our duty to go thoroughly into the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He says that, “The war against -it”—that is the war against England—“can only be justified and -have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as -politically and militarily.” Then you go on to say “waged with the -aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I just want to see how you prepared.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is quite clear and quite correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s just look how you had -begun to prepare economically. Let’s take that first, as you put -it first.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Would you look at Document C-29, which is Page 8.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, hadn’t we better break off now -before going into this?</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I told you, Defendant, that I was -next going to ask you a question about Document C-29, which is -on Page 8 of the English Document Book 10 and on Pages 13 and 14 -of the German document book. You will remember, this document -gives general directions for export given by the German Navy to -the German armament industry...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...and you told us when you -were dealing with the document that you wanted your service not -<span class='pageno' title='164' id='Page_164'></span> -to be small-minded about matters of a not very high secrecy but, -in addition to that, your general policy was that the German -armament firms should develop a foreign trade so that they would -have the capacity to deal with the increased demands of the -German Navy as soon as possible. Is that right, is that a fair -summary, or shall I repeat it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but it must be added that I said in two places -that we hoped at that time that the Treaty of Versailles would be -relaxed, because it was a comparatively favorable period for -negotiations for disarmament and we already had the governments -headed by Von Papen and Von Schleicher, both of whom showed -great understanding for the needs of the Armed Forces and therefore -fought hard for that at the disarmament conference. So a -definitely legal development might be hoped for in this direction; -and on the other hand, our entire industry was unable to cope with -armaments production except on an insignificant scale and had -therefore to be increased. I again stress the fact that it had nothing -to do with the Hitler regime. That decree just happened to come out -on 31 January.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think you are really disagreeing -with me that your policy, your broad economic policy for -the German armament industry, was to develop its export trade -so as to be able to deal with increased home requirements in future -years; that is what you advocated, isn’t it, that the German -armament industry should at once increase its export trade so as -to be able to deal with increased home requirements when these -requirements arose? Isn’t that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is correct but I do not quite understand that -expression. Did you say “Eigenhandel” or “Eisenhandel”—internal -trade or iron trade? I did not quite hear the expression—“Eigenhandel” -or “Eisenhandel”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Aussenhandel” (Foreign Trade).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: “Aussenhandel”—yes, undoubtedly we wanted to be -able to compete industrially with other nations, so that our industry -would be in favorable position, and would gain strength.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I will ask you to turn to -Document Number C-135, which is Page 21 of the—sorry My Lord, -Page 20 of the English document book and Page 73 of the German -document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Book 10.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Book 10, My Lord, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, you remember that document, -you dealt with it? You said... -<span class='pageno' title='165' id='Page_165'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it was dealt with in the Lohmann affidavit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is a document of the—I -think, in April 1933, judging by the dates which I put to you -a moment ago, and you said to the Tribunal in giving your evidence -that it was mere chance that the year 1938 was mentioned; that -that was the same period as has been dealt with.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It has already been stated several times that the year -1938 was mentioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Has it been mentioned in some -Weimar Republic document? Will you just look at the second last -paragraph; that will be on your Page 74, Page 21 of the English -document. It is in the middle paragraph of Paragraph 3:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Now Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler had made the clear political -request to build up for him in 5 years, that is, by the first -of April 1938, armed forces which he could place in the -balance as an instrument of political power.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>Is that sure, that Hitler had made a clear political request?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, as far as I remember, he demanded a sort of -five year plan in 1933 the last year of which, 1938, happened to -coincide with the 1938 mentioned in our substitute plan for -subsurface construction, and that directive had obviously been given -for the whole of the Armed Forces; since the naval agreement, -which gave us the right to arm only in the proportion of 1:3 and -not in accordance with any special plans, had become the basis -for the Navy as early as 1935.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The point that I want to deal -with is this: Did Hitler tell you that he wanted these forces to -place in the balance as an instrument of political power, did he -tell you that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I can no longer tell you that; but I believe that it is -a perfectly ordinary expression to say that one uses one’s armed -forces as an instrument which could also be thrown into the scales at -political negotiations, so that we need no longer be kicked around -by the different nations, as had so far been the case. In my opinion, -no suspicion attaches to the expression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To put it bluntly, Hitler was -telling you, “by 1938 I want armed forces that I can use in war, -if war should become necessary.” That is what it means, isn’t it? -That is what you understood it to mean, isn’t that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. There was no word about a war, only about the -fact that we had to keep our position among the other nations so -that we could no longer be tossed aside, as had hitherto been -the case. -<span class='pageno' title='166' id='Page_166'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If anyone tried to push you over, -you could fight; that is it, wasn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is obvious. That would be the case, of course, -if we were attacked. We wanted to be in a position to defend -ourselves if we were attacked. Up till that point we were unable -to do this.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let us take the first -example, when you contemplated fighting. If you look at Document -Book 10a, Document Number C-140, Page 104 of the English translation -and Page 157 of the German version, you remember that is -the directive of Field Marshal Von Blomberg on Germany leaving -the disarmament conference and League of Nations. And there, -there is a pretty full general directive as to what military measures -you would take if the members of the League of Nations applied -sanctions against you; in other words you were quite prepared...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...for a war happening on that -peace policy; that is so, isn’t it, and that is what it says, it gives -all preparations ready for fighting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: These preparations were made, if I remember correctly, -11 days after we had left the League of Nations, and it was -quite natural that, if the Führer believed that in consequence of -our leaving the League of Nations, which was quite a peaceful -action in itself, warlike measures or sanctions would be applied -against us, we would have to defend ourselves; and if such an -attack was probable we had to take these preparatory steps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you realized, Defendant, that -as early as October 1933 the course of Hitler’s foreign policy might -have brought about an immediate war, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I did not expect at all that such a measure as the -secession from the League of Nations, where we had always been -treated unjustly because we had no power behind us, would result -in a war with any other power. Nevertheless, it was right to take -such eventualities into consideration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is good enough -for me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, just let us look at the same document book, Document -Number C-153, on Page 107 of the English version and Page 164 -to 167 of the German version. That is, you will remember, your -armament plan for the third armament phase, and I would just -like you first of all to look at Paragraph 3.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In (a) and (b) of Paragraph 3 you give the general basis for -your arrangements: -<span class='pageno' title='167' id='Page_167'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“(a) For the military leaders a sound basis for their strategic -considerations, and</p> - -<p>“(b) For the political leaders a clear picture of what may be -achieved with the military means available at a given time.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it is quite obvious that such a plan would have -this purpose.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that your political leaders -were to make their plans on what armed forces you had available -for war, if necessary. That was what you were contemplating -then, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is a matter of course; I reported to the -Führer that I could put a certain military strength at his disposal -during that year. The Chief of State must know that in order -to know what he can count on. But that has nothing to do with -plans for war. That is the case in every state. On the other hand, -I cannot influence the political leader as to what he wants. I can -only report what I could have. Therefore, I had nothing to do -with political matters. I only did what is necessary and what is -done in every state.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at Paragraph 7.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am not going to argue with you as to whether states base -their foreign politics on things other than war as a matter of -argument, but look at Paragraph 7: “All theoretical and practical -R-preparations (armament) are to be drawn up with a primary -view to readiness for a sudden war.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is that you, as far as the Navy was concerned, you had -to be ready then for an immediate war footing, have the Navy on -an immediate war footing, isn’t that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no. This concerns the sequence of the things to -be taken for granted. The armament plan listed the most important -immediate requirements of the Navy and at that point I say here -that this applied to weapons to be used in a war where there was -no time to prepare and that is, in plain language, the mobile fleet, -which must be in a state of constant readiness. It had to be kept -ready for action at a moment’s notice and it had to receive priority. -All other matters, such as quarters, and things that had nothing -to do with direct combat, were attended to afterwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought that is what I put to -you, that the fleet had to be ready and ready for war. However, -you have given your account of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Just turn over, if you will be so good, to Page 66 of Document -Book 10, Page 285 of the German document book; Document -Number C-189, My Lord. -<span class='pageno' title='168' id='Page_168'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, I want to raise just this one -point on which you made a point in your examination and which -I must challenge. You say in Paragraph 2:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy expresses the opinion -that later on”—and I ask you to note the words “later on”—“the -fleet must anyhow be developed against England and -that therefore from 1936 onwards the large ships must be -armed with 35 centimeter guns.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, are you telling the Tribunal, that “gegen England” does -not mean “against” in the sense of in antagonism to, directed -against, in opposition to—that it merely means in comparison to? -Are you seriously saying that, are you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I explained the other day that we are dealing here -with the question of keeping up with other navies. Up to that -time we were keeping up with the French Navy which had 33 cm -guns. Then England went beyond that in mounting 35.6 cm guns -on her ships and then, as I said before, France went beyond -England in using 38 cm guns. Thus I said to the Führer that our -28 cm guns which we believed we could use against the French -<span class='it'>Dunkerque</span> class would not be heavy enough, and that we would -have to take the next bigger caliber, that is 35.6 like those of the -English ships. That was never done because the French began to -use 38 cm guns and our <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> class followed the French lines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That comparison of calibers and classes of vessels was at that -time quite customary and was also...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told us all that before and -my question is a perfectly simple one; that this document in the -original German, when you say “gegen England” is exactly the -same as in your song <span class='it'>Wir fahren gegen England</span>. It means against, -in antagonism and directed against, and not in comparison. That -is what I am putting to you and it is a perfectly short point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you telling this Tribunal that “gegen England” means in -comparison with England?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is what I want to say; because it says “develop -gegen England” and at that time we had not even signed the Naval -Agreement. It is hardly likely that I would consider following an -anti-British policy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look to the next page, Document -Number C-190, Page 67 of the English document book, -Page 284 of the German document book. That is your conversation -with Hitler, on the 2nd November 1934, when you are discussing -bigger naval estimates and the availability of more money. I want -you to look at the end of the first paragraph which gives Hitler’s -reasons. -<span class='pageno' title='169' id='Page_169'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>“He considers it vital that the Navy be increased as planned”—now -look—“as no war could be carried on if the Navy were not -able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you still telling the Tribunal you were not from 1934 -onwards contemplating war? Well, if so, why does Hitler say that? -That is one of the most vital points of German naval strategy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“No war could be carried on if the Navy were not able to safeguard -the ore imports from Sweden.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Were you not contemplating war in November? Were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Hitler said that a navy is built so that, if war becomes -necessary, the navy can use its weapons to defend the country. -A navy is established for no other purpose, and that was definitely -one of the general reasons for the existence of a German Navy. -There were many people who thought a navy was unnecessary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, what I am putting to -you is this. You have told the Tribunal that the Navy was purely -defensive, all your preparations were purely defensive. I am -suggesting to you that Hitler there is contemplating a war and -contemplating the task of a navy during a war, a few months -before he intended to denounce the military clauses of Versailles.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You were all set for a war if it should become necessary, and -you knew that. Was that not the position?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is a complete misrepresentation of the facts, -Mr. Prosecutor. Of course it is necessary during peacetime to -contemplate the circumstances which might arise to make it -necessary to call on the Armed Forces for defense. At that time -nobody thought of a war of aggression, and the individual tasks -must be understood. One of the Navy’s tasks was undoubtedly to -secure the Swedish and Norwegian ore exports in case of war; -and it had to be developed with a view to that end.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you just look at the next -sentence in Paragraph-2: “When I pointed out that in the critical -political situation in the first quarter of 1935, it would be desirable -to have six U-boats already assembled....”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You were preparing for the critical political situation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s look at what you were -doing in 1936. Would you give the defendant and Dr. Siemers -Document Number D-806.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is a report of yours dated the 11th of November 1936, -dealing with the U-boat construction program, and after the first -paragraph you say this in the second paragraph: -<span class='pageno' title='170' id='Page_170'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The military and political situation urgently demands that -the extension of our U-boat fleet should be taken in hand -immediately and completed with the greatest energy and -dispatch, as it is a particularly valuable part of our armament -at sea and possesses special striking power.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you saying that what you were urging there was purely -defensive and that you had no idea of the special striking powers -that would be needed in a war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The entire political situation, or so I seem to remember, -made me consider it necessary to put the construction of -submarines in the foreground. But I never expected that we would -start a war on our own account. Hitler himself had told me that -again and again, but he had made his political moves which could -undoubtedly lead us into war if the other powers intervened -against such a political move. The charge made against me was that -I did not push the construction of U-boats sufficiently far ahead.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are stressing it sufficiently -there, aren’t you? “On the military and political situation”—you -were kept fully informed of the political situation and were -adjusting your naval armament accordingly; isn’t that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that time I not only knew nothing about what was -going to happen, but I knew that we had occupied the Rhineland -during that year, and that in consequence of the clouds which -appeared on the horizon as a result of the occupation of the Rhineland -Hitler maintained an attitude of greatest caution and said -that we must be prepared for further complications. For that reason -a special directive was issued in 1936, and I took precautions along -the lines suggested by these considerations. My main duty was -to watch; and on the basis of my observations and the conclusions -which I drew from them, I had to strengthen myself as much as -possible. This document, about which you did not question me, -had the same connotation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I asked whether—should political tension develop at the beginning -of 1935, before the signing of the Naval Agreement, and that would -not be done till June—we should perhaps assemble six U-boats. -That was also in the case of tension arising; and I knew at that -time that the declaration of freedom of territorial defense was -intended to be made in 1935.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, you have told us -what you knew in 1936. Now, just let’s pass on to 1937. I want -to know exactly what you say. That of course, as you remember, -turns on the Hossbach Document, 386-PS, which is at Page 81 of -Document Book 10, Page 314 of the German document book. -<span class='pageno' title='171' id='Page_171'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, did you give the number of that -last document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful, My Lord. It -is Exhibit GB-462.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, I want you just—have you got -that, Page 314 of the German document book?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Can you tell me the paragraph? I have...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, the first thing I want to ask -you about is the third paragraph, the last sentence, where Hitler -is reported as saying: “The German future is therefore dependent -exclusively on the solution of the need for living space.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And then I wanted you, if you would be so good, to turn over two -pages to 316. My Lord, it is Page 83 of the English document book. -That is repeated. My Lord, it is about seven lines down. Where -Hitler says: “The only way out, and one which may appear -imaginary, is the securing of greater living space.” And then he -says that: “The history of all times has proved that every space -expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance.” And then -in a separate paragraph he says: “The question for Germany is -where the greatest possible conquest could be made at the -lowest cost.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you see that, on Page 316?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I begin with the last one? It is wrongly translated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that’s what I’m really going -to ask you. I want you to just tell us, did you hear Hitler say -that that was the general problem, “the greatest possible conquest -to be made at the lowest cost.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. The English document has the word “conquest” -(Eroberung), but that is not in the German document. The German -text reads: “the highest possible gain (Gewinn) with the smallest -risk.” That is a phrase borrowed from sport. There is no mention -of conquest.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m quite prepared to accept that -it comes after the passage which I have referred to you in quite -some detail, because I don’t want to select anything out of the -context. Did you appreciate that Hitler there was saying, “The -only possibility for Germany is to get extra living space,” and that -had to be got at the expense of other nations? He said that, -didn’t he?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He did say that; and I explained recently how that -is to be understood. He was speaking of Austria and Czechoslovakia, -<span class='pageno' title='172' id='Page_172'></span> -of the Sudetenland. We were of the opinion that no change was -intended in that policy; nor did one take place later. War was not -waged against Austria or Czechoslovakia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We were all convinced that he would solve that question peacefully, -like all other political questions. I explained that in great -detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what I was -going to ask you about. You have taken my second point yourself. -The rest of the document deals with action against Austria and -Czechoslovakia. Would you look at Page 86?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I think you will agree with me that Field Marshal Von Blomberg -and General Von Fritsch rather poured cold water on Hitler’s ideas. -Isn’t that a fair way of putting it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They rather thus showed a certain -antipathy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was in November 1937.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: We all of us told him constantly that in no circumstances -might he start a war with England and France, and he -always agreed. But I explained that this entire speech had a -definite purpose; and that for this purpose he exaggerated a great -deal and at once withdrew that exaggeration when a hint was -given to him about the danger of a war with France and England.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was what I was going to -ask you. That was in November. By January, Field Marshal Von -Blomberg had made his unfortunate marriage, hadn’t he?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I believe it was in January. I do not know exactly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took the view, didn’t -you, that he had been encouraged to do that by the Defendant -Göring?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I never said that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, didn’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not that I know of. I never thought that at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember making a statement -in Moscow on this point? Let me read it to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: To whom, please?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In Moscow to the Russians.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“At the beginning of the year 1938 I had experiences of a -personal nature, which although they did not concern the -<span class='pageno' title='173' id='Page_173'></span> -Navy directly caused me to lose confidence, not only in -Göring but also in the sincerity of the Führer. The situation -in which Field Marshal Von Blomberg found himself as a -result of his unfortunate marriage made his position as a -Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces impossible. I came -to the belated conclusion that Göring was making every -effort to obtain the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht -in place of Blomberg.</p> - -<p>“He favored the marriage because it made Blomberg ineligible -for this post, while Blomberg believed—and even stated -repeatedly—that such a marriage was possible under the -present system. Göring had already had him shadowed in -the past, as I learned from later remarks.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Didn’t you say that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In Moscow, immediately after the collapse, I made -a note of the causes of the collapse as seen in the light of my own -experience. I wrote this document under the conditions there—where -I was treated very chivalrously—and I had no hesitation in -informing the highest general of the Commissariat of the Interior -of this when I was asked what I was doing there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All I want to know is, is that -true, what you said?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I wrote these notes, and it is also true that it -occurred to me afterwards that Göring might have favored the -marriage. I believe that he himself told me that here. He had -assisted Blomberg in such a way that, I think, he did not know -what the true state of affairs was or how serious the matter was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you see, your view at that -time was that Göring was encouraging the marriage because he -knew that it would put Blomberg off the map as Commander-in-Chief -because he, Göring, wanted the position. Was that the view -that you held last summer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I believed that last summer, yes. And it is also true -that Göring certainly wanted to become Commander-in-Chief of -the Armed Forces, but the Führer himself thwarted him in that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was Von Blomberg. -We know what happened to him. Your second choice, after Von -Blomberg, was Von Fritsch, was it not? You thought that Von -Fritsch would have been the best Commander-in-Chief if Von -Blomberg went, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mentioned that to Hitler? -And... -<span class='pageno' title='174' id='Page_174'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He asked me, and I said that if I were consulted, -I would suggest Baron von Fritsch. But the Führer said that that -was out of the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. But there were some of -them bringing a charge of homosexuality against Von Fritsch; isn’t -that right? That was why it could not be done?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. He said, in general terms, that some kind of -moral crime existed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were one of the court who -inquired into that charge, were you not? Göring, as president, you -and General Von Brauchitsch?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you came to the conclusion -that the charge of homosexuality against Von Fritsch was a frame-up -by the Gestapo, did you not? Do you know what I mean? -I am afraid “frame-up” is rather difficult to translate.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The whole thing gave me that impression. Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is because the denunciation -had been by some shady character who you thought was a “hang-around” -of the Gestapo; and at the trial, the co-operation of the -Gestapo with the accuser was brought to light; that is right, is -it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You were satisfied, from sitting at the trial?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you agree that there had -been—not a confusion—but that the guilty party was a cavalry -captain, Rittmeister Von Fritsch, and not this general at all; isn’t -that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I agree absolutely. We acquitted Baron von Fritsch -because his innocence was proved. There was no suspicion of any -kind remaining against him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You acquitted him, but his -reinstatement did not follow? His reinstatement in command did -not follow?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I went to him, as I knew him very well, and -asked him if he would agree to my going to Hitler and suggesting -that he, Baron von Fritsch, be reinstated. But Fritsch replied that -he considered that quite impossible. He thought that his authority -was so much impaired that he would no longer care to resume his -position as Commander-in-Chief of the Army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After that, unfortunately, I could do no more about it. I reported -this to the Führer, but there were no further developments. All -<span class='pageno' title='175' id='Page_175'></span> -that happened was that the Führer confirmed the absolute innocence -of Baron von Fritsch in a large assembly of generals and admirals.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you say this with -regard to the Von Fritsch incident:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I was convinced that Göring had a hand in this well-prepared -situation, since in order to attain his goal it was -necessary to eliminate every possible successor to Von -Blomberg”?</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you remember saying that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do not remember that now; but I believe that I held -that opinion. To be quite just, I must say that Baron von Fritsch’s -acquittal was due principally to the way in which Göring conducted -the proceedings. The witness who was brought up told so -many lies and made so many contradictory statements every -few minutes, that only Göring could cope with him. After seeing -that, I was very thankful that I had not been appointed president, -as suggested by the Minister of Justice. I could not have coped -with those people. It was entirely due to Göring’s intervention -that he was acquitted without any difficulties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But of course, I think you have -said, Witness, that whether he was acquitted or not, the authority -of Von Fritsch in the German Army was in his own view destroyed -by the fact that this charge had been brought against him. That -was the result of it, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Herr Von Fritsch thought so. I would have insisted -on being reinstated after I had been acquitted in that manner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did it not strike you as curious -that the two people who on the 5th of November had tried to head -Hitler off from a course that might have meant war were both -disgraced in 2 months? Didn’t it strike you as curious?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That did not strike me as curious at all; and there -is certainly no connection. If Hitler had thought it necessary to -remove the men in high positions who opposed him in such matters, -he would have had to remove me long ago. But he never said -anything about it to me, and I have never noticed that he said -anything like that because I contradicted him. I have frequently -pointed out, with regard to that very question of England and -France, that no war should be caused there; and I never had the -impression that he ever took it amiss.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let us take it very -shortly. Within 6 weeks of the disgrace of Blomberg and the -removal of Von Fritsch, the Anschluss with Austria took place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not know that there -were pretended military preparations for the Anschluss with -<span class='pageno' title='176' id='Page_176'></span> -Austria, the ones described by General Jodl in his diary and also -described by Field Marshal Keitel? Did you know that these threats -of military action would have been made?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do not believe that I ever took part in a military -discussion concerning the Austrian Anschluss, because actually -I had nothing to do with it. But I should like to emphasize here, -once and for all, that I learned of such enterprises as, for instance, -the annexation of Austria through a directive issued by the Führer, -and not before, because one copy of these directives, regardless of -whether or not they concerned the Navy, was always sent to me -as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. So, of course, I must have -received a directive in this case, too. Unfortunately, I cannot tell -you the date of it; but I confirm that a directive came to my -knowledge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, the point that I am -putting—and I do not want to waste time on it—is this: That on -the 5th of November Hitler said that he was going to get Austria -in 1943 to 1945 at the latest, and earlier if an opportunity arises. -Four months later, in March 1938, he takes Austria after having -got rid of the people who threw cold water on his plans. But if -you did not know about it, we shall not waste time, but shall look -at Czechoslovakia, because there you did get the decree.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You will find that on Page 163 of Document Book 10a, Page 276 -of the German document book. That is the distribution of the -directive for operations against Czechoslovakia. It is bringing up -to date the one of the 24th of June, and you will see that its -execution must be assured as from the 1st of October 1938, at the -latest, and Copy Number 2 goes to you as Commander-in-Chief of -the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, if you will turn over the page to the actual directive, -146 of the English document book, 277 to 278, you see the first -sentence of Paragraph 1, “Political Prerequisites”:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by -military action in the near future. It is the job of the -political leaders to await or bring about the politically or -militarily suitable moment.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I ask where it is? I do not seem able to find it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The first sentence in the directive, -Paragraph 1, Political Prerequisites—Sentence 1: “It is my -unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in -the near future.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The numbering is confused here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very sorry. Page 277, 278. -<span class='pageno' title='177' id='Page_177'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Now I have found it. What was the date?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 28th of May 1938, that is -approximately six months after the meeting which you had attended -at which Hitler had said he would attack Czechoslovakia at the -earliest opportunity that he could. Didn’t that make you think -that Hitler’s speech in November was not merely froth but was -stating his plans?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, because he kept on changing his decisions all the -summer. He made a fresh decision every month. That can be seen -from Document 388-PS. And it was like this, I believe: on 10 September -troops began to assemble and on the same day negotiations -were started. On 1 October the peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland -took place, after the other powers had agreed to that at -Munich. After the Munich negotiations...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We all know that. The point is -perfectly clear...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should like to finish.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In May, here were the plans, -and the Führer had mentioned—in his speeches he had expressed -this: that it was his determination at the end of May to smash -Czechoslovakia by military action. Are you telling the Tribunal -that you read that directive and still took the view that Hitler -had not got aggressive intentions? That is the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, at the end of May.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why, what more proof could -you want than his own determination to smash it? What clearer -proof could you want?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He frequently said that he intended to smash something -and then did not do it. The question was peacefully solved -then. I should like to add that on 30 May—I believe that was the -date—after mobilization had just been carried out in Czechoslovakia, -and that had led him to use such stern words then, and from -this—I think he was justified in doing so, for this mobilization -could only be directed against Germany, and as I said, he changed -his opinion at least three or four times in the course of the summer, -saying again and again that he would reserve his decision and—or -that he did not wish to use military force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Tribunal have gotten -the whole of the 388-PS document in mind. I won’t argue it. You -say that didn’t convince you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When Hitler went into Prague on the 15th of March 1939, did -it then occur to you that there might be something in what he said -in the interview on the 5th of November 1937 when he occupied -<span class='pageno' title='178' id='Page_178'></span> -the Slav part of Bohemia and Moravia and broke his own rule -about keeping Germany for the Germans? Did it then occur to -you that he might not then have been joking or merely talking -froth in November? Did it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He had issued a directive saying that the aims for -that year were:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>1) The defense of Germany against outside attack.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>2) The settlement of the rest of Czechoslovakia in case she -adopted a line of policy hostile to Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I heard nothing at all about his negotiations with Hacha and -his decision following them to occupy Czechoslovakia. I only knew -that he wanted to take action against Czechoslovakia according to -his directive, in case Czechoslovakia should adopt a line of policy -hostile to Germany; and according to the propaganda at that period, -that actually did occur. I had nothing at all to do with the occupation -of Czechoslovakia; nor with the occupation of the Sudeten -area, because the only service which we could have rendered in -these operations was our small Danube Flotilla which was subordinated -to the Army for this purpose so that I had nothing at -all to do with it. There were no other military orders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your answer that even -when Hitler went into Prague on the 15th of March 1939, you still -thought he had no aggressive intentions? Is that what you want -the Tribunal to believe from you? Is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I ask the Tribunal to do so because I believe that -he did not want to fight a war, to conduct a campaign against -Czechoslovakia. By means of his political measures with Hacha he -succeeded so far that war did not break out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, you heard the Defendant -Göring give his evidence that he told President Hacha that his -armed forces would bomb Prague if he didn’t agree. If that is not -war, it is next door to it, isn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It is very close to it. Yes, a threat.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let’s go further on for -another 2 months. If you didn’t see it, on March—on the 23rd of -May—when you came to the Reich Chancellery there were six -high-ranking officers, of which you were one. And Hitler said that -he would give you an indoctrination on the political situation. And -his indoctrination was that, “We are left with a decision to attack -Poland at the first opportunity.” When you heard him say that -on the 25th of May, did you still think he had no aggressive -intentions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I thought so for a long time after that. Just as -Generaloberst Jodl said, since he had solved the Czech problem -<span class='pageno' title='179' id='Page_179'></span> -by purely political means, it was to be hoped that he would be -able to solve the Polish question also without bloodshed; and -I believed that up to the last moment, up to 22 August.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just take one glance—I shan’t -keep you long—at Document L-79, which you will find on Page 74, -I think it is, of Document Book 10. I am sorry. Page 298 of the -German document book. I beg your pardon. I am not going to ask -you about the document because the Tribunal has dealt with that. -I want you to look at the people who were there—298 in the -German document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I know the people who were there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s look: Lieutenant Colonel -Schmundt; he was afterwards General, Hitler’s principal adjutant, -and killed on the 20th of July, 1944, isn’t that right? Then the -Defendant Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; yourself -as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; Colonel General Von -Brauchitsch who was Commander-in-Chief of the Army; General -Keitel who was head of the OKW; General Milch who was Göring’s -Deputy; Halder who was Chief of Staff; Schniewind who was your -Chief of Staff; and Jeschonnek who was I think a Chief of Staff -or a high...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. And Colonel Warlimont, -who was General Jodl’s assistant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, what do you think Hitler got these high-ranking generals -for, and told them, “We are left with a decision to attack Poland -at the first opportunity,” if he hadn’t any aggressive intentions? -What were these people there for if it wasn’t to develop a war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already explained that the main purpose of -that speech, as may be seen from the last part of it, was to give -a purely academic lecture on the conduct of war, and on the basis -of that lecture to create a special study staff, a project which the -chiefs of the Armed Forces had so far strongly opposed. I also -explained at the start that his explanations were at first the most -confused that I have ever heard regarding the matter, and that -he issued no directives in regard to them but that the last lines -read: “The branches of the Wehrmacht determine what will be -built. There will be no alteration in the shipbuilding program. The -armament programs are to be fixed for 1943 or 1944.” When he -said that, he could certainly not have intended to solve the Polish -question by a war in the near future.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal -that when he said, “We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech -affair; further successes cannot be obtained without the shedding -<span class='pageno' title='180' id='Page_180'></span> -of blood,” you paid no attention to it at all? You are seriously -telling the Tribunal that you paid no attention to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I certainly did not at all, because by this time -I was getting to know Hitler and was familiar with the exaggerations -contained in his speeches.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At this time you had already -had the directives for a surprise attack on Danzig, in November -1938. You had had the directive on the 3rd of April for the Fall -Weiss, and you know this whole matter was <span class='it'>en train</span>. Are you -seriously, Defendant, telling the Tribunal that you had any doubt -after the 23rd of May that Hitler intended war against Poland and -was quite prepared to fight England and France, if they carried out -their guarantee? I mean, seriously, I give you this chance before -we adjourn: Do you say that you had any doubt at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course; I have surely explained that even in August -I was still doubtful. For instance, in estimating this speech, -I must compare it, as has already been done here, with the speech -which Hitler had made a few weeks earlier at the launching of -the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span>, where he spoke only of the peace of true justice. -Those speeches were decisive for me. I did not base my conclusions -on this particular speech which is reproduced in such an extremely -confused manner; and that I proved by the fact that during the -whole of the summer I never said a word to the Navy to suggest -that war might break out in the autumn. Confirmation of that was -given here; and anybody can give further confirmation. I thought -very highly of Hitler’s political ability and even on 22 August, -when we were informed of the pact with Russia, I was still -convinced that we should again be able to find a peaceful solution -of the problem. That was my definite conviction. I may be accused -of faulty judgment, but I thought I had formed a correct estimate -of Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I understand you to say -that even on the 22nd of August you didn’t think that Hitler had -any aggressive intentions. Do you really mean that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, and there is a perfectly good reason for it, -because there was every prospect of our forming an alliance with -Russia. He had given all sorts of reasons why England and France -would not intervene; and all those who were assembled there drew -from that the sincere hope that he would again be successful in -getting out of the affair without fighting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will this be a convenient time -to adjourn, My Lord?</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='181' id='Page_181'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am most anxious not -to take up unnecessary time. With regard to the meeting of the 22d -of August, Your Lordship may remember that Dr. Siemers raised a -point as to the two accounts of the meeting, one in Documents -1014-PS and 798-PS and the other in the account by Admiral Böhm. -I have had a comparison made out in English and German showing -the points which are similar to both, and I thought it would be more -convenient just to put that in. Let Dr. Siemers see the German copy -and make any suggestion at the appropriate time rather than spend -any time in cross-examining the witness as to any differences in the -accounts. My Lord, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will put -that in now and hand Dr. Siemers a copy so that he can draw the -Tribunal’s attention to any points at a convenient stage.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did not Admiral Böhm make the accounts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution’s -account is in two documents, 798-PS and 1014-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There was another document -which was mentioned by my friend, Mr. Alderman, but not put in. -It was an account by a journalist which was the first account the -Prosecution had had, but when they got the two accounts from the -OKW files, they did not use their first one; so I had only taken the -two accounts from the OKW files and Admiral Böhm’s account.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But does not that make three documents -in all, apart from the one which has been left out?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, and I have taken -each of the two and compared it with Admiral Böhm’s.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So, on that I shall not pursue -this interview. I thought that it would save time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I’d like you, therefore, -Defendant, to look at Document Number 789-PS, which is at -Page 261 of Book 10a and Pages 438 to 440 of the German book—438 -to 440. This is the note, Defendant, of a conference on the 23d -of November 1939 with Hitler, to which all Supreme Commanders -were ordered. Do you see that at the beginning, Pages 438 to 440? -Do you see what it says, “to which all Supreme Commanders are -ordered”? Were you present? -<span class='pageno' title='182' id='Page_182'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it is the conference during the war on 23 November -1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Were you present?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I was present.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who were the other commanders-in-chief -who were present?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The commanders-in-chief of the Army, the Air Force, -and a considerable number of generals of the Army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The “Oberbefehlshaber”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but in the Army...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, I want you to look at -a passage. The paragraph begins: “One year later, Austria came. -This step also was considered very hazardous.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you see that? Do you see that paragraph?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have got it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Much obliged. Now, I just want -you to look at the next few sentences.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It brought about a considerable strengthening of the Reich. -The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. But this -step was not to be accomplished in one move. First of all, the -West Wall had to be finished in the West. It was not possible -to reach the goal in one bound. It was clear to me from the -first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German -territory. It was only a partial solution. The decision -to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the establishment -of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the -conquest of Poland was laid, but I was not yet clear at that -time whether I should start first against the East and then -against the West or vice-versa. Moltke often had to ponder -over the same things in his time. Of necessity it came to a -fight with Poland first. I shall be accused of wanting to fight -and fight again; in struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody -can avoid a struggle if he does not want to go under. The increasing -population requires a larger living space. My goal -was to create a logical relation between the population and -the living space.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Whatever you had understood up to that time, you appreciated -then, that Hitler himself had had a consistent and clear aim of -aggression throughout these matters that I put to you this morning; -did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but now we were already in the middle of a war -and he was looking at these things retrospectively. Also, he wanted -<span class='pageno' title='183' id='Page_183'></span> -to make it clear to the generals, with whom he had a conflict at that -time, that he had always been right in his political conceptions. That -is the reason why he quoted all these detailed points again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you turn over -to Pages 445-448, which is Page 264 of the English document book, -German document book Pages 445-448. Have you got that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Perhaps you would be good enough to read, I have -here a...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the paragraph that begins: -“We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look about halfway -down that paragraph. You will see: “England cannot live without -its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines -off the English coasts will bring England to her knees.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Have you got that passage?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. Now, if you would -just listen.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“However, this”—that is bringing England to her knees—“can -only occur when we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It -is a difficult decision for me. Nobody has ever achieved what -I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have -led the German people to a great height, even if the world -does hate us now. I am setting this work at stake. I have to -choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory, the -greatest historical choice—to be compared with the decision -of Frederick the Great before the first Silesian War. Prussia -owes its rise to the heroism of one man.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And there is some more about Frederick the Great and Bismarck:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England -at the most favorable and quickest moment. Violation of -the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is unimportant. No one -will question that when we have won. We shall not give such -idiotic reasons for the violation of neutrality as were given -in 1914. If we do not violate the neutrality, then England and -France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended -victoriously.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, do you remember, Defendant, that this was just 3 weeks -after the plans for “Fall Gelb,” that is plans for the attack on -Holland and Belgium, had been issued on 10 November? Do you -remember that? -<span class='pageno' title='184' id='Page_184'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I know that this was discussed here. But we were -already at war with England, therefore at that stage it was no -longer necessary to discuss an attack against England and France -and...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR. DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were not at war with -Holland and Belgium, were you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Please, I would like to finish.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, I thought you had -finished.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Here it says: “If the French Army marches into Belgium -to attack us, then it will be too late for us. We must be first.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler at that time stated that he had received definite news that -Belgium would not respect her neutrality and that he also had news -already that certain preparations for the reception of French and -British troops <span class='it'>et cetera</span> had already been made. For that reason, he -wanted to forestall an attack from Belgium against us. Apart from -that, in his speech of 22 August 1939, he had made a statement -entirely to the opposite effect. He had said that Belgium and -Holland would not break their neutrality.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with what he -said, that the “Violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland -is unimportant. No one will question that when we have won.” -Did you agree with that view?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it is not exactly my opinion, but I had no cause -on my part to raise any objection against that statement of his at -that moment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The view of the Naval War -Command was put up to him a month later with regard to U-boat -warfare, was it not? Do you remember that on 30th December you -had a meeting with Hitler, at which Colonel General Keitel and -Fregattenkapitän Von Puttkamer were present?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I was with him on 30 December.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like you to look at the -new document, which is Document Number C-100, Exhibit Number -GB-463.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought not this document be identified?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship, of course, is -right. I think we had perhaps better give them two numbers, one -for each of the original PS documents. My Lord, the comparison...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 1014-PS has a number already, has it not? -<span class='pageno' title='185' id='Page_185'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. That has a -number.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought perhaps the comparative document -ought to have a number.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. Shall we call one -comparison Exhibit Number GB-464, the comparison of Document -Number 798-PS; and the comparison of Document Number 1014-PS, -Exhibit Number GB-465?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have only got one here, as far as I can see.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am going to get -some more done. I am afraid I have passed out only a limited -number at the moment, but I will have some more run off.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>464, 798; GB-465 will be 1014-PS. It will be the comparison of -Document Number 798-PS with the Raeder Document, and Exhibit -Number GB-465 will be the comparison of Document Number -1014-PS in the Raeder document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now you are going to give us Document -Number C-100?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: C-100, My Lord, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Defendant, I will be grateful if you will turn over a few pages -to where it comes to a report, the date of 30 December 1939, and -then after that there is an enclosure to the report to the Führer of -30 December 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Would you look at Paragraph IV, which says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“With regard to the form and the moment for the commencement -of further intensification of the war at sea, the decision -of the supreme war command to begin the general intensification -of the war with an offensive in the West is of decisive -importance.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Have you got that, Paragraph IV?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Page?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am afraid the paging is different.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: “With regard to the form”—yes.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “With regard to the form -and the moment for the commencement of further intensification -of the war at sea, the decision of the supreme war -command to begin the general intensification of the war with -an offensive in the West is of decisive importance. -<span class='pageno' title='186' id='Page_186'></span></p> - -<p>“I. Possibility: The decision of the Führer is made in favor -of a Western offensive, beginning very shortly, within the -framework of the instructions issued for this to date, by -violating the neutrality of other states:</p> - -<p>“In this case the intensified measures for the war at sea will -in their political effect only represent a small part of the -entire intensification of the war. The gradual change-over to -the intensified form of waging the war at sea within the -American restricted zone, with the ultimate aim of a ruthless -employment of all means of warfare to interrupt all commerce -with England, is therefore proposed with the start of the -offensive.</p> - -<p>“Immediate anticipation of individual intensified measures for -the war at sea is not necessary and may be postponed until -the start of the general intensification of the war. The benevolent -neutrals Italy, Spain, Japan and Russia as well as -America, are to be spared as far as possible.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Isn’t that right, that you contemplated that Hitler’s violation of -the neutrality of the Low Countries would cover, by being a more -important matter, your adopting the most ruthless methods of war -at sea? Isn’t that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What does that mean if it does -not mean that? What does that mean if it does not mean what I -have put to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: With the beginning of the offensive in the West, Hitler -also wanted a certain more energetic pursuit of the war at sea. For -that reason, he asked me to introduce only at this point the intensified -measures which I considered already justified because of the -attitude of the British forces. These intensifications were very -carefully considered in that memorandum, and they followed step -by step the different steps taken by Britain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal with the memorandum. -You need not be afraid that I will omit that, but what I -am putting to you at the moment is this: That so far from disapproving -of the violation of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium, -you on behalf of the Navy were quite prepared to accompany it by -the intensification of submarine warfare; isn’t that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is twisting my words. I had nothing to do with -this violation of neutrality for we were not there when they marched -into these two countries. The only thing I was interested in was to -intensify the submarine war step by step, so as to meet the measures -introduced by the British, which also violated international law. -<span class='pageno' title='187' id='Page_187'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to come to submarine -warfare, but at the moment I want to try to keep in compartments. -There are only two more points on this aggressive war. -I am now going to pass—you can leave that document for the -moment. I will come back to it, Defendant; you need not be afraid, -and I want you to help me on one or two points in Norway.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With regard to Norway, you were quite content to leave Norway -neutral, not occupied, so long as you had a protected channel up the -Norwegian coast in neutral waters, is that right? That was an important -point for you, to have a channel in neutral waters so that -not only your ships, but also your submarines, could go up and -start out from neutral waters, is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I have very clearly explained the origin of the -Norwegian campaign in documents. There was the danger that the -British might occupy Norway, and information of all sorts indicated -that. Of course, if we were forced to occupy the Norwegian coast, -then, apart from all the numerous disadvantages which I have explained, -we had the advantage that we would gain this or that base -for our Atlantic submarines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal -that the Navy seriously thought that the British wanted to occupy -Norway?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I most certainly thought that. We had so much information -about it that I could have no doubt whatever, and it was -fully confirmed later on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just ask you, then, to look at -just one or two typical Navy reports. We won’t refer to the document -again, but we will start from there, just to get the time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You remember, on the 13th of March 1940, General Jodl entered -in his diary that the Führer was still looking for justification; do -you remember that? You remember that, don’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already explained once that the expression just -used, “justification,” is wrong, wrongly translated, Jodl wrote “Begründung,” -“reason.” But that is also wrong—please will you let -me finish—even that is incorrect, because the Führer had an abundance -of reasons, which he laid down in the instruction issued on the -1st of March, and it was known to all of us. I have said that by -the expression “Begründung,” “reason,” he probably meant that he -had not yet had a diplomatic note compiled. He had not told the -Foreign Minister anything about it at that stage. I told you that -recently under oath and I repeat it under oath today.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is the meaning that -you have given to it. Well now, will you look at your own Raeder -Exhibit Number 81, in Raeder Document Book 5, Page 376. -<span class='pageno' title='188' id='Page_188'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I have Document Book 5?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, you have not got it. I’m -sorry. I will get you one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, that is dealing with the first point, encroachment by the -English into Norwegian territorial waters, and it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“An examination of the question as to whether a mass encroachment -by the English into the Norwegian territorial -waters was so immediately imminent that it might represent -a danger to present German shipping produces the opinion -that this is not to be expected at the present time. The ore -transports are to be continued, as no losses have yet occurred.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Was that your information, that no mass encroachment of Norwegian -territorial waters was to be expected on the 22d of March?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That was not at all my conception. It was the view of -Kapitän zur See Fricke, who was at that time the Chief of the -Operations Department. He did not quite agree with me about the -whole of this question. He was of the opinion that the British should -be allowed to enter Norway first, and then we should throw them -out through Sweden, a completely distorted idea which I could not -approve of in any way. I had such clear information from Quisling -and Hagelin, particularly at that time, the second half of March, -that there was no longer any doubt whatever that within a reasonable -time the British would intervene on a big scale.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that that was Admiral -Fricke’s view, and you didn’t pay attention to it. Well, now, let me -look...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not concern myself with it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know, Admiral Assmann, -whom you have described as a sound historian, kept a headline -diary, and on the next day he gives an account of a meeting between -you and Hitler, and he says this. This is the same day. You may -have read it, because he turns down your proposal to use U-boats -off Halifax. It is the same day, the 23d of February. Then, at -that date, you are quoted as saying that to insure the supply of ore -from Narvik, it would be best to preserve the neutrality of Norway.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, on the 26th of March, Admiral Assmann in his report of -the meeting between you and Hitler records your answers as -follows. It is quite short: “British landing in Norway not considered -imminent—Raeder suggests action by us at the next new moon—to -which Hitler agrees.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is Admiral Assmann’s report of the meeting between you -and Hitler on the 26th of March: “British landing in Norway not -<span class='pageno' title='189' id='Page_189'></span> -considered imminent—Raeder suggests action by us at the next new -moon, the 7th of April—to which Hitler agrees.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you remember that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I mean, it is quite improbable that at that moment -I should not have been fully convinced of the imminent landing -about which the whole of Documents 004-PS and 007-PS gave me -reliable information. I did not see the documents, but the information -contained in them was fully available.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Admiral Assmann compiled his notes from all sorts of war -diaries and records. I most certainly never said that because at that -time I reported to Hitler again and again that our preparations -which had already been started a time ago would be complete at -the end of January, and that that would be the time when the -landings had to be carried out for the reasons I always put forward. -It is completely wrong to assume that at that time I had the slightest -doubt. Later everything was proved right...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now really we must...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: And later on, it all turned out to be correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must get down to this -matter. You have told us that Admiral Assmann was a trustworthy -officer and good at naval history.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He is not a deceiver, but he compiled the document -from all sorts of papers and I cannot imagine how he could have -arrived at that statement, I certainly never made it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, but the second part of it, -the second sentence, is right, isn’t it? “Raeder suggests action by us -at the next new moon, the 7th of April.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is right; that is when you did invade. That was when your -armada started off to arrive there on the 9th, wasn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But yes, of course. I was in favor of carrying out the -landings in Norway at the earliest possible time, after ice conditions -had improved, as we had previously decided and as had been ordered -by Hitler. For that I assume full responsibility. There was every -reason for that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well. Again I mustn’t argue -with you, but the point comes to this, that you are saying that -Admiral Assmann, who is right in his second sentence, is not only -wrong but entirely wrong—I mean, stating the opposite of the truth—when -he says that the British landing in Norway was not considered -imminent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Well now, we will just pursue that a little. -<span class='pageno' title='190' id='Page_190'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I only submitted to the Führer this matter of landing -in Norway on the supposition that this information was available -and would continue to be available.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, what was that document of the -26th of March 1940?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was an extract from the -Assmann Diary which I have used before, and I will have one made -up and put in for identification. I haven’t got it copied yet, My -Lord, I am sorry. I shall have it done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should be grateful if perhaps you could show me the -document. You have shown me all the others, but not this one, the -one I contest.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is such -a short extract I thought you would take it from me, but the last -thing I want is not to show you any documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You see the entry for the 26th of March:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“British landing in Norway not considered imminent. Raeder -suggests action by us at next new moon, 7th of April, to which -Hitler agrees. Further discussions about laying of mines at -Scapa before German invasion of Norway. Hitler agrees with -Raeder and will issue instructions accordingly.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I come back to it now. Here it says, the 26th of -March 1940: “Occupation of Norway by British was imminent when -the Russian-Finnish peace was concluded.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That very Russian-Finnish affair was making it particularly -urgent for us to carry out a landing because the danger existed that -the British, under the pretext of supporting the Finns, would carry -out a bloodless occupation of Norway.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I go on to the question of the Führer, whether a landing -by the British in Norway might be imminent. One must consider -that Assmann had summarized all that from war diaries, and this -question is explained by the fact that the Führer wanted to know -whether the situation had changed in any way, because the peace -had been signed. However, the situation had not changed at all, -because we knew in reality that the landings by the British were -not to be carried out to help the Finns, but for other reasons. That -question, therefore, whether at the time, because of the peace treaty, -the British landings might be particularly imminent, was answered -by me in the negative. Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action -by us at next new moon, 7th April—Führer agrees. Everything -remained as before. Only the question whether because of this -peace treaty we ought to land at once, I answered “no.” That is -completely different from what you have been telling me. -<span class='pageno' title='191' id='Page_191'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You read out the entry for the -26th of March. What is the entry for the 26th of March? You read -it out in German and we can translate it.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>RAEDER: “Occupation of Norway by the British was imminent -when the Russian-Finnish peace treaty was signed. -Apparently, because of the treaty, it was postponed. Question -by the Führer, whether at that moment a landing by the -British in Norway was imminent, was answered in the -negative by the Commander-in-Chief Navy....”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Yes, that did not mean that because of that we had to renounce -the idea.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action by us at next new -moon.” The reasons for our landing remained the same as before; -only the Finnish business could no longer be used by the British.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The peace treaty, the end of -the war with Finland, had taken place in the middle of March. That -was off the map at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, it was no longer important for us, but our -reasons remained as before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, will you look at -Document Number D-843. This will be Exhibit Number GB-466. -This is a report from your diplomatic representative in Norway, -dated the 29th of March, and at the end of the first paragraph you -will see:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The British apparently did not want to take upon themselves -the responsibility for openly violating Norwegian territory -and Norwegian territorial waters without cause, and for -carrying out warlike operations in them.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is a quotation from the Norwegian Foreign Minister. Then -your diplomatic representative takes it up:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees -things quite right. It definitely appears, however, as I”—that’s -the German Foreign Minister’s representative—“have -frequently pointed out, that the British have no intentions of -landing, but that they want to disturb shipping in Norwegian -territorial waters perhaps, as Koht thinks, in order to provoke -Germany. Of course, it is also possible that the British behavior -of last week, which I have pointed out as well, will -grow into more or less regular and increasing interference -in territorial waters to attack our ore traffic off the Norwegian -coast.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then Paragraph 3: -<span class='pageno' title='192' id='Page_192'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The firm intention of Norway to maintain her neutrality and -to insure that Norway’s neutrality rules be respected can be -accepted as a fact.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Were you told that your diplomatic representative in Oslo was -reporting that the British had no intentions of landing?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Dr. Breuer, the Minister to Norway, held a -completely wrong view. He believed Foreign Minister Koht’s assurances -even though our naval attaché kept reporting that Koht was -completely on the side of the British and his assurances were not to -be believed. At the same time, information had been received from -Hagelin that the Norwegians were giving assurances on paper but -they themselves had said that they were doing that only as subterfuge -and that they would continue to co-operate with the British. -That is contained in the documents which we have submitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at another document. -Look at Document Number D-844. This is what your diplomatic -representative in Sweden was saying at the same time. That will -be Exhibit Number GB-467, that is from your representative in -Sweden and you will notice that he quotes Foreign Minister -Guenther of Sweden, as first of all—about ten lines down, just -after the name of “Weizsäcker,” you will see:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Swedish Government had no reason at all to believe in -an impending action by the Western Powers against Scandinavia. -On the contrary, on the strength of all official reports -and other information, they considered the situation lately to -be much calmer.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>And then he says there is no prospect of a coup against Swedish ore. -Then he goes on to deal with Norway. Without being Anglophile, -Guenther did not believe in a British act of war against Norway -either, but, of course, he could not speak of this with as much certainty -as with regard to Sweden. At any rate, however, the Norwegian -Government, with whom he was in close contact, was of the -same opinion. And if you look two paragraphs farther on, it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In conclusion, Guenther requested me to report his statements -to my government, and repeated that the Swedish -Government attached the greatest value to the German -Government not erroneously getting the impression of the -existence of circumstances which might evoke the possibility—he -would not use the word necessity at all—of special -measures by Germany with regard to Scandinavia.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>And then he says in the last paragraph that the Swedish Foreign -Minister had probably heard of the German preparations. -<span class='pageno' title='193' id='Page_193'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, would you look at Document Number D-845 which will be -Exhibit Number GB-468—that is the next day—from your diplomatic -representative in Stockholm:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Serious anxiety exists in Swedish military and government -circles regarding possible German military preventive measures -in Scandinavia against the announced intensification of -war measures by the Western Powers. Swedish and Norwegian -military and government authorities consider it -unlikely that military measures will be taken against Scandinavia -by the Western Powers. Press reports on this subject -by the Western Powers are attempting to provoke Germany.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is from your military attaché in Stockholm. Were you told -about these reports from Stockholm, were you told of that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I assume the Führer told me this. But we had no -reason at all to believe these assurances because obviously, quite -obviously, Sweden had considerable interest in our not going to -Norway, because Sweden believed that by so doing we would be -able to exercise pressure on Sweden also. That was what the -British wanted, according to the information we received later. Our -minister was completely misinformed and as a result was not informed -by us because it was known that he sided with Foreign -Minister Koht. Our information was so clear, so frequent and so -unequivocal, that we could certainly carry out our landing with a -clear conscience and in fact this proved to be true. Therefore, there -is no point in discussing whether the order on the part of the -British to land in Norway—it was Trondheim, Stavanger and, I -believed, Kristiansand—whether this order was given on 5 April. -On the 7th, during the night of the 7th to 8th, as the British -reported in a wireless message, the mine-laying in Norwegian -waters was completed by British ships and on the 7th, troops were -shipped on cruisers, the names of which I forget.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Therefore, this actually took place and my conception was correct -and not Herr Breuer’s who was dismissed immediately after this -because he was a failure. Thereupon, we carried out the landings -on the strength of quite positive information which we can prove -in detail. Sweden’s action is thoroughly understandable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with -you although you ought to know and I think you do know that -there was no British order for an invasion at all; there was an order -for laying mines; but you took this course as I suggested, you, knowing -quite well that no British invasion was imminent, contrary to -your own Chief of Operations, Captain Fricke, and contrary to all -the information from your diplomatic representatives in Norway. -Now, I want to come to another point with regard to Norway and -<span class='pageno' title='194' id='Page_194'></span> -then I am finished with that. You told the Tribunal that in your -view, using the enemy’s colors was a permissible <span class='it'>ruse de guerre</span> so -long as you stopped before you went into action. Do you remember -saying that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not understand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember telling the -Tribunal that morning that using the enemy’s colors on a warship -was a permissible <span class='it'>ruse de guerre</span> so long as you stopped before you -went into action. Do you remember saying that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; of course, that is the principle which is absolutely -recognized in naval warfare, that at the moment of firing you have -to raise your own flag.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal -that it is a recognized procedure in naval warfare to use another -country’s colors in making an attack on a neutral country, an unannounced -attack on a neutral country? There was no war between -you and Norway and there was no reason for there to be any ruse. -You were at peace with Norway. Are you saying that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It was all a question of pulling down the flag and -raising the German flag if we met the British. We did not want to -fight with the Norwegians at all. It says somewhere that we should -first of all try to effect a peaceful occupation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you give me a precedent -even where the German Navy, before this operation, had ever -attacked a neutral country with which it was at peace, using enemy -colors? You tell me when you did it before?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do not know. I cannot tell you whether any other -navy did it. I have...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can assume any other -navy—I even ask—have you ever done it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, we have not done it and apart from that, we did -not do it because on 8 April, we gave the order by wireless—and -you know from our War Diary—that this should not be done, so it -is quite useless to talk here about what might have been done if it -has not been done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to get clear on what -your views on the permissibility of naval warfare were. I want to -come to one other point, and then I am finished with this section -of the case. With regard to the attack on the Soviet Union, I am -not going to ask you about all your own views and what you said -to Hitler, because you told us that at length; but I would just like -you to look at Document Book 10a, Page 252 of the English book -and Page 424 of the German book. -<span class='pageno' title='195' id='Page_195'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Which document is it, please?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The big one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have not got that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Document Number 447-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am so sorry, My Lord, this is entirely my fault. I beg the -Tribunal’s pardon. I have given the wrong reference. I really -wanted him to look at Page 59 in Document Book 10, Document -Number C-170. I am very sorry, My Lord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, that is the extract from the -Naval War Diary, the one that I want you to look at is on Page 59, -for the 15th of June. “On the proposal of the Naval Operations Staff -(SKL) the use of arms against Russian submarines south of the -northern boundary of Öland warning area...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Have you got it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “...is permitted immediately, -and ruthless destruction is to be aimed at.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, would you mind, before I ask you a question, turning back -to Document Number C-38, which is on Page 11, which is Page 19 of -your own document book, German document book, Document Number -C-38; Page 11 of the British document book, and Page 19 of the -German. That is an order of the same date, signed by Defendant -Keitel, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel -to the southern tip of Öland is authorized if the boats cannot -be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by -German naval forces. The reason to be given up to ‘B’ Day”—that -is Barbarossa—“is that our naval forces are believed to -be dealing with penetrating British submarines.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Why did you suggest that you should attack the Soviet submarines -6 days before your own invasion when they wouldn’t be -expecting any attack and there was no question of any war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As it has already been explained once here, it had -happened just before, that is before the 15th of June, that a submarine -had penetrated into the area of Bornholm, which is a long -way to the west, and then had given wrong recognition signals -when the patrol boat near Bornholm called it. If the wrong recognition -signals are given, then it means that it could not be a German -submarine but it must be a foreign one. In this case, the course of -the ship and the location would bring us to the conclusion that it -must be a Russian boat. Apart from that, Russian submarines at -that time had repeatedly been located and reported off German -ports—Memel, for instance, and others. Consequently, we had the -<span class='pageno' title='196' id='Page_196'></span> -impression that Russian submarines were already occupying positions -outside German ports, either to lay mines or to attack merchant -or warships. For that reason, as a precaution, I had to report this -and I had to propose that we should take action against non-German -submarines in these areas outside German ports. That suggestion -was passed on the same day and this additional statement was made, -which, in my opinion, was not necessary at all, but which prevented -complications from arising.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is still not an answer to my -question. I will put it this way. You considered it right to attack -and urge the ruthless destruction of Soviet submarines 6 days before -you attacked the Soviet Union? You consider that right? And then, -to blame it on penetrating British submarines—this is Keitel’s -suggestion—is that your view of proper warfare?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Well, I consider the first point right because it is -always important to get in before one’s opponent, and this was -happening under certain definite conditions. The second point was -ordered by the Führer. Neither of the two points was ever carried -out, and therefore it is useless, in my opinion, to discuss this matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is something for the -Tribunal, and I will decide what is useful to discuss.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do I take it, then, that you entirely approve of attacking Soviet -submarines and ruthlessly destroying them 6 days before you start -the war? That is what the Tribunal is to understand, is it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, if they appeared in our waters to reconnoiter or -to carry out some other war action, then I considered it right. I considered -that better than that our ships should run into Russian mines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, let us just come, for -a short time, to your views on U-boat warfare. Do you remember -the document which I put to the Defendant Dönitz about the memorandum -of the Foreign Office, Document Number D-851, which -became Exhibit Number GB-451?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have it before me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Right. Well, I will ask about -that in a moment. This is what you said about it when you were -answering Dr. Kranzbühler, I think on Saturday. You said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Since the war against England came as a complete surprise -to us, we had up until then dealt very little with detailed -questions of submarine warfare. Among other things, we had -not yet discussed the question of so-called unrestricted submarine -warfare which had played such a very important part -in the previous war. And from that fact it developed that on -3 September, that officer who was recently mentioned here -<span class='pageno' title='197' id='Page_197'></span> -was sent to the Foreign Office with some points for discussion -on the question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that -we could clarify with the Foreign Office the question as to -how far we could go.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, do you think that is...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: So far as I can recollect, that is the way it happened. -Unrestricted warfare had not been considered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the document in -front of you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: You mean the one regarding the Foreign Office, Document -Number D-851?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dönitz 851, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think this is in any copy, -My Lord. Has Your Lordship a copy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, I don’t think so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did put it in when -I was cross-examining the Defendant Dönitz.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is very likely with our Dönitz papers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps Your Lordship will -allow me to just read it slowly, for the moment. The document -says this:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The question of an unrestricted U-boat warfare against -England is discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the -High Command of the Navy.</p> - -<p>“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum -damage to England which can be achieved with the forces -available can only be attained if the U-boats are permitted -an unrestricted use of arms without warning against enemy -and neutral shipping in the prohibited area indicated on the -enclosed map. The Navy does not fail to realize that:</p> - -<p>“(a) Germany would thereby publicly disregard the agreement -of 1936 regarding the conduct of economic war.</p> - -<p>“(b) Conduct of the war on these lines could not be justified -on the basis of the hitherto generally accepted principles of -international law.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, I ought to read this, or point it out. I have dealt with it -before, it is the second last paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using -the method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England -<span class='pageno' title='198' id='Page_198'></span> -gives us a justification by her method of waging war to order -this form of warfare as a reprisal.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, I want you to take it by -stages. You see the paragraph that says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum -damage to England which can be achieved with the forces -available can only be attained if U-boats are permitted an -unrestricted use of arms without warning in the area...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that your view? Was that your view on the 3d of September?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it is not my view; it is a conditional view. We -had given submarines the order to wage economic war according to -the Prize Ordinance, and we had provided in our War Diary that if -the British were to arm merchant ships or something like that, then -certain intensifications...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please give me an -answer to the question I asked you? It is a perfectly easy question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, isn’t it your view?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In theory, of course, considering the small resources -that we had, the greatest possible damage to England could only be -achieved through—we had to discuss with the Foreign Office just -how far we could go with this intensification. For this reason, this -officer was sent there. The discussions with the Foreign Office resulted -in the submarine memorandum which shows, from beginning -to end, that we were trying to adhere to the existing law as far as -possible. The whole memorandum is nothing more than just that -sort of discussion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you answer my question? -When this document says “the Navy has arrived at the conclusion,” -is it true that the Navy had arrived at that conclusion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But of course, everybody would arrive at that conclusion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is much easier to say “yes” -than to give a long explanation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, let us come to another point. Is it true that you had arrived -at that conclusion without consulting the Flag Officer, U-boats, as -the Defendant Dönitz said when he gave evidence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Regarding these matters? We only agreed before the -submarines put to sea that they should wage war according to the -Prize Ordinance. I did not ask him whether he wanted to carry out -<span class='pageno' title='199' id='Page_199'></span> -unrestricted U-boat warfare, because I did not want that. First of -all I had to discuss it with the Foreign Office to find out how far -we could go. That was the purpose of this affair, which was to give -individual orders, such orders which we were entitled to give, step -by step, in accordance with the behavior of the British. This was a -question of international law, which I had to discuss with the expert -on international law in the Foreign Office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Isn’t it correct that you continued -to press this point of view, the conclusion of which you had -arrived at, with the Foreign Office for the next 3 months? Isn’t it -correct that you continued to press for an unrestricted U-boat warfare -within the area for the next 3 months?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I hardly think so; otherwise I would not have issued -the memorandum of 3 September. Maybe we did go to the Foreign -Office and put on pressure, but what we did is contained in the -memorandum and our measures were intensified step by step, -following steps taken by the British.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the next step with -the Foreign Office was a conference with Baron Von Weizsäcker, on -the 25th of September, which you will see in Document Number -D-852, Exhibit Number GB-469. You see Paragraph 3 of that document:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The High Command of the Navy will submit to the Foreign -Office a proposal, as a basis for a communication to the -neutral powers, in which those intensifications of naval warfare -will be communicated, the ordering of which has already -taken place or is impending in the near future. This includes, -particularly, a warning not to use wireless on being stopped, -not to sail in convoy, and not to black-out.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That was your first step, was it not? That was put up to the -Foreign Office, with a number of other proposals?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course! The first measure was that armed merchant -ships could be attacked because as early as 6 or 8 September, a -submarine had stopped a merchant ship, the <span class='it'>Manar</span>, had fired a -warning shot, and had at once been fired on by the British steamer. -Thereupon the submarine started firing at the merchant ship. Such -cases were known. And since one cannot recognize in every case -whether the ship is armed or not, we assumed that it would lead to -all ships being fired at. However, at that time it was ordered that -only armed British merchant ships should be fired at. Secondly, -that ships which sent a wireless message when stopped could also -be shot at, because this use of wireless which was done by order of -the Admiralty would immediately bring to the spot both naval and -air forces, especially the latter which would shoot at the U-boat. -<span class='pageno' title='200' id='Page_200'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first step, therefore, was firing on armed merchant ships—the -passenger steamers were still excepted—and secondly, firing on -blacked-out vessels and firing on those who made use of wireless. -Blacked-out vessels are...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you look at -Document Number D-853. I only want you to look at the next document, -which will be Exhibit Number GB-470. I want you to come as -soon as possible to this memorandum of which you talked.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>D-853, if you will look at Section II, is a report by the Under -Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, dated the 27th of September, -which goes through these matters which you talked about just -now, the sinking at sight of French and British ships, under the -assumption that they are armed. In Paragraph II it is said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Naval Operations Staff indicated anew that the Führer -will probably order ruthless U-boat warfare in the restricted -area in the very near future. The previous participation of -the Foreign Office remains guaranteed.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Were you still pressing for absolutely unrestricted warfare within -a large area to the west of Britain and around Britain?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Insofar as we took intensification actions step by -step on the basis of our observations regarding the attitude of -enemy forces, and that is in those cases where intensification was -perfectly justified and was legally proved.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Baron -Weizsäcker’s minutes of the 14th of October which is Document -Number D-857, which will be Exhibit Number GB-471.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, you see, this is after these measures have been taken, which -you have just explained to the Tribunal. Baron von Weizsäcker -reports to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“According to my information, the decision on unrestricted -U-boat warfare against England is imminent. This is at least -as much a political decision as it is a technicality of war.</p> - -<p>“A short while ago I submitted my personal view in writing, -that unrestricted U-boat warfare would bring new enemies -upon us at a time when we still lack the necessary U-boats -to defeat England. On the other hand, the Navy’s attitude of -insisting on the opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare is -backed by every convincing reason.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then he says that it is necessary to ask for certain information. -On that you put in—on that point you put in your memorandum -of the 15th of October, which, My Lord, is Document Number C-157, -and Exhibit Number GB-224.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: First of all, may I say something about the previous -document? This expression “unrestricted U-boat warfare...” -<span class='pageno' title='201' id='Page_201'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can do it later on, because -we have got a lot of ground to cover here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks he ought to -be allowed to say what he wants to say on that document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, if Your -Lordship pleases. Please go on, Defendant, my fault.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Now the two documents are gone. What I wanted to -say was that the expression “unrestricted submarine warfare” on -the part of the Foreign Office originated from the previous World -War. In reality, and during the entire war, we did not wage unrestricted -U-boat war in the sense of the unrestricted submarine -warfare of the first World War. Even there, where he says “unrestricted -submarine warfare might be imminent”—are only ordered -very restricted measures, which always were based on the fact that -the British had ordered something on their part. The chief action -on the part of the British was that of militarizing the entire merchant -fleet to a certain extent. That is to say, the merchant fleet was being -armed, and they received the order to use these arms.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t see how that arises out -of the last document at all. Unless the Tribunal wants to go into it, -I think we might pass on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Doesn’t Your Lordship think so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Out of both documents. Not out of one only...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have put that point, I -should think, at least seven times this afternoon. I am going to -suggest to you that your real object of the submarine war was set -out in the first paragraph of the memorandum. Would you just look -at it? You see “Berlin, 15 October...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I must still say that there was not any unrestricted -U-boat warfare but merely an intensification of measures, step by -step, as I have repeatedly said, and these were always taken only -after the British took some measure. The British...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest that that is an entire -untruth, and that I will show you out of this document. Look at -your own document, this memorandum. In the first paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Führer’s proposal for the restoration...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am not telling untruths, I would not think of doing -it. I do not do that sort of thing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is what I am suggesting -to you, and I will show it out of this document.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Führer’s proposal for the restoration of a just, honorable -peace and the new adjustment of the political order in Central -<span class='pageno' title='202' id='Page_202'></span> -Europe had been turned down. The enemy powers want the -war, with the aim of destroying Germany. In this fight, in -which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and -her rights, she must use her weapons with the utmost ruthlessness, -at the same time fully respecting the laws of military -ethics.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, let’s see what you were suggesting.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Germany’s principal enemy in this war is Britain. Her most -vulnerable spot is her maritime trade. The war at sea against -Britain must therefore be conducted as an economic war, with -the aim of destroying Britain’s fighting spirit within the -shortest possible time and forcing her to accept peace.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, miss one paragraph and look at the next.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The principal target of our naval strategy is the merchant -ship”—now, let’s look—“not only the enemy’s, but in general -every merchant ship sails the seas in order to supply the -enemy’s war industry, both by way of imports and exports. -Side by side with this the enemy warship also remains an -objective.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, wasn’t that the object which you in the Naval Command -were putting up to Hitler and to the Foreign Office, to use utmost -ruthlessness to destroy Britain’s fighting spirit, and to attack every -merchant ship coming in or going out of Britain? Wasn’t that your -object?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, but attacks on neutrals only insofar as they -were warned and advised not to enter certain zones. Throughout the -centuries in economic warfare the enemy merchant ship as well as -the neutral merchant ship has been the object of attack.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are not telling the Tribunal -that you were suggesting use of warnings. Are you seriously -suggesting to the Tribunal that what you meant by that paragraph -was that neutral ships were only to be attacked with warning?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, and that happened. Afterwards we issued -the warning to neutral ships, after our blockade zone was established -in accordance with the American blockade zone. We warned them -that they should not enter this zone because they would run into -most serious danger. That I am saying, and I can prove it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest to you that that is -untrue, and I will show it out of the document. Now, just turn -to page...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: On 24 November that warning was issued.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you will turn to Section C of -the document, “Military requirements for the decisive struggle -against Great Britain.” -<span class='pageno' title='203' id='Page_203'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Our naval strategy will have to employ to the utmost advantage -every weapon at our disposal. Military success can -be most confidently expected if we attack British sea communications -where they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness; -the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports -into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the -interest of neutrals, insofar as this is possible without detriment -to military requirements. It is desirable to base all -military measures taken on existing international law; however, -measures which are considered necessary from a military -point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected -from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not -covered by existing international law.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Wasn’t that the view you were putting up to the Foreign Office -and the Führer, “Use international law as long as you can, but if -international law conflicts with what is necessary for military -success, throw international law overboard.” Wasn’t that your -view?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that is quite incorrectly expressed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then explain these words. -Explain these words:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“We should try to consider the interest of neutrals insofar as -this is possible without detriment to military requirements. -However, measures which are considered necessary from a -military point of view, provided a decisive success can be -expected from them, will have to be carried out even if they -are not covered by international law.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>What did you mean by that if you didn’t mean to throw international -law overboard?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It says “If the existing rules of land warfare cannot -be applied to them.” It is generally known that international law -had not yet been co-ordinated with submarine warfare, just as the -use of aircraft at that time. It says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective -in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some -legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new -code of naval warfare”—that is, a new code of naval warfare -on the basis of actual developments.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Throughout the war a new code of naval warfare was developing, -starting with the neutrals themselves. For instance, the Pan-American -Security Conference defined a safety zone 300 miles around -the American coast, thereby barring a tremendous sea area for -overseas trade. -<span class='pageno' title='204' id='Page_204'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Likewise, the United States fixed a fighting zone around the -British Isles which was not at all to our liking, and on 4 November -1939, the United States themselves maintained that it would be -extremely dangerous for neutral ships to enter it, and they prohibited -their own ships and their own citizens to enter this area.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We followed that up by asking the neutrals that they too should -proceed in the same way as the United States, and then they would -not be harmed. Then only those neutrals sailed to Great Britain -which had contraband on board and made a lot of money out of it, -or which were forced by the British through their ports of control -to enter that area and nevertheless submit themselves to those -dangers. Of course, they were quite free to discontinue doing that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now tell me, what changes had -taken place in the development of either airplanes or submarines -from the time that Germany signed the Submarine Protocol of 1936 -to the beginning of the war? You say that international law had -to adapt itself to changes in weapons of war. What changes had -taken place between 1936 and 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The following changes took place: The Submarine -Protocol of 1936 was signed by us because we assumed that it concerned -peaceful actions...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not an answer to my -question. My question is quite clear. It is: What changes in weapons -of war, either in the air or in the submarines, had taken place -between 1936 and 1939? Now, there is a question. You are a naval -officer of 50 years’ experience. Tell me, what were the changes?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It turned out that because of the airplane the submarine -was no longer in a position to surface and to investigate -enemy ships or any other merchant ships, particularly near the -enemy coast where the U-boats carried on their activities at first. -There was no regulation at all issued about airplanes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is not an answer to the question. -The question you were asked was, what changes had taken -place in the weapons of war, either airplanes or submarines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But Mr. President, the changes took place in the airplane. -The ever-increasing efficiency of the airplanes and the extension -of their activities also over the seas led to the situation -where it became impossible to examine any merchant vessel without -aircraft being called to threaten the submarine. That got worse -and worse, so that later on even rescuing had to be restricted -because of enemy aircraft, and the entire submarine warfare was -completely turned upside down in that manner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the only change that you -can say in order to justify your statement that international law -<span class='pageno' title='205' id='Page_205'></span> -was to be thrown overboard where it didn’t fit in with military -necessities? Is that the only change, the increase in the power of -aircraft between 1936 and 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already said once it was not thrown overboard. -It was to be limited and changed and that was done by others too.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you just look -at the next paragraph. You talked about your consideration for -neutrals. At the top of Page 5 in the English text; it is the paragraph -that follows the one that I have just read. You say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective -in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some -legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new -code of naval warfare.</p> - -<p>“The Supreme War Command, after considering the political, -military and economic consequences within the framework of -the general conduct of the war, will have to decide what -measures of a military nature are to be taken, and what our -attitude to the usage of war is to be. Once it has been decided -to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in -fulfillment of military requirements, this decision is definitely -to be adhered to under all circumstances. On no account may -such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, -once it has been made, be dropped or subsequently relaxed -under political pressure from neutral powers, as took place in -the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by -neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats from -other countries, especially the United States, to come into the -war, which can be expected with certainty should the war -last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of -economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly -economic warfare is waged, the earlier will it show results and -the sooner will the war come to an end.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now agree with that -suggestion and that point of view expressed in the paragraph which -I have just read to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It has to be understood quite differently from the way -you are trying to present it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite differently from what it -says...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not what it says. This is the point. We had the -experience during the first World War that, as soon as the order for -intensification had been given and communicated, as soon as the first -<span class='pageno' title='206' id='Page_206'></span> -neutral had raised a finger to object, these measures were immediately -cancelled, particularly when the United States had a hand -in it. And here I am saying that under all circumstances it must be -avoided that we always withdraw our measures at once; and I give -a warning to the effect that we should consider our measures as -carefully as possible. That is the reason for the discussion with the -Foreign Office and others, namely, to avoid the situation where later -on they might be withdrawn, which would mean a considerable loss -of prestige and the results would not be achieved.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the reason. Numerous protests were received by Britain -too, and in most cases they were unanswered. I can quote from the -Document Number C-170, Exhibit Number USA-136, where there -are a lot of figures, Number 14, where it says: “Sharp Russian note -against the British blockade warfare on 20 October 1939;” and -Number 17, on 31 October, where it states: “Political Speech of -Molotov.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All that I ask is, was that a -proper procedure?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I must give an explanation on that matter, and I was -just about to do that. Sharp attacks on the British blockade, in -violation of international law—these attacks were made by -M. Molotov. Here too, protests were made which were turned down. -But I wanted to prevent protests and the entire document shows -that our deliberations always aimed at taking measures in such a -way that they could not be objected to, but were always legally -justified.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you tell me, Defendant, -how it was going to prevent protests if you suggest in this -paragraph to use the most ruthless measures and disregard every -protest that neutrals made? How is that going to prevent protests?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: These measures were to be taken in such a way that -no objection was possible. If I tell the neutrals: “This is a dangerous -area in every way,” and nevertheless they go there because they -want to make money or because they are being forced by the -British, then I need not accept any protest. They are acting for -egotistical reasons, and they must pay the bill if they die. I must -also add...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is true. They must pay -the bill if they die. That was what it came to, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: They received large premiums for exposing themselves -to that risk, and it was their business to decide about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we might break off now for -10 minutes.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='207' id='Page_207'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to be much longer, Sir David?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought about half an hour, -My Lord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Defendant, in this document the -Naval Command suggests that it calls for a siege of England, that -is, the sinking without warning of all ships that come into a big -area around England.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Didn’t you hear? Sorry. In this document the Naval Command -suggests what is called the siege of England, on Pages 10 to 13. -And that is, the sinking of all merchant ships, including neutrals -and tankers, which come into an area around England. Isn’t that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that is not true. The Navy Command does not -suggest that, but discusses the idea of a siege after the blockade -had been discussed and rejected. It likewise comes to a conclusion -why the siege, which until that time had not been accepted as a -recognized idea by international law, should not be undertaken; -and it draws the inference from all these discussions by setting -out on the last page, the last page but one, what shall now be -considered the final conclusion. These are only those measures -which can be justified by the actions already taken by the British. -And during the entire discussion about blockading, the consideration -was always in the foreground as to whether the neutrals would -not suffer too much damage by that. And the whole idea of a siege -is based on the fact that Prime Minister Chamberlain had already -said—on 26 September—that there would not be any difference -between a blockade on the seas and a siege on land, and the commander -of a land siege would try to prevent with all means the -entry of anything into the fortress. Also, the French press had -mentioned that Germany was in the same situation as a fortress -under siege.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am suggesting is that -you come down in favor of a siege, but you do not want any siege -area declared. Will you look at Paragraph 2 of the conclusions, -and then I will leave the document to the Tribunal. That is the -point I suggest. In paragraph 2 of the conclusions you say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“For the future conduct of economic war, the basic military -requirements demand the utmost ruthlessness. The employment -of the siege by sea as the most intensified form of economic -warfare meets this demand. Even without the public -announcement of a state of siege, after it has been clearly -defined as a concept, a declaration which would have drawbacks -militarily and from the point of view of international -law, and even without the declaration of a prohibited zone, -<span class='pageno' title='208' id='Page_208'></span> -it seems perfectly possible at the moment, as has been explained -in this memorandum, to take military measures to -introduce the most intensive form of economic warfare, and -to achieve what are at present the greatest possible results -in the interruption of enemy trade”—now the last words—“without -the Naval Operations Staff being tied in all cases, -to special forms and areas.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is your final conclusion, that you should have as effective -a siege as possible without proclaiming any area. Isn’t that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that is not the conclusion. The conclusion is that -we cannot carry out a siege, and that it would be a matter for -the political leadership of the State to decide. The political leadership -of the State has never suggested to decree a siege, and it -can be seen here quite clearly what, on the basis of the memorandum, -is suggested for the time being, and then how the intensification -gradually took place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must not take time arguing -about it, I want you to make clear...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me finish. My suggestion -to you is—and there I leave it—that you rejected a formal siege, -but you claimed the right to sink at sight, without warning, all -neutral vessels in an area which the High Command may choose.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I want to pass on to another subject, because I am afraid -time is getting on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is no siege, however. That was a directive issued -after neutral ships did not heed our warning and continued to -enter the sea around Britain in order to support Britain in the -economic warfare which she, with the greatest ruthlessness and -severity, was conducting against us. It was a measure of self-defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it that the document -speaks for itself, now that the attention of the Tribunal has been -drawn to it. I want to come to another point. You have mentioned -certain matters, in answer to Dr. Horn this morning, with regard -to the treatment of American ships in the summer of 1941. In -April 1941 you were pressing for German naval forces to operate -freely up to three miles of the American coast instead of the -300-mile safety limit which the Americans were suggesting, were -you not? Well to save time I will give the witness Document -Number D-849, Exhibit Number GB-472.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was handed to the defendant.</span>] -<span class='pageno' title='209' id='Page_209'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>That says you couldn’t get in touch with the Defendant Von -Ribbentrop and therefore you asked Baron Von Weizsäcker to get -a decision on these points:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“1) Authorization for the German naval forces in the western -part of the Atlantic Ocean to operate freely as far as the -international customary 3-mile boundary.</p> - -<p>“2) The cancellation of the preferential treatment which -American merchant vessels have been enjoying so far in our -warfare at sea.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I hand you Document Number 850, that will be Exhibit -Number GB-473. Your suggestion, which had been made in April, -was turned down by Hitler in June. It is a memorandum from -Ritter in the Foreign Office and it reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“General Jodl informs me that at the recent report of Grossadmiral -Raeder to the Führer, the more far-reaching orders -to the naval forces, as they were discussed in connection -with the Raeder interview, have been postponed until further -notice.</p> - -<p>“In the same way, permission to attack United States’ -merchant vessels within the framework of the prize law -has not been granted.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Your suggestion was to abandon the policy then existing and -attack up to the 3-mile limit. Now, I want you to come to another -point...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, please may I make a statement concerning that? -I should like to say something, even if you do not put a question -to me. It is not right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that time, in March 1941, and on the 1st of April and the -following dates in 1941, a whole number of intensifications were -introduced by the United States, which I mentioned this morning, -from the document which I had before me. Therefore, it was -clear that I, on behalf of the Naval Operations Staff, which was -supposed to conduct the most effective naval war, urged that also -with respect to the United States those steps should be taken which -were permissible according to international law, and that we should -start slowly. Those steps included:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First: that we should no longer respect that 300-mile limit, -but go as far as the 3-mile limit, where according to existing -international law, it was possible to attack. That is to say, not -against international law, but it was just discontinuing certain -favorable conditions which we had granted the United States. And -Point 2: The cancellation of the preferential treatment... -<span class='pageno' title='210' id='Page_210'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That’s exactly what I suggest -to you. There is no dispute between us. I was just establishing -that point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes—no...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want you to come...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I only wanted to say that during the hearing of -Grossadmiral Dönitz the Prosecution demanded of us that we -should not treat certain neutrals better than others, but we should -treat them all alike; that is to say in plain language, we must -sink them all, no matter whether we wanted to do so or not, and -of course we were not bound to do that. The second thing: it -was a matter of course that a thoroughly justified suggestion on my -part from the point of view of the Naval Operations Staff had -been rejected by the Führer if, with regard to the political situation, -he decided that at that time he did not desire to adopt a -more severe attitude towards the United States.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to -quite a different point. Do you say that you did not know anything -about the extermination of Jews in the Eastern Territories?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you say that you did not know about the extermination of -Jews in the Eastern Territories?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I say clearly under oath that I had not the slightest -inkling about it. I might add in explanation that on no account -would Hitler have spoken about such things to a man like myself, -whose opinion he knew, especially because he was afraid that on -my part there would be very serious objections. I explained the -other day why I used the word “Jews” in my memorial speech. In -my opinion, I was obliged to do so. But that had nothing at all -to do with an extermination of Jews. About the Jewish matter -I have only learned...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Excuse me, please, one moment. I only learned -something about the Jewish matter when Jews who were known -to me, mostly friends of my old parents, approached me and told -me that they were about to be evacuated from Berlin. And then -I intervened for them. That was the only thing I knew. On -occasions I was told in answer to my questions that they were to -be evacuated to cities where ghettos had been established. I always -understood that a ghetto was a district in a city where all the Jews -lived together, so that they would not have to mingle with the -rest of the population. -<span class='pageno' title='211' id='Page_211'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you know, my question -was only: Did you know or did you not, and you could have answered -that yes or no. I want you now to answer about that -point...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but I must—so many questions have been asked -about this very point and as every man in my position who held -the same views says the same, that he does not know anything -about it, I should like to explain once for all that one did not -hear about these things, because civilians certainly did not talk -to us about that, because they were always afraid that they would -get into difficulties. The Führer did not speak about it. I had no -connection with Himmler nor with other agents of the Gestapo. I -did not know anything about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you just to -tell the Tribunal your chain of command for the Baltic coast. Is -this right that you had the naval chief command, and then the -Flag Officer of the East Baltic coast Tallinn and, under him, you -had a command at Libau; is that right? Was that your chain of -command?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not understand that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was your chain of command -for the East Baltic coast, Kiel, Flag Officer Tallinn, and a detachment -under him at Libau? You had...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I assume, so—that depends on various things. If -they were operational matters, then it had to do with the Naval -Group Commander East or North; and as far as matters of organization -were concerned, then it might have gone through the Station -Chief of the Baltic Sea.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, at any rate, you -had got in 1941 a naval command at Libau, had you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like you -just to look at Document Number D-841, which is a deposition on -oath by one of the naval employees at Libau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, that will be Exhibit Number GB-474.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This witness says: “Deposition on oath of Walter Kurt Dittmann.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And then it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I was Naval Administration Inspector and officer in charge -of the Naval Clothing Depot at Libau in Latvia.</p> - -<p>“I held this position from the beginning of August 1941 to -the end of March 1942. -<span class='pageno' title='212' id='Page_212'></span></p> - -<p>“The Jewish population of Libau at that time was supposed -to be about 7,000 people.</p> - -<p>“Up to the end of March 1942 many thousands of them had -already been ‘evacuated’ by the Gestapo and the Latvian -Police.</p> - -<p>“ ‘Evacuated’ was the local expression for the annihilation -of these people.</p> - -<p>“All Jews were registered. When a new lot was to be evacuated -it happened in the following way:</p> - -<p>“The Latvian Police fetched the Jews out of their houses, -put them on lorries and drove them to the Naval Port about -six to seven kilometers outside the town. Later on these -people had to march and were not taken there in lorries.</p> - -<p>“In the Naval Port these people were then shot with machine -guns. This was done by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. -The police, of course, got their orders from the German -Gestapo.</p> - -<p>“I personally did not witness these incidents, but comrades -told me all about them.</p> - -<p>“Some of the Jews before they were shot worked for the -Navy.</p> - -<p>“About 80-100 people worked in the Clothing Depot every -day.</p> - -<p>“About 100-150 people worked in the Garrison Administration -every day.</p> - -<p>“About 50 people worked in the Garrison Building Office -(Navy) every day.</p> - -<p>“Through these contacts and through personal visits to the -houses of Jews I heard a lot regarding the terrible happenings -in Libau during these months.</p> - -<p>“I personally went to my superior, Festungs-Intendant -Dr. Lancelle, and before that I also went to another superior, -the officer in charge of the Hospital Administration, named -Müller, both were Naval Administration Officials. I pointed -out to them these abuses which have already been described. -The answer I got was that they could not do anything and -that things like that were best overlooked.</p> - -<p>“The Marineverwaltungsassistent Kurt Traunecker accompanied -a consignment of clothing from Kiel to Libau. He -stayed a few weeks in Libau and he expressed his displeasure -at the conditions there regarding the annihilation of the -Jews.</p> - -<p>“He then went back to Kiel to the local clothing office. There -again he expressed his displeasure and was ordered to appear -<span class='pageno' title='213' id='Page_213'></span> -at the Naval Administration Headquarters (Marine-Intendantur). -Whom he saw there, I do not know, but it was made -clear to him that these occurrences were not true, and therefore -he should not talk about them any more, otherwise he -would get into most serious trouble.</p> - -<p>“My personal opinion is that the higher offices of the Navy -in Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had -knowledge of these terrible conditions.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you saying, Defendant, that with your naval detachments -on the East coast of the Baltic and with these things happening, -that nobody reported to you that the Jews were being slaughtered -by the thousands in the Eastern Territories, you are still saying it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I knew nothing about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your staff doing, if -they were not telling you about this? Had you an efficient staff? -Do you say you had an efficient staff?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is a question which is not relevant here. Of -course I had only efficient officers around me. But here we are -dealing with things which were not done at all by the Navy. It -says here in all places that it was the police and so on. I even -was in Libau once and I was told—and this is the only thing in -connection with this matter—that the peculiar thing was that the -Jews in Libau, contrary to their custom, were craftsmen and -therefore they were doing useful work there. That was the only -thing I heard about it. As regards any extermination...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When were you in Libau?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot say that now. It was after it was occupied, -probably immediately afterwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were you there in 1941 or 1942?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I said just now that I do not know exactly when; -I have to look it up somewhere. It does not say here that -anything was reported, only that it was apparently discussed in -the Navy Headquarters and with the Navy Quartermaster (Marine-Intendantur), -who does not report to me. Of course I would have -intervened if I had heard about such happenings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You think you would? Well, -I’ll leave that. Now, tell me about the Commando Order of the -18th of October 1942. You received Hitler’s Commando Order and -passed it on to your various divisions of the Navy, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I passed it on through the Naval Operations -Staff.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you approve of it? -<span class='pageno' title='214' id='Page_214'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not recommend it, but I passed it on. I have -to make a statement if you want to know what I thought about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that’s not what I’m asking -you. I’m asking you—first answer my question—did you approve -of an order to shoot Commandos or to hand them over to the SD -to be shot, did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not recommend the order, but I received it as -drafted by the Führer, and as it came into my hands, I passed it -on as ordered with the same remark as to how far it has to be -passed on and how it has to be returned. It was all ordered by -Hitler in detail. It was decisive for me that in one of the first -paragraphs the reason for this order was given, and the reasons -why Hitler considered a deviation from international law justified. -Moreover, a short time before I had been in Dieppe in France, -and there I was informed that on the occasion of the Commando -action of the British in France, the prisoners, I believe they were -from the Labor Service, who were working along the coast, had -been shackled with a noose around their neck and the other end -of the noose around the bent-back lower leg, so that when the -leg weakened, the noose tightened and the man choked.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you answer -my question: Did you approve of the order or not? You haven’t -answered it yet. Did you approve of the order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I always said—yes, I did—no, I do not want to say—I -said that twice already. I passed it on because it was an order -from my Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, in one of the last paragraphs -it said that that order should not be applied for the treatment -of prisoners taken after a naval action or after large scale -landing operations and I, as well as many others in the Navy, -concentrated our attention on this point because that was our -main activity. But I saw no reason to raise objections to the -Führer on account of this order which I thought justified in this -way. And I would like to state very clearly that I, as a soldier, -was not in a position to go to my Supreme Commander and Chief -of State to tell him, “Show me your reasons for this order,” that -would have been mutiny and could not have been done under -any circumstances.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, do you remember that one -example which we have discussed a great deal in this Trial, which -you must have listened to, was the case of naval men coming in -with a two-man torpedo, trying to sink the <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>. Do you -remember that case? Surely you can answer that “yes” or “no,” -because either you remember or you do not. We have discussed -it about six times. -<span class='pageno' title='215' id='Page_215'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I remember. If I remember I will say “yes.” -The contrary does not have to be assumed at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that during the -time that you were Inspector General, or Admiral Inspector of -the German Navy, that there was started a “Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände,” -under Vice Admiral Helmut Heye, which included -in its command one-man torpedoes, one-man U-boats, explosive -motor boats, and had personnel, starting at about 5,000 and rising, -I think, as far as 16,000? Did you know that there was that Kommando -in the Navy, “Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände”? Did -you know that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I knew that of course and that it operated quite -openly on the French coast and later on, I believe, also on the -North coast.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you have approved if -the Allies had shot any one of your thousands of personnel in that -Kommando that was dealing with one-man and two-man torpedoes -and explosive motor boats? Would you have approved if we had -shot them out of hand?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: First, I cannot give any information about what I -would have done in a particular case with which I had nothing -to do any more. Secondly, here it is...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, if you don’t want to -answer, it is good enough for me. I will point it out in due course -to the Tribunal with...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But you interrupted me again. I should like to make -a second point after what I said first. Secondly, these units fought -quite openly, just below the coast, and had no civilians on board -and also no murderous instruments or instruments for sabotage -with them, so they were fighters just like the fighters in a submarine. -I know...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly the point that I -have put with our Commandos, so I will not argue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want to pass to one other point. Was it under your orders -that the log on the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was falsified? Was it by your direct -order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not at all. I have explained the other day here -that my order was, “First: absolute secrecy upon the order of the -Führer. Secondly: politically it will be dealt with by the High -Command of the Navy. Thirdly”—there was a third point—I will -find it in a second—“I do not intend to punish the commander -because he acted in good faith and committed an error.” That is -what I ordered. I did not order anything further concerning that. -<span class='pageno' title='216' id='Page_216'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you know under whose -orders the log was falsified? I am very anxious to know. The log -was falsified. I have asked the Defendant Dönitz. He cannot tell -me. He has put in an affidavit that the matter was to be left -to you, and now I am asking you whether you can tell me. I think -the commander is dead, as far as I remember, so he cannot tell -me. Do you say that you cannot tell me under whose orders the -log of the Submarine <span class='it'>U-30</span>, that sank the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, was falsified?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already said that I had nothing to do with -it, because in fact I did not have anything to do with such details. -I did not order such details. The other day—I do not know whether -Admiral Wagner said it—it was discussed who did it. I assumed -that it was within the flotilla.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me just this about the -<span class='it'>Athenia</span>. You told us the other day that you gave these orders, -and then washed your hands of the matter. Nearly a month later...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already said I had nothing further to do with -it, for you know...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had nothing to do with it. -Nearly a month later the Propaganda Ministry put out this suggestion, -I think you said on Hitler’s orders—that the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> had -been sunk by Churchill. Did you not feel that it was your duty -as Grand Admiral and head of the German Navy to make any -protests against this disgraceful, lying suggestion, that the First -Lord of the British Admiralty had deliberately sent to their deaths -a lot of British and American subjects? Did you not think it was -your duty to do that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I spoke to Hitler about it—but it had happened without -our having any idea about it. I was extremely embarrassed -about it when the First Lord of the Admiralty was attacked in that, -one can say, boorish manner but I could not change anything subsequently -and Hitler did not admit that he...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you did not bother about -that, as I understand it, you didn’t bother at all...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I had misgivings about it, and I was very indignant -about it. Please do not keep twisting what I say...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you translate your indignation -into actions? That is what I am asking.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Into what kind of action?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Any action.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that Hitler should get Goebbels to contradict -that article? That Hitler would not do if he himself had been the -author of the article. -<span class='pageno' title='217' id='Page_217'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to get it clear. -You did nothing when you knew that Von Blomberg and -Von Fritsch, who were old friends and comrades of yours, had been -framed up by sections of these Nazi plotters; you did nothing about -that? You did nothing to protest against the treatment meted out -to Von Blomberg or Von Fritsch? You did nothing, did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, but at that time I did not know anything about -the background, as you yourself said this morning. I knew nothing -about the background. Later when I became acquainted with the -details I gradually put the whole picture together. At that time -I was not in a position to assume that such methods would be at -all possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I put to you your own -statement that you made a year ago. I just want to get it quite -clear that the first time in your life that you were moved to protest -was, I think, in March 1945, when you saw the actual marks of -torture on the hands of your friend, Herr Gessler, and at that -time the Soviet troops were over the Oder and the Allies were -over the Rhine, and that was the first time that you made any -protest when you took off your Party Golden Emblem, wasn’t it? -That was the first protest you ever made in your naval, military, -political career; is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Not a bit of it. I did not really know what was -going on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then—I put it again. In -March 1945 you took off the Party Golden Emblem when you saw -the marks of torture on your friend Gessler’s hands. Isn’t that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: When Dr. Gessler, who in spite of my objections had -been kept for several months in a concentration camp, returned -from the concentration camp and informed me that he was in -extremely pitiful condition, and that in spite of my request in -August, when he was sent to the concentration camp and when -I had asked the Führer through Admiral Wagner for Dr. Gessler -to be questioned quickly because he was certainly innocent in -connection with the assassination attempt, so that he could be -released as soon as possible, then...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, my question is, was it then -that you took off the Party Emblem. You can answer that. You -can give your explanation later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but wait a moment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But up to then you did not -make any protest against anything that Hitler did, except the -purely military one on the invasion of the Soviet Union? -<span class='pageno' title='218' id='Page_218'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I always made serious protests, and that I have proved -here, and the adjutant, General Schmundt, told me, “You will -be most successful if you try to influence the Führer personally -when you are alone with him and tell him quite openly what you -think.” This is important enough to mention and I must say it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Well, Dr. Gessler came back from the concentration camp and -told me that during his first interrogation—at that time I had not yet -had a chance to intervene—he had been tortured. That was the -first time that I heard that anywhere in Germany anybody was -tortured. There is a letter from Dr. Gessler about that—that I told -him immediately, “I am going to the Führer at once to tell him -about this because I cannot imagine that he knows about that.” -Gessler begged me—when he confirmed that letter—for goodness -sake not to go to the Führer then, because that would endanger -his, Gessler’s, life. I said I would answer for it that nothing would -happen to him, and that I would still try to approach the Führer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the whole of the ensuing period I attempted to approach -the Führer, who was not at headquarters. When I was informed in -April that he was in Berlin, which was already under heavy attack, -I tried to approach the Führer day after day by calling Admiral -Voss over the telephone. That was no longer possible, and after I -received that information the first thing I did was that I went, -together with my wife, to the lake which was behind our house and -tore off my Party Emblem and threw it into the lake. I told that -to Admiral Voss but unfortunately I could not tell it to the Führer -any more. That can be seen from the letter which Dr. Gessler -wrote, and we would have liked to have him as a witness, but his -state of health did not permit it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was your first protest.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It was not my first protest. That is twisting my words.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross-examination?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: On 18 May 1946, during the morning session -of the Tribunal you testified that during your service as Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy you twice made application to resign. The -first time you tried to resign was in November 1938 when you were -dealing with the building up of the Navy, and Hitler was not pleased -with your plans, and the second time was when Hitler, without your -knowledge, permitted his adjutant who was a naval officer to marry -a certain young girl. Is that not so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but I put in further applications for resignation -which were not so sensational, once in 1937, and I believe even in -1935, when I was not in good health. But these were two typical -examples which show how such things came about. -<span class='pageno' title='219' id='Page_219'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I understood that in the first of these two -cases Hitler finally persuaded you not to resign.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: And in the second case, he complied with -your wish but he never forgot it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In fact, you resigned only in January 1943, -is that not so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In actual fact, yes. But I must add that during the -war I felt I could not leave the Navy, which was already in such a -difficult situation, and I believed I enjoyed its confidence to a certain -extent so that I could be useful.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: On the morning of 18 May you said here in -the Court in regard to your resignation, that it seemed to you then -that Hitler, at that particular moment, wanted to get rid of you. -Is that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that moment I had the impression, when he made -such serious accusations and when he considerably contradicted his -previous judgments, that maybe he wanted to get rid of me, and I -therefore considered that that was a particularly favorable moment -to leave.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: The question of successors was solved by -your naming a few people to Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: And among them was the Defendant Dönitz. -Did you mention his name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I mentioned his name. I informed the Führer of -that in writing, first Carls, second, in case he wanted to concentrate -on submarine warfare, Grossadmiral Dönitz, who was the highest -authority in that field.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: And does it not seem to you, after your -answer to my questions, that the answer which you gave to -Dr. Laternser on 18 May, when you mentioned the absolute impossibility -of resigning from the general staff, was not a proper answer? -It was possible to resign, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but in this case, of course, there were two prerequisites. -The first was that Hitler himself did not like me any more -and I knew it, so that it would not be insubordination if I threw -up my post for some reason or other.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Secondly, because it was possible, as I pointed out in that conversation, -for the change to take place under peaceful conditions so -<span class='pageno' title='220' id='Page_220'></span> -that the Navy would not suffer by it. If I had left because of a -quarrel, then that would have had a very bad effect on the Navy -because it might have meant a certain split between the Navy and -Hitler, and I had particularly to preserve unity, at that critical -moment of the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to understand my question -correctly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I understand...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I am not asking you about the prerequisites -which might have been required for granting an application for -resignation. I am asking you a question in principle:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Was it possible or was it not possible to resign? After all, you -did resign. You resigned from your post as Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but I had been in the service for 15 years, and I -could tell him, “If that is the way you yourself judge me, then there -is no sense in your continuing to work with me.” That was a favorable -opportunity which made it permissible for me to ask him to -release me. But what one could not do was to throw up the job -and give the impression of being insubordinate. That had to be -avoided at all costs, I would never have done that. I was too much -of a soldier for that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I have already heard what I wanted to -hear from you in reply to my question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I will pass on to the next question. You maintain that all -the time you were striving towards normalizing relations with the -Soviet Union, is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am sorry; I could not understand what you said.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: You maintain that during your service you -always strove to make the relations between Germany and the -Soviet Union quite normal, is that not so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I was always in favor of the Bismarck policy, that we -should have a common policy with Russia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: If I understood your testimony correctly -the day before yesterday and on Friday, in 1940, already, you had -knowledge of the fact that Hitler intended to attack the Soviet Union.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In September 1940 for the first time I heard certain -statements from Hitler himself that he was thinking of a war with -Russia, given certain circumstances. Even in the directive he -mentioned one of these prerequisites, one of these circumstances. -He did not say to me at that time that in any circumstances he -wanted to wage war, but that we had to be prepared, as it says in -<span class='pageno' title='221' id='Page_221'></span> -Paragraph 1, that before crushing England we might have to fight -against Russia. And from September on I began to make objections -to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Was there not a case of an incident when -you maintained that the explanations which had been given by -official governmental organs or agencies for an attack on the Soviet -Union gave you and the others the impression that it was a -deliberate propaganda, and in fact they were quite repulsive in -their effect? Do you remember that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The propaganda made by Hitler made an impression? -I did not quite get it...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I believe that you once expressed in writing -the view that the OKW and the Foreign Ministry explained to the -German people the reasons for attacking the Soviet Union in such a -way as to give the impression that it was deliberate propaganda, -and the total effect was repulsive. Do you not remember it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Oh, you mean the broadcasts emanating from the -Foreign Office when the war started? Yes, that was Hitler’s propaganda -to make the German people understand the reason for this -war. That is right. As regards breaking the Pact...