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diff --git a/old/67006-0.txt b/old/67006-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index bae1459..0000000 --- a/old/67006-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32237 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 14, by Various - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International - Military Tribunal, Volume 14 - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 - -Author: Various - -Release Date: December 24, 2021 [eBook #67006] - -Language: English - -Produced by: John Routh PM, Cindy Beyer, and the online Distributed - Proofreaders Canada team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR -CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOLUME 14 *** - - - [Cover Illustration] - - - - - TRIAL - OF - THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - - BEFORE - - THE INTERNATIONAL - MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - _NUREMBERG_ - 14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946 - - - [Illustration] - - - _PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY_ - _1948_ - - - - - This volume is published in accordance with the - direction of the International Military Tribunal by - the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction - of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. - - - - - VOLUME XIV - - _OFFICIAL TEXT_ - - _IN THE_ - - ENGLISH LANGUAGE - - - - _PROCEEDINGS_ - - 16 May 1946—28 May 1946 - - - - - CONTENTS - - - One Hundred and Thirty-first Day, Thursday, 16 May 1946, - Morning Session 1 - Afternoon Session 32 - - One Hundred and Thirty-second Day, Friday, 17 May 1946, - Morning Session 63 - Afternoon Session 82 - - One Hundred and Thirty-third Day, Saturday, 18 May 1946, - Morning Session 107 - - One Hundred and Thirty-fourth Day, Monday, 20 May 1946, - Morning Session 143 - Afternoon Session 181 - - One Hundred and Thirty-fifth Day, Tuesday, 21 May 1946, - Morning Session 228 - Afternoon Session 261 - - One Hundred and Thirty-sixth Day, Wednesday, 22 May 1946, - Morning Session 287 - Afternoon Session 320 - - One Hundred and Thirty-seventh Day, Thursday, 23 May 1946, - Morning Session 357 - Afternoon Session 386 - - One Hundred and Thirty-eighth Day, Friday, 24 May 1946, - Morning Session 418 - Afternoon Session 450 - - One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Day, Monday, 27 May 1946, - Morning Session 494 - Afternoon Session 533 - - One Hundred and Fortieth Day, Tuesday, 28 May 1946, - Morning Session 567 - Afternoon Session 601 - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST DAY - Thursday, 16 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MARSHAL (Col. Charles W. Mays): If it please the Tribunal, the -Defendants Sauckel and Von Papen are absent. - -[_The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand._] - -DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Admiral, yesterday we -finished with the somewhat involved Document C-32, and we had got as far -as Point 11. We now come to Point 12, “Ammunition stocks in excess of -the armament permissible.” May I remind the Tribunal that this is -Document C-32, Exhibit USA-50, in Document Book 10 a, Page 8, Point 12, -which contains three columns. - -Defendant, may I ask what you have to say to the accusation that you -exceeded the permissible amount of ammunition? - -ERICH RAEDER (Defendant): Certain ammunition stocks were in excess of -the permissible amount and some were below it. I cannot tell you at this -date what the reason was in each particular case. I assume that this -depended to a considerable extent on the amounts left over from the last -World War. - -In the case of the first two items, the 17- and 15-centimeter shells, -the actual stocks rather exceeded the quantity permitted, whereas the -third item, the 10.5-centimeter, falls very far short of it—instead of -134,000 there were 87,000. In the case of the 8.8-centimeter shells -there was an excess, then again a deficit, and the same thing applies to -the last item. But they are all very insignificant amounts. - -DR. SIEMERS: In the copy before the Tribunal there appears to be a note -in the third column—on the next page in yours, Defendant—saying that -quantities of ammunition are partly manufactured and partly in course of -delivery, and that the total amount permissible will soon be exceeded. - -I only wanted to ask you: The list was made out in September 1933. Then -are the figures stated correct for September 1933 or autumn 1933? - -RAEDER: I did not quite understand you. - -DR. SIEMERS: If it says in this document that measures to be taken later -will bring the totals above the quantities permissible, which—according -to this statement—they had not yet reached, then that is calculated as -from autumn 1933. - -RAEDER: That may be assumed, yes. Because new ammunition as well as new -guns were being manufactured, and old ammunition then had to be -scrapped. - -It also must be noted that ammunition for heavy artillery, which is not -listed here, was in every case short of the permissible amount. A -comparatively large amount of heavy artillery ammunition had been -granted us for heavy coastal guns, and we had by no means as much as we -were allowed to have. - -DR. SIEMERS: For the assistance of the Tribunal, I may point out that -this last point is proved by the actual documents in the hands of the -Tribunal. In the Tribunal’s copy under the Figure 12, Column 2, just -beside the separate figures, there is a sentence which says, “... that -the whole quantity permitted for heavy artillery has not been reached.” - -We now come to Number 13: “Exceeding the permissible stocks of machine -guns, rifles, pistols, and gas masks.” - -RAEDER: Here, too, it must be admitted that in isolated cases stocks -were a little higher than permitted. There were, for instance, 43,000 -gas masks instead of the 22,500 permitted. Large numbers of rifles and -machine guns were taken away even by individuals after the World War to -farms, _et cetera_. They were later collected, and for that reason there -was a comparatively large stock of them. But we are not dealing here -with any considerable quantities. Similarly ammunition, bayonets, hand -grenades, searchlights, fog equipment, _et cetera_, also exceeded the -prescribed limits but not to any great extent. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now, Figure 14: “Obtaining 337 M.G. C/30’s without -scrapping equally serviceable weapons.” As I did not ... - -THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Surely, Dr. Siemers, -it would be possible to deal with all these various points in the -documents in one statement as to why there were these excesses. We have -a statement here which contains 30 different items, and you have only -got as far as 13, and you are dealing with each one. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, personally I agree entirely. I am sorry that -I caused the Tribunal so much trouble in connection with this document. -As I am not a naval expert, I had a great deal of trouble finding my way -through it; but I do not think that I was the cause of the trouble. The -Prosecution, you see, have made use of the single points in evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the question is—I am not blaming you, but -we want to get on. We are not blaming you. Can’t it be done in one -explanatory statement, one short statement? - -DR. SIEMERS: I will try, Mr. President, and I will shorten it. - -There is no need to say anything more about Numbers 15 to 17. I think -these were the most important points. The points planned for a later -date were not to be effective until the years ’33 and ’34. I may perhaps -just point out to the Tribunal that Number 17 refers to the intended -construction of reserve destroyers. The Versailles Treaty permitted the -construction of these. - -I pass over Number 18 because we have already dealt with that. Number -19, again, refers only to intended construction. Number 20 I may -consider irrelevant; it concerns only the arming of fishing vessels. -Numbers 21 to 29 ... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think, perhaps, you should ask the Defendant to explain -some of these observations in the third column. I mean in Number 18, for -instance: “Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied.” - -RAEDER: These were explanations given to our League of Nations -representative at the Disarmament Conference by the competent expert. It -does not refer to local conditions. Construction of submarine spare -parts, for instance, took place abroad or was to be prepared. It was -actually carried out in 1934 and ’35, and the first submarine was -launched at the end of June 1935. - -DR. SIEMERS: I may take it, Defendant, that only the construction and -purchase of submarines was prohibited. - -RAEDER: Yes, the construction in Germany. - -DR. SIEMERS: I cannot prove until a later stage that no violation of the -Treaty was involved by the construction of these spare parts; but I -think you will have to give some indication of your reason for wishing -to conceal it, in view of the fact that spare parts were not forbidden. -I may remind you that this took place in September 1933 at a time when -negotiations had already been planned. - -RAEDER: At that period, before the German-English Naval Agreement was -concluded on the basis of 35 to 100, Hitler was particularly eager to -avoid everything which might embarrass the negotiations in any way. The -construction and preparation of submarine parts came under this heading -as being a subject on which England was peculiarly sensitive. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an additional reason for this appendix and -other remarks in this second column—namely, the unfortunate experiences -which the Navy had caused in home politics, the fact that whenever the -slightest action was taken a quarrel immediately ensued on the home -political front? - -RAEDER: Yes; and that went so far that the Reichswehrminister was -attacked on occasions by Prussian ministers who disagreed with the Reich -Government—for instance, Müller, Severing, Stresemann and later -Brüning, who alleged to the Reich Chancellor that he took steps which he -was not authorized to take. In reality, however, the Reich Government -itself had sanctioned these things already and had accepted the -responsibility for them. - -DR. SIEMERS: So these things were kept secret for reasons of home -policy, so that they should not be apparent... - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: With the approval of the Reich Government? - -RAEDER: With the approval of the Reich Government. As regards the firms, -a number of firms... - -DR. SIEMERS: I would prefer now to refer back to Column 2, Number 20, as -I see from the record that the Prosecution have also expressly raised -this point in connection with the arming of fishing craft, emphasized -it, and made it the basis of a charge, “Warning shots, play it down.” - -RAEDER: The two fishing boats were quite small vessels and were normally -unarmed. They served to supervise the fishing boats in the North Sea -right up to Iceland, to help them in case of emergency, to take sick men -aboard and to afford protection against fishermen of other nations. We -thought it advisable to mount at least a 5-centimeter gun on these ships -since they were actually warships. “Warning shots” means that they fired -a salute when they wanted to draw the fishermen’s attention to -something; so it was quite an insignificant affair and had no need to be -artificially reduced to a bagatelle but was in fact a bagatelle. - -DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Numbers 21 to 28. This is a list of various -firms, including industrial firms working on armament contracts. The -Versailles Treaty admitted certain firms for this type of work while it -excluded others. In actual fact, other firms had received contracts. -Perhaps you can make a general statement on this point. - -RAEDER: This was at a time when we had strong hopes that progress would -be made at the Disarmament Conference. The Macdonald Plan, which brought -about a certain improvement, had already been accepted; and we might -have expected, in consequence, that the few factories still left to us -would have to increase their output during the next few years. I may -refer you to the shipping replacement scheme. Consequently, factories -producing specialized articles were better equipped and supplied. There -was, however, never any question of heavy guns or anything of that kind -but of automatic fuse-igniters, explosives—for instance, mine -containers, _et cetera_, small items but special items which could be -made only by certain firms. But, apart from the firms admitted, other -firms which had been excluded were also employed. Thus, for instance, -the Friedrich Krupp Grusenwerke A.G. at Magdeburg, Number 25, was -equipped to manufacture antiaircraft guns and antiaircraft barrels from -2-centimeters to 10.5-centimeters; similarly Number 26, a firm -manufacturing antiaircraft ammunition, explosives; Number 27... - -DR. SIEMERS: I do not think we need the details. - -RAEDER: No. And then engines for which there was also a great demand. - -DR. SIEMERS: I have some questions which apply to all these figures. Is -this not offset to a certain extent by the fact that some of the firms -admitted had already dropped out for economic reasons? - -RAEDER: Yes, you can certainly say that. These firms had comparatively -few deliveries which were not sufficient to keep them going. - -DR. SIEMERS: Defendant, I think one not only can—I think one must—say -so. May I draw your attention to Point 22, Column 3, which reads, “The -list in any case is out of date, as some firms have dropped out.” - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: That leaves us with Numbers 29 and 30. Number 29, -“Preparations in the field of experiments with motorboats.” I think that -these were preparations in a very small field. - -RAEDER: At the moment I cannot tell you exactly what this means. - -DR. SIEMERS: I do not believe in any case that the Prosecution will -attach any importance to it. - -Then I only want you to make a final statement on Number 30, “Probable -further concrete violations becoming necessary in the near future” up to -1934 inclusively. To all intents and purposes you have already answered -the question by your reference to the negotiations planned with the -British Government, some of which were already in progress. - -RAEDER: Yes, that was the point. - -DR. SIEMERS: These are matters, therefore, which were in any case due to -be discussed in the course of the negotiations with the British -Government, or rather the Admiralty. - -RAEDER: You cannot say that of them all. For instance, Points 1 to 3 -deal with mines. The number of mines was to be increased and modern -material was to replace the old. It goes on in the same way with the -transfer of guns from the North Sea to the Baltic “A” batteries, not -with the scrapping of guns. - -DR. SIEMERS: To conclude the whole matter, may I ask you to say what -impression the whole thing made on a naval expert like yourself. All -things considered, would you say that these are minor violations, and -how far are these violations of an aggressive nature? - -RAEDER: As I said yesterday, most of them are very inadequate -improvements in defense of an almost entirely defenseless position. The -separate items, as I explained yesterday, are so insignificant that it -is really impossible to spend very much time on them. I believe that the -Control Commission also had the impression that very little weight need -be attached to all these matters; for in 1925 when the Control -Commission left its station at Kiel where it had worked with the -organizations of the Naval Command, Commander Fenshow, Admiral -Charlton’s chief of staff and head of the Commission, whose main -interest was guns and who had worked with a Captain Raenkel, a gunner -and a specialist in these matters, said: - - “We must leave now, and you are glad that we are going. You did - not have a pleasant task, and neither did we. I must tell you - one thing. You need not think that we believed what you have - said. You did not say a single word of truth, but you have given - your information so skillfully that we were able to accept it, - and for that I am grateful to you.” - -DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-29, which is Exhibit USA-46. Mr. -President, it is in Raeder’s Document Book 10, Page 8 of the -Prosecution’s document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean 10a? - -DR. SIEMERS: Number 10, Page 8. This document, too, was submitted during -the general Indictment made by the Prosecution at the beginning of the -Trial on 27 November. It consists of a speech, a document signed by -Raeder, dated 31 January 1933, “General Directives for the Support of -the German Armaments Industry by the Navy.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution pointed this out; and they -have thought fit to conclude from it that on the day after Hitler’s -nomination as Chancellor of the Reich, you were already acting -positively in his support through this letter. Will you define your -attitude, please? - -RAEDER: There is no connection whatsoever between this letter and -Hitler’s accession to power. You must admit that it would be impossible -to compile so long and complicated a document—which was, after all, -carefully prepared—between the evening of 30 and the morning of 31 -January. This document results from the hope, which I mentioned before, -that already under the Papen and Von Schleicher Government the -stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and the Disarmament Conference -might be gradually relaxed, since the British Delegation had repeatedly -said that they favored the gradual restoration of equal rights. We had, -therefore, to get our industries into the best possible condition, as -far as the manufacture of armaments was concerned, by increasing their -output and enabling them to overcome competition. - -As I say in Paragraph c of this letter, almost every country was at that -time making efforts in the same direction, even those which, unlike -Germany, had no restrictions imposed on them. Great Britain, France, -North America, Japan, and especially Italy made the most determined -efforts to gain markets for their armaments industry; and I wanted to -follow them in this particular sphere. In order to do this, there had to -be an understanding between the various departments of the Naval Command -Staff to the effect that industry must be given support in a way which -avoided the secrecy of technical matters and developments to too petty a -degree. That is why I explain in Paragraph c that secrecy in small -matters is less important than maintaining a high standard and keeping -the lead. - -I state in the final sentence: - - “To sum up, I attach particular importance to the continued - support of the industry in question by the Navy, even after the - expected relaxation of the present restrictions, so that the - industry would command confidence abroad and would find a - market.” - -This has nothing at all to do with Hitler nor with any independent -rearmament on my own behalf. - -DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us when, approximately, you drafted these -directives? - -RAEDER: During the month of January. I may say that we had a -conference—perhaps at the beginning of January—and after that I had it -put in writing. - -DR. SIEMERS: That would be certainly 2 to 3 weeks before this letter was -written? - -RAEDER: Yes, certainly. - -DR. SIEMERS: I think it happens rarely that one receives a letter from a -government office one day after its being conceived by the head of that -office. - -May I ask you now to tell me one thing more in connection with the -“relaxation of the present restrictions.” That means the relaxation of -the Versailles Treaty, I presume, through the Disarmament Conference. -You have mentioned that four times in this document, so that I assume -that was your basis. - -RAEDER: Yes, it was. The whole atmosphere at that time, under both the -governments I mentioned, was such that one could expect an improvement. - -DR. SIEMERS: And this was the basis for which, to quote a few names -only, Stresemann, Brüning, fought. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: As they felt it their duty to take certain advance -precautions? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: I think there is no need for me to go into further details. -I have read this document again and again, and have been unable to find -any point on which the Prosecution could base the conclusion that you -had National Socialist ideas. - -I now come to Document C-140. It is Exhibit USA-51, and is in the -Document Book 10a, Page 104. - -RAEDER: May I interrupt you, please? Would it not be appropriate that I -should say now what I wanted to say to supplement the statement in C-156 -regarding aircraft? - -DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It might be practicable to finish with the -infringements of the Versailles Treaty before going on to another -subject. I had forgotten that. - -The Prosecution have submitted Document C-156. It is Captain Schüssler’s -book from the year 1937 and contains almost the same list of -infringements as Document C-32, so that that document can be disposed of -at the same time. In addition, it deals with the case of the designing -office for submarines in Holland, with which we have already dealt. But -there is still one point on which I should like to have your comments, -and that concerns certain preparations in connection with navy aircraft -which might be permitted later. - -RAEDER: All sorts of preparations had been made in the field of aviation -long before I came into office. A number of aircraft had been purchased, -as I see from this book. They were stored with a firm called “Severa -G.m.b.H.,” which was known to the Reichswehrminister. The Versailles -Treaty had permitted us antiaircraft guns both on ships and on the -coast, as was mentioned yesterday; and for these antiaircraft, firing -practice had to be arranged. The Control Commission had allowed us a -certain number of aircraft to tow the necessary targets. These aircraft -were flown by ex-naval pilots employed by this company. The company, in -turn, was managed by an old naval pilot. - -Since we were not allowed to train naval pilots or were not allowed to -have any naval air force, we gave a year’s training in the civil -aviation school to a number of prospective naval officers before they -joined the Navy, so that through this 1-year training they developed -into very good pilots. Then they joined the Navy and went through their -ordinary naval training. The aircraft purchased in this way was -temporarily in the possession of the “Severa,” which also had a good -deal to do with the Lohmann affairs and for that reason was dissolved by -Reichswehrminister Gröner in the summer of 1928. Reichswehrminister -Gröner established a new company with similar assignments in the autumn -of 1928, soon after I assumed office. But he had signed the agreement -himself in order to control the correct management of the whole affair. - -In this company, in addition to their ordinary work, the Navy pilots -carried out experiments in connection with the development of aircraft -for a later Navy air force. We had the Government’s permission to -manufacture a model of every type likely to be of use, but we were not -allowed to accumulate aircraft. The Government had expressly forbidden -that. The result was that in the course of years the company developed a -number of aircraft types which would be useful at a later date when we -were once more allowed to have aircraft. - -In the early period exercises in the Navy were carried out by the old -naval pilots—that is to say, it was demanded that exercises in -observation be taken and that the crews of ships learn how to act -against aircraft. When these young naval pilots were assigned to such -exercises, they were discharged from the Navy for that time. It was an -awkward affair, but it was always carried out punctiliously. - -DR. SIEMERS: I may now turn to Document C-140, which is in Document Book -10a, Page 104. It is a letter from Reich Defense Minister Von Blomberg -dated 25 October 1933. It is addressed to the Chief of the Army, the -Chief of the Navy, and the Reich Minister for Aviation. - -On this document the Prosecution based their accusations that you, -Witness, prepared military plans for an armed resistance which might -become necessary in consequence of Germany’s withdrawal from the -Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Perhaps you can -briefly state your view. - -RAEDER: I had no previous knowledge of our imminent withdrawal from the -League of Nations. This directive came out 11 days after we had left the -League of Nations, and it merely provides defensive measures in the -event of sanctions being applied against Germany by other powers in -consequence of her departure from the League of Nations. It says under -2c: “I prohibit any practical preparations in the meantime.” So, at -first, nothing was done in consequence of this directive, and the Reich -Defense Minister merely asked for a report from me as to what should be -done. - -As far as I remember, no practical preparations of any kind were carried -out by the Navy at the time, because the situation remained absolutely -quiet and there was no reason to assume that there would be any need for -defense. - -DR. SIEMERS: That is probably indicated by the words under Point 2a, -“Preparation for defense against sanctions.” It concerns the defense -only. - -RAEDER: The defense only. - -DR. SIEMERS: That the withdrawal from the League of Nations occurred 14 -October 1933, 11 days before the document was written, is a well-known -fact and has been mentioned by the Prosecution on Page 257 of the record -(Volume II, Page 304). - -Now we come to Document C-166. This is Exhibit USA-48. Mr. President, -this is in Document Book 10, on Page 36. It is a document dated 12 March -1934. It emanates from the Command Office of the Navy and refers to the -preparation of auxiliary cruisers for action. The Prosecution have -quoted only the first two paragraphs of this document and have pointed -out that it shows that auxiliary cruisers were to be built and describes -transport ships “O” for camouflage purposes. - -The two paragraphs sound incriminating, but they can very easily be -explained. May I refer to Lohmann’s affidavit, Document Number Raeder-2, -my Document Book 1, Page 5. I refer to Paragraph II. I quote: - - “The Document C-166, submitted to me, a communication from the - Office of the Naval Command of 12 March 1934, deals with the - ‘availability of auxiliary cruisers’ which, as stated in the - document, were marked as ‘Transport Ships O.’ These ships were - not to be newly constructed but were to be selected from the - stock of the German merchant marine in accordance with the - demands enumerated in the document and were to be examined as to - their suitability for the tasks to be assigned them. Then plans - were made for reconstruction in case of necessity, but the boats - remained in the merchant marine.” - -May I state at this point that in the English translation the word -“Umbau” has been translated by the word “reconstruction.” I have my -doubts as to whether this is quite correct. I presume that the -interpreter has now translated it as “Umbau” accordingly. As far as I -know, the German word “Umbau” only means much the same thing as the -English word “changes”—that is, “Veränderung.” - -I continue to quote: - - “The order to select such boats from German shipyards was - received, among others, by the Hamburg Office of the Naval - Command where I was serving at the time.” - -Thus far Admiral Lohmann. - -Witness, is Lohmann’s statement correct? Have you anything to add? - -RAEDER: No. I can only emphasize again that there was no question of -immediate construction but only of selecting suitable ships and -examining them with a view to ascertaining the alterations necessary to -enable them to function as auxiliary cruisers in the case of a general -mobilization. The preparation of the plans and the plans themselves were -to be ready by 1 April 1935, as laid down in Number 12. They were to be -submitted to the naval administration so that in the case of -mobilization the ship concerned could be taken from the stock of the -merchant marine and converted. - -All these proposals for mobilization were, of course, kept secret. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, that the whole -misunderstanding would not have arisen if the Prosecution had translated -two further sentences. The English version is very short and Point 11 is -missing. I quote the text of Point 11: - - “‘B’ is requested in co-operation with ‘K,’ first of all, to - select suitable vessels and to ascertain how many 15-centimeter - guns have to be mounted to achieve the required broadside...” - -The word “selected” is used here so that the intention is not—as the -Prosecution assert—the building of auxiliary cruisers but the making of -a selection from merchant vessels. - -RAEDER: Yes; and the ships continued to sail in the service of the -merchant marine. - -DR. SIEMERS: The second sentence, which I find has been unfortunately -omitted from the English translation of the Prosecution, reads as -follows: - - “As long as only a restricted number of guns—at present 24—can - be placed at our disposal for this purpose, preparations are to - be made for only four transport ships (O). An increase of this - number, presumably to six, will be postponed to a date when more - guns are available. Until then we must await the results of the - preparations for the first auxiliary cruisers.” - -The fact that only four, or at the most six, merchant navy vessels were -involved shows the insignificance of the whole matter. - -I now come to Document C-189, USA-44. It is in Document Book Number 10 -of the British Delegation, Page 66. - -I should like your comments.—I beg your pardon. I should remind you -that this concerns the conversation between Grossadmiral Raeder and the -Führer aboard the _Karlsruhe_ in June 1934. - -Grossadmiral, will you please state your views on the three points -mentioned in this brief document and which you discussed with Hitler in -June 1934. - -First question: Why was Hitler unwilling to reveal the increase in -displacement of D and E—that is, the _Scharnhorst_ and the -_Gneisenau_—when, according to this document, these were defensive -weapons and every expert would notice the increased tonnage of these -ships and, as far as I know, did notice it? - -RAEDER: At that time we were considering what we could do with the two -armored ships D and E, after the signing of the impending naval pact -with England—that is, the two ships which Hitler had granted me for the -Navy in the 1934 budget. We had definitely decided not to continue -building these armored ships as such, since we could make better use of -the material at our disposal. - -DR. SIEMERS: But surely you realized that every expert in the British or -American or any other Admiralty would see on a voyage, as soon as he had -sighted the ship, that the 10,000 tons had now become 26,000? - -RAEDER: Yes, of course. - -DR. SIEMERS: So that there was merely the intention... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, when you are examining a witness directly, -you are not to ask leading questions which put into his mouth the very -answer that you desire. You are stating all sorts of things to this -witness and then asking him “isn’t that so?” - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. I shall make every effort to put my -questions differently. - -RAEDER: My answer is different anyway. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes? - -RAEDER: We are dealing here, in the first place, with plans: I asked -permission to revise the plans for these two armored ships; first, by -strengthening their defensive weapons—that is, the armor-plating and -underwater compartments—and then by increasing their offensive -armaments—namely, by adding a third 28-centimeter instead of -26-centimeter tower. The Führer was not yet willing to sanction, a new -28-centimeter tower because, as I said before, he did not in any -circumstances want to prejudice the negotiations going on with Great -Britain. To begin with, therefore, he sanctioned only a medium -displacement of 18,000 to 19,000 tons; and we knew that when matters -reached the stage where a third 28-centimeter tower could be mounted, -the displacement would be about 25,000 to 26,000 tons. - -We saw no cause to announce it at this stage, however, because it is -customary in the Navy that new construction plans and especially new -types of ships should be announced at the latest possible moment. That -was the principal reason; and apart from that, Hitler did not want to -draw the attention of other countries to these constructions by giving -the figures mentioned or stating the very high speed. There was no other -reason for not announcing these things. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should like your comments on Number 2 of the document. -That has been specially held against you by the Prosecution, because -there you state the view that the fleet must be developed to oppose -England later on. - -RAEDER: At first—as I intended to explain later—we had taken the new -French ships as our model. The French Navy was developing at that time -the _Dunkerque_ class with eight 33-centimeter guns and a high speed, -and we took that for our model, especially since, in Hitler’s -opinion—as you will hear later—there was no question of arming against -England. We intended to reconstruct these two armored ships on this -pattern as battleships with nine 28-centimeter guns and capable of a -high speed. But then we heard that the _King George_ class was being -designed in England with 35.6-centimeter guns and, therefore, stronger -than the French type; and so I said that we would in any case have to -depart from the French type eventually and follow the English model -which is now being built with 35-centimeter guns. - -There is an error in the translation—namely, “oppose England.” It says -in my text that developments should follow the lines of British -developments—in other words, that we should design vessels similar in -type to the English ships. But they were out of date, too, shortly -afterwards, because France was then building ships of the _Richelieu_ -class with 38-centimeter guns. Therefore, we decided that we too would -build ships with 38-centimeter guns. That was how the _Bismarck_ came to -be built. The word “oppose” would have been quite senseless at a time -when we intended to come to an agreement with Britain on terms under -which we could in no way vie with her. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now we come to Point 3 of this document, which the -Prosecution regard as equally important. I quote: - - “The Führer demands complete secrecy with regard to the - construction of U-boats—in consideration, also, of the Saar - plebiscite.” - -RAEDER: I have already referred to the Führer’s wish for secrecy in -connection with both the construction of submarines and the preparations -for that construction. This is one of the points on which he was most -sensitive, because in no circumstances did he wish to prejudice the -negotiations. He himself was generally extremely cautious during this -period and would not in any circumstances do anything which might -sabotage the naval pact which he was so eager to conclude. - -DR. SIEMERS: I do not quite understand the reference to secrecy in -connection with the construction of submarines. These were as yet not -under construction, were they? - -RAEDER: No. I said secrecy in connection with the preparations for the -construction of submarines; that is just a short way of expressing it. - -DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Document C-190, Exhibit USA-45. It is in -Document Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, Page 67. This is a -conversation which took place between Hitler and Raeder on 2 November -1934 aboard the _Emden_. In the document before you Hitler informs you -that he considers it necessary to enlarge and improve the Navy by 1938 -and that, if necessary, he would instruct Dr. Ley to place at the -disposal of the Navy 120 to 150 million marks from the Labor Front. - -Did you have anything at all to do with raising funds for rearmament? - -RAEDER: No, not actually with the raising of funds. I applied for funds -to the Reich Defense Minister, who allocated them to me for the purpose -of this rearmament. I presume that this statement was made because the -allocation sanctioned for the Navy appeared too small to me, and for -this reason the Führer said that if necessary he would get Ley to act. -This did not actually happen. I received my funds only through the Reich -Defense Minister. - -DR. SIEMERS: Although the charge made by the Prosecution is not quite -clear to me, since it is based on Hitler’s views—which have nothing to -do with you—I want to come back to this sum once more. I may remind you -that an armored cruiser of the old 10,000-ton class, which after all was -small, cost 75 to 80 million. Could this figure of 120 to 150 million be -large enough to put the Navy in a position to carry out rearmament on a -large scale? - -RAEDER: No, certainly not. Two battleships were also under construction, -apart from those two armored cruisers. You can imagine that the costs -continually increased. - -DR. SIEMERS: So that this sum was not final? - -RAEDER: No, it was not final. - -DR. SIEMERS: Will you please go on, then, to Point 2. According to Point -2 of the document, you pointed out to Hitler during this conference that -it might be necessary to assemble six submarines during the first -quarter of 1935. - -RAEDER: I said this because I knew that at the beginning of 1935 we were -going to aim at the re-establishment of the Armed Forces; and I thought -that this might create a critical situation in respect to sanctions, -which Hitler always expected, too. I assume that we were talking about -this and that is why I suggested that if the necessity for any special -preparations should arise out of the re-establishment of the Armed -Forces then six submarines should be assembled, at a date previous to -their proper date of assemblage, from those parts which were obtained -from abroad. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler actually give the order? - -RAEDER: No, the order was not given. - -THE PRESIDENT: We might break off now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-159, Exhibit USA-54. This document -may be found in the British Delegation’s Document Book 10a, Page 110. -This document is a letter written by Von Blomberg on 2 March 1936, -dealing with the demilitarized zone. Did you, Witness, make lengthy -military preparations for the action which took place on 7 March 1936? - -RAEDER: No, I made no lengthy preparations; I heard of the plan only -through this document of 2 March. I may refer you to Point 6 which says, -“To preserve the peaceful character of the operation, no military -security or advance measures are to be taken without my express orders.” -It was made clear, therefore, that the entire action was to have a -peaceful character. - -DR. SIEMERS: You knew nothing at all about this entire action until the -beginning of March? - -RAEDER: No, I believe that this action was kept especially secret. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then I will turn to Document C-194, Exhibit USA-55, in the -British Delegation’s Document Book 10a, Page 128. This document is a -communication from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy dating from 1936—the wording seems to -indicate 6 March 1936. It deals, therefore, with the same subject as the -last document. May I have your comments. - -RAEDER: The Reich Defense Minister had sanctioned a certain air -reconnaissance to take place over the North Sea on 6 March—that is to -say, the day before the occupation of the Rhineland. He intended to -withhold his decision as to whether U-boats were also to be sent out on -reconnaissance assignments in the West as far as the Texel until the -next day. I thereupon issued an order on 6 March 1936 and gave special -instructions... - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] I would like to point out that Raeder’s -order of 6 March 1936 is appended to the same document and that the text -is therefore before the Tribunal. - -[_Turning to the Defendant._] Please go on. - -RAEDER: I prepared this decree of 6 March concerning the planning of the -U-boat line and the reconnaissance to take place in the German bay on 7 -March. I pointed out especially that everything must be avoided which -might create a false impression of the Führer’s intentions and thus put -difficulties in the way of this peaceful action. - -DR. SIEMERS: I would like to add to your statement that these words -taken from the decree of 6 March 1936 are to be found under Point 5. -They are in the last two lines. - -RAEDER: Those were all precautionary measures in case of a hostile -counteraction. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were there any preparations on a large scale? - -RAEDER: No, no. - -DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the two last documents dealing with the topic -of the Versailles Treaty and rearmament, Document C-135, Exhibit GB-213, -Document Book 10, Page 20—that is the British Delegation’s Document -Book 10—which is headed, “History of the War Organization”—that is, -the “War Organization and Mobilization Scheme.” This dates from 1938. -This document was read in its entirety by the Prosecution and a very -grave charge was based upon it, because the document contains a -statement to the effect that Hitler had demanded that in 5 years—that -is, by 1 April 1938—a Wehrmacht should be created which he could employ -as a political instrument of power and also because the document -mentions the Establishment Organization Plan 1938 and the Combat -Organization Plan. - -Considering the significance of this point, I asked Vice Admiral Lohmann -for his comments on this rather technical question. We are dealing with -Exhibit Number Raeder-2, in my Document Book 2, under part III, on Page -5. I think the Prosecution have misunderstood the meaning of certain -terms. The terms “Kriegsgliederung” (Combat Organization Plan) and -“Aufstellungsgliederung” (Establishment Organization Plan) have been -misunderstood. - -I ask permission, therefore, to read this affidavit in conjunction with -the documents I have submitted in evidence. I quote: - - “III. Referring to Documents C-135 and C-153, Armament Plan, - Mobilization Plan, Establishment Organization - Plan—Aufstellungsgliederung, A.G.—and Combat Organization - Plan—Kriegsgliederung, K.G....” - -I would like to add that C-153 and C-135 are connected. I have taken -them together for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, I would like to -state for the record that 153 is Exhibit USA-43 and may be found in -British Document Book 10a, Page 107. It is headed, “Armament Plan (A.P.) -for the Third Armament Period.” It is a rather long document and is -dated 12 May 1934. - -I quote Lohmann’s affidavit on these two documents: - - “The above-named documents submitted to me deal with the - Establishment Organization Plan, the Combat Organization Plan, - the Mobilization Plan, and the Armament Plan. The first three - plans, or orders of distribution, deal with the same matters and - differ only in manner of composition. The Armament Plan differs - from the other plans inasmuch as it deals with new construction - and the required new materials and is hence less extensive. - - “The German Navy, like the Armed Forces as a whole—and, no - doubt, the Armed Forces of every nation—made such plans in - order to be able, in the case of a conflict or of military - complications, to prepare in time and use efficiently the means - of combat available. Owing to changing conditions, military - developments, changes in personnel, and advances in technique, - such plans were revised every year. An essential part of these - preparations, self-evident in the case of any Armed Forces, - consisted of the establishment, mobilization, or combat - organization, which provided a survey of all naval installations - on land and sea, their local defenses, and tactical - subordination—as well as of all combat material on hand or to - be secured, increased, or reorganized by a specified date. All - operations envisaged by the military command were based on this - Combat Organization Plan, and it also served the political - leaders as an indication of the possibilities according to the - strength and number of the military resources available. - - “The Combat Organization Plan always had to be prepared with - great foresight and was issued by the High Command of the Navy - generally 1½ years before it was to go into effect, in order to - enable the responsible offices to attend in time to such - necessary preliminaries, such as applying to the Navy Budget - Office for funds and materials—such as iron, steel, _et - cetera_—and for the preparation of accommodation insofar as all - this was not already covered by the peacetime development of the - Navy. - - “In 1933, when Hitler in his Five Year Plan demanded that by 1 - April 1938 an armed force should be created which he could throw - into the balance as an instrument of political power, the Combat - Organization Plan for 1938 was worked out independently of the - scheduled yearly Combat Organization Plan, and up to 1935 it - dealt mostly with the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles - which had not yet been exhausted and with the question of - supplementing the naval strength with craft not subject to - limitation in type or number. After the Naval Pact of 1935, the - Combat Organization Plan 1938 was replaced by a “Combat - Organization Plan Ultimate Goal” (K.G. Endziel), which regulated - the number of warships of all types existing or to be built in - the proportion of 35:100 measured by the tonnage actually - existing in the English Fleet. In consideration of monetary and - material resources, the capacity of the shipyards, and the - length of time required to build large warships, this ultimate - goal was in the meanwhile fixed for the year 1944-45. - - “There remained always the possibility of postponing it further, - in accordance with the building program of the English Fleet. - - “The various terminologies have only a naval technical - significance and do not permit conclusions as to political - plans.” - -I would like to indicate a slight error in translation in the English -text. The translation of the word “Terminierungen” by “terminology” is, -in my opinion, not correct. It should probably be “dates” or -“deadlines.” - -Witness, are Vice Admiral Lohmann’s statements correct? Can you add -anything to this basic point of view? - -RAEDER: These statements contain everything which can be said on this -matter. All these arrangements are, in my opinion, preparations which -must be made by every navy if it is to be systematically equipped and -made ready for operation. - - * * * * * - - Editor’s Note - - In spite of the meticulous care given to this edition certain - inexactitudes may slip in, some originating with the speakers - themselves. In order to give a faithful rendering of the Record - we are avoiding alterations, but corrective notes will be - printed in the final volume. - - The General Secretary’s Office would be grateful if the reader - would draw to his attention any errors or omissions, so that - they may also be included in the list of corrections. - - _S. Paul A. Joosten_ - Deputy General Secretary - Editor of the Record - - Address: - Editor of the Record - International Military Tribunal - APO 696 A, United States Army - - * * * * * - -It says somewhere—in Document Number C-135, Page 1, under Point -2—that, “The growing tension between Germany and Poland forced us to -make practical instead of theoretical preparations for a purely -German-Polish conflict.” That was interpreted to mean that at some -time—I believe in 1930—we planned a war of aggression against Poland. - -I testified yesterday that our main object was and had to be, nor could -it have gone any further than, to oppose with force any aggression -committed by Poland against East Prussia. That was the object of our -work—to protect Germany from an invasion by the Poles. At that time, it -would have been madness for German forces, which were still very -inadequately armed, to invade Poland or any other country. - -Then too, since the dates 1938 and 1944-45 constantly recur, I would -like to point out again that the year 1938 first came into question as -the final date for the first phase of the Shipping Replacement Plan. The -last ship of this Shipping Replacement Plan was to be built from 1936 to -1938. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] I would like to call your attention to the -fact that this is Document Number Raeder-7. - -RAEDER: [_Continuing._] Then Hitler decreed a Five Year Plan, which -happened also to cover the years 1933 to 1938 and in accordance with -which the Combat Organization Plan was to be fixed for the year 1938. -The Combat Organization Plan Ultimate Goal was fixed for 1944-45; and -the reason for fixing this date, as stated in the document which you -have just read, was the fact that in fixing our program we had to take -into consideration the funds and material at our disposal, the capacity -of our shipbuilding yards, and the length of time needed to build big -warships. A reasonably strong fighting force could not be created before -that date. Later on the Combat Organization Plan appears again in -several of my letters. But there was no date given which, on our part, -was intended as the appointed time of attack. - -DR. SIEMERS: The statements in Document C-135 are in accordance with the -German-English Naval Agreement. Is that correct? - -Perhaps I did not formulate my question clearly. The statement that a -new program was set up implies then that it was done in accordance with -the German-English Naval Agreement? - -RAEDER: Yes, of course. - -DR. SIEMERS: In any case, the reference to Document C-135, Point 8, is -probably to be interpreted in that way since it says, “...A modern -fleet, bound only by the clauses of the German-British Naval Agreement.” - -RAEDER: Of course. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now I turn to another topic and go back to the year 1933. - -Grossadmiral, when did you meet Hitler, and did you have any connection -with National Socialism before 1933? - -RAEDER: I met Hitler on 2 February 1933 when I saw him and talked to him -for the first time. It was at an evening party arranged by General Von -Blomberg at the home of General Von Hammerstein, the Chief of the Army -Command Staff, at which Reich Defense Minister Von Blomberg intended to -present to Hitler senior generals and admirals. I shall describe the -proceedings later. - -Up to that time, I had had no connection whatsoever with National -Socialism. I knew Admiral Von Levetzow only from the first World War. He -was on the staff of Admiral Scheer whom I knew well and who had -obviously met Hitler at a comparatively early date. It was through him, -however, that I heard that Hitler took a very active interest in naval -matters and was surprisingly well-informed about them. On the other -hand, I believe that Von Levetzow had also spoken to Hitler about the -reputation of the Navy and his own opinion of the Navy at that time. But -I had no connections beyond that. - -DR. SIEMERS: What were your reasons for remaining in office in 1933, -Grossadmiral, when you had no connection with National Socialism? - -RAEDER: The Reich President, Field Marshal Von Hindenburg, at the same -time Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, had appointed the leader of the -largest party as Chancellor of the Reich. I think that, if I had gone to -him and told him I wanted to resign—or intended to resign—because he -had appointed a new Chancellor, he would quite certainly have taken it -as an insult and would then really have dismissed me. I had not the -slightest reason to ask my Supreme Commander to release me from my -military post because he, in his capacity of Reich President, had -appointed a new Reich Chancellor of whom I, perhaps, might not approve. - -DR. SIEMERS: When and where did you first hear Hitler state his basic -political principles? - -RAEDER: I heard him for the first time on the afore-mentioned 2 -February, after the dinner at General Von Hammerstein’s home. I was -introduced to him before dinner, and after dinner he made a speech. He -was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr Von Neurath. -There were no other members of the Party present. - -In his speech, he first of all spoke of his career and of his social and -national aims. He said that he wanted to regain equal rights for the -German Reich and that he would try to rid the country of the shackles of -the Versailles Treaty and restore to Germany her internal sovereignty; -and he also discussed his social aims: the establishment of true -community among the people, the raising of the workers’ standard of -living, assistance to be given to the farmers, and the promotion of -agriculture, the establishment of a labor service, and the elimination -of unemployment. He specially emphasized—and this was really the main -point—that both domestic and foreign policy were to be left entirely in -his hands, that the Wehrmacht was to have nothing at all to do with -this, that the Wehrmacht was not to be used even to deal with unrest at -home, and that he had other forces to deal with these affairs. He wanted -to insure an undisturbed period of development for the Wehrmacht so that -it could become the factor necessary to prevent the Reich from becoming -the sport of other nations; and for that reason it would be necessary in -the next few years for the Wehrmacht to devote its entire attention to -the preparation of its main objective, training for the defense of the -fatherland in the case of aggression. The Wehrmacht would be the sole -bearer of arms, and its structure would remain unaltered. He spoke of no -details. - -There was a comparatively large party assembled. As far as schemes for -war were concerned—none was mentioned, and all those present were -uncommonly pleased with this speech. He spoke with particular respect of -Reich President Von Hindenburg, the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, -and we had the impression that he would respect this much-revered -personality. - -This speech was the only account of his basic principles which he gave -me as Chief of the Naval Command Staff, as well as to the Chief of the -Army Command Staff and others. - -DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, when did you report to Hitler for the first -time on the Navy; and what was Hitler’s general attitude on this -occasion—toward the Navy in particular? - -RAEDER: The first naval report I gave was a few days later in the -presence of General Von Blomberg, who in his capacity of Reich Defense -Minister was my superior. I cannot give the exact date, but it was -shortly afterwards. - -On this occasion, Hitler gave me a further account of the principles on -which I was to command the Navy. I reported to Hitler first of all on -the state of the Navy; on the rather slight degree to which the -provisions of the Versailles Treaty had been carried out by the Navy, -its inferior strength, the Shipping Replacement Plan, and incidents -concerned with naval policy, such as the Treaty of Washington, the -Treaty of London, 1930, the position of the Disarmament Conference. He -had already been fully informed on all these matters. - -He said he wanted to make clear to me the principles on which his policy -was based and that this policy was to serve as the basis of long-term -naval policy. I still remember these words quite clearly, as well as -those which followed. - -He did not under any circumstances wish to have complications with -England, Japan, or Italy—above all not with England. And he wanted to -prove this by fixing an agreement with England as to the strength to be -allotted to the German Fleet in comparison with that of the English -Navy. By so doing, he wanted to show that he was prepared to -acknowledge, once and for all, England’s right to maintain a navy -commensurate with the vastness of her interests all over the world. The -German Navy required expansion only to the extent demanded by a -continental European policy. I took this as the second main principle on -which to base my leadership of the Navy. The actual ratio of strength -between the two navies was not discussed at the time; it was discussed -later on. - -This decision of Hitler’s afforded extreme satisfaction both to myself -and to the whole of the Navy, for it meant that we no longer had to -compete senselessly with the first sea power; and I saw the possibility -of gradually building up our Navy on a solid foundation. I believe that -this decision was hailed by the whole Navy with joy and that they -understood its significance. The Russian Pact was later greeted with the -same appreciation, since the combination of the Russian Pact and the -naval agreement would have been a guarantee of wonderful development. -There were people—but not in the Navy—who believed that this amounted -to yielding ground, but this limitation was accepted by the majority of -Germans with considerable understanding. - -DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, what were your personal relations with -Hitler? How did you judge him in the course of the years, and what was -Hitler’s attitude toward you? - -RAEDER: I welcomed this vigorous personality who was obviously most -intelligent, had tremendous will power, was a master in handling people, -and—as I myself observed in the early years—a great and very skillful -politician whose national and social aims were already well known and -accepted in their entirety by the Armed Forces and the German people... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this might be taken more shortly. We -have heard it from so many of the others. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Is the defendant not to describe his relations with -Hitler? Do the Tribunal consider them irrelevant? - -THE PRESIDENT: He might do it shortly. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Good. Grossadmiral, please do it shortly. - -RAEDER: I would just like to say what I thought of Hitler in order to -make clear my reasons for not at any time leaving him, which fact the -Prosecution have raised very strongly against me. His first steps in -both domestic and foreign policy undoubtedly called forth admiration for -his political ability and awakened the hope that, since he had taken -these first steps without bloodshed or political complications, he would -be able to solve in the same way any problems, which might arise later. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have heard this as I have pointed out—this quality or -power of Hitler’s ability from nearly every one of the defendants and it -is very cumulative, and if this defendant wishes to say he was greatly -impressed by Hitler’s qualities, that is quite sufficient. All of the -rest is cumulative. - -RAEDER: Very well. Then I shall only say that during the early years I -had no reason to wonder whether I should remain in my position or not. - -DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, we shall automatically come to the later -complications at a later stage of the hearing. - -I come now to the German-British Naval Agreement and would like to ask -you briefly how this Naval Agreement of 1935 came about. I am referring -to Document Number Raeder-11, Document Book 1, Page 59, which contains -the Naval Agreement in the form of a communication from the German -Foreign Minister to the British Government. The actual content was fixed -by the British, as the first few words show: - - “Your Excellency, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt - of your Excellency’s note of to-day’s date, in which you were so - good as to communicate to me on behalf of His Majesty’s - Government in the United Kingdom the following”: - -Then come the following statements by the British: - - “1. During the last few days the representatives of the German - Government and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom - have been engaged in conversations, the primary purpose of which - has been to prepare the way for the holding of a general - conference on the subject of the limitation of naval armaments. - It now gives me great pleasure to notify your Excellency of the - formal acceptance by His Majesty’s Government in the United - Kingdom of the proposal of the German Government discussed at - those conversations, that the future strength of the German Navy - in relation to the aggregate naval strength of the Members of - the British Commonwealth of Nations should be in the proportion - of 35:100. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom regard - this proposal as a contribution of the greatest importance to - the cause of future naval limitation. They further believe that - the agreement which they have now reached with the German - Government and which they regard as a permanent and definite - agreement as from to-day between the two Governments...” - -THE PRESIDENT: This is a well-known document, and the Tribunal will take -judicial notice of it, of course. It is not necessary to read it all. - -DR. SIEMERS: Very well. I should nevertheless like to point out that, -according to Point 2f of this document, the British Government -recognized that, as far as submarines were concerned, Germany should be -allowed the same number as Britain. At that time that amounted to about -52,000 tons, or rather more than 100 U-boats. The Government of the -German Reich, however, voluntarily undertook to restrict itself to 45 -percent of the total submarine tonnage of the British Empire. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you and the Navy regard such -considerable restrictions as the basis for Germany’s peaceful -development, and was it received favorably by the Navy in general? - -RAEDER: Yes, as I have already said, it was received with greatest -satisfaction. - -DR. SIEMERS: Since a judgment formed some years ago carries more weight -than a declaration made now in the course of the Trial, I wish to submit -Document Number Raeder-12, Document Book 1, Page 64. This document deals -with a communication made by Grossadmiral Raeder for the information of -the Officers’ Corps. It is dated 15 July 1935, a month after the signing -of the naval agreement. Raeder says—and I quote the second paragraph: - - “The agreement resulted from the Führer’s decision to fix the - ratio of the fleets of Germany and the British Empire at 35:100. - This decision, which was based on considerations of European - politics, formed the starting point of the London conferences. - In spite of initial opposition from England, we held inflexibly - to our decision; and our demands were granted in their entirety. - The Führer’s decision was based on the desire to exclude the - possibility of antagonism between Germany and England in the - future and so to exclude forever the possibility of naval - rivalry between the two countries.” - -A sentence on Page 66 is also important. I wish to ask the High Tribunal -to take judicial notice of the rest of it: - - “By this agreement, the building-up of the German Navy to the - extent fixed by the Führer was formally approved by England.” - -This is followed by individual statements as to tonnage. - -Then I should like to call attention to the final sentence, which is -indicative of Raeder’s attitude at the time: - - “This agreement represents a signal success in the political - sphere since it is the first step towards a practical - understanding and signifies the first relaxation of the - inflexible front so far maintained against Germany by our former - opponents and implacably demonstrated again at Stresa.” - -DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, were the lines of peaceful development laid -down by you at that time followed in the next years? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I should like to submit Document -Raeder-13. This is a document which enables me—in order to save -time—to dispense with the testimony here in Court of Vice Admiral -Lohmann. This document will be found in Document Book 1, Page 68, and is -entitled, “The New Plan for the Development of the German Navy,” and is -a standard work. It is a speech made by Vice Admiral Lohmann in the -summer of 1935 at the Hanseatic University in Hamburg. I ask the High -Tribunal to take judicial notice of the essential points of this -document; and as this is an authoritative work done at the request of -the High Command, I may perhaps just quote the following. Admiral -Lohmann sets forth first of all that since we now had the liberty to -recruit and arm troops, the Navy was then free of restrictions, but that -that was not Hitler’s view. I now quote: - - “The Führer, however, chose another way. He preferred to - negotiate on German naval armament direct with Britain which, as - our former adversary”—I beg your pardon; I am quoting from Page - 70—“has tried for years to show understanding for our difficult - position.” - -And on Page 71 Lohmann speaks about misleading reports published in the -press, _et cetera_, and continues literally: - - “All the more surprising, then, was the ratification of the - treaty which expressed the full agreement of both governments - and did not, like some armament treaties of former time, leave - more embitterment than understanding in its wake. The sense of - fairness which British statesmen have retained, despite the - frequently dirty ways of higher politics, came through when - confronted with the unreserved sincerity of the German - declarations, the dignified firmness of the German - representatives, and the passionate desire for peace inspiring - the speeches and acts of our Führer. Unlike former times, the - speeches of the British leaders expressed respect and - recognition. We have acknowledged this as a sign of honest - willingness to understand. The voices from the circles of - British war veterans are hardly less valuable than the attitude - of the official leaders. In November 1918, for instance, when - the German Fleet was taken by British squadrons to be interned - in Scapa Flow, the British Commander-in-Chief, Lord Beatty, the - great foe of our Admiral Hipper, sent the famous signal, ‘Do not - forget that the enemy is a contemptible beast.’ This Grand - Admiral expressed his dislike for Germany on many occasions, but - on 26 June this same Lord Beatty stated in the House of Lords, - ‘I am of the opinion that we should be grateful to the Germans. - They came to us with hands outstretched, announcing that they - agreed to the ratio of 35:100.’ If they had submitted other - proposals, we could not have prevented them. We may be truly - grateful for the fact that there is at least one country in the - world whose competition in regard to armament we do not need to - fear.” - -Then I should like to refer to Page 73, which limits battleships to -35,000 tons. This limitation plays a part in the Prosecution Document -C-23. The fact that in this document next to the words “Panama Canal” -are placed the words “battleships 35,000 tons” has a certain -significance. The limitation to 35,000 tons is not so decisive and -important as the Prosecution would like us to believe. This is the -origin: The United States of America at that time wanted to limit the -tonnage to 35,000 tons on account of the width and depth of the Panama -Canal, for the Panama Canal would have had to be enlarged in order to -admit ships of greater tonnage. I shall return to this point later since -this limit of 35,000 tons was not maintained. - -Then as evidence of the basis for comparison with German U-boats, I -should like to point to Page 76 where the figure mentioned is 52,700 -tons. It is a historical fact—which is set down here—that France took -no part in this limitation and at that time was the strongest U-boat -power with her 96,000 tons, 96 ready and 15 under construction. It is -also a historical fact that Germany—and this is shown on the same -page—had agreed to abolish submarines, having had to destroy 315 after -the first World War. - -Grossadmiral, did this accord with the British Fleet apparent in these -documents show itself on another, or on any particular occasion? - -RAEDER: I tried to maintain this good understanding and to express these -sentiments to the British Navy as, for instance, when I was informed of -the death of Admiral Jellicoe through a phone call from an English news -agency. He stood against us as the head of the English Fleet in the -first World War, and we always considered him a very chivalrous -opponent. Through this agency I gave a message to the English Fleet. - -THE PRESIDENT: I doubt if this really has any effect on the issues we -have to consider. - -RAEDER: In any event, I tried to bring about a good understanding with -the British Navy for the future and to maintain this good understanding. - -DR. SIEMERS: On 17 July 1937 a further German-English Naval Agreement -was signed. I am submitting this document as Document Raeder-14, -Document Book 1, Page 81. This is a rather lengthy document only part of -which has been translated and printed in the document book; and in order -to understand the violation with which the Prosecution charge us, I must -refer to several of the points contained in this document. - -The agreement concerns the limitation of naval armaments and -particularly the exchange of information on naval construction. In -Article 4 we find the limitation of battleships to 35,000 tons, which -has already been mentioned; and in Articles 11 and 12—which I will not -read because of their technical nature but would ask the Tribunal to -take note of—both governments are bound to report annually the naval -construction program. This must be done during the first 4 months of -each calendar year, and details about certain ships—big ships in -particular—4 months before they are laid down. For a better -understanding of the whole matter, which has been made the basis of a -charge against the defendants in connection with the naval agreement, I -may refer to Articles 24 to 26. The three articles show... - -THE PRESIDENT: Can you summarize these articles? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I did not intend to read them, Your Honor. I just want -to quote a point or two from them. - -These articles enumerate the conditions under which either partner to -the agreement could deviate from it. From the start, therefore, it was -considered permissible under certain conditions to deviate from the -agreement, if, for instance, (Article 24) one of the partners became -involved in war, or (Article 25) if another power, such as the United -States or France or Japan, were to build or purchase a vessel larger -than those provided for in the agreement. In this article express -reference is made to Article 4—that is, to battleships of 35,000 -tons—in the case of deviation, the only obligation was to notify one’s -partner. Article 26 states a very general basis for deviation from the -agreement—namely, in cases where the security of the nation demands it -such deviation is held to be justified. No further details are necessary -at this point. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): -My Lord, the deviation is subject to notification of the other party -under Subarticle 2. It was just relevant in Article 26—any deviation is -subject to notification to the other party of the deviation to be -embarked on. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it, Dr. Siemers? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, of course. I believe... - -THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution say that this agreement was broken? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes. With reference to the remarks just made by Sir David, -I would like to say that I pointed out that such deviation was permitted -under these conditions, but that there was an obligation to notify the -other partners. Perhaps that did not come through before. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Was this agreement concluded, Admiral, in -1937, from the same point of view which you have already stated? Are -there any other noteworthy facts which led to the agreement? - -RAEDER: In 1936, as well as I remember, the treaties so far made by -England with other powers expired, and England was therefore eager to -renew these treaties in the course of 1936. The fact that we were -invited in 1937 to join in a new agreement by all powers meant that -Germany would henceforth be completely included in these treaties. - -DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have accused you of violating this -German-English Naval Agreement, and this charge is based on Document -C-23, Exhibit USA-49, in the British Delegation’s Document Book 10, Page -3. This document is dated 18 February 1938. It has been mentioned -repeatedly in these proceedings and begins as follows, “The actual -displacement of the battleships _Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_ and _F/G_ is -in both cases 20 percent greater than the displacement stated to the -British.” Then we find a list which shows that the displacement of the -_Scharnhorst_ was given as 26,000 tons but was actually 31,300 tons, and -that the draught stated one meter less than was actually the case. And -the “F” class, that is, the _Bismarck_ and _Tirpitz_, were listed as -35,000 tons but had an actual displacement of 41,700 and a difference of -80 centimeters in draught. Therefore, according to what we have seen, -there is an evident infringement of the treaty. Grossadmiral, I am -assuming that you do not dispute this violation of the treaty? - -RAEDER: No, in no way. - -DR. SIEMERS: Certainly, at the time of this document there were only -four battleships in question: _Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_, _Bismarck_, -and _Tirpitz_... - -THE PRESIDENT: It seems you are again stating these things to the -Tribunal, making statements instead of asking questions of the witness. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Mr. President, that I was incorporating my -documentary evidence in order to show the connection, so as to make -clear what we are dealing with. I was about to put the question: Were -the four battleships mentioned actually in commission when this document -was drawn up? - -RAEDER: No, they had not yet been commissioned. - -DR. SIEMERS: None of these four battleships? - -RAEDER: No. - -DR. SIEMERS: If I am permitted to do so, I may say that the exact dates -on which these ships were commissioned—dates which the defendant can -hardly repeat from memory—can be seen from Point IV of Lohmann’s -affidavit, Document Number Raeder-2. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you must prove them. You cannot state them -without proving them. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, certainly, Your Honor. - -I am referring to Document Number Raeder-2, which has been submitted to -the Tribunal already. This is the affidavit by Lohmann, on Page 5. I -quote from Document Book 1, Page 8: - - “Within the limits defined by the German-English Naval - Agreement, the German Navy commissioned four battleships. I - append the dates of laying down the keel, launching, and - commissioning, as far as I can still determine them. - _Scharnhorst_: laid down keel, exact date cannot be determined; - launched, 3 October 1936; commissioned, 7 January 1939. - _Gneisenau_: laid down keel, date cannot be determined; - launched, 8 December 1936; commissioned, 31 May 1938. - _Bismarck_: laid down keel, 1936; launched, 14 February 1939; - commissioned, 2 August 1940. _Tirpitz_: laid down keel, 1936; - launched, 1 April 1939; commissioned, 1941.” - -Admiral Lohmann was unable to ascertain the exact date. The “H”—I may -add that the other ships mentioned under Document C-23 were planned but -were broken up later. They had already been broken up in the summer of -1939, and this applies only to the first “H.” So far there is no -question of final preparation or construction. Since an obvious -violation of the treaty exists, we now have to consider in what light -this violation should be regarded. The Prosecution have said that this -violation of the treaty is criminal since it implies intended -aggression. In order to save time, especially since technical problems -are involved, I should like, before questioning the defendant further, -to submit Document Number Raeder-15, within the scope of the documentary -evidence which I have submitted with the Tribunal’s permission. In my -opinion, this document proves that there was no intention of aggression. - -Document Number Raeder-15 is an affidavit—I beg your pardon—it is in -Document Book 1, Page 94. This document deals with an affidavit deposed -before a notary at Hamburg by Dr. Ing. h.c. Wilhelm Süchting and is -important for the refutation of Document C-23, and for that purpose I -should like to quote: - - “I am the former Director of the shipbuilding yard of Blohm & - Voss in Hamburg. I was with this firm from 1937 to 1945”—pardon - me—“from 1907 to 1945 and I am conversant with all questions - concerning the construction of warships and merchant ships. In - particular, as an engineer I had detailed information about the - building of battleships for the German Navy. Dr. Walter Siemers, - attorney at law of Hamburg, presented to me the Document C-23, - dated 18 February 1938, and asked me to comment on it. This - document shows that the Navy, contrary to the previous - agreement, informed the British that the battleships - _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_—as well as other intended - constructions—had a displacement and draught of about 20 - percent less than was actually the case. - - “I can give some details to explain why this information was - given. I assume that the information given to the - British—information which according to naval agreement 4 had to - be supplied 4 months before the keel was laid down—was based on - the fact that the battleships _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ were - originally intended to have a displacement of 26,000 tons and a - draught of 7.50 meters and the battleship “F” (_Bismarck_) a - displacement of 35,000 tons and a draught of 7.90 meters, as - stated. - - “If these battleships were afterwards built with a greater - displacement and a greater draught, the changes were the result - of orders given or requests made by the Navy while the plans - were being drafted and which the construction office had to - carry out. The changes were based upon the viewpoint repeatedly - expressed by the Navy—namely, to build the battleships in such - a way that they would be as nearly unsinkable as possible. The - increase of the tonnage was not meant to increase the offensive - power of the ship”—I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I shall be - finished in a moment—“The increase of the tonnage was not meant - to increase the offensive power of the ship but was done for - defensive and protective purposes.” - -I may perhaps point out that in the English text there is a mistake in -translation. In this text the word “not” is missing. It should read, -“was not meant,” and not “meant.” - - “As time went on, the Navy attached more and more importance to - dividing the hull of the battleship into a greater number of - compartments in order to make the ship as unsinkable as possible - and to afford the maximum protection in case of leakage. The new - battleships were therefore built broad in the beam with many - bulkheads, only about ten meters apart, and many longitudinal - and latitudinal bulkheads outside the torpedo bulkhead. At the - same time, both the vertical and the horizontal armor-plating - were, as far as my information goes, heavier and composed of - larger plates than those used by other navies. In order...” - -THE PRESIDENT: In other words, his explanation is that they were altered -in the course of construction for technical reasons. It does not matter -what the technical reasons are. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, but I do believe that -when we are dealing with a clearly-established violation of a treaty, -the manner of this violation is of some importance. I do not believe -that each and every violation of a treaty can be described as a war -crime. The point is whether this violation of the treaty was a war crime -in the sense of the Charter—in other words, whether it was motivated by -the intention of waging a war of aggression. An insignificant violation -of a kind which, after all, is found in every commercial lawsuit cannot -be a crime. - -THE PRESIDENT: The affidavit is before us. We shall read it. In fact, -you have already read the material parts of it. - -Now, I think we had better adjourn. How long do you expect to be? - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is very difficult for me to judge that -accurately, but I imagine I shall be able to conclude sometime tomorrow. -I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be able to conclude at noon; but I -am asking Your Honor to take into consideration the fact that I am -incorporating my documentary proof in the interrogation and that this -documentary proof, which in many other cases has taken hours to present, -is thus dealt with simultaneously. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope that you will make your presentation as -short as you possibly can. We have already been so long a time over this -defendant. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I must first make a formal request, namely, -that in addition to my own secretary I may have another here in Court. -She was here this morning but has just been told that she may not come -into the courtroom, and she is now standing outside the door. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - -[_The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand._] - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Grossadmiral, you just saw the affidavit of Dr. -Süchting. I ask you: Is it true, or rather—not to confuse you I will -ask—on what did the Navy base its ideas about enlarging the battleships -by about 20 percent? - -RAEDER: Originally there was no intention to enlarge the ships by 20 -percent. But at the time when we resumed battleship construction, when -we could see that we would have a very small number of battleships in -any case, it occurred to us that the resistance to sinking of ships -should be increased as much as possible to render the few we had as -impregnable as possible. It had nothing to do with stronger armament or -anything like that, but merely with increasing the resistance to sinking -and to enemy guns. For this reason a new system was worked out at that -time in order to increase and strengthen the subdivision of the space -within the ship. This meant that a great deal of new iron had to be -built into the ships. Thereby the draught and the displacement were -enlarged. This was unfortunate from my point of view, for we had -designed the ships with a comparatively shallow draught. The mouths of -our rivers, the Elbe, Weser, Jade, are so shallow that ships with a deep -draught cannot navigate all stages of the rivers. Therefore, we had -these ships built broad, intending to give them a shallow draught; but -by building in these many new latitudinal and longitudinal bulkheads, we -increased the draught and also the displacement. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were these disadvantageous changes, which took place during -construction, due in part to a comparatively limited experience in -battleship construction? - -RAEDER: Yes. Since the designers in the High Command of the Navy and the -designers and engineers in the big shipyards had not built any heavy -warships for a very long time, they lacked experience. As a result, the -High Command of the Navy had to issue supplementary orders to the -shipyards. This in itself was a drawback which I tried hard to overcome. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did the construction of these four battleships surpass the -total tonnage accorded by the naval agreement? - -RAEDER: No, the total tonnage was not overstepped until the beginning of -the war. - -DR. SIEMERS: Your Honors, in this connection I should like to refer to -Document Raeder-8, which has already been submitted in Raeder Document -Book 1, Page 40, under II. In this affidavit Lohmann gives comparative -figures which show how much battleship tonnage Germany was allowed under -the naval agreement. Please take notice of it without my reading all the -figures. What is important is that, according to comparison with the -British figures, Germany was allowed to have 183,750 tons. At that time -she had three completed armored cruisers with 30,000 tons—which is -shown here—so that according to this affidavit 153,750 tons still -remained. - -With reference to Document Raeder-127, I should like to submit a short -correction, because Grossadmiral Raeder, in looking through the -affidavit, observed that Vice Admiral Lohmann made a mistake in one -figure. The mistake is unimportant in terms of the whole, but in order -to be absolutely fair and correct I thought it necessary to point it out -to Vice Admiral Lohmann. Instead of 30,000 it should actually read about -34,000 tons, so that there is a difference, not of 153,750 tons but of -149,750. According to the naval agreement, we were allowed to build -146,000, the final figure, so that the result is not changed. Admiral -Lohmann’s mistake—as the Tribunal know—can be attributed to the fact -that we were very limited in our material resources. - -RAEDER: May I add a remark to what I said before? The statement of these -displacements deviated from the terms of the treaty insofar as only the -original construction displacement or draught was reported and not the -draught and displacement which gradually resulted through these changes -in the course of the planning of the construction. - -DR. SIEMERS: In addition, may I refer the honorable Court to the -following: The Naval Agreement of 1937 was changed by the London -Protocol of 30 June 1938. I refer to Exhibit Raeder-16. My secretary -just tells me it is not here at the moment; I will bring it up later. It -is the last document in Raeder Document Book 1, Page 97. - -May I remind the Court that Document C-23 is of February 1938. By this -London Protocol, at the suggestion of the British Government, the -limitation on battleship tonnage to 35,000 tons was changed because the -British Government, as well as the German Government, realized that -35,000 tons was too low. As the protocol shows, effective 30 June 1938, -the battleship tonnage was raised to 45,000 tons. Thereby this -difference in the battleships, referred to in Document C-23, was settled -a few months later. - -Now, I shall take up a new subject, the question of your participation -in the planning and conspiracy to wage wars of aggression. This is the -question of the so-called key documents which the Prosecution presented. -Since you, Admiral, were present during these speeches of Hitler’s to -the commanders-in-chief, I must ask you to comment on these documents. -The first document is Document 386-PS, the so-called Hossbach Document, -Exhibit USA-25, in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number -10, Page 81. It is Hitler’s speech of 5 November 1937. - -Herr Grossadmiral, did you ever see this document of Hossbach before the -Trial began? - -RAEDER: No, I saw no document and no protocol of any speeches which -Hitler made. No minutes were taken officially. Only in later years—I -believe since 1941—were stenographers present who wrote down every -word. These are really not minutes at all, since the document is written -in indirect discourse. It was written down by the author 5 days after -the speech itself, as we have heard. - -DR. SIEMERS: Although it is a very important document, I have noted that -in contrast to other documents it has no distribution list; it was -written down 5 days after the speech and is not even marked “secret.” -Can you explain where these minutes were set down? - -RAEDER: I cannot recollect in detail the conditions that prevailed. I -can only imagine that the adjutant in question kept the minutes in his -safe. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then you have only an over-all impression of this speech, -after 8 or 9 years? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: The document was read in full here by the Prosecution and, -as cannot be denied at all, it contains serious references to a war of -aggression. It mentions, for instance, something bequeathed by will, the -problem of space, the hatred against England and France; it says that, -armament now being completed, the first goal is the overthrow of -Czechoslovakia and Austria. - -Please explain to the Court what effect the speech had on you at that -time, and how it happened that you ascribed no such importance to the -speech as did Herr Von Neurath, for example, who was also present? And -in spite of the speech how did you retain your opinion that Hitler would -hold the old line and not seek a solution by force? - -RAEDER: By way of introduction I may say that the assertion contained in -the trial brief, that an influential group of Nazis met in order to -examine the situation, does not give a correct picture of the situation -at all. Hitler called together the persons mentioned in the document to -explain to them the possibilities for political development and in order -to give them any instructions he might have. - -And here I should like to say something in general—since there are -quite a number of Hitler’s speeches coming—about the nature of his -speeches. Hitler spoke at great length, going very far in retrospect. -Above all, in every speech he had a special purpose depending on the -audience. Just as he was a master of dialectics, so he was also a master -of bluff. He used strong expressions again according to the objective he -was pursuing. He afforded his imagination full play. He also -contradicted himself frequently in successive speeches. One never knew -what his final goals and intentions were. At the end of such a speech it -was very difficult to determine them. As a rule, his speeches made a -greater impression on people who heard him infrequently than on those -already acquainted with his whole manner of speaking on such occasions. -It was never a question of taking counsel but, as has been said, always -of giving undisputed orders. - -The purpose of the speech on 5 November 1937 was, as Reich Marshal -Göring said at the beginning... - -DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is at the beginning of this speech of 5 -November? - -RAEDER: Yes, at the beginning of the speech. - -He told me he had spoken with the Führer beforehand. The Führer wanted -to spur on the Army to carry out its rearmament somewhat faster. It was -going too slowly for the Führer. The subject of the speech was Austria -and Czechoslovakia, which he said in one place he wanted to overthrow. -He said that the latest date would be 1943-1945, because after that our -situation would become worse. But the case could come up earlier due to -two conditions: In the first place, if internal unrest occurred in -France; in the second place, in the event of the outbreak of a -Mediterranean war in which England, France, Italy, and probably Spain, -would participate, which in my opinion was fantastic. - -The assertion that the arming of the Army, Navy, and Air Force was as -good as completed in November 1937, I could not understand. The Navy -still had not a single battleship in service. The situation was similar -in the Air Force and Army. In no way were we armed for war, and a war -against England, for example, would have been sheer madness. For me, the -decisive sentences in his speech were that first, England and France—I -believe—had already written off Czechoslovakia, and secondly, that he -was convinced that France and England would not interfere. In the third -place was the fact that just a few months before, in July 1937, the -second naval agreement had been signed. These three facts seemed to me -to make it certain that Hitler would not seek a warlike solution to -these problems of Austria and Czechoslovakia. At that time it was a -question of the Sudetenland under any circumstances and it seemed he -would strive for a peaceful solution. For that reason the speech did not -impress me with the fact that Hitler at that time wanted to change his -policy—that he wanted to turn from a policy of peace to one of war. I -can imagine that Herr Von Neurath, not knowing the purpose of this -speech, received a different impression. But, as I now think back over -the matter, I can imagine that the exaggerated character of the speech -was specifically intended to force Von Neurath out of the Cabinet, -because I have learned that at that time the Führer was already inclined -to replace Von Neurath by Von Ribbentrop. That was only an assumption -which I made afterwards. - -For me the conclusions to be drawn from the speech were none other than -these: The construction of the fleet in the ratio of one to three, -relative to England, was to be continued, and a friendly relationship -with England was still to be striven for. The ratio agreement which had -just been reached was to be observed. - -DR. SIEMERS: And, it is obvious at the end of the document—namely in -the fourth paragraph from the end—that Field Marshal Von Blomberg and -Colonel General Von Fritsch, in giving their estimate of the situation, -repeatedly pointed out the necessity of England and France not playing -the role of our enemies. This is commented on further, and one sees that -Blomberg and Fritsch were disturbed and for once opposed Hitler. - -After the speech you talked to Blomberg. Is it true that Blomberg, who -can unfortunately not be examined and Fritsch, who is also dead, saw -through this exaggeration of Hitler’s and therefore pointed out their -misgivings and in this way intended to intervene? About what did you -talk to Blomberg after this speech? - -RAEDER: In the first place, Blomberg and Fritsch... - -THE PRESIDENT: You must try not to put leading questions, Dr. Siemers. -You are putting into the witness’ mouth what you want him to answer. If -you want to... - -DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry if I did so. It is a little difficult when the -two men who were there, Blomberg and Fritsch, are dead. I can only point -out that they are not alive now. My final question is... - -THE PRESIDENT: That cannot be helped, the fact that they are dead. But, -if you want to get anything in about that, you must get it from the -witness, not from yourself. - -DR. SIEMERS: What impression did Blomberg have after this speech? What -did he say to you afterwards? - -RAEDER: I believe Blomberg himself in a questionnaire stated to Field -Marshal Keitel that when we military men left the room Blomberg, who was -with the Führer frequently, said that this again had not been meant so -earnestly and was not to be judged so seriously. He believed that the -Führer would settle these questions peacefully, too. And as Dr. Siemers -said, Blomberg and Fritsch had both already called the attention of the -Führer to the fact that under no circumstances should England and France -be allowed to intervene, since the German Wehrmacht would not be able to -cope with them. - -I may add that in this case I intentionally did not make any such -objections because it was, after all, a daily occurrence that whenever I -met the Führer, I told him, “_Ceterum censeo_, we must stay on the -course in order to avoid entanglements with England.” And the Führer -repeatedly confirmed this intention of his. It is typical that as soon -as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel General Von Fritsch, said -that after these remarks he would not be able to take the vacation in -Egypt in the winter of 1937-38 which he had planned for his health, the -Führer immediately retracted his statement and said that the affair was -not so urgent, that he could go ahead on his vacation undisturbed, which -he then did. - -This shows that it was again a question of exerting pressure. That was -the speech of 5 November 1937. In fact he did not crush either Austria -or Czechoslovakia at that time; but in 1938 the question was settled -peacefully without bloodshed, and even with the agreement of the other -powers. - -DR. SIEMERS: In this connection may I submit the document dating from -the following year, Exhibit Raeder-23, Raeder Document Book 2, Page 127. -On 30 September 1938—I need not say anything further about Munich, -because the defendant was not directly participating—Hitler and -Chamberlain jointly declared that the agreement signed the previous -night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement were considered symbols of -the desires of both nations never again to wage war against each other. -The rest of the contents is well known. - -Then I come to the second key document which the Prosecution -submitted—namely, Document L-79, the so-called “Little Schmundt.” It is -Exhibit USA-27, Number 10 in the document book of the British -Delegation, Page 24. The document in spite of its astonishing length was -also presented in full by the Prosecution, so that I shall not read from -it. May I remind the Court that it states that further successes could -not be achieved without bloodshed, and on 23 May 1939 with reference to -Poland it states that not Danzig but the readjustment of Lebensraum was -the issue at stake. - -It speaks of the readjustment of Lebensraum and of the fact that the -Polish problem could not be separated from the conflict with the West. -Thereupon Hitler said that the only way out was to attack Poland at the -first suitable opportunity. Unfortunately, this is again a document -which is undated. - -Do you know when Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt prepared this report? - -RAEDER: No, unfortunately I cannot say that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say it is undated? - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, there is no date stating when the document -was prepared. There is only the date referring to the minutes of the -conference of 23 May. In the case of the Hossbach Document the -conference was on 5 November, but it was written down by Hossbach 5 days -later from memory, on 10 November. In the case of Schmundt, we do not -know whether it was written down after 1 day, 5 days, or 4 weeks. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it in evidence that the document of 5 November was -written down 5 days later? - -DR. SIEMERS: No. The document of 5 November shows that it was prepared 5 -days later. The document is dated at the top, “Berlin, 10 November 1937; -Notes of the Conference in the Reich Chancellery on 5 November 1937....” - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is right, then there is evidence. - -DR. SIEMERS: [_Turning to the defendant._] In the case of Schmundt, -there is no indication? - -RAEDER: No. - -DR. SIEMERS: You do not know when it was written down? - -RAEDER: No, I never heard when. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you ever see this document before this Trial? - -RAEDER: No. - -DR. SIEMERS: Does this document contain a correct reproduction in all -points of Hitler’s speech, or does what you said about the Hossbach -Document apply here also? - -RAEDER: It applies even more here. In my opinion it is the most abstruse -document concerning a Hitler speech in existence, for a large part of -the statements in my opinion makes no sense whatsoever, as I have tried -to show. The adjutant stated that he was only paraphrasing. - -DR. SIEMERS: This is on the first page in the center where it is -written, “Reproduced in Substance.” - -Please explain to the Court what impression this speech made on you at -the time and why you believed, in spite of this speech, that Hitler was -not planning any war of aggression. - -RAEDER: I should like to point out again here that the trial brief makes -the comment that consultation took place regarding the scale on which -the plan should be executed. Particularly in this case this does not at -all represent the character of the speech correctly. The meaning of the -whole first part of the speech, as I said, is extremely vague. Whereas -in the 1937 speech he gave 1943 to 1945 as the latest deadline and the -possibility of an earlier date under certain improbable circumstances, -here Hitler speaks of a solution as being possible in 15 to 20 years. He -says that Poland is always on the side of the enemy, in spite of the -treaty of friendship, that her secret intention is to take advantage of -any opportunity to act against us, and that he, therefore, wants to -attack Poland at the first opportunity. The Polish problem cannot be -separated from the conflict in the West, but a conflict in the West must -not be permitted to arise simultaneously. If it is uncertain as to -whether a war with the West will or will not take place in the wake of -the German-Polish conflict, then a line of battle first against England -and France is perhaps of greater importance. Then again, he says that we -cannot allow ourselves to be drawn into a war with England on account of -Poland, a war on two fronts such as the incapable men of 1914 had -brought about. - -Then again, England—and that is comparatively new here—is the driving -force against Germany. We must prepare for a long war in addition to a -surprise attack, obviously against England. It is astonishing that we -were to endeavor, at the beginning of such a war, to strike a -destructive blow against England. The goal is to force England to her -knees. Then follows quite a new part... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the defendant appears to be reading from a -document an argument about this document. That is not giving evidence. -If he can tell us anything about what happened at this meeting, it is -open to him to do so. - -DR. SIEMERS: He is repeating, with the aid of this document, the -involved thoughts which Hitler expressed at that time, and he is -pointing out the contradictions contained in Hitler’s speech at that -time. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of argument, to point out that there are -conflicts between one part of the document and another. That is not the -subject of evidence. He has already told us that Hitler’s speeches -generally were—that one speech generally contradicted another, but we -can see for ourselves from the document if one part of it conflicts with -another. - -DR. SIEMERS: Is it not of importance, Mr. President, that the abstruse -statements of Hitler at that time had such an effect on the witness that -he says so and so many points are false? Then the whole tendency which -we read out of it cannot be true. As I understand the witness, Hitler -must have had mental reservations back of such conflicting remarks to -commanders. But I believe we can shorten this. - -Herr Grossadmiral, according to the wish of the Court, just explain what -the effect was on you and what in your opinion were the special designs -connected with this document. - -RAEDER: By contrasting these sentences, I wanted only to show how -muddled the speech was. At the end there is a second part in which a -number of doctrinaire, academic opinions on warfare are expressed and a -conclusion to the effect that it was also a wish of Hitler to have -formed in the OKW a research staff to work out all these plans for war -preparation, evaluation of individual weapons, _et cetera_, without the -participation of the general staffs, with which he did not like to -collaborate. He wanted these things to be in his own hands. Thus it was -the formation of a research staff which motivated this speech. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemens, I have already told you that the Tribunal -thinks that argument is not evidence. This seems to be purely argument -upon this document. If there is anything in the shape of recollection as -to what passed at this meeting, that would be evidence; but merely to -argue upon the document is not in evidence. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may the witness not say what effect Hitler’s -processes of thought had on him? The Prosecution say that Hitler and -Raeder entered upon a conspiracy together. - -THE PRESIDENT: He can say he did not understand it or did not think it -was sincere. - -DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I should like to point out that the -witness referred to this point because this is the only passage from -this document which the Prosecution have not read. In this document the -sentences about the research staff, as I noticed immediately, were not -read. This research staff was what Hitler wanted to obtain. - -Herr Grossadmiral, after this speech, was anything changed in your -department? - -RAEDER: No. The conclusion drawn was: First, that the ship construction -program was to be continued in the same way as in the past—so Hitler -himself said—and in the second place, he said that the armament -programs were to be geared for the year 1943-1944. That was the positive -thing which I could conclude for myself. - -At that time, moreover, I was strongly impressed by the speech which -Hitler himself made at the launching of the battleship _Bismarck_ in -Hamburg. There he said that the Wehrmacht, as the keenest instrument of -war, had to protect and help to preserve the peace founded on true -justice. That made the greatest impression on me at that time with -regard to Hitler’s intentions. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was the fleet at that time in a position to do this? - -RAEDER: No. It was completely incapable. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, if there are any passages in this document -which have not been read and to which you attach importance, you may -read them now; and for the rest, all that the Tribunal thinks you ought -to do is to ask the defendant, what his recollection was or what -happened at that meeting, and if he can supplement the document as to -what happened at the meeting, he is entitled to do so. The Tribunal does -not intend to prevent your reading anything from the document which has -not yet been read nor from getting from the witness anything which he -says happened at the meeting. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I understood the witness to mean that he -recalled the research staff which the Prosecution had not mentioned. -Thus it came about that the witness, since he too knows the document, at -the same time pointed out that the research staff was also mentioned in -the document. I believe that can explain the misunderstanding. The -situation is clear to me, and perhaps I may read this sentence in that -connection. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. - -DR. SIEMERS: Under Number 3, toward the end of the Document L-79, it -says: - - “To study weak points of the enemy. - - “These studies must not be left to the general staffs. Secrecy - would no longer be guaranteed. The Führer has, therefore, - decided to order the formation of a small research staff within - the OKW composed of representatives of the three branches of the - Wehrmacht and, as occasion arises, the three - commanders-in-chief—that is to say, general staff chiefs. - - “The staff shall keep the Führer constantly informed. - - “The research staff shall undertake the planning of operations - from the theoretical side and the preparations which of - necessity arise therefrom...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. A passage is left out in the English -translation. The copy I have before me says, “These studies must not be -left to the general staffs; secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.” And -then it goes on, “This staff shall keep the Führer informed and shall -report to him.” I do not think it is very important. Go on. - -DR. SIEMERS: Apparently the paragraph about the research staff in the -Armed Forces High Command was left out in the English. Continuing the -document: - - “The purpose of certain regulations concerns no one outside the - staff; however great the increase in armament of our adversaries - may be, they must at some time come to the end of their - resources and ours will be greater. The French have 120,000 men - in each class! We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall - not be able to avoid one.” - -This research staff, in effect, eliminated the commanders-in-chief and -that was what Hitler wanted to achieve. - -If I am correctly informed, the rest has been read by the -Prosecution—namely, the subsequent aim and the principle, to be -specific, the well-known order to keep everything secret and, at the -end, that which the witness remembered, that the shipbuilding program -should not be changed and the armament program should be fixed for -1943-1944. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Had Hitler at this time intended a war of -aggression, would he have had to speed up any particular part of the -Navy’s armament? - -RAEDER: Yes, indeed. He would have had to speed up all naval -construction. - -DR. SIEMERS: Would not the construction of submarines especially have -had to be speeded up? - -RAEDER: Yes, of course, particularly because they could be built most -quickly. - -DR. SIEMERS: How many submarines did you have at this time? - -RAEDER: I cannot say exactly. I think about 26. - -DR. SIEMERS: If I remember rightly, Admiral Dönitz has already answered -that there were 15 capable of sailing in the Atlantic—by the way, there -were altogether 26. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, in the winter of 1938-1939, did you have a talk -with Sir Nevile Henderson on relations between Germany and England? - -RAEDER: Yes, a very short talk at an evening reception in the Führer’s -house, where I stood near Ambassador Henderson and Herr Von Neurath, and -wherein the question was discussed—it was brought up by me—as to -whether England had not welcomed Germany’s offer to set the proportion -of strength at 1 to 4 and would not draw certain conclusions from this -reciprocal relationship. Ambassador Henderson answered, without anyone -else having brought up this question, “Yes, that would be shown in the -future when the colonial question was settled.” I later reported this -answer to the Führer in order to use it to maintain a friendly policy -toward England. - -DR. SIEMERS: We are now at the summer of 1939. Admiral, in the course of -the summer, after the speech of 23 May 1939, did you talk to Hitler in -view of the generally known danger of war, and what did he tell you? - -RAEDER: Whenever I talked to the Führer, I always brought up the -question of England, whereby I annoyed him to a certain extent. I tried -to convince him that it would be possible to carry out the peace policy -with England which he himself had urged at the beginning of his regime. -Then he always reassured me that it remained his intention to steer a -policy of peace with England, always leaving me in the belief that there -was no danger of a clash with England—in any case, that at this time -there was no such danger. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the third key document—namely, Hitler’s -speech before the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939, at -Obersalzberg. There are two documents: Document 1014-PS and Document -798-PS. Document 1014-PS is Exhibit USA-30, in Raeder Document Book 10a, -Page 269; and Document 798-PS is Exhibit USA-29, in Document Book 10a, -Page 266. In regard to this Document 1014-PS, which I have here in the -original in the form submitted by the Prosecution, I should like to make -a formal request. This Number 1014-PS was read into the record in the -afternoon session of 26 November 1945 (Volume II, Page 286). I object to -the use of this document. I request that this document be stricken from -the trial record for the following reason... - -THE PRESIDENT: What document are you speaking about now, 1014-PS? - -DR. SIEMERS: In Raeder Document Book 10a, Page 269, Exhibit USA-30. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, what are your reasons? - -DR. SIEMERS: The deficiencies which were already mentioned in the other -transcripts are much greater here. This document is nothing but two -pieces of paper headed “Second Speech by the Führer, on 22 August 1939.” -The original has no heading, has no file number, no diary number, and no -notice that it is secret; no signature, no date, no... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the original. Yes, Dr. -Siemers. - -DR. SIEMERS: It has no date, no signature—in the original in the -folder, it has no indication of where the document comes from. It is -headed “Second Speech...” although it is certain that on this date -Hitler made only one speech, and it is hardly 1½ pages long, although... - -THE PRESIDENT: When you say it has no date, it is part of the document -itself which says that it is the second speech of the Führer on the 22d -of August 1939. - -DR. SIEMERS: I said, Mr. President, it has a heading but no date. - -THE PRESIDENT: But you said it has no date. - -DR. SIEMERS: It has no date as to when these notes were put in writing. -It has only the date of when the speech is supposed to have been made. -On all documents which the Prosecution submitted, also in the case of -minutes, you will find the date of the session and the date on which the -minutes were set up; also the place where the minutes were set up, the -name of the person who set it up, an indication that it is secret or -something like that. Furthermore, it is certain that Hitler spoke for 2½ -hours. I believe it is generally known that Hitler spoke very fast. It -is quite out of the question that the minutes could be 1½ pages long if -they are to give the meaning and the content, at least to some extent, -of a speech which lasted 2½ hours. It is important—I may then refer to -still another point. I will submit the original of Document 798-PS -afterwards. I am no expert on handwriting or typewriters, but I notice -that this document, which is also not signed, whose origin we do not -know, is written on the same paper with the same typewriter. - -THE PRESIDENT: You say we do not know where it has come from—it is a -captured document covered by the affidavit which was made with reference -to all other captured documents. - -DR. SIEMERS: Well, but I would be grateful to the Prosecution if, in the -case of such an important document, the Prosecution would be kind enough -in order to determine the actual historical facts to indicate more -exactly where it originates. Because it is not signed by Schmundt or -Hossbach or anyone and has no number, it is only loose pages. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether the Prosecution can do that, but it -seems to me to be rather late in the day to ask for it. - -MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Mr. -President, I do not know what the exact origin of this document is -offhand, but I expect that we could probably get some information before -the Tribunal if the Tribunal wishes us to do so. But as the President -pointed out, it is a captured document and everything that counsel says -about it seems to go to its weight rather than to its admissibility. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know where the document was -found, if that is possible. - -MR. DODD: I will make an effort to find that out. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd just pointed out that my objection -comes rather late. I believe I recall correctly that repeated objections -were raised... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think it was I who pointed it out, not Mr. Dodd. - -DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. I believe I recall correctly that the Defense on -several occasions raised objection during the Prosecution’s case, and it -was said that all statements could be made during the Defense’s case at -a later time—namely, when it is the defense counsel’s turn to speak. - -THE PRESIDENT: I only meant that it might not be possible at this stage -to find out exactly where the document came from, whereas, if the -question had been asked very much earlier in the Trial, it might have -been very much easier. That is all I meant. Have you anything more to -add upon why, in your opinion, this document should be stricken from the -record? - -DR. SIEMERS: I should like to point out, Mr. President, that I do not do -it for formal reasons but rather for a very substantial reason. Most -important words in this document have constantly been repeated by the -Prosecution during these 5 or 6 months—namely, the words “Destruction -of Poland, main objective... Aim: elimination of vital forces, not -arrival at a certain line.” These words were not spoken, and such a war -aim the German commanders-in-chief would not have agreed to. For that -reason it is important to ascertain whether this document is genuine. - -In this connection, may I remind the Court that there is a third version -of this speech as mentioned in this courtroom—namely, Document L-3, -which is even worse than these and which was published by the press of -the whole world. Wherever one spoke to anyone, this grotesque and brutal -speech was brought up. For that reason it is in the interest of -historical truth to ascertain whether Hitler spoke in this shocking way -at this time. Actually, I admit he used many expressions which were -severe, but he did not use such words, and this is of tremendous -significance for the reputation of all the commanders who were present. - -Let me point out the next words. They say expressly, “close your hearts -against pity, brutal measures.” Such words were not used. I will be in a -position to prove this by another witness, Generaladmiral Böhm. - -I therefore request the Court to decide on my request for striking this -document from the record. I should like to point out that the document -is mentioned in the record at many points. Should the honorable Court so -wish, I would have to look for all the points. I have found only four or -five in the German record. If necessary, I would give all the points in -the English record. It was submitted on 26 November 1945, afternoon -session (Volume II, Page 286). - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need bother to do that. You are now -only upon the question of whether the document should be stricken from -the record. If it were to be stricken from the record, we could find out -where it is. Is that all you wish to say? - -DR. SIEMERS: One question to Admiral Raeder. - -The words which I just read, “brutal measures, elimination of vital -forces”—were these words used in Hitler’s speech at that time? - -RAEDER: In my opinion, no. I believe that the version submitted by -Admiral Böhm, which he wrote down on the afternoon of the same day on -the basis of his notes, is the version nearest to the truth. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to achieve clarity on this -question, I submit as Exhibit Raeder-27, in Raeder Document Book 2, Page -144, an orderly reproduction of this speech. - -RAEDER: May I also have Document Book 2? - -DR. SIEMERS: This is the speech according to the manuscript of -Generaladmiral Hermann Böhm. Generaladmiral Böhm was present at Hitler’s -speech on 22 August 1939 at Obersalzberg. He made the notes during the -speech. He transcribed them in the present form on the same -evening—that is, on 22 August 1939—in the Vier Jahreszeiten Hotel in -Munich. I have certified the correctness of the copy. The original is in -the handwriting of Generaladmiral Böhm. Böhm has been called by me as a -witness for various other questions. He will confirm that the speech was -made in this form as I have submitted here. A comparison of the two -documents shows that all terms, such as “brutal measures,” are not -contained in this speech. It shows further... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Surely this part of Dr. Siemers’ argument must -go to weight. He has said that a comparison of the two documents shows -such and such. I have just looked at the end of Admiral Böhm’s affidavit -and it contains, I should argue, every vital thought that is contained -in Document 1014-PS. But whether it does or not, that is a matter of -weight, surely. We cannot, in my respectful submission, go into -intrinsic comparisons to decide the admissibility of the document. As I -say, on that I should have a great deal to say by comparing the -documents in detail. That is not before the Tribunal now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal was only wanting to hear whatever Dr. -Siemers has got to say upon the subject. - -DR. SIEMERS: A comparison of the document with Document 798-PS, in the -longer and better version, as the Prosecution submitted... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, as Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has just pointed -out, a mere comparison of the documents—of the two or three documents -does not help us as to its admissibility. We know the facts about the -document. It is a document in German, captured among German documents. - -DR. SIEMERS: I understand. I made the statement only in order to show -that I am not raising objections for formal reasons, but because the -thing is actually of great importance. In proof of my... - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you will be able to urge that when you make -your speech in criticism of the document as to its weight. You will be -able to point out that it does not bear comparison with a fuller -document taken down by Admiral Böhm or with the other document. - -DR. SIEMERS: Absolutely right. To explain my formal request, I refer to -my statement on the formal character of the document which I submitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -The application to strike out Document 1014-PS is denied. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Has Counsel for the Prosecution understood that the -Tribunal wishes to have information as to where that document was found? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord; we will do our best to get it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and also the other, Document 798-PS. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, if Your Lordship pleases. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I submitted Document Raeder-27, which is the Böhm -version, to you. You have read the speech in this version. Is this -reproduction correct on the whole, in your recollection? - -RAEDER: Yes. In my opinion, this version is that one which corresponds -most closely to reality. I remember especially that Hitler devoted a -large portion of his remarks to the point that England and France would -not intervene, giving reasons why they would not. He mentioned a number -of reasons, and I missed just that portion, in its elaboration, in the -other reproductions of the speech. - -DR. SIEMERS: In the version of the speech Document 798-PS or Exhibit -USA-29 it says verbatim: “I am only afraid that at the last moment some -swine will offer me some plan of arbitration.” Were those words used in -the speech at that time? - -RAEDER: In my recollection, certainly not. The Führer was not accustomed -to using expressions like that in speeches which he made to the -generals. - -DR. SIEMERS: On the other hand, the version put forth by Böhm shows that -Hitler had, by this time, decided to attack Poland. I am asking you to -give us briefly the impression, which the speech made on you at the -time. Tell me also why, despite this speech which even in this version -is severe, you retained your office as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. - -RAEDER: Without doubt, I had the impression that the situation was -serious and tremendously tense. The fact, however, that Hitler in his -speech put too great a stress on proving that France and England would -not intervene, and the second fact that Herr Von Ribbentrop, the Reich -Foreign Minister, left for Moscow on the same day to sign a pact there, -as we were told—these things filled not only me but all listeners as -well with the strong hope that here again was a case of a clever move by -Hitler, which in the end he would successfully solve in a peaceful way. - -Therefore I saw no reason to resign my office at that moment. I would -have considered that pure desertion. - -DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would -like, because of their chronological correspondence, to submit the two -documents Exhibits Raeder-28 and 29, and I ask that the Tribunal only -take judicial notice without my making further reference to them. - -The Prosecution have cited Document C-155 and have accused you, through -this document... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, of the documents to which Dr. Siemers -has just referred—Documents Raeder-28 and 29—the first is a memorandum -of General Gamelin and the second is a letter from General Weygand to -General Gamelin of 9 September 1939. - -Your Lordship will remember that the Prosecution objected to these -documents as being irrelevant, and, My Lord, the Prosecution maintain -that objection. - -I do not wish to interrupt Dr. Siemers’ examination any more than is -necessary. If at the moment he is merely asking the Tribunal to take -judicial notice of the documents and does not intend to use them, it -would probably be convenient—in order not to interrupt the -examination-in-chief—that I merely indicate formally that we are -maintaining our objection to the document. Of course, I am at the -disposal of the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is this the position, that they were allowed to be -translated and put in the document book but that no further order of the -Tribunal has been given? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No further order has been given and therefore, -My Lord, it is still open to us to object, as I understand the position. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better deal with it now, then. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. - -DR. SIEMERS: May I make a few remarks on this point? I believe... - -THE PRESIDENT: But we had better hear the objection first, had we not? -And then we will hear you afterwards. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, as you wish. This is a purely formal -point. I believe that Sir David erred slightly in referring to Document -Raeder-28. There was no objection to this document by the Prosecution, -but only against Document Raeder-29. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My friend is quite right; we did not object to -the translation of 28. However, My Lord, it falls into the same category -as 29, and I would still raise an objection. I apologize to Your -Lordship if I conveyed the impression that we had made an objection -before. - -My Lord, the Number 28 is a letter from General Gamelin to M. Daladier -on the 1st of September 1939, in which General Gamelin gives his views -as to the problem of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg and -contrasts that view with the view of the French Government. - -Now, My Lord, I submit that that expression of opinion on the part of -General Gamelin is in itself intrinsically too remote from the issues of -this Trial to be of any relevance or probative value. - -Then, apart from its intrinsic nature, the position is that this was a -document which, as I understand from Dr. Siemers’ verification on Page -158, is taken from the _White Book of the German Foreign Office_, from -the secret files of the French General Staff, which could not have been -captured until sometime after June 1940. Therefore, as a secondary -reason, it can have no relevance to any opinion formed by the Defendant -Raeder in September of 1939. - -My Lord, the second document is, as I said to the Tribunal, a -letter to General Gamelin from General Weygand, who was then the -Commander-in-Chief of the French Army in the Levant. It describes a plan -which General Weygand had in mind with regard to possible operations in -Greece. Nothing came of these operations before June 1940 when an -armistice was made by Marshal Pétain on behalf of part of the French -people—although not, of course, of the whole—and it can have no -relevance to October 1940 when Greece was invaded by Italy, or to the -position at the end of 1940 and the beginning of 1941 when the invasion -of Greece begins to be considered in the German directives and -operational orders which have been put in before the Tribunal. - -That is the first point. And the same secondary point applies, that it -was also a captured document which could not have been captured before -June 1940; therefore, it can have no relevance to this defendant’s state -of mind in August or September of 1939. - -My Lord, as a matter of convenience, I have just made a list of the -documents to which objections will be made and, My Lord, there are one -or two additions which my French and Soviet colleagues have asked me to -make, and I will deal with them when they arise. - -My Lord, I would just like the Tribunal to have in mind that there are -four geographical groups of documents as opposed to the groups under -which they are arranged here, which the Tribunal will have to consider. -One is formed by documents relating to the Low Countries, the second, -which is Group G on the list which I have just put before the Tribunal, -deals with Norway; a third deals with Greece, of which Document -Raeder-29 is an example; and a fourth is Group E in the list which I -have just put in, dealing with tentative proposals and suggestions made -by various military figures with regard to the oil field in the Caucasus -or operations on the Danube. - -My Lord, the same objections which I have made particularly with regard -to Documents Raeder-28 and 29 will apply generally to these groups, and -I thought that I ought to draw the Tribunal’s attention to that fact. In -addition, my friend Colonel Pokrovsky has intimated to me some special -objections which we will have to certain documents on which he can -assist the Tribunal himself when they arise. - -But, My Lord, I do take these specific cases, 28 and 29, as -objectionable in themselves, and I draw the Tribunal’s attention to the -fact that they are also typically objectionable as belonging to certain -groups. - -The decision of the Tribunal, Your Lordship, is given in the morning -session of 2 May 1946. Your Lordship said, “The question of their -admissibility will be decided after they have been translated.” - -M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): May -it please the Tribunal, I would ask the Tribunal for an opportunity to -associate myself publicly with the declaration just made by Sir David -and to propose a few examples which will show the degree of importance -which should be attached to the documents in question. - -The Defense is asking that the Tribunal take into account a document -published in the German _White Book_ Number 5, under Number 8. This -document reports a statement by a French prisoner of war who is supposed -to have said that he had been in Belgium since 15 April. However, the -German _White Book_ gives neither the name of this prisoner nor any -indication of his unit. We have none of the information which we need in -order to judge whether the statement is relevant. We are therefore faced -with a document which is not authentic and which has no value as -evidence. - -The Defense is asking that Document Raeder-102 of the same document book -be admitted by the Tribunal. I ask the Tribunal to let me make a few -observations to show the one-sided manner in which these documents have -been assembled by the German authorities in the _White Book_. - -I would say, first of all, that this Document Raeder-102 has not been -quoted at length. The French Delegation has referred to the text of the -German _White Book_. We have read it carefully. This document is only a -preparatory order in view of defensive preparations organized by the -Belgians on the French-Belgian frontier facing France. We have consulted -the Belgian military authorities. This order was a manifestation of the -Belgian Government’s determination to defend Belgium’s neutrality on all -its frontiers. - -It is therefore contrary to the truth to try to prove by means of this -document the existence of staff contacts between Brussels, London, and -Paris, which, if they had existed, would have been contrary to the -policy of neutrality. - -The commentary made by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs in the -introduction to the German _White Book_, Page 11 of the French text, -took the counsel by surprise and certainly did not mislead Admiral -Raeder, who is a serviceman. In fact, it is at the price of a lie that -the official commentator affirms, on the one hand, that the expression -“les forces amies” (friendly forces) used in this document means French -and British troops, whereas in reality it is a regular expression used -in the Belgian Army to describe Belgian units in the immediate vicinity -of those actually fighting. On the other hand, the German commentator -claims, and I quote, “The general line Tournai-Antoing, of the canal -from Mons to Condé, Saint Ghislain and Binche, is partly in Belgian and -partly in French territory.” It is sufficient to look at a map to see -that all those localities are in Belgian territory and they are all at -least some dozens of kilometers distant from the French-Belgian -frontier, and in places, 60 kilometers from the French frontier. - -I ask the Tribunal to excuse this interruption. I thought it was -advisable to enlighten them by giving a convincing example of the value -of the evidence furnished by the German _White Book_. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks the most convenient -course would be to hear your argument now upon these documents, not only -upon 28 to 29, but upon the other documents specified in Sir David -Maxwell-Fyfe’s list, and then the Tribunal would consider these -documents after the adjournment and would give its decision tomorrow -morning. - -DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I should be very grateful if it -would be possible to proceed in a somewhat different manner. I should -like to call attention to the fact that a rather lengthy debate -regarding documents has already taken place, and the decision of the -Court followed. I believe that if I comment upon all the documents at -this point a great deal of time will be lost, since the coherence of the -documents will emerge of itself later during my presentation of -evidence. If I now deal with the list submitted by Sir David, I would, -in order to show my reasons, have to set forth all that which will -appear again in the regular course of testimony later on. I thought that -the decision of the Tribunal first to present the documents in the -document book was specifically to save time, and then objections could -be made one by one as individual documents are presented. - -THE PRESIDENT: I know; but there are a very great number of documents. -The Tribunal will have to hear an argument upon each document if we do -what you suggest, reading the list of Sir David. There are 30 or 40 -documents, I suppose. - -DR. SIEMERS: Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has already stated that he will be -guided according to different geographical groups. Therefore, there will -not be objections with regard to each document but rather with regard to -each group of documents and each group of questions—for instance, an -objection in the Norway case against all Norwegian documents or in the -Greek case against all Greek documents. It would be easier to deal with -matters that way, since in my testimony I shall be dealing with Greece -and Norway anyway, whereas if I do so now I shall have to say everything -twice. But I shall of course be guided by the decision of the honorable -Tribunal. I only fear that an unnecessary amount of time will be lost -that way. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I only want to say one word on -procedure. I did hope that Dr. Siemers and I had already occupied -sufficient of the Tribunal’s time in arguing this point because, of -course, the arguments as to relevancy must be the same. Whether they are -so obviously irrelevant as not to be translatable, or whether they are -inadmissible, at any rate my arguments were the same, and I did not -intend to repeat the argument which I had made before the Tribunal. - -Dr. Siemers already assisted the Tribunal for an hour and a half on this -point, which we discussed before, and I hoped that if I stated as I did -state that I have maintained the points which I put before the Tribunal -in my previous argument, that Dr. Siemers might be able on this occasion -to shorten matters and to say that he relied on the—if I may say -so—very full argument which the Tribunal had on the other occasion. -That is why I thought it might be convenient if we dealt with them now -and put this problem out of the need for further consideration. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks that you must argue -these questions now, and it hopes that you will argue them shortly, as -your arguments have already been heard in favor of them. But we think -that you must argue them now and not argue each individual document as -it comes up, and it will consider the matter. It already has these -documents, but it will consider the matter again and decide the matter -tonight. - -COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): My -Lord, inasmuch as the Tribunal decided to have Dr. Siemers argue the -point which was expressed by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe and other -prosecutors, I think it is my duty to name three documents to which our -Prosecution object. - -The Soviet Prosecution would like to object altogether to five -documents. Two of them—I have in mind Documents Raeder-70 and 88—have -already been included by my friend Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe in the list -which has been given to the Tribunal. So all I have to do now is to name -the three remaining numbers, so that Dr. Siemers would have it easier in -answering all together. I name Documents Raeder-13, 27, and 83. - -Document Raeder-13 is a record of a report of Captain Lohmann. There is -an idea expressed in this report which I cannot call other than a mad -and propagandist idea of a typical Nazi. The idea is that the aim of the -Red Army is world revolution, and that the Red Army is really trying to -incite world revolution. I consider that it would not be proper if such -nightmares and politically harmful ideas were reflected in the documents -which are to be admitted by the Tribunal. - -My second objection is in connection with the Document Raeder-27. This -is a record which was made by a voluntary reporter, Böhm, of an address -of Hitler’s at Obersalzberg. The Tribunal already rejected Dr. Siemers’ -application to include two documents pertaining to the same questions -and emphasized the fact that the Tribunal does not wish to compare the -authenticity of different documents pertaining to or dealing with the -same question. - -I consider that inasmuch as the Tribunal already has at its disposal -among documents which were admitted two records dealing with Hitler’s -address at Obersalzberg, therefore, there is no necessity to admit the -third record of his speech, especially since in this third version there -are altogether shameless, slanderous, and calumnious remarks against the -Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and the leaders of the Soviet -Government. Neither the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union nor we as -representatives of the Soviet State would ever agree to have such -remarks included in the record. - -The third document is Document Raeder-83. Document 83 is an excerpt from -the German _White Book_. Since the authenticity of this _White Book_ has -already been questioned by Dr. Dubost, I consider it material which -cannot be relied upon, and in particular with regard to the Document -Raeder-83. There are several remarks, harmful to the Soviet Union, which -have absolutely no political basis—that is, the passage pertaining to -the relations between the Soviet Union and Finland. So on the grounds of -such general political motives, I would ask the High Tribunal to exclude -as evidence Document Raeder-83 from the list of documents which were -presented to the Tribunal by Defense Counsel Siemers. Furthermore, -strictly speaking, it is absolutely clear that this document is -irrelevant. That is all I want to say. - -DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I note to my regret that we are -back at the beginning again in our debate about documents; for we are -disputing about documents now which were not mentioned at all in the -original debate concerning documents, which took place on 1 May. I had -believed, however, that I could rely on this one principle, that at -least those documents which at that time were not objected to would be -considered granted. Now, however, I find that those documents which were -not discussed at that time at all are under dispute. It is extremely -difficult... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks you are entirely in -error in that, because it is obvious that a document which has not been -translated cannot be finally passed on by the Prosecution or by the -Tribunal, and the fact that the Prosecution does not object to it at -that stage does not prevent it from objecting at a later stage when it -has been translated. - -DR. SIEMERS: There were some documents to which I was told that the -Prosecution did not object, and with regard to them I believed at any -rate that that was final, just as with reference to some documents... - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought I had made myself clear. What I said was this: -The Prosecution in objecting or not objecting to a document before it is -translated does not in any way bind them not to object to it after it is -translated. Is that clear? - -DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall take these documents one by one. First of all, -I would like to start with those documents which Colonel Pokrovsky... - -THE PRESIDENT: No, no, Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal will not listen to -these documents taken one by one. If they can be treated in groups they -must be treated in groups. They have been treated in groups by Sir -David, and I am not saying you must adhere exactly to the same groups, -that the Tribunal is not proposing to hear each document one by one. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Then it is a misunderstanding. I wanted -to discuss those documents at the beginning, because there are some -things which are not clear and which were objected to by Colonel -Pokrovsky. I did not realize that Colonel Pokrovsky mentioned the -documents in groups. I believe he mentioned five documents—three of -them individually—and I believe that, though I have not understood -everything, I can deal with these individually mentioned documents one -by one. However, I shall be glad to start with the group laid down by -Sir David if that is to be dealt with first. Shall I first... - -THE PRESIDENT: When you said you were going to deal with the documents -one by one, you meant all the documents one by one? I am not suggesting -that you... - -DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: You can deal with Colonel Pokrovsky first if you like. - -DR. SIEMERS: Colonel Pokrovsky has as his first objection Document -Raeder-13. This deals with a document dated 1935. Certainly Colonel -Pokrovsky can offer some objection to the contents of this document, but -how a document can be classed as irrelevant just because a certain -sentence allegedly contains propaganda is not quite clear to me. I -believe I could find sentences in other documents which have been -submitted during these past 6 months which might be interpreted in some -way as propaganda. I cannot quite imagine that that is an objection, and -I would like to remind the Tribunal that right at the beginning of the -proceedings, when we were dealing with Austria, the Tribunal rejected an -objection made by the Defense regarding a letter. The Defense objected -because the author of the letter was available as a witness. Thereupon, -the Tribunal, and justly so, decided that the letter was evidence. The -only matter for debate is the probative value. The Tribunal admitted -this document. And in connection with this I should like to mention that -a lecture at a university which is set down in writing is a document. -The lecture deals with the naval agreement, and I believe that therewith -the relevancy... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, have you not made your point on Number 13? -You said the majority of the thing is clearly relevant, though there is -one sentence which may be alleged to be propaganda, and, therefore, the -document ought not be struck out. Is that not your point? - -DR. SIEMERS: No, I am saying that it is a document which has a bearing -on the evidence used in this Trial, and the Soviet Prosecution cannot -dispute it because it was a lecture given in 1935. I cannot at all -understand the use of the word “propaganda” by Colonel Pokrovsky in -connection with this document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I do not understand what you say in the least. I -thought I put the point you had made. I thought you made it clear that -the document in itself was relevant and could not be rejected because it -contained one sentence which was alleged propaganda. That is your point, -and I shall want it stated in one or two sentences, and the Tribunal -will consider it. I do not see why the time of the Tribunal should be -taken up with a long argument about something else. - -DR. SIEMERS: Colonel Pokrovsky secondly, if I understood the -interpreter, objected to Document Number Raeder-27. In this instance we -are concerned with the speech of Hitler at Obersalzberg on 22 August -1932. It is Exhibit Raeder-27. It is very hard for me to comment on this -document since I do not understand the objections of Colonel Pokrovsky. -It deals... - -THE PRESIDENT: The objection was that there was no necessity for a third -record of the speech. There were two records which you objected to, and -he said there was no necessity for a third. - -DR. SIEMERS: I would like to add to that then, Your Honor, that the -Soviet Delegation does not agree with the Delegation of the United -States. In the record at that time the representative of the American -Delegation said that if any one had a better version of that speech, he -should present it. Therefore, I agree with the opinion of the American -Prosecution and I believe, aside from that, that not a word about the -relevancy of a speech which was made shortly before the outbreak of the -war is necessary. - -Document Raeder-83 is the third document objected to by Colonel -Pokrovsky. This contains the sixth session of the Supreme Council on 28 -March 1940, the drafting of a resolution with the heading “Strictly -Secret.” In this document the Supreme Council—that is, the constituents -of the Allied leadership—agreed that the French and British Governments -on Monday, 1 April, would tender a note to the Norwegian and Swedish -Governments. The contents of this note is then given, and there is a -reference to the point of view of vital interests, and it says there -then the position of the neutrals would be considered by the Allies as -one contrary to their vital interests, and that it would evoke an -appropriate reaction. - -Under Figure 1c of this document, it says: - - “Any attempt by the Soviet Union which aimed at obtaining from - Norway a position on the Atlantic Coast would be contrary to the - vital interests of the Allies and would provoke the appropriate - reaction.” - -THE PRESIDENT: You do not need to read the document, do you? I mean you -can tell us what the substance of it is. It appears to be an objection -to any further attack upon Finland, which would be considered by the -Allies to be contrary to their vital interests. That is all. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, just this expression “vital interests” is -the decisive one. I do not wish, as the Prosecution always seem to -think, to bring up some sort of objection from the point of view of _tu -quoque_. I want to show only what the situation was according to -international law, and that at the same time when Admiral Raeder was -entertaining certain thoughts regarding Norway, Greece, and so forth, -the Allied agencies had the same thoughts and were basing these thoughts -on the same concept of international law which, as I recently said, was -upheld by Kellogg—namely that the right of self-preservation still -exists. Now I can prove my point through these documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: The point made against you by Sir David was that the -document could not have come into the hands of the German authorities -until after the fall of France. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall deal with the groupings designated by Sir -David. - -Sir David made certain fundamental statements. Regarding Document -Numbers Raeder-28 and 29, he pointed out specifically that in one case -they were the thoughts of General Gamelin and in the other case those of -General Weygand, and that these ideas were not known to the Germans at -that time since these documents were not yet in our hands. The latter -point is correct. The concept and the plan of occupying Greece, of -destroying Romanian oil wells, those thoughts were known to the -Germans—namely, through their intelligence service. The Prosecution did -not present the data of the German High Command which show these -reports. Since I do not have these documents, I believe it would be just -if I am given the possibility of presenting the actual facts which were -known to Germany and in this way prove them. I have no other proofs. -That it is agreeable to the Prosecution to deprive me of the documents -which I need for the defense, I can understand; but the Prosecution must -also understand the fact that I consider it important that those -documents which are definite proof of certain plans remain at my -disposal. - -The charge has been made against Admiral Raeder that it was an -aggressive war—a criminal war of aggression—to formulate plans for the -occupation of Greece. Document Raeder-29 shows that General Weygand and -General Gamelin on 9 September 1939 concern themselves with planning the -occupation of neutral Salonika. So if this is the case, I cannot -understand how one can point an accusing finger at Admiral Raeder, on -the German side, for having concerned himself with such plans a year and -half later. I believe, therefore, that these and similar documents must -be granted me, for only from them can the military planning and the -value of the military planning, or the objectionable side—that is the -criminal side of the planning, be understood. The strategic thinking of -the defendant can be understood only if one knows approximately what -strategic thinking prevailed at the same time with the enemy. The -strategic reasoning of Admiral Raeder was shut up in an airtight -compartment but depended on the reports received about the strategic -planning of the opposition. It is a reciprocal activity. This reciprocal -activity is necessary for an understanding. Therefore, in view of this -very essential point, I ask to be granted this kind of document since, -as I have recently stated, I do not know how I can carry on my defense -at all in the face of these grave accusations regarding Greece and -Norway if all of my documents are stricken. I believe that I am -understood correctly when I do not assert that we were cognizant of -these documents. But Germany knew the contents of these documents, and I -believe that is sufficient. - -May it please the Tribunal, we are once again at Document Raeder-66 in -Group A. This Document Raeder-66 is the opinion of Dr. Mosler, an expert -in international law, about the Norwegian operation as judged from the -standpoint of international law. - -Since we are always talking about saving time in this courtroom, I would -have my doubts about rejecting this article, for a refusal would force -me to set forth the trend of thought point by point in detail, and I -believe that it is much easier for the Tribunal, for the Prosecution and -for me, if I submit general legal arguments in this connection. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this is a document which is a matter of -legal argument. If the Tribunal thinks it would be of any assistance to -have the argument in documentary form, I willingly withdraw my objection -to that. That is on quite a different project than the other one, and I -want to help in any way I can. - -While I am before the microphone: I did mention that there were two -other documents that fall into the same group. Document Raeder-34 falls -into Group B, and Document Raeder-48 into the Group E. - -My Lord, I did mention 28 when I was addressing the Tribunal. - -DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I do not wish to dispute -Document Raeder-66, I have really done this just to ease the situation -for everyone. The additional documents in this group are Raeder-101 to -107. I cannot say that this is a homogeneous group. One document deals -with Norway, another deals with Belgium, a third deals with the Danube. -The unity of this group escapes me. Basically these documents have this -point in common: that, as I have already stated, a plan existed in the -Allied General Staff, as well as in the German, and all were based on -the tenet of international law regarding the right of self-preservation -and vital interests. - -In order to be brief at this point I should like to refer to Document -Raeder-66 particularly, and to save time I ask that the quotations from -this document be considered the basis for my remarks today on the right -of self-preservation. I am referring to the quotations on Page 3 and -Page 4 of this expert opinion. The legal situation is made very clear -therein, and it is set forth very clearly in this expert opinion that, -with regard to the question of the occupation of Norway, we are not -concerned with whether the Allies had actually landed in Norway but only -whether such a plan existed, that we are not concerned with the fact -whether Norway agreed or did not agree. The danger of a change of -neutrality according to international law gives one the right to use -some compensating measure or to attack on one’s own accord; and this -basic tenet has been maintained in the entire literature which is quoted -in this document, and to which I shall refer later in my defense speech. - -Out of group 101 to 107, I have to mention Document Raeder-107 -especially. Document Raeder-107 is not concerned at all with the _White -Books_ as the other documents are. 107 is an affidavit by Schreiber. -Schreiber was naval attaché at Oslo from October 1939 onward. From the -beginning I have said that I needed Schreiber as a witness. In the -meantime, I dispensed with Schreiber because even though we tried for -weeks, we could not find him. I discussed this matter with Sir David and -with Colonel Phillimore. I was advised that there would be no objection -on this formal point since Schreiber suddenly and of his own accord -reappeared again. - -If, as the Prosecution wish, this piece of evidence is taken from -me—namely, the affidavit of Schreiber about the reports which Admiral -Raeder received from Oslo and, in addition to that, the documents from -which the authenticity of these reports may be shown—then I have no -evidence for this entire question at all. Besides, Schreiber was in Oslo -during the occupation and he has commented in his affidavit with regard -to the behavior of the Navy and the efforts of Admiral Raeder in -connection with the regrettable civil administration of Terboven. -Therefore, I am asking the High Tribunal to grant this affidavit to me -or to grant Schreiber as a witness so that he can testify personally. -This latter course, however, would take up more time. I have limited my -evidence through witnesses to such a degree that I believe that, in view -of the entire span of 15 years with which we are dealing, in the case of -the Defendant Raeder at least, such an affidavit should be granted me. - -With regard to Group B, I should like to refer to the remarks which I -have already made. As far as I can see, the group seems to be thoroughly -heterogeneous, but I believe they are all documents taken from the -_White Book_. The same ideas should be applied which I have recently -expressed to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think Sir David recognized that there was a certain -degree of lack of identity in these groups, but he suggested that they -all fall into geographical groups: one group, the Low Countries; one -group, Norway; one group, Greece; and one group, the Caucasus and the -Danube—which agrees with “E.” That is what he said. Could you not deal -with them in those geographical groups? - -DR. SIEMERS: Very well. - -I have already talked about Norway and in that connection I therefore -refer to the remarks I have already made. I have already briefly -mentioned Greece. I would like to say that there was a double accusation -made: One, that neutral ships were sunk—namely, neutral Greek ships, -and secondly, the accusation of an aggressive war against Greece—that -is, the occupation of all Greece. - -With regard to the last point, I have already made a few statements. -Dealing with the Greek merchantmen I would like to say only that in this -case the action and attitude of the defendant appears justified in that -he received reports which coincided with the documents which were found -a month later in France. The same reports were received by Raeder when -he expressed his views to Hitler. I would like to prove that these -reports which came to him through the intelligence service were not -invented by the intelligence service but were actual facts. The same -applies to the oil regions. Plans existed to destroy the Romanian oil -wells and furthermore there was a plan to destroy the Caucasian oil -wells; both had the object of hurting the enemy; in the one case Germany -alone—as far as Romania was concerned—and in the second case Germany -and Russia, because at that time Russia was on friendly terms with -Germany. - -These plans are—and this is shown by the documents—in the same form as -all other documents presented by the Prosecution. These documents as -well, in their entirety, are “top secret,” “personal,” “confidential.” -Just as the Prosecution have always said, “Why did you do everything -secretly? That is suspicious.” These documents contain ideas based on -strategic planning just as do the documents presented by the -Prosecution. That is something which arises from the nature of war and -which is not meant to be an accusation on my part, nor should it be -construed as an accusation against Admiral Raeder by the Prosecution. - -Then the group of Ribbentrop documents follows. I can say only what I -said recently. And as I glance at it cursorily now, the documents in the -Ribbentrop document book are not as complete as they are here. -Therefore, I believe it is important to take the documents and to -investigate their complete content from the point of view of Raeder -rather than the point of view of Ribbentrop. That perhaps may have taken -place, as the High Tribunal suggested the other day. Then I believe, -however, it is not an objection which can be used by the Prosecution to -say that in the case of Ribbentrop they were partially admitted and -partially rejected. For some documents which were granted Ribbentrop -were refused me. - -Then we turn to Group “E,” and that is _tu quoque_. I believe I have -already spoken sufficiently on that point just recently. I dispute it -again and I cannot understand why the Prosecution will not agree with me -on that. I do not wish to object. I am not saying _tu quoque_; I am only -saying that there is strategic planning which is carried on in every -army and there are tenets in international law which applied to the -Allies exactly in the same way as to us, and I beg to be granted these -possibilities of comparison in foreign politics. - -I believe herewith that I have dealt with all points so far as it is -possible for me to define my position in such a brief period of time -with regard to about 50 documents, and I am asking the High Tribunal not -to make my work more difficult by refusing these documents to me. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will carefully consider these documents and -your arguments. - -The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 May 1946, at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND DAY - Friday, 17 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have given careful and prolonged attention -to the consideration of the documents offered by Dr. Siemers on behalf -of the Defendant Raeder; and they, therefore, do not wish the documents -which they propose to admit to be read because they have already read -them all. - -I will now deal with the documents individually. - -Document 66 is admitted for the purposes of argument, and not as -evidence; Document 101 is denied; Documents 102 to 105 are admitted; -Document 106 is denied; Document 107 is admitted; Document 39 is denied; -Document 63 is admitted; Document 64 is denied; Document 99 is denied; -Document 100 is admitted; Documents 102 to 107 are admitted; Document 38 -is denied; Document 50 is denied; Document 55 is denied; Document 58 is -denied; Documents 29, 56, 57, 60, and 62 are denied. I should have -included in that group Document 28, which is also denied. Documents 31, -32, 36, 37, and 39 are denied; Document 41 is admitted; Document 99 has -already been denied, and Document 101 has already been denied; Document -59 is admitted; Document 68 is denied; Document 70 is denied; Document -72 is denied; Document 74 is denied; Document 75 is admitted; Document -77 is admitted; Document 79 is admitted; Document 80 is admitted; -Document 84 is admitted; Document 85, which is on Page 82 of Volume V, -is admitted; Document 87 is denied; Document 88 is admitted; Document 91 -is admitted; Document 13 is admitted; Document 27 is admitted. - -The Prosecution may, if they wish it, apply to cross-examine the witness -who made that document. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): That is -Admiral Böhm. - -THE PRESIDENT: Admiral Böhm, yes. - -Document 83 is admitted; Document 34 is admitted; Document 48 is denied. - -Have I gone too quickly for you, Dr. Siemers? You have the last few? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I heard everything. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, yesterday afternoon the Tribunal asked that we -ascertain the origins, if possible, of Document 1014-PS. Some question -was raised about it by Dr. Siemers. It is Exhibit USA-30. - -I have had a search made, and I have some information that we are -prepared to submit concerning this document. I should like to point out -that 1014-PS and 798-PS and L-3 are documents all concerning this same -speech made at Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939. They were offered in -evidence by Mr. Alderman of the American staff on the 26th day of -November 1945. - -I should like to point out that L-3, to which Dr. Siemers made reference -yesterday, was offered only for identification, as the record shows for -the proceedings of that day on the 26th of November, and has received -the mark Exhibit Number USA-28 for identification only. Mr. Alderman -pointed out, as appears in the record, that he was not offering it in -evidence, that it was a paper which came into our hands originally -through the services of a newspaperman, and that later on the Documents -798-PS and 1014-PS were found among captured documents. They referred to -the same speech in Obersalzberg. Mr. Alderman offered these two at that -time. - -Now Document 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29, and Document 1014-PS, -Exhibit Number USA-30, were both found by the forces of the United -States in this fashion: - -They had been taken from the OKW headquarters in Berlin, and in the -course of various journeys in those days they finally arrived at one -place and were stored, it now appears, at various places by the OKW -under the control of a General Winter of the German forces; and they -were transported in three railway trains to Saalfelden in the Austrian -Tyrol. Subsequently, General Winter ordered that all documents in his -possession be turned over to the Allied forces and they were. These -particular documents, together with some other papers, were turned over -by General Winter and members of his staff at that time; and on the 21st -day of May 1945, they were removed from Saalfelden where they were under -the control of General Winter and taken to the Third U.S. Army Document -Center at Munich. While at Munich they were sorted and cataloged by -Department G-2 Supreme Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Force -with the assistance of clerks from the OKW and OKH. On the 16th of June -1945 these documents, together with others, were removed on six trucks -from the headquarters of the Third Army at Munich and were taken to the -U.S. Group Control Council Number 32 at Seckenheim, Germany, which was -located in the former offices of the I.G. Farben Company, and were -placed on shelves on the third floor of the building and kept under -guard. Between the 16th of June 1945 and the 30th of August 1945, the -task of collecting, sorting, assembling and cataloging these documents -was carried out under the supervision of the British Colonel Austin, -with personnel of the Supreme Headquarters and the G-2 Document Center -of the G-2 Operational Intelligence Section, 6889 Berlin Document -Section, and the British Enemy Document Unit, and the British Military -Intelligence Research Section. Beginning on the 5th day of July 1945, -and continuing until the 30th of August 1945, these documents were -screened at that place by members of the staff of the United States -Chief Counsel. Lieutenant Margolies, who is here in the courtroom and a -member of our staff, personally picked these documents out of your file -798-PS and 1014-PS from the OKW captured files, brought them to -Nuremberg, and lodged them in the document room where they have been -kept under strict security ever since. - -Now, that is the history of these two documents about which Dr. Siemers -raised some question yesterday—a considerable question I might say—and -inferred there was something strange about their contents. I think the -story which I have given in the form of a statement over the signature -of Lieutenant Commander Hopper clearly establishes the source and where -they have been ever since; and I think it is only fair to say that, -since Dr. Siemers saw fit to point out that this language sounded -extremely harsh and was attributed to Hitler, these documents were -offered to show these people were actually talking about aggressive war. -The reading of the three documents by the Tribunal will clearly show -they are all in agreement in substance; of course, there are differences -in phraseology, but the important thing and purpose for which they were -offered was to show that these people were talking aggressive war. I -might say I am not surprised to find my friend is sensitive about the -remark, but I think the unanswered proof in the case thus far shows that -not only were these things said but they were done. - -M. DUBOST: May it please the Court. No doubt it is a mistake in -translation. We understood 106 had been rejected the first time and -admitted the second time in the Group 102 to 107. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was my mistake. I did say that the Group -102 to 107 were admitted; but I have also said 106 was rejected, and it -is rejected. It is entirely my mistake. 106 is rejected. - -M. DUBOST: 106 is thrown out and 102 to 107 are also rejected, are they? - -THE PRESIDENT: No, I will state the exact numbers: 102, 103, 104, 105, -and 107 are admitted. - -M. DUBOST: Very good. Mr. President, we want to offer further -explanations on 102 to 107 during the course of the proceedings. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I say a few words concerning the -statement made by Mr. Dodd? - -I had no doubts, and I certainly have no doubt now, that since these -documents were found they have been handled very correctly and Mr. Dodd -spoke only about that. I believe it is important to establish: Whether -one can determine the connection these documents had with other -documents, because in that way one can see whether these were documents -belonging to a certain adjutant. For instance, were they together with -the Hossbach papers or together with the Schmundt file? If, for -instance, the documents were with the Schmundt documents it is probable -that they belonged to the adjutant. - -THE PRESIDENT: That all goes to the weight of the document, does it not? -No doubt, a document which is signed has more weight than a document -which is not signed. All those matters the Tribunal will take into -account when considering the documents, but the admissibility of the -document depends upon its being a German document found and captured. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I wanted to say this only because it is -unpleasant to have the American Delegation misunderstand my motion -concerning the document. I make no charges concerning the manner in -which the document was found, I merely say that it is undecided among -which papers it was found. It came to my attention that Mr. Dodd treated -the three documents concerned in quite the same way, whereas Mr. -Alderman on Page 188 of the record (Volume II, Page 286), states that -one of these three documents, L-3, was evidently not in order because of -its doubtful origin. And therefore he withdrew the document. - -May I then, if it please the Court, continue with the examination of the -Defendant Raeder? - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, we have a few final questions -concerning the conspiracy. I believe it will not take much time. I ask -you to look at the Document C-155. That is Exhibit GB-214, in Document -Book 10, Page 24—Document Book 10 of the British Delegation, Page 24. - -It is your letter of 11 June 1940, which was sent to 74 Navy offices and -which the Prosecution has called a letter of justification. The -Prosecution wants to deduce from this that you knew that a war was to be -expected as early as the summer of 1939. I should like you to answer -this charge very briefly. - -RAEDER: There is manifold proof to show that I was not expecting a war -in the fall at all, and in view of the small extent of rearmament of the -German Navy this was quite natural. I have stated quite clearly in my -speech before the U-boat officers in Swinemünde that we could not count -on it. - -DR. SIEMERS: And what was the reason for that letter, C-155? - -RAEDER: The reason was that a number of torpedo boats had misfired and -this could be traced to the fact that torpedoes had not yet been as -perfectly developed as they should have been at the beginning of a war. -An additional reason was that, now that the war had so suddenly broken -out, many officers believed that it would have been better to have -developed the submarine weapon as much as possible first, so that at -least this weapon would be ready in large numbers in the event of a war. -I objected to that opinion precisely because such a war was not to be -expected. And on Page 6, 8th paragraph, I emphasize again—in the second -line—that the Führer hoped until the end to postpone the imminent -dispute with England until 1944 or 1945. I am speaking here of an -imminent dispute. An imminent dispute is not exactly something to strive -for, it is rather to be feared. - -DR. SIEMERS: There is another key document, that is, Document 789-PS, -Exhibit USA-23, the very long speech made by Hitler on 23 November 1939 -before the commanders-in-chief. - -The document, Mr. President, is in Document Book 10a on Page 261. This -is again a Hitler speech where there is no indication of who recorded -it. Signature and date are missing. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Since this is similar to the other -documents I do not have to question you on that point. I would merely -like to know, Admiral, did that speech also betray a definite -background, a certain mental reservation on the part of Hitler? - -RAEDER: Yes. There was at that time a rather severe conflict between -Hitler and the commanders-in-chief of the Army, and also a difference of -opinion with the leading generals concerning the offensive in the West. -The Führer assembled all the leaders in order to give them his opinion -about this whole matter. He stated—and I was present myself—that up to -that time he had always been right in his decisions and that he would -also be right in the opinion that the western offensive had to be -undertaken in the fall if possible. Toward the end he used very harsh -words; in the third from the last paragraph of the document he states: -“I shall not be afraid of anything and I shall destroy everyone who is -against me.” That was directed against the generals. Actually the -western offensive did not take place until the spring because the -weather conditions delayed them. - -DR. SIEMERS: We have heard details of that during previous proceedings, -and I believe we do not have to go into that now. In this connection we -come to the last document, that is C-126, which you also have in front -of you, GB-45. It is in Document Book 10a on Page 92. - -With regard to the preparation of the war against Poland, the -Prosecution has submitted this document of the High Command of the Armed -Forces dated 22 June 1939 and signed by Keitel, because that document -contained a timetable for “Case White”; that is, the case of Poland. Did -that document or that directive indicate to you a definite aggressive -intention? - -RAEDER: No. Not a definite intention of aggression at all. In all cases -certain long-range questions had to be cleared up, such as, for -instance, whether our training ships which used to put to sea in summer -should leave, or whether they should wait. This decision, however, was -only to be made in the beginning of August. In connection with that -order I issued the order of 2 August also pertaining to that document, -to the individual higher Naval offices, namely, an operational directive -for the use of Atlantic submarines in the Case White. May I be permitted -to read the first lines, because the wording is important: - - “Attached is an operational directive for the employment of - U-boats which are to be sent out into the Atlantic by the way of - precaution in the event that the intention to carry out Case - White should remain unchanged. F.d.U. (Commander of the U-boat - fleet) is to hand in his operation orders to SKL by 12 August. - The decision regarding the sailing of U-boats for the Atlantic - will probably be made before the middle of August. - - “If the operations are not carried out, this directive must be - destroyed by 1 October 1939 at the latest.” (Document C-126, - Exhibit GB-45) - -Thus it was not definite that such operations would take place. It was -rather a precautionary measure which had to be taken under all -circumstances in connection with the Case White. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have said that Hitler assured you repeatedly, -particularly when you spoke to him personally, that there would not be a -war? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Particularly there would be no war against England? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now, then, on 3 September 1939 war did start with England. -In connection with this did you speak to Hitler about that question—and -if so, when? - -RAEDER: On the 3 September in the morning, I believe between 10 and 11 -o’clock—I cannot remember the exact hour—I was called into the Reich -Chancellery. The SKL had already informed me that the ultimatum had been -received from England and France. I came into the study of the Führer -where a number of persons were assembled. I only remember that Deputy of -the Führer Hess was present. I could not say who else was there. I -noticed that Hitler was particularly embarrassed when he told me that -despite all his hopes, war with England was imminent, and that the -ultimatum had been received. It was an expression of embarrassment such -as I had never noticed on Hitler. - -DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the charge made by the Prosecution that you, -Admiral, agreed with National Socialism and strongly supported it. - -May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal to look at Document D-481, which -is GB-215 in Document Book 10a, Page 101. This deals with the oath of -civil servants and the oath of soldiers. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution, with reference to this -document, has stated that on 2 August 1934, in a special ceremony, you -took an oath to Adolf Hitler, and not to the fatherland. In the -transcript, of 15 January 1946, Page 2719 (Volume V, Page 262), we read, -“The Tribunal will see that Raeder”—in his oath—“put Führer in the -place of fatherland.” - -I do not understand this and I will ask you to explain, whether it is -correct that you had any part in changing the oath from “fatherland” to -“Hitler.” - -RAEDER: No. I cannot understand that accusation at all. The entire -matter was not particularly a ceremony. I do not know who is supposed to -have observed it so that he could make such a statement. The -Commander-in-Chief, Von Blomberg, and the three commanders-in-chief of -the Armed Forces were called to Hitler on the morning of 2 August. We -were in his study and Hitler asked us to come to his desk without -ceremony or staging. There we took the oath which he, as Chief of State -and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, read to us. We repeated that -oath. None of us participated in the writing of that oath and no one had -asked us to do so. That would have been quite unusual. The oath referred -to the person of Hitler. No previous oath had ever been rendered to the -fatherland as far as the words were concerned. Once I took an oath to -the Kaiser as Supreme War Lord, once to the Weimar Constitution, and the -third oath to the person of the Chief of State and Supreme Commander of -the Armed Forces—Hitler. In all three cases I took the oath to my -people, my fatherland. That is a matter of course. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when you were ordered to that meeting on 2 August, -did you know before what it was to deal with? - -RAEDER: Well, I would assume that his adjutant informed my adjutant that -I was to come in connection with the taking of the oath. I could not -speak with certainty now, but I assume so. - -DR. SIEMERS: It was the morning after the death of Hindenburg? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: On the day after the death of Hindenburg? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you know about the wording of the oath? - -RAEDER: No, but the oath was written on a piece of paper and I assume -that we were informed of the wording before, at the desk, there. - -DR. SIEMERS: May I say at this time, Mr. President, that the wording is -contained in the document that I have mentioned and represents a Reich -law. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution asserts that on 30 January -1937 you became a Party member by virtue of the fact that you received -the Golden Party Badge. Will you answer briefly to this point, which has -been discussed previously in other cases? - -RAEDER: When the Führer gave me the Golden Party Badge he said, -specifically, that this was the highest decoration which he could give -at the time. I could not become a Party member at all because it had -been stated that soldiers could not be members of the Party. That was -generally known, and for this reason that assertion likewise is -incomprehensible. - -DR. SIEMERS: The membership of soldiers was prohibited by the -Constitution? - -RAEDER: Yes, prohibited. May I say one more thing to prevent any -misunderstanding? It was prohibited both by the Weimar Constitution and -the decrees which Hitler had issued. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were you in opposition to the Party because of your staunch -Christian and Church attitude, which was generally known? Briefly, how -did it work out? Did you have any difficulties with the Party because of -it? - -RAEDER: In general I had no great difficulties with the Party, which I -think is best explained by the fact that the Navy had considerable -prestige in the Party, as it did in all Germany. I always had the higher -officers, at least the chiefs of bases and fleet commanders, settle any -friction which occurred in the lower echelons, through the proper -authorities. If they were more important they were brought to my -attention and I took care of them; if they dealt with matters of -principle I passed them on to the OKW. Since I never let anything slip -through, in case of incitement by the Party, the entire relations soon -became very smooth and I could prevent all sorts of friction, so that -before long they rarely occurred. In that respect we had the advantage -in the Navy because there were no territorial matters to administer. We -were concerned with the sea and only worked in the coastal cities where -actually everything concerned the Navy. I did have difficulties because -of Heydrich, whom I had removed from the Navy in 1928 or 1929 after a -court of honor had sentenced him for unscrupulous treatment of a young -girl. He was very resentful toward me for a long time and he tried on -various occasions to denounce me to the leadership of the Party or to -Bormann and even to the Führer. However, I was always able to counteract -these attacks so that they had no effect on my situation in general. - -This attitude of Heydrich communicated itself in some way to Himmler, so -that here also, from time to time, I had to write a strongly worded -letter; but it was precisely the strong wording of those letters which -was of help in most cases. - -I should not like to waste any time by mentioning various instances, -such as the one with the SD; however, there were no direct attacks -because of my position in regard to the Church. There was only the -statement made by Goebbels, which I learned of through my Codefendant, -Hans Fritzsche, that I was in disfavor with the Party on account of my -attitude toward the Church; but, as I have said, I was not made to feel -it in a disagreeable way. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe I do not need to ask you to waste any time in -explaining the importance which you placed on religious matters in the -Navy. I will submit an affidavit to this effect without reading it. It -was made by Chief Navy Chaplain Ronneberger, whom you have known for -many years and who described the situation and thus clarified -everything. In that connection, however, may I put one question: Did you -emphasize repeatedly to Hitler that a religious attitude was necessary -for the soldiers and the Navy? - -RAEDER: Yes, that happened frequently, and I kept to this course in the -Navy until the end without hesitation. - -DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, Mr. President, I might submit Exhibit -Number Raeder-121 (Document Raeder-121). It is in my Document Book -Raeder Number 6, Page 523. I should not like to take the time of the -Tribunal by asking questions about the contrasting views between the -Party and the Navy in matters of the Church. I believe that this -document makes it sufficiently clear that a bond between Church and -National Socialism was not possible. In this field Bormann is the most -outstanding figure, and I should like to read only the first paragraph -of the exposé which I have submitted: - - “National Socialistic and Christian concepts are incompatible. - Christian churches are built on the ignorance of man and are at - pains to sustain the ignorance of as large a part of the - population as possible, for only in this way can the Christian - churches maintain their power. In contrast to this, National - Socialism rests on scientific foundations.” - -In the second paragraph, the last sentence: - - “If therefore in the future our young people do not learn - anything more about Christianity, the teachings of which are far - inferior to our own, then Christianity will disappear of - itself.” - -And, on the second page at the end: - - “Just as the harmful influence of astrologers, soothsayers, and - other swindlers are eliminated and suppressed by the State, so - the possibilities for the Church to exert its influence must - also be entirely removed. Only when this has happened will the - State leadership have full influence over the individual - citizen. Only then will the existence of the people and the - Reich be guaranteed for all time.” - -Since the religious and Christian attitude of the defendant is generally -known, I believe this is enough to show the contrast between the Party -and the defendant in these matters. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Concerning the conspiracy, the Prosecution -has also accused you of being a member of the Secret Cabinet Council and -the Defense Council. Will you please answer quite briefly, because these -questions have been discussed so often that I assume that no one in this -Court wishes to hear anything further about these things. Were you a -member of the Reich Government? - -RAEDER: No. - -DR. SIEMERS: According to Document 2098-PS, which is GB-206, Document -Book 10, Page 39, a decree of the Führer of 25 February 1938, you and -the Commander-in-Chief of the Army were made equal in rank to the Reich -Ministers. The Prosecution asserts that therefore you were a member of -the Cabinet and were permitted to and did participate in the meetings. -Is that correct? - -RAEDER: No. I was not a Reich Minister but only equivalent in rank. The -reason for that was, I believe, that General Keitel was made equal in -rank with the Reich Ministers because, in administering the affairs of -the War Ministry, he was frequently in contact with them and had to be -on the same level in order to negotiate with them. And since Brauchitsch -and myself had seniority over General Keitel we also received the same -rank. I was not a member of the Cabinet at all, but the decree states -that on the order of the Führer I could participate in a Cabinet -meeting. It was probably intended that I was to come to the Cabinet when -technical matters had to be explained. However, that never occurred, -since after that time there were no Cabinet meetings. - -DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that in Paragraph 2 of that decree by -Hitler it states: “The commanders-in-chief... on my orders shall -participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet.” - -RAEDER: Yes. And as far as the Secret Cabinet Council is concerned I -need only confirm that, as Hitler told me himself the Secret Cabinet -Council had only been formed in order to honor the retiring Foreign -Minister, Von Neurath, in order to give the impression abroad and at -home that Von Neurath would still be consulted on foreign policy in the -future. However, that Secret Cabinet Council never met. - -DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has made the charge that on 12 March 1939, -on the day commemorating the heroes, you made a speech and that in that -speech you came forth with a ruthless challenge to fight against -Bolshevism and international Jewry. - -May I state, if it please the Court, that unfortunately the speech was -entered in the document book by the Prosecution only from an excerpt -which was selected from a certain point of view; and I believe that it -would be well to know the context of the entire speech. Of course, I -shall not read it, but I should like to submit it as Exhibit Number -Raeder-46. The sentence is in my Document Book Number 3, Page 235, the -page from which the Prosecution took the quotation. Will you please -briefly express your opinion of that. - -RAEDER: May I in doing so read a few short sentences which will -characterize the entire speech? - -DR. SIEMERS: I have no doubt that the Tribunal will permit that. I only -ask you to use only a few significant sentences, just as the Prosecution -have done. - -RAEDER: On Page 7, Line 6, it says... - -DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is on Page 235, the same page which -contains the quotation of the Prosecution. - -RAEDER: Shortly before the quotation of the Prosecution we read on Line -6: - - “He has given back self-confidence and confidence in their own - ability to the German people, and thereby enabled them to - retake, by their own strength, their sacred right refused to - them during the time of their weakness and, beyond that, to - approach the tremendous problems of the times with courage, and - to solve them. Thus the German people and the Führer have done - more for the peace of Europe and the world than some of our - neighbors are able to realize today.” (Document Number - Raeder-46) - -Then we come to the sentence where I speak about the announcement of the -fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry which has been quoted -by the Prosecution. I should like to state briefly in connection with it -that after the experiences of the years 1917 to 1919, communism and -international Jewry had destroyed the resistance of the German people to -a considerable degree and had gained an excessively large and oppressive -influence in German affairs, in affairs of state as well as in economic -affairs, as for example also in the legal field. Therefore, in my -opinion, one could not be surprised that the National Socialist -Government tried to loosen and, as far as possible, remove this large -and oppressive influence. Although in pursuing this course the National -Socialist Government took rather severe steps which led to the Nuremberg -Laws—the exaggerations of which I regretted, of course—nevertheless, -in the course of the speech which I made in public at the orders of the -Reich Government, I could not find it compatible with my conscience to -express my personal opinions, which were basically different. It must -also be considered that such a speech had to fit into a general -framework. That, however, was only one short sentence, whereas other -points were considerably more in the foreground. In that connection I -ask for permission to read two more short sentences: - - “And this is the reason for the demand for equal rights and - equal respect with all other nations which alone can guarantee - that the nations will live peacefully together on this earth.” - -Then the last sentence, on Page 235: - - “Within the bounds of German national community the Führer has - assigned us our tasks as soldiers to protect our homeland and - our peaceful national reconstruction and to train the young - manhood, fit for military service, which was entrusted to us and - which has to pass entirely through our hands.” - -The next sentence was quoted by the Prosecution, because there I spoke -of the fact that we should not only train these young people technically -in the sense of the technical use of arms but also educate them in the -sense of National Socialist ideology and philosophy, and I stated that -we had to march shoulder to shoulder with the Party. - -I have always taken the view that the Armed Forces should not be a -completely extraneous body in the State. It would be impossible to have -a republican armed force in a monarchist state or an armed force with -monarchist tendencies in a democratic state. Thus our Armed Forces would -have to be incorporated into the National Socialist State to the extent -necessary to create a real people’s community, and it would be the task -of the commanders of the Armed Forces to educate their branches of the -forces in such a way that they would recognize and live up to the good -national and socialist ideals of the National Socialist State. This -would be done in the same way as I did it as Commander-in-Chief of the -Navy. In this way it was possible to incorporate the Armed Forces in an -orderly manner, to keep them from all exaggeration and excesses, and at -the same time to form a people’s community within the State. - -And then on the bottom of Page 236: - - “This nation needed a new, a true peace, the peace of justice - and honor, peace without hatred. The world also needs peace. - Because a weak Germany could not obtain peace, a strong one has - won it for herself. It is the proud task of the German - Wehrmacht, to secure this peace for the German nation against - everybody.” - -And quite at the end of the document, the 11th or 12th line from the -bottom of the page: - - “But the soldier over there, whom we respect as the valiant - representative of his country, may accept a soldier’s word: What - Germany needs and wants is peace. These are not just words but - it has been proved by practical examples. The construction work - of Germany requires many years of quiet development.” - -I think that this is sufficient... - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient. - -May I point out to the High Tribunal that in the English translation, on -Page 236, as far as I remember, one sentence was underlined. That is: -“The Wehrmacht and Party are one indivisible entity.” The Prosecution -has submitted that. Apart from that, nothing is underlined. - -I wish to say in passing that in reality, in the original, many other -passages are underlined, particularly those sentences which Admiral -Raeder has just read which deal with peace. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, the Prosecution has accused you -with having connections with all the political activities of National -Socialism. Therefore I am compelled to ask you briefly concerning your -participation in actions in those countries where participation by the -Navy is certainly surprising. - -In what way were you connected with the measures concerning the -annexation of Austria? - -RAEDER: The Navy had nothing to do with the Anschluss of Austria at all -and did not take part in any way. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you make any preparations? - -RAEDER: No. In the case of Austria, no preparations were needed. The -case of Austria was mentioned in Document C-175, but that dealt only -with the directive of 1 July 1937 for the unified preparation of the -Armed Forces for war. - -DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that C-175 is USA-69, in the Document Book -of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 117. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution considers this document -important and therefore I should like you to say a few words about it. - -RAEDER: It deals with a statement, which, according to my knowledge, is -made in every state for every year and in which, according to the -political situation, such cases are mentioned which may arise in the -course of the year and for which, of course, certain preparations have -to be made. For the Navy, however, that document had no sequel as far as -Austria was concerned. - -DR. SIEMERS: So it is a document which numerous... - -THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we have the reference to that right. -It came through, I thought, C-157, USA-69, 10a, and then I did not get -the page. - -DR. SIEMERS: Page 117. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that C-157 or 175? - -DR. SIEMERS: C-175. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Does this concern strategic preparations -for various eventualities? - -RAEDER: Yes; various cases are mentioned here, for instance, the “Case -Red” and the special “Case Extension Red-Green.” All these had to be -dealt with but they did not necessarily lead to any consequences. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection I wanted to submit -various documents, Raeder exhibits, from which it can be seen that the -same type of preparations, since they are necessary for military and -strategic reasons, were also undertaken by the Allies—only to show -their necessity. At this moment I should like to forego that because I -cannot determine so quickly which of these documents are admitted and -which have been rejected. Perhaps I may therefore submit the connected -documents at the end in order that no misunderstanding may occur now by -my quoting the wrong figures. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] In what way did you and the Navy -participate in measures concerning the Sudetenland? - -RAEDER: In a directive... - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. May I ask you to look at the document of -the Prosecution 388-PS. It is USA-126—no, excuse me—USA-26. It is in -the Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 147. It is a -draft for the new directive “Grün” of 20 May 1938. - -RAEDER: Yes, I have the directive here. It is of 20 May 1938 and says -with regard to the Navy: - - “The Navy participates in the operations of the Army by - employing the Danube flotilla. That flotilla is put under the - command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In regard to the - conduct of naval warfare, at first only those measures are to be - taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of - the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in - the conflict by other states. Those measures must be confined to - what is absolutely necessary, and must be carried out - inconspicuously.” - -The entire course of action at the end of September and beginning of -October made the special measures unnecessary, so the Danube flotilla -which we had taken over from Austria was put under the command of the -Army. - -DR. SIEMERS: What was the size of the Danube flotilla? - -RAEDER: It consisted of some small river craft, one small gunboat and -minesweepers. - -DR. SIEMERS: That is the total extent to which the Navy participated? - -RAEDER: Yes, in which the Navy participated. - -DR. SIEMERS: In what way did you and the Navy participate in the -preparations for the occupation of what the document calls the -“remainder of Czechoslovakia”? - -This concerns Document C-136, USA-104 in the Document Book of the -British Delegation, 10a, Page 101. It is of 21 October 1938. The -Prosecution points out that according to that you had already been -informed in October that Czechoslovakia was to be occupied after some -time, that is in March, as actually happened. Will you please tell us -something about that? - -RAEDER: That directive looks suspicious at first but the way in which it -is drafted shows that this again refers to possible cases. Point 1 deals -with the securing of the borders of the German Reich and protection -against surprise air attacks. - -Points 2 and 3 are “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia,” -“Occupation of the Memel Country.” - -Number 2, “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia”: The first -sentence reads, “It must be possible to shatter the remainder of -Czechoslovakia at any time if her policy should become hostile toward -Germany.” - -That is the prerequisite in case of any action against Czechoslovakia; -that did not mean that it was certain that any action would be taken. - -In the same manner, under Number 3, mention is made of the occupation of -the Memel country, where it says: “The political situation, particularly -warlike complications between Poland and Lithuania, may make it -necessary for the German Armed Forces to occupy the Memel country.” - -DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. May I point out that, according to my document, -the part which the witness has just read is missing in the English -translation—so that you will not look for it unnecessarily. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] So here again this is a possible -eventuality? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: On 3 September 1939, at the beginning of the war, the -_Athenia_ was sunk. From the military point of view that case has -already been clarified by Herr Kranzbühler, but I should like you as -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to state your position and give an -explanation of the incident with special consideration of the fact that -the Prosecution, especially in this case, has raised a very severe and -insulting accusation. They have made the accusation that you, purposely -and in violation of the truth, held England and Churchill responsible -for the sinking of the _Athenia_, although you knew perfectly well that -the _Athenia_ had been sunk by a German U-boat. As proof, the -Prosecution has submitted the article of 23 October 1939 from the -_Völkischer Beobachter_. - -Mr. President, that is Document Number 3260-PS, GB-218. Document Book 10 -of the British Delegation on Page 97. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I would like you to explain that point. - -RAEDER: The fact is that on 3 September at dusk the young submarine -commander of the submarine _U-30_ met an English passenger ship which -had its lights dimmed and torpedoed it because he assumed, by mistake, -that it was an auxiliary cruiser. In order to avoid misunderstanding I -should like to state here that the deliberations of Kapitänleutnant -Fresdorf, which have been mentioned here concerning the torpedoing of -dimmed ships in the Channel, did not yet play any part in the Naval -Operations Staff at that time and that this commanding officer could not -have known anything about these deliberations. He knew only that -auxiliary cruisers had their lights blacked out, and he assumed that -this was an auxiliary cruiser at the entrance of the northwest channel, -England-Scotland. He did not make a report since it was not necessary. -The information that a German U-boat had torpedoed the _Athenia_ was -broadcast by the British radio, and we probably received the news during -the night of the 3d to the 4th, and transmitted it to the various news -services. - -In the morning of 4 September we received that news at the offices of -the Naval Operations Staff, and I requested information as to how far -our nearest submarine was from the place of the torpedoing. I was told, -75 nautical miles. At about the same time, State Secretary Von -Weizsäcker in the Foreign Office, who had been a naval officer in the -first World War, learned of this situation and made a telephone call to -the Naval Operations Staff, asking whether it was true. He did not call -me personally. He received the answer that, according to our -information, it could not be right. Thereupon he sent for the American -Chargé d’Affaires—I believe Mr. Kirk—in order to speak to him about -the matter because the radio broadcast had also mentioned that several -Americans had been killed in that accident. From his experiences in the -first World War it was clear to him how important it was that there -should be no incident involving America. Therefore, he told him what he -had heard from the Naval Operations Staff. I personally told the same -thing to the American Naval Attaché, Mr. Schrader, and that certainly in -good faith. I believed that I could tell him that in good faith because -we had no other information. State Secretary Von Weizsäcker then came to -see me personally, if I remember correctly. We were very close friends, -and he told me what he had told the American Chargé d’Affaires. He -apologized, I believe, for not having spoken to me personally and that -concluded the case for the time being. - -The matter was such that, if it had been reported in a normal way, we -would not have hesitated to admit and to explain the reason. We would -not have hesitated to apologize to the nations concerned. Disciplinary -measures would have been taken against the officer. I also reported the -incident to the Führer himself in his headquarters and told him that we -were convinced such was not the case, and the Führer ordered that it -should be denied. This was done by the Propaganda Ministry, which had -been informed of the order by my press department. - -The submarine returned on 27 September... - -DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me if I interrupt. That date, Mr. President, is -identified by Document D-659, which was submitted by the Prosecution, it -is Exhibit GB-221 in Document Book 10 on Page 110. - -RAEDER: The submarine commander returned on 27 September to -Wilhelmshaven. Admiral Dönitz has already described how he received him -and how he immediately sent him to me to Berlin by air. - -The U-boat commander reported the entire incident to me and confirmed -that it was a sheer mistake, that it was only through all these messages -he had heard that he himself discovered that it was not an auxiliary -cruiser that was concerned but a passenger steamer. - -I reported the facts to the Führer because they could have had severe -political consequences. He decided that, as it had been denied once, we -had to keep it utterly secret, not only abroad but also within official -circles and government circles. Consequently, I was not in a position to -tell State Secretary Von Weizsäcker or the Propaganda Ministry that the -facts were different. My order to the Commander of the U-boat fleet -reads: - - “1. The affair is to be kept strictly secret upon orders of the - Führer. - - “2. On my part, no court-martial will be ordered because the - commanding officer acted in good faith and it was a mistake. - - “3. The further political handling of the matter is to be - attended to by the High Command of the Navy, as far as anything - has to be done.” - -With that the commander returned to Wilhelmshaven and Admiral Dönitz has -already reported that he was punished by disciplinary procedure. To our -great surprise, about one month later that article appeared in the -_Völkischer Beobachter_ in which Churchill was accused of being the -author of that incident. I knew absolutely nothing about that article -beforehand. I would certainly have prevented its appearance because, -knowing that our submarine had torpedoed that ship, it was out of the -question to lay the blame on the enemy, on the First Lord of the -Admiralty of all people. - -I found out later that the order to publish such an article was issued -by Hitler and reached the Propaganda Ministry through the Reich Press -Chief. As far as I remember I was told that the Propaganda Minister had -himself drafted that article. Later I could not prevent it. I did not -see the article nor did any of my officers of the High Command of the -Navy see it. They would certainly have come to me at once so that I -could have prevented its publication. We had no reason to expect such an -article 4 weeks after the torpedoing of the _Athenia_. That is the case -of the _Athenia_. - -DR. SIEMERS: You just said that you had discovered that Hitler knew -about the article. When did you discover this? - -RAEDER: Here, from my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche. - -DR. SIEMERS: Not at that time then? - -RAEDER: No, by no means. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit again at a quarter past two. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. SIEMERS: In the meantime I have perused my documents and I am -therefore in a position to carry out the original plan, that is, of -submitting the documents during the examination. - -In connection with the documents which we dealt with last, Document -C-126, “Strategic Preparations,” I should like to submit the following -documents which are contained in the _White Books_, documents which have -been granted me for my use and which also concern strategic preparations -on the part of the Allies. We are dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-33. -It is the document dated 9 November 1939; and also Exhibit Number -Raeder-34, General Gamelin to General Lelong, 13 November 1939; and also -Exhibit Number Raeder-35, two extracts from the Diary of Jodl, 1809-PS, -which concern the measures taken by the Luftwaffe regarding the -Caucasus. It is not necessary for me to comment on this. I would just -like to call your attention to the questions which I put to the witness -Reich Marshal Göring on 18 March; he has already testified regarding the -plans of the Allies for the destruction of the Caucasian oil fields. And -finally in this connection, Exhibit Number Raeder-41, to be found in the -Document Book 3, Page 205, and the following pages, a report of the -Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin, dated 16 March -1940, it deals with the war plans for the year 1940 concerning the -tightening of the blockade, the plans regarding the Scandinavian -countries and, in addition, the plans for the destruction of the Russian -oil wells in the Caucasus. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, before I deal with the separate -campaigns of Greece, Norway, and so forth, I would like to ask you to -answer a question which relates to you personally. What decorations did -you receive from Hitler? - -RAEDER: I received from Hitler in the autumn of 1939 in addition to the -Golden Emblem, which I have already mentioned, the Knight’s Order to the -Iron Cross. Furthermore, in the year 1941 on the occasion of my 65th -birthday I received a donation of 250,000 marks. This donation was given -to me by Hitler through an adjutant and in connection with that he sent -a document. - -When I thanked him on the very first occasion, he told me that he was -giving me this donation as a means of decoration in the same manner as -the former rulers of Prussia had given their generals similar donations, -whether as sums of money or as a country estate; then he emphasized that -Field Marshals Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen had received donations -from him as well. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the passage “Greece.” With regard to -Greece, the Prosecution has quoted Document C-12, which is GB-226. This -is to be found in Document Book Number 10, Page 1. This document deals -with the decision on the part of Hitler which was transmitted through -the OKW, dated 30 December 1939, signed by Jodl, and we read under -Number 1.: - - “Greek merchant ships in the area around England, declared by - the United States to be a barred zone, are to be treated as - enemy vessels.” - -This decision on the part of Hitler was made on the basis of a report by -the SKL. What caused you to make this report even though Greece was -neutral at the time? - -RAEDER: At that time we had received a large number of intelligence -reports from our intelligence service that Greek shipping companies -apparently with the knowledge of the Greek Government were allowing -Greek ships to be chartered by England under favorable conditions. -Therefore, these Greek ships were in the service of England and thus -were to be treated in the same way as we were treating the English -merchantmen. These intelligence reports were confirmed later on to an -even greater degree than had been the case in the beginning. - -DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I would like to submit to the High -Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-53, to be found in my Document Book 3, Page 258. -This document deals with the War Diary kept by the SKL in the month of -December 1939. - -On Page 259, under the date of 19 December, the following entry is made: - -“Greece has hired out about 20 vessels to ply between the United States, -Le Havre and Liverpool.” - -This is confirmed by the reports just mentioned by the defendant. The -next entry, on the same page under the date 30 December: - - “Justified by the sales and chartering of numerous Greek ships - to England it has been decreed, with the agreement of the - Führer, that Greek ships in the zone from 20 degrees West to 2 - degrees East and from 44 degrees North to 62 degrees North shall - be considered as hostile craft by U-boats. Attacks to be made - invisibly as far as possible.” - -I also submit the following document, Number Raeder-54. This document is -taken from the _White Books_. It is dated 23 January 1940, and it is a -report from the German Embassy at the Hague to the Foreign Office. The -heading is: “The Contemplated Chartering of 50 to 60 Greek Ships to the -British Government.” It is not necessary for me to read it. I should -like merely to quote the beginning of the first sentence: - -“After the British press brought reports at the end of November last -year”—that is, 1939—“about the alleged charterings of Greek vessels to -British companies”—and so forth—then follows the statement that these -50 to 60 ships are now chartered by British companies. - -Even though it is not quite accurate historically, I would now like -first of all to conclude the question of Greece. In historical sequence -Norway should follow now first, but for the sake of coherence I should -like to deal with Greece and the occupation of Greece first. - -In the Document C-152, identical with C-167 or Exhibit GB-122, in the -Document Book of the British Delegation Number 10, Page 23, the -Prosecution has charged you with the Figure 9 of this lengthy document, -specifically Figure 9.)B.)f.). It says there: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy requests confirmation of the - fact that the whole of Greece is to be occupied even in the case - of a peaceful solution. The Führer: Complete occupation is a - stipulation for any settlement.” - -This document concerns your report to Hitler of 18 March 1941. What were -the reasons for your making this proposal? - -RAEDER: In the beginning I had but little knowledge of the political -intentions of the Führer as far as Greece was concerned, but I did know -of his Directive Number 20, dated 13 December 1940. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, I would like to mention for the -assistance of the Court that we are dealing with Document 1541-PS, that -is GB-117, Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 270. This -directive is dated 13 December 1940. - -RAEDER: In this directive the Führer, for the reasons given in Paragraph -1, said that his intention was, as set forth in Paragraph 2: - - “b.) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in - March, to employ this group of forces to occupy the north coast - of the Aegean by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the - entire Greek mainland (‘Operation Marita’). The support of - Bulgaria is to be expected.” - -The next time I heard about these things again was when I heard that the -British had landed in southern Greece on 3 March. We learned that on -about 5 or 6 March. For this reason I asked the Führer that he occupy -all of Greece in order to prevent the British from attacking us from the -rear, by air, and from erecting air bases, all of which would hamper the -conduct of our war not only in Greece but also in the eastern -Mediterranean. - -The fact was that when a political decision had been made by Hitler of -his own accord and without having consulted anyone, I, as Chief of the -Naval Operations Staff, always had to draw my strategic conclusions from -this political decision and then had to make to him my proposals on -naval and on other warfare as far as they concerned me. - -Since in December he had already considered the possibility that all of -Greece would have to be occupied, the case had now actually arisen for -me to make this proposal to him for the reason I have already mentioned. -When I said “all of Greece,” that implied to me and the Naval Command -the entire Greek coast, where the British forces might land. - -DR. SIEMERS: Your proposal was made about 2 weeks after British troops -had landed in Greece? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection I would like to submit Exhibit -Raeder-58, in my Document Book 3, Page 271. This is a document contained -in the _White Book_, according to which on 4 January—I beg the -Tribunal’s pardon. Sir David is right. Document 58 has been rejected and -I withdraw it. - -In this connection I would like to submit Exhibit Number Raeder-59. It -is to be found in Document Book 3, Page 273 and is an extract from the -_White Book_: It is the minutes of the French War Committee of 26 April -1940. This document deals with the decision of the War Committee -regarding Norway, the Caucasus, Romania, and Greece. - -I also submit Exhibit Number Raeder-63, in Document Book 3, Page 285, -which is an address by the British Secretary of State for India, Amery, -dated 1 December 1940. This document also shows plans regarding Greece, -a year and a quarter before the time just mentioned by the witness. - -Now I shall turn to the topic of Norway. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] The British prosecutor, Major Elwyn Jones, -considers the attack against Norway a special case in the series of -aggressive wars waged by the Nazi conspirators. In this connection he -pointed out that, in this case, Hitler did not think of this himself but -rather was persuaded by you. Since his point is very important, I should -like to ask you to describe this event exactly, and therefore I ask you -first of all: When was the first conversation about this matter between -you and Hitler? - -RAEDER: The first conversation between Hitler and myself concerning the -question of Norway was on 10 October 1939, and that was at my request. -The reason for this was that we had received reports at various times -during the last week of September through our intelligence service of -the offices of Admiral Canaris that the British intended to occupy bases -in Norway. - -I recall that after reports to this effect had reached me several times -Admiral Canaris visited me himself on one occasion—something he did in -very important cases only. And, in the presence of my chief of staff, he -gave me a coherent explanation concerning the intelligence reports which -had been received. In this connection air bases were constantly -mentioned, as well as bases in the south of Norway. Stavanger was -mentioned constantly with the airport Sola, and Trondheim was usually -mentioned and occasionally Christiansand. - -During the last days of September I had a telephone conversation with -Admiral Carls who was the commander of Navy Group North and was -therefore in charge of operations in the Skagerrak, the Kattegat and in -the North Sea. This man had obviously received similar reports. He -informed me that he had composed a private letter addressed to me, in -which he dealt with the question of the danger of Norway’s being -occupied by British forces and in which he was in a general way dealing -with the question as to what disadvantages such a step would have for -us, and whether we should have to forestall such an attempt, and also -what advantages or disadvantages the occupation of Norway—that is, of -the Norwegian coast and the Norwegian bases—by our forces would have. - -Up until that point I had not concerned myself with the Norwegian -question at all, except for the fact I had received these reports. The -arrival of this letter at the end of September or the beginning of -October, it must have been about then, impelled me to show it to the -Chief of Staff of the SKL and to instruct him to deal with all dispatch -with the question of the occupation of Norwegian bases by England, and -the other questions which Admiral Carls had dealt with, and to have the -questions discussed in the SKL. The advantages and disadvantages of an -expansion of the war towards the North had to be considered, not only of -an expansion on our part but, above all, an expansion on the part of -England; what value, what advantage would accrue to us if we acted -first; what disadvantages would result if we had to defend the Norwegian -coast? - -The result of this was the questionnaire mentioned in C-122, GB-82, -where the questions were asked: What places were to be used as bases; -what the possibility of defense by us would be; whether these ports -would have to be developed further; and also, what advantages would -result so far as our U-boats were concerned? - -These questions, as I have already stated, were put to Admiral Dönitz as -well, but his answers arrived only after I had made the report on 10 -October. I would like to say, by way of introduction, that it was -entirely clear to me that if we undertook to occupy these bases we would -violate neutrality. But I also knew of the agreement which existed -between the German and Norwegian Governments of 2 September regarding -neutrality, and I knew the concluding sentence, in this _aide memoire_, -which is Document TC-31, GB-79, dated 2 September 1939. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, but I should like to point out, Mr. -President, that this document is found in the Document Book of the -British Delegation 10a, at Page 330. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You have that document before you? - -RAEDER: Yes, I have it before me, and I would like to quote the -concluding sentence. - -DR. SIEMERS: It is the last document in the book, Your Honor, at Page -329. - -RAEDER: [_Continuing._] The last sentence: - - “Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government change so - that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the - Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard - the interests of the Reich in such a way as would be forced upon - the Reich Cabinet by the resulting situation.” - -Then, within the next few days, I asked the Chief of Staff of the SKL to -submit to me the data which the SKL had prepared during the preceding -days and I reported to Hitler on 10 October, because I considered this -problem particularly important. It was entirely clear to me that the -best possible solution for us would be that Norway should maintain a -steadfast neutrality, and I expressed my opinion, as may be seen in -Document C-21, GB-194. - -This is an extract from the War Diary of the SKL. - -DR. SIEMERS: It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, -Page 6. - -RAEDER: It says here, on Page 3 of the German version, the next but last -paragraph, under the date of 13 January: “Situation discussion with the -Chief of the SKL.” - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. C-21 was not entirely -translated by the Prosecution. This document may be found in my document -book under Exhibit Number Raeder-69, and I should like to submit it -herewith. It is in Document Book 3, Page 62. - -THE PRESIDENT: Document Book 3 only goes to 64, is that not right? It -must be Document Book 4. - -DR. SIEMERS: There must be a mistake in the document book then. At -first, due to an oversight, the table of contents was only completed as -far as 64 by the Translation Section, but since that time it has been -corrected and supplemented. It is in Document Book 4, Page 317. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Page 317, at the top. - -DR. SIEMERS: [_Turning to the defendant._] Please comment on this -document. - -RAEDER: In the next but last paragraph, it says: - - “In complete agreement with this point of view, the Chief of the - Naval Operations Staff is therefore also of the opinion that the - most favorable solution would doubtless be the maintenance of - the present situation which, if strictest neutrality is - exercised by Norway, will permit the safe use of Norwegian - territorial waters for the shipping vital to Germany’s war - effort without the attempt being made on the part of England to - seriously endanger this sea lane.” (Document Number Raeder-69) - -I maintained this point of view when reporting to Hitler. In that report -I first mentioned the intelligence reports which we had at hand. Then I -described the dangers which might result to us from a British occupation -of bases on the Norwegian coast and might affect our entire warfare, -dangers which I considered tremendous. I had the feeling that such an -occupation would gravely prejudice and imperil the whole conduct of our -war. - -If the British occupied bases in Norway, especially in the South of -Norway, they would be able to dominate the entrance to the Baltic Sea -from those points, and also flank our naval operations from the -Helgoland Bight and from the Elbe, Jade and Weser. The second outlet -which we had was also gravely imperiled, affecting the operations of -battleships as well as the courses of our merchantmen. - -In addition to that, from their air bases in Norway, they might endanger -our air operations, the operations of our pilots for reconnaissance in -the North Sea or for attacks against England. - -Furthermore, from Norway they could exert strong pressure on Sweden, and -that pressure would have been felt in this respect, that the supplies of -ore from Sweden would have been hindered or stopped by purely political -pressure. Finally, the export of ore from Narvik to Germany could have -been stopped entirely, and it is known how much Germany depended on -supplies of ore from Sweden and Norway. They might even have gone so -far—and we learned about this subsequently that such plans were -discussed—as to attack and destroy the ore deposits at Lulea, or to -seize them. - -All of these dangers might become decisive factors in the outcome of the -war. Aside from the fact that I told Hitler that the best thing for us -would be to have strict neutrality on the part of Norway, I also called -his attention to the dangers which would result to us from an occupation -of the Norwegian coast and Norwegian bases, for there would have been -lively naval operations near the Norwegian coast in which the British, -even after our occupation of bases, would try to hamper our ore traffic -from Narvik. A struggle might ensue which we, with our inadequate supply -of surface vessels, would be unable to cope with in the long run. - -Therefore, at that time I did not make any proposal that we should -occupy Norway or that we should obtain bases in Norway. I only did my -duty in telling the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht about this grave -danger which was threatening us, and against which we might have to use -emergency measures for our defense. I also pointed out to him that -possible operations for the occupation of Norwegian bases might be very -expensive for us. In the course of later discussions I told him that we -might even lose our entire fleet. I would consider it a favorable case -if we were to lose only one-third, something which actually did happen -later on. - -There was, therefore, no reason for me to expect that I would gain -prestige by such an enterprise—I have been accused of this ambition by -the Prosecution. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite might easily -result. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the -fact that these things may be seen in documents which date from the time -of the war, one of which is Exhibit Number Raeder-69, of 13 January -1940, which has just been handed over. This document is a study, and it -is claimed that this study is based on the consideration that if England -were to have the bases in Norway, the situation would be impossible for -the conduct of the war by Germany and such a situation could be -prevented only if we forestalled England by occupying Norway ourselves. -What the witness has just said is stated in exactly the same way in the -War Diary. - -In the same connection, I should like to refer to the document of the -Prosecution, Document C-66, GB-81, which may be found in British -Document Book 10a, Page 35. This document is dated 10 January 1944. May -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the fact that there, under -the code name “Weserübung” (Weser Maneuver)—that was the name covering -this action—the substance of the statements the witness has just made -is to be found. I do not wish to read all of them since we would lose -valuable time thereby. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean C-66? That is about the Plan Barbarossa. Is that -the one you mean? - -DR. SIEMERS: The last page, under the heading “Weserübung,” Page 39 of -the English document book. Mention is made there of the letter by -Admiral Carls, spoken of by the witness, and of his thoughts in -connection with this matter. In the German original there is the -heading, “Appendix 2.” - -A clearer version is found in Document Raeder-69, since that dates from -January 1940, 3 months later, and in the meantime new reports had come -in. This, on the other hand, is a description dating from October 1939. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, I must once more refer to -Document C-122, which you have already mentioned. - -The Prosecution, in that document, accuses you of saying: - - “The Chief of SKL deems it necessary to tell the Führer as soon - as possible of the ideas of the SKL on the possibility of - expanding the sphere of operations in the North.” - -They think they may conclude therefrom that your primary thought was to -expand the operational sphere of the Navy. - -RAEDER: I have already said that by the possibility of expansion of the -operational zone to the North I meant an expansion of British operations -and its consequences, and also the possibility of our forestalling this, -thus gaining bases which would be of certain importance to us. - -DR. SIEMERS: What did Hitler reply at this discussion on 10 October -1939? - -RAEDER: Hitler had not yet concerned himself with this question. The -question was very far from his mind, for he knew very little about -matters of naval warfare. He always remarked that he did not have an -over-all picture of these things, and therefore felt somewhat uncertain. -He said that he would deal with this question and that I should leave -the notes with him, which I had worked out on the basis of statements -made by the SKL, so that he might use them as a basis for his -deliberations on this problem. - -It was typical and really speaks very much against the character of the -conspiracy, that on this occasion Hitler, when confronted with the -problem of Norway, did not say a single word about the fact that -previously, the last time evidently in the summer of that year, he had -already dealt with Norwegian questions prompted by Rosenberg. I gather -from a document which I saw for the first time here that on 20 June -1939, Rosenberg had submitted to the Führer a comprehensive report about -his connections with Norwegian political circles, but I heard of these -connections for the first time on 11 December. - -It would have been a matter of course for me if the Führer, who was -dealing with Norwegian strategical matters, had told me on this -occasion: “I have such and such information about Norwegian matters.” -But he did not do that—there was always a considerable lack of -collaboration. The Führer told me that we should await the arrival of -further reports and that he would deal with these questions. - -DR. SIEMERS: In the subsequent period of October and November, up until -11 December, did you discuss this question with Hitler again? - -RAEDER: No, the question was not discussed at all during those months, -but in September Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, who had first been -appointed assistant attaché in Oslo and later, naval attaché, gave me -further reports at that time about conditions in Norway, and so did the -intelligence service. He told me of reports which were circulating there -about a possible British landing. Later on Kapitän Schreiber was -actually my chief collaborator in these Norwegian problems, and he -showed a particular understanding of the whole situation. - -DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to submit to the Tribunal -Exhibit Raeder-107, an affidavit of the naval attaché who has just been -mentioned, Richard Schreiber. This may be found in my Document Book 5, -Page 464. - -According to that document, Schreiber was drafted on 7 September 1939 as -a reserve officer and was sent to Oslo as a naval attaché. He states -that he held that post there since the autumn of 1939. - -With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read a portion of -this, under I, on Page 465, at the bottom. - -THE PRESIDENT: We told you that we had read all these documents which -were objected to. We let in this document, so it is not necessary for -you to read it again. - -DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then in this connection, may I refer to the -first part of this affidavit, Part I? - -Mr. President, I should like to point out a small but misleading error -in translation on Page 466. In the second paragraph, second line, the -word “deutsch,” (German) is missing: “...there were clear directives of -the German Foreign Office that Norwegian neutrality should be -particularly respected by the Germans...” In the English text it says: -“of the Foreign Office.” It should read “of the German Foreign Office.” -I should be very grateful if this mistake would be rectified. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, you know the affidavit given by -Schreiber? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Different reports are contained therein. You have already -referred to them in part. Did any additional special reports come in -during those 2 months? Was Narvik mentioned in addition to the other -ports already mentioned? - -RAEDER: As far as I remember it was Kapitän Schreiber who expressly -mentioned Narvik for the first time. Kapitän Schreiber had very quickly -made himself acquainted with conditions there. He had established good -connections in Norwegian circles. A confirmation of all that I had known -up to that point came on 11 December. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now, would you please describe your meeting with Quisling -on 11 December 1939? - -RAEDER: May I first ask whether the Documents 004-PS and 007-PS, which I -believe were submitted by the Prosecution, may be used in this -connection? For example, the minutes of the conference of 11 and 12 -December, an accompanying letter by Rosenberg referring to these -minutes, and similar matters? - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I believe that you will be permitted to use these -documents. But since they are known you only need to mention the points -that you remember. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: On this occasion I should merely like to ask whether you -did not know the documents by Rosenberg, 004-PS and 007-PS? - -RAEDER: No, I did not know those documents. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you see them for the first time here? - -RAEDER: I saw them for the first time here. But the reports contained in -these documents were already known to us at that time as is proved by -the dates of the documents. - -DR. SIEMERS: Please tell us only what you heard at that time from -Quisling. - -RAEDER: Up until 11 December I had neither connections with Herr -Rosenberg—except for the fact that I had seen him on occasion—nor, -above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about whom I had -heard nothing up to that time. - -On 11 December my Chief of Staff, Schulte-Mönting, reported to me that -Major Quisling, a former Norwegian Minister of War, had arrived from -Oslo. He was asking for an interview with me through a Herr Hagelin, -because he wished to tell me about Norwegian conditions. - -Herr Hagelin had been sent to my chief of staff by Herr Rosenberg. -Rosenberg had already known Hagelin for some time as I have mentioned -before. Since reports from such a source on Norwegian conditions seemed -to be of great value to me, I declared myself ready to receive Herr -Quisling. - -He arrived on the same morning and reported to me at length about the -conditions in Norway, with special reference to the relations of the -Norwegian Government to England and the reports on the intention of -England to land in Norway, and he characterized the whole situation as -especially critical for, according to his reports, the danger seemed to -be imminent. He tried to fix a date. He thought it should occur before -10 January, because then a favorable political situation would arise. - -I told him that I was not really concerned with the political situation, -but I would try to arrange to have him give his information to the -Führer. I would be concerned only with the military and strategic -situation, and in that connection I could tell him right away that it -would not be possible to take any measures from 11 December until 10 -January, first because the time was too short and secondly because it -was winter. - -I considered his expositions to be of such importance that I told him I -would try to arrange for him to report to the Führer personally, so that -these reports would reach and influence him directly. - -Then on the 12th—that is on the next day—I went to Hitler and informed -him of the conversation between Quisling and me, and I asked him to -receive Quisling personally so that he might have a personal impression -of Quisling. On this occasion I told him—and this is written down in -one of the documents—that in cases of this kind one would have to be -especially cautious, since one could not know to what degree such a -party leader would try to further the interest of his party. Therefore -our investigations would have to be especially careful. And I again -called the attention of the Führer to the fact that an attempt to occupy -Norway would bring with it greatest risks as well as certain -disadvantages for the future situation. In other words, I carefully -presented both sides of the picture in a neutral manner. - -Hitler then decided to receive Quisling together with Hagelin on one of -the following days. The two gentlemen then were obviously in touch with -Rosenberg. I believe they stayed with him, and Rosenberg sent me, by -letter, a record of a meeting which had apparently been drawn up by -Quisling and Hagelin and also a description of Quisling’s personality. - -In this letter, which is here as a document but which was not read by -the Prosecution, it says specifically that Rosenberg knew what the -political conditions were but that, of course, he would have to leave -the military side entirely to me since I was the competent authority on -that. - -DR. SIEMERS: If it please the High Tribunal, in this connection I would -like to submit Exhibit Raeder-67, to be found in my Document Book 4, -Page 309. That is the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder dated 13 December -1939, which was not mentioned by the Prosecution. The Prosecution merely -mentioned the appendix mentioned in the letter—that is, a note by -Rosenberg, under Number C-65, the same as GB-85. According to its -contents C-65 belongs to Exhibit Raeder-67. - -THE PRESIDENT: You say there was another besides Raeder-67 which you -were referring to? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes; I am referring to Raeder-67. - -THE PRESIDENT: I got that. But you said some other document as well. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the document submitted by the Prosecution, C-65, and -that is an appendix to this letter; the two belong together. The latter -document, C-65, is to be found in the Document Book of the British -Delegation 10a, Page 33. If these two documents are taken together, it -can be seen that the political side is not mentioned in either document; -and this explains what the witness meant when he said that he was not -concerned with the political side of the question but only with the -military side. It is for that reason that Rosenberg had sent it to him. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think it would be a good time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the case of the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart, counsel and representatives of the Prosecution have been -conferring with respect to his application for documents. We have agreed -on a great number, but there are 20 upon which we are unable to agree. - -THE PRESIDENT: 20? - -MR. DODD: 20. I think we could do it in 30 minutes if the Tribunal will -set some time aside; it might take a little more. Sir David has reminded -me that the translators are waiting on us to go ahead with their -translation work. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think the best thing would be to take it -tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock. - -MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. It has been suggested also that the -case of Seyss-Inquart precede that of Defendant Von Papen. I understand -that is the wish of the counsel, and it is very satisfactory to us as -well. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. SIEMERS: We have to refer briefly to Document 1809-PS, the Diary of -Generaloberst Jodl. It is GB-88 in the Document Book of the British -Delegation 10a, Page 289. - -May I first ask when were the plans for the occupation of Norway -drafted? - -RAEDER: I may say that on the basis of the conference which Quisling had -with the Führer in my presence on 14 December the Führer ordered the OKW -to deal with the matter and study it. The Führer had two more -conferences with Quisling on 16 and 18 December at which I was not -present. The matter was then handled by the OKW according to the -directives and an initial plan known as “North” was drafted. Document -C-21, which I have mentioned before, shows that this Plan North was -received by SKL on 13 January and then, in the course of January, the -date 27 January was mentioned, the draft of a directive for the Plan -North was made. That draft was made in the OKW in the usual way. Kapitän -zur See Krancke as expert for the Navy took part in it. The directive -was completed on 1 March 1940, and was issued to the three branches of -the Armed Forces. In the meantime, a large number of reports had been -received, and it was possible to use these as a basis for the drafting -of the directive. These reports besides coming from Kapitän Schreiber -now also came direct from Quisling, who sent them to the Führer. They -mentioned the preparatory work carried out by the English and the -French—special mention was made of the Navy Attaché Kermarrec—in -Norwegian ports for finding out the possibilities of landing, -measurements of quays, and the height of the bridges between Narvik and -the Swedish border and similar things. - -These reports which reached us showed clearly that within a reasonable -time a landing was intended. Also political reports reached us which -Hagelin received through his connections in Norwegian circles, reports -which in part came directly from members of the Storting—and from -members of the Government and their entourage. - -All of these reports confirmed that the pretext of aid for Finland in -the dispute between Finland and Russia played a certain role. The danger -was discussed that England under pretext of aid for Finland would -proceed to a bloodless occupation of Norway. The directive for the case -Norway, therefore, was issued on 1 March. In the further course of the -month of March more reports were received. In the meantime, the -_Altmark_ incident had occurred, and it was observed by Hagelin too that -the behavior of the Norwegian commander was a pretense, and it was clear -that in the case of any encroachment on the part of Great Britain, the -Norwegian Government would protest only on paper. - -DR. SIEMERS: You said just now the directive is dated 1 March. This is -correct. The Prosecution submitted a quotation of 5 March from Document -1809-PS. That is an entry in Jodl’s Diary: “1500 hours big conference -with the three commanders-in-chief regarding Weserübung. Field Marshal, -having no knowledge about plans, is furious.” How is it possible, -Admiral, that Reich Marshal Göring had not been consulted at a time when -the directive was already issued? - -RAEDER: I cannot explain that at all. I had no authority to speak about -it and I cannot say why he was not consulted. - -DR. SIEMERS: It is in the nature of conspiracy that the second man in -the Reich would be informed about it from the beginning. Has he not ever -spoken to you about that matter? - -RAEDER: No, not that I remember, but that shows how little, especially -in the Führer’s entourage, one can speak of a conspiracy. The Foreign -Minister, Von Ribbentrop, also was not present during any of the -Quisling conferences or receptions and I had no authority, to speak to -him about these matters. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to know your position regarding Jodl’s -entry of 13 March, in which he stated: “Führer does not give the order -for ‘W’ (Weserübung). He is still trying to find a justification.” - -I ask you to explain these words to us as you understand them. - -RAEDER: Yes. The English translation as far as I can remember says -“Looking for an excuse.” But he needed neither justification nor excuse, -because in the first paragraph of the directive of 1 March—that is to -say, 2 weeks before that—he had stated what circumstances made it -necessary to occupy Norway and Denmark with certain forces of the -Wehrmacht. British encroachments in Scandinavia and the Baltic were to -be prevented thereby, our ore deposits in Sweden safeguarded, and the -bases against England for the Navy and the Air Force were to be -expanded. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that is the Document C-174; -that is, GB-89, Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 113. -That is the directive for case “Weserübung” of 1 March 1940, which as -the witness has mentioned, already contains the justification for it. - -May it please the Tribunal, to prove that the information received by -the witness through the intelligence service of Admiral Canaris, through -Kapitän Schreiber and so on, is objective and in agreement with facts, -may I be permitted to submit several documents—and that Exhibit Number -Raeder-75 from the _White Book_ dated 17 February 1940, which mentions -the landing of British troops in Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik, and -several appendices to it, which show the trends of thoughts at that time -in regard to the Swedish ore; Document Exhibit Raeder-77... - -THE PRESIDENT: This is 75, Pages 43 and 44? - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Not page, but Exhibit Raeder-75. It is -Page 340. Document Book 4. - -Then Exhibit Number Raeder-77, also from the _White Book_: “The French -Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs Daladier to the French -Ambassador in London, Corbin.” - -In Document Book 4, Page 352. I have seen that there is a mistake in the -English document book. On Page 353 the heading is missing or rather on -Page 354. I may point out that this document bears the date 21 February -1940. That is contained in the original document under the heading -“Intervention in Scandinavia.” It concerns the occupation of the most -important Norwegian ports, _et cetera_, and mentions again the question -of the Swedish ore. - -Then I come to the Document Exhibit Raeder-78; Document Book 4, Page -357, an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff of 4 -March in which in connection with the case of the _Altmark_ it is -explained that a defense by Norway against British military action is -not possible. - -Then Exhibit Raeder-79, Document Book 4, Page 359, note by the -Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin. Here also there -is a mistake in the translation. The heading of the document was omitted -on Page 360. I would be grateful if the Tribunal would note that the -original document bears the date 10 March 1940. It is top secret and is -based on the fact that the general plan for armed intervention in -Finland existed since 16 January and therefore as a precautionary -measure the ports and airfields on the Norwegian coast should be -occupied. I refer to the remaining contents of document. - -Then may I submit Exhibit Number Raeder-80, a report about negotiations -of the Scandinavian Commission of the Inter-Allied Military Study -Commission of 11 March 1940, top secret, concerning landing at Narvik. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Then, Admiral, we are finished with -Norway. I believe you said already that the reports increased -considerably in the month of March. When did Hitler give the final order -for the occupation? - -RAEDER: At the end of March or beginning of April. I cannot recall the -exact date. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient. - -RAEDER: May I also mention a particularly important report which I -remember now. Quisling reported in February that Lord Halifax had told -the Norwegian Ambassador in London that an operation on the part of the -British for the acquisition of bases in Norway was planned for the near -future. That report also reached us at that time. I should like to add, -as I emphasized before, that being fully conscious of my responsibility -I always tried to show the Führer both sides of the picture and that the -Führer would have to be guided by my documentary proof when deciding, to -take or refrain from taking that tremendous step. But that does not mean -to say that because I pointed out to my Supreme Commander of the Armed -Forces that particular danger, I in any way decline to accept -responsibility. Of course, I am in some measure responsible for the -whole thing. Moreover, I have been accused because in a letter submitted -here under C-155 I had told my officers’ corps that I was proud of the -way in which this extraordinarily dangerous enterprise had been -executed. I should like to confirm this, because I believe I was -entitled to be proud that the Navy had carried out that operation with -such limited means and in the face of the entire British fleet; I still -stick to that. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did reports reach the SKL in March about violations of the -neutrality of Norway? That is incidents in territorial waters? - -RAEDER: Yes. In the second half of March repeated attacks were made by -British planes and naval forces against our merchant ships bringing the -Swedish ore down from Narvik. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection may I submit some more -documents? Exhibit Raeder-81, Document Book 5, Page 372, War Diary of -the Naval Operations Staff which contains several entries showing that -towards the end these incidents became more and more frequent and that -the Norwegian neutrality was violated by British air and naval forces. -As that document is known there is no need to read anything from it. - -Then Exhibit Raeder-82 in Document Book 5, Page 377, also War Diary of -27 March, also concerning violations of neutrality. Furthermore, Exhibit -Raeder-83, Page 379, a draft resolution of the sixth session of the -Supreme Council, dated 28 March 1940, which was already mentioned -yesterday. It deals with vital interests from the standpoint of -international law and with the laying of mines in territorial waters on -5 April. - -Then Exhibit Raeder-84, Page 384, and Exhibit Raeder-85, Page 386, both -of which are documents from the _White Book_. May I only point out that -it mentions that the first transport is to leave on J.1. day, that is -actually on 5 April; in other words, 4 days before the occupation by -Germany. - -Exhibit Raeder-86 is an excerpt from the War Diary, of which I ask you -to take official notice and which concerns the chartering by England of -90 percent of the Norwegian tankers. - -To conclude Norway, may I ask you to look at two Documents, C-151 and -C-115. Those are Exhibits GB-91 and GB-90, respectively, Document Book -of the British Delegation 10a, on Pages 106 and 62. The dates are 30 -March 1940 and 4 April 1940. The documents show that the ships which -were to carry out the landing should carry the British flag for -camouflage reasons. The Prosecution uses that document also to support -its accusation. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] What do you say about it? - -RAEDER: That is quite a regular ruse of war, that warships carry a -foreign flag. A requisite for the legality of that act, however, is that -at the moment of an enemy action, the moment fire is opened, their own -flag must be hoisted in time. That has always been done in the German -Navy, especially in the case of our auxiliary cruisers, which frequently -sailed under a foreign flag in order to avoid being reported by merchant -ships, but which always lowered that flag in time. That is a matter of -honor. It must be added that in this case, as the War Diary shows... - -DR. SIEMERS: 8 April. - -RAEDER: ...that on 8 April, on account of certain considerations, we -rescinded that order, because we had the report that an English action -was under way, and we feared that complications would arise from that. -So this order was not carried out in the long run. I believe the -document can be found which contains that. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I submit, in this connection, Exhibit Number -Raeder-89 (Document Raeder-89), Document Book 5, Page 400, where we find -under 8 April: “The previous order is rescinded, the British flag is not -to be used.” - -RAEDER: You also asked about Document C-115, which says that the -blockade runners camouflaged as merchant ships with dimmed lights should -enter Oslo Fjord unobtrusively. This too is quite a regular ruse of war -against which, from the legal point of view, no objection can be made. -Likewise there is nothing to be said against English names given in -answer to signals of identity. - -I did not finish answering one question because I was interrupted. That -was the question concerning the expression “justification” or “excuse” -in the War Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. As I have shown, it was not a -question of the justification, which had been expressed a long time -before by Hitler, but I believe that I am right in saying that the -question was that the diplomatic note which, at the moment of the -execution of the enterprise, had to be presented to the Norwegian and -Danish governments, giving the reason for his action, had not yet been -drafted, especially as he had not yet spoken to the Foreign Minister at -that time at all. The Foreign Minister received the information, as he -has said himself, only on 3 April. - -DR. SIEMERS: With this I should like to conclude the question of the -occupation of Norway. May I still submit the approved document, Exhibit -Raeder-66, which was approved for the purpose of argument? It is an -opinion expressed by Dr. Mosler, and it can be found in Document Book 4, -Page 291; and in this connection, concerning the use of flags, may I -draw special attention to Figure 7, Page 304, from which we may see the -legal reasoning. Furthermore, may I submit Exhibit Raeder-90, Document -Book 5, Page 402, and the series of documents as far as they are -approved: Exhibit Raeder-91, Admiral Darlan to the French War Minister -Daladier on 12 April 1940; Exhibit Raeder-92, Page 412. This document -contains the English-French note to the Norwegian Government of 8 April -1940. I have submitted that document because this note expresses the -same legal points of view as expressed in the legal opinion of Dr. -Mosler. - -Exhibit Number Raeder-97 and Exhibit Number Raeder-98: Number 97 -concerns the _White Book_ and the planning of 7 February 1940, -concerning the Allied bases in Norway; and Number 98 is an excerpt from -the War Diary concerning the orders which, at the time of the occupation -of Norway, were found and from which it could be seen that an English -landing was imminent and the so-called plan under the camouflage name -“Stratford Plan,” which was prepared by the British Admiralty. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Concerning Norway, may I ask you the -following: During and after the occupation did you intervene to see that -the Norwegian population was treated decently, and what was your view of -the political question in Norway with regard to the attitude of Germany -to Norway? - -RAEDER: From the very beginning I was for good treatment of the -Norwegian population. I knew that Hitler had given Gauleiter Terboven, -whom he had unfortunately appointed Reich Commissioner for Norway and to -whom he had entrusted the civil administration, instructions that he, -Terboven, should bring the Norwegian people to him; that is to say, make -them favorably disposed, and that he had the intention, finally, to -maintain Norway as a sovereign state in a North Germanic Empire. - -Terboven was opposed to that. He treated the Norwegian population in a -very unfriendly manner, and by his treatment he actually sabotaged the -aims of Hitler. In close understanding with Admiral Böhm, who became the -naval commander in Norway and who had taken Kapitän Schreiber, the -former attaché, on his staff as liaison officer to the Norwegian -population, I tried to counteract these intentions of Terboven. On the -basis of the reports of Admiral Böhm I repeatedly approached the Führer -and told him that with Terboven he would never achieve his purpose. The -Führer designated Quisling chief of the Government. I cannot remember -exactly when he became Minister President, but Terboven also sabotaged -Quisling in his activities by making it extremely difficult for him, and -even discredited him among the population. Terboven’s chief reason was, -in my opinion, that he wanted to remain Gauleiter of Norway. All our -endeavors were unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that Admiral Böhm -tried very hard to achieve with the help of the Navy what Hitler had -expected, that is, to win over the Norwegian people. - -I did not understand how on the one side one wanted to gain the sympathy -of the Norwegians and on the other hand one sabotaged Hitler’s -intentions. - -That went on until 1942, at which time Böhm made a final report to me, -in which he explained that things could not go on like that, and that -Hitler’s intentions would never be realized. I submitted that report to -Hitler, but since it did not bring about any change—it was in the late -autumn of 1942—this failure of mine became one of the reasons which -finally led to my retirement. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you ask Hitler specifically to dismiss Terboven? - -RAEDER: Several times. And I suggested that he should appoint General -Admiral Böhm as commander of the armed forces for Norway and give him -far-reaching powers so that he could carry out his—Hitler’s—aims. I -suggested that the Führer should as soon as possible conclude a peace -with Norway because only in that way could he bring about co-operation -between Norway and Germany and make the population turn to him. I told -him the attempts of sabotage by the Norwegian emigrants would lose their -meaning and cease and that possibly the Norwegian emigrants who were -leaning toward England at that time could be induced to return, because -they might be afraid that they might “miss the bus”; especially from the -point of view of economic advantages. The task of defending Norway would -be considerably easier if a state of peace could be brought about. - -DR. SIEMERS: In conclusion, may I refer to Exhibit Raeder-107 which is -already known to the Tribunal. It is the affidavit by Schreiber under -Roman Numeral II. There Schreiber has mentioned in detail the utmost -endeavors of the Navy to prevent the regrettable terror regime of -Terboven and explained that Raeder, for the last time in 1942, used all -his efforts to get Hitler to conclude a peace between Norway and -Germany. I believe that the Navy had a good reputation in Norway, that I -can assume this is historically known without my having to prove it. To -be on the safe side I applied for a witness, but consent was not given. - -May I also submit Exhibit Raeder-108 (Document Raeder-108), Document -Book 6, Page 473, a letter from Raeder to Admiral Böhm of 23 October -1942. Raeder writes: - - “To my regret I have to send you enclosed, for your personal - information, a letter from Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to Prime - Minister Quisling.” - -On Page 476 there is the letter from Lammers to Quisling which says—I -quote only one sentence: - - “The Führer, therefore, desires that during the war there shall - be no conferences or discussions concerning a final or a - preliminary peace between the Greater German Reich and Norway, - or concerning other measures fixing or anticipating Norway’s - position to the Reich after the end of the war.” - -This is the letter which the witness mentioned, which finally brought to -nought all his endeavors and those of Admiral Böhm. - -Admiral, you had little to do with France, and therefore we can be very -brief. May I merely ask you, did you attempt at any time to influence -the political relations between Germany and France? - -RAEDER: This influence, when there was any, was in the first place -directed as much as possible towards improving the defense of the -country. In the second place, there were above all humanitarian reasons. -I often visited naval and submarine bases in France. During these -journeys I got some knowledge of conditions in France. I saw that in -1940 and still in 1941 the population lived just as if it were at peace, -completely undisturbed. Consequently I believed, since the Führer had -shown so much moderation on the occasion of the Armistice, that a basis -could be found which would draw France—whose government was after all -collaborationist—closer to us. - -I was informed that Laval was really sincere in his opinion that only -co-operation between France and Germany could guarantee a lasting peace -in Europe for the future. Therefore I suggested to him whether he -himself could not try to do something in that direction. He did not -intend to do this, and I referred to it again when I heard that Admiral -Darlan was trying to work more closely with our naval commander in -France, Admiral Schultze. That was first achieved in the field of -intelligence, where his services were very useful to us. - -At the end of the year 1941 he mentioned that he would like to speak to -me. Admiral Schultze reported that to me and I told Hitler about it and -recommended such a conversation because I thought Lt would do some good. - -DR. SIEMERS: It would do what? - -RAEDER: That it might bring some advantage. The Führer approved this -meeting and instructed me as to his views. The meeting took place near -Paris on the occasion of an official trip which I made to the French -bases at the end of January or beginning of February 1942. I had the -impression that the meeting was very satisfactory, inasmuch as Darlan -was of the opinion that a peace would be of advantage to both nations -and he also appeared to be inclined to co-operate. He stressed, however, -that the whole political situation would have to be settled before peace -could be concluded. I also showed that I was prepared to meet him -concerning the negotiations with the Armistice Commission with respect -to heavy guns for big French ships. I reported to the Führer on the -results of the meeting. But in this case too the Führer was again -hesitant and did not want to make a decision. He said he had to see -first how the war went before he could decide upon his final attitude -toward France. Besides, that would be a precedent which might have an -effect on other nations. So that also was a failure. I did not obtain -the relief in the defense of France which I had hoped for and so, in the -case of France, this failure was the second reason which contributed -later to my asking for my release, because I could not carry my plans -through. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the next subject where accusations are made -against you, and that is Russia. When did you hear for the first time -that Hitler intended to wage war against Russia, although he had -concluded a Nonaggression Pact with Russia? - -RAEDER: May I first remind you that in the summer of 1940, that is to -say, July, August, and September, we in the Navy were very much occupied -with preparations for a landing in England; therefore it never entered -our heads that there could be any plans for action in another direction. -In August I heard from some Army office, possibly that of the -Commander-in-Chief, that considerable troop transports were going to the -East. I asked Hitler what that meant and he told me it was a grandiose -camouflage for his intentions to invade England. He knew that I would be -against it right away if he were to speak about an enterprise against -Russia. In September—I cannot recall the date exactly—he finally -admitted to me that he had certain intentions against Russia. In -September I reported to him at least twice, my more important report was -26 September, when I did everything I could to dissuade him from any -undertaking against Russia. In that report which I made in the presence -of Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl I emphasized -particularly the strategic military side; first, because I could do that -in all clarity in the presence of other people, and then because I -assumed that such military reasons, that is, the possibility of failure -of an operation against Russia at a time when the struggle was on -against England, would impress him and dissuade him from that plan. On -26 September, after making this official report, I asked for a personal -conference alone with Hitler. Keitel and Jodl can testify that I always -did this when I wanted to discuss something particularly important with -the Führer, where I had to go beyond the conventional procedure and -which I could only do if nobody else was present. One could tell Hitler -a lot of things if one was alone with him, but one could not make any -such statements in a larger group. Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel -General Jodl know that very well, particularly well, because they were -the ones who in such cases always had to leave the room. On that -occasion I gave Hitler my views in detail; first, that it was not -possible to break the pact with Russia, that it would be morally wrong, -that it would serve no purpose because the pact gave us great advantages -and was a basis for a sound policy for Germany later on. Then I told him -that under no circumstances could he start a two-front war, as it was he -who had always emphasized that he would not repeat the stupidity of the -government of 1914 and that, in my opinion, it could never be justified. -Then I put to him again the difference of the forces on each side, the -absolute necessity for the Navy to concentrate on the war against -England and particularly at that moment when all resources were strained -to the utmost to carry out the invasion. - -On that day I had the impression that Hitler was inclined to listen to -my argument because later, or the next day, the naval adjutant, Kapitän -Von Puttkamer, reported to me that Hitler had spoken in very much the -same vein as I had spoken, and had appreciated my argument. - -That went on for several months. I presented many such reports, -returning always with the same arguments. I believed again in November -that I had been successful. To my utter surprise, however, on 18 -December, Directive Number 21 (Barbarossa) came out, which dealt with -the case of a war with the Soviet Union before the termination of the -war against England. It is true, of course, that it was a directive for -an eventuality. It is Document 446-PS, USA-31, of 18 December 1940. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is in Document Book 10a, Page 247. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, the Prosecution asserted that the -Navy and you assisted in drawing up this directive. Is that correct? - -RAEDER: That is in no way correct. Such directives were drafted in the -OKW after the Führer had taken his political decision, in the Armed -Forces Operations Staff; and in that Armed Forces Operations Staff there -was also one naval officer and one or more Air Force officers who, under -the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, dealt with matters -concerning the Navy and Air Force when such directives were being -drafted. The directive then went to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed -Forces and they were ordered, for their part, to work out and present -suggestions for the execution of the orders of the Führer. They had no -influence on the directive itself and did not see it at all beforehand. - -May I add one more thing? I have been accused by the Prosecution that I -used my influence with the Führer not for moral and ethical reasons but -that I tried in a cynical way first to settle the account with England -and then to assail Russia. I have said before that I told all my reasons -to the Führer whenever I had the chance, but that I could not do that in -a public meeting or in the presence of other people, nor could I write -it down in my war diary, because the sharp words which fell there must -not become known to other people by means of the war diary. I want to -point to Document C-170, Exhibit USA-136, which dates from 23 August -1939 to 22 June 1941. It is a compilation of many excerpts from the War -Diary of the Naval Operations Staff—and from my minutes of conferences -with Hitler in which the Russian question was dealt with. This is not a -literal reproduction of my statements or word for word excerpts from the -War Diary, but it is a summary of excerpts by the naval archivist, -Admiral Assmann. I will not read details from these many entries, but I -should like to point out that precisely this document, C-170, shows in a -large number of entries contained therein that, since the beginning of -the war in 1939, I continuously used my influence with the Führer to -maintain good relations with Russia for the reasons which I have -previously mentioned. It would lead us too far if I were to start -quoting several entries here. But the document, I would like to -emphasize, is entirely convincing. - -DR. SIEMERS: You had nothing to do with the Directive 21, which is -signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl? - -RAEDER: Absolutely nothing. - -DR. SIEMERS: But following that, you made some preparations in -accordance with the directive? As they concerned the Navy they were in -any case not so important here. - -RAEDER: Yes. We had the first conference in January, as can be seen from -one of these entries in C-170. I had reported to the Führer on 4 -February about our intentions and in March the Navy began with certain -preparations. I have said already that the Navy throughout the first -period was hardly concerned with major operations, but only with the -cutting off of the Gulf of Finland by mines and light naval forces. I do -not know whether that is in Directive 21 or somewhere else but the -Führer, at my urgent request, had ordered that the center of gravity of -the naval warfare should still be in the direction of England. -Consequently, we could use only relatively small forces for the war -against Russia. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we had better break off now. - -The Tribunal rather understood that you hoped to finish by midday today. -We realize that you had 2 hours of today taken up with your documents, -but when do you think you will be able to finish now? - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe I will need only about three-quarters of an hour, -between half an hour and an hour. - -THE PRESIDENT: Tomorrow at 10 o’clock we shall deal with the documents -of Seyss-Inquart, and we are told that will only last 30 minutes. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 18 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD DAY - Saturday, 18 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the application for documents -of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, 87 documents altogether have been -submitted to the Prosecution, and we have gone over them in the German. -After numerous conferences with counsel for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, -we find we are unable to agree now on 17 of these documents. As of -yesterday the number was 20, as I so stated, but we have now reduced it -to 17. - -Document Number 5 in the defendant’s list is a copy of a resolution of -the German National Assembly on the 21st of February 1919, advocating -Anschluss between Austria and Germany. We have told counsel we object to -it as being really irrelevant here and immaterial. It is a resolution of -a German parliamentary body, and it doesn’t seem to us to make any -difference what they were thinking of Anschluss in 1919. - -Document Number 10 is an extract from a newspaper article published in -October 1945 and written by a man named Walford Selby. It is a critical -article criticizing the Treaty of St. Germain for not avoiding the -obliteration of the Austro-Hungarian economic entity, and it discusses -what it describes as the mistakes of 1919, and so on. We understand that -it is intended to explain, with other documents, the economic background -of the Anschluss movement. Whatever may be said for that type of proof, -there are at least five other documents on the same basis and we made no -objection to them. But we did feel that somewhere this sort of thing, -even if relevant, certainly became cumulative. Documents 7, 12, 26, and -33 are all on the same subject, the economic background of Anschluss, -and this is a long one. Therefore, we feel that it certainly is not -necessary, doesn’t add very much, merely creates a lot of paper work, -and is cumulative. - -Document Number 11 is a speech delivered by a Dr. Schober, giving the -area and population of the Republic of Austria. We haven’t any very -serious objection to this type of thing excepting that there probably -are better sources if the defendant wishes to establish the area and -population of Austria in 1921. Further, it seems to us that the Tribunal -could very well take judicial knowledge of the area and population of -Austria as of that date from reliable publications. - -Document Number 14 is a statement by the former Chancellor of Austria in -1922 to the effect that Austria belongs to Germany. Our objection is -again based on the cumulative feature of this document, because there -are at least three other documents with almost identical statements by -Dr. Renner to which we have made no objection. - -Document 19 is an extract from a book written by a man called -Kleinschmied, and the extract purports to show that a number of -politicians lived or prospered on the Anschluss movement in Austria. -That doesn’t seem to us to be very important here or likely to help the -Tribunal very much. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, what exactly does “lived from the propaganda” -mean? That they made their living by reason of propaganda, or what? - -MR. DODD: Yes. It purports to show that they made it a vehicle for -carrying on political activities, and made an issue of it and sustained -themselves politically. - -Number 21 is an extract from Kunschak’s book _Austria 1918-1934_, and it -gives the increase in the National Socialist votes in Austria between -1930 and 1932. That didn’t seem to us to be very material or very -helpful or likely to be helpful to the Tribunal. We objected to it on -the grounds that it was irrelevant and immaterial. - -Document Number 22 is an extract from an article in the _New Free Press_ -of August 1932, opposing the League of Nations loan. This again is -submitted to prove the flow or the continuity of the Anschluss movement. -There is at least one other document, Number 23, which purports to -establish the same principle on the same kind of proof. - -Number 27 is an extract from an article written by Martin Fuchs, “Un -Pacte avec Hitler,” and it discusses the Yugoslav policy with respect to -Anschluss between Germany and Austria. Again that doesn’t seem to the -Prosecution to have any direct bearing or any helpful bearing upon the -issues here, whatever the Yugoslavs thought about it. - -Number 31 is an extract from the _Neue Zeitung_ of the 11th of January -of this year wherein Gordon Walker states that the celebration in -Austria after the Anschluss was genuine. Well, that is Mr. Walker’s -opinion, and there is some other substantial opinion on the other side. -We doubt very much that his opinion is material here or competent. - -THE PRESIDENT: Who is he? - -MR. DODD: I understand he is a member of the Labor Party in Great -Britain, and a writer. - -Number 39 is an extract from the _Archiv_ of 1938. This sets forth a -statement made by Senator Borah, of the United States, that the -Anschluss was a natural and inevitable affair and had nothing to do with -the United States. This was not a speech made by the late Senator Borah -in the Senate; it was his own opinion, and it does not seem to us that -it would be very helpful. Some later opinions of Senator Borah were not -so helpful, and this doesn’t seem to be very likely to be helpful to the -Tribunal with respect to this issue. - -Number 47 is an extract from Zernatto’s book _The Truth about Austria_. -Zernatto was one of the State Under Secretaries of Austria, as the -Tribunal knows. He left the country after the Anschluss and went to the -United States and wrote this book. He makes a number of statements, I -might say, about the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. The Tribunal would be -interested in knowing that this Document 47, and Documents 48, 50, 54, -55, 60, and 61 are all extracts from the same book. Now, we felt that -wherever he reports a conversation with Seyss-Inquart, that would have -bearing and relevancy before the Court; but where he expresses his -opinion, we have more doubt about its relevancy. This one statement, -Number 47, seems to be his opinion. He doesn’t cite any conversation or -anything other than what appears to be his impression that Seyss-Inquart -disassociated himself from Leopold’s efforts. - -Now, we do not object to 48, and to 50, or to 54, because although we -originally thought we would object, on reviewing them they appeared to -set out actual conversations between Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart, and it -might be helpful to the Tribunal. Therefore, we do not object to the -next three. - -But 55, again, is a statement in Zernatto’s book that, in Zernatto’s -opinion, Seyss-Inquart was a figure on the chess board and was -double-crossed by the Nazi or new Party leadership. We object to that -for the reason that I have stated; it is the author’s opinion. He is -deceased, by the way, and is certainly not available. In any event, we -do not think his opinion can be very helpful. - -Number 60 is also a statement from Zernatto’s book and it sets out a -conversation with an unnamed Austrian Nazi. We felt that was altogether -too vague and would not be of value or helpful. In Number 61, again, the -author Zernatto expresses his opinion that Seyss-Inquart was afraid of -shouldering responsibility. I don’t want to stress our objections too -heavily to these extracts. I don’t think they are very harmful, -certainly, but I rather object because we would like to cut down some of -this printing, and I do not think they will be very helpful to -Seyss-Inquart. - -Number 68 is the first document on anti-Semitism, and it is an excerpt -from the publication entitled _The Elements of National Socialism_ by -Bishop Alois Hudal. It explains anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria; -and it goes on to discuss matters that the Tribunal has heard very much -about through other defendants, the disproportionate position of the -Jewish population in Germany, and so on. We object to it as not being -helpful and not material. - -Again 69 is another extract from Zernatto’s book on the causes, as some -of these people see it, of anti-Semitism. It is his opinion and does not -to us seem to be helpful or material here. Number 71 is on the Slovak -question. I doubt that there has been any serious claim made anywhere in -this case that at various times the Slovaks have not claimed autonomy. -This extract from the _Archiv_ of 1938, insofar as we can discover, -seeks to establish that they did want autonomy. Well, we don’t think -that is very important here, and it will not be helpful to the Tribunal -or to Seyss-Inquart. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it a document of state? - -MR. DODD: Well, it is a document from the _Archiv_, and in that sense it -is a public document. - -THE PRESIDENT: After Slovakia had been taken over by the Reich? - -MR. DODD: No, not afterwards, it’s in 1938, and it preceded the taking -over. - -THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes. - -MR. DODD: These are our objections, Mr. President. I do think we have -tried to be rather... - -THE PRESIDENT: Of course, Mr. Dodd, we are only considering now the -question of objections to translation. We are not considering the -question of admissibility, nor are we binding you not to object to them -after they have been translated. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I am aware of that, Mr. President. We tried to be, I -think, fairly generous about this list. The excerpts, or most of them, -are not too long. We did think we would have to call a halt somewhere, -and I do not think our 17 objections out of the 87 listed are very -strict or are pinching, really, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. - -DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Your -Lordship, High Tribunal, I know that you value my small country, -Austria, not only because of its ancient culture and its scenic beauty, -but also because it was the first country which lost its freedom through -Hitler. However, with all respect which you have for this country, I -cannot expect of you that, as representative of great powers, you know -the history of my country to the last detail. I do believe that it is of -the utmost importance for the defense of Seyss-Inquart that you -understand fully on the basis of what background and what motives this -man acted the way he did. - -I myself can see three reasons which led to the Anschluss. - -First of all, the desperate economic situation which runs like a red -thread from 1918 right up to—I am sorry to say—and through the year -1946. - -The second reason, and I shall be very brief with regard to the -documents... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, will you come to the actual documents as -soon as possible, because you will remember we are only discussing the -question of whether they should be translated or not. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. The second reason was the disunity of the -democratic parties. The third reason was the attitude of the surrounding -powers. From these points of view I have assembled my documents. - -The first document is a resolution of the Weimar National Assembly, and -I am of the point of view that it is important in respect to a final -judgment that the Anschluss was not only a wish of the Austrian -population, but an all-German postulate. It is very short and I request -that it be admitted. - -The second document is by Selby, who for many years was the British -Ambassador in Vienna, a genuine friend of our country. In this article -he refers to the economic background and conditions in Austria, which -led to the Anschluss. That was the reason for my including this -document. - -The next document is a speech delivered by Federal Chancellor Schober -who was held in great esteem by the world. In this speech he refers to -the fact that the burdens imposed on Austria are too great for her to -carry. He described the situation as a whole as a case of bankruptcy. - -The next document is a statement by the present Federal Minister, Dr. -Karl Renner, in 1922. At that time Dr. Seipel went to Geneva and with -great difficulty put through a loan at the League of Nations which was -of great importance to us because at the same time it was demanded of -Austria that we should forego independence for 10 years’ duration. That -meant that we were not to take any steps to change the conditions for an -Anschluss. Renner opposed Seipel in Parliament at that time. This -document is in no way cumulative to Document 33, since in Document 33 I -want merely to describe the economic situation as it obtained in the -year 1938. - -The next document is Point 2 of my evidence; namely, the strong -political propaganda for the Anschluss. In any event, I must dispute -most strongly the assertion that Document Number 21, which is very -short, is irrelevant. I consider it extremely important to prove that -this new, very young party, which grew in the fertile soil of a -desperate economic situation, increased tenfold, as far as the number of -votes was concerned, in the years 1930 to 1932; thus all the time there -existed a recognized political opposition to the government. - -The next Document, Number 22, is an article which again illustrates the -economic situation in Austria at a very essential period of history, -namely, the moment when Federal Chancellor Dollfuss went to Lausanne in -order to negotiate another loan from the League of Nations, and we again -were forced to suppress thoughts of an Anschluss for another 10 years. -This Document, Number 22, as well as the next one, Number 23, is not -cumulative, since the one shows the political and the other the economic -position of the members of Parliament with respect to the League of -Nations’ loan of the year 1932. - -The next document is only an extract from the views taken by the various -surrounding states to the Anschluss question. I selected only -Yugoslavia, for Yugoslavia was the country which most strongly supported -the idea of Anschluss in her foreign policy. - -As far as Document 31 is concerned, I should like to remark, -supplementing the remarks made by the Prosecution, that Gordon Walker is -not only a member of the Labor Party, but—and this point is much more -important—during the entire war years he was head of the British Radio -Division Austria, and he was himself in Austria in the year 1938 and he -witnessed the Anschluss. His judgment therefore is of extraordinary -importance since it is the judgment of a prominent foreigner. - -The same remark also applies to the following document, the statement by -Senator Borah who for 25 years was the Chairman of the American -Committee on Foreign Affairs. His opinion is surely deserving of notice. - -The next documents concern statements made by Dr. Zernatto. I should -like to add that Dr. Zernatto was Federal Minister, General. Secretary -of the Fatherland Front and Schuschnigg’s right-hand man during the -period of the Anschluss. He was one of the spiritual fathers of the -Schuschnigg plebiscite. I am sorry to say that he died an emigrant in -1940, and I cannot produce him as a witness here; but his book is a -document and actually tells what this man experienced in those critical -days. - -I urgently request that the remaining three documents, which are very -brief, be left in the book. - -The next two documents, which concern anti-Semitism, I included very -unwillingly in order to avoid any accusation of anti-Semitic propaganda. -I included them because in the trial brief my client is accused of being -a member of an anti-Semitic organization. This accusation is -unjustifiable insofar as more importance is attached to this -organization than it actually deserves. If this matter is not further -emphasized by the Prosecution, I shall not attach any particular -importance to these two documents myself. - -The last document which is being objected to, Number 71, contains the -Agreement of Pittsburgh which was concluded between Masaryk and Hlinka, -the Slovak leader, at which occasion Masaryk solemnly promised autonomy -to the Slovaks, a promise which was not kept according to the letter of -the agreement and which gave rise to a strong demand for autonomy in -Slovakia, which was supported by Hitler. For these reasons I ask that -this document also be approved. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal will consider the question -of these documents. - -Now, Dr. Siemers. - -[_The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand._] - -DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday in connection with -Norway I submitted on one occasion Documents 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, and 86. -I beg the Tribunal’s pardon, but I forgot to submit one document -pertinent to this matter, and I should like to remedy this omission. - -The document, which has already been granted me, is Exhibit Number -Raeder-88, which likewise is an extract from the _White Book_ and is -printed in my Document Book Number 5, on Pages 392 and following. This -document shows the British order of 6 April 1940, regarding the plans -for the occupation of northern Swedish ore fields, proceeding from -Narvik. - -Since the Tribunal is familiar with this document, it will not be -necessary for me to read from it. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, yesterday we had arrived at the -topic of Russia. You had answered my question regarding Directive Number -21, Document 446-PS, of 18 December 1940, to the effect that the Navy -had not worked on this directive. You further stated that the Navy -undertook preparations in January in accordance with the command. - -RAEDER: May I make a brief remark on this directive to the effect that -yesterday I believe you made a mistake when you said that this directive -was signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl. This was the copy of the -operational staff which Hitler had signed; but Keitel and Jodl only -countersigned. Thus there is no question of a signature of these two; -when such directives were issued they were signed only by Hitler, and -the others could merely countersign. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, and I thank you for the correction. - -In this connection, I should like to ask the Tribunal to consider -Document C-35, USA-132. This document is found in the Document Book of -the British Delegation, Number 10a, on Page 16. It is an extract from -the War Diary with the date of 30 January 1941. It describes the -preparations by the Navy, in accordance with Hitler’s command of 18 -December, where Hitler under Number IV of the directive commanded that -precautionary measures be taken in case Russia should alter her previous -attitude toward Germany, that is, only in case of this possibility. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, in connection with your -representation of the Russian situation, the Prosecution has submitted -Document C-66, which corresponds to GB-81. This is your report of 10 -January 1944 to Admiral Assmann for the historical archives of the Navy. -The document will be found in the Document Book of the British -Delegation, Number 10, Page 13. There you will find the basic position -taken by Raeder with respect to “Fall Barbarossa.” This is set forth -under “a” of the document under Number 1... - -I have just heard that this document is also to be found in the Document -Book 10a, on Page 35. There you wrote: - - “At this time the Führer had made known his ‘unalterable - decision’ to conduct the eastern campaign in spite of all - remonstrances. Accordingly, further warnings, as long as - completely new situations had not arisen, were completely - without purpose, as one knew from experience. As Chief of the - Naval Operations Staff I was never convinced of the ‘compelling - necessity’ for Barbarossa.” - -Do you have anything to add to these statements which you made at that -time? - -RAEDER: I should like to say in this connection that despite the fact -that the directive had been issued on 18 December, I made a -comprehensive report at the end of December, as can be seen from -Document C-170, which I mentioned yesterday on several occasions, in -order to convince the Führer of the wrongness of this decision. This -shows that I have gone very far, for when the Führer had issued a -directive, even if it applied only to a hypothetical case, it was -generally impossible to approach him with basic considerations against -this directive. Everything else I mentioned already yesterday. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday, in connection with your -counterproposals made to Hitler with respect to Russia, you mentioned -that in the autumn the plan was still to carry through the action -“Seelöwe,” that is, to land in England. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: When, according to your strategic opinion, or the opinion -of the Navy, did this possibility cease to exist? When did you have to -dispense with this plan? - -RAEDER: In the course of the month of September we still believed that -the landing could be carried through. As a necessary condition the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army and I, too, always insisted—and he -realized this fully—that for a landing air superiority would have to be -on our side; and therefore we were waiting to see whether we could -actually produce this air superiority in time for the landing, which due -to weather conditions could not be carried out later than the beginning -of October. If it were not possible by then, it would have to be -postponed until May of the following year. It developed that air -superiority could not be produced to the necessary extent; consequently -it was said that the landing was to be postponed until the spring of the -following year. Further preparations were to be taken and they actually -were taken. But in the course of the winter the idea of a landing was -completely abandoned, and Hitler decreed that preparations in the -harbors along the Channel should be carried on only to such an extent as -would give the British the impression that this landing actually was to -take place. In September I had the impression that Hitler no longer had -any great interest in this landing and that in his own mind he was -completely committed to the Russian campaign in conjunction with which -he, of course, could not carry out the landing in England. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now, I turn to the accusation raised against you by the -Prosecution that you demanded that war be waged against America. The -Prosecution has submitted in this connection Document C-152, or GB-122, -which is to be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, -Number 10, Page 23. This is an extract from the War Diary of the Naval -Operations Staff dealing with a report of the Commander-in-Chief of the -Navy—that is, you—to the Führer on 18 March 1941. Under Figure 11 of -this document, it is stated, and I quote: - - “Japan must proceed to take Singapore as soon as possible, since - the opportunity will never again be so favorable (preoccupation - of the entire British fleet elsewhere; the unreadiness of the - United States to carry on a war against Japan; the inferiority - of the United States fleet to the Japanese fleet). Japan is, - indeed, preparing for this action but will carry it out, - according to statements of Japanese officers, only at the moment - when Germany proceeds with the landing in England. All efforts - on Germany’s part must therefore aim to incite Japan to - immediate action. If Japan captures Singapore, then all other - Eastern Asiatic problems relating to the United States and - England will be solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, and Dutch - East Indies). - - “Japan wants to avoid a war against the United States of - America, if at all possible, and can do so if she takes - Singapore promptly.” - -The Prosecution has construed this statement of yours to mean that you -wanted to lead Japan into a war against America. Is that correct? - -RAEDER: It is one of the most incorrect assertions contained in the -Indictment against me. It is entirely clear that, since I was involved -in a naval war with England with my small German Navy, I did not want, -under any circumstances, to have America on my neck as well; and it has -been discussed here repeatedly that my most urgent effort during the -entire first few years of the war was to avoid, under all circumstances, -being involved with the United States. Admiral Wagner described here in -detail the limitations which I had imposed on the German Navy in order -to prevent any clashes with the United States. I imposed limitations -which actually I could hardly justify when I carried on U-boat warfare -with such relatively small means. On the other hand, the United States -from the end of 1940 on, at the latest, and during the entire year of -1941, exerted pressure on us in our naval warfare wherever possible and -committed actions which could be interpreted as definitely not neutral. -I remind you merely of the repairing of British warships in the United -States, something which up until that time was completely impossible and -unheard of; and Roosevelt’s orders to shoot given in July and in -September 1941; attacks by the American destroyers _Greer_ and _Kearney_ -in the Atlantic on our U-boats. In two cases U-boats were pursued with -depth charges for 2 hours until finally they surfaced and fired, in one -case damaging one destroyer. Despite all this, in June 1941 I reported -to Hitler that we were continuing not to disturb the merchantmen of the -United States in any way—with the result that United States merchantmen -were crossing the Atlantic completely unmolested on sea lanes of their -own choosing, were in a position to give reports about our U-boats and -our sea warfare without our preventing them from doing so; because of -this the British were in a position to camouflage their ships as -American ships. That they did. The first time our pocket battleship -_Admiral Scheer_, while crossing the Atlantic, searched a ship flying -the American flag it turned out to be the British ship _Canadian -Cruiser_. Despite all this I recommended to the Führer, and he fully -approved my suggestion, that we should take no measures against American -ships. That we did not go to Halifax to lay mines Admiral Wagner has -already mentioned. I need not mention that any further. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was this proposal that Japan capture Singapore only for the -purpose of having assistance and an ally against England, with whom we -were already at war? - -RAEDER: That is actually the case, and I should like to picture very -briefly the development which led to this proposal. This was not -anything that I did on my own initiative, but rather at the beginning of -the year 1941 political negotiations were carried on with Japan partly -by the Führer and partly by the Foreign Minister. I was not even called -into these negotiations, and I must say regrettably so, for at these -negotiations many things were discussed which were not correct. However -on the other hand this shows again that there can be no talk about a -conspiracy. Contact was made, and then the visit of the Foreign Minister -Matsuoka took place, I believe, in March. - -On the basis of this entire development the Führer, on 5 March 1941, -issued Directive Number 24. That is Document C-75, USA-151, of 5 March. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the High Tribunal to -Document C-75, which is the same as USA-151, to be found in the Document -Book of the British Delegation, Number 10a, Page 58. In this Directive, -Number 24, it says under Figure 3a: - - “As the joint object in the war it is important to defeat - England quickly and in that way keep the United States out of - the war.” - -And three paragraphs farther down, under “d,” it says: - - “The capture of Singapore...” - -THE PRESIDENT: That on Page 58 is Instruction Number 54, concerning -collaboration with Japan. - -DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised—to my surprise—that only a part -of this directive is to be found in the English translation. I ask that -the Tribunal grant me permission, under these circumstances, to submit -the complete directive later as a Raeder document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your Raeder book, Dr. Siemers? - -DR. SIEMERS: No, not up until now; for I did not know that only a part -had been translated. I am asking for permission to submit this whole -document later as a Raeder document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. This may be found under Figure 3a, and the next -quotation will be found under Figure 3d, and it says: - - “The capture of Singapore, which is the key position of England - in the Far East, would be a decisive achievement in the war - effort of the three powers. Beyond that, attacks on other bases - of British and American sea power, if the entry of the United - States into the war cannot be prevented, will serve to shatter - the might of the enemy in that zone....” - -I ask the Tribunal to note the fact that already on 5 March, which is -the date of this directive, Hitler decreed the capture of Singapore. -Consequently, the suggestion made by Admiral Raeder in Document C-152, -dated 18 March, cannot be considered decisive, since a Hitler decree was -already in existence. - -RAEDER: May I make a brief remark about that? The same thing seems to -apply to all the cases which are being mentioned here: First of all, the -political decision by Hitler, the head of the State; then the directive -of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to the Armed Forces; then -the conclusions drawn by the commanders-in-chief of the separate -branches of the Wehrmacht. So, after I received the directive of 5 -March, I had to contemplate how Japan, after entering the war, could -strategically be used with the best results. And that depended on how we -could most effectively wound our main opponent, England, on the sea. In -this connection I had to insist most urgently that Japan move against -Singapore since there were also circles who were of the opinion that -Japan should attack Vladivostok, which would have been a grave mistake. - -England’s power center in East Asia had to be attacked. But the very -fact that I believed that the capture of Singapore would cause the -United States of America to shy away from the war occasioned this -proposal of mine, and not the opposite. - -DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection, I refer to Document 1877-PS which -was submitted in the special Indictment against you. It is USA-152 and -may be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, -Page 320. It is a conversation between the Japanese Foreign Minister, -Matsuoka—I am just told now that 320 is incorrect. It should be 319. - -THE PRESIDENT: And it should be 10a, I think. - -DR. SIEMERS: 10a, I beg your pardon. - -It is a conversation between Matsuoka and Von Ribbentrop on 29 March -1941. We have already discussed this matter. On Page 8 of this document, -the following is said: - - “The Reich Foreign Minister again referred to the problem of - Singapore. Because of the fear expressed by Japan that there - might be U-boat attacks from the Philippines and that the - British Mediterranean Fleet and Home Fleet would join the attack - he had discussed the situation once more with Admiral Raeder. - The latter told him that the British fleet would be so - completely occupied in the home waters and in the Mediterranean - this year that she would not be able to dispatch even a single - ship to the Far East. - - “The American U-boats were described by Admiral Raeder as being - so inferior that Japan would not have to concern herself about - them at all.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Herr Von Ribbentrop, in reply to my -question on 1 April 1946, declared that he had been mistaken, that the -statement was probably made by Hitler. Will you please clarify this -statement once and for all? - -RAEDER: I can only confirm that I never discussed such questions with -Herr Von Ribbentrop, for unfortunately there was no connection between -the Foreign Office and the High Command of the Navy especially since the -Führer had forbidden that any information be given by the Foreign Office -to the military authorities. I would never have made such statements -since they were in direct opposition to my own opinion, and especially -since in this case I had no basis for any such statements. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, were not, on the other hand, questions frequently -dealt with in the Naval Operations Staff as to the industrial and -military strength of the United States, and that for these reasons any -entrance of the United States was to be feared? - -RAEDER: This was fully clear to us, even to the last detail. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you at any time during the war see this Document -1877-PS, which is before you? - -RAEDER: No, no. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were you advised about these discussions between Herr Von -Ribbentrop and the Foreign Minister Matsuoka or the discussion with -Oshima? - -RAEDER: No; I was merely told by the Führer, and that is shown in the -Document C-170, dealing with the results of this discussion with -Matsuoka. But I had no discussions with Herr Von Ribbentrop. - -DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I have just been asked to -correct a word which I have just used; in order to be fair, I should -like to do so. I said that Hitler, in his directive of 5 March 1941, -“decreed” that Singapore be taken. The expression is not correct. He -naturally could not give any orders to Japan. The mistake arises because -the directive starts with the words: “The Führer has commanded the -following for our co-operation.” And under Figure 3 it says: “The -following directives apply in this case.” And among these directives the -taking of Singapore is mentioned. - -Admiral, in any conversation did you suggest to anyone at any time that -Japan attack Pearl Harbor? - -RAEDER: No, we never talked about that at all. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear anything about this plan before Japan attacked -Pearl Harbor? - -RAEDER: Never. It was a complete surprise for me and the Naval -Operations Staff that this attack took place; and it is a complete -mistake in judging the mentality of the Japanese to assume that they -would have spoken of such a plan to anyone, even inside Japan, who was -not directly connected with it. In 1904 they likewise attacked Russian -ships “out of the blue” without anyone suspecting anything at all. - -DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I should -like to submit three documents which have been granted me, first Exhibit -Number Raeder-19, to be found in Document Book 2, Page 108. This -document deals with the report by the American General Marshall which -has been placed at my disposal through the help of the Court. - -In this report, dated 1 September 1945, General Marshall stated the -following; and I refer to Page 116: - - “In order to establish for the historical record where and how - Germany and Japan failed I asked General Eisenhower to have his - Intelligence officers promptly interrogate the ranking members - of the German High Command who are now our prisoners of war. The - results of these interviews are of remarkable interest. They - give a picture of dissension among the enemy nations and lack of - long-range planning that may well have been decisive factors of - this world struggle at its most critical moments.” - -And two paragraphs further: - - “No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command had - any over-all strategic plan. Although the High Command approved - Hitler’s policies in principle, his impetuous strategy outran - German military capabilities and ultimately led to Germany’s - defeat. The history of the German High Command from 1938 on is - one of constant conflict of personalities in which military - judgment was increasingly subordinated to Hitler’s personal - dictates. The first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the - removal of Blomberg, Von Fritsch, and Beck and of the last - effective conservative influence on German foreign policy. - - “The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, and the Low Countries - developed serious diversions between Hitler and the General - Staff as to the details of execution of strategic plans. In each - case the General Staff favored the orthodox offensive, Hitler an - unorthodox attack with objectives deep in enemy territory. In - each case Hitler’s views prevailed and the astounding success of - each succeeding campaign raised Hitler’s military prestige to - the point where his opinions were no longer challenged. His - military self-confidence became unassailable after the victory - in France, and he began to disparage substantially the ideas of - his generals, even in the presence of junior officers. Thus no - General Staff objection was expressed when Hitler made the fatal - decision to invade Soviet Russia.” - -And on Page 118, there is an extract dealing with Germany and Japan. I -quote: - - “Nor is there evidence of close strategic co-ordination between - Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized that - Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but hoped - that the Japanese would tie down strong British and American - land, sea, and air forces in the Far East. - - “In the absence of any evidence so far to the contrary, it is - believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in - accordance with a unified strategic plan.” - -And further, in the documents which were also granted me, Exhibit -Raeder-113 and 114, in the Document Book 6, Page 491 and Page 497... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think you should ask the witness whether -he agrees with General Marshall’s appreciation. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you agree with the opinions of the American -General Marshall? - -RAEDER: I have not completely absorbed these statements. In general they -are the lines of thought which we also had pursued, but I cannot vouch -for each single point. In order to speak with certainty I would have to -look at them or they would have to be read to me again. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe the general confirmation is sufficient. In -Document Raeder-113 I should like to refer to the heading: - - “Army Foresaw Japan’s Move, Marshall Says: - - “Washington, December 11 (AP)—General George C. Marshall, - formerly Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged last night that the - Army knew more than 10 days before December 7, 1941, that a - Japanese move toward Pearl Harbor might take them past the - deadline where the American chiefs believed the U.S. should - fight.” - -In order to save time I shall not read the particulars; but it can be -gathered from the report by Marshall that the American Army knew about -it and later the date of November 25 and 26 is mentioned. In addition -Marshall testifies that preparations had been worked out in the United -States before the war for the construction of landing strips for -American bombers in Rabaul, Port Moresby, and Singapore. - -In Exhibit Number Raeder-114, which I am also submitting, Henry L. -Stimson, the former United States Secretary of War, made a statement -under date of 21 March. - - “Henry L. Stimson, former U.S. Secretary of War, disclosed that - the late President Roosevelt’s War Cabinet had discussed and - rejected—9 days before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor—an - American attack on the Japanese forces without further - warning... - - “Stimson related that he had received on November 28, 1941 - information of Japanese movements along the Asiatic coast. On - the same day, he said, the Cabinet met and discussed the - possible meaning of the Japanese move.” - -He further said that: - - “...if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British - would fight, and that if the British fought we would have to - fight.” - -According to this, Admiral, did the United States know about these -Japanese plans before you did? - -RAEDER: Apparently, yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall turn to the last accusation by the -Prosecution, and that concerns Brazil. In this connection, the -Prosecution has submitted Document 1807-PS, GB-227, to be found in the -Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 288. This is Jodl’s -diary, the entry of 16 June 1942. I have to beg your pardon, I am told -it is Page 287, not 288. This entry reads: - - “The Naval Operations Staff applied on 29 May for permission to - attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. It considers that a - sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is - expedient at this moment when defensive measures are still - incomplete and there is the possibility of surprise, since - Brazil is to all intents and purposes waging naval warfare - against Germany.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution is accusing you of -violating neutrality and violating international law because you made -that proposal at a time when Brazil was neutral. I call your attention -to the fact that the war with Brazil broke out 2 months later on 22 -August 1942. Please tell me briefly from memory just how you came to -make this proposal. - -RAEDER: The relations between Brazil and Germany at this time could not -have been worse. The Germans were very much persecuted and treated very -badly. Germany’s economic interests were heavily impaired. The -Brazilians were already completely on the side of the United States. -They had allowed United States air bases to be established along the -Brazilian coast, and also intelligence stations. They themselves -confirmed that they had destroyed a German U-boat; and, on the other -side, the German U-boats had also attacked Brazilian ships, for the -Brazilian ships were not illuminated according to regulations and -consequently could not be recognized as Brazilian ships. Germany had -previously asked all of the South American countries to illuminate their -ships in such a way that their nationality could be distinguished at -night. Then there were air attacks on U-boats of the Axis Powers, and -they could have been carried out only from Brazilian bases. At this -request of the Naval Operations Staff to the Führer, the Führer decreed -that once again we should ask the Italians what intelligence reports -they had received; and Italy in turn confirmed that some weeks before -Italian U-boats, which had been operating together with ours, had been -attacked near the Brazilian coast. Likewise the Brazilian Air Ministry -had made known the fact that Brazilian aircraft or United States -aircraft coming from Brazilian air bases had attacked Axis U-boats. - -On the basis of that confirmation the Führer permitted the use of -weapons against Brazilian ships along the Brazilian coast. A plan was -worked out, according to which a certain wave of U-boats, which left the -French coast in June to proceed into the Atlantic, was to go to the -Brazilian coast. The Führer had ordered in particular that this was not -to be mere pin-pricks but rather a serious enterprise. This operation -was later stopped and not carried through. I am sorry that I am not able -to say for what reason. But it can be seen from our document which gives -the statements made in the War Diary. - -DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I believe that the entire -accusation of the Prosecution regarding this planning would not have -been raised if Document 1807-PS, Jodl’s diary entry of 16 June, had been -submitted _in toto_. Only the first part was submitted. Therefore, I -submit this entry as Exhibit Number Raeder-115, to be found in Document -Book 6, Page 500. From the further statements made by General Jodl in -his diary we may conclude that the situation was correctly investigated. - -The first part, which was submitted by the Prosecution, that is, the -first two sentences, I have already read. The rest of the entry is as -follows: - - “Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office declares that an - aggravation of the conflict with Brazil is undesirable in view - of the attitude of Argentina and Chile and that, previous to - measures of war against Brazil, consultations must be held with - Italy and Japan. Acting on the report of the Chief of the Armed - Forces Operations Staff, the Führer has ordered on 30 May, that - the Naval Operations Staff is to ascertain, by inquiring in - Rome, whether the Brazilian reports about warlike actions - against Axis U-boats are correct. The inquiry by the Naval - Operations Staff shows that Italian U-boats were attacked on 22 - and 26 May at the northeast corner of Brazil by airplanes which - beyond a doubt had started from a Brazilian air base. The Naval - Operations Staff transmit, moreover, the text of the official - communiqué of the Brazilian Air Ministry about the fighting and - propose to put into action near the main Brazilian harbors - during the period from 3-8 August 10 U-boats to sail from 22 - June to 4 July from ports in western France, along with the - tanker _U-460_. The order for execution must be given to the - U-boats by 15 June at the latest. After the Commander-in-Chief - of the Navy had reported this to the Führer at the Berghof on - the afternoon of 15 June, the Führer declared himself in - agreement with the intentions of the Naval Operations Staff but - ordered, however, that before any final decision is made, the - political situation be examined once again by the Foreign - Office.” - -I believe that this proves that we were careful enough; and I refer -further to Exhibit Number Raeder-116 which I should like to submit -herewith, in the same document book, Page 503, which is an extract from -the War Diary. Under date 6 June there is an entry which states that the -development has gone so far that: - - “...a latent state of war is practically already in existence, - (Brazil entirely on the side of USA; most severe damage to all - German interests; individual Brazilian steamers not properly - illuminated sunk by U-boats; increasing agitation in Brazil; - Brazilians claim they have already sunk German U-boat while - patrolling the coast).” - -And a further extract from the War Diary, Exhibit Raeder-117, which I -should like to submit herewith, to be found in the same document book, -Page 509. I ask the High Tribunal to take notice of this document and -its contents and I refer only to Figures 3 and 4 in detail. Under Figure -3 it reads: - - “When Brazilian ships began to provide themselves with - camouflage paint and to arm, the order was given on 15 May 1942 - to use arms at once against recognizable armed South Americans.” - -And under Figure 4 it says: - - “On the basis of the fact that Axis submarines were attacked by - vessels along the Brazilian coast and that the Brazilian Air - Ministry officially made known that attacks had been made by the - Brazilian Air Force, the Naval Operations Staff on 29 May 1942, - in Document 12938/42, Top Secret, asked the Armed Forces - Operations Staff for permission to use arms against Brazilian - military forces and merchant ships.” - -I submit also Exhibit Number Raeder-118, Document Book 6, Page 510. I -ask the High Tribunal to take notice of this document. I do not wish to -quote it, since it repeats the facts we have already heard. I believe -that Figure 4 of Document 117 which I have just read clarifies the -matter completely and refutes every accusation against the Navy. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, do you have anything to add to -these extracts from the War Diary? - -RAEDER: No, I have nothing to add. It is entirely clear. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I ask you now to describe to the High -Tribunal—and with this I am coming to the conclusion, of my -examination—how it came about that you resigned in January 1943? - -Your Honors, shall we have a recess first? - -THE PRESIDENT: It depends on whether you hope to finish in a few -minutes. If you hope to finish in a few minutes we will sit on so that -you may finish your examination. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe it will take perhaps 10 minutes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on. - -DR. SIEMERS: [_Turning to the defendant._] Please describe how it came -about that you resigned in January of 1943; but first I should like to -ask you one more question: Did you, even before this, have the idea of -resigning? - -RAEDER: I should like to say briefly that on several occasions before -the war I asked the Führer to relieve me of my post, or I presented him -with an ultimatum. I should like briefly to cite two cases as examples. -In November 1938 in the presence of General Keitel I made a report to -the Führer about the type of ships and our plans as to how the ships -should be developed further. On this occasion the Führer, in a manner -defying explanation, began to attack everything that we had built and -were building, including the plans for the _Bismarck_, and to declare -them wrong. Later I found out that things like that happened whenever -some persons of his entourage, who knew very little about such things, -gave him their opinion, that he always followed it up, probably -wanting—as I told myself later—to check whether the things he had been -told were actually correct. - -This case, however, was so extreme that I could not do anything else but -simply pick up my plans, put them in my brief case, and leave the room. -General Keitel was present. The Führer followed me to the door, asked me -to come in again, softened his accusations, and asked me not to resign -now under any circumstances. - -The second case was a purely personal one, but it is rather typical. His -naval adjutant, who had just been appointed, wanted to marry a young -girl who had a very unsavory reputation at the University of Kiel. I -told him I would never consent to the marriage. The Führer had the girl -introduced to him and decided he had nothing against the marriage; I -left the Berghof and sent the Führer a letter via a staff officer in -which I told him that I would refuse my consent, that the officer would -not remain in the Navy should he marry, or else I would not remain. I -asked the officer who acted as my courier to bring back the answer since -I wanted to reach a decision at once. The Führer had the officer wait 2 -days at the Berghof and then sent him back to me with a letter saying: - - “Very well, the officer cannot marry and remain in the Navy and - he will not be used further as a naval adjutant; someone else - will be put in his place. He will become some sort of leader in - my National Socialist Motor Corps and will then serve as one of - my Party adjutants.” - -It was also typical of the Führer that, to a certain degree, he wanted -to see his will carried through; but this man was out of the Navy, and I -could make my conviction felt in this case. Under these circumstances I -declared myself ready to continue in office. That was at the beginning -of 1939; in the course of the spring, however, I asked again whether I -could not be relieved of my position now, since I had served for many -years in the Navy and I did not believe I would be able to maintain the -dignity of the office much longer. I suggested to him that perhaps in -October 1939 I should leave my post. The Führer refused at the time, and -on 1 October we were at war, and in time of war I did not believe that I -could leave the Navy under any circumstances unless it was very urgent, -especially since I considered myself totally responsible for all -preparations and for the training of the Navy. In the course of the war -our co-operating which up until then, aside from such incidents, had -been quite congenial, since the Führer had always made an effort to show -me respect, our connection gradually became very strained during the -war. The Führer became more nervous when I made reports, flared up in -rage when there were divergences of opinion or if there had been any -incidents, as, for instance, a technical defect or poor performance by a -ship. It happened again and again that his entourage influenced him -before I could actually explain matters to him, and I was called in -subsequently to set him straight on these matters. In that way -unpleasant scenes ensued which wore me out. - -One point about which the Führer was especially sensitive was the large -ships. He was always uneasy when our large ships were out on the high -seas and were carrying on raids against shipping. The loss of a ship, -such as the _Graf Spee_ or later the _Bismarck_, he considered a -tremendous loss of prestige; and matters like that, therefore, excited -him tremendously. That went on until the end of 1942. Then there -came—and this particularly impressed me—my defeat in the consultation -with the Führer on questions dealing with Norway, France, and above all, -Russia. In the final analysis he always listened more to the Party -people as, for example, Terboven, than to an old officer. That led to a -situation which could not be tolerated for any length of time. One of -the basic characteristics of the Führer was a tremendous suspicion -toward anyone and everyone, but especially directed against old officers -who had come from the old Wehrmacht and of whom he always -assumed—despite all well-intentioned treatment—that in their hearts -they did not share these feelings which he had to demand of them. -Especially the case of Russia had led me to so many conflicts with him -that our relations were strongly influenced thereby. Indeed, the man who -compiled all these war diaries and minutes, Admiral Assmann, summed it -up on one occasion at the conclusion of such a discussion with the -words: “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, therefore, is in complete -opposition to the Führer in this matter.” - -At the end of 1942, just after I had had to put an end to the entire -Norwegian question, an incident occurred which led to the end. There was -to have been an attack on a convoy which was going to Murmansk or -Archangel from England. It was in December at a time when in those -northern regions there are just 1 or 2 hours of light and hence no -favorable weather for fighting by large ships when up against large -numbers of destroyers. The ships, together with the destroyers, had -started on their journey and had reached the convoy while it was still -light. But since daylight soon disappeared and darkness fell and since -the convoy was guarded by many destroyers, the admiral considered it -expedient to withdraw the big ships from the battle. That was the only -correct decision for he might have lost them all by torpedo attack. This -fact, and secondly the fact that unfortunately the radio connection -between this admiral and the Naval Operations Staff was made difficult -and at times completely broken off by static, caused the Führer to -become extremely excited in his headquarters where I reported to him -everything I found out myself. The whole day was spent with questions -back and forth, and even in the evening I could not give him a clear -picture. This excited him extremely. Through Admiral Krancke he had all -sorts of insults transmitted to me and demanded that I report to him -immediately; and I could see that very strong friction would result. I -arranged it so that I did not need to report to him until 6 days later -on 6 January so that the atmosphere could first cool off a little. On 6 -January I could go to him with a complete report; and in the evening, at -a discussion at which Field Marshal Keitel was also present, he made a -speech of about an hour’s duration in which he made derogatory remarks -about everything that the Navy had done so far, in direct contrast to -every judgment passed on the Navy up until this time. From this I saw -that he was anxious to bring about a break. - -I personally was firmly prepared to seize this opportunity to resign, -especially as it became ever clearer that the war was becoming a pure -U-boat war, and I could therefore feel that I could leave at this moment -with a clear conscience. - -After the Führer had concluded his speech I asked to be permitted to -speak with him alone. Field Marshal Keitel and the stenographers left -and I told him that I was asking for my resignation as I could see from -his words that he was entirely dissatisfied with me and therefore this -was the proper moment for me to leave. As always, he tried at first to -dissuade me but I remained adamant and told him that a new -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy who would have complete responsibility -would definitely have to be appointed. He said that it would be a great -burden for him if I were to leave now since for one thing the situation -was very critical—Stalingrad was impending—and secondly, since he had -already been accused of dismissing so many generals. In the eyes of the -outside world it would incriminate him if I were to leave at this point. -I told him that I would do everything I could to prevent that happening. -If he wanted to give the appearance as far as the outside world was -concerned that I had not resigned because of a clash, then he could make -me a general inspector with some sort of nominal title, which would -create the impression that I was still with the Navy and that my name -was still connected with the Navy. This appealed to him at once and I -told him on 6 January that I wanted to be dismissed on 30 January. At -this point I had concluded 10 years of service as Commander-in-Chief of -the Navy under him. He agreed to this proposal and asked me to suggest -two successors so that he could make a choice. - -On 30 January he then personally dismissed me by appointing me Admiral -Inspector of the Navy. He said that he would still on occasion ask me -for advice; but that never happened. I was merely sent out twice, once -to Bulgaria when the King of Bulgaria was buried and once to Hungary, to -the Hungarian Regent Horthy to bring him a gift from the Führer. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you otherwise performed no tasks as Admiral -Inspector? - -RAEDER: I had no functions and received no orders. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then my last question: Did you have the impression, on the -occasion of your conversation of 6 January 1943 with Hitler, that he in -a way was glad to get rid of you in view of the many differences of -opinion and the fact that you contradicted him frequently on technical -naval and political matters concerning Norway, France, Russia? - -RAEDER: I do believe that he wanted to get rid of me at this time, for I -was in a certain way an inconvenience for him. This one case which I -described, where I had my way in the end, he had never forgotten. - -DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. - -This concludes my examination of Admiral Raeder. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit today until half past one. It will -adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask questions? - -FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Admiral, -you recall the memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff of 15 October -concerning possibilities for an intensification of the economic war. -That is in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, on -Pages 96 and 97 of the English text. Admiral Wagner has already -testified about it here. Can you add anything to that statement -concerning the purpose and the meaning of that memorandum? - -RAEDER: Since the war against England came as a complete surprise to us, -we had up until then dealt very little with detailed questions of -submarine warfare. Among other things we had not yet discussed the -question of so-called unrestricted submarine warfare which had played -such a very important part in the previous war. And from that fact it -developed that on 3 September that officer who was recently mentioned -here was sent to the Foreign Office with some points for discussion on -the question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that we could clarify -with the Foreign Office the question as to just how far we could go. And -that is the document which recently played a role here, D-851, GB-451, -of 3 November. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: 3 September, you mean. - -RAEDER: Yes, 3 September. This touches upon all these questions. Then -discussions with the Foreign Office took place and this U-boat -memorandum mentioned by you was worked out in the High Command of the -Navy on the basis of these discussions and released on 15 October. I -believe that on 15 October I presented it to the Führer who in principle -agreed to the contents. But the very fact that a memorandum about -submarine warfare concerning possibilities for an intensification of -submarine warfare was issued only on 15 October shows how little we were -prepared for that eventuality. - -That memorandum contains near the beginning that sentence which has been -quoted by the Prosecution concerning our position with respect to -international law, where reference is made to highest ethics of warfare, -adherence to international law, and the desire to base all military -measures on existing laws wherever possible. But if this is not possible -or when by deviation it is possible to achieve decisive military -results, and we could take the responsibility for this deviation, then -in case of necessity we must depart from existing international law. -That means that also a new international law may have to be developed. - -However, this entire memorandum represents merely a constant search for -possibilities for conducting submarine warfare with the least damage to -neutrals and the greatest possible adherence to international law and in -such a way that it would become a decisive factor in the outcome of the -war. - -Various cases are discussed as to how an intensification can be reached, -but it always was a question of finding countermeasures against enemy -measures. Such possibilities as blockade or the new concept to lay siege -to England by submarine warfare are examined in all directions; but the -draft always states the conclusion that in view of the number of -submarines and other misgivings it is not yet possible to conduct such -operations. - -And the final result of that entire memorandum, as set down in that -document, can be found in the two last pages. Unfortunately I have only -the German copy in front of me where under the last Paragraph D the -final opinion, the following sentences which I should like to quote, are -worthy of notice... - -THE PRESIDENT: Where is the extract? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On Pages 99 and 100 in the Document Book 10, -GB-224. - -Mr. President, another excerpt from the same document has already been -mentioned and that is in the Document Book Dönitz 3, on Pages 199 to -203; but I do not believe that it is necessary to refer to it because -the witness will only read one or two sentences. - -RAEDER: [_Continuing._] Now, the last paragraph “Conclusions” reads: - - “1.) The manner in which economic warfare has been conducted - until now, in accordance with Prize Regulations, does not meet - with military demands for ruthless severity. - - “A large part of enemy mercantile trade including all exports in - neutral ships is not covered. - - “The requirements of naval law that neutral merchantmen be - stopped and searched can no longer be fulfilled, in view of the - strength of aerial reconnaissance and U-boat countermeasures in - the enemy’s coastal approaches. Economic warfare according to - Prize Regulations has therefore to be limited and in the North - Sea and the Baltic must be left to surface craft only. In the - Atlantic the U-boats in enemy coastal waters will limit their - activities to attacks without warning on convoys, troop - transports, and once it has been approved, armed and all enemy - merchantmen, and will conduct economic warfare according to the - law governing prizes only in exceptional cases. The use of the - Operational Air Force for economic warfare is not possible. - Economic warfare is conducted within the framework of - international law. A possibility of controversy with neutral - states is ruled out.” - -Then one more sentence: - - “If the Supreme War Command for political reasons should not be - able at present to decide to wage the economic war in the most - vigorous form possible by having recourse to a siege, it will be - possible to increase the effectiveness of the policy of stopping - enemy trade by a ruthless increase in the use of mines and by - air attacks on enemy port installations. One cannot, however, - expect a decisive result from the economic war in its present - form.” (Document C-157, Exhibit GB-224) - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The immediate result of that memorandum and -of your report to the Führer was the order of 17 October? - -RAEDER: Yes, and that provided: Firstly, that all enemy merchantmen -could be torpedoed; and secondly, as a severer measure, that passenger -ships in convoys could be torpedoed a short time after an announcement -to that effect had been made. That was all done in connection with the -intensification, measure for measure, which we had brought about in -answer to individual acts of the enemy. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, that long passage that the defendant has -just read, if it has not been put in evidence yet, must be offered in -evidence by you. I understand it is not in evidence at present. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I can help. I shall be using this -document and I shall put it in. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has it been offered in evidence? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Only part of it, not the part that the defendant -has referred to. But, in view of that I shall refer to it later on. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you mentioned that before 1935 -certain preparations were made for the construction of a German -submarine weapon. Did Admiral Dönitz participate in any way in these -preparations? - -RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. As was said before, he was abroad during -the last year; but even before that he had nothing to do with it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You have reported about your dismissal as -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Would you please tell me how it came -about that Admiral Dönitz became your successor? - -RAEDER: The Führer had ordered that I propose two admirals as -successors. I suggested in writing first, as the elder... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, how does this arise? I mean, what -relevancy has it to anything we have to decide as to how Admiral Dönitz -became head of the Navy? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That has significance, Mr. President, in -view of the Prosecution’s assertion that Admiral Dönitz became the -successor of Admiral Raeder on the basis of political relations or -services rendered. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please continue, Admiral. - -RAEDER: I’ll be very brief. I suggested, first, Admiral Carls, who was -the senior and has vast knowledge of the entire conduct of naval policy. -In the event that the Führer should want to manifest that he now was -placing U-boat warfare in the foreground I suggested Admiral Dönitz, who -was the greatest authority in that field. Political considerations of -any kind were not mentioned at all; it was purely an official, technical -appointment. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no more questions. - -DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, the -Tribunal, through its letter of 26 March, has consented that an -affidavit be submitted by the Codefendant Raeder for the Defendant -Keitel, provided the Prosecution has an opportunity to question Admiral -Raeder on his statements in cross-examination. - -I have sent the affidavit to the Prosecution, and the Prosecution has -raised no objection. I ask to be permitted to submit this affidavit -which is concerned with the functions and position of the Defendant -Keitel as Chief of the OKW, as Exhibit Number Keitel-19, after Admiral -Raeder has confirmed that he signed this affidavit and that he agrees to -its being submitted. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, you are acquainted with the -questions which I put to you and which, after a conference with your -counsel, you answered and signed on 19 March? - -RAEDER: That is about the position of Field Marshal Keitel in the OKW? - -DR. NELTE: Yes. - -RAEDER: I am quite familiar with that. - -DR. NELTE: Then, may I submit this affidavit? The Prosecution has a copy -of it. - -I have a few more questions for Admiral Raeder, the answers to which can -be greatly simplified with the permission of the Court. These are the -same questions which on 9 May, a week ago, I put to Admiral Dönitz and -which refer to the assertion made by the witness Dr. Gisevius about -Keitel’s tremendous influence and the circle of silence which Keitel is -said to have drawn around Hitler. I merely want to ask the witness -Admiral Raeder, with the permission of the Tribunal, whether he can -confirm as correct for the period before 1943 as well—that is, for the -period during which Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy—the -answers to my questions given by Admiral Dönitz in Raeder’s presence. I -ask for the decision of the Tribunal whether I may put this general -question in order to save time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. - -DR. NELTE: You heard what I said, and I ask you, can you confirm the -answers given by Admiral Dönitz to my questions on 9 May for the period -before 1943 as well? - -RAEDER: Yes, that I can do. - -DR. NELTE: Now, I have one final question. During your testimony -Document L-79, the “Little Schmundt” file, was treated. You objected to -this document as inaccurate and not of probative value? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. NELTE: Dr. Siemers then quoted a part of that document which the -Prosecution, at the time when it submitted the document, had not read. -In that part of the document there is mention of a research staff in the -OKW. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. NELTE: I ask you now to tell me whether such a research staff in the -OKW was ever actually created. - -RAEDER: Not to my knowledge. The work was done by the Armed Forces -Operations Staff in which there were officers representing all three -branches of the Armed Forces. - -DR. NELTE: So there was no change in the scope of tasks and in the -division of jurisdiction? - -RAEDER: No, definitely not. - -DR. NELTE: That also concerns the question of working out strategic and -operational matters between the OKW and the Armed Forces Operations -Staff on one hand and the general staffs of the Armed Forces branches, -including the Naval Operations Staff, on the other? - -RAEDER: As far as the Naval Operations Staff is concerned, yes, there -was no change. - -DR. NELTE: And as far as the other branches of the Armed Forces are -concerned do you know of no change or...? - -RAEDER: That I cannot say. I do not know about that. - -DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and Halder have testified about -that. - -Thank you. I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, is the affidavit that you referred to -contained in your document book? - -DR. NELTE: No, not yet. It will be Number Keitel-19. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Will you have translations supplied to the Tribunal? - -DR. NELTE: Yes. - -DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the -German Armed Forces): Admiral, you are the senior member of the group of -the General Staff of the OKW, and you belonged to this so-called group -for the longest time? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: In what manner did you become a member of this so-called -group? - -RAEDER: I was appointed Chief of the Naval Command Staff by Reich -President Field Marshal Von Hindenburg. I did not join that group by -doing so; rather I became Chief of the Navy. One was not aware of any -group. - -DR. LATERNSER: Joining and remaining in this group the Prosecution -maintains was voluntary. Was there any possibility at all for military -leaders to apply for any vacant posts? - -RAEDER: No, there was nothing of the sort. - -DR. LATERNSER: In other words, military accomplishments were the -decisive factor? - -RAEDER: It was a military order. There was no question, of it being -voluntary. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you know the various members of the group at the time -when you belonged to it? - -RAEDER: No, I certainly did not know all individuals from the other -branches. Of course, I knew a large number. - -DR. LATERNSER: Within the purely military leadership was there ever a -conference about a plan which had as its purpose the launching of -aggressive wars? - -RAEDER: No, there was never such a conference. Frequently it has been -mentioned here how the various enterprises came about—the political -decision of the Führer, a directive issued by him, and then the working -out of the final order. - -DR. LATERNSER: Admiral, I do not mean now by this question the meetings -which took place under Hitler’s leadership. I mean meetings of purely -military officers. - -RAEDER: Do you mean within the various branches of the Armed Forces? - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, within the various branches. - -RAEDER: Of course, within the Naval Operations Staff there were meetings -about various questions, but not about aggressive wars. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, my questions referred only to that. The Prosecution -asserts, furthermore, that this indicted group was first established by -the National Socialist Regime. Is that correct? - -RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. There was no group at all, but the -organization was such as has frequently been described. - -DR. LATERNSER: And such as has always existed in all armies of the -world? - -RAEDER: Yes, as has always existed. - -DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has furthermore asserted that, after the -seizure of power by Hitler, the high military leaders had the choice -either of co-operating or of accepting the consequence that the new -regime would establish new armed forces, that is armed forces of their -own, and that on the basis of this situation the generals decided to -co-operate. Is that assertion by the Prosecution correct? - -RAEDER: No. It is not true that thereupon any joining of forces took -place. I know that such tendencies existed. For instance, once in 1934 I -reported to the Führer that I had been informed that SA Gruppenführer -Killinger, who had formerly been in the Navy and had advanced to -prominence (in the SA), had the intention of becoming the Chief of Naval -Operations Staff. But I was not aware of any further efforts. But above -all, there was no coalition of the generals for defensive action against -such an intention. - -DR. LATERNSER: So the assertion made by the Prosecution is not correct? - -RAEDER: No, not correct. That was not in the least a method which would -have been in accordance with the sentiments of the soldier—that such a -coalition be formed to avert something. - -DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution furthermore asserts that the group, above -all, the generals, let themselves be won over by the regime because of -the chance of conquest. Is that assertion correct? - -RAEDER: That is an absolutely incorrect and farfetched assertion. - -DR. LATERNSER: Was the effort of the Party to acquire for itself supreme -authority ever supported or promoted by the military? - -RAEDER: I do not know that that ever happened. Do you mean the seizure -of power? - -DR. LATERNSER: After the seizure of power was the Party supported by -military leaders, as far as you know, in its efforts to attain sole -domination in Germany? - -RAEDER: No. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday, in reply to the question of your counsel, you -described how you came to swear your oath to Hitler. If such an -intention had existed in the mind of one of the commanders-in-chief, -would it have been possible for him to refuse the oath? - -RAEDER: That I cannot say, but I believe that not one of us saw any -necessity for refusing that oath. - -DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has further asserted that the high -military chiefs agreed completely with the principles and aims of -National Socialism. Is that correct? - -RAEDER: I explained here yesterday how far one could agree with the -principles of National Socialism and to what extent one trained one’s -soldiers according to these principles. Anything that went beyond that -was rejected and found no acceptance in the Navy. Here I can speak only -for the Navy. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did the officers who were subordinate to you and who were -in the group ever have an insight into the political situation and -Hitler’s intention so that one could speak about participation or -membership in the plan? - -RAEDER: No. There was an absolute prohibition on speaking to anyone -about speeches in which Hitler mentioned intentions and possible -developments. The officers below the rank of Armed Forces commander were -informed only when things had gone so far that the directive was to be -issued. - -DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution further asserts... - -RAEDER: I have to qualify that. That directive was first worked out by -the High Command of the Army and the Navy. Thus they received -information as soon as the directive of the individual branches of the -Armed Forces was issued and that always happened sometime later. - -DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution also asserts that the high military -leaders were not military experts but that they knew Hitler’s intentions -of aggression and willingly co-operated. Can you name any military -leaders who, before they had received orders, took a positive attitude -toward any aggressive action? - -RAEDER: I cannot answer that. I explained yesterday how Admiral Carls -pointed out to me the danger imminent in Norway; but he did not do -anything more than give me the information, point out the danger, and -elucidate the situation there. - -DR. LATERNSER: The attitude of the former Commander-in-Chief of the -Armed Forces, Von Fritsch, and of the Chief of the General Staff Beck to -the question of a war is known. I just wanted to ask you, did the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, have the -same attitude concerning the war? - -RAEDER: I believe so, yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Concerning the conference on 5 November 1937, you have -already made detailed statements yesterday. I would like... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you have been putting this class of -question to every naval and military witness who has been called, and -what the Tribunal desires me to point out to you is that there has been -no cross-examination by any member of the Prosecution challenging any of -these points, so this evidence is entirely repetitive and cumulative and -is not bound to be put by you to every military and naval witness who -comes into the witness box, and it is simply a waste of time to the -Tribunal. When questions are answered by a witness and are not -cross-examined to by the other side, it is the practice to assume that -the answers are accepted. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for me this is an extremely important -question which has just been touched upon, namely, the question of -whether a question is inadmissible because in the opinion of the Court -it is cumulative. I should like to make a few statements concerning -whether or not a question is cumulative. - -THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Laternser, you can understand what the -Tribunal has said to you, that it is now desired, in view of the -directives of the Charter, that this Trial should be as expeditious as -it can reasonably be; and it does not desire to have the same evidence -adduced to it over and over again. Is that not clear? - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I can assume that the Tribunal accepts -as true these proofs which I want to bring by means of my question, then -I can of course forego these questions. But I cannot determine whether -that is the case unless I know that I have succeeded in bringing -definite proof... - -THE PRESIDENT: What I wanted to point out to you was that you asked the -same question of a great number of witnesses and that those questions -have not been cross-examined, and in such circumstances you can assume -that answers given by the witnesses are accepted. - -DR. LATERNSER: If I am justified in drawing this conclusion, then of -course I shall dispense with such questions in the future. I have only a -few more questions, Mr. President. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] In support of the Indictment of the group -of the General Staff and the OKW two affidavits have been presented by -the Prosecution, one by Field Marshal Von Blomberg and one by -Generaloberst Blaskowitz. In these two affidavits both generals state -that as a whole, within the circle of generals before the war, the -opinion existed that the question of the Corridor would have to be -decided unconditionally and, if necessary, with force. Is that opinion -stated by the two generals correct? Was that the general attitude at -that time? - -RAEDER: I never heard of such an opinion. In my presence General Von -Blomberg never made any statement of that kind. The Polish question was -discussed by us in the Navy only to the extent already mentioned here -during the last few days, namely that an attack on Poland by Germany -would have to be prevented under all circumstances. The political -treatment of this question... - -THE PRESIDENT: The defendant says he has never heard of this suggestion. - -DR. LATERNSER: That was the reason why I put the question to the -witness. - -RAEDER: After 1933 political questions were handled and decided by -Hitler exclusively, and he said that he made all policies. - -DR. LATERNSER: It is therefore correct that this opinion which Blomberg -and Blaskowitz have mentioned does not apply for the circle of generals? - -RAEDER: Well, at any rate, I have never heard it expressed by the -generals. It did not exist in the Navy. - -DR. LATERNSER: You were present at the conferences of 23 November 1939? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put one supplementary question -concerning those conferences. Admiral, do you remember that in the -course of these conferences Hitler reproached the generals because they -still had old-fashioned ideas of chivalry and that these ideas had to be -rejected? - -RAEDER: That I cannot say with certainty. I believe that I can recall -having once heard it said that Hitler was of that opinion. - -DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question concerning the document -which your defense counsel already put to you in the course of your -examination. It is Document C-66 submitted by the British Prosecution -under GB-81. It is in Document Book 10, on Page 13, or 10a, Page 35. On -Page 5, in the last paragraph of that page, you said the following and I -quote: - - “It can be seen from my statements and plans that the Führer - reckoned with a definite conclusion of the eastern campaign in - the fall of 1941, whereas the High Command of the Army (General - Staff) was very skeptical.” - -Admiral, I wanted to ask you of what this skepticism consisted? - -RAEDER: As far as I know, the High Command of the Army was of the -opinion that it was impossible to conclude such a tremendous campaign in -so short a time; and many others shared that opinion, whereas the Führer -believed that because of the new weapons and his strategy he could -conclude that campaign very quickly. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about whether the High Command of -the Army had any fundamental objections before the beginning of the -Russian campaign? - -RAEDER: As far as I know, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was very -much against it; but that too, I cannot say definitely. - -DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no more questions. - -PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Representing Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, Counsel -for Defendant Von Neurath): Admiral, in the course of the proceedings it -has been testified, I believe by the Codefendant Göring, that Field -Marshal Von Hindenburg had expressly desired that Herr Von Neurath -become Foreign Minister. Do you know anything about that? - -RAEDER: I learned at the time that Hindenburg had expressed that wish, -and it caught my attention because Field Marshal Von Hindenburg until -that time had always considered merely the appointment of the Minister -of Defense and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy as his privilege -in the Reich Government. This was the first time that he expressed such -a wish in the case of a Foreign Minister. - -DR. KRAUS: So it was not the practice of the Field Marshal to make any -suggestions regarding the appointments of Ministers? - -RAEDER: No. He had merely acted according to his own wish to appoint the -Defense Minister, even in the previous Social Democratic, Democratic, -and other cabinets. - -DR. KRAUS: What may have been the reason for Field Marshal Von -Hindenburg’s making that exception in the case of Neurath? - -RAEDER: He probably wanted to make sure under all circumstances that the -peaceful policies which had prevailed in Germany up to that time would -be continued. He was sure that Herr Von Neurath would continue these -policies in the same direction. - -DR. KRAUS: So he had particular confidence in Herr Von Neurath’s -attitude up to that time? - -RAEDER: Yes, beyond a doubt. - -DR. KRAUS: You knew Von Neurath very well, and you were informed about -his political principles, weren’t you? What were the main lines of his -policies? - -RAEDER: Herr Von Neurath wanted to see the gradual recovery of the -German people to normal conditions and he wanted to strive with peaceful -means for equal rights for the German Reich. Above all, he wanted to -have good relations with England, which was also in conformity with -Hindenburg’s intentions, and on this very point both of us agreed -completely. - -DR. KRAUS: So one can say that you considered Von Neurath an exponent of -a policy of understanding with England and a peaceful policy of -compromise. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. KRAUS: Then I have a second question for you, Admiral. A Fritz -Wiedemann, who was Hitler’s adjutant from 1935 to 1939, has submitted an -affidavit. The Prosecution has submitted that affidavit under 3037-PS. -In this affidavit Herr Wiedemann states that on 28 May 1938 a conference -took place in the winter garden of the Reich Chancellery with all -important people of the Foreign Office, the Army, and the Operational -Staffs present, a meeting so large that one almost doubts whether all -these people could get into the winter garden. - -And here, he says, in addition to Göring, General Beck, General Keitel, -and Von Brauchitsch, there were also present Von Neurath, Von -Ribbentrop, and yourself. - -In this meeting Hitler spoke among other things about Czechoslovakia and -stated that it was his unshakeable intention that Czechoslovakia must -disappear from the map. Do you know anything about that meeting? - -RAEDER: Although I can otherwise recall every large or more important -meeting, I do not have the slightest recollection of this meeting at -that time. The list of those present also seems very unlikely. I have -never seen Herr Von Neurath and Herr Von Ribbentrop together at the same -meeting. I should also doubt whether Herr Von Neurath at that time was -in Berlin at all. He was quite definitely not present at that meeting. -But I also do not remember any meeting at which Von Ribbentrop was -present as Foreign Minister when military matters were discussed. I -think this Herr Wiedemann is mistaken because I believe also that I have -never seen him at a meeting in which such matters are supposed to have -been discussed. The Führer always sent this personal adjutant of his out -of the room beforehand. I believe there is some mistake. - -DR. KRAUS: Such an important statement by the Führer you would doubtless -have remembered. - -RAEDER: Yes. During that summer the Führer’s opinions fluctuated -greatly. I believe that at the end of May a mobilization took place in -Czechoslovakia, or something of the sort—I do not remember exactly -what. But I attended no meeting, as far as I know, at which such a -statement was made. - -DR. KRAUS: Thank you. I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any -questions? - -[_There was no response._] - -Sir David, it seems scarcely worthwhile starting the cross-examination. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, I entirely agree. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 20 May 1946, at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH DAY - Monday, 20 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand._] - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dr. Horn wishes to ask some questions. - -DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): With the -permission of the Tribunal I should like to put a few more questions to -the witness. - -Admiral, is it true that on 24 April 1941 the so-called neutrality -patrol of North American warships was extended past the 300-mile limit -to a distance of at least 1,000 miles? - -RAEDER: I cannot remember the date, but such an extension did take place -at some time. - -DR. HORN: Is it true that at the beginning of June 1941 a law was passed -in the United States confiscating foreign ships immobilized in North -American harbors as a result of the war and including 26 Italian and 2 -German ships? - -RAEDER: Here again I cannot tell you the date for certain. It happened -in the summer of 1941. The ships were mostly Italian, with a few German -ships. I cannot swear to the exact figures. - -DR. HORN: In June 1941 the United States publicly declared its -willingness to give the Soviet Union every possible aid. Did you discuss -this with Hitler, and what was his attitude towards it? - -RAEDER: Yes, that is correct. There were some questions of a loan -without interest, or some such thing. Very probably I did speak to -Hitler about it, but I cannot tell you what his attitude was. I can say -only that all these measures at that time in no way deterred us from the -course we had pursued until then. In June I had the conversation with -Hitler at which I explained to him that up to that time we had allowed -American warships to go completely unmolested, and that we would -continue to do so in spite of the considerable disadvantages entailed -which I mentioned recently. - -DR. HORN: In 1941 the American Secretary of War Mr. Stimson and the -Secretary of the Navy Mr. Knox, as well as Secretary of State Mr. Hull, -repeatedly advocated in public the use of the United States fleet to -safeguard English transports of war material to Great Britain. On 12 -July 1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox informed the representatives of -the press of Roosevelt’s order to shoot at German ships. How did Hitler -and you react to these actions, which were contrary to neutrality? - -RAEDER: Your facts are correct. They will go down in the annals of -history. Hitler did subsequently issue an express order that we were in -no circumstances to open fire of our own accord, but only in -self-defense. This situation actually did arise later in the case of the -two destroyers _Greer_ and _Kearny_. - -DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions. - -MARSHAL: Your Honor, the report is made that Defendant Göring is absent -this morning. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you had read at the time of its -publication the book by Captain Schüssler, _The Fight of the Navy -against Versailles_, had you not? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at it on Page 26 of Document Book -10, Page 123 of the German document book? Captain Schüssler had told you -that he was going to write such a work, had he not? - -RAEDER: Yes. And I might add that this book was written because we in -the Navy had been accused by National Socialist circles of not having -done enough to strengthen the Navy in the period previous to 1933. That -is why all these things were mentioned in that book. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the book was circulated among senior -officers in the Navy, was it not? - -RAEDER: Yes; at any rate, any of the senior officers who wanted it could -have it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you just turn to Page 127, or to Page -27 of the English book, which gives the preface? You will see at the end -of the first paragraph it says that it is to give a reliable picture of -the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace -Treaty of Versailles. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And in the third paragraph: - - “This memorandum is also meant to distinguish more clearly the - services of those men who, without being known to wide circles, - were ready to accept extraordinary responsibility in the service - of the fight against the peace treaty.” - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree, Defendant, that that preface -represents generally but accurately the feeling of the Navy with regard -to invading the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles? - -RAEDER: Yes, as regarding circumventing the Versailles Treaty as far as -necessary to improve our defenseless position, for reasons which I -explained recently here. To do this was a matter of honor for every man. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just turn over—it is Page 28, My Lord, and -it is Page 126 of your copy. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] It gives a summary of contents. You see, -it is in four sections. The first section deals with the first defensive -actions against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles, and then -enumerates what they were. Don’t trouble about that. The second is -independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government -and legislative bodies. - -RAEDER: In both cases it says: From the end of the war until taking over -the Ruhr in 1923; from 1923 until the Lohmann case in 1927. I had -nothing to do with either case. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see. From 1922 to 1924 you were -inspector of naval training at Kiel, were you not? - -RAEDER: Inspector of the training system; the schools, the further -training of officer candidates, the complete training of assistants of -the Chief of Staff, that is, chief-of-staff assistants, a sort of -general staff officer, and similar matters. I had nothing to do with -affairs of the front. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is what you were asked. You were asked whether you -were inspector of training. The answer was “yes,” was it not? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As inspector of training, are you telling the -Tribunal that you did not have a very complete knowledge of the weapons -available for your service? - -RAEDER: No, no. It was not a question of weapons visible for all to see. -As I explained to you recently, that was a matter of setting up gun -platforms and transferring guns from the North Sea to the Baltic. This -was done by a special command, which worked under the direct order of -the Chief of Navy; among others, there was this Kapitänleutnant Raenkel, -for instance, who was the specialist dealing with all gunnery questions -at the time. I myself was in Kiel, and there were no guns or anything of -the kind in Kiel and its neighborhood. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Take the next period from 1923 to 1927. From -1925 to 1928 you were Chef der Marine Station der Ostsee, were you not? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not -know about the independent armament measures taken behind the back of -the Reich Government? - -RAEDER: No; I had nothing at all to do with these affairs. I have -already said that was done by the Chief of the Naval Command Staff. I -knew in a general way... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you whether you ever had to do -with them, I am asking you whether you are saying that you did not know -about them. You knew all about them, did you not? - -RAEDER: I knew it in a general way, that such measures were being taken. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, take the next, Number III: “Planned -armament works tolerated by the Reichskabinet, but behind the back of -the legislative bodies.” The legislative bodies would be the Reichstag -and the Reichsrat, would they not? - -RAEDER: Yes. But I already said recently that it was not the military -commander-in-chief’s business to negotiate these matters with the -Reichstag. This was a matter for the Government. Herr Severing will also -testify to that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will hear Herr Severing when he comes. At the -moment I want you to tell the Tribunal this... - -RAEDER: [_Interposing._] I say the same... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just wait a minute; you have not heard my -question yet. What did you say to Captain Schüssler? Did you tell him -you are giving an entirely false picture in suggesting that the Navy had -anything to do with going behind the back of the Reichstag? Did you make -any effort to correct what Captain Schüssler was saying? - -RAEDER: No; I did not correct his book. I had no time for that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just before we come to Number IV, if you -just look, it’s page— - -My Lord, it is Page 32 of the English book, and Page 186 of your book. -This is part of Captain Schüssler’s description of Section II dealing -with economic rearmament; it comes under the heading, “Difficult Working -Conditions.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you see that? It begins: “There were -often difficult working conditions.” Do you see that? The heading is -“Difficult Working Conditions.” - -RAEDER: Yes I see, “Difficult Working Conditions.” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to look at the last part of it. -Now, I want it quite clear, Defendant. This is dealing with the period -from 1923 to 1927, before you were head of the Navy; so I want to ask -you about it. - - “There were often many external difficulties besides these for - the Tebeg—the camouflaging of the task and the work, the - distance separating them, the impossibility of settling any - questions even of minor importance by telephone, and the - necessity of avoiding if possible any written correspondence, - and of carrying it out in any case as private correspondence - with false names and disguised expressions.” - -Did you not know that that was the method by which it was being carried -on? - -RAEDER: No; I really knew very little about the Tebeg—the Tebeg, the -Navis—any of these things. But I think it was quite right for these -people to work like that, because at that time the attitude of a large -percentage of the German people was unreliable, and there was great -danger if these things leaked out. In any case, the Tebeg had been -dissolved when I arrived. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you kindly turn back to Page 126, in -Book 4, Page 28 of the English book, and just look at Captain -Schüssler’s description of the fourth period: “Armament under the -direction of the Reich Government in camouflaged form (from 1933 to 1935 -when we were free to recruit on an unrestricted basis.)” - -Do you agree that Captain Schüssler was giving an accurate description -of your methods from 1933 to 1935? - -RAEDER: How does he describe it? Where is that passage? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Number 4. - -RAEDER: “Armament under the leadership of the Reich Government in -camouflaged form”? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that it is a correct description of -your activities from 1933 to 1935? - -RAEDER: Of course. I did that on orders from the head of the State; and -before all the head of the State was very anxious to see that no -exaggerated measures should be taken, so that it would not interfere in -any way with his plans for making an agreement with Great Britain. He -allowed very little to be done with regard to the Navy. He could at once -have built eight armored ships, so many destroyers, and so many torpedo -boats, none of which had yet been built, but he did none of these things -because he said, “We do not want to create the impression that we are -arming on a large scale.” He approved only two... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have explained that; so note, Defendant, the -point is this—the “camouflaged form” when you were negotiating the -naval agreement. You did not want anyone to know what steps you had -taken contrary to the treaty and how far you had gone. That is the plain -fact of it—you wanted to get the naval agreement without disclosing -what you had done, isn’t that so? - -RAEDER: No, that distorts the sense of what I said. We did not want the -announcement of these measures to cause strained relations between -Germany and Britain. The measures as such were completely justifiable -and were extremely minor ones. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will come to that in a moment. I only do want, -before we leave these naval works, to ask you one question about another -book. You know that Oberst Scherff projected a history of the German -Navy. I don’t want any misunderstanding about it. As I understand the -position, you permitted Oberst Scherff to have recourse to the archives -of the Navy but beyond that you hadn’t seen anything of his work, isn’t -that right? - -RAEDER: I did not see his book at all. I saw the table of contents here -the first time I was interrogated. I did not give him the order, either; -he received it from the Führer; and for that reason I allowed the Chief -of the Navy Archives to assist him. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is exactly what I put to you. I want -you to turn to Book 10a. It starts at Page 1 in the English version and -also Page 1 in the German. And if you would look at Page 3 you will find -the proposed table of contents of Oberst Scherff’s book, Page 3 in the -English version. I think it must be about Page 3 in the German version, -too. Now would you look at the heading of Section 2. It is: -“Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State.” And then he -describes, “(a) National Socialism in the Navy before 1933”... - -RAEDER: Where is that? I have not found it yet. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Section 2 of the table of contents. - -RAEDER: No, that must be something quite different. I have not got it -here... - -I have got it now. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Section 2, which is: -“Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State.” And you can -see the proposed headings which were to cover some 30 pages: “National -Socialism in the Navy before 1933.” Then: “The oath of the Navy to the -Führer; the taking over of the National Insignia; the first alteration -of the flag and the New War flag.” Do you agree with Oberst Scherff’s -description? You agree that this is a correct description, that the -proceedings could be described as the incorporation of the Navy in the -National Socialist State? - -RAEDER: Of course—I explained that here recently—the Navy—the Armed -Forces—had to have some connection with the National Socialist State. A -democratic Navy in a monarchy is impossible. The basic principles must -agree. But I myself decided the extent to which these principles were -adopted—that is to the degree where the Navy maintained its internal -independence and yet occupied its appropriate position with regard to -the National Socialist State. - -Apart from that, I do not see any text here; I can only see the -headings. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that doesn’t offend you as a -description. That is all I wanted to get clear. I do not want to spend a -great deal of time. - -RAEDER: But the headings mean nothing. - -For instance, it might say in the actual text that the Navy did not fit -into the National Socialist State properly. I do not know. The same -holds good of the fleet. Of course... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to waste time on it. There were -three matters which you dealt with in your examination-in-chief, and I -am not going to deal with them in detail; but I just want to remind you -of them and put one general question. You can put that document away; I -am not going to pursue it further. Would you mind putting that document -away and giving me your attention for the next question? - -You were asked about the E-boats, your survey list, that long document, -in September 1933, and the question of disguised auxiliary cruisers as -transport ships O. Is this a fair summary of your answer: That you -admitted that these breaches of the Treaty took place, but said in each -case that the breach was only a little one. Is that a fair summary of -your answer? Is it? - -RAEDER: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s take it in bits, then. Are you -disputing that any of these matters with regard to the E-boats, the -matters on the survey lists or the transport ships O—are you disputing -that any of these matters took place? I understood, you admitted they -all did take place... - -RAEDER: No, they took place in the way I described. For instance, these -auxiliary cruisers were not built. We were not allowed to do that. But -we were allowed to make plans and we were allowed to select those ships -which, in the event of war—if a war had broken out in which Germany was -attacked by another state—could have been used as auxiliary cruisers. -That was not a violation. If it were I would admit it. The U-boat -designing office in Holland was not a violation of the Versailles Treaty -either. The wording was quite different; I do not remember the third -case which you mentioned. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember there was a long list in a -document, from yourself. - -RAEDER: Yes, of course. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I understood, maybe wrongly, that you -admitted these things took place, but you said “it is only a little -one.” - -RAEDER: Yes, of course. Those were small things, but they were urgently -necessary in Germany’s defense interests. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about an officer of -yours, Vice Admiral Assmann. Was he an officer in whom you had -confidence? - -RAEDER: He was a very able historian. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you answer my question? Was he an officer -in whom you had confidence? - -RAEDER: I had confidence that he would write history correctly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all I wanted. Now, would you have a look -at a new document, which is Document Number D-854, which, My Lord, will -be Exhibit Number GB-460. Now, that is an extract from one of a series -of essays on the operational and tactical considerations of the German -Navy and consequent measures taken for its expansion between 1919 and -1939, contained among the files of Vice Admirals Assmann and Gladisch, -who were in the historical section of the German Admiralty. - -Now, would you mind not looking at it for a moment, Defendant? I want to -ask you some questions and then you can look at it with pleasure -afterwards. Do you agree that in nearly all spheres of armament where -the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in the -letter and all the more in the spirit? Do you agree with that? - -RAEDER: No, by no means in every sphere. In the most important sphere we -were far behind the Versailles Treaty, as I explained to you very -clearly. Possibly we infringed on it the other way round, by not doing -as much as we could have done. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you just look at this document. At the -beginning of the first quotation your officers say: - - “But if—as was stated—in nearly all spheres of armament where - the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in - the letter and all the more in the spirit—or at least its - violation was prepared—a long time before the 16th of March - 1935...” - -Are your admirals wrong in stating that? Is that what you are telling -the Tribunal? - -RAEDER: May I please see which page this is on? I have not seen it yet. -Yes, he says, “in nearly all spheres of naval armament...” - -That is not the case, for in the sphere of... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That’s what I put to you; is that right? - -RAEDER: No, it is not right. We had not even built as many ships as we -could have built, but—as I have explained repeatedly, the violations -were concerned with... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You’ve explained that. - -RAEDER: ...violations were... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, we do know the position of your -shipbuilding yards. You’ve given that explanation and it’s a matter of -discussion whether it’s of any value. I am not going to argue with you. -I am asking you this question: Are you saying that the admirals of your -historical section are wrong in that sentence that I read out to you? - -RAEDER: Yes, I am stating that. It is wrong as it stands. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now let’s pass on—the Tribunal -will judge that—to the statement of Admiral Assmann. It goes on: - - “This probably took place in no other sphere, on the one hand so - early, and on the other hand under such difficult circumstances, - as in the construction of a new submarine arm. The Treaty of - Versailles had only been in force a few months (since 10 January - 1920) when it was already violated in this point.” - -Do you agree with Admiral Assmann on that? - -RAEDER: No, he is wrong. It was not violated at all in this point, and -the reason it started so early was because all the ex-U-boat commanders -and U-boat officers and technicians were out of a job and offered their -services to maintain technical developments in U-boats abroad; that is -why it was so early. But that has nothing to do with me because I had no -say in these matters then. At that time I was working on the Navy -Archives. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, how are you able to be so confident today -that Admiral Assmann is wrong? I thought you said that he was a good -historian. He had not to go back very far. He only goes back 20 years. - -RAEDER: A good historian can make mistakes too if his information is -wrong. I merely said I had confidence in him... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say quite in detail—the first paragraph is -about Japan. - -RAEDER: Yes; what he says about the building of U-boats is wrong. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let’s just see how far he was wrong. We -needn’t go into the first paragraph which deals with shipbuilding for -Japan, but take the second one: “In 1922...” Do you see the paragraph -which begins: - - “As early as 1922, three German shipbuilding yards established a - German U-boat designing office in Holland under a Dutch cover - name with about 30 engineers and designers. In 1925 a Dutch - shipbuilding yard built two 500-ton U-boats for Turkey according - to the plans of this bureau, which enjoyed the financial and - personal support of the Naval Command. In the solution of this - question, too, Kapitän zur See Lohmann was concerned - decisively.” - -Is that right? - -RAEDER: We have admitted that. That was in no way a violation of the -Versailles Treaty. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We’ll not argue that, but it’s right anyway. -Admiral Assmann’s right about that. Then he deals with Finland and with -Spain. And, if you look at the end of the paragraph after dealing with -Spain, he says: - - “Already in the autumn of 1927 the Naval Designing Department - was commissioned to carry out construction in Spain by the Chief - of the Naval Command Staff, Admiral Zenker, who accepted the - responsibility despite all the difficulties in the field of home - politics. The working out of the project and the drawing up of - the construction plans took place in the Dutch Bureau. After - completion in 1931, the ship carried out trial runs and diving - exercises from Cadiz to Cartagena, under German direction and - with German personnel, consisting of officers, engineers, naval - construction students and foremen.” - -That’s all. That’s quite right, isn’t it? - -RAEDER: Yes, but the shipbuilding designer from our designing office, in -particular, as well as the above-named other persons employed on U-boat -construction, were discharged from the Navy. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at the last sentence: “This boat -which is now the Turkish submarine _Gür_ became the prototype for the -_U-25_ and _U-26_.” - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the 250-ton submarines which were made in -Finland. And, if you look at the last sentence of the next paragraph: - - “The Finnish U-boat was the first U-boat plan to be worked out - in Germany and successfully carried out; the Dutch bureau was - called upon only to work out the details. - - “The Finnish 250-ton vessel became the prototype for _U-1_ to - _U-24._” - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And now the next paragraph: - - “The building and the thorough trial of the prototype vessel - made it possible to obtain the parts for _U-1_ to _U-24_ in 1933 - to 1935, long before the order for the assembly of the vessels; - and the latter was prepared beforehand as far as was possible - without endangering secrecy.” - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you turn on to Page 156. You see -where the next quotation is from: - - “At the beginning of 1935”—that is 6 months before the - Anglo-German Treaty—“there were probably six 250-ton boats - ready for assembly, six 275-ton and two 750-ton boats on which - preparatory work was being done. About 4 months were needed for - assembling the small ships and about 10 months for the big ones, - dating from 1 February 1935, but everything else was still quite - uncertain.” - -Now, look at the next words: - - “It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction - that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the - German-British Treaty. - - “Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been - ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to - 1938. In reality 118 were completed and under construction. - - “The preparations for the new U-boat arm were made so early, so - thoroughly and so carefully, that already 11 days after the - conclusion of the German-British Naval Treaty, which permitted - the construction of U-boats, the first German U-boat could be - put into commission on 29 June 1935.” - -Now, take that sentence, which is written by Admiral Assmann, and we’ve -seen what your connections with Assmann were through about 100 -documents. He said: “It is probably in this very sphere of submarine -construction that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the -German-British Treaty.” - -Now, you’ve told this Tribunal for about several hours of your evidence -that that was a freely negotiated treaty of which you were very proud -and which you were ready to support. Are you telling the Tribunal that -your admirals are wrong in saying that in submarine construction Germany -adhered the least to the restrictions of that freely negotiated treaty? - -RAEDER: That is a completely false judgment. I have stated here that, as -long as no negotiations with Great Britain had taken place with regard -to the pending agreement, all the preparations which we did make were -exclusively attended to abroad—that in the proportion which probably... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you can make your explanation... - -RAEDER: Will you please stop interrupting me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We’ll take it in this order, and don’t get cross -about it. You answer my question, and then you make your explanation. -Now answer my question first. Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is -wrong in saying in that first sentence that it was just in the “sphere -of submarine construction that Germany adhered least to the restrictions -of the German-British Treaty.” Is Admiral Assmann wrong when he says -that, is that what you’re telling the Tribunal? Well, that is my -question. - -RAEDER: He is wrong. I said so; I have already said so. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe these are not questions relating -to facts. They are questions for legal decisions. It is a legal argument -as to just how Article 191 of the Versailles Treaty is to be -interpreted. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the question is quite proper. In -his explanation, of course, he can explain that in his view it was not a -breach of the Treaty and he has already explained that. He can give us -his opinion about it. He was the head of the German Navy. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you take the second sentence... - -RAEDER: But I should like to finish if I may. I can give an explanation -of that. - -All these things were only preparations made outside Germany. The point -under discussion is whether the Finnish U-boats were constructed with -the help of German designers. That is true. German designers were not -forbidden to help Finnish designers to draft designs for U-boats. It is -also true that this U-boat later... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m awfully sorry to interrupt you, but you know -this isn’t dealing—this sentence isn’t dealing with this early period. -This is dealing with the period after the Anglo-German Treaty in 1935 -and that’s what I want you to answer me about. This Finnish matter was -long before that. - -RAEDER: I am still speaking of the period preceding the agreement, for I -was accused of manufacturing U-boat parts abroad. And the fact is -that... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I know, but don’t you see that... - -RAEDER: I have not given my answer yet. No... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you about that. I like you to -answer the right question. I’m not asking you about the question of -Versailles any longer. I’m asking you about Admiral Assmann’s assertion -that you did not adhere to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty -in 1935, and what you did in Finland in the 20’s has nothing to do with -that. Now, that’s all. You can give your explanation. - -RAEDER: That is entirely wrong. We particularly restricted ourselves -with regard to the construction of U-boats; and in 1938 we had still not -built the 45 percent which we were entitled to build, so we made an -application for permission to build up to 100 percent; and this was -agreed on, and came into effect, as appears from the text of the English -treaty, after a friendly discussion with the British Admiralty at the -end of 1938. At the beginning of the war we still did not have 100 -percent. We were always behind with the construction of submarines. - -Admiral Assmann, who probably had no up-to-date knowledge of these -matters, is quite wrong. I can swear to that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next sentences. This is -dealing... - -RAEDER: What page are you speaking of? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 156. I will read it very slowly again: - - “Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been - ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to - 1938. In reality 118 were completed and under construction.” - -Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong when he states that? - -RAEDER: I am awfully sorry; I still have not got the passage from which -you are reading, that is quite—which line... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the sentence, Defendant? - -RAEDER: Yes, I have found it now. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you see what Admiral Assmann says, -that: - - “Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been - ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to - 1938.” That is before there was any mention of going from 45 to - 100. “In reality 118 were completed and under construction.” - -Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong in giving these figures? - -RAEDER: Certainly. In 1939 we entered the war with 40 submarines—I do -not know the exact number. This is either a misprint or quite an -incredible figure. As you know, we started the war with—I think—26 -U-boats capable of sailing the Atlantic, and in addition a number of -smaller boats. I cannot tell you for certain now what was under -construction at the beginning of the war but there was no intention of -this kind. That was precisely the accusation made against me—that I did -not have sufficient U-boats built in good time. I dispute the whole of -that sentence. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree then, Defendant, that Admiral -Assmann’s figures are quite incompatible with what you have told the -Tribunal about the number of U-boats with which you started the war? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should be grateful to Sir David if he would read the -entire sentence; that is, if he would also read Note 6, which appears -after the Number 118 and after the word “ordered.” Note 6 which, as I -have just observed, is not included in the English translation is worded -as follows: “Chief of the Naval Budget Department, B. Number E 311/42, -Top Secret, of 19 November 1942.” - -The figure, Mr. President, refers to a much later period, not 1938 at -all. - -I should be extremely grateful if, after the experience we have just -had, I could in future have not only the German document but also the -English translation from Sir David. I should be very grateful to Sir -David if he could have this done. - -THE PRESIDENT: Could you not have the passage you want translated from -the German into English by the time you want to re-examine? As I -understand it, you are referring to some note which is an addition to -what has been translated into English. Will you read it again, would you -read the passage again? - -DR. SIEMERS: Sir David has been reading the following: “In reality 118 -were completed and under construction.” - -That is as far as Sir David has read. After the word “ordered” there is -the figure 6. This refers to Note 6. Note 6 is worded as follows: “Chief -of the Naval Budget Department, B. Number E 311/42, Top Secret, of 19 -November 1942. (Page 19).” - -In other words, this shows that the Number 118 must have been mentioned -on Page 19 of this document of the Naval Budget Department in 1942. The -figure therefore does not refer to the year 1938 but to a later date. - -RAEDER: I can add another explanation to that which is quite possible. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will look into that, but the text -says—and there is no difference in the German text—exactly what I -read—that “about 55 could have been provided up to 1938 and that in -reality 118 were ready and ordered.” That is Admiral Assmann’s text. - -DR. SIEMERS: But not 1938. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, My Lord, my friend, Dr. Siemers, will -have ample opportunity—if there is any point, I shall consider it, but -there is the text, and the text includes that. What the footnote says, -Dr. Siemers, can be put in re-examination. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Sir David, will you look at the note and see -if the report was made in 1942, rather than the construction? I suggest -that you ask him whether or not the note doesn’t show that the report -was made in 1942. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, my translation of this note is “Chief of -the Naval Budget Department.” Then it gives the reference to his note, -dated 19 November 1942. It seems entirely to bear out the suggestion of -the learned American Judge, that this is the reference to the report, -nothing more. It is only suggesting that the date of construction was -1942, and I think it really would be a matter of convenience that, -unless Dr. Siemers has got something to say on the text that I am -putting, if he reserved these argumentative points to re-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you can raise it all in re-examination. You -can have a translation of this note laid before us by that time. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I am perfectly agreeable. I have merely -requested that one copy of the English translation of the newly -submitted documents should be given to me. - -Mr. President, you will admit that it is a considerable handicap to me -to ascertain during the cross-examination what passages are missing from -the translation and translate them myself when the British Delegation -have an English translation on hand. I think it might be easier if Sir -David would be good enough to let me have an English translation for my -own use. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you will be able to let him have an English -translation of any new document? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. The Tribunal has ordered that. That -is prepared. Surely you got the English translation? Certainly, My Lord. -As I put each document, a translation will be given to Dr. Siemers. - -THE PRESIDENT: There may have been some mistake. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will certainly get it. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, we will pass to another gentleman on -your staff. You told us a good deal about the naval budgets. Do you -remember a Flottenintendant in your department, Secretary -Flottenintendant Thiele, of the OKM Department E, the Budget Department -of the German Admiralty? Do you remember? - -RAEDER: Yes. Mr. Prosecutor, may I just say one more thing about the -question of 118? I have just remembered something in connection with -this Number 6, Chief of the Naval Budget Department. It is perfectly -possible that in this case Admiral Assmann has taken two things -together. All U-boats and ships were, of course, included in the budget -and in this way sanctioned. This budget was drafted at the end of the -year and published before the year to which it applied. As this large -figure suddenly appears in this document, it is perfectly possible that -here the Figure 118 originates on the basis of the agreement with -England made on 30 or 31 December. It is perfectly natural that we -should include in the budget all the other U-boats which we were allowed -to build to complete the 100 percent. This does not necessarily mean -that we started to build the U-boats in 1938. Incidentally I think we -might have perhaps begun, because one can only build so and so many -U-boats in any one year. - -I think that this explanation, which occurred to me when I saw the words -“Naval Budget Department,” is a perfectly correct one. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal has the wording; that is, “up to -1938,” and I am not going to argue the point with you. The words speak -for themselves. - -I would like you to look at Document Number D-855, which becomes Exhibit -Number GB-461, and it is an extract from a lecture by the gentleman I -have just mentioned, Herr Thiele, which was given at the German Naval -Training Center for Administrative Officers in Prague on 12 July 1944. -The extract I want to put to you is on Page 22, and it is headed “Ship -Construction Plan.” Have you got that—Page 22, and the heading is “Ship -Construction Plan”? You see the paragraph beginning: - - “The era of the very large development of the Navy had therefore - come at the moment of the seizure of power. Already in the first - year after this, in March 1935, the construction of battle - cruisers with a displacement of 27,000 tons was undertaken. Such - a vessel was ordered to be constructed. Thus one of the clauses - of the Treaty of Versailles which was the most important for us - was at once violated in the naval sphere in a manner which in a - short time could no longer be camouflaged.” - -Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right when he says that in his lecture? - -RAEDER: Of course it was a violation, but I have explained here at -length that there was no question of building new battle cruisers but of -utilizing the two armored ships which had already been granted us; and I -said that in 1934 Hitler had only given me permission to enlarge -somewhat the plans for these ships, so that the armor might be heavier. -I see from this that it was not until March 1935, when it was certain -that the treaty would be concluded and also that England would allow us -to build such ships through this treaty in a few months’ time that the -Führer sanctioned the plans projected for the 26,500 ton ships which -were to be the first of the battleships in the new program; and they -were then begun. So that the three 28 cm turrets—that is, the offensive -weapons which he had not yet approved in 1934—were thrown in. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This gentleman seems to agree with you more than -the other. Just look at what he says about U-boats two sentences further -on. He says: - - “The U-boats were completed in separate parts, as their - construction was under no circumstances to be apparent to the - outside world. These parts were stored in sheds for the time - being and needed only to be assembled after the declaration of - freedom to rearm.” - -Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that point? - -RAEDER: Yes, he is right. We have admitted that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at his next point. - -RAEDER: Perhaps I can complete my explanation? We... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do try to keep it as short as you can. I don’t -want to cut you out, but keep it as short as you can. - -RAEDER: Of course, but I must complete my defense. - -We had U-boat parts manufactured abroad and only at the beginning of -1935 did we bring them in and assemble them, when the naval treaty was -certain. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You say you were anticipating the treaty; -well now, just look at what he says after that: - - “The third also of those clauses of the Treaty of Versailles - that was most disadvantageous for us, the limitation of - personnel to 15,000 men, was immediately ignored after the - seizure of power. The total personnel of the Navy was already - 25,000 in 1934, and in 1935, the year of the London Naval - Agreement, 34,000 men.” - -Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that? Is that right? - -RAEDER: Yes, that is admitted. It was clear that we had to train -personnel in good time so that crews might be available for our -increased naval forces. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now I just want you to look for a moment -at the document which is on Page 3 of Document Book 10, which you did -refer to in your examination-in-chief. That is Document C-23, about the -displacement of the _Scharnhorst_ and the _Gneisenau_ and the _Tirpitz_ -and the _Bismarck_ and the other ships. - -Now, you are familiar with that document; we have discussed it. - -RAEDER: Yes. I know the documents. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, that is dated the 18th of February, -1938. Germany didn’t denounce the Anglo-German Naval Treaty until after -the British guarantee to Poland in April 1939, which is 14 months later. -Why didn’t you simply send a notification to Great Britain that the -displacements had come out 20 percent bigger because of defensive -matters in construction? Why didn’t you do it? - -RAEDER: I cannot tell you that today. We explained recently how the -displacements gradually increased through quite insignificant changes to -our own detriment. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Really, Defendant, I have got that well in -mind. We have got the reason why the displacements came out bigger, and -I don’t think you are prejudicing yourself if you don’t repeat it, but -just look at the bottom of that page, because I think you will find the -reason which you can’t remember there; won’t you? - - “In the opinion of A IV, it would be quite wrong to report a - larger tonnage than that which will probably be published - shortly, for instance, by England, Russia, or Japan, so as not - to bring upon ourselves the odium of an armament race.” - -Isn’t that the reason? - -RAEDER: Yes, that was intended for a future date. We wished in no -circumstance to create the impression that we were increasing the -offensive power of our ships. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I am going to pass to another -subject, and I want to put quite shortly and bluntly, as you will -appreciate, the point the Prosecution puts to you, that for 20 years, -from 1918 to 1938, you and the German Navy had been involved in a course -of complete, cold and deliberate deception of your treaty obligations. -That is what I am putting to you. Do you understand? After these -documents, do you deny that that is so? - -RAEDER: Of course. It was not a cold-blooded affair. All our evasions of -the Versailles Treaty were due to our desire to be able to defend our -country more efficiently than we had been allowed to. I have proved here -that in the Versailles regulations the only points restricted were those -unfavorable to the defense of our country and favoring aggression from -without. As regards the ships, I may add that we could never complete -any very great number of ships, and consequently we were interested in -increasing as far as possible the power of resistance, that is, their -seagoing security, _et cetera_. At no time did we increase the offensive -power above the strength which was permitted. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I want you to understand what my next -series of questions is directed to. I don’t want there to be any -misapprehension. I am now going to suggest to you that these breaches of -treaty and your naval plans were directed toward the possibility, and -then the probability of war. I would just like you to take the same -document that I have been dealing with, C-23. We will use that to pass -from one to the other. - -Would you turn to Page 5 of Document Book 10, and there you will see -that there is a memorandum, I think of the Planning Committee to the -Flottenchef, Admiral Carls. We have heard your view of Admiral Carls, -that you thought he was a very good officer, and in fact he was your -first choice for your successor. - -Now, that is in September 1938, and it is a top secret opinion on the -strategic study of naval warfare against England, and you see “A” says: - - “There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.” - -Now, look at Paragraph 1: - - “If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to acquire a - position as a world power, she needs not only sufficient - colonial possessions, but also secure naval communications and - secure access to the oceans.” - -Do you agree with that, Defendant? - -RAEDER: Yes, that is correct. I know the whole document. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at 2: - - “Both these requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to - Anglo-French interests, and would limit their position as world - powers. It is unlikely that this can be achieved by peaceful - means. The decision to make Germany a world power, therefore, - forces upon us the necessity of making corresponding - preparations for war.” - -Do you agree with that? - -RAEDER: Yes, that is all quite correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s take 3: - - “War against England means at the same time war against the - Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well, and a - large number of countries overseas—in fact, against half to - two-thirds of the whole world.” - -I needn’t ask you about that, because the facts have shown it. - -Now, look at the next: “It can only be justified....” - -RAEDER: Yes, but I must be allowed to comment on that document. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh certainly, I’m sorry. We got on so quickly I -thought we were not going to have any explanation. - -RAEDER: In 1938, as has been stated here quite often, the Führer’s -attitude towards Great Britain became more difficult in spite of all the -efforts of General Von Blomberg and myself to tell him that it was not -so on England’s side, and that it was possible to live in peace with -England. In spite of that the Führer ordered us to prepare for possible -opposition by England to his plans. He for his part never contemplated a -war of aggression against Great Britain; and we in the Navy still much -less; in fact, I have proved that I did nothing but try to dissuade him -from that. In 1938 he ordered us to make a study similar to those we had -already made in the case of other possibilities of war—which it was the -duty of the Wehrmacht Command to do—but dealing with the course which a -war against England might take and what we would require for it. This -study was prepared, and I reported to the Führer that we could never -increase our fighting forces to such an extent that we could undertake a -war against England with any prospect of success—it would have been -madness for me to say such a thing. I told him—that has repeatedly been -mentioned—that by 1944 or 1945 we might build up a small naval force -with which we could start an economic war against England or seize her -commercial shipping routes, but that we would never really be in a -position to defeat England with that force. I sent this study, which was -compiled under my guidance in the Naval Operations Staff, to -Generaladmiral Carls who was very clear-sighted in all such questions. -He thought it his duty to explain in this introduction of his reply, -which agreed with our opinion, the consequences which such a war against -Great Britain would have for ourselves, namely, that it would bring -about a new world war, which neither he nor we in the Navy nor anyone in -the Armed Forces wanted—in my opinion, not even Hitler himself, as I -proved the other day—hence this statement. He said that if we must have -war with England, it was essential that we should first of all have -access to the ocean and, secondly, that we should attack English trade -on the sea route of the Atlantic. Not that he proposed that we, on our -part, should embark on such a venture. He was only thinking of the case -of such a war breaking out very much against our will. It was our duty -to go thoroughly into the matter. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He says that, “The war against it”—that is the -war against England—“can only be justified and have a chance of success -if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily.” -Then you go on to say “waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an -outlet to the ocean.” - -Now, I just want to see how you prepared. - -RAEDER: Yes, that is quite clear and quite correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s just look how you had begun to prepare -economically. Let’s take that first, as you put it first. - -Would you look at Document C-29, which is Page 8. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, hadn’t we better break off now before going -into this? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I told you, Defendant, that I was next going to -ask you a question about Document C-29, which is on Page 8 of the -English Document Book 10 and on Pages 13 and 14 of the German document -book. You will remember, this document gives general directions for -export given by the German Navy to the German armament industry... - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...and you told us when you were dealing with -the document that you wanted your service not to be small-minded about -matters of a not very high secrecy but, in addition to that, your -general policy was that the German armament firms should develop a -foreign trade so that they would have the capacity to deal with the -increased demands of the German Navy as soon as possible. Is that right, -is that a fair summary, or shall I repeat it? - -RAEDER: Yes, but it must be added that I said in two places that we -hoped at that time that the Treaty of Versailles would be relaxed, -because it was a comparatively favorable period for negotiations for -disarmament and we already had the governments headed by Von Papen and -Von Schleicher, both of whom showed great understanding for the needs of -the Armed Forces and therefore fought hard for that at the disarmament -conference. So a definitely legal development might be hoped for in this -direction; and on the other hand, our entire industry was unable to cope -with armaments production except on an insignificant scale and had -therefore to be increased. I again stress the fact that it had nothing -to do with the Hitler regime. That decree just happened to come out on -31 January. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think you are really disagreeing with me -that your policy, your broad economic policy for the German armament -industry, was to develop its export trade so as to be able to deal with -increased home requirements in future years; that is what you advocated, -isn’t it, that the German armament industry should at once increase its -export trade so as to be able to deal with increased home requirements -when these requirements arose? Isn’t that right? - -RAEDER: Yes, that is correct but I do not quite understand that -expression. Did you say “Eigenhandel” or “Eisenhandel”—internal trade -or iron trade? I did not quite hear the expression—“Eigenhandel” or -“Eisenhandel”? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Aussenhandel” (Foreign Trade). - -RAEDER: “Aussenhandel”—yes, undoubtedly we wanted to be able to compete -industrially with other nations, so that our industry would be in -favorable position, and would gain strength. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I will ask you to turn to Document Number -C-135, which is Page 21 of the—sorry My Lord, Page 20 of the English -document book and Page 73 of the German document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Book 10. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Book 10, My Lord, yes. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, you remember that document, you dealt -with it? You said... - -RAEDER: Yes, it was dealt with in the Lohmann affidavit. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is a document of the—I think, in April -1933, judging by the dates which I put to you a moment ago, and you said -to the Tribunal in giving your evidence that it was mere chance that the -year 1938 was mentioned; that that was the same period as has been dealt -with. - -RAEDER: It has already been stated several times that the year 1938 was -mentioned. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Has it been mentioned in some Weimar Republic -document? Will you just look at the second last paragraph; that will be -on your Page 74, Page 21 of the English document. It is in the middle -paragraph of Paragraph 3: - - “Now Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler had made the clear political - request to build up for him in 5 years, that is, by the first of - April 1938, armed forces which he could place in the balance as - an instrument of political power.” - -Is that sure, that Hitler had made a clear political request? - -RAEDER: Yes, as far as I remember, he demanded a sort of five year plan -in 1933 the last year of which, 1938, happened to coincide with the 1938 -mentioned in our substitute plan for subsurface construction, and that -directive had obviously been given for the whole of the Armed Forces; -since the naval agreement, which gave us the right to arm only in the -proportion of 1:3 and not in accordance with any special plans, had -become the basis for the Navy as early as 1935. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The point that I want to deal with is this: Did -Hitler tell you that he wanted these forces to place in the balance as -an instrument of political power, did he tell you that? - -RAEDER: I can no longer tell you that; but I believe that it is a -perfectly ordinary expression to say that one uses one’s armed forces as -an instrument which could also be thrown into the scales at political -negotiations, so that we need no longer be kicked around by the -different nations, as had so far been the case. In my opinion, no -suspicion attaches to the expression. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To put it bluntly, Hitler was telling you, “by -1938 I want armed forces that I can use in war, if war should become -necessary.” That is what it means, isn’t it? That is what you understood -it to mean, isn’t that right? - -RAEDER: No. There was no word about a war, only about the fact that we -had to keep our position among the other nations so that we could no -longer be tossed aside, as had hitherto been the case. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If anyone tried to push you over, you could -fight; that is it, wasn’t it? - -RAEDER: That is obvious. That would be the case, of course, if we were -attacked. We wanted to be in a position to defend ourselves if we were -attacked. Up till that point we were unable to do this. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let us take the first example, when -you contemplated fighting. If you look at Document Book 10a, Document -Number C-140, Page 104 of the English translation and Page 157 of the -German version, you remember that is the directive of Field Marshal Von -Blomberg on Germany leaving the disarmament conference and League of -Nations. And there, there is a pretty full general directive as to what -military measures you would take if the members of the League of Nations -applied sanctions against you; in other words you were quite prepared... - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...for a war happening on that peace policy; -that is so, isn’t it, and that is what it says, it gives all -preparations ready for fighting? - -RAEDER: These preparations were made, if I remember correctly, 11 days -after we had left the League of Nations, and it was quite natural that, -if the Führer believed that in consequence of our leaving the League of -Nations, which was quite a peaceful action in itself, warlike measures -or sanctions would be applied against us, we would have to defend -ourselves; and if such an attack was probable we had to take these -preparatory steps. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you realized, Defendant, that as early as -October 1933 the course of Hitler’s foreign policy might have brought -about an immediate war, did you not? - -RAEDER: No, I did not expect at all that such a measure as the secession -from the League of Nations, where we had always been treated unjustly -because we had no power behind us, would result in a war with any other -power. Nevertheless, it was right to take such eventualities into -consideration. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is good enough for me. - -Now, just let us look at the same document book, Document Number C-153, -on Page 107 of the English version and Page 164 to 167 of the German -version. That is, you will remember, your armament plan for the third -armament phase, and I would just like you first of all to look at -Paragraph 3. - -In (a) and (b) of Paragraph 3 you give the general basis for your -arrangements: - - “(a) For the military leaders a sound basis for their strategic - considerations, and - - “(b) For the political leaders a clear picture of what may be - achieved with the military means available at a given time.” - -RAEDER: Yes, it is quite obvious that such a plan would have this -purpose. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that your political leaders were to make -their plans on what armed forces you had available for war, if -necessary. That was what you were contemplating then, was it not? - -RAEDER: Yes, that is a matter of course; I reported to the Führer that I -could put a certain military strength at his disposal during that year. -The Chief of State must know that in order to know what he can count on. -But that has nothing to do with plans for war. That is the case in every -state. On the other hand, I cannot influence the political leader as to -what he wants. I can only report what I could have. Therefore, I had -nothing to do with political matters. I only did what is necessary and -what is done in every state. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at Paragraph 7. - -I am not going to argue with you as to whether states base their foreign -politics on things other than war as a matter of argument, but look at -Paragraph 7: “All theoretical and practical R-preparations (armament) -are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a sudden war.” - -That is that you, as far as the Navy was concerned, you had to be ready -then for an immediate war footing, have the Navy on an immediate war -footing, isn’t that right? - -RAEDER: No, no. This concerns the sequence of the things to be taken for -granted. The armament plan listed the most important immediate -requirements of the Navy and at that point I say here that this applied -to weapons to be used in a war where there was no time to prepare and -that is, in plain language, the mobile fleet, which must be in a state -of constant readiness. It had to be kept ready for action at a moment’s -notice and it had to receive priority. All other matters, such as -quarters, and things that had nothing to do with direct combat, were -attended to afterwards. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought that is what I put to you, that the -fleet had to be ready and ready for war. However, you have given your -account of it. - -Just turn over, if you will be so good, to Page 66 of Document Book 10, -Page 285 of the German document book; Document Number C-189, My Lord. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I want to raise just this one point -on which you made a point in your examination and which I must -challenge. You say in Paragraph 2: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy expresses the opinion that - later on”—and I ask you to note the words “later on”—“the - fleet must anyhow be developed against England and that - therefore from 1936 onwards the large ships must be armed with - 35 centimeter guns.” - -Now, are you telling the Tribunal, that “gegen England” does not mean -“against” in the sense of in antagonism to, directed against, in -opposition to—that it merely means in comparison to? Are you seriously -saying that, are you? - -RAEDER: I explained the other day that we are dealing here with the -question of keeping up with other navies. Up to that time we were -keeping up with the French Navy which had 33 cm guns. Then England went -beyond that in mounting 35.6 cm guns on her ships and then, as I said -before, France went beyond England in using 38 cm guns. Thus I said to -the Führer that our 28 cm guns which we believed we could use against -the French _Dunkerque_ class would not be heavy enough, and that we -would have to take the next bigger caliber, that is 35.6 like those of -the English ships. That was never done because the French began to use -38 cm guns and our _Bismarck_ class followed the French lines. - -That comparison of calibers and classes of vessels was at that time -quite customary and was also... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told us all that before and my question is a -perfectly simple one; that this document in the original German, when -you say “gegen England” is exactly the same as in your song _Wir fahren -gegen England_. It means against, in antagonism and directed against, -and not in comparison. That is what I am putting to you and it is a -perfectly short point. - -Are you telling this Tribunal that “gegen England” means in comparison -with England? - -RAEDER: That is what I want to say; because it says “develop gegen -England” and at that time we had not even signed the Naval Agreement. It -is hardly likely that I would consider following an anti-British policy. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look to the next page, Document Number C-190, -Page 67 of the English document book, Page 284 of the German document -book. That is your conversation with Hitler, on the 2nd November 1934, -when you are discussing bigger naval estimates and the availability of -more money. I want you to look at the end of the first paragraph which -gives Hitler’s reasons. - -“He considers it vital that the Navy be increased as planned”—now -look—“as no war could be carried on if the Navy were not able to -safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia.” - -Are you still telling the Tribunal you were not from 1934 onwards -contemplating war? Well, if so, why does Hitler say that? That is one of -the most vital points of German naval strategy. - -“No war could be carried on if the Navy were not able to safeguard the -ore imports from Sweden.” - -Were you not contemplating war in November? Were you not? - -RAEDER: Hitler said that a navy is built so that, if war becomes -necessary, the navy can use its weapons to defend the country. A navy is -established for no other purpose, and that was definitely one of the -general reasons for the existence of a German Navy. There were many -people who thought a navy was unnecessary. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, what I am putting to you is this. You -have told the Tribunal that the Navy was purely defensive, all your -preparations were purely defensive. I am suggesting to you that Hitler -there is contemplating a war and contemplating the task of a navy during -a war, a few months before he intended to denounce the military clauses -of Versailles. - -You were all set for a war if it should become necessary, and you knew -that. Was that not the position? - -RAEDER: That is a complete misrepresentation of the facts, Mr. -Prosecutor. Of course it is necessary during peacetime to contemplate -the circumstances which might arise to make it necessary to call on the -Armed Forces for defense. At that time nobody thought of a war of -aggression, and the individual tasks must be understood. One of the -Navy’s tasks was undoubtedly to secure the Swedish and Norwegian ore -exports in case of war; and it had to be developed with a view to that -end. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you just look at the next sentence in -Paragraph-2: “When I pointed out that in the critical political -situation in the first quarter of 1935, it would be desirable to have -six U-boats already assembled....” - -You were preparing for the critical political situation. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s look at what you were doing in 1936. Would -you give the defendant and Dr. Siemers Document Number D-806. - -That is a report of yours dated the 11th of November 1936, dealing with -the U-boat construction program, and after the first paragraph you say -this in the second paragraph: - - “The military and political situation urgently demands that the - extension of our U-boat fleet should be taken in hand - immediately and completed with the greatest energy and dispatch, - as it is a particularly valuable part of our armament at sea and - possesses special striking power.” - -Are you saying that what you were urging there was purely defensive and -that you had no idea of the special striking powers that would be needed -in a war? - -RAEDER: The entire political situation, or so I seem to remember, made -me consider it necessary to put the construction of submarines in the -foreground. But I never expected that we would start a war on our own -account. Hitler himself had told me that again and again, but he had -made his political moves which could undoubtedly lead us into war if the -other powers intervened against such a political move. The charge made -against me was that I did not push the construction of U-boats -sufficiently far ahead. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are stressing it sufficiently there, aren’t -you? “On the military and political situation”—you were kept fully -informed of the political situation and were adjusting your naval -armament accordingly; isn’t that so? - -RAEDER: At that time I not only knew nothing about what was going to -happen, but I knew that we had occupied the Rhineland during that year, -and that in consequence of the clouds which appeared on the horizon as a -result of the occupation of the Rhineland Hitler maintained an attitude -of greatest caution and said that we must be prepared for further -complications. For that reason a special directive was issued in 1936, -and I took precautions along the lines suggested by these -considerations. My main duty was to watch; and on the basis of my -observations and the conclusions which I drew from them, I had to -strengthen myself as much as possible. This document, about which you -did not question me, had the same connotation. - -I asked whether—should political tension develop at the beginning of -1935, before the signing of the Naval Agreement, and that would not be -done till June—we should perhaps assemble six U-boats. That was also in -the case of tension arising; and I knew at that time that the -declaration of freedom of territorial defense was intended to be made in -1935. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, you have told us what you knew in -1936. Now, just let’s pass on to 1937. I want to know exactly what you -say. That of course, as you remember, turns on the Hossbach Document, -386-PS, which is at Page 81 of Document Book 10, Page 314 of the German -document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, did you give the number of that last document? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful, My Lord. It is Exhibit -GB-462. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I want you just—have you got that, -Page 314 of the German document book? - -RAEDER: Can you tell me the paragraph? I have... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, the first thing I want to ask you about is -the third paragraph, the last sentence, where Hitler is reported as -saying: “The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the -solution of the need for living space.” - -And then I wanted you, if you would be so good, to turn over two pages -to 316. My Lord, it is Page 83 of the English document book. That is -repeated. My Lord, it is about seven lines down. Where Hitler says: “The -only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of -greater living space.” And then he says that: “The history of all times -has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking -resistance.” And then in a separate paragraph he says: “The question for -Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at the -lowest cost.” - -Do you see that, on Page 316? - -RAEDER: May I begin with the last one? It is wrongly translated. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that’s what I’m really going to ask you. I -want you to just tell us, did you hear Hitler say that that was the -general problem, “the greatest possible conquest to be made at the -lowest cost.” - -RAEDER: No. The English document has the word “conquest” (Eroberung), -but that is not in the German document. The German text reads: “the -highest possible gain (Gewinn) with the smallest risk.” That is a phrase -borrowed from sport. There is no mention of conquest. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m quite prepared to accept that it comes after -the passage which I have referred to you in quite some detail, because I -don’t want to select anything out of the context. Did you appreciate -that Hitler there was saying, “The only possibility for Germany is to -get extra living space,” and that had to be got at the expense of other -nations? He said that, didn’t he? - -RAEDER: He did say that; and I explained recently how that is to be -understood. He was speaking of Austria and Czechoslovakia, of the -Sudetenland. We were of the opinion that no change was intended in that -policy; nor did one take place later. War was not waged against Austria -or Czechoslovakia. - -We were all convinced that he would solve that question peacefully, like -all other political questions. I explained that in great detail. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what I was going to ask you -about. You have taken my second point yourself. The rest of the document -deals with action against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Would you look at -Page 86? - -I think you will agree with me that Field Marshal Von Blomberg and -General Von Fritsch rather poured cold water on Hitler’s ideas. Isn’t -that a fair way of putting it? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They rather thus showed a certain antipathy? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was in November 1937. - -RAEDER: We all of us told him constantly that in no circumstances might -he start a war with England and France, and he always agreed. But I -explained that this entire speech had a definite purpose; and that for -this purpose he exaggerated a great deal and at once withdrew that -exaggeration when a hint was given to him about the danger of a war with -France and England. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was what I was going to ask you. That was -in November. By January, Field Marshal Von Blomberg had made his -unfortunate marriage, hadn’t he? - -RAEDER: I believe it was in January. I do not know exactly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took the view, didn’t you, that he had -been encouraged to do that by the Defendant Göring? - -RAEDER: I never said that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, didn’t you? - -RAEDER: No, not that I know of. I never thought that at all. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember making a statement in Moscow on -this point? Let me read it to you. - -RAEDER: To whom, please? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In Moscow to the Russians. - - “At the beginning of the year 1938 I had experiences of a - personal nature, which although they did not concern the Navy - directly caused me to lose confidence, not only in Göring but - also in the sincerity of the Führer. The situation in which - Field Marshal Von Blomberg found himself as a result of his - unfortunate marriage made his position as a Commander-in-Chief - of the Armed Forces impossible. I came to the belated conclusion - that Göring was making every effort to obtain the post of - Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht in place of Blomberg. - - “He favored the marriage because it made Blomberg ineligible for - this post, while Blomberg believed—and even stated - repeatedly—that such a marriage was possible under the present - system. Göring had already had him shadowed in the past, as I - learned from later remarks.” - -Didn’t you say that? - -RAEDER: In Moscow, immediately after the collapse, I made a note of the -causes of the collapse as seen in the light of my own experience. I -wrote this document under the conditions there—where I was treated very -chivalrously—and I had no hesitation in informing the highest general -of the Commissariat of the Interior of this when I was asked what I was -doing there. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All I want to know is, is that true, what you -said? - -RAEDER: Yes. I wrote these notes, and it is also true that it occurred -to me afterwards that Göring might have favored the marriage. I believe -that he himself told me that here. He had assisted Blomberg in such a -way that, I think, he did not know what the true state of affairs was or -how serious the matter was. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you see, your view at that time was that -Göring was encouraging the marriage because he knew that it would put -Blomberg off the map as Commander-in-Chief because he, Göring, wanted -the position. Was that the view that you held last summer? - -RAEDER: I believed that last summer, yes. And it is also true that -Göring certainly wanted to become Commander-in-Chief of the Armed -Forces, but the Führer himself thwarted him in that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was Von Blomberg. We know what -happened to him. Your second choice, after Von Blomberg, was Von -Fritsch, was it not? You thought that Von Fritsch would have been the -best Commander-in-Chief if Von Blomberg went, did you not? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mentioned that to Hitler? And... - -RAEDER: He asked me, and I said that if I were consulted, I would -suggest Baron von Fritsch. But the Führer said that that was out of the -question. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. But there were some of them bringing a -charge of homosexuality against Von Fritsch; isn’t that right? That was -why it could not be done? - -RAEDER: Yes. He said, in general terms, that some kind of moral crime -existed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were one of the court who inquired into that -charge, were you not? Göring, as president, you and General Von -Brauchitsch? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you came to the conclusion that the charge -of homosexuality against Von Fritsch was a frame-up by the Gestapo, did -you not? Do you know what I mean? I am afraid “frame-up” is rather -difficult to translate. - -RAEDER: The whole thing gave me that impression. Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is because the denunciation had been by -some shady character who you thought was a “hang-around” of the Gestapo; -and at the trial, the co-operation of the Gestapo with the accuser was -brought to light; that is right, is it not? - -You were satisfied, from sitting at the trial? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you agree that there had been—not a -confusion—but that the guilty party was a cavalry captain, Rittmeister -Von Fritsch, and not this general at all; isn’t that right? - -RAEDER: I agree absolutely. We acquitted Baron von Fritsch because his -innocence was proved. There was no suspicion of any kind remaining -against him. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You acquitted him, but his reinstatement did not -follow? His reinstatement in command did not follow? - -RAEDER: No. I went to him, as I knew him very well, and asked him if -he would agree to my going to Hitler and suggesting that he, Baron -von Fritsch, be reinstated. But Fritsch replied that he considered -that quite impossible. He thought that his authority was so much -impaired that he would no longer care to resume his position as -Commander-in-Chief of the Army. - -After that, unfortunately, I could do no more about it. I reported -this to the Führer, but there were no further developments. All that -happened was that the Führer confirmed the absolute innocence of -Baron von Fritsch in a large assembly of generals and admirals. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you say this with regard to the Von -Fritsch incident: - - “I was convinced that Göring had a hand in this well-prepared - situation, since in order to attain his goal it was necessary to - eliminate every possible successor to Von Blomberg”? - -Do you remember saying that? - -RAEDER: I do not remember that now; but I believe that I held that -opinion. To be quite just, I must say that Baron von Fritsch’s acquittal -was due principally to the way in which Göring conducted the -proceedings. The witness who was brought up told so many lies and made -so many contradictory statements every few minutes, that only Göring -could cope with him. After seeing that, I was very thankful that I had -not been appointed president, as suggested by the Minister of Justice. I -could not have coped with those people. It was entirely due to Göring’s -intervention that he was acquitted without any difficulties. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But of course, I think you have said, Witness, -that whether he was acquitted or not, the authority of Von Fritsch in -the German Army was in his own view destroyed by the fact that this -charge had been brought against him. That was the result of it, was it -not? - -RAEDER: Herr Von Fritsch thought so. I would have insisted on being -reinstated after I had been acquitted in that manner. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did it not strike you as curious that the two -people who on the 5th of November had tried to head Hitler off from a -course that might have meant war were both disgraced in 2 months? Didn’t -it strike you as curious? - -RAEDER: That did not strike me as curious at all; and there is certainly -no connection. If Hitler had thought it necessary to remove the men in -high positions who opposed him in such matters, he would have had to -remove me long ago. But he never said anything about it to me, and I -have never noticed that he said anything like that because I -contradicted him. I have frequently pointed out, with regard to that -very question of England and France, that no war should be caused there; -and I never had the impression that he ever took it amiss. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let us take it very shortly. Within 6 -weeks of the disgrace of Blomberg and the removal of Von Fritsch, the -Anschluss with Austria took place. - -Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not know that there were -pretended military preparations for the Anschluss with Austria, the ones -described by General Jodl in his diary and also described by Field -Marshal Keitel? Did you know that these threats of military action would -have been made? - -RAEDER: I do not believe that I ever took part in a military discussion -concerning the Austrian Anschluss, because actually I had nothing to do -with it. But I should like to emphasize here, once and for all, that I -learned of such enterprises as, for instance, the annexation of Austria -through a directive issued by the Führer, and not before, because one -copy of these directives, regardless of whether or not they concerned -the Navy, was always sent to me as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. So, -of course, I must have received a directive in this case, too. -Unfortunately, I cannot tell you the date of it; but I confirm that a -directive came to my knowledge. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, the point that I am putting—and I do -not want to waste time on it—is this: That on the 5th of November -Hitler said that he was going to get Austria in 1943 to 1945 at the -latest, and earlier if an opportunity arises. Four months later, in -March 1938, he takes Austria after having got rid of the people who -threw cold water on his plans. But if you did not know about it, we -shall not waste time, but shall look at Czechoslovakia, because there -you did get the decree. - -You will find that on Page 163 of Document Book 10a, Page 276 of the -German document book. That is the distribution of the directive for -operations against Czechoslovakia. It is bringing up to date the one of -the 24th of June, and you will see that its execution must be assured as -from the 1st of October 1938, at the latest, and Copy Number 2 goes to -you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. - -Now, if you will turn over the page to the actual directive, 146 of the -English document book, 277 to 278, you see the first sentence of -Paragraph 1, “Political Prerequisites”: - - “It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by - military action in the near future. It is the job of the - political leaders to await or bring about the politically or - militarily suitable moment.” - -RAEDER: May I ask where it is? I do not seem able to find it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The first sentence in the directive, Paragraph -1, Political Prerequisites—Sentence 1: “It is my unalterable decision -to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.” - -RAEDER: The numbering is confused here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very sorry. Page 277, 278. - -RAEDER: Yes. Now I have found it. What was the date? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 28th of May 1938, that is approximately six -months after the meeting which you had attended at which Hitler had said -he would attack Czechoslovakia at the earliest opportunity that he -could. Didn’t that make you think that Hitler’s speech in November was -not merely froth but was stating his plans? - -RAEDER: No, because he kept on changing his decisions all the summer. He -made a fresh decision every month. That can be seen from Document -388-PS. And it was like this, I believe: on 10 September troops began to -assemble and on the same day negotiations were started. On 1 October the -peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland took place, after the other -powers had agreed to that at Munich. After the Munich negotiations... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We all know that. The point is perfectly -clear... - -RAEDER: I should like to finish. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In May, here were the plans, and the Führer had -mentioned—in his speeches he had expressed this: that it was his -determination at the end of May to smash Czechoslovakia by military -action. Are you telling the Tribunal that you read that directive and -still took the view that Hitler had not got aggressive intentions? That -is the question. - -RAEDER: Yes, at the end of May. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why, what more proof could you want than his own -determination to smash it? What clearer proof could you want? - -RAEDER: He frequently said that he intended to smash something and then -did not do it. The question was peacefully solved then. I should like to -add that on 30 May—I believe that was the date—after mobilization had -just been carried out in Czechoslovakia, and that had led him to use -such stern words then, and from this—I think he was justified in doing -so, for this mobilization could only be directed against Germany, and as -I said, he changed his opinion at least three or four times in the -course of the summer, saying again and again that he would reserve his -decision and—or that he did not wish to use military force. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Tribunal have gotten the whole of the -388-PS document in mind. I won’t argue it. You say that didn’t convince -you. - -When Hitler went into Prague on the 15th of March 1939, did it then -occur to you that there might be something in what he said in the -interview on the 5th of November 1937 when he occupied the Slav part of -Bohemia and Moravia and broke his own rule about keeping Germany for the -Germans? Did it then occur to you that he might not then have been -joking or merely talking froth in November? Did it? - -RAEDER: He had issued a directive saying that the aims for that year -were: - -1) The defense of Germany against outside attack. - -2) The settlement of the rest of Czechoslovakia in case she adopted a -line of policy hostile to Germany. - -I heard nothing at all about his negotiations with Hacha and his -decision following them to occupy Czechoslovakia. I only knew that he -wanted to take action against Czechoslovakia according to his directive, -in case Czechoslovakia should adopt a line of policy hostile to Germany; -and according to the propaganda at that period, that actually did occur. -I had nothing at all to do with the occupation of Czechoslovakia; nor -with the occupation of the Sudeten area, because the only service which -we could have rendered in these operations was our small Danube Flotilla -which was subordinated to the Army for this purpose so that I had -nothing at all to do with it. There were no other military orders. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your answer that even when Hitler went -into Prague on the 15th of March 1939, you still thought he had no -aggressive intentions? Is that what you want the Tribunal to believe -from you? Is that right? - -RAEDER: Yes, I ask the Tribunal to do so because I believe that he did -not want to fight a war, to conduct a campaign against Czechoslovakia. -By means of his political measures with Hacha he succeeded so far that -war did not break out. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, you heard the Defendant Göring give his -evidence that he told President Hacha that his armed forces would bomb -Prague if he didn’t agree. If that is not war, it is next door to it, -isn’t it? - -RAEDER: It is very close to it. Yes, a threat. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let’s go further on for another 2 months. -If you didn’t see it, on March—on the 23rd of May—when you came to the -Reich Chancellery there were six high-ranking officers, of which you -were one. And Hitler said that he would give you an indoctrination on -the political situation. And his indoctrination was that, “We are left -with a decision to attack Poland at the first opportunity.” When you -heard him say that on the 25th of May, did you still think he had no -aggressive intentions? - -RAEDER: I thought so for a long time after that. Just as Generaloberst -Jodl said, since he had solved the Czech problem by purely political -means, it was to be hoped that he would be able to solve the Polish -question also without bloodshed; and I believed that up to the last -moment, up to 22 August. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just take one glance—I shan’t keep you long—at -Document L-79, which you will find on Page 74, I think it is, of -Document Book 10. I am sorry. Page 298 of the German document book. I -beg your pardon. I am not going to ask you about the document because -the Tribunal has dealt with that. I want you to look at the people who -were there—298 in the German document book. - -RAEDER: I know the people who were there. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s look: Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt; he was -afterwards General, Hitler’s principal adjutant, and killed on the 20th -of July, 1944, isn’t that right? Then the Defendant Göring, -Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; yourself as Commander-in-Chief of -the Navy; Colonel General Von Brauchitsch who was Commander-in-Chief of -the Army; General Keitel who was head of the OKW; General Milch who was -Göring’s Deputy; Halder who was Chief of Staff; Schniewind who was your -Chief of Staff; and Jeschonnek who was I think a Chief of Staff or a -high... - -RAEDER: Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. And Colonel Warlimont, who was General -Jodl’s assistant. - -Now, what do you think Hitler got these high-ranking generals for, and -told them, “We are left with a decision to attack Poland at the first -opportunity,” if he hadn’t any aggressive intentions? What were these -people there for if it wasn’t to develop a war? - -RAEDER: I have already explained that the main purpose of that speech, -as may be seen from the last part of it, was to give a purely academic -lecture on the conduct of war, and on the basis of that lecture to -create a special study staff, a project which the chiefs of the Armed -Forces had so far strongly opposed. I also explained at the start that -his explanations were at first the most confused that I have ever heard -regarding the matter, and that he issued no directives in regard to them -but that the last lines read: “The branches of the Wehrmacht determine -what will be built. There will be no alteration in the shipbuilding -program. The armament programs are to be fixed for 1943 or 1944.” When -he said that, he could certainly not have intended to solve the Polish -question by a war in the near future. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that when he said, -“We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair; further successes -cannot be obtained without the shedding of blood,” you paid no attention -to it at all? You are seriously telling the Tribunal that you paid no -attention to that? - -RAEDER: No, I certainly did not at all, because by this time I was -getting to know Hitler and was familiar with the exaggerations contained -in his speeches. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At this time you had already had the directives -for a surprise attack on Danzig, in November 1938. You had had the -directive on the 3rd of April for the Fall Weiss, and you know this -whole matter was _en train_. Are you seriously, Defendant, telling the -Tribunal that you had any doubt after the 23rd of May that Hitler -intended war against Poland and was quite prepared to fight England and -France, if they carried out their guarantee? I mean, seriously, I give -you this chance before we adjourn: Do you say that you had any doubt at -all? - -RAEDER: Of course; I have surely explained that even in August I was -still doubtful. For instance, in estimating this speech, I must compare -it, as has already been done here, with the speech which Hitler had made -a few weeks earlier at the launching of the _Bismarck_, where he spoke -only of the peace of true justice. Those speeches were decisive for me. -I did not base my conclusions on this particular speech which is -reproduced in such an extremely confused manner; and that I proved by -the fact that during the whole of the summer I never said a word to the -Navy to suggest that war might break out in the autumn. Confirmation of -that was given here; and anybody can give further confirmation. I -thought very highly of Hitler’s political ability and even on 22 August, -when we were informed of the pact with Russia, I was still convinced -that we should again be able to find a peaceful solution of the problem. -That was my definite conviction. I may be accused of faulty judgment, -but I thought I had formed a correct estimate of Hitler. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I understand you to say that even on the -22nd of August you didn’t think that Hitler had any aggressive -intentions. Do you really mean that? - -RAEDER: Yes, and there is a perfectly good reason for it, because there -was every prospect of our forming an alliance with Russia. He had given -all sorts of reasons why England and France would not intervene; and all -those who were assembled there drew from that the sincere hope that he -would again be successful in getting out of the affair without fighting. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will this be a convenient time to adjourn, My -Lord? - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am most anxious not to take up -unnecessary time. With regard to the meeting of the 22d of August, Your -Lordship may remember that Dr. Siemers raised a point as to the two -accounts of the meeting, one in Documents 1014-PS and 798-PS and the -other in the account by Admiral Böhm. I have had a comparison made out -in English and German showing the points which are similar to both, and -I thought it would be more convenient just to put that in. Let Dr. -Siemers see the German copy and make any suggestion at the appropriate -time rather than spend any time in cross-examining the witness as to any -differences in the accounts. My Lord, with the permission of the -Tribunal, I will put that in now and hand Dr. Siemers a copy so that he -can draw the Tribunal’s attention to any points at a convenient stage. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did not Admiral Böhm make the accounts? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution’s account is in two -documents, 798-PS and 1014-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There was another document which was mentioned -by my friend, Mr. Alderman, but not put in. It was an account by a -journalist which was the first account the Prosecution had had, but when -they got the two accounts from the OKW files, they did not use their -first one; so I had only taken the two accounts from the OKW files and -Admiral Böhm’s account. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But does not that make three documents in all, apart -from the one which has been left out? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, and I have taken each of the two -and compared it with Admiral Böhm’s. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So, on that I shall not pursue this interview. I -thought that it would save time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I’d like you, therefore, Defendant, to look -at Document Number 789-PS, which is at Page 261 of Book 10a and Pages -438 to 440 of the German book—438 to 440. This is the note, Defendant, -of a conference on the 23d of November 1939 with Hitler, to which all -Supreme Commanders were ordered. Do you see that at the beginning, Pages -438 to 440? Do you see what it says, “to which all Supreme Commanders -are ordered”? Were you present? - -RAEDER: Yes, it is the conference during the war on 23 November 1939. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Were you present? - -RAEDER: I was present. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who were the other commanders-in-chief who were -present? - -RAEDER: The commanders-in-chief of the Army, the Air Force, and a -considerable number of generals of the Army. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The “Oberbefehlshaber”? - -RAEDER: Yes, but in the Army... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, I want you to look at a passage. The -paragraph begins: “One year later, Austria came. This step also was -considered very hazardous.” - -Do you see that? Do you see that paragraph? - -RAEDER: Yes, I have got it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Much obliged. Now, I just want you to look at -the next few sentences. - - “It brought about a considerable strengthening of the Reich. The - next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. But this step was - not to be accomplished in one move. First of all, the West Wall - had to be finished in the West. It was not possible to reach the - goal in one bound. It was clear to me from the first moment that - I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. It - was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia - was made. Then followed the establishment of the Protectorate - and with that the basis for the conquest of Poland was laid, but - I was not yet clear at that time whether I should start first - against the East and then against the West or vice-versa. Moltke - often had to ponder over the same things in his time. Of - necessity it came to a fight with Poland first. I shall be - accused of wanting to fight and fight again; in struggle I see - the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does - not want to go under. The increasing population requires a - larger living space. My goal was to create a logical relation - between the population and the living space.” - -Whatever you had understood up to that time, you appreciated then, that -Hitler himself had had a consistent and clear aim of aggression -throughout these matters that I put to you this morning; did you not? - -RAEDER: Yes, but now we were already in the middle of a war and he was -looking at these things retrospectively. Also, he wanted to make it -clear to the generals, with whom he had a conflict at that time, that he -had always been right in his political conceptions. That is the reason -why he quoted all these detailed points again. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you turn over to Pages 445-448, -which is Page 264 of the English document book, German document book -Pages 445-448. Have you got that? - -RAEDER: Perhaps you would be good enough to read, I have here a... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the paragraph that begins: “We have an -Achilles heel: The Ruhr.” - -RAEDER: I have it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look about halfway down that -paragraph. You will see: “England cannot live without its imports. We -can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines off the English coasts -will bring England to her knees.” - -Have you got that passage? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. Now, if you would just listen. - - “However, this”—that is bringing England to her knees—“can - only occur when we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a - difficult decision for me. Nobody has ever achieved what I have - achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led - the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate - us now. I am setting this work at stake. I have to choose - between victory or destruction. I choose victory, the greatest - historical choice—to be compared with the decision of Frederick - the Great before the first Silesian War. Prussia owes its rise - to the heroism of one man.” - -And there is some more about Frederick the Great and Bismarck: - - “My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England - at the most favorable and quickest moment. Violation of the - neutrality of Belgium and Holland is unimportant. No one will - question that when we have won. We shall not give such idiotic - reasons for the violation of neutrality as were given in 1914. - If we do not violate the neutrality, then England and France - will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously.” - -Now, do you remember, Defendant, that this was just 3 weeks after the -plans for “Fall Gelb,” that is plans for the attack on Holland and -Belgium, had been issued on 10 November? Do you remember that? - -RAEDER: I know that this was discussed here. But we were already at war -with England, therefore at that stage it was no longer necessary to -discuss an attack against England and France and... - -SIR. DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were not at war with Holland and Belgium, -were you? - -RAEDER: Please, I would like to finish. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, I thought you had finished. - -RAEDER: Here it says: “If the French Army marches into Belgium to attack -us, then it will be too late for us. We must be first.” - -Hitler at that time stated that he had received definite news that -Belgium would not respect her neutrality and that he also had news -already that certain preparations for the reception of French and -British troops _et cetera_ had already been made. For that reason, he -wanted to forestall an attack from Belgium against us. Apart from that, -in his speech of 22 August 1939, he had made a statement entirely to the -opposite effect. He had said that Belgium and Holland would not break -their neutrality. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with what he said, that the -“Violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is unimportant. No -one will question that when we have won.” Did you agree with that view? - -RAEDER: No, it is not exactly my opinion, but I had no cause on my part -to raise any objection against that statement of his at that moment. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The view of the Naval War Command was put up to -him a month later with regard to U-boat warfare, was it not? Do you -remember that on 30th December you had a meeting with Hitler, at which -Colonel General Keitel and Fregattenkapitän Von Puttkamer were present? - -RAEDER: Yes, I was with him on 30 December. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like you to look at the new document, -which is Document Number C-100, Exhibit Number GB-463. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought not this document be identified? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship, of course, is right. I think we -had perhaps better give them two numbers, one for each of the original -PS documents. My Lord, the comparison... - -THE PRESIDENT: 1014-PS has a number already, has it not? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. That has a number. - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought perhaps the comparative document ought to have -a number. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. Shall we call one comparison Exhibit -Number GB-464, the comparison of Document Number 798-PS; and the -comparison of Document Number 1014-PS, Exhibit Number GB-465? - -THE PRESIDENT: I have only got one here, as far as I can see. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am going to get some more done. I am -afraid I have passed out only a limited number at the moment, but I will -have some more run off. - -464, 798; GB-465 will be 1014-PS. It will be the comparison of Document -Number 798-PS with the Raeder Document, and Exhibit Number GB-465 will -be the comparison of Document Number 1014-PS in the Raeder document -book. - -I am very much obliged to Your Lordship. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now you are going to give us Document Number C-100? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: C-100, My Lord, yes. - -Defendant, I will be grateful if you will turn over a few pages to where -it comes to a report, the date of 30 December 1939, and then after that -there is an enclosure to the report to the Führer of 30 December 1939. - -Would you look at Paragraph IV, which says: - - “With regard to the form and the moment for the commencement of - further intensification of the war at sea, the decision of the - supreme war command to begin the general intensification of the - war with an offensive in the West is of decisive importance.” - -Have you got that, Paragraph IV? - -RAEDER: Page? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am afraid the paging is different. - -RAEDER: “With regard to the form”—yes. - - SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “With regard to the form and the moment - for the commencement of further intensification of the war at - sea, the decision of the supreme war command to begin the - general intensification of the war with an offensive in the West - is of decisive importance. - - “I. Possibility: The decision of the Führer is made in favor of - a Western offensive, beginning very shortly, within the - framework of the instructions issued for this to date, by - violating the neutrality of other states: - - “In this case the intensified measures for the war at sea will - in their political effect only represent a small part of the - entire intensification of the war. The gradual change-over to - the intensified form of waging the war at sea within the - American restricted zone, with the ultimate aim of a ruthless - employment of all means of warfare to interrupt all commerce - with England, is therefore proposed with the start of the - offensive. - - “Immediate anticipation of individual intensified measures for - the war at sea is not necessary and may be postponed until the - start of the general intensification of the war. The benevolent - neutrals Italy, Spain, Japan and Russia as well as America, are - to be spared as far as possible.” - -Isn’t that right, that you contemplated that Hitler’s violation of the -neutrality of the Low Countries would cover, by being a more important -matter, your adopting the most ruthless methods of war at sea? Isn’t -that right? - -RAEDER: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What does that mean if it does not mean that? -What does that mean if it does not mean what I have put to you? - -RAEDER: With the beginning of the offensive in the West, Hitler also -wanted a certain more energetic pursuit of the war at sea. For that -reason, he asked me to introduce only at this point the intensified -measures which I considered already justified because of the attitude of -the British forces. These intensifications were very carefully -considered in that memorandum, and they followed step by step the -different steps taken by Britain. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal with the memorandum. You need not be -afraid that I will omit that, but what I am putting to you at the moment -is this: That so far from disapproving of the violation of the -neutrality of Holland and Belgium, you on behalf of the Navy were quite -prepared to accompany it by the intensification of submarine warfare; -isn’t that right? - -RAEDER: That is twisting my words. I had nothing to do with this -violation of neutrality for we were not there when they marched into -these two countries. The only thing I was interested in was to intensify -the submarine war step by step, so as to meet the measures introduced by -the British, which also violated international law. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to come to submarine warfare, but at -the moment I want to try to keep in compartments. There are only two -more points on this aggressive war. I am now going to pass—you can -leave that document for the moment. I will come back to it, Defendant; -you need not be afraid, and I want you to help me on one or two points -in Norway. - -With regard to Norway, you were quite content to leave Norway neutral, -not occupied, so long as you had a protected channel up the Norwegian -coast in neutral waters, is that right? That was an important point for -you, to have a channel in neutral waters so that not only your ships, -but also your submarines, could go up and start out from neutral waters, -is that right? - -RAEDER: No, I have very clearly explained the origin of the Norwegian -campaign in documents. There was the danger that the British might -occupy Norway, and information of all sorts indicated that. Of course, -if we were forced to occupy the Norwegian coast, then, apart from all -the numerous disadvantages which I have explained, we had the advantage -that we would gain this or that base for our Atlantic submarines. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that the Navy -seriously thought that the British wanted to occupy Norway? - -RAEDER: I most certainly thought that. We had so much information about -it that I could have no doubt whatever, and it was fully confirmed later -on. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just ask you, then, to look at just one or two -typical Navy reports. We won’t refer to the document again, but we will -start from there, just to get the time. - -You remember, on the 13th of March 1940, General Jodl entered in his -diary that the Führer was still looking for justification; do you -remember that? You remember that, don’t you? - -RAEDER: I have already explained once that the expression just used, -“justification,” is wrong, wrongly translated, Jodl wrote “Begründung,” -“reason.” But that is also wrong—please will you let me finish—even -that is incorrect, because the Führer had an abundance of reasons, which -he laid down in the instruction issued on the 1st of March, and it was -known to all of us. I have said that by the expression “Begründung,” -“reason,” he probably meant that he had not yet had a diplomatic note -compiled. He had not told the Foreign Minister anything about it at that -stage. I told you that recently under oath and I repeat it under oath -today. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is the meaning that you have given -to it. Well now, will you look at your own Raeder Exhibit Number 81, in -Raeder Document Book 5, Page 376. - -RAEDER: May I have Document Book 5? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, you have not got it. I’m sorry. I will get -you one. - -Now, that is dealing with the first point, encroachment by the English -into Norwegian territorial waters, and it says: - - “An examination of the question as to whether a mass - encroachment by the English into the Norwegian territorial - waters was so immediately imminent that it might represent a - danger to present German shipping produces the opinion that this - is not to be expected at the present time. The ore transports - are to be continued, as no losses have yet occurred.” - -Was that your information, that no mass encroachment of Norwegian -territorial waters was to be expected on the 22d of March? - -RAEDER: That was not at all my conception. It was the view of Kapitän -zur See Fricke, who was at that time the Chief of the Operations -Department. He did not quite agree with me about the whole of this -question. He was of the opinion that the British should be allowed to -enter Norway first, and then we should throw them out through Sweden, a -completely distorted idea which I could not approve of in any way. I had -such clear information from Quisling and Hagelin, particularly at that -time, the second half of March, that there was no longer any doubt -whatever that within a reasonable time the British would intervene on a -big scale. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that that was Admiral Fricke’s view, and -you didn’t pay attention to it. Well, now, let me look... - -RAEDER: I did not concern myself with it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know, Admiral Assmann, whom you have -described as a sound historian, kept a headline diary, and on the next -day he gives an account of a meeting between you and Hitler, and he says -this. This is the same day. You may have read it, because he turns down -your proposal to use U-boats off Halifax. It is the same day, the 23d of -February. Then, at that date, you are quoted as saying that to insure -the supply of ore from Narvik, it would be best to preserve the -neutrality of Norway. - -Then, on the 26th of March, Admiral Assmann in his report of the meeting -between you and Hitler records your answers as follows. It is quite -short: “British landing in Norway not considered imminent—Raeder -suggests action by us at the next new moon—to which Hitler agrees.” - -That is Admiral Assmann’s report of the meeting between you and Hitler -on the 26th of March: “British landing in Norway not considered -imminent—Raeder suggests action by us at the next new moon, the 7th of -April—to which Hitler agrees.” - -Do you remember that? - -RAEDER: No. I mean, it is quite improbable that at that moment I should -not have been fully convinced of the imminent landing about which the -whole of Documents 004-PS and 007-PS gave me reliable information. I did -not see the documents, but the information contained in them was fully -available. - -Admiral Assmann compiled his notes from all sorts of war diaries and -records. I most certainly never said that because at that time I -reported to Hitler again and again that our preparations which had -already been started a time ago would be complete at the end of January, -and that that would be the time when the landings had to be carried out -for the reasons I always put forward. It is completely wrong to assume -that at that time I had the slightest doubt. Later everything was proved -right... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now really we must... - -RAEDER: And later on, it all turned out to be correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must get down to this matter. You have told -us that Admiral Assmann was a trustworthy officer and good at naval -history. - -RAEDER: He is not a deceiver, but he compiled the document from all -sorts of papers and I cannot imagine how he could have arrived at that -statement, I certainly never made it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, but the second part of it, the second -sentence, is right, isn’t it? “Raeder suggests action by us at the next -new moon, the 7th of April.” - -That is right; that is when you did invade. That was when your armada -started off to arrive there on the 9th, wasn’t it? - -RAEDER: But yes, of course. I was in favor of carrying out the landings -in Norway at the earliest possible time, after ice conditions had -improved, as we had previously decided and as had been ordered by -Hitler. For that I assume full responsibility. There was every reason -for that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well. Again I mustn’t argue with you, but the -point comes to this, that you are saying that Admiral Assmann, who is -right in his second sentence, is not only wrong but entirely wrong—I -mean, stating the opposite of the truth—when he says that the British -landing in Norway was not considered imminent. - -Well now, we will just pursue that a little. - -RAEDER: I only submitted to the Führer this matter of landing in Norway -on the supposition that this information was available and would -continue to be available. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, what was that document of the 26th of March -1940? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was an extract from the Assmann Diary which -I have used before, and I will have one made up and put in for -identification. I haven’t got it copied yet, My Lord, I am sorry. I -shall have it done. - -RAEDER: I should be grateful if perhaps you could show me the document. -You have shown me all the others, but not this one, the one I contest. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is such a short extract I -thought you would take it from me, but the last thing I want is not to -show you any documents. - -You see the entry for the 26th of March: - - “British landing in Norway not considered imminent. Raeder - suggests action by us at next new moon, 7th of April, to which - Hitler agrees. Further discussions about laying of mines at - Scapa before German invasion of Norway. Hitler agrees with - Raeder and will issue instructions accordingly.” - -RAEDER: May I come back to it now. Here it says, the 26th of March 1940: -“Occupation of Norway by British was imminent when the Russian-Finnish -peace was concluded.” - -That very Russian-Finnish affair was making it particularly urgent for -us to carry out a landing because the danger existed that the British, -under the pretext of supporting the Finns, would carry out a bloodless -occupation of Norway. - -Then I go on to the question of the Führer, whether a landing by the -British in Norway might be imminent. One must consider that Assmann had -summarized all that from war diaries, and this question is explained by -the fact that the Führer wanted to know whether the situation had -changed in any way, because the peace had been signed. However, the -situation had not changed at all, because we knew in reality that the -landings by the British were not to be carried out to help the Finns, -but for other reasons. That question, therefore, whether at the time, -because of the peace treaty, the British landings might be particularly -imminent, was answered by me in the negative. Commander-in-Chief Navy -suggests action by us at next new moon, 7th April—Führer agrees. -Everything remained as before. Only the question whether because of this -peace treaty we ought to land at once, I answered “no.” That is -completely different from what you have been telling me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You read out the entry for the 26th of March. -What is the entry for the 26th of March? You read it out in German and -we can translate it. - - RAEDER: “Occupation of Norway by the British was imminent when - the Russian-Finnish peace treaty was signed. Apparently, because - of the treaty, it was postponed. Question by the Führer, whether - at that moment a landing by the British in Norway was imminent, - was answered in the negative by the Commander-in-Chief Navy....” - -Yes, that did not mean that because of that we had to renounce the idea. - -“Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action by us at next new moon.” The -reasons for our landing remained the same as before; only the Finnish -business could no longer be used by the British. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The peace treaty, the end of the war with -Finland, had taken place in the middle of March. That was off the map at -that time? - -RAEDER: Of course, it was no longer important for us, but our reasons -remained as before. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, will you look at Document Number -D-843. This will be Exhibit Number GB-466. This is a report from your -diplomatic representative in Norway, dated the 29th of March, and at the -end of the first paragraph you will see: - - “The British apparently did not want to take upon themselves the - responsibility for openly violating Norwegian territory and - Norwegian territorial waters without cause, and for carrying out - warlike operations in them.” - -That is a quotation from the Norwegian Foreign Minister. Then your -diplomatic representative takes it up: - - “The future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees things - quite right. It definitely appears, however, as I”—that’s the - German Foreign Minister’s representative—“have frequently - pointed out, that the British have no intentions of landing, but - that they want to disturb shipping in Norwegian territorial - waters perhaps, as Koht thinks, in order to provoke Germany. Of - course, it is also possible that the British behavior of last - week, which I have pointed out as well, will grow into more or - less regular and increasing interference in territorial waters - to attack our ore traffic off the Norwegian coast.” - -And then Paragraph 3: - - “The firm intention of Norway to maintain her neutrality and to - insure that Norway’s neutrality rules be respected can be - accepted as a fact.” - -Were you told that your diplomatic representative in Oslo was reporting -that the British had no intentions of landing? - -RAEDER: Yes. Dr. Breuer, the Minister to Norway, held a completely wrong -view. He believed Foreign Minister Koht’s assurances even though our -naval attaché kept reporting that Koht was completely on the side of the -British and his assurances were not to be believed. At the same time, -information had been received from Hagelin that the Norwegians were -giving assurances on paper but they themselves had said that they were -doing that only as subterfuge and that they would continue to co-operate -with the British. That is contained in the documents which we have -submitted. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at another document. Look at -Document Number D-844. This is what your diplomatic representative in -Sweden was saying at the same time. That will be Exhibit Number GB-467, -that is from your representative in Sweden and you will notice that he -quotes Foreign Minister Guenther of Sweden, as first of all—about ten -lines down, just after the name of “Weizsäcker,” you will see: - - “The Swedish Government had no reason at all to believe in an - impending action by the Western Powers against Scandinavia. On - the contrary, on the strength of all official reports and other - information, they considered the situation lately to be much - calmer.” - -And then he says there is no prospect of a coup against Swedish ore. -Then he goes on to deal with Norway. Without being Anglophile, Guenther -did not believe in a British act of war against Norway either, but, of -course, he could not speak of this with as much certainty as with regard -to Sweden. At any rate, however, the Norwegian Government, with whom he -was in close contact, was of the same opinion. And if you look two -paragraphs farther on, it says: - - “In conclusion, Guenther requested me to report his statements - to my government, and repeated that the Swedish Government - attached the greatest value to the German Government not - erroneously getting the impression of the existence of - circumstances which might evoke the possibility—he would not - use the word necessity at all—of special measures by Germany - with regard to Scandinavia.” - -And then he says in the last paragraph that the Swedish Foreign Minister -had probably heard of the German preparations. - -Now, would you look at Document Number D-845 which will be Exhibit -Number GB-468—that is the next day—from your diplomatic representative -in Stockholm: - - “Serious anxiety exists in Swedish military and government - circles regarding possible German military preventive measures - in Scandinavia against the announced intensification of war - measures by the Western Powers. Swedish and Norwegian military - and government authorities consider it unlikely that military - measures will be taken against Scandinavia by the Western - Powers. Press reports on this subject by the Western Powers are - attempting to provoke Germany.” - -That is from your military attaché in Stockholm. Were you told about -these reports from Stockholm, were you told of that? - -RAEDER: I assume the Führer told me this. But we had no reason at all to -believe these assurances because obviously, quite obviously, Sweden had -considerable interest in our not going to Norway, because Sweden -believed that by so doing we would be able to exercise pressure on -Sweden also. That was what the British wanted, according to the -information we received later. Our minister was completely misinformed -and as a result was not informed by us because it was known that he -sided with Foreign Minister Koht. Our information was so clear, so -frequent and so unequivocal, that we could certainly carry out our -landing with a clear conscience and in fact this proved to be true. -Therefore, there is no point in discussing whether the order on the part -of the British to land in Norway—it was Trondheim, Stavanger and, I -believed, Kristiansand—whether this order was given on 5 April. On the -7th, during the night of the 7th to 8th, as the British reported in a -wireless message, the mine-laying in Norwegian waters was completed by -British ships and on the 7th, troops were shipped on cruisers, the names -of which I forget. - -Therefore, this actually took place and my conception was correct and -not Herr Breuer’s who was dismissed immediately after this because he -was a failure. Thereupon, we carried out the landings on the strength of -quite positive information which we can prove in detail. Sweden’s action -is thoroughly understandable. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with you although you -ought to know and I think you do know that there was no British order -for an invasion at all; there was an order for laying mines; but you -took this course as I suggested, you, knowing quite well that no British -invasion was imminent, contrary to your own Chief of Operations, Captain -Fricke, and contrary to all the information from your diplomatic -representatives in Norway. Now, I want to come to another point with -regard to Norway and then I am finished with that. You told the Tribunal -that in your view, using the enemy’s colors was a permissible _ruse de -guerre_ so long as you stopped before you went into action. Do you -remember saying that? - -RAEDER: I did not understand. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember telling the Tribunal that -morning that using the enemy’s colors on a warship was a permissible -_ruse de guerre_ so long as you stopped before you went into action. Do -you remember saying that? - -RAEDER: Yes; of course, that is the principle which is absolutely -recognized in naval warfare, that at the moment of firing you have to -raise your own flag. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that it is a -recognized procedure in naval warfare to use another country’s colors in -making an attack on a neutral country, an unannounced attack on a -neutral country? There was no war between you and Norway and there was -no reason for there to be any ruse. You were at peace with Norway. Are -you saying that? - -RAEDER: It was all a question of pulling down the flag and raising the -German flag if we met the British. We did not want to fight with the -Norwegians at all. It says somewhere that we should first of all try to -effect a peaceful occupation. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you give me a precedent even where the -German Navy, before this operation, had ever attacked a neutral country -with which it was at peace, using enemy colors? You tell me when you did -it before? - -RAEDER: I do not know. I cannot tell you whether any other navy did it. -I have... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can assume any other navy—I even ask—have -you ever done it? - -RAEDER: No, we have not done it and apart from that, we did not do it -because on 8 April, we gave the order by wireless—and you know from our -War Diary—that this should not be done, so it is quite useless to talk -here about what might have been done if it has not been done. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to get clear on what your views on the -permissibility of naval warfare were. I want to come to one other point, -and then I am finished with this section of the case. With regard to the -attack on the Soviet Union, I am not going to ask you about all your own -views and what you said to Hitler, because you told us that at length; -but I would just like you to look at Document Book 10a, Page 252 of the -English book and Page 424 of the German book. - -RAEDER: Which document is it, please? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The big one. - -RAEDER: I have not got that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Document Number 447-PS. - -I am so sorry, My Lord, this is entirely my fault. I beg the Tribunal’s -pardon. I have given the wrong reference. I really wanted him to look at -Page 59 in Document Book 10, Document Number C-170. I am very sorry, My -Lord. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, that is the extract from the Naval -War Diary, the one that I want you to look at is on Page 59, for the -15th of June. “On the proposal of the Naval Operations Staff (SKL) the -use of arms against Russian submarines south of the northern boundary of -Öland warning area...” - -Have you got it? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “...is permitted immediately, and ruthless -destruction is to be aimed at.” - -Now, would you mind, before I ask you a question, turning back to -Document Number C-38, which is on Page 11, which is Page 19 of your own -document book, German document book, Document Number C-38; Page 11 of -the British document book, and Page 19 of the German. That is an order -of the same date, signed by Defendant Keitel, to the Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy. - - “Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel to - the southern tip of Öland is authorized if the boats cannot be - definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German - naval forces. The reason to be given up to ‘B’ Day”—that is - Barbarossa—“is that our naval forces are believed to be dealing - with penetrating British submarines.” - -Why did you suggest that you should attack the Soviet submarines 6 days -before your own invasion when they wouldn’t be expecting any attack and -there was no question of any war? - -RAEDER: As it has already been explained once here, it had happened just -before, that is before the 15th of June, that a submarine had penetrated -into the area of Bornholm, which is a long way to the west, and then had -given wrong recognition signals when the patrol boat near Bornholm -called it. If the wrong recognition signals are given, then it means -that it could not be a German submarine but it must be a foreign one. In -this case, the course of the ship and the location would bring us to the -conclusion that it must be a Russian boat. Apart from that, Russian -submarines at that time had repeatedly been located and reported off -German ports—Memel, for instance, and others. Consequently, we had the -impression that Russian submarines were already occupying positions -outside German ports, either to lay mines or to attack merchant or -warships. For that reason, as a precaution, I had to report this and I -had to propose that we should take action against non-German submarines -in these areas outside German ports. That suggestion was passed on the -same day and this additional statement was made, which, in my opinion, -was not necessary at all, but which prevented complications from -arising. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is still not an answer to my question. I -will put it this way. You considered it right to attack and urge the -ruthless destruction of Soviet submarines 6 days before you attacked the -Soviet Union? You consider that right? And then, to blame it on -penetrating British submarines—this is Keitel’s suggestion—is that -your view of proper warfare? - -RAEDER: Well, I consider the first point right because it is always -important to get in before one’s opponent, and this was happening under -certain definite conditions. The second point was ordered by the Führer. -Neither of the two points was ever carried out, and therefore it is -useless, in my opinion, to discuss this matter. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is something for the Tribunal, and I will -decide what is useful to discuss. - -Do I take it, then, that you entirely approve of attacking Soviet -submarines and ruthlessly destroying them 6 days before you start the -war? That is what the Tribunal is to understand, is it? - -RAEDER: Yes, if they appeared in our waters to reconnoiter or to carry -out some other war action, then I considered it right. I considered that -better than that our ships should run into Russian mines. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, let us just come, for a short time, to -your views on U-boat warfare. Do you remember the document which I put -to the Defendant Dönitz about the memorandum of the Foreign Office, -Document Number D-851, which became Exhibit Number GB-451? - -RAEDER: I have it before me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Right. Well, I will ask about that in a moment. -This is what you said about it when you were answering Dr. Kranzbühler, -I think on Saturday. You said: - - “Since the war against England came as a complete surprise to - us, we had up until then dealt very little with detailed - questions of submarine warfare. Among other things, we had not - yet discussed the question of so-called unrestricted submarine - warfare which had played such a very important part in the - previous war. And from that fact it developed that on 3 - September, that officer who was recently mentioned here was sent - to the Foreign Office with some points for discussion on the - question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that we could - clarify with the Foreign Office the question as to how far we - could go.” - -Now, do you think that is... - -RAEDER: So far as I can recollect, that is the way it happened. -Unrestricted warfare had not been considered. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the document in front of you? - -RAEDER: You mean the one regarding the Foreign Office, Document Number -D-851? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dönitz 851, yes. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think this is in any copy, My Lord. Has -Your Lordship a copy? - -THE PRESIDENT: No, I don’t think so. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did put it in when I was -cross-examining the Defendant Dönitz. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is very likely with our Dönitz papers. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps Your Lordship will allow me to just read -it slowly, for the moment. The document says this: - - “The question of an unrestricted U-boat warfare against England - is discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the High Command - of the Navy. - - “The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage - to England which can be achieved with the forces available can - only be attained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted - use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping - in the prohibited area indicated on the enclosed map. The Navy - does not fail to realize that: - - “(a) Germany would thereby publicly disregard the agreement of - 1936 regarding the conduct of economic war. - - “(b) Conduct of the war on these lines could not be justified on - the basis of the hitherto generally accepted principles of - international law.” - -Then, I ought to read this, or point it out. I have dealt with it -before, it is the second last paragraph: - - “Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using the - method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England gives us a - justification by her method of waging war to order this form of - warfare as a reprisal.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I want you to take it by stages. You -see the paragraph that says: - - “The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage - to England which can be achieved with the forces available can - only be attained if U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of - arms without warning in the area...” - -Is that your view? Was that your view on the 3d of September? - -RAEDER: No, it is not my view; it is a conditional view. We had given -submarines the order to wage economic war according to the Prize -Ordinance, and we had provided in our War Diary that if the British were -to arm merchant ships or something like that, then certain -intensifications... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please give me an answer to the -question I asked you? It is a perfectly easy question. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, isn’t it your view? - -RAEDER: In theory, of course, considering the small resources that we -had, the greatest possible damage to England could only be achieved -through—we had to discuss with the Foreign Office just how far we could -go with this intensification. For this reason, this officer was sent -there. The discussions with the Foreign Office resulted in the submarine -memorandum which shows, from beginning to end, that we were trying to -adhere to the existing law as far as possible. The whole memorandum is -nothing more than just that sort of discussion. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you answer my question? When this -document says “the Navy has arrived at the conclusion,” is it true that -the Navy had arrived at that conclusion? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true or not? - -RAEDER: But of course, everybody would arrive at that conclusion. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is much easier to say “yes” than to give a -long explanation. - -Now, let us come to another point. Is it true that you had arrived at -that conclusion without consulting the Flag Officer, U-boats, as the -Defendant Dönitz said when he gave evidence? - -RAEDER: Regarding these matters? We only agreed before the submarines -put to sea that they should wage war according to the Prize Ordinance. I -did not ask him whether he wanted to carry out unrestricted U-boat -warfare, because I did not want that. First of all I had to discuss it -with the Foreign Office to find out how far we could go. That was the -purpose of this affair, which was to give individual orders, such orders -which we were entitled to give, step by step, in accordance with the -behavior of the British. This was a question of international law, which -I had to discuss with the expert on international law in the Foreign -Office. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Isn’t it correct that you continued to press -this point of view, the conclusion of which you had arrived at, with the -Foreign Office for the next 3 months? Isn’t it correct that you -continued to press for an unrestricted U-boat warfare within the area -for the next 3 months? - -RAEDER: I hardly think so; otherwise I would not have issued the -memorandum of 3 September. Maybe we did go to the Foreign Office and put -on pressure, but what we did is contained in the memorandum and our -measures were intensified step by step, following steps taken by the -British. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the next step with the Foreign Office -was a conference with Baron Von Weizsäcker, on the 25th of September, -which you will see in Document Number D-852, Exhibit Number GB-469. You -see Paragraph 3 of that document: - - “The High Command of the Navy will submit to the Foreign Office - a proposal, as a basis for a communication to the neutral - powers, in which those intensifications of naval warfare will be - communicated, the ordering of which has already taken place or - is impending in the near future. This includes, particularly, a - warning not to use wireless on being stopped, not to sail in - convoy, and not to black-out.” - -That was your first step, was it not? That was put up to the Foreign -Office, with a number of other proposals? - -RAEDER: Of course! The first measure was that armed merchant ships could -be attacked because as early as 6 or 8 September, a submarine had -stopped a merchant ship, the _Manar_, had fired a warning shot, and had -at once been fired on by the British steamer. Thereupon the submarine -started firing at the merchant ship. Such cases were known. And since -one cannot recognize in every case whether the ship is armed or not, we -assumed that it would lead to all ships being fired at. However, at that -time it was ordered that only armed British merchant ships should be -fired at. Secondly, that ships which sent a wireless message when -stopped could also be shot at, because this use of wireless which was -done by order of the Admiralty would immediately bring to the spot both -naval and air forces, especially the latter which would shoot at the -U-boat. - -The first step, therefore, was firing on armed merchant ships—the -passenger steamers were still excepted—and secondly, firing on -blacked-out vessels and firing on those who made use of wireless. -Blacked-out vessels are... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you look at Document Number -D-853. I only want you to look at the next document, which will be -Exhibit Number GB-470. I want you to come as soon as possible to this -memorandum of which you talked. - -D-853, if you will look at Section II, is a report by the Under -Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, dated the 27th of September, -which goes through these matters which you talked about just now, the -sinking at sight of French and British ships, under the assumption that -they are armed. In Paragraph II it is said: - - “The Naval Operations Staff indicated anew that the Führer will - probably order ruthless U-boat warfare in the restricted area in - the very near future. The previous participation of the Foreign - Office remains guaranteed.” - -Were you still pressing for absolutely unrestricted warfare within a -large area to the west of Britain and around Britain? - -RAEDER: Yes. Insofar as we took intensification actions step by step on -the basis of our observations regarding the attitude of enemy forces, -and that is in those cases where intensification was perfectly justified -and was legally proved. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Baron Weizsäcker’s minutes of -the 14th of October which is Document Number D-857, which will be -Exhibit Number GB-471. - -Now, you see, this is after these measures have been taken, which you -have just explained to the Tribunal. Baron von Weizsäcker reports to the -Defendant Von Ribbentrop: - - “According to my information, the decision on unrestricted - U-boat warfare against England is imminent. This is at least as - much a political decision as it is a technicality of war. - - “A short while ago I submitted my personal view in writing, that - unrestricted U-boat warfare would bring new enemies upon us at a - time when we still lack the necessary U-boats to defeat England. - On the other hand, the Navy’s attitude of insisting on the - opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare is backed by every - convincing reason.” - -Then he says that it is necessary to ask for certain information. On -that you put in—on that point you put in your memorandum of the 15th of -October, which, My Lord, is Document Number C-157, and Exhibit Number -GB-224. - -RAEDER: First of all, may I say something about the previous document? -This expression “unrestricted U-boat warfare...” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can do it later on, because we have got a -lot of ground to cover here. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks he ought to be allowed to -say what he wants to say on that document. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, if Your Lordship pleases. -Please go on, Defendant, my fault. - -RAEDER: Now the two documents are gone. What I wanted to say was that -the expression “unrestricted submarine warfare” on the part of the -Foreign Office originated from the previous World War. In reality, and -during the entire war, we did not wage unrestricted U-boat war in the -sense of the unrestricted submarine warfare of the first World War. Even -there, where he says “unrestricted submarine warfare might be -imminent”—are only ordered very restricted measures, which always were -based on the fact that the British had ordered something on their part. -The chief action on the part of the British was that of militarizing the -entire merchant fleet to a certain extent. That is to say, the merchant -fleet was being armed, and they received the order to use these arms. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t see how that arises out of the last -document at all. Unless the Tribunal wants to go into it, I think we -might pass on. - -Doesn’t Your Lordship think so? - -RAEDER: Out of both documents. Not out of one only... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have put that point, I should think, at -least seven times this afternoon. I am going to suggest to you that your -real object of the submarine war was set out in the first paragraph of -the memorandum. Would you just look at it? You see “Berlin, 15 -October...” - -RAEDER: No, I must still say that there was not any unrestricted U-boat -warfare but merely an intensification of measures, step by step, as I -have repeatedly said, and these were always taken only after the British -took some measure. The British... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest that that is an entire untruth, and -that I will show you out of this document. Look at your own document, -this memorandum. In the first paragraph: - - “The Führer’s proposal for the restoration...” - -RAEDER: I am not telling untruths, I would not think of doing it. I do -not do that sort of thing. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is what I am suggesting to you, and I -will show it out of this document. - - “The Führer’s proposal for the restoration of a just, honorable - peace and the new adjustment of the political order in Central - Europe had been turned down. The enemy powers want the war, with - the aim of destroying Germany. In this fight, in which Germany - is now forced to defend her existence and her rights, she must - use her weapons with the utmost ruthlessness, at the same time - fully respecting the laws of military ethics.” - -Now, let’s see what you were suggesting. - - “Germany’s principal enemy in this war is Britain. Her most - vulnerable spot is her maritime trade. The war at sea against - Britain must therefore be conducted as an economic war, with the - aim of destroying Britain’s fighting spirit within the shortest - possible time and forcing her to accept peace.” - -Now, miss one paragraph and look at the next. - - “The principal target of our naval strategy is the merchant - ship”—now, let’s look—“not only the enemy’s, but in general - every merchant ship sails the seas in order to supply the - enemy’s war industry, both by way of imports and exports. Side - by side with this the enemy warship also remains an objective.” - -Now, wasn’t that the object which you in the Naval Command were putting -up to Hitler and to the Foreign Office, to use utmost ruthlessness to -destroy Britain’s fighting spirit, and to attack every merchant ship -coming in or going out of Britain? Wasn’t that your object? - -RAEDER: Of course, but attacks on neutrals only insofar as they were -warned and advised not to enter certain zones. Throughout the centuries -in economic warfare the enemy merchant ship as well as the neutral -merchant ship has been the object of attack. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are not telling the Tribunal that you were -suggesting use of warnings. Are you seriously suggesting to the Tribunal -that what you meant by that paragraph was that neutral ships were only -to be attacked with warning? - -RAEDER: Of course, and that happened. Afterwards we issued the warning -to neutral ships, after our blockade zone was established in accordance -with the American blockade zone. We warned them that they should not -enter this zone because they would run into most serious danger. That I -am saying, and I can prove it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest to you that that is untrue, and I will -show it out of the document. Now, just turn to page... - -RAEDER: On 24 November that warning was issued. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you will turn to Section C of the document, -“Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain.” - - “Our naval strategy will have to employ to the utmost advantage - every weapon at our disposal. Military success can be most - confidently expected if we attack British sea communications - where they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness; - the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports into and - exports from Britain. We should try to consider the interest of - neutrals, insofar as this is possible without detriment to - military requirements. It is desirable to base all military - measures taken on existing international law; however, measures - which are considered necessary from a military point of view, - provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have - to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing - international law.” - -Wasn’t that the view you were putting up to the Foreign Office and the -Führer, “Use international law as long as you can, but if international -law conflicts with what is necessary for military success, throw -international law overboard.” Wasn’t that your view? - -RAEDER: No, that is quite incorrectly expressed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then explain these words. Explain these -words: - - “We should try to consider the interest of neutrals insofar as - this is possible without detriment to military requirements. - However, measures which are considered necessary from a military - point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from - them, will have to be carried out even if they are not covered - by international law.” - -What did you mean by that if you didn’t mean to throw international law -overboard? - -RAEDER: It says “If the existing rules of land warfare cannot be applied -to them.” It is generally known that international law had not yet been -co-ordinated with submarine warfare, just as the use of aircraft at that -time. It says: - - “In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is - effective in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some - legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new - code of naval warfare”—that is, a new code of naval warfare on - the basis of actual developments. - -Throughout the war a new code of naval warfare was developing, starting -with the neutrals themselves. For instance, the Pan-American Security -Conference defined a safety zone 300 miles around the American coast, -thereby barring a tremendous sea area for overseas trade. - -Likewise, the United States fixed a fighting zone around the British -Isles which was not at all to our liking, and on 4 November 1939, the -United States themselves maintained that it would be extremely dangerous -for neutral ships to enter it, and they prohibited their own ships and -their own citizens to enter this area. - -We followed that up by asking the neutrals that they too should proceed -in the same way as the United States, and then they would not be harmed. -Then only those neutrals sailed to Great Britain which had contraband on -board and made a lot of money out of it, or which were forced by the -British through their ports of control to enter that area and -nevertheless submit themselves to those dangers. Of course, they were -quite free to discontinue doing that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now tell me, what changes had taken place in the -development of either airplanes or submarines from the time that Germany -signed the Submarine Protocol of 1936 to the beginning of the war? You -say that international law had to adapt itself to changes in weapons of -war. What changes had taken place between 1936 and 1939? - -RAEDER: The following changes took place: The Submarine Protocol of 1936 -was signed by us because we assumed that it concerned peaceful -actions... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not an answer to my question. My -question is quite clear. It is: What changes in weapons of war, either -in the air or in the submarines, had taken place between 1936 and 1939? -Now, there is a question. You are a naval officer of 50 years’ -experience. Tell me, what were the changes? - -RAEDER: It turned out that because of the airplane the submarine was no -longer in a position to surface and to investigate enemy ships or any -other merchant ships, particularly near the enemy coast where the -U-boats carried on their activities at first. There was no regulation at -all issued about airplanes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is not an answer to the question. The -question you were asked was, what changes had taken place in the weapons -of war, either airplanes or submarines. - -RAEDER: But Mr. President, the changes took place in the airplane. The -ever-increasing efficiency of the airplanes and the extension of their -activities also over the seas led to the situation where it became -impossible to examine any merchant vessel without aircraft being called -to threaten the submarine. That got worse and worse, so that later on -even rescuing had to be restricted because of enemy aircraft, and the -entire submarine warfare was completely turned upside down in that -manner. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the only change that you can say in -order to justify your statement that international law was to be thrown -overboard where it didn’t fit in with military necessities? Is that the -only change, the increase in the power of aircraft between 1936 and -1939? - -RAEDER: I have already said once it was not thrown overboard. It was to -be limited and changed and that was done by others too. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you just look at the next -paragraph. You talked about your consideration for neutrals. At the top -of Page 5 in the English text; it is the paragraph that follows the one -that I have just read. You say: - - “In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is - effective in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some - legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new - code of naval warfare. - - “The Supreme War Command, after considering the political, - military and economic consequences within the framework of the - general conduct of the war, will have to decide what measures of - a military nature are to be taken, and what our attitude to the - usage of war is to be. Once it has been decided to conduct - economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfillment of - military requirements, this decision is definitely to be adhered - to under all circumstances. On no account may such a decision - for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been - made, be dropped or subsequently relaxed under political - pressure from neutral powers, as took place in the World War to - our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be - turned down. Even threats from other countries, especially the - United States, to come into the war, which can be expected with - certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a - relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. - The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will - it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end.” - -RAEDER: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now agree with that suggestion and that -point of view expressed in the paragraph which I have just read to you? - -RAEDER: It has to be understood quite differently from the way you are -trying to present it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite differently from what it says... - -RAEDER: No, not what it says. This is the point. We had the experience -during the first World War that, as soon as the order for -intensification had been given and communicated, as soon as the first -neutral had raised a finger to object, these measures were immediately -cancelled, particularly when the United States had a hand in it. And -here I am saying that under all circumstances it must be avoided that we -always withdraw our measures at once; and I give a warning to the effect -that we should consider our measures as carefully as possible. That is -the reason for the discussion with the Foreign Office and others, -namely, to avoid the situation where later on they might be withdrawn, -which would mean a considerable loss of prestige and the results would -not be achieved. - -That is the reason. Numerous protests were received by Britain too, and -in most cases they were unanswered. I can quote from the Document Number -C-170, Exhibit Number USA-136, where there are a lot of figures, Number -14, where it says: “Sharp Russian note against the British blockade -warfare on 20 October 1939;” and Number 17, on 31 October, where it -states: “Political Speech of Molotov.” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All that I ask is, was that a proper procedure? - -RAEDER: I must give an explanation on that matter, and I was just about -to do that. Sharp attacks on the British blockade, in violation of -international law—these attacks were made by M. Molotov. Here too, -protests were made which were turned down. But I wanted to prevent -protests and the entire document shows that our deliberations always -aimed at taking measures in such a way that they could not be objected -to, but were always legally justified. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you tell me, Defendant, how it was -going to prevent protests if you suggest in this paragraph to use the -most ruthless measures and disregard every protest that neutrals made? -How is that going to prevent protests? - -RAEDER: These measures were to be taken in such a way that no objection -was possible. If I tell the neutrals: “This is a dangerous area in every -way,” and nevertheless they go there because they want to make money or -because they are being forced by the British, then I need not accept any -protest. They are acting for egotistical reasons, and they must pay the -bill if they die. I must also add... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is true. They must pay the bill if they -die. That was what it came to, was it not? - -RAEDER: They received large premiums for exposing themselves to that -risk, and it was their business to decide about it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we might break off now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to be much longer, Sir David? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought about half an hour, My Lord. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, in this document the Naval -Command suggests that it calls for a siege of England, that is, the -sinking without warning of all ships that come into a big area around -England. - -Didn’t you hear? Sorry. In this document the Naval Command suggests what -is called the siege of England, on Pages 10 to 13. And that is, the -sinking of all merchant ships, including neutrals and tankers, which -come into an area around England. Isn’t that so? - -RAEDER: No, that is not true. The Navy Command does not suggest that, -but discusses the idea of a siege after the blockade had been discussed -and rejected. It likewise comes to a conclusion why the siege, which -until that time had not been accepted as a recognized idea by -international law, should not be undertaken; and it draws the inference -from all these discussions by setting out on the last page, the last -page but one, what shall now be considered the final conclusion. These -are only those measures which can be justified by the actions already -taken by the British. And during the entire discussion about blockading, -the consideration was always in the foreground as to whether the -neutrals would not suffer too much damage by that. And the whole idea of -a siege is based on the fact that Prime Minister Chamberlain had already -said—on 26 September—that there would not be any difference between a -blockade on the seas and a siege on land, and the commander of a land -siege would try to prevent with all means the entry of anything into the -fortress. Also, the French press had mentioned that Germany was in the -same situation as a fortress under siege. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am suggesting is that you come down in -favor of a siege, but you do not want any siege area declared. Will you -look at Paragraph 2 of the conclusions, and then I will leave the -document to the Tribunal. That is the point I suggest. In paragraph 2 of -the conclusions you say: - - “For the future conduct of economic war, the basic military - requirements demand the utmost ruthlessness. The employment of - the siege by sea as the most intensified form of economic - warfare meets this demand. Even without the public announcement - of a state of siege, after it has been clearly defined as a - concept, a declaration which would have drawbacks militarily and - from the point of view of international law, and even without - the declaration of a prohibited zone, it seems perfectly - possible at the moment, as has been explained in this - memorandum, to take military measures to introduce the most - intensive form of economic warfare, and to achieve what are at - present the greatest possible results in the interruption of - enemy trade”—now the last words—“without the Naval Operations - Staff being tied in all cases, to special forms and areas.” - -That is your final conclusion, that you should have as effective a siege -as possible without proclaiming any area. Isn’t that so? - -RAEDER: No, that is not the conclusion. The conclusion is that we cannot -carry out a siege, and that it would be a matter for the political -leadership of the State to decide. The political leadership of the State -has never suggested to decree a siege, and it can be seen here quite -clearly what, on the basis of the memorandum, is suggested for the time -being, and then how the intensification gradually took place. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must not take time arguing about it, I want -you to make clear... - -RAEDER: But... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me finish. My suggestion to you is—and -there I leave it—that you rejected a formal siege, but you claimed the -right to sink at sight, without warning, all neutral vessels in an area -which the High Command may choose. - -Now, I want to pass on to another subject, because I am afraid time is -getting on. - -RAEDER: That is no siege, however. That was a directive issued after -neutral ships did not heed our warning and continued to enter the sea -around Britain in order to support Britain in the economic warfare which -she, with the greatest ruthlessness and severity, was conducting against -us. It was a measure of self-defense. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it that the document speaks for itself, -now that the attention of the Tribunal has been drawn to it. I want to -come to another point. You have mentioned certain matters, in answer to -Dr. Horn this morning, with regard to the treatment of American ships in -the summer of 1941. In April 1941 you were pressing for German naval -forces to operate freely up to three miles of the American coast instead -of the 300-mile safety limit which the Americans were suggesting, were -you not? Well to save time I will give the witness Document Number -D-849, Exhibit Number GB-472. - -[_The document was handed to the defendant._] - -That says you couldn’t get in touch with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop -and therefore you asked Baron Von Weizsäcker to get a decision on these -points: - - “1) Authorization for the German naval forces in the western - part of the Atlantic Ocean to operate freely as far as the - international customary 3-mile boundary. - - “2) The cancellation of the preferential treatment which - American merchant vessels have been enjoying so far in our - warfare at sea.” - -Now, I hand you Document Number 850, that will be Exhibit Number GB-473. -Your suggestion, which had been made in April, was turned down by Hitler -in June. It is a memorandum from Ritter in the Foreign Office and it -reads: - - “General Jodl informs me that at the recent report of - Grossadmiral Raeder to the Führer, the more far-reaching orders - to the naval forces, as they were discussed in connection with - the Raeder interview, have been postponed until further notice. - - “In the same way, permission to attack United States’ merchant - vessels within the framework of the prize law has not been - granted.” - -Your suggestion was to abandon the policy then existing and attack up to -the 3-mile limit. Now, I want you to come to another point... - -RAEDER: No, please may I make a statement concerning that? I should like -to say something, even if you do not put a question to me. It is not -right. - -At that time, in March 1941, and on the 1st of April and the following -dates in 1941, a whole number of intensifications were introduced by the -United States, which I mentioned this morning, from the document which I -had before me. Therefore, it was clear that I, on behalf of the Naval -Operations Staff, which was supposed to conduct the most effective naval -war, urged that also with respect to the United States those steps -should be taken which were permissible according to international law, -and that we should start slowly. Those steps included: - -First: that we should no longer respect that 300-mile limit, but go as -far as the 3-mile limit, where according to existing international law, -it was possible to attack. That is to say, not against international -law, but it was just discontinuing certain favorable conditions which we -had granted the United States. And Point 2: The cancellation of the -preferential treatment... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That’s exactly what I suggest to you. There is -no dispute between us. I was just establishing that point. - -RAEDER: Yes—no... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want you to come... - -RAEDER: I only wanted to say that during the hearing of Grossadmiral -Dönitz the Prosecution demanded of us that we should not treat certain -neutrals better than others, but we should treat them all alike; that is -to say in plain language, we must sink them all, no matter whether we -wanted to do so or not, and of course we were not bound to do that. The -second thing: it was a matter of course that a thoroughly justified -suggestion on my part from the point of view of the Naval Operations -Staff had been rejected by the Führer if, with regard to the political -situation, he decided that at that time he did not desire to adopt a -more severe attitude towards the United States. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to quite a different -point. Do you say that you did not know anything about the extermination -of Jews in the Eastern Territories? - -[_There was no response._] - -Do you say that you did not know about the extermination of Jews in the -Eastern Territories? - -RAEDER: I say clearly under oath that I had not the slightest inkling -about it. I might add in explanation that on no account would Hitler -have spoken about such things to a man like myself, whose opinion he -knew, especially because he was afraid that on my part there would be -very serious objections. I explained the other day why I used the word -“Jews” in my memorial speech. In my opinion, I was obliged to do so. But -that had nothing at all to do with an extermination of Jews. About the -Jewish matter I have only learned... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well... - -RAEDER: Excuse me, please, one moment. I only learned something about -the Jewish matter when Jews who were known to me, mostly friends of my -old parents, approached me and told me that they were about to be -evacuated from Berlin. And then I intervened for them. That was the only -thing I knew. On occasions I was told in answer to my questions that -they were to be evacuated to cities where ghettos had been established. -I always understood that a ghetto was a district in a city where all the -Jews lived together, so that they would not have to mingle with the rest -of the population. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you know, my question was only: Did you -know or did you not, and you could have answered that yes or no. I want -you now to answer about that point... - -RAEDER: Yes, but I must—so many questions have been asked about this -very point and as every man in my position who held the same views says -the same, that he does not know anything about it, I should like to -explain once for all that one did not hear about these things, because -civilians certainly did not talk to us about that, because they were -always afraid that they would get into difficulties. The Führer did not -speak about it. I had no connection with Himmler nor with other agents -of the Gestapo. I did not know anything about it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you just to tell the Tribunal -your chain of command for the Baltic coast. Is this right that you had -the naval chief command, and then the Flag Officer of the East Baltic -coast Tallinn and, under him, you had a command at Libau; is that right? -Was that your chain of command? - -RAEDER: I did not understand that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was your chain of command for the East Baltic -coast, Kiel, Flag Officer Tallinn, and a detachment under him at Libau? -You had... - -RAEDER: I assume, so—that depends on various things. If they were -operational matters, then it had to do with the Naval Group Commander -East or North; and as far as matters of organization were concerned, -then it might have gone through the Station Chief of the Baltic Sea. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, at any rate, you had got in 1941 a -naval command at Libau, had you not? - -RAEDER: Yes, of course. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like you just to look at -Document Number D-841, which is a deposition on oath by one of the naval -employees at Libau. - -My Lord, that will be Exhibit Number GB-474. - -This witness says: “Deposition on oath of Walter Kurt Dittmann.” - -And then it says: - - “I was Naval Administration Inspector and officer in charge of - the Naval Clothing Depot at Libau in Latvia. - - “I held this position from the beginning of August 1941 to the - end of March 1942. - - “The Jewish population of Libau at that time was supposed to be - about 7,000 people. - - “Up to the end of March 1942 many thousands of them had already - been ‘evacuated’ by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. - - “‘Evacuated’ was the local expression for the annihilation of - these people. - - “All Jews were registered. When a new lot was to be evacuated it - happened in the following way: - - “The Latvian Police fetched the Jews out of their houses, put - them on lorries and drove them to the Naval Port about six to - seven kilometers outside the town. Later on these people had to - march and were not taken there in lorries. - - “In the Naval Port these people were then shot with machine - guns. This was done by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. The - police, of course, got their orders from the German Gestapo. - - “I personally did not witness these incidents, but comrades told - me all about them. - - “Some of the Jews before they were shot worked for the Navy. - - “About 80-100 people worked in the Clothing Depot every day. - - “About 100-150 people worked in the Garrison Administration - every day. - - “About 50 people worked in the Garrison Building Office (Navy) - every day. - - “Through these contacts and through personal visits to the - houses of Jews I heard a lot regarding the terrible happenings - in Libau during these months. - - “I personally went to my superior, Festungs-Intendant Dr. - Lancelle, and before that I also went to another superior, the - officer in charge of the Hospital Administration, named Müller, - both were Naval Administration Officials. I pointed out to them - these abuses which have already been described. The answer I got - was that they could not do anything and that things like that - were best overlooked. - - “The Marineverwaltungsassistent Kurt Traunecker accompanied a - consignment of clothing from Kiel to Libau. He stayed a few - weeks in Libau and he expressed his displeasure at the - conditions there regarding the annihilation of the Jews. - - “He then went back to Kiel to the local clothing office. There - again he expressed his displeasure and was ordered to appear at - the Naval Administration Headquarters (Marine-Intendantur). Whom - he saw there, I do not know, but it was made clear to him that - these occurrences were not true, and therefore he should not - talk about them any more, otherwise he would get into most - serious trouble. - - “My personal opinion is that the higher offices of the Navy in - Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of - these terrible conditions.” - -Are you saying, Defendant, that with your naval detachments on the East -coast of the Baltic and with these things happening, that nobody -reported to you that the Jews were being slaughtered by the thousands in -the Eastern Territories, you are still saying it? - -RAEDER: Yes, I knew nothing about it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your staff doing, if they were not -telling you about this? Had you an efficient staff? Do you say you had -an efficient staff? - -RAEDER: That is a question which is not relevant here. Of course I had -only efficient officers around me. But here we are dealing with things -which were not done at all by the Navy. It says here in all places that -it was the police and so on. I even was in Libau once and I was -told—and this is the only thing in connection with this matter—that -the peculiar thing was that the Jews in Libau, contrary to their custom, -were craftsmen and therefore they were doing useful work there. That was -the only thing I heard about it. As regards any extermination... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When were you in Libau? - -RAEDER: I cannot say that now. It was after it was occupied, probably -immediately afterwards. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were you there in 1941 or 1942? - -RAEDER: I said just now that I do not know exactly when; I have to look -it up somewhere. It does not say here that anything was reported, only -that it was apparently discussed in the Navy Headquarters and with the -Navy Quartermaster (Marine-Intendantur), who does not report to me. Of -course I would have intervened if I had heard about such happenings. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You think you would? Well, I’ll leave that. Now, -tell me about the Commando Order of the 18th of October 1942. You -received Hitler’s Commando Order and passed it on to your various -divisions of the Navy, did you not? - -RAEDER: Yes, I passed it on through the Naval Operations Staff. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you approve of it? - -RAEDER: I did not recommend it, but I passed it on. I have to make a -statement if you want to know what I thought about it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that’s not what I’m asking you. I’m asking -you—first answer my question—did you approve of an order to shoot -Commandos or to hand them over to the SD to be shot, did you? - -RAEDER: I did not recommend the order, but I received it as drafted by -the Führer, and as it came into my hands, I passed it on as ordered with -the same remark as to how far it has to be passed on and how it has to -be returned. It was all ordered by Hitler in detail. It was decisive for -me that in one of the first paragraphs the reason for this order was -given, and the reasons why Hitler considered a deviation from -international law justified. Moreover, a short time before I had been in -Dieppe in France, and there I was informed that on the occasion of the -Commando action of the British in France, the prisoners, I believe they -were from the Labor Service, who were working along the coast, had been -shackled with a noose around their neck and the other end of the noose -around the bent-back lower leg, so that when the leg weakened, the noose -tightened and the man choked. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you answer my question: Did you -approve of the order or not? You haven’t answered it yet. Did you -approve of the order? - -RAEDER: I always said—yes, I did—no, I do not want to say—I said that -twice already. I passed it on because it was an order from my -Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, in one of the last paragraphs it said that -that order should not be applied for the treatment of prisoners taken -after a naval action or after large scale landing operations and I, as -well as many others in the Navy, concentrated our attention on this -point because that was our main activity. But I saw no reason to raise -objections to the Führer on account of this order which I thought -justified in this way. And I would like to state very clearly that I, as -a soldier, was not in a position to go to my Supreme Commander and Chief -of State to tell him, “Show me your reasons for this order,” that would -have been mutiny and could not have been done under any circumstances. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, do you remember that one example which we -have discussed a great deal in this Trial, which you must have listened -to, was the case of naval men coming in with a two-man torpedo, trying -to sink the _Tirpitz_. Do you remember that case? Surely you can answer -that “yes” or “no,” because either you remember or you do not. We have -discussed it about six times. - -RAEDER: Yes, I remember. If I remember I will say “yes.” The contrary -does not have to be assumed at all. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that during the time that you were -Inspector General, or Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, that there -was started a “Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände,” under Vice Admiral -Helmut Heye, which included in its command one-man torpedoes, one-man -U-boats, explosive motor boats, and had personnel, starting at about -5,000 and rising, I think, as far as 16,000? Did you know that there was -that Kommando in the Navy, “Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände”? Did you -know that? - -RAEDER: Yes, I knew that of course and that it operated quite openly on -the French coast and later on, I believe, also on the North coast. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you have approved if the Allies had shot -any one of your thousands of personnel in that Kommando that was dealing -with one-man and two-man torpedoes and explosive motor boats? Would you -have approved if we had shot them out of hand? - -RAEDER: First, I cannot give any information about what I would have -done in a particular case with which I had nothing to do any more. -Secondly, here it is... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, if you don’t want to answer, it is -good enough for me. I will point it out in due course to the Tribunal -with... - -RAEDER: But you interrupted me again. I should like to make a second -point after what I said first. Secondly, these units fought quite -openly, just below the coast, and had no civilians on board and also no -murderous instruments or instruments for sabotage with them, so they -were fighters just like the fighters in a submarine. I know... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly the point that I have put with -our Commandos, so I will not argue. - -I want to pass to one other point. Was it under your orders that the log -on the _Athenia_ was falsified? Was it by your direct order? - -RAEDER: No, not at all. I have explained the other day here that my -order was, “First: absolute secrecy upon the order of the Führer. -Secondly: politically it will be dealt with by the High Command of the -Navy. Thirdly”—there was a third point—I will find it in a second—“I -do not intend to punish the commander because he acted in good faith and -committed an error.” That is what I ordered. I did not order anything -further concerning that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you know under whose orders the log was -falsified? I am very anxious to know. The log was falsified. I have -asked the Defendant Dönitz. He cannot tell me. He has put in an -affidavit that the matter was to be left to you, and now I am asking you -whether you can tell me. I think the commander is dead, as far as I -remember, so he cannot tell me. Do you say that you cannot tell me under -whose orders the log of the Submarine _U-30_, that sank the _Athenia_, -was falsified? - -RAEDER: I have already said that I had nothing to do with it, because in -fact I did not have anything to do with such details. I did not order -such details. The other day—I do not know whether Admiral Wagner said -it—it was discussed who did it. I assumed that it was within the -flotilla. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me just this about the _Athenia_. You told -us the other day that you gave these orders, and then washed your hands -of the matter. Nearly a month later... - -RAEDER: I have already said I had nothing further to do with it, for you -know... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had nothing to do with it. Nearly a month -later the Propaganda Ministry put out this suggestion, I think you said -on Hitler’s orders—that the _Athenia_ had been sunk by Churchill. Did -you not feel that it was your duty as Grand Admiral and head of the -German Navy to make any protests against this disgraceful, lying -suggestion, that the First Lord of the British Admiralty had -deliberately sent to their deaths a lot of British and American -subjects? Did you not think it was your duty to do that? - -RAEDER: I spoke to Hitler about it—but it had happened without our -having any idea about it. I was extremely embarrassed about it when the -First Lord of the Admiralty was attacked in that, one can say, boorish -manner but I could not change anything subsequently and Hitler did not -admit that he... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you did not bother about that, as I -understand it, you didn’t bother at all... - -RAEDER: Yes, I had misgivings about it, and I was very indignant about -it. Please do not keep twisting what I say... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you translate your indignation into actions? -That is what I am asking. - -RAEDER: Into what kind of action? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Any action. - -RAEDER: Yes, that Hitler should get Goebbels to contradict that article? -That Hitler would not do if he himself had been the author of the -article. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to get it clear. You did -nothing when you knew that Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch, who were old -friends and comrades of yours, had been framed up by sections of these -Nazi plotters; you did nothing about that? You did nothing to protest -against the treatment meted out to Von Blomberg or Von Fritsch? You did -nothing, did you? - -RAEDER: No, but at that time I did not know anything about the -background, as you yourself said this morning. I knew nothing about the -background. Later when I became acquainted with the details I gradually -put the whole picture together. At that time I was not in a position to -assume that such methods would be at all possible. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I put to you your own statement that you -made a year ago. I just want to get it quite clear that the first time -in your life that you were moved to protest was, I think, in March 1945, -when you saw the actual marks of torture on the hands of your friend, -Herr Gessler, and at that time the Soviet troops were over the Oder and -the Allies were over the Rhine, and that was the first time that you -made any protest when you took off your Party Golden Emblem, wasn’t it? -That was the first protest you ever made in your naval, military, -political career; is that right? - -RAEDER: Not a bit of it. I did not really know what was going on. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then—I put it again. In March 1945 you -took off the Party Golden Emblem when you saw the marks of torture on -your friend Gessler’s hands. Isn’t that right? - -RAEDER: When Dr. Gessler, who in spite of my objections had been kept -for several months in a concentration camp, returned from the -concentration camp and informed me that he was in extremely pitiful -condition, and that in spite of my request in August, when he was sent -to the concentration camp and when I had asked the Führer through -Admiral Wagner for Dr. Gessler to be questioned quickly because he was -certainly innocent in connection with the assassination attempt, so that -he could be released as soon as possible, then... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, my question is, was it then that you took -off the Party Emblem. You can answer that. You can give your explanation -later. - -RAEDER: Yes, but wait a moment. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But up to then you did not make any protest -against anything that Hitler did, except the purely military one on the -invasion of the Soviet Union? - -RAEDER: I always made serious protests, and that I have proved here, and -the adjutant, General Schmundt, told me, “You will be most successful if -you try to influence the Führer personally when you are alone with him -and tell him quite openly what you think.” This is important enough to -mention and I must say it. - -Well, Dr. Gessler came back from the concentration camp and told me that -during his first interrogation—at that time I had not yet had a chance -to intervene—he had been tortured. That was the first time that I heard -that anywhere in Germany anybody was tortured. There is a letter from -Dr. Gessler about that—that I told him immediately, “I am going to the -Führer at once to tell him about this because I cannot imagine that he -knows about that.” Gessler begged me—when he confirmed that letter—for -goodness sake not to go to the Führer then, because that would endanger -his, Gessler’s, life. I said I would answer for it that nothing would -happen to him, and that I would still try to approach the Führer. - -During the whole of the ensuing period I attempted to approach the -Führer, who was not at headquarters. When I was informed in April that -he was in Berlin, which was already under heavy attack, I tried to -approach the Führer day after day by calling Admiral Voss over the -telephone. That was no longer possible, and after I received that -information the first thing I did was that I went, together with my -wife, to the lake which was behind our house and tore off my Party -Emblem and threw it into the lake. I told that to Admiral Voss but -unfortunately I could not tell it to the Führer any more. That can be -seen from the letter which Dr. Gessler wrote, and we would have liked to -have him as a witness, but his state of health did not permit it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was your first protest. - -RAEDER: It was not my first protest. That is twisting my words. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross-examination? - -COL. POKROVSKY: On 18 May 1946, during the morning session of the -Tribunal you testified that during your service as Commander-in-Chief of -the Navy you twice made application to resign. The first time you tried -to resign was in November 1938 when you were dealing with the building -up of the Navy, and Hitler was not pleased with your plans, and the -second time was when Hitler, without your knowledge, permitted his -adjutant who was a naval officer to marry a certain young girl. Is that -not so? - -RAEDER: Yes, but I put in further applications for resignation which -were not so sensational, once in 1937, and I believe even in 1935, when -I was not in good health. But these were two typical examples which show -how such things came about. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I understood that in the first of these two cases Hitler -finally persuaded you not to resign. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: And in the second case, he complied with your wish but -he never forgot it. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In fact, you resigned only in January 1943, is that not -so? - -RAEDER: In actual fact, yes. But I must add that during the war I felt I -could not leave the Navy, which was already in such a difficult -situation, and I believed I enjoyed its confidence to a certain extent -so that I could be useful. - -COL. POKROVSKY: On the morning of 18 May you said here in the Court in -regard to your resignation, that it seemed to you then that Hitler, at -that particular moment, wanted to get rid of you. Is that so? - -RAEDER: At that moment I had the impression, when he made such serious -accusations and when he considerably contradicted his previous -judgments, that maybe he wanted to get rid of me, and I therefore -considered that that was a particularly favorable moment to leave. - -COL. POKROVSKY: The question of successors was solved by your naming a -few people to Hitler. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: And among them was the Defendant Dönitz. Did you mention -his name? - -RAEDER: Yes. I mentioned his name. I informed the Führer of that in -writing, first Carls, second, in case he wanted to concentrate on -submarine warfare, Grossadmiral Dönitz, who was the highest authority in -that field. - -COL. POKROVSKY: And does it not seem to you, after your answer to my -questions, that the answer which you gave to Dr. Laternser on 18 May, -when you mentioned the absolute impossibility of resigning from the -general staff, was not a proper answer? It was possible to resign, was -it not? - -RAEDER: Yes, but in this case, of course, there were two prerequisites. -The first was that Hitler himself did not like me any more and I knew -it, so that it would not be insubordination if I threw up my post for -some reason or other. - -Secondly, because it was possible, as I pointed out in that -conversation, for the change to take place under peaceful conditions so -that the Navy would not suffer by it. If I had left because of a -quarrel, then that would have had a very bad effect on the Navy because -it might have meant a certain split between the Navy and Hitler, and I -had particularly to preserve unity, at that critical moment of the war. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to understand my question correctly. - -RAEDER: Yes, I understand... - -COL. POKROVSKY: I am not asking you about the prerequisites which might -have been required for granting an application for resignation. I am -asking you a question in principle: - -Was it possible or was it not possible to resign? After all, you did -resign. You resigned from your post as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. - -RAEDER: Yes, but I had been in the service for 15 years, and I could -tell him, “If that is the way you yourself judge me, then there is no -sense in your continuing to work with me.” That was a favorable -opportunity which made it permissible for me to ask him to release me. -But what one could not do was to throw up the job and give the -impression of being insubordinate. That had to be avoided at all costs, -I would never have done that. I was too much of a soldier for that. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I have already heard what I wanted to hear from you in -reply to my question. - -Now, I will pass on to the next question. You maintain that all the time -you were striving towards normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, -is that correct? - -RAEDER: I am sorry; I could not understand what you said. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You maintain that during your service you always strove -to make the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union quite normal, -is that not so? - -RAEDER: I was always in favor of the Bismarck policy, that we should -have a common policy with Russia. - -COL. POKROVSKY: If I understood your testimony correctly the day before -yesterday and on Friday, in 1940, already, you had knowledge of the fact -that Hitler intended to attack the Soviet Union. - -RAEDER: In September 1940 for the first time I heard certain statements -from Hitler himself that he was thinking of a war with Russia, given -certain circumstances. Even in the directive he mentioned one of these -prerequisites, one of these circumstances. He did not say to me at that -time that in any circumstances he wanted to wage war, but that we had to -be prepared, as it says in Paragraph 1, that before crushing England we -might have to fight against Russia. And from September on I began to -make objections to him. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Was there not a case of an incident when you maintained -that the explanations which had been given by official governmental -organs or agencies for an attack on the Soviet Union gave you and the -others the impression that it was a deliberate propaganda, and in fact -they were quite repulsive in their effect? Do you remember that? - -RAEDER: The propaganda made by Hitler made an impression? I did not -quite get it... - -COL. POKROVSKY: I believe that you once expressed in writing the view -that the OKW and the Foreign Ministry explained to the German people the -reasons for attacking the Soviet Union in such a way as to give the -impression that it was deliberate propaganda, and the total effect was -repulsive. Do you not remember it? - -RAEDER: Oh, you mean the broadcasts emanating from the Foreign Office -when the war started? Yes, that was Hitler’s propaganda to make the -German people understand the reason for this war. That is right. As -regards breaking the Pact... - -COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to take a look at one document. This is -a document written by you, and I would like you to tell us whether this -document contains the precise subject matter of my question. - -RAEDER: Where is it? - -COL. POKROVSKY: “The propagandistic...” - -RAEDER: “The propagandistic”—shall I read it? - - “The propagandistic, political and military announcements given - out at the beginning of the war by the Foreign Office and the - High Command of the Armed Forces, which were to justify the - breaking of the Pact because of breaches by the Soviet Union, - found very little credence among the people as well as among the - Armed Forces. They showed too clearly that they were propaganda - for a certain purpose and had a repulsive effect.” (USSR-460.) - -I know that at that time Hitler himself drafted these documents, -together with Goebbels. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In connection with this question I have another question -for you. Am I to understand you in this way; that your divergence of -opinion with Hitler over foreign policy, and in particular in regard to -aggressive wars, was less strongly defined than your difference of -opinion about the question of the marriage of a naval officer with a -certain girl? Did you understand me? - -RAEDER: No, they were two quite different things. Those were military -questions where the political decisions remained with the Führer. I was -very insistent about the moral issues also, where they concerned the -Pact, but I did not send him any written ultimatum because in this -matter it would have been unsoldierly. I did not have the final -decision, he had it; whereas in the case of Albrecht, it was up to me to -decide—to say yes or no—and not to sign that which I was supposed to -sign. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You are saying now that this is a question of morals. -Does it not seem to you that an unprovoked attack on a country with -which Germany had a nonaggression treaty—do you not think that such a -question is always connected with the question of morals? - -RAEDER: Of course; that is what I said myself, that in this case too I -laid special stress on the moral issue. But in spite of that, as the -highest man of the Navy, I was not in a position to hold out the threat -of resignation at that moment. I was too much of a soldier to be able to -do that, to be able to leave the Navy at a moment like that. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In answer to questions put to you by your counsel here -in this courtroom you testified that your speech, which was delivered by -you on 12 March 1939—that is Page 169 of the Russian text in the Raeder -document book, My Lord—the speech where you praised Hitler and Hitler’s -policies—you mentioned that this speech was not in accord with your -true opinion. Is it so or is it not? - -RAEDER: No, that is not correct. I said that we had had the experience -that the Communists and Jews, from 1917 to 1920, had strongly undermined -our power of resistance, and that for this reason it could be -understood, if a National Socialist government took certain measures -against both of them in order to stem their influence, which was -excessive. That was the sense of my statements and I made absolutely no -mention of any further steps which might come into question. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In short, you are saying now that when you delivered -that speech on 12 March 1939, that this speech was fully in accord with -your ideas and your views. Is that correct? - -RAEDER: Yes, it was, or I would not have made it. It was in accord -insofar as I had to recognize that the National Socialist Government had -in some way to stem that influence which was generally recognized to be -excessive, and as I said yesterday, the National Socialist Government -had issued the Nuremberg Laws, which I did not entirely approve of where -they went to extremes. But if the Government was so disposed, it was not -possible for me in an official public speech, which I gave on the orders -of that Government, to express my personal views which were different. -That had to be considered within this address to the nation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish in a very few moments? It is -now five minutes past five. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I think, My Lord, that only about 10 minutes will be -sufficient for me. I have only about three or four more questions left. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - -COL. POKROVSKY: [_Turning to the defendant._] In order to save time I am -not going to argue with you in regard to the motives which made you -deliver the speech. It was important for me that you should confirm what -you said, and that is, that this speech was in accord with your views -and ideas. Now I will pass on to the next question. - -On 29 September 1941, your Chief of Staff, Admiral Fricke—do I -pronounce his name correctly? Is it Fricke or Fricker? - -RAEDER: Fricke, yes, Chief of the Staff of the Naval Operations Staff. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Admiral Fricke published a directive in regard to the -future fate of Leningrad. Do you know what document I mean, or must this -document be shown to you? - -RAEDER: No. I know that document very well. - -COL. POKROVSKY: This directive was published with your consent? - -RAEDER: I did not give a specific order for it because there was no -necessity for passing it on. May I just explain briefly how it was. I -had... - -COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, and I would like you to be brief. - -RAEDER: Quite briefly, yes. I had requested Hitler when I heard that he -intended in the course of the war to bombard Leningrad, that he should -spare the port and dock installations because they would be useful for -us later, as we had to keep moving our bases back to the East on account -of the British air attacks in the Baltic. Shortly before the date which -you have mentioned Admiral Fricke had been at the Führer’s -headquarters—I do not know for what reason—and had there spoken with -the Führer in my absence, and the Führer had explained to him that plan -to bombard Leningrad, especially with aircraft, and he used those very -exaggerated words which were then written down in the document. The Navy -had absolutely nothing to do with the shelling of Leningrad. We received -no orders for that. We were only interested in that one thing which I -mentioned before, that the shipyards and port installations should be -spared. The Führer had informed Fricke that unfortunately he was not in -a position to do that because the attack, especially if made with -aircraft, could not be directed quite so precisely. All we could do was -to inform Generaladmiral Carls that Leningrad, in case it should be -taken, could not be used as a base, and Generaladmiral Carls had to stop -the preparations which he had already begun by allocating German workers -and probably also machinery which was intended to be used in Leningrad -later on. Carls had to know of that and, as the document says, the -so-called Quartermaster Department of the Navy had to know about it, and -that was why Admiral Fricke passed on that paper. Unfortunately he -included in this paper the expressions used by Hitler, which had nothing -to do with the whole affair as far as we were concerned, because we had -nothing to do with the shelling. By so doing he did not assume in any -way the responsibility, in the sense that he approved it. He only -believed that he had to pass on Hitler’s wording of the order. - -The Navy had nothing to do with the matter. It would not have been -necessary to pass it on, and unfortunately and very clumsily that -expression used by Hitler was entered in that document. However, nothing -happened and that document was not passed on from Generaladmiral Carls -to our Finland Commander. That is the whole story. - -COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me the question is becoming more -complicated. I asked you a simple question. Your Chief of Staff, Chief -of Operations, published a directive. Did you know about the directive? - -RAEDER: No. That is not a directive—that can be seen also from the -photostat—because the letter had not been submitted to me for passing -on, and that shows that it was not considered to be very important. It -was not a directive to undertake any operation or anything important. It -was just a directive to stop anything that might have been done with -regard to bases; so that really nothing happened. Thus, when that -document was passed on by Admiral Fricke, nothing happened at all. It -was quite superfluous. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You are talking about the destruction of one of the -biggest cities of the Soviet Union. You are talking in this document -about razing the city to the ground, and you maintain now that it is a -more or less trifling question, that this question was not important -enough to be reported to you, as Fricke’s Chief? Do you want us to -believe that? - -RAEDER: Of course. It is not a question of the shelling of Leningrad, -with which we had nothing to do at all. It was the minor question which -concerned us, the question as to whether we would later be able to -establish a naval base there, and whether we could bring workers and -machines and such things to Leningrad. That was a minor issue. The -shelling of Leningrad was a major issue. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I think that the Tribunal will be able to understand you -correctly and to draw the necessary conclusions, both from this document -and from your testimony. - -Now, I have one last question for you. On 28 August 1945, in Moscow, did -you not write an affidavit as to the reasons for Germany’s defeat? - -RAEDER: Yes, I took special pains with that after the collapse. - -COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, we submit this document to the Tribunal in the -form of excerpts, Document Number USSR-460. In order to save time I -would like you to hear several excerpts from this affidavit. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You will be shown where they can be found -on the original, and you can say whether it was correctly read into the -record and whether you acknowledge and confirm it. - - “My Attitude Towards Adolf Hitler and the Party. Disastrous - influence on the fate of the German State...” - -Did you find this place? - -RAEDER: Yes, I have it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable...” - -DR. SIEMERS: Would you be kind enough to give me a copy so that I can -follow? - - COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable ambition - were his main peculiarities; running after popularity and - showing off, untruthfulness, vagueness, and selfishness, which - were not restrained for the sake of State or People. He was - outstanding in his greed, wastefulness, and effeminate - unsoldierly manner.” - -Then, a little further on: - - “It is my conviction that Hitler very soon realized his - character, but made use of him where it suited his purpose, and - burdened him perpetually with new tasks in order to avoid his - becoming dangerous to himself.” - -On Page 24 of your document you give another characteristic: - - “The Führer continued to attach importance to the fact that from - the outside his relations to me seemed normal and good. He knew - I was well thought of in all the really respectable circles of - the German people, and that in general everybody had great faith - in me. This cannot be said of Göring, Von Ribbentrop, Dr. - Goebbels, Himmler and Dr. Ley.” - -Now I will ask you to find Page 27. - -RAEDER: But there is something missing. “In the same way, as for -instance, Baron Von Neurath, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Schacht, -Dorpmüller and others,” who were on the other side. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Evidently it was not correctly translated to you. I will -read this passage into the record. Now, on Page 27, this place is -underlined in red pencil: “Dönitz’ strong political inclination to the -Party...” - -THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] I think the Tribunal could read this -themselves if the defendant says that it is true that he wrote it. -Probably Dr. Siemers could check it over and see that there are no -inaccuracies. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, My Lord. Then I shall have the opportunity to -put a very brief question. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I will ask you to take a look at a place -on Page 29, which is marked with pencil, where the paragraph deals with -Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl. - -Will you confirm that? - -RAEDER: What am I supposed to do? Yes, well... - -COL. POKROVSKY: I am asking you with regard to everything that I read -into the record and what you say just now in this paragraph. I would -like to have an answer from you. Do you confirm all that? - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I quite agree with the suggestion by the -Tribunal. However, I should like to ask that the entire document be -submitted. I have only short excerpts before me, and I would be grateful -if I could see the entire document. I assume that Colonel Pokrovsky -agrees to that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Siemers, one part of the document having -been put in evidence, you can refer to the remainder of the document. -You can put the remainder of the document in, if you want to. - -RAEDER: I said that at the time I tried to find an explanation for the -cause of our collapse. - -COL. POKROVSKY: First, I ask you to give the answer, yes or no. - -RAEDER: Yes. On the whole, I agree entirely with this judgment. But I -should like to add that I wrote those things under entirely different -conditions. I do not wish to go into details, and I never expected that -that would ever become public. These were notes for myself to help me -form my judgment later on. I also want to ask especially that what I -said about Generaloberst Jodl should also be read into the record, or -where it belongs, that is, right after the statement about Field Marshal -Keitel. With regard to Field Marshal Keitel, I should like to emphasize -that I intended to convey that it was his manner towards the Führer -which made it possible for him to get along with him for a long time, -because if anybody else had been in that position, who had a quarrel -with the Führer every day or every other day, then the work of the whole -of the Armed Forces would have been impossible. - -That is the reason and the explanation of what I wanted to express by -that statement. - -COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution has no further questions to ask -the defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, have you got the whole document before you? -Was that the original document you had before you? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: In your writing? - -RAEDER: No, it is typewritten. But it is signed by me. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the document can be handed to Dr. Siemers. - -Dr. Siemers, do you want to re-examine beyond putting in that document? -Have you any questions you want to ask in addition to putting in that -document? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, on account of the cross-examination made by Sir David -Maxwell-Fyfe, I should like to re-examine, and I should like to ask for -permission to do that after I have read this document, so that I can -also cover the document tomorrow in this connection. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, the thought occurs to me with respect to this -document—do I understand that the Tribunal will order copies to be -distributed to all of the Defense Counsel? There are matters with -respect to the defendants on which the Counsel might want to examine. -They might be surprised. - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought it was fair that Dr. Siemers should see the -document. - -MR. DODD: Yes. I have no objection to that. But my point is, that in the -document there is reference to defendants other than the defendant -represented by Dr. Siemers. And at a later date, if this document is not -made known to the others by the reading of it or by the turning over to -them in translated form, they may claim surprise, and lack of -opportunity to examine on it. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think some photostatic copies of the document should be -made so that all the defendants referred to therein may be acquainted -with the terms of the document. - -MR. DODD: I just thought I would make that suggestion. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 21 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH DAY - Tuesday, 21 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand._] - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with reference to your examination yesterday, I -have to put the following questions to you in re-examination. Sir David -was talking about the fact that before 1933 you had carried out -rearmament behind the backs of the law-making bodies. I think that -question, as such, has been clarified; but there is one supplementary -question. On whom did it depend just what was submitted to the -Reichstag? - -RAEDER: On the Reichswehrminister. - -DR. SIEMERS: And who was the Reichswehrminister at that time? - -RAEDER: He was a member of the government and my direct superior. I had -to submit everything to him which I wished to get. - -DR. SIEMERS: And his name was Gröner, wasn’t it? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: May I draw the Tribunal’s attention to the extract from the -Constitution which I have recently submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-3, -according to which Article 50 lays down that the Reich President gives -all orders and decrees even where the Armed Forces are concerned. For -their validity decrees require to be countersigned by the Chancellor or -the Minister concerned. By the act of countersigning responsibility is -accepted. In this, our case, the Reichswehrminister was the competent -Reich Minister; and anything that was done afterwards with reference to -the law-making bodies was a matter for the government to decide. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Sir David has submitted to you Document -C-17. It is the index of a book written by Colonel Scherff, called _The -History of the German Navy from 1919 to 1939_. Was this book ever -written? - -RAEDER: As far as I know, only the index was compiled. I assume that if -anything had been written, then it would have been submitted to me a -long time ago, but I never heard of that at all. - -DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that the American Prosecution, at -the time when they submitted the document, pointed out that as far as -they knew the book was not written. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I believe that it is very difficult to -base accusations on an index, but I want you to tell me, Defendant, when -did you learn of this index? - -RAEDER: It became known to me during my first interrogation by an -American prosecutor. - -DR. SIEMERS: Furthermore, Document D-854, which is GB-460, was put to -you yesterday. May I come back to one question put by Sir David. On Page -1 Sir David had been reading as follows: - - “But if—as was stated—in nearly all spheres of armament where - the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in - the letter and all the more in the spirit—or at least its - violation was prepared—a long time before the 16th of March - 1935....” - -Then Sir David asked you: “Do you want to say that this is untrue?” You -answered but you did not quite finish your reply, at least it never -became quite clear what you said in the German or the English record. I -want you to tell me why you are of the opinion that Assmann was not -quite right in this respect? - -RAEDER: It is an utter exaggeration. First of all, violations—as have -been proved here in detail—were mostly of a very minor nature; and only -the number of deviations may have given the impression that there were -many violations. Secondly, in its essential points, we never actually -filled the quotas allowed by the Versailles Treaty; in fact, we remained -below the figures granted. Besides, only defense measures are involved, -very primitive defense measures—Assmann’s representations are just a -great exaggeration. - -DR. SIEMERS: What you are trying to say, therefore, is that Assmann’s -way of putting it “in practically every sphere of rearmament” is wrong? - -RAEDER: Yes, probably Document C-32 will have led him to that conclusion -because there were so many points. However, on closer examination they -turn out to be very minor points. - -DR. SIEMERS: With regard to the important points of rearmament, that is -to say construction of large ships, the Navy did not violate the Treaty, -did it? - -RAEDER: No, no. - -DR. SIEMERS: By repeating it three times, Sir David emphasized the fact -that you had a great deal of confidence in Assmann. I have nothing to -say against it, but beyond that I would like to put a supplementary -question to you: Did you have that much confidence in him, that in your -opinion Assmann could pass a proper legal judgment? Was he a lawyer? - -RAEDER: No. Assmann was a naval officer who was not used at the front -any more. He was a very clever writer who had written a few volumes -about the first World War. He wrote very well, but even the volumes on -the naval warfare during the first World War were corrected a great deal -by the persons concerned; but against him and his ability to write -history nothing can be said. - -DR. SIEMERS: I think you remember this document from yesterday. Is it a -final historical work? Is it a final and corrected edition? - -RAEDER: No. So far as I know, he had not got that far. He was making -summaries and extracts from war diaries and records. - -DR. SIEMERS: Assmann has written (Document D-854, GB-460): - - “If, in this light, there were plans for ‘preparing the - construction’ in 1935 of twelve 275-ton submarines, six 550-ton - submarines, and four 900-ton submarines, then one will have to - consider the strategic points of view valid at that time.” - -Added together 22 were planned, and for the following year 14 -submarines—by no means built, just planned. Are these figures correct -in your opinion? - -RAEDER: They are correct in my opinion. The only thing I am not sure -about is the 900-ton type; I cannot quite explain that. I cannot -remember that at that time we were building 900-ton boats. Apart from -the 250-ton type, our first types were 550-tons, and only then did the -740-ton boats come. Perhaps he is thinking of those when he says -900-tons. We did not actually build 900-ton boats. - -DR. SIEMERS: On Page 158, Sir David has read to you the following -sentence, which I want to repeat because it needs clarification. - - “It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction - that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the - German-British Treaty. Considering the size of U-boats which had - already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided - for up to 1938. In reality, 118 were completed and constructed.” - -I want to remind you that in the original there is the Note Number 6 -referring to a letter of the Chief of the Naval Budget Department... - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: ...from the year 1942, presumably containing statistics on -the construction of submarines as the years went by. I believe that -these figures need to be clarified. - -According to material at my disposal, it appears that these 55 U-boats -were in accordance with the London Agreement; that is to say, in -accordance with the 45 percent agreed on in 1935. You probably have not -got the exact figure in mind, but is that roughly correct? - -RAEDER: Yes, that is probably right. - -DR. SIEMERS: And now, the Figure 118. That, according to material at my -disposal, is also well-founded. That is the figure which corresponds to -the 100 percent equality in regard to the tonnage of submarines. If we -had 118 submarines, then our submarine equipment corresponded to that of -Britain at that time. Is that so? - -RAEDER: Yes, it is correct; and it is also correct that we included -these later boats in the budget and had ordered them after we had seen -Admiral Cunningham and his staff in Berlin on 30 December and had -reached a friendly understanding in accordance with the agreement, -allowing us to build 100 percent. The remark read at the beginning, -saying that we had committed most violations in this sphere, is a -complete untruth. Until the beginning of the war we only built such -U-boats as we were allowed to build; that is to say, first 45 percent -and later 100 percent. It was a great mistake, of course, that we did -it. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have just said that it was a complete untruth. -I think that, even if Sir David used that word against you, one ought -not to pass such sharp judgment against Assmann. Do you not think, -Admiral, that there was possibly a legal error on his part when... - -RAEDER: Yes, that may be. - -DR. SIEMERS: ...he wrote these details and that he was not really -thinking of what you have just told us had happened; namely, that in -1938 there had been an agreement between England and Germany, according -to which Germany could now build 100 percent? - -RAEDER: That is quite probable. When I said “untruth,” I meant -incorrectness. - -DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that in the Naval Agreement of -1935, 100 percent was planned from the beginning and that Germany at -first renounced that but had the right at any time to increase to 100 -percent, provided that Great Britain was notified. The notification is -presumably what you described, Witness; that is the negotiation with -Admiral Cunningham? - -RAEDER: Yes, that was on 30 December 1938, or it may have been 31 -December. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant saying that there was a notification to -Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938? Is that what you said; -that there was notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of -December 1938? - -RAEDER: Admiral Cunningham came to Berlin, to this friendly negotiation -which had been provided for in the agreement. On that 30 December we -arranged with him that from now on, instead of 45 percent, 100 percent -would be built. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was that an oral arrangement or a written one? - -RAEDER: It was a conference between the Chief of Staff of the Naval -Operations Staff and Admiral Cunningham, and certain other individuals, -but I cannot remember the details. However, I am pretty certain that -minutes were taken. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, unfortunately, I have not been able to trace -any written evidence. I only know from Exhibit Number Raeder-11, that is -the agreement of 1935, that Germany could increase the tonnage, and the -agreement of ’37, that Germany had the duty to give notification. -Generally, notification is only in writing in diplomatic relations, -although, in my opinion, it was not necessarily a duty in this case. -Negotiations, as the witness said, did take place. - -RAEDER: May I, perhaps, add that apart from the submarine problem, the -question of two heavy cruisers, which we had originally dropped, was -also settled. We only wanted to build three for the time being; and now -we were asking for assent to build the other two, to which we were -entitled. That was also agreed upon in accordance with the agreement. - -DR. SIEMERS: Document C-140 was put before you yesterday; it is USA-51. -You will find it in the British Document Book 10a on Page 104. I want to -put one sentence from that document to you again, which has not been -quoted by the Prosecution, neither in November nor yesterday. It appears -under Figure 2-c. There is the following statement—I want to add that -this is the question of sanctions and the possible preparation of a -defense against sanctions in 1935. I quote from 2-c: “For the time being -I prohibit any practical preparations.” - -Witness, I want to ask you... - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not 10a, 104. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. Elwyn Jones has just been kind enough to point out to -me the English translation. It appears from it that—as I have also the -English translation before me—that there are two documents C-140; one -has one page and the other has two. One has not got a heading and is -dated, Berlin, 25 October 1933. In my opinion it is the document... - -THE PRESIDENT: That is the one on Page 104? - -DR. SIEMERS: No, on Page 104 there is, as I just heard from Major Elwyn -Jones, the other document, C-140, which has the heading, “Directive for -the Armed Forces in Case of Sanctions.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and the date of it is 25 January 1933? - -DR. SIEMERS: 25 October 1935, but that is a clerical error. It is 1933. - -MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): There -appears to be another document which is not in the document book. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, perhaps I may point out that the Document -C-140, USA-51, presented by the Prosecution, must be the one I have -referred to, because it tallies with the record; I mean the record of -the session of 27 November. That is the document to which I have just -now referred. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it C-140 or C-141? - -DR. SIEMERS: C-140, the same number, and that is the same as USA-51. - -Mr. President, perhaps to simplify matters, I may later, after today’s -session or tomorrow submit the Document C-140 in the, here presented, -English and German text. - -THE PRESIDENT: Read the document now and you can settle with Mr. Elwyn -Jones about the proper notation of the document, whether it should be -C-140 or whatever the exhibit number ought to be. - -DR. SIEMERS: [_Turning to the defendant._] In the version submitted by -the Prosecution, preparation for the defense against sanctions is -mentioned. I shall now read a further sentence to you, and I quote, “For -the time being, I prohibit all practical preparations.” Would it be -right, therefore, that in 1933 nothing whatever was prepared by you in -the Navy? - -RAEDER: No. Apart from the ordinary state of preparedness, nothing was -allowed to be done, in accordance with this order. This was merely a -precaution on the Führer’s part in order to take preparative measures in -case the opponent might do something. - -DR. SIEMERS: You see, the reason why I am asking you this is that -yesterday in the cross-examination the preparations that you were -supposed to have made in this connection were held against you. - -I now come to Document C-189, which is USA-44. I beg to apologize for -troubling the Tribunal in that I am asking them, if possible, to look at -the document again. It is contained in Document Book Raeder 10, Page 14; -and, incidentally, Sir David re-submitted it yesterday. Sir David -attached great importance to the two words “against England.” There -under Figure 2 it says: - - “The Ob.d.M. expresses the opinion that later on the fleet must - anyhow be developed against England and that, therefore, from - 1936 onward, the large ships must be armed with 35 centimeter - guns like those of the _King George_ class.” - -Would this mean that you were using the plans of the English for -building ships of the _King George_ class? - -The only reason, therefore, why you were pointing this out was that you -were considering the 35 centimeter guns used in the _King George_ class -by the British Admiralty? - -RAEDER: Yes, it was the aim of every navy at that time to know as early -as possible which was the largest caliber of guns being used by other -navies. I said yesterday that, to start with, we had chosen as a model -the French _Dunkerque_ type, but later on we discovered that the British -used up to 35.6 centimeters. Ships have to be used, if war breaks out, -in their actual state; their gun caliber cannot be changed any more. -Therefore we always went as high as possible. - -DR. SIEMERS: Would I be right, therefore—please excuse me—if I said -that the expression “against Britain” in this connection is not correct -grammatically, that according to German language usage it should have -said “with reference to England”? - -RAEDER: Yes, it should have said “developing with regard to England.” I -said yesterday that it would have been quite senseless if I were to do -something against Great Britain before the conclusion of the pact. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that was fully gone into in -cross-examination, and the defendant stated his explanation of the words -used. - -DR. SIEMERS: From Document C-190, which is the conversation on 2 -November 1934 aboard the _Emden_ between you and Hitler, Sir David has -held up to you that Hitler, in a discussion with you and Göring, said -that he considered the expansion of the Navy in the planned manner an -absolutely vital necessity, since war could not be conducted unless the -Navy safeguarded the ore imports from Scandinavia. It was said that this -would have to be understood to mean that the Navy was planned in view of -a war and in view of safeguarding the ore imports, which really meant -aggressive intentions. Are you of the opinion that the British Navy was -not planned to safeguard imports to England or for the event of war and -was not equipped accordingly? - -RAEDER: No, there is not the slightest doubt about that. - -DR. SIEMERS: Six submarines are mentioned in this document. Considering -that figure, may I ask you to tell me the number of submarines that -Germany would have needed in order to conduct an aggressive war? - -RAEDER: Well, at any rate, many more than we had in October 1939, a -multiple of that. - -DR. SIEMERS: From a document, Mr. President, which was submitted -yesterday, D-806, I want to quote, in addition to the second paragraph -which has been quoted, the first paragraph and put it to the witness. It -is D-806, GB-462, submitted yesterday at noon. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] There it says: - - “1.) Reference: Submarine Construction Program. On 27 October - 1936 I made decision regarding the full utilization of the still - available U-boat tonnage according to the Naval Agreement of - 1935 and regarding the immediate ordering of the construction of - _U-41_ to _U-51_.” - -Were these the rest of the submarines within the 45 percent limit to -which we were entitled according to the Naval Agreement of 1935? - -RAEDER: Yes, that is right, judging from the figures. - -DR. SIEMERS: And then, Admiral, you have been very thoroughly questioned -about Austria and Czechoslovakia. Since that subject has been gone into -in detail, I shall confine myself to just one question: Did you, at any -time, receive any tasks or orders of a foreign political nature from -Hitler? And did he ask you for your advice especially in foreign -political matters? - -RAEDER: I was never asked for advice, and I had no foreign political -tasks, unless you consider the duties which I had to fulfill in Bulgaria -and Hungary after my resignation of a foreign political nature. - -DR. SIEMERS: Regarding Czechoslovakia, that is, concerning the document -about the “Rest Tschechei,” you were asked whether Hitler had aggressive -intentions against Prague at that time. I think the question ought to -have been whether his intentions were for an aggressive war. - -In connection with that, you have been asked about Göring’s threat to -bombard Prague, and you quite rightly admitted to Sir David that such a -bombing would be a threat. Sir David commented on it as being near to -aggressive war; but in order to be quite clear, I want you to tell the -Tribunal when you learned of this planned bombing. - -RAEDER: Only after the whole matter had been settled, and only by way of -conversation. I heard no announcement and I knew nothing else of it -beforehand. - -DR. SIEMERS: So you knew nothing of it before the occupation of Prague? - -RAEDER: No, because military undertakings against Prague were altogether -unknown to me. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then there is the Document C-100. Mr. President, it was -presented yesterday under the Number GB-464. - -THE PRESIDENT: 463, I’ve got it. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; 463. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] From that document I want to quote to you -from Page 10. It is Page 3 of the attached document. I want to put the -following sentence to you. I quote: - - “Führer asked Ob.d.M. whether there were any special wishes of - the Navy with reference to bases on Dutch-Belgian coast. Ob.d.M. - says no, since bases are within reach of the British coast and - are therefore useless as submarine bases.” - -According to this, Witness, you were not in favor of an occupation of -Belgian and Dutch bases, nor did you in any way occupy yourself with -this question. - -RAEDER: This was always my point of view, that from the experience of -the first World War Belgium and Holland, as far as the Navy was -concerned, could not offer any useful bases, since all forces were under -the control of the British Air Force. In the first World War serious -fighting occurred between the submarines leaving their ports and -destroyers stationed nearby. Therefore I declared myself not to be -interested in Belgium and Holland. - -DR. SIEMERS: Skipping various documents, I now come to D-843, GB-466. -This is a document in which Dr. Breuer from the Oslo Embassy expresses -the view that the danger of a British occupation of Norway was not -really very great and that certain actions were only taken in order to -provoke Germany. - -I have one more question on that. Did the Embassy in Oslo, that is to -say Breuer, know about the information that Admiral Canaris was -supplying to you? - -RAEDER: I cannot tell you that, as far as I am concerned. I was never in -direct contact with Dr. Breuer, only with the naval attaché; but I must -add that Dr. Breuer had only been in Oslo for a comparatively short -period and that apparently he was not particularly well informed. The -statements made by Norwegian Ministers were certainly not properly -judged by him. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an order from Hitler that the Foreign Office -should not be informed about probable plans concerning Norway? - -RAEDER: Yes, he expressly ordered that, and it is obvious that for that -reason the Reich Foreign Minister himself was informed very late. - -DR. SIEMERS: In other words, as far as you can see, the ambassador could -not have had Canaris’ information through military sources. - -RAEDER: No, hardly. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then there were several documents, D-844 and D-845. It was -put to you from those that there was no danger in Scandinavia. Was the -information that you received at the time different? - -RAEDER: Yes. I had continual information... - -THE PRESIDENT: All this was gone into yesterday, and the witness gave -the same answer. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe that the following has never been mentioned -before. Did you know whether as early as 5 April mines had been laid in -the territorial waters off Norway? - -RAEDER: The Allies had announced it on 7 April, but the actual -operations must have taken place a few days earlier. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday... - -THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing_] Dr. Siemers, the only purpose of -re-examination is to bring out matters which are favorable to your -client which have not been raised in cross-examination, that is to say, -to explain anything which has not been given in cross-examination. When -he has given this account in cross-examination it is no good putting it -to him again in re-examination. We have heard it. - -DR. SIEMERS: I think that on this particular point one explanation is -missing. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Yesterday you were asked, rather -unexpectedly, what had been the technical changes since 1936 and how the -legal situation regarding submarine warfare would have been influenced -thereby. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: It is a somewhat difficult question to answer in two -seconds. You have mentioned aircraft. Can you not supplement your -statement? - -RAEDER: Yes, I forgot the most important point due to the fact that -there was a rather lively controversy. The important point is that the -spotting of vessels at sea by aircraft was something quite new and had -been developed very efficiently. That development continued very rapidly -during the war, until submarines could very quickly be located and -pursued. - -DR. SIEMERS: Regarding D-841, which is the affidavit from Dietmann, may -I, with the Tribunal’s permission, make a formal application? In this -affidavit, there is the following sentence: - - “It is my personal opinion that the higher authorities of the - Navy in Kiel and other places in Germany had knowledge of these - dreadful things.” - -THE PRESIDENT: It isn’t “had knowledge” but “must have had knowledge.” -It seems to me it is in the translation “must have had knowledge.” - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I have not got the German and I do not know how the -original is worded. I only have the English translation. It is not quite -clear to me how the German version was worded. May I ask the Tribunal... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is the document put in in the original German or is it -put in in the English? The deposition is in German presumably. - -DR. SIEMERS: I presume that originally the statement was in German. The -copy I have states that this is a translation and that is English, but I -have not seen the German original. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there must have been a German copy for -the witness yesterday. I don’t know whether or not it is the original. I -didn’t see it but I assume it was. - -THE PRESIDENT: It isn’t the case that the deposition was made in German, -then translated into English, and then translated back into German, was -it? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is why I assume it was the -original. I am sorry this was done. I haven’t got the original document -in front of me but I assume that was so. I will find out in a moment for -you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What is the point, Dr. Siemers? - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this sentence should be struck from the -document. It does not record a fact. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean you are asking to have it struck out or... - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: What do you say, Sir David? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the witness sets out fully the facts in -the preceding paragraphs of the affidavit and then it is true that he -introduces the sentence “By my personal opinion....” but the gist of the -statement is that from these facts which I have stated the higher -formations of the Navy in Kiel and in other places in Germany must have -had knowledge of these terrible conditions. A man who has been working -in that detachment of the German Navy and knows the communications -between that detachment and the headquarters is in a position to say -whether headquarters would have knowledge from the facts he has stated. -His inference has a greater probative value than the inference which the -Court can draw. The objection to the statement of a matter of opinion is -where the witness gives his opinion on a matter on which the Court is -equally capable of drawing an opinion from the same facts, but the -importance of that statement is that he is saying “working in the bow -and being familiar with the chain of command and communications.” I say -that anyone at Kiel must have been able to learn from these facts what -was going on at these places—so that is the narrow point, whether his -special knowledge entitles him to express a view which the Court, -without that special knowledge, would not be in a position to draw. - -THE PRESIDENT: But ought he not theoretically to state all the facts; -and if he does state all the facts, then the Tribunal will be in the -same position as he is to form a judgment; and it is for the Tribunal to -form the judgment. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is exactly the point to which I -was addressing my argument, that there is the additional fact, that -because he was working there, was part of the chain of naval command and -he is speaking of the knowledge of the naval command from the point of -view of somebody who was working in it, and, therefore, he has on that -point his opinion as to the sources of knowledge; and the necessity of -constructive knowledge is an additional fact. My Lord, the state of a -man’s mind and the expression of his knowledge may be a fact in certain -circumstances, just as much a fact as that stated, as Lord Bowen once -put it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if the state of his knowledge is directly relevant -to an issue. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the point here. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is a form of expert evidence. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, in a sense, it is not as Your Lordship -says, in a form, it is not in a usual form, but it is the evidence of -somebody who has special knowledge. My Lord, it is a well-known -distinction, for example, in the laws of libel between the persons who -have expert knowledge and the public at large; and, My Lord, the opinion -of someone with a special knowledge of the facts must have probative -value within Article 19 of the Charter. My Lord, if the provision that -this Tribunal is not bound by the technical rules of evidence is to mean -anything at all, I submit it should cover the expression of opinion on a -point such as this; that is the ability to have knowledge, which is -given by somebody who is in a special position to state such an opinion. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is a very small point, Sir David, and we have got to -decide the matter and form our own opinion about it; and this man isn’t -here for the purpose of being cross-examined for anything of that sort. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is so, My Lord, but, of course that, -with respect, cuts both ways. I mean here he gives an affidavit and part -of it as the basis leads up to that conclusion. I should respectfully -submit that that conclusion is a statement of fact—but, if Your -Lordship says so, the time will come when we can ask Your Lordship to -draw that conclusion as a matter of argument ourselves; but, My Lord, on -the general position, the only reason that I have occupied even this -much of the Tribunal’s time is that Article 19 is an important matter in -the view of the Prosecution and, therefore, we have to argue against its -being whittled down. It is the only reason that I’ve taken up the -Tribunal’s time. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I just draw your attention to one point. -Sir David has just been mentioning the well-known legal difference. That -is just what I want to base my argument on, the difference between facts -and opinions. Here it is a question of opinion and please note the -following sentence does even go further; there, the witness is coming to -a legal opinion and he is stating who is responsible; therefore, he is -passing some sort of judgment. Furthermore, I beg you to consider that -this is quite a minor official who, after all, cannot possibly make -statements of such portent to the effect that higher formations in Kiel -and some other places in Germany—he is quite vague—had some sort of -knowledge. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, before the Tribunal adjourn, might I -make a correction and an apology? My Lord, I thought that a copy in -German had been put to the witness yesterday—of this affidavit; and -apparently it was a copy in English. The original affidavit was sent off -on the 6th of May; it was verified over the telephone by Colonel -Phillimore and it has not yet arrived. An English copy was sent and has -been processed and the original will be put in as soon as it arrives. My -Lord, I thought that we had got the original but apparently it has not -yet arrived, but it is an English document put to the defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you let Dr. Siemers see the original as soon as it -arrives? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered Dr. Siemers’ -application and it has decided that the passage to which he objects and -which he asks the Tribunal to strike out in the affidavit of Walter Kurt -Dietmann shall not be struck out in view of Article 19 of the Charter. -The passage contains an opinion only, and the Tribunal will consider -that opinion in relation to the whole of the evidence when it is before -the Tribunal and will decide at that time the probative value of this -opinion as well as the probative value of the other evidence. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then I just have... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, may I remind you that you told us that your -re-examination would take, you hoped, about half an hour? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, I shall conclude very shortly. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, in connection with this Commando -decree which we discussed a good deal, Sir David yesterday put a case to -you regarding the attack on the ship _Tirpitz_. In this connection I -should like to ask you: Do you recall that in the testimony of Wagner -there was the question of a British sailor named Evans? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: And do you recall also that, according to the affidavit of -Flesch, Number D-864, GB-457, Flesch declared, “I am unaware of the fact -that Evans wore a uniform”? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then I do not need to submit the document to you? - -RAEDER: No, I recall it. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall further that it is said in Document UK-57, -submitted on the same day as Wagner’s testimony: “The British sailor -Evans was captured wearing civilian clothing”? - -RAEDER: Yes. I have the document here. - -DR. SIEMERS: And that was one case where the SD, obeying the Commando -order, committed a murder without the knowledge of the Navy? - -RAEDER: Yes. This man had been apprehended by the SD or the Police, not -by the Navy. He had only been interrogated in the meantime by the -admiral. - -DR. SIEMERS: The second case of which you are accused is the sabotage -attack on German ships near Bordeaux. I clarified this situation in -Wagner’s testimony the other day. - -Do you recall that his document also states that these men tried to -escape to Spain in civilian clothes? - -RAEDER: Yes, that is true. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when using the small fighter craft mentioned -yesterday under the command of Vice Admiral Heye, did our soldiers ever -wear civilian clothing? - -RAEDER: No, never. - -DR. SIEMERS: Always in uniform? - -RAEDER: Yes, always in uniform. These craft were a weapon just like -submarines, speed boats, _et cetera_. - -DR. SIEMERS: As my last point, Mr. President, I should like to point out -that yesterday Colonel Pokrovsky submitted a document, USSR-460, which -deals with the Moscow notes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, the point is that yesterday the Tribunal made a -decision about submitting to the attorneys for the Defense extracts from -USSR-460. Today the prosecutors have exchanged opinions among -themselves; and the Prosecution of the United States, represented by Mr. -Dodd; Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe for Great Britain; and myself for Russia, -have agreed that it is necessary for us to request you to permit us to -read into the record here today the three brief extracts referring to -Dönitz, to Keitel, and to Jodl so that they will be included in the -record. These are the excerpts which yesterday the Tribunal did not -allow to have read into the record as evidence. If we understood the -Tribunal rightly it was due to lack of time as the session was dragging -on. - -Due to these circumstances these three extremely important -excerpts—important from our point of view—the accuracy of which was -confirmed yesterday by the Defendant Dönitz, have not been included in -the transcript of the session. For that reason I am requesting just -about 5 minutes time to read these excerpts into the record today, on -behalf of the Prosecution of the three countries. - -THE PRESIDENT: What would be the most convenient course, Dr. Siemers? -Would you like to have them read now so that you can put any questions -upon them? - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I make some remarks about this document? -The Soviet Delegation has been kind enough to put the original at my -disposal. I perused the original yesterday, and I looked at the -extracts. The Soviet Delegation desires to retain the original but has -also been kind enough to put instead a photostatic copy of the extracts -involved at the disposal of the High Tribunal. I am completely in -agreement with the suggestion, but I personally do not have the -intention of putting any questions on this document, which is clear to -me. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. SIEMERS: And so I would like to ask that the resolution put forth by -the High Tribunal yesterday be upheld, that this should not be read, -just as other documents were not read out either. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the document was originally in German. -Presumably it has been translated into Russian; it has certainly been -translated into English. Unless the French members of the French -Prosecution want it read if it hasn’t been translated into French there -doesn’t seem to be any use in taking up the time of the Tribunal by -reading it into the record. We have got the document in English, and we -have all read it. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I think there is one reason. Even if it is read -into the record, it will at least be tomorrow before the transcript is -available for the defendants who are referred to, and this witness, or -this defendant, will be off the stand. If they want to cross-examine -about what he has said about them, then we will have, I suppose, to -bring this defendant back on the stand. I think we will lose far more -time by doing that, rather than now having Colonel Pokrovsky take 5 -minutes to read it. They will all hear it, and then if they want to -examine about it, they can do so promptly. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, very well. - -Dr. Siemers, if you don’t want to ask any questions about it, you can -conclude your re-examination now, and then Colonel Pokrovsky can read -the document. Then any of the other defendants can question the witness -if they want to, upon it. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that not be the best way, Colonel Pokrovsky? - -COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, certainly. - -DR. SIEMERS: I agree, Mr. President, but I do believe that this document -need not be read, because Mr. Dodd was somewhat mistaken when he said -that the defendants are not familiar with this document. They and their -counsel are thoroughly familiar with it. I believe everyone knows it, -and I do not think that it needs to be read. However, in the final -analysis, it really makes very little difference to me personally. - -THE PRESIDENT: If the defendants’ counsel do not want it read then the -Tribunal does not want to have it read unless defendants’ counsel want -to ask questions upon it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I, as defense counsel for -Admiral Dönitz, am not interested in having the document read. I know -the document. - -DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised that the Defense Counsel know the -document and do not put any value on having it read nor do they wish to -put any questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well then, Mr. Dodd and Colonel Pokrovsky, it does not -seem that it serves any useful purpose to have it read. - -MR. DODD: No, I am satisfied, Your Honor. I have not heard from Keitel’s -attorney; I assume he is satisfied. I am just concerned that at some -later date—a very interesting document to us, of course—and I am just -concerned some question may be raised and I am also sympathetic to the -desires of these defendants not to have it read publicly. - -The Defendant Schacht’s counsel has not spoken either. I think it might -be well, Mr. President, if we had a careful statement from counsel for -each of these men that they do not want to question or, if so, that we -can be completely sure that it will not be raised again. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the defendants’ counsel are all here or all -the defendants are represented and they must clearly understand what I -am saying and I take it from their silence that they acquiesce in what -Dr. Siemers has said, that they do not wish the document to be read and -they do not wish to ask any questions. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I have not understood your decision, My Lord. Are you -permitting me to read into the record these few excerpts or are you not? - -THE PRESIDENT: No, Colonel Pokrovsky; I am saying that as the -defendants’ counsel do not wish the document to be read it need not be -read. - -COL. POKROVSKY: We do give a great deal of importance and significance -to this document as it involves not only the interests of the Defense -but also the interests of the Prosecution. The document was accepted by -the Tribunal yesterday but for some reason only a very small part of the -characterization given therein by Admiral Raeder was included in the -stenographic record for the day. I do not see any reason why these -excerpts should not be read into the record now, and why the witness -Raeder, who intimately knew the Defendants Dönitz, Keitel, and Jodl, -should not hear the excerpts here and now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky and Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal ruled -yesterday that it was unnecessary that the document should be read and -the Tribunal adheres to that decision in view of the fact that the -defendants’ counsel do not wish it to be read and have no questions to -put upon it. - -Yes, Dr. Siemers. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I will now conclude my examination of -Admiral Raeder. I do not know whether other questions will be put to -Admiral Raeder. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there any question which has arisen out of the -cross-examination which the defendants’ counsel want to put? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to put two questions, Mr. -President. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, in cross-examination you were -confronted with orders and memoranda as to the U-boat warfare. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider yourself responsible for -these decrees dealing with the U-boat warfare which you issued during -your term as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy? - -RAEDER: I consider myself fully responsible for all decrees issued as to -the U-boat warfare which took place under my responsibility as well as -every naval operation which I ordered. In the Naval Operations Staff and -together with the officers of the Naval Operations Staff I worked out -these directives; I approved memoranda and in accordance therewith I -gave my orders. The Commander of the U-boat fleet was solely the -tactical commander of U-boats. He transmitted the orders and he carried -through the details of the operations. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, yesterday Sir David charged you -that he could not determine who actually gave the orders to change the -log book of the U-boat which sank the _Athenia_. Admiral Godt testified -in answer to my question that he had issued this order at the request of -Admiral Dönitz. Do you know of any facts which would show this testimony -of Admiral Godt to be incorrect? - -RAEDER: Actually I was never concerned with this case. I only decreed -the three points which have come up here several times. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Therefore, you consider Admiral Godt’s -testimony as being correct? - -RAEDER: I assume that it is correct since everything else he said was -very reliable. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the High Tribunal I should -like to call my first witness, the former Reich Minister of the -Interior, Severing. - -[_The witness Severing took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please. - -KARL SEVERING (Witness): Karl Severing. I am 70 years old and I live at -Bielefeld. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait one minute. Will you repeat this oath after me: I -swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure -truth—and will withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -You may sit down. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, please tell the High Tribunal what role you -played in the Social Democratic Party up until the year 1933 and the -principal ministerial posts you held up until the year 1933. - -SEVERING: At the age of 16½ I entered the labor union movement and when -I was 18 years old I entered the Social Democratic Party and as a result -of that fact I held honorary positions in the Party at a relatively -early age. - -In the year 1905 I became councillor in the city of Bielefeld. I was -member of the Reichstag from 1907 until 1912; and I again became a -member of the Reichstag and at the same time a member of the Prussian -Diet in 1919. I was in the Reichstag and in the Prussian Diet until -1933. I was Minister in Prussia from 1920 until 1921; then again from -1921 to 1926, and from 1930 until 1933; from 1928 until 1930 I was Reich -Minister of the Interior. - -DR. SIEMERS: When and why did you leave public life? - -SEVERING: I retired from official public life in July 1932, and from -political life when the Social Democratic Party was prohibited. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were you arrested when leaving public life in 1933, or -perhaps at a later date and, if so, at whose order? - -SEVERING: I was arrested on the very same day on which the Enabling Act -was scheduled to be read and passed in the Reichstag. The order for my -arrest was signed by the then Minister of the Interior, Herr Göring, who -at that time was also President of the Reichstag and, if I may utter an -opinion, who would have had the obligation, as President of the -Reichstag, to protect the immunity of the members of the Reichstag. -Under breach of this immunity I was arrested the moment I entered the -Reichstag building. - -DR. SIEMERS: But you participated in the vote on the Enabling Act? - -SEVERING: The Chairman of the Social Democratic Reichstag faction had -complained to Göring against the treatment to which I was subjected with -the result that I was given leave to vote. But the voting had already -come to a close. However, Reichstag President Göring still permitted me -to give my “no” vote for the Enabling Act. - -DR. SIEMERS: You were arrested thereafter but only for a very short -time? - -SEVERING: On the next day I had to appear for further interrogations. I -was permitted to leave Berlin on the second day and was given the order -to hold myself ready at my home in Bielefeld for further interrogations. - -DR. SIEMERS: Despite your well-known anti-Nazi attitude, you were not -arrested later and put in a concentration camp, if I am not mistaken. - -SEVERING: I was never in a concentration camp, thanks to the -respect—and I say this with all modesty—which the old Prussian -officials, my previous subordinates, had for me. At the end of October -1933 I heard from the Police Chief in Bielefeld that trouble was brewing -for me. The police notified me that they would not be able to give me -any protection and advised me, therefore, to leave Bielefeld for several -months. I followed this advice and, from October 1933 until the end of -March 1934, I lived in Berlin using a false name. I first stayed with -friends, and then I went to a small Jewish sanatorium at Wannsee. I -feared another arrest in August 1944; according to someone whom I knew -in the police my name was on a list of people who were to be arrested -summarily—men and women who were suspected of having plotted against -Hitler in July 1944. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you say ’44 or ’34? - -DR. SIEMERS: ’44. After the attempted assassination of Hitler of July -1944. - -SEVERING: May I continue? - -DR. SIEMERS: Please do. - -SEVERING: After the attempted assassination of Hitler orders were given -to the police to arrest certain people. My name was on the Bielefeld -list. Then a police official whom I knew from the past pointed out that -I was close to my seventieth year and had lost my son in the war. Thus -he succeeded in having my name struck off the list. - -DR. SIEMERS: Aside from what you have told us now, did you suffer any -further disadvantage at the hands of the National Socialists? - -SEVERING: Well, I was considerably hindered in my movements. I was not -especially surprised that my mail was censored and my telephone tapped. -I considered that as a matter of course. But I could not even take a -trip without being followed and watched by the police. - -If you do not mind, I should like to call your attention to the fact -that in addition to material damages there is also harm to one’s ideals -(ideelle Schädigungen), and in this respect I suffered a great deal at -the hands of the National Socialist Party after it assumed power. A -political measure, taken in connection with the polls of 1932, was used -against me, I might say, in a criminal way. They talked about me and my -friend Braun as the “thieves of millions,” and this epithet was also -applied to the members of my family. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, is this witness going to give any evidence -which has relevancy to the defendant’s case? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, bring him to it then as quick as possible. - -DR. SIEMERS: Very well. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Herr Minister, try to be as brief as -possible in this connection. It is of course true that with respect to -your ideals you suffered harm as well, but as the basis of my -examination and your testimony I would like to ascertain whether serious -harm was caused to you and I would like to have you tell us, but -briefly, whether National Socialism... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, what relevancy has this got to Raeder’s -case? - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, my intention is to show that Minister -Severing, after a brief description of his life during Nazism can, -without bias, give entirely impartial answers in reference to Raeder. -Since he had no advantages but rather disadvantages at the hands of the -Nazis and on the other side... - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have dealt sufficiently with the disadvantages -now. Go to the matter which relates to Raeder. He has given us, from -1933 to 1944, a fairly general account of his life and that ought to be -sufficient. - -DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses the Defendant Raeder, that in his -capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he violated the Treaty of -Versailles, in the intention of carrying on aggressive wars, and that -behind the back of the Reich Government. In order to shorten the -testimony, I would like to point out to you that it is an undisputed -historical fact that Germany, in developing her Navy within the -framework of the Versailles Treaty, violated the stipulations of the -Versailles Treaty. All that is known to the Tribunal. Even before this -time, the government applied for the construction of armored cruiser A -within the compass of the Versailles Treaty. A great inner political -conflict arose over the construction of this cruiser and, in connection -with a debate before the Reichstag on this cruiser, the witness made a -speech. I have a brief excerpt from this speech which I should like to -submit to you and which I should like to read. Mr. President, this is -Exhibit Number Raeder-5, to be found in Document Book 1, Page 13. This -is an extract from a speech by the former Reichsminister Karl Severing -before the German Reichstag on 20 January 1928. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Herr Minister, at this period of time you -were not a Minister; rather, you gave this speech as a deputy of the -Social Democratic Party? - -SEVERING: Yes, that is correct. - -DR. SIEMERS: The extract reads: - - “Now the armored cruiser. The fact that a government, which - knows precisely what gigantic sums we must raise during the - coming year, should make such demands, is, to say the least, - quite surprising. It says, the Peace Treaty permits it—yes, but - the Peace Treaty also decrees the payment of reparations. The - 9,300,000 marks demanded for this year will play their decisive - part only in the consequences entailed which would require the - raising of several hundred million marks, which during the next - few years seems to me absolutely impossible. Considering the - development of weapons for naval warfare, I am not convinced of - the military value of armored cruisers. It may be that armored - cruisers are the backbone of the defense at sea, as the - government says. But, to form an active fighting unit - (Gefechtskörper), the backbone must also be made up of other - elements, of U-boats and airplanes; and as long as we are not - allowed to build these, armored cruisers are of very little - value even for defense.” - -Is that extract from the speech correct? - -SEVERING: Yes, that, extract is reproduced correctly. - -DR. SIEMERS: Is it right to conclude here that the Social Democratic -Party and you, personally, at that time, were of the opinion that the -Wehrmacht which was granted Germany by the Versailles Treaty might not -be sufficient for a defensive war? - -SEVERING: That is correct. - -DR. SIEMERS: Will you please comment on that a little more extensively. - -SEVERING: That the 100,000-man army granted to Germany was not -sufficient even for a defensive war was and is known today possibly to -everyone in Germany concerned with politics. Germany got into a very bad -situation with regard to her eastern neighbors since the establishment -of the Corridor. The insular position of East Prussia forced Germany -even at that time to take measures which I reluctantly helped to carry -out; but the population of East Prussia had a right to be protected -against attacks which were threatening from the East. I am not speaking -about an aggressive war and I am not speaking of any plans of the Polish -Government; but I would like to refer you to the fact that in the years -1919, 1920, and 1921, there were aggressive groups in Poland who set -foot on German soil, possibly with the idea of establishing a _fait -accompli_... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, this evidence is all a matter of argument. -Not only is it a matter of argument, but we have had it over and over -again from nearly all the defendants and a good many of their witnesses; -and, surely, it is not assisting the Tribunal in the very least to know -what this witness said in 1928 or what view he took in 1928. - -DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I believe this will become -clear in the following. Minister Severing was a member of the government -that held this cabinet meeting of 18 October 1928. I agree with the High -Tribunal that the matters have been heard frequently—these things only -once, however—but I should like to point out that Sir David even -yesterday in cross-examination accused the defendant, despite his -testimony, that, against the will of the Reich Government and against -the wish of the Parliament, he had violated the Treaty of Versailles. -If, therefore, after the testimony of Raeder, the Prosecution persists -in their opinion, I have no other possibility to prove the incorrectness -of the opinion of the Prosecution than by questioning a witness who... - -THE PRESIDENT: The question whether the Treaty of Versailles was -violated is a question of fact and, of course, upon that you can give -evidence and you did give evidence through the Defendant Raeder; but -this witness is not talking about the question of fact. He is arguing -that Germany was entitled to defend herself in violation of the Treaty -of Versailles. That is what I understood his evidence to be and that is -a question of argument, not a question of fact. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, as far as I know juridically... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the class of evidence which has just been -given by this witness will not be listened to by the Tribunal. If you -want to prove facts by him, you can prove them, but you cannot prove -arguments or his views upon arguments. - -DR. SIEMERS: Could Germany with her Wehrmacht protect herself against -the incursions in Silesia by Poland? - -SEVERING: In the year 1920 the Wehrmacht would not have been able to -protect Germany in East Prussia; therefore, it was necessary to protect -the population of East Prussia, and this was achieved in that I, -personally, agreed that all weapons which were found in East Prussia -were to be given to the population. Under conditions which applied at -that time, it was, even for purposes of inspection, very hard to pass -through the Corridor by rail; so that in 1920, I had to make a tour of -inspection by way of water from Stolpmünde to Pillau. I am mentioning -this fact to show the difficulties of transportation through the -Corridor. In 1920 and ’21, it was not possible for the German Wehrmacht -to prevent attacks of Polish insurgents in Upper Silesia and, I am sorry -to say, and I emphasize “I am sorry” that a certain self-defense had to -be created in order to protect and defend German life and German -property. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, were the measures with regard to rearmament -as they were wanted and accounted for since January 1928 by -Reichswehrminister Gröner based on defensive or offensive ideas as far -as you know Gröner? - -SEVERING: As far as I am acquainted with Gröner and his own personal way -of carrying on his office, everything that he conceived and carried out -was in view of defense. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then this should also apply to the armored cruiser A. I -should like to know why the Social Democratic Party, which was -interested in the idea of defense, was against the building of this -armored cruiser. - -SEVERING: In 1928 the Social Democratic Party was against the building -of the armored cruiser as the economic situation did not warrant -expenses which were not absolutely necessary. And the Social Democratic -Party wanted to prove and to show that they did everything within their -power in order to make the much-discussed disarmament a reality. They -did not believe that the building of an armored cruiser would be a -favorable gesture for the bringing about of appropriate negotiations. - -DR. SIEMERS: On 28 June 1928 a new Reich Government was formed. Müller -was Reich Chancellor; Stresemann was Foreign Minister, and you were -Minister of the Interior. What position did your government take to the -then pending problem of universal disarmament stipulated in Versailles, -or to the then pending problem of rearmament by Germany? - -SEVERING: I have just made a reference to this problem. We were of the -opinion in the Social Democratic Party, even after entering the Müller -government, that we would have to use all our efforts in order to solve -just this problem. In September of 1928 the then Reich Chancellor -Müller, replacing the Foreign Minister Stresemann who was ill, went to -Geneva in order to bring this problem up before the League of Nations. -Müller made a very resolute speech which, if I remember correctly, was -received very coolly by Allied statesmen; so that any practical -suggestions for the realization of disarmament could not be hoped for in -the near future. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, in July 1928 you spoke with -Reichswehrminister Gröner about the budget and specifically about the -fact that secret budgets of the Wehrmacht, on the armored cruiser and so -forth, had become known. What attitude did you take in this connection -and what were the results following your agreement with Gröner? - -SEVERING: In order to answer this question I would like to touch again -on the extract from my speech, which you just submitted to the High -Tribunal. In the same Reichstag session in which I gave this speech, the -Reichswehrminister Gröner appeared for the first time as successor of -Gessler. I had said a few farewell words in honor of Gessler who was -leaving. I greeted the new Minister with the remark that my political -friends would show him respect, but that he would have to earn our -confidence first. It was probably while thinking of this remark that -Gröner came up to me in the first session of the Müller Government and -said that he was looking forward to a sincere collaboration with me. I -quoted a passage from _Iphigenie_ on that occasion, “May there be truth -between us.” Only complete sincerity would make possible fruitful -co-operation, I said. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks that this is an absolute -waste of time and this speech of the witness is entirely irrelevant. Why -do you not ask him some questions which have some bearings on the case -of Raeder? - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that the Prosecution has -made the accusation that the rebuilding was undertaken by means of a -secret budget and that a secret rearmament was carried on with the idea -of starting wars of aggression. It is not quite clear to me how I can -cross-examine the witness in any other way than by asking him how these -secret budgets, which to a certain extent are practically identical with -violations of the Versailles Treaty, were dealt with in his government. -That is exactly what I just questioned the witness on. - -THE PRESIDENT: This speech that you have drawn our attention to is -simply a speech in which he said that he did not think that armored -cruisers were of any use. That is the only meaning of the speech, except -insofar as it refers to the fact that reparations had not been paid. For -the rest it simply says that armored cruisers, in his opinion, are of no -use. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I may not and do not wish to make a plea -here. In the speech which I read something else is said. It says there -that the Social Democratic Party was against the building of this -armored cruiser, because of economic reasons and not because of -strategic reasons, and that if an armored... - -THE PRESIDENT: What has that got to do with a charge of making an -aggressive war in 1939? - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I did not raise the accusation of an -aggressive war; the Prosecution did that, but I have to protect my -client against the accusation that in 1928 he had intentions of carrying -on an aggressive war; I assert that he had no intention of that sort, -that the Reich Government knew about the violations of the Treaty, that -the Reich Government took the responsibility for them, and the testimony -of the Minister will show that these are actual facts which were -challenged only yesterday. - -THE PRESIDENT: Ask him some direct questions on issues of fact. Then the -Tribunal will listen to them if they are relevant, but the Tribunal -considers that the evidence of his speech that you have been dealing -with is an utter waste of time. - -DR. SIEMERS: I shall try to be brief. As a result I shall put questions -to the witness which he will answer one by one. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You just said that you demanded of Gröner -confidence and absolute truthfulness. Did you ask him in this connection -for enlightenment on the secret budgets and the violations of the Treaty -of Versailles which had taken place up to that time? - -SEVERING: I specifically asked him for enlightenment since, in January -of 1928, the then Reich Chancellor Marx had frankly admitted that under -Kapitän Lohmann in the Navy Department there had been misrepresentations -in the budget which could not be in accordance with good bookkeeping and -political honesty. - -DR. SIEMERS: What did Gröner reply? - -SEVERING: Gröner then told me that he had the intention of discussing -these matters at a cabinet meeting and of clarifying all these matters. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were the commanders-in-chief of the two branches of the -Wehrmacht to be present at this meeting? - -SEVERING: On 18 October they were to appear and did appear. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, when did you meet Admiral Raeder for the -first time? - -SEVERING: The first official contact, according to my recollection, was -made the beginning of October 1928, probably on the day when he paid me -an official visit on my assuming office. - -DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-6, I submitted to the High -Tribunal, as the High Tribunal will probably recall, a speech by Raeder -dated 23 January 1928. There was a covering letter with this document. -This letter will now be submitted to the witness. - -[_Turning to the witness._] According to this document, did your meeting -with Raeder take place on 5 October 1928, 5 days after the appointment -of Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy? - -SEVERING: This discussion probably took place on that day. May I -mention... - -DR. SIEMERS: Just a moment, Herr Minister. I think it will be safer if -you look at the letter. There it says: “Following our discussion of 5 -October...” May I ask you to confirm to the High Tribunal that this -report made by Raeder was saved by you and that it is a true and -authentic copy? - -SEVERING: The letter which I put at your disposal is the original of the -letter by Raeder. It is in accordance with the incidents which you just -mentioned. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then, on 5 October this conversation with Raeder did take -place. Were the conversations between you and Raeder basically in -accordance with the ideas expressed in this speech? - -SEVERING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall that in this speech Raeder declared -emphatically that a war of aggression was a crime? - -SEVERING: Yes, I remember that. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you on the occasion of this conversation tell Raeder -that you had agreed with Gröner that the actual violations of the Treaty -of Versailles would have to be discussed and clarified and that a -cabinet meeting would have to be held? - -SEVERING: I do not recall this detail, but it was quite probable. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you demand of Raeder that between yourself and him -there should be absolute sincerity and truthfulness? - -SEVERING: Of Raeder, too, but especially of the chiefs of the Army. - -DR. SIEMERS: As a result of this discussion with Raeder, did you have -the impression that you could work with Raeder in a satisfactory manner -and that he would tell you the truth? - -SEVERING: Yes, I had that impression. - -DR. SIEMERS: On 18 October 1928 the cabinet meeting which we have -already mentioned took place. May I ask you to describe briefly that -cabinet meeting, provided it is agreeable to the High Tribunal to have -the witness picture this session. I believe that a description of this -session would save time, rather than to have me ask single questions. -Therefore, Herr Minister, be brief in telling us what happened. - -SEVERING: At this session, members of the cabinet were familiarized with -the details of what might be considered a concealment of the budget or -violations of the Versailles Treaty. Both gentlemen, the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, -spoke, if I remember rightly. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did the entire cabinet attend? - -SEVERING: Yes, perhaps with the exception of one or two members who were -ill, but it was a session which in general might be called a plenary -session. - -DR. SIEMERS: The principal members were present? - -SEVERING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were Müller, Stresemann present? - -SEVERING: I cannot tell you whether Stresemann was present. He was still -ill in September and whether he had recovered by 18 October, I cannot -say. But I might add, that if Herr Stresemann was not present, certainly -someone else was present as an authorized deputy from the Foreign -Office. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Admiral Raeder and General Heye at this meeting -expressly give the assurance to the cabinet—as I remember, in form of -an affidavit—that only those violations had occurred which were -mentioned by them? - -SEVERING: Whether that was proclaimed in a solemn manner by affidavit or -by word of honor, I cannot say; but, in any event, at the request of the -Reich Chancellor and especially at my own request, they said that no -further violations would take place. - -DR. SIEMERS: They assured you specifically that there would be no -further violations without the knowledge of the Reich Government? - -SEVERING: Yes, exactly that. - -DR. SIEMERS: And over and above that, they stated that now the Cabinet -knew about everything? - -SEVERING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: A declaration to that effect was made? - -SEVERING: Yes, such a declaration was made. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were important matters connected with these secret budgets -or violations of the Treaty of Versailles? - -SEVERING: I may state here and have to admit even that since I was used -to violations of the Versailles Treaty, I was especially interested in -the extent of the violations with regard to the sum. I wanted to know -what I could do in my new capacity against secret arms-bearers and -against illegal organizations; and I asked what was the total sum -involved. I was thereupon told—and I believe that this was set down and -confirmed in writing later—that perhaps 5½ to 6 million marks was the -amount involved in these secret budgets. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you remember the budget figures of those -days better than I do. What can we gather from these figures? Must we -conclude that they were grave violations involving aggressive intentions -or may we gather that in the final analysis they were just trifles? - -SEVERING: I do not have the figures as they apply to the budget plans of -the Navy and the Army. I cannot quote the figures from memory. But the -impression I gained from the reports of the two Wehrmacht leaders was -that only trifles were involved. It was this impression which caused me -to assume a certain political responsibility for these things, and -especially in view of the fact that we were assured that further -concealment of budget items or other violations were not to occur in -future. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember that Gröner at this session declared that -the small infringements of the Treaty dealt purely with defense -measures, with antiaircraft guns, coastal fortifications, _et cetera_? - -SEVERING: I cannot give you the details today, but I might remind you -that all the speeches which Gröner made at the time when he was Defense -Minister were along these general lines. In all of his speeches in the -Reichstag, Herr Gröner expressly declared that he was an advocate of -sound pacifism. In answer to your question I reply that Gröner’s -statements, and also my own, were based on defense and defensive -measures. - -DR. SIEMERS: In other words at the end of this session, the Reich -Government expressly accepted the responsibility for these infringements -and the small secret budget items? - -SEVERING: To the extent that we have mentioned. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder in the future adhere to the clear directives of -the Reich Government? - -SEVERING: I cannot answer that in a positive manner, but I can say that -I did not observe any violations on the part of the Navy in respect to -the agreements during my term of office as Minister of the Interior. - -DR. SIEMERS: Are you personally of the opinion, since you know Raeder -sufficiently well, that he kept the promise he made to you not to resort -to secret violations? - -SEVERING: Raeder gave me the impression that he was an honest man and I -believed that he would keep his word. - -DR. SIEMERS: Just one more question, Herr Minister. Of course, you -cannot remember the details, but do you perhaps recall that on the -occasion of the cabinet meeting of 18 October there was discussion about -a Dutch firm which was designing U-boats? - -SEVERING: No, I cannot give you details of the discussion; but I do know -that at that period of time, there was much talk—either in another -cabinet meeting or by a subcommittee of the Reichstag or by a different -parliamentarian body—of experimental workshops which had been -established for the Army and the Navy in Russia, Sweden, and Holland. - -DR. SIEMERS: Purely experimental workshops? - -SEVERING: I can say only that there was talk to this effect. Whether -these experimental workshops had been established I cannot tell you from -my own experience. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, could Germany, by reason of governmental -discussions going on at the time, hope that some day, despite the -Versailles Treaty, she would be permitted to build U-boats? - -SEVERING: The leading statesmen... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, how can he answer that there was a hope that -they would be allowed to build U-boats? That is what your question was, -was it not; was there a hope? - -DR. SIEMERS: I know, Mr. President, these questions were already dealt -with by the governments which obtained through the years 1928 to 1932; -and I believe that Stresemann carried on these discussions. Since -Stresemann is no longer alive, I would like to ask Herr Severing on this -point. - -THE PRESIDENT: It seems to the Tribunal that it is mere political -gossip. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, on whom did it depend what was brought up in -the Reichstag? Raeder is accused of acting behind the back of the -Reichstag. Who submitted this to the Reichstag? Did Raeder do that? - -SEVERING: I do not quite follow you. Who submitted the budget, you mean? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes. - -SEVERING: The budget went through the hands of the experts of the -various Ministries and the entire Cabinet, and the budget was submitted -to the Reichstag by the Cabinet. - -DR. SIEMERS: The matter of dealing with the budget before the Reichstag -was a matter for the Reich Government and not for the Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy, is that right? - -SEVERING: Inasmuch as a budget item was submitted to the Reichstag, the -competent Reich Minister took care of it in the main committee and the -plenary session of the Reichstag, but the political responsibility was -assumed by the entire Reich Cabinet. - -THE PRESIDENT: It was never alleged as to the Defendant Raeder that he -had submitted the budget to the Reichstag; it was never put to him. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, yesterday it was asserted... - -THE PRESIDENT: Don’t argue! Go on with any other questions. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall whether at the end of 1929 you talked with a -member of the government with regard to the various leading -personalities in the Wehrmacht, and that you made a comment which -subsequently became known concerning certain personalities? - -SEVERING: Yes, it is correct that on one occasion I had been asked to -give a personal estimate of certain military personalities. I named -Gröner and Raeder in this connection. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, how many concentration camps do you know of? - -SEVERING: How many do I know of now? - -DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry; not now. How many did you know of before the -collapse of Germany? - -SEVERING: Perhaps 6 to 8. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you know before the collapse of Germany -or rather did you know in 1944 already about the mass murders which have -been dealt with so frequently in this proceeding? - -SEVERING: I gained knowledge of concentration camps when murder, if I -may say so, became professional and when I heard of a few cases which -affected me personally very deeply. First of all, I was told that the -Police President of Altona, a member of the Reichstag and a Social -Democrat of the right wing of the Party, had been murdered in the -concentration camp at Papenburg. Another friend of mine, the chairman of -the Miners Union, Fritz Husemann, is said to have been murdered shortly -after his being committed to the same concentration camp. Another friend -of mine, Ernst Heimann, was beaten to death in the Oranienburg Camp -according to the reports received by his family. - -Dachau was known even in the north of Germany as a concentration camp. -Some Jewish inmates returned from Buchenwald in the spring of 1939, and -in that way I learned of this camp. Columbia House at Berlin I figured -to be a concentration camp also. - -That was my only knowledge of camps and their horrors up until the time -when the London radio started to report about concentration camps. I -perhaps might mention another case. In 1944 a friend of mine, a member -of the Reichstag, Stefan Meier, who had served 3 years in the -penitentiary, was put into a concentration camp in or near Linz. After a -brief stay there he was murdered, according to reports received by his -family. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you just heard of these and similar -individual cases? - -SEVERING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: You were not familiar with the fact that thousands were -murdered every day in gas chambers or otherwise in the East? - -SEVERING: I believed I should tell the High Tribunal only of those cases -which were, so to say, authentically reported to me. Everything I -learned of later through indirect reports, from my friend Seger or from -the book of the now Generalintendant Langhoff, had been told me but I -had no possibility of checking up on their accuracy. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you and your Party friends have the -possibility... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, are you going to finish this examination, or -are you going on? Do you see the clock? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I should like to leave the decision to the High -Tribunal as to whether we shall have a recess