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to take a look at one document. -This is a document written by you, and I would like you to -tell us whether this document contains the precise subject matter -of my question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Where is it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: “The propagandistic...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: “The propagandistic”—shall I read it?</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The propagandistic, political and military announcements -given out at the beginning of the war by the Foreign Office -and the High Command of the Armed Forces, which were to -justify the breaking of the Pact because of breaches by the -Soviet Union, found very little credence among the people as -well as among the Armed Forces. They showed too clearly -that they were propaganda for a certain purpose and had a -repulsive effect.” (USSR-460.)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I know that at that time Hitler himself drafted these documents, -together with Goebbels.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In connection with this question I have -another question for you. Am I to understand you in this way; that -your divergence of opinion with Hitler over foreign policy, and in -particular in regard to aggressive wars, was less strongly defined -than your difference of opinion about the question of the marriage -of a naval officer with a certain girl? Did you understand me? -<span class='pageno' title='222' id='Page_222'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, they were two quite different things. Those were -military questions where the political decisions remained with the -Führer. I was very insistent about the moral issues also, where -they concerned the Pact, but I did not send him any written ultimatum -because in this matter it would have been unsoldierly. I did -not have the final decision, he had it; whereas in the case of Albrecht, -it was up to me to decide—to say yes or no—and not to sign that -which I was supposed to sign.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: You are saying now that this is a question -of morals. Does it not seem to you that an unprovoked attack -on a country with which Germany had a nonaggression treaty—do -you not think that such a question is always connected with the -question of morals?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course; that is what I said myself, that in this case -too I laid special stress on the moral issue. But in spite of that, as -the highest man of the Navy, I was not in a position to hold out the -threat of resignation at that moment. I was too much of a soldier to -be able to do that, to be able to leave the Navy at a moment like that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In answer to questions put to you by your -counsel here in this courtroom you testified that your speech, which -was delivered by you on 12 March 1939—that is Page 169 of the -Russian text in the Raeder document book, My Lord—the speech -where you praised Hitler and Hitler’s policies—you mentioned that -this speech was not in accord with your true opinion. Is it so or -is it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that is not correct. I said that we had had the -experience that the Communists and Jews, from 1917 to 1920, had -strongly undermined our power of resistance, and that for this -reason it could be understood, if a National Socialist government -took certain measures against both of them in order to stem their -influence, which was excessive. That was the sense of my statements -and I made absolutely no mention of any further steps which -might come into question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In short, you are saying now that when -you delivered that speech on 12 March 1939, that this speech was -fully in accord with your ideas and your views. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it was, or I would not have made it. It was in -accord insofar as I had to recognize that the National Socialist Government -had in some way to stem that influence which was generally -recognized to be excessive, and as I said yesterday, the National -Socialist Government had issued the Nuremberg Laws, which I did -not entirely approve of where they went to extremes. But if the -Government was so disposed, it was not possible for me in an official -public speech, which I gave on the orders of that Government, to -<span class='pageno' title='223' id='Page_223'></span> -express my personal views which were different. That had to be -considered within this address to the nation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish in a very few -moments? It is now five minutes past five.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I think, My Lord, that only about 10 minutes -will be sufficient for me. I have only about three or four more -questions left.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In order to save -time I am not going to argue with you in regard to the motives -which made you deliver the speech. It was important for me that -you should confirm what you said, and that is, that this speech -was in accord with your views and ideas. Now I will pass on to -the next question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 29 September 1941, your Chief of Staff, Admiral Fricke—do I -pronounce his name correctly? Is it Fricke or Fricker?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Fricke, yes, Chief of the Staff of the Naval Operations -Staff.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Admiral Fricke published a directive in -regard to the future fate of Leningrad. Do you know what document -I mean, or must this document be shown to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I know that document very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: This directive was published with your -consent?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not give a specific order for it because there was -no necessity for passing it on. May I just explain briefly how it was. -I had...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, and I would like you to be brief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Quite briefly, yes. I had requested Hitler when I heard -that he intended in the course of the war to bombard Leningrad, -that he should spare the port and dock installations because they -would be useful for us later, as we had to keep moving our bases -back to the East on account of the British air attacks in the Baltic. -Shortly before the date which you have mentioned Admiral Fricke -had been at the Führer’s headquarters—I do not know for what -reason—and had there spoken with the Führer in my absence, and -the Führer had explained to him that plan to bombard Leningrad, -especially with aircraft, and he used those very exaggerated words -which were then written down in the document. The Navy had -absolutely nothing to do with the shelling of Leningrad. We received -no orders for that. We were only interested in that one thing which -I mentioned before, that the shipyards and port installations should -<span class='pageno' title='224' id='Page_224'></span> -be spared. The Führer had informed Fricke that unfortunately he was -not in a position to do that because the attack, especially if made -with aircraft, could not be directed quite so precisely. All we could -do was to inform Generaladmiral Carls that Leningrad, in case it -should be taken, could not be used as a base, and Generaladmiral -Carls had to stop the preparations which he had already begun by -allocating German workers and probably also machinery which was -intended to be used in Leningrad later on. Carls had to know of that -and, as the document says, the so-called Quartermaster Department -of the Navy had to know about it, and that was why Admiral Fricke -passed on that paper. Unfortunately he included in this paper the -expressions used by Hitler, which had nothing to do with the whole -affair as far as we were concerned, because we had nothing to do -with the shelling. By so doing he did not assume in any way the -responsibility, in the sense that he approved it. He only believed -that he had to pass on Hitler’s wording of the order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Navy had nothing to do with the matter. It would not have -been necessary to pass it on, and unfortunately and very clumsily -that expression used by Hitler was entered in that document. However, -nothing happened and that document was not passed on from -Generaladmiral Carls to our Finland Commander. That is the -whole story.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me the question is becoming -more complicated. I asked you a simple question. Your Chief of -Staff, Chief of Operations, published a directive. Did you know -about the directive?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. That is not a directive—that can be seen also -from the photostat—because the letter had not been submitted to -me for passing on, and that shows that it was not considered to be -very important. It was not a directive to undertake any operation -or anything important. It was just a directive to stop anything that -might have been done with regard to bases; so that really nothing -happened. Thus, when that document was passed on by Admiral -Fricke, nothing happened at all. It was quite superfluous.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: You are talking about the destruction of -one of the biggest cities of the Soviet Union. You are talking in -this document about razing the city to the ground, and you maintain -now that it is a more or less trifling question, that this question -was not important enough to be reported to you, as Fricke’s Chief? -Do you want us to believe that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course. It is not a question of the shelling of -Leningrad, with which we had nothing to do at all. It was the minor -question which concerned us, the question as to whether we would -later be able to establish a naval base there, and whether we could -<span class='pageno' title='225' id='Page_225'></span> -bring workers and machines and such things to Leningrad. That -was a minor issue. The shelling of Leningrad was a major issue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I think that the Tribunal will be able to -understand you correctly and to draw the necessary conclusions, -both from this document and from your testimony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I have one last question for you. On 28 August 1945, in -Moscow, did you not write an affidavit as to the reasons for Germany’s -defeat?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I took special pains with that after the collapse.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, we submit this document to the -Tribunal in the form of excerpts, Document Number USSR-460. In -order to save time I would like you to hear several excerpts from -this affidavit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You will be shown where they can -be found on the original, and you can say whether it was correctly -read into the record and whether you acknowledge and confirm it.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“My Attitude Towards Adolf Hitler and the Party. Disastrous -influence on the fate of the German State...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you find this place?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Would you be kind enough to give me a copy so -that I can follow?</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable -ambition were his main peculiarities; running after popularity -and showing off, untruthfulness, vagueness, and selfishness, -which were not restrained for the sake of State or People. He -was outstanding in his greed, wastefulness, and effeminate -unsoldierly manner.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, a little further on:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is my conviction that Hitler very soon realized his character, -but made use of him where it suited his purpose, and -burdened him perpetually with new tasks in order to avoid -his becoming dangerous to himself.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>On Page 24 of your document you give another characteristic:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Führer continued to attach importance to the fact that -from the outside his relations to me seemed normal and good. -He knew I was well thought of in all the really respectable -circles of the German people, and that in general everybody -had great faith in me. This cannot be said of Göring, Von -Ribbentrop, Dr. Goebbels, Himmler and Dr. Ley.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now I will ask you to find Page 27. -<span class='pageno' title='226' id='Page_226'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But there is something missing. “In the same way, -as for instance, Baron Von Neurath, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, -Schacht, Dorpmüller and others,” who were on the other side.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Evidently it was not correctly translated to -you. I will read this passage into the record. Now, on Page 27, -this place is underlined in red pencil: “Dönitz’ strong political inclination -to the Party...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] I think the Tribunal could -read this themselves if the defendant says that it is true that he -wrote it. Probably Dr. Siemers could check it over and see that -there are no inaccuracies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, My Lord. Then I shall have the -opportunity to put a very brief question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I will ask you to take a look at a -place on Page 29, which is marked with pencil, where the paragraph -deals with Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Will you confirm that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: What am I supposed to do? Yes, well...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I am asking you with regard to everything -that I read into the record and what you say just now in this paragraph. -I would like to have an answer from you. Do you confirm -all that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I quite agree with the suggestion -by the Tribunal. However, I should like to ask that the entire document -be submitted. I have only short excerpts before me, and I -would be grateful if I could see the entire document. I assume that -Colonel Pokrovsky agrees to that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Siemers, one part of the document -having been put in evidence, you can refer to the remainder -of the document. You can put the remainder of the document in, -if you want to.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I said that at the time I tried to find an explanation -for the cause of our collapse.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: First, I ask you to give the answer, yes or no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. On the whole, I agree entirely with this judgment. -But I should like to add that I wrote those things under -entirely different conditions. I do not wish to go into details, and I -never expected that that would ever become public. These were -notes for myself to help me form my judgment later on. I also want -to ask especially that what I said about Generaloberst Jodl should -also be read into the record, or where it belongs, that is, right after -the statement about Field Marshal Keitel. With regard to Field -Marshal Keitel, I should like to emphasize that I intended to convey -<span class='pageno' title='227' id='Page_227'></span> -that it was his manner towards the Führer which made it possible -for him to get along with him for a long time, because if anybody -else had been in that position, who had a quarrel with the Führer -every day or every other day, then the work of the whole of the -Armed Forces would have been impossible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the reason and the explanation of what I wanted to -express by that statement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution has no further questions -to ask the defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, have you got the whole document -before you? Was that the original document you had before you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: In your writing?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it is typewritten. But it is signed by me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the document can be handed to -Dr. Siemers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Dr. Siemers, do you want to re-examine beyond putting in that -document? Have you any questions you want to ask in addition to -putting in that document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, on account of the cross-examination made -by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, I should like to re-examine, and I should -like to ask for permission to do that after I have read this document, -so that I can also cover the document tomorrow in this connection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, the thought occurs to me with -respect to this document—do I understand that the Tribunal -will order copies to be distributed to all of the Defense Counsel? -There are matters with respect to the defendants on which the -Counsel might want to examine. They might be surprised.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought it was fair that Dr. Siemers should -see the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. I have no objection to that. But my point is, -that in the document there is reference to defendants other than the -defendant represented by Dr. Siemers. And at a later date, if this -document is not made known to the others by the reading of it or -by the turning over to them in translated form, they may claim -surprise, and lack of opportunity to examine on it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think some photostatic copies of the document -should be made so that all the defendants referred to therein -may be acquainted with the terms of the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I just thought I would make that suggestion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 21 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='228' id='Page_228'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH DAY</span><br/> Tuesday, 21 May 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with reference to your examination -yesterday, I have to put the following questions to you in -re-examination. Sir David was talking about the fact that before -1933 you had carried out rearmament behind the backs of the law-making -bodies. I think that question, as such, has been clarified; -but there is one supplementary question. On whom did it depend -just what was submitted to the Reichstag?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: On the Reichswehrminister.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And who was the Reichswehrminister at that -time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He was a member of the government and my direct -superior. I had to submit everything to him which I wished to get.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And his name was Gröner, wasn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I draw the Tribunal’s attention to the -extract from the Constitution which I have recently submitted as -Exhibit Number Raeder-3, according to which Article 50 lays down -that the Reich President gives all orders and decrees even where -the Armed Forces are concerned. For their validity decrees -require to be countersigned by the Chancellor or the Minister -concerned. By the act of countersigning responsibility is accepted. -In this, our case, the Reichswehrminister was the competent Reich -Minister; and anything that was done afterwards with reference to -the law-making bodies was a matter for the government to decide.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Sir David has submitted to you -Document C-17. It is the index of a book written by Colonel -Scherff, called <span class='it'>The History of the German Navy from 1919 to 1939</span>. -Was this book ever written?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as I know, only the index was compiled. -I assume that if anything had been written, then it would have -been submitted to me a long time ago, but I never heard of that -at all. -<span class='pageno' title='229' id='Page_229'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that the American -Prosecution, at the time when they submitted the document, -pointed out that as far as they knew the book was not written.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I believe that it is very difficult to -base accusations on an index, but I want you to tell me, Defendant, -when did you learn of this index?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It became known to me during my first interrogation -by an American prosecutor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Furthermore, Document D-854, which is GB-460, -was put to you yesterday. May I come back to one question put by -Sir David. On Page 1 Sir David had been reading as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“But if—as was stated—in nearly all spheres of armament -where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was -violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit—or at -least its violation was prepared—a long time before the -16th of March 1935....”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then Sir David asked you: “Do you want to say that this is -untrue?” You answered but you did not quite finish your reply, at -least it never became quite clear what you said in the German or -the English record. I want you to tell me why you are of the -opinion that Assmann was not quite right in this respect?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It is an utter exaggeration. First of all, violations—as -have been proved here in detail—were mostly of a very minor -nature; and only the number of deviations may have given the -impression that there were many violations. Secondly, in its essential -points, we never actually filled the quotas allowed by the Versailles -Treaty; in fact, we remained below the figures granted. Besides, -only defense measures are involved, very primitive defense -measures—Assmann’s representations are just a great exaggeration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What you are trying to say, therefore, is that -Assmann’s way of putting it “in practically every sphere of rearmament” -is wrong?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, probably Document C-32 will have led him to -that conclusion because there were so many points. However, on -closer examination they turn out to be very minor points.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: With regard to the important points of rearmament, -that is to say construction of large ships, the Navy did not -violate the Treaty, did it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: By repeating it three times, Sir David emphasized -the fact that you had a great deal of confidence in Assmann. I have -nothing to say against it, but beyond that I would like to put a -supplementary question to you: Did you have that much confidence -<span class='pageno' title='230' id='Page_230'></span> -in him, that in your opinion Assmann could pass a proper legal -judgment? Was he a lawyer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. Assmann was a naval officer who was not used -at the front any more. He was a very clever writer who had -written a few volumes about the first World War. He wrote very -well, but even the volumes on the naval warfare during the first -World War were corrected a great deal by the persons concerned; -but against him and his ability to write history nothing can be said.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think you remember this document from -yesterday. Is it a final historical work? Is it a final and corrected -edition?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. So far as I know, he had not got that far. He -was making summaries and extracts from war diaries and records.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Assmann has written (Document D-854, GB-460):</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“If, in this light, there were plans for ‘preparing the construction’ -in 1935 of twelve 275-ton submarines, six 550-ton -submarines, and four 900-ton submarines, then one will have -to consider the strategic points of view valid at that time.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Added together 22 were planned, and for the following year -14 submarines—by no means built, just planned. Are these figures -correct in your opinion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: They are correct in my opinion. The only thing I am -not sure about is the 900-ton type; I cannot quite explain that. -I cannot remember that at that time we were building 900-ton -boats. Apart from the 250-ton type, our first types were 550-tons, -and only then did the 740-ton boats come. Perhaps he is thinking -of those when he says 900-tons. We did not actually build -900-ton boats.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On Page 158, Sir David has read to you the -following sentence, which I want to repeat because it needs -clarification.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction -that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the -German-British Treaty. Considering the size of U-boats -which had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have -been provided for up to 1938. In reality, 118 were completed -and constructed.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I want to remind you that in the original there is the Note -Number 6 referring to a letter of the Chief of the Naval Budget -Department...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='231' id='Page_231'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: ...from the year 1942, presumably containing -statistics on the construction of submarines as the years went by. -I believe that these figures need to be clarified.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>According to material at my disposal, it appears that these 55 -U-boats were in accordance with the London Agreement; that is to -say, in accordance with the 45 percent agreed on in 1935. You -probably have not got the exact figure in mind, but is that roughly -correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is probably right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And now, the Figure 118. That, according to -material at my disposal, is also well-founded. That is the figure -which corresponds to the 100 percent equality in regard to the -tonnage of submarines. If we had 118 submarines, then our -submarine equipment corresponded to that of Britain at that time. -Is that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it is correct; and it is also correct that we -included these later boats in the budget and had ordered them -after we had seen Admiral Cunningham and his staff in Berlin on -30 December and had reached a friendly understanding in accordance -with the agreement, allowing us to build 100 percent. The -remark read at the beginning, saying that we had committed most -violations in this sphere, is a complete untruth. Until the beginning -of the war we only built such U-boats as we were allowed to build; -that is to say, first 45 percent and later 100 percent. It was a great -mistake, of course, that we did it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have just said that it was a -complete untruth. I think that, even if Sir David used that word -against you, one ought not to pass such sharp judgment against -Assmann. Do you not think, Admiral, that there was possibly a -legal error on his part when...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that may be.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: ...he wrote these details and that he was not -really thinking of what you have just told us had happened; -namely, that in 1938 there had been an agreement between England -and Germany, according to which Germany could now build -100 percent?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is quite probable. When I said “untruth,” -I meant incorrectness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that in the Naval -Agreement of 1935, 100 percent was planned from the beginning -and that Germany at first renounced that but had the right at any -time to increase to 100 percent, provided that Great Britain was -notified. The notification is presumably what you described, -Witness; that is the negotiation with Admiral Cunningham? -<span class='pageno' title='232' id='Page_232'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that was on 30 December 1938, or it may have -been 31 December.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant saying that there was a -notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938? -Is that what you said; that there was notification to Admiral -Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Admiral Cunningham came to Berlin, to this friendly -negotiation which had been provided for in the agreement. On that -30 December we arranged with him that from now on, instead of -45 percent, 100 percent would be built.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Was that an oral arrangement or a written one?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It was a conference between the Chief of Staff of the -Naval Operations Staff and Admiral Cunningham, and certain other -individuals, but I cannot remember the details. However, I am -pretty certain that minutes were taken.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, unfortunately, I have not been -able to trace any written evidence. I only know from Exhibit -Number Raeder-11, that is the agreement of 1935, that Germany -could increase the tonnage, and the agreement of ’37, that Germany -had the duty to give notification. Generally, notification is only in -writing in diplomatic relations, although, in my opinion, it was -not necessarily a duty in this case. Negotiations, as the witness said, -did take place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I, perhaps, add that apart from the submarine -problem, the question of two heavy cruisers, which we had -originally dropped, was also settled. We only wanted to build three -for the time being; and now we were asking for assent to build -the other two, to which we were entitled. That was also agreed -upon in accordance with the agreement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Document C-140 was put before you yesterday; -it is USA-51. You will find it in the British Document Book 10a on -Page 104. I want to put one sentence from that document to you -again, which has not been quoted by the Prosecution, neither in -November nor yesterday. It appears under Figure 2-c. There is -the following statement—I want to add that this is the question of -sanctions and the possible preparation of a defense against sanctions -in 1935. I quote from 2-c: “For the time being I prohibit any -practical preparations.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, I want to ask you...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is not 10a, 104.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. Elwyn Jones has just been kind enough to -point out to me the English translation. It appears from it that—as -<span class='pageno' title='233' id='Page_233'></span> -I have also the English translation before me—that there are two -documents C-140; one has one page and the other has two. One -has not got a heading and is dated, Berlin, 25 October 1933. In my -opinion it is the document...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is the one on Page 104?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, on Page 104 there is, as I just heard from -Major Elwyn Jones, the other document, C-140, which has the -heading, “Directive for the Armed Forces in Case of Sanctions.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and the date of it is 25 January 1933?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: 25 October 1935, but that is a clerical error. It -is 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United -Kingdom): There appears to be another document which is not in -the document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, perhaps I may point out that the -Document C-140, USA-51, presented by the Prosecution, must be the -one I have referred to, because it tallies with the record; I mean -the record of the session of 27 November. That is the document -to which I have just now referred.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it C-140 or C-141?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: C-140, the same number, and that is the same -as USA-51.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, perhaps to simplify matters, I may later, after -today’s session or tomorrow submit the Document C-140 in the, -here presented, English and German text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Read the document now and you can settle -with Mr. Elwyn Jones about the proper notation of the document, -whether it should be C-140 or whatever the exhibit number -ought to be.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In the version -submitted by the Prosecution, preparation for the defense against -sanctions is mentioned. I shall now read a further sentence to you, -and I quote, “For the time being, I prohibit all practical preparations.” -Would it be right, therefore, that in 1933 nothing whatever -was prepared by you in the Navy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. Apart from the ordinary state of preparedness, -nothing was allowed to be done, in accordance with this order. -This was merely a precaution on the Führer’s part in order to take -preparative measures in case the opponent might do something.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You see, the reason why I am asking you this -is that yesterday in the cross-examination the preparations that -you were supposed to have made in this connection were held -against you. -<span class='pageno' title='234' id='Page_234'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now come to Document C-189, which is USA-44. I beg to -apologize for troubling the Tribunal in that I am asking them, if -possible, to look at the document again. It is contained in Document -Book Raeder 10, Page 14; and, incidentally, Sir David -re-submitted it yesterday. Sir David attached great importance to -the two words “against England.” There under Figure 2 it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Ob.d.M. expresses the opinion that later on the fleet -must anyhow be developed against England and that, therefore, -from 1936 onward, the large ships must be armed with -35 centimeter guns like those of the <span class='it'>King George</span> class.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Would this mean that you were using the plans of the English -for building ships of the <span class='it'>King George</span> class?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The only reason, therefore, why you were pointing this out was -that you were considering the 35 centimeter guns used in the -<span class='it'>King George</span> class by the British Admiralty?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it was the aim of every navy at that time to -know as early as possible which was the largest caliber of guns -being used by other navies. I said yesterday that, to start with, -we had chosen as a model the French <span class='it'>Dunkerque</span> type, but later -on we discovered that the British used up to 35.6 centimeters. Ships -have to be used, if war breaks out, in their actual state; their gun -caliber cannot be changed any more. Therefore we always went as -high as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Would I be right, therefore—please excuse me—if -I said that the expression “against Britain” in this connection is -not correct grammatically, that according to German language -usage it should have said “with reference to England”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it should have said “developing with regard to -England.” I said yesterday that it would have been quite senseless -if I were to do something against Great Britain before the conclusion -of the pact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that was fully gone into in -cross-examination, and the defendant stated his explanation of the -words used.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: From Document C-190, which is the conversation -on 2 November 1934 aboard the <span class='it'>Emden</span> between you and Hitler, -Sir David has held up to you that Hitler, in a discussion with you -and Göring, said that he considered the expansion of the Navy in -the planned manner an absolutely vital necessity, since war could -not be conducted unless the Navy safeguarded the ore imports from -Scandinavia. It was said that this would have to be understood to -mean that the Navy was planned in view of a war and in view of -safeguarding the ore imports, which really meant aggressive intentions. -Are you of the opinion that the British Navy was not planned -<span class='pageno' title='235' id='Page_235'></span> -to safeguard imports to England or for the event of war and was -not equipped accordingly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, there is not the slightest doubt about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Six submarines are mentioned in this document. -Considering that figure, may I ask you to tell me the number of -submarines that Germany would have needed in order to conduct -an aggressive war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Well, at any rate, many more than we had in October -1939, a multiple of that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: From a document, Mr. President, which was -submitted yesterday, D-806, I want to quote, in addition to the -second paragraph which has been quoted, the first paragraph and -put it to the witness. It is D-806, GB-462, submitted yesterday -at noon.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] There it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“1.) Reference: Submarine Construction Program. On 27 October -1936 I made decision regarding the full utilization of the -still available U-boat tonnage according to the Naval Agreement -of 1935 and regarding the immediate ordering of the -construction of <span class='it'>U-41</span> to <span class='it'>U-51</span>.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Were these the rest of the submarines within the 45 percent -limit to which we were entitled according to the Naval Agreement -of 1935?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is right, judging from the figures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And then, Admiral, you have been very -thoroughly questioned about Austria and Czechoslovakia. Since -that subject has been gone into in detail, I shall confine myself to -just one question: Did you, at any time, receive any tasks or orders -of a foreign political nature from Hitler? And did he ask you for -your advice especially in foreign political matters?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I was never asked for advice, and I had no foreign -political tasks, unless you consider the duties which I had to fulfill -in Bulgaria and Hungary after my resignation of a foreign political -nature.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Regarding Czechoslovakia, that is, concerning -the document about the “Rest Tschechei,” you were asked whether -Hitler had aggressive intentions against Prague at that time. I think -the question ought to have been whether his intentions were for -an aggressive war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In connection with that, you have been asked about Göring’s -threat to bombard Prague, and you quite rightly admitted to Sir -David that such a bombing would be a threat. Sir David commented -on it as being near to aggressive war; but in order to be -<span class='pageno' title='236' id='Page_236'></span> -quite clear, I want you to tell the Tribunal when you learned of -this planned bombing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Only after the whole matter had been settled, and -only by way of conversation. I heard no announcement and -I knew nothing else of it beforehand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So you knew nothing of it before the occupation -of Prague?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, because military undertakings against Prague -were altogether unknown to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then there is the Document C-100. Mr. President, -it was presented yesterday under the Number GB-464.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 463, I’ve got it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; 463.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] From that document I want to -quote to you from Page 10. It is Page 3 of the attached document. -I want to put the following sentence to you. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Führer asked Ob.d.M. whether there were any special -wishes of the Navy with reference to bases on Dutch-Belgian -coast. Ob.d.M. says no, since bases are within reach of the -British coast and are therefore useless as submarine bases.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>According to this, Witness, you were not in favor of an -occupation of Belgian and Dutch bases, nor did you in any way -occupy yourself with this question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: This was always my point of view, that from the -experience of the first World War Belgium and Holland, as far as -the Navy was concerned, could not offer any useful bases, since all -forces were under the control of the British Air Force. In the first -World War serious fighting occurred between the submarines -leaving their ports and destroyers stationed nearby. Therefore -I declared myself not to be interested in Belgium and Holland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Skipping various documents, I now come to -D-843, GB-466. This is a document in which Dr. Breuer from the -Oslo Embassy expresses the view that the danger of a British -occupation of Norway was not really very great and that certain -actions were only taken in order to provoke Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have one more question on that. Did the Embassy in Oslo, -that is to say Breuer, know about the information that Admiral -Canaris was supplying to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot tell you that, as far as I am concerned. -I was never in direct contact with Dr. Breuer, only with the naval -attaché; but I must add that Dr. Breuer had only been in Oslo -for a comparatively short period and that apparently he was not -<span class='pageno' title='237' id='Page_237'></span> -particularly well informed. The statements made by Norwegian -Ministers were certainly not properly judged by him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an order from Hitler that the -Foreign Office should not be informed about probable plans concerning -Norway?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, he expressly ordered that, and it is obvious that -for that reason the Reich Foreign Minister himself was informed -very late.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In other words, as far as you can see, the -ambassador could not have had Canaris’ information through -military sources.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, hardly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then there were several documents, D-844 and -D-845. It was put to you from those that there was no danger in -Scandinavia. Was the information that you received at the time -different?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I had continual information...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All this was gone into yesterday, and the -witness gave the same answer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that the following has never been -mentioned before. Did you know whether as early as 5 April -mines had been laid in the territorial waters off Norway?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Allies had announced it on 7 April, but the -actual operations must have taken place a few days earlier.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>Interposing</span>] Dr. Siemers, the only purpose -of re-examination is to bring out matters which are favorable to -your client which have not been raised in cross-examination, that -is to say, to explain anything which has not been given in cross-examination. -When he has given this account in cross-examination -it is no good putting it to him again in re-examination. We have -heard it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think that on this particular point one explanation -is missing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Yesterday you were asked, rather -unexpectedly, what had been the technical changes since 1936 and -how the legal situation regarding submarine warfare would have -been influenced thereby.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It is a somewhat difficult question to answer in -two seconds. You have mentioned aircraft. Can you not supplement -your statement? -<span class='pageno' title='238' id='Page_238'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I forgot the most important point due to the fact -that there was a rather lively controversy. The important point -is that the spotting of vessels at sea by aircraft was something -quite new and had been developed very efficiently. That development -continued very rapidly during the war, until submarines could -very quickly be located and pursued.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Regarding D-841, which is the affidavit from -Dietmann, may I, with the Tribunal’s permission, make a formal -application? In this affidavit, there is the following sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is my personal opinion that the higher authorities of the -Navy in Kiel and other places in Germany had knowledge of -these dreadful things.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It isn’t “had knowledge” but “must have had -knowledge.” It seems to me it is in the translation “must have -had knowledge.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I have not got the German and I do not -know how the original is worded. I only have the English translation. -It is not quite clear to me how the German version was -worded. May I ask the Tribunal...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is the document put in in the original German -or is it put in in the English? The deposition is in German -presumably.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I presume that originally the statement was in -German. The copy I have states that this is a translation and that -is English, but I have not seen the German original.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there must have been -a German copy for the witness yesterday. I don’t know whether -or not it is the original. I didn’t see it but I assume it was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It isn’t the case that the deposition was made -in German, then translated into English, and then translated back -into German, was it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is why I assume -it was the original. I am sorry this was done. I haven’t got the -original document in front of me but I assume that was so. I will -find out in a moment for you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What is the point, Dr. Siemers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this sentence should be struck from -the document. It does not record a fact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean you are asking to have it struck -out or...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What do you say, Sir David? -<span class='pageno' title='239' id='Page_239'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the witness sets out -fully the facts in the preceding paragraphs of the affidavit and -then it is true that he introduces the sentence “By my personal -opinion....” but the gist of the statement is that from these facts -which I have stated the higher formations of the Navy in Kiel -and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of these -terrible conditions. A man who has been working in that detachment -of the German Navy and knows the communications between -that detachment and the headquarters is in a position to say -whether headquarters would have knowledge from the facts he -has stated. His inference has a greater probative value than the -inference which the Court can draw. The objection to the statement -of a matter of opinion is where the witness gives his opinion -on a matter on which the Court is equally capable of drawing an -opinion from the same facts, but the importance of that statement -is that he is saying “working in the bow and being familiar with -the chain of command and communications.” I say that anyone at -Kiel must have been able to learn from these facts what was going -on at these places—so that is the narrow point, whether his special -knowledge entitles him to express a view which the Court, without -that special knowledge, would not be in a position to draw.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But ought he not theoretically to state all -the facts; and if he does state all the facts, then the Tribunal will -be in the same position as he is to form a judgment; and it is for -the Tribunal to form the judgment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is exactly the -point to which I was addressing my argument, that there is the -additional fact, that because he was working there, was part of -the chain of naval command and he is speaking of the knowledge -of the naval command from the point of view of somebody who -was working in it, and, therefore, he has on that point his opinion -as to the sources of knowledge; and the necessity of constructive -knowledge is an additional fact. My Lord, the state of a man’s -mind and the expression of his knowledge may be a fact in certain -circumstances, just as much a fact as that stated, as Lord Bowen -once put it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if the state of his knowledge is directly -relevant to an issue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the -point here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is a form of expert evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, in a sense, it is not -as Your Lordship says, in a form, it is not in a usual form, but -it is the evidence of somebody who has special knowledge. My -<span class='pageno' title='240' id='Page_240'></span> -Lord, it is a well-known distinction, for example, in the laws of -libel between the persons who have expert knowledge and the -public at large; and, My Lord, the opinion of someone with a -special knowledge of the facts must have probative value within -Article 19 of the Charter. My Lord, if the provision that this -Tribunal is not bound by the technical rules of evidence is to mean -anything at all, I submit it should cover the expression of opinion -on a point such as this; that is the ability to have knowledge, -which is given by somebody who is in a special position to state -such an opinion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is a very small point, Sir David, and we -have got to decide the matter and form our own opinion about it; -and this man isn’t here for the purpose of being cross-examined -for anything of that sort.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is so, My Lord, but, -of course that, with respect, cuts both ways. I mean here he gives -an affidavit and part of it as the basis leads up to that conclusion. -I should respectfully submit that that conclusion is a statement -of fact—but, if Your Lordship says so, the time will come when -we can ask Your Lordship to draw that conclusion as a matter -of argument ourselves; but, My Lord, on the general position, the -only reason that I have occupied even this much of the Tribunal’s -time is that Article 19 is an important matter in the view of the -Prosecution and, therefore, we have to argue against its being -whittled down. It is the only reason that I’ve taken up the Tribunal’s -time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I just draw your attention to -one point. Sir David has just been mentioning the well-known -legal difference. That is just what I want to base my argument -on, the difference between facts and opinions. Here it is a question -of opinion and please note the following sentence does even go -further; there, the witness is coming to a legal opinion and he is -stating who is responsible; therefore, he is passing some sort of -judgment. Furthermore, I beg you to consider that this is quite -a minor official who, after all, cannot possibly make statements of -such portent to the effect that higher formations in Kiel and some -other places in Germany—he is quite vague—had some sort of -knowledge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, before the Tribunal -adjourn, might I make a correction and an apology? My Lord, -I thought that a copy in German had been put to the witness -yesterday—of this affidavit; and apparently it was a copy in English. -The original affidavit was sent off on the 6th of May; it was verified -<span class='pageno' title='241' id='Page_241'></span> -over the telephone by Colonel Phillimore and it has not yet arrived. -An English copy was sent and has been processed and the original -will be put in as soon as it arrives. My Lord, I thought that we had -got the original but apparently it has not yet arrived, but it is -an English document put to the defendant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you let Dr. Siemers see the original as -soon as it arrives?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered -Dr. Siemers’ application and it has decided that the passage to -which he objects and which he asks the Tribunal to strike out in the -affidavit of Walter Kurt Dietmann shall not be struck out in view -of Article 19 of the Charter. The passage contains an opinion only, -and the Tribunal will consider that opinion in relation to the whole -of the evidence when it is before the Tribunal and will decide at -that time the probative value of this opinion as well as the probative -value of the other evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I just have...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, may I remind you that you told -us that your re-examination would take, you hoped, about half -an hour?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, I shall conclude very shortly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, in connection with this -Commando decree which we discussed a good deal, Sir David -yesterday put a case to you regarding the attack on the ship <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>. -In this connection I should like to ask you: Do you recall that in -the testimony of Wagner there was the question of a British sailor -named Evans?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And do you recall also that, according to the -affidavit of Flesch, Number D-864, GB-457, Flesch declared, “I am -unaware of the fact that Evans wore a uniform”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I do not need to submit the document -to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I recall it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall further that it is said in Document -UK-57, submitted on the same day as Wagner’s testimony: -“The British sailor Evans was captured wearing civilian clothing”? -<span class='pageno' title='242' id='Page_242'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I have the document here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And that was one case where the SD, obeying -the Commando order, committed a murder without the knowledge -of the Navy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. This man had been apprehended by the SD or -the Police, not by the Navy. He had only been interrogated in the -meantime by the admiral.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The second case of which you are accused is the -sabotage attack on German ships near Bordeaux. I clarified this -situation in Wagner’s testimony the other day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you recall that his document also states that these men -tried to escape to Spain in civilian clothes?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is true.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when using the small fighter craft mentioned -yesterday under the command of Vice Admiral Heye, did -our soldiers ever wear civilian clothing?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, never.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Always in uniform?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, always in uniform. These craft were a weapon -just like submarines, speed boats, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As my last point, Mr. President, I should like to -point out that yesterday Colonel Pokrovsky submitted a document, -USSR-460, which deals with the Moscow notes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, the point is that yesterday the -Tribunal made a decision about submitting to the attorneys for -the Defense extracts from USSR-460. Today the prosecutors have -exchanged opinions among themselves; and the Prosecution of the -United States, represented by Mr. Dodd; Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe -for Great Britain; and myself for Russia, have agreed that it is -necessary for us to request you to permit us to read into the record -here today the three brief extracts referring to Dönitz, to Keitel, -and to Jodl so that they will be included in the record. These -are the excerpts which yesterday the Tribunal did not allow to -have read into the record as evidence. If we understood the Tribunal -rightly it was due to lack of time as the session was dragging -on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Due to these circumstances these three extremely important -excerpts—important from our point of view—the accuracy of which -was confirmed yesterday by the Defendant Dönitz, have not been -included in the transcript of the session. For that reason I am -requesting just about 5 minutes time to read these excerpts into -the record today, on behalf of the Prosecution of the three countries. -<span class='pageno' title='243' id='Page_243'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What would be the most convenient course, -Dr. Siemers? Would you like to have them read now so that you -can put any questions upon them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I make some remarks about -this document? The Soviet Delegation has been kind enough to put -the original at my disposal. I perused the original yesterday, and -I looked at the extracts. The Soviet Delegation desires to retain -the original but has also been kind enough to put instead a photostatic -copy of the extracts involved at the disposal of the High -Tribunal. I am completely in agreement with the suggestion, but -I personally do not have the intention of putting any questions -on this document, which is clear to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And so I would like to ask that the resolution -put forth by the High Tribunal yesterday be upheld, that this -should not be read, just as other documents were not read out -either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the document was originally -in German. Presumably it has been translated into Russian; -it has certainly been translated into English. Unless the French -members of the French Prosecution want it read if it hasn’t been -translated into French there doesn’t seem to be any use in taking -up the time of the Tribunal by reading it into the record. We have -got the document in English, and we have all read it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I think there is one reason. Even if -it is read into the record, it will at least be tomorrow before the -transcript is available for the defendants who are referred to, and -this witness, or this defendant, will be off the stand. If they want -to cross-examine about what he has said about them, then we will -have, I suppose, to bring this defendant back on the stand. I think -we will lose far more time by doing that, rather than now having -Colonel Pokrovsky take 5 minutes to read it. They will all hear -it, and then if they want to examine about it, they can do so -promptly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Dr. Siemers, if you don’t want to ask any questions about it, -you can conclude your re-examination now, and then Colonel -Pokrovsky can read the document. Then any of the other defendants -can question the witness if they want to, upon it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would that not be the best way, Colonel -Pokrovsky?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, certainly. -<span class='pageno' title='244' id='Page_244'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I agree, Mr. President, but I do believe that this -document need not be read, because Mr. Dodd was somewhat -mistaken when he said that the defendants are not familiar with -this document. They and their counsel are thoroughly familiar -with it. I believe everyone knows it, and I do not think that it -needs to be read. However, in the final analysis, it really makes -very little difference to me personally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If the defendants’ counsel do not want it -read then the Tribunal does not want to have it read unless defendants’ -counsel want to ask questions upon it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I, as defense -counsel for Admiral Dönitz, am not interested in having the -document read. I know the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised that the Defense Counsel -know the document and do not put any value on having it read -nor do they wish to put any questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well then, Mr. Dodd and Colonel Pokrovsky, -it does not seem that it serves any useful purpose to have it read.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, I am satisfied, Your Honor. I have not heard -from Keitel’s attorney; I assume he is satisfied. I am just concerned -that at some later date—a very interesting document to us, of -course—and I am just concerned some question may be raised and -I am also sympathetic to the desires of these defendants not to have -it read publicly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Schacht’s counsel has not spoken either. I think -it might be well, Mr. President, if we had a careful statement from -counsel for each of these men that they do not want to question -or, if so, that we can be completely sure that it will not be -raised again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the defendants’ counsel are all -here or all the defendants are represented and they must clearly -understand what I am saying and I take it from their silence that -they acquiesce in what Dr. Siemers has said, that they do not -wish the document to be read and they do not wish to ask any -questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I have not understood your decision, My -Lord. Are you permitting me to read into the record these few -excerpts or are you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, Colonel Pokrovsky; I am saying that as -the defendants’ counsel do not wish the document to be read it -need not be read.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: We do give a great deal of importance and -significance to this document as it involves not only the interests -<span class='pageno' title='245' id='Page_245'></span> -of the Defense but also the interests of the Prosecution. The document -was accepted by the Tribunal yesterday but for some reason -only a very small part of the characterization given therein by -Admiral Raeder was included in the stenographic record for the -day. I do not see any reason why these excerpts should not be -read into the record now, and why the witness Raeder, who -intimately knew the Defendants Dönitz, Keitel, and Jodl, should -not hear the excerpts here and now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky and Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal -ruled yesterday that it was unnecessary that the document -should be read and the Tribunal adheres to that decision in view -of the fact that the defendants’ counsel do not wish it to be read -and have no questions to put upon it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yes, Dr. Siemers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I will now conclude my examination -of Admiral Raeder. I do not know whether other questions -will be put to Admiral Raeder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is there any question which has arisen out -of the cross-examination which the defendants’ counsel want to put?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to put two -questions, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, in cross-examination you -were confronted with orders and memoranda as to the U-boat -warfare.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider yourself -responsible for these decrees dealing with the U-boat warfare which -you issued during your term as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I consider myself fully responsible for all decrees -issued as to the U-boat warfare which took place under my -responsibility as well as every naval operation which I ordered. In -the Naval Operations Staff and together with the officers of the -Naval Operations Staff I worked out these directives; I approved -memoranda and in accordance therewith I gave my orders. The -Commander of the U-boat fleet was solely the tactical commander -of U-boats. He transmitted the orders and he carried through the -details of the operations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, yesterday Sir -David charged you that he could not determine who actually gave -the orders to change the log book of the U-boat which sank the -<span class='it'>Athenia</span>. Admiral Godt testified in answer to my question that he -had issued this order at the request of Admiral Dönitz. Do you -know of any facts which would show this testimony of Admiral -Godt to be incorrect? -<span class='pageno' title='246' id='Page_246'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Actually I was never concerned with this case. I only -decreed the three points which have come up here several times.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Therefore, you consider -Admiral Godt’s testimony as being correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I assume that it is correct since everything else he -said was very reliable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions, -Your Honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the High Tribunal -I should like to call my first witness, the former Reich Minister -of the Interior, Severing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Severing took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>KARL SEVERING (Witness): Karl Severing. I am 70 years old -and I live at Bielefeld.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait one minute. Will you repeat this oath -after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that -I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, please tell the High Tribunal what -role you played in the Social Democratic Party up until the year -1933 and the principal ministerial posts you held up until the -year 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: At the age of 16½ I entered the labor union movement -and when I was 18 years old I entered the Social Democratic -Party and as a result of that fact I held honorary positions in the -Party at a relatively early age.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the year 1905 I became councillor in the city of Bielefeld. -I was member of the Reichstag from 1907 until 1912; and I again -became a member of the Reichstag and at the same time a member -of the Prussian Diet in 1919. I was in the Reichstag and in the -Prussian Diet until 1933. I was Minister in Prussia from 1920 -until 1921; then again from 1921 to 1926, and from 1930 until 1933; -from 1928 until 1930 I was Reich Minister of the Interior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When and why did you leave public life?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I retired from official public life in July 1932, and -from political life when the Social Democratic Party was prohibited.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were you arrested when leaving public life in -1933, or perhaps at a later date and, if so, at whose order? -<span class='pageno' title='247' id='Page_247'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I was arrested on the very same day on which the -Enabling Act was scheduled to be read and passed in the Reichstag. -The order for my arrest was signed by the then Minister of the -Interior, Herr Göring, who at that time was also President of the -Reichstag and, if I may utter an opinion, who would have had -the obligation, as President of the Reichstag, to protect the -immunity of the members of the Reichstag. Under breach of this -immunity I was arrested the moment I entered the Reichstag -building.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But you participated in the vote on the Enabling -Act?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The Chairman of the Social Democratic Reichstag -faction had complained to Göring against the treatment to which -I was subjected with the result that I was given leave to vote. But -the voting had already come to a close. However, Reichstag -President Göring still permitted me to give my “no” vote for the -Enabling Act.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You were arrested thereafter but only for a very -short time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: On the next day I had to appear for further interrogations. -I was permitted to leave Berlin on the second day and -was given the order to hold myself ready at my home in Bielefeld -for further interrogations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Despite your well-known anti-Nazi attitude, you -were not arrested later and put in a concentration camp, if I am -not mistaken.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I was never in a concentration camp, thanks to the -respect—and I say this with all modesty—which the old Prussian -officials, my previous subordinates, had for me. At the end of -October 1933 I heard from the Police Chief in Bielefeld that -trouble was brewing for me. The police notified me that they -would not be able to give me any protection and advised me, therefore, -to leave Bielefeld for several months. I followed this advice -and, from October 1933 until the end of March 1934, I lived in -Berlin using a false name. I first stayed with friends, and then -I went to a small Jewish sanatorium at Wannsee. I feared another -arrest in August 1944; according to someone whom I knew in the -police my name was on a list of people who were to be arrested -summarily—men and women who were suspected of having plotted -against Hitler in July 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did you say ’44 or ’34?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: ’44. After the attempted assassination of Hitler -of July 1944. -<span class='pageno' title='248' id='Page_248'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: May I continue?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Please do.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: After the attempted assassination of Hitler orders -were given to the police to arrest certain people. My name was -on the Bielefeld list. Then a police official whom I knew from -the past pointed out that I was close to my seventieth year and -had lost my son in the war. Thus he succeeded in having my name -struck off the list.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Aside from what you have told us now, did -you suffer any further disadvantage at the hands of the National -Socialists?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Well, I was considerably hindered in my movements. -I was not especially surprised that my mail was censored -and my telephone tapped. I considered that as a matter of course. -But I could not even take a trip without being followed and -watched by the police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If you do not mind, I should like to call your attention to the -fact that in addition to material damages there is also harm to one’s -ideals (ideelle Schädigungen), and in this respect I suffered a great -deal at the hands of the National Socialist Party after it assumed -power. A political measure, taken in connection with the polls of -1932, was used against me, I might say, in a criminal way. They -talked about me and my friend Braun as the “thieves of millions,” -and this epithet was also applied to the members of my family.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, is this witness going to give -any evidence which has relevancy to the defendant’s case?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, bring him to it then as quick as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Herr Minister, try to be as brief as -possible in this connection. It is of course true that with respect to -your ideals you suffered harm as well, but as the basis of my -examination and your testimony I would like to ascertain whether -serious harm was caused to you and I would like to have you tell -us, but briefly, whether National Socialism...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, what relevancy has this got to -Raeder’s case?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, my intention is to show that -Minister Severing, after a brief description of his life during Nazism -can, without bias, give entirely impartial answers in reference to -Raeder. Since he had no advantages but rather disadvantages at -the hands of the Nazis and on the other side... -<span class='pageno' title='249' id='Page_249'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have dealt sufficiently with the -disadvantages now. Go to the matter which relates to Raeder. He -has given us, from 1933 to 1944, a fairly general account of his life -and that ought to be sufficient.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses the Defendant Raeder, -that in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he violated -the Treaty of Versailles, in the intention of carrying on aggressive -wars, and that behind the back of the Reich Government. In order -to shorten the testimony, I would like to point out to you that it is -an undisputed historical fact that Germany, in developing her -Navy within the framework of the Versailles Treaty, violated the -stipulations of the Versailles Treaty. All that is known to the -Tribunal. Even before this time, the government applied for the -construction of armored cruiser A within the compass of the Versailles -Treaty. A great inner political conflict arose over the -construction of this cruiser and, in connection with a debate before -the Reichstag on this cruiser, the witness made a speech. I have a -brief excerpt from this speech which I should like to submit to you -and which I should like to read. Mr. President, this is Exhibit -Number Raeder-5, to be found in Document Book 1, Page 13. This -is an extract from a speech by the former Reichsminister Karl -Severing before the German Reichstag on 20 January 1928.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Herr Minister, at this period of time -you were not a Minister; rather, you gave this speech as a deputy -of the Social Democratic Party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, that is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The extract reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Now the armored cruiser. The fact that a government, which -knows precisely what gigantic sums we must raise during -the coming year, should make such demands, is, to say the -least, quite surprising. It says, the Peace Treaty permits it—yes, -but the Peace Treaty also decrees the payment of -reparations. The 9,300,000 marks demanded for this year -will play their decisive part only in the consequences entailed -which would require the raising of several hundred million -marks, which during the next few years seems to me -absolutely impossible. Considering the development of weapons -for naval warfare, I am not convinced of the military value -of armored cruisers. It may be that armored cruisers are the -backbone of the defense at sea, as the government says. But, -to form an active fighting unit (Gefechtskörper), the backbone -must also be made up of other elements, of U-boats -and airplanes; and as long as we are not allowed to build -these, armored cruisers are of very little value even for -defense.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='250' id='Page_250'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that extract from the speech correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, that, extract is reproduced correctly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is it right to conclude here that the Social -Democratic Party and you, personally, at that time, were of the -opinion that the Wehrmacht which was granted Germany by the -Versailles Treaty might not be sufficient for a defensive war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Will you please comment on that a little more -extensively.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That the 100,000-man army granted to Germany -was not sufficient even for a defensive war was and is known -today possibly to everyone in Germany concerned with politics. -Germany got into a very bad situation with regard to her eastern -neighbors since the establishment of the Corridor. The insular -position of East Prussia forced Germany even at that time to take -measures which I reluctantly helped to carry out; but the population -of East Prussia had a right to be protected against attacks -which were threatening from the East. I am not speaking about an -aggressive war and I am not speaking of any plans of the Polish -Government; but I would like to refer you to the fact that in the -years 1919, 1920, and 1921, there were aggressive groups in Poland -who set foot on German soil, possibly with the idea of establishing -a <span class='it'>fait accompli</span>...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, this evidence is all a matter -of argument. Not only is it a matter of argument, but we have had -it over and over again from nearly all the defendants and a good -many of their witnesses; and, surely, it is not assisting the Tribunal -in the very least to know what this witness said in 1928 or what -view he took in 1928.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I believe this -will become clear in the following. Minister Severing was a -member of the government that held this cabinet meeting of -18 October 1928. I agree with the High Tribunal that the matters -have been heard frequently—these things only once, however—but -I should like to point out that Sir David even yesterday in cross-examination -accused the defendant, despite his testimony, that, -against the will of the Reich Government and against the wish of -the Parliament, he had violated the Treaty of Versailles. If, therefore, -after the testimony of Raeder, the Prosecution persists in -their opinion, I have no other possibility to prove the incorrectness -of the opinion of the Prosecution than by questioning a -witness who...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The question whether the Treaty of Versailles -was violated is a question of fact and, of course, upon that -<span class='pageno' title='251' id='Page_251'></span> -you can give evidence and you did give evidence through the -Defendant Raeder; but this witness is not talking about the question -of fact. He is arguing that Germany was entitled to defend herself -in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. That is what I understood -his evidence to be and that is a question of argument, not a question -of fact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, as far as I know juridically...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the class of evidence which has -just been given by this witness will not be listened to by the -Tribunal. If you want to prove facts by him, you can prove them, -but you cannot prove arguments or his views upon arguments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Could Germany with her Wehrmacht protect -herself against the incursions in Silesia by Poland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In the year 1920 the Wehrmacht would not have -been able to protect Germany in East Prussia; therefore, it was -necessary to protect the population of East Prussia, and this was -achieved in that I, personally, agreed that all weapons which were -found in East Prussia were to be given to the population. Under -conditions which applied at that time, it was, even for purposes of -inspection, very hard to pass through the Corridor by rail; so that -in 1920, I had to make a tour of inspection by way of water from -Stolpmünde to Pillau. I am mentioning this fact to show the -difficulties of transportation through the Corridor. In 1920 and ’21, -it was not possible for the German Wehrmacht to prevent attacks -of Polish insurgents in Upper Silesia and, I am sorry to say, and -I emphasize “I am sorry” that a certain self-defense had to be -created in order to protect and defend German life and German -property.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, were the measures with regard -to rearmament as they were wanted and accounted for since -January 1928 by Reichswehrminister Gröner based on defensive or -offensive ideas as far as you know Gröner?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: As far as I am acquainted with Gröner and his -own personal way of carrying on his office, everything that he -conceived and carried out was in view of defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then this should also apply to the armored -cruiser A. I should like to know why the Social Democratic Party, -which was interested in the idea of defense, was against the -building of this armored cruiser.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In 1928 the Social Democratic Party was against -the building of the armored cruiser as the economic situation did -not warrant expenses which were not absolutely necessary. And -the Social Democratic Party wanted to prove and to show that -<span class='pageno' title='252' id='Page_252'></span> -they did everything within their power in order to make the much-discussed -disarmament a reality. They did not believe that the -building of an armored cruiser would be a favorable gesture for the -bringing about of appropriate negotiations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On 28 June 1928 a new Reich Government was -formed. Müller was Reich Chancellor; Stresemann was Foreign -Minister, and you were Minister of the Interior. What position -did your government take to the then pending problem of universal -disarmament stipulated in Versailles, or to the then pending -problem of rearmament by Germany?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have just made a reference to this problem. We -were of the opinion in the Social Democratic Party, even after -entering the Müller government, that we would have to use all -our efforts in order to solve just this problem. In September of -1928 the then Reich Chancellor Müller, replacing the Foreign -Minister Stresemann who was ill, went to Geneva in order to -bring this problem up before the League of Nations. Müller made -a very resolute speech which, if I remember correctly, was received -very coolly by Allied statesmen; so that any practical suggestions -for the realization of disarmament could not be hoped for in the -near future.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, in July 1928 you spoke with -Reichswehrminister Gröner about the budget and specifically about -the fact that secret budgets of the Wehrmacht, on the armored -cruiser and so forth, had become known. What attitude did you -take in this connection and what were the results following your -agreement with Gröner?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In order to answer this question I would like to -touch again on the extract from my speech, which you just submitted -to the High Tribunal. In the same Reichstag session in which -I gave this speech, the Reichswehrminister Gröner appeared for -the first time as successor of Gessler. I had said a few farewell -words in honor of Gessler who was leaving. I greeted the new -Minister with the remark that my political friends would show -him respect, but that he would have to earn our confidence first. -It was probably while thinking of this remark that Gröner came -up to me in the first session of the Müller Government and said -that he was looking forward to a sincere collaboration with me. -I quoted a passage from <span class='it'>Iphigenie</span> on that occasion, “May there be -truth between us.” Only complete sincerity would make possible -fruitful co-operation, I said.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks that this -is an absolute waste of time and this speech of the witness is -entirely irrelevant. Why do you not ask him some questions which -have some bearings on the case of Raeder? -<span class='pageno' title='253' id='Page_253'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that the Prosecution -has made the accusation that the rebuilding was undertaken -by means of a secret budget and that a secret rearmament was -carried on with the idea of starting wars of aggression. It is not -quite clear to me how I can cross-examine the witness in any -other way than by asking him how these secret budgets, which to -a certain extent are practically identical with violations of the -Versailles Treaty, were dealt with in his government. That is -exactly what I just questioned the witness on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This speech that you have drawn our attention -to is simply a speech in which he said that he did not think that -armored cruisers were of any use. That is the only meaning of -the speech, except insofar as it refers to the fact that reparations -had not been paid. For the rest it simply says that armored -cruisers, in his opinion, are of no use.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I may not and do not wish to -make a plea here. In the speech which I read something else is said. -It says there that the Social Democratic Party was against the -building of this armored cruiser, because of economic reasons and -not because of strategic reasons, and that if an armored...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What has that got to do with a charge of -making an aggressive war in 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I did not raise the accusation of -an aggressive war; the Prosecution did that, but I have to protect -my client against the accusation that in 1928 he had intentions of -carrying on an aggressive war; I assert that he had no intention of -that sort, that the Reich Government knew about the violations of -the Treaty, that the Reich Government took the responsibility for -them, and the testimony of the Minister will show that these are -actual facts which were challenged only yesterday.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Ask him some direct questions on issues of -fact. Then the Tribunal will listen to them if they are relevant, but -the Tribunal considers that the evidence of his speech that you -have been dealing with is an utter waste of time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I shall try to be brief. As a result I shall put -questions to the witness which he will answer one by one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] You just said that you demanded of -Gröner confidence and absolute truthfulness. Did you ask him in -this connection for enlightenment on the secret budgets and the -violations of the Treaty of Versailles which had taken place up to -that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I specifically asked him for enlightenment since, -in January of 1928, the then Reich Chancellor Marx had frankly -admitted that under Kapitän Lohmann in the Navy Department -<span class='pageno' title='254' id='Page_254'></span> -there had been misrepresentations in the budget which could not -be in accordance with good bookkeeping and political honesty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Gröner reply?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Gröner then told me that he had the intention of -discussing these matters at a cabinet meeting and of clarifying all -these matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were the commanders-in-chief of the two -branches of the Wehrmacht to be present at this meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: On 18 October they were to appear and did appear.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, when did you meet Admiral -Raeder for the first time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The first official contact, according to my recollection, -was made the beginning of October 1928, probably on the day -when he paid me an official visit on my assuming office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-6, I submitted to the -High Tribunal, as the High Tribunal will probably recall, a speech -by Raeder dated 23 January 1928. There was a covering letter with -this document. This letter will now be submitted to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] According to this document, did your -meeting with Raeder take place on 5 October 1928, 5 days after the -appointment of Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: This discussion probably took place on that day. -May I mention...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Just a moment, Herr Minister. I think it will be -safer if you look at the letter. There it says: “Following our discussion -of 5 October...” May I ask you to confirm to the High Tribunal -that this report made by Raeder was saved by you and that it is -a true and authentic copy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The letter which I put at your disposal is the -original of the letter by Raeder. It is in accordance with the -incidents which you just mentioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then, on 5 October this conversation with Raeder -did take place. Were the conversations between you and Raeder -basically in accordance with the ideas expressed in this speech?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall that in this speech Raeder declared -emphatically that a war of aggression was a crime?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I remember that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you on the occasion of this conversation tell -Raeder that you had agreed with Gröner that the actual violations -of the Treaty of Versailles would have to be discussed and -clarified and that a cabinet meeting would have to be held? -<span class='pageno' title='255' id='Page_255'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not recall this detail, but it was quite probable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you demand of Raeder that between yourself -and him there should be absolute sincerity and truthfulness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Of Raeder, too, but especially of the chiefs of -the Army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As a result of this discussion with Raeder, did -you have the impression that you could work with Raeder in a -satisfactory manner and that he would tell you the truth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I had that impression.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On 18 October 1928 the cabinet meeting which -we have already mentioned took place. May I ask you to describe -briefly that cabinet meeting, provided it is agreeable to the High -Tribunal to have the witness picture this session. I believe that a -description of this session would save time, rather than to have -me ask single questions. Therefore, Herr Minister, be brief in -telling us what happened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: At this session, members of the cabinet were -familiarized with the details of what might be considered a concealment -of the budget or violations of the Versailles Treaty. Both -gentlemen, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy, spoke, if I remember rightly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did the entire cabinet attend?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, perhaps with the exception of one or two -members who were ill, but it was a session which in general might -be called a plenary session.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The principal members were present?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were Müller, Stresemann present?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot tell you whether Stresemann was present. -He was still ill in September and whether he had recovered by -18 October, I cannot say. But I might add, that if Herr Stresemann -was not present, certainly someone else was present as an -authorized deputy from the Foreign Office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Admiral Raeder and General Heye at this -meeting expressly give the assurance to the cabinet—as I remember, -in form of an affidavit—that only those violations had occurred -which were mentioned by them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Whether that was proclaimed in a solemn manner -by affidavit or by word of honor, I cannot say; but, in any event, -at the request of the Reich Chancellor and especially at my own -request, they said that no further violations would take place. -<span class='pageno' title='256' id='Page_256'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: They assured you specifically that there would -be no further violations without the knowledge of the Reich -Government?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, exactly that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And over and above that, they stated that now -the Cabinet knew about everything?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: A declaration to that effect was made?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, such a declaration was made.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were important matters connected with these -secret budgets or violations of the Treaty of Versailles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I may state here and have to admit even that -since I was used to violations of the Versailles Treaty, I was -especially interested in the extent of the violations with regard to -the sum. I wanted to know what I could do in my new capacity -against secret arms-bearers and against illegal organizations; and -I asked what was the total sum involved. I was thereupon told—and -I believe that this was set down and confirmed in writing later—that -perhaps 5½ to 6 million marks was the amount involved in -these secret budgets.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you remember the budget figures -of those days better than I do. What can we gather from these -figures? Must we conclude that they were grave violations involving -aggressive intentions or may we gather that in the final analysis -they were just trifles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not have the figures as they apply to the -budget plans of the Navy and the Army. I cannot quote the figures -from memory. But the impression I gained from the reports of -the two Wehrmacht leaders was that only trifles were involved. -It was this impression which caused me to assume a certain political -responsibility for these things, and especially in view of the fact -that we were assured that further concealment of budget items or -other violations were not to occur in future.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember that Gröner at this session -declared that the small infringements of the Treaty dealt purely -with defense measures, with antiaircraft guns, coastal fortifications, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot give you the details today, but I might -remind you that all the speeches which Gröner made at the time -when he was Defense Minister were along these general lines. In -all of his speeches in the Reichstag, Herr Gröner expressly declared -that he was an advocate of sound pacifism. In answer to your -<span class='pageno' title='257' id='Page_257'></span> -question I reply that Gröner’s statements, and also my own, were -based on defense and defensive measures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In other words at the end of this session, the -Reich Government expressly accepted the responsibility for these -infringements and the small secret budget items?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: To the extent that we have mentioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder in the future adhere to the clear -directives of the Reich Government?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot answer that in a positive manner, but -I can say that I did not observe any violations on the part of the -Navy in respect to the agreements during my term of office as -Minister of the Interior.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Are you personally of the opinion, since you -know Raeder sufficiently well, that he kept the promise he made to -you not to resort to secret violations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Raeder gave me the impression that he was an -honest man and I believed that he would keep his word.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Just one more question, Herr Minister. Of -course, you cannot remember the details, but do you perhaps recall -that on the occasion of the cabinet meeting of 18 October there -was discussion about a Dutch firm which was designing U-boats?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, I cannot give you details of the discussion; but -I do know that at that period of time, there was much talk—either -in another cabinet meeting or by a subcommittee of the Reichstag -or by a different parliamentarian body—of experimental workshops -which had been established for the Army and the Navy in Russia, -Sweden, and Holland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Purely experimental workshops?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I can say only that there was talk to this effect. -Whether these experimental workshops had been established I -cannot tell you from my own experience.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, could Germany, by reason of -governmental discussions going on at the time, hope that some -day, despite the Versailles Treaty, she would be permitted to -build U-boats?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The leading statesmen...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, how can he answer that there -was a hope that they would be allowed to build U-boats? That is -what your question was, was it not; was there a hope?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I know, Mr. President, these questions were -already dealt with by the governments which obtained through the -years 1928 to 1932; and I believe that Stresemann carried on these -<span class='pageno' title='258' id='Page_258'></span> -discussions. Since Stresemann is no longer alive, I would like to -ask Herr Severing on this point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It seems to the Tribunal that it is mere -political gossip.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, on whom did it depend what was -brought up in the Reichstag? Raeder is accused of acting behind -the back of the Reichstag. Who submitted this to the Reichstag? -Did Raeder do that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not quite follow you. Who submitted the -budget, you mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The budget went through the hands of the experts -of the various Ministries and the entire Cabinet, and the budget -was submitted to the Reichstag by the Cabinet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The matter of dealing with the budget before -the Reichstag was a matter for the Reich Government and not for -the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Inasmuch as a budget item was submitted to the -Reichstag, the competent Reich Minister took care of it in the main -committee and the plenary session of the Reichstag, but the political -responsibility was assumed by the entire Reich Cabinet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It was never alleged as to the Defendant -Raeder that he had submitted the budget to the Reichstag; it was -never put to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, yesterday it was asserted...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Don’t argue! Go on with any other questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall whether at the end of 1929 you -talked with a member of the government with regard to the -various leading personalities in the Wehrmacht, and that you made -a comment which subsequently became known concerning certain -personalities?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, it is correct that on one occasion I had been -asked to give a personal estimate of certain military personalities. -I named Gröner and Raeder in this connection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, how many concentration camps -do you know of?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: How many do I know of now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry; not now. How many did you know -of before the collapse of Germany?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Perhaps 6 to 8. -<span class='pageno' title='259' id='Page_259'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you know before the collapse -of Germany or rather did you know in 1944 already about the mass -murders which have been dealt with so frequently in this -proceeding?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I gained knowledge of concentration camps when -murder, if I may say so, became professional and when I heard of -a few cases which affected me personally very deeply. First of all, -I was told that the Police President of Altona, a member of the -Reichstag and a Social Democrat of the right wing of the Party, -had been murdered in the concentration camp at Papenburg. -Another friend of mine, the chairman of the Miners Union, Fritz -Husemann, is said to have been murdered shortly after his being -committed to the same concentration camp. Another friend of -mine, Ernst Heimann, was beaten to death in the Oranienburg -Camp according to the reports received by his family.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Dachau was known even in the north of Germany as a concentration -camp. Some Jewish inmates returned from Buchenwald -in the spring of 1939, and in that way I learned of this camp. -Columbia House at Berlin I figured to be a concentration camp also.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That was my only knowledge of camps and their horrors up -until the time when the London radio started to report about concentration -camps. I perhaps might mention another case. In 1944 -a friend of mine, a member of the Reichstag, Stefan Meier, who -had served 3 years in the penitentiary, was put into a concentration -camp in or near Linz. After a brief stay there he was murdered, -according to reports received by his family.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you just heard of these and similar -individual cases?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You were not familiar with the fact that thousands -were murdered every day in gas chambers or otherwise in the -East?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I believed I should tell the High Tribunal only of -those cases which were, so to say, authentically reported to me. -Everything I learned of later through indirect reports, from my -friend Seger or from the book of the now Generalintendant Langhoff, -had been told me but I had no possibility of checking up on -their accuracy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you and your Party friends -have the possibility...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, are you going to finish this -examination, or are you going on? Do you see the clock? -<span class='pageno' title='260' id='Page_260'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I should like to leave the decision to the -High Tribunal as to whether we shall have a recess now. I understand -there will be a cross-interrogation so that...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but presumably you know what -questions you are going to ask; I don’t.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I cannot say exactly what answer the witness is -going to give. It might take perhaps another 10 minutes, Your Honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn now till a quarter -past 2 o’clock.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='261' id='Page_261'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Saturday -morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, Mr. Dodd, could you tell us what the position is with -reference to the documents of the Defendants Von Schirach, Sauckel, -and Jodl?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: As far as Von Schirach is concerned, we are waiting -for a ruling on those documents concerning which we were heard on -Saturday. I’m sorry, that was on Seyss-Inquart. I wasn’t sure the -documents were ready.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These documents are all ready; they are all translated and in -book form.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will it be necessary to have any further -discussion of them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I believe not, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then, we can take it that we -needn’t have another argument about those documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, Sir, I comprehend no need for any further argument -on Von Schirach’s documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With reference to Sauckel, I have asked our French colleagues -what the situation is, since they have the primary responsibility. -And so far as the Prosecution is concerned, I am told that Mr. Herzog -of the French Prosecution staff is on his way here and he will -be able to report more accurately.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, we can mention that at a later stage -then. Schirach at any rate then is ready to go on?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: He is ready to go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Sir David has the information about the Defendant -Jodl.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Roberts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the position with regard to Jodl’s -documents is that Dr. Jahrreiss produced for me a draft book, just -before Easter, which had a certain number of documents, all except -four of which had already been exhibited, and therefore no objection -could be taken to them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My Lord, the other four were all short. Two, I thought, were -objectionable on the ground that they referred to alleged war crimes -by one of the Allies. But, My Lord, they were so short that I thought -the best course would be for them to be translated—they were only -<span class='pageno' title='262' id='Page_262'></span> -a page or so, each of them—so that when the books had been translated -any objection could be taken, and then the Tribunal could -shortly decide the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, as there are only four of them and only -two which might be objected to, that can be dealt with when we -come to hear the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there are only two.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We needn’t have any special hearing for it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: No, My Lord, certainly not. It could be disposed -of in a very few minutes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): -Mr. President, I should like to say one more word about these Jodl -documents. We are having difficulties over one document. It is the -affidavit of Lohmann, which we submitted in German, but which -was not translated into English for us on the grounds that only such -documents could be translated which the Prosecution had already -accepted; and the Prosecution had adopted the standpoint that it -cannot express any opinion on that document as it has not been -translated into English.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have mentioned this in a brief petition to the Tribunal, and I -hope that the Tribunal will settle the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Lohmann’s affidavit which is very -short—it goes principally to character—and it is really not objectionable, -but I had to point out that it hadn’t actually been allowed -by the Tribunal in their order. The Tribunal ordered it in -regard to...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If it is accepted in the translation, that is all -that is necessary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I entirely agree, and it is all on one -page.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Let it be translated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, it may be convenient -for me to indicate to the Tribunal at this stage of Raeder’s -case that with regard to the witness Lohmann, the Prosecution does -not now desire to cross-examine that witness in view of the documents -which are before the Court, and the fact that the matters his -affidavit dealt with were dealt with yesterday by my learned friend -Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in his cross-examination of Raeder, and -finally, in view of the passages of time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the Prosecution -want to cross-examine Lohmann?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord. -<span class='pageno' title='263' id='Page_263'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to -ask any questions of Lohmann?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Very well, then I understand that the witness Lohmann is being -kept here and perhaps a message could be given to the Marshal -that he needn’t remain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. JACQUES B. HERZOG (Assistant Prosecutor for the French -Republic): Mr. President, in the name of the French Prosecution -I should like to say a word about the documents presented by -Sauckel’s defense. I have no objection to the presentation of these -documents with the reservation, of course, that a ruling on them -be made after they are presented. We have no objection to the -documents being translated or presented.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary or desirable for -there to be a special hearing with reference to the admissibility, -or can that be done in the course of the Defendant Sauckel’s case? -At the moment I apprehend that the documents have been looked -at for the purpose of translation. They have now been translated. -If you think it necessary that there should be any special hearing -before the case begins, as to admissibility, we should like to know. -Otherwise they would be dealt with in the course of the case, -in the course of Sauckel’s case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. HERZOG: I think, Mr. President, it will be sufficient if the -Tribunal deals with these documents during the course of the -defendant’s case. I do not think we need a special hearing as far -as these documents are concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, as far as I have been able to -ascertain, you have inadvertently not yet answered one of my -questions clearly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With reference to the concentration camps you said that you -had heard of certain individual cases, and you named the individual -cases. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I just want to ask -you in conclusion: did you hear of the mass murders which have -been mentioned in this Trial, whereby at Auschwitz, for instance, -an average of about 2,000 persons a day were exterminated in -the gas chambers? Were you in possession of this knowledge before -the collapse, or did you not know anything about that either?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I knew nothing whatsoever about these mass -murders, which only became known in Germany after the collapse -of the Hitler regime, partly through announcements in the press -and partly through trials.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, what could you and your -friends in the Party do during the National Socialist regime, against -<span class='pageno' title='264' id='Page_264'></span> -the National Socialist terror which you have partly mentioned, and -did anyone abroad support you in any way in this respect?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: If you will limit the question to asking what I and -my political friends could do and did do after 30 January to combat -the Hitler regime, then I can only say—but little. If there was any -question of resistance against the Hitler regime, then that resistance -was not a centrally organized one. It was restricted to the extent -that in various cities the opponents of the Nazis met to consider -how one might, at least by propaganda, overcome the mental terror. -No open resistance was possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But perhaps I should here draw your attention to the following: -On 30 January I personally made a decisive attempt—or rather an -attempt which, in my opinion, might have proved decisive—to -oppose the Hitler regime. In the autumn of 1931 I had an interview -with the Chief of the Army Command, Von Hammerstein, during -which Von Hammerstein explained to me that the Reichswehr -would not allow Hitler to usurp the seat of the President of the -State. I remembered that conference, and on 30 January 1933 -I inquired whether Von Hammerstein would be prepared to grant -me an interview. I wanted to ask him, during that interview, -whether he was still of the opinion that the Reichswehr would not -only declare itself to be against the Hitler regime, but would -oppose such a regime by force of arms.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Hammerstein replied to the effect that, in principle, -he would be prepared to have such an interview with me, but -that the moment was not a propitious one. The interview never -took place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If you were to ask me whether in their efforts to fight the Hitler -regime, at least by propaganda, my political friends had received -any support from foreign personalities whom one might have called -anti-Fascists, then I must say—unfortunately no. On the contrary, -we quite often noticed, with much sorrow, that members of the -English Labor Party, not officials but private individuals, were -Hitler’s guests and that they returned to England to praise the then -Chancellor Hitler as a friend of peace. I mention Philipp Snowden -in that connection and the <span class='it'>doyen</span> of the Labor Party, Lansbury. In -this connection I would like to draw your attention to the following -facts: In the year...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The attitude of political parties in other -countries has nothing to do with any question we have to decide, -absolutely nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this is sufficient. I have no further -questions to ask, Herr Minister, and I thank you. -<span class='pageno' title='265' id='Page_265'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Minister Severing, during your term of office -was the figure of 100,000 men, conceded by the Peace Treaty of -Versailles for a normal army, ever exceeded?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have no official knowledge of that. I would -assume, however, that that was not the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Do you know at all whether, at the end of -1932, the League of Nations made a promise or held out prospects -that this Army of 100,000 could be increased to 300,000 men?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Here too I am unable to give you any official -information. I can, however, give the following explanation: In -1932 I received a letter from a party friend of mine, Dr. Rudolf -Breitscheid, who was a member of the League of Nations Delegation -and in which he mentioned rumors of that kind; but he also added -other information...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we don’t think that rumors -are relevant in the Trial. He says he can’t give us any official -information. He then begins to give us rumors. Well, we don’t -want to hear rumors.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, what the witness is now saying -is rather more than a rumor and I think you will probably be able -to judge for yourself when he has entirely answered the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He is speaking of rumors. If you have any -fresh question to ask him, you can ask him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did the increase of the Army from 100,000 -to 300,000 men ever assume any palpable shape in the sense that -the question was discussed elsewhere, too?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have just told you that Dr. Breitscheid was a -member of the League of Nations Delegation and that his information -to me was not a fabric of his own invention. That information -stated that an extension of the Army had been envisioned but -that this extension would probably be made at the expense of the -police. Dr. Breitscheid informed me accordingly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much, I have no further -questions to ask.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: You have just told us that you had no knowledge -of the Jewish mass murders in Auschwitz before the collapse. -Did you have any knowledge of other measures or deeds perpetrated -against Jews which you could define as criminal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I experienced one such case personally. In 1944 a -friend of mine in Bielefeld, Karl Henkel, was arrested and transferred -to a labor camp near Emden, and he was shot on the -third day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you know who arrested him, what authority? -<span class='pageno' title='266' id='Page_266'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: He was arrested by the Bielefeld Gestapo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did that occur in connection with some large scale -action or was it an individual case?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: It appeared to me to be an individual case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did you hear of a number of such individual -cases at that time, that is in 1944?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In 1944 I did not hear of any individual cases of -murder, but I did hear of deportations from Westphalian towns to -unknown destinations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: What authorities dealt with these deportations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot say for certain, but I assume that it was -the Gestapo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Are you of the opinion that considerable sections -of the population knew of these occurrences?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: You mean, of the deportations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: They usually took place quite publicly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Are you of the opinion that the people were -generally just as well acquainted with these events as the members -of the organizations as, for instance, the ordinary SS man, or would -you say that the ordinary SS man knew more than other people?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Oh yes. He was informed of the places of destination -of these transports.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: But I understood you to say, that the convoys -were not escorted by the SS; you said it was the Gestapo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I have just stated that I assumed that the -Gestapo had conducted the arrests and the lootings, but I did not -receive any assurances that this was exclusively the work of the -Gestapo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And as to the other measures—apart from such -deportations—which might be called a kind of local pogrom, have -I understood you to say that you did not hear of them often?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Local pogroms occurred in November 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did you, during the execution of such measures, -of which we have frequently heard, make your own observations -or did you remain at home?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I remained at home. I only saw the results of these -pogroms afterwards in the shape of destroyed Jewish firms, and -in the remains of the synagogues.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And to which organizations or groups do you -attribute these events of November 1938? -<span class='pageno' title='267' id='Page_267'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: My own judgment would not have any decisive -value, but I tell you quite frankly, it was the SA or the SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And what makes you think that it was precisely -these two groups?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Because the members of these groups, in my home -town of Bielefeld, were called the instigators of the synagogue fires.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: By whom?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: They were indicated by name by the population in -general.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: You knew about the concentration camps. Can -you still remember when you heard about them for the first time? -It is important at least to determine the year.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No. I cannot tell you that at the present moment. -I can only reply to your question by referring to individual dates. -The first murder in a concentration camp became known to me -when I heard that, in the Papenburg Concentration Camp, the -former member of the German Reichstag and Police President of -Altona had been shot. That could have been either in 1935 or 1936, -I am no longer sure when.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And later, did you hear of many other such -cases, or did you have personal knowledge of them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: From personal knowledge which is so certain that -I could give it with a clear conscience to the Tribunal only in the -cases I mentioned this morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Were you told that concentration camps were -places in which the political opponents of the regime were to be -interned without anything worse happening to them than loss of -liberty?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Whether I was told that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Whether you were told that, whether you heard -that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No. On the contrary, I heard that concentration -camps meant to the population the very incarnation of all that is -terrible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: What do you mean by “population”? Do you -also mean those sections of the population who had some official -connection with the Party: small Party members, small SA men -and small members of the SS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot say anything about that since I conversed -nearly exclusively with opponents of the system. -<span class='pageno' title='268' id='Page_268'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that these opponents with whom -you conversed presented a united front against anyone who wore -a party emblem or a badge of some organization?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No. This question upon which you are dwelling -affects wide sections of the population, their general humanitarian -feeling, and their feeling of indignation about conditions in the -camps, as and when the facts became known.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: I asked my question with the intention of -hearing whether this feeling of indignation was noticeable even in -people who actually wore the emblem of the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I assume so, but I cannot offer it to the Tribunal -as a fact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: But were even these people exposed to the considerable -pressure which you have alluded to?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: They probably felt that their Party membership -rendered them, in a certain sense, immune.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that many people became members -in order to benefit by this immunization?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I believe so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: I heard that you yourself were a member of the -NSV; is that true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Is it true that you were arrested after 20 July -1944?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have already answered that question this morning. -I was not arrested.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: You were never arrested at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, with the exception of the one case which -I also mentioned this morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did you at any time express the opinion that -what had been achieved in Germany in the social sphere after -1933 did, to a considerable extent, represent the ideal of previous -governments?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I expressed this as follows: “What was new -was not good, and what was good was not new.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that any German, be he a Party -member, a member of the SS or not, must have had any knowledge -of events at Auschwitz of which you yourself knew nothing at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No. He would not necessarily have to possess this -knowledge. I would not go so far as to say that. But he might, -perhaps, have known about it. -<span class='pageno' title='269' id='Page_269'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And what exactly do you mean by “He might, -perhaps, have known about it”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Through guards escorting the transport echelons. -They did not always remain in the area of the concentration camps; -they usually returned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And if they were sworn to the strictest secrecy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Then they could not tell anything.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you know of cases where people were condemned -for speaking of such matters?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did you ever hear anything about the activities -of the “special courts”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, in any case I heard nothing in connection with -these particular activities of the “special courts.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: But the sentences pronounced against people -who listened to foreign broadcasts (Schwarzhörer) and to people -accused of spreading so-called false rumors, were published very -often in the papers. Did you never read them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I have only one question to ask -you. You told us this morning that in 1919 you were a member -of the Weimar National Assembly. May I ask what the attitude -of the National Assembly was—particularly of the faction of the -Social Democrats of whom you too were a leader—towards the -problem of the Austrian “Anschluss”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: During the time of the sessions of the Weimar -National Assembly I was Reich and State Commissioner for the -Rhineland and Westphalia, and was seldom able to participate in -the debates of the Weimar National Assembly. I therefore have -no detailed knowledge as to how these matters were formulated or -expressed. But one thing I do know and that is, that it was practically -the unanimous wish of the Assembly to include a paragraph, or -an article in the Constitution, ratifying the “Anschluss” of Austria -to Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Herr Minister, you have told the Tribunal that -in 1928 the Defendant Raeder assured you solemnly that there -would be no further violations of the Treaty of Versailles without -the knowledge of the Reich Cabinet. Did Raeder fulfill that -assurance? -<span class='pageno' title='270' id='Page_270'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have already stated this morning that I cannot -answer that in any positive sense. I can only state that violations -of the agreement of 18 October 1928 by the Naval Command did -not come to my knowledge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did you know, for instance, of the construction -in Cadiz, in Spain, of a 750-ton U-boat under German direction -between the years 1927 and 1931?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the authority for that statement of -fact is the Document D-854.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And, Herr Minister, did you know that after its completion in -1931 that U-boat carried out trial runs under German direction -and with German personnel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, I did not know anything about that either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think he said he didn’t know of any -violations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I am putting to you certain matters, and I suggest -to you, Herr Minister, that it may well be that you were being -deceived during this time. Do you agree with me about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I would not deny the possibility of deception, but -I must very definitely declare that I did not know anything of the -construction of a submarine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at the Document C-156. -This is a new extract from Captain Schüssler’s <span class='it'>Fight of the Navy -against Versailles</span>. You will see that the following entry appears -on Pages 43 and 44.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In 1930 Bartenbach succeeded, in Finland also, in making -preparations for the construction of a U-boat answering to -the military demands of the German Navy. The Naval Chief -of Staff, Admiral Dr.h.c. Raeder, decided, as a result of the -reports of the Chief of the General Naval Office, Konteradmiral -Heusinger Von Waldegg, and of Captain Bartenbach, -to supply the means required for the construction of the -vessel in Finland. A 250-ton plan was chosen for this U-boat, -so that the amount of 1½ million Reichsmark was sufficient -for carrying out the project.</p> - -<p>“The fundamental intention was to create a type of U-boat -which would permit the inconspicuous preparation of the -largest possible number of units which could be assembled at -shortest possible notice.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Herr Minister, did you know that 1½ million Reichsmark were -spent in 1930 in connection with this U-boat construction? -<span class='pageno' title='271' id='Page_271'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have stated this morning that I was Minister in -the Reich Ministry of the Interior from 1928 to 1930. I consider it -necessary to determine these dates a bit more precisely. I resigned -on 30 March 1930. If the year 1930 is mentioned in a general way, -then it is not impossible that everything mentioned here was -carried out after 30 March 1930.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You have said that the rearmament that went -on when you were connected with the Government of Germany -was purely defensive. When did you realize that the Nazi Government’s -rearmament was not defensive but aggressive? At what -date did you come to that conclusion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: From 30 January 1933 on. That both the choice and -the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of the Reich meant war, -was not in the least doubted by me and my political friends.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: So that you realized from the first day of Nazi -power that the Nazi Government intended to use force or the threat -of force to achieve its political aims; is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not know if knowledge and conviction are -identical. I was convinced of it, and so were my political friends.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about -the Defendant Von Papen. Did Papen use force in carrying out the -Putsch which brought him to power in July 1932?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Von Papen did not personally exercise such force, -but he did order it. When, on the morning of 20 July 1932, I refused -to surrender voluntarily the office of the Prussian Ministry of the -Interior to the man who had been appointed by Von Papen as my -successor, I explained to him that I had no intention of doing so -and in order to make my protest more emphatic, I pointed out -that I would only give way to force. And then force was used in -the evening of 20 July in my office. The newly appointed police -president of Berlin appeared in my office, accompanied by two -police officers. I asked these gentlemen whether they were authorized -by the President of the Reich or by the Reich Chancellor to carry -out this mission. When they answered “yes,” I stated that I would -leave my office rather than cause the shedding of blood.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did the Defendant Papen, when he secured -power, purge the police and the government of anti-Nazis?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes. There are numerous indications that the intention -existed to purge the police of all republican elements and to -replace them with men who were first devoted to Von Papen and -then to the National Socialists.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about -the Defendant Göring. -<span class='pageno' title='272' id='Page_272'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Göring has stated, and the entry is on Page 5837 -of the transcript of the proceedings (Volume IX, Page 258), that -the institution of protective custody existed in Germany before the -Nazis came into power. Is that true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I would say that the institution of protective custody -did exist, theoretically, and it was last formulated in the Prussian -Police Administrative Law, in Paragraph 15. During my term of -office protective custody was never applied in normal civilian life. -The regulations in Paragraph 15 of the Police Administrative Law -stipulated quite definitely that if anybody was taken into protective -custody the police administration was obliged to bring him before -the courts within 24 hours. This procedure is in no way identical -with that protective custody, the threat of which for decades -remained suspended over the peaceful citizens of the State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And, of course, there were no concentration -camps in pre-Nazi Germany, I take it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Never.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: How many of your political associates and colleagues -of the Social Democratic Party were murdered in concentration -camps while Göring was still Chief of the Gestapo?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: It is very difficult to make an estimate. You might -say 500, you might also say 2,000. Reliable information is now -being collected. My estimate is that at least 1,500 Social Democrats, -or trade-union officials, or editors were murdered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And how many Communist leaders do you -think were murdered during Göring’s period of power over the -Gestapo?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I would assume that if you include among the Communist -leaders also such trade union officials, who considered -themselves members of the Communist Party, then approximately -the same figure would be reached.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did Göring personally have any knowledge of -these murders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That I cannot say. If I were to answer that question, -then I should have to ask myself what I would have done -in case it had been one of my functions to administer camps in -which the fate of tens of thousands was being decided.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am not sure whether it is of any interest to the Tribunal if -I were to give you one or two examples from my own experience.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1925 I had to create a camp for refugees from Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You need not trouble to go into that, Herr -Minister. -<span class='pageno' title='273' id='Page_273'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No? At any rate I would have considered it my -first and foremost task to inquire whether, in the camps which -I had installed, the principles of humanitarianism were being -adhered to. I was under the impression that this was not being -done. I always reminded my police officials that they were servants -of the people and that everyone in those camps should be humanely -treated. I told them that never again should the call resound in -Germany, “Protect us from the police.” (“Schutz vor Schutzleuten”). -I myself demanded punishment for police or other officials when -I was under the impression that defenseless prisoners were being -ill-treated by members of the police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: As Minister of the Interior, did you become -familiar with the organized terror of the SA against the non-Nazi -population of Germany in the years after 1921?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Oh yes. Keeping an eye on the so-called armed -organizations was one of my most important tasks during my term -of office in Prussia. The roughest of all the armed organizations -proved to be the SA. They sang songs such as: “Clear the streets -for the Brown Battalions” and with the same arrogance with which -they sang these songs, they forcibly became masters of the streets, -wherever they encountered no adversary worth mentioning. Another -rowdy song of theirs seemingly illustrated their program: “Hang -the Jews and shoot the bigwigs.” Wherever the SA could exercise -terror unhindered, they raged and blustered in such style. They -waged beer-hall battles with people of different opinion. These -were not the customary skirmishes between political opponents -during election fights. No, this was organized terror. During the -first Jewish boycott in 1933, they stood on guard to frighten those -customers from buying in department stores who were accustomed -to buy in these stores. As the Tribunal already know, they organized -the terror actions of 8 November 1938. In 1930 they also damaged -numerous Jewish shops in Berlin, possibly as a worthy prelude to -the convening of the Reichstag into which 107 National Socialists -entered at the time, as we know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Finally, I want to ask you one or two questions -about the Defendant Schacht.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When did you first hear of Schacht’s relations with the Nazi -leaders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In 1931 I received information from the police -administration in Berlin, that interviews had been taking place -between Mr. Schacht and the leaders of the National Socialist -German Workers Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did you have any connections with Schacht -in 1944? -<span class='pageno' title='274' id='Page_274'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: If the matter is of any interest here to anybody, -I actually refused these connections. Schacht—although I held him -in high esteem as an economic expert—was known to me as a -rather unreliable person in political matters. By joining the Harzburg -Front, Schacht betrayed the cause of democracy. This was not -only an act of ingratitude, for it was only through the Democrats -that he ever reached the post of President of the Reichsbank, but it -was also a great mistake since he and others of the same social -standing by joining the Harzburg Front first made the National -Socialists—so to speak—socially acceptable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I could not, for this very reason, agree to any co-operation with -Schacht on 20 July 1944, and when in March 1943 I was asked to -join a government which was to overthrow Hitler, I categorically -refused to do so, giving Schacht’s machinations and sundry other -circumstances as my excuse.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: What was your reason for that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have just indicated these reasons. My friend -Leuschner, who was hanged, together with other young Social -Democrats—Von Harnack, Weber, Maas—my friend Leuschner and -I discussed the composition of such a government. Leuschner -informed me that a general would probably be the President of -the Reich, and another general would be the Minister for War. -I pointed out that Schacht in all probability would become financial -or economic dictator, since Schacht was suitable for such a post -through his actual or alleged connections with American business -circles. But these connections between Schacht and—in National -Socialist parlance—between plutocracy and militarism, this connection, -I say, appeared to me so compromising to the cause of -democracy, especially to the cause of Social Democracy, that I was -under no circumstances prepared to become a member of any -cabinet in which Schacht would be the financial dictator.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, the Prosecutor has just talked -about the construction of a U-boat in Finland and of a U-boat in -Cadiz. With regard to the construction of the U-boat in Cadiz, -he has referred to D-854. I presume that this document is -unknown to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, the witness said he knew -nothing about either of those instances.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Do you not remember that during that -discussion Admiral Raeder and Reichswehrminister Gröner mentioned -the Finland U-boat? -<span class='pageno' title='275' id='Page_275'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not remember.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You do not know about it? And now—a leading -question: Is it true that the agreement made on 18 October 1928 -stipulated that the Chief of the Naval Command Staff was obligated -to keep the Reichswehrminister informed and the Minister of the -Reichswehr, in his turn, would inform the other Ministers of the -Cabinet?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: As far as I can remember, the agreement or the -promise of the two Chiefs of the Command Staffs was that the -Cabinet should, generally speaking, be kept informed about all -questions. That was technically possible only in the manner in -which you have just indicated, that is to say, that the Reichswehrminister -would be the first to be informed and that he, in turn, -would pass this information on to the Cabinet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that there was no obligation, on Raeder’s part, -currently to report to you or to appear before the Cabinet?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That would have been quite an unusual measure, -just as the meeting of 18 October was in itself unusual; the members -of the Cabinet consisted either of the Ministers or of their official -representatives.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that the further management of the matter -would technically be handled by the Reichswehrminister?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Technically by the Reichswehrminister and politically -by the Cabinet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. I have no further questions -to put to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): -On what legal regulation was your exemption from the duties of -Minister of the Interior in Prussia, on 20 July 1932, based?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The release from my duties?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. The release from your duties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: It was based on Article 48.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Who, on the strength of Article 48, issued -emergency decrees?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: This emergency decree was issued by the Reich -President, who alone was entitled to do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the fact that you were removed from -office on 20 July, under the circumstances which you have just -described, based on the fact that Von Papen and Hindenburg, who -issued the decree, were of the opinion that the emergency decree -was legal, whereas it was your point of view that the legal basis -<span class='pageno' title='276' id='Page_276'></span> -for the emergency decree did not exist and in consequence you -remained in your office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I was of the opinion, and it was later confirmed by -the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) that the President of the Reich -was authorized on the strength of Article 48 to issue directives for -the maintenance of peace and order; and if he did not see in the -Prussian Ministers, and particularly in myself as Minister of Police, -sufficient guarantee that this peace and order would be insured -in Prussia, he had the right to relieve us of our police functions, -and especially to exclude us from all other executive measures. But -he did not have the right to discharge us as ministers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it known to you that the highest court in -Germany, the State Court of Justice, on 25 October 1932 issued a -statement to the effect that the decree of the Reich President of -20 July 1932 was compatible with the Constitution insofar as it -had appointed the Reich Chancellor as Reich Commissioner for -Prussia and authorized him temporarily to deprive Prussian Ministers -of their official functions and to assume these functions -personally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have just explained the meaning of that decision -of the High Court of Justice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: One more question: Did Von Papen, then -Reich Commissioner, in carrying out certain changes in personnel, -bring National Socialists into the police force?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot say. The political character of the police -officials was not outwardly recognizable. That might be the case -with Oberpräsidenten, Regierungspräsidenten and police presidents, -but not with every simple police official.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it true that Von Papen gave the key -position of police president in Berlin to the former police president -of Essen, Melcher, who in your time was already police president -of a large city?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now then, the witness can retire and the -Tribunal will now adjourn.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>How many more witnesses have you got?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I now have the witnesses, Freiherr Von Weizsäcker -and Vice Admiral Schulte-Mönting, the Chief of Staff. The examination -of Schulte-Mönting will take up some time, whereas I shall -be through with Freiherr Von Weizsäcker in a short while.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='277' id='Page_277'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If it please Your Honors, may the Witness Freiherr -Von Weizsäcker, be called?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Von Weizsäcker took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>ERNST VON WEIZSÄCKER (Witness): Ernst von Weizsäcker.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Baron Von Weizsäcker, at the beginning of the -war you were State Secretary in the Foreign Office, is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You will recollect that on 3 September 1939, -that is on the first day of the war between Germany and England—the -English passenger ship <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was torpedoed northwest -of Scotland. There were American passengers on board. The -sinking of the ship naturally caused a great sensation. Please tell -the Tribunal how this matter was treated politically, that is, by you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I remember this incident, but I am not -certain whether it was a British or an American ship. In any case, -the incident alarmed me very greatly at the time. I inquired of -the Naval Operations Staff whether a German naval unit could -have sunk the ship. After this was denied, I begged the American -Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Alexander Kirk, to call on me and told him -that no German naval unit could have participated in the sinking -of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>. I asked the Chargé d’Affaires to take cognizance of -this fact and to cable this information to Washington without -delay, adding that it was most important in the interests of our two -nations—Germany and America.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you had contacted the -Navy before taking these steps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you, at this first conversation, talk to -Admiral Raeder personally or did you speak with some other -officer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I could not say that now, but I did get -definite information. I am sorry I cannot give you the full details. -But I did receive a definite answer that no German naval unit was -involved. That satisfied me. -<span class='pageno' title='278' id='Page_278'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In connection with this subject did you, on the -same day or shortly after, visit Admiral Raeder and discuss this -matter further with him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that is true. I can recall. Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you on this occasion that it -could not have been a German U-boat, since reports coming in -from the U-boats said that the distance from the nearest U-boat -was too great, that is—about 75 nautical miles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Raeder informed me that no German -U-boat could have been involved. He may also have mentioned -details, concerning the distance of the U-boats from the point where -the ship went down, but I cannot today tell you about this with -any certainty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: During this conversation with Raeder, did you -declare that everything should be done to avoid war with the -United States, referring particularly to incidents like the sinking -of the Lusitania in the previous war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I certainly and emphatically did, for -at that time the recollections of similar past incidents during the -first World War were still very vivid in my mind. I am sure I -drew his attention to the urgent necessity of avoiding all naval -operations which might cause a spreading of the war and—as I -used to say in those days—decrease the “neutral substance.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder share your opinion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: To the best of my recollections—yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Are you convinced, Herr Von Weizsäcker, that -Raeder gave you truthful answers in this report about the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now U-boat Number <span class='it'>30</span> returned from her -combat mission on 27 September 1939, that is—about three weeks -after the sinking of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, and her commander reported -that he had inadvertently sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>. He had not noticed -the fact at the time but was apprised of the incident later by -various wireless messages. Raeder heard about it at the end of -September, and discussed the matter with Hitler in order to decide -what attitude should be adopted. Hitler issued an order enjoining -silence. All this has already been discussed here. I would like -you to tell me if you were informed of the fact, subsequently -established, of the sinking by a German U-boat.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No, certainly not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear of Hitler’s order enjoining silence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I naturally did not hear of that either. -<span class='pageno' title='279' id='Page_279'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I shall now have Document Number 3260-PS -handed to you and I must ask you to have a look at it. It is an -article entitled “Churchill Sinks the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>,” taken from the -<span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> of 23 October 1939. Do you remember this -article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. Perhaps I may look through it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I inform you, in order to -assist the Tribunal, that this is GB-218 in the British Document -Book Number 10a, Page 97, to be correct—Page 99.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Herr Von Weizsäcker, you have read -this article. May I ask you to tell me whether you recall having -read this article at the time of its appearance?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do recall that such an article did appear -at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you further what your attitude -was at the time when you heard about this article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I considered it a perverted fantasy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then you condemned this article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Naturally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Even though at the time you did not know yet -that it was a German U-Boat?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: The question of whether it was a German -U-boat or not could in no wise influence my opinion of the article.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then you considered this article objectionable, -even if it had not been a German U-boat?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now the Prosecution asserts that Admiral Raeder -had instigated this article and is reproaching him very gravely on -moral grounds for this very reason, and the reproach is all the -graver since, as we have seen, Raeder at this time—unlike yourself—knew -that it was a German U-boat which had sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>. -Do you consider such an action possible on Raeder’s part? That -he could have instigated this article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Siemers, you can only -ask the witness what he knew and what he did. You cannot ask -him to speculate about what Raeder has done.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I believed -that, according to this morning’s affidavit, it would be possible to -voice an opinion; but I shall, of course, retract my question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What affidavit are you talking about?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The affidavit in which I suggested the expunging -of any expression of opinion, Dietmann’s affidavit. -<span class='pageno' title='280' id='Page_280'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is a perfectly different matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you at that time hear -that Raeder had instigated this article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No, I did not hear that; I would never -have believed it either. I consider it entirely out of the question -that he could have instigated an article of that sort or that he -could have written it himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: To your knowledge, could this article be traced -exclusively to the Propaganda Ministry?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only answer this question in the -negative; not to Raeder and not to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, are you in a position to -judge whether grave points were involved in the historically-known -violations committed by the Navy against the Treaty of Versailles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only answer that question indirectly. -The details are unknown to me. But I can scarcely consider it -possible that grave or important violations could have occurred, -for it is precisely in naval matters that the observance of contract -agreements is particularly easy to control. Ships cannot be built -without being seen. I must therefore assume that these infringements -were of an insignificant nature.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in your opinion, did the -Defendant Raeder prepare a war of aggression or do you know of -any case from which Raeder’s attitude...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is the very charge against -the Defendant Raeder which the Tribunal has got to decide.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in February 1939, when -you traveled by train from Hamburg to Berlin with Admiral -Raeder, did you converse with him? And what was the occasion -and what did you discuss?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. It is quite true that I met Admiral -Raeder on the train from Hamburg to Berlin, after the launching -of a ship at Hamburg. On this occasion the Admiral told me that -he had just made a report to Hitler in which he said he had made -it quite clear that the size of the Navy would preclude any war -against England for years to come. I presume that this is the reply -to the question which you wished to receive from me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That was in February 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was the launching of the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then it is known to the Tribunal, for the launching -of the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> is entered in the records. -<span class='pageno' title='281' id='Page_281'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It must have been in the spring—in -February or March.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder’s declaration at that time have a -calming influence on you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I heard Raeder’s declaration on the subject -with very great pleasure because there could be no other...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do not care whether it had a -calming influence on him or not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, and to the best of your knowledge, -did Raeder—either as a politician or as a naval expert—exercise -any influence over Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the witness can tell us what -Raeder said, but he really cannot tell us in what capacity he was -speaking, whether as a politician or an admiral. If you want to -know whether he had his uniform on...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you have any conversations -with Raeder or with any other high-ranking personages?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: About what?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: About Raeder’s influence on Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was a well-known fact that political -arguments expressed by soldiers scarcely influenced Hitler at all, -although military arguments of a technical nature certainly did -carry weight with him, and in this sense Raeder may have exercised -some influence over Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in the winter of 1938 to -1939, the usual large diplomatic dinner party took place in Berlin -and you, as far as I know, were present at this dinner. On this -occasion Raeder spoke to Sir Nevile Henderson about the probable -return of Germany’s colonies...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, why do you not ask him -instead of telling him. You are telling him what happened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you are.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; this was a conversation -between Raeder and Sir Nevile Henderson, not between Herr -Von Weizsäcker and Henderson.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am now asking you, Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you have a -conversation to this effect with Sir Nevile Henderson or with other -British diplomats? And do you know anything about their attitude?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I cannot recall having spoken personally -with any British diplomats about the question of the colonies. On -<span class='pageno' title='282' id='Page_282'></span> -the other hand, I do know that between 1934 and 1939 the question -of the colonies was repeatedly handled by the British Government -either officially, unofficially or semiofficially, and their attitude -was expressed in a friendly and conciliatory manner. I believe -I can remember reading a report on the visit of two British ministers -to Berlin and that on this occasion the question of the colonies was -also discussed in a conciliatory manner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, can you tell us anything -about the behavior or the reputation of the Navy during the -Norwegian occupation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: An occupational force always finds it -difficult to be popular anywhere. But with this one reservation -I should like to state that the Navy, as far as I heard, enjoyed a -good, even a very good, reputation in Norway. This was repeatedly -confirmed to me during the war by my Norwegian friends.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You made these Norwegian friendships at the -time you were Minister in Oslo? When was that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was Minister in Oslo from 1931 to 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question. A document, D-843, was -submitted yesterday, signed by Breuer who was with the Oslo -Legation in March 1940. May I submit this document to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Am I to read the entire document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think it would suffice if you were just to -glance through it, especially over the middle part of the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the President.</span>] Mr. President, it is GB-466 and the -document was submitted yesterday.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] According to this document Breuer -stated that the danger of a British landing in Norway was not so -great as was assumed by the other side, and he speaks of measures -only by which Germany might be provoked. What can you tell us -about these statements of Breuer’s? Are these statements correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Breuer was not with the Legation—he -was the Minister himself—and I take it for granted that he reported -correctly on the subject from an objective or rather, if I may say -so, subjective point of view. Whether this was really correct from -an objective point of view or not, is quite another question. To -put it in plain German, whether Breuer was correctly informed of -the intentions of the enemy forces is another question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, according to the information -you subsequently received from the Ministry for Foreign -Affairs, were Raeder’s misgivings justified or was the picture, as -painted by Breuer, correct? -<span class='pageno' title='283' id='Page_283'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I must confess that my personal opinion -tallied with the opinion of Breuer, although both our opinions -subsequently proved to be incorrect and the conjectures of the -Navy were justified, or—at least—more justified than the opinion -voiced by the Minister.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much indeed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to -ask any questions of this witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hess): Witness, on -23 August 1939, a nonaggression pact was concluded between Germany -and the Soviet Union. Were any other agreements concluded -on that day by the two governments, outside of this pact of nonaggression?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the USSR): -Mr. President, the witness is called upon to answer certain definite -questions which are set forth in the application of counsel for the -defendant, Dr. Siemers. I consider that the question which is being -put to him at this moment by the defense counsel Seidl has no -connection with the examination of the case in hand and should -be ruled out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the question, Dr. Seidl, that -you were going to ask.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I ask you again, Herr Von Weizsäcker, whether on -23 August 1939, other agreements had been reached between the -two governments, which were not contained in the nonaggression -pact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Where were these agreements contained?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: These agreements were contained in a -secret protocol.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself read this secret protocol in your -capacity of State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have before me a text and Ambassador Gaus -harbors no doubt at all that the agreements in question are correctly -set out in this text. I shall have it put to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One moment, what document are you putting -to him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The secret addenda to the protocol of 23 August 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that not the document—what is this document -that you are presenting to the witness? There is a document -<span class='pageno' title='284' id='Page_284'></span> -which you have already presented to the Tribunal and which has -been ruled out. Is that the same document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: It is the document which I submitted to the Tribunal -in my documentary evidence and which was refused by the Tribunal, -presumably because I refused to divulge the origin and -source of this document. But the Tribunal granted me permission -to produce a new sworn affidavit by Ambassador Gaus on the subject -in question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have not done it? You have not done it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: No, but I should, Your Honor, like to read this text -in order to stimulate the memory of the witness, and to ask him -whether in connection therewith, as far as he can remember, the -secret agreements are correctly reproduced in this document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors! I would like to protest against -these questions for two reasons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First of all, we are examining the matter of the crimes of the -major German war criminals. We are not investigating the foreign -policies of other states. Secondly, the document which defense -counsel Seidl is attempting to put to the witness has been rejected -by the Tribunal, since it is—in substance—a forged document and -cannot have any probative value whatsoever.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: May I in this connection say the following, Mr. President. -This document is an essential component of the nonaggression -pact, submitted by the Prosecution in evidence as GB-145. If I now -submit the text to the witness...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The only question is whether it is the document -which has been rejected by the Tribunal. Is it the document -which has been rejected by the Tribunal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: It was rebutted as documentary evidence <span class='it'>per se</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, then the answer is “yes.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: But it seems to me that there is a difference as to -whether this document may be put to the witness during the hearing -of his testimony. I should like to answer this question in the -affirmative since the Prosecution when cross-examining can put the -document in their possession to the witness, and on the basis of his -testimony we should then see which is the correct text or whether -these two texts harmonize at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where does the document which you are -presenting come from?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I received this document a few weeks ago from a -man on the Allied side who appeared absolutely reliable. I received -it only on condition that I would not divulge its origin, a condition -which seemed to me perfectly reasonable. -<span class='pageno' title='285' id='Page_285'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you say that you received it a few -moments ago?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Weeks ago.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is the same document that you say just -now that you presented to the Tribunal and the Tribunal rejected?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the Tribunal also decided that I might -submit another sworn affidavit from Ambassador Gaus on this -subject, and this decision only makes sense...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but you have not done so. We -do not know what affidavit Dr. Gaus has made.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Ambassador Gaus’ sworn affidavit, the new one, is -already in my possession, but it has not yet been translated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I certainly join General Rudenko in -objecting to the use of this document. We now know that it comes -from some anonymous source. We do not know the source at all, -and anyway it is not established that this witness does not remember -himself what this purported agreement amounted to. I do not -know why he can not ask him, if that is what he wants to do.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you may ask the witness what his -recollection is of the treaty without putting the document to him. -Ask him what he remembers of the treaty, or the protocol.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, please describe the contents of the agreement -insofar as you can remember them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It is about a very incisive, a very far-reaching -secret addendum to the nonaggression pact concluded at -that time. The scope of this document was very extensive since it -concerned the partition of the spheres of influence and drew a -demarcation line between areas which, under given conditions, belonged -to the sphere of Soviet Russia and those which would fall -in the German sphere of interest. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Eastern -Poland and, as far as I can remember, certain areas of Romania -were to be included in the sphere of the Soviet Union. Anything -west of this area fell into the German sphere of interest. It is true -that this secret agreement did not maintain its original form. Later -on, either in September or October of the same year, a certain -change, an amendment was made. As far as I can recall the essential -difference in the two documents consisted in the fact that Lithuania, -or—at least—the greater part of Lithuania, fell into the sphere of -interest of the Soviet Union, while in the Polish territory the line -of demarcation between the two spheres of interest was moved very -considerably westwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe that I have herewith given you the gist of the secret -agreement and of the subsequent addendum. -<span class='pageno' title='286' id='Page_286'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it true that in case of a subsequent territorial -reorganization, a line of demarcation was agreed upon in the territory -of the Polish State?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I cannot tell you exactly whether the -expression “line of demarcation” was contained in this protocol or -whether “line of separation of spheres of interest” was the actual -term.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: But a line was drawn.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Precisely the line which I have just mentioned, -and I believe I can recall that this line, once the agreement -became effective, was adhered to as a general rule with possible -slight fluctuations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Can you recall—this is my last question—if this -secret addendum of 23 August 1939 also contained an agreement on -the future destiny of Poland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: This secret agreement included a complete -redirection of Poland’s destiny. It may very well have been that -explicitly or implicitly such a redirection had been provided for in -the agreement. I would not, however, like to commit myself as to -the exact wording.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Witness, did you see the original of the secret -treaty?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I saw a photostat of the original, possibly -the original as well. In any case I had the photostatic copy in my -possession, I had a photostatic copy locked up in my personal safe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would you recognize a copy of it if it was -shown to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Oh, yes, I definitely think so. The original -signatures were attached and they could be recognized immediately.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has been considering whether -it ought to put to the witness the document in the possession of -Dr. Seidl, but in view of the fact that the contents of the original -have been stated by the witness and by other witnesses and that it -does not appear what is the origin of the document which is in -Dr. Seidl’s possession, the Tribunal has decided not to put the document -to the witness. The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 22 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='287' id='Page_287'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH DAY</span><br/> Wednesday, 22 May 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Von Weizsäcker resumed the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think yesterday we got to the -stage whether any of the other defendants’ counsel wished to ask -any questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, indeed; I believe Dr. Von Lüdinghausen -wishes to examine the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): -Witness, I should like to put a few questions to you about -the activity of Herr Von Neurath in his capacity as Foreign Minister. -You were at that time Director of the Political Department -of the Foreign Office. What were the dates?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe from late autumn of 1936, as a -deputy, and from the spring of 1937 until the spring of 1938 with -full capacity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But before then you had already -had occasion to work with Herr Von Neurath? In the autumn of -1932 were you not together now and then at the Disarmament Conference -at Geneva?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What tendencies did Herr Von -Neurath follow, and what attitude did Von Neurath adopt at the -Disarmament Conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: The attitude of Herr Von Neurath was -dictated by the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations -which provided for disarmament. He followed those lines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that he followed the same policy -which his predecessors had followed at the Disarmament Conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was always the same.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, all the previous governments -pursued a policy aimed at peace and unity, or understanding; and -Herr Von Neurath continued this policy wholeheartedly, is that not -correct? -<span class='pageno' title='288' id='Page_288'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I never noticed anything to the contrary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you at that time—that is in -1932—notice in any way that he had National Socialist tendencies -or that he was at all in sympathy with the National Socialists?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that there was no -common ground between him and National Socialism.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you quite briefly summarize -Herr Von Neurath’s views with respect to foreign politics? Could he -have been at that time in favor of belligerent action, or was he -the representative, the acknowledged representative, of a policy of -understanding and peace?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should say that Herr Von Neurath pursued -a policy of peaceful revision, the same policy that had been -carried on by his predecessors. His aim was good neighborliness -with all, without binding himself politically in any special direction. -I never noticed any bellicose tendencies in his policies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was there any change in Herr -Von Neurath’s views in the year 1936, when you became one of -his closest collaborators, or did they always remain the same?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: They were always the same.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He was especially interested in -bringing about an understanding with England, but also with -France; is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath -wanted to bring about an understanding with all sides.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put a few more -questions to you which more or less concern his relations with -Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>According to your knowledge of the circumstances, as his collaborator, -can it be said that he had the confidence of Adolf Hitler -at all times when he was Foreign Minister, and also that Hitler let -himself be advised and led by him altogether?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I am in a position to judge, he -was the adviser but not the confidant of Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But there was a certain contact -between those gentlemen; is that not right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was hardly ever a witness of such contacts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you observe, when Von Neurath -and Hitler met, whether they frequently discussed the political -situation, what had to be done, and what should be done?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only say that we of the Foreign Office -regretted that the contact was not closer; all the more so as Hitler -<span class='pageno' title='289' id='Page_289'></span> -was frequently absent from Berlin. We considered the contact -too loose.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then, one cannot speak of close -relations or of very close collaboration with Hitler in the case of -Von Neurath?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: In my opinion, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And, in your opinion and according -to your observation, how did the activity of Von Neurath affect -foreign policy? Was he the leading man, or was he not perhaps -a retarding element, that is a brake, so to speak, where matters -contrary to his convictions were concerned?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I have no actual proof that important foreign -political actions of this period were influenced by Von Neurath. -But I can well imagine that certain actions in the sphere of -foreign politics were prevented...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think we can have -the witness imagine. We cannot have the witness telling us what -he can imagine. I think the question is too vague, and not a proper -question to ask.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During the time when Herr Von Neurath -was Foreign Minister, did any authority in the Party also have -an influence on the foreign policy which in effect was contrary to -the tendencies of Von Neurath or at least was not shared by him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe there was not only one but many -who acted in that way and had connection and influence with Hitler -of course. That could not be verified, but it could be concluded from -the results.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know why, for what reason, -the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in November 1935 was not -signed by Von Neurath but by the then Ambassador Von Ribbentrop -in London?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Was not that in 1936?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 1936; yes that is right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I assume for the reason that Hitler always -liked to put several persons on to certain work, and he would then -select from among them the one he considered best suited to carry -the work through.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was Von Neurath at all in agreement -with this Anti-Comintern Pact?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know. -<span class='pageno' title='290' id='Page_290'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Von Neurath’s policy -regarding personnel? Did he try to keep old officials in office, or -did he bring in National Socialist officials?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was very anxious to -retain the old and familiar Foreign Office staff, in the Foreign Office, -as well as in positions abroad.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But that changed the moment he -resigned?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Not immediately, but later on to an increasing -extent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, just two more questions. What -was the attitude of Herr Von Neurath when he was no longer Foreign -Minister and the Sudeten questions became acute, in the autumn -of 1938; and what part did he play at the Munich Conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I recall a scene in the Reich Chancellery, -a day before the Munich Agreement, when Herr Von Neurath very -strongly recommended pursuing a policy of appeasement and following -the suggestion of Mussolini to hold a four-power conference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that after Von Neurath -had left the Foreign Office that office was forbidden to give -him any information about foreign politics?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I think I remember that the successor of -Herr Von Neurath kept to himself information his predecessor -received about foreign political matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you were German Ambassador -to the Holy See in Rome from the summer of 1943?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: At the same time the commander-in-chief in -the Italian theater of war was Field Marshal Kesselring?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes; that is, he was the commander-in-chief -in that theater from 25 September 1943. Before that time an -Italian general held the post.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Were you frequently called upon by Kesselring -to settle differences between the German Army on one hand -and the civil authorities on the other?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: There was constant communication between -Field Marshal Kesselring and my own office, not only in -order to straighten out differences, but above all to prevent differences. -<span class='pageno' title='291' id='Page_291'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did you, through your frequent contacts with -Field Marshal Kesselring, gain a personal impression with regard -to the attitude of the military...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we are not trying Kesselring. -What relevance has this question got?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: This question is relevant because in the cross-examination -of Field Marshal Kesselring the Prosecution produced -incriminating material to the effect that the military leadership in -Italy did not observe the usages of war and the laws of humanity. -I distinctly remember that you, Mr. President—and this may be seen -on Pages 5803 and 5805 (Volume IX, Pages 234, 235)—said in reply -to an objection by Dr. Stahmer that it was material incriminating -the General Staff. I should like to ask the witness now present a -few questions about this incriminating material.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you wish to ask him anything that he -knows about accusations which have been made by the Prosecution -against Kesselring as a member of the General Staff, then you may -do that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. I started and that was to -be a preparatory question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Weizsäcker, were the objects of art of Italy in the -Italian theater of war spared and put in safekeeping?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Wehrmacht, under the leadership -of Field Marshal Kesselring, made the greatest efforts to spare -and protect edifices, property, and objects of art belonging to the -Church. This was a large chapter in the activities of the staff of -Field Marshal Kesselring, and success was not wanting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Can you give us one or two especially significant -examples on this point?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes, there are a lot of examples. I would -like to mention that 6 months or a year ago an exhibition of -manuscripts, incunabula, and similar things, was held in the Vatican. -The German Wehrmacht is to be thanked for having saved a large -part, if not the greater part of these objects.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: That is sufficient, Herr Von Weizsäcker. The -high military command in Italy is accused of having treated the -Italian population with especial harshness and cruelty. Can you -tell us anything about the fact that precisely on the part of the high -military command in Italy special measures were taken for the -feeding of the population at a period when the food problem was -difficult?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Does this question refer especially to the -food problem? -<span class='pageno' title='292' id='Page_292'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, the food problem in Rome.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, my field of observation was only -Rome. But there I can say that Field Marshal Kesselring told me -one day that half his time was taken up with the question of feeding -Rome. And I knew one of the higher military officials—I believe -his name was Seifert or something like that—who with great devotion -concerned himself with this task and carried it through with -success.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Now my last question, Herr Von Weizsäcker: -Through your observations of the activities of the high military -leaders in Italy you must have gained a personal impression of -these people. Did you get the impression that there was a sincere -effort on the part of these military leaders to observe the laws of -war and the laws of humanity?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is a matter of course, for otherwise -certain results could not have come about. Perhaps it is not known -here that in the autumn of 1943 the Holy See published a communiqué, -an official communiqué, which especially praised the -behavior of the German soldiers in Rome. Besides that, the sparing -of the Eternal City could not have been realized if the German -Wehrmacht had not behaved as it did.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: And that was a special merit of Field Marshal -Kesselring in particular?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I would say that when the history of this -time comes to be written first in the list of merit will be Pope -Pius XII. Then praise will be accorded, in the second place to the -German Wehrmacht under the leadership of Kesselring.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further -questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: It has been asserted once that the Defendant -Von Papen, who in the summer of 1934 had been appointed ambassador -to Vienna, directed from that office a policy of aggressive -expansion taking in the entire southeast up to Turkey; and that he, -among other things, had offered neighboring states like Hungary -and Poland territory to be gained from the intended partitioning of -Czechoslovakia. Did this policy actually exist?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry. I did not quite understand -your question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy, which I just outlined, actually -exist?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: My observation dates only from the late -summer of 1936, as before that time I was abroad. I did not notice -later that Herr Von Papen had carried on a southeastern policy for -<span class='pageno' title='293' id='Page_293'></span> -Vienna, or that he was commissioned to do so. The Foreign Office -could not entrust him with such a mission, for he did not come -under the Foreign Office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: And this policy, as just outlined, did that -exist at all when you entered the Foreign Office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Please repeat the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy of expansion on the part of -Germany...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Which policy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: The aggressive policy of expansion on the -part of Germany to the southeast as far as Turkey, the partitioning -of Czechoslovakia, and the cession of parts of Czechoslovakia to -Poland and Hungary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. In 1939, no doubt?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: 1936—in 1936.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you one or two questions -about the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> matter. You have told the Tribunal that -you, yourself, saw the American chargé d’affaires and informed -him, about the middle of September, that the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> could not -have been sunk by a German U-boat. That is so, is it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not see the American chargé d’affaires -in the middle of September, but on the day on which I heard -of the sinking, and that must have been, perhaps, 3, 4, or 5 of September.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Were you already assuring the American representatives -as early as that that a U-boat could not have been responsible?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And did you recommend, or rather, did the -German Foreign Office recommend that the Commander-in-Chief -of the German Navy should receive the American naval attaché and -tell him the same thing, namely, that a U-boat could not have sunk -the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know. I only dealt with the -chargé d’affaires.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I would like you to look at a new document, -Document. Number D-804, which will be Exhibit GB-477, which is -an extract from the SKL on the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> case. You will see that -<span class='pageno' title='294' id='Page_294'></span> -that is a report from Neubauer to the naval attaché and it reads -as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Foreign Office has had a report of the meeting between -the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and the American -naval attaché, on 13 September 1939, passed on to it by -telephone. It is worded as follows:</p> - -<p>“ ‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief -of...’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry; I have not found the place -as yet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Perhaps you would like to follow the English -copy, Witness, if you would like.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I read the second paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“ ‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy received the American naval -attaché on the advice of the Reich Foreign Minister and told -him more or less the following: He had intended for some -days already—as he knew—to write him that he should visit -him in order to tell him his opinion about the sinking of the -<span class='it'>Athenia</span>, in view of the continued agitation about it. However, -he had waited for the return of those of the submarines -that had been employed in waging war against merchant -ships at the time in question and which might possibly be -concerned, in order to receive reports about their activity personally. -He repeated most emphatically that the sinking of -the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was not caused by a German submarine. The -ship nearest to the place of the incident was at the time -actually situated about 170 sea miles away from the place of -the sinking. Besides this, the instructions as to how the commanders -were to wage war against merchant shipping, had -after all been published. Up to date, in no case had these -instructions been even slightly disregarded. On the contrary, -an American captain reported a short time before about the -particularly courteous and chivalrous behavior of the submarine -commanders.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Well, now, it is clear from that, is it not, that the German Foreign -Office was most anxious to cover up this matter of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> -as best it could; was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No; there was nothing to be covered up.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: When you discovered at the end of September -that in fact it was the <span class='it'>U-30</span> that had sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, there was -then a good deal to be covered, was there not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that I stated already yesterday -that I had heard nothing to that effect. -<span class='pageno' title='295' id='Page_295'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you did not know at the -end of September, on the return of the <span class='it'>U-30</span>, that the <span class='it'>U-30</span> had -in fact sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not remember that in any way at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: When did you first discover that the <span class='it'>U-30</span> had -sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I remember, not at all during -the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But I understood you to say yesterday that you -thought that the publication in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, accusing -Mr. Winston Churchill of sinking the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, was a piece of perverse -imagination; is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Completely.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Are you really saying to the Tribunal that—though -you were in a responsible job—are you saying to the Tribunal -that you did not discover the true facts about the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> -until the end of the war, when you were directly concerned in the -Foreign Office with this matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I told you already yesterday what I know -about this. It seems, does it not, that it was realized later by the -Navy that the sinking of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was due to the action of a German -submarine, but I cannot at all remember that I or the Foreign -Office were informed of this fact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder took no -steps to correct the information that had been passed to the American -diplomatic representatives, did he?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder -advised me or the Foreign Office of the fact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Now, with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If it please the Tribunal, I am not proposing to question the -witness as to the earlier diplomatic history, as this Tribunal has -indicated that it is desirable to reserve the matter for the defendants -as they go into the witness box later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] But I want to ask you a general question. -What was the earliest date at which responsible officials of -the Foreign Office, like yourself, first realized that Hitler intended -to wage aggressive war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That the foreign policy of Hitler’s Government -was a dangerous one I realized clearly for the first time in -May 1933; the fact that an aggressive war was planned, perhaps, -in the summer of 1938, or at least that the course pursued in foreign -policy might very easily lead to war. -<span class='pageno' title='296' id='Page_296'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Already in April 1938, the foreign political -situation was so tense that you sent a special memorandum to all -German diplomatic representatives dealing with the situation—the -critical situation of Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That may be. May I be permitted to read -the document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at Document Number -3572-PS, which is a memorandum of the 25th of April 1938, signed -by yourself, and a copy of which was sent to all the German diplomatic -representatives. It will be Exhibit GB-478. That document -reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Since the work in the field of preparation for the mobilization -has made further progress within Germany in the -Armed Forces and in all civil administrations including the -Foreign Office, it is necessary now that in the case of government -offices abroad corresponding measures also be taken in -their area of jurisdiction without delay.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then there follows a series of instructions as to the actions -that are to be taken on the commencement of the period of crisis, -or of actual mobilization, and there is an insistence in the last -paragraph but one:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I request the heads of offices, without waiting for further -instructions, to start considering now the measures to be -taken in their sphere of activity in the case of an emergency. -In the interest of absolute secrecy it must be observed strictly -that the number of people informed remains as restricted as -possible.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That suggests, does it not, that as early as April 1938 you were -conscious of the imminent approach of actual mobilization; is that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: May I ask, is this document really dated -the year 1938, or is it 1939? I cannot quite distinguish the date.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: It is dated the 25th of April 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, that may be.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Now, you yourself were opposed to Hitler’s -aggressive foreign policy, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not quite understand your question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You yourself were opposed to Hitler’s aggressive -foreign policy, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I personally, completely.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did you endeavor to persuade the Defendant -Von Neurath also to oppose Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy? -<span class='pageno' title='297' id='Page_297'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was not Foreign Minister -at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But he continued to be a very important functionary -of the Nazi State, did he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that his influence in that period -was even smaller than before; but I kept in touch with him, and I -think I agreed with his opinion and he with mine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And yet he continued to serve the Nazi State, -in particular, in a territory which was acquired as a result of this -policy of aggression; is that not so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should be grateful if this question would -be put to Herr Von Neurath rather than to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: If you please. Now, you were in Italy and in -Rome, were you not, in March of 1944?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You have given me some evidence as to the -behavior of the German forces in Italy. Were you in Rome at the -time of the massacres in the Hadrian Cave? You remember the -incident, Witness, do you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: When 325 Italians were murdered and 57 Jews -were thrown in as a bit of makeweight. You were there when that -happened, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe it was 320 prisoners who were -murdered in this cave which you just mentioned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Yes. Were you consulted about that matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That was an action by German forces, was -it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe by the German Police, and not -by the German Armed Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And you know, Witness, that there were many -murders of that kind carried out by the SS during the period of -German activity in Italy, do you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not know about many murders having -taken place, but I believe that the German Police were quite capable -of such things.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You know that they left a record of terror and -brutality wherever they left their mark upon Italy; is that not so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Police, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions. -<span class='pageno' title='298' id='Page_298'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have no more questions, Your Honor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I now call the witness Vice -Admiral Schulte-Mönting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go ahead.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Schulte-Mönting took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>ERICH SCHULTE-MÖNTING (Witness): Erich Schulte-Mönting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, please tell us briefly what positions you -held from 1925 to 1945, particularly in what positions you served -immediately under Admiral Raeder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1925 to 1928 I was naval adjutant -to Reichspräsident Hindenburg and, as such, simultaneously second -adjutant to the Chief of the Naval Command Staff. Consequently -my first collaboration with Raeder dates back to 1928.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>From 1929 until 1933 I had several front commands. From 1933 -to 1937 I was first adjutant to Raeder. From 1937 to 1939 I had -several front commands. From 1939 to 1943 I was Admiral Raeder’s -Chief of Staff; and up to 1944 I remained Admiral Dönitz’ Chief -of Staff. In January 1944 I was naval commander in southern -France until the invasion; subsequently commanding general in -North Trondheim. After the collapse I was employed for some -months with the British Navy in winding up activities. Then in -the autumn I was interned in a camp for generals in England.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Please tell me, if you can remember, in which -month of 1939 you started to work with Raeder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The first of January 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us briefly anything about Raeder’s -prestige as a navy expert, especially abroad? I mean only with -regard to technical naval questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I believe that through the many -years of service I had with Raeder, and the many conversations I -had with foreigners, I have been able to form some idea. After all, -Raeder was head of the Navy for 15 years. He was known, or -rather had a name, as a naval officer and as Chief of Staff of the -<span class='pageno' title='299' id='Page_299'></span> -last Commander-in-Chief of the German Imperial Navy, Admiral -Hipper, the opponent of the famous British Admiral Beatty in the -Skagerrak battle. He was known...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you kindly observe that light. -When the yellow light goes on, you are talking too fast. When the -red light goes on, you must stop.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was known through his literary activity -at the time of the “Tirpitz Era,” when he edited the <span class='it'>Nautikus</span>, and -later, after the first World War, through his two works on cruiser -warfare in the last World War, for which he received an honorary -doctor’s degree and which, I should say, gained him a reputation -among experts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The defendant is accused of building up the Navy -with the intention of carrying on an aggressive war, and this even -after the Treaty of Versailles was already in force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. Never in all my conversations -which I had with Raeder was the thought—much less the -word—of an aggressive war mentioned. I believe that all his actions -and his directives contradict this.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were there possibly any ideas of a strategic -nature under consideration, while the Versailles Treaty was in force, -with a view to an aggressive war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Never.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What was the basic reason for the maneuvers -held by the Navy from the years 1932 until 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: They were held exclusively with a view -to the security, protection, and defense of the coastal waters and -the coast itself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was a war with England taken as a basis for -any of these maneuvers between 1932 and 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that was never made a basis, and -I believe that would have appeared impossible and unreasonable -to every naval officer. I remember that even at the beginning of -the year 1939 Raeder issued a directive to the front commanders -to hold maneuvers, in which he excluded a maneuver directed -against England as an impossibility. It was forbidden to carry out -that maneuver at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, it is now confirmed, as you know, that -the Navy in the twenties, with the knowledge of the then parliamentary -government, violated the Treaty of Versailles. These questions -have been discussed a great deal here, therefore, we can -be brief. -<span class='pageno' title='300' id='Page_300'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to ask you generally: Is it possible from these violations, -which are known to you, to deduce aggressive intentions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I consider that is completely out of -the question. The violations were so insignificant and were based -so exclusively on protection and defense that I think it is impossible -to construe them as aggressive intentions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Can you give us briefly a few instances or name -a few cases where violations took place?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, they were limited to the -installation of coastal batteries, antiaircraft batteries, the procuring -of mines and similar things, all of which were exclusively for the -purpose of defense or protection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did these violations of the Treaty of Versailles—or, -shall we say, the slight deviations—become known to the Inter-Allied -Commission in whole or in part, and did that commission -partly overlook these things because they were really trifles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I would say it was an open secret.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you, Admiral, to pause between question -and answer so that the interpreters can keep up. Just pause -a moment after my questions before you reply. May I ask you to -repeat the answer to my question with regard to the commission?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I would say that it was an open secret. -It was just passed by.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As proof that these violations of the treaty were -made with the intention of waging aggressive war the Prosecution -has several times presented the book by Post Captain Schüssler -entitled <span class='it'>The Navy’s Fight against Versailles</span>. It is Document C-156. -I will have this document submitted to you in the original. In order -to save time and not to burden the Tribunal again with details—I -do not want to go into details—I shall just ask you: What do you -know about this book, and what caused it to be written at all? -When was it written and what is your general opinion about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I know this book. It came about as a result -of the attacks of the National Socialist regime in the years 1934 and -1935, which blamed the preceding government and the Navy for -not having done enough in the past to arm the nation and for not -even having exhausted the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles. -Consequently, the idea arose at that time of publishing a sort of -justification. This brochure is to be considered in that light; a sort -of justification for, I might say, sins of omission.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This booklet was later never actually published, or rather it was -withdrawn from circulation because it was, I might say, a rather -<span class='pageno' title='301' id='Page_301'></span> -poor attempt, for, after all, it contains no challenging points which -might be classified as rearmament.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was this booklet distributed within the Navy -later on?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. As I said, it was withdrawn from the -circles which had already had it and it was also severely criticized.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was the book withdrawn on Raeder’s orders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe so, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Through this book and another document, by -Assmann, a charge has been brought concerning the known endeavors -made with a construction firm in Holland. And it was also said -yesterday that, by order of Admiral Raeder, U-boats were built for -Germany in Finland and in Spain. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. The U-boats which -were designed by the Dutch firm, and which were built abroad, -were not built for the German Navy, but for foreign countries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know for whom they were built? Who -received the boat which was built in Finland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe Turkey received one, and one -went to Finland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then the ships were constructed for foreign -orders and for a foreign country?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What advantages at all did the Navy have from -their collaboration in the construction?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We were only interested in keeping alive -the experiences gained in U-boat warfare during the last World -War. Consequently the Navy was interested in seeing that constructors -of U-boats continued along those lines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, was that prohibited according -to the Treaty of Versailles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I know of no paragraph which prohibits -our activity in foreign countries along those lines.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the beginning of February 1933 Admiral -Raeder made his first naval report to Hitler. Do you know what -Hitler, on that occasion, gave Raeder as the basis for rebuilding -the Navy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I remember it exactly, because it -was the first report which the then Chief of the Naval Command -Staff, Admiral Raeder, made to the Reich Chancellor Hitler. -<span class='pageno' title='302' id='Page_302'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler said to Raeder that the basis of his future policy was to -live in peace with England and that he intended to demonstrate -that by trying to conclude a naval agreement with England. In -this he wanted the German Navy to be kept relatively small. He -wished to recognize Britain’s naval superiority because of her position -as a world power. He would accordingly suggest an appropriate -ratio of strength. He wanted an understanding with regard to the -construction of our Navy; and we should take these, his political -points of view, into consideration. Raeder was impressed with the -statements, for they were completely in accordance with his own -basic attitude.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Within the framework of this policy the German-British -Naval Agreement was then concluded in 1935. Was the -Navy as a whole and Raeder in particular pleased with this agreement, -or did they see certain disadvantages in it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder and the Navy were very pleased -with this agreement, although we had to impose voluntarily upon -ourselves severe limitations for a certain length of time. By this -agreement, in comparison with the Washington conference, I should -say we ranged among the smallest sea powers. In spite of that, this -agreement was generally welcomed, because friendly relations with -the British Navy were desired, and it was believed that if we followed -a wise and moderate policy, England in return would show -her appreciation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know whether at that time Hitler as well -approved of the agreement in that form and was pleased about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I can affirm that. Raeder and I -happened to be together with Hitler in Hamburg the day this agreement -was concluded, and Hitler said to Raeder when this fact was -reported to him:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“This is the happiest day of my life. This morning I received -word from my doctor that my throat trouble is insignificant, -and now this afternoon I receive this very gratifying political -news.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You have already stated, Admiral, that the naval -agreement was welcomed by the Navy. You will recall that in the -year 1937 a modified naval agreement was concluded with England. -Was the attitude of the Navy to that question still the same at -that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The Naval Agreement of -1937 brought merely one, I might say, additional clause. This was -for an exchange of information; and we had also reached an agreement -with the British Navy with regard to a fixed U-boat tonnage. -We had no reason... -<span class='pageno' title='303' id='Page_303'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, referring to the U-boat tonnage, I -remember the 1935 agreement: 100 percent of the British U-boat -tonnage; Germany limited herself to 45 percent, but reserved the -right to increase the tonnage up to possibly 100 percent, in which -case she must, however, notify England and discuss it with the -British Admiralty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Was this notification about the increase to 100 percent given, and -if so, when and in what way?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After we had reached 100 percent, Admiral -Cunningham was in Berlin and on that occasion the fact was -discussed once more. Whether a written confirmation was made in -addition I no longer recall. I take it for granted because that was -the purpose of the agreement of 1937. On the occasion of his visit -in December 1938, Admiral Cunningham explicitly gave Britain’s -agreement to the final 100 percent equality in U-boats. That is the -way I, or rather all of us, interpreted his visit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember whether there was a special -conversation, or a conversation between Admiral Cunningham and -Raeder, on the occasion of this visit, in which Admiral Cunningham -discussed generally the relations between the German and the British -Navy, and between Germany and England?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I had the personal impression that Cunningham -and Raeder parted on very friendly terms. At Cunningham’s -departure there was a breakfast for a rather limited circle, -and on that occasion Cunningham expressed his pleasure at the -conclusion of the naval agreement, concluding his speech with a -toast to the effect that now all these questions had been settled at -last, and it was to be hoped that in the future there would be -no war between our navies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this incident?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: December 1938. I believe that is correct, Admiral?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As far as I remember, December 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I remember the date from the testimony given -by Admiral Raeder. I myself knew only that it took place in 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What Admiral Cunningham is it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I do not know, I am not a naval expert. Perhaps -Admiral Schulte-Mönting can tell us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not understand the question, -Doctor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Which Admiral Cunningham is that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The present Lord Cunningham. The elder -of the two. -<span class='pageno' title='304' id='Page_304'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that it must have -been on 30 or 31 December 1938, as far as we, or rather as far as -Raeder recalls.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] From 1933 until 1939 was Raeder confident -that Hitler would not start a war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. Raeder was completely confident of -that. As proof of this I may say that actually nothing was changed -in our building program within that period. That would have been -necessary if one had had to prepare oneself, at least mentally, for -an armed conflict.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In what respect would the building program -have had to be changed if one had wanted to wage an aggressive -war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It would have been necessary to give -priority at least to the U-boat building program.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was it clear to you and to the leading naval -officers that a real aggressive war started by Germany would perforce -result in a war with England?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. The knowledge of this fact is proof -in my opinion that a war of aggression was not planned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, now in 1938 and 1939 incidents took -place which perhaps justified a certain amount of skepticism. I -should like to remind you of the crisis in the autumn of 1938 concerning -the Sudetenland which almost led to war, which was then -prevented only at the last moment through the Munich Agreement. -I should like to call your attention specifically to the occupation -of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, which was contradictory -to the Munich Agreement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, what was the attitude of Raeder to this incident, which -you must know as you spoke to him practically every day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As Hitler had stated expressly at Munich -that he was interested only in the German areas of Czechoslovakia; -and, even though perhaps he seemed exceedingly determined -to the outside world, was actually willing to negotiate, -Raeder and the leading circles in the Navy believed that these -things would be adjusted politically.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With the occupation of Czechoslovakia a great disquiet certainly -did arise among us. But we were firmly convinced that Hitler -would not make any exaggerated demands, and that he would be -prepared to settle these matters politically, because we could not -imagine that he would expose the German people to the danger -of a second world war. -<span class='pageno' title='305' id='Page_305'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you know that before the agreement with -Hacha was made, under rather strange circumstances, a bombardment -of Prague had allegedly been threatened; or did Raeder know -anything about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Raeder knew anything -about this. I am hearing about it for the first time now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the Document L-79. This -is a speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939; that is the so-called -“Little Schmundt File.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, this is Exhibit USA-27, and is to be found in -Document Book Number 10, Page 74, of the British Delegation. -I am submitting this document to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] This speech delivered by Hitler on -23 May 1939 was recorded by the adjutant on duty, Lieutenant -Colonel Schmundt. As far as I know, Raeder, on the same day, -discussed this speech with you in detail. At that time you had -been Chief of Staff for a period of about 6 months. From your -later activity are you familiar with the type of recording which -was customary for military speeches?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This record can really not be considered -a true account. I have from this record...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, in the first place, your question -was very much leading. You did not ask him a question. You put -into his mouth what had happened. That is altogether wrong. You -ought to have asked him, if you wanted to prove a conversation -he had with Raeder, whether he did have a conversation with -Raeder. You have told him that he had a conversation with Raeder. -The purpose of examination is to ask questions, and then he could -tell us if he had a conversation with Raeder. He cannot tell us -whether this is a true account or a true form of the account when -he was not at the meeting himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I wish to thank the High Tribunal, and I shall -try to put the questions properly. The witness...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Not only that, but the Tribunal cannot listen -to this witness’ account, or his opinion as to whether this is a -true account of a meeting at which he was not present.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, the witness, as Chief of Staff, -has always seen the exact minutes on important meetings. They -were delivered to him in accordance with the distribution list. -Therefore, as this document is of a decisive nature, I should like -to determine whether Schulte-Mönting, as Chief of Staff, received -the minutes or whether he just received knowledge of the contents -<span class='pageno' title='306' id='Page_306'></span> -through Admiral Raeder’s immediate reporting. That was the purpose -of my question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, you mean you want to -ask him whether he ever saw this document. Yes, you may certainly -ask him that. Ask him if he saw the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Your Honor, but I believe -the answer of the witness was lost in the interpretation, and if -I am correct...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Never mind about his answer; the question -is what question you are to put to him, and he can answer whether -he ever saw the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I shall put that question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Admiral, did you get to see this document at the time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I am just seeing it now for the first -time, here in Nuremberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: How did you hear about the contents of the -speech of 23 May?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, as a matter -of principle, after every speech or conference, confidential or -otherwise. Immediately after the speech, Raeder gave me his -impressions which are in contradiction to these so-called minutes. -Raeder did not have this, I might say, exaggerated bellicose impression -which is apparent in this document. But, on the other -hand...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness must tell us what Raeder said -to him. That is what I told you before. He may tell us what Raeder -said to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I should like you to tell us just what -Raeder said to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder told me that Hitler in his speech -said there was a prospect of a future conflict with Poland, and -that this was in contradiction to those things which he had discussed -with him alone. That the speech in itself was contradictory, -was the impression he expressed to me at that time. He also told -me that after the speech he had had a conversation with Hitler -alone during which he called his attention to the contradictions -contained in the speech. At the same time he reminded Hitler of -what he had told him previously, namely that he would settle -the Polish case under all circumstances in a peaceful way; and now -he was considering a warlike solution possible. Hitler, he said, -had reassured him and had told him that politically he had things -firmly in hand. Then when Raeder asked him, or rather called -<span class='pageno' title='307' id='Page_307'></span> -his attention to this contradiction and asked him just what he -really intended to do, Hitler had answered, Raeder told me, the -following:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I, Hitler, have three ways of keeping secrets. The first, -when we two speak alone; the second, when I, Hitler, keep -them to myself; the third, for problems of the future, which -I do not think out to an end.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>Raeder called his attention to the impossibility of a warlike conflict. -To that, according to Raeder, Hitler replied:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is as if you and I had agreed on a settlement of one -mark. Now, I, Hitler, have already paid you 99 pfennig. Do -you think that because of this last 1 pfennig you would -take me to court?”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And Raeder said “No.”</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“You see”—Hitler said to Raeder—“I have got what I want -by political means, and I do not believe that because of this -last political question”—the solution of the Polish Corridor, -as we called it—“we will have to anticipate a war with England.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And that was in a conversation between Hitler -and Raeder after this speech had been made?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That took place after this speech.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with regard to the minutes which I have -shown you, I have one final question: Did you personally, as Chief -of Staff, also receive and read all minutes which were sent to -Raeder?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, as a rule I saw all minutes and -reports before they were given to Raeder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was Admiral Reader of the opinion—excuse me, -I should like to put the question differently.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What was Raeder’s point of view concerning the Navy and -politics?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder’s opinion was that we, the Navy, -had nothing to do with politics. He adopted that attitude as -an order and a trust received from the old Reich President, -Von Hindenburg, who, when appointing Raeder to be head of the -Navy, imposed that as a duty upon him. -<span class='pageno' title='308' id='Page_308'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Norway. What were the reasons -which induced Raeder, in September and October 1939, to consider -a possible occupation of Norway?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The reasons were the reports which came -from various sources about alleged intentions of an occupation of -Norway by the Allies. These reports came from the following -sources: First, Admiral Canaris, who was the chief of our intelligence -service. He reported to Raeder, in my presence, once a week, -the information that had come in. Secondly, the reports that came -from the naval attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, which -indicated that rumors were increasing that the Allies intended to -drag Scandinavia into the war in order to prevent, if possible, the -iron ore exports from Sweden to Germany. We did not consider -these reports altogether impossible, because, as documentary -evidence from the last World War proves, Churchill had seriously -considered the occupation of Norway.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was there a further source for reports of that -kind?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Admiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief -of Group North, had received similar reports which he passed on -orally and in writing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember any details from these reports -which you could give us quite briefly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. There were reports concerning the -presence of British air crews in Oslo, allegedly posing as civilians. -There were reports about Allied officers making surveys of Norwegian -bridges, viaducts, and tunnels all the way to the Swedish -border, which was taken as an indication that the transportation -of heavy material and equipment was planned. And last but not -least there were reports about a secret mobilization of Swedish -troops because of the alleged danger to the ore areas.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What danger arose for Germany on account of -that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If Norway were to have been actually -occupied, the conduct of the war in the North Sea would have -become almost impossible, and it would have been very difficult -in the Baltic Sea. The ore imports most probably would have been -stopped. The danger from the air would have become terrible for -north Germany and the eastern territories. In the long run the North -Sea and the Baltic would have been blocked completely, which -eventually would have led to the total loss of the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Admiral Raeder do on the basis of -these considerations? -<span class='pageno' title='309' id='Page_309'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He reported to Hitler about his misgivings -and called his attention to the dangers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When was that report made?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If I remember correctly, in the autumn -of ’39.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, until the adjournment, will you -go very slowly because, owing to the power of the electrical -recording being off, what is happening here in Court is impossible -to take and therefore we have to rely solely upon the shorthand -notes which cannot be checked back against the electrical recording. -Do you understand? Therefore I want you to go rather more -slowly than usual.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When was the conference between Hitler and -Raeder in which Raeder for the first time pointed out these dangers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In October 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: According to the War Diary that conference took -place, which of course you cannot remember offhand, on 10 October. -At any rate you probably mean that conference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler then, as a result of that conference, -make a final decision?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, in no way at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did discussions about that subject then take -place continually between Hitler and Raeder?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. No further discussions along that -line took place then until perhaps the end of the year. Only when -the reports which I mentioned before were received in increasing -numbers was that subject taken up again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is it known to you that in December 1939 Quisling -came to Berlin and also talked with Raeder?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is known to me, and I took part -in that meeting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Quisling tell Raeder?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Quisling came on a recommendation -from Rosenberg and said he had important news of a military -and political nature. He confirmed, more or less, the things which -we knew already.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were only the military dangers discussed in this -conference?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Only these things were discussed; the -conference was very short. -<span class='pageno' title='310' id='Page_310'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No political questions were discussed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Raeder met Quisling for the -first time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the occasion of that visit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have at that time any close connections -with Rosenberg?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, he knew him casually, having just -seen him a few times.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Had Rosenberg informed Raeder before about -the relations between Rosenberg and Quisling?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not to my knowledge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Raeder do when Quisling confirmed -the reports received from Canaris and other sources?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As the things we suspected were confirmed -from Norway, Raeder considered this so serious that he went -immediately to Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you also know what he suggested to Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Hitler wanted to talk to Quisling himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And that took place?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it did.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was a final decision made then concerning Norway, -in December 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Hitler directed that as a countermeasure, -theoretical preparations should be made for a German -landing in Norway. The order, the final order, as far as I know -was not given until March.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was the landing in Norway an undertaking which -you and Raeder considered a risky one or was it considered absolutely -safe to do so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Raeder and the gentlemen from the -Naval Operations Staff and also the front commanders considered -that undertaking very risky. I remember Churchill’s speech in -Parliament when he said, after he had been questioned about that -matter, that he did not believe the German Navy would undertake -that risk in face of the British Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Churchill made that statement, -approximately?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe it was between 7 and 9 April.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: 1940? -<span class='pageno' title='311' id='Page_311'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What was your estimate at the Naval Operations -Staff of the risks of losses?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder had told Hitler that he would -have to reckon on the possible complete loss of the fleet, and that -if the operations were carried out successfully he would have to -be prepared for the loss of about 30 percent of the forces used.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And how much was lost?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: About 30 percent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In view of the risk of losing the entire fleet, -was Raeder at first in favor of that operation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. He considered a neutral attitude on -the part of Norway as much better than having to take this risk.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder and -the Naval Operations Staff recommended the occupation of Norway -out of the desire for fame and conquest. What do you say -about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The desire for fame was not in Raeder’s -character. The plans for operations which came from his desk -bore the mark of bold daring, but also of thorough planning. One -does not work out plans to the minutest detail covering the distance -from German ports up to Narvik, which is about that from Nuremberg -to Madrid, and one does not use the Navy against a superior -British fleet for the sake of fame.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Raeder had told the Naval Operations Staff and the front commanders -that he had to carry out that operation against all the -rules of warfare because there was a compelling necessity to do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When did the actual drafting of the military -operation take place at the Naval Operations Staff?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: February 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: During the period from December 1939 until -March 1940 did you continue to receive reports from the sources -you have mentioned?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did these later reports contain a clearer indication -as to the place of the landings, or did you not see the details -about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, they covered the areas between -Narvik via Bergen to Trondheim, from Bergen to Oslo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder—excuse me, I want to put the -question differently: What was the basis which Raeder suggested -to Hitler for the relations between Germany and Norway? -<span class='pageno' title='312' id='Page_312'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To that I would like to...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, I mean in the period after the -operation was carried out and Germany had occupied Norway.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder in speaking to Hitler advocated -a policy of peace. He suggested repeatedly that attempts should -be made for peace with Norway. He was in agreement in that -respect with the German Commander-in-Chief in Norway, Generaladmiral -Böhm, while Terboven, who was directing political matters, -was of a somewhat different opinion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did serious conflicts arise in that respect -between Terboven and his civil administration on the one side, -and Raeder and Böhm and his colleague, Korvettenkapitän -Schreiber, on the other?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, there were serious differences and -quarrels all the way up the line to Hitler. Hitler at that time -told Raeder that he could not make peace with Norway because -of France.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said, “because of France.” Was it -not possible to make peace with France also, and what was Raeder’s -attitude in that regard?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder advocated the same thing concerning -France.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And what did he say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He tried to arrange a conference with -Admiral Darlan in an effort to forward these matters. He had -pointed out to Hitler, when the Atlantic Coast was fortified, that -it would be better and more practical to make peace with France -than to make great though inadequate sacrifices for defense. Hitler -replied that he fully agreed but out of consideration for Italy he -could not conclude a peace treaty with France.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did the conversations between Raeder and -Darlan take place?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, near Paris.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were you present?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Admiral Schultze, the Commanding -Admiral in France.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you whether the results of the -conversation were favorable?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he told me about the very favorable -results.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder report on that to Hitler? -<span class='pageno' title='313' id='Page_313'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And in spite of that, Hitler refused?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Out of consideration for Mussolini.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: According to your knowledge, did the Party or -the leadership of the SS through Heydrich attempt to fight Raeder?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Heydrich repeatedly attempted to bring -Raeder and the Navy into discredit with Hitler through defamatory -remarks and by spying, either by posting spies in the officers corps -or the casinos, or by misrepresenting or distorting news. Against -these attacks, Raeder defended himself tenaciously and successfully.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Why was the Party against Raeder?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a question which is very difficult -to answer. I believe mainly because, first of all, there were -differences in the religious field. Many commanders before they -put to sea for combat turned to Raeder for help so that during -their absence their relatives would not have their religious freedom -curtailed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When did the first differences occur between -Raeder and Hitler, and during what period did Raeder ask for his -dismissal?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have had that from that defendant himself, -have we not? Raeder told us when he asked for it. No cross-examination -about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you for what reasons Raeder -remained?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First, because Hitler himself had asked -him to stay, and gave him assurances for the integrity of the Navy. -Furthermore, at that time, there were discussions about combining -the Navy and the merchant marine into one ministry and -putting Party people into that ministry. In that event we did not -see a strengthening but a weakening of our fighting force. Besides, -during that period there occurred a gap in the line of successors, -due to illness and losses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And last but not least, Raeder remained in the war out of a -sense of responsibility and patriotism.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you yourself ask Raeder to remain in office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I had to ask Raeder frequently and -very seriously. I myself was once ordered by Hitler to come to the -Reich Chancellery.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When was that? -<span class='pageno' title='314' id='Page_314'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the beginning of 1939, when he explained -his standpoint to me in a long conversation and asked me -to convince Raeder that he had to stay. Moreover, he enjoyed the -confidence of the Navy. The senior officers and officials of the -Navy had asked me orally and in writing to try to persuade Raeder -not to leave his office prematurely. Since 1928 he had led the Navy -with a firm hand through all political vicissitudes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I return again to your conversation -with Hitler in the beginning of 1939? Did you speak with -Hitler alone?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that was a private conversation of -about an hour and a half.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler tell you anything about his political -plans on that occasion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; not about political plans in the sense -of what is called politics, but he tried once more to bridge political -differences with Raeder. He told me one should not weigh each -individual word of his. His visitors were right, but only after they -had left; he would put forward records and witnesses; all he wanted -was to appeal to the emotions of his listeners and to stir them up -to do their utmost, but not to commit himself with words. In the -future he promised he would try to give the Navy independence -in all technical questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You just said “not to weigh each individual -word.” Admiral, were the speeches of Hitler ever taken down accurately, -that is, by stenographers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, but as far as I know only in the -later part of the war. Hitler was against having his words put on -record, because everyone who listened to him returned home with -his own opinion. He himself did not stick to his text; he thought -out loud and wanted to carry his listeners away, but he did not -want his individual words to be taken literally. I spoke about that -to Raeder very frequently. We always knew what was expected of -us, but we never knew what Hitler himself thought or wanted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If Hitler did not want to be taken at his word, -how did it come about that he agreed in the war to have his speeches -taken down by stenographers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I told you before that too many misunderstandings -had occurred, and that Hitler as well as those who -reported to him believed that everyone had convinced the other of -his opinion. Thereupon they started keeping minutes. The minutes -kept up to then were personal impressions of those who were not -instructed to keep them but who did so on their initiative. -<span class='pageno' title='315' id='Page_315'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What time is the witness speaking of? He -said up to then the minutes had been kept on the personal initiative -of the person who took them. What time is he speaking of?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: From what time, according to your recollection, -were these minutes taken by the stenographers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1942, I believe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: From 1942?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It might also be 1941. During the war, -at any rate.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But your conversation with Hitler was in January -1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, January 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what did the stenographic minutes look -like later on? Did you ever see them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We repeatedly asked for excerpts from -the minutes and tried to compare them with the prepared text and -they too contained contradictions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, I come to the period when Hitler prepared -for war against Russia, and I am going to show you the Directive -Number 21, of 18 December 1940, concerning the Case Barbarossa.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, that is Document Number 446-PS, Exhibit USA-31, -in the Document Book of the British Prosecution Number 10a, -Page 247.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] The Prosecution have asserted that -Raeder or the Naval Operations Staff had taken part in the drafting -of that directive; is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. The Navy had -nothing to do with the drafting of that directive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have any previous knowledge of -Hitler’s plan to attack Russia, before he received that directive?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, by an oral communication from -Hitler to Raeder, about the middle of August 1940—or October 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: October 1940. Did Raeder inform you about his -conferences with Hitler concerning Russia, and what attitude did -he adopt in these conferences?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, because the -prospect of war with Russia was much too serious to be taken -lightly. Raeder opposed most energetically any plan for a war -against Russia; and, I should like to say, for moral reasons because -Raeder was of the opinion that the pact with Russia should not be -broken as long as the other side gave no cause for it. That, as far -<span class='pageno' title='316' id='Page_316'></span> -as Raeder knew, was not the case in October. That economic treaty—as -we called it at that time—to our knowledge was about 90 percent -at the expense of the Navy. We gave Russia one heavy cruiser, -heavy artillery for battleships, artillery installations, submarine -engines, submarine installations, and valuable optical instruments -for use on submarines. Besides, Raeder was of the opinion that the -theater of operations should not be allowed to be carried into the -Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea was our drill field, I might say. All our -recruits were trained there; all our submarine training took place -in the Baltic Sea.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We had already partly stripped the Baltic coast of batteries and -personnel for the purpose of protecting the Norwegian and the -French coasts. We had very small oil reserves at our disposal, the -synthetic oil production was not yet in full swing. The Navy had -to turn over some of its reserves to industry and agriculture. Consequently, -Raeder was strongly opposed to waging war against Russia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution believe that Raeder was -only opposed to the date set for the war against Russia and concludes -this from the War Diary in which actually the entries refer -to the date. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. After the receipt -of Directive 21, called Barbarossa, Raeder approached Hitler again -with reference to the war against Russia, and also put down his -thoughts in a memorandum. He tried to convince Hitler of the following: -Poland had been crushed, France had been occupied, and, -for military reasons, an invasion of England was out of the question. -He said clearly that now the time had arrived when the further -conduct of the war could not be decisive on the Continent, but -in the Atlantic. Therefore, he told him that he had to concentrate -all forces at his disposal on one objective: To hit the strategic points -of the Empire, especially the supply lines to the British Isles in -order to compel England to sue for negotiations or, if possible, to -make peace. He suggested, as has been mentioned before, that the -policy of peace with Norway should be pursued, peace with France, -and closer co-operation with the Russian Navy, such as was provided -for in the economic treaty, and the repurchase of submarine equipment -or submarines. He said that the decision or the date for a -decision no longer rested with us because we did not have the necessary -sea power and that in case of a long duration of the war the -danger of the participation of the United States had also to be considered; -that therefore the war could not be decided on the European -continent and least of all in the vastnesses of the Russian steppes. -That point of view he continued to present to Hitler as long as he -was in office. -<span class='pageno' title='317' id='Page_317'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said at first that Raeder had protested, -in principle as you have expressed it, for moral reasons, that -is, for reasons of international law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Why was not that entered into the War Diary -when the other reasons that you have mentioned can be found in -the War Diary? At least they are alluded to.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I can answer, or at least give you -an explanation. Raeder, as a matter of principle, never criticized -the political leadership in the presence of the gentlemen of the -Naval Operations Staff or the front commanders. Therefore, he did -not speak to me and the others about the private conversations -which he had with Hitler, except when it was necessary for military -reasons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When were the preparations by the Navy, on the -basis of Directive 21 that you have in front of you, made? Do you -remember that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe about 3 months later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, certainly after the directive?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, after the directive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were they made on the basis of that directive?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the basis of that, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was that directive already a final order or was -it just a precautionary strategic measure?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my estimation it should not be considered -as an order, and that can be seen from Points IV and V.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In what way?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Point V says that Hitler was still waiting -for reports from commanders-in-chief. And Raeder still reported -to Hitler after he had received the directive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is Point IV, if you will look at it once more, also -in accordance with your opinion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The words “precautionary -measures” are underlined.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Precautionary measures for what?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In case of war against Russia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Well, I think, Admiral, since you have mentioned -it yourself, you should read the sentence which follows the words -“precautionary measures.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: “In case Russia should change her attitude, -she is...” -<span class='pageno' title='318' id='Page_318'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You cannot argue with your own witness -about the meaning of the words. He has given his answer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Was Raeder of the opinion, at any -time, that he had succeeded in dissuading Hitler from the unfortunate -plans against Russia?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. After he had made his report at -that time, he returned and said, “I believe I have talked him out -of his plan.” And at first we did have that impression because in -the following months there were no more conferences about it, to -my knowledge, not even with the General Staff.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you quite briefly then about Greece. -According to Document C-152, which I will have shown to you, -Raeder made a report to Hitler on 18 March 1941, in which he asked -that the whole of Greece should be occupied. What were the reasons -that caused the High Command, that is, Raeder and you, to make -that suggestion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: When Raeder asked for authorization, as -it says here in the War Diary, for the occupation of the whole of -Greece, even in the event of a peaceful settlement, we, according to -my recollection, had already been for 3 months in possession of the -directive which was concerned with the occupation of Greece, and -when...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. Was that Directive Number 20? I -will have it shown to you. Is that the one you mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, “Marita,” that is the one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is Document Number 1541-PS, -Exhibit GB-13, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution 10a, -Page 270. That is Directive Number 20, Case Marita of 13 December -1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Admiral, what caused Raeder, apart -from that point which Hitler had already explained, to ask that -specific question again in the month of March, that is to say, on -18 March?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: A British landing had already occurred -in the south of Greece a few days before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did this landing make it necessary to occupy the -whole of Greece?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, for strategic reasons, absolutely. -The menace of an occupation from the sea or from the air, or the -formation of a Balkan front against Germany, or the menace from -the air to the oil fields, had to be eliminated under all circumstances. -May I only remind you of the Salonika operation in the -first World War. I believe that was a similar situation. -<span class='pageno' title='319' id='Page_319'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Here again the Prosecution say this was governed -by the desire for conquest and fame. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to answer that fame requires -achievements, and I do not know what the Navy could have conquered -in the Mediterranean. We did not have a single man or a -single ship down there; but Raeder, of course, for the strategic -reasons I have mentioned, had to advise Hitler in that direction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were breaches of neutrality on the part of Greece -known to you before this time, before we occupied Greece?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We had been informed that in 1939, certain -Greek political and military circles had been in the closest -connection with the Allied General Staff. We knew that Greek -merchantmen were in British service. Therefore we were compelled -to consider the Greek merchantmen which sailed through the prohibited -zone to England as enemy ships. And, I believe, in the -beginning of 1940, or the middle of 1940, we received information -that the Allies intended to land in Greece or to establish a Balkan -front against Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='320' id='Page_320'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, as the last point in my questions dealing -with Russia, I should like to show you the document submitted by -the Soviet Prosecution, Document USSR-113. This document is a -communication from the Naval Operations Staff of 29 September -1941 to Group North, that is, Generaladmiral Carls. Under II it -states as to the result of a conversation between Admiral Fricke and -Hitler: “The Führer is determined to make the city of St. Petersburg -disappear from the face of the earth.” Raeder has been accused -of not having done anything to oppose such a monstrous intention -and has been accused because the Naval Operations Staff passed on -this communication. I ask you, Admiral, did you know of this communication -in 1941?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the President.</span>] I beg your pardon, Mr. President, I -should like to remark that at this moment, I am sorry to say, I have -no photostatic copy of this document. I tried to procure it. I have -this very moment received it, and I should like to submit the photostatic -copy at this point, instead of the written copy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This seems to be the original which I have -before me?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, Admiral, it is a copy, an exact copy of the -photostatic copy with all paragraphs and names, made for my own -special use.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Were you acquainted with this piece of writing in 1941?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not know it in 1941, it is submitted -to me at this moment for the first time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe that Admiral Raeder saw this -communication before it was sent off, even though you yourself had -not seen it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That would have been a miracle. Communications -which were submitted to Admiral Raeder all went -through my hands. They always had the notation, either “the -Commander-in-Chief has taken due note,” and were initialed by -me personally in order to certify this notation, or “this order or this -directive is to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief,” and in this -case too my initials were affixed. This order and this copy which -you have just shown to me I have never seen before; I am not -acquainted with it; and I consider it impossible that Admiral Raeder -should have seen it, because on 29 September 1941 I was in good -health and exercising my duties in Berlin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what do you know about this question -of Leningrad and the Navy? -<span class='pageno' title='321' id='Page_321'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I recall that at the so-called daily discussions -regarding the general situation one of the officers of the Naval -Operations Staff reported on the intentions of the Army regarding -the future of Leningrad—not Petersburg. Whereupon Raeder expressed -the desire that it be kept in mind during the operations that -Leningrad should, under all circumstances, fall intact into our hands, -for he needed shipyards and adjoining territory for naval construction; -and he wished that the Army be informed of the urgency of -this desire, because in view of the ever-increasing danger of air -attacks, we intended to shift part of our shipyard facilities to -the East.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that time we had already begun, if I remember correctly, to -move installations from Emden to the East and wanted, furthermore, -as Raeder wished, to evacuate Wilhelmshaven subsequently and -move the installations there as far to the East as possible. He -emphasized expressly that the city should also be left as undamaged -as possible because otherwise there would be no place for the -workers to live. This is all I can truthfully tell you about the case -of Leningrad.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know that this wish of Raeder’s was -rejected by Hitler because he said it was not possible?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not recall that this case was -taken up again. For the operations in the North soon came to a -standstill, I believe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did other high officers tell you anything at all -about this document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I never heard anything about this -document, nor did I see any reason to discuss it with anyone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, if it is agreeable to the Tribunal, -I should like to submit a document which was granted me, Exhibit -Raeder-111, because of its connection with this problem. It is to be -found in my Document Book 6, Page 435. It is an affidavit by Rear -Admiral Hans Bütow, dated 21 March 1946. I should like to read -this document since it is very brief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What page is this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Page 435 in Document Book 6, Exhibit Number -Raeder-111. It reads as follows:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“During the period from 20 June 1941 to 20 October 1941, -namely, the period to which Document USSR-113, (1), UK-45, -refers, I was stationed in Finland as Naval Commander. I was -under Generaladmiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of -Group North. I declare that the document in question, -USSR-113, (1), UK-45, a communication of 29 September 1941 -<span class='pageno' title='322' id='Page_322'></span> -sent by the Naval Operations Staff to Group North, and its -contents have never come to my knowledge, as it doubtless -would have if Generaladmiral Carls had passed on the letter -to the offices subordinate to him. As far as I know, no one -else in my command received this communication.</p> - -<p>“I myself first obtained knowledge of this order of Hitler’s -in November 1945 on the occasion of a conversation with -Dr. Siemers, the defense counsel for Admiral Raeder.</p> - -<p>“Other officers, especially other naval commanders, have -never spoken to me about this order. It is thus clear that the -other commanders likewise had no knowledge of this order.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then there is the certification and the signature of the senior -naval judge before whom this affidavit was made.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Admiral, then I should like to turn to a new topic, the alleged -war of aggression which Raeder is supposed to have planned against -America. Did Raeder at any time try to instigate Japan to a war -against America?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, never. We never had any military -discussions with Japan at all before her entry into the war. Quite -on the contrary, he warned Hitler against war with America in -view of England’s naval superiority and her co-operation with -America.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: For what reasons did you, Raeder, and the High -Command especially, warn Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, for the reasons which I outlined -before, reasons of over-all strategy which motivated Raeder -during the entire course of the war. Raeder considered the enemy -on the sea primarily, and not on land. If the largest sea power -in the world were added to England, which was already superior, -then the war would have taken on unbearable proportions for us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Besides, through the reports of our naval attaché in Washington, -Vice Admiral Witthöft, Raeder was very well informed about the -tremendous potential at the disposal of the United States.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I might also say with reference to the conversion of the normal -economy into a war economy, that the tremendous outlay of shipyards -and installations, as Witthöft stated a few months before the -war, permitted the construction of a million tons of shipping each -month. These figures were very eloquent and were naturally at the -same time a terrible warning to us not to underestimate the armament -potential of the United States.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution believes it must draw a contrary -conclusion from the fact that Raeder on 18 March 1941, according -to the War Diary, proposed that Japan should attack Singapore. -<span class='pageno' title='323' id='Page_323'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, that was an absolutely -correct measure and a correct proposal, which was in line with -Raeder’s reasoning. He was interested in dealing blows to England’s -important strategic centers. That he tried to ease our situation is -understandable and self-evident. But at no time did he propose that -Japan should enter into a war against America, but rather against -England.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were there any discussions about these strategic -questions at that time between you and Raeder on the one hand -and Japanese military authorities on the other?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I have already stated that before -Japan’s entry into the war no military discussions with Japan had -ever taken place. The Japanese attitude was very reserved.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder ever discuss the fact that Japan -should attack Pearl Harbor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. We heard about this for the first time -over the radio.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, during the time of your activity in the -High Command of the Navy or during your activity as a commanding -admiral at Trondheim did you have any knowledge about -the treatment of Allied prisoners of war by the German Navy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might reply that I know of no case in -which Allied prisoners of war, as long as they were under the control -of the Navy, were treated other than properly and chivalrously. I -could refer to the testimony given by the English commander of the -midget U-boat, which attacked the <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span> in the Alta Fjord, who -after his return to England from imprisonment, gave a press interview -on the occasion of his being awarded the Victoria Cross. In -this interview he mentioned the particularly chivalrous and correct -treatment he had received at the hands of the commander of the -<span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>From my own command in Norway I could mention a case in -which members of the Norwegian resistance movement dressed in -civilian clothing were treated just as chivalrously and correctly. I -had to investigate these cases in the presence of British authorities, -and the correctness of the treatment became evident.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When did you have to investigate this at the -order of the British Military Government?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After the capitulation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, not the Military Government, -but the British Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The British Navy at Trondheim, while I -was a commanding admiral. -<span class='pageno' title='324' id='Page_324'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And the cases which were investigated there, -first by you and then by the competent British admiral, were not -contested?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Were not contested. The naval officer -handed them over to me for safekeeping, and I had to present the -findings of the courts of inquiry in writing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And the result...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The result was good, proper, and occasioned -no protests.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And the result was presented to the competent -British officer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it was on his very order that I had -to do it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the case of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> has been dealt -with here in detail and is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, in -order to save time, I should like merely to touch this case in -passing. I should like you to tell me: Did the High Command know, -did you and Raeder know, at the beginning of September 1939 that -the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> had been sunk by a German U-boat?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. The Commander of U-boats reported -on the 3d that the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> could not have been sunk by a German -U-boat since, if I remember correctly, the nearest boat was about -70 nautical miles away.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When did you learn that a German U-boat had -sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe 2 or 3 weeks afterwards, after -this U-boat returned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I should like to refer to a document, -according to which the date was 27 September.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Do you know that a declaration had -been made by State Secretary Von Weizsäcker on 3, 4, or 5 September -to the effect that it was not a German U-boat? When it was -established that it actually had been a German U-boat, what did -Raeder do about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The assumption that it had not been a -German U-boat was at first justified and State Secretary Von Weizsäcker -therefore acted in the best of faith, as did we. After this -regrettable mistake became known, Raeder reported this fact to -Hitler. Hitler then gave the order that he did not want the statement -which had been made by the Foreign Office denied. He ordered -that the participants, that is those who knew, should give their oath -to remain silent until, I believe, the end of the war. -<span class='pageno' title='325' id='Page_325'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you give your oath of silence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I personally did not give my oath of -silence, and neither did Admiral Raeder. In the High Command we -were the only ones, I believe, with the exception of Admiral Fricke -who had knowledge of that, and we should probably have taken -the oath.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: At Hitler’s order you were obliged to administer -an oath to the others who knew about this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I am of the opinion that it was the -crew of the U-boat, insofar as they knew about this mistake.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not -having gone to Freiherr Von Weizsäcker to tell him that it actually -was a German U-boat and of not having said to the American naval -attaché, “I am sorry; it was a German U-boat after all.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Such thoughts occurred to us as well, but -we thought that any discrepancies which might arise and lead to -political ill-humor in America were to be avoided as much as possible. -Stirring up this case once more would have greatly aroused -public feeling. I remember, for instance, the <span class='it'>Lusitania</span> case during -the first World War. To have stirred up this case again after a few -weeks and to arouse public opinion, and then to force entry into -the war would have had little sense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And that was the train of thought which caused -Hitler to issue this decree?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It was the train of thought which we also -shared.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You said it was not to be stirred up again but -regrettably, as you know, this case was stirred up again. On 23 October -1939 in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> a very unfortunate article -appeared with the heading “Churchill Sinks the Athenia.” Do you -remember that article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. That article was published -without Raeder’s knowledge and without the knowledge or -complicity of the Navy. Even today I do not know yet who the -author of the article was. It originated in the Propaganda Ministry, -and Raeder and the rest of us in the High Command of the Navy -were most indignant, not so much because this topic was being -stirred up again, but rather because of the tenor of the article for -whether deliberately or unintentionally—we did not know which it -was—there was a misrepresentation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We were obliged to keep silence. To what extent the Propaganda -Ministry had been informed about this matter by Hitler, we -<span class='pageno' title='326' id='Page_326'></span> -did not know. We also had no opportunity to speak with the Propaganda -Ministry about this case and we were completely surprised -when this article appeared several weeks later in the <span class='it'>Völkischer -Beobachter</span>. We were therefore deeply indignant, especially Raeder, -because it was fundamentally against his principles that leading -foreign statesmen be attacked in a caustic manner; and, in addition, -the facts were completely distorted. And besides—this may also be -important—this involved Raeder’s opponent whom Raeder did not -in the least wish to disparage before the German public, for Raeder -took him only too seriously; and this was, I believe, no other than -Churchill.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question: Did the Propaganda -Ministry call you or Raeder up before this article appeared?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to turn to the last question -of my examination. This is the last point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is about the sixth final -question you have asked.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, the translation -must have been wrong. The previous question was the final question -on the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> problem. Now, this is actually the final question -which I wish to put.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] The Prosecution accuses Admiral -Raeder of not supporting Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch after -the latter had been exonerated and acquitted in court and accuses -Raeder of not having used his influence to reinstate Fritsch in office -and restore his dignity. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. Raeder gave me -all the files of the legal proceedings against Generaloberst Von -Fritsch sometime in the beginning of 1939 to be kept in the safe. At -that time he told me how the course of the proceedings had impressed -him and also of the fact that he had made Generaloberst -Von Fritsch the offer of a complete reinstatement, going so far as to -have him reinstated in his previous office. Von Fritsch thanked him -for that and told him personally that he would never assume his -former office again, that he would not even consider returning after -what had happened, for which reason he was requesting Raeder not -to make any efforts in this direction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Besides, Fritsch and Raeder were on good personal terms—to say -that they were friends is going perhaps too far, but I have often -seen Fritsch at Raeder’s house even after his dismissal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you, Admiral.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, I have no further questions. -<span class='pageno' title='327' id='Page_327'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ -counsel want to ask any questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Schulte-Mönting, -you just spoke about the correct treatment of prisoners in connection -with a U-boat attack on the <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>. Do you mean by that the -attack in November 1943 in the Alta Fjord?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is the one I mean.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it a two-man -U-boat?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Whether it was a two-man or three-man -U-boat, I do not know, but it was a midget U-boat. Several U-boats -attacked simultaneously. Some of them were sunk, and the commander -who successfully, I believe, placed his magnetic mine was -taken prisoner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And this commander -was treated according to the Geneva convention?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Absolutely.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you first about the -<span class='it'>Athenia</span> episode. I take it you agree that the article in the <span class='it'>Völkischer -Beobachter</span> was thoroughly dishonorable, lying, and discreditable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I heard nothing at all in German.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I will repeat my question. With regard to the -<span class='it'>Athenia</span>—do you hear me now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: With regard to the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> -article on the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, do you agree that it was a thoroughly dishonorable -publication?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I agree that it was a dishonorable -publication, untrue and dishonorable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Perhaps if you keep your headphones on—I -have a number of questions to ask you, I am afraid—it might be -more convenient for the work we have to do.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And you say that the Defendant Raeder thought it was dishonorable?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he did as well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: What action did he take to manifest his displeasure?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In this case he valued the interests of the -State more than a newspaper article. The interests of the State -<span class='pageno' title='328' id='Page_328'></span> -required that in any event all complications with the United States -were to be avoided.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That appears to be a characteristic on the part -of Raeder that runs throughout the history from 1928 to 1943, that -throughout he put what he thought were the interests of the Nazi -State before conditions of morality, honor, and public decency, is -that not so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I do not believe. I believe that in -this he acted consistently as a good patriot would act.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You see, with regard to the invasion of Russia, -for example, you said to the Tribunal that on both moral and -strategic grounds, Raeder was against the invasion of Russia. Why -did he not resign?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: By way of reply I must mention first -Hitler’s answer to Raeder’s statements against a war with Russia. -This answer was to the effect that he saw no possibility of avoiding -a conflict for the following reasons:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First, because of the personal impression which he, Hitler, had -received from Molotov’s visit, which had taken place in the meantime. -By “in the meantime” I mean between the directive and the -carrying through of the directive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Secondly, the fact that allegedly the economic negotiations had -not only been dragged out by the Russians but, as Hitler expressed -it, had been conducted with blackmail methods.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thirdly, as he had been informed by the German General Staff. -Russian troop deployment had taken on such threatening proportions -that he, Hitler, could not wait for the first blow from the other -side because of the air threat to Brandenburg and the capital and to -the Silesian industry. Raeder then, of course, had to realize that he -could not refute these arguments or prove the opposite.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You are not suggesting that you thought that -the war between Germany and Russia was a defensive war so far -as Germany was concerned, are you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, we were of the opinion that the -deployment of troops on both sides had reached such an extreme -point that it would not take long for the storm to burst, and that -from the military point of view anyone who sees that a conflict is -inevitable, naturally likes to have the advantages which result from -dealing the first blow.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: The invasion of Russia was a brutal aggression -on the part of Nazi Germany, you admit that now, do you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I do admit that. -<span class='pageno' title='329' id='Page_329'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want you to turn your mind for a moment, if -you will, to Document L-79, which is in the British Document -Book 10, Page 74. Those are the minutes of the Hitler conference -on 23 May 1939 which you discussed in your evidence-in-chief this -morning. I take it that you have read those minutes, Witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I look at them now? I have never -seen these minutes before. If I were to be asked about them, I -would first have to read them in toto.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Well, you need not trouble to do that, Witness. -You gave evidence this morning as to Raeder’s discussion with you -about this conference. Did Raeder tell you that Hitler had said on -23 May 1939, for instance:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with -the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. -We cannot expect a repetition of the Czechoslovakian -affair. There will be war.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then further, Page 76 of the report:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement -with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict... -England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England -will be a life and death struggle.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then the next paragraph but one:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed -force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I am suggesting to you that those statements of Hitler’s -represented Hitler’s considered policy, and that that policy was in -fact carried out in the field of action. Is that not so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, I must correct a mistake. I -thought that you had shown me a record on Russia and not the one -on Poland. I saw it in different writing, and I thought it was another -record. If it is the same record which I mentioned this morning, -then I must state again that Raeder did not agree with the belligerent -wording of these minutes as written down by Schmundt.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Just one moment, Witness, if you please. I have -read out certain extracts from that document, which I take it that -you heard interpreted. Do you agree with me that those extracts -represented Hitler’s considered policy at the time and that that -policy was in fact carried out in the field of action?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If you keep your headphones on—I know it is difficult. Just -move them back if you wish to talk. Now, see if you can answer my -question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to remark in this connection -that Hitler in his speeches pursued a certain purpose. In preparations -<span class='pageno' title='330' id='Page_330'></span> -for war he saw a means of political pressure, and in the phrase -“war of nerves” (which was not used in Germany only, but went -everywhere through the ether far beyond Europe’s boundaries) he -tried to find a means of preventing war as well as a means of -exerting pressure. This document itself contains contradictions -which lead to the conclusion that he himself could not seriously -have thought that a war would develop. I can prove this by saying, -for example, that he states that the General Staff or the general -staffs are not to concern themselves with this question; but toward -the end he says that all the branches of the Wehrmacht must get -together to study the problem. He says that a war with Poland must -in no event result in war with England; politics must see to that. -But in the next paragraph one reads: “But if a war actually does -arise, I shall deal short sharp blows for a quick decision.” In the -next paragraph it says again, “But I need 10 to 15 years to prepare,” -and in the concluding paragraph it says: “The construction program -of the Navy will in no wise be changed.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If, therefore, Hitler at that time had really been serious in his -speech, that is, that an armed conflict with Poland would result -shortly, then he would not have exclaimed first that we would have -time until 1943 and, secondly, that there were to be no changes as -far as the Navy was concerned. Rather he would have said to -Raeder, privately at least: “In all haste prepare a strong U-boat -program because I do not know what course events will take.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But it is a fact that at about this time, the -Fall Weiss operation was being prepared to the very last detail, was -it not? That is the operation against Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The operation was prepared to such a -stage that when it was canceled at the last minute we thought that -we would not be able to reach our forces at sea by wireless. We -considered this an extreme policy of exerting pressure in the form -of a war of nerves. Since at the last minute everything was canceled -we believed without doubt that it was only a means of pressure and -not an entry into war. Not until we heard the cannons were we -convinced that the war was no longer to be prevented. I personally -believe...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: If you would shorten your answers as best you -can, it would be very convenient.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want to go from Poland to Norway. The first conference of -the Defendant Raeder with regard to Norway took place on 10 October, -you have told us. I want you to hear the record of that conference, -which is found in Admiral Assmann’s headline diary. It -is dated 10 October 1939: -<span class='pageno' title='331' id='Page_331'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states conquering the -Belgian coast no advantage for U-boat warfare; refers to -value of Norwegian bases.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I suggest to you that the interests of the German Navy in Norway -from the point of view of requiring submarine bases was manifesting -itself at that time; is that not so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I look at this document first? It is -unknown to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You shall see the original diary, if you want to -reassure yourself that I am reading it correctly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was handed to the witness.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In this sentence, I do not see any belligerent -intentions. It says expressly that he attaches importance to -the winning of Norwegian bases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That is all I am putting to you at the moment. -And do you know that on 3 October the Defendant Raeder was -sending out a questionnaire upon the possibility of extending the -operational base to the north, and upon the bases that it would be -desirable for German power to acquire?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am referring to Document C-122, My Lord. The document -C-122 is in Document Book 10a at Page 91.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If you will look at that document, Witness, you will see in the -second sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases -in Norway with the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, -with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic -and operational position. The following questions are to be -examined...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then there follow these questions:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“What places in Norway can be considered as bases?</p> - -<p>“Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s will, -if it is impossible to achieve this without fighting?</p> - -<p>“What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?</p> - -<p>“Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases, -or do they possibly have decisive advantages simply as supply -centers? (The Commander of U-boats considers such harbors -extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic -U-boats on temporary stops.)”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then finally:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“What decisive advantages would there be for the conduct of -the war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, for -instance, Skagen?”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='332' id='Page_332'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I suggest to you that those documents are the clue to the -German invasion of Norway. Do you not agree with that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not see any aggressive intentions -in these purely operational plans and considerations when thinking -of what bases might come into consideration for the conduct of the -war. This morning I said that, to the best of my knowledge, Generaladmiral -Carls as early as September sent a letter to this effect -to Raeder in which he expressed his concern and stated his -strategical ideas and plans in case of an Allied occupation of Norway.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: The source of the information which the Defendant -Raeder was receiving you discussed this morning, but one -source that you did not give wets the Norwegian traitor Quisling. -The relations between the Defendant Raeder and him were very -close, were they not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: There was no contact at all between -Raeder and Quisling until December 1939; then Raeder met Quisling -for the first time in his life and never saw him again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But after December Quisling’s agent Hagelin -was a very frequent visitor of the Defendant Raeder, was he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Hagelin ever went -to Raeder before Quisling’s visit, unless I am very mistaken. I think -he visited Raeder for the first time when he accompanied Quisling.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Yes, but thereafter Raeder was in very close -touch with the Quisling movement, the Quisling treachery, was -he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. Raeder had nothing at all to do with -the Quisling movement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Do you know a man, Erich Giese, Walter Georg -Erich Giese, who was an administrative employee of the adjutancy -of the supreme commander of the Navy in Berlin?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not quite catch the name.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Giese, G-i-e-s-e. He was a—part of his -duties were to receive the visitors of the supreme commander. He -was an assistant of the supreme commander’s adjutant and he was -dismissed from his post in April 1942. And no doubt you recollect -the man.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Will you please tell me the name again? -Although it was spelled to me I did not catch it. Is this a Norwegian?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: This is a German subject, an employee of the -supreme command of the Navy. Part of his duties were to receive -all the supreme commander’s visitors, to accept applications for -<span class='pageno' title='333' id='Page_333'></span> -interviews, and draw up the list of callers for the supreme commander. -Now you are looking at an affidavit from this man, Document -D-722, to be Exhibit GB-479.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness answered the question yet?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Not yet, My Lord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Now I have the name. The man of whom -you are talking was in the reception room of the adjutant’s office. -It was not up to this man, who was to be admitted to the Admiral; -that was up to me. I asked the callers for what reason they had -come. Mr. Hagelin did not visit Raeder before Quisling’s visit, that -is, not before December 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I am not suggesting that but what I am suggesting -is that after December 1939 there was a very close link -between Raeder and the Quisling movement. I just read out to you -this extract from the affidavit of this man. From Page 3, My Lord, -of the English text:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I can state the following about the preparations which led up -to the action against Denmark and Norway: An appointment -with the Commander-in-Chief was frequently made for a -Mr. Hagelin and another gentleman, whose name I cannot -recall at present, by a party official of Rosenberg’s Foreign -Political Office; as a rule they were received immediately. -I also had received instructions that if a Mr. Hagelin should -announce himself personally, I should always take him to the -Commander-in-Chief at once. Shortly afterwards I learned -from the minute book and from conversations in my room -that he was a Norwegian confidential agent. The gentleman -from the Foreign Political Office who frequently accompanied -him and whose name I do not remember at the moment also -conversed with me and confided in me, so that I learned -about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and about the preparations -for the Norway campaign. According to all I heard -I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from -Raeder and met with Hitler’s heartiest approval. The whole -enterprise was disguised by the pretense of an enterprise -against Holland and England. One day Quisling, too, was -announced at the Commander-in-Chief’s by Hagelin and was -received immediately. Korvettenkapitän Schreiber of the -Naval Reserve, who was later naval attaché in Oslo and -knew the conditions in Norway very well, also played a role -in all these negotiations. He collaborated with the Quisling -party and its agents in Oslo.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It is not true that Mr. Hagelin was -received by Admiral Raeder. Herr Giese cannot possibly have any -<span class='pageno' title='334' id='Page_334'></span> -information about that because he was stationed two rooms away. -If he had perhaps noted down that he was received by me, that -would in a certain sense be correct. The fact is that at the time, -after the Quisling-Hagelin visit, I had said that if he were to pass -through Berlin again and he had any naval political information in -this connection, I should like him to make this information available -to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that Defendant Raeder never -met Hagelin?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He did not meet him before Quisling’s -visit in December. Later he did not receive him any more.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But he in fact received Hagelin and took him -to Hitler on 14 December 1939, did he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was accompanied by Quisling, that is -correct. But he did not have any special discussion with Raeder -alone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You said—you spoke this morning as to a conference -between Quisling and Raeder on 12 December 1939 and -suggested that politics were not discussed at that conference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: By the word “politics” I mean politics in -the National Socialistic sense, that is, National Socialistic politics -on the Norwegian side and on our side. The matters discussed were -only naval political questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But I will not go into a discussion of the -question of politics with you. I will consider the familiar German -definition that politics is a continuation of war by other means. -But if you look at the Document C-64 you will see that political -problems were discussed on 12 December. You see that is a report -of Raeder to Hitler. It is found on Page 31 of the Document -Book 10a, in which Raeder writes in Paragraph 2:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling -in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England’s influence -is very great, especially because of Hambro, the President of -the Storting (a Jew and a friend of Hore-Belisha) who is all-powerful -in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there -is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible -occupation of Norway, in which case Sweden would also stand -against Germany. Danger of Norway’s occupation by England -is very great—possibly very shortly. From 11 January 1940 -on, the Storting and thereby the Norwegian Government is -unconstitutional since the Storting, in defiance of the constitution, -has prolonged its term for a year.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Politics was very much under discussion at that conference, was -it not? You have said that the Defendant Raeder was anxious for -<span class='pageno' title='335' id='Page_335'></span> -peace with Norway. Was it for peace with a Norway ruled by the -traitor Quisling?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In reply to your first question I should -like to say that in the minutes it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out that in connection -with such offers we can never know to what extent the -persons involved want to further their own party aims, and to -what extent they are concerned about German interests. -Hence caution is required.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This entry in the document which you have just presented to -me corroborates what I was trying to say, that is, that no party -matters or matters depending on agreement along ideological lines -were to be settled between Admiral Raeder and Quisling. For this -reason I said that Raeder did not discuss politics with him, but -merely factual matters. That Quisling, at the time of his introduction, -should mention certain things as a sort of preamble is self-evident. -But he points out the factor of caution and asks: “What -does this man want? Does he want to work with the Party or does -he really want to remain aloof?”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder was preferring -the reports of Quisling to the reports of the German -Ambassador in Oslo which were entirely different from the reports -of the traitor Quisling. That is so, is it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe that Raeder never saw the -reports from the German Ambassador in Oslo. I at any rate do not -know these reports.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Now the Tribunal has the documents with -regard to that matter. I will not pursue it. I want to ask you next -about the relations with the United States of America. When did -the German Admiralty first know of Japan’s intention to attack the -United States?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I can speak only for Raeder and myself. -As far as I know, it was not until the moment of the attack on -Pearl Harbor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But you had received a communication from -your German naval attaché at Tokyo before the attack on Pearl -Harbor, indicating that an attack against the United States was -pending, had you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Pearl Harbor? No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But against the United States forces. Just look -at the Document D-872, which will be Exhibit GB-480. You see -that those are extracts from the war diary of the German naval -attaché in Tokyo. The first entry is dated 3 December 1941: -<span class='pageno' title='336' id='Page_336'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“1800 hours. The naval attaché extended an invitation to -several officers of the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires -from the conversation that the negotiations in Washington -must be regarded as having broken down completely and that, -quite obviously, the beginning of actions to the south by the -Japanese Armed Forces is to be expected in the near future.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then on 6 December 1941:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Conversation with Fregattenkapitän Shiba.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the -following telegram:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Naval Attaché, 1251. Military Secret:</p> - -<p>“1. Last week America offered a nonaggression pact between -the United States, England, Russia and Japan. In view of the -Tripartite Pact and the high counterdemands, Japan rejected -this offer. Negotiations have therefore completely broken -down.</p> - -<p>“2. The Armed Forces foresaw this development and consented -to Kurusu’s being sent only to impress the people with -the fact that all means had been exhausted.</p> - -<p>“3. The Armed Forces have already decided 3 weeks ago that -war is inevitable, even if the United States at the last minute -should make substantial concessions. Appropriate measures -are under way.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then—I will not read the whole document, and at the end -it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“A state of war with Britain and America would certainly -exist by Christmas.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Assuming that signal reached you before 8 December, you -became familiar with the plans of the perfidious Japanese attack -upon the United States, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not quite grasp it. I have already -said that we had no contact with the Japanese experts or attachés in -Berlin. I asserted that we first learned of the Pearl Harbor incident -by radio, and I cannot quite see what difference it makes whether -on 6 December the attaché in Tokyo told us his predictions, or -whether he was drawing conclusions about a future conflict from -information sources which we could not control. That has nothing -to do with our having advised the Japanese in Berlin to attack -America.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you had no conversations -in Berlin with the Japanese attaché?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To my knowledge there were no official -conferences between the two admiralty staffs, that is, official -<span class='pageno' title='337' id='Page_337'></span> -operational conferences between the Naval Operations Staff and the -Japanese admiralty staff.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, before you part from that -document, I think you ought to read Paragraph 5.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Paragraph 5, My Lord, reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“5. Addition—Naval Attaché.</p> - -<p>“No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the -commencement of the southern offensive. All the evidence, -however, indicates that it may be expected to start within -3 weeks, with simultaneous attacks on Siam, the Philippines -and Borneo.</p> - -<p>“6. The Ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of -the telegram, but is acquainted with its contents.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now I want to...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: With reference to what the witness has just -said, I do not know whether I understood him right before, but -what I took down he said was that the German Admiralty first -knew of Japan’s intention to attack, after Pearl Harbor, not that it -first knew of Pearl Harbor by radio. It was the first indication they -had of an intention to attack.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That is so, My Lord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] I am suggesting to you, Witness, that -you knew perfectly well of the Japanese intention to attack the -United States before the incident of Pearl Harbor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not know whether you are stressing -Pearl Harbor, or the fact that 2 days before the attack on Pearl -Harbor we received a telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conflict -was to be counted on. I was asked whether we had known of -the fact of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and to that I said: “No.” -I said that we had had no conferences in Berlin between the Naval -Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff. What you are -presenting to me...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I just want to deal with that, but I want to -read out to you what your Commander-in-Chief said about that, -because it is not what you are saying, you know. On the interrogation -of Admiral Raeder on 10 November 1945 (Document -D-880, GB-483) he was asked:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Question: Would such matters be accomplished by Foreign -Office people alone, or would that be in collaboration with -the High Command of the Navy and OKW?”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And Defendant Raeder’s answer was:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“No, the negotiations were conducted by the Foreign Office -and on the part of the Japanese diplomats there was this -<span class='pageno' title='338' id='Page_338'></span> -delegate, Oshima, who was an officer. He negotiated with -the Foreign Office in his capacity as delegate, but apart -from that he was enough of an expert to look at this -thing from a military standpoint as well. Military authorities -had long before that carried on negotiations with military -and naval attachés about the needs and other things that -the Japanese needed... This was all talked about and -thrashed out with the military and naval attachés.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is a very different version of the fact from the version -you have given, Witness, is it not? Now, there are two more -matters which I want to deal with.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not know whether it will be convenient, My Lord, to have -a brief adjournment.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the -extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder which I -read I wanted to be clear that the defendant was then dealing -with the relationship generally between the German authorities -in Berlin and the Japanese representatives. I do not want to have -given the Court the impression it was a direct negotiation with -regard to intervention against America itself. I do not want to -mislead the Court in any way with regard to that matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Did you know of the shooting in -December 1942 by a naval unit belonging to the German naval -officer in command at Bordeaux of two British Royal Marines who -took part in a raid on shipping in the Gironde estuary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I learned of that later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did you see the entry with regard to that -shooting in the SKL War Diary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, here in Nuremberg the defendant’s -counsel showed me an entry, but I do not know whether it was the -War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: It has been suggested by both counsel for -the Defendant Dönitz and counsel for the Defendant Raeder that -the entry in D-658 which contained the sentence: “The measure -would be in accordance with the Führer’s special order, but is -nevertheless something new in international law since these soldiers -were in uniform,” that that entry was not from the SKL War -Diary. Now, you are familiar with the initial of the Defendant -Raeder, are you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want you now to look at the original of D-658, so that it may -be established beyond peradventure that this matter was entered -<span class='pageno' title='339' id='Page_339'></span> -in the SKL War Diary. I will put in a photostatic copy of the -original if the Tribunal will allow me, because the original is -required for other purposes. D-658 was GB-229, and it may be -convenient to call the photostats of the originals D-658(a) and -GB-229(a). That is the War Diary of the SKL, is it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I recognize it as such.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And the SKL was perfectly familiar with that -dreadful murder of the men at Bordeaux, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From the War Diary I can see—such is -my impression—that afterward on 9 December they were informed -about the fact of the shooting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And their laconic comment was...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the Armed Forces communiqué it -says: “According to the Armed Forces communiqué, the two soldiers -have been shot in the meantime.” This can be seen in the War -Diary of the SKL and I acknowledged it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And the humane comment of the SKL is, “It -is something new in international law, since the soldiers were in -uniform.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is one final matter which I wish to ask you about: Is it -your contention that the German Navy fought a clean war at sea?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I contend that the German Navy fought -a very clean war and that has nothing to do with the fact that it -is said here in the Diary of the SKL, as taken from the Armed -Forces communiqué, that two soldiers were shot and that this was -in accordance with the special order given by the Führer which -has been cited but, as the Naval Operations Staff adds, was something -new in the history of naval warfare. This too...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I am turning to another matter, but you say -generally...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I just say in conclusion that this -postscript has been confirmed and that the Navy, in this case -Raeder, had no influence on these matters. If you ask me whether -I approved that order or something of the sort I would give you -my personal opinion of the matters which Raeder and I discussed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But you know Raeder was Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy, and who would have influence in Germany if -the commanders-in-chief did not have influence? Here was a matter -directly reflecting on the honor of German Armed Forces and -despite that deliberate denial of the protection of the Geneva Convention -for those British marines he continued in office, after they -were deliberately murdered. -<span class='pageno' title='340' id='Page_340'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a matter of opinion. I may take -the following stand: The fact is that in this war, for the first time, -a form of sabotage was applied, whether behind the lines by means -of air landings or otherwise.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Just a moment. These were marines in uniform. -Your own report in the SKL War Diary says so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have to comment on that order which -was issued earlier. The preamble of that order said that, since there -was knowledge of orders to the Allied soldiers or—I do not -remember the exact wording any more—since these soldiers were -given orders not to bother taking German prisoners but rather -to shoot them while carrying out their work in the so-called Commando -raids, the following directives had to be issued.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that time I discussed this matter with Raeder, of course, and -I can merely state my personal opinion. I felt that I could believe -this preamble because I am of the opinion that if I resorted to, let -us say, sabotage behind the lines then of course I could not be -bothered with taking prisoners, because then the element of surprise -would be excluded. If, therefore, a troop of three to five -men, a so-called Commando undertaking, is sent behind the lines -in order to destroy enemy installations, then of course they cannot -burden themselves with prisoners without running the risk of being -killed themselves or of being recognized before they can carry out -their undertaking. Therefore I considered this preamble quite -credible and I expressly said so at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And you think that that shooting of those two -marines was therefore perfectly justified? That is your position on -this matter, is it not? Just say “yes” or “no” on that; I will not -argue with you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have not asserted that in any way. -Rather I said, here is a fact of which we were informed only by -the Armed Forces communiqué, and that Raeder and the High -Command had not been heard on this point. That is what I stated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Now, the final matter I wanted to ask you -about, you have indicated that in your opinion Germany fought -a clean war at sea. I want you to look at the new Document D-873 -which will be GB-481, which is the log book of U-boat <span class='it'>U-71</span>, under -the date line 21 June 1941, when the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief -of the German Navy. You see the entry reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Sighted lifeboat of the Norwegian motor tanker <span class='it'>John -P. Pederson</span> drifting under sail. Three survivors were lying -exhausted under a tarpaulin and only showed themselves as -the U-boat was moving away again. They stated that their -ship had been torpedoed 28 days before. I turned down their -<span class='pageno' title='341' id='Page_341'></span> -request to be taken aboard, provisioned the boat with food -and water and gave them the course and distance to the Icelandic -coast. Boat and crew were in a state that, in view of -the prevailing weather, offered hardly any prospects of -rescue.”—Signed: “Flachsenberg.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Is that your conception of a clean war at sea?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I observe that the commanding officer -did what he could, in view of the weather which he described -when he said that in view of the bad weather he could not rescue -them. He threw provisions to them in a sack and gave them the -course to the coast. I do not know what there is about that that -is inhumane. If he had left without giving them food and the -course, then you might make that accusation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But he could have taken them aboard, you -know. These were three men who did...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I believe you cannot judge that. -Only the commanding officer himself can judge that, the man in -charge of the U-boat. I would have to look at the weather, because -it says here “Medium swell.” That could also...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But you see here the U-boat commander must -have spoken to these people and physically it must have been possible -to take them aboard, but he left them to their fate, you know, -knowing quite well he was leaving them to die.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all. Then he would not have -needed to give them any food and to give them the course to the -coast. What makes you think that they had to die? By the way...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: The last sentence is a clear indication that the -U-boat captain knew he was leaving them to die. I am suggesting -to you that he could have taken them aboard and should have -done so if he had the elements of humanity in him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; I do not know the condition of the -U-boat, whether the boat was in a position to take prisoners on -board. I believe that you have never seen conditions on a U-boat; -otherwise you would not judge it like that. Considering that the -crew of a U-boat is under water for weeks and uses every last -bit of space and is exposed to the greatest dangers day and -night, one cannot simply say that it would have been a humane -act to take these additional men aboard. Besides, the commander -himself says there was hardly a chance of rescue in view of the -prevailing weather.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions, My Lord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I have some questions concerning a -few points which Mr. Elwyn Jones put to you. An entry was shown -<span class='pageno' title='342' id='Page_342'></span> -to you from the document by Assmann of 10 October 1939 with -the assertion that from this it can be seen that Raeder wanted -to occupy Norway only in order to have Norwegian bases. I should -like to read to you the full entry and I should like you then to -take position to the entire document:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Führer agrees that full use of the only two battleships -which we have at the time should not be made for -the time being. Russia offered bases near Murmansk...</p> - -<p>“Question of siege of England: Führer and Commander-in-Chief -of Navy agree that all objections by neutrals have -to be rejected, even in view of the danger of entry of U.S.A. -into the war which seems certain if the war keeps on.</p> - -<p>“The more brutally the war is conducted the sooner the effect, -the shorter the war.</p> - -<p>“Capacity for large U-boat production program. Führer -rejects suggestion to have submarines built by or bought -from Russia for political reasons. Commander-in-Chief of -Navy states no advantages to be won for the U-boat war by -conquest of Belgian coast; refers to the value of winning -Norwegian bases—Trondheim—with the help of Russian -pressure. Führer will consider the question.” (Document -D-879, Exhibit GB-482)</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Admiral, according to the entire contents, is this a complete -clarification of the Norwegian problem?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Am I right in concluding that here a great -number of questions are treated and only one strategic question -with reference to Norway...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship pleases, the translation came -through as, “no advantage of occupation of Norwegian bases” and -the translation which is in the document is “Raeder stresses importance -of obtaining Norwegian bases.” Perhaps if there might be -a careful—I am not saying this in any critical sense—a very careful -translation of the entry, it might be important.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the—did you give that an exhibit -number?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord. That is the entry from Assmann’s -headline diary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is. But I want to know the -exhibit number.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I will have an extract made and the exhibit -number given this evening, My Lord. -<span class='pageno' title='343' id='Page_343'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It would be GB-482, would it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Yes, My Lord, that is it; GB-482.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is the same date; I beg your -pardon if it does not agree; but the document from which I read -I received through the courtesy of Mr. Elwyn Jones.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You had better go into the question of translation -and get that settled.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Yes, Your Lordship.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, Admiral, both entries are 10 October, -that is, of the same conference. Am I right in saying that consequently -there were many strategic questions, not one of which -can be said to have been treated completely and conclusively?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I believe that this complex of -questions has nothing to do with the comprehensive discussion -between Hitler and Raeder concerning the occupation of Norway. -The Norwegian question was touched upon, the occupation of -Norway, and then a few points brought up for discussion which -Raeder usually jotted down in his notebook. Apart from the -question whether an occupation of Norway was necessary or not, -the possibility of conquering bases outside German territory was -accidentally touched on the same day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Therefore, Murmansk which had been offered -by Russia was discussed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From Russia to Belgium—all along the -coast, wherever there were possibilities and advantages for our -submarine strategy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If in the War Diary a sentence in connection -with a conference between Raeder and Hitler is in quotation marks, -does that mean that these words were used by Hitler? Can one -assume that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If it says...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship please, the translation has -now been checked, and the original reading of “Raeder stresses -the importance of obtaining Norwegian bases” appears to be a perfectly -correct translation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Siemers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I understood, Dr. Siemers; shall I speak -about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, did you want to add something to that -point?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I understand that the other gentleman -just pointed out that Raeder allegedly called Hitler’s attention -<span class='pageno' title='344' id='Page_344'></span> -to the necessity of acquiring submarine bases and in that connection -once spoke about Russian assistance and also about the possibility -of acquiring bases from Norway. But that does not reveal -any aggressive intentions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to save time, I also asked -Dr. Kranzbühler to check the translation. The German text as I -should like to point out right now says: “The Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy points out the value of winning Norwegian bases.” -That is something different from the English translation. But I -should like to come back to this later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Admiral, Mr. Elwyn Jones then submitted -the affidavit of Walter Giese. I should be grateful if you -would look at it again. It is D-722. The first line reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I was born at Stettin on 24 November 1900, the son of a -bricklayer’s foreman, Ernst Giese.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I sat in the reception room of the Commander-in-Chief as -assistant to the adjutant.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then it says, in the same paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I received the minute book from the adjutant at midday -after the conferences had ended and locked it up in the -general safe.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then it says on the second page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I did not have much contact with the Commander-in-Chief -personally. This consisted merely in my submitting to him -or fetching from him top-secret correspondence.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Admiral, am I right in assuming, therefore, that Giese was a -sort of messenger?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. In order to save officers we filled -a large number of unimportant positions with civilians, people who -we thought were worthy of our confidence. The care of a safe -or guarding the key was really the task of the second adjutant, -who later had to be used elsewhere.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Giese had been a sergeant in the Navy for many years and for -12 years had been a clerk in the Navy, and therefore had had a -certain amount of practice in keeping files.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All this is stated in the document. If there -is anything inaccurate in the document, you can put it to him. But -it all is set out in the document, exactly as the Admiral said. You -are wasting the time of the Tribunal by repeating it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe what Mr. Elwyn Jones -presented was also in the document. What matters is the question -of interpretation and the witness has been referred to very definite -<span class='pageno' title='345' id='Page_345'></span> -points. If I should be mistaken, I beg your pardon. I believed -that I also had the right in re-examination to refer to certain points -in the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you want to, you can draw our attention -to the paragraphs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHUJLTE-MÖNTING: I can be very brief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Giese had no inside information about the facts, and even if he -had, without permission, looked into the minutes of the adjutant, -which were not a shorthand record but merely notes to aid the -memory of the adjutant, he could never have received the right -impression without having taken part in the conference. And it was -not up to him in the reception room to decide who should be -admitted to the Commander-in-Chief, but rather up to the adjutant -or to me. He did not even know who was to be admitted. And it -is a bold statement or assumption when he says that a man like -Hagelin saw Raeder each time instead of seeing me first. By the -way, Hagelin came to me perhaps four or five times.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe Giese was present when Raeder -talked to Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Giese? No, never. Giese sat in the reception -room and took care of Raeder’s telephone calls.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, nobody here suggests that he -was. Mr. Elwyn Jones was not putting it that this man Giese was -present at talks between Raeder and the Führer or Raeder and -Hagelin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is his affidavit, and in the -affidavit, it says, as I should like to point out now, on Page 5, -“According to all I heard, I can say that the idea of this undertaking -emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler’s joyous agreement.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>How could he know that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might stress that even I as chief of -staff was not present at these private conferences, and Herr Giese -had to stay with the telephone and had no other way of gaining -an insight than by giving his imagination free rein.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That is enough, thank you. I come now to Document -D-872. That is the war diary of the naval attaché in Japan, -in connection with which you were told that you must have known -that Japan would attack America on 7 December. The telegram -which is mentioned here is of 6 December. When could that telegram -have arrived in your office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean, when could I have received -it personally? -<span class='pageno' title='346' id='Page_346'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes; or Raeder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Not before the next morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That would be 7 December.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: At the earliest. In this case, the Chief -of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff would decide whether for -operational reasons that telegram should be presented at once, -or not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you remember that document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is Pearl Harbor mentioned in the document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. I tried to explain that Pearl Harbor -had no connection with that telegram from Admiral Wennecker -at all and that Wennecker depended on sources of information and -on his assumptions or formulated his assumptions in a telegram on -the basis of his information without having any definite facts. Such -telegrams were received continuously. Sometimes these assumptions -were correct; sometimes they were incorrect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted it to -prove that military negotiations had taken place with Japan. Am I -correct in saying that that was only a message concerning possible -developments?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. I have tried before to -explain that there were no military negotiations between the admiralty -staffs. Rather the naval attaché was charged with examining -and transmitting all information of value which came to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then a document was shown you which was not -submitted, an interrogation of Raeder of 10 November 1945. May -I ask to look at the bottom of Page 5 of this document which I -am handing to you and the passage which was read on Page 6?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, that ought to have a -number, ought it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That will be GB-483, My Lord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On that document, Page 5 at the bottom, is -Document C-75 mentioned?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe you are mistaken, Admiral, or else I -have made a mistake.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have an English copy—do you mean the -English one?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the English copy because it does not exist -in German. -<span class='pageno' title='347' id='Page_347'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean the last paragraph?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe the last line or the line before the last. -The page numbers are very hard to read. Maybe you have the -wrong page.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This interrogation, Mr. President, concerns Document C-75. I -believe the witness will find it soon. Mention has been made of -this document recently and in accordance with the wish recently -expressed by the Tribunal, I am submitting C-75; that is Directive -Number 24 about the co-operation with Japan, and the full text is -Document Number Raeder-128. The Tribunal will recall that the -British Delegation...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has it already been put in, C-75, has it -already been put in?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I submit it now, C-75.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, has it already been put in? Has it -already been offered in evidence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You may recall that the Prosecution has submitted -Document C-75 as USA-151...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is all I wanted to know. If it -has already been put in, it does not need a new number, is that not -the position?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that it needs -a new number because only the first part was submitted by the -Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: It has already been exhibited as USA-151, -My Lord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we are not giving fresh numbers, -Dr. Siemers, to parts of documents which had already been -put in. If the document has been put in, then where you want to -use a fresh part of the document it has the same number as the -old number; that is all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But, Mr. President, if the Prosecution in their -document put in only the first three paragraphs then I cannot...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; I know that perfectly well, but -you are perfectly entitled to put in any part of the document. It -is only a question of what number is to be given to it and I think—I -may be wrong—that up to the present we have not given new -numbers to documents once that they have been put in, although -fresh parts of the documents are put in.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the position with regard to C-75 is -that the whole of the original has been put in as USA-151, but only -<span class='pageno' title='348' id='Page_348'></span> -an extract from the original was included in the English document -which was put before the Court.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. All I was concerned with was -the number of the thing. It has got the number USA-151 and I -thought our practice had been that it should continue to have that -number. You can put in any part of it you like, and if it is a -question of translation, no doubt the Prosecution will hand it to the -translation department and have it translated for you; but you -are attempting to give it a new number, that is all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, once more, but I was asked -recently to submit the document anew and that is where the misunderstanding -arose. Under these circumstances, now that I hear -that it has been submitted in its entirety, I can withdraw it; I -should be grateful if the Tribunal were also to receive the complete -translation of the document in English and not only the first two -paragraphs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Admiral, have you found it in the -meantime?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it is on Page 7 as you thought and -not on Page 5. The document refers...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It is right then that the interrogation -refers to Document C-75?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Document C-75, Admiral, is Directive Number 24 -concerning collaboration with Japan, and it says: “The following -rules apply: Our common war aim is to defeat England quickly and -thereby keep the U.S.A. out of the war.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Besides that the document also mentions the fact I referred to -recently, that Singapore should be occupied by Japan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now Raeder, on 10 November ’45 stated his position in respect -to this and, according to the next page of the document, he said -that which Mr. Elwyn Jones has just put to you. May I ask you to -look at it again? It says there, on Page—I thought it was at the -top of Page 6, maybe it is at the top of Page 8...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The top of Page 8. I do not know English -as well as German, but I would translate it: “If that which Japan -needs...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If I remember correctly, the word is “need.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he uses the word “need”—“and -other things, things that the Japanese need.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That is to say, Japan’s needs and other things -which Japan requires. Therefore, the conversations mentioned by -Raeder were not concerned with strategic points? -<span class='pageno' title='349' id='Page_349'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, these are two entirely different -things.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that Raeder’s answer is concerned purely -with questions of supplies and material.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, purely questions of supplies and -material...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: ...which we had with all the navies, not -only with the Japanese.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I come to the Commando Order about which -you testified already. I want to put to you the following: You have -been shown Document D-658, which says that according to the -Armed Forces communiqué the soldiers were executed, that the -soldiers wore uniforms and that the Führer’s Order was something -new in international law. I believe that the naval commander in -western France reported this and that this was contained in the -Armed Forces communiqué. The man who compiled the War Diary -wrote: “A new thing in international law.” I am not a military man, -but I should like to ask you, would you consider such a reference -a criticism of the order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe that I have to answer the question -in the following manner: Normally, the fact of an execution -is not entered in a war diary on operational matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that is really a matter which -we can go into, whether he thinks this is an entry which is a -criticism of the order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe he wanted to establish that it -was something new.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Never mind, Admiral. A factual question. The -Prosecution asserts again that it concerns soldiers in uniform. The -Wehrmacht communiqué announced the execution on 9 December. -The execution, as I have already shown in another connection, did -not take place until 11 December. I am presenting to you now -Document UK-57, and ask you to look at the second paragraph -under Figure 4. The heading Figure 4 reads: “Sabotage against -German ships near Bordeaux”; then it says: “December 12, 1942”; -and further on we read:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“From the submarine the participants went two by two in -paddle boats up the Gironde estuary. They wore special olive -gray uniforms. After carrying out the blastings they sank -their boats and tried, with the aid of French civilians, to -escape to Spain in civilian clothes.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='350' id='Page_350'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did these soldiers behave correctly according to the provisions -of international law?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I have no more questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If they had had a clear conscience, they -would not have needed to wear civilian clothes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, just this final question:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you personally in the High Command receive an inquiry -or any information before this execution which was carried out at -the direct order of the Führer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, neither an inquiry nor any information.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, the question -as to whether a document concerning Norway had been translated -correctly was just discussed. I shall find out what number -it is. The English translation which I have before me is not identical -with the German original. It deviates considerably. It is Document -GB-482.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I shall read the German text which in my opinion differs from -the English translation.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states: Conquest of -Belgian coast provides no advantage for our submarine warfare; -points out value of winning Norwegian bases (Trondheim) -with the help of Russian pressure. The Führer will -consider the question.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, would it not save time, -really, if we have the sentence which is said to have been wrongly -translated referred to a committee of experts in the translating -division?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It really is not a matter which it is worth -while wasting time over.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, I -did not know that it was to be examined again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better have it examined and -then the translation certified to.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, -Mr. President. I, myself, have a question to put to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Admiral, Document D-873 has been put to you before. That was -a war diary of <span class='it'>U-71</span> and concerned the supplying of three Norwegians -in a lifeboat. The entry was on 21 June. I have already -<span class='pageno' title='351' id='Page_351'></span> -submitted it to the Tribunal under Dönitz Number 13, on Page 23 -of my document book, a statement by the above-mentioned commanding -officer Flachsenberg. According to that statement this -submarine put to sea on 14 June. It was west of Norway. Can -you tell me if that U-boat, therefore, on 21 June, was putting out -for operations or returning from operations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean from memory?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, considering the dates, -put out to sea on 14 June, this entry on 21 June.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Putting out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Putting out. As you -know, this submarine was a 500-ton vessel. Is a boat of that size in -a position to carry out an operation over several weeks with three -additional people on board?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe not. I am not enough of an -expert to be able to judge definitely what the extra weight of additional -persons on board might mean as far as trimming experiments -and such things are concerned; but aside from that, I do not believe -that such a small boat, which is putting out to sea for an operation, -can load itself on the way with prisoners. I do not consider that -possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the Court, the -witness may retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the President.</span>] Mr. President, in accordance with my -statement at the beginning of this case, I have already submitted -the majority of my documents during the examination. With the -permission of the Tribunal, may I proceed now to submit as quickly -as possible the remainder of the documents with a few accompanying -statements.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number Raeder-18, an excerpt -from the Document Book 2, Page 105, an excerpt from a book -which Churchill wrote in 1935 called <span class='it'>Great Contemporaries</span>. I ask -the Tribunal to take official notice of the contents. Churchill points -out that there are two possibilities, that one cannot say whether -Hitler will be the man who will start another world war or whether -he will be the man who will restore honor and peace of mind to -the great German nation and bring it back serene, helpful and -strong to a galaxy of the European family of nations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As Exhibit Number Raeder-20 I submit a short excerpt from -Adolf Hitler’s <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> with reference to the fact that the Prosecution -has said that from that book one could see that Hitler -<span class='pageno' title='352' id='Page_352'></span> -intended to wage aggressive wars. I shall show in my final pleadings -how much one can see from that book. I ask that the Tribunal -take judicial notice of the short excerpt on Page 154: “For such a -policy there was but one ally in Europe, England.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Number Raeder-21, a speech made by Hitler to the -German Reichstag on 26 April 1942, is to show how rights were -increasingly limited in Germany and how the dictatorship became -more and more powerful.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Book 4, Exhibit Number Raeder-65, intended to facilitate -my arguments, is the Hague Agreement about the rights and -duties of neutrals in naval warfare. I need that for my final pleadings -in connection with Exhibit Number Raeder-66, the statement -of opinion by Dr. Mosler in Document Book 4, Page 289, the first -document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Can you give us the pages?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Page 289, Mr. President. It is the first page of -the Document Book 4.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I ask the Tribunal to be kind enough to -take up Document Book 5, since the remaining documents have -already been submitted. I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-100, -Document Book 5, Page 437, a document from the <span class='it'>White Book</span> concerning -the “top-secret” meeting of the French War Commission -on 9 April 1940, with Reynaud, Daladier, Gamelin, General Georges, -the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of the Colonies and the Air -Minister present. It concerns the suggestion by Admiral Darlan -of moving into Belgium. The suggestion was supported by General -Gamelin and also by the Minister for National Defense and War. -On Page 442 there is mention of the march into Holland and finally -of Luxembourg. Since the High Tribunal has knowledge of the -contents from the discussion of the documents, I do not want to -read any details. I simply ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice -of it. I should also like to point out that on Page 443 of this very -long document mention is made of the occupation of the harbor of -Narvik and of the intention to get hold of the mines of Gallivare.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now submit Exhibit Number Raeder 102, in the same document -book, Page 449. This is an order of the 2d Belgian Infantry -Regiment of 13 April 1940 concerning information about friendly -troops and the building of a fortified position. It can be seen from -the document that the friendly troops mentioned are the Allies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-103, Page 452, which is a French -document of 16 April 1940 from headquarters concerning measures -about the rail transportation of French troops in Belgium. -<span class='pageno' title='353' id='Page_353'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of all these documents, -which I shall not read in detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The same applies to Exhibit Number Raeder-104, Document -Book 5, Page 455, which is the order of 19 April 1940 of the 2d -British Division concerning security measures in Belgium. There -we find a directive similar to one in a document which has been -submitted by the Prosecution, a directive to establish contact with -Belgian civilian authorities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Number Raeder-105, Document Book 5, Page 459, is the -statement of a Luxembourg citizen which shows that 200 men, -French soldiers in uniform, entered Belgium in armored cars 7 days -before the outbreak of the German-Belgian hostilities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May it please the Tribunal, I originally intended not to submit -anything in this Trial concerning the character of my client because -I was of the opinion that Admiral Raeder, both at home and abroad, -enjoyed great respect. The first trial brief against Raeder did not -affect that intention. Shortly before the presentation of that trial -brief it was changed, becoming considerably more severe and containing -moral accusations which seriously injure and insult Raeder’s -honor. I have no doubt that the High Tribunal will understand -why under these circumstances I ask to be permitted to submit some -of the documents granted me which concern Raeder’s character. I -submit Exhibit Raeder-119, Document Book 6, Page 514. That is -a letter from Frau Von Poser addressed to me. It is not an affidavit -and quite purposely I have submitted the original because in my -opinion it will make a more immediate and direct impression than -an affidavit which I would first have to ask for in my capacity as -defendant’s counsel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Similarly, there is a fairly long letter from Professor Dr. Seibt -who approached me on his own initiative. I submit Exhibit Number -Raeder-120, Document Book 6, Page 517. I would be grateful to the -Tribunal if it would take judicial notice of that letter. In order to -save time I refrain from reading it since it is six pages long.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-122, Document Book 6, Page 526, -a letter from Herr Erich Katz, which I submit with its appendices -and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. This presents -one of the cases in which Raeder intervened personally, using his -influence and position—he used the official stationery of the Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy to intervene on behalf of Herr Katz -who had been attacked as a Jew—and actually succeeded in protecting -him. Herr Katz has sent me these documents on his own -initiative in order to show his gratitude.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As Exhibit Raeder-123 I submit a letter from Günter Jacobsen -that concerns a similar case. Jacobsen also, without my asking it, -approached me in order to testify that Raeder rescued his father, -<span class='pageno' title='354' id='Page_354'></span> -who as a Jew had been accused of race defilement, from the concentration -camp Fuhlsbüttel—I believe it was still a prison at that -time—so that Jacobsen could emigrate to England where he is -living now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-124, an affidavit...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, I must make the following -statement. All four exhibits mentioned just now by Dr. Siemers -are personal letters from various persons to Dr. Siemers. They are -not sworn affidavits. They are not interrogations. Therefore these -documents have little probative value, and I hold the view that they -ought not to be admitted as evidence. Many letters are received, -and if they were all to be submitted to the Tribunal, the Tribunal -would have great difficulty in establishing the truth and how far -they are of probative value. In that connection, I personally object -to the fact that these documents should be accepted as evidence in -Raeder’s case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: My Lord, may I...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that the matter -is of sufficient importance to insist upon evidence being upon oath. -The documents are admitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-124 I submit an -affidavit by Konrad Lotter. The affidavit is very short and with -the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read this one page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Grand Admiral Raeder has always appeared to me a man -who embodied the finest traditions of the old Imperial Navy. -This was true particularly in regard to his philosophy of life. -As a man and as an officer he was at all times the best -model imaginable.</p> - -<p>“In 1941, when the anti-Christian policy of the Hitler regime -was in full force in Bavaria, when cloisters were closed and -in the education of the youth intolerance against every creed -became crassly manifest, I sent a memorandum of 12 pages -to the Admiral in which I presented to him my objections to -this policy. Admiral Raeder intervened at once. Through his -mediation, I was called to the Gauleiter and Minister of the -Interior, Wagner, in Munich. After a series of discussions -between the clerical, governmental, and Party authorities -an agreement was reached which had the following results: -The school prayer was retained, the crucifix was allowed to -remain in the schools, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>; furthermore, 59 clergymen -who had been fined 500 marks each were pardoned.</p> - -<p>“The closing down of cloisters was also stopped at that time. -Gauleiter Wagner had to...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='355' id='Page_355'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, all these documents have been -read by us very recently.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then I just ask the Tribunal to take -judicial notice of the remainder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I submit also the two documents, Exhibit Number Raeder-125 -and Exhibit Number Raeder-126. Number 125 is an affidavit by -the former Reich Defense Minister, Dr. Otto Gessler, and Number -Raeder-126 is an affidavit by the Navy Chaplain Ronneberger. I -ask you to take judicial notice of this latter document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to be permitted to read the short affidavit by -Dr. Gessler since it contains not only something of a purely personal -nature, but also remarks concerning the accusations against Raeder.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I, Gessler, have known the former Admiral Dr. Raeder -personally since about the middle of the 20’s when I was -Reichswehrminister. Raeder was then inspector of the educational -system in the Navy. I have always known Raeder -as a man of irreproachable, chivalrous character, as a man -fully conscious of his duty. As to the subject of the Indictment, -I know very little.</p> - -<p>“Raeder visited me repeatedly after my release from imprisonment -by the Gestapo in March 1945 when I lay in the -Hedwig Hospital in Berlin and he also made arrangements -for me to get home, as I was ill and completely exhausted. I -told him then about the ill-treatment I had suffered, especially -the torture. He was obviously surprised and incensed -about this. He said he would report this to the Führer. I -asked him at once to refrain from that, for I had been told -before the torture, and officially, that all of this was taking -place at the explicit order of Hitler. Moreover, I knew definitely -that I would immediately be rearrested, since on my -release I had signed the well-known declaration and could -not even obtain a confirmation of my detention in order to -get a ticket for my trip home.</p> - -<p>“I heard nothing about secret rearmament in the Navy, -neither during my term of office nor later. During my term -of office, until January 1928, Admiral Raeder would not have -been responsible either, for at that time he was not Chief -of the Naval Command.</p> - -<p>“At the time of the National Socialist regime I was ignored -by my former department and snubbed. One of the few -exceptions was Dr. Raeder. Before 1939 among other things -he invited me three times to visit on the cruiser <span class='it'>Nürnberg</span> -although I had refused twice. During the visit in June 1939 -he came to Kiel personally to pay his respects to me. At that -<span class='pageno' title='356' id='Page_356'></span> -time we also discussed the political situation. I expressed the -apprehension that an attack on Poland would mean a European -war. Raeder declared positively that he considered it -out of the question that Hitler would attack Poland. When -this did happen later, I explained this to myself on the -grounds that Hitler liked to place even the highest military -leaders face to face with accomplished facts.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then there is the statement “under oath” and the signature of -the notary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As to the last Exhibit Number Raeder-126, from the Navy Chief -Chaplain Ronneberger, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of -it since it is too late to read it. It is a factual description and survey -of church questions and of religious matters in the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, with that, with the exception of three points, I -can conclude my case. There are still two interrogatories missing -which have not yet been returned. I ask permission to submit these -as soon as they are received.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, there is the witness Generaladmiral Böhm, who has -already been approved, but who on account of illness has not yet -been able to appear. The British Delegation, through Sir David, has -been kind enough to agree that if necessary this witness can be -interrogated at a later date. May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal -to keep this open, and if possible to permit Admiral Böhm to be -questioned at a later date. I want to point out now that it will not -be so large a complex of questions as in the case of Admiral -Schulte-Mönting, which the Tribunal knows from the material I -have submitted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This concludes my case Raeder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 23 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='357' id='Page_357'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH DAY</span><br/> Thursday, 23 May 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the documents of the -Defendant Seyss-Inquart, the Tribunal admits the following documents -which were objected to: Number 11, Number 47, Number 48, -Number 50, Number 54, and Number 71.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The remainder of the documents which were objected to are -rejected. I will enumerate them: Number 5, Number 10, Number 14, -Number 19b, Number 21, Number 22, Number 27, Number 31, Number -39, Number 55, Number 60, Number 61, Number 68, Number 69.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: Mr. President, last night at the end of the session -the counsel for Admiral Raeder submitted a certain number of -documents including Document Raeder-105 of Document Book 5. -This document is an excerpt from the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>, Number -5. It is the testimony of an old man of 72, a native of Luxembourg, -who had lived in Belgium for only 6 months, and who affirms -that in April 1940 he saw 200 French soldiers in Belgium. These -soldiers, who he said were French, were in armored cars.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I must ask the Tribunal to allow me to make objection to this -Document Number 7 of the <span class='it'>White Book</span> Number 5, the original of -which has never been submitted and has not even been reproduced -in the <span class='it'>White Book</span>, as is the case with a certain number of documents -in the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>. It is necessary that in the name -of France and of Belgium a protest—a formal, categorical protest—be -made against such an assertion. At no time before the invasion -of Belgium by the German forces did any French troops set foot on -Belgian soil. The reading of this document, Number Raeder-105 of -Document Book 5 of Admiral Raeder, enables us to understand how -there came to be the error in the testimony by Grandjenet that -is cited.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have already told the Tribunal that this man is 72 years old -and was from Luxembourg. To the question put to him by the -German authorities as to how he recognized the soldiers he had -seen as being of French nationality, he answered: -<span class='pageno' title='358' id='Page_358'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I was quite sure that they were French soldiers because I -know their uniform well. Moreover, I recognized the soldiers -because of the language they used when they spoke -to me.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, as far as the uniform is concerned, the Tribunal knows -that at the time when these events took place, the Belgian Army -had a uniform of the same color as the French Army and a helmet -of the same shape. As for the language, the Tribunal knows that -a great part of the Belgian population who live along the Luxembourg -frontier speak French, and the Belgian soldiers recruited in -these districts speak French.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will certainly remember that this witness, who is -a very old man, had only been living for 6 months in Belgium and -probably had only a limited experience with things Belgian—and -especially with the Belgian Army.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At any rate, we assert in the name of France and in the name -of Belgium that before 10 May 1940 no French troops, no organized -French troops, penetrated Belgium, and that the isolated individuals -who did go into Belgium were interned there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Siemers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If it please the Tribunal, may I reply very -briefly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This matter concerns a document from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>, on which -a decision has already been handed down once and which was -granted me. I propose that the Prosecution be requested to submit -the original if they dispute the correctness of this document. In -this I am in agreement with a decision of the Tribunal according -to which the application is to be made for the presentation of the -original if it is available, or application should be made so that -whoever has the original should produce it. As far as I know the -Prosecution have the original, since all original documents were -located in the Foreign Office in Berlin, or in the alternative place -of safekeeping, and all the originals of these <span class='it'>White Books</span> fell into -the hands of the Allies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “original”? The original, -I suppose, is the original of the <span class='it'>White Book</span>. Is that what -you mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I mean now, Mr. President, the original of -this court record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, this comes from a <span class='it'>White Book</span>. That -is a printed document, I suppose, I do not suppose it contains the -original of the statement of this Luxembourg man.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The <span class='it'>White Book</span> is a collection of numerous documents, -and the single original documents are in the possession of -<span class='pageno' title='359' id='Page_359'></span> -the Foreign Office; in part they were from the files of the French -General Staff, and partly they were records of court proceedings. -Regarding the contents of this document...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, you are not proposing that we -should strike the document out, but the Tribunal will certainly take -into account the facts to which you have drawn our notice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: This is an application that the Tribunal shall refuse -to admit that document, Mr. President. At the same time this is a -protest against the assertion made by the Defense that French soldiers -violated Belgian neutrality in the course of the month of April. -I hope the Tribunal will allow me to add a few words of explanation. -The <span class='it'>White Book</span>, which we have here, comprises two parts. The -first part reproduces texts and the second part gives photostatic -copies of these texts. In the first part, which simply reproduces the -texts, is found the document which I ask the Tribunal to strike from -the record. We have searched in the second part which gives the -photostatic copies of the documents in the first part, and we do not -find it. We state to the Tribunal that the original of the document, -which we ask the Tribunal to strike out, has not been reproduced -in the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>, since it is not to be found in the second -part.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe that M. Dubost’s entire -explanation refers to the question of the value of the document as -evidence and not to the question of the admissibility of the document. -That this document is in order appears to me to be quite -clear, since it is a record of court proceedings where a certain person, -namely Grandjenet, has been interrogated. Everything said by -M. Dubost referred more to the contents of the document than to -the question of its value as evidence. May I ask therefore that the -document be admitted, as has been done up to now, and ask that -consideration be given to the fact that the document has value in -connection with the other documents which have been granted to -me and to Dr. Horn in his document book with reference to Holland -and Belgium.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If, in the second part of the document book there is no photostatic -copy...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, and M. Dubost, the Tribunal -will consider the objection that has been made.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I merely mention, Mr. President, that if the -photostat is not in the book, as M. Dubost states, then this is due -to the fact that this court record in its original text was German, -and the facsimiles are those prepared from the original text in -French, that is to say, of those documents which in their original -version were in French. If necessary I would appeal to Geheimrat -<span class='pageno' title='360' id='Page_360'></span> -Von Schnieden as a witness regarding this record, since he at the -time was informed about all the records of this type and helped -in the work of compiling the book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will consider the -objection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, with the -permission of the Tribunal I should like to say that the interrogatory -put to the American Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, -Admiral Nimitz, is available. I received it the day before yesterday -and in the meantime it has gone in to the interpreters for translation. -With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to submit -it now, in connection with the cases of Admiral Dönitz and Admiral -Raeder.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution seen it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got copies for us?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I had been informed that -the copies for the Tribunal would be handed on by the General -Secretary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Unless we have copies, the document must -not be read. It must be put off until we have copies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There are two copies in -English and one in French.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I present the document as Number Dönitz-100.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Soviet members of the -Tribunal do not have a copy of the document translated into their -language, so you will present it at a later date.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Will the counsel for the Defendant Von Schirach present his case?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for the Defendant Von Schirach): -Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I propose first of all to conduct the -examination of the Defendant Schirach himself, and in the course -of this examination I will bring to your attention the passage of the -document book concerned, as the individual points come up. Following -the examination of the defendant I shall then call my four -witnesses, and at the end I intend to submit the remaining documents, -insofar as these documents have not by that time been -presented during the examination of the Defendant Von Schirach. -I presume, Mr. President, that you agree to this procedure.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now call to the witness stand, first, Baldur von Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Baldur von Schirach took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the following oath after me: -I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak -the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing. -<span class='pageno' title='361' id='Page_361'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The defendant repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what is the date of your birth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>BALDUR VON SCHIRACH (Defendant): 9 May 1907.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That means that a few days ago you were 39. You -have been married for 14 years; is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And you have four children, whose ages are...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 4, 8, 11, and 13 years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the Third Reich you were mainly active as -Youth Leader?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What offices did you fill in that connection, that -is, offices in the Party and in the Government—please state also how -long you held these various offices?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: To start with, in 1929 I was the leader of the -National Socialist Students’ Union. In 1931 I became Reich Youth -Leader of the NSDAP, at first on the staff of the SA Supreme Command; -in 1932, Reich Leader for Youth Education of the NSDAP; -in 1933, Youth Leader of the German Reich, at first under the Minister -of the Interior, Dr. Frick. In 1934, I held the same position -under the Reich Minister of Education, Rust. In 1936 the Reich -Youth Leader became a leading Reich official, and in that capacity -I came directly under the Führer and Reich Chancellor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Now, which of your offices were Party positions -and which of the ones you have mentioned were offices of the Reich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Party positions were the office of Reich Youth -Leader of the NSDAP, and that of Reich Leader for Youth Education. -Government positions: The Youth Leader of the German -Reich, at first subordinate to the Minister of the Interior as I have -described or under the Minister for Education, and then in an independent -position.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you were removed from some of these -offices in 1940. What positions in Youth Leadership did you lose in -1940, and what positions did you still continue to fill to the end?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In 1940 I left the position as the leader of -Youth, that is, I left the office of the Reich Youth Leadership of -the NSDAP, but I retained the office of Reichsleiter for Youth -Education and with that the entire responsibility for German youth. -I received as an additional new post that of Gauleiter of Vienna, -<span class='pageno' title='362' id='Page_362'></span> -which was combined with the governmental post of Reichsstatthalter -of Vienna and also that of Reich Defense Commissioner for -Wehrkreis XVII.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we want now to come back to your activity -as Youth Leader. There is an affidavit by you here dated -4 December 1945, 3302-PS. In this affidavit you stated to the Prosecution -in December that you acknowledge yourself to be responsible -for all youth education in the Third Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you, when you gave the statement of guilt, -under the impression that your successor, the late Reich Youth -Leader Axmann, was dead?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You thought that he died in the last battles of -the war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I was convinced that he had died in -Berlin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the meantime, Witness, you have learned from -newspaper reports that your successor as Reich Youth Leader, this -man Axmann, is still alive. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you want then, today, to support your affidavit -regarding your personal responsibility as Youth Leader without -reservation; or do you want to limit it in any respect today?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not want to limit this affidavit in any -way. Although during the last years of his life Hitler gave orders -to the Youth of which I do not know and also my successor, Axmann, -particularly in 1944, gave orders with which I am not acquainted -since the relationship between us had been broken off due to the -events of the war, I stand by the statement that I have made in the -expectation that the Tribunal will consider me the only person -responsible in Youth Leadership and that no other Youth Leader -will be summoned before a court for actions for which I have -assumed responsibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I would now be interested in knowing -whether possibly principles and directives which you received from -Hitler or from any Party office or from any governmental quarter -were the formula for your youth education; or whether, for your -youth education, the principles were derived from the experiences -which you had during your own youth and among the youth leaders -of that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The latter is correct. Of course, the education -of the Hitler Youth was an education on the basis of the National -<span class='pageno' title='363' id='Page_363'></span> -Socialist idea. But the specifically educational ideas did not originate -with Hitler, they also did not originate with other leaders -in the Party; they had their origin in youth itself, they originated -with me, and they originated with my assistants.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Perhaps you will be good enough now to explain -to the Tribunal somewhat more in detail how you, yourself, arrived -at those principles and that type of youth education, based on your -own education, your personal development, and so forth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the simplest way for me to do -this would be for me here, very briefly, to sketch the story of my -youth and describe also in that connection the youth organizations -with which I came in contact. I can in that way save much time -for my further statements.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My father was a professional officer in the Garde-Kürassier -Regiment of the Kaiser. I was born in Berlin and one year later -my father retired and moved to Weimar, where he took over the -management of the Court Theater there, which later became the -Weimar National Theater. Thus I grew up in Weimar, and that -town, which in a certain sense is the native city of all Germans, -I regard as my native city. My father was well off; our home -offered a great deal of intellectual and artistic stimulation, above -all in the literary and musical field, but apart from and beyond the -educational opportunities of our home, it was the atmosphere of the -town itself, that atmosphere of the classic and also the postclassic -Weimar which influenced my development. It was most of all the -genius loci, which early captured my imagination. It is directly -due to those experiences of my youth that later on I led the youth -back again, year after year, to Weimar and to Goethe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And the first document which is important in this connection -for my case, which is Document Schirach-80, will prove just that. -There is a brief reference in that document to one of the many -speeches which I made in the course of my activity as Youth Leader -to the leaders of the young generation, and in which I directed the -youth to Goethe...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: May I interrupt you for a moment, Herr -Von Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this Document Number Schirach-80, Mr. President, there is—on -Page 133 of Schirach’s document book—a brief report on a -Reich Cultural Convention (Reichskulturtagung) of the Hitler Youth -in Weimar. This happens to be a report from 1937, but the defendant -has already told you that such cultural conventions of the Hitler -Youth took place every year in Weimar, the city of Schiller and -Goethe. In this report, Document 80 of document book Schirach, -there is, for instance, discussion of a speech of the defendant on -<span class='pageno' title='364' id='Page_364'></span> -the importance of Goethe for the National Socialist education of -youth. It is said, in this connection, that at that time Schirach -stated, and I quote...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You need not read it to us, Dr. Sauter. It -refers to Goethe, that is all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In that case, Herr Von Schirach, will you continue?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was not only the annual cultural convention -but the annual meeting of the leaders of the Hitler Youth which -took place in Weimar. Apart from that there were also what we -called the “Weimar Festivals of German Youth.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What is important in this connection is that in this speech I -quoted a sentence of Goethe which, to a certain extent, became the -leitmotiv of all my educational work: “Youth fashions itself afresh -from youth.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Even my worst enemy cannot deny the fact that I was to the -young generation of the German people at all times not only the -propagandist of National Socialism but also the propagandist of -Goethe. A certain Herr Ziemer has submitted a lengthy affidavit -against me in which he quarrels with the youth education for which -I am responsible. I believe that Herr Ziemer did his work a little -too superficially. In his description of German national education -he should at least have taken into consideration my educational -efforts designed to guide youth toward the life work of Goethe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I joined my first youth organization when I was 10 years old. -I was then just the age of the boys and girls who later on entered -the Jungvolk. That youth organization which I joined was the -so-called “Young German League,” (Jungdeutschland Bund), which -Count von der Goltz had founded, a Boy Scout organization. Count -von der Goltz and Haeseler, impressed by the British Boy Scout -movement, had formed Pathfinder units in Germany, and one of -these Pathfinder organizations was the Jungdeutschland Bund just -mentioned. It played an important part in the education of German -youth until about 1918 or 1919.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Much more significant in my development, however, was the -time which I spent in a country boarding school (Waldpädagogium). -This was an educational institution directed by an associate of the -well-known educator, Hermann Lietz. There I was educated in the -way which I later, on an entirely different basis...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, do you think the education of the -defendant himself is in any way material for the Tribunal to hear? -It is the education which he imparted which is the matter that is -material. What he imparted, not what he himself took in. -<span class='pageno' title='365' id='Page_365'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the defendant would nevertheless -ask you to allow him these statements, particularly, from the point -of view that with them he wants to show you that the principles -according to which he led youth education came to him not from -Hitler and not from any Party source, but that they resulted from -his own experiences in his own youth. It is, indeed, of some importance -for the Tribunal to examine the question: According to -what principles did the defendant direct youth education and how -did he arrive at these principles? The defendant is asking permission -to explain that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Sauter, the defendant has already -taken some considerable time in telling us about his early youth -and his education, and the Tribunal thinks that it ought to be cut -short, and that not much more time ought to be taken up in dealing -with the education of the defendant. As I have pointed out to you, -what is material for us is the education he imparted to German -youth and not the education which he received himself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: We shall, of course, comply with your wish, -Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Herr Von Schirach, will you please -make your statements as brief as possible?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I can be very brief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please, go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Lietz’ idea was to give youth an education -in which they have in the school an image of the state. The school -community was a miniature state and in this school community was -developed a self-administration of youth. I only want to point out -in passing that he, too, was applying ideas which long before him -had been developed by Pestalozzi and the great Jean Jacques. All -modern education, of course, goes back somehow to Rousseau, be it -a question of Hermann Lietz or the Boy Scouts, the Pathfinder -movement or the German Wandervogel movement. At any rate, -that idea of self-administration of youth in a school community gave -me my idea of the self-leadership of youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>My thought was to attract the younger generation in school to -ideas that Fröbel had originated 80 years before. Lietz wanted to -win over youth from early school days onward.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I may perhaps mention very briefly that when in 1898 Lietz -began his educational work, the British Major Baden-Powell was -being surrounded by rebels in a South African town, and was -training youngsters to scout in the woods and with this laid the -groundwork for his own Boy Scout movement, and that in that -same year, in 1898, Karl Fischer from Berlin-Steglitz founded the -Wandervogel movement. -<span class='pageno' title='366' id='Page_366'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I think that this chapter, which is merely -the historic background, might perhaps, in accordance with the -wish of the President, be terminated now. If I understand you -rightly then, you mean that those principles which you applied -later on as Reich Youth Leader had become familiar to you in -your own youth and in the youth movement of the time. Is that -right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes; basically, yes. The basic principles of -my later work originate there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: There is one more point I want to know in this -connection. Did this education at that time have any political or -anti-Semitic tendencies and how did you happen to get into politics?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that educational work had no political -and most certainly no anti-Semitic tendencies, because Lietz came -from the circles around the Democrat Naumann, from the Damaschke -circle.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But how did you get into politics?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the meantime the revolution had broken -out. My father...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The revolution of 1918-1919?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, the revolution of 1918-1919. My father -had been thrown out of his position by the Reds. The National -Assembly in Weimar had convened. The Weimar Republic had -been founded. We had a parliamentary system, we had a democracy, -or what we in Germany thought was a democracy—I doubt -that it was one. It was about 1923. I was at home at the time. It -was a period of general insecurity, want, and dissatisfaction; many -respectable families had become beggars through the inflation, and -the worker and the citizen had lost their savings. The name “Hitler” -made its appearance in connection with the events of 9 November -1923. I was not able at the time to gain any exact information -about him. This Trial has informed me and people of my generation -for the first time what Hitler actually wanted. At that time -I was not a National Socialist. Together with some boys of my age -I joined a youth organization which had the name “Knappenschaft.” -It was in some way connected with the people’s movement, but it -was not bound to any party. The principles of that organization -were simply comradeship, patriotism, and self-control. There were -about 100 boys from my city in it at the time who, in this youth -organization, fought against the shallow tendencies of youth in the -postwar period and against the dissipation indulged in by growing -youngsters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that circle, as a 16-year-old, I first came in contact with -socialism, for here I found youths from every level, working boys, -<span class='pageno' title='367' id='Page_367'></span> -craftsmen, young office employees, sons of farmers. But there were -some older ones among us too, who were already settled in life, and -some also who had been in the World War. From discussions with -these comrades I came to grasp for the first time the consequences -of the Versailles Treaty in their full import. The situation of the -youth at the time was this: The school boy had the prospect of -struggling through somehow or other as a working student, and -then he would in all probability become a member of the academic -proletariat for the possibility of an academic career practically did -not exist for him at all. The young worker had no prospect of finding -an apprenticeship. For him there was nothing other than the -grim misery of unemployment. It was a generation nobody would -help unless it helped itself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And that circle to which you belonged as a -16-year-old boy, then, gradually drifted into the currents of National -Socialism?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and in quite a natural way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How did it happen?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In central Germany there were disturbances. -I need only mention the name of the Communist bandit leader, -Max Hölz, to indicate what conditions obtained at the time. And -even after outward calm had come, conditions still prevailed that -made it impossible to hold patriotic meetings because they were -usually broken up by Communists. There came an appeal to us -young people to furnish protection for these patriotic meetings, -and we did. Some of us were wounded in doing this. One of us, -a certain Garschar, was killed by Communists. In that manner a -large number of national meetings took place which otherwise could -not have been held in the Weimar Republic, National Socialist -meetings, too; and to an increasing degree it was exactly such -meetings that we had to protect because the Communist terror was -directed against them particularly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Through this protective activity I met leading National Socialists—at -first as speakers, naturally, not personally. I heard Count -Reventlow speak; I think I heard Rosenberg then too; I heard -Streicher speak and heard the first oratorical efforts of Sauckel, -who soon after became Gauleiter of the National Socialist Party -in Thuringia. In this way...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What date is he speaking of?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This is the period around 1924, that is, a year -after the Hitler Putsch.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that way, Witness, the circle of which you were then a -member came under National Socialist influences. Was this also -supported with reading, reading of National Socialist literature? -<span class='pageno' title='368' id='Page_368'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course, I do not know what my comrades -read, with the exception of one book which I shall give you directly. -I know only what I read myself; I was interested at that time in -the writings of the Bayreuth thinker, Chamberlain, in <span class='it'>The Foundations -of the Nineteenth Century</span>, in the writings of Adolf Bartels, -in his <span class='it'>Introduction to World Literature</span> and <span class='it'>History of German -National Literature</span>. There were works...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that we do not want -to know the full story of the defendant’s education. He is now -giving us a series of the books which he has read, but we are not -interested.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I shall only say in one sentence that these -were works which had no definite anti-Semitic tendencies, but -through which anti-Semitism was drawn like a red thread. The -decisive anti-Semitic book which I read at that time and the book -which influenced my comrades...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: ...was Henry Ford’s book, <span class='it'>The International -Jew</span>; I read it and became anti-Semitic. In those days this book -made such a deep impression on my friends and myself because -we saw in Henry Ford the representative of success, also the exponent -of a progressive social policy. In the poverty-stricken and -wretched Germany of the time, youth looked toward America, and -apart from the great benefactor, Herbert Hoover, it was Henry Ford -who to us represented America.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks, as I have -said twice now, that the educational influences of the defendant -are quite irrelevant to us. I do not want to say it again and, unless -you can control the defendant and keep him to the point, I shall -have to stop his evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But, Mr. President, is it not of interest to the -Tribunal when judging this defendant and his personality that -they know how the defendant became a National Socialist and -how the defendant became anti-Semitic? I had thought...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, it is not of interest to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, how did you then meet Hitler and how -did you happen to join the Party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I must say that I did not become a National -Socialist because of anti-Semitism but because of Socialism. I met -Hitler as early as 1925. He had just left Landsberg on the Lech, -his imprisonment was ended, and he came to Weimar and spoke -there. It was on that occasion that I was introduced to him. The -<span class='pageno' title='369' id='Page_369'></span> -program for the national community which he developed appealed -to me so enormously because in it I found on a large scale something -I had experienced in a small way in the camaraderie of my -youth organization. He appeared to me to be the man who would pave -the way into the future for our generation. I believed that through -him there could be offered to this younger generation the prospect -of work, of happiness. And in him I saw the man who would -liberate us from the shackles of Versailles. I am convinced that -without Versailles the rise to power of Hitler would never have -happened. That dictate led to dictatorship.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, when did you then become a member -of the Party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I became a member of the Party in 1925. -I joined the SA at the same time, with all my comrades.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You were 18 at the time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why did you join the SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The SA furnished the protection for the -meetings, and we simply continued in the SA, as part of the Party, -the activities which we had carried out before in our youth organization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In 1926, Witness, that is when you were 19 years -old, there was a Party rally in Weimar?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, you talked to Hitler personally -on that occasion; is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I was to have talked personally to -Hitler one year earlier. On this occasion there was another meeting. -He was making speeches at various mass meetings in Weimar, -and he came back to Weimar again during the same year to speak -before a smaller circle. Together with Rudolf Hess he paid a visit -to the home of my parents and on that occasion he suggested that -I should study in Munich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He thought I ought to know the Party at its -very core and thought I would become acquainted with the Party -work in that way. But I want to say here that at that time I did -not have any intention at all of becoming a politician. Nevertheless, -I was very much interested, of course, in getting acquainted -with the Movement at the place where it had been founded.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You went, then, to Munich, and studied there? -<span class='pageno' title='370' id='Page_370'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I then went to Munich. At first I did -not concern myself with the Party. I was occupied with Germanic -studies, history, and the history of art; I wrote and I came into -contact with many people in Munich who were not actually National -Socialists but who belonged, I should say, to the periphery of the -National Socialist movement. At that time I lived in the house -of my friend, the publisher Bruckmann...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then in 1929 you became the head of the Movement -within the universities. I think you were elected, not nominated, -to that post?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The situation at the beginning was this: I -attended Party meetings in Munich; in Bruckmann’s salon I met -Hitler and Rosenberg and many other men who later played an -important role in Germany. And at the university I joined the -university group of the National Socialist German Students League.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Go on, Herr Von Schirach, you have just told us -that you joined this university group in Munich. Will you please -continue?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and I also started to take an active part -in this group. I spoke there before my comrades, at first about my -own work in the literary field, and then I began to give lectures -to the students also about the National Socialist movement. I -organized Hitler student meetings among the students in Munich, -and then I was elected a member of the General Students Committee, -the ASTA, and through this activity among the students -I came more and more into contact with the Party leadership. -In 1929, the man who was the then so-called Reich Leader of the -National Socialist Students Union retired, and the question arose -of who should be given the leadership of all the university groups. -At that time Rudolf Hess, on behalf of the Führer, questioned all -university groups of the National Socialist University Movement -and the majority of all these groups cast their vote for me to head -the National Socialist Students Union. This accounts for the curious -fact that I am the only Party leader who was elected into the -Party leadership. That is something which has otherwise never -occurred in the history of the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You mean to say by that, that all the others were -nominated, and you alone were elected?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was elected, and then I was confirmed in -office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And if I am right, you were elected at the -students’ meeting at Graz in 1931. -<span class='pageno' title='371' id='Page_371'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. That is wrong. I am now -talking only of the National Socialist University Movement; I will -come back to this point later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now I was leader of the National Socialist University Movement, -and I reorganized this movement. I began my work as a -speaker. In 1931 I was...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely it is sufficient that he became the -leader. It really does not matter very much to us whether he was -elected or not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I am making every effort all the -time to abbreviate this speech. But perhaps I may ask just one -more question with reference to this subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, then in 1931 you were, as far as I know, elected to -the presidency of the General Congress of Austrian and German -Students, comprising all parties, and elected, I think, unanimously. -Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is not correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then explain briefly, Herr Von Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. At the meeting of the -General German Students Congress in 1931, at which all German -students and all Austrian students and Sudeten-German students -were represented, one of my collaborators whom I had suggested -as leader was unanimously elected head of the entire student -group. This was a very important affair for the youth and for the -Party. Two years before the seizure of power the entire academic -youth had unanimously given their vote to a National Socialist. -After this students’ rally at Graz, I had with Hitler a...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a convenient time to -adjourn.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, before the recess we stopped at the fact -that in 1929 you had been elected the leader of the academic youth. -Two years later, Hitler made you Reich Youth Leader. How did -that appointment come about?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: After the student meeting at Graz in 1931, -the success of which was very surprising to Hitler, I had a conference -with him. In the course of that meeting, Hitler mentioned -a conversation we had had previously. At that time he had asked -<span class='pageno' title='372' id='Page_372'></span> -me how it came about that the National Socialist University Movement -was developing so quickly, whereas the other National Socialist -organizations lagged behind in their development.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I told him at that time that one cannot lead youth organizations -as an appendix of a political party; youth has to be led by youth, -and I developed for him the idea of a youth state, that idea which -had come to me from experiencing the school community, the -school state. And thereupon in 1931 Hitler asked me whether I -would like to assume the leadership of the National Socialist Youth -Organization. This included youth cells, then the Hitler Youth -and the National Socialist Students Organization, which also was -in existence at that time. Several men had already tried their hand -at the leadership of these organizations: the former Oberstführer -SA Leader Pfeffer, the Reichsleiter Buch, actually without much -result.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I agreed and became then Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP, -temporarily a member of the staff of the Oberst SA Leader Röhm. -In that position, as Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP in the staff -of Röhm, I had the rank of an SA Gruppenführer and kept that -rank also when, half a year later, I became independent in my -position. That explains also the fact that I am an SA Obergruppenführer. -I got that rank many years later, <span class='it'>honoris causa</span>. However, -I did not possess an SA uniform—even after 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then in 1931 you became Reich Youth Leader of -the NSDAP?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That, of course, was a Party office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then in 1932 you became Reichsleiter? At that -time you were 25 years old. How did that come about?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have already said that I had expressed the -opinion to Hitler that youth could not be the appendix of another -organization, but youth had to be independent; it had to lead itself; -it had to become independent; and it was in fulfillment of a promise -which Hitler had already given me that, half a year later, I became -an independent Reichsleiter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Independent Reichsleiter, so that you were subordinate -directly to the Party leader Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: With what material means was that youth organization -created at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: With the means furnished by the young -people themselves. -<span class='pageno' title='373' id='Page_373'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And how were those funds raised? By collections?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The boys and girls paid membership fees. A -part of these membership fees was kept at the so-called district -leadership offices, which corresponded to the Gauleitung in the -Party or to the SA Gruppenführung in the SA. Another part went -to the Reich Youth Leader. The Hitler Youth financed its organization -with its own means.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, I am interested in the following: Did the -Hitler Youth, which you created and which was given Hitler’s name, -get its importance only after the seizure of power and by the -seizure of power only, or what was the previous size of this youth -organization which you created?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Before the seizure of power, in 1932 the -Hitler Youth was already the largest youth movement of Germany. -I should like to add here that the individual National Socialist -youth organizations which I found when I took over my office as -Reich Youth Leader were merged by me into one large unified -youth movement. This youth movement was the strongest youth -movement of Germany, long before we came to power.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On 2 October 1932, the Hitler Youth held a meeting at Potsdam. -At that meeting more than 100,000 youth from all over the Reich -met without the Party’s providing a single pfennig. The means were -contributed by the young people themselves. Solely from the -number of the participants, it can be seen that that was the largest -youth movement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That was, therefore, several months before the -seizure of power, and at that time already more than 100,000 participants -were at that rally at Potsdam?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution has made the accusation, Witness, -that later, after the seizure of power—I believe in February -1933—you took over the Reich Committee of German Youth -Organizations. Is that correct, and against whom was that action -directed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. The Reich Committee of -Youth Organizations was practically no more than a statistical office -which was subordinate to the Reich Minister of the Interior. That -office was managed by a retired general, General Vogt, who later -became one of my ablest assistants. The taking over of that Reich -Committee was a revolutionary act, a measure which youth carried -out for youth, for from that day on dates the realization of the -idea of the Youth State within the State. I cannot say any more -about that. -<span class='pageno' title='374' id='Page_374'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution further accuses you, Witness, of -having dissolved the so-called “Grossdeutscher Bund” in 1933, that -is, after the seizure of power. What was the Grossdeutscher Bund, -and why did you dissolve it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Grossdeutscher Bund was a youth organization, -or rather a union of youth organizations, with pan-German -tendencies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am surprised, therefore, that the Prosecution has made the -dissolution of that organization an accusation at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Many members of this Grossdeutscher Bund were -National Socialists. There was no very essential difference between -some of the youth groups associated in that organization and the -Hitler Youth. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I wanted youth to be united, and the Grossdeutscher -Bund wanted to continue a certain separate existence. -I objected to that, and there was agitated public controversy -between Admiral Von Trotha, the leader of the Grossdeutscher -Bund and me, and in the end the Grossdeutscher Bund was -incorporated into our youth organization. I do not recall exactly -whether I banned the organization formally; I know only that the -members came to me, and that between Admiral Von Trotha -and me a discussion took place, a reconciliation. Admiral Von -Trotha until his death was one of the warmest sponsors of my work.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How did the suppression of the Marxist youth -organization come about?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the suppression of the Marxist -youth organizations, if I remember correctly, came about in connection -with the suppression of trade unions. I have no exact -documents any more regarding that. But at any rate, from the -legal point of view, I was not authorized in 1933 to order a suppression -of that kind. The Minister of the Interior would have had -to do that. I had the right to ban youth organizations, <span class='it'>de jure</span>, -only after 1 December 1936. That the Marxist youth organizations -had to disappear was a foregone conclusion for me, and in speaking -about this suppression order as such, I can only say that the -German working youth found the realization of its socialistic ideas, -not under the Marxist governments of the Weimar Republic, but -in the community of the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, at first you were Reich Führer of the -NSDAP; that was a Party office. And after the seizure of power, -you became Youth Leader of the German Reich; that was a State -office. On the basis of this State or national office, did you also -have jurisdiction over and responsibility for the school system, for -the elementary schools, for instance? -<span class='pageno' title='375' id='Page_375'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: For the school system in Germany the Reich -Minister for Science, Education, and Culture was the only authority. -My field was education outside the schools, along with the home -and the school, as it says in the law of 1 December 1936. However, -I had some schools of my own, the so-called Adolf Hitler Schools, -which were not under national supervision. They were creations -of a later period. And during the war, through the Child Evacuation -Program that is, the organization by which we took care of -evacuating the young people from the big cities endangered by -bombing—I was in charge of education within the camps where -these children were housed. But on the whole I have to answer -the question about competence for the school system in Germany -in the negative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This youth which you had to educate outside of -the schools was called the Hitler Youth, the HJ.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Was membership in the Hitler Youth compulsory or voluntary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The membership in the Hitler Youth was -voluntary until 1936. In 1936 the law already mentioned concerning -the HJ was issued which made all the German youth members -of the HJ. The stipulations for the carrying out of that law, however, -were issued only in March 1939, and only during the war, in -May 1940, was the thought of carrying out a German youth draft -considered within the Reich Youth Leadership and discussed publicly. -May I point out that my Deputy Lauterbacher, at the time -when I was at the front, stated in a public meeting—I believe at -Frankfurt in 1940—that now, after 97 percent of the youngest age -group of youth had volunteered for the Hitler Youth, it would be -necessary to draft the remaining 3 percent by a youth draft.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In this connection, Mr. President, may I refer -to two documents of the document book Schirach. That is Number -Schirach-51.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I did not quite understand what the defendant -said. He said that the membership was voluntary until 1936, -that the HJ Law was then passed, and something to the effect that -the execution of the law was not published until 1939. Was that -what he said?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, that is correct. Until 1936—if I may explain -that, Mr. President—membership in the Hitler Youth was absolutely -voluntary. Then in 1936 the HJ Law was issued, which provided -that boys and girls had to belong to the Hitler Youth. But the stipulations -for its execution were issued by the defendant only in 1939 -so that, in practice, until 1939 the membership was nevertheless on -a voluntary basis.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that right, Defendant? -<span class='pageno' title='376' id='Page_376'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And these facts which I have just presented, -Mr. President, can also be seen from two documents of the document -book Schirach, Number Schirach-51, on Page 91, and Number -Schirach-52 on Page 92. In the latter document...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Sauter, I accept it from you -and from the defendant. I only wanted to understand it. You -can go on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And in the second document mention is also made -of the 97 percent which the defendant has said had voluntarily -joined the HJ, so that now there were only 3 percent missing. May -I continue:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Witness, what was the attitude of the -parents of the children on the question of whether the children -should join the HJ or not? What did the parents say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: There were, of course, parents who did not -like to have their children join the HJ. Whenever I made one of -my radio speeches to the parents or to the youth, many hundreds -of parents sent me letters. Among these letters, there were many -in which the parents voiced their objections to the HJ, or expressed -their dislike for it. I always considered that a special proof of the -confidence which the parents had in me. I should like to say here -that never, when parents restrained their children from joining, -have I exerted any compulsion or put them under pressure of any -kind. In doing that I would have lost all the confidence placed in -me by the parents of Germany. That confidence was the basis of -my entire educational work.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe that on this occasion I have to say also that the concept -that any youth organization can be established and carried on, -and successfully carried on, by coercing youth, is absolutely false.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, did youngsters who did not join the -Hitler Youth suffer any disadvantage for that reason?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Youngsters who did not join the Hitler Youth -were at a disadvantage in that they could not take part in our -camping, in our trips, in our sporting meets. They were in a certain -sense outsiders of the youth life, and there was a danger that -they might become hypochondriacs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But were there not certain professions in which -membership in the HJ was a prerequisite for working in those professions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What were the professions? -<span class='pageno' title='377' id='Page_377'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: For instance, the profession of teacher. It is -quite clear that a teacher cannot educate youth unless he himself -knows the life of that youth, and so we demanded that the young -teachers, that is those in training to teach, had to go through the -HJ. The junior teacher had to be familiar with the ways of life of -the pupils who were under his supervision.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But there were only a few such professions, -whereas for other professions membership in the HJ was not a -prerequisite for admission. Or what was the situation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that in detail. I believe that -a discussion about that is not even possible, because the entire -youth was in the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you know that the Prosecution has also -accused the defendants of having advocated the Führer Principle. -Therefore, I ask you:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Was the Führer Principle also valid in the HJ, and in what form -was it carried out in the HJ? I should like to remind you that I -mean that kind of Führer Principle of which we have heard in the -testimony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course, the HJ was built up on the Führer -Principle; only the entire form of leadership of youth differed -basically from that of other National Socialist organizations. For -instance, we had the custom in youth leadership of discussing -frankly all questions of interest to us. There were lively debates -at our district leader meetings. I myself educated my assistants -even in a spirit of contradiction. Of course, once we had debated -a measure and I had then given an order or a directive, that ended -the debate. The youth leaders—that is the young boy and girl -leaders—through years of working together and in serving the common -purpose, had become a unity of many thousands. They had -become friends. It is evident that in a group of that kind the carrying -out of orders and directives takes place in ways entirely -different from those in a military organization or in any other -political organization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I add something?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Leadership based on natural authority such as we had in the -youth organization is something which is not alien to youth at all. -Such leadership in the youth organization never degenerated into -dictatorship.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have been accused of training the -youth in a military way, and in that connection, the fact has been -pointed out that your HJ wore a uniform. Is that correct, and why -did the HJ wear a uniform? -<span class='pageno' title='378' id='Page_378'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have stated my opinion about that in many -instances. I believe there are also documents to illustrate it. I have -always described the uniform of the HJ as the dress of comradeship. -The uniform was the symbol of a community without class -distinctions. The worker’s boy wore the same garb as the son of -the university professor. The girl from the wealthy family wore -the same garb as the child of the day laborer. Hence the uniform. -This uniform did not have any military significance whatsoever.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In that connection, Mr. President, may I ask you -to take judicial notice of Document Number Schirach-55 of the -document book Schirach, then of Numbers Schirach-55a and 117, -where the Defendant Von Schirach, many years ago, expressed in -writing and repeatedly the same trends of thought which he is -expressing today.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should only like to ask, Mr. President, for permission to correct -an error in Document 55, on Page 98. Rather far down, under -the heading “Page 77,” is a quotation from a book by Schirach. -There it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Even the son of the millionaire has no other power...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not know whether you have found the passage. It is on -Page 77 of the book quoted, and Page 98 of the document book, -Number Schirach-55. There is a quotation near the bottom of -the page:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“Even the son of the millionaire has no other power...” It -should read “dress,” not “power.” The German word “Macht”, is -an error, and should be the word “Tracht.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So I ask now to have the word “Macht” (power), changed to the -word “Tracht” (dress).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, I shall then continue with the interrogation. You have -been accused of having prepared youth for the war, psychologically -and pedagogically. You are alleged to have participated in a conspiracy -for that purpose, a conspiracy by which the National Socialist -movement acquired total power in Germany, and finally -planned and carried out aggressive wars. What can you say about -that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not participate in any conspiracy. I cannot -consider it participation in a conspiracy if I joined the National -Socialist Party. The program of that party had been approved; it -had been published. The Party was authorized to take part in elections. -Hitler had not said—neither he nor any of his collaborators—“I -want to assume power by a <span class='it'>coup d’état</span>.” Again and again he -stated in public, not only once but a hundred times: “I want to -overcome this parliamentary system by legal means, because it is -leading us, year by year, deeper into misery.” And I myself as the -<span class='pageno' title='379' id='Page_379'></span> -youngest deputy of the Reichstag of the Republic told my 60,000 -constituents similar things in electoral campaigns.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There was nothing there which could prove the fact of a conspiracy, -nothing which was discussed behind closed doors. What we -wanted we acknowledged frankly before the nation, and so far as -printed paper is read around the globe, everyone abroad could have -been informed also about our aims and purposes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As far as preparation for war is concerned, I must state that I -did not take part in any conferences or issuing of orders which -would indicate preparation for an aggressive war. I believe that -can be seen from the proceedings in this Court up to now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I can state only that I did not participate in a conspiracy. I do -not believe either that there was a conspiracy; the thought of conspiracy -is in contradiction to the idea of dictatorship. A dictatorship -does not conspire; a dictatorship commands.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what did the leadership of the Hitler -Youth do to prepare the youth for war and to train it for warlike -purposes?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Before I answer that question, I believe I will -have to explain briefly the difference between military and premilitary -training.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Military training, in my opinion, is all training with weapons -of war, and all training which is conducted by military personnel, -that is, by officers, with and without weapons of war. Premilitary -education—premilitary training is, in the widest sense, all training -which comes before the time of military service; in particular cases -it is a special preparation for military service. We, in the Hitler -Youth, were opponents of any military drills for youth. We disliked -such drills as not youthful. I am not giving my personal opinion -here, but the opinion of thousands of my co-workers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is a fact that I rejected the Wehrjugend (the Youth Defense -Groups), which had formerly existed in Germany, and did not -allow any continuation of Wehrjugend work within the HJ. I had -always been strongly opposed to any soldier-playing in a youth -organization. With all my high esteem for the profession of an -officer, I still do not consider an officer capable of leading youth -because in some way or other, he will always apply the tone of -the drill field and the forms of military leadership to youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the reason why I did not have any officers as my assistants -in the Hitler Youth. Just on account of my refusal to use -officers as youth leaders, I was severely criticized by the Wehrmacht -on occasion. I should like to stress that that did not come from the -OKW; Field Martial Keitel, especially, had a great deal of understanding -for my ideas. However, in the Wehrmacht, now and again, -<span class='pageno' title='380' id='Page_380'></span> -criticism was heard on account of the general attitude of opposition -of the Youth Leadership corps toward having officers used as leaders -of a youth organization. The principle of “youth leading youth” was -never broken in Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If I am now to answer definitively the question of whether the -youth was prepared for the war and whether it was trained in a -military sense, I shall have to say, in conclusion, that the main -efforts of all youth work in Germany culminated in trade competition, -in the trade schools, in camping, and competition in sports. -Physical training, which perhaps in some way could be considered -a preparation for military service, took only a very small part of -our time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to give as an example here: A Gebiet, or district, -of the Hitler Youth, for instance the Gebiet of Hessen-Nassau which -is about the same as a Gau in the Party, contributed from its funds -in 1939 as follows: For hikes and camping, 9/20; for cultural work, -3/20; for sports and physical training, 3/20; for the Land Service -(Landdienst), and other tasks and for the offices, 5/20.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The same area spent, in 1944—that is, 1 year before the end -of the war—for cultural work, 4/20; for sports and defense training, -5/20; for Landdienst and other tasks, 6/20; and for the evacuation -of children to the country, 5/20.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In that connection I should like to mention briefly that the same -area, in the time from 1936 until 1943, made no expenditures for -racial-political education; in 1944 there was an entry of 20 marks -under the heading of racial-political education for the acquisition -of a picture book about hereditary and venereal diseases. However, -in that same district, in one single town, during the same time, -200,000 marks were given to have youth visit the theaters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The question concerning premilitary or military education cannot -be answered by me without describing small-caliber shooting -practice. Small-caliber firing was a sport among the German youth. -It was practiced on the lines laid down in the international rules -for sport shooting. Small-caliber shooting, according to Article 177 -of the Treaty of Versailles, was not prohibited. It states expressly -in that article of the treaty that rifle clubs, sporting, and hiking -organizations are forbidden to train their members in the handling -and use of war weapons. The small-caliber rifle, however, is not -a war weapon. For our sport shooting we used a rifle similar to -the American 22-caliber. It was used with the 22-caliber Flobert -cartridge for short or long distance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to say here that our entire marksmanship training -and other so-called premilitary training have been collected in a -manual entitled “HJ Service.” That book was printed and sold not -only in Germany but was also available abroad. -<span class='pageno' title='381' id='Page_381'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The British Board of Education in 1938 passed judgment on that -book, in the educational pamphlet, Number 109. With the permission -of the Tribunal, I should like to quote briefly what was said -about it in this educational pamphlet. I quote in English:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It cannot fairly be said to be in essence a more militaristic -work than any thoroughgoing, exhaustive, and comprehensive -manual of Boy Scout training would be. Some forty pages -are, to be sure, devoted to the theory and practice of shooting -small-bore rifle and air gun, but there is nothing in them -to which exception can reasonably be taken, and the worst -that one can say of them is that they may be confidently -recommended to the notice of any Boy Scout wishing to -qualify for his marksmanship badge.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>As to the mental attitude of the Hitler Youth, I can only say -that it was definitely not militaristic.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: We will perhaps come back to that later with -another question. You say the Hitler Youth had been trained with -Flobert rifles, or small-caliber rifles, as they are also called. Was -the Hitler Youth also trained with infantry rifles, or even machine -guns or machine pistols?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Certainly not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Not at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not a single German boy, until the war, had -been trained with a war weapon, a military weapon, be it an -infantry rifle, machine gun, or infantry gun; nor with hand grenades -in any form.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in the document book Schirach are -several documents which will show that the attitude of the Defendant -Von Schirach concerning the question of military or premilitary -education of the Hitler Youth was exactly the same as he has -stated it today, particularly, that he expressed himself against any -military drill, barracks language, and all such things.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These are mainly documents in the document book Schirach: 55, -then 122, 123, 127, 127a, 128, and 131. I ask you to take judicial -notice of these documents. They contain, on the whole, the same -statements which Herr Schirach has made briefly already.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Schirach, in connection with the so-called military -training of the youth, I should like to know what influence the SA -had on the training of youth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: None at all. The SA tried to have an influence -on the education and training of youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In what way? -<span class='pageno' title='382' id='Page_382'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was in January of 1939. At that time I -was in Dresden, where I arranged a performance which presented -modern gymnastics for girls. I still remember it distinctly. While -I was there, a newspaper was shown to me which carried a decree -by Hitler, according to which the two oldest age groups of the -Hitler Youth were to receive premilitary training from the SA. -I protested against that at once and after my return to Berlin I -succeeded not in having the decree withdrawn for that could not -be done for reasons of prestige since Hitler’s name was on it—but -invalidated as far as the youth were concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, that incident is contained in a document -in the document book Schirach, Number Schirach-132. That -is a statement from <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>, a semiofficial news periodical. I -should like to refer to that as evidence; and in regard to the question -of training in shooting I should like to ask the defendant one -more question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What part of the entire training did the shooting practice have -in the HJ? Was it a very essential part or the essential part?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Unfortunately, I do not have the documentary -material here which would enable me to answer that exactly. But -at any rate, it was not an essential part of the training in the HJ.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did that marksmanship training go any further, -according to your experiences and observations, than the marksmanship -training of youth in other nations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The marksmanship training of youth in other -nations went much further, much beyond that which we had in -Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that from your own observation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know that from many of my assistants who -constantly made a detailed study of the training in other countries, -and I know about it from my own observation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you think that is relevant, the fact that -other nations trained in marksmanship? I am not sure it is true -either, but anyhow, it is not relevant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then I come to another question, Witness. The -Prosecution have asserted and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“...that thousands of boys were trained militarily by the -HJ in the work of the Navy, of the naval aviation and of the -armored troops, and that over seven thousand teachers trained -over a million Hitler Youth in rifle marksmanship.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the citation of the Prosecution referring to some meeting -of the year 1938. I should like to have you state your position with -<span class='pageno' title='383' id='Page_383'></span> -regard to the question here, the question of the special units of the -Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Prosecution refers, if I am not mistaken, -to a speech which Hitler made. How Hitler arrived at the figures -concerning training, I cannot say. Concerning training in the special -units I can only say, and prove with documents, the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the year 1938 the motorized Hitler Youth—that is that special -unit of our youth organization which the Prosecution think received -preliminary training in the tank branch—in 1938 the motorized -Hitler Youth had 328 vehicles of their own.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In all Germany?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In all Germany. There were 3,270 private -cars of their family members which, of course, were at their disposal -for their work; and 2,000 cars of the NSKK (National Socialist -Motor Corps). In the year 1938 21,000 youth got their driving -licenses. I believe, but I cannot be sure about it, that that is twice -the number of youngsters that received a driving license in 1937—that -is, the driving license for a passenger car. These figures alone -show that the motorized Hitler Youth did not receive preliminary -training for our armored forces. The motorized Hitler Youth had -motorcycles; they made cross-country trips. That is correct. What -they learned in this way was, of course, useful for the Army too, -when these boys later were drafted into the motorized units; but -it was not true that the boy who had been in the motorized Hitler -Youth went to the Army. There was no compulsion in that respect -at all. The motorized Hitler Youth was not created upon the -request of the Wehrmacht, but it was already created in the -fighting years—long before the seizure of power, simply from the -natural desire of the boys who owned a motorcycle and wanted -to drive it. So we formed our motorized HJ; we used these boys -as messengers between tent camps and we used them as drivers -for our minor leaders, and later, in order to give them a regular -training, especially knowledge of motors, of engines, we made an -arrangement with the NSKK, which had motor schools and could -train the boys.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Other units were created in the same way. The Flieger HJ, for -example, never had any airplanes. We had only gliders. The entire -Hitler Youth had but one airplane and that was my own, a small -Klemm machine. Aside from that, the Hitler Youth had only model -airplanes and gliders. The Hitler Youth not only taught their own -members the use of gliders in the Rhön Hills and elsewhere, but -also thousands of youth from England and other countries. We had -glider camps where young Englishmen were our guests and we -even had camps in England. -<span class='pageno' title='384' id='Page_384'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Navy HJ, did they perhaps have warships?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Navy HJ, of course, had not a single -warship, but from time to time our former Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy, Raeder, kindly gave us an old cutter and with that -we put to sea.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The boys, for instance, who lived in a city like Berlin, near -the Wannsee, and did some rowing, became members of the Navy -HJ. When entering the Wehrmacht they did not, just because they -had been in the Navy HJ, go into the Navy, but just as many went -afterwards into the Army or the Air Force, and it was the same -with other special units.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you say therefore that in your opinion -the Hitler Youth was not educated in a military way for the war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to be quite precise about that. -The training in these special units was carried out in such a -manner that it really had a premilitary value. That is to say -that whatever the boy learned in the Navy Hitler Jugend, regardless -of whether he wanted to use it only as a sportsman later, or -whether he actually went into the Navy, the basic principles were -valuable as premilitary education. If one considers these special -units of the HJ, one can establish that here a premilitary education -actually took place, but not a military training. The youth were -not prepared for the war in any place in the HJ; they were not -even prepared for the military service, because the youth did not -go direct from the Hitler Youth into the Army. From the Hitler -Youth they went into the Labor Service.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And how long were they in the Labor Service?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Half a year.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And only then did they get to the Wehrmacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In that connection, however, the Prosecution has -used an agreement which was made between the HJ leadership -and the OKW in August 1939, and which has been submitted as -Document 2398-PS by the Prosecution. What are the facts about -that agreement between you and the OKW?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember any details. Between -Field Marshal Keitel and myself, according to my recollection, -there was no discussion concerning that agreement, but I believe -we arranged that by correspondence. And I should just like to -state that during the entire time from 1933 to 1945, only one or -two conversations of about half an hour took place between Field -Marshal Keitel and me. The agreement, however, resulted from -the following considerations: We endeavored in the Hitler Youth, -<span class='pageno' title='385' id='Page_385'></span> -and it was also the endeavor of the leading men in the Wehrmacht, -to take nothing into our training which belonged to the later -military training. However, in the course of time, the objection -was raised on the part of the military, that youth should not learn -anything in its training which later would have to be corrected -in the Wehrmacht. I am thinking, for instance, of the compass. -The Army used the infantry compass; the Hitler Youth, in cross-country -sports, used compasses of various kinds. It was, of course, -quite senseless that youth leaders should train their boys, for -instance, to march according to the Bèzar compass if later, in their -training as recruits, the boys had to learn something different. The -designation and the description of the terrain should also be given -according to the same principles in the Hitler Youth as in the -Army, and so this agreement was made by which, I believe, thirty -or sixty thousand HJ leaders were trained in cross-country sports. -In these cross-country sports no training with war weapons was -practiced.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, now I come to another chapter. It -may be that this is the best time to adjourn.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='386' id='Page_386'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Schirach resumed the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, before the adjournment we spoke about -the question of the military or premilitary education of the youth. -And now I come to a similar chapter; that is the question of whether -you, as Youth Leader, in your articles, speeches, and orders did in -any way attempt to influence young people psychologically towards -an aggressive war in order to make them war-minded by such -means.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, never in my speeches to German youth, -or in anything which I laid down for youth in the way of orders -and directives, did I prepare German youth for war; nor have I -ever, even in the smallest circle of my collaborators, expressed -myself in such terms. All my speeches are contained in the collection -<span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>, at least their essential contents. A considerable part -of my speeches is collected also in a book <span class='it'>Revolution der Erziehung</span> -(<span class='it'>The Revolution in Education</span>), which has been submitted to the -Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All this evidence shows that I never spoke to the youth of the -country in that sense; it would have been in direct contradiction -to all my aims of co-operation with the youth of other nations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, perhaps I may draw your attention -in this connection to the document which is in the Schirach document -book under Number Schirach-125, I repeat 125—and also 126, -where Schirach expresses his opinion about the question of preserving -peace and rejecting war. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of these documents as evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, you have just spoken of co-operation between your -Reich Youth Leadership Office and the German Hitler Youth with -the youth of other nations. Could you give us a more detailed -statement on that, in particular which youth associations of other -nations you co-operated with, which you attempted to approach, -and in which way and to what degree?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Starting in 1933, and in an increasing degree -year by year, I made efforts to bring about exchange camps with -youth organizations in other countries. Here in Germany these -groups of English youth, French youth, Belgian youth, and the youth -of many other countries, particularly, of course, from Italy, often -came as our guests. I remember that in one year alone, I think -in 1936, there were approximately 200,000 foreign youths who -stayed overnight in our youth hostels.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps it is important in this connection to say that the youth -hostel system, which I took over in 1933, was developed by me and -<span class='pageno' title='387' id='Page_387'></span> -finally formed a part of an international youth hostel system, the -president of which was sometimes a German, sometimes an Englishman. -An international youth hostel agreement made it possible that -youngsters of our nations could stay overnight in youth hostels of -the guest nations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I myself took great pains to bring about an understanding with -the youth of France. I must say that this was a pet idea of mine. -I think that my former assistants will remember just how intensely -I worked towards the realization of that idea. I had my leaders’ -periodical appear in the French language; I do not know whether -more than once, but certainly at least once, so that the understanding -between the French and the German youth could be -strengthened thereby.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I went to Paris and I invited the children of one thousand -veterans of the first World War to come to Germany. I very often -had young French guests as visitors in Germany. But over and -above this understanding with France, which eventually also led to -difficulties between the Führer and myself, I co-operated with -many, many other organizations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps I may add that German-French co-operation, as far as -youth was concerned, was supported particularly by Ambassador -Poncet in Berlin, Premier Chautemps, and other French personalities -who wrote in my leadership periodical on that particular -subject. I exchanged views with youth leaders all over the world, -and I myself undertook long journeys to visit youth organizations -in other countries and establish contact with them. The war terminated -that work. I do not want to omit mentioning here that for -one whole year I put the entire youth program under the slogan -“Understanding,” and that in all my speeches before the youth I -tried to direct and educate it toward a better understanding of -other nations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Is it true that, for instance, even during the last -years before the war, I think even in the winter of 1937-1938 and -again 1938-1939, you received large delegations of English youth in -skiing camps of the Hitler Youth and that vice versa also during -those years considerable delegations of Hitler Youth leaders and -Hitler Youth members were sent to England so that the people -could get to know and understand each other?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is correct. There were innumerable -encampments of foreign youth in Germany and very many camps -of German youth abroad, and I myself often visited such camps or -received delegations from them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like to add that as late as 1942 I made an attempt to -co-operate with the youth of France. At that time the difficulty lay -<span class='pageno' title='388' id='Page_388'></span> -in Mussolini’s attitude. I went to Rome and, through Count Ciano’s -intervention, had a long conversation with Mussolini and succeeded -in having him withdraw his objections to having our youth invite -all French groups to come to Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Unfortunately, when I reported this result to our Foreign -Minister, Hitler turned it down. At any rate, that is what Herr -Von Ribbentrop said.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: From an article in the paper <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span> of 1938 I -gather, for instance, that during that year you invited among others, -1,000 children of French war veterans to come into the Hitler Youth -camps in Germany and into the German-French youth skiing camps. -Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have already told you that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Another article shows me that, for instance, I -believe in 1939, you had a special memorial erected, I think in the -Black Forest, when some members of an English youth delegation -were accidentally killed there during games.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the defendant had mentioned -earlier that near Berlin he erected a special house for these purposes -under the name “The Foreign House of the Hitler Youth.” May I -present to the Tribunal in the original, pictures of this “Foreign -House,” as Document Number Schirach-120; and may I ask the -Tribunal to look at these pictures, because in them...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We are quite prepared to take it from you -without looking at the house. The particular style of architecture -will not affect us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, but if you will not look at the pictures, then -you will not know how the house was furnished; and you will not -see that in the house, for instance, there was not a single swastika, -not a single picture of Hitler, or any such things. That, again shows -considerations for the views of the foreign guests.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this connection, Mr. President, may I also ask you to take -judicial notice of a number of documents, all of which refer to the -efforts of the Defendant Von Schirach to bring about an understanding -between German youth and the youth of other nations. -These are the documents in Schirach’s document book which have -the Numbers Schirach-99 up to and including Schirach-107, then -Documents Schirach-108 through 113, and also Documents Schirach-114 -up to and including 116, and then Documents Schirach-117, 119, -and 120. All these documents refer to the same subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, when you invited such delegations from foreign -youth organizations to Germany, was anything concerning German -<span class='pageno' title='389' id='Page_389'></span> -institutions and organizations, particularly with reference to the -Hitler Youth, ever kept secret from these delegations, or how was -that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, as a matter of principle, foreign youth -leaders who wished to get to know our institutions were shown -everything without any reservations whatever. There was, in fact, -no institution of German youth in the past which was not shown to -our foreign guests. Also the so-called premilitary education was -demonstrated to them in every detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then in 1939 the second World War broke -out. During the last months before that happened, did you seriously -expect a war; or with what did you occupy yourself at the time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was firmly convinced that Hitler would not -allow a war to break out. It was my opinion that he was in no -way deceived about the fact that the Western Powers were firmly -resolved to be serious. Until the day when war broke out, I firmly -believed that the war could be avoided.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you discuss with military leaders or political -personalities at that time the danger of war and the prospects of -maintaining the peace?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No; in fact, I want to say something here and -now about my discussions with military personalities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have already stated that over a period of 12 years—that is -from 1933 to 1944 or 1945; that is, 13 years—I had perhaps one or -possibly two half-hour conversations with Field Marshal Keitel. I -remember that one of them dealt entirely with a personal matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the same period I had, I think, only one single discussion -with Admiral Raeder, and Admiral Dönitz I met for the first time -here in Nuremberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I never had any official discussions with Generaloberst Jodl at -all, and I talked to the late Field Marshal Von Blomberg, if I -remember rightly, possibly twice for half an hour. I had no official -discussions at all with the former Supreme Commander of the -Army, Von Fritsch. I was his guest on one occasion only, when -he was running skiing competitions for the army, and he kindly -invited me because he knew that I was interested in skiing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With his successor, Von Brauchitsch, I had a general chat on -questions of education when I talked before the youth of Königsberg -in 1933. Later, I believe, I visited him once on official business; -and we discussed a question which was of no particular importance -for the education of youth. It was some technical matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These are the discussions which I have had with military personalities. -In fact, altogether I must say that I did not have time for -conferences. I led an organization comprising 8 million people; and -<span class='pageno' title='390' id='Page_390'></span> -my duties in that organization were such that I did not possibly -have the time to participate in conferences and discussions in Berlin -regarding the situation, even if I had been admitted to them, which -was not the case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, from 1932 you were a Reichsleiter. That -means that you belonged to the highest level of leaders in the -Party. Were you not, in that capacity as Reichsleiter, informed by -Hitler, his deputy, or other political personalities about the political -situation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think that Hitler invited the Reichs- and -Gauleiter, on an average, twice a year to a conference, during -which he retrospectively discussed political events. Never at any -time did Hitler discuss before these men operations of the future, -whether of a political or military nature.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, if I understand your answer correctly, you -were always surprised by these foreign developments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Does the same apply to the question of the -Austrian Anschluss?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I heard of the Anschluss of Austria, -which of course I hailed enthusiastically, through the radio, if I -remember rightly, during a trip by car from my Academy at -Brunswick to Berlin. I continued my journey to Berlin, boarded -a train at once, and arrived the following morning in Vienna. There -I greeted the young people: youth leaders, some of whom had -been in prisons or in a concentration camp at Wöllersdorf for a -long time, and also many women youth leaders, who had also -experienced great hardships.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what about the march into Czechoslovakia?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Like every other German citizen, I heard of -that through the radio, and did not learn any more than any other -citizen learned from the radio.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you, in any capacity, a participant in the -negotiations regarding the Munich Pact with Chamberlain and -Daladier in 1938?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what was your opinion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I regarded that agreement as the basis for -peace, and it was my firm conviction that Hitler would keep that -agreement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you know anything about the negotiations -with Poland in 1939? -<span class='pageno' title='391' id='Page_391'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I heard about the negotiations which led -to the war, only here in this courtroom. I was merely acquainted -with that version of the negotiations which was officially announced -through the radio or by the Ministry of Propaganda; and I know no -more, therefore, than what every other German citizen knows. The -version which Hitler announced before the Reichstag was considered -by me to be absolutely true; and I never doubted it, or at least I -did not doubt it until about 1943, and all I have heard about it -here is new to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution, among other things, -have made the accusation against you that in your book, <span class='it'>Die Hitler-jugend—Idee -und Gestalt</span> (<span class='it'>Hitler Youth—Idea and Form</span>)—which, -Mr. President, is Number 1458-PS—you used the expression “Lebensraum” -(living space) and “Ostraum” (eastern space) and that by -doing so you welcomed or considered as a necessity German conquests -in the East, that is, at the expense of Soviet Russia and -Poland.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What do you have to say about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In this book of mine, <span class='it'>Die Hitler-jugend—Idee -und Gestalt</span>, the word “Lebensraum” (living space) is not used at all -to my knowledge. Only the word “Ostraum” (eastern space) is used, -and I think it is in connection with a press service in the East. In -a footnote, in connection with a description of the tasks of the -Colonial Advisory Board in the Reich Youth Leadership, there is -a statement to the effect that, as a result of the activities of this -Colonial Advisory Board the necessity of drawing the attention of -youth to the exploitation of the eastern territory—and by that is -meant the thinly populated eastern area of Germany—should not -be overlooked.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That was at a time when we in the youth organizations were -particularly concerned with the problem of the “flight from the -land,” that is to say, the migration of the second or third sons of -farmers to the cities. I formed a special movement of youth to -combat that trend, the Rural Service, which had the task of stopping -this flow of youth from the country to the towns and also of bringing -home to youth in towns the challenge of the country.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Of course I never thought of a conquest of Russian territory -because ever since I occupied myself with history it was always my -point of view politically that the policy regarding mutual security -with Russia, which broke off with Bismarck’s dismissal, should be -resumed. I considered the attack against the Soviet Union as the -suicide of the German nation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, did you, as the Youth Leader of the -German Reich, have the right to report to Hitler directly? -<span class='pageno' title='392' id='Page_392'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is true; but this right to make -reports was more or less only on paper. To picture that precisely, -before the seizure of power I frequently reported to Hitler in -person. In 1932 he quite often announced his intention to dine with -me in the evening, but it is clear that in the presence of my wife -and other guests political questions were not discussed, particularly -not the questions which fell into my special sphere. Only -now and then, perhaps, could I touch upon a subject which interested -me in connection with education.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1933, as far as I can remember, I reported twice to him personally, -once regarding the financing of the youth movement, and -the second time in connection with the Party Rally of 1933. During -the following years my reports averaged one or two a year whereby -I was treated in the same way as most people who reported to -Hitler. Of the 15 odd points on which I wanted to report to him, -I managed to deal with 3 or 4, and the others had to be dropped -because he interrupted me and very explicitly elaborated on the -things which interested him most.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I then tried to help myself by taking along models of youth -buildings, views of the big stadiums and of youth hostels, which I -had set up in a hall in the Reich Chancellery, and when he looked -at them I used the opportunity to put two or three questions to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I must state here—I think I owe it to German youth—that Hitler -took very little interest in educational questions. As far as education -was concerned, I received next to no suggestions from him. -The only time when he did make a real suggestion as far as athletic -training was concerned was in 1935, I believe, when he told me that -I should see to it that boxing should become more widespread -among youth. I did so, but he never attended a youth boxing -match. My friend Von Tschammer-Osten, the Reich Sports -Leader, and I tried very often to persuade him to go to other -sporting events, particularly to skiing contests and ice hockey -championships in Garmisch, but apart from the Olympic Games, -it was impossible to get him to attend.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You have told us a little earlier about this so-called -military or premilitary education, stating that, as far as one -could talk about such education at all, it played only a minor part -in the training of the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I ask you to tell us, though not at length but only in condensed -phrases, what, in your mind, were the chief aims of your -youth education program. Be very brief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Tent encampments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Tent encampments? -<span class='pageno' title='393' id='Page_393'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Trips, construction of youth hostels and -youth homes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What do you mean by “trips”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Youth hikes, individually and in groups; also -the construction of more and more youth hostels. In one year alone, -more than 1,000 homes and youth hostels were built by me in -Germany. Then there was additional professional training, and -then what I called the “Labor Olympics,” namely, the annual Reich -trade contests, voluntary competition between all youth of both -sexes who wanted to participate. In fact millions participated. -Then our great Reich sports contests, championships in every type -of sport, our cultural work, and the development of our singing -groups, our acting groups, youth concert choirs, and the development -of our youth libraries, and then something which I mentioned in -connection with combating the migration from the country, the -Rural Service with its rural help groups, those youths, who for -idealistic reasons were working in the country, even town boys—to -show the farmer boys that the country was really more beautiful -than the city, that even a city boy will give up his life in the city -temporarily to devote himself to the land and to tilling the soil. -Then, as a great communal accomplishment of youth, I must mention -the dental improvement and the regular medical examinations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>These, in a few summary words, were the main tasks which our -youth organizations had, but they are by no means all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, these ideas, these thoughts, and -these aims of the Defendant Von Schirach are contained in a -number of documents which are found in the Schirach document -book, and which are extracts from his works, speeches, and orders. -I am referring to Schirach document book, Numbers Schirach-32 -through 39, 44 through 50, 66 through 74(a), 76 through 79, and, -finally, 80 through 83.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>All these documents deal with the tasks which the Defendant -Schirach has just described to you, and I am asking the Tribunal -to take judicial notice of the details in these documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] There is only one point of that -Hitler Youth program, if I may call it that, with which I would -like to deal, because it has been particularly stressed against you -in the Indictment. That is your collaboration with the Lawyers’ -League, that is to say, your occupation with law. In that connection -I would like to know why you, the Reich Youth Leader, were -interested in legal problems at all. What were you striving for, -and what did you achieve? Please, will you tell us that briefly, -because it has been emphasized in the Indictment. -<span class='pageno' title='394' id='Page_394'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I remind you that the youth of the -state was regarded by me as being a Youth State. In that Youth -State all professions and all tasks were represented. My collaboration -with the Lawyers’ League was due to the necessity of training -legal advisers for our working youth whom they could offer -the necessary legal protection. I was anxious that those Hitler -Youth leaders who were studying law should return to the organization -to deal with just such tasks within the organization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>From this type of training a large organization developed within -the ranks of youth which was equivalent to the organization of -doctors within the youth organization; our medical organization -comprised approximately 1,000 doctors, men and women. These -legal men assisted the staff, in the districts and other units of our -youth organization, putting into practice those demands which I had -first enunciated early in our fighting days, before the seizure of -power, and which I had championed in the State later on, namely, -the demand for free time and paid vacations for the young worker.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This legal work of our youth led to the founding of seminars -for Youth Law and Working Youth Law, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, attached to the -universities at Kiel and Bonn. In particular it had the result that -those demands which I voiced in a speech in 1936, before the Committee -for Juvenile Law of the Academy for German Law, could -be carried through.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Just one moment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Tribunal.</span>] This is the speech of which excerpts -are reproduced, in Schirach document book, Number Schirach-63. -It is copied from <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span> of October 1936.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Schirach, perhaps you can tell us very briefly which -social demands you, as Reich Youth Leader, made regarding youth. -You said earlier, “free time.” What did you mean by that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the first place, a shortening of working -hours for young people, the abolition of night work for young -people, a fundamental prohibition of child labor, extended weekends, -and 3 weeks’ paid vacation every year.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1937 at Liegnitz I noticed that at that time 50 percent of the -young workers had no holidays at all and that only 1 percent had -15 to 18 days per annum. In 1938, on the other hand, I had put -through the Youth Protection Law which prohibited child labor, -raised the age of protection for juveniles from 16 to 18 years, prohibited -night work, and realized my demand regarding the extended -weekend, at the same time stipulating at least 15 days’ vacation -annually for youngsters. That was all I could achieve. It was only -part of what I wanted to achieve. -<span class='pageno' title='395' id='Page_395'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: These are the demands which are contained in -the following documents in the document book: Schirach-40 to 41 -and 60 to 64. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, I now come to another problem, and that is your -position within the Party. Some time ago we were shown a chart -here giving a clear picture of the organization of the Party. Was -that plan correct, or what was your position within the Party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My position in the Party was not correctly -depicted in that chart, at least not as far as the channels of command -are concerned. According to the chart which was exhibited -here, the channel of command would have been from the Reich -Leader for Youth Education to the Chief of the Party Chancellery, -and from there to Hitler and from Hitler to the Reich Youth Leadership -Office of the Party. That, of course, is an erroneous picture.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I was not in the Party Directorate to give my orders via the -Gauleiter to the district leaders but as the representative and -head of the youth movement, so that if you want to describe my -position and the position of my organization in the framework of -the NSDAP correctly, you would actually have to draw a pyramid, -the apex of which, that is to say my position in the Party Directorate, -would be above the Reichsleiter. I was the only person in the youth -movement who was connected with the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And the other leaders and subleaders of the youth -movement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Some of them may have been Party members, -but not all. At any rate, they were not members of the -Gauleitung or Kreisleitung. The entire staff of the youth movement, -the entire youth organization, stood alongside the Party -as a unit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, as the Youth Leader of the German -Reich, were you a civil servant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And from 1 December 1936, I believe, you were -the chief of a high Reich office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was a civil servant only from 1 December -1936.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: With the title?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Youth Leader of the German Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As the chief of a high Reich office, were you -actually independent of the Minister of the Interior and the Minister -for Education? -<span class='pageno' title='396' id='Page_396'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that was, after all, the purpose of creating -an independent Reich office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you thereby become a member of the Reich -Cabinet, as has been claimed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I am sure I did not. I heard here for the -first time that I was supposed to have been a member of the Cabinet. -I never participated in a Cabinet meeting. I never received a decree -or anything of the sort which would have made me a member of -the Cabinet. I never received invitations to attend Cabinet meetings. -I never considered myself a member of the Cabinet, and I believe -that the Ministers did not consider me a member either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you in any way informed of the resolutions -passed by the Reich Cabinet, for instance, by having the minutes of -the meetings sent to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. Resolutions passed by the Reich Cabinet, -insofar as any were passed after 1 December 1936, only came to -my attention in the same way as they reached any other higher -official or employee of the Reich who read the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> or -the <span class='it'>Reichsministerialblatt</span>. Records and minutes: were never sent -to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When you became a high Reich authority, did you -receive the staff which you needed through a ministry, or how did -you obtain that staff for yourself?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: A few youth leaders who had worked on -my staff for a number of years were made civil servants through -me. I did not receive a single official from any ministry to deal -with matters relating to the youth organization. The entire high -Reich office, if I remember correctly, consisted of no more than five -officials. It was the smallest of the high Reich offices, something I -was particularly proud of. We carried out a very large task with -a minimum of personnel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And now, Witness, I want to come to a subject -which is going to be rather extensive and that is the affidavit by -Gregor Ziemer, which you have already mentioned. It is a very -lengthy affidavit which has been presented by the Prosecution under -Document Number 2441-PS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, what do you have to say in detail with regard to that -affidavit? Do you know it? Do you know this man Gregor Ziemer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Have you found out who he is and from where -he gathered his alleged knowledge?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I gather from the affidavit that Herr Ziemer -before the war was headmaster of the American school in Berlin -<span class='pageno' title='397' id='Page_397'></span> -and that he has written a book which apparently deals with youth -and school education in Germany. This affidavit is an extract from -that book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The affidavit as such, if you regard it in its entirety, has, I -believe, more importance as propaganda than as an impartial -judgment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want to start by quoting something from the very first page, -which is the page containing Ziemer’s affidavit, and in the last -paragraph it says that street fights took place outside the American -school between the Jewish children going to this school and the -local youngsters. I need not deal with the difficulties which the -school itself had, because that was not part of my department. But -these street fights took place outside the school, and I think I -ought to say something about them. I never heard anything about -these clashes, but I should have heard about them under all circumstances, -because during most of 1938 I was in Berlin. I should have -heard of them first through the youth organization itself, because -the senior youth leaders would have been obliged to report to me -if such incidents had taken place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Furthermore, I would have had to hear about it through the -Foreign Office, because if youngsters from the American colony -had been molested, protests would certainly have gone through the -Embassy to the Foreign Office, and these protests would without -fail have been passed on to me at once or reported to me by -telephone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I can only imagine that the whole affair is a very gross exaggeration. -The American Ambassador Wilson even had breakfast -with me—I think in the spring of 1939, and I do not think I am -wrong about the date—in Gatow.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the Foreign House?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the Foreign House.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And we discussed a number of subjects privately. I believe that -on that occasion or afterwards he would most certainly have -mentioned such incidents if they had in reality occurred in the way -Herr Ziemer describes them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe I can go over to Page 2, where...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, how much of this document has -been read by the Prosecution? As far as I know, very little.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I beg your pardon?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How much of this affidavit has been read -and put in evidence by the Prosecution?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I cannot tell you that offhand, Mr. President. But -judging by practice, I must assume that if a document is submitted -<span class='pageno' title='398' id='Page_398'></span> -to the Tribunal, judicial notice of the entire document is taken by -the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is not so. We have stated over and -over again that we take only judicial notice on documents which -have been read to the Tribunal, unless they are documents of -which full translations have been given. This document was, -I suppose, presented in the course of the Prosecution’s case, and -probably one sentence out of it was read at the time. I do not -know how much was read; but you and the defendant ought to -know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: There was only one paragraph read, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One paragraph?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: One full paragraph and perhaps one short one on -Page 21.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have it here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I think the Prosecution covered the part having -to do with the speech at Heidelberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And that is the only part of it that has been -read, and that is, therefore, the only part of it that is in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Perhaps for the sake of credibility—and I -shall not deal in detail with the accusations contained in that affidavit—I -might be allowed to say, with one sole exception, all the -annual slogans of the Hitler Youth are reproduced falsely in this -affidavit and that Gregor Ziemer nevertheless swears to the correctness -of his statement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be the best, if you want to reply -to his affidavit, that you should direct the defendant’s attention to -the part which has been read? Then he can make an answer to that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in Ziemer’s affidavit, which the -defendant has told me he regards as a clearly inflammatory piece -of writing, the annual slogans are mentioned which are supposed -to have been issued by the defendant, that is, the slogans for the -work for the following year.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One passage of this document has been put -in. If you want to put in the rest, you are entitled to do so. But I -should have thought that it would have been the best way for you -to answer the passage which has been put in. The rest of the affidavit -is not in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in that case my client would get -the worst end of the bargain, because in other passages which have -not been used by the Prosecution... -<span class='pageno' title='399' id='Page_399'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I said you could use the other passages if -you want to.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Certainly, but I want to prove that Herr Ziemer’s -statements are not correct; that is why I have just been discussing -the question of annual slogans with the defendant. This is only -one example.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the defendant is apparently -saying that the affidavit is unreliable because of the slogans which -are referred to in it. Is that not sufficient for your purpose?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes; but I intend to prove that Herr Ziemer’s -statements are untrue. The defendant maintains that the statements -contained in that affidavit are not true. But I am trying to prove -to you that, in fact, Herr Ziemer has deliberately stated and sworn -to untruths.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Sauter, there being one passage -in this affidavit which is in evidence, you can deal very shortly -with the question of the credit of the person who made the affidavit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, this Herr Ziemer, in his affidavit, has -made statements regarding the annual slogans...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: ...which you issued for the Hitler Youth. How -these annual slogans were worded can be easily seen by the Tribunal -from the affidavit. I now ask you to tell us how the annual -slogans of the Hitler Youth were worded during your time; that -is, 1933 to 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Herr Ziemer mentions the slogan on Page 15 -of the English document. Herr Ziemer says that in 1933 the motto -for German Youth had been “One Reich, One Nation, One Führer.” -He probably means “One People, One Reich, One Führer.” Actually, -the year 1933 was the year of “Unity.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What do you mean by “Unity”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The year in which German youth joined -ranks in one organization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I want to skip a few years now and come to the -year 1938. What was your slogan for the Hitler Youth in 1938?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 1938 was the year of “Understanding.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The year of “Understanding”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Herr Ziemer says the slogan was “Every -Youth a Flyer.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then in 1939 what was your slogan?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was the year of “Duty Towards Health.” -<span class='pageno' title='400' id='Page_400'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The year of “Duty Towards Health”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: According to Herr Ziemer, it was “Hitler -Youth on the March.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And finally 1940, your last year?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was the year of “Instruction.” But he -called it “We March Against England.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But I want to add that the first slogan, “One People, One Reich, -One Führer,” which Ziemer says was the official slogan of the year -1933 for German youth, arose first in 1938 when Hitler went into -Austria. Before that, that slogan did not exist at all. It was never -the annual slogan of German youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we must comply with the wish of the -Tribunal and not go into the affidavit of Ziemer any further, with -the exception of the one point which has been used by the Prosecution -in the Indictment against you in connection with the accusation -of anti-Semitism. I skip Herr Ziemer’s further statements -and come to this speech at Heidelberg. Will you tell me first of all, -what Ziemer said, and then make your own comments on that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Ziemer said that during a meeting of students -in Heidelberg—I think either at the end of 1938 or the beginning of -1939—I had made a speech against the Jews in connection with a -rally of the National Socialist Student Union. He says that on that -occasion I praised the students for the destruction of the Heidelberg -Synagogue, and that following that I had the students file past me -and gave them decorations and certificates of promotion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First of all, I have already referred to my activity in the student -movement. Upon the request of the Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf -Hess, I handed the leadership of the student movement over to him -in 1934. He then appointed a Reich student leader; and after that -I did not speak at any student meetings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As far as I can remember, I visited Heidelberg during the summer -of 1937; and there I spoke to the youth group. This was 1 or 1½ -years before Ziemer’s date. And on one occasion I attended a -festival play at Heidelberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: All of this is irrelevant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no recollection of any meeting of this -sort with students, and I have no recollection of ever having -publicly stated my views about the Jewish pogrom of 1938. I will -state at another point what I said in my capacity as Youth Leader -regarding this.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Ziemer says—I am translating from the English text—he says -that “the day will come when the students of Heidelberg will take -<span class='pageno' title='401' id='Page_401'></span> -up their place side by side with the legions of other students to win -the world over to the National Socialist ideology.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have never spoken like that before youth, in public, or even -in a small circle. These are not my words; I did not say that. I -had no authority whatsoever to confer decorations or certificates, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>, upon students. Medals of distinction for students did not -exist. All decorations were conferred by the head of the State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I personally had the right to confer the golden youth decoration, -and I think it was conferred by me about 230 times in all, almost -entirely upon people who earned distinction in the field of education, -but not upon unknown students.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the important point in your testimony is -to tell us whether it is correct that the speech made at the end of -1938 before the students at Heidelberg, in which the speaker referred -to the wreckage of the synagogues, was not made by you, -because at that time you had not had anything to do with the -student movement for years. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had nothing to do with the student movement, -and I do not remember having spoken before such a meeting. -I consider it quite out of the question that such a meeting of students -took place at all. I did not make those statements.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Have you got the affidavit before you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I cannot find that particular passage at -the moment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: It says something which I have translated into -German, namely, it mentions the “small, fat student leader.” Have -you got that passage? Does it not say so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, it says so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Well then, surely “small, fat student leader” cannot -be applied to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I, Mr. President, in this connection, draw your attention to -an affidavit which appears in Schirach’s document book under -Number Schirach-3, and which I herewith submit to the Tribunal. -It is an affidavit of a certain Hoepken, who, beginning with 1 May -1938, was the female secretary of the Defendant Von Schirach and -who, in this affidavit under the Figure 16—which is Page 22 of the -document book—mentioning exact details—states under oath that -during the time with which we are here concerned the defendant -was not at Heidelberg at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not suppose it is necessary for me to read that part of the -affidavit. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to break off.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='402' id='Page_402'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have spoken in another connection -about the fact that you did not consider officers suitable as youth -leaders. I would be interested to know how many members of the -leadership corps of the Hitler Youth in 1939 at the outbreak of -the war were reserve officers in the Armed Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I would judge that the leadership corps of -the HJ had about 1,300 leaders. Those were leaders of the Banne, -leaders of the districts or regions, and the corresponding staff of -assistants. Of these 1,300 youth leaders, 5 to 10 men were reserve -officers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And how many active officers did you have at -that time on your staff or in the leadership corps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Active officers were not youth leaders and -could not be youth leaders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why not? Was that contained in the regulations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. An officer was not permitted to be a -member of the Party or any one of its organs or affiliated organizations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who was responsible to you for the physical -education and sports programs in the Hitler Youth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Obergebietsführer Von Tschammer-Osten, -who was also Reich Sports Leader. In the Olympic year he co-operated -very closely with me and voluntarily subordinated himself -to me in December or November 1936. He was responsible to me -for the entire physical education of the boys and girls.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This Herr Von Tschammer-Osten, who was -very well known in the international sports world, was he an officer -by profession?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: According to my recollection he had been an -officer during the first World War. Then he left the Army and was -a farmer by profession. Later on he concerned himself only with -questions of physical education and sport. One of his brothers was -an active officer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Von Tschammer-Osten become an officer -during the second World War?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, he did not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you remember that? A document has been -submitted here by the Soviet Prosecution, namely a report from -Lvov, in which it is stated that the Hitler Youth or the Reich -Youth Leadership had conducted courses for young people from -Poland, and these young people were to be trained as agents, spies, -<span class='pageno' title='403' id='Page_403'></span> -and parachutists. You have stated today that you take the complete -responsibility for the youth leadership. I ask you to tell us something -about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: We had absolutely no possibilities for espionage -training in our youth organization. Whether Heydrich on his -part, without my knowledge and without the knowledge of my -assistants, had hired youthful agents in Poland and used them -within his intelligence service, it is not possible for me to say. I -myself did not conduct any espionage training; I had no courses for -agents, and courses for training parachutists were out of the question -because, after all, I had no air force. Training of that kind could -only have been conducted through the Air Force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then you, as Reich Youth Leader or, as you were -called later, Reich Leader for Youth Education, have never known -anything about these things before this Trial? Can you state that -under oath?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I can state upon my oath. I should like -to add that shortly before the war young refugees from Poland -came to us in large numbers, but they of course could not return -to Poland. The persecution of the Germans in Poland is a historical -fact.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution has asserted that in the -Hitler Youth a song was sung, “Heute gehört uns Deutschland, und -morgen die ganze Welt” (Today Germany belongs to us, tomorrow -the whole world); that is the alleged title of that song, and that is -supposed to have expressed the will for conquest of the Hitler -Youth; is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The song says, in the original text which was -written by Hans Baumann and is also included in a document here: -“Heute da hört uns Deutschland und morgen die ganze Welt” -(Germany hears us today and tomorrow the whole world). But it -had come to my knowledge also that the song, from time to time, -was being sung in the form which has been mentioned here. For -that reason I issued a prohibition against singing the song which -differed from the original text. I also prohibited, years ago, the -song “Siegreich wollen wir Frankreich schlagen” (Victoriously we -will conquer France) from being sung by the German Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You prohibited the last mentioned song entirely?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Out of consideration for your French guests?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not out of consideration for guests but -because it was contrary to my political conceptions. -<span class='pageno' title='404' id='Page_404'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thus, Mr. President, I submit the correct text -which I got from a song book. It is Number Schirach-95 of the -Schirach document book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In connection with the question of whether the Hitler Youth -intended a premilitary training of youth, I should like to put the -following additional questions. Did the physical and sport training -of youth apply only to the boys, Herr Von Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. Of course all young people received -physical training.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Also the girls?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Is it correct that your efforts directed toward the -physical training and physical strengthening of youth also applied -to the physically handicapped and to the blind and other young -people who from the very outset could not be used for military -purposes?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Very early in our work I included the blind -and deaf and the cripples in the Hitler Youth. I had a periodical -especially issued for the blind and had books made for them in -Braille. I believe that the Hitler Youth was the only organization -in Germany which took care of these people, except for special -organizations of the NSV (National Socialist Welfare Organization) -and so on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I ask, in connection with that, Mr. President, that -you take notice of Document Schirach-27 of the Schirach document -book. That is a long article entitled “Admission of Physically -Handicapped Young People in the Hitler Youth,” where the deaf, -dumb, and blind are especially mentioned and their training to -enable them to take up a professional occupation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I have refrained all day from making any objection, -but I think this examination has gone very far afield. We have -made no charge against this defendant with respect to the blind, -the deaf, the lame, and halt. He keeps going way back to the Boy -Scouts and we haven’t gotten to any of the relevant issues that are -between us and this defendant. At the present rate I fear we will -never get through.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we have listened to this somewhat -long account of the training of the Hitler Youth. Don’t you -think you can go on to something more specific now? We have got -a very fair conception, I think, of what the training of the Hitler -Youth was; and we have got all these documents before us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I shall try, Mr. President, to proceed according to -your wishes so far as it is at all possible. -<span class='pageno' title='405' id='Page_405'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, is it correct that you personally intervened with Hitler -to prevent the re-establishment of cadet academies as institutions -for purely military training?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is correct. I prevented the re-establishment -of cadet academies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I come now to another chapter. The defendant -has been accused of wrecking the Protestant and Catholic youth -organizations. What can you say in answer to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First, the following: I wanted, as I have -already explained, the unification of all our youth. I also wanted -to bring the Protestant organizations, which were not very large -numerically, and the numerically very large Catholic organizations -into the Hitler Youth, particularly because some of the organizations -did not limit themselves to religious matters but competed with -the Hitler Youth in physical training, hikes, camping, and so on. -In this I saw a danger to the idea of unity in German national -education, and above all I felt that among young people themselves -there was a very strong tendency toward the Hitler Youth. The -desertion from the confessional organizations is a fact. There were -also many clergymen who were of the opinion that the development -should perhaps take the following direction: All youth into the -Hitler Youth; the religious care of the youth through clergymen; -sports and political work through youth leaders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1933 or 1934—but I think it was as early as 1933—Reich -Bishop Müller and the Protestant Bishop Oberheidt approached me -on their own initiative and proposed that I incorporate the Protestant -youth organizations into the Hitler Youth. Of course I was -very happy about that proposal and accepted it. At that time I -had no idea that there was opposition to Reich Bishop Müller within -the Protestant Church. I found out about that only much later. I -believed that I was acting with the authority and in the name of the -Evangelical Church, and the other bishop who accompanied him -further strengthened this belief of mine. Even today I still believe -that with the voluntary incorporation of the Protestant youth into -the Youth State, Müller acted in accordance with the will of the -majority of the Protestant youth themselves; and in my later -activity as Youth Leader I frequently met former leaders from the -Protestant youth organizations, who had leading positions with me -and worked in my youth organization with great enthusiasm and -devotion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Through that incorporation of Protestant youth—I should like to -stress this—spiritual ministration to youth was not limited or -hindered in any way; there never was a restriction of church -services for youth in Germany, either then or later. Since Protestant -<span class='pageno' title='406' id='Page_406'></span> -youth had been incorporated on the basis of an agreement between -the Church and the Hitler Youth, there was practically only a dispute -about youth education between the Catholic Church and the -Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In May or June 1934 I asked personally to participate in the -negotiations for the Reich Concordat because I wanted to eliminate -entirely the differences between the Catholic Church and the Hitler -Youth. I considered an agreement in this field to be very important -and in fact I was allowed to participate in these negotiations which -took place in June ’34 in the Reich Ministry of the Interior under -the chairmanship of Reich Minister for the Interior Frick. On the -Catholic side Archbishop Gröber and Bishop Berning took part in -the negotiations; and at that time I personally proposed a formula -for co-operation, which met with the approval of the Catholic side, -and I believed that I had found the basis for agreement in this -sphere.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The conferences were unfortunately interrupted on the evening -of 29 June; and on 30 June ’34 we experienced the so-called “Röhm -Putsch,” and the negotiations were never resumed. That is not my -fault, and I bear no responsibility for that. Hitler simply did not -want to accept the consequences of the Concordat. I personally -desired to conclude that agreement, and I believe that the representatives -of the Church saw from these negotiations and from certain -later conferences with me that the difficulties did not originate with -me. At any rate Bishop Berning came to me, I believe in 1939. We -discussed current questions between the youth leadership and the -Church. I believe that he also got the impression at that time that -it was not I who wanted to make difficulties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The difficulties arose at that time from the increasingly strong -influence of Martin Bormann, who tried to prevent absolutely any -kind of agreement between the Party offices and the Church or -between the youth leadership and the Church.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the course of the dispute about the leadership of confessional -youth organizations and their incorporation, animated public discussions -arose. I myself spoke at various meetings. Statements were -issued by the Church also, which according to the state of affairs, -were more or less sharp. But I did not make statements inimical to -religion in connection with that subject, nor did I at any time -during my life.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, is it correct that in 1937 you concluded -an agreement with the Church to the effect that the Hitler Youth -should, in principle, not be on duty on Sundays during church time, -so that the children could attend religious services, and furthermore, -that on account of this agreement you ran into considerable -difficulties? -<span class='pageno' title='407' id='Page_407'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Will you tell us very briefly about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe one can say that it was an -agreement with the Church. If I remember correctly, I issued a -decree based on various letters I had received from clergymen—which -to a very great extent took into account the wishes expressed -in these letters. I then issued that decree and I gather from many -affidavits which have been sent by youth leaders to me recently that -that decree was very carefully obeyed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Difficulties arose in the Party Chancellery on account of my -attitude. Bormann, of course, was an energetic enemy of such a -basic concession to the Church, and Hitler himself—I don’t know -whether it was in connection with this decree, but, at any rate, in -connection with the regulation of the dispute between the youth -leadership and the Church—also reprimanded me once.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have a small book here, entitled -<span class='it'>A Good Year 1944</span>, with the sub-title “Christmas Gift of the War -Welfare Service of Reich Leader Von Schirach.” I submit that book -as Document Number Schirach-84 to the Tribunal for judicial notice. -On Page 55 is a picture of the Madonna. On Page 54 is a Christian -poem written by the defendant, with the title “Bavarian Christmas -Crib.” On the lower half of Page 54 there is the famous “Wessobrunner -Prayer,” the oldest prayer in the German language, dating -from the eighth century.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, is it also correct that on account of the Christian -content of that book you had difficulties with Reichsleiter Bormann; -and if so, what were they?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. I had that Christmas gift -made for, I believe, 80,000 to 100,000 soldiers and sent to them at -the front as late as 1944. I did not hear anything directly from -Bormann, but he suddenly asked for 10 copies of that book; and I -was informed by people who were near the Führer in his headquarters -that he used that book in some way in order to incite -Hitler against me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to add that at all times of my life, at any rate -insofar as I have written poetry, I have expressed myself in the -same way as in this poem. Also in the collection of poems, <span class='it'>The Flag -of the Persecuted</span>, which I do not have here unfortunately but which -was distributed among the youth in a very large edition, where my -revolutionary poems can be found, there are poems of a Christian -content which, however, were not reprinted by the Party press in -the newspapers and therefore did not become so well-known as -my other verses. But I should like to express quite clearly that I -was an opponent of confessional youth organizations, and I wish to -<span class='pageno' title='408' id='Page_408'></span> -make it just as clear that I was not an opponent of the Christian -religions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Not an opponent?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you leave the Church?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In spite of many hints by Bormann, I never -left the Church.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: May I, Mr. President, ask the Tribunal to take -judicial notice of Documents Schirach-85 to 93, inclusive, of the -Schirach document book. All of these are documents from the -period when he was Reich Youth Leader and show his attitude -toward the Church.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I add something to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: If you please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as my religious attitude is concerned, -I always identified myself with the thoughts expressed in <span class='it'>Wilhelm -Meisters Wanderjahre</span> about religions in general and the importance -of the Christian religion in particular. I should like to say here that -in my work as an educator I was mistaken in holding the opinion -that positive Christianity existed outside of the Church.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, I never made any anti-Christian statements; and I -should like to say here for the first time in public that in the closest -circles of the Hitler Youth I have always expressed a very unequivocal -belief in the person and teachings of Christ. Before educators -of the Adolf Hitler School—a fact which naturally was never -allowed to come to the knowledge of the Party Chancellery—I spoke -about Christ as the greatest leader in world history and of the -commandment to “Love thy neighbor” as a universal idea of our -culture. I believe that there are also several testimonials by youth -leaders about that in your possession, Mr. Attorney.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, I shall refer to that later. I should like to -begin a new chapter now. In 1940 you were dismissed as Reich -Youth Leader?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And you were succeeded by Axmann who has -already been mentioned. But you remained connected with youth -education through what office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Through the office of the Reichsleiter of Youth -Education.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And in addition to that you received another title, -I believe? -<span class='pageno' title='409' id='Page_409'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I became Deputy of the Führer for the -Inspection of the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was that only a title, or was that some kind of -office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was an office to the extent that the -Reichsleiter office was concerned with youth work in the Party -sector. The Youth Leader of the German Reich—that was Axmann -as my successor—also had a field of activity in the State, and I too -became competent for that by my appointment as inspector.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How did your dismissal as Reich Youth Leader -come about, and why were you called specifically to Vienna as -Gauleiter? What can you tell us about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: At the end of the French campaign, in which I -participated as an infantryman, I was in Lyon when a wireless -message from the Führer’s headquarters was received, and the chief -of my company told me that I had to report to the Führer’s headquarters. -I went there at once; and at the Führer’s headquarters, -which was at that time situated in the Black Forest, I saw the -Führer standing in the open speaking to Reich Foreign Minister -Von Ribbentrop. I waited a while, maybe a quarter of an hour or -20 minutes, until the conversation had ended and then reported at -once to Hitler and there, outside, before the Casino building where -later we all had our meal together, he told me the following in -about 10 minutes:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should propose to him a successor for the leadership of the -youth. He intended for me to take over the Reich Gau Vienna. I at -once suggested my assistant, Axmann, who was not a man who -advocated physical or military training but was concerned with -social work among the youth, and that was most important to me. -He accepted this proposal...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we need not go through Axmann’s -qualifications, need we? Is it material to the Tribunal to know what -his successor was like?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Axmann? Axmann was successor as Reich Youth -Leader.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What I was asking you was whether it was -material for the Tribunal to know the qualities of Axmann. We -have nothing to do with that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Von Schirach, you can be more brief about -that point, can you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Hitler then said that I should keep my job as -Reich Leader of Youth Education and that I should assume at the -same time the office of the Inspector of Youth and that I should -<span class='pageno' title='410' id='Page_410'></span> -go to Vienna as the successor to Bürckel. In Vienna, especially in -the cultural field, serious difficulties had arisen; and therefore I was -to direct my attention to the case of the institutions of culture, -particularly of theaters, art galleries, libraries, and so forth; and -I was to be especially concerned about the working class. I raised -the objection that I could carry out that cultural work only if -independent of Goebbels, and Hitler promised at that time that this -independence would be fully safeguarded; but he did not keep that -promise later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And lastly he said that he was sending the Jewish population -away from Vienna, that he had already informed Himmler or -Heydrich—I do not remember exactly what he said—of his intentions, -or at least would inform them. Vienna had to become a German -city, and in that connection he even spoke of an evacuation -of the Czech population.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That concluded that conversation. I received no other instructions -for this office, and then we dined together as usual. I took -my leave then and went to Berlin to talk to my assistants.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Vienna was considered at that time, if I am -correctly informed, the most difficult Gau of the Reich; is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Vienna was by far the most difficult political -problem which we had among the Gaue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Because—I learned the details only from -other persons in Berlin, after I had received my mission from -Hitler—in Vienna the population had sobered considerably after -the first wave of enthusiasm over the Anschluss had subsided. Herr -Bürckel, my predecessor, had brought many officials to Vienna from -the outside; and the German system of administration, which was -in no wise more practicable or efficient than the Austrian, was -introduced there. This resulted in a certain over-organization in the -administrative field, and Bürckel had started on a Church policy -which was more than unsatisfactory. Demonstrations took place -under his administration. On one occasion the palace of the archbishop -was damaged. Theaters and other places of culture were not -taken care of as they should have been. Vienna was experiencing a -feeling of great disillusionment. Before I got there I was informed -that if one spoke in the streetcars with a North-German accent, -the Viennese took an unfriendly attitude.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what duties did you have or what offices -did you hold in Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In Vienna I had the office of Reich Governor -(Reichsstatthalter), which included two administrations, the municipal -administration and the national administration. In addition, -<span class='pageno' title='411' id='Page_411'></span> -I was Reich Defense Commissioner for Wehrkreis XVII, but only -until 1942. In 1942, the Wehrkreis was subdivided, and each Gauleiter -of the Wehrkreis became his own Reich Defense Commissioner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then you also were Gauleiter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I was also Gauleiter, the highest official -of the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In other words, you represented city, state, and -Party, all at once—the highest authority of city, state, and Party in -Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. Now the situation was such in the administration -that there was an official representative to take charge of -national affairs, namely, the Regierungspräsident; for the municipal -administration there was another representative, the mayor; in the -Party, the Deputy Gauleiter in Vienna had the title of Gauleiter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should not like to belittle my responsibility for the Gau by -explaining that, and I want to protect the exceptionally efficient -Deputy Gauleiter who was there. I just want to say that in order -to clarify my position.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What really was your position as Reich Defense -Commissioner, Witness? Was that a military position, or what -was it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was not a military position at all. The -Reich Defense Commissioner was simply the head of the civil administration, -in contrast to the situation prevailing during the first -World War, where the head of the civil administration was assigned -to and subordinated to the commanding general; in this war the -Reich Defense Commissioner was co-ordinate with him, not subordinate.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The tasks of the Reich Defense Commissioner—at least, that is -how I saw my tasks—were at certain intervals, to co-ordinate the -most pressing problems of food economy, transportation—that is, -local and distant transportation, coal supplies, and price regulation -for the Gaue of Vienna, Upper Danube, and Lower Danube, all of -which belonged to Wehrkreis XVII.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There were several meetings for that purpose—I believe three -all together. In 1942 the reorganization which I previously mentioned -took place. Bormann carried his point against the Reich Marshal. -The Reich Marshal was of the opinion that the Reich Defense Commissioner -had to be Defense Commissioner for the entire Wehrkreis. -Bormann wanted each Gauleiter to be Defense Commissioner, and -so that led to the division. From 1942 on I was only Reich Commissioner -for Vienna. -<span class='pageno' title='412' id='Page_412'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, it seems that a decree was issued at that -time—will you please tell me when you were informed about it—namely, -a decree by Reichsleiter Bormann, that not more than two -Gauleiter could meet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not a decree by Bormann; that was an -order by Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What were its salient points?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I must explain that briefly. Because of the -fact that the Reich Commissariat was subdivided, I had to meet from -time to time with the Reichsstatthalter of other provinces in order -to discuss the most important questions, especially concerning our -food economy. However, I believe it was in 1943, Dr. Ley came to -me in Vienna and brought me an official order from the Führer, -according to which it was considered illegal—that was the way he -expressed it—for more than two Gauleiter to meet for a conference.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that time I looked at Dr. Ley speechless; and he said:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Yes, that does not concern you alone. There is still another -Gauleiter who has called a conference of more than two, and -that fact alone is already considered as virtual mutiny or -conspiracy.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, when you were in Vienna, were you -given a further mission which took up much of your time? Please -tell us briefly about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had just started to work in Vienna when, in -October 1940, I received an order to appear at the Reich Chancellery.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Will you please be very brief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And there Hitler personally gave me the -mission of carrying out the evacuation of all German youth from -areas endangered by aerial attack, and simultaneously to carry out -the evacuation of mothers and infants; and he said that that should -begin in Berlin and then gradually take in the entire Reich. He said -that education was of secondary importance now; the main thing -was to maintain the nervous energy of the youth and to preserve -life. However, I asked at once that I be given the possibility of -establishing an educational organization, and I did so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not wish to speak about details, but one of the demands, -which I made at once—this is important in connection with the -Indictment—was that there should be no difficulties placed in the -way of young people’s participation in church services. That was -promised to me, and it was expressed very clearly in my first directives -for the children’s evacuation. The youth leaders who were -active in this field of my organizational work will confirm this. -<span class='pageno' title='413' id='Page_413'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This evacuation of children to the country was a -very extensive task, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was the most difficult, and from a psychological -point of view, the most complicated work which I ever -carried out. I transferred millions of people in this way; I supplied -them with food, with education, with medical aid, and so on. Of -course that work took up my time fully or to a large extent only -during the first years. After that I had trained my assistants for -that kind of work.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Later, as I have heard from you, you tried from -time to time to report to Hitler about your successes and about -problems requiring decision. How often during the entire years of -the war were you admitted to discuss that important field of work -with Hitler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Mr. Attorney, I am afraid I have to correct -you. I never tried to report to Hitler about my successes, but only -about my problems.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Problems, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: About that entire program of evacuation of -children I could only report to him twice; the first time in 1940, -after I had got the whole program under way, and the second time -in 1941, when the evacuation had reached very large proportions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And about Vienna I could only report on very rare occasions, -and in 1943 the possibility of reporting ceased altogether with the -breach of relations which I will describe later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, during your period in Vienna you became -the Chairman of the Würzburg Bibliophile Society.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is an honorary office, the Würzburg -Bibliophile Convention had appointed me Chairman of the German -Bibliophile Society.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Your Honor, Schirach—Number Schirach-1 of the -document book makes reference to that matter, and I submit it as -a piece of evidence. It it an affidavit by an old anti-Fascist, Karl -Klingspor, an honorary member of the society, who gives valuable -information about the character of the Defendant Von Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And in addition, Herr Von Schirach, I believe you were the -Chairman of the Southeast Europe Society, is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In brief, what was the mission of that society?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It had as its purpose the improvement of trade -relations, economic relations, with the southeast. Its functions were -essentially in the field of research and representation. -<span class='pageno' title='414' id='Page_414'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what were your main Viennese activities?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My principal activities in Vienna were social -work and cultural work, as I have already explained before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Social work and cultural work?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: These were the two poles which dominated -my entire political life.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I come now to the particular accusations which -have been made against you by the Prosecution concerning that -period in Vienna. Among other things you have been accused of -participating in the so-called slave-labor program, and I ask you to -state your position concerning that, and in that connection also to -deal with Directive Number 1 of the Plenipotentiary General for -the Allocation of Labor, of 6 April 1942, which was presented, I -believe, as Document 3352-PS. Please go ahead.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Maybe I would do best to start with the decree -by which Gauleiter were appointed Plenipotentiaries for the -Allocation of Labor under the Plenipotentiary General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: 6 April 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the way of documentary material that -decree contains no more than that the Gauleiter could make suggestions -and submit requests to the competent offices for the allocation -of labor. But they were held responsible—I do not know whether -by this decree or another one—for the supervision of the feeding -and quartering, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, of foreign workers. This feeding and -quartering, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, of foreign workers was—in my Gau and I -believe also in all other Gaue of the Reich—mainly in the hands of -the German Labor Front.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Gauobmann of the German Labor Front in Vienna reported -to me very frequently about the conditions among German workers -and foreign workers in the Gau. He often accompanied me on -inspection tours of industries; and from my own observations I can -describe my impressions here of the life of foreign workers in -Vienna as far as I could watch it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I well remember, for instance, my visit to a large soap factory -where I saw barracks in which Russian and French women were -living. They had better quarters there than many Viennese families -which lived six or eight people in the usual one-room apartments -with kitchen. I remember another inspection where I saw a billet -of Russian workers. It was clean and neat, and among the Russian -women who were there I noticed that they were gay, well-nourished, -and apparently satisfied. I know about the treatment of -Russian domestic workers from the circle of my acquaintances and -from the acquaintances of many assistants; and here, also, I have -<span class='pageno' title='415' id='Page_415'></span> -heard, and in part observed myself, that they were extremely well -treated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Let me say something in general about Vienna as a place for -foreign workers. For centuries foreign workers have worked in -Vienna. To bring foreign workers from the southeast to Vienna is -no problem at all. One likes to go to Vienna, just as one likes to -go to Paris. I have seen very many Frenchmen and French women -working in Vienna, and at times I spoke with them. I also talked -to French foremen in the factories. They lived as tenants somewhere -in the city, just like any other private person. One saw them in -the Prater. They spent their free time just as our own native -workers did.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the time I was in Vienna, I built more factory kitchens -than there are in any other Gau in Germany. The foreign workers -frequented these kitchens just as much as the native workers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>About treatment at the hands of the population, I can only say -that the population of a city which has been accustomed for centuries -to work together with foreign elements, will spontaneously -treat any worker well who comes from the outside.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Really bad conditions were never reported to me. From time to -time it was reported that something was not going well here or -there. It was the duty of the Gauobmann of the Labor Front to -report that to me. Then I immediately issued a directive from my -desk by telephone to the regional food office or the quota office for -the supply of material, for kitchens or heating installations, or -whatever it was. At any rate, I tried within 24 or 48 hours to take -care of all complaints that came to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>While we are on the subject I would like to give my impression -of the use of manpower in general. I am not responsible for the -importation of labor. I can only say that what I saw in the way of -directives and orders from the Plenipotentiary General, namely the -Codefendant Sauckel, always followed the line of humane, decent, -just, and clean treatment of the workers who were entrusted to -us. Sauckel literally flooded his offices with such directives.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I considered it my duty to state that in my testimony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: These foreign workers, who were in the Gau -Vienna and for whom you do not consider yourself responsible, -were they employed in the armament industry or elsewhere?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: A large portion was employed in agriculture, -some in the supply industry. Whether there were some directly in -the armament industry I could not say. The armament industry was -not accessible to me in all its ramifications, even in my functions as -Gauleiter, because there were war production processes which were -kept secret even from the Reichsstatthalter. -<span class='pageno' title='416' id='Page_416'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, in connection with the subject of Jewish -forced labor, a letter was read, Document 3803-PS. It is, I believe, -a handwritten letter from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner to Blaschke. -Blaschke, I believe, was the second mayor of Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He was the mayor of Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This is a letter of 30 June 1944. In that letter -Kaltenbrunner informs Blaschke that he had directed that several -evacuation transports should be sent to Vienna-Strasshof. “There -are four transports,” it says in the letter, “with about 12,000 Jews, -which will arrive in the next few days.” So much about the letter. -Its further content is only of importance because of what it says in -the end—and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I beg you to arrange further details with the State Police -Office, Vienna, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Ebner, and SS -Obersturmbannführer Krumey, of the Special Action Command -Hungary, who is at present in Vienna.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you have anything to do with that matter, and if so what?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know of the correspondence between -the Codefendant Kaltenbrunner and the mayor of Vienna. To my -knowledge Camp Strasshof is not within Gau Vienna at all. It is in -an altogether different Gau. The designation, “Vienna-Strasshof,” -is, therefore, an error. The border runs in between the two.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And were you informed of the matter itself at -that time, or only here in the courtroom?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know of that matter only from this courtroom, -but I remember that mention was made about the use of -Jewish workers in connection with the building of the Southeast -Wall or fortifications. The Southeast Wall, however, was not in the -area of Reich Gau Vienna. It was a project in the area of Gau -Lower Danube, Lower Austria, or Styria. I had nothing to do with -the construction of the Southeast Wall; that was in the hands of -Dr. Jury, that is, the O. T....</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: O. T. is the Organization Todt?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: ...the Organization Todt. And in the other -part of the border it was in the hands of Dr. Uiberreither, the Gauleiter -of Styria, and his technical assistants.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So I can sum up your statement to mean that you -had nothing to do with these things because they were matters -which did not concern your Gau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I cannot understand what connection -there should be with Gau Vienna. Whether the mayor intended to -divert some of these workers for special tasks in Vienna is not -known to me. I do not know about that matter. -<span class='pageno' title='417' id='Page_417'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the same connection, Witness, another document -has been submitted, 1948-PS, a file note of 7 November 1940. -That was a date on which you had already been Gauleiter in Vienna -for several months and it, too, concerns forced labor of the Jews who -were capable of work. That file note was written on stationery with -the heading “The Reichsstatthalter in Vienna,” and apparently the -note in question was written by a Dr. Fischer. Who is Dr. Fischer? -What did you, as Reichsstatthalter, have to do with that matter? -What do you know about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First of all, Dr. Fischer is not known to me -personally. I do not want to dispute the possibility that he may -have been introduced to me once and that I do not remember him; -but I do not know who Dr. Fischer is. At any rate, he was not an -expert working in my central office. I assume that he may have -been an official, because his name appears in connection with -another document also. He was probably the personal consultant -of the Regierungspräsident. The note shows that this official used -my stationery, and he was entitled to do that. I believe several -thousand people in Vienna were entitled to use that stationery, -according to the usage of German offices.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On this note he has put down a telephone conversation with the -Gestapo from which it can be seen that the Reich Security Main -Office—that is Heydrich—was the office which decided, by internal -directives to the Gestapo, on the use of Jewish manpower.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Regierungspräsident wanted to know more about that; but -I believe one cannot draw the conclusion from this that I was informed -about cruelties committed by the Gestapo, as the Prosecution -has concluded. It is doubtful whether I was in Vienna at all at that -time. I want to remind you of my other tasks, which I have described -before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>However, if I was there, I certainly did not concern myself with -the work of cleaning up the streets. But I should like to say that -the variety of my tasks caused me to establish an organizational -structure which did not exist in other Gaue, namely, the Central -Office of the Reich Leader.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Perhaps you will tell us, before concluding for -today, approximately how many officials in Vienna were subordinated -to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I guess it may have been about 5,000 officials -and employees.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Shall I continue, Mr. President? It is 5:00 o’clock.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned, until 24 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='418' id='Page_418'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH DAY</span><br/> Friday, 24 May 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Schirach resumed the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is counsel for the Defendant Bormann -present?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): -Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would it be convenient to you to present -your documents on Tuesday at 10 o’clock?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, agreed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would it be convenient to the Prosecution?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Quite convenient, would it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, indeed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Your Honors, we left off yesterday with Document -Number 1948-PS. That, as you will recall, is a memorandum -by a certain Dr. Fischer about a telephone conversation he had -held with an official of the Secret State Police, Standartenführer -Huber, from Vienna, and refers to forced labor of Jewish youth. -Special mention is made of the employment of Jews in the removal -of ruined synagogues. In connection with this memorandum I should -like to put just one more question to the Defendant Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] When were these synagogues -destroyed in Vienna? Was it in your time and on your responsibility, -or at another time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The synagogues in Vienna were destroyed -2 years before I assumed office in Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I now proceed to the chapter on anti-Semitism -which—according to your admission yesterday—you -followed in your youth. I should like to know what your attitude -was, when you joined the Party and when you became an official -in the Party, toward a practical solution of this anti-Semitism?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: According to my opinion—in 1924-1925—Jews -were to be entirely excluded from the civil service. Their -<span class='pageno' title='419' id='Page_419'></span> -influence in economic life was to be limited. I believed that Jewish -influence in cultural life should be restricted. But for artists of -the rank of, for instance, Max Reinhardt, I still envisioned the -possibility of a free participation in this cultural life. That, I -believe, exactly reflects the opinion which I and my comrades held -on the solution of the “Jewish Problem” in 1924-1925 and in the -following years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Later, when I was leading the high-school youth movement, I -put forward the demand for the so-called <span class='it'>Numerus clausus</span>. It was -my wish that the Jews should be allowed to study only on a proportional -basis commensurate to their percentage of the total population. -I believe one can realize from this demand for the <span class='it'>Numerus -clausus</span>, known to the entire generation of students in that period, -that I did not believe in a total exclusion of the Jews from artistic, -economic, and scientific activities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have submitted a document, Document -Schirach-136, in the Schirach document book, which contains -statements by an official of the Reich Youth Leadership about the -treatment of Jewish youth as contrasted with Christian youth. -Do you know what attitude the Reich Youth Leadership had -adopted at that time toward the Jewish youth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that we are dealing with the decree -of the year 1936.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Autumn 1936?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Autumn 1936. According to that, Jewish -youth organizations were to exist under the official supervision of -the Reich Youth Leader, who controlled all the youth of Germany, -and Jewish youth would be able to carry out their own youth -education autonomously.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: It says in that decree, <span class='it'>inter alia</span>—I quote one -sentence only from Document Schirach-136 of the Schirach document -book:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Today in its youth, Judaism already assumes that special, -isolated position, free within its own boundaries, which at -some future date Judaism will occupy within the German -State and in the economy of Germany and which it has -already occupied to a great extent.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, at about the same time, or shortly before then, the -so-called Nuremberg Laws had been promulgated, those racial laws -which we have frequently heard mentioned here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you help pass these laws, and how did you personally judge -these laws? -<span class='pageno' title='420' id='Page_420'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had no part in the drafting of these laws. -In my room at the Hotel Deutscher Hof, here in Nuremberg, I was -surprised to find a slip of paper stating that there would be a -Reichstag meeting on the next day and that it would take place -in Nuremberg. At that Reichstag meeting, at which I was present, -the Nuremberg Laws were promulgated. I do not know to this -day how they were drafted. I assume that Hitler himself determined -their contents. I can tell you no more about them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Can you state on your oath, and with a clear -conscience, that before these laws were published you had not -known of the plan for such laws, although you had been Reich -Youth Leader and Reichsleiter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: After these laws had been promulgated in Nuremberg, -how did you personally envisage the further development -of the Jewish problem?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I must say, first of all, that we had, as a -matter of fact, not expected these laws at all. I believe that the -entire youth of the country at that time considered the Jewish -problem as solved, since in 1935 there could be no more question -of any Jewish influence. After these laws had been published we -were of the opinion that now, definitely, the last word had been -spoken on the Jewish problem.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Briefly, Witness, you are accused of having incited -and influenced the youth of the country. I therefore ask you: As -Reich Youth Leader did you incite youth to anti-Semitic excesses, -or did you, as Reich Youth Leader, and particularly at meetings -of the Hitler Youth, make any inflammatory anti-Semitic speeches?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not make any inflammatory anti-Semitic -speeches, since I attempted, both as Reich Youth Leader and youth -educator, not to add fuel to the fire; for neither in my books nor in -my speeches—with the exception of one speech in Vienna, to which -I shall refer later on and which was not made at the time when -I was Reich Youth Leader—have I made any inflammatory statements -of an anti-Semitic nature.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will not make myself ridiculous by stating here that I was not -an anti-Semite; I was—although I never addressed myself to the -youth in that sense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The office of the Reich Youth Leader published -an official monthly entitled <span class='it'>Will and Power, Leadership Publication -of the National Socialist Youth</span>. Excerpts from this official publication -have previously been submitted to the Tribunal in the -document book. -<span class='pageno' title='421' id='Page_421'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now I would be interested to know: Is it true that certain Party -authorities repeatedly demanded from you that you publish a special -anti-Semitic issue of this official Youth Leadership publication -in order to show the youth of the country the path to follow in the -future, and what was your attitude with regard to that demand?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is true that the Reich Minister for Propaganda -repeatedly demanded of my editor-in-chief that such an anti-Semitic -issue should be published. On receiving the report of the -editor-in-chief I invariably refused to comply with this request. I -believe that the editor-in-chief has already signed a sworn affidavit -to that effect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the question of anti-Semitism would also -include your attitude to <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, the paper issued by your -fellow-Defendant, Streicher. Did you distribute this anti-Semitic -paper <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> within your youth organization, and did you -in any way further its distribution?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> was not distributed within the -youth organization. I believe that with the sole exception of those -of the young people who lived in this Gau...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Gau Franken?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, Gau Franken—that the rest of the German -youth organization never read <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> at all. The paper -was definitely rejected by all the youth leaders—both boys and -girls—in my organization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, Witness, I must point out to you that the -Prosecution have accused you of having given, on one occasion, an -introduction to this paper, this anti-Jewish paper <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. Do -you know about it, and what have you got to say on the matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can say the following in this respect. I was -always in close collaboration with the press; in fact, I came from -the press myself. In my press office, as Reich Youth Leader, I gave -definite instructions that all requests from Gau papers for an introduction, -or something else of the kind from me should be granted -on principle. Therefore, whenever a Gau paper celebrated a jubilee—perhaps -the tenth or twentieth anniversary of its existence, or published -some special issue—then the experts in my press office would -run up a draft and, together with the considerable volume of evening -mail presented to me for my signature, these drafts and elaborations -would be submitted to me. In this way it might have happened that -I signed that introduction for <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> which, of course, was -the paper of the local Gau. Otherwise I have no recollection of the -episode. -<span class='pageno' title='422' id='Page_422'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Consequently you cannot remember whether you -drafted that short introduction yourself, or whether it was drafted -by one of your experts and presented to you for signature?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I definitely believe that I did not draft it -myself, because such short introductions—as already stated—were -always submitted to me. I wrote my newspaper articles myself but -never introductions of this description.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, since we have just mentioned the name -of Streicher, I would remind you of a very ugly picture book which -was submitted here by the Prosecution. Was that picture book -distributed among the youth with your consent, or do you know -anything else about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course this book was not distributed among -the young people. It is quite out of the question that an office of -the HJ (Hitler Jugend) would have transmitted that book to the -youth. Besides, the picture books of the Stürmer Publishing Firm -are unknown to me. I am, of course, not competent to speak on -education in the schools, but I should also like to say on behalf of -education in the schools that I do not believe this picture book was -ever introduced into any school outside of this Gau. At any rate, -that book and similar writings of the Stürmer Publishing Firm were -not, as a rule, distributed among the young people and the youth -organizations. What I have already said when judging <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> -also holds good for these books—namely, that the leadership corps of -the Hitler Youth categorically rejected writings of this description.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have also experienced how the anti-Semitic -question actually developed and how it eventually resulted -in the well-known anti-Jewish pogroms of November 1938. Did you -yourself, in any way, participate in these anti-Jewish pogroms of -November 1938?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I personally did not participate in any way, -but I did participate in the Munich session...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Which session?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The session which was traditionally held on -9 November of each year in memory of those who had fallen on -9 November 1923. I did not take part in all the discussions of that -day. But I do remember a speech by Goebbels in connection with -the murder of Herr Vom Rath. That speech was definitely of an -inflammatory nature, and one was free to assume from this speech -that Goebbels intended to start some action. He is alleged—but that -I only discovered later—to have given detailed instructions for this -action directly from his hotel in Munich to the Reich Propaganda -Ministry. I was present at the Munich session, as was my colleague -Lauterbacher, my chief of staff, and we both rejected the action. -<span class='pageno' title='423' id='Page_423'></span> -The HJ, as the largest National Socialist organization, was not -employed at all in the anti-Jewish pogroms, of 9, 10, and 11 November -1938. I remember one incident where a youth leader, without -referring to my Berlin office and carried away by some local propaganda, -took part in a demonstration and was later called to account -by me for so doing. After 10 November I was again in Munich for -a few days and visited, <span class='it'>inter alia</span>, a few of the destroyed business -houses and villas as well. It made a terrible impression on me at -the time, and under that impression I instructed the entire Youth -Leadership, the regional leaders if I remember rightly—in other -words, all the highest responsible youth leaders—to come to Berlin -and there, in an address to these youth leaders, I described the incidents -of the 9 and 10 November as a disgrace to our culture. I also -referred to it as a criminal action. I believe that all the colleagues -present on that occasion will clearly remember how agitated I was -and that I told them that my organization, both now and in the -future, would never have anything to do with acts of this sort.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You previously mentioned one individual case -where an HJ leader, subordinate to you, participated in some action. -Did you know of other cases, in November 1938 and after, where -units of the HJ were factually supposed to have participated in the -anti-Jewish pogroms?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I know of no other cases. The only thing -I did hear was that here and there individual lads, or groups of -youths, were called out into the streets by local authorities which -were not of the HJ. In the majority of cases these lads were -promptly sent home again by the youth leaders. The organization -was never employed, and I attach great importance to the statement -that the youth organization, which included more members than -the Party itself with all its affiliated organizations, was never involved -in these incidents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you saw at least, from the incidents in -November 1938, that developments in Germany were taking a different -trend to the course you had expected—if we are to judge -by your previous description. How did you, after November 1938, -envisage the further solution of the Jewish problem?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: After the events of 1938 I realized that -Jewry’s one chance lay in a state-supported emigration; for in view -of Goebbels’ temper, it seemed probable to me that overnight -similar actions could arise from time to time, and under such conditions -of legal insecurity I could not see how the Jews could continue -living in Germany. That is one of the reasons why Hitler’s -idea of a closed Jewish settlement in the Polish Government General, -of which he told me at his headquarters in 1940, was clear to -<span class='pageno' title='424' id='Page_424'></span> -me. I thought that the Jews would be better off in a closed settlement -in Poland than in Germany or Austria, where they would -remain exposed to the whims of the Propaganda Minister who was -the mainstay of anti-Semitism in Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Is it true that you yourself, whenever you had a -chance of approaching Hitler, gave him your own positive suggestions -for settling the Jews in some neutral country, under humane -conditions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is not true.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Well?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like fully to elucidate this matter. -I mentioned yesterday how I had reported to Hitler and how he had -told me that the Viennese Jews would be sent to the Government -General. Before that, I had never thought of an emigration of the -Jews from Austria and Germany for resettlement in the Government -General. I had only thought of a Jewish emigration to countries -where the Jews wanted to go. But Hitler’s plan, as it then -existed—and I believe that at that time the idea of exterminating -the Jews had not yet entered his mind—this plan of resettlement -sounded perfectly reasonable to me—reasonable at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But I believe that in 1942 you are supposed to -have tried, through the kind offices of your friend, Dr. Colin Ross, -to suggest to Hitler that the Jews from Hungary and the Balkan -States be allowed to emigrate to some neutral country, taking their -goods and chattels with them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was at a later date. I no longer remember -exactly when, but in any case it was after the occupation of -Hungary. Among the innumerable suggestions which I made to the -Führer and to the Minister for Foreign Affairs through Colin Ross, -was one to the effect that the entire Jewish population of Hungary -be transferred to the neutral countries. If the witness Steengracht -has stated here that this idea had been discussed in the Ministry of -Foreign Affairs and that it had emanated from the Ministry of Foreign -Affairs, then he probably spoke in good faith. The idea originated -in discussions held between Colin Ross and myself, and Ross -then put it down in the form of a memorandum. But—and this is -specially important—it was reported verbally to the Reich Minister -for Foreign Affairs who, in turn, informed Colin Ross, on the occasion -of a further visit, that the Führer had definitely turned the -suggestion down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The emigration to neutral countries abroad?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, to neutral countries abroad. -<span class='pageno' title='425' id='Page_425'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The majority of the Viennese Jews, Witness, were—as -you yourself know—deported from Vienna. In 1940, when you -became Gauleiter in Vienna—or later on—did you ever receive a -directive from Hitler to the effect that you yourself should carry -out this deportation of the Jews from Vienna or that you should -participate in the deportation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I never received any such directive. The only -directive which I received in connection with the deportation of the -Jewish population from Vienna was a question from Hitler asking -about the number of Jews living in Vienna at the time. That number, -which I had forgotten, was recalled to my memory by a document -put to me by the Prosecution. According to that document -I reported to Hitler that 60,000 Jews were then living in Vienna. -That figure probably comes from the registration office. In former -times about 190,000 Jews, all told, lived in Vienna. That, I believe, -was the highest figure reached. When I came to Vienna there were -still 60,000 Jews left. The deportation of the Jews was a measure -immediately directed, on orders from Hitler, or by Himmler; and -there existed in Vienna an office of the Reich Security Main Office, -or local branch office under Himmler-Heydrich, which carried out -these measures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who was in charge of that office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The head of that office was—that I found out -now; I did not know his name at the time—a certain Brunner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: An SS Sturmführer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: An SS Sturmführer, Dr. Brunner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The one who, a few days ago, is supposed to have -been condemned to death? Did you know that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I heard it yesterday.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you have to issue any orders to this Brunner -who was an SS leader, or could you give him any kind of instructions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was entirely impossible for me to stop the -deportation of the Jews or to have any influence thereupon. Once, -as early as 1940, I told the chief of my Regional Food Supply Office -that he should see to it that departing Jewish people be provided -with sufficient food. Frequently, when Jews wrote to me requesting -to be exempted from deportation, I charged my adjutant or some -assistant to intervene with Brunner so that possibly an exception -might be made for these persons. More I could not do. But I have -to admit frankly, here and now, that I was of the opinion that this -deportation was really in the interests of Jewry, for the reasons -which I have already stated in connection with the events of 1938. -<span class='pageno' title='426' id='Page_426'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did the SS, which in Vienna too was charged with -the evacuation of the Jews, send continuous reports as to how and -to what extent this evacuation of the Jews was carried out?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I am, therefore, also not in a position to -state when the deportation of the Jews was concluded and whether -the entire 60,000 were dragged out of Vienna or if only a part of -them was carried off.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did not the newspapers in Vienna report anything -at all about these deportations of the Jews, about the extent of the -deportations and the abuses occasioned in this connection?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Nothing? But, Witness, I must put a document -to you which has been submitted by the Prosecution. It is Document -Number 3048-PS, an excerpt from the Viennese edition of the -<span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, on a speech which you, Witness, made on -15 September 1942 in Vienna, and in which occurs the sentence—I -quote from the newspaper:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Every Jew who operates in Europe is a danger to European -culture. If I were to be accused of having deported tens of -thousands of Jews from this city, once the European metropolis -of Jewry, to the Eastern ghetto, I would have to reply, -‘I see in that an active contribution to European culture.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus runs the quotation from your speech which otherwise contains -no anti-Semitic declarations on your part. Considering your -previous statements, Witness, I am compelled to ask you: Did you -make that speech, and how did you come to make it despite your -basic attitude which you have previously described to us?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First, I want to say that I did make that -speech. The quotation is correct. I said that. I must stand by what -I have said. Although the plan of the deportation of the Jews was -Hitler’s plan and I was not charged with its execution, I did utter -those words, which I now sincerely regret; but I must say that I -identified myself morally with that action only out of a feeling of -misplaced loyalty to the Führer. That I have done, and that cannot -be undone. If I am to explain how I came to do this, I can only -reply that at that time I was already “between the Devil and the -deep sea.” I believe it will also become clear from my later statements -that from a certain moment on I had Hitler against me, the -Party Chancellery against me, and very many members of the Party -itself against me. Constantly I heard from officials of the Party -Chancellery who expressed that to the Gauleiter of Vienna, and from -statements made in Hitler’s entourage that one was under the impression—and -that this could be clearly recognized from my attitude -and my actions—that I was no longer expressing myself publicly -<span class='pageno' title='427' id='Page_427'></span> -in the usual anti-Semitic manner or in other ways, either; and I -just have no excuse. But it may perhaps serve as an explanation, -that I was trying to extricate myself from this painful situation by -speaking in a manner which today I can no longer justify to myself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I should like to ask you, in this connection—you -have just spoken of a painful situation in which you found -yourself in Vienna. Is it true that Hitler himself, on various occasions, -reproached you personally and severely because your attitude -in Vienna had not been sufficiently energetic, that you had become -too slack and too yielding; that you should concern yourself more -with the interests of the Party, and that you should adopt far -stricter methods? And what, Witness, did you then do?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, I assume that you realize that you -are putting questions in the most leading form, that you are putting -questions which suggest the answer to the defendant, and such questions -cannot possibly carry—the answers to such questions cannot -possibly carry the weight which answers given to questions not in -their leading form would carry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, did Hitler personally reproach you for -your behavior in Vienna, and what attitude did you adopt?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe that is not a suggestive question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it is. I should have thought it is a -leading question. He says he was in a very difficult situation. You -could ask him if he would explain what was the difficulty of the -situation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well. Then will you answer this question, -Witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Counsel for the defense, I could not, in any -case, have accepted the question in the form in which you previously -presented it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The difference between Hitler and myself arose primarily over -an art exhibition, and the breach between Hitler and myself in 1943 -was in the beginning the result of differences of opinion over the -cultural policy. In 1943 I was ordered to the Berghof where Hitler, -in the presence of Bormann, criticized me violently on account of -my cultural work and literally said that I was leading the cultural -opposition against him in Germany. And further, in the course of -the conversation he said that I was mobilizing the spiritual forces -of Vienna and Austria and the spiritual forces of the young people -against him in cultural spheres. He said he knew it very well -indeed. He had read some of my speeches, primarily the Düsseldorf -speech; he had discovered that I had authorized in Weimar and in -Vienna art exhibitions of a decadent nature; and he offered me the -<span class='pageno' title='428' id='Page_428'></span> -alternative, either to end this kind of oppositional work immediately—then -for the time being everything could remain as in the -past—or he would stop all Government subsidies for Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This scene made a frightful impression on me, for it represented -to me a breach of Hitler’s promised word, since he had granted me -absolute freedom of action when he appointed me to the Vienna -mission. I then recognized that he nourished an icy hatred toward -me, and that behind these statements on cultural policies something -else was concealed. Whether he was dissatisfied in every detail with -the way I conducted my office in Vienna at the time, I do not know. -He rarely expressed himself directly about such matters. From his -entourage I learned only of occasional happenings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I then—and that led to the complete and final break between -Hitler and myself—a few weeks after I had received this order, if -I may call it so, received a strange invitation for myself and my -wife to spend some time on the Berghof. At that time I innocently -believed that Hitler wished to bridge the gap between us and to let -me know, in one way or another, that he had gone too far. In any -case, at the end of a 3 days’ visit—I cut my stay short—I discovered -that this was a fundamental error on my part. Here I will limit -myself to a few points only. I had intended—and I also carried out -my intention—to mention at least three points during my visit. One -was the policy toward Russia, the second was the Jewish question, -and the third was Hitler’s attitude toward Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I must state, to begin with, that Bormann had issued a decree -addressed to me, and probably to all the other Gauleiters, prohibiting -any intervention on our part in the Jewish question. That is -to say, we could not intervene with Hitler in favor of any Jew or -half-Jew. That too was stated in the decree. I have to mention -this, since it makes matters clearer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the first evening of my stay at the Berghof, on what appeared -to me a propitious occasion, I told Hitler that I was of the opinion -that a free and autonomous Ukraine would serve the Reich better -than a Ukraine ruled by the violence of Herr Koch. That was all -I said, nothing more, nothing less. Knowing Hitler as I did, it was -extremely difficult even to hazard such a remark. Hitler answered -comparatively quietly but with pronounced sharpness. On the same -evening, or possibly the next one, the Jewish question was broached -according to a plan I made with my wife. Since I was forbidden -to mention these things even in conversation, my wife gave the -Führer a description of an experience she had had in Holland. She -had witnessed one night, from the bedroom of her hotel, the deportation -of Jewish women by the Gestapo. We were both of the -opinion that this experience during her journey and the description -of it might possibly result in a change of Hitler’s attitude toward -<span class='pageno' title='429' id='Page_429'></span> -the entire Jewish question and in the treatment of the Jews. My -wife gave a very drastic description, a description such as we can -now read in the papers. Hitler was silent. All the other witnesses -to this conversation, including my own father-in-law, Professor -Hoffmann, were also silent. The silence was icy, and after a short -time Hitler merely said, “This is pure sentimentality.” That was all. -No further conversation took place that evening. Hitler retired -earlier than usual. I was under the impression that a perfectly -untenable situation had now arisen. Then the men of Hitler’s -entourage told my father-in-law that from now on I would have -to fear for my safety. I endeavored to get away from the Berghof -as quickly as possible without letting matters come to an open break, -but I did not succeed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then Goebbels arrived on the next evening and there, in my -presence and without my starting it, the subject of Vienna was -broached. I was naturally compelled to protest against the statements -which Goebbels at first made about the Viennese. Then the -Führer began with, I might say, incredible and unlimited hatred -to speak against the people of Vienna. I have to admit, here and -now, that even if the people of Vienna are cursing me today, I have -always felt very friendly toward them. I have felt closely attached -to those people. I will not say more than that Joseph Weinheber -was one of my closest friends. During that discussion, I, in accordance -with my duty and my feelings, spoke in favor of the people -under my authority in Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At 4 o’clock in the morning, among other things, Hitler suddenly -said, something which I should now like to repeat for historical -reasons. He said, “Vienna should never have been admitted into -the Union of Greater Germany.” Hitler never loved Vienna. He -hated its people. I believe that he had a liking for the city because -he appreciated the architectural design of the buildings on the Ring. -But everybody who knows Vienna knows that the true Vienna is -architecturally Gothic, and that the buildings on the Ring are not -really representative.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I consider that this subject has little to -do with the Indictment—please adhere to the Indictment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I shall now conclude. I only want to say that -so total a break resulted from that discussion—or, rather explosion—of -Hitler’s that on that very night at about 0430 I took my leave -and left the Berghof a few hours later. Since then I had no further -conversations with Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I must now refer to something else in this connection. Reich -Marshal Göring, in the witness box, mentioned a letter of mine -which Hitler had shown him, and Herr Von Ribbentrop has stated -<span class='pageno' title='430' id='Page_430'></span> -here that he was present at a conversation during which Himmler -suggested to Hitler that I be indicted before the People’s Court, -which meant in reality that I should be hanged. I must add one -thing more: What Göring said about this letter is mainly true. I -wrote in quite a proper manner about family relations in that letter. -I also wrote one sentence to the effect that I considered war with -America a disaster.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When was that letter written?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 1943, shortly after my stay at the Berghof. -That statement contained nothing special, since Hitler even without...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He hasn’t given the date of his stay at the -Berghof yet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: He has said 1943, Mr. President. He has just -said 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There are 12 months in 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe you ought to give us the month.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the conversation on the Berghof -was in the spring, and that the letter, though I cannot tell you precisely -when, was written in the summer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Summer of 1943?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, 1943; but I could not say precisely when -the letter was written. The letter was correct. It was written by -hand, and no secretary read it. It went by courier to the head of -the State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: To Hitler personally?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: To Hitler. It is also possible that it was -addressed in care of Bormann. I cannot remember exactly. It -went by courier, and that letter contained nothing else but the -clarification required for replying to questions put to me in a circular -which Göring mentioned in his statement here. That letter -caused Hitler to have an absolute loathing for me; and at about -the same time a file was started against me in the Reich Security -Main Office. That was due to the fact that I had described in a -small circle of political leaders—of high-ranking political leaders—the -foreign political situation such as I saw it, as I was accustomed -to do from the days of my youth. One of these leaders was an SS -intelligence officer and reported what I said, and then the file was -started. The material was compiled in order to eventually bring me -to trial. That I was never brought to trial I owe solely and exclusively -to the circumstance that both in the Army and at home my -comrades from the Youth Leadership stood solidly behind me, and -any proceedings against me would have led to trouble. After 20 July -<span class='pageno' title='431' id='Page_431'></span> -1944 my situation became very precarious. My friends in the Army, -therefore, placed a company of hand-picked men at my disposal. -They were under the orders of the former adjutant of Generaloberst -Fromm. The company was directly subordinate to me. It -took over the protection of my person and remained with me to -the end.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was that company of the Wehrmacht, which you -have just mentioned, placed at your disposal in place of the police -protection previously afforded you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have to refer once more to your Vienna -speech of September 1942. In that speech you speak of the deportation -of tens of thousands of Jews to the Eastern ghetto. You did -not speak about the extermination or the murder of the Jews. -When did you discover that Hitler’s plan aimed at extermination -or destruction?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Counsel, if I at that time had known anything -about the destruction—that is the extermination of the Jews—I -would not be sitting here today. As far as I can recall, I heard -about an extermination of the Jews for the first time through the -following incident.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Dr. Ross came to see me...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Dr. Colin Ross came to Vienna in 1944 and -told me that he had received information, via the foreign press, that -mass murders of Jews had been perpetrated on a large scale in the -East. I then attempted to find out all I could. What I did discover -was that in the Warthegau executions of Jews were carried out in -gas vans. These shootings in the East...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, what was the Gau that he spoke -of? The Wart Gau?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Warthegau, My Lord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Warthegau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That is a Gau, a district on the Polish border. -That is an area in the east of Germany,—W-a-r-t-h-e-g-a-u—in the -west of Poland, near Silesia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Please, Witness, will you continue briefly:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The executions, the shootings on Russian territory, -mentioned in the documents submitted in the course of the -cross-examination in the Kaltenbrunner case, were not known to -me at that time. But at a later date—it was before 1944—I heard -about shootings in the ghettos of the Russian area and connected -<span class='pageno' title='432' id='Page_432'></span> -this with developments on the front, since I thought of possible -armed uprisings in the ghettos. I knew nothing of the organized -annihilation which has been described to us in the Trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, if I have heard you correctly, you were -informed about these events for the first time in 1944 by your friend, -Dr. Colin Ross, who knew it from reports in the foreign papers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you still remember the month?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I cannot say.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In any case it would be in 1944?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That again I cannot say. But I believe I have -to explain something more about it. I asked myself what can one -do to prevent it? And I still ask myself, day after day, what did I -do to prevent it? I can only answer practically nothing, since from -1943 on I was politically dead. Beyond what I had attempted in -1943 on the Berghof, I could do nothing at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Nothing?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I should in this connection like to ask you -a question of principle. You admitted yesterday that you had become -an anti-Semite—and that is according to your conception—in -your very early youth. You have, in the interim, heard the testimony -of Hoess, the Auschwitz commander, who informed us that -in that camp alone, I believe, 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 innocent people, -mostly Jews, had been done to death. What, today, does the name -of Auschwitz convey to you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is the greatest, the most devilish mass murder -known to history. But that murder was not committed by -Hoess; Hoess was merely the executioner. The murder was ordered -by Adolf Hitler, as is obvious from his last will and testament. The -will is genuine. I have held the photostat copy of that will in my -hands. He and Himmler jointly committed that crime which, for -all time, will be a stain in the annals of our history. It is a crime -which fills every German with shame.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The youth of Germany is guiltless. Our youth was anti-Semitically -inclined, but it did not call for the extermination of Jewry. -It neither realized nor imagined that Hitler had carried out this -extermination by the daily murder of thousands of innocent people. -The youth of Germany who, today, stand perplexed among the ruins -of their native land, knew nothing of these crimes, nor did they -desire them. They are innocent of all that Hitler has done to the -Jewish and to the German people. -<span class='pageno' title='433' id='Page_433'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to say the following in connection with Hoess’ case. -I have educated this generation in faith and loyalty to Hitler. The -Youth Organization which I built up bore his name. I believed that -I was serving a leader who would make our people and the youth -of our country great and happy and free. Millions of young people -believed this, together with me, and saw their ultimate ideal in -National Socialism. Many died for it. Before God, before the German -nation, and before my German people I alone bear the guilt of -having trained our young people for a man whom I for many long -years had considered unimpeachable, both as a leader and as the -head of the State, of creating for him a generation who saw him as -I did. The guilt is mine in that I educated the youth of Germany -for a man who murdered by the millions. I believed in this man, -that is all I can say for my excuse and for the characterization of -my attitude. This is my own—my own personal guilt. I was responsible -for the youth of the country. I was placed in authority over -the young people, and the guilt is mine alone. The younger generation -is guiltless. It grew up in an anti-Semitic state, ruled by -anti-Semitic laws. Our youth was bound by these laws and saw -nothing criminal in racial politics. But if anti-Semitism and racial -laws could lead to an Auschwitz, then Auschwitz must mark the -end of racial politics and the death of anti-Semitism. Hitler is dead. -I never betrayed him; I never tried to overthrow him; I remained -true to my oath as an officer, a youth leader, and an official. I was -no blind collaborator of his; neither was I an opportunist. I was a -convinced National Socialist from my earliest days—as such, I was -also an anti-Semite. Hitler’s racial policy was a crime which led to -disaster for 5,000,000 Jews and for all the Germans. The younger -generation bears no guilt. But he who, after Auschwitz, still clings -to racial politics has rendered himself guilty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is what I consider my duty to state in connection with the -Hoess case.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, is this perhaps a convenient moment -to break off?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How long is the defendant’s examination -going to continue, Dr. Sauter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe it will take about 1 hour.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe it will take about one more hour—an -hour at the most. Did you hear me, Mr. President?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I hear you now. We have been hearing -you for a very long time now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='434' id='Page_434'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, after this declaration by the -Defendant Von Schirach I would gladly dispense with all further -questions, but the Prosecution have brought definite accusations -against this defendant and I fear that, if he does not briefly voice -an opinion on the subject, these accusations would be considered as -tacitly accepted. I shall try to be as brief as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, you have just described the impressions you had -gathered from the proceedings of the Tribunal. Have you yourself -ever visited a concentration camp?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When, and for what reason?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As the witness Höllriegel has testified before -this Tribunal, I visited Mauthausen Concentration Camp in 1942. -The testimony given by another witness, Marsalek, to the effect -that this visit took place in 1944, is incorrect. I also mentioned it -when I was interned, in June 1945 and in the course of my preliminary -interrogation in Nuremberg.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Prior to Höllriegel’s testimony?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through “interned in -June 1940.” Is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: 1945, Herr Von Schirach, not 1940?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I went into voluntary internment in 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then you can confidently state that you visited -Mauthausen in 1942?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: For what reason and how...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: There had been a session...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Just one moment...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What does he mean by “voluntary internment”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Von Schirach was, at that time, -living in the Tyrol under an assumed name, and in the place where -he lived—perhaps Defendant Schirach can himself, but very briefly, -tell us how this voluntary internment came about.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was then still at liberty and I sent a letter, -through my adjutant, to the local American commander, stating that -I should like to surrender voluntarily in order to be tried by an -Allied court. That was in June 1945. The CIC officer who later discovered -where I lived told me that I might have stayed there a good -<span class='pageno' title='435' id='Page_435'></span> -time longer. I personally am convinced that I could have remained -in hiding there, and elsewhere, for years—as long as I wished.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Von Schirach, we shall now revert to your -visit to Mauthausen, which you said with certainty and under oath -took place in 1942. Is this right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe the date given by witness Höllriegel -is correct. I quite definitely know that the date given by Marsalek -is not correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then it was not in 1944?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Probably 1942. I therefore confirm Höllriegel’s -testimony. There was a meeting at Linz at which various departments -of the Ostmark participated. There were conferences on -economic or agrarian problems, and in the late afternoon we went -to Mauthausen Concentration Camp at the request of Gauleiter -Eigruber. At the time I was rather surprised that the Gauleiter was -even in a position to invite us there. I assumed that he had previously -been in touch with the SS offices, and that the reason for -Eigruber’s invitation was that he wished to erect a rifle factory or -something of the kind there. At any rate, though I can no longer -remember exactly, it was somehow connected with the production -of the Steyr Works.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who showed you about and what did you see?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: We were shown about by the camp commandant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Whose name was?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: His name—as has already been mentioned -here—was Ziereis, or something of the kind.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: SS leader?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: SS Camp Commandant. And I should now -like to give you my first impressions. The camp area was very -large. I immediately asked how many internees there were. I -believe I was told 15,000 or 20,000. At any rate, the figure varied -between 15,000 and 20,000. I asked what kind of internees were -imprisoned there and received the reply I was always given whenever -I inquired about concentration camps—namely, that two-thirds -of the inmates were dangerous criminals collected from the prisons -and penitentiaries and brought to work in the camp; that the -remaining third was allegedly composed of political prisoners and -people guilty of high treason and betrayal of their country, who, it -is a fact, are treated with exceptional severity in wartime.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you, in this camp, convince yourself as to the -nature of the treatment meted out to the prisoners, accommodations, -the food situation, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>? -<span class='pageno' title='436' id='Page_436'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I witnessed one food distribution and gained -the impression that, for camp conditions, the food ration was both -normal and adequate. I then visited the large quarry, once famous -and now notorious, where the construction stone for Vienna had -been quarried for centuries. There was no work going on at the -quarry since the working day had come to an end, but I did, however, -visit the works where the stone was cut. I saw a building -with an exceptionally well-equipped dental clinic. This clinic was -shown to me because I had questioned Ziereis about the medical -assistance afforded in the camp. I would add that, during this visit, -I asked in general the same questions which I had been used to -ask during all my visits to the camps of the youth organizations—that -is, questions pertaining to food, medical aid, the number -of people in the camp, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I was then taken to a large room in which music was being -played by the prisoners. They had gathered together quite a large -symphony orchestra, and I was told that on holiday evenings they -could amuse themselves, each man according to his own tastes. In -this case, for instance, the prisoners who wished to make music -assembled in that room. A tenor was singing on that occasion—I -remember that particularly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I then inquired about the mortality rate and was shown a room -with three corpses in it. I cannot tell you here and now, under -oath, whether I saw any crematorium or not. Marsalek has testified -to that effect. I would not, however, have been surprised if there -had been a crematorium or a cemetery in so large a place, so far -removed from the city. That would be a matter of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Von Schirach, during this official visit under -the guidance of Camp Commandant Ziereis, did you discover anything -at all about any ill-treatment, or atrocities, or of the tortures -which were allegedly inflicted in the camp? You can answer the -question briefly—possibly with “yes” or “no.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Had that been the case, I would of course -have endeavored to do something about it. But I was under the -impression that everything was in order. I looked at the inmates, -for instance, and I remember seeing, among others, the famous -middle-distance runner Peltzer, who was known as a sexual pervert. -He had been punished because he had, on innumerable occasions, -freely committed sexual offences against youths in his charge -in a country school.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I asked Ziereis, “How does one ever get out of these concentration -camps? Do you also release people continuously?” In reply -he had four or five inmates brought to me who, according, to him, -were to be released the very next day. He asked them in my -<span class='pageno' title='437' id='Page_437'></span> -presence, “Have you packed everything, and have you prepared -everything for your release?”—to which, beaming with joy, they -answered, “Yes.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, can you remember whether on this occasion -you also asked Camp Commander Ziereis whether political prisoners -from your Vienna district—that is, from the city of Vienna—were -interned in the camp? And did you then have a group of political -prisoners from Vienna brought before you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: You have already, Counsel, put this question -to me during an interview, and I can only tell you the following -under oath: I cannot remember, but you may take it for granted -that, on an occasion of this kind, I would certainly ask after prisoners -from my own Gau. But I cannot remember. Herr Marsalek -mentioned it in his testimony, and I consider it probable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should, in connection with this visit, like to add the following: -I have always been rather hampered in my recollections of Mauthausen...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What hampered you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: After May 1945 I heard innumerable radio -reports on Mauthausen and other concentration camps, and I read -everything I could lay my hands on in the way of written reports -about Mauthausen—everything that appeared in the press—and I -always pondered on the question, “Did you see anything there which -might have pointed to a mass destruction of human beings?” I was, -for instance, reading the other day about running belts for the -conveyance of corpses. I did not see them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I must add that I also visited Dachau; I must not forget that. -In 1935, together with the entire Party leadership group, I paid a -visit to Dachau from Munich. This visit was a result of the objections -against existing preventive custody measures expressed by certain -political leaders to the Deputy of the Führer Hess who, in -turn, passed these objections on to Himmler who subsequently sent -out an invitation to inspect Dachau. I believe that there were, at -that time, 800 or 1,000 internees at Dachau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I did not participate in the entire official visit for I was conversing -with some of the Gauleiter who were being shown about -the camp. I saw quite excellent living quarters at Dachau and, -because the subject interested me particularly, I was shown the -building which housed the camp library. I saw that there were also -good medical facilities. Then—and I believe this fact is worthy of -mention—after the visit I spoke with many Gau- and Reichsleiter -about the impression they had formed of Dachau. All impressions -gained were to the effect that all doubts as to Himmler’s preventive -custody measures were definitely dispersed, and everybody said that -<span class='pageno' title='438' id='Page_438'></span> -the internees in the camp were, on the whole, better accommodated -than they would have been in a state prison. Such was my impression -of Dachau in 1935, and I must say that ever since that visit my -mind was far more at ease regarding conditions in the concentration -camps. In conclusion, I feel I must add the following:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Up to the moment of the final collapse I firmly believed that we -had 20,000 people in the Mauthausen Camp, 10,000 at Oranienburg -and Dachau—two more large camps whose existence was known to -me and one of which I had visited—and possibly 10,000 more at -Buchenwald, near Weimar, a camp I knew by name but which I had -never visited. I therefore concluded that we had roughly 50,000 -people in the German camps, of which I firmly believed that two-thirds -were habitual criminals, convicts, and sexual perverts, and -one-third consisted of political prisoners. And I had arrived at this -conclusion primarily because I myself have never sent a single -soul to the concentration camps and nourished the illusion that -others had acted as I did. I could not even imagine, when I heard -of it—immediately after the collapse—that hundreds of thousands -of people in Germany were considered political offenders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is something else to be said on the whole question of the -concentration camps. The poet Hans Carossa has deposed an affidavit -for me, and this affidavit contains a passage about a publisher -whom I had liberated from a concentration camp. I wish to -mention this because it is one of many typical cases where one -exerted one’s entire influence to have a man freed from a concentration -camp, but then he never tells you afterwards how he fared -in the camp. In the course of the years, I have received many -letters from people having relatives in the concentration camps. -By establishing, in Vienna, a fixed day on which audience was -granted to anybody from the population who wished to speak to -me, I was able to talk to thousands of people from every class and -standing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On one such occasion I was approached by someone who requested -me personally to free some friend or relative in a concentration -camp. In cases like that I usually wrote a letter to the -Reich Security Main Office—at first to Herr Heydrich and later to -Herr Kaltenbrunner—and after some time I would be informed -that the internee in question had or had not been released, according -to the gravity of the charges brought against him. But the -internees released never told me their experiences in the camp. -One never saw anybody who had been ill-treated in the camps, and -that is why I myself, and many others in Germany with me, was -never able to visualize conditions in the concentration camps at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, this affidavit of the poet Hans -Carossa, just mentioned by the defendant, is Document Number -<span class='pageno' title='439' id='Page_439'></span> -Schirach 3(a). I repeat, Schirach 3(a) of the Schirach document book. -It is a sworn affidavit by the poet Carossa, and I ask the Tribunal -to put the entire contents of the document into the evidence. In the -last paragraph, mention is made of the case about which the defendant -has just been speaking—that is, the liberation of a publisher -named Suhrkamp from a concentration camp.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the page of it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Page 25 of the document book, Document Number -Schirach 3(a)—Hans Carossa. The remainder of this document deals -with the humane impression Dr. Carossa received of the defendant, -and with Defendant Von Schirach’s solicitude for the victims of -political persecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, how many concentration camps did you know anything -about?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have just enumerated them: Oranienburg, -Dachau, Buchenwald, and Mauthausen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was there a concentration camp in your own Gau?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In connection with this entire group of questions -on the treatment of the Jews, I turn to orders allegedly issued in -your presence to the camp commandant of Mauthausen in March -1945. It is Document Number 3870-PS, submitted by the Prosecution. -According to this document, Himmler in March 1945 is -supposed to have issued a directive to the effect that the Jews -from the Southeast Wall were to be sent on foot to Mauthausen. -Did you have anything at all to do with this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can tell you exactly from memory what -Himmler said at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Himmler came to Vienna towards the middle, or the end of -March, to talk to the Commander of Army Group South. On this -occasion—the Commander of Army Group South was, of course, -not stationed in Vienna, he had ordered all the Reichsstatthalter -of the Ostmark up to Vienna and granted them full authority to -enforce martial law in the future, since Vienna and some of the -other Ostmark Gaue had by that time become almost front-line -zones. At this conference Himmler told his adjutant to call Ziereis -in, while the papers for full powers were being typed in the next -room. That is how I came to meet Ziereis for the second time in -my life.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And now Himmler did not, as Marsalek said, tell Ziereis that -the Jews were to be marched on foot from the Southeast Wall to -Mauthausen, but he did say something else which surprised me -enormously. He said: -<span class='pageno' title='440' id='Page_440'></span></p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I want the Jews now employed in industry to be taken by -boat, or by bus if possible, under the most favorable food -conditions and with medical care, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, to Linz or Mauthausen.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not quite remember whether he said they should be taken -to Mauthausen, but he also said to Ziereis:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Please take care of these Jews and treat them well; they are -my most valuable assets.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>From this declaration I assumed, in the very beginning—it was -my very first, fleeting impression—that Himmler wished to deceive -me in some way or another, and then it became clear to me that -with these instructions he was following certain foreign political -intentions, in the last moments of the war, in emphasizing the excellent -treatment of the Jews.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What Marsalek therefore said about making them go on foot -is not correct. As I have already mentioned, Himmler, under all -circumstances, wanted the best possible treatment to be given to -the Jews. I gained the impression—and later on it was confirmed -by other things we heard—that he wished, at the last minute, to -somehow redeem himself with this treatment of the Jews.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That was the end of March 1945?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was the end of March 1945, on the -occasion when authority to apply martial law was granted to the -Statthalter of the Ostmark.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Therefore, immediately before the collapse?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In connection with your activities in Vienna there -is also an accusation, Witness, brought against you by the Prosecution, -to the effect that you participated in the persecution of the -Church. This accusation is supported exclusively as far as I can -see by Document Number R-146. I repeat, R-146, which has already -been submitted by the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This, Witness, is a letter addressed by the witness, Dr. Lammers, -who has been heard before the Tribunal, to the Reich Minister -of the Interior, dated 14 March 1941, and further, a circular from -Bormann, addressed to all the Gauleiter, dated 20 March 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to hear your comments on both of these letters, -especially since Dr. Lammers’ letter speaks of property belonging -to enemies of the people and the state, whereas in Bormann’s -circular of 20 March 1941 mention is made of the confiscation of -Church property—monastic property—<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. Do you know what -led to these letters, and what part did you yourself play in the -matter? -<span class='pageno' title='441' id='Page_441'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The document written by Dr. Lammers is -correct. Bormann’s covering letter referred to Church property; -I referred to property belonging to enemies of the people and the -State, for that was a technical expression at the time. I should -like to mention in this matter that when I came to Vienna in 1940 -the confiscation of such property was already in full swing; an -argument had arisen on the subject between the Gauleiter and the -Reich Minister for Finance. The Reich Minister for Finance wanted -the confiscated property taken over by the Reich, while I considered -that this property should remain fundamentally the possession -of the Gaue.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>So far as I can remember, I was involved in this question only -through the following confiscations: Prince Schwarzenberg possessed -property, the greater part of which lay in the region of the -Upper Danube; the smaller part was the famous Vienna Palace. Now -this Prince Schwarzenberg had refused, in the presence of some German -consul general, or consul abroad, to return to Germany and serve -in the Army. Thereupon his property was confiscated. In the -interest of the Reich I endeavored to maintain this property for -the Vienna Reich Gau and to prevent it from passing over to the -Reich. I have no files before me, so I cannot from memory give -you any information about other, similar actions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am not responsible for confiscations in the other Austrian -Gaue. But I may state one thing here—namely, that I put an end -to all confiscations throughout the entire Reich. When, through an -intermediary, women from an Austrian convent appealed to me for -help, I asked my father-in-law to act behind Bormann’s back and -explain to Hitler the disastrous political effects which these confiscations -would have and to beg him to issue a direct order for their -suppression. This was achieved, and when the order was put -through, Bormann turned against my father-in-law as well. From -then on I never had any further opportunity to bring this question -to the Führer’s notice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have not, so far, quite explained -your attitude toward Dr. Lammers’ letter of 14 March 1941. To -refresh your memory I should like to read out the first sentence -of that letter. This letter of Lammers’ dated 14 March 1941, Document -Number R-146, states, and I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Von Schirach, together -with Dr. Jury and Eigruber, has recently complained to -the Führer that the Reich Minister for Finance is still of -the opinion that the seizure of property belonging to enemies -of the state and people should be effected in favor of the -Reich, and not in favor of the Reich Gau.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus runs the quotation. -<span class='pageno' title='442' id='Page_442'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>And because of this incident the Prosecution have accused you -of participating in the persecution of the Church in Vienna. I -must request you to tell us what you really did do in the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Well, the Church in Vienna had actually been -persecuted under my predecessor, Bürckel, and this can be proved. -I mentioned yesterday the demonstrations before the Archbishop’s -Palace. But from the day of my arrival in Vienna, anti-Church -demonstrations in the nature of a political agitation no longer took -place. Immediately upon my arrival I gathered all the political -officials and all my other colleagues of the Gau and demanded that -they should never, either in writing or by word of mouth, express -anything likely to offend the religious sentiments of other people. -I believe that this is a fact which was gratefully noted by the entire -population of Vienna. From that day on there were no further -actions against the Church. Just how much Church property, -though, was called in in compliance with the law for special war -contributions, a law which likewise applied to other property—I -cannot tell you without documentary evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we can see from this document that you -must have spoken on the subject to Hitler personally...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: ...because it states that the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter -Von Schirach complained to Hitler on the subject. You have -not said anything to us about that so far.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I myself, during a visit by Hitler to -Vienna where he signed a southeast pact, told him I was of the -opinion that the property confiscated belonged to the Gaue and -not to the Reich. That was my point of view and one which I -believed to be entirely correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Indictment further accuses you of -having had some kind of connection with the SS, thereby promoting -the SS, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. Were you yourself ever a member of the SS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Himmler, the leader of the SS, have any -influence over the youth organizations and over the education of -the young people?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were the replacements in the SS, especially in -the SS Leadership Corps, recruited from the HJ, and if so, why?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The replacements in all the leadership corps -in Germany were recruited from the youth. Our youth organization -was a state institution. You now are probably referring to an -agreement which I had with Himmler on the patrol services? -<span class='pageno' title='443' id='Page_443'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, that too plays a part in this connection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Agreements of that sort...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Just one more moment, Herr Von Schirach. -This agreement is entered in the documents of the Prosecution as -Number 2396-PS. I repeat 2396-PS, in which a special statement -occurs—and I should appreciate your comments on the subject—to -the effect that the SS received their replacements from the patrol -service of the HJ, allegedly by an agreement of October 1938. -Please tell us about it and explain to us what actually was this -patrol service.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The patrol service was one of the special -units of the HJ which I forgot to mention yesterday. The patrol -service was a youth service for keeping order. It consisted of outstandingly -decent lads who had no police duties—I now refer to -documentary reports which I procured—but who had to supervise -the general behavior of the young people, examine their uniforms, -control the visits of the boys to the taverns; and it was their duty -to inspect the HJ hostels for cleanliness and neatness, to supervise -the hiking expeditions of the young people and the youth hostelries -in the country. They stood guard and were on order duty at mass -meetings and demonstrations. They watched over encampments -and accompanied the convoys. They were employed in the search -for youths who were lost. They gave advice to traveling youth, -attended to station service, were supposed to protect young people -from criminal elements, and, above all, to protect national property—that -is, woods, fields, for instance—and to see that they were -safe from fires, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Since Himmler might make trouble for this section of the youth -organization, I was interested in having the Police recognize my -patrol service; for in my idea of the State youth as a youth state, -the Police should not be employed against the youth, but these -young people should keep order among themselves. That this principle -was a sound one can be judged from the immense decline in -juvenile delinquency from 1933 up to the outbreak of the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: One moment, I have not yet finished. After -this agreement...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Sauter, we have heard enough -about this unit. The whole point of the document was that they -were used for recruiting for the SS, wasn’t it? That is the complaint -of the Prosecution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, the patrol service... -<span class='pageno' title='444' id='Page_444'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have heard, at considerable length the -description of what they did in the way of the protection of the -youth. Surely we have heard enough about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, these so-called special units were -specially mentioned by the Prosecution as a means for preparation -for war—that is, as a means for the military training of the young -people. In this connection all these special units were mentioned, -and therefore we considered it necessary that the defendant inform -you what this patrol service really was. But I can, Mr. President, -set this topic aside immediately.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have heard what they were at some -considerable length.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, from which departments did the SS mainly recruit -its leader replacements?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In order to assure its leader replacements, -the SS founded its own training schools which were entirely outside -my influence. They were the so-called National Socialist Training -Institutes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In connection with the SS, the Prosecution, Witness, -mentioned a further agreement between you and Reichsführer -SS Himmler, an agreement of December 1938, submitted as -Document Number 2567-PS, the so-called “Landdienst” of the HJ. -Why was this agreement concluded with the Reichsführer SS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is very hard to give a brief answer. The -Reichsführer SS was a farmer with an agronomical degree. In -his student days he had belonged to the so-called “Artaman Movement,” -whose program it was to prevent the flight from the land, -and he was particularly keen to collaborate within the SS with the -farm labor service groups of the HJ who were doing the same work -as the “Artaman” groups in the past.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In conclusion, I should like to say about the “Landdienst” and -the patrol service, that no coercion was ever brought to bear on -the young people to enter the SS. Any lad from the patrol service -was, of course, free to become a member of the SA or of the -NSKK—and frequently did so—or else become a political leader -just like any other boy from the farm labor service or the Hitler -Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Indictment states, <span class='it'>inter alia</span>, that -a directive was addressed to the political leaders demanding that -the Hitler Youth Leaders—that is, the leaders subordinate to you—be -employed on their staffs. What can you say to that? -<span class='pageno' title='445' id='Page_445'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can only say in reply that this is one of -many attempts by the Party Chancellery to bring the Youth -Leadership into the political leadership. The practical result of the -directive was that a number of youth leaders were given insignificant -duties as adjutants. They complained to me, and I withdrew -them from these posts. It is a historical fact that in Germany -there was no real flow of people from the youth organization -into the political leadership. I can personally name those -youth leaders who came into the political leadership, there were -so few of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Soviet Prosecution have submitted -a document, Document Number USSR-6, which is a report from the -Lemberg Commission. Herein the following fact is mentioned. A -French woman, Ida Vasseau, the head of an asylum for old people -in Lemberg, testified in writing—I am only quoting the gist of -the affidavit—that ghetto children were handed over as presents -to the Hitler Youth and that these children were then used as -living targets by the HJ for their drill practice. In all the time -that you were active in the Reich Youth Leadership, did you -ever hear of such misdemeanors or excesses?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. We are dealing here with the first and, -so far, the only accusation of crimes committed by the HJ which -has been brought to my notice. There were no HJ commandos, -either in the East or in the West, capable of committing such -crimes. I consider the statements in this affidavit as absolutely -untrue, and that is all I can say on the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, in the course of his examination your -fellow-Defendant, Dr. Schacht, mentioned that a suggestion had -been made in his time to Mr. Eden, to divest the SS, the SA, and -the HJ of their military character if the other powers would consent -to disarm. What do you know of such proposals or negotiations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know of no such offer, as far as the Hitler -Youth is concerned. I consider it entirely out of the question that -any such offer could have been received by Mr. Eden regarding -the HJ; for Hitler himself did not consider the HJ as a military -or even a semimilitary organization. The disarming of the HJ -could factually never have taken place since the only weapon carried -by the Hitler Youth was the camping knife, the equivalent -of a Boy Scout’s bowie knife of the Jungvolk Pimpfe (boys of 10-14 -years of age).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution further charge that you, -in 1933, concluded an agreement with the VDA—an abbreviation -for the “Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland.” Is that true? -And what was your intention in concluding this agreement? -<span class='pageno' title='446' id='Page_446'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is true. I do not wish to express an -opinion on the aims and objects of the VDA. I believe that counsel -for the Defendant Frick has already done so. I refer to these statements -and merely state that it was my perfectly natural wish to -incorporate in the HJ the numerically powerful group of lads -belonging to the VDA. The majority of these youths, moreover, -had graduated from the public schools, and it was my second -intention to place some of my collaborators on the board of the -VDA so as to be currently informed about the young people abroad.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution further accuse you of having -founded the so-called Adolf Hitler Schools where the training of -young leaders for the National Socialist State and for the Party -was carried out. What have you to say to this accusation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: There is a lot that I could say about that -accusation, but I shall limit myself to essential remarks only.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Adolf Hitler Schools were founded as scholastic units of the -HJ. They were founded with the means which Dr. Ley placed -at my disposal when I told him of my plans for the training I had -envisaged. These schools were not intended to train leaders for the -Party exclusively but served to prepare the youth for all the -professions. I myself often talked to these boys on their graduation -and I always told them “You can choose any profession -you like. Your training in this school carries no obligation, either -moral or otherwise, to become a political leader.” <span class='it'>De facto</span>, relatively -few political leaders emerged from the Adolf Hitler Schools. -Very many of the boys became doctors, officials, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. I -cannot quote any figures from memory, but the communications I -have received from the young people, including statements from -teachers in the Adolf Hitler Schools, show their attitude towards -this point of the Indictment. And I should like to ask that at -least 50 to 60 of these numerous affidavits, which confirm all that -I have said, be submitted in support of my declarations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, one more question on a different topic. -Did you ever receive any so-called endowment funds, or anything -of that kind, from Hitler or from other sources?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I never received any endowment funds.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you ever receive gifts in kind, such as -valuable paintings or other costly gifts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The only thing Hitler ever gave me was -his photograph on the occasion of my thirtieth birthday.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: His photograph—presumably with a few words -of dedication?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='447' id='Page_447'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Now I have a few final, very brief questions to -ask you—they refer to the last days of your activities in Vienna. -You have already mentioned, in connection with Himmler’s visit -to Vienna at the end of March 1945, that you had at that time -received from Himmler the so-called authority for the proclamation -of martial law. If I have understood you correctly, you, in -your function of Reich Defense Commissioner, were authorized to -convene a drumhead court martial?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and that made me lord of life and -death.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, this drumhead court martial -was only supposed to pass death sentences?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you ever convene this drumhead court -martial in Vienna, and did you appoint the members?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I appointed the members of the court -martial. An outstanding lawyer was the president. I never convened -the drumhead court martial and I never once imposed a -death sentence. If I remember rightly, the military court martial -of the local military commandant passed four death sentences on -four military traitors. My court martial never met and never -passed a death sentence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Had you any connection with the military drumhead -court martial?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. The Vienna commandant was, of course, -president of that particular court, and I was the head of court -martial “Schirach.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You said you had a distinguished lawyer as your -president?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was his profession?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think he was president of a district court, -of something of the kind. I cannot quite remember; I have -forgotten.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So he was an official Viennese judge?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you give the order, in Vienna, to have certain -vitally important factories either blown up or destroyed as so often -happened in other Gaue, as for instance, here in Nuremberg?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. It has escaped my knowledge, that much -I must admit, how far crippling and destructive measures were -<span class='pageno' title='448' id='Page_448'></span> -executed in the military and armament sectors, pursuant to direct -instructions from the Reich Government. For instance, the dynamiting -of bridges was a military precaution. The order could never -have emanated from me. Hitler reserved for himself the right -to issue the orders for blowing up the bridges over the Danube. -The Chief of Army Group South, Generaloberst Rendulic, prior -to giving the order for blowing up these bridges, had to consult the -Führer’s headquarters by telephone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you yourself leave Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I left Gau Vienna after the withdrawal of -the last troops from the city and after the command post of the -2d corps of the 6th SS Panzer Army had been moved to the -region of the Lower Danube.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When was that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was—sorry, I cannot remember the -date offhand. It was toward the end of the battle for Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And now I have one last question to ask you. -You know that the order went out from the Party Leadership and -from circles of the Reich Chancellery to stage a “Werewolf” movement -for fighting the advancing troops. What was your attitude -towards this movement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I prohibited any Werewolf organization in -my Gau, but to avoid misunderstandings I must tell you that there -was a youth battalion, a Volkssturm battalion, which bore the name -of “Werewolf,” but there was no Werewolf unit. I invariably refused, -both for the young people and the adults, permission to -participate in any form of combat contrary to the decrees of international -law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ -counsel want to ask any questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): -Witness, what was the attitude of Rosenberg, as the Führer’s -Plenipotentiary for the Ideological Education of the Party, toward -the Reich Youth Leadership?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the Chief of the Department -for Ideological Education in the Reich Youth Leadership had to -attend, on an average, two, perhaps three, meetings per annum, -also attended by educational leaders from other Party organizations. -These meetings took place under the chairmanship of Reichsleiter -Rosenberg. On these occasions, as I have been told by the chief -of the department, Rosenberg was wont to lay down general -<span class='pageno' title='449' id='Page_449'></span> -instructions and directives and ask for reports on the educational -work of the individual organizations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg select specific subjects to be lectured -on at these meetings?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I do not know for certain. At these -meetings of the Youth Leadership representatives, at which Rosenberg -spoke once a year, he usually selected educational themes, -themes dealing with character training. He would, for instance, -speak about solitude and comradeship and, as far as I remember, -about personality, honor, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg at these meetings mention the -Jewish problem and the confessional question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: During these Youth Leadership sessions he -never made any speeches against the Jews, nor did he, as far as -I can remember, ever touch on the subject of the confession—at -least, not in my presence. I usually heard him speak on subjects -such as I have just enumerated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Witness, did you read Rosenberg’s <span class='it'>Myth of the -Twentieth Century</span>? And if so, when?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I began to read it, but I did not read -the whole book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did this Rosenberg’s <span class='it'>Myth</span> make any impression -on the young people or did other leaders have experiences similar -to your own?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The youth leaders certainly did not read the -<span class='it'>Myth of the Twentieth Century</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: I have no more questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to -ask questions? Or perhaps we had better adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='450' id='Page_450'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have already stated in connection -with Sauckel’s directive regarding employment of labor that you -were flooded with such directives. Were these directives carried out?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as my own information goes, I can confirm -that. I had the impression that the functionaries of the labor -employment administration felt that they had to keep strictly to -Sauckel’s orders, and in those industrial plants which I visited I was -able to ascertain that the requirements stated in the directives were -in fact fulfilled.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel himself take steps to insure that -these things were carried out?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I remember that Sauckel once came to -Vienna—I think in 1943—and that on that occasion he addressed all -his labor employment functionaries and repeated orally everything -which he had stated in his directives. He spoke of the foreign workers -in particular, demanding just treatment for them; and I remember -that on this occasion he even spoke of putting them on the same -footing as German workers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have a few more questions about the political -leaders. How were political leaders on the Gauleiter level informed? -Did the Gauleiter have individual interviews with the Führer, especially -in connection with the Gauleiter assemblies?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. After the Gauleiter assemblies the Führer -always held forth in a comparatively large circle just as he did in -his speeches. Interviews in the real sense of the word did not exist. -He always made speeches. Fixed dates on which Gauleiter could -have interviews with Hitler almost ceased to exist once the war -had begun.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could not a Gauleiter approach Hitler personally -and ask for an interview?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He could ask for an interview, but he did not -get it; he received an answer from Bormann, usually in the form -of a telegram. That happened to me very frequently, because I made -such requests; one was asked to submit in writing the points one -wanted to discuss, after which one either received an answer or did -not receive one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, a letter has been submitted here as -Document D-728, signed or initialed by Gauleiter Sprenger. You were -here when it was submitted and you know the document. I have -two questions concerning it. -<span class='pageno' title='451' id='Page_451'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you know anything about a list, which was to be compiled, -containing the names of those suffering from heart and lung diseases, -who were to be removed from the population?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I know nothing about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Or that you were to make suggestions for this -to the Führer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: In my opinion that document also contains an -error which has already been mentioned here, namely, the word -“Herr” as a form of address. This letter was addressed to the -“Herren Ortsgrüppenleiter,” and repeated mention is made of the -“Herren Kreisleiter and Ortsgrüppenleiter” in the text. I ask you -now if the expression “Herr” was customary in Party language?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I have never known a Party document -with the exception of this one, which I consider a fraud, in which -the term “Herr” was used.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You are therefore of the opinion that that -designation proves in itself that the document is false?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Herr Von Schirach, your predecessor as Gauleiter -was Josef Bürckel. What sort of relations existed between -Bürckel and Seyss-Inquart?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can only repeat what was generally known -in the Party about relations between them. They were extremely -bad, and all of us had the impression that from the very beginning -Bürckel worked hard to push Seyss-Inquart out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Which one of the two really had the power -in his hands?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Bürckel, undoubtedly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Who, in your opinion and according to the -actual information you obtained from the files, is responsible for the -persecution of Jews in Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: All right. You say Hitler; but Hitler was not -in Vienna. Who carried out these orders in Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In my opinion, these orders were carried out—even -during Bürckel’s and Seyss-Inquart’s time—by the same man -who has already been mentioned here once today and who, in the -meantime, has been condemned to death in Vienna—Dr. Brunner. -<span class='pageno' title='452' id='Page_452'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Good. Are you aware that Seyss-Inquart -repeatedly protested to Bürckel about excessively severe measures -and quarreled with Bürckel on account of that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot say anything about that. I do not -know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: My client has been accused in a document of -presenting to Adolf Hitler tapestries, among them Gobelins, formerly -in the Emperor’s possession. Do you know anything about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know this: In the large collection of Gobelins -in Vienna, there were two sets depicting Alexander’s victory. The -inferior series was loaned by Reich Governor Seyss-Inquart to the -Reich Chancellery, where it hung in the lobby.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: So it was a loan and not a definite gift, which -would have entailed a loss for Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the catalog of the Gobelin collection this -set was marked as a loan.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Are you aware that other Gobelins were put -at the disposal of the Reich—that is to say, at Adolf Hitler’s disposal—by -Seyss-Inquart?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I was not aware of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: But maybe you know who did take away -other such Gobelins and tapestries?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I assume that you allude to Bürckel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know for certain whether Bürckel -took Gobelins. When I took up my appointment in Vienna, I found -that Bürckel had taken from the imperial furniture depot a number -of pieces of furniture including, I believe, some carpets, not for his -personal use but for a Viennese house which he intended to establish -in Gau Saarpfalz as a sort of clubhouse.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I therefore approached the competent office in Berlin—I do not -know whether it was the Reich Finance Ministry or the Reich Ministry -of Culture—and when I was not successful there, I approached -Hitler himself. In the end I succeeded in having Bürckel ordered -to return these objects to Vienna at once; I cannot say with certainty -whether these objects were in fact returned. I know that he -received injunctions to return them and I assume that these objects -were really returned later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: All right. You know from statements which -I have made to your defense counsel that we Austrians always hated -Bürckel intensely for a number of very good reasons and that -in fairness it must be admitted that many things, including, for -<span class='pageno' title='453' id='Page_453'></span> -instance, the city’s food supplies, improved after you took over. -For this reason it seems to me all the more important to clear up -completely the most serious charge against you. You have been -made responsible in your capacity of Reich Defense Commissioner -for the destruction of the most valuable monuments in Vienna. I -ask you: On 2 April, when your deputy Scharizer and Engineer -Blaschke, the National Socialist mayor, wanted to declare Vienna -an open city as the Red Army approached, did you oppose them -and give orders that Vienna must be defended to the last? Or who -gave that order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Neither Blaschke nor Scharizer expressed the -view that Vienna should be declared an open city. There was...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal understands you -are appearing for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, because this is a War Crime and in the -light of conspiracy he is responsible for everything and the main -charge made against Herr Von Schirach must be clarified—that is, -we must find out who actually gave this order which did so -much harm.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, but you just said that you were not -asking the questions in defense of Seyss-Inquart, but in defense of -Von Schirach. I do not think that the Tribunal really ought to have -the defense of Von Schirach prolonged by questions by other counsel. -We have already had his defense for a considerable time presented -by Dr. Sauter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Then I shall not put this question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you also remember what attitude Seyss-Inquart adopted on -Church matters when dealing with Bürckel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know only that Dr. Seyss-Inquart, generally -speaking, was considered a man with Church ties. That this brought -him into conflict with Bürckel is quite obvious to me. I cannot go -into details.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, we understood you this morning to -make a statement in the nature of a confession with respect to, at -least, the persecution of the Jews; and while that part of it that -you gave was perhaps bravely enough said, I think there is much -of it that you neglected to say, perhaps through oversight.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I wish you would tell the Tribunal whether or not it is a -fact that your responsibility for young people in Germany under -the National Socialists was fundamentally concerned with making -really good National Socialists out of them, in the sense of making -them fanatical political followers. -<span class='pageno' title='454' id='Page_454'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I considered it my task as educator to bring -up the young people to be good citizens of the National Socialist -State.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And ardent followers and believers in Hitler and his -political policies?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe I already said this morning that I -educated our youth to follow Hitler. I do not deny that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. And while you said to us that you did not -have the first responsibility for the educational system, I am sure -you would not deny that for all of the other activities with which -young people may be concerned you did have first responsibility?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Out-of-school education was my responsibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And, of course, in the schools the only people who -taught these young people were those who were politically reliable -in keeping with Hitler’s opinions and beliefs and the teachings of -National Socialism?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The teaching staffs of German schools were -definitely not homogeneous bodies. A large part of the teaching -body belonged to a generation which had not been educated on -National Socialist lines and did not adhere to National Socialism. -The young teachers had been educated on National Socialist principles.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, you are not saying, certainly, -that young people under the public educational system of Germany -were not, at all times, under the guidance of those who were politically -reliable, certainly after the first year or two of the administration -of Hitler and his followers, are you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Would you please repeat the question? I did -not quite understand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What I am trying to say to you is that there is not -any doubt in your mind or in ours that the public school system -of Germany was supervised, for the most part at least, by people -who were politically sound insofar as National Socialism is concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should not care to say that. Educational -administration in Germany was supervised by Reich Minister Rust, -who—and this is a fact—for reasons of ill health took very little -interest in his official duties. Many thousands of older men were -employed in connection with educational administration. They had -received their appointments long before the days of the National -Socialist State and had retained them throughout. -<span class='pageno' title='455' id='Page_455'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not care whether they were old or young or -how long they had been in office. They all took an oath to Hitler, -did they not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct; inasmuch as they were civil -servants, they all took their oath as such.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Rosenberg had a very considerable influence on -young people in Germany, did he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe that. I think you are estimating -my Codefendant Rosenberg’s influence on youth quite -wrongly—meaning that you are overestimating it. Rosenberg certainly -had some influence on many people who were interested in -philosophical problems and were in a position to understand his -works. But I must dispute the extent of the influence which you -are ascribing to him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You publicly said on one occasion that the way of -Rosenberg was the way of the Hitler Youth, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was, I believe, in 1934...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Never mind when it was. Did you say it or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did say it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When was it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was in Berlin, at a youth function there. -But later I myself led youth along an entirely different path.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, we will get around to that a little later. But -in any event, on this occasion in Berlin, when you had a large group -of your youth leaders present, you were doing your best, at least, -to have them understand that the way of Rosenberg was the way -that they should follow?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But those were the same youth leaders who -later received different instructions from me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I dare say that may be so. We will get around -to those different instructions; but on this occasion and at that time, -insofar as you were concerned, you wanted them to understand that -they were to follow Rosenberg’s way, didn’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but this way only affected one quite -definite point, which was under discussion at that time, namely, -the question of denominational youth organizations. Rosenberg and -I agreed on this point, whereas we differed on many others; and it -was to this point that the statement referred.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Rosenberg’s way certainly wasn’t the way of young -people remaining faithful to their religious obligations or teachings, -was it? -<span class='pageno' title='456' id='Page_456'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I would not like to say that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What do you mean? You don’t know?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can say in so many words that I have never -heard Rosenberg make any statement to the effect that young people -should be disloyal to their religious convictions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I don’t know that he ever said it that way -either; but I think you do know perfectly well, as many other people -who were outside of Germany through all of these years, that -Rosenberg was a violent opponent of organized religious institutions. -You don’t deny that, do you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I certainly do not deny that in principle, but -I do not think that it can be expressed in these terms. Rosenberg -in no way tried to influence youth to withdraw from religious -societies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And later on, actually—aren’t you willing to now say -that later on, and perhaps at that time, in a secret and indirect sort -of way you played Rosenberg’s game by arranging youth affairs at -hours when Church ceremonies were going on?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I deny absolutely that I worked against the -Church in such a way. In the years 1933-34, I was concerned mainly -with the denominational youth organizations. I explained that here -yesterday.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know. You garbled them up, and they all had to -join your organization sooner or later. But I am not talking about -that now. What I am trying to say is—and I think you must agree—that -for a considerable period of time you made it really impossible -for young people of certain religious belief to attend their Church -services, because you scheduled your youth affairs at which attendance -was compulsory.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is not correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You say that is not so? Didn’t the Catholic bishops -publicly object to this very sort of thing, and don’t you know it as -well as I do?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot recall that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You do not recall any Catholic clerics objecting to -the fact that you were scheduling your youth affairs on Sunday -mornings when their clerics were holding services?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the course of time, as I explained yesterday, -many clergymen either approached me personally or complained -in public that they were hampered in their spiritual ministration -by the youth service and the forms which it took; and that -is why I adjusted matters in the way shown by the document which -my counsel submitted to the Court yesterday. -<span class='pageno' title='457' id='Page_457'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I don’t think that is altogether an answer; and -perhaps I can help your memory by recalling for you that your -organization specifically provided that these young people, who were -attending church on Sunday, could not go in uniform; and that was -a very purposeful thing, wasn’t it, because they could not get out -of church and get to their youth attendance places at all if they had -to go home and change their clothes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But in many parishes the Church authorities -forbade young people wearing uniform to enter the church.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to argue about it with you. -Your answer is that you don’t recall any frequent and strong criticism -and objection from churchmen about this particular Sunday -morning program. Is that the way you want to leave it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I certainly do not mean that. There were -periods of great tension, periods of heated argument, just as there -was a stormy period in youth organization generally. Later, all these -things were satisfactorily settled and put in order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, I understood you also to say that, whatever -else you may have done with the young people of Germany during -the years over which you had control of them, you certainly did -not prepare them militarily in any sense, in any sense ordinarily -accepted as being military; is that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, let’s see. What was the name of your -personal press expert, or consultant, if you prefer that term?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The press expert who worked with me longest -was a Herr Kaufmann.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you have asked him—as a matter of fact, you -do have an interrogatory from him, don’t you, which will be submitted. -I assume you know about that, don’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know that my counsel has applied for it, -but I do not know the answers which Kaufmann gave.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you know the questions he asked, don’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not remember them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, perhaps if I remind you of one or two you will -remember. You asked him if he ever put out any press releases -without your authority. You asked him if he wasn’t your personal -press consultant. And you asked him if it wasn’t true that you -personally gave him the directive for what you wanted published -in the press, and particularly in the youth press. Do you remember -those questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>] -<span class='pageno' title='458' id='Page_458'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But you don’t know the answers; is that it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, do you know that he published in the SS -official publication in September of 1942 an article about the young -people and the youth of Germany?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember that article.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I think that you had better have a look at it. -It is Document 3930-PS. That becomes USA-853, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, this document which I am showing you is a telegram, of -course, a teletype message, “Reich Governor in Vienna.” You will -see at the top that it was received by you on 10 September 1942, -and it sets out a copy of the subject for the body of this article -for the editorial staff of the <span class='it'>Schwarzes Korps</span>. That is the SS -magazine, as you recall.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, you will see from reading it, and in the very first part it -states that a high-ranking officer who had come back to Berlin from -Sevastopol said that the youngsters who had been seen some 4 -years ago in short pants marching through German cities singing -“Yes, the flag is more than death,” were the 19-year-olds who took -that city of Sevastopol.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The article goes on to say that the lads are fulfilling in fighting -what they promised in singing and that the National Socialist movement -had brought up a young generation, filling them with faith -and self-denial, and so on. And then the rest of it goes on in substance -to say that there were people who objected to your program -at the time that you were trying to make these youngsters strong.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The clear meaning of it is that you are now claiming credit for -having had something to do with making them the good 19-year-old -fighters who took Sevastopol, isn’t that so? You are claiming credit, -I say, in this article for having produced this kind of 19-year-old -boy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had no knowledge of this article up to now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you do now. You can talk about it, certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is just what I want to do. Herr Kaufmann -at that time had just returned from the Eastern Front, and -under the impression of what he had experienced out there he -wrote down what appears in this article, which I cannot possibly -read now in its entirety.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it isn’t very long. Really I read what I think -are the most important parts of it insofar as you are concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That the youth was trained in a military -way I believe is not mentioned in one single sentence in that entire -article. -<span class='pageno' title='459' id='Page_459'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Oh, I know. I am simply asking if it isn’t a fact -that you were claiming credit in this article for having had something -considerable to do with the fact that these 19-year-old boys -were such good fighters in Russia. That is all I am asking you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have already told you that I wanted to -train the youth to become good citizens, and that I wanted to train -them to be good patriots, who did their duty in the field later on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And should also do their duty in the field.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, your answer then is, yes, you were claiming -credit for the fact that they were such good fighters. Now, there is -no trick in this question. It is merely preliminary, and I want to -get on, but I think you might say “yes.” And incidentally, this song, -“The flag is more than death,” was a song that you wrote, wasn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The “Flag Song” which I based on the refrain -“The flag is more than death.” That is true.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, you have also published a number of other -songs for young people, in the formative days before the war -started, in a songbook.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: A great many songbooks for young people -were published. I do not know them all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, I don’t either, but I am asking you if it isn’t a -fact that you did publish songbooks for young people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Both the Cultural Service of the Reich Youth -Leadership and the Press Service published such books. Of course, -I did not look at each single song in them myself; but on the whole -I believe that only songs which were sung by young people appeared -in these books.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. We have some extracts from one of your -songbooks, and there is only one that I wish to refer to. Do you -remember the one “Forward, Forward,” that you wrote, by the -way; another one that you wrote. Do you remember that song?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: “Forward, Forward” is the Flag Song of the -youth organization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. Did you write it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, certainly that also contains, does it not, -highly inciting words and phrases for young people with respect to -their military duty?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Flag Song of the youth organization? I -cannot see that? -<span class='pageno' title='460' id='Page_460'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, words, like these: “We are the future soldiers. -Everything which opposes us will fall before our fists. Führer, we -belong to you,” and so on. Do you remember that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not say: “We are the future soldiers,” -as I hear now in English, but “We are the soldiers of the future.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The soldiers of the future, the bearers of a -future.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, but that is another one of your songs, -isn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is a revolutionary song dating from the -fighting period; it does not refer to a war between, say, Germany -and other powers, but to the fight which we had to carry on inside -the country in order to achieve our revolution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, we will see. Do you remember the one, -“Can you see the dawn in the East?” Do you remember that song?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not one of my songs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is one of the songs in the Hitler Youth Songbook, -is it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is an old SA song dating from 1923-24.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, that may be. I am only asking you, isn’t it -a fact that it was in your official songbooks for your young people?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is in that song that you vilify the Jews, is it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not remember that. I would have to see -the song.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I can show it to you, but perhaps if you recall -it we can save a little time. Don’t you remember that the second -stanza says, “For many years the people were enslaved and misguided, -traitors and Jews had the upper hand?” Do you remember -those words in that song? “People to Arms” is the next one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but I am not sure if that was published -in a youth songbook.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I can assure you that it was; and if you would like -to see it, we have it here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is a very well-known SA song, which was -sung by the young people, and was therefore included in the youth -songbook.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, that is all I wanted to find out. I don’t -care where it originated. It is the kind of song you had in your -songbook for young people. -<span class='pageno' title='461' id='Page_461'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say one more thing. The -songbook which I have here was published in 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe that the youth organization -which I built up can be judged from the year 1933 only.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I don’t suggest that either, but we found it in 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Later we published other songbooks, with -very different songs.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I am going to get around to these in a minute.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That songbook was 3764-PS, USA-854. It has just been called -to my attention that the last phrase in that fourth stanza says: -“Germany awake! Death to Jewry! People to arms!”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: One moment, please; where is that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In the English text, in the fourth stanza. I don’t -know where it would be; it is on Page 19, I am told, of the German -text. Did you find it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, maybe it is the wrong document. In any -event, we will find it for you. However, you remember the song, -do you not? You don’t deny that it says “Death to the Jews,” and -so on, do you, in that song?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is the song that starts with the words, -“Can you see the dawn in the East?”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is all I wanted to know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That song is not in this book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>A book was handed to the defendant.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: We have quite a few of your songbooks here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but there is a great difference between -them. This book, which does not contain the song, is an official -edition published by the Reich Youth Leadership. As I say, it does -not contain the song. It does appear, however, in a songbook published -by Tonners, a firm of music publishers in Cologne, under the -title of “Songs of the Hitler Youth.” This book is not, however, an -official collection issued by the Reich Youth Leadership. Any publishing -firm in Germany can publish such books.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, I will accept that, but certainly you won’t -deny that the book was used, will you? And that is all we are -trying to establish. -<span class='pageno' title='462' id='Page_462'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I do not know. I do not know whether -that book was used by the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know that the one which it is contained in -was published by you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Well, in any event, I would like to point this out to you. I am -not claiming, or trying to suggest to you by questions, that any one -of these songs in themselves made young people in Germany fit for -war; but rather, what I am trying to show is that, as distinguished -from the testimony you gave here yesterday, you were doing something -more than just giving these boys and girls games to play.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My statements of yesterday certainly did not -imply that we only gave them games to play. For every song of -this kind there are innumerable others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I know, but these are the ones we are concerned -with right now. “Unfurl the Blood-Soaked Banners,” you -remember that? “Drums Sound Throughout the Land”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: These are all songs of the “Wandervogel” -and the Youth League. They are songs which were sung at the -time of the Republic, songs which did not have anything to do with -our time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Just a minute.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: They are songs which had nothing to do with -our period.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you think that anybody, in the days of the Republic, -was singing Hitler Youth marches?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: What song is that? I do not know it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is the one, “Drums Sound Throughout the -Land.” Don’t you remember any of these songs, actually?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course, I know quite a number of these -songs; but the most important—the bulk of them—come from the -old “Zupfgeigenhansl” of the Wandervogel movement and from the -Youth League. That the SA also sang these songs goes without -saying.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I don’t doubt that they did; but wherever they -emanated from, you were using them with these young people. -And that one, “Drums Sound Throughout the Land,” you wrote -yourself; isn’t that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: “Drums Sound Throughout the Land?” Yes, -I believe I did write some such song.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right; that certainly doesn’t have a very ancient -origin then, does it? -<span class='pageno' title='463' id='Page_463'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was long before the seizure of power.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, you also recall, perhaps, that on one occasion -Field Marshal Von Blomberg wrote an article for the Hitler Year -Book. Do you remember that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it wasn’t so very long ago. It was in 1938. I -suppose you read the Year Book of your organization for that year -at that time, anyway?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That may be taken for granted; but I really -cannot remember what Field Marshal Von Blomberg wrote for it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, all right. I would like you to look at this -document; it is 3755-PS. I think it is on Page 134 of the text that -you have, Mr. Witness; and on Pages 148 to 150 you will find an -article, “Education for War of German Youth,” or rather, it says, -“The work ‘Education for War of German Youth,’ by Dr. Stellrecht, -contains a slogan of Field Marshal Von Blomberg, in which the -following passage is quoted.” And then it goes on to give the -quotation. Do you find that? “The fighting spirit is the highest -virtue of the soldier.” And so on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Have you found the quotation of Blomberg’s? That is what I -want to know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And then the article by Stellrecht is also contained -there, after the quotation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now certainly, when you move down a few lines, -you will see this sentence: “Therefore, it is a stern and unalterable -demand which Field Marshal Von Blomberg makes of the young -men marching in the columns of the Hitler Youth,” and so on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In those days, in 1938, Mr. Witness, you were at least thinking -in terms of future military service and so was Field Marshal Von -Blomberg, with respect to the Hitler Youth. That is the point I am -trying to make.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: We had a State with compulsory military -training.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And it goes without saying that we as educators -were also anxious to train our youth to the highest degree -of physical fitness so that they would also make good soldiers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You weren’t doing any more than that? Is that -what you want this Court to understand? -<span class='pageno' title='464' id='Page_464'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I described to you yesterday what else we -did in the way of rifle training, cross-country sports, and the training -of special units.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is USA-856, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Yes, I know you told us yesterday that, whatever else it might -have been, it certainly was not any kind of military training.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This man Stellrecht was associated with you, was he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Dr. Stellrecht had the “Office for Physical -Training” in the Hitler Youth under Reich Sport Leader Von -Tschammer-Osten. That office was one of 21 offices within the -Youth Leadership.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: He was associated with you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you have also used something from him as part -of your defense; it is in your document book. Do you know -about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, it is a statement made by Dr. Stellrecht, -in which he speaks of education for defense and physical training -for youth; and says that not a single boy in Germany is trained -with weapons of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know that, and therefore I want you to look at -another statement that he made on another date.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is Document 1992-PS, Mr. President, and we offer it as -USA-439.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you remember when he made the speech to the military men -in January of 1937, while he was affiliated with your Hitler Youth -organization? Do you know the speech to which I refer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was not present on the occasion of that -speech and I do not consider myself responsible for any statement -which he may have made in it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, that is your statement, but perhaps others -feel differently. At any event, I ask you whether or not you were -aware of and knew about the speech, and will you tell us whether -you do know about it before you look at it? You know the speech -I am talking about, don’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember being informed of the fact -that he spoke at a national and political training course for the -Armed Forces; but I may have been informed of it. The speech, -itself...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it seems to me you were very anxious to deny -responsibility for it before you knew what he said. -<span class='pageno' title='465' id='Page_465'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not want to make a statement on that. -Disputes arose between Dr. Stellrecht and myself on account of a -certain tendency which he showed with regard to defense training, -because I felt that he insisted too much on his office. Disputes arose -also with the other offices of the Reich Youth Leadership which -finally led to his dismissal from the Reich Youth Leadership.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, he was on your staff when he -made this speech and I wish now you would look at page—well, I -have it Page 3 of the English, and it is Page 169 of the text that -you have; and it begins at the very bottom of the English page. The -paragraph reads:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“As far as purely military education is concerned this work -has already been done in years of co-operation, and very -extensively. The result has been set down in a book written -by myself, regulating future work in military education down -to the last detail of training and which, with our mutual -agreement, included a foreword and preface by the Reich -Defense Minister and the Reich Youth Leader.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then the next paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The basic idea of this work is always to present to the boy -that which belongs to the particular stage of his development”—and -so on. And I want you to come to the sentence -that says:</p> - -<p>“For that reason no boy is given a military weapon, simply -because it seems to serve no useful purpose for his development. -But, on the other hand, it seems sensible to give him -guns of small caliber for training. Just as there are certain -tasks occurring in military training which are only suitable -for grown men, so there are other training tasks more suited -to boys.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then moving down further in the English text, next to the -last paragraph, Page 170 of your text, you will find in the next to -the last paragraph that Dr. Stellrecht says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“This picture is the goal of a comprehensive education which -starts with the training of the boy in outdoor games and ends -with his military training.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then moving on again to the fifth page of the English text, -and I think it is Page 171 of your text, the next to the last paragraph, -in talking about the hiking trip, he says that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“...has still a wider purpose...because it is the only way in -which the boy can get acquainted with the fatherland for -which he will have to fight one day.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Moving on through this article, finally, I want to direct your -attention to Page 6 of the English text and Pages 174 and 175 of -<span class='pageno' title='466' id='Page_466'></span> -your text. In the last paragraph of the English text, you will find -this sentence which says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“All training, therefore, culminates in rifle training. It can -scarcely be emphasized enough; and because shooting is a -matter of practice, one cannot start too early. The result we -want to achieve in the course of time is that a gun should -feel just as natural in the hands of a German boy as a pen.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, move over to the next page, Page 7 of the English text -and Page 176 of your text. Your Dr. Stellrecht says there more -about shooting and how it “meets with the boys’ desire”; and then -he goes on to say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Along with the general training there is special training for -new replacements for Air Force, Navy, and motorized troops. -The training course for this has been established in conjunction -with the competent offices of the Armed Forces... -on as broad a basis as possible, and in the country cavalry -training is given.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And I suppose it is on the next page of your text, but it is the -next to the last paragraph of the English text—I want to call your -attention to this sentence—or it is two from the last paragraph in -the English text: “Military education and ideological education -belong together.” The English text says “philosophical,” but I think -that’s a mistranslation and actually in German it is “ideological.” -And you see the sentence that says in the next paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The education of youth has to take care that the knowledge -and the principles, according to which the State and the -Armed Forces of our time have been organized and on which -they base, enter so thoroughly into the thoughts of the individual -that they can never again be taken away and that -they remain guiding principles all through life.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And the last paragraph of that speech, Mr. Witness—I wish you -would look at it because I think you used the term “playful” -yesterday, if I am not mistaken, and Dr. Stellrecht, anyway, a little -earlier in his speech. Here is what he said to the military men -that day: “Gentlemen, you can see that the tasks of present youth -education have gone far beyond the ‘playful.’ ”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Are you sure, now, that you didn’t have any kind of a program -for military training in your youth organization?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can see from this document, which I should -really have to read in its entirety in order to be able to answer -correctly, that Dr. Stellrecht, to put it mildly, considered himself -very important. The importance of Dr. Stellrecht for the education -of youth and the importance of the office which he held in the -Youth Leadership were definitely not as great as implied by this -<span class='pageno' title='467' id='Page_467'></span> -training course for men of the Armed Forces. I have already said -before that disputes arose between Dr. Stellrecht and myself on -account of his exaggerations and especially because of the extent to -which he overestimated the value of rifle training and what he -called “military training” and that these differences of opinion -finally led to his dismissal and departure from the service of the -Reich Youth Leadership. He was one of many heads of offices, and -the importance of his special activity was not as great as he has -represented it to be in his statement here. I think I explained -yesterday what a large number of tasks confronted the Youth -Leadership. I was also able to indicate the approximate proportion -of premilitary training or military training, as Herr Stellrecht calls -it, as compared with other forms of training. But this document -also states clearly that there was no intention of anticipating military -training, as I said yesterday. When he says that every German -boy should learn to handle the gun as easily as the pen, that is an -expression of opinion with which I cannot identify myself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, of course, you have your view of him; but I -think it is well that we brought it out in view of the fact that you -have yourself offered before this Tribunal a statement by Stellrecht -in your own document book. You are aware of that, of course, -aren’t you? You want, of course, to have us understand that Stellrecht -is reliable when you quote him, but he is not reliable when -we quote him; is that it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not mean that at all. He is a specialist -in ballistics and outdoor sports and, of course, he represented his -tasks, as is natural to human nature, as being the most important -in youth training. Probably another office chief would have described -cultural work or occupational competition contests, as the -case might be, as being the most important aspects of youth training. -At any rate, the decisive pronouncement for the education of -German youth was not the remarks which Stellrecht made during -a course for soldiers but my own remarks to the youth leaders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I just want to remind you that a year after he made -this speech you wrote a preface for his book, didn’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe this preface was written for the -book “Hitler Youth on Service.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I say it was a year after he wrote this speech, which -was put out and published in Germany. He not only made the -speech; but it was put out in pamphlet form, wasn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember exactly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I can tell you if you look at the document -that I handed you. I think you will see that. Well, in any event, -<span class='pageno' title='468' id='Page_468'></span> -we will pass along. You told the Tribunal yesterday that the statement -in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, attributed to Hitler, on 21 February -1938 was something of a mystery to you; you did not know -where he got his figures from. Did you understand what I said, -Mr. Witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And do you know to what I referred in your testimony -of yesterday, that quotation from Hitler in the <span class='it'>Völkischer -Beobachter</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What is wrong with those figures?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think that these figures are exaggerated -and I think that there are errors in the text in my possession, -which is a translated text. He probably received these figures from -Dr. Stellrecht’s office, or so I assume. The statements regarding -armored troops were, I imagine, probably added by himself; for -the conclusion that some thousands or tens of thousands qualified -for driving licenses is really an incorrect one, just as it is incorrect -to draw from the fact that some tens of thousands of lads qualify -for driving licenses the conclusion that they were trained as tank -troops.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you see, we didn’t say so. You understand it -was your Führer who said so in February 1938, and what I asked -you was that I wish perhaps we can go through it and you can -tell the Tribunal where they are in error and to what extent. Now -Hitler said, according to the press, that your naval Hitler Youth -comprised 45,000 boys. Would you say that figure was too large -and altogether untrue?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: He then said, the motor Hitler Youth 60,000 boys. -What do you say about that figure?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And then he said that, as part of the campaign to -encourage aviation, 55,000 members of the Jungvolk were trained -in gliding for group activities. What do you say about that figure?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Glider training and model plane construction -in the youth organization with—may I have the figure again—50,000 -youth airmen?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: 55,000. -<span class='pageno' title='469' id='Page_469'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 55,000—yes, that is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That’s correct. Then he says, “74,000 of the Hitler -Youth are organized in its flying units.” Now, what do you say -about that figure?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: You say “flying units”; those are “Fliegereinheiten,” -groups of Hitler youth airmen, who—as I must emphasize -again—were concerned only with gliding and the construction of -model planes. There may have been such a large number at the -time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Is the figure correct, 74,000?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It may be.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, he lastly says, “15,000 boys passed their gliding -test in the year 1937 alone.” What do you say about that; is it -too big or too little or not true at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is probably correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, so far you haven’t disagreed with Hitler -on any of these, have you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Then, he lastly says, “Today, 1.2 million boys of -the Hitler Youth receive regular instruction in small-bore rifle -shooting from 7,000 instructors.” What’s wrong with that figure, -if anything?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It may be correct—of course, I have no documentary -proof that we had 7,000 young men who conducted training -in small-bore rifle shooting. I discussed this small-bore rifle -shooting yesterday. It is well known that we carried that out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Actually you haven’t disputed any of these figures. -They are true, then, to the best of your knowledge, aren’t they?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My objection concerned a remark, which I -remember in connection with the speech, mentioning tank force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, we don’t have it but, if you have it, we’d be -glad to see it. But this is the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> speech that -was put in by the Prosecution at the time that the case against -you was put in; there is nothing in that about the tanks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe the reason is that the retranslation -of the document from English back into German is incorrect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, we agree that Hitler wasn’t very -far off on his figures when he made this speech or gave them out?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No; I think the figures which you have just -mentioned are correct. -<span class='pageno' title='470' id='Page_470'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. Now, then, in the Year Book of your -Hitler Youth for 1939, Stellrecht, your man who had charge of -training, uses that same expression. Do you recall that? “To handle -a rifle should be just as natural for everybody as to handle a pen”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I have the month?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it’s in the Year Book of the Hitler Youth for -the year 1939, at Page 227. If you’d like to see it, I’ll be glad to -show it to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, thank you. I do not have to see it. If -he has already mentioned it before, it is possible that he will -repeat it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. You see, the importance of it to us is that this -is 2 years after he made this speech, 1 year after you wrote the -preface to his book, and I assume some time after you found him -to be—what did you say—unreliable?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I did not say that. On the contrary, he -was a reliable man, but differences of opinion arose between us -because I did not agree with him on the question of overemphasizing -premilitary training.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I considered the rifle training as constituting -only a part of our training, and not the most essential part; and -he pushed it too much into the foreground.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. But you let him write in the Year Book; -and 2 years, after he made the speech, he made this same kind -of a statement for young people to read, that they should be as -handy with a rifle as they were with a pen. Did you make any -objection when that book went to press? I assume you must have...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not see the book before it went to -press...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not proofread it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: ...and I had no objections to raise in -particular.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you object when you read in the same book -and on the same page that the Wehrmacht had presented to your -Hitler Youth in 1937, 10,000 small-bore rifles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I was very glad to have that gift from -the Armed Forces. As we in any case did small-bore shooting, I -was grateful for every rifle we received because we always had -less than we needed for training purposes. -<span class='pageno' title='471' id='Page_471'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And were you distressed when you also read in -that same Year Book that there was no shortage of shooting ranges:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Since organized rifle training was started in the autumn of -1936, 10,000 shooting instructors have acquired the green -shooting license in weekend courses and special courses; and -this figure increases by some thousands every year.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you remember that in your Year Book for 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not remember it, but I think you are -probably presenting the facts correctly; I will not dispute it. -Switzerland gave her young men a much more intensive rifle training -than we did and so did many other countries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not deny that our young men were -trained in shooting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I hope you’re not comparing yourself to Switzerland, -either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: This document is 3769-PS, Mr. President; it becomes -USA-857.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, we’ve heard about this agreement that you and the Defendant -Keitel drew up in 1939, not very long before the war -against Poland started. It was in August of 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It’s already in evidence, Mr. President, as USA-677.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It was the 8th day of August, wasn’t it—or 11th day; I’m sorry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know the exact date. The fact that -the agreement was concluded in August 1939 is enough to show -that it did not have—and could not have had—any connection with -the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You say it had no relation to the war, 3 weeks -before the attack on Poland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: If that agreement had had any significance -for the war, it would have had to be concluded much earlier. The -fact that it was only concluded in August shows in itself that we -were not thinking of war. If we had wanted to train youth for the -war, we would have made an agreement of this kind in 1936 -or 1937.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, will you agree to this: That this -agreement between you and Keitel certainly was related to your -shooting practice and related to the Army?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as I remember, the agreement referred -to training for outdoor sports. -<span class='pageno' title='472' id='Page_472'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, then I had better show it to you and read -from it to you, if you have forgotten insofar that you don’t remember -that it had something to do with your shooting practice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that it says—and to that extent a -connection with rifle shooting does exist—that in future field sports -are to receive the same attention which has hitherto been given to -shooting. I do not know if I am giving that correctly from memory.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I’ll tell you what it says and you can look at it in -a minute. It says that you already have 30,000 Hitler Youth leaders -trained annually in field service. And in the whole sentence it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In the Leadership Schools of the Hitler Youth, particularly -in the two Reich schools for shooting practice and field sports -and in the District Leadership Schools, 30,000 Hitler Youth -leaders are being trained every year in field service...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>and that this agreement gives you the possibility of roughly doubling -that number.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And it goes on to say how you will quarter these -people and billet them, and so on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And it does have some relationship to your shooting -training program, doesn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I explained that before I even saw it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I misunderstood you then. I thought that you -said that it didn’t have...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, no, I explained that. I said that field -service should have the same prominence as rifle training in the -program; but, here again, we are not concerned with training youth -leaders to become officers. It was not a question of military training, -but of training in field sports for the youth leaders who, after -short courses—I believe they lasted 3 weeks—went back again to -their units. A young man of 16 cannot be trained along military -lines in that period of time, nor was that the purpose of the agreement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Surely you are not asking us to believe that you -and Keitel were entering into an agreement over cross-country -sports, are you, in August of 1939? Are you serious about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I am perfectly serious when I say that at that -time I knew nothing about a war—the war to come. I said yesterday...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, but you... -<span class='pageno' title='473' id='Page_473'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And I do not believe either that Field -Marshal Keitel drafted that agreement; I think one of his assistants -worked it out along with Dr. Stellrecht. If it had had any -significance for the war, it would certainly not have been announced -in August in an official publication.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, listen. You just look at the first paragraph -of this and read what it says the purpose of this agreement -is, and perhaps we can put an end to this discussion.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“An agreement was made between the High Command of -the Wehrmacht and the Reich Youth Leadership representing -the result of close co-operation between the Chief of the High -Command of the Wehrmacht, General Keitel, and the Youth -Leader of the German Reich, Von Schirach, and promising -the co-operation of the Wehrmacht in the military education -of the Hitler Youth.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>You don’t see anything there about cross-country running, do you, -or training?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to give an explanation as to -that. What you have just quoted is not part of the text of the -agreement, but represents a commentary by the editor of the collection -<span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I’m not going on; but I’ll leave it up to the -Tribunal to decide whether that has to do with sports or has any -relation to military education.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it is a convenient time to break off.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that -the Defendant Raeder is absent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, would you agree that from time to -time members of your Hitler Youth sang songs and otherwise conducted -themselves in a manner which certainly was hostile to -organized religious institutions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not intend to deny that isolated members -behaved in that way during the early years of the National Socialist -State, but I should like to add a short explanation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the early years I took into my movement millions of -young people from Marxist organizations and the atheist movement, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>; and, of course, it was not possible in the space -of 2 or 3 or 4 years’ time to discipline all of them completely. But -I think I may say that after a certain date, say 1936, things of that -sort no longer happened. -<span class='pageno' title='474' id='Page_474'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I thought perhaps we could say, anyway, that -in 1935 this sort of thing was going on and perhaps save some time. -Would you agree to that? They were singing songs such as, “Pope -and Rabbi shall yield, we want to be pagans again” and that sort -of business. Are you familiar with that? Do you know that kind -of thing that came to the attention of the Minister of Justice from -the prosecuting authority in Baden.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know that they sang a song published in the -songbook “Blut und Ehre,” a song saying, “We want to kill the -priest, out with your spear, forward; set the red cock on the cloister -roof.” You know that old song?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is a song dating back to the Thirty Years’ -War and sung by the youth movement for many, many years, even -before the first World War.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know, you have told me that before. I am trying -to cut that down. Will you agree that your people were singing it -in 1933, 1934, and 1935, to the extent that when clerics objected they -were subjected themselves to the prosecuting authorities for interfering -and criticizing? That is how important it was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know, as I have already said, that this song -dates back to the Thirty Years’ War. It was sometimes sung by -young people in the years 1933-1934. I tried to abolish this song, -but I cannot give you any information as to special complaints -which were lodged about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not think that we have made clear that these -songs were put out in a book which you published for the Hitler -Youth to sing in these days. Do you agree to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think it is possible, as for many years this -song was included in every collection. It is a song which appeared -in the first songbooks of the Wandervogel movement in 1898.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am not really interested in the history. All I am -trying to establish is that in your songbook for your young people -this song was present, that it was sung, that when the Church people -complained, they were subjected to the prosecuting authorities for -complaining.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I must dispute the last point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I will have to put this document in.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is Number 3751-PS. These are extracts from the diary of the -prosecuting authorities, the diary of the Minister of Justice. And -that becomes USA-858. -<span class='pageno' title='475' id='Page_475'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, the very first entry that is shown to you is a note from -the diary of the Minister of Justice on the Catholic Vicar Paul -Wasmer concerning criminal proceedings against him, and it is a -question of whether a penal sentence should be proposed by Rosenberg -because of libel. The vicar in his sermon cited a song being -sung by young people. I quoted a few words of it a moment ago -about “Pope and Rabbi shall yield, out with the Jews,” and so on. -The Minister of Justice in his diary goes on to say that this Catholic -vicar also quoted from “the little book of songs published by Baldur -von Schirach” a verse with the following text:</p> - - - <div class='poetry-container' style=''> - <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' --> -<div class='stanza-outer'> -<p class='line0'>“To the Lord in Heaven we’ll surely say</p> -<p class='line0'>That we his Priest would gladly slay.”</p> -</div> -</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend --> - -<p class='noindent'>and so on:</p> - - - <div class='poetry-container' style=''> - <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' --> -<div class='stanza-outer'> -<p class='line0'>“Out with your spear, forward march.”</p> -</div> -</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend --> - -<p class='pindent'>And he further quoted you as saying, “The path of German -youth is Rosenberg.” Now, that is what he got into trouble for -doing, and all I am asking you—and all I did ask—is if you won’t -admit that people who criticized the use of this kind of stuff by -your young people under your leadership were subjected to possible, -and in many cases actual, prosecution? You see, you told the Tribunal -yesterday that you never did anything directly to interfere -with the Church, Catholic or Protestant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The song quoted, which has the refrain “Kyrieleis,” -which in itself shows it is a very old song...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May I interrupt you to say...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: ...may possibly be included in the songbook -“Blood and Honor.” I am, of course, unaware that a clergyman was -prosecuted for criticizing it. That is something new which I learn -for the first time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. Look at Page 192 of that same diary, and -you will see where the Archbishop of Paderborn reported the incident -of 12 May. In this case he was asking that something be done -to stop this sort of thing, and there is a rather nasty little song there -about a monk and a nun, and so on, which your young people were -singing; and then it goes on to say what happened to the Archbishop -when he came out into the square and what the Hitler Youth did, -what names they called him, and it says there were seven Hitler -Youth leaders from outside present in that city that day and they -were in civilian clothing. Do you mean to say you never heard of -these things?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know of this incident. I called the competent -leader of the area, Langanke by name, to account for this. I -had a good deal of trouble in connection with the incident. I shall -<span class='pageno' title='476' id='Page_476'></span> -therefore ask my counsel to question the witness Lauterbacher, who -then held the rank of Stabsführer and is acquainted with the details. -Some lines of the song you quoted just now caused a good deal of -violent feeling among the population at the time—some of those -lines are quoted here—on account of the foreign currency racketeering -indulged in by some clergymen. That is why this satirical -song was sung.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to say in conclusion that I thoroughly and obviously -disapproved of the attitude of these youth leaders. The whole affair -is, as I have already said, one of those incidents dating back to the -years when I had to take into my organization an enormous number -of youths from other organizations and with an entirely different -intellectual background.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, turn to Page 228 of that diary, and you -will see where a Chaplain Heinrich Müller and a town clergyman -Franz Rümmer were under suspicion because they said in a circle -of Catholic clergy that a certain song was sung by the Hitler Youth -at the Party Rally in 1934:</p> - - - <div class='poetry-container' style=''> - <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' --> -<div class='stanza-outer'> -<p class='line0'>“We are the rollicking Hitler Youth;</p> -<p class='line0'>We have no need of Christian truth;</p> -<p class='line0'>For Adolf Hitler is our Leader</p> -<p class='line0'>And our Interceder.</p> -<p class='line'> </p> -</div> -<div class='stanza-outer'> -<p class='line0'>“No evil old priest these ties can sever;</p> -<p class='line0'>We’re Hitler’s children now and ever.”</p> -</div> -</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend --> - -<p class='pindent'>Wait until I get through.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have not found the place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is Page 228, a and b, I’m sorry. Maybe you will -remember the song anyway if I read it to you. Do you remember -the lines that said, “We don’t follow Christ but instead Horst Wessel”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This is the first time I have seen this song. I -do not know this song.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right; I will not go on reading it. You noticed -that in an entry in the diary, the last paragraph, it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Advocate General notes that there is no doubt that the -song in question was sung or circulated in Hitler Youth circles; -he thinks that the statement that this song was sung at the -Party Rally, that is, to a certain extent under the eyes and -with the consent of the highest Party officials, can be refuted.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The third stanza reads:</p> - - - <div class='poetry-container' style=''> - <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' --> -<div class='stanza-outer'> -<p class='line0'>“I am no Christian, no Catholic;</p> -<p class='line0'>I follow the SA through thin and thick.”</p> -</div> -</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend --> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='477' id='Page_477'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>We gather that it is not a youth song. If the young people sang -that song, I very much regret it. That song was certainly not sung -at a youth festival at the Party Rally in 1934, as stated here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I myself read through all the programs for -youth events at the Party Rally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I do not know this song; I have never heard it; and I do not -know the text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD; You will notice that the last line says: “Baldur -von Schirach, take me too!”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The only point to all this is that certainly it is a surprise to the -Prosecution to hear you say, as the Youth Leader, that you did not -know that there was a great difficulty between the churchmen of -all the churches in Germany and the youth organization in Germany, -certainly during these years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The point that I should like to make clear to -the Tribunal is that in the youth movement there was a period of -storm and stress, a period of development, and that the organization -must not be judged by the actions of a few individuals or groups -in the same year in which these individuals or groups became members -of the organization. The result of educational work cannot be -judged until some years have elapsed. It is possible that a group of -youths who entered our ranks from the atheist movement in 1934 -composed and sang these songs. In 1936 they would certainly no -longer have done it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, let’s see what you were doing in 1937. You -know the publication “Enjoyment, Discipline, Faith”? Do you know -that handbook for cultural work in your youth camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to see it, please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I’ll show it to you, but I wanted to ask you, first of -all: Do you know the publication? Do you know what I am talking -about when I refer to it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know all our publications. We had -such an enormous number of publications that unless I have the -book in front of me I cannot make any statement on the subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right; I’ll take your answer that you don’t know -this one without seeing it. We’ll show it to you. This one, among -other things, has the program for a week in one of your camps, a -suggested series of programs. And again I’ll ask you a question and -maybe we can cut this down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Isn’t it a fact that in your camps you tried to make Hitler and -God more than partners and particularly tried to direct the religious -<span class='pageno' title='478' id='Page_478'></span> -attitudes of young people to the belief that Hitler was sent to this -earth by God and was his divinely appointed in Germany?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Well, just answer that first of all, and then we can look at the -program.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I never made any comparison between -Hitler and God; and I consider it blasphemous and have always considered -such a comparison blasphemous.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It is true that during the long period of years in which I believed -in Hitler, I saw in him a man sent by God to lead the people. That -is true. I believe any great man in history—and in the past I considered -Hitler such a man—may be regarded as being sent by God.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: This is Document 2436-PS, USA-859.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am not going to go all through it with you, but I do want to -call your attention to some specific parts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>First of all, on Page 64 you have the names of people suggested -as mottoes, I guess you would say, for the day. They are all political -or military heroes of Germany, I expect, aren’t they?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Arminius, Geiserich, Braunschweig...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You don’t need to read them all. If they are not, -say they aren’t, and if they are, say “yes.” I merely asked you if -they were not all military or political heroes of Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know whether Prince Louis Ferdinand -of Prussia can be characterized simply as a war hero here. He was -certainly an artist as much as an officer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, I’ll pass that and take your answer that -they are not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Let’s move on to the Sunday morning celebration on Page 70 of -your text, near the end of it. I wanted particularly to direct your -attention to this in view of what you said about Rosenberg earlier -this afternoon:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“If there is no one who can make a short formal address—it -must be good and command attention—extracts from ‘Mein -Kampf’ or from the Führer’s speeches or Rosenberg’s works -should be read.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you find that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have found it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, do you still say that Rosenberg and his works -had nothing to do with your Hitler Youth? You were suggesting -that, for Sunday morning reading, they might listen to this benign -philosopher’s works, weren’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Nothing is proved by the fact that such a -reference is made in one of the numerous handbooks of cultural -<span class='pageno' title='479' id='Page_479'></span> -work to one of the training staff who attended those biannual discussions -of Rosenberg’s which I have already mentioned. I think -you will look a long time before you find this particular passage in -one of the many youth handbooks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me ask you something about this. You find one -line in here for the Sunday morning celebration about a churchman, -a chaplain, Holy Scripture, or anything related to religious institutions -and tell the Tribunal where it is.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I take it as certain that nothing like that -occurs there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is your Sunday morning program?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Hitler Youth was a state youth organization, -and my aim was to separate religious and state education. -A young man who wanted to go to church could go after the morning -celebration—it was a camp function—or before it, according to -whether he wanted to attend mass or go to a Protestant service; and -on these Sundays on which he was not in camp—the whole camp -lasted 3 weeks at the outside—he was completely free to attend -church at home with his parents or other friends.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think it is fair to say that immediately -before the words “Page 71” there are three lines which -might be said to refer to religion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I intend to quote it. I was saving that for a -little later. I will be glad to do it now if Your Honor prefers to -have it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I want to call your attention to a historical moral -ballad that is suggested for the youth of this camp, on Page 89 of -your text or 90, and on Page 6 of the English text.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I am not going to read this whole ballad, but I think you -will agree that it ridicules, to put it mildly, the Jews, other political -parties in Germany. It refers to “Isidor, Isidor” in the opening -lines, and it goes on down, “Poor Michael was a wretched man; he -had to serve the Jewish clan.” In another line, “He gave the gang -and the Jew a kick.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And then your Party youth leaders suggest that now they have -a—what is it—a shadow show:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The nose of Isidor must be strongly exaggerated; the German -Michael should be presented in the conventional manner; the -Communist as a wild stormer of barricades; the Social Democrat -with a balloon cap; the Center Party man with a Jesuit -cap, and the reactionary with top hat and monocle.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='480' id='Page_480'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you ever see one of those shows, by the way?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot find the text you have just quoted -on Page 89.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I probably have given you the wrong page. I have -just been told it is Page 154 of your text—155, rather.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I just want to know about this suggested part -of the program for these young people of yours.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say something about the whole -question as far as this book is concerned. I wrote the preface and -I accept responsibility for the contents. I did not read every detail -of this book beforehand; and I do not wish to dispute the fact that -in the camps forming part of the camp circus, as it was called, political -caricatures were presented in the form of shadow-shows.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You know one of your youngsters wrote Streicher -a letter telling him that he saw this kind of a show. Do you know -about that? I am going to show you that letter in a little while, -just to show you that it did happen, and that your young people -wrote to Streicher about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>And on the last page of the English text, for Sunday, 19 July—I -think it is Page 179 of your text—the motto for the day is “Our -service to Germany is divine service.” And that was a slogan you -used on other Sundays, and as the Tribunal has pointed out, on -Page 70 of your text you say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“...that this Sunday morning ceremony does not aim at -presenting arguments or conflicts with confessional points of -view, but at imbuing life and men with courage and strength -to fulfill their greater and lesser tasks through unqualified -faith in the divine power and the ideology of the Führer and -his movement.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, in no place where you ever made any reference to God -did you ever fail also to mention Hitler or the leaders of the Party, -did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Will you please indicate the passage that you -quoted just now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is on Page 70, right at the bottom of your Page 70.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, it says here:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It does not aim at presenting arguments or conflicts with -confessional points of view, but at imbuing life and men with -courage and strength to fulfill their greater and lesser tasks -through unqualified faith in the divine power and the ideology -of the Führer and his Party.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='481' id='Page_481'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>That does not, after all, mean that Hitler is compared to God, -but I believe that in the answer I gave a few minutes ago I did -define my attitude.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let’s see if you don’t. In your book <span class='it'>Revolution of -Education</span>, on Page 148, do you remember this statement: “The flag -of the Third Reich”—we’ll begin the whole sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“On the contrary, the service of Germany appears to us to -be...the service of God. The banner of the Third Reich -appears to us to be His banner; and the Führer of the people -is the savior whom he sent to save us from the calamity -and peril into which we were actually plunged by the most -pious parties of the defunct German Republic.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to see the original of this text, -please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Here I write:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“We consider that we are serving the Almighty when with -our youthful strength we seek to make Germany once more -united and great. In acknowledging loyalty to our Homeland -we see nothing which could be construed as a contradiction -of His eternal will. On the contrary, the service of Germany -appears to us to be genuine and sincere service of God; the -banner of the Third Reich appears to us to be His banner; -and the Führer of the people is the savior whom He sent to -rescue us from the calamity and peril into which we were -actually plunged by the most pious parties of the defunct -German Republic.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This is the Center Party of the old Republic and other similar -organizations of a confessional and political nature. I wrote this. -I really do not see anything in that which could be construed into -a deification of the Führer. For me, service to my country was -service to the Almighty.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, if that is your answer—I see it differently. -Let’s go on to something else so that we can get through. I don’t -want to neglect to show you, if you care to be shown, that communication -to Streicher. It has already been presented to the Tribunal -by the British Delegation, the British prosecutor. I think it -was read from, but not put in, I am told.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In any event, do you know about that, Mr. Witness? Do you -know about the letter that the boys and girls of the Youth Hostel -at Grossmöllen wrote to Streicher in April of 1936, when they told -him about seeing the Jews, “Every Sunday our leader shows a play -about the Jews with his puppet theater.” -<span class='pageno' title='482' id='Page_482'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I just want to know if you are aware of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say in this connection that -the National Socialist Youth Home at Grossmöllen, which is mentioned -here, was not a Hitler Youth institution but was, I believe, -a kindergarten run by the National Socialist Public Welfare Organization -or some other organization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is typical of the letters ordered by the publisher of <span class='it'>Der -Stürmer</span> for recruiting purposes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Just a moment. Didn’t you take over every youth -hostel in 1933?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, what do you mean by saying that in 1936 this -National Socialist Youth Hostel at Grossmöllen was not a part of -the Hitler Youth organization?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It says here youth home (Heimstätte), not -hostel (Herberge). I am not familiar with the expression “Heimstätte.” -That must refer to a home run by the National Socialist -Public Welfare Organization or the National Socialist Women’s -League. We had only “Jugendheime” and “Herbergen.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, doesn’t it strike you as being strangely coincidental -that in your program for one of your youth camps you -suggest a show which portrays a Jewish man with a great nose and -ridicules him and teaches children to dislike him and laugh at him -and that from a youth camp a youngster writes to Streicher saying -that she and boys and girls saw such a show?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This letter was not written from any youth -camp.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I accept it if that is your answer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not deny that this puppet play was -shown and that this letter was written; but I believe the connection -is pulled in by the hair, so to speak. The connection is a very -remote one.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You think the connection about the ridiculing of the -Jews is very far afield and pulled in by the hair.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I dispute the statement that this is a -Hitler Youth institution. I believe actually it is a day nursery run -by the National Socialist Public Welfare Organization or something -similar.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, maybe the explanation is that all the young -people in Germany saw one of those shows. But, in any event, I -want to take up the last matter on this subject with you. -<span class='pageno' title='483' id='Page_483'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>This morning your counsel examined you about the confiscation -of a monastery, I believe it was in Austria while you were there, -Klosterneuburg. Do you remember?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: We discussed Count Schwarzenberg’s palace -this morning. That was not a monastery. It was the property of a -private citizen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, the document that Counsel Dr. Sauter referred -to was R-146, USA-678. It was a letter from Bormann to all Gauleiter, -and it began by saying that valuable Church properties had -to be seized in Italy and in Austria. It was signed by Bormann. -And then also on that document was a letter from Lammers saying -that there had been some dispute as to whether the seized Church -property should go back to the Reich or should remain in your Gau. -You remember that, don’t you? Well, now, you seized the monastery -down there, didn’t you, in 1941, at Klosterneuburg? Klosterneuburg, -you know what I am referring to. I may mispronounce it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. The well-known foundation Klosterneuburg, -the famous monastery, served as a receiving office for collections -of works of art taken from our art museum.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. Now, what excuse did you have for seizing the -monastery at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can no longer give you exact details with -regard to this. I believe there were very few people in the monastery, -that the large building was not being used to the fullest -possible extent, and that we urgently needed more space for the -expansion of the experimental station run in conjunction with our -State School of Viniculture. I believe that is why this monastery -was confiscated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. I am going to ask that you look at Document -3927-PS, and I wish you would remember that this morning -you told the Tribunal that you stopped the confiscation of churches -and Church property in Austria. When you look at this document -I wish you to recall your testimony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did you offer M-25 in evidence or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I wish to do so, Mr. President. It is USA-861. And -this one, 3927-PS, becomes USA-862.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, the first page of this document shows that it is marked -secret. It is dated 22 January 1941. It is a letter addressed to Dellbrügge -in your organization in Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He says that he hears there is a possibility of getting a Hitler -School, which the city of Hamburg is also trying to get, and that -he wants the monastery Klosterneuburg considered as the place for -the Hitler School in Vienna. This letter is written by Scharizer, -your deputy, as you described him yesterday. -<span class='pageno' title='484' id='Page_484'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, he enclosed a communication, a teletype letter, from Bormann; -and if you turn the page, you will see that it is dated 13 January. -Bormann says it is strictly confidential:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“It is learned that the population does not show any indignation -when monastery buildings are used to serve what appears -to be a generally appropriate purpose.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>He goes on to say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Their conversion into hospitals, convalescent homes, educational -institutes, Adolf Hitler Schools, may be considered as -serving a generally appropriate purpose.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, that communication was dated the 13th of January, and -your deputy wrote the letter on the 22d.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now turn another page, and you will find a Gestapo report on -the monastery, dated 23 January 1941, addressed to your assistant -Dellbrügge. I wish you would look where it says, “Oral order of -23 January 1941.” Apparently somebody in your organization, you -or your assistants, orally asked the Gestapo to get up a report on -this monastery the very day that you wrote to Berlin asking that -it be considered as a Hitler School.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There are some charges against the inhabitants of that monastery -in this Gestapo report, but I ask you to turn over further and you -will find where you wrote an order for the taking over of the -monastery as an Adolf Hitler School on 22 February 1941. I will -show it to you if you like to see it, but that order bears your -initials, the original does—Pages 15 to 17 of the photostat that -you have.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, you framed up an excuse to seize that monastery, didn’t -you, when you really wanted it for a Hitler School; and you didn’t -have any just grounds for seizing it. And you get the Gestapo to -write a report and then you never referred to the reason that the -Gestapo framed up for you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I myself as head of these schools was naturally -extremely anxious to have such a school established in Vienna. At -one time the idea expressed here of taking Klosterneuburg and -housing one of the Adolf Hitler Schools in it did occur to me, and -I probably did discuss it with Herr Scharizer; but I dropped the idea -completely. Klosterneuburg was never converted into an Adolf -Hitler School.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No. But it never was turned back to the Church -people, either, was it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. Since the museum space available in -Vienna was not sufficient for the very large collections, we wanted -to turn this monastery into an additional large museum which would -be open to the public. We began to carry out this plan, and a great -<span class='pageno' title='485' id='Page_485'></span> -part of the collections was transferred to the building. In addition, -we needed the strongly built cellars of this monastery for the safekeeping -of the many art treasures which we had to protect against -bombing attacks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>It occurred to me that we might house an Adolf Hitler School -in this building and I discussed the possibility with one or two of -my colleagues and then abandoned it: Firstly, because it would -have caused some ill-feeling if we had housed an Adolf Hitler School -in a building which had formerly been consecrated ground, and -secondly, because we badly needed the monastery for these other -purposes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have nothing to add to my explanation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You will notice the date of that whole transaction -and the communication from Bormann. When did you first discover -that Bormann was so antireligious and anti-Church as you told -the Tribunal he was?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Bormann...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Just tell us when you found that out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was just about to. Bormann showed his -antireligious views most clearly in 1943; but they had already -begun to appear in 1937.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And this telegram from him was when? 1941?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Witness, when did you first start to do business -with Himmler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I met Hitler...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I met Himmler in 1929 when I visited the -offices of the Party Leadership. At that time he was the propaganda -chief of the Party. That was our first meeting.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not really want to know, although it’s of -interest, when you first met him. What I really wanted to know -was when you with your youth groups started really to do business -with him for the first time. And by “business” I mean arrangements -such as the recruitment of young men into the Death’s-Head -Brigade of the SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think I explained that this morning. One -of the first agreements laid down was, I think, contained in the -agreement regarding the patrol service, the date of which I do not -recall. This was not, by the way, a guarantee of reinforcements -for Death’s-Head units, but for police units generally. These were -special troops to be at the disposal of the Police. -<span class='pageno' title='486' id='Page_486'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How long did you continue to channel or divert -young men from your Youth organization to the SS? When was the -last time that you remember this program being effective?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not artfully drive young people into -the SS. But I permitted the SS to recruit among young people like -any other organization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not ask you that. I asked you when you -would say was the latest date when you were effectively helping, -at least, Himmler to get young candidates from the young people -of Germany through your Hitler Youth organization. I do not -expect an exact date. Approximately?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: From 1940 on I tried constantly to have -youth taken into Army units. The SS, the Waffen-SS, carried on -very active recruitment among youth up to the last day of the war. -I could not prevent this recruitment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you knew what use they were being put to -in the last days of the war and in the mid-days of the war, did -you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did know that all young people who were -drafted or who volunteered had to fight.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am talking about something other than fighting. -You knew what was going on in the East, and you knew who -the guards were in the concentration camps, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This morning I testified on what I knew -about events in the East. I did not know that young men who -volunteered to go into the Waffen-SS were used during the war -to guard concentration camps.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not know who were the guards there, -although you visited two of them yourself?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Those guards did not belong to the Waffen-SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know, but your agreement with Himmler provides -specifically for recruitment for SS Death’s-Head troops.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: When I concluded that agreement, I did not -know that he effected the supervision of concentration camps -chiefly by means of Death’s-Head units. Besides, I thought at that -time that concentration camps were something quite normal. I -said so this morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal yesterday that it was in -1944, I think, that you found out about the extermination. And I -want to talk to you about that a little bit, and ask you some -questions. And the first one is, how did you find out? Was it only -through this man Colin Ross? -<span class='pageno' title='487' id='Page_487'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I said that I heard of it through Colin Ross...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And, furthermore, that I asked numerous -questions of everyone I could reach, in order to get definite information.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Really I asked you if, from any other source, you -found out? And you can answer that pretty simply. We know that -you found out through Ross. Was there anyone else from whom -you found out?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I could not obtain any really definite information.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Most people had no information. I only received -positive—that is, detailed—information by way of the -Warthegau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, as a matter of fact, you got regular reports -about the extermination of the Jews, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: These...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Written reports, I mean.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: These reports, two of which have been submitted -in this Court, were sent to the Reich Defense Commissioner -for the attention of the expert in question. This expert passed -the copies on to the inspector—I believe—or the commander of the -regular Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have looked at the copy which was submitted here in Kaltenbrunner’s -case but I had never seen it before (Document 3876-PS).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You mean you did not know that it was arriving -in your office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have never seen this text before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My office was the Central Office; it was not -the office of the Reich Defense Commissioner. The affairs of the -Reich Defense Commissioner were officially in charge of the -Regierungspräsident, whose personal adviser took care of routine -matters. My mail was delivered at the Central Office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You were the Reich Defense Commissioner for that -district, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: This was an SS report of a highly confidential -nature, was it not? They were not just peddling this all over -Germany? -<span class='pageno' title='488' id='Page_488'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know how many copies of this were -sent out, I cannot say.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: 100, and you got the sixty-seventh copy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And these copies, as I gathered from the -original which I saw, were not sent to me but to the competent -adviser, a Herr Fischer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And who was Herr Fischer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have already told you this morning that -I have no idea who this Herr Fischer was. I assume that he was -the expert attached to the Regierungspräsident, the expert on -defense matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, I am going to show you some documents from -your own files.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We don’t have a full translation, Mr. President, because some -of this we located too late (Document 3914-PS).</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But I think you will readily recognize this original is from your -files. And in there you will find—and I will direct your attention -to the page—something that I think will recall to your mind who -Dr. Fischer is.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I think it is on Page 29, you will find the names of persons -to serve on the Reich Defense Council submitted; and you will -find the name of Fischer, together with General Stülpnagel, Major -General Gautier, Dr. Förster—do you find that? This was your -own Reich Defense Council, before which you appeared from time -to time, and with whom you met frequently. And I will show -you documents on that, if you care to deny it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Just a moment, please. Will you please repeat -the page to me?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Page 29; it is a memorandum dated 28 September -1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have it now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you find the name of Dr. Fischer? You found -Dr. Fischer’s name as one of those suggested to your defense council? -His is the last name, by the way, and his signature. He is the -one that suggested the others to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, will you go a little bit more -slowly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: His name is the twentieth name on the list: -“Regierungsrat Dr. Fischer, Expert for Reich Defense Matters”—in -other words, expert attached to the Regierungspräsident. I have -probably seen him at some meeting or other. I take it that he -<span class='pageno' title='489' id='Page_489'></span> -kept the minutes. However, I must admit that I have no personal -recollection of this gentleman. I cannot attach any owner to that -name; but it is clear to me now that he was the person who took -charge of incoming mail for the Reich Defense Commissioner and -probably kept the minutes as well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In view of his junior status—he is only a -Regierungsrat—he cannot have held any other appointment on -this council.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: On Page 31 of that same file you will find another -reference to him, and your initials on the paper this time. It is the -membership list of the Reich Defense Council. There are 20 persons -on there, and the last name is Fischer’s. And at the bottom of the -page are your initials, apparently approving the list. Do you -see that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes; I had to initial this list.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you approved the membership, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot swear that I would not recognize -Dr. Fischer again if I were confronted with him. He seems to have -been the official who kept the minutes. However, among the large -circle of people who attended meetings of this kind, he did not -come to my attention. Only very few Reich defense meetings of -this sort actually took place. What seems to me the decisive point -is that he did not report to me personally but to the Regierungspräsident.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How could you fail to meet him? You met regularly -in 1940 with this Reich Defense Council. We have some documents -here, and I will be glad to show them to you, showing exactly -what you said before that council.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, as I said, he probably kept the minutes -of the meetings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well surely, then, you saw him certainly on some -occasions, between 1940, the date of these files, and 1942, the date -of the SS reports on the exterminations. He apparently was with -you for 2 years before the first report that we have, which is -dated 1942, and he was 1 of 20 on your council.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe I must describe the exact composition -of this Reich Defense Council. There were the leading commanding -generals of the Army and the Luftwaffe; there were -various Gauleiter; there were the people mentioned here; there -was Dr. Putt, the representative of the Economic Management Staff -and all the others who are listed here. In this large circle of people, -whom I had to welcome, there was an official who kept the minutes -<span class='pageno' title='490' id='Page_490'></span> -and who was one of many officials in my office. These meetings, -as you have probably ascertained, took place very infrequently. -Dr. Fischer did not report to me currently, nor did he submit to -me the minutes of these sessions; the Regierungspräsident reported -to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you think that Heinrich Himmler or Reinhard -Heydrich were sending these reports to inferior people around -Germany in these Gaue about the exterminations in the East?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: If these reports had been meant for me, -they would have been sent to me directly. Moreover, I said today -that I do not dispute having been informed of the shooting of Jews -in the East, but at a later period. I mentioned that in connection -with the war. However, the reports themselves were not in my -hands. If these reports had been before me, they would have had -a certain note, which I would recognize immediately.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, let’s see. Of course they are addressed to you, -to the attention of Fischer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But I am going to move on a little bit. Now I am going to tell -you that you got weekly reports. You haven’t seen these. What -do you say to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Weekly reports?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I received innumerable weekly reports from -every possible office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, I am talking about one kind of report. I am -talking about the reports from Heydrich and Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know what you mean.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you had better take a look (Document -3943-PS). We have 55 of them, for 55 weeks. They are all here, -and they run consecutively, and Dr. Fischer is not involved in these. -And each one bears the stamp of your office having received it -on it, and the date that it was received.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>They tell, by the way—and you can look at them—what was -happening to the Jews in the East.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: All these probably—I cannot look at them -all just now. These reports went from the Chief of the Security -Police to the Office of the Reich Defense Commissioner. They -were not, as I can tell from the first document, initialed by myself, -but bear the initials of the Regierungspräsident. I did not receive -these reports; otherwise my initial would have to be there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Dr. Dellbrügge was the man who received them, -according to the note, and he was your chief assistant. Incidentally, -<span class='pageno' title='491' id='Page_491'></span> -I think we ought to make this clear to the Tribunal, both of your -chief assistants were SS Brigadeführer, were they not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should in any case have stated that -Dr. Dellbrügge was one of Himmler’s confidants; but I believe...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And he was your chief assistant, that is the point -I am making. And so was your other chief assistant, also an SS -Brigadeführer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that this statement proves the -opposite of what you want to prove against me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I am going to go on with these weekly reports -in a minute, but there is one thing I do want to ask you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Were you pretty friendly with Heydrich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I knew Heydrich, and while he was Reich -Protector in Prague he extended an invitation to me as President -of the Southeastern Europe Society to hold a meeting there which -I accepted. However, I did not have close personal contact with -Heydrich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you think he was a good public servant at the -time that he was terrorizing Czechoslovakia?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had the impression that Heydrich, as he said -himself during my stay in Prague, wanted to carry out a policy -of conciliation, especially in regard to Czech workers. I did not -see in him an exponent of a policy of terror. Of course, I have -no practical knowledge of the incidents which took place in Czechoslovakia. -I made only this one visit, or possibly one further visit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You sent a telegram to “Dear Martin Bormann” -when Heydrich was assassinated; do you remember that—the man -who was, I understand, not in your good standing in 1942? Do you -remember when Heydrich was assassinated by some Czech patriots -in Prague?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you remember what you did when you heard -about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not remember exactly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Perhaps if I read you this telegram you will -remember it.</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“To Reichsleiter Bormann, Berlin, Party Chancellery; Express. -Urgent. Immediate attention.</p> - -<p>“Dear Martin Bormann:</p> - -<p>“I request that the following be submitted to the Führer.</p> - -<p>“Knowing the Czech population and its attitude in Vienna -as well as in the Protectorate, I would draw your attention -to the following: -<span class='pageno' title='492' id='Page_492'></span></p> - -<p>“The enemy powers and the British cliques around Beneš -have for a long time felt bitter about the co-operation -generally found among the Czech workers and their contribution -to the German war economy. They are seeking for a -means to play off the Czech population and the Reich against -each other. The attack on Heydrich was undoubtedly planned -in London. The British arms of the assailant suggest parachuted -agents. London hopes by means of this murder to -induce the Reich to take extreme measures with the aim of -bringing about a resistance movement among Czech workers. -In order to prevent the world from thinking that the population -of the Protectorate is in opposition to Hitler, these acts -must immediately be branded as of British authorship. A -sudden and violent air attack on a British cultural town -would be most effective and the world would have learned of -this through the headline ‘Revenge for Heydrich.’ That alone -should induce Churchill to desist immediately from the procedure -begun in Prague of stirring up revolt. The Reich -replies to the attack at Prague by a counterattack on world -public opinion.</p> - -<p>“It is suggested that the following information be given the -press tomorrow regarding the attempt on Heydrich’s life.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And then you go on to say that it was the work of British -agents and that it originated in Britain. You sign it, “Heil Hitler, -Dein Schirach.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you remember sending that telegram to Bormann?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have just been listening to the English -translation. I should like to see the German original, please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you read, I thought, a British -“coastal” town, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, “cultural” I meant to say, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is what I have got.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, it is “cultural.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Incidentally, I call your attention, Mr. Witness, to the word -“cultural.” You have expressed such a great interest in culture.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would it be all right to break off now, or do -you want to go on?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I had hoped I could finish. I won’t be many minutes, -but I do have one or two rather important documents that I would -like to put to the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, if we recess, may I ask that the witness not be -talked to by his counsel overnight? I think it is only fair, when -<span class='pageno' title='493' id='Page_493'></span> -a witness is under cross-examination, that he not have conversations -with his counsel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say to this document...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I should like to have this question -clarified as to whether as defense counsel I am entitled to talk with -my client or not. Mr. Dodd forbade me to talk to my client some -time ago; and, of course, I acquiesced. But, if I am told that I -must not speak to my client until the end of the cross-examination -and the cross-examination is to be continued on Monday, that -means that I cannot speak with my client tomorrow or the day -after. But, in order to carry on his defense, I must have an opportunity -of discussing with my client all the points raised here today.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I will withdraw my request. I really -forgot we were going over until Monday. I do think it is the -ordinary rule, but I do think it might present some difficulty for -the counsel here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I want to be fair with the Tribunal. During the recess Dr. Sauter -approached the witness stand and I did tell him then that I did -not think he should talk to him during the recess while he was -under cross-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is the British rule, but I think in -the circumstances we had better let Dr. Sauter...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I quite agree. I was thinking we would go on -tomorrow, but I do not want to interfere with his consultation -over the weekend.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 27 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='494' id='Page_494'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINTH DAY</span><br/> Monday, 27 May 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Schirach resumed the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I would like to make certain that I -did offer the following documents in evidence: 3914-PS, which -becomes USA-863; 3943-PS, USA-864; and 3877-PS, USA-865.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, at the close of the session on Friday we -had just handed to you a copy of the teletype message to Martin -Bormann. I had read it to you over this transmission system. I -wish to ask you now if you sent that message to Bormann.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I dispatched that teletype message, and -I should like to give an explanation in this connection. First...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May I interrupt you just for a minute and ask that -for the little while that we will be talking today, that you wait just -a minute after your answer. I think it would help a little bit with -the interpreting. I do not think we will have any trouble this -morning. I will try to do the same thing, and perhaps we will work -a little better together.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First of all, then, I want to explain why I -addressed Bormann with “Du,” in the friendly form. Bormann and -I come from the same town; I knew him from Weimar, but only -slightly. And when in 1928 or ’29 he came to Munich, he paid me a -visit, and because he was the elder of us he suggested to me that -we should call one another “Du.” We maintained that form until -1943, when on his own initiative he dropped it and addressed me -in his letters only with “Sie.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, the text of this teletype message: We were in the third -year of the war; the Czech population both in the Protectorate of -Bohemia and Moravia and in Vienna had remained perfectly quiet; -in the Protectorate conditions were almost like those in peacetime. -I had a very large Czech population in Vienna, and as a result of -the attempt on Heydrich’s life I feared that in the Protectorate -there might be unrest which would no doubt have serious repercussions -in Vienna. This was the time when German troops were -advancing on the peninsula of Kerch; it was a time when we could -<span class='pageno' title='495' id='Page_495'></span> -not afford to have anything happen behind our front. And simultaneously -with the news of the murder of the Protector I received -official notification that the attempt, as is mentioned in this document, -had been carried out by British agents and with British -weapons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>During the same month we heard, and it was also mentioned in -the Wehrmacht communiqués, that British bombers had bombed -residential areas in Hamburg and Paris and had attacked German -cultural sites at Kiel. And so I suggested a reprisal measure to -establish before the world British guilt in this attempt and to -prevent serious unrest in Czechoslovakia. That is all I have to say. -This teletype message is genuine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I at this point also comment on a difficulty of translation -which occurred during the last cross-examination on Friday? The -German word “Retter” was at that time translated into the English -“savior.” It is an expression which I used in my book when I described -the Führer as a “Retter,” and the difficulty lies in the translation -of that word into English: it can only be translated into -English as “savior.” But retranslated into German, “savior” means -“Heiland.” In order to make quite clear what the German “Retter” -is meant to express in English, I should have to use an explanatory -phrase. If I say that the exact translation is “rescuer,” then the -real meaning of the word “Retter” is clearly set forth; and there is -nothing blasphemous in the comparison or the description of the -head of the State as a “rescuer.” But if I had written in German -that the head of the State was a “Heiland,” then, of course, that -would be blasphemy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This sort of explanation should be kept for -re-examination. It is not a matter which ought to interrupt the -cross-examination.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, I have only one or two questions to ask you -in addition about this message.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Were you thinking of some particular cultural city in Britain, -like Cambridge, Oxford, Stratford, Canterbury?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I had no definite plan in mind. I thought -that one ought to choose an objective corresponding to the sites hit -by British bombers in Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: As long as it was a cultural city. Were you thinking -of what happened in Germany or of what happened to Heydrich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was thinking of the cultural buildings in -Germany which had been attacked, and I wanted to suggest this as -an opportunity to make clear unmistakably that the murder of -Heydrich had not been committed by the Czech population but by -<span class='pageno' title='496' id='Page_496'></span> -the Czech emigrants in London with British support. This retaliation -in the third year of the war was to be a reply both to the -attempt against Heydrich and to the attacks on German cultural -monuments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not make any reference in this telegram -to any so-called or alleged bombings of cultural objects in Germany, -did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Wehrmacht communiqués had already announced -them, and they were generally known.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is not what I asked you. I asked if it is not a -fact that in this teletype you made no reference at all to the alleged -bombing of cultural objects in Germany, nor did you relate your -suggestion for the bombing of a cultural town in England to any -alleged cultural bombing in Germany, but rather, you made it perfectly -clear that you wanted to strike at a cultural town in England -because of what had happened to Heydrich. That is so, is it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was not at all necessary for me to point -to the bombing of German cultural sites. It was a fact known to -the entire German population from the daily attacks of British -bombers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I suppose by this time you knew very well the -general reputation of Heydrich, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is not correct. I considered Heydrich -in this particular case as the representative of the Reich in Bohemia -and Moravia and not as the Chief of the Gestapo.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you know his general reputation in Germany at -least at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I knew that he was the Chief of the Gestapo. -I did not know that he had committed the atrocities which have -meanwhile become known.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You had no knowledge that he was considered “the -terror of the Gestapo”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is an expression which enemy propaganda -used against him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You mean you still think it is propaganda?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, was it through enemy propaganda that you -heard that he was called a terror before he was killed in 1942?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not want to say that...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How did you know it? -<span class='pageno' title='497' id='Page_497'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I merely want to state here that for me the -Reich Protector Heydrich was during this third year of the war a -person other than the Chief of the Gestapo. This was a political -matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not content yourself with this suggestion to -bomb England, did you? Do you recall what else you suggested not -long afterwards?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you recall anything that you either suggested or -did by way of further so-called retaliation for the assassination of -Heydrich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I have no recollection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You suggested evacuating all the Czechs out of -Vienna, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This is a suggestion which did not originate -with me personally, but which goes back to a remark about Vienna -which the Führer himself had made in 1940 while I was reporting -to him at his headquarters. I think I already mentioned during my -own testimony that he said, “Vienna must become a German city -and the Jews and Czechs must gradually be evacuated from -Vienna.” I already said that during my own testimony here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: My question is: Is it not a fact that a few days after -the assassination of Heydrich you suggested the evacuation of the -Czechs from Vienna as a retaliatory measure for the assassination of -Heydrich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no recollection of it, but it is possible -that in the excitement of this event, which disquieted me greatly, -I said something like that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I suggest that you take a look at Document 3886-PS, -which becomes USA-866, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, this document consists of excerpts from the record of a -meeting of the Vienna City Council on 6 June 1942, as you will see -on Page 9 of the original. You were present, and according to these -notes, you spoke as Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach and, moving -down towards the bottom of that page, you will find this statement:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Finally, he”—meaning you—“disclosed that already in the -latter part of summer or in the fall of this year all Jews -would be removed from the city, and that the removal of the -Czechs would then get under way, since this is the necessary -and right answer to the crime committed against the Deputy -Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you remember saying that? -<span class='pageno' title='498' id='Page_498'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no exact recollection, but I consider -that these records here are genuine, and they probably represent -the sense of what I said at the time. I was very much perturbed by -Heydrich’s death. I was afraid of serious trouble in Bohemia and -Moravia, and I expressed my fears. The essential thing is that after -calm consideration of this plan I dropped it, and did nothing more -about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, I think it is perfectly clear—and -I ask you if you do not agree—that you made two suggestions -at least: one for the bombing of a cultural English town and the -other for the wholesale evacuation of the Czechs from Vienna, -because of the assassination of this man Heydrich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is true that I put the idea of such an -evacuation of the Czechs into words. It is equally true, and a -historical fact, that I dropped the idea and that it was never carried -out. It is correct that I suggested the bombing of a British cultural -site as an answer to the attempt against Heydrich and to the -innumerable bombardments of German cultural places in the third -year of the war, at a time when vital interests of the German people -were at stake.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Incidentally, Hitler also suggested the wholesale -evacuation of the Czechs from Czechoslovakia as a punishment for -the murder of Heydrich, did he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now I want to turn to something else and see if we -can get through here rather soon this morning. You recall that on -Friday we talked a little bit about your relationship with the SS -and with Himmler, and I want to ask you this morning if it is not -a fact, Mr. Witness, that you worked very closely with Himmler -and his SS from almost the earliest days right down to almost the -last days of your regime in Vienna. I wish you would answer that -question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should very much like to answer that -question in great detail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It does not require great detail in the first answer, -but later, if you feel that you have some necessary explanation, I -am sure you will be permitted to do so. Will you tell the Tribunal -first of all, rather, if it is not a fact that you did closely co-operate -with Himmler and his SS from the earliest days of your public -office to the very late days of your public office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Close collaboration in the sense that Himmler -had considerable influence upon education did not exist. -<span class='pageno' title='499' id='Page_499'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let us stop right there and inquire a little bit. Is it -not a fact that Himmler assigned his SS personnel to your youth -organization for the training purpose of your young people? You -can answer that very simply. Did he or did he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: For training purposes?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I am not aware of anything like that. The -fact that there might have been liaison officers would not be -unusual, because practically all ministries and organizations had -liaison officers. What you have just suggested, however, I do not -recall.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I think we had better clear this up first, and I ask -you that you look at Document 3931-PS, which is a new document -which becomes USA-867, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, Mr. Witness, if you will look at this document, you will -observe that it is a message which you sent to “Dear Party Member -Bormann” in August of 1941. It is quite long, and there will not be -any necessity, I am sure, for reading all of it, but I want to direct -your attention to some parts of it that might help your memory -with respect to the SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>By way of preliminary question, the SA apparently had suggested -that it take over some of the training of young people, had it not, -some time in the summer of 1941?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I said in my testimony—I think on Thursday—that -already in the spring of 1939, I believe, the SA had -attempted to take over the premilitary training of the youth of the -two older age classes, and such attempts were probably repeated -in 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I knew you were complaining to Bormann -about it when you wrote this message. You recall now, do you not, -from just looking at the letter, that that is the whole substance of -the letter—a complaint about the attempt of the SA to directly -control the training of some young people in the Hitler Youth -organization.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot speak about this long teletype letter -without having read through it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, let us see. If you will turn to the second page -of the English text—you do not have any pages there; I think it is -all one. It is all a teletype, but it will be not too far down on the -first part of it. First of all, I want to have you see if you can find -the statement that “the Hitler Youth has considered it necessary -from the very beginning to make the Party itself the agency for the -<span class='pageno' title='500' id='Page_500'></span> -direction and administration of its military training.” Do you find -that passage?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you will find the paragraph numbered (1) on -your teletype, small Arabic number one. You will find they start to -be numbered (1), (2), (3), and so on. Do you find that, Mr. Witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have Roman numeral I.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. That is what I want to call your attention -to. If we hit some place that we agree on, then we can move on. -You found that Number (1) that says that “for more than one year -an agreement in draft form has been submitted to the SA which -requests that the SA cadre be furnished for the military training -of the youth,” and that the SA leadership did not comply with this -request.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, will you move down further, let me see, in Number (3), -and then following (3), probably down another whole length three -or four paragraphs, you will find—it is in capital letters, by the -way—what I want to call your attention to; I assume it is in capital -letters in the German:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I would be happy if the SA would put personnel at my -disposal for support for this purpose, similar to the way in -which the SS and the Police have been doing for a long time -already.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>In the English, Mr. President, that is at the bottom of Page 4 -and the top of Page 5.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Did you find that sentence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You say there that you would be happy if the SA -would put personnel at your disposal for support of this purpose, -similar to the way in which the SS and the Police have been doing -for a long time already, and you are referring—if you will read -back to the paragraph just ahead of that sentence—to the training -of the young people. You talk about Hitler Schools and the training -of Hitler Youth. Now, it is perfectly clear, is it not, that you did -have assistance from the SS, according to your own words, from -the SS and Police, for a long time before you sent this message?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: During the war, yes; since the beginning of -the war in 1939 we had premilitary training camps and I wanted -youth instructors for these camps. Neither the Army nor the SA -could supply sufficient instructors; the SS and the Police could -place a few young officers at my disposal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: So it was only from the beginning of the war that -you had personnel from the SS and Police for the training of young -people, was it? -<span class='pageno' title='501' id='Page_501'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not think that there would have been -need for SS instructors otherwise. As I have said, we selected youth -leaders from among youth itself.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I ask you again, do you want the Tribunal to understand -that it was only from the beginning of the war that you had -the assistance of SS and Police personnel assigned to your youth -organization for the training of young people?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that question definitely for -this reason: we had for example a training camp for skiing practice, -and it was quite possible that one of the instructors was an SA man -or an SS man only because by chance he happened to be one of the -best sportsmen in that field. But I cannot think where such collaboration -existed elsewhere.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Are you able to say that you did not have SS -personnel assigned for training purposes; and I am not talking -about some isolated skimaster, I am talking about a regular program -of assistance from the SS to you in your training of young -people.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as premilitary training is concerned, -it was only through this teletype message that I requested help for -training purposes. Apart from that, I do not recollect any collaboration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know the term “Heuaktion”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Heuaktion? I do not remember it. I do not -know what is meant by that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you have been in the courtroom every day. -Do you not remember that there was proof offered here by the -Prosecution concerning the Defendant Rosenberg and an action -termed Heuaktion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not remember it at the moment; I do -not know it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you not remember that there was some talk -here in the courtroom about the seizing of young people in the East -and forcing them to be brought to Germany, 40,000 or 50,000 youths -at the ages of 10 to 14? You remember that, don’t you, and that one -of the purposes was to destroy the biological potentiality of these -people? You do not know what I refer to?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is an action which I now remember -in connection with this Trial. The only thing I can say on this in -an official capacity is what Axmann told me during the war—I -cannot recall the exact year—namely, that he had placed a large -number of young Russians in apprentice hostels and apprentice -workshops at the Junkers works in Dessau, and that these youths -<span class='pageno' title='502' id='Page_502'></span> -were extremely well accommodated and looked after there. I had -not been in any way concerned with this action before, but as I -stated at the beginning of my testimony here, I assume responsibility -for the actions of youth in this war; I adhere to that statement. -I do not think, however, that youth is responsible in this case, -and I recall the Defendant Rosenberg’s statements that he was -complying with the wishes of the Army and an army group in this -affair.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, we have the document here. It is already in -evidence as USA-171—the Tribunal is familiar with it—and I would -like to call your attention to the fact that in this document, which -says that Rosenberg agreed to the program of seizing or apprehending -40,000 to 50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 and the transportation -of them to the Reich, it also said that this program can be -accomplished with the help of the officers of the Hitler Youth -through the Youth Bureau of Rosenberg’s Ministry; and it also said -that a number of these young people were to be detailed to the SS -and SS auxiliaries. Now, what I want to ask you particularly is -what you know about that program and how the Hitler Youth -co-operated in it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot add to what I have already said -about this program.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You were in charge of the war commitment of the -Hitler Youth, were you not, the “Kriegseinsatz”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The war commitment of German youth was -under immediate direction of the Reich Youth Leader. From my -own knowledge I can give only general but no detailed information.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, I ask you again, were you not appointed -and did you not serve as the person responsible for the war -commitment of youth in Germany? Now, I have got the document -to show your appointment if you want to see it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes; I do not want to deny it at all. In 1939 -and 1940, as long as I was Reich Youth Leader, I myself directed -that war commitment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am talking about an appointment that was made -even later than 1939 or 1940. You were appointed the person in -charge of the war commitment of German youth by the Führer at -his headquarters in March of 1942, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Will you be good enough to show me the -document. I consider it possible, but I have no exact recollection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. It is 3933-PS, which becomes USA-868. -But first of all: You do not know you were appointed in charge of -the war commitment for youth without being shown the document? -<span class='pageno' title='503' id='Page_503'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No; only I cannot tell you the exact date from -memory. I was under the impression that I had been responsible -for the war commitment beginning in 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, that is all I wanted to establish, that you -were in fact responsible for it and continued to be responsible for -it right up to the end of the war. I understood you to say a minute -ago that the Reich Youth Leader was the man responsible rather -than yourself?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I said that I could give you only general -but no special information, because the practical application of the -war commitment was a matter for Axmann; I do not, however, -want to minimize my own responsibility in any way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well. I think we are sufficiently clear about -the fact that you were certainly named to the position no matter -how you now wish to “water” your responsibility. What do you say -is the date when you first became responsible for the war commitment -of youth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as I remember, I was responsible for it -beginning 1939, at the outbreak of war, but I now see that this -decree was not signed until 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right; we will agree then that from that date, -March 1942, you were responsible. Now, I want to ask you to look -at another document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: One moment, may I explain something in -this connection? I do not know whether Hitler signed this decree in -March 1942; I do not know when it was signed. In this document -Axmann tells me: the draft of the decree is now going to the Chief -of the Reich Chancellery, who will request the official approval of -the higher Reich authorities concerned, and then Bormann...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You do not need to read it, really. What do you -want to say now? Are you saying that maybe it was not signed, or -maybe you were not appointed, or are you going to say that you -were appointed? Will you please give us an answer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not at all. But I really cannot say that the -date of the publication of this decree was March 1942. It may not -have been published until May.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am not attaching any great importance to the date. -I want you to look at 345-PS, which we offer as USA-869. This may -help you on this Heuaktion program; that is, with respect to your -memory.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, this is a telegram that the Defendant Rosenberg sent to -Dr. Lammers at the Reich Chancellery for the Führer’s headquarters -<span class='pageno' title='504' id='Page_504'></span> -on 20 July 1944. You will observe that in the first paragraph there -is stated:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In accordance with an agreement between the Reich Marshal -as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, the Reichsführer -SS, the Youth Führer of the German Reich, and the Reich -Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the recruiting -of young Russians, Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Lithuanians, -and Tartars, between 15 and 20 years of age, ‘will -take place on a volunteer basis for Kriegseinsatz in the -Reich’ ”—“Kriegseinsatz” being a program that you were -responsible for clearly at that time.</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, moving down, I want to call your attention to Paragraph 3, -and I want to remind you of the Heuaktion document that is -already in evidence. This telegram says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“On the basis of a suggestion by military offices, the seizing -and turning over of youths between the ages of 10 to 14 to -the Reich territories will take place (Heuaktion) in a part of -the operational territory, since the youths in the operational -territory present a not insignificant burden.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>It goes on to say:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The aim of the action is a further disposal of the youths by -placing them in the Reich Youth Movement, and the training -of apprentices for German economy in a form similar to that -which has been effected in agreement with the Plenipotentiary -General for the Allocation of Labor with White Russian -Youths, which already shows results.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I particularly call your attention to that last phrase, “which -already shows results.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then the last clause in the next sentence, which says, “...these -youths are to be used later in the Occupied Eastern Territories as -especially reliable construction forces.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You will observe that the last paragraph says that “the actions -under Points 1 and 3”—which I have just been reading—“are known -to the Führer.” And there is something about SS help in regard to -this action. You had set a time limit on that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next page of the document has the distribution, to the Reich -Marshal, the Reichsführer SS, the Reich Youth Führer, and the -Reich Minister of Interior, and down at the bottom, a Gauleiter -bureau, among others.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>What do you know about this seizing of young people between -10 and 14 and the turning over of them to your youth organization -in Germany during these war years, and about how many thousands -of them were so kidnaped, if you know? -<span class='pageno' title='505' id='Page_505'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have already said that I do not wish to -minimize my responsibility in this connection. But it was not until -later that I was informed of this matter. Not I, but somebody else -was Youth Leader of the German Reich in that year; and he made -the agreement with the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and -the Reichsführer SS. But my own measures were...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Later you were the Youth Reichsleiter of Germany, -were you not? And you were also the war commitment officer of -Youth in Germany at this very time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was at Vienna, and the date was 20 July -1944. You will remember that the history-making events of that -time were occupying all officials in Germany to a very great extent. -Later I heard about this matter from Axmann, and I know that the -accommodation, training, feeding, and the whole treatment of these -Russian youths was actually excellent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You also know that even at this hour the Allied -forces are trying to find thousands of these young people to return -them to their proper place? Do you know that this morning’s press -carried an account of 10,000 people that are still unlocated?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe that those are these young -people who were accommodated in apprentice hostels and who -under exceptionally well-ordered conditions received very good -professional training.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You see, it is perfectly clear from this Document -345-PS that this program was in fact in operation. The letter from -Rosenberg says so. He says it had “already shown results.” And so -your youth organization must have had something to do with it -before this message was sent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have not at all denied that. Youth leaders -were active within the framework of the Reich Ministry for the -Occupied Eastern Territories. And on the basis of what I have -heard here during the Trial, I can perfectly well understand that -the generals in the East said that the young people must be taken -out of the combat zone. The point was that these youngsters from -10 to 14 years of age had to be taken away from the front.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: With the help of the SS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, I want to show you another document, 1137-PS, which will -give you some idea, if you do not recall, of what was done with -these young people, and how many of them are involved.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That will become USA-870.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, there is a paragraph at the bottom -of Page 1 of that document which relates to another defendant. -<span class='pageno' title='506' id='Page_506'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor, I am sorry; I overlooked that. I -will read it for the benefit of the record, if I may, at this time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. Witness, I direct your attention back, if I may, to this Document -345-PS, so that you will be aware of what I am reading. You -will observe that in the last paragraph of Rosenberg’s communication -to Dr. Lammers we find this sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I have learned that Gauleiter Sauckel will be at the Führer’s -headquarters on 21 July 1944. I ask that this be taken up -with him there and then a report made to the Führer.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Sauckel was participating in this kidnaping of 10- to 14-year-olds -as well, was he? Do you know about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no knowledge of it. I cannot give any -information on that subject.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, this Document 1137-PS begins with a letter -from a general, a message rather, an interoffice memorandum, -dated 27 October 1944, and it closes with a report by the brigadier -general of the Hitler Youth, a man named Nickel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you know Nickel, by the way? N-i-c-k-e-l?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The name is known to me, and probably I -know the man personally; but at the moment I do not recall more -than just the name. At any rate, he was not a brigadier general; -he was a Hauptbannführer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, all right. Whatever he was, he was an official -of the youth organization. That is all I am trying to establish. -I may have his title wrong. We have it brigadier general.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>But in any event, if you look over this document, you will see -that he is reporting about the seizing of these youths in the -Occupied Eastern Territory. This is October 1944. And he begins by -saying that on 5 March he “received an order to open an office for -the recruitment of youths from 15 to 20 years of age from the -Occupied Eastern Territories for war employment in the Reich.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then he goes on to cite figures, and he tells where he began his -work: Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, the middle sector of the Eastern -front, the southern sector of the Eastern front. And then on the next -page of the English—and I imagine it is also on your next page—it -tells how they were classified, those that were brought back:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>“1,383 Russian SS Auxiliaries, 5,953 Ukrainian SS Auxiliaries, -2,354 White Ruthenian SS Auxiliaries, 1,012 Lithuanian SS -Auxiliaries.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then he gets into the Air Force: “3,000 Estonian Air Force -Auxiliaries,” and so on. Some went to the Navy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am not going to read all of it; but it gives you an idea of what -distribution was made of these men, or young boys and girls rather -than men. You will notice that a considerable number went to the SS. -<span class='pageno' title='507' id='Page_507'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but Hauptbannführer Nickel’s letter bears -a stamp with the words “Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories.” -That means he was not acting on behalf of the Reich Youth -Leader’s department but on behalf of the Reich Ministry for -the East.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. I also want to ask you if you will look at -Page 6. I think it is Page 5 of the original of your German. You -will find what personnel Hauptbannführer Nickel had for the -purpose of carrying out his task. He had members of the Hitler -Youth, so he says: 5 leaders, 3 BDM leaders, 71 German youth -leaders as translators and assistant instructors, 26 SS leaders, 234 -noncommissioned officers and troops, drivers, and translators of -the SS. And of the Air Force personnel, he had 37 officers, 221 non-coms, -and so on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Does that help your memory any with this program that your -youth people were engaging in? Do you recall any more of it now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It does not help my memory at all, because I -hear this for the first time from this document. I was not informed -of the activities of the Eastern Ministry in Russia, and I do not -know what assignment the Eastern Ministry gave to Hitler Youth -Leader Nickel. I assume responsibility for what was done on my -orders, but anything done on the orders of others must be their -responsibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me show you something with respect to your -answer that you have just made. That personnel that I read out, -you know, was only in one part of the program. And on the last -page of the document you will see on how wide an area Nickel was -operating. He was operating in co-operation with the Netherlands -Hitler Youth Operational Command, the Adria Hitler Youth -Operational Command, the Southern Hitler Youth Operational -Command in Slovakia and Hungary, the Lieutenant Nagel Special -Command in refugee camps within the Reich, and then, interestingly -enough, the field offices in Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is where you were located at the time, is it not? And you -are telling the Tribunal you did not know anything about this -program and the participation of your Hitler Youth Leaders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I received no written or verbal report from -Nickel. His report, as can be seen from the letter, went to the Reich -Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and to what extent -the Reich Youth Leader was being informed is not known to me. -I myself do not know what took place. What I do know of the entire -affair I very clearly stated in my testimony with reference to the -Junkers works and the professional training which these youngsters -<span class='pageno' title='508' id='Page_508'></span> -were given in Germany. Apart from that I have no further -knowledge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Observe also, if you will, Mr. Witness, that your -Hitler Youth Operational Command was in Poland, and even in -northern Italy. And now I ask you once again, as the long-time -Hitler Youth Leader, as the leader for the War Commitment of -Youth, then Gauleiter in Vienna, with part of this program being -carried on in Vienna and the whole program being carried on on -this vast scale, do you want the Tribunal to believe that you knew -nothing about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no knowledge of it, but I assume -responsibility for it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal in your direct examination -that you wrote the letter to Streicher’s <span class='it'>Stürmer</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like to submit this in evidence, Mr. President, so that the -Tribunal will have an idea of what it appeared like on the front -page of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps—if you would like to look at it, you may, of course, -Mr. Witness. It is USA-871. I just wanted you to have a look at it -before it was submitted. You know about it anyway.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I already made a statement about that the -other day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I did not wish to go into it further. What I do -want to ask you, Mr. Witness, is: Do I understand you clearly when -I say that from your testimony we gathered that it was Hitler who -ordered the evacuation of the Jews from Vienna and that you really -did not suggest it or wish to see it carried out? Is that a fair understanding -of your testimony of a day or two ago?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I stated the other day, and I repeat this, that -the idea of evacuating the Jews from Vienna was Hitler’s idea -which he communicated to me in 1940 at his headquarters. Furthermore, -and I want to make this quite clear, I stated that after the -events of those November days in 1938 I was actually of the opinion -that it would be better for the Jewish population to be accommodated -in a closed settlement than to be regularly singled out by -Goebbels as a target for his propaganda and his organized actions. -I also said that I identified myself with that action suggested by -Hitler, but did not carry it out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now you had a meeting at the Führer’s headquarters -in October 1940. Present was the Defendant Frank and the -now notorious Koch whom we have heard so much about. Do you -remember that meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I no longer recall it exactly. -<span class='pageno' title='509' id='Page_509'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, you mean you do not recall that meeting at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In October 1940 I was in the Reich Chancellery -because that was the time when I was organizing the evacuation -of youth. It is possible that at lunch...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You were asked whether you recalled a -particular meeting in October 1940 with certain particular people. -Do you remember it or do you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no recollection of it. If I am shown -a document, then I can confirm it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well; that is what I wanted to know. I will -now show you the document USSR-172. A part of this document -was read over the system for the Tribunal by Colonel Pokrovsky. -Now you will observe that on 2 October—this is a memorandum, by -the way, made up of the meeting. Herr Martin Bormann compiled -these notes, so I assume he was there too. After a dinner at the -Führer’s apartment there developed a conversation on the nature of -the Government General:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The treatment of the Poles and the incorporation already -approved by the Führer for the districts Petrikau and -Tomassov.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Then it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The conversation began when Reich Minister Dr. Frank -informed the Führer that the activities in the Government -General could be termed very successful. The Jews in Warsaw -and other cities were now locked up in the ghettos and -Kraków would very shortly be cleared of them. Reichsleiter -Von Schirach, who had taken his seat at the Führer’s other -side, remarked that he still had more than 50,000 Jews in -Vienna whom Dr. Frank would have to take over. Party -Member Dr. Frank said this was impossible. Gauleiter Koch -then pointed out that he, too, had up to now not transferred -either Poles or Jews from the District of Ziechenau, but that -these Jews and Poles would now, of course, have to be -accepted by the Government General.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And it goes on to say that Dr. Frank protested against this also. -He said there were not housing facilities—I am not quoting directly, -I do not want to read all of it—and that there were not sufficient -other facilities. Do you remember that conference now?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have refreshed my memory now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. And you suggested that you wanted to get -50,000 Jews moved into Frank’s territory out of Vienna, didn’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. The Führer asked me -how many Jews were still in Vienna, and at that time—I mentioned -<span class='pageno' title='510' id='Page_510'></span> -this during my own testimony the other day and it is contained in -the files—there were still 60,000 Jews in Vienna. During that conversation, -in which the question of settling Jews in the Government -General was discussed, I also said that these 60,000 Jews from -Vienna were still to be transferred to the Government General. I -told you earlier that as a result of the events of November 1938 I -was in favor of the Führer’s plan to take the Jews to a closed -settlement.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well now, later on, as you know from USA-681 -concerning which your own counsel inquired, Lammers sent you a -message in Vienna and he said the Führer had decided, after receipt -of one of the reports made by you, that the 60,000 Jews in Vienna -would be deported most rapidly, and that was just 2 months after -this conference that you had with Frank and Koch and Hitler, -wasn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, since 1937—and I think that becomes -clear from the Hossbach minutes—the Führer had the idea of -expatriating the Jewish population. This plan, however, did not -become known to me until August 1940 when I took over the -Vienna district. I reported to Hitler on that occasion, and he asked -me how many Jews there were in Vienna. I answered his question, -and he told me that he actually wanted all of them to be settled in -the Government General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How many Jews did you, in fact, deport out of -your district while you were the Gauleiter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First of all, the practical measures of that -action were not in my hands. I do not know how many of these -60,000 Jews were actually transported out of Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you have any idea where they went to?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was informed that the aged were being -taken to Theresienstadt and the others to Poland, to the Government -General. On one occasion—it was either when I took my oath -of office as Governor or when I made a speech about the evacuation -of children—I even asked Hitler how these Jews were being -employed, and he told me: in accordance with their professions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: We will get around to that. You remember, don’t -you, that they were sent, at least some of them were sent, to the -cities of Riga and Minsk, and you were so notified. Do you remember -receiving that information?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now take a look at Document 3921-PS, which -becomes USA-872. Now this is a communication concerning the -evacuation of Jews, and it shows that 50,000 Jews were to be sent -<span class='pageno' title='511' id='Page_511'></span> -to the Minsk-Riga area, and you got a copy of this report as the -Commissar for the Defense of the Reich, and if you will look on -the last page you will see an initial there of your chief assistant, -the SS man Dellbrügge, and also the stamp of your own office as -having received it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can only see that Dr. Dellbrügge marked the -matter for filing. It shows the letters “z. d. A.” to the files.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And he did not tell you about this report concerning -the Jews? Even though you had been talking to Hitler about it? -That they were being moved out of your area? I suppose your chief -assistant did not bother to tell you anything about it. Is that what -you want us to understand?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now then, take a look at another document which -will shed some light on this one. It is USA-808, already in evidence. -It tells you what happened to the Jews in Minsk and Riga, and this -was also received in your office if you recall. Maybe it is not -necessary to show it to you again. You remember the document—that -is one of those monthly reports from Heydrich wherein he said -that there were 29,000 Jews in Riga and they had been reduced to -2,500, and that 33,210 were shot by the special unit, and “Einsatz” -group. Do you remember that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: During the last 2 days I looked at these -monthly reports most carefully. The bottom right-hand corner of -the cover of these monthly reports—and I want to make this -categorically clear—bears initials something like “Dr. FSCH.,” -that is Dr. Fischer’s initials. At the top the reports are not initialed -by me, but by the Government President, with the notation that -they should be put into the files. If I had read them...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am not suggesting that you had your initials on any -document like this, but I am claiming that these documents came -into your organization and into the hands of your principal assistant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But I must point out that if they had been -submitted to me, then there would have been on them the notation, -“submitted to the Reichsleiter,” and the official submitting them -would have initialed this notation. If I myself had seen them, then -my own initials would be on them with the letters “K.g.,” noted.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. I want to remind you that the date of that -report is February 1942, and I also want to remind you that in -there as well Heydrich tells you how many Jews they had killed in -Minsk. Now you made a speech one time in Poland about the Polish -or the Eastern policy of Germany. Do you remember it, Mr. -Witness? -<span class='pageno' title='512' id='Page_512'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In Poland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In Poland, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In 1939 I spent a short time in Poland, but I -do not think I was there again later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Your memory seems particularly poor this morning. -Don’t you remember speaking in Katowice on 20 January 1942?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is Upper Silesia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Upper Silesia, all right. Do you remember that -speech?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I made a speech at Katowice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And did you talk about Hitler’s policy for the -Eastern Territories?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot say from memory what I spoke about -there. I have made many speeches.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I will ask that you be shown D-664, which -becomes USA-873. You were speaking to a group of Party leaders -and German youth leaders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In Paragraph 7, you dealt with the tasks of German -youth in the East. The Hitler Youth had carried out political -schooling along the line of the Führer’s Eastern policy and you -went on to say how grateful you were to the Führer for having -turned the German people toward the East, because the East was -the destiny of your people. What did you understand to be the -Führer’s Eastern policy, or did you have a good understanding of it -at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I said this in Upper Silesia out of gratitude -for the return of that territory to us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I didn’t ask you that, really. I asked you if -you then understood the Führer’s policy when you made that -speech?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: On the basis of our victory over Poland and -the recovery of German soil, I naturally affirmed Germany’s policy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You not only affirmed it, but I want to know if you -really understood it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not quite know how I should answer that -question. Probably Hitler’s conception of the term Eastern policy -was quite different from mine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But my point is that he had told you about it, hadn’t -he, some time before you made this speech? -<span class='pageno' title='513' id='Page_513'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>You had better look back at that document you have in your -hands, USSR-172, and you will find that, after you and Frank and -Koch and Hitler finished talking about deporting the Jews from -Vienna, the Führer then told you what he intended to do with the -Polish people, and it is not a very pretty story, if you will look at it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Hitler says here:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The ideal picture would be that a Pole in the Government -General had only a small parcel of land sufficient to feed -himself and his family fairly well. Anything else he might -require in cash for clothing, additional food, and so on he -would have to earn by working in Germany. The Government -General would be the central office for providing untrained -workers, particularly agricultural workers. The livelihood -of these workers would be assured, for they could -always be used as cheap labor. There would be no question of -further agricultural labor for Poland.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me read a few excerpts that I think you have -missed:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Führer further emphasized that the Poles, in direct contrast -to our German Workmen, are born for hard labor...” -and so on. “The standard of living in Poland has to be and to -remain low.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Moving over to the next page:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“We, the Germans, had on one hand overpopulated industrial -districts, while there was also a shortage of manpower for -agriculture. That is where we could make use of Polish -laborers. For this reason, it would be right to have a large -surplus of manpower in the Government General so that -every year the laborers needed by the Reich could in fact be -procured from there. It is indispensable to keep in mind -that there must be no Polish land owners. However cruel this -may sound, wherever they are, they must be exterminated. -Of course, there must be no mixing of blood with the -Poles.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Further on, he had to stress once more that:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“There should be one master only for the Poles, the Germans. -Two masters side by side cannot exist. All representatives of -the Polish intelligentsia are to be exterminated. This sounds -cruel, but such is the law of life.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Stopping there for a minute, by the way, Mr. Witness—you are -a man of culture, so you have told the Tribunal—how did that -sentiment expressed by the Führer impress you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have never agreed with these opinions of -the Führer, and I said here that I approached him in 1943 on the -<span class='pageno' title='514' id='Page_514'></span> -subject of this policy in the Ukraine. When in 1942 I talked about -Eastern policy in Katowice, the German town of Katowice, to the -German population of Upper Silesia, then, of course, I did not mean -this brutal Polish policy of Hitler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But you knew about it when you made the speech, -did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not recollect it on that occasion 2 years -later, and my speech did not mean it either.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You forgot that Hitler said he must exterminate the -intelligentsia, that you must be masters of these people, that they -must remain at a low standard of living? Did that pass out of your -mind so easily?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I remember that speech in Katowice; I spoke -there about completely different matters. I assume that the Prosecution -even has the shorthand record of that speech and need only -submit it here. This is just a short extract.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But, you see, Mr. Witness, the point is, knowing -what the policy was, I would like to have you tell the Tribunal -how you could urge and praise that policy to a group of young -people and party leaders on the occasion of this speech in Katowice.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The policy which I was recommending to -youth leaders there was not the policy which Hitler developed in -his table talk.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Of course, you said it was the Führer’s policy in -your speech, and you know what it was, but I won’t press it further -if that is your answer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Very often probably—and I once said this -here—I supported the policy of the Führer out of erroneous loyalty -to him. I know that it was not right.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is what I want to know. You were, weren’t -you, acting under an impulse of loyalty to the Führer. Now you -recognize it to be erroneous, and that is all I am inquiring for, and -if you tell the Tribunal that, I shall be perfectly satisfied.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I am prepared to admit that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well. And, Mr. Witness, now we are getting to -it; that goes for all these things that went on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Don’t you have to say to the Tribunal, concerning -your letter to <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, and all these things you said about the -Jewish people to the young people, and this slow building up of -race hatred in them, the co-operation with the SS, your handling -<span class='pageno' title='515' id='Page_515'></span> -of the Jews in Vienna, that for all these things you are, and for all -of them, responsible?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Finally, I want to offer in evidence, Mr. President, -some excerpts from these weekly SS reports to which I referred -briefly on Friday, so that they shall be before the Tribunal. There -are 55 of them, Mr. President, and they run consecutively by weeks, -and they all bear the stamp of this defendant’s office as having been -received there, and they supplant the monthly report which was -received up to the time that weekly reports began arriving.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We have not had all of them translated or mimeographed, and -if the defendant wishes to put in any others, we will make them -available, of course. We have selected a few as samples to illustrate -the kind of report that was contained in these weekly reports, and -I wish to offer them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first one is Number 1, beginning on 1 May 1942, and Numbers -4, 6, 7, 9, 38, 41, and 49.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now I want to make this clear to you, Mr. Witness, out of fairness. -Besides statements concerning what was happening to the -Jews, you will find in these weekly reports a number of statements -about the partisan affairs in the East as well. These excerpts have -mostly to do with what happened to the Jews, and we have not, -Mr. President, drawn out a great number that had to do with the -partisans. There are a number, however, that do have to do with -partisans and not with the Jews, so we wish there to be no doubt -about how we offer these weekly reports. I just want to ask you, -with respect to these weekly reports: Do you this morning recall -that you did receive them every week in your office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But that is not my office. My office is the -Central Office. That office was directed by the Government President, -and one of his officials initialed the files, as appears from the -marking on them, and as any official trained in German office -routine can confirm. They were then put before the Government -President who marked them “for the files” and initialed them. I -could not know these documents at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now just a minute. You were the Reich Commissioner -for the defense of that territory; weren’t you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And that is the stamp that is on these weekly reports, -isn’t it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, what do you mean by saying that it was not -your office? -<span class='pageno' title='516' id='Page_516'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Because the mail, by a procedure similar to -that in a ministry, where it goes to the office of the minister, reached -me in the Central Office; and a corresponding notation had to be -made on these files. I can understand perfectly well why the Government -President, since I was overburdened with work, did not -submit to me material which had no connection at all with Vienna -or my activities, but which was merely informatory and concerned -with events in Russia, mostly guerrilla fighting in Russia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am going to ask you again, as I have so many -times in the course of this examination: Dellbrügge, who initialed -these, was your principal assistant, wasn’t he? Yes or no?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, he was one of my three deputies.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And he was also an SS man, and so was your other -principal assistant, as we asked the other day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Dellbrügge was a high SS leader. He was a -special confidant of the Reichsführer SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How did he happen to be working for you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He was assigned to me there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I don’t think it is necessary to read -any excerpts from these weekly reports. They have been translated -into four languages, and—well, I am misinformed. I thought -they were translated. Then I think it would be better if we do -have them translated and submit them at a later date rather than -take the time to read them now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine? We had better -adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor -for the U.S.S.R.): Do you admit that the Hitler Jugend had the task -of inculcating German youth and children, starting from 9 years of -age, with Fascist ideology?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you hear me?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I understood you to ask, whether, I -would admit having inculcated Fascist ideas into 10- to 14-year-old -children of the Hitler Youth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As I said in my testimony a few days ago, I saw my mission -and my duty in educating German youth to be citizens of the -National Socialist State...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] That is not an answer to the -question. It is not necessary for you to tell us what you said in -<span class='pageno' title='517' id='Page_517'></span> -your previous evidence. Will you just answer the question: Do you -admit that you inculcated in the Hitler Youth Hitler’s ideology? -You can answer that “yes” or “no.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that question with “yes,” -because it referred to Fascism. There is a great difference between -Fascism and National Socialism. I cannot answer that question with -“yes.” I did educate German youth in the spirit of National -Socialism, that I can admit.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like you to confirm the evidence -which you gave on 16 November 1945, during your interrogation. -You defined your personal attitude to Hitler in the following way; -and I quote your evidence: “I was an enthusiastic adherent of Hitler -and I considered everything that he wrote and stated to be a manifestation -of truth.”<a href='#fa'><span style='font-size:smaller'><sup>[*]</sup></span></a> Do you confirm this statement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not say that, and that is not a record -which was submitted to me. I never spoke of Hitler as a deity, -never. I remember exactly, General, that you interrogated me on -this point, and I was asked whether I had been an enthusiastic -follower. I confirmed that, and I spoke about the time when I -joined the Movement; but I never set up the comparison with which -I am now confronted in the translation; I never said that I believed -in Hitler as a deity, never.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You do not understand me correctly. -Nothing is said here about deity. Your evidence has been taken -down, and I will repeat it: “I was an enthusiastic adherent of Hitler, -and I considered everything that he wrote and stated to be a -manifestation of truth.”<a href='#fa'><span style='font-size:smaller'><sup>[*]</sup></span></a></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you confirm this statement? Answer the question directly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The translation is quite inexact. May I ask -you to put the exact question again?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will quote your statement again: “I was -an enthusiastic adherent of Hitler, and I considered everything that -he wrote and stated to be a manifestation of truth.”<a href='#fa'><span style='font-size:smaller'><sup>[*]</sup></span></a> Is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I am accused now of having said: “I was an -enthusiastic adherent of Hitler, and I considered everything that he -wrote and stated to be the personification of truth.” That is how I -understood it, and I must say I could never have uttered such -nonsense.</p> - -<hr class='footnotemark'/> - -<p class='pindent'><a id='fa'></a><span style='font-size:smaller'><sup>[*]</sup></span> The interpreter mistranslated this “and looked upon him as a deity.”</p> - -<hr class='footnotemark'/> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: May I give an explanation of this translation? -I think the correct German would have to be: “I considered -what Hitler said to be a manifestation of truth,” and not “the -<span class='pageno' title='518' id='Page_518'></span> -personification of truth”; then it would be intelligible. There is a -mistake in the interpretation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel has perhaps helped -you to answer my question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: General, that was not my defense counsel, -but the defense counsel for the Defendant Sauckel. If it is translated -“manifestation of truth,” then of course the whole passage -makes sense, and also corresponds roughly to what I said to you -when I described the period of my youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In your book entitled the <span class='it'>Hitler Jugend</span> it said, and I quote -Page 17: “Hitler’s book, <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, is our bible.” Do you confirm -this? Did you write that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But I added something to that in my book -<span class='it'>The Hitler Youth, Its Faith and Organization</span>. I want to say, first -of all, that I did write this book. I wrote it...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like to interrupt you. I do not -need such detailed explanations, and I would like you to answer the -question: Is that sentence contained in your book?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have just confirmed that, but I would like -to add an explanation. In this book—which I wrote in 1933, and -which was published in 1934—I said: “We could not yet offer -detailed reasons for our belief, we simply believed. But when -Hitler’s <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> appeared, it was like a bible, which we almost -learned by heart so as to answer the questions of doubtful and -deliberating critics.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is how I worded it at the time; that is correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like to put another more precise -question to you. Do you admit that the Hitler Jugend was a -political organization which, under the leadership of the NSDAP, -carried out the policy of this Party among German youth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Hitler Youth was a large educational -community on a political basis, but I cannot admit that it was led -by the Party; it was led by me. I was a member of the Executive -Committee of the Party, and in that sense one might speak of a -Party influence. But I can see no reason for having to confirm this, -since I have already testified to it. It is correct that the Hitler -Youth was the youth organization of the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If that is the sense of your question, I will confirm it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, I just had that in view.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I would like to remind you of the tasks which Hitler had assigned -for the education of German youth. That is set out in Rauschning’s -<span class='pageno' title='519' id='Page_519'></span> -book, which has already been submitted as documentary evidence -before the Tribunal as USSR-378. I quote Page 252 of that book:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In my schools we will bring up youth who will make the -world shudder with fear, youth that is hard, exigent, unafraid, -and cruel. That is my wish. Youth must have all these -qualities; they must be indifferent to sufferings; they must -have neither weakness nor softness. I would like to see in -their eyes the proud, self-sufficient glitter of a beast of prey.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>You educated German youth in accordance with these demands -of Hitler. Do you admit that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I will not admit what Herr Rauschning wrote. -Just by accident I was present at a conversation between Hitler -and Rauschning and, judging by it, I must say that the statements -in Rauschning’s book represent an unfaithful record of what Hitler -said. Just by accident I witnessed a conversation between them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hitler did not give me the directives which Rauschning sets -forth here as the guiding principles laid down by Hitler himself for -the training of the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I did not ask you to give such a detailed -explanation. I would like you to answer the question I put to you -briefly in order to shorten the time of interrogation. You have -stated the Hitler Youth did not educate German youth in the militaristic -spirit and did not prepare German youth for future aggressive -wars. I would like to remind you of certain statements you -made in that very same book of yours, “Hitler Youth,” right here -on Page 83 of that book. Talking of the younger generation, the -so-called Jungvolk, you wrote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“They carry the National Socialist characteristics. The toy -merchants are worried because these children no longer need -toys; they are interested in camp tents, spears, compasses and -maps. It is a particular trait of our youth. Everything that -is against our unity must be thrown to the flames.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And these also were the directives which German soldiers, trained -in the Hitler Youth, followed when they set on fire houses of the -peaceful population in occupied territories, isn’t that true? Is that -contained in the book, the passage I have just read?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: What is in front of me now, is contained in -my book. What I heard from the interpreter is not in my book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Well, then make your corrections.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I read the correct passage?</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The toy merchants have complained to me that the boys”—they -mean the Jungvolk—“no longer want toys, but are -interested only in tents, spears, compasses, and maps. I cannot -help the toy merchants, for I agree with the boys that -<span class='pageno' title='520' id='Page_520'></span> -the times of the Indians are finally gone. What is ‘Old -Shatterhand,’ what is a trapper in the backwoods of America -compared to our troop leader? A miserable, dusty remnant -from the lumber chest of our fathers. Not only the toy -merchants are complaining but also the school-cap manufacturers. -Who wears a school cap nowadays? And who -nowadays is a high-school boy or girl? In some towns the -boys have banded together and publicly burned such school -caps. Burning is, in fact, a specialty of new youth. The -border fences of the minor states of the Reich have also been -reduced to ashes in the fires of your youth.</p> - -<p>“It is a simple but heroic philosophy; everything that is -against our unity must be thrown to the flames.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That, General, is the expression of the “storm and stress” of -youth which has found its special unity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: According to your opinion, the philosophy -implies that children must no longer play with toys, but must do -other things. Did I understand you correctly? I do not see any -essential difference between my quotation and yours.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I say that I think the military training -of the youth of Germany falls much behind that of the Soviet Union.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This is an irrelevant comparison. On -Page 98 of your book, speaking of the Hitler Youth, you wrote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“They strive to be political soldiers. Their model is Adolf -Hitler.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>Did you write that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have not found the place; is it Page 98?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness has admitted he wrote the whole -book, hasn’t he?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: In order not to lengthen the proceedings -we will pass to the next question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You have already spoken here of a specially created organization -of motorized Hitler Youth; you assert this organization had sport as -its aim; is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In connection with the training of the motorized -Hitler Youth I spoke also of ground and driving exercises, and -I admitted that the motorized Hitler Youth had premilitary significance. -I did not dispute this point at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd cross-examined the witness at very -considerable length on these matters about the special units of the -Hitler Youth, and it really is not any good to go over it all again. -<span class='pageno' title='521' id='Page_521'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, several points which are -still unexplained will be clarified through the following questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you have knowledge of the fact that at the end of 1938 the -organization of motorized Hitler Youth consisted of 92 detachments, -that is of 100,000 young men?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot tell you from memory whether there -were 92 detachments, because the word “Abteilung”—that was the -translation—was not a designation for any unit of the Hitler Youth. -I gave the exact strength of the motorized Hitler Youth for 1938 -in one of my statements here either to my defense counsel or to -Mr. Dodd. I gave exact figures of its strength in 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, I am speaking of 1938, and you give -the number of 100,000 Hitler Youths who formed the motorized youth -organization. Do you have knowledge of this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot tell you from memory whether there -were 100,000 members of the motorized Hitler Youth in 1938. There -might have been 60,000 or 120,000. I cannot say; I do not know. -I have not the documents to prove it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, but I am quoting this number from -data given by the magazine <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>. I would like to recall to -you the tasks of these organizations as they were set out in this -magazine in November-December 1939. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The preliminary training of the motorized Hitler Youth must -be carried out in special training groups, and later in special -motorization schools of the National Socialist Motor Corps.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I quote this excerpt according to the document book of the -Defense, Document 20, Page 50 of the Russian text. I repeat:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The preliminary training of the motorized Hitler Youth must -be carried out in special training groups, and later in special -motorization schools of the National Socialist Motor Corps, but -this applies only to youths who have reached the age of 17 or -more. The course of instruction includes motor mechanics, a -driving license test, field driving exercises, and also ideological -schooling. Those who successfully participate in this course -of instruction will be admitted into the National Socialist -Motor Corps.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>This does not quite agree with your statement that the aim was -sport, does it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We heard a long commentary about these -special units, and we really do not want to hear it any more. If you -have any questions on new matters which have not been dealt with -by Mr. Dodd, we shall be glad to hear them, but we do not want -to hear about whether there are 60,000 or 70,000 or 100,000 or -120,000 Hitler Youths in the motorized units. -<span class='pageno' title='522' id='Page_522'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am only quoting what has not been mentioned -yet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General, we do not want to hear it. We do -not want to hear it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will pass on to the next question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You issued a directive for a nation-wide training scheme of the -members of the Hitler Youth, known as “Hitler Youth on Duty.” -This directive foresaw the following kind of education for the Hitler -Youth: the theory of weapons, the theory of firing, target shooting, -rifle practice, military drill, topography, and field exercises; also -instruction in the use of the field compass and the goniometer. Are -you acquainted with this directive? Do you consider that this also -did not constitute military training of German youth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I spoke in great detail about the training of -“Hitler Youth on Duty” in my testimony last Thursday, and I particularly -discussed rifle training which takes up 40 pages of this -book. I mentioned in that connection that this rifle training was -carried out according to the rules of international rifle sport and -that the British Board of Education recommended this rifle training, -and also the entire book, to all Boy Scouts. I do not dispute that -I published this book <span class='it'>Hitler Youth</span> and that it served as a guiding -directive for this training. But I already said that here the other day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have denied that the Hitler Youth -played an important part in the Fifth Column in Poland. Similar -methods were carried out especially in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav -Government has put at the disposal of the Soviet Prosecution documents -which estimated the part of the “Hitler Youth on Duty,” -under the leadership of the Hitler Jugend, in the organization of the -Fifth Column on Yugoslav territory. Do you have any knowledge -of this? Do you know anything about this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Hitler Youth was never active in the Fifth -Column either in Yugoslavia or anywhere else.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will then quote excerpts from the official -report of the Yugoslav Government. This has already been submitted -to the Tribunal as Exhibit USSR-36. I quote from Page 3 -of the Russian text of this document:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The Reich Government and the Hitler Party have secretly -organized the German minority. From 1930 they had their -own organization, the ‘Union of Culture.’ Already in 1932 -Dr. Jacob Awender held the view that the ‘Union of Culture’ -should be Fascist in its outlook. In 1935 he was put at the -head of an active youth organization which shortly afterwards -received the name of ‘Organization of Revival.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='523' id='Page_523'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Do you know anything about this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot comment on the information which -you have just mentioned. I heard that Bohle had some youth leaders -there as his representatives, but I do not know any details. On the -subject of Yugoslavia I can tell you from my previous activity that -my relations with Yugoslav youth were very amiable and friendly -in the period before the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am not interested in that. I will try to -help your memory by quoting a few excerpts from a supplementary -report of the Yugoslav Government, which is submitted to the Tribunal -as Yugoslav Exhibit, Document Number USSR-357. On Page 5, -in the third line of the Russian text of this document, it says:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“In 1937 there began among the Volksdeutsche in our country -an orientation towards National Socialism, and the first groups -of youth started going to Germany for special courses of -instruction.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>Further down on Page 8, we read that later on, but before the -war with the Soviet Union, the greater part of these members became -officers of the German Army. In addition, a special SS division, -“Prinz Eugen,” was formed from among members of the youth -organizations. Do you deny these facts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can admit some; others I must deny. May -I explain this? Since 1933 I tried to bring about good relations with -Yugoslav youth. Starting in 1936 or 1937 I extended invitations to -Yugoslav youth groups, as well as to youth groups of all European -countries, to visit and inspect German youth institutions. Yugoslav -youth groups actually came to Germany in reply to my invitation. -But I know nothing about the enlisting of Yugoslav youths in the -German Army; I do not believe that. I can only say that at the -time of the regency of Prince Regent Paul there was very close -collaboration with Yugoslav youth. During the war we maintained -good relations with both Serbian and Croatian youth. German youth -visited Serbia and Croatia, while Serbian and Croatian youth came -to German youth camps, German youth leader training schools, and -so on, and looked at our institutions. That, I think, is everything -I can say about this. But we had friendly relations not only with -Yugoslavia but also with many other countries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You did not understand me correctly. I -was not speaking of Yugoslav or Croatian youth. I am speaking of -the youth of the German minority in Yugoslavia who are mentioned -in this report and who, with the help of the Hitler Youth, created -centers of Fifth Column activity to engage in subversive operations -and recruit for the SS units and the Wehrmacht. That is what I am -speaking about. Are these facts known to you? -<span class='pageno' title='524' id='Page_524'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know that there were young people among -the German minority in Yugoslavia, just as in Romania and Hungary. -I know that this German youth felt that it belonged to the -Hitler Youth, and I think it is perfectly natural that these young -people welcomed the German troops on their arrival. I cannot give -information on the extent to which collaboration existed between -the troops and the youth, but that it did exist is also quite natural. -Of course, it could not be considered military collaboration, but -rather the kind of co-operation which will always exist between an -occupying force and the youth of the same country or nationality -as the members of that force. But that has nothing to do with -espionage or the like.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: But the major part of the SS Division -“Prinz Eugen” which was formed on Yugoslav territory was made -up of Hitler Youth members from the German national minority in -Yugoslavia; and this was the result of the preparatory work of the -Hitler Youth. Do you admit that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know how the divisions of the -Waffen-SS, of which there were very many, were recruited. It is -possible that some members of the German minority were recruited -then and there, but I have no definite information on this.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will quote a few excerpts from two -German documents. They have not yet been submitted to the Tribunal. -The first excerpt is from a book by Dr. Sepp Janko who was -the youth leader in Yugoslavia, entitled <span class='it'>Speeches and Articles.</span> He -wrote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“All our national work before 1 September 1939 depended on -the help of the Reich. When on 1 September 1939 the war -began and it at first appeared impossible to receive further -aid, there was a danger that all our work would be interrupted....”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>And later:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The fact that in this cause, so decisive for a nation and its -worth, I put at the disposal of the Führer almost the entire -German national group in the former State of Yugoslavia and -gave him so many volunteers as soldiers, is to me a subject -of great pride....”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I submit this to the Tribunal as evidence; Exhibit USSR-459.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The next excerpt is from an article, “We in the Batchka,” written -in 1943 by Otto Kohler who was leader of German youth in that -territory. I submit this document to the Tribunal as Exhibit USSR-456. -Otto Kohler wrote in that article:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Ninety percent of our youth are members of the Hitler Youth, -the youth organization for Germans abroad.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='525' id='Page_525'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The statements ought to convince you that the subversive activity -and organization of the Fifth Column, the “nazification” of the German -minority and its enlistment in military units were actually -carried out on Yugoslav territory through the Hitler Youth. Please -answer “yes” or “no.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. But I should like to comment on these -documents. This Dr. Sepp Janko who is said to have been the leader -of the Volksdeutsche in Yugoslavia is not known to me either by -name or personally. I have visited Yugoslavia several times in the -past, but neither in 1937, when I believe I was there for the first -time, nor later in 1938 when I visited Prince Regent Paul, did I concern -myself with the Volksdeutsche youth there or with their leaders. -On those visits I spoke only with youth of Yugoslav nationality. -That is all I have to say about the first document, which on the -whole does not refer to youth at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The second document, which is signed by one Otto Kohler, who -calls himself the “D. J. leader”—probably German youth leader—in -Subdivision 7, to that document I can only say that it was taken -from a book about German youth in Hungary which appeared in -1943. In the Batchka we had a very large settlement of Germans, -people who had been living there for 150 or 200 years, and this -youth leader organized the German youth there with the approval -of the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian Minister of Education -and in collaboration with other Hungarian authorities. It was -an entirely legal measure, and no controversy existed about it -between the two countries. These young people were not members -of the German Hitler Youth, but they belonged to Hungarian youth -groups of the German minority in Hungary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: And did the Reich Leadership of Hitler -Youth have no connection at all with such organizations abroad?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course we visited these youths. When, for -instance, I was a guest in Budapest, the Hungarians themselves -asked me whether I would like to visit the villages and the youth -of the German minority. Neither the Regent nor any other government -authority had any objections to this. There was no reason -why I should ask German youth leaders to engage in espionage in -Hungary. I could just as easily have asked Hungarian youth leaders -with whom I was on very good terms.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Who was the leader of the Hitler Youth -organizations abroad? There was a special foreign section in the -Reich Leadership of the Hitler Youth. Its task was the direction -of the German youth organizations abroad, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. The foreign office of the -Reich Youth Leadership was, if I may say so, the “foreign office” -<span class='pageno' title='526' id='Page_526'></span> -of the younger generation. It was the task of the foreign office to -maintain contact with other national youth organizations, to invite -youth leaders from abroad, to organize tours of foreign youth -organizations through Germany, and to arrange visits of German -youth to other countries, in co-operation with the foreign offices of -those countries; in a case like this, the foreign office of the Reich -Youth Leadership would approach the Foreign Office, and the Foreign -Office would approach the ambassador or representative of the -country involved. The Organization of Youth Abroad to which you -are referring was an organization subordinate to the Organization -of Germans Abroad, the head of which was Gauleiter Bohle, who -has already been heard in this court. This youth abroad consisted -of German nationals who formed units of the Hitler Youth in the -countries where they were living. For instance in Budapest the -children of the German colony, starting with the children of the -German Minister...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Defendant, it is not necessary to make -such a long speech about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You are giving too many details. The -next question:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories, a special -youth department was created in the first main office. What do you -know about the work of this department and what was its relationship -to the Reich Leadership of the Hitler Youth? Please answer -briefly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: From my knowledge, I can say that when the -Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories was created, -Reichsleiter Rosenberg expressed a wish that the Reich Youth Leader -should put at his disposal an official for the youth department in -the new Ministry. This official was appointed; he was taken into -the Ministry and directed its youth department. He was, of course, -responsible to the Eastern Minister. I cannot say more about this -point. Reports from this department did not reach me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You mean that the Reich Leadership of -the Hitler Youth appointed a representative to a post in the Ministry -for Eastern Occupied Territories, and that this gentleman did -not send in any report to the Reich Youth Leadership; is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: General, I meant that the head of this department -or whatever he was, this official in the Eastern Ministry who -came from the Hitler Youth, did not report to me. He naturally -reported to his immediate superiors in the Reich Youth Leadership. -The Reich Youth Leadership was located in Berlin, and I assume -that the officials of its staff were in constant touch with him. -<span class='pageno' title='527' id='Page_527'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: As I understand it, the measures that -were carried out by the youth department in the Reich Ministry -for Eastern Occupied Territories were carried out with the knowledge -of the Reich Youth Leadership; is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The measures taken there were carried out -according to directions laid down by the Reich Minister, who was -the immediate superior of his officials. If actual youth measures, the -treatment of youth, and so on, were dealt with, I am sure that this -official or youth leader discussed the matter with the Reich Youth -Leadership and made a report to it. The Minister is always responsible -for the youth official in his Ministry, and not the organization -from which the youth official happens to come.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I understand. To the question put to you -by your defense counsel regarding the participation of the Hitler -Youth in the atrocities committed in Lvov, you answered that the -testimony of the French citizen, Ida Vasseau, supplied by the -Extraordinary State Commission, is not true.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, the Soviet Prosecution has had occasion to interrogate -the witness Ida Vasseau. The defense counsel for the Defendant -Schirach also requested an interrogation. I now submit to the -Tribunal excerpts from the testimony of the witness Vasseau, dated -16 May 1946, and I would like to submit it as Exhibit USSR-455. -I shall now read the excerpts into the record:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The atrocities against the Jewish and the Soviet population -of Lvov were perpetrated not only by adult Germans and old -Nazis, but also by the German youth of the Fascist youth -organization in Lvov. These youngsters, dressed in uniforms, -armed with heavy sticks, hunting knives, and often with -pistols, ran about the streets, broke into Jewish apartments -and destroyed everything in them. They killed all the inhabitants -of these apartments, including the children. Very often -they stopped children who looked suspicious to them in the -streets, shouted: “Stop, you damned Jew!” and shot them on -the spot. This Hitlerite youth was often active in locating -Jewish apartments, hunting Jews in hiding, setting traps, and -assaulting innocent people on the streets, killing them if they -were Jews and dragging others away to the Gestapo. Often -their victims were Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, and people of -other nationalities. This terror of adult and young Germans -continued until the last day of the German occupation of -Lvov. The intention of completely annihilating the Jews was -especially apparent in the “Ghetto actions” in which Jewish -children of various ages were systematically killed. They were -put into houses specially set up for Jewish children and when -<span class='pageno' title='528' id='Page_528'></span> -sufficient children had been assembled, the Gestapo accompanied -by the Hitler Youth broke in and killed them.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>I end the reading of the statement of Ida Vasseau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Thus, the Hitler Youth in the service of the German army, SS -and the Gestapo took part in these atrocities. Do you admit that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe a word of what is contained -in this document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Well, that is your affair.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, I am submitting to the Tribunal another document, -USSR-454, excerpts from the testimony of the German prisoner of -war Gert Bruno Knittel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Gert Bruno Knittel, a hatter by trade, was born in 1924 in -Saxony. After 1938 he was a member of the Hitler Youth. His sister -Ursula was also a member of the National Socialist League of German -Girls (BDM). In 1942, when he was 18 years old, he was called -up for the German Army. Thus, he is a typical representative of -the Hitler Youth, and his testimony is therefore of interest. This is -what he relates about his service in the German Army. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Not less than twice a week we were called upon to comb -out the forests.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I must object against the use of this -document of which we have just received a copy. It does not appear -from this copy whether the document was actually signed, whether -it was sworn or who drew up this document, which seems to be a -report. I must object to this document until these questions have -been clarified.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps in this connection, Mr. President, I might comment on -the other document which contains the testimony of Ida Vasseau—the -writing is difficult to read. I assume that this witness is identical -with the French national Ida Vasseau to whom a questionnaire was -sent a long time ago with the permission of the Tribunal. We have -been constantly waiting for the answers to this questionnaire, and -now today we receive this report dated 16 May 1946, which apparently -refers to the same witness. It is obvious that...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am not following quite what you are saying. -Are you saying that you have issued a questionnaire to the person -who is alleged to have made this document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The High Tribunal approved a questionnaire to a -French woman, Ida Vasseau; I will spell the name, V-a-s-s-e-a-u. -This is the French woman, Ida Vasseau, who was working in an -establishment in Lvov, and who is mentioned in the Lvov Commission -report. Perhaps you remember, Mr. President, that one of these -reports says that children were taken from the ghetto and given to -<span class='pageno' title='529' id='Page_529'></span> -the Hitler Youth and that the Hitler Youth used these children as -live targets. That is the statement of the witness Ida Vasseau, and -I am sure that she is the same person who is now mentioned in the -report of 16 May 1946. The remarkable thing is that in the report -of 16 May 1946, she does not answer the questions which are set -down in the questionnaire, but makes further allegations which are -obviously not contained in the earlier Lvov Commission report. This -is a very mysterious matter, and I believe it would not be just to -the Defendant Von Schirach if I did not call your attention to these -contradictions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: May I give my explanation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We would like to hear you in detail, General, -in answer to what Dr. Sauter has said.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Ida Vasseau, excerpts from whose statement -I have read, is certainly the person of whom Dr. Sauter is -speaking. I do not know to whom and through what channels the -interrogatory was sent; it was not sent through our office. Ida -Vasseau was interrogated on our own initiative and we could do -so only on 16 May. A special interrogatory was not received by -us, and we could not have sent it because the evidence was given -only...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have only got this document here in German -and it doesn’t appear to be a document signed or made by a -person called “Vasseau” at all. I don’t know whether it is dealing -with something that Ida Vasseau is alleged to have said.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This document is signed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I said it wasn’t signed by Vasseau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This document is signed by Ida Vasseau-Thom -and also by the interrogating officials, namely the Chief of -the Investigation Branch, Public Prosecutor’s Department for the -Lvov Region, Kryzanovsky, and the public prosecutor for the Lvov -Region, Kornetov. The interrogation took place on 16 May 1946.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Look at this document and see if it is the -right document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, these are excerpts from the interrogation -of Ida Vasseau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that the same document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, yes, that is the same document which -we are now submitting to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that the original you have got before you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, this is an excerpt from the record, -certified by the Chief of Documentation of the Soviet Delegation, -<span class='pageno' title='530' id='Page_530'></span> -Colonel Karev. This is not the original record of the interrogatory. -These are excerpts from it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that it is a document which -is admissible under Article 21 or what are you saying about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: We are submitting it. If the Tribunal considers -that it is necessary to bring out the original of the record, -which at the present moment is at Lvov, we will be able to do so -in a short time. If the Tribunal is not satisfied with these excerpts, -we will very easily be able to submit the record in full.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell us what the document is? Is it -an affidavit? Is it sworn to? Is it made before an official of the -Soviet Union?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: There is a note on the record referring to -the responsibility for false testimony, as set forth under Article 89 -of the Penal Code of the Ukrainian S.S.R. This warning is in -accordance with the requirements for legal procedure in the Soviet -Union, and this warning was given to Ida Vasseau, as a special certification -on the record shows.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that it is a document which -falls within Article 21 of the Charter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, but if the Tribunal consider it necessary, -we will later be able to submit the complete original record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am now asking the Tribunal to accept the excerpts from this -record which have been certified by the Chief of our Documentation -Division.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, what is the date on which your -interrogatory was allowed by the Tribunal and what was the date -on which it was sent out to this person?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the interrogatory bears the date of -11 April.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: The interrogatory could not be sent -because we did not know where the witness Vasseau was. We only -discovered it recently.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the interrogatory has not been -administered to the person who made this statement?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This interrogatory could not have reached -its destination because, I repeat, until quite recently the whereabouts -of the witness Vasseau was unknown.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you did find out where the witness was, -the interrogatory could have been administered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN; ALEXANDROV: Yes, yes, it can be sent to her. It can be -done now if it is necessary. -<span class='pageno' title='531' id='Page_531'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I point out the following: This -woman, Ida Vasseau, was in Lvov when this statement which is -mentioned in the Commission Report was made; that is clear from -the report. I believe it is USSR-6, but I am not quite certain. Now, -on 16 May of this year, this woman, Ida Vasseau, was also at Lvov; -and her whereabouts were not unknown, since she was interrogated -on that day. I had discussed the interrogatory which was sent to -Vasseau with the Prosecution; it was at first said that the questions -were suggestive or that something was not in order. But we came -to terms and I altered the questions which I submitted to the High -Tribunal according to the wishes of the Prosecution; so if the Soviet -Delegation were willing, Ida Vasseau could be interrogated at any -time. It is remarkable that in this later statement, this woman -testified on something entirely different from what is set forth in -her previous statement, and something entirely different from what -she was asked in the interrogatory. I think it would be useful if -Ida Vasseau were examined here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, what previous statement do -you mean? What previous statements do you mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The statement in the commission report of the -City of Lvov. This commission report was read here once and it -says that the Hitler Youth committed these outrages against the -children; my questionnaire, which the Tribunal approved, deals with -this point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General, was the interrogatory submitted -by Dr. Sauter shown to the witness Vasseau?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, it was not sent to her. May I, to -clarify the matter, come back to the history of this interrogatory? -The Soviet Prosecution submitted a document, the Report of the -Extraordinary State Commission on German Atrocities in the Lvov -Region, and this document contained a statement by the witness -Ida Vasseau; no one interrogated her at that time. In this statement -she said that she witnessed how the Hitler Youth used small -children as targets. That was her statement in the Report of the -Extraordinary State Commission. This document was accepted by -the Tribunal. Then, on our own initiative—Dr. Sauter’s interrogatory -did not come to us and we did not send it out—the whereabouts -of Ida Vasseau was established. She was examined by -interrogating officers and supplemented the testimony which she -had given before the Extraordinary State Commission. I am now -submitting to the Tribunal excerpts from her interrogatory on -16 May in which she dwelt on certain details of the treatment of -children by the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We all understand that, General, but the -question is: Why, if interrogatories had been allowed by the -<span class='pageno' title='532' id='Page_532'></span> -Tribunal and had been seen by the Prosecution and were dated -sometime in April, why was the witness interrogated in May -without having seen these interrogatories? This document is dated -16 May 1946, isn’t it, Dr. Sauter?—Dr. Sauter tells us that interrogatories -allowed by the Tribunal were dated in April.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not know where Dr. Sauter sent his -interrogatory. He did not send it through our office. I repeat that -we did not send this interrogatory and could not have sent it on, -for we did not know where Ida Vasseau lived. On our initiative -steps were taken to establish her whereabouts, and when we found -her she was interrogated, namely on 16 May.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='533' id='Page_533'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General, the Tribunal will not admit this -document at the present time, but it would wish that you should -present the original document and at the same time the answers -to the interrogatories which the Tribunal has ordered; and the -Tribunal will call upon the Secretary General for a report upon -the whole matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, during the recess I had a -chance to talk this over with Dr. Sauter. He will give me the -interrogatory and measures will be taken to get the necessary -replies from the witness in the shortest possible time. Besides this -the request of the Tribunal to get the original of the document -will be complied with as soon as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>May I continue now with my interrogation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, please.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I stopped at the testimony of Gert Bruno -Knittel. Here is what he relates about his service in the German -Army:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Not less than twice a week we were sent to comb the forests, -to round up guerrillas and to look for discontent against the -German regime, so that these people could be arrested -and shot immediately. Our 3d Company, Field Depot -Battalion 375, caught and shot five persons in the woods. -Most possibly these persons were not even partisans or guerrillas, -but merely citizens who went into the woods for -personal matters. But we had orders to shoot all who crossed -our path in the woods. I did this together with the other -soldiers of my company.</p> - -<p>“One day in June 1943, in a roundup in the village of -Lishaysk, we surrounded the whole place with three to four -companies so that no one could leave or enter the village. -Outside each house that had to be searched...”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are cross-examining the Defendant -Von Schirach who was in Vienna. What has this document got to -do with him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This is the testimony of one of the -members of the Hitler Jugend regarding his participation in atrocities -during his service in the German Army in the occupied territory. -This document is translated into German. I need not read -it. However, I would like the witness Von Schirach to familiarize -himself with this document. Did you read this document? I am -asking you this now, Witness, have you read that document? -<span class='pageno' title='534' id='Page_534'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have read the document. This man -Knittel who is testifying here was not a member of the Hitler -Youth, but belonged either to the Labor Service or to a unit of -the Army. Earlier in his life, just like all the other young Germans, -he had been a member of the Hitler Youth. He states that; but in -this case he was acting as a member of some unit of the Armed -Forces, not as a member of the Hitler Youth. The entire testimony -seems to be of little credibility. For example, he mentions a Hitler -Youth Party...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you read all the testimony that is -given there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you read all this testimony?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: In connection with this, do you admit -that participation of German youth in similar atrocities was the -effect of the special education and preparation of the Hitler Youth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not admit that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have two more questions, and that will -be all. Up to what time did you hold the post of Reichsstatthalter -of Vienna and Reichsleiter of Youth Education?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was head of Youth Education from 1931 and -Reich Governor of the city of Vienna since 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am interested in knowing to what date, -to what moment?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I held both of these offices until the collapse.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You were telling here in detail about -your break with Hitler in 1943. You stated that from that time on -you were politically dead. However, you continued to hold your -posts to the very end. Therefore your break with Hitler was only -theoretical, and in effect entailed no consequences for you. Is that -correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is wrong. I described the consequences -which it had for me in my statement either on Thursday or Friday, -and I also mentioned at that time that up to the very last moment -I kept my oath which I had given to Hitler as Youth Leader, as an -official, and as an officer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have no more questions, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in order to expedite the proceedings, -I should like to put two brief questions to Defendant -Von Schirach. -<span class='pageno' title='535' id='Page_535'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first question, Witness: in the course of the cross-examination -you were asked whether you gave the order to hold Vienna -until the very last moment and to defend the city to the last man. -As far as I remember, you answered that question in the negative. -Now, I am interested in knowing in this connection what orders -you gave to your subordinates during the last days in Vienna—I -mean to the Deputy Gauleiter Scharizer and the then Mayor -Blaschke?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The order for the defense of Vienna originated -with Hitler. The defense of Vienna was a matter for the -military authorities, that is, the commandant of the city of Vienna, -the military commander who was in charge of the 6th SS Panzer -Division....</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was his name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Sepp Dietrich, and the officer commanding -the Army Group South, Generaloberst Rendulic.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did they give the orders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In carrying out the order which Hitler had -given them regarding the defense of Vienna, they defended Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What orders did you, Witness, give your subordinates -in this connection?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: For the defense of Vienna I gave only such -orders as related to the Volkssturm, or those dealing with the food -supply of the city and similar matters with which I was charged. -I personally had nothing to do with the actual defense of the city. -For even the work of destruction which was necessary in the course -of the military defense of the city is to be traced back to orders -which originated from the Führer’s headquarters and had been -transmitted to the officer commanding the Army group, and to -the city commandant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: My second question, Witness: In your cross-examination -you were questioned about Document 3763-PS. This -is a document which deals with the songs of youth, into which the -Prosecution seems to read a different attitude from the one you -set forth. Do you wish to supplement your testimony on this point?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I must supplement it briefly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please do.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Prosecution accuses me concerning a -certain song, a song which begins, “We are the black swarms of -Geyer, hey, ho”; the chorus of which goes, “Spear them, spike them, -put the red cock on the cloister roof,” and one verse runs, “We will -cry to Him on high that we want to kill the priest.” -<span class='pageno' title='536' id='Page_536'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>This is a Christian song.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How is that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This can be seen in the fourth and fifth -verses. It is the song of the Protestant peasants under the leadership -of Florian Geyer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The fourth verse goes: “No castle, abbey, and monastery matters. -Nothing but the Holy Scripture is of value to us.” The next verse -goes: “We want the same law from prince down to peasant.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Protestantism, too, was once a revolution. The rebel peasants -sang this song; and it may serve as an example, this song of the -16th century, like some of the songs of the French revolution. This -song may be used as an example to show how, in the beginning, -revolutions are radical rather than tolerant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, with this point I should like to -conclude my direct examination of the Defendant Von Schirach. -Thank you very much. I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Who were your principal assistants in your -office at Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First of all, the chief of my Central Office, -Hoepken; secondly, the Regierungspräsident Dr. Dellbrügge; thirdly, -the Mayor, Blaschke; and fourthly, the Deputy Gauleiter, Scharizer. -They were my chief collaborators.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That makes four, does it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And did they occupy the whole of their time -working for you in your office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not all of them. The Deputy Gauleiter had -already been functioning under my predecessor, Bürckel. Mayor -Blaschke, as far as I recall, first became mayor in 1943. His predecessor -as mayor was a Herr Jung. The District President, Dr. Dellbrügge, -assumed his office in 1940, after my arrival in Vienna. He -was sent to me from the Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well then, from the time that you took over -the office in Vienna these four men were working for you, is that -right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I should like to mention also that the -head of the Central Office, Hoepken, was first of all active under -me as adjutant and assumed his position as chief only when the -former chief of this office, Obergebietsführer Müller, lost his life in -an air raid.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which of the four was it who initialed those -weekly reports which were received in your office? -<span class='pageno' title='537' id='Page_537'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was the District President, Dr. Dellbrügge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dellbrügge?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And at the time that he received them he -was working in your office as one of your principal assistants?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He was my deputy in the State Administration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That was your office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was one of my offices.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, one department in your office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. May I add, by way of explanation, that -there were various branches: The State Administration, the Municipal -Administration, the Party Management and the Reich Defense -Commissariat. The Reich Defense Commissariat and the State -Administration were combined as far as their representation was -concerned. Everything was co-ordinated in the Central Office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, in which department was this principal -assistant who initialed these documents? Which department was he -head of?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He held a key position in the office of the -Reichsstatthalter as Chief of the State Administration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Civil administration?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, Civil State Administration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Was he the Deputy Reich Defense Commissioner?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And you were the Reich Defense Commissioner -for the Military District Number XVII, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And he was your deputy in that military -district?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He received and initialed those reports in -that office, did he not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Schirach left the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, with your permission I should like -to call to the witness box the witness Lauterbacher. -<span class='pageno' title='538' id='Page_538'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Lauterbacher took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HARTMANN LAUTERBACHER (Witness): Hartmann Lauterbacher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Lauterbacher.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, I have already discussed this -matter with you in the prison; is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please pause after each question before you answer -so that the interpreters may keep up.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When were you born?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On 24 May 1909.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: 1909?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, 1909.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Are you married?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You have three children?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What is your profession?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Druggist.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Retail druggist?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You are in an American prison?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In an English prison.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Since when?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Since 29 May 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Have you been interrogated by the Prosecution on -this matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you become an official, that is to say, -a paid employee of the Hitler Youth? -<span class='pageno' title='539' id='Page_539'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I became a paid employee of the Hitler Youth -when appointed District Leader (Gebietsführer) of the Westphalia-Lower -Rhine area.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And when was that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In April 1932:</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: April 1932. That was at the age of 23?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, at the age of 23.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Before then had you been a member of the HJ?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. I was...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Slowly, please, and always wait until the question -has been completed before you answer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I was asking you if you were already a member -of the Hitler Youth when you took up your paid appointment in -the year 1932.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. When I was 13 years old, in the year -1922, I joined what was then known as the National Socialist Youth -Organization. Then, when I was 18 years old, in the year 1927, I -accepted the duties of an Unterführer in my home province of the -Tyrol...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And officially you were...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: ...then I worked in an honorary capacity in -Brunswick from 1929 until 1932; and later on I had a paid appointment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That is to say from 1932?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was your status in the year 1932? What -position did you get then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In the year 1932 I was entrusted with the -leadership of the area then known as Westphalia-Lower Rhine.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When were you assigned to the Defendant -Von Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On 22 May 1934.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was your position under him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Stabsführer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How long did you remain a Stabsführer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Until August 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I suppose until the time he resigned his office as -Reich Youth Leader? -<span class='pageno' title='540' id='Page_540'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When you took up your paid appointment with -the HJ, had you already served with the Army?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then you had not been an officer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You told us, I believe, that since 1934 you had -been Stabsführer of the Reich Youth Leadership. What tasks did -the Stabsführer of the Reich Youth Leadership have? Please tell -us briefly, so we may have an idea of what your jurisdiction was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: As the title of Stabsführer indicates, I was -in the first place the chief of the staff of the Reich Youth Leadership. -As such, I had the task of dealing with the general directives -of the Reich Youth Leader, particularly those concerning the Hitler -Youth offices and regions insofar as the Youth Leader did not do -that himself. I had to co-ordinate the various departments of the -Reich Youth Leadership and in particular to deal with matters of -an organizational and personal nature.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Furthermore, in the years 1935 to 1939 I made a number of journeys -abroad at Von Schirach’s request.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who was the deputy of the Reich Youth Leader -when he could not act personally?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was his deputy on occasions when he was -prevented from acting personally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then apparently you were the first man in the -Reich Youth Leadership after Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were your relations with Von Schirach purely -official, or were you friends as well?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Our association was not limited only to official -matters; we were also personal friends, and so our personal -relationship was not interrupted by Schirach’s appointment in -Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you believe, Herr Lauterbacher—regarding this -friendly relationship that you had with Von Schirach—that he concealed -certain things from you; or are you of the conviction that so -far as official matters were concerned he had no secrets from you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I always have been, and still am today, convinced -of the fact that Von Schirach made all his intentions and -educational measures known to me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So he kept nothing from you? -<span class='pageno' title='541' id='Page_541'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, he kept nothing from me. If Schirach -had discussions with Adolf Hitler during the earlier years he always -informed me immediately afterwards.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, in the year 1939 the second World War -broke out. Did the Defendant Von Schirach, in the last few years -prior to the outbreak of the World War, have any discussions with -you in which he expressed the view that youth should be educated -for war—in other words—that in educating youth the necessities -and requirements of future war must be taken into account? What -transpired on this point between you and Von Schirach before -the war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The possibility of war was never discussed. -Occasionally I attended Party rallies in the company of Von Schirach; -and on these occasions, when Adolf Hitler delivered a speech, I -only—on the occasion of these rallies I had the definite and unalterable -impression that Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Reich -were determined to maintain peace and to allow matters to follow -a peaceful course. That is why it never occurred to me that youth -should be trained specifically for war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, in your capacity as Stabsführer of the -Reich Youth Leadership, did you have any knowledge about the -mail as a whole which either came to Schirach or was dispatched -by him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I always saw all the official mail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the mail which reached Schirach in his office, -did you see anything about directives for the Reich Youth Leadership -received from Hitler, from the Party leadership, from the OKW, -or from any other agency, either State or Party, regarding the preparations -for war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, neither open nor camouflaged.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we have already heard about the main -functions of youth education in the course of the last few days. I -do not believe, Mr. President, that I need go into these subjects in -detail. The witness is the person best qualified to give us information, -but I think I may take the subject of youth education as -clarified.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think so. I think the facts about it have -been sufficiently stated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thank you. Then I can pass on to another subject -immediately.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] You said that you had not been a -soldier. Did not Schirach attach importance to the inclusion among -his collaborators of a certain number of officers, or at least of men -<span class='pageno' title='542' id='Page_542'></span> -who had served their term of military service and who might be -enrolled as instructors? Please be brief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, at first, that is, during the early years of -the period of development, Von Schirach rejected officers as youth -leaders on ideological and educational grounds. The aim and mission -of the Hitler Youth were those of a socialist community and -of a socialist state; and the old type of officer of the period, the -representative of a reactionary epoch, would have been absolutely -incompatible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Absolutely incompatible? Do you mean with the...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: With the principles of education which -Schirach had laid down for the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, have you any idea whether Schirach -always rejected the proposal, or to put it the other way round, do -you know whether he agreed when any military authorities tried -to influence the character of the Youth Leadership? Perhaps you -could also answer this point briefly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Even in 1933 attempts were made to introduce -officers into the Hitler Youth as leaders. As far as my -information goes, two officers had been given appointments in the -Hitler Youth before my period of office as Stabsführer, under more -or less direct orders from Hitler. They were entirely unable to cope -with youth as such; and I think I am justified in saying that their -appearance was a complete failure.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What happened to them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Schirach went to Adolf Hitler and succeeded -in having these gentlemen dismissed; also through him, a directive -was drawn up by Hitler which said that officers were not to hold -positions in the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were no further attempts of the kind made to -force officers from somewhere or other upon him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Oh, yes. In 1936 and 1937, and then again -in 1938, attempts were made to influence the education of the Hitler -Youth through so-called liaison officers. But these attempts also -failed; and up to the very end there were no officers working with -the Hitler Youth who were responsible to any other authority except -Schirach, apart from former Hitler Youth leaders who had served -in the Army and received officers’ commissions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: If I understand you correctly, Witness, you wish to -say—and please confirm whether I have understood you correctly—that -Schirach rejected these attempts. Is that correct?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='543' id='Page_543'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, why did the Hitler Youth wear uniform—the -girls as well?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Uniform is perhaps not quite the correct term -for the clothing worn by the members of the Hitler Youth. It was -more in the nature of a national costume which was worn by members -of youth organizations before the existence of the Hitler Youth, -not only in Germany but in other countries as well. Moreover, -Schirach was anxious that all boys and girls should, as he expressed -himself, wear the dress of the socialist community.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Of the socialist community. Does that mean a -community of all—of all the boys and girls of every class of German -society without any distinction?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Without any distinction as to descent or creed -or anything else.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Or rich or poor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were the Hitler Youth in possession of weapons -and were they trained in the use of military weapons? You must -know that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, they were not trained in the use of military -weapons during the period in which Schirach and I held office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did the Hitler Youth have, in particular, tanks, -armored cars, and so forth, since reference was made to the training -of the young men in the so-called “motorized Hitler Youth” in connection -with the question of the special unit (Sonderformation)—tanks, -armored cars?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, to my knowledge the Hitler Youth never -received any training in armored cars, tanks, or anything of the -kind, even after Schirach’s term of office. At any rate...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the facts stated by the defendant -as to the weapons of the Hitler Youth and their formations were -not cross-examined. You need not go into that. Mr. Dodd did not -suggest that they had tanks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thank you, Mr. President. Then I can perhaps be -more brief.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I now come, Herr Lauterbacher, to the Defendant Von Schirach’s -attitude toward the Jewish question. Was the Hitler Youth involved -in any way in the Jewish pogroms of November 1938?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I think I can answer your question with a -definite “no.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, you told me something about -a speech made by the Defendant Von Schirach a few days after -<span class='pageno' title='544' id='Page_544'></span> -9 November 1938, on the subject of these Jewish pogroms. Tell me -when and to whom he delivered this speech and what the contents -of the speech were.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Von Schirach was in Munich on 10 November -1938 and I was in Berlin. Schirach instructed me by telephone to -tell the district leaders of the Hitler Youth that their organizations -were in no circumstances to take part in these anti-Jewish demonstrations, -and to call a meeting of all these leaders to hear a specific -declaration on this point. This meeting took place about 15 November -1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Where?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In Berlin. Schirach asked these district leaders -to report to him and expressed his satisfaction at having in the -meantime received reports to the effect that the Hitler Youth had -not been involved in these excesses. He then described the said -excesses in his speech. I still remember this speech extraordinarily -well, for it was particularly impressive. He described these pogroms -as a disgrace to our culture and as amounting to self-defamation. -He said that such things might be expected of an uncivilized people -but not of the German people. He went on to say that we had -antagonized not only the world in general but also all decent people -in Germany itself by these demonstrations. He was afraid that -serious political difficulties would arise at home, as well as difficulties -within the Party itself. As we know, the Party was not at all -unanimous in its judgment of these happenings. A very large section -of the Party members and of the Party leadership condemned -these excesses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please tell us more of what Schirach said at that -time. I should be more interested in that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Von Schirach then gave the Youth Leadership -special instructions to keep out of demonstrations of this or a -similar kind in the future, no matter what the circumstances might -be, and condemned every use of violence on educational grounds -alone. He concluded the proceedings by prohibiting the reading of -the newspaper <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> by the Hitler Youth at club evenings -or on any other occasions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: On this occasion, Herr Lauterbacher, did he say -anything about the needless destruction of so many cultural treasures, -art treasures, property belonging to the people, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and -did he not give certain instances of this?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. As an especially glaring instance, he -quoted the case of the attempt, which was at least partially carried -through, to loot the Jewish firm of Bernheimer, art dealers in -Munich. -<span class='pageno' title='545' id='Page_545'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Munich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. He quoted this example to the Youth -Leadership to illustrate the dangerous and irreparable inroads made -on the reservoir of our culture and our cultural treasures by these -demonstrations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Is it true that immediately after this Berlin speech -about which you have just told us, the Defendant Von Schirach -caused definite directives to be issued by telephone from Berlin, -through your agency, to the individual Hitler Youth offices?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: This took place as early as 10 November, the -day after the Munich meeting. It had nothing to do with the district -leaders’ meeting, which only took place about 15 November.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, I assume that, as time went -on, you were present at a good many speeches made by the Defendant -Von Schirach to his subleaders, or to the Hitler Youth, and that -you listened to many of these speeches yourself. Did the Defendant -Von Schirach engage in Jew-baiting on these or other occasions? -Did he suggest that violence be used against the Jews? What was -his attitude?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes; I must have listened to all the important -speeches delivered by Von Schirach before the Leadership Corps -of the Hitler Youth, and on the occasion of these speeches I never -heard him urge the use of violence, which would in any case have -been completely foreign to his nature. At any rate, I cannot recall -that Von Schirach ever called upon the Youth Leadership, either -directly or indirectly, to take part in acts of violence of any kind -against anyone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What did Schirach usually talk about in delivering -one of his many speeches addressed to youth? Just the main topic, -briefly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: One must certainly differentiate between the -long speeches which he delivered at public demonstrations and the -speeches which he made before the leaders of the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the speeches he addressed to the leaders he always discussed -the main political and ideological tasks and the tasks of social policy, -cultural policy, and professional training which he had assigned to -the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Now, we shall turn to a different topic, Herr -Lauterbacher. Did Schirach cause you to leave the Church?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you leave the Church?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I do not believe that Herr Von Schirach even -knew to what religious denomination I belonged or whether I left -<span class='pageno' title='546' id='Page_546'></span> -the Church or not. I left the Church in 1937 or 1938, without being -influenced or forced to do so by anyone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Von Schirach urge his other collaborators to -leave the Church, as far as you know?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Schirach abuse Christianity or incite others to -attack it on the occasion of the numerous speeches made by him, to -which you have just told us that you listened?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On those occasions Schirach always told the -youth to respect religious convictions, and characterized atheism as -an evil, not only once but many times. In his speeches, Von Schirach -vigorously criticized, for instance, the athletic clubs existing both -before and after 1933 in connection with the various churches and -demanded the unity of youth; but on these occasions he did not -attack Christianity or the religious convictions of others either in -public or in private.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, during the time the Defendant -Von Schirach was Reich Youth Leader, negotiations were pending -with the Roman Catholic Church with a view to concluding a concordat, -so that relations between the State and the Church would -be regulated by an agreement. Do you know whether Von Schirach -took part in these concordat negotiations and whether he took -much trouble to effect an understanding with the Church on a basis -satisfactory to both sides?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. In 1933 and 1934 Schirach had numerous -discussions with representatives of the Church, Reich Bishop Müller -of the Protestant Church and the representative of the Fulda Conference -of Bishops, Bishop Berning of Osnabrück. I remember that -Schirach strove to draw a dividing line between their respective -powers and jurisdiction on some such basis as: “Render unto Caesar -the things which are Caesar’s and unto God the things which are -God’s.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I have another question, Witness: Do you know -whether Von Schirach actually tried to bring about an understanding -between the Hitler Youth, of which he was the leader, -and the youth of other countries, and can you tell us, for instance, -what he did and what steps he took to that end?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The establishment of a cordial understanding -between German youth and world youth generally was undoubtedly -one of those tasks the importance of which Schirach constantly -emphasized to his youth leaders, and I always had the impression -that this task was, as I might almost say, his particular passion. I -myself, on his orders—and perhaps I am a cardinal witness on -<span class='pageno' title='547' id='Page_547'></span> -precisely this point—visited the various European countries, from -1935 onwards, at least once a year and sometimes even two or three -times a year, so that I could get in touch with existing youth organizations -and with organizations of combatants of the first World War, -in order to establish contact with them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Which countries?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: It can truthfully be said that the Hitler Youth -sought contacts with all the countries of Europe; and I myself, at -the direct order of Von Schirach, visited England several times. -There I met the leader of the British Boy Scouts and his colleague, -but also...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think those facts are in dispute. It -is merely the inference that is to be drawn from the facts that -the Prosecution will rely upon. Therefore it is not necessary for -you to go into the facts again, as to the connection of the Hitler -Youth with the foreign youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, you have just heard that these facts are not in dispute. -We can therefore turn to another topic. You were the Stabsführer -of the Hitler Youth in the Reich Youth Leadership. Do you know -whether the Leadership of the Hitler Youth maintained spies or -agents abroad, or whether it trained people for the so-called Fifth -Column—and I take it you know what that is—in other countries, -or whether it brought young people over to be trained as parachutists -in Germany and then sent them back to their own countries. -During your whole period of office as Stabsführer, did you ever -learn of anything like that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The Hitler Youth did not have spies, agents, -or parachutists to operate in any country in Europe. I would have -been bound to learn of such a fact or such an arrangement in any -circumstances.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Even if Schirach had made such an arrangement -behind your back, do you believe that you would have been bound -to learn of it in any case through the channels of reports from -district leaders and similar channels?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I would inevitably have learned of this or -have observed it in these districts on some of my many official trips.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, Witness, I should like to turn to another -topic. The other day you told me about a certain discussion. After -the Polish campaign—that would be, presumably, at the end of September -or beginning of October 1939—and before the actual campaign -in France you had a meeting with the Defendant Von Schirach -<span class='pageno' title='548' id='Page_548'></span> -in your residence in Berlin-Dahlem, on which occasion the Defendant -Von Schirach voiced his attitude to the war. Will you describe -this conversation briefly to the Court?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. Von Schirach came to see me at the end -of September or beginning of October 1939. He visited me in the -house which I occupied at the time in Berlin. The conversation very -quickly turned to war, and Schirach said that, in his opinion, this -war should have been prevented. He held the Foreign Minister of -that time responsible for having given Hitler inadequate or false -information. He regretted the fact that Hitler and the leading men -of the State and the Party knew nothing about Europe and the -world generally and had steered Germany into this war without -having any idea of the consequences.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At that time he was of the opinion that if the war could not be -brought to an end in the shortest possible time, we should lose it. -In this connection he referred to the enormous war potential of the -United States and England. He said—and I remember the expression -very well—that this war was an unholy one and that if the -German people were not to be plunged into disaster as a result of -it, the Führer must be informed of the danger which would arise -for Germany if America were to intervene, either through deliveries -of goods or through actual entry into the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We considered at the time who could inform Hitler, who, in -fact, could even obtain access to him. Schirach suggested trying -in some way to introduce Colin Ross into Adolf Hitler’s presence. -Colin Ross was to call Hitler’s attention to the threatening catastrophe -and to inform Hitler of the facts. This was to be done -outside the competency of the Foreign Minister and without the -Foreign Minister being present. At that time Colin Ross was not -yet in Germany. I remember that when he returned he was -introduced into Hitler’s presence by way of Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, will you tell us more about the discussion -which you mentioned as having taken place in 1939. I should like -you to answer this question: How did he come to choose Dr. Colin -Ross in particular? How did you happen to think of him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I have already mentioned that the leaders of -the National Socialist State and of the Party were almost totally -lacking in knowledge of the world and foreign countries generally, -and had consequently hit upon this man, who had seen so much of -the world. Colin Ross had occasionally attended meetings of the -Hitler Youth Leaders before 1939 and had addressed them...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What about?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: ...and thus he was known to Schirach and -the Hitler Youth. -<span class='pageno' title='549' id='Page_549'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What were the topics he discussed before the -Hitler Youth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Colin Ross spoke of his experiences in every -continent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How did Colin Ross become known to the Hitler -Youth? On this occasion did you also speak of whether an attempt -should be made to find a solution of the Jewish problem, so that -it would be easier to reach an understanding with other countries, -and if so, on what basis?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. In the course of this conversation -Schirach referred to the excesses of 9 November 1938 and to the -speech he made immediately afterwards, and said that in the -circumstances it would naturally be extremely difficult to start -discussions with America; that we might have to try beforehand—if -circumstances permitted—and he wished to suggest this to -Hitler during an interview...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal does not think it is -really sufficiently important to go into Schirach’s private discussions -with this witness. If he can say anything as to what Schirach did, -it may be different, but now the witness is simply reciting the discussions -which he had with Schirach, nothing more than private -discussion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what steps did Schirach actually take -towards peace, or to shorten the war, as a result of these discussions -with you? Did he take any steps; and what were -these steps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, as he told me at a later discussion, -Schirach made use of every opportunity at the beginning of the -war to convince Hitler of the need for discussions with America, -and with this purpose in view, he actually brought Colin Ross to -Hitler, as he told me later. Colin Ross was with Hitler for several -hours. When Colin Ross visited me at Hanover he told me about -this discussion and on this occasion he said that Hitler was very -thoughtful. He did say also, however, that a second discussion which -had been planned with Hitler had not materialized, for, according -to his version, the Foreign Office had protested against this kind -of information.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks that this -witness is dealing in great detail with matters which are of very -<span class='pageno' title='550' id='Page_550'></span> -little importance and the Tribunal wishes you to bring his attention -to something which is of real importance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have in any case only one more -question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>One last question, Witness. You have not been with Schirach -since 1940. I believe you became a Gauleiter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Schirach went to Vienna. But in 1943 you again -had a long talk with him, mainly about why Schirach did not -resign from his post. My reason for putting this question to you -is that one member of the Prosecution has already discussed the -question today. Will you tell us briefly what reasons Schirach gave -at the time for retaining his office or why he did not resign, and -what his views on the war were in 1943—at that time, I mean?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In March 1943, when I made an unofficial -visit to Vienna, a very long conversation took place between -Von Schirach and myself. At that time, Von Schirach talked very -pessimistically about the prospects of the war and told me that -we should soon be fighting outside Vienna, in the Alps and along -the Rhine. On that occasion he said that he had not been able to -see Adolf Hitler for a very long time; that he had had no further -opportunity of reporting to him, as had formerly been the case; -and that the Chief of the Party Chancellery, Bormann, had consistently -prevented him from seeing the Führer and talking to him -alone; and that he therefore no longer had any opportunity whatsoever -of discussing Viennese questions or general questions with -Hitler. In this connection he also stated that Bormann came to him -with objections and complaints every day, cancelling orders and -directives he had issued in his capacity of Gauleiter in Vienna, -and that in view of all this, it was no longer possible for him to -remain in office and to shoulder the responsibility.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>At a later stage of that conversation, in the course of which we -considered all kinds of possibilities, he said that, as he had sworn -an oath of allegiance to Hitler, he felt bound to remain in office -whatever happened and that, above all, he could not take the -responsibility in the present military situation for abandoning the -population over which he had been appointed Gauleiter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>He saw the catastrophe coming but said that even his resignation -or any action that he might take would not have any influence on -the leaders of the State or on Hitler himself and that he would, -therefore, remain true to his oath, as a soldier would, and retain -his appointment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, that concludes my examination of -this witness. -<span class='pageno' title='551' id='Page_551'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defense counsel want to ask -him any questions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, were you Gauleiter in Hanover -from 1940?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, from December 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You were also Plenipotentiary for Labor in -that capacity?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were there many foreign laborers in your -Gau?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, there were a great many foreign -laborers in my district. This was mainly due to the Hermann -Göring Works, which had been established near Brunswick.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have to look after them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, my assignments as Plenipotentiary for -Labor were confined to looking after foreign civilian workers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive instructions from Sauckel on -that point?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I, like all other Gauleiter of the NSDAP, -constantly received instructions from Sauckel with regard to the -recruitment of labor; that is to say, regarding the welfare of these -civilian workers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What type of instructions were they?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The instructions which I received as Gauleiter -consisted almost exclusively of repeated demands to do everything -to satisfy the foreign workers in matters of accommodation, -food, clothing, and cultural welfare.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was that carried out in practice?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: It was naturally carried out within the limits -of existing possibilities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you inspect camps or factories where these -workers were employed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, I myself inspected such camps and -especially such factories on my official trips. Apart from that I had, -as my Gau supervisor of the German Labor Front, a man who -assisted me in this task on such occasions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you or your Gau supervisor discover the -existence of shocking conditions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. After the air raids from which Hanover -and Brunswick suffered particularly badly from 1943 onwards, I -<span class='pageno' title='552' id='Page_552'></span> -found conditions in foreign civilian labor camps—just as I did in -the living quarters of German people—to be what I would call, perhaps -not shocking, but certainly very serious; and after that I tried -as far as possible to have these destroyed dwellings repaired, for -instance, or to have new ones built.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you see any abuses for which these industrial -enterprises of the supervisory agencies were directly responsible?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, I do remember two such cases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Several firms in Hanover had formed a kind of industrial association—a -kind of union—and had established a camp for their foreign -civilian workers. The trustees of these firms were responsible -for this camp. One day the Gau supervisor of the German Labor -Front reported to me that living conditions did not comply with -instructions received and asked my permission to intervene, that -is to say, to be allowed to assume responsibility through the German -Labor Front for that collective camp. I gave him this assignment; -and sometime afterwards he reported that these difficulties had -been overcome.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Hermann Göring Works constitute another example of this -kind. Since I am speaking under oath here, I must mention the fact -that that firm disregarded Sauckel’s instructions in many respects. -On one occasion they recruited workers independently, outside the -jurisdiction of the labor administration through their branches in -the Ukraine and other countries. These laborers came to Watenstedt, -in the area supervised by the Executive Board of the Party, -outside the quota fixed by the Plenipotentiary for Labor, and consequently -outside of his jurisdiction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I myself had very considerable difficulty in obtaining entry to -the works and the camp. For although Gauleiter and Plenipotentiary, -I was not by any means in a position simply to...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What has this got to do with -the Defendant Sauckel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I asked him about any abuses which he had -found, for as plenipotentiary for the recruitment of foreign workers -it was his duty to ascertain where such bad conditions existed and -to report them so that they would finally be brought to Sauckel’s -notice. He has digressed rather widely and has just been describing -the Hermann Göring Works.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You should stop him, Dr. Servatius. You know -the question you were asking.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you discover the existence of -abuses in the camp? -<span class='pageno' title='553' id='Page_553'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was unable to enter the camp, because -entry was forbidden.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel himself address the workers in -your Gau?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, not during my period of office. But he -frequently sent representatives.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have now got some questions to put on behalf -of the political leaders whom I represent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you receive special instructions from the Führer on your -appointment as Gauleiter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. When I was appointed Gauleiter I was -merely introduced by Herr Hess as Gauleiter, during an assembly -of Gauleiter. But I received no special instructions on the occasion -of that meeting, and during my...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Witness, the answer was “no” and you did -not need to add to it at all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you talk to the Führer later on? Did you -receive special or secret instructions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I only saw the Führer now and again at -Gauleiter meetings and I never had any official discussions with him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know anything about the activities of -block leaders? In particular, I want to ask you: Were they used -as spies?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: But there seems to be a widespread belief that -in fact block leaders did act as spies and informers and that has -been brought up by the Prosecution. Perhaps the SD used block -leaders for that purpose?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The SD had its own agents who were not -known to the Party. At any rate, the block leaders had no instructions -to work for the SD.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was no card index kept of Party opponents?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Not in the Party organizations. As far as I -know this card index was kept by the Secret Police, as was made -known in connection with the plot of 20 July 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Party use agents for spying who may -not have been block leaders but who worked for you in your capacity -of Gauleiter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When did you join the SS, Witness? -<span class='pageno' title='554' id='Page_554'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was made an SS Brigadier General on -2 August 1940, on the occasion of my appointment as Deputy Gauleiter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not hear your answer as to when you first -joined the SS. Would you repeat it, please?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On 2 August 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You had not belonged before that date to the organization -at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was not a member of the SS before that -date; but I served in the Waffen-SS as a soldier, from 26 May 1940 -to September 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And then you later became an SS Obergruppenführer, -did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On 20 April 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And when did you join the staff of Himmler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was never a member of Himmler’s staff.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you not join it in January of 1944, or what would -you say that you did join in the Reichsführer SS Organization? Perhaps -I have used the wrong term “staff.” There is some other name -for it. Were you not affiliated in some way with Himmler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, I never had any SS assignments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you have any connection with the Reichsführer -SS from January 1944 on?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In October 1944 the Reichsführer SS had -gone in his special train to Bad Pyrmont, on the occasion of a meeting -of West German Gauleiter and Higher SS and Police Leaders. -I had orders to be present at that function; and in the course of -the meeting I had a talk with him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is not what I asked; but I will pass it. Did you -become an SA Obergruppenführer in 1944, as well as SS Obergruppenführer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I became an SA Obergruppenführer, I think, -in 1944 or 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You were also a member of the Reichstag in 1936, -were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And a member of the Party, I guess you said, since -1927; is that right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Since 1927.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And a member of the Hitler Youth, or NSDAP, -since 1923? -<span class='pageno' title='555' id='Page_555'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I joined the Hitler Youth in 1927. The Hitler -Youth was not established until 1927.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, whenever it was, the youth organization of the -Party, that is what I mean. How many people did you have hanged -publicly while you were the Gauleiter up in Hanover?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I did not understand the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I said: How many people did you have hanged publicly -while you were the Gauleiter up in Hanover?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I never hanged anyone publicly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Are you sure about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How many people did you send to concentration -camps?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I might have handed over 5 or 10 persons -to ordinary courts for violating war economy regulations. And in -one case which I remember particularly well, there were two people -who refused...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I do not care about the details. Just tell me -how many you sent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: There were two. I do not know if they were -sent to concentration camps, because I myself could not intern them. -The internment was decided in Berlin.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know a man by the name of Huck, H-u-c-k, -Heinrich Huck?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Huck—no. At the moment I cannot remember -that name.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: The police commissar under your Gau, or in your -Gau?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, I do not know him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I want to ask: Did you not have a foreign worker -from one of the eastern countries hanged, publicly hanged in the -market square, and to remain there a whole day, at one time, while -you were the Gauleiter up there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. Where is that supposed to have happened?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is supposed to have happened in Hildesheim.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In March of 1945, just before the war ended.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. That is unknown to me. I never gave -any such instructions. -<span class='pageno' title='556' id='Page_556'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you order 400 or 500 prisoners poisoned or shot -just before the city was taken by an Allied army?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, that was put to me in London, and I -think I cleared up the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You know what I am talking about, then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, the penitentiary at Hameln.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You know that your Kreisleiter says that you ordered -them poisoned with either prussic acid or strychnine, or else they -were to be shot?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>You know about that, do you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was told about that in London.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And not only does your Kreisleiter say that but -Richard Rother, who was an inspector at the prison at Hameln, confirms -that the order was passed on, that either they were to be -poisoned or shot; do you know about that as well?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I never gave any such order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am asking you if you know that these people -associated with you have sworn under oath that you did. You have -seen these affidavits, have you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was told of it in London; but I was also -told that the inmates of that penitentiary were neither poisoned nor -shot, but sent back.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, they were, but not because of you, but because -your people refused to carry out your orders, is not that so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I know nothing about that, because I was -no longer in Hameln and no longer a Gauleiter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You have seen these affidavits, so I do not think -there is any need to hand them to you, but I am going to offer them -in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I received the statement of the commissioned -Kreisleiter, Dr. Krämer, in London, and I replied to it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well. You know what he says, then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I offer this D-861 as Exhibit USA-874, Mr. President. It is a document -consisting of 7 affidavits from persons associated with this witness -when he was the Gauleiter, and having to do with his conduct -while he was Gauleiter there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How do you suggest that that evidence is -relevant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I offer them in relation to this man’s credibility, or -rather lack of it. I do not think that they have anything to do -directly with the case, other than they show the kind of individual -<span class='pageno' title='557' id='Page_557'></span> -he is, as we claim, and that the Tribunal should have this information -before it when it considers the weight it will give to his -testimony.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I have also just been reminded by my friend, Mr. Elwyn Jones, -that of course it would have a bearing on the issue of the Leadership -Corps of the Nazi Party, of which he is a member. That had -not occurred to me, however. However, I do wish to claim it as a -ground, also, for this document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where are the people who made these affidavits?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I will have to inquire. I do not know. -They are in custody, some of them at least, in the British zone here -in Germany.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, you have just inquired where these -people are who made these affidavits. Perhaps I can assist you in -clarifying these questions. This Josef Krämer, whom the Prosecution -have just quoted as the leading witness against the witness -Lauterbacher, was sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment by an -English court some 8 or 10 days ago, and this for the very reason -which the prosecutor has just mentioned. Herr Lauterbacher knows -nothing about this matter, but quite accidentally I read a report of -this trial in a German newspaper and I have the report here. In -that article, dated 2 May of this year, it is stated that the former -Kreisleiter of Hameln, Dr. Josef Krämer, was sentenced by the court -of the 5th British Division to 7 years’ imprisonment. I quote from -that article:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“Upon the approach of the Allied troops Krämer had given -the order to liquidate the inmates of the penitentiary at -Hameln. ‘No dangerous prisoner and no foreigner is to be -allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy,’ was his order. -‘They must all be poisoned with prussic acid, or, if that is not -possible, they will have to be shot.’ ”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>That was the wording of the order given by ex-Kreisleiter Josef -Krämer; and he is now being used as a witness against my witness -here. The report goes on to say that officials at the penitentiary, -who appeared as witnesses, stated that in spite of this order from -Dr. Krämer they had refused to liquidate the prisoners. The rest is -of no interest but I thought that perhaps it might be important for -the Tribunal, when dealing with this question, to see from a document -how this former Kreisleiter behaved in reality. If you are -interested, Mr. President, the newspaper clipping, although it is in -German, can be admitted to you at once.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May I say, Mr. President, that perfectly substantiates -the document; that is, Krämer says in here that is what he did, that -<span class='pageno' title='558' id='Page_558'></span> -he passed orders on but that he got them from this man. If anything, -it supports us. It does not hurt us one whit insofar as the -value of this document is concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In looking them over, I think it is perhaps best if I only offer -the first one and the last one. There are some others in this group -that are not particularly helpful, I expect, for the Court. I shall -withdraw all but the first and last and offer only the affidavit of -Krämer and the affidavit of Huck.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal does not think that -these documents ought to be admitted. In the first place, so far as -the credit of the particular witness is concerned, they do not think -that his answers on questions of credit ought to be challenged by -other evidence. So far as the Leadership Corps is concerned, they -think that these documents are only evidence of one individual -crime.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, I understood you to say that you never heard the -Defendant Von Schirach say anything really derogatory of the -Jewish people, and, on the contrary, you heard him speak out -quite openly after the events of 9 November 1938. Did I understand -you correctly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, he criticized the atrocities in no uncertain -terms at the meeting of Gauleiters. He had no doubt that...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do not go all through it again. I just wanted to be -sure that I understood you correctly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I suppose you read the Hitler Youth yearbook for the year 1938, -as the Deputy to the Reich Leader.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: At the moment I do not remember this book. -If I could have a look at it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Of course I do not expect you to. I merely wanted -to ascertain that you did read it. I suppose you always read your -yearbook?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What, you did not read it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I cannot remember, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, would it not be customary for you to read the -yearbook? Let us put it that way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The yearbook was compiled by the Press -Department and I had no influence on the details of the journalistic -make-up of our newspapers, periodicals or yearbooks. I do not -remember this book, at least as far as it concerns demands for anti-Semitic -atrocities, or a policy of force. -<span class='pageno' title='559' id='Page_559'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I will show it to you in any event and call -your attention to an article in the yearbook concerning the Jewish -people. Do you know what I refer to? Where they were charged -with having spilled the blood of millions of dead in history. That -was put out, I assume, after the brave statements by the defendant -in November of 1938, since it is for the whole year of 1938. You -will find the article that I refer to on Page 192.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Have you seen that article before?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. That yearbook had no official character; -it was a private enterprise on the part of the publishers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. What do you mean, “it had no -official character”? It was the yearbook of the Hitler Youth, was -it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: This yearbook was not officially edited by -the Hitler Youth or by the Party. I never saw it until after it was -published.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It was published by the Central Publishing House -of the NSDAP, was it not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, that is correct; I see that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It was called <span class='it'>The Yearbook of the Hitler Youth</span>, and -you put it out for a good many years consecutively, did you not? -I do not mean you personally, but I mean the Party and the Hitler -Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. This yearbook was compiled and published -every year by the gentleman mentioned there, or by others, as -the case might be.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know that. I am simply trying to establish this, -that this was the yearbook of the Hitler Youth and the only one -that was put out, and it was put out each year. Now is that not so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: This book appeared every year, but I repeat -again that it had no official character, nor do I believe that...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, what would you say would give it an official -character?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: If it said here, “Published by the Reich Youth -Leader’s Office,” it would have an official character.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And the fact that it said, “Published by the Central -Publishing House of the NSDAP” would not give it one, is that it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Certainly not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not put out any other publications in the -nature of a yearbook, did you, except this one? -<span class='pageno' title='560' id='Page_560'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: A calendar was published every year.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I am certainly not talking about a calendar; -I am talking about a report or a book.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you are still telling this Tribunal that this was -not the yearbook of the Hitler Youth and the only one that was -published in Germany?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I repeat that this yearbook did not have any -official character.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, after having read that quotation, do you still -think that Schirach, as leader of the Reich Youth, was not actively -speaking about the Jews in a derogatory sort of way, or that talk -of this kind was not going on under his leadership?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Von Schirach never left any doubt regarding -his anti-Semitic attitude as long as he was Reich Youth Leader.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know the speech he made in 1942 when he -took credit for deporting the Jews from Vienna? Are you familiar -with that speech?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, I do not know that speech. During that -time I was in Hanover, and Schirach was in Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. He was a fellow Gauleiter at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you ever get any SS reports on what was happening to the -Jews in the East?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Never. I never had access to SS reports, SS -circulars, or orders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you deport any Jews from your Gau?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: When I came to the Gau in December 1940, -the Jews had already emigrated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: They were already out by the time you got there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you ever hear of Gauleiters getting reports from -Heydrich or from Himmler about what was happening to the Jews -in the East? Did any of your fellow Gauleiter ever tell you that -they got reports regularly, say by the month or by the week?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. Himmler’s reports were no more accessible -to the Gauleiter than they were to the honorary leaders of the -SS. As Obergruppenführer of the SS I never received a report or -an instruction from Himmler.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Those Himmler reports were handled pretty carefully, -were they not? -<span class='pageno' title='561' id='Page_561'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am now asking you—as an SS Obergruppenführer I suppose -you know something about it—were those reports handled very -carefully, those Himmler and Heydrich reports?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: As an SS Obergruppenführer I never received -any of Himmler’s reports, and I know that Himmler sent all reports -dealing with confidential or internal SS matters only to SS and -Police, that is, SS leaders in the service of the SS, but never to the -honorary leaders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, what I really asked you was whether or not -the reports, when they were sent out, were very carefully handled. -Do you know the answer to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I do not know. I do not know how these -reports were handled.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What was Heydrich’s reputation, so far as you were -concerned, in 1942? Did you think very well of him or did you -think very poorly of him before he was killed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I only knew Heydrich from meeting him a -few times in the Reich Youth Leader’s Office, and I had a good -impression of him personally. I am forced to have a different -opinion of him now; but only because I now know of his measures.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What was he doing in the Reich Youth Leader’s -Office the few times that you met him? What business did he have -there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: He had intervened on his own initiative and -through his own agencies in cases of homosexuality. Schirach forbade -that and told him that these matters too were first of all subject -to his own jurisdiction.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You sat in on all of these conferences with Heydrich, -no matter how many there were, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I participated in one conference on the question -of homosexuality in the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Tell us this: Did it appear to you, from what you -saw and heard there, that Heydrich and Schirach were very friendly, -or on a very friendly basis?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: That conference did not take place with Von -Schirach, but with one of the officials from the Reich Youth Leader’s -Office who, as Chief of the Hitler Youth Legal Administration, -conducted the discussion with Heydrich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were you ever present when Heydrich talked to -Von Schirach? Were you ever present?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. -<span class='pageno' title='562' id='Page_562'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did Heydrich ever talk to you, or rather, did -Von Schirach ever talk to you about Heydrich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, I cannot remember that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: We have no further questions, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thank you, I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: With the permission of the President, I shall now -call my next witness, Gustav Hoepken.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Hoepken took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>GUSTAV DIETRICH HOEPKEN (Witness): Gustav Dietrich -Hoepken.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Hoepken, I have already examined you on -the case of Schirach when you were in prison?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, you have already examined me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How old are you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I am 36.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What is your father’s occupation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: My father is a dock laborer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And yourself?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I was a newspaper boy, a dock laborer, a spare-time -student, and sports instructor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Sports instructor. You are now in American hands, -are you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I am a prisoner in American hands.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Since when?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Since 19 May 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Has the Prosecution interrogated you on this -matter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Up to now the Prosecution has not interrogated me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you join the Hitler Youth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I joined the Hitler Youth in 1933. -<span class='pageno' title='563' id='Page_563'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You joined the Hitler Youth in 1933? How old -were you at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I was 23.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And in what capacity did you join?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: First as an ordinary member. In September 1933 -I became an Unterbannführer in the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Unterbannführer in 1933?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, in September 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was that a salaried position or an honorary -appointment?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: From 1933 to 1935 I worked as a sports instructor -in the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And in 1935?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: In 1935 I joined the government offices at Potsdam -as an expert on PT in schools.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But that had nothing to do with the Hitler Youth, -had it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: At Potsdam I also commanded the Potsdam unit and -local headquarters of the Hitler Youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So you were a civil servant—or rather, an employee -of the State and apart from that an honorary leader of the -Hitler Youth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: From 1935 until 1939 I was a civil servant in the -government offices at Potsdam and I also commanded the Hitler -Youth unit and local headquarters at Potsdam in an honorary -capacity.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Therefore in the summer of 1939 you joined the -Reich Youth Leadership, did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: In June 1939 I joined the Reich Youth Leadership -and became adjutant to Baldur von Schirach who was Reich Youth -Leader at the time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And how long did you hold that office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Until August 1939, and then I became a soldier.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Before you joined Schirach’s staff, had you not -served in the Armed Forces?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Up to joining Schirach in 1939 I had done 8 weeks’ -obligatory training in the Air Force.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Apart from that, you had no training?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Apart from that I had no military training. -<span class='pageno' title='564' id='Page_564'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you an officer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I had not been an officer up to that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So far as his other collaborators were concerned, -did Schirach attach importance to their being officers or trained -soldiers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: So far as I know, Von Schirach did not care whether -his collaborators were soldiers or officers, on the contrary, it was -his view, as he told me repeatedly, that soldiers and officers, as -far as he could see, were less suitable as youth leaders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I do not want to go into the general question of -the training of the Hitler Youth, but I wish to ask you one single -question on this point, especially because you are a sports instructor -by profession. It is a question about the training of the Hitler -Youth in shooting. Were they trained with military weapons, or -how were they trained in firing?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The Hitler Youth were trained in shooting with air -guns or small arms. They did not shoot with military weapons.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In that case I will not put any further questions -to you on the subject of uniform as these questions have already -been clarified. But there is one other thing in which I am interested -and that is the relationship to the Church: Do you know, Witness, -whether the Defendant Von Schirach in 1937, that is in the issue of -the Berlin paper, the <span class='it'>Berliner Tageblatt</span> of 14 January 1937, published -an article written by his press adviser Günther Kaufmann, -headed “Can the Gap be Bridged”? That article, a copy of which I -have before me, deals with a problem in which I am interested, and -that is why I want to ask you: Do you know what Schirach made -his press adviser write in that article on the question of whether -the Hitler Youth leaders should consider the young people’s need -for church services or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know the article.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You know it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I also know the order issued by the Reich Youth -Leader of that time stating that on Sundays there should be no -Hitler Youth duty for all those boys and girls who wanted to attend -church. Every boy and girl in the Hitler Youth at that time was -supposed to be able to attend religious services of his or her own -free will; and it was made part of the duty of the Hitler Youth -leaders at the time to refrain from entering into any arguments -or controversies about the Hitler Youth and the Church. He prohibited -that. -<span class='pageno' title='565' id='Page_565'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, that is the main point of that article of -14 January 1937. But you know that the Defendant Schirach had -certain difficulties with Hitler because of this article. Will you tell -us briefly what you know about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: As soon as the agreement between the Church and -the Hitler Youth was made, the article mentioned appeared in the -<span class='it'>Berliner Tageblatt</span>. On the day that article appeared, Schirach -was at a meeting in Rosenberg’s office. Hitler called Schirach to -the telephone at that time. Hitler took Schirach sternly to task, -firstly, for making an agreement between the Church and the -Hitler Youth and, secondly, for publishing this article. His intention -was to cancel the agreement and to ban any further issue -of the newspapers. Neither of these things happened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Schirach refuse to withdraw the article?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: So far as I know he did.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In 1940 you went to Vienna with Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I did not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you go?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I went to Vienna for the first time in September 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Where had you been in the meantime?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I have already told you that I joined the Luftwaffe -in August 1939 and served during that time as a service flying -instructor in a Luftwaffe training school.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And you did not rejoin Schirach until 1941, and -then in Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes; I joined Schirach in Vienna in September 1941.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The highest dignitary of the Catholic Church in -Vienna is Cardinal Innitzer, right?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know what Von Schirach’s attitude to -Cardinal Innitzer was? I will tell you at once why I am asking -you this question; I want to know if it is true that Schirach objected -to Cardinal Innitzer’s being molested by the Hitler Youth, and what -steps he took, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Schirach told me repeatedly that he would like to -have a talk with Cardinal Innitzer, but that he was not allowed to -do so, firstly, because of a decree issued by the former head of the -Party Chancellery, Martin Bormann, prohibiting the Gauleiter from -contacting Church dignitaries and, secondly, because Schirach knew -that he himself was under surveillance. -<span class='pageno' title='566' id='Page_566'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who, Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: That Schirach was under surveillance and thought -that if he forced such a discussion, Bormann would be certain to -know of it on the next day, which would have had most unpleasant -consequences both for Schirach and Cardinal Innitzer. On the other -hand, it was Schirach’s view that Cardinal Innitzer also would -certainly have liked to have a talk with Schirach and Schirach -thought that certainly would not have been the case if Cardinal -Innitzer had not known of his tolerant attitude toward the Church -and the Christian religion. It is furthermore known to me—and I -think this happened in the winter of 1944 to 1945—that Cardinal -Innitzer was molested by youthful civilians while returning from -mass. Cardinal Innitzer had the police find out the names of these -youngsters, and they turned out to be Hitler Youth leaders. -Schirach ordered the competent district leader of the Hitler Youth -to him the same day, took him severely to task, and demanded that -the youth leaders in question be relieved of their duties at once. As -far as I know, this was actually done. I believe I also remember -that Schirach had a letter of apology sent to Cardinal Innitzer, -either personally or through one of his officials.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better break off now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 28 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<div><span class='pageno' title='567' id='Page_567'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH DAY</span><br/> Tuesday, 28 May 1946</h1></div> - -<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that -Defendant Göring is absent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We were going to deal with Defendant Bormann’s -documents, were we not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, two witnesses only have arrived -so far for the Defendant Sauckel. Three essential witnesses are still -missing. Perhaps the Court can help to bring these witnesses -quickly so that the case will not be delayed. They are the witnesses -Stothfang, Dr. Jäger, and Hildebrandt. I have repeatedly asked the -Prosecution to get them but they are not here yet. I have not yet -spoken to the witnesses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have they been located?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. One is in a camp in Kassel, which is only -a few hours from here, and the other is in Neumünster. That is a -little farther, perhaps 6 or 7 hours from here. Dr. Jäger is free.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is not in accordance with the information -which the Tribunal has. The Tribunal has the information that -they cannot be found.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I received the information that their whereabouts -has been ascertained.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: From whom did you receive that information?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Officially, from the General Secretary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will make inquiries into it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, first, with regard to -the witnesses applied for for the Defendant Bormann. They are, -as I understand it, Fräulein Krüger, to whom we have no objection. -The witness Müller is no longer applied for?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, I have dispensed with that witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, Klopfer, and lastly, -Friedrich. These are with regard to Bormann’s law-making activities, -and the Prosecution have no objections. -<span class='pageno' title='568' id='Page_568'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Your Lordship, in place of the witness Müller, -whom I have withdrawn, I have an additional request for the -witness Gerta Christian on the same subject for which I had -requested the witness Müller.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The first witness, Miss Krüger, is going to -speak to exactly the same facts, is she not, to the death of Bormann?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, Your Lordship. The circumstances concerning -Bormann’s death are not very clear. It is very necessary to -hear all the available witnesses on this subject because only in this -way can one be convinced of the fact, which I am trying to establish, -that the Defendant Bormann is already dead.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It does not seem to be a very relevant fact. -It is very remotely relevant whether he is dead or whether he is -alive. The question is whether he is guilty or innocent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Your Lordship, my point of view is that sentence -cannot be passed against a dead man. That is not provided for in -the Charter. According to the Charter, the Court can only sentence -an absent person, but a dead person cannot be included under the -term “absent.” If the defendant is dead, the Charter does not -provide the possibility of continuing proceedings against him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you any objection to that -other witness?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, the Prosecution -does not make any objections.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, My Lord, with regard to -the documents, the first batch of documents is a series of treaties -and diplomatic pronouncements and documents to counteract the -statement of Sir Hartley Shawcross as to the position of international -law before the Charter, the statement that the law of -nations had constituted aggressive war an international crime before -this Tribunal was established and this Charter became part of the -public law of the world. The position of the Prosecution is that -evidence on that point is really irrelevant because after all, the -Tribunal is covered by the Charter, and it seems unnecessary to -translate and publish, by way of document books, all these matters -which the learned counsel has set out in his application. That is, -shortly, the position of the Prosecution with regard to that first -batch of documents. Especially, I do not want to discuss the problem -for the reason that I have given.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What are the numbers of them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are 1 to 11—no, 7, in the -application. -<span class='pageno' title='569' id='Page_569'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Are they long documents?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Your Lordship, I have not seen them yet. I -applied for these documents 3 months ago in order to look them -over, but unfortunately I have not received them yet and therefore -I cannot give the Court any information as to whether they are long -or not and what parts of them I will need for my defense.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Number 2 looks like a long document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: But I will not use all these documents if I -receive them. I shall probably take some of them, Your Lordship; -I shall only...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you say you applied for them 3 months -ago, you do not mean you applied to the Tribunal, do you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: I applied to the General Secretary, but perhaps -it was put aside when Your Lordship decided that my case should -be postponed to the end. Perhaps it was forgotten.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Was there any order on your application?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You applied, I think, for an adjournment, -did you not, in order that the matter might be brought up later?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, Your Lordship; I am in an especially -difficult situation. I have questioned many witnesses and have tried -very hard, but I can find nothing exonerating. All the witnesses are -filled with great hatred toward the Defendant Bormann, and they -want to incriminate him in order to exonerate themselves. That -makes my case especially difficult. The man himself is probably -dead and can give me no information. Any day now I might get -new information. For example, a few days ago one of Bormann’s -co-workers, a Dr. Von Hummeln, was arrested in Salzburg. I will -go to see him and perhaps I shall get fresh information—perhaps -none. I must also assume...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We need not bother about that now. We are -only inquiring about your application with reference to the documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Sir David, have you anything further you want to say about the -documents?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is my short point. I do -not want to discuss the merits of my points because that is the -issue, that I am saying is irrelevant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What about Number 11?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not disposed to object to -any of the other documents, My Lord. -<span class='pageno' title='570' id='Page_570'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are there any others besides...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Number 11—I can see a possible -argument on that, My Lord; therefore I am not going to object to -it. The other documents we certainly have no objection to; the -ordinances of the Führer’s Deputy and...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All under “B”?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The Prosecution makes no -objection to these.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Now, what do you say to Sir David’s objection to these documents, -1 to 7?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Well, Your Lordship, I have already made my -point of view clear in my application. In order to save the time of -the Court, I will merely refer to this written application. I will not -say any more at the moment on the subject, but if Your Lordship -wants me to explain it here now I am ready to do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the matter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did Your Lordship wish to deal -with the other outstanding applications or would Your Lordship -prefer to deal with that later on at the end of the case of Von -Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we have the papers here. We -were only going to deal with Bormann this morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, we have got a document here, -D-880, said to be extracts from testimony of Admiral Raeder, taken -at Nuremberg on 10 November 1945 by Major John Monigan. Have -you offered that document in evidence or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May I have just a minute to check it? I am not -certain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we will give you the document.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I believe not, Mr. President; I do not believe it has -been offered in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It seems to have been handed up yesterday -or the day before...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I think through a mistake.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: ...or last week. Yes. But you will find out -about that and let us know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Sir. -<span class='pageno' title='571' id='Page_571'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, you were still examining Gustav -Hoepken, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I shall continue my examination of -the witness Hoepken.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Hoepken resumed the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Hoepken, we stopped yesterday when discussing -the question whether the Defendant Von Schirach during -his time in Vienna was opposed to the Church or was tolerant in -this connection. The last answer you gave me yesterday referred to -the relations of the Defendant Von Schirach to the Viennese Cardinal, -Innitzer. Is it correct, Witness, that at the suggestion and -with the knowledge of the Defendant Von Schirach during his time -in Vienna you periodically had talks with a Catholic priest there, -a Dean, Professor Ens, for the purpose of discussing Church -questions with him and removing any differences which might arise?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, that is true. Professor Ens was not, as you -assume, Catholic, but Protestant. He was Dean of the faculty of -theology of the University of Vienna. When he visited me he submitted -many Church and religious questions to me. I discussed -them with him. He then asked me to report on them to Herr Von -Schirach so that, if it were in his power, he could make redress. -This was done as far as possible.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know, Witness, that the Defendant Von -Schirach, for example, ordered that at the Party Christmas celebrations -new National Socialist Christmas songs were not to be -sung, but the old Christian Christmas hymns?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I know that at the Christmas celebrations of -the Party and of the Hitler Youth, and the Christmas celebration -for wounded soldiers, the old Christian Christmas carols, such as -“Es ist ein Ros’ entsprungen,” and “Silent Night, Holy Night...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This is surely not a matter which is worthy -to be given in evidence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know that the Defendant Von -Schirach, in the official magazine of the Hitler Youth, had a special -number published which was in favor of humane treatment of the -people of the Eastern Territories, and when was that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know that it was the quarterly number for April -to June 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that in the same official magazine -of the Hitler Youth, at the request of the Defendant Bormann, a -special anti-Semitic number was to appear, but that Von Schirach -refused it? -<span class='pageno' title='572' id='Page_572'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know that it was requested at that time by the -Propaganda Ministry and also by the Party Chancellery. Von -Schirach refused each time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know that Von Schirach once inspected -a concentration camp?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I know that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Which one?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The concentration camp Mauthausen.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In regard to this point, which has already been -more or less cleared up by the testimony of other witnesses, I am -interested only in one question. When was this visit to Mauthausen?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I cannot say exactly. I can say with certainty, however, -that it was not after April 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why can you say that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: In April 1943 I was discharged from hospital and -began my service in Vienna. From that day on until April 1945 I -knew every day where Von Schirach was. Moreover, immediately -after my arrival in Vienna in April 1943, when I asked him, as I -was rather run-down physically because of my wound and was also -a sports teacher, whether I might do some sports between 7 and -8 in the morning...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we do not want to know about -the witness’ health, do we?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you heard what the President just said. -I have already told you I am interested in when this visit to Mauthausen -was. You said, if I understood you correctly...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He said he could not say when it was and it -was after April 1943. He said he could not say when it was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I believe you misunderstood the -witness. Witness, please pay attention as to whether this is correct. -I understood the witness to say that it was before April 1943. The -visit must have been before April 1943. It could not have been later.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, he also said, according to the -conversation I heard and took down, that he could not say when -the particular time was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, but through the testimony of the witness I -should like to settle the fact that it was not later than April 1943.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He said that already. He said it. He said, -“I cannot say when it was, but it was not after April 1943.” He -said: “In April 1943 I was discharged from the hospital and began -my service in Vienna. I knew every day where Schirach was.” I -have got that all written down. -<span class='pageno' title='573' id='Page_573'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well. Witness, in this conversation about his -visit to Mauthausen did the Defendant Von Schirach tell you anything -to the effect that on this visit he got to hear of any atrocities, -ill-treatment, and such things?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, he said nothing about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I now turn to the question of the deportation -of Jews from Vienna. As far as I know you were an ear-witness -of a conversation between the Reichsführer SS Himmler -and the Defendant Schirach. Will you tell us what was said in this -conversation on the question of the deportation of Jews?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I believe it was in November 1941; Himmler and -Schirach were motoring through East Prussia from Himmler’s -quarters to his special train. In the car Himmler asked Von -Schirach: “Tell me, Von Schirach, how many Jews are still in -Vienna?” Von Schirach answered, “I cannot say exactly. I estimate -40,000 to 50,000.” And Himmler said: “I must evacuate these Jews -as quickly as possible from Vienna.” And Schirach said: “The Jews -do not give me any trouble, especially as they are now wearing -the yellow star.” Then Himmler said: “The Führer is already -angry that Vienna, in this matter as in many others, is made an -exception, and I will have to instruct my SS agencies to carry this -out as speedily as possible.” That is what I remember of this conversation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know anything about the anti-Semitic -speech made by the Defendant Von Schirach in September 1942 at -a Congress in Vienna, which the Prosecution submitted to the Court?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, the contents of the speech are known to us.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I want to know whether you know anything -about it, especially whether Schirach said anything to you about -why he made this anti-Semitic speech?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know from the press officer Günther Kaufmann, -who was mentioned yesterday, that directly after this speech Von -Schirach instructed Kaufmann that every point in the speech should -be telephoned to the DNB (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro) in Berlin, -with the remark that he had every reason to make a concession to -Bormann on this point.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why a concession?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I assume that Schirach knew that his position in -Vienna was precarious, and that he constantly heard, especially -from the Party Chancellery, that he must take a stricter course in -Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You were Chief of the Central Bureau with -Schirach in Vienna. In this capacity, did all Schirach’s incoming -mail go through you? -<span class='pageno' title='574' id='Page_574'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Not all of his mail, but the great majority of it. -Mail stamped “only direct” and “personal” did not go through my -hands.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But the other mail?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: That went through my office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we have here a number of documents -which have been submitted to the Court. They are the activity and -situation reports which the Chief of the Security Police made, I -believe, monthly or weekly and which have been submitted to the -Court under Number 3943-PS. These reports came from Vienna, -and since you know the situation in the Central Bureau in Vienna -and are well-informed about its activity, I will now hand you -several of these documents. Please look at the documents and then -tell us whether from these documents, which are photostat copies, -you can determine whether these reports of the SS came to you or -to the Defendant Von Schirach, or whether they went to a different -office. I call your special attention to the manner in which these -documents are annotated. Please note on the individual documents -who initialed the document and what was done with the document -after that. And then please tell us who these officials are who figure -in the documents as officials of the Reich Defense Commission; for -instance, a Dr. Fischer, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Those are the documents, Mr. President, about which the Court -asked questions the other day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know they are, but I do not know -what the question is exactly. It seems to me there are a great -number of questions. Well, let us get on, Dr. Sauter. We shall have -to consider these documents, you know, and the witness ought to -be able to give his answer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President. Of course, the witness has to -look at the documents first. He must especially note which officials -initialed the documents and what the officials did with them. That -is what I must ask the witness, in order to ascertain what the -documents...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought that he had seen these -documents before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: No; they were just handed over in cross-examination. -I could not discuss them previously with the witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: They were certainly handed over before this -morning.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Not to the witness—to me, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, get on, Dr. Sauter, get on. -<span class='pageno' title='575' id='Page_575'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what do these documents tell you? Did -they come to the knowledge of the Defendant Von Schirach, or how -were they dealt with?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: These documents did not go through the Central -Bureau. I see here that they are initialed by a Dr. Felber. I know -him. He was the expert assigned to the Regierungspräsident in -Vienna for all matters concerning the Reich Defense Commissioner.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>From the treatment given these documents, I must assume that -the Berlin SD agency sent them directly to the office of the Regierungspräsident, -and from there they were entered into the files, -as I see here. I do not see Von Schirach’s initials here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Regierungspräsident was a certain Dellbrügge?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Dr. Dellbrügge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And this Dr. Felber whom you mentioned was an -official of the Regierungspräsident?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, an official of the Regierungspräsident.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And when such a document as you have there -arrived, where did the post office or any other agency deliver it? -Was it delivered to you or did the Regierungspräsident have his -own office for incoming mail, or how was it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I already said that they must have been sent directly -to the office of the Regierungspräsident, who had his own office for -incoming mail.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How can you tell that the Defendant Von Schirach -had no knowledge of these documents?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Because he did not initial these documents. If documents -were submitted to him, they were initialed “z.K.g.”—noted—“B.v.S.,” -and that does not appear on these documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, I do not think the Prosecution -suggested that they were initialed by Von Schirach. It was quite -clearly brought out in Von Schirach’s evidence that he had not -initialed them, and that fact was not challenged by Mr. Dodd.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I believe it is a decisive point -whether Defendant Von Schirach had any knowledge of these -documents.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Why do you keep asking whether they were -initialed by him or not? That fact, as I have pointed out, has already -been proved and not challenged.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have here an additional collection of -documents under Number 3876-PS. They are additional reports -from the Chief of the Security Police. There is another address -<span class='pageno' title='576' id='Page_576'></span> -on these. It says here, among other things: “To the Reich Defense -Commissioner for the Defense District XVII”—that was Vienna—“for -the attention of Oberregierungsrat Dr. Fischer in Vienna.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am interested in knowing who Dr. Fischer was. Was he in the -Central Bureau, or who was he?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I do not know a Dr. Fischer either in the Central -Bureau or in the Reichsstatthalterei.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then how do you explain the fact that in these -reports it always says, “To the Reich Defense Commissioner for the -Defense District XVII, for the attention of Oberregierungsrat -Dr. Fischer?”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I assume he was a colleague of Oberregierungsrat -Dr. Felber, who specialized in these matters. Also I see they were -secret letters, and were therefore addressed to him personally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As far as you know, did not the Regierungspräsident -Dellbrügge report to the Defendant Von Schirach on -these reports which reached him, or have one of his officials report -about them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The Regierungspräsident reported directly to Herr -Von Schirach about matters concerning the Reich Governor and the -Reich Defense Commissioner. I was not present at these conversations; -consequently I cannot say to what extent he reported to -Von Schirach on these matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: If the Regierungspräsident or one of his officials -reported to the Defendant Von Schirach on these reports, would -that be shown in the documents?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Probably yes. In that case the Regierungspräsident -or the officials would have had to write on them “To be filed after -being reported to the Reich Governor,” or “for further action.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: On the documents which I submitted to you there -is no such indication?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: On these documents, no.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And on the documents which I have here, there is -no such note either. Do you conclude from this that the Defendant -Von Schirach received no report on them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I must conclude that Von Schirach was not informed -on these matters.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Defendant Von Schirach was chief of -the state administration in Vienna in his capacity as Reich Governor, -as well as chief of the local administration to a certain extent -as mayor, and finally chief of the Party as Gauleiter. Now, we hear -that in each of these capacities he had a permanent representative. -<span class='pageno' title='577' id='Page_577'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should like to know who normally administered the affairs of -the Reich Defense Commissioner and the Reich Governor; that is, -the affairs of the state administration?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I have already said that it was the Regierungspräsident, -Dr. Dellbrügge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then what did the Defendant Von Schirach do -in the field of state administration?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: He was given regular reports by the Regierungspräsident. -Von Schirach then made his decision, and these decisions -were then carried out by the officials or departments.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: If I understand you correctly, the Defendant -Von Schirach concerned himself only with such matters as were -reported to him by the Regierungspräsident or which were brought -to his special attention in writing; is that true?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, that is true.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, were you yourself a member of the SS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I was never a member of the SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Of the SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that these three permanent representatives, -whom the Defendant Von Schirach had in Vienna, -namely the Regierungspräsident, the Deputy Gauleiter, and the -Mayor, were all three SS Führer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I know that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How was that? Did the Defendant Von Schirach -select these men himself, or how do you explain the fact that all -three of his representatives were SS Führer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The Deputy Gauleiter, Scharizer, was an honorary -SS Führer and, as far as I recall, he was Oberbefehlsleiter of the -Party. When Von Schirach came to Vienna, Scharizer had already -been active for several years in Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As what?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: As Deputy Gauleiter. I do not know when the Regierungspräsident, -Dr. Dellbrügge, came to Vienna; but I assume -either before or at about the same time as Von Schirach. Moreover, -the Regierungspräsidenten were appointed by the Ministry of the -Interior, so that I think he could hardly have had sufficient influence -to refuse or select a particular Regierungspräsident.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>As for the mayor, the situation was similar.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: He was a certain Blaschke? -<span class='pageno' title='578' id='Page_578'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes. He was SS Brigadeführer Blaschke, he was also -appointed by the Ministry of the Interior as acting mayor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: By the Ministry of the Interior?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When was that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I believe that was in 1944, in January or February -of 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that this SS Brigadeführer, or -whatever he was, this Blaschke, before the time of the Defendant -Von Schirach, was active in Vienna as a town councillor, and I -believe also as vice mayor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: He was a town councillor before; and I believe he -was vice mayor before I came to Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that the Defendant Von Schirach -for a long time opposed this SS Oberführer or Brigadeführer -Blaschke being appointed mayor of Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I should say he opposed this for about 6 or 9 months, -and I believe later he refused to allow the Minister of the Interior -finally to confirm his appointment as mayor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what were the relations between the -Defendant Von Schirach and the SS and the SS officers? Were they -especially friendly and cordial or what were they like?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: As far as I know, Schirach associated with the SS -Führer as far as was officially necessary and no more.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was he friendly with SS men?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No; I do not know. In any case I knew of no such -friendship.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did he not express to you his attitude toward -the SS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I have already said that he always had the feeling -that he was under a certain supervision from them and for that -reason he was rather distrustful.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Distrustful of...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Of the SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know how the Defendant -Von Schirach received his information about the foreign press and -foreign press reports?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: He received them from the Reich Propaganda Office -in Vienna. They were excerpts which the Propaganda Ministry -<span class='pageno' title='579' id='Page_579'></span> -issued in collaboration with the Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich. As -far as I know, however, they were selected and screened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you live for a long time with Von Schirach in -Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: From 1944 on I lived in Schirach’s house.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You also took your meals with him?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I also took meals with him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did not the Defendant Von Schirach obtain information -from the foreign radio?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I am almost certain he did not, because after every -meal he listened to the official German news services with me and a -few other co-workers. Besides, if he had done so it would in my -opinion have become known very soon for, as I said already, he had -the feeling that he was being watched.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the witness can only tell us what -he knows. How could he know whether Von Schirach ever listened -to any foreign news? If he does not know, why do you not take him -on to something else?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The witness said, Mr. President, that during the -latter part of his time in Vienna, from the spring of 1944 I believe -he said, he lived in the house of the Defendant Von Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know he said that, and he said that he -did not think he heard foreign news. What more can he give? What -more evidence can he give on that subject?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I wanted to hear that, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But he said it already. I have taken it down. -Why do you not go on to something else?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know that in the last weeks of -the resistance an order came to Vienna from Berlin according to -which all defeatists, whether men or women, were to be hanged? -What attitude did Schirach take toward this order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know that so-called courts martial were to be set -up with the purpose of speedily sentencing people who objected to -the conduct of the war or who showed themselves to be defeatists. -This court martial was set up in Vienna, or rather appointed, but -it did not meet once, and thus did not pronounce any sentences.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did the court martial of the Defendant Von -Schirach carry on any proceedings at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, not to my knowledge.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know anything about it? -<span class='pageno' title='580' id='Page_580'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, that fact, again, was given in -evidence by Von Schirach and was not cross-examined to—that that -court martial did not meet.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know anything about the fact that -in the last weeks an order came to form <span class='it'>franc-tireur</span> units? What -was Von Schirach’s attitude to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I do not know that <span class='it'>franc-tireur</span> units were to be -formed, but I do know that a “Freikorps Hitler” was to be formed. -They were to be in civilian clothes. Schirach ordered that no people -from the Reichsgau Vienna were to be assigned to this “Freikorps.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Because at that time he considered resistance -senseless. Secondly, because he considered it contrary to international -law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: My last question to you, Witness. You were with -Schirach to the last, until he left Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Schirach give an order to destroy bridges or -churches, residential quarters, and so forth, in Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not know of that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was the position he took?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: That orders to blow up bridges or to take any -defense measures were given only by the military authorities, as far -as I know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But not by Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no more questions to put to -this witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to -ask questions? The Prosecution?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Witness, would you see all of the files that were in -Von Schirach’s office during the time that you were his adjutant?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I have already told you, or I told the defense -counsel, that most of the mail went through the Central Bureau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I want to show you a document that is in evidence -here and ask you if you can tell us whether or not you have seen -this before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>A document was handed to the witness.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Have you ever seen that document before? -<span class='pageno' title='581' id='Page_581'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I do not know this document officially, as I see it is -dated 28 May 1942, at which time I was an officer in the Luftwaffe.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I see, you did not mean the Tribunal to understand -that you were familiar with everything that was in Von Schirach’s -files, because certainly this document was there during the years -that you were his adjutant. You never saw it. It is marked “Central -Bureau,” and you had charge of these very files, yet you never saw -this teletype to Bormann? So you certainly did not know everything -that was in his files, did you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I said that the majority of the mail went through -my offices but, of course, since I was not in Vienna at this time but -only came to Vienna in April 1943, I was not able to look through -all the back documents and letters in the files of the Reich Governor. -That would have taken years.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me ask you something else. You were there in -the last days, I assume, when the city was taken by the Allied -Forces, were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I was in Vienna until April 1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What was done with Von Schirach’s files when the -end was very obviously coming? What did you do with all those -files over which you had control?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I was not in charge of any files. I was chief of the -bureau, and I...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you know what I mean—chief of the bureau -or of the office where these files were kept. What I want to know is -what did you do with the files?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I gave no orders in this connection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know what became of the files?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: They were taken out of the office sometime before -the city was captured; do you not know that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I did not know that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were the files there the last day that you were -there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Probably, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not want a “probably.” I want to know if you -know and if you do, to tell us. Were they there or not the last day -that you were in the office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I gave no orders to destroy them or to remove them. -<span class='pageno' title='582' id='Page_582'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not ask you if you gave orders. I asked you -if you know what became of them and whether or not they were in -the office the last day that you were there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I do not know what happened to them. Nor can I -say whether they were still there on the last day.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you not know that they were all moved to a salt -mine in Austria?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not know that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You have never heard that, or that they were taken -out of the office and were later found by the Allied Forces in a -salt mine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not know that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not mean that you heard they were found -there, but you certainly knew that they were taken out of the office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not know. I also gave no orders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, let me put this proposition to you, and -then perhaps you can give an explanation of it to the Tribunal. -This document that I have just shown to you and these reports that -you examined for Dr. Sauter were all found in Schirach’s files in a -salt mine. Would you have any explanation for that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I cannot explain that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: They were found together. Would that mean -anything to you, or would you have any explanation for it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I have not. I can only explain that by saying -that probably the Chief of the Reich Governor’s office or one of his -officials who was in charge of these things gave the order to that -effect, of course without my knowledge and without any order -from me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Tell the Tribunal exactly what day you closed up -your office in Vienna, or the last day that you were in this office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: It might have been the 3d or 4th of April.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When was the city taken?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I read in the newspaper afterwards that the city -finally fell into the hands of the Allies on 13 April.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you all leave your office on the 3d or 4th of -April? Did Von Schirach leave as well, and all the clerical staff, -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Schirach and I and his adjutant left the office on this -day, or rather, Schirach had previously set up his office at his home -and was working there. -<span class='pageno' title='583' id='Page_583'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Had he taken any files from his office to his home?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Only what he needed immediately to carry on his -business; that is, the matters which were being dealt with at the -moment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you leave someone in charge of the files when -you left there, you and Von Schirach on the 3d of April; and if -you did, who was it that you left in charge?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I did not leave anyone to supervise. The file clerks -did that of their own accord.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am trying to understand—and I think it would be -helpful to the Tribunal—whether or not you just walked out of this -office and left everything there, or whether just you and Von Schirach -left and left other people there, or whether the place was in such -chaos that nobody remained. I have not any accurate picture of it, -and I think it is of some importance. You ought to be able to tell us. -You left there with him. What was the situation on the 3d or 4th -of April? The city was practically to be taken in another 10 days. -It was under siege. There was much confusion. What were you -doing about your files and all of your other papers in your office -when you walked out of there that day? You certainly just did not -walk out and not give some directions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I believe that we are not clear about the character -of the Central Bureau. The Central Bureau, of which I was in -charge for the last few months, had no powers, no executive powers, -but all of these things were done by the competent Reich Governor, -that is, the Regierungspräsident, and he probably...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not need any explanation of how your office -was set up. I want to know if the papers were left there or not, -or if anybody was left with them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The papers, as far as I know, were left there, and -the archivists were instructed to take care of them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you order any papers to be destroyed before you -walked out that day, the 3d or 4th of April, anything at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I gave no orders to destroy anything in the Reich -Governor’s Office; I had no authority to do that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did anybody to your knowledge order anything -destroyed, whether you did or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Whether such an order was given and who gave it, -I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the document you put to him? -<span class='pageno' title='584' id='Page_584'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Number USA-865. It is Document 3877-PS, a teletype -to Bormann from Von Schirach on 28 May 1942.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine the witness, -Dr. Sauter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I should like to go back to what the -Prosecution just asked you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The documents of the Reich Governor’s office apparently are -supposed to have been found in a salt mine. Did you have any -supervision over the documents of the Reich Governor’s office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I had no supervision over these documents. I -just explained that. For that reason, I could not give any order to -remove them. I know that valuable objects, pictures, and so on, -were removed, but much earlier.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And the other employees of the Central Bureau, -were they Viennese? Did they stay in the office, or what do you -know about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Most of them were Viennese, of course, and probably -remained behind. I shook hands and said goodbye to them, and -then we separated. I also asked whether I could do anything for -them, and then I left Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions, Mr. President.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Perhaps we had better adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the application on behalf -of the Defendant Bormann the Tribunal allows witness Number 1, -Miss Else Krüger.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal allows witnesses Numbers 3 and 4, Dr. Klopfer and -Helmuth Friedrich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal also allows the witness whose name I have got -inserted instead of Number 2, Christians, I think it was.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>With reference to the documents applied for, Numbers 1 to 7, -the application is refused. But the Tribunal will consider any -application for documents which the defendants’ counsel, who may -be appointed to argue the general questions of law on behalf of all -the defendants, may wish to have translated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Document Number 11 may be translated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Counsel for the Defendant Bormann may see the documents -which are mentioned under Roman Number III in the application -<span class='pageno' title='585' id='Page_585'></span> -and counsel for the Defendant Bormann may also use the documents -contained under heading “B.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The final decision upon the admissibility of all these documents -is, of course, a matter which will be decided at the time the documents -are presented.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is one other thing that I want to announce, and it is in -answer to the application of Dr. Servatius on behalf of the Defendant -Sauckel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I am told that the witness Timm is in Nuremberg prison. The -witness Biedemann is also in Nuremberg prison. The witness -Hildebrandt will probably arrive in Nuremberg today. His whereabouts -had been lost and he has only just been rediscovered. The -witness Jäger is in the British zone, and the British secretary is -trying through the military authorities to obtain his attendance; -The witness Stothfang has not been located. There appears to be -a mistake in the identity of the person who was reported to the -General Secretary previously. The witness Mitschke has never been -located, although every effort is now being made to locate him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I ask permission to call a further witness, Fritz -Wieshofer. I shall examine this witness only very briefly, because -most points have already been clarified through the other witnesses.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Wieshofer took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRITZ WIESHOFER (Witness): Fritz Wieshofer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Wieshofer, how old are you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: 31 years old.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Married?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Children?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: One son.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you a member of the Party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I applied for membership in 1938.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You only applied for membership?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes. -<span class='pageno' title='586' id='Page_586'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you a member of the SS or the SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was in the Waffen-SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Since when?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Since June 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Are you Austrian by birth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I am Austrian.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you join the Reich Youth Leader’s -Office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I joined Herr Von Schirach on 3 October 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what did you do before that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Before that I had a temporary post in the Foreign -Office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: For how long?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Only from May until October 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And before that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Before that I was employed in the Gauleiter’s -office in Carinthia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you have anything to do with the Hitler Youth?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In October of 1940, then, you came to Vienna to -join Von Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes, to Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In what capacity did you go there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I went there as Von Schirach’s adjutant.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what did your duties mostly consist of?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: As adjutant I was responsible for the handling of -the mail, engagements for conferences, seeing to it that files were -presented on time at conferences, travel arrangements, and so on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you only work for Schirach in his capacity as -Reich Governor, as Gauleiter, or did you act for him only as mayor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was adjutant for Herr Von Schirach in all his -capacities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you also have access to the secret files?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I shall only have a very few brief -questions to put to you. First of all, I am interested in this: Who -was responsible for the forced evacuation of Jews from Vienna? -<span class='pageno' title='587' id='Page_587'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The forced evacuation of Jews from Vienna, as -far as I know, was handled by the RSHA. The representative in -Vienna was a certain Dr. Brunner, an Obersturmführer in the SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you often visit Dr. Brunner officially in connection -with the forced evacuation of Jews, and for what reason?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: In some cases, Jews who were affected by this -forced evacuation made written applications to Von Schirach to be -left out of the transport. In such cases, Von Schirach, through the -Chief of his Central Bureau, took the matter up with Dr. Brunner’s -office and asked that the request of the applicant be granted. I -would say that generally this was done by the Chief of the Central -Bureau. I remember two cases where I myself received instructions -to intervene with Dr. Brunner, not by writing or telephoning, but -by going to see him personally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what did this SS Sturmführer Dr. Brunner -tell you about what was actually going to happen to the Jews when -they were taken away from Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Dr. Brunner only told me, on the occasion of one -of these interventions, that the action of resettling the Jews would -be a resettlement from the district of Vienna into the zone of the -former Government General. He also told me in what way this was -being carried out. For instance he said that women and small -children would travel in second-class carriages; that sufficient -rations for the journey and milk for small children would be -provided. He also told me that these resettled persons, upon arrival -at their destination, insofar as they were capable of working, would -immediately be put to work. First of all, they would be put into -assembly camps, but that as soon as accommodation was available, -they would be given homes, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. He also told me that because -of the numerous interventions by Herr Von Schirach his work had -been made very difficult.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you, or have you—I will put my next question -this way: Did you ever see an order in which Gauleiter were -forbidden to intervene in any way on behalf of Jews, and did you -discuss that order with Von Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I recollect a written order which we received -either at the end of 1940 or at the beginning of 1941. It stated that -“There are reasons which make it necessary once more to point out,” -<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. It obviously was a repetition of an order which had -already been given. The purport of the order was that because of -certain reasons, Gauleiter were prohibited from intervening on -behalf of Jews in the future.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you talk about that with Schirach? -<span class='pageno' title='588' id='Page_588'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I talked to Herr Von Schirach about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What did he say?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: As far as I can recollect, Von Schirach wrote on -the order “To be filed.” He did not say anything more about it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I have another question, Witness. The Defendant -Von Schirach was once in the concentration camp at Mauthausen. -Can you tell us when that was?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I cannot tell you that exactly. All I can say on -that subject is that when I came back from the front—and this was -either in the autumn of 1942 or in June 1943—the adjutant who -was on duty at the time told me that he had accompanied Herr -Von Schirach to a concentration camp, Mauthausen Camp. Some -time afterwards—it must have been when I came back from the -front the second time, at the end of 1943—Herr Von Schirach also -told me that he had been to Mauthausen. I only recollect that he -said that he had heard a symphony concert there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Well, we are not interested in that; we have heard -that. I am only interested in one thing: Did he visit Mauthausen -or another concentration camp again later on? Can you give us -reliable information on that or not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I can give you reliable information on that. That -is quite out of the question, because from November 1943 until the -collapse I was continuously on duty and I knew where Von Schirach -was, day and night.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did he go to Mauthausen again in 1944?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No, certainly not, that is out of the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you remember that toward the end of the -war there were orders coming from some source or other stating -that enemy airmen who had been forced to land were no longer to -be protected. Do you know of that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That somewhere such orders were issued?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was the attitude of Defendant Von Schirach -regarding such orders, and how do you know about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I talked about these orders with Herr Von Schirach. -Von Schirach was always against the idea contained in the order, -and he always said that these airmen, too, should be treated as -prisoners of war. Once he said: “If we do not do that, then there -is the danger that our enemies, too, will treat their prisoners, that -is Germans, in the same manner.” -<span class='pageno' title='589' id='Page_589'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you yourself know of cases where Defendant -Von Schirach actually intervened on behalf of enemy airmen in -that way?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Will you please tell us about it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: During one of the last air attacks on Vienna, in -March 1945, an American plane was shot down and crashed near -the headquarters of the Gau command post. That command post -was on a wooded hill in Vienna to which part of the population -used to go during air attacks. Von Schirach was watching from a -32-meter high iron structure on which he would always stand -during air attacks, and he observed that a member of the American -crew bailed out of the aircraft. He immediately ordered the commander -in charge of this command post to drive to the place of the -landing so as to protect the American soldier against the crowd and -bring him to safety. The American soldier was brought to the -command post and after the air attack he was handed over to the -Air Force Command XVII as a prisoner of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you leave Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I left Vienna with Herr Von Schirach on 13 April -1945.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: On 13 April together with the Defendant Von -Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Together with Herr Von Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Now, this is the last question I have to put to -you: Witness, have you ever heard from Schirach’s lips anything to -the effect that Vienna was to be held “to the last man” at all costs, -or that destruction should be carried out in Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have never heard him say either the one or -the other.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put -this witness.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, do you know the Prater in Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes, of course, I am Viennese.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of an institution is that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The Prater is, or at least was, a pleasure park.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was it closed during the war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The Prater was not closed during the war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of people used to go there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: During the war you mean? -<span class='pageno' title='590' id='Page_590'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Workers, employees, civil servants, that is the -Viennese, the whole of Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you also see foreign workers there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: A great many or just a few?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The situation in Vienna was such that we used to -say that if you wanted to go to the Prater then you would have to -be able to speak French and Russian, because with Viennese alone -you could not get along. The Prater was overcrowded with foreign -workers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How were these foreigners dressed, badly -or well?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: These foreigners were well dressed, so that you -could not distinguish them from the population. Only when they -talked could you recognize that they were foreigners.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How did they look otherwise? As regards -food, did they look starved?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: As far as I myself could see, the workers looked -perfectly well fed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did the people have money?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: They had lots of money. It was known that the -“black market” in Vienna was almost entirely dominated by foreign -workers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could foreigners be seen only in the Prater or -were they to be seen everywhere in the town?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Not only in the Prater, but also in the rest of the -town, in cafés, of which there are so many in Vienna, in restaurants, -and in hotels.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Whom, besides the Defendant Von Schirach, do you -know of these defendants? And by “know” I mean know personally, -or have some acquaintanceship with the person, or had something -to do with the person?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Personally, I only know Herr Funk.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know Sauckel?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, who else?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I know Herr Seyss-Inquart, but I did not have -any personal dealings with him. I was the adjutant of Von Schirach. -<span class='pageno' title='591' id='Page_591'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How do you know Funk?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was invited by Herr Funk a few times. Officially, -as adjutant of Herr Von Schirach, I had some dealings with -him, and apart from that, he invited me several times privately.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were you in the SS at that time, when you were -invited by Funk?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: At that time I was in the Waffen-SS as an officer.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: By the way, when did you first join the SS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I joined the Waffen-SS on 26 June 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were you in any other branch of the SS besides the -Waffen-SS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was also in the General SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When did you join the General SS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: In June or July 1939.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: So you were actually in the SS from as far back -as 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: In the General SS; yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, you also became an SS Obersturmführer at -one time, did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When was that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I became Obersturmführer about 21 June 1944.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When did you join the SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I joined the SA on 9 May 1932.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you know the Strasshof Camp, S-t-r-a-s-s-h-o-f?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: This is the first time I have heard that name.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it may have been mispronounced. It was a -camp located outside Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I do not know which camp you mean. I understood -Strasshof. I do not know of any such camp.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, something like that. You never heard of that -camp?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Never.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you were in Vienna from what year?—19...?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was born in Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I know you were, but I am talking about -your service with the Defendant Schirach. You were there with him -for how long? -<span class='pageno' title='592' id='Page_592'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: From the beginning of October 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you never heard of Strasshof?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you have much to do with the files of this -Defendant Von Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What would you say you had to do with them? -What was your responsibility?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I merely had to see to it that files were presented -in good time for the conference, and that after they had been used -they were returned to the Central Bureau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Where would you go to get a file for Von Schirach -that had to do with the Reich Defense Commission for that district -or that defense district? Where would you go to get a file that had -to do with matters concerning the Reich Defense Commission? Now, -let us assume a situation—let me make it clear to you. Say that -Von Schirach tells you he wants a file about a certain matter that -has to do with the Reich Defense Commission. You had to have it -on his desk by a certain hour and see that it was there, as you say. -Tell the Tribunal just what you would do, where you would go, -who you would talk to, and how you would get that for him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: That would be simple for me. I would apply to -the Chief of the Central Bureau, knowing that he would probably -have to go to the Regierungspräsident to obtain that file. That is -what I assume. I myself would only have gone to the Central -Bureau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You had a central filing place, did you not, for all -of your files, whether they were under the Reich Defense Commission -or the Gauleiter or the civil government of Vienna; is that not -so? They were all kept in one place?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: They were not all together in one place; only a -part of the files were in the Central Bureau. I cannot tell you -which part because I have never had anything to do with that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You left Vienna on 13 April, you say, with Von -Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I suppose, as his adjutant, you had to make considerable -preparations for leaving for some days previously, did -you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What did you pack up? What did you take with you? -<span class='pageno' title='593' id='Page_593'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: We did not take anything with us from Vienna. -Von Schirach went by car, and the gentlemen on his staff went in -two or three other cars. Nothing else was taken along from Vienna.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, what did you do in the office; how did you -leave it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: We had not used the office since, I think, the -spring or early summer of 1944, because the “Ballhausplatz,” that -is, the office of the Reich Governor, had a direct hit and Von Schirach -could no longer work there. He was working in his apartment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In his apartment? And did he have all his files in -his apartment or somewhere near at hand?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: He had no files whatever in his apartment. They -remained in the office, in that part of the Reich Governor’s building -which was still being used and in which one could still work.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were any files taken out of the filing department of -the Reich Governor’s Office when you left Vienna, or before you -left Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I do not know anything about that. I know that -an order existed, both for the State Administration as well as for -the Party, that files must be destroyed when the enemy approached. -Whether that was done or what actually happened to the files, I do -not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Who got that order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The order, as far as the Party channels were concerned, -went to the deputy Gauleiter, and as far as the State Administration -was concerned, to the Regierungspräsident.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you also receive an order to start moving your -files to places of safety some time in the spring of 1945 or even the -late winter of 1944?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have no recollection of such an order.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know that some 250 folders of your files -were moved to a salt mine outside Vienna? Do you know anything -about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No, I hear that for the first time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know that there is such a mine near Vienna? -You have lived there quite a while, I gather.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. It is not near Vienna—if I may be permitted -to put this matter right—but near Salzburg; we never lived there. -I only know that this mine exists.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How far is it from Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Approximately 350 kilometers. -<span class='pageno' title='594' id='Page_594'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You do not know anything about any files being -taken there. You are sure about that, are you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I am absolutely certain; I do not know anything -about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I have just one other question to ask. I suppose you -knew the defendant pretty well. He is a little older than you, but -you had worked for him for some time. Is that not so?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Why did you not join the Army instead of the SS -when you wanted to do something for your country?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: When I was called up, the Waffen-SS was considered -the elite unit and I preferred to serve in such a guards unit, -if I may say so, than in the general Armed Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Was it partly due to the fact that you had been in -the General SS since 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. That had nothing to do with it. Many members -of the General SS went to the Forces.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you talk this matter over with your superior, -the Youth Leader Von Schirach, before you joined the SS in 1939, -and the Waffen-SS later on?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. Might I remind you that I did not join Von -Schirach until October 1940, whereas I joined the Waffen-SS on -26 June 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, but you were, I suppose, a young man and you -were in touch with the Reich Youth organization in 1939 when you -joined the General SS. Is that not a fact? Were you not a part of -the Youth organization in 1939?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. I was not taken into the Youth Officers Corps -until April 1944 when I became Bannführer. Before that I had -nothing to do with it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I do not think you understand me. It is not -too important, but how old were you in 1939? You were 24, approximately, -were you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And were you not then in some way affiliated with -the Hitler Youth or the Youth organization in Germany, either as -a member, or having something to do with it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. Neither as a member nor in any other way. -Of course I knew Youth Leaders in Carinthia, yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You were quite a speech maker for the Party, were -you not, during your lifetime? -<span class='pageno' title='595' id='Page_595'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I spoke at several meetings in Carinthia between -April 1938 and May 1940.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: At about how many meetings would you say you -spoke in that period of 2 years?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: During that time I spoke at about 80 meetings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Before an average of about, say, 3,000 persons per -meeting?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I also spoke in very small villages. I would say -that the average attendance would be about 200.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is all I have.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: What were the subjects you talked about at these -meetings?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Our subject was given to us by the Reich Propaganda -Ministry. The meetings were conducted in such a way that -every speaker was able to talk on general matters. For instance -the subject might have been “With the Führer to Final Victory,” -or “Why Welfare for the Nation?” or “Why Winter Relief?” Such -subjects were always given.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did you spread Rosenberg’s <span class='it'>Myth of the 20th -Century</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did you speak about such subjects?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Never; in view of my education I would not have -been in a position to do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Have you ever read this <span class='it'>Myth</span>?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have not read the <span class='it'>Myth</span>.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did you speak to youth at these meetings?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I did not speak to youth—that is, not particularly -to youth.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Thank you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I do not wish to put any questions -to the witness; thank you very much.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Witness, did Schirach have any -authority to intervene in case of Jews who were being deported -from Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: He had no authority to do so, but he did it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many times did he intervene?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I cannot recollect a single case where Von Schirach -did not intervene when he received a petition. -<span class='pageno' title='596' id='Page_596'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask that; I asked how -many times he intervened.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I cannot give you any figure without being inaccurate. -It is difficult to say.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did he intervene many times, or -a few?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. He intervened often.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you see the order to the -Police not to protect aviators? You said it was in writing, did -you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Who signed it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The order was signed by Bormann.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And was it distributed to the -Police in Vienna?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: By the Police? If I have understood you rightly, -you were talking about the order that Gauleiter must not intervene -on behalf of Jews.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No. This was the order about not -protecting aviators who had crashed. You said you saw that order, -did you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I did see the order, yes. I can no longer remember -whom it came from and to whom it was addressed. It was merely -sent to our office for our information. We were not called upon -to take any action.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you not know whether or not -the Police had a copy of it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Please, will you be good enough to repeat the -question?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know whether or not the -Police in Vienna had copies of the order?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: That I do not know.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you ever know Himmler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have seen him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did he give you any instructions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you get any instructions -from the SS?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: In which way do you mean? -<span class='pageno' title='597' id='Page_597'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Any instructions from the SS -directly when you were in Von Schirach’s office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): None at all?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: None at all. I cannot recollect any.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think you said once that -Schirach sent a command to save American aviators from the crowd, -did you not? Do you not understand?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes, I understand, and I did say that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And what other efforts did Von -Schirach make to protect aviators from the crowd? Did he make -any other efforts?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did he issue any orders to the -Police or take it up with the Police?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Von Schirach’s opinion was known. In the -circles...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you the opinion. -Did he issue any orders to the Police or talk to the Police?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have no recollection of that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you would know if he had, -would you not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: If I had been present when he gave the orders -then I would know it, but it is possible that he talked when I was -not there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you say you had access to -the secret files?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What was kept in the secret files?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I did not understand the question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I asked you what was kept, what -was put in the secret files, what sort of papers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: There were secret files which came from the -Supreme Party Headquarters, secret files which came from the -Minister of the Interior; there were things which made one wonder -why they were called “secret.” But as far as details of these files -are concerned, I cannot, of course, today remember them.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I suppose any documents, -any reports, that were marked “secret” would be put in those secret -files, would they not? -<span class='pageno' title='598' id='Page_598'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Reports from us to higher departments, or do you -mean from the top downwards?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Reports coming in to you.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: They would then have been filed in the secret -archives.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And SS secret reports would go -in the secret files, would they not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: SS reports did not come to us, because we were -not a service department of the SS.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you have no questions yourself, Dr. Sauter, -then the witness may retire.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Wieshofer left the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in Schirach’s document book there -are still a few documents which, up to now, have not been expressly -presented; but I believe it is not necessary to read these documents -to you. To save time, I should like, if I may, to refer to the documents -and ask you to take judicial notice of them; for instance, of -the affidavit of Frau Hoepken, which is incorporated in the document -book under Number 3 and which has already been submitted -somewhere else.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is only one document, Mr. President, about which I want -to give a very brief explanation. In the Schirach document book, -under Number 118(a), there is the farewell letter of the explorer -Dr. Colin Ross. With reference to this Dr. Colin Ross, when the documents -were dealt with, the Prosecutor said that the body of Dr. Ross -had not been discovered. My first reaction was of course surprise, -and I made inquiries as to what actually had been done with these -bodies and I discovered that in fact on 30 April 1945, the day before -the arrival of American troops, the bodies of Dr. Colin Ross and his -wife were found in the house of Defendant Von Schirach at Urfeld, -on Lake Walchen. They had both first taken poison and then, to be -quite sure, Dr. Ross shot his wife and then himself. German -soldiers who were still at Urfeld on Lake Walchen as patients at the -time then buried the bodies quite close to the house of the Defendant -Von Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the autumn the American Governor ordered that the bodies -were to be transferred to the cemetery, but eventually he rescinded -that order and permitted the bodies to remain where they had -originally been buried.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, can you indicate in what way -you will submit this document has any relevance at all? We have -<span class='pageno' title='599' id='Page_599'></span> -read the document. It does not appear to have any striking -relevance.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, we have submitted this document -because it is to prove, or at least indicate, that the Defendant Von -Schirach, together with this Dr. Colin Ross, continuously worked -to maintain peace, and later on to limit the war. Therefore it is -submitted only to show that the Defendant Von Schirach worked -for peace.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The document does not mention Von Schirach -or in any way indicate that he had worked for peace.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But it says in the document, “We have done everything -in our power to prevent this war, or...”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the word “We” must mean the -people who “leave this world by our own will,” namely Dr. Colin -Ross and his wife. It does not refer to Von Schirach.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: We do not know that. Why should it not also -refer to Von Schirach?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, because there is such a thing as grammar. -The document begins “We leave this world by our own will.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As to that, Mr. President, may I remind you that -this name, Dr. Colin Ross, has been mentioned very often during -this trial in connection with the peace efforts of the Defendant Von -Schirach, and that Dr. Colin Ross, together with his wife, was -living in Schirach’s apartment when they committed suicide.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, very well, Dr. Sauter, if you wish to -draw our attention to it, you may do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thank you. Mr. President, this letter was not -really meant for the public; the original of the letter was left -behind by Dr. Ross, and a number of carbon copies were sent to -personal friends. In this way we found this letter of Dr. Colin Ross. -I do not think there is anything else I have to say.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have not said anything critical of the letter. -If you want to read some sentences of it, read them; if you do not -we will take judicial notice of it. As I tell you, we have already -read this letter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am not stopping your reading a sentence of -it, if you want to read a sentence of it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: It is of course not necessary, Mr. President, if you -have taken cognizance of it. I have nothing else to say, and at this -point I can end my case for the Defendant Von Schirach. -<span class='pageno' title='600' id='Page_600'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, have you offered in evidence all -the documents which are in these books?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then they will be numbered with the numbers -which are in the books.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then we will take judicial notice -of them all.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, Mr. President, there is one here which the Tribunal -expressly ruled on—the affidavit of Uiberreither. The Defendant -Von Schirach was told he would have to present Uiberreither -if he were to use this affidavit. He has not been presented -here and now the affidavit is being offered. We expressly asked -that he be called here if this affidavit was to be submitted to the -Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I am not making any reference to Uiberreither’s -affidavit, and I will forego calling the witness Uiberreither.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Sauter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Then the affidavit is not offered?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, it is not being offered.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is Page 135.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then it will not be admitted, and we will -adjourn now.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<h2><span class='pageno' title='601' id='Page_601'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, during the presentation of the case -involving the Defendant Funk, there was a number of documents -that we did not submit in evidence at the time; and I asked the -Tribunal’s permission to do so at a later time. I am prepared to -do so now if the Tribunal would care to have me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it would be quite convenient now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The first one is a matter of clarifying the record with respect -to it. It is Document 2828-PS. It has already been offered in evidence -as Exhibit USA-654. But the excerpt, or the extract, which was -read will be found on Page 105 of the document. We cited another -page, which was in error. Reference to this Document USA-654 -will be found on Page 9071 (Volume XIII, Page 141) of the record.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We also offered our Document EC-440, which consisted of a statement -made by the Defendant Funk, and we quoted a sentence from -Page 4 of that document. I wish to offer that as Exhibit USA-874.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then Document 3952-PS was an interrogation of the Defendant -Funk dated 19 October 1945. We wish to offer that as USA-875.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I might remind the Tribunal that the excerpt quoted from that -interrogation had to do with the statement made by Funk that the -Defendant Hess had notified him of the impending attack on the -Soviet Union. That excerpt has been translated into the four -languages, and therefore will be readily available to the Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then there is also another interrogation dated 22 October 1945. -We read from Pages 15 and 16 of that interrogation, as it appears -in the record at Page 9169 for 7 May (Volume XIII, Page 214). The -document is Number 3953-PS; we offer it as Exhibit USA-876.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>We next referred to Document Number 3894-PS, the interrogation -of one Hans Posse. We offered it as Exhibit USA-843 at the -time, as appears on Page 9093 of the record for 6 May (Volume XIII, -Page 158). At that time I stated to the Tribunal that we would -submit the whole interrogation in French, Russian, German, and -English. We are now prepared to do that, and do so.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then we have Document 3954-PS. This is an affidavit by one -Franz B. Wolf, one of the editors of the <span class='it'>Frankfurter Zeitung</span>. -Reference to it will be found at Page 9082 of the transcript, where -we stated that we would have more to say about the reason for -the retention of the editorial staff of the <span class='it'>Frankfurter Zeitung</span> (Volume -XIII, Page 150). That Document, 3954-PS, is also now available -to the Tribunal in French, Russian, German, and English; and -we offer it as Exhibit USA-877. -<span class='pageno' title='602' id='Page_602'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then, Mr. President, a motion picture film was shown during -this cross-examination of the Defendant Funk; and the Tribunal -inquired as to whether or not we would be prepared to submit -affidavits giving its source, and so on. We are now prepared to -do so; and we offer first an affidavit by Captain Sam Harris who -arranged to have the pictures taken, which becomes Exhibit -USA-878. The second affidavit is by the photographer who actually -took the picture. We offer that as Exhibit USA-879.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Finally, I should also like to clear up one other matter. On -March 25, during the cross-examination of the witness Bohle, -witness for the Defendant Hess, Colonel Amen quoted from the -interrogation of Von Strempel, as appears in the record beginning -at Page 6482 (Volume X, Page 40). We have had the pertinent -portions translated into the operating languages of the Tribunal, -and we ask that this interrogation, which bears our Document -Number 3800-PS, be admitted in evidence as Exhibit USA-880.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I believe, Mr. President, that clears up all of the documents that -we have not offered formally, up to this date.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now, counsel for the Defendant Sauckel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I will -now call Defendant Sauckel to the witness stand.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Sauckel took the stand.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>FRITZ SAUCKEL (Defendant): Ernst Friedrich Christoph Sauckel.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear -by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The defendant repeated the oath.</span>]</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, please describe your career to the -Tribunal.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was the only child of the postman Friedrich -Sauckel, and was born at Hassfurt on the Main near Bamberg. I -attended the elementary school at Schweinfurt and the secondary -school.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How long were you at the secondary school?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: For 5 years. As my father held only a very humble -position, it was my mother, a seamstress, who made it possible for -me to go to that school. When she became very ill with heart -trouble, I saw that it would be impossible for my parents to -<span class='pageno' title='603' id='Page_603'></span> -provide for my studies, and I obtained their permission to go to -sea to make a career for myself there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you join the merchant marine, or where -did you go?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: First of all I joined the Norwegian and Swedish -merchant marine so that I could be thoroughly trained in seamanship -on the big sailing vessels and clippers.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How old were you at the time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: At that time I was 15½.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What were you earning?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As a cabin boy on a Norwegian sailing ship I earned -5 kronen in addition to my keep.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And then, in the course of your career at -sea, where did you go next?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the course of my career as a sailor, and during -my training which I continued afterwards on German sailing -vessels, I sailed on every sea and went to every part of the world.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you come into contact with foreign -families?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Through the Young Men’s Christian Association, -principally in Australia and North America, as well as in South -America, I came into contact with families of these countries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Where were you when the first World War -started?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: It so happened that I was on a German sailing -vessel on the way to Australia when the ship was captured, and on -the high seas I was made prisoner by the French.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How long did you remain prisoner?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Five years, until November 1919.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And did you return home then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes, I returned home then.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And then what did you do?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Although I had finished my training and studies -in seamanship required of me, I could not go to sea again and take -my examination, since my savings made during those years at sea -had become worthless because of the German inflation. There -were also few German ships and very many unemployed German -seamen, so I decided to take up work in a factory in my home -town of Schweinfurt. -<span class='pageno' title='604' id='Page_604'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you remain in your home town?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: At first I remained in my home town. I learned to -be a turner and engineer in the Fischer ball-bearing factory in -order to save money so that I later could attend a technical school, -an engineering college.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you already interested in politics at -that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Although as a sailor I despised politics—for I loved -my sailor’s life and still love it today—conditions forced me to -take up a definite attitude towards political problems. No one in -Germany at that time could do otherwise. Many years before I -had left a beautiful country and a rich nation and I returned to -that country 6 years later to find it fundamentally changed and -in a state of upheaval, and in great spiritual and material need.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you join any party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. I worked in a factory which people in my home -town described as “ultra-Red.” I worked in the tool shop, and -right and left of me Social Democrats, Communists, Socialists, and -Anarchists were working—among others my present father-in-law—and -during all the rest periods discussions went on, so that whether -one wanted to or not one became involved in the social problems -of the time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You mention your father-in-law. Did you -marry then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In 1923 I married the daughter of a German workman -I had met at that time. I am still happily married to her -today and we have 10 children.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: When did you join the Party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I joined the Party definitely in 1923 after having -already been in sympathy with it before.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What made you do it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: One of those days I heard a speech of Hitler’s. In -this speech he said that the German factory worker and the German -laborer must make common cause with the German brain worker. -The controversies between the proletariat and the middle class must -be smoothed out and bridged over by each getting to know and -understand the other. Through this a new community of people -would grow up, and only such a community, not bound to middle -class or proletariat, could overcome the dire needs of those days -and the splitting up of the German nation into parties and creeds. -This statement took such hold of me and struck me so forcibly, that -<span class='pageno' title='605' id='Page_605'></span> -I dedicated my life to the idea of adjusting what seemed to be -almost irreconcilable contrasts. I did that all the more, if I may -say so, because I was aware of the fact that there is an inclination -to go to extremes in German people, and in the German -character generally. I had to examine myself very thoroughly to -find the right path for me personally. As I have already said, I had -hardly taken any interest in political questions. My good parents, -who are no longer alive, brought me up in a strictly Christian but -also in a very patriotic way. However, when I went to sea, I -lived a sailor’s life. I loaded saltpeter in Chile. I did heavy lumber -work in Canada, in Quebec. I trimmed coal on the equator, and I -sailed around Cape Horn several times. All of this was hard work; -I ask...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Please, come back to the question of the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: This has to do with the question of the Party, for -we must all give some reasons as to how we got there. I myself...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I stated at the beginning of -the defendant’s case that we had heard this account from the -Defendant Göring and that we did not propose to hear it again -from 20 defendants. It seems to me that we are having it inflicted -upon us by nearly every one of the defendants.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I believe, Mr. President, that we are interested -in getting some sort of an impression of the defendant himself. -Seen from various points of view, the facts look different. I will -now briefly...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is quite true, Dr. Servatius, but we have -had half an hour, almost, of it now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I shall limit it now.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>The Party was dissolved in 1923, and refounded in 1925. Did -you join it again?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you take an active part in the Party or -were you just a member?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: From 1925 on I took an active part in it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what position did you hold?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was then Gauleiter in Thuringia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you do that to get work, to earn your -living, or for what reason?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As Gauleiter in Thuringia I earned 150 marks. In -any other profession I would have had accommodations and earned -more money. -<span class='pageno' title='606' id='Page_606'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: When did you make Hitler’s acquaintance?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I met him briefly in 1925.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: When did you become Gauleiter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I became Gauleiter in 1927.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And how were you appointed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was appointed by letter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any special instructions which -pointed to secret intentions of the Party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: At that time we were very definitely told that under -no circumstances should there be any secret chapters or any other -secrecy in the life of the Party, but that everything should be -done publicly.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Who was your predecessor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Dr. Dinter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Why was he relieved of his post?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Dr. Dinter was dismissed because he wanted to -found a new religious movement within the Party.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: In 1929 you became a member of the -Thuringian Diet?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you elected to that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was elected to the Diet in the same way as at -every parliamentary election.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was dictatorship in power there already at -the time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: That was not possible; the province was governed -in accordance with the Thuringian constitution.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How long were you a member of the Diet?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was a member of the Diet as long as it existed, -until May 1933.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How was it dissolved?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Diet was dissolved by a Reich Government -decree.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Then in 1932, you were a member of the -Provincial Government of Thuringia. How did you get into that -position?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In 1932, in the month of June, new elections took -place for the Thuringian Diet, and the NSDAP obtained 26 out -of 60 seats. -<span class='pageno' title='607' id='Page_607'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was any mention made of a dictatorship which -was to be aimed at?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, a government was elected according to parliamentary -principles.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Well, you had a majority in the Thuringian -Government, had you not, and you could use your influence?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Together with the bourgeois parties, by an absolute -majority, a National Socialist government was elected.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What happened to the old officials? Were -they dismissed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I myself became the President and Minister of the -Interior in that government; the old officials, without exception, -remained in their offices.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And with what did that first National Socialist -government concern itself in the field of domestic politics?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the field of domestic politics there was only one -question at that time, and that was the alleviation of an indescribable -distress which is only exceeded by that of today.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: In this connection, Mr. President, may I submit -two government reports from which I only wish to draw your -attention briefly to two passages. One is the report contained in -Document Number 96, which shows the activity of the government -and its fight against social distress. What is particularly important -when you run through it, is what is not mentioned, that is, there -is no mention of the question of war or other such matters, but -again and again the alleviation of distress is mentioned. And -important, too, is the work that was carried out. That is in Document -Number 97. In this book, on Page 45, there is a statement -of the work undertaken by the government—bridge-building, road-making, -and so on—and in no way had this work anything to do -with war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Then I am submitting Document Number 95 from the same -period. It is a book called <span class='it'>Sauckel’s Fighting Speeches</span>. Here, too, -the book is remarkable for what does not appear in it, namely -preparations for war. Instead it emphasizes the distress which must -be alleviated. It becomes clear from the individual articles that -these are speeches made during a number of years, which show -in a similar way what the preoccupations were of the Defendant -Sauckel. It begins in 1932 with a speech dealing with the misery -of the time, and ends with the final questions where reference is -made once again to the alleviation of social need and the preservation -of peace. The Tribunal will be able to read these articles in -the document book. -<span class='pageno' title='608' id='Page_608'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>In 1933 you also became Reich Regent of Thuringia. How did -you manage to get to that position?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was appointed Reich Regent of Thuringia by Field -Marshal Von Hindenburg, who was Reich President at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What were the instructions you received when -you took up your offices?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When I took over my office as Reich Regent I -received instructions to form a new Thuringian Government, as -the Reich Regent was to keep out of the administrative affairs of -a German state...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You need not tell us these technical details. -I mean what political task were you given?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was given the political task of administering -Thuringia as Reich Regent within the existing Reich law and -prevailing Constitution, and of guaranteeing the unity of the Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And did the words “guarantee the unity of -the Reich” mean the overpowering of others, in particular the -authorities in Thuringia?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, the authorities remained.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Now, you held both the position of Gauleiter -and that of Reich Regent. What was the aim of that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Both positions were entirely separate in their organizations. -Under the Regent were officials in office, and under the -Gauleiter were employees of the Party. Both positions were administered -absolutely separately, as is the case in any other state -where members of a party are at the same time party officials or -leaders and exercise both these functions simultaneously.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: So you received no order that one position -should absorb the other?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, I had no such orders. The tasks were entirely -different.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you a member of the SA?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I myself was never an SA man. I was an honorary -Obergruppenführer in the SA.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How did you receive that appointment?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you. It was honorary.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you appointed SS Obergruppenführer by -Himmler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, the Führer made me honorary SS Obergruppenführer -for no special reason and without functions. -<span class='pageno' title='609' id='Page_609'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you a member of the Reichstag?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes, from 1933 on.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: As a member of the Reichstag, did you know -anything in advance about the beginning of the war? Were you -informed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was never informed in advance about the start -of the war or about foreign political developments. I merely -remember that quite suddenly—it may have been during the days -between 24 August and the end of August—we were called to a -session of the Reichstag in Berlin. This session was canceled at -the time, and we were later ordered to go to the Führer, that is, the -Gauleiter and Reichsleiter. But a number had already left so that -the circle was not complete. The conference, or Hitler’s speech, -only lasted a short time. He said, roughly, that the meeting of the -Reichstag could not take place as things were still in the course -of development. He was convinced that there would not be a war. -He said he hoped there would be some settlement in a small way -and meant by that, as I had to conclude, a solution without the -parts of Upper Silesia lost in 1921. He said—and that I remember -exactly—that Danzig would become German, and apart from that -Germany would be given a railway line with several tracks, like a -Reichsautobahn, with a strip of ground to the right and left of it. -He told us to go home and prepare for the Reich Party Rally, where -we would meet again.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any close connections with the -Führer?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I personally, as far as I know the Führer, had a -great deal of admiration for him. But I had no close connection -with him that one could describe as personal. I had a number of -discussions with him about the administration of my Gau and in -particular about the care he wished to be given to cultural buildings -in Thuringia—in Weimar, Eisenach, and Meiningen; and later on -there were more frequent meetings because of my position as Plenipotentiary -General for the Allocation of Labor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: We shall come to that later. What connections -did you have with the Reichsleiter?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My connections with the Reichsleiter were no different -from my connections with the Führer. They were of an official -and Party nature. As regards personal relationships I cannot say -that I had any particularly personal intercourse with anyone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What about your connection with the Reich -Ministers? -<span class='pageno' title='610' id='Page_610'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My connection with the Reich Ministers was of a -purely official nature and was very infrequent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What about the Wehrmacht?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I could not have the honor of being a German -soldier because of my imprisonment in the first World War. And -in this World War the Führer refused to allow me to serve as a -soldier.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have held a number of high -positions and offices. You knew the Reich Ministers and Reichsleiter. -Will you please explain why you went aboard the submarine -at that time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had repeatedly made written requests to the -Führer that I might be allowed to join the Wehrmacht as an -ordinary soldier. He refused to give me this permission. So I -arranged in secret for someone to take my place and went aboard -Captain Salmann’s submarine with his agreement. As a former -sailor and now a politician in a high position I wanted to give -these brave submarine men a proof of my comradeship and understanding -and of my sense of duty. Apart from that I had 10 children -for whom, as their father, I had to do something too.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I should like now, in a number of questions, -to refer to your activities. Were you a member of a trade union?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know what the aims of German trade -unions were?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes, I do.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were they economic or political?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As I, as a worker, came to know them, the aims of -German trade unions were political, and there were a number of -different trade unions with varied political views. I considered -that a great misfortune. As workman in the workshop I had had -experience of the arguments among the trade unionists—between -the Christian Socialist trade unions and the Red trade unions, between -the syndicalist, the anarchist and the communist trade unions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The trade unions in your Gau were then -dissolved. Were the leaders arrested at the time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you approve of the dissolution of the -trade unions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The dissolution of the trade unions was in the air -then. The question was discussed in the Party for a long time and -<span class='pageno' title='611' id='Page_611'></span> -there was no agreement at all as to the position trade unions -should hold, nor as to their necessity, their usefulness and their -nature. But a solution had to be found because the trade unions -which we, or the Führer, or Dr. Ley, dissolved all held different -political views. From that time on, however, there was only one -party in Germany and it was necessary, I fully realize, to come to -a definite decision as to the actual duties of the trade unions, the -necessary duties indispensable to every calling and to workers -everywhere.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was not the purpose of removing the trade -unions to remove any opposition which might stand in the way of -an aggressive war?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I can say in all good conscience that during those -years not one of us ever thought about a war at all. We had to -overcome such terrible need that we should have been only too -glad if German economic life could have been started again in -peace and if the German worker, who had suffered the most during -that frightful depression, could have had work and food once more.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did members of trade unions suffer economically -through the dissolution?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In no way. My own father-in-law, who was a -member of a trade union and still is today, and whom I repeatedly -asked for information, whom I never persuaded to join the Party—he -was a Social Democrat and never joined the Party—confirmed -the fact that even when he was getting old and could no longer -work, the German Labor Front never denied him the rights due -to him as an old trade unionist and by virtue of his long trade-union -membership, but allowed him full benefits. On the other -hand, the German State—since in Germany old age and disability -insurance and the accident insurance, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, were paid and -organized by the State—the National Socialist State guaranteed him -all these rights and made full payment.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were all Communist leaders arrested in your -Gau after the Party came to power?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. In my Gau, as far as I know, only Communists -who had actually worked against the State were arrested.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what happened to them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The State Police arrested and interrogated them -and detained them according to the findings.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR.. SERVATIUS: Did you have Kreisleiter in your Gau who had -been members of a former opposition party?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Party’s activity was recruiting. Our most intensive -work was the winning over of political opponents. I am very -<span class='pageno' title='612' id='Page_612'></span> -proud of the fact that many workers in my Gau, numerous former -Communists and Social Democrats, were won over by us and -became local group leaders and Party functionaries.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: But were there not two Kreisleiter from the -extreme left appointed by you?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: One Kreisleiter from the extreme left was appointed. -Also, besides a number of other leaders, the Gau sectional manager -of the German Labor Front had belonged to the extreme left for -a long time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How did you personally deal with your -political opponents?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Political opponents who did not work against the -State were neither bothered nor harmed in my Gau.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the Socialist Deputy Fröhlich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Socialist Deputy August Fröhlich was my -strongest and most important opponent. He was the leader of the -Thuringian Social Democrats and was for many years the Social -Democrat Prime Minister of Thuringia. I had great respect for him -as an opponent. He was an honorable and upright man. On 20 July -1944, through my own personal initiative, I had him released from -detention. He had been on the list of the conspirators of 20 July, -but I had so much respect for him personally that, in spite of that, -I asked for his release and obtained it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you treat other opponents similarly?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I also had a politician of the Center Party I knew -in my home town of Schweinfurt released from detention.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The Concentration Camp of Buchenwald was -in your Gau. Did you establish it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Buchenwald Camp originated in the following -manner: The Führer, who came to Weimar quite often because of -the theater there, suggested that a battalion of his SS Leibstandarte -should be stationed at Weimar. As the Leibstandarte was considered -a picked regiment I not only agreed to this but was very -pleased, because in a city like Weimar people are glad to have a -garrison. So the State of Thuringia, the Thuringian Government, -at the request of the Führer, prepared a site in the Ettersburg -Forest, north of the incline outside the town.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>After some time Himmler informed me, however, that he could -not bring a battalion of the SS Leibstandarte to Weimar, as he -could not divide up the regiment, but that it would be a newly -established Death’s-Head unit, and Himmler said it would amount -to the same thing. It was only some time later, when the site had -<span class='pageno' title='613' id='Page_613'></span> -already been placed at the disposal of the Reich, that Himmler -declared that he now had to accommodate a kind of concentration -camp with the Death’s-Head units on this very suitable site. I -opposed this to begin with, because I did not consider a concentration -camp at all the right kind of thing for the town of Weimar -and its traditions. However, he—I mean Himmler—making use of -his position, refused to have any discussion about it. And so the -camp was set up neither to my satisfaction nor to that of the -population of Weimar.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the administration -of the camp later on?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I never had anything to do with the administration -of the camp. The Thuringian Government made an attempt at the -time to influence the planning of the building by saying that the -building police in Thuringia wished to give the orders for the -sanitary arrangements in the camp. Himmler rejected this on the -grounds of his position, saying that he had a construction office -of his own and the site now belonged to the Reich.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you visit the camp at any time?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As far as I can remember, on one single occasion at -the end of 1937 or at the beginning of 1938, I visited and inspected -the camp with an Italian commission.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you find anything wrong there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I did not find anything wrong. I inspected the accommodations—I -myself had been a prisoner for 5 years, and so it interested -me. I must admit that at that time there was no cause for -any complaint as such. The accommodations had been divided into day -and night rooms. The beds were covered with blue and white sheets; -the kitchens, washrooms, and latrines were beyond reproach, so that -the Italian officer or officers who were inspecting the camp with me -said that in Italy they would not accommodate their own soldiers -any better.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Later on did you hear about the events in that -camp which have been alleged here?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I heard nothing about such events as have been -alleged here.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the evacuation -of the camp at the end of the war, before the American Army -approached?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When the mayor of Weimar informed me that they -intended to evacuate the camp at Buchenwald and to use the camp -guards to fight the American troops, I raised the strongest objections. -<span class='pageno' title='614' id='Page_614'></span> -As I had no authority over the camp, and since for various reasons -connected with my other office I had had considerable differences -with Himmler and did not care to speak to him, I telephoned the -Führer’s headquarters in Berlin and said that in any case an evacuation -or a transfer of prisoners into the territory east of the Saale -was impossible and madness, and could not be carried through from -the point of view of supplies. I demanded that the camp should be -handed over to the American occupation troops in an orderly manner. -I received the answer that the Führer would give instructions -to Himmler to comply with my request. I briefly reported this to -some of my colleagues and the mayor, and then I left Weimar.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The witness Dr. Blaha has stated that you had -also been to the concentration camp at Dachau on the occasion of -an inspection.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, I did not go to the Dachau Concentration Camp -and, as far as I recollect, I did not take part in the visit of the Gauleiter -to Dachau in 1935 either. In no circumstances did I take part -in an inspection in Dachau such as Dr. Blaha has described here; and -consequently, above all, I did not inspect workshops or anything of -the sort.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not, as Gauleiter, receive official -reports regarding the events in the concentration camp, that is to -say, orders which passed through the Gau administrative offices -both from and to the camp?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. I neither received instructions for the Buchenwald -Camp, nor reports. It was not only my personal opinion but -it was the opinion of old experienced Gauleiter that it was the -greatest misfortune, from the administrative point of view, when -Himmler as early as 1934-35 proceeded to separate the executive -from the general internal administration. There were continual -complaints from many Gauleiter and German provincial administrations. -They were unsuccessful, however, because in the end -Himmler incorporated even the communal fire brigades into the -Reich organization of his Police.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any personal relations with the -Police and the SS at Weimar?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had no personal relations with the SS and the -Police at all. I had official relations inasmuch as the trade police -and the local police of small boroughs still remained under the -internal administration of the State of Thuringia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did not the Police have their headquarters -near you, at Weimar? -<span class='pageno' title='615' id='Page_615'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, it was the ridiculous part of the development at -that time that, as I once explained to the Führer, we had been -changed from a Party state, and a state made up of provinces, into -a departmental state. The Reich ministries had greatly developed, -their departments being fairly well defined, and the individual -district departments of the various administrations did not agree -among one another. Until 1934 Thuringia had its own independent -police administration in its Ministry for Home Affairs. But from -that time the headquarters of the Higher SS and the Police Leader -were transferred to Kassel, so that Himmler, in contrast to the rest -of the State and Party organizations, obtained new spheres for his -Police. He demonstrated this in Central Germany where for example -the Higher SS and Police Leader for Weimar and the State of Thuringia -was stationed in Kassel, whereas for the Prussian part of the -Gau of Thuringia—that is to say the town of Erfurt which is 20 kilometers -away from Weimar—the Higher SS and Police Leader and -the provincial administration had their seat in Magdeburg. It is -obvious that we, as Gau authorities, did not in any way agree with -such a development and that there was great indignation among the -experienced administrators.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The question is: Did you co-operate with these -offices and did you have a friendly association with the officials in -the regime and therefore know what was going on in Buchenwald?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: On the contrary, it was a continual battle. Each -separate organization shut itself off from the others. At such a -period of world development this was most unfortunate. For the -people it was disadvantageous and it made things impossible for -any administration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was there persecution of the Jews in your Gau?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What about the laws concerning the Jews and -the execution of those laws?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: These Jewish laws were proclaimed in Nuremberg. -There were actually very few Jews in Thuringia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were there no violations in connection with the -well-known events, following the murder of the Envoy Vom Rath in -Paris, which have repeatedly become the subject of discussion in -this Trial?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I cannot recollect in detail the events in Thuringia. -As I told you, there were only a few Jews in Thuringia. The Gauleiter -were in Munich at the time, and had no influence at all on -that development, for it happened during the night, when all the -Gauleiter were in Munich. -<span class='pageno' title='616' id='Page_616'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: My question is this: What happened in your -Gau of Thuringia, and what instructions did you give as a result?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There may have been a few towns in Thuringia -where a window was smashed or something of that sort. I cannot -tell you in detail. I cannot even tell you where or whether there -were synagogues in Thuringia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Now one question regarding your financial -position.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>On the occasion of your fiftieth birthday the Führer made you a -donation. How much was it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: On my fiftieth birthday in October 1944 I was surprised -to get a letter from the Führer through one of his adjutants. -In that letter there was a check for 250,000 marks. I told the adjutant -that I could not possibly accept it—I was very surprised. The -Führer’s adjutant—it was little Bormann, the old Bormann, not -Reichsleiter Bormann—told me that the Führer knew quite well -that I had neither money nor any landed property and that this -would be a security for my children. He told me not to hurt the -Führer’s feelings. The adjutant left quickly and I sent for Demme -who was both a colleague and a friend of mine and the president -of the State Bank of Thuringia. He was unfortunately refused as -a witness as being irrelevant ...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it is enough if we know whether he -ultimately accepted it or not.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Let us drop that question. What happened to -the money?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Through the president of the State Bank in question -the money was placed into an account in the State Bank of Thuringia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What other income did you receive from your -official positions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The only income I had from my official positions was -the salary of a Reich Regent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How much was that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The salary of a Reich Minister; I cannot tell you -exactly what it was. I never bothered about it. It was something -like 30,000 marks.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what means have you today apart from -the donation in that bank account?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I have not saved any money and I never had any -property. -<span class='pageno' title='617' id='Page_617'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: That, Mr. President, brings me to the end of -those general questions and I am now coming to the questions -relating to the Allocation of Labor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: To aid the Court I have prepared a plan showing -how the direction of labor was managed, which should help to -explain how the individual authorities co-operated and how the -operation was put into motion.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will concern myself mainly with the problem of meeting the -demand, that is with the question of how the labor was obtained. -I shall not concern myself much with the question of the use made -of the labor and the needs of industry. That is more a matter for -Speer’s defense, which does not quite fit in with my presentation of -things. But those are details which occurred in error because I did -not go into such matters thoroughly when the plan was being prepared. -Fundamentally there are no differences.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>If I may explain the plan briefly: At the top there is the Führer, -in red; under him is the Four Year Plan; and under that, as part -of the Four Year Plan, there is the office of Sauckel, who was Plenipotentiary -General for the Allocation of Labor and came directly -under the Four Year Plan. He received his instructions and orders -from the Führer through the Four Year Plan, or, as was the Führer’s -way, from him direct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Sauckel’s headquarters were at the Reich Ministry of Labor. It -is the big space outlined in yellow to the left, below Sauckel’s office -which is in brown. Sauckel only became included in the Reich Labor -Ministry by having a few offices put at his disposal. The Reich Minister -of Labor and the whole of the Labor Ministry remained.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In the course of time Sauckel’s position became somewhat -stronger, individual departments being necessarily incorporated -into his, over which, to a certain extent, he obtained personal -power; but the Reich Ministry of Labor remained until the end.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I should now like to explain how the “Arbeitseinsatz” was put -into operation. Owing to operations in Russia and the great losses -in the winter, there arose a need for 2 million soldiers. The -Wehrmacht, OKW, marked in green at the top next to the Führer, -demands soldiers from the industries. It is marked here in the green -spaces which run downwards below the OKW. The line then turns -left downwards to the industries which are marked as having -30 million workers. The Wehrmacht withdraws 2 million workers -but can only do so when new labor is there. It was at that -moment that Sauckel was put into office in order to obtain this labor. -<span class='pageno' title='618' id='Page_618'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>The number of men needed was determined by the higher -authorities through the so-called “Requirements Board,” marked at -the top in yellow, which represented the highest offices: the Armaments -and Production Ministries, the Ministry of Air, Agriculture, -Shipping, Traffic, and so on. They reported their requests to the -Führer and he decided what was needed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Sauckel’s task was carried out as follows: Let us go back to the -brown square. On the strength of the right of the Four Year Plan -to issue orders, he applied to the space on the right where the -squares are outlined in blue. They are the highest district offices -in the occupied territories, the Reich Ministry for the Eastern Territories, -that is, Rosenberg; then come the military authorities; and as -things were handled a little differently in each country, here are the -various countries, Belgium, Northern France, Holland, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, -marked in yellow. These agencies received the order to make labor -available. Each through its own machinery referred the order to the -next agency below and so on down to the very last, the local labor -offices which are under the district authorities, and here the workers -were assigned to the factories. That is the reserve of foreigners. -Beside that there are two other sources of labor available, the main -reserve of German workers, which is marked in blue to the left at -the bottom, and the reserve of prisoners of war.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Sauckel had to deal with all these three agencies. I will now -put relevant questions to the witness. This is only to refresh our -memories and to check the explanation.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I will submit other charts later. There is a list of the witnesses -drawn up according to their offices so that we know where they -belong; and later there will be another chart showing the inspection -and controls which were set up.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you will no doubt be asking the -witness whether he is familiar with the chart and whether it is -correct.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have seen this chart. Is it correct? -Do you acknowledge it?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: To the best of my memory and belief it is correct, -and I acknowledge it.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: On 21 March 1942 you were made Plenipotentiary -General for the Allocation of Labor. Why were you chosen for -this office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The reason why I was chosen for this office was -never known to me and I do not know it now. Because of my -engineering studies and my occupation I took an interest in questions -concerning labor systems, but I do not know whether that was -the reason. -<span class='pageno' title='619' id='Page_619'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was your appointment not made at Speer’s -suggestion?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Reichsleiter Bormann stated that in the preamble to -his official decree. I do not know the actual circumstances.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I beg to refer to Sauckel Document Number 7. -It is in Document Book 1, Page 5.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I should like to add that this appointment came as -a complete surprise to me, I did not apply for it in any way. I never -applied for any of my offices.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What number are you giving to this document?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number 7.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I mean the chart. What number are you -giving to the chart?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Document 1.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see, and Document Number 7, Page 5.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. This document is a preamble added by -Reichsleiter Bormann to the decree and which shows that it was -Speer who suggested Sauckel for this position.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Was it an entirely new office which you then entered?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. The Arbeitseinsatz had been directed by the -Four Year Plan before my appointment. A ministerial director, -Dr. Mansfeld, held the office then. I only learned here, during these -proceedings, that the office was already known before my time as -the office of the Plenipotentiary General.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: On taking up your office did you talk to -Dr. Mansfeld, your so-called predecessor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I neither saw Dr. Mansfeld nor spoke to him, nor did -I take over any records from him.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: To what extent was your office different from -that of the previous Plenipotentiary General?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My office was different to this extent: The department -in the Four Year Plan was given up and was no longer used -by me. I drew departments of the Reich Labor Ministry more and -more closely into this work as they had some of the outstanding -experts.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the reason for this reconstruction of -the office?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The reason was to be found in the many conflicting -interests which had been very prominent up to the third year of the -war in the political and state offices, internal administration offices, -<span class='pageno' title='620' id='Page_620'></span> -Party agencies and economic agencies, and which now for territorial -considerations opposed the interdistrict equalization of the labor -potential, which had become urgent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of task did you have then? What -was your sphere of work?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My chief sphere of work was in directing and regulating -German labor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What task were you given then?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had to replace with suitably skilled workers those -men who had to be freed from industry for drafting into the German -Wehrmacht, that is, into the different branches of the Wehrmacht. -Moreover, I also had to obtain new labor for the new war -industries which had been set up for food production as well as for -the production of armaments, of course.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was your task definitely defined?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: It was at first in no way definitely defined. There -were at that time about 23 or 24 million workers to be directed, -who were available in the Reich but who had not yet been fully -employed for war economy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you look on your appointment as a permanent -one?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. I could not consider it as permanent.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Why not?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Because in addition to me the Reich Labor Minister -and his state secretaries were in office and at the head of things; -and then there was the whole of the Labor Ministry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What sources were at your disposal to obtain -this labor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: First, there were the workers who were already -present in the Reich from all sorts of callings who, as I have said, -had not yet been directed to war economy, not yet completely incorporated -in the way that was necessary for the conduct of the war. -Then further there were the prisoners of war as far as their labor -was made available by the army authorities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: At first then, if I have understood you correctly, -proper distribution, and a thrifty management of German -labor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When my appointment ...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I do not understand the German -language, but it appears to me that if you would not make pauses -between each word it would make your sentences shorter; and pause -<span class='pageno' title='621' id='Page_621'></span> -at the end of the sentence. It would be much more convenient for -the interpreter. I do not know whether I am right in that. That is -what it looks like. You are pausing between each word, and therefore -it is difficult, I imagine, to get the sense of the sentence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I beg your pardon, Your Lordship.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Servatius.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What did you do to carry out your task?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I will repeat. First, as I had received no specific -instructions I understood my task to mean that I was to fill up the -gaps and deficiencies by employing labor in the most rational and -economic way.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the order you received? How many -people were you to obtain?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: That question is very difficult to answer, for I -received the necessary orders only in the course of the development -of the war. Labor and economy are fluid, intangible things. However -I then received the order that if the war were to continue for -some time I was to find replacements in the German labor sector -for the Wehrmacht, whose soldiers were the potential of peacetime -economy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You drew up a program. What was provided -for in your program?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I drew up two programs, Doctor. At first, when I -took up my office, I drew up one program which included a <span class='it'>levée -en masse</span>, so to speak, of German women and young people, and, -another, as I already said, for the proper utilization of labor from -the economic and technical point of view.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was the program accepted?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The program was rejected by the Führer when I -submitted it to him and, as was my duty, to the Reich economic -authorities and ministries which were interested in the employment -of labor.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Why?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Führer sent for me and in a lengthy statement -explained the position of the German war production and also the -economic situation. He said that he had nothing against my program -as such if he had the time; but that in view of the situation, -he could not wait for such German women to become trained and -experienced. At that time 10 million German women were already -employed who had never done industrial or mechanical work. -Further, he said that the results of such a rationalization of working -methods as I had suggested, something like a mixture of Ford -and Taylor methods ... -<span class='pageno' title='622' id='Page_622'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: One moment. The interpreters cannot translate -your long sentences properly. You must make short sentences -and divide your phrases, otherwise no one can understand you and -your defense will suffer a great deal. Will you please be careful -about that.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In answer to my proposal the Führer said that he -could not wait for a rationalization of the working methods on the -lines of the Taylor and Ford systems.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what did he suggest?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: May I explain the motives which prompted the Führer’s -decision. He described the situation at that time, at the end -of the winter of 1941-42. Many hundreds of German locomotives, -almost all the mechanized armed units, tanks, planes, and mechanical -weapons had become useless as a result of the catastrophe of that -abnormally hard winter.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Hundreds of thousands of German soldiers had suffered terribly -from the cold; many divisions had lost their arms and supplies. The -Führer explained to me that if the race with the enemy for new -arms, new munitions, and new dispositions of forces was not won -now, the Soviets would be as far as the Channel by the next winter. -Appealing to my sense of duty and asking me to put into it all I -could, he gave me the task of obtaining new foreign labor for -employment in the German war economy.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have no scruples that this was against -international law?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Führer spoke to me in such detail about this -question and he explained the necessity so much as a matter of -course that, after he had withdrawn a suggestion which he had -made himself, there could be no misgivings on my part that the -employment of foreign workers was against international law.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You also negotiated with other agencies and -there were already workers within the Reich. What were you told -about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: None of the higher authorities, either military or -civilian, expressed any misgivings. Perhaps I may add some things -which the Führer mentioned as binding upon me. On the whole, the -Führer always treated me very kindly. On this question, he became -very severe and categorical and said that in the West he had left -half the French Army free and at home, and he had released the -greater part of the Belgian Army and the whole of the Dutch Army -from captivity. He told me that under certain circumstances he -would have to recall these prisoners of war for military reasons, -but that in the interests of the whole of Europe and the Occident, -<span class='pageno' title='623' id='Page_623'></span> -so he expressed himself, only a united Europe, where labor was -properly allocated, could hold out in the fight against Bolshevism.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you know the terms of the Hague land -warfare regulations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: During the first World War I myself was taken prisoner -as a sailor. I knew what was required and what was laid down -with regard to the treatment and protection of prisoners of war and -prisoners generally.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did foreign authorities—I am thinking of the -French—ever raise the objection that what you planned with your -Arbeitseinsatz was an infringement of the Hague land warfare -regulations?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. In France, on questions of the Arbeitseinsatz, -I only negotiated with the French Government through the military -commander and under the presidency of the German Ambassador -in Paris. I was convinced that as far as the employment of labor in -France was concerned, agreements should be made with a proper -French Government. I negotiated in a similar manner with the General -Secretary in Belgium.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Now a large part—about a third—of the foreign -workers were so-called Eastern Workers. What were you told -about them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: With regard to the employment of workers from the -East I was told that Russia had not joined the Geneva Convention, -and so Germany for her part was not bound by it. And I was further -told that in the Baltic countries and in other regions, Soviet -Russia had also claimed workers or people, and that in addition -about 3 million Chinese were working in Soviet Russia.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what about Poland?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As regards Poland I had been told, just as in the -case of other countries, that it was a case of total capitulation, and -that on the grounds of this capitulation Germany was justified in -introducing German regulations.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you consider the employment of foreign -labor justifiable from the general point of view?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: On account of the necessities which I have mentioned, -I considered the employment of foreign workers justifiable -according to the principles which I enforced and advocated and to -which I also adhered in my field of work. I was, after all, a German -and I could feel only as a German.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Herr Sauckel, you must formulate your sentences -differently, the interpreters cannot translate them. You must -not insert one sentence into another. -<span class='pageno' title='624' id='Page_624'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>So you considered it justifiable, in view of the principles you -wished to apply and, which as you said, you enforced in your field -of work?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you also think of the hardships imposed -on the workers and their families through this employment?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I knew from my own life even if one goes to foreign -countries voluntarily, a separation is very sad and heartbreaking -and it is very hard for members of a family to be separated from -each other. But I also thought of the German families, of the German -soldiers, and of the hundreds of thousands of German workers -who also had to go away from home.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The suggestion has been made that the work -could have been carried out in the occupied territories themselves, -and it would not then have been necessary to fetch the workers -away. Why was that not done?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: That is, at first sight, an attractive suggestion. If it -had been possible, I would willingly have carried out the suggestion -which was made by Funk and other authorities, and later even by -Speer. It would have made my life and work much simpler. On the -other hand, there were large departments in this system which had -to provide for and maintain the different branches of German economy -and supply them with orders. As the Plenipotentiary General -for the Allocation of Labor I could not have German fields, German -farming, German mass-production with the most modern machinery -transferred to foreign territories—I had no authority for that—and -those offices insisted that I should find replacements for the agricultural -and industrial workers and the artisans whose places had -become vacant in German agriculture or industry because the men -had been called to the colors.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You said before that the manner in which you -had planned the employment of workers was such that it could have -been approved. What then were your leading principles in carrying -out your scheme for the employment of labor?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When the Führer described the situation so drastically, -and ordered me to bring foreign workers to Germany, I -clearly recognized the difficulties of the task and I asked him to -agree to the only way by which I considered it possible to do this, -for I had been a worker too.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was not your principal consideration the economic -exploitation of these foreign workers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Arbeitseinsatz has nothing to do with exploitation. -It is an economic process for supplying labor. -<span class='pageno' title='625' id='Page_625'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You said repeatedly in your speeches and on -other occasions that the important thing was to make the best possible -economic use of these workers. You speak of a machine which -must be properly handled. Did you want to express thereby the -thought of economic exploitation?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: At all times a regime of no matter what nature, -can only be successful in the production of goods if it uses labor -economically—not too much and not too little. That alone I consider -economically justifiable.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: It was stated here in a document which was -submitted, the French Document RF-22, a government report, that -the intention existed to bring about a demographic deterioration, -and in other government reports mention is made that one of the -aims was the biological destruction of other peoples. What do you -say about that?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I can say most definitely that biological destruction -was never mentioned to me. I was only too happy when I had -workers. I suspected that the war would last longer than was -expected, and the demands upon my office were so urgent and so -great that I was glad for people to be alive, not for them to be -destroyed.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the general attitude toward the -question of foreign workers before you took office? What did you -find when you came?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There was a controversy when I took up my office. -There were about two million foreign workers in Germany from -neutral and allied states and occupied territories of the East and -the West. They had been brought to the Reich without order or -system. Many industrial concerns avoided contacting the labor -authorities or found them troublesome and bureaucratic. The conflict -of interests, as I said before, was very great. The Police point -of view was most predominating, I think.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And propaganda? What was the propaganda -with regard to Eastern Workers, for example?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Propaganda was adapted to the war in the East. I -may point out now—you interrupted me before when I was speaking -of the order given me by the Führer—that I expressly asked -the Führer not to let workers working in Germany be treated -as enemies any longer, and I tried to influence propaganda to that -effect.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What else did you do with regard to the -situation which confronted you? -<span class='pageno' title='626' id='Page_626'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I finally received approval from the Führer for -my second program. That program has been submitted here as -a document. I must and will bear responsibility for that program.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: It has already been submitted as Document -016-PS. It is the Program for the Allocation of Labor of -20 April 1942, Exhibit USA-168.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this program you made fundamental statements. I will hand -it to you and I ask you to comment on the general questions only, -not on the individual points.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>There is a paragraph added to the last part, “Prisoners of War -and Foreign Workers.” Have you found the paragraph?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: If you will look at the third paragraph you -will find what you want to explain.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I should like to say that I drew up and worked out -this program independently in 1942 after I had been given that -difficult task by the Führer. It was absolutely clear to me what -the conditions would have to be if foreign workers were to be -employed in Germany at all. I wrote those sentences at that time -and the program went to all the German authorities which had to -deal with the matter. I quote:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“All these people must be fed, housed, and treated in such -a way that with the least possible effort”—here I refer to -economics as conceived by Taylor and Ford, whom I have -studied closely—“the greatest possible results will be achieved. -It has always been a matter of course for us Germans to -treat a conquered enemy correctly and humanely, even if -he were our most cruel and irreconcilable foe, and to abstain -from all cruelty and petty chicanery when expecting useful -service from him.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Will you put the document aside now, please. -What authority did you have to carry out your task?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had authority from the Four Year Plan to issue -instructions. I had at my disposal—not under me, but at my disposal—Sections -3 and 5 of the Reich Labor Ministry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What departments did they represent?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The departments, “Employment of Labor” and -“Wages.”</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could you issue directives and orders?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I could issue directives and orders of a departmental -nature to those offices.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could you carry on negotiations with foreign -countries independently? -<span class='pageno' title='627' id='Page_627'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I could carry on negotiations with foreign countries -only through the Foreign Office or, when I had received permission, -with the ambassadors or ministers in question.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could you give your orders independently -or was agreement and consultation necessary?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My field of work, as in every large branch of an -administration, made it absolutely necessary for me to discuss the -questions and have consultations about them with neighboring -departments. I was obliged to do so according to instructions.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: With whom did you have to consult, apart -from the Four Year Plan under which you were placed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had first of all to consult the departments themselves -from which I received the orders, and in addition the Party -Chancellery, the office of Reich Minister Lammers—the Reich -Chancellery, the Reich Railways, the Reich Food Ministry, the -Reich Defense Ministry.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did things go smoothly, or were there difficulties?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There were always great difficulties.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any dealings with Himmler?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had dealings with Himmler only insofar as he -gave instructions. He was Reich Minister and was responsible for -security, as he said.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was not that a question which was very -important for you in regard to the treatment of workers?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: During the first months or in the first weeks, I -believe, of my appointment I was called to see Heydrich. In a very -precise way, Heydrich told me that he considered my program -fantastic, such as it had been approved by the Führer, and that -I must realize that I was making his work very difficult in demanding -that barbed wire and similar fences should not and must not -be put around the labor camps, but rather taken down. He then said -curtly that I must realize that if it was I who was responsible for -the allocation of labor, it was he who was responsible for security. -That is what he told me.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you accept the fact that these strict police -measures now existed?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Through constant efforts I had these police measures -gradually reduced as far as they concerned the workers who were -employed in Germany through my agency and my office.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What did your authority to issue instructions -consist of? Could you issue orders or had you to negotiate, and how -was this carried out in practice? -<span class='pageno' title='628' id='Page_628'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The authority I had to issue instructions was doubtful -from the beginning because, owing to the necessities of war, -the lack of manpower, and so on, I was forbidden to establish -any office of my own or any other new office or organization. I -could only pass on instructions after negotiation with the supreme -authorities of the Reich and after detailed consultation. These -instructions were, of course, of a purely departmental nature. I -could not interfere in matters of administration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How was this right to issue instructions exercised -with regard to the high authorities in the occupied territories?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: It was exactly the same, merely of a departmental -nature. In practice it was the passing on of the Führer’s -orders which were to be carried out there through the individual -machinery of each separate administration.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could you give binding instructions to military -authorities, to the Economic Inspectorate East, for example?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, there was a strict order from the Führer that -in the Army areas, the operational areas of the Commanders-in-Chief, -the latter only were competent, and when they had examined -military conditions and the situation, everything had to be -regulated according to the needs of these high military commands.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did that apply to the military commander -in France, or could you act directly there?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In France I could, of course, proceed only in the -same way, by informing the military commander of the instructions -which I myself had received. He then prepared for discussions -with the German Embassy and the French Government, so that -with the Ambassador presiding, and the military commander taking -an authoritative part, the discussion with the French Government -took place.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what happened as far as the Ministry -for the Occupied Eastern Territories was concerned?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the case of that Ministry I had to transmit my -orders to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories -and had to consult with him. With Reich Minister Rosenberg we -always succeeded in arranging matters between ourselves in a way -that we considered right. But in the Ukraine there was the Reich -Commissioner who was on very intimate terms himself with headquarters, -and, as is generally known, he was very independent and -acted accordingly by asserting this independence.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How did these authorities in the occupied -territories take your activities at first? -<span class='pageno' title='629' id='Page_629'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the occupied territories there was naturally -much opposition at the start of my work, because I brought new -orders and new requirements and it was not always easy to reconcile -conflicting interests.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was there any apprehension that you would -intervene in the administration of the territories?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: From my own conviction I refrained entirely from -any such intervention and I always emphasized that in order to -dispel any such apprehensions, since I myself was not the administrator -there; but there were many selfish interests at work.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: We will discuss this on another occasion. Now -I should like to ask you: You had deputies for the Arbeitseinsatz—when -did you obtain them?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was given these deputies for the occupied territories -through a personal decree of the Führer on 30 September -1942, as far as I remember.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the reason?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The reason for appointing these deputies was to do -away more easily with the difficulties and the lack of direction -which prevailed to some extent in these areas.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I refer in this connection to Document 12, -“The Führer’s Decree Concerning the Execution of the Decree of -the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.” No, it is -Document 13. “Decree Concerning the Appointment of Deputies”—on -Page 13 of the English document book, and I also refer to -Document 12 which has already been submitted as 1903-PS, Exhibit -USA-206.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Did you not have two different kinds of deputies, I mean, were -there already some deputies previously?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There were previously deputies of the Reich Labor -Ministry who in allied or neutral countries were assigned to the -German diplomatic missions. They must be distinguished from -those deputies who were assigned to the chiefs of the German -military or civilian administration in the occupied territories.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What position did the deputies hold in the -occupied territories?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the occupied territories the deputies had a dual -position. They were the leaders of the labor sections in the local -government there—a considerable burden for me—and at the same -time my deputies who were responsible for the uniform direction -and execution of the principles of the allocation of labor as laid -down by me. -<span class='pageno' title='630' id='Page_630'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have your own organization with -the deputy at the head, or was that an organization of the local -government?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I did not have any organization of my own. The -local governments were independent separate administrations with -an administrative chief as head to whom the various departments -were subordinated.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How many such deputies were there in one -area?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the various countries I had one deputy in each -of the highest offices.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the task of the deputy?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The task of the deputy, as I have already said, was -to guarantee that German orders were carried out in a legal way -and, as member of the local administration, to regulate labor -questions which arose there.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What tasks did they have as regards the -interest of the Reich and the distribution of labor for local employment -and in the Reich?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: It was expressly pointed out that they were to -produce labor in reasonable proportions with consideration for local -conditions; they also had to see to it that my principles were -observed with respect to the treatment, feeding, and so forth of -workers from the occupied zones. That is laid down in the form -of a directive.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not have your own recruiting commissions?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There were no recruiting commissions in the sense -in which the expression is often used here and in our own documents. -It was a question of reinforcements of experts which were -requested by the local government, in order to carry out the tasks -in the countries concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions did these recruiting commissions -have?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: They received the instructions which are frequently -and clearly expressed in my orders and which, as they have been -laid down, I need not mention.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I refer here to Document 15 which has already -been submitted as 3044-PS; Exhibit Number USA-206, and also -USSR-384.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>That is the Order Number 4 of 7 May 1942, which settles in -principle all the problems relating to this question, and gives the -necessary directives to the deputies regarding recruitment. -<span class='pageno' title='631' id='Page_631'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>Were those directives which you issued always adhered to?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The directives I issued were not always adhered -to as strictly as I had demanded. I made every effort to impose -them through constant orders, instructions, and punishment which, -however, I myself could not inflict.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were these orders meant seriously? The French -Prosecution has submitted in the government report one of your -speeches, which you made at that time in Posen. It was termed a -speech of apology. I ask you whether these principles were meant -seriously or whether they were only for the sake of appearances, -since you yourself believed, as the document stated, that they could -not be carried out?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I can only emphasize that in my life I had worked -so much myself under such difficult conditions that these instructions -expressed my full conviction as to their necessity. I ask to -have witnesses heard as to what I thought about it and what I -did in order to have these instructions carried out.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was there any noticeable opposition to your -principles?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I have already said that to a certain extent my -principles were considered troublesome by some authorities and -injudicious as far as German security was concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>When I was attacked on that account, I took occasion, in addition -to a number of instructions to the German Gauleiter, to issue -a manifesto to all the highest German government offices concerned.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: May I remark that this is Document S-84, in -Document Book 3, Page 215.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I submit the document once more in German because of the -form in which it is printed. It is in the form of an urgent warning -and was sent to all the authorities.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it Document Number 84?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Witness, did you, in a meeting of the Central Planning Board ...</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: May I be allowed to say a word with regard to -this manifesto?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When I issued the manifesto, I was met with the -objection, mainly from Dr. Goebbels, that a manifesto should really -be issued only by the Führer and not by a subordinate authority -such as myself. Then I found that I was having difficulties in -getting the manifesto printed. After I had had 150,000 copies -printed for all the German economic offices, for all the works -<span class='pageno' title='632' id='Page_632'></span> -managers and all the other offices which were interested, I had it -printed again myself in this emphatic form and personally sent -it once more, with a covering letter, to all those offices.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>In this manifesto, in spite of the difficulties which I encountered, -I especially advocated that in the occupied territories themselves -the workers should be treated in accordance with my principles -and according to my directives and orders.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>I respectfully ask the Court to be allowed to read a few sentences -from it:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“I therefore order that for all the occupied territories, for -the treatment, feeding, billeting, and payment of foreign -workers, appropriate regulations and directives be issued -similar to those valid for foreigners in the Reich. They are -to be adjusted to the respective local conditions and applied -in accordance with prevailing conditions.</p> - -<p>“In a number of the Eastern Territories indigenous male and -female civilian labor working for the German war industry -or the German Wehrmacht is undernourished. In the urgent -interests of the German war industry in this territory this -condition should be remedied. It is checking production and -is dangerous. And endeavor must therefore be made by all -means available to provide additional food for these workers -and their families. This additional food must be given only -in accordance with the output of work.</p> - -<p>“It is only through the good care and treatment of the whole -of the available European labor on the one hand, and through -its most rigid concentration”—here I mean organizational—“leadership -and direction on the other hand, that the fluctuation -of labor in the Reich and in the occupied territories can -be limited to a minimum, and a generally stable, lasting and -reliable output be achieved.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>May I read one more sentence:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“The foreign workers in the Reich and the population in the -occupied territories who are being employed for the German -war effort must be given the feeling that it is to their own -interests to work loyally for Germany and that therein alone -will they see and actually find their one real guarantee of -life.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='noindent'>May I read still one sentence in the next paragraph:</p> - -<div class='blockquote'> - -<p>“They must be given absolute trust in the justness of the -German authorities and of their German employers.”</p> - -</div> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better not go further in this -document. Can you indicate to us at all how long you are likely -to be with this defendant? -<span class='pageno' title='633' id='Page_633'></span></p> - -<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I shall probably need the whole day tomorrow.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, would it be convenient for you -some time to deal with the documents of the remaining defendants?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, Mr. President, any time that you might set -aside.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know how far the negotiations -and agreements with reference to documents have gone.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do with some, but not with all. I can ascertain -the facts tonight, or before the morning session, and advise you -at that time.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and you will let us know tomorrow what -time will be convenient?</p> - -<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, Sir.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> - -<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 29 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> - -<hr class='pbk'/> - -<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:1.2em;'>TRANSCRIBER NOTES</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; -however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus -“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes -French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: -hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the -tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations -between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in the trial.</p> - -<p class='pindent'>An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as -possible to the original document presentation and layout.</p> - -<p class='line'> </p> - -<p class='noindent'>[The end of <span class='it'>Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 14</span>, -by Various.]</p> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOLUME 14 ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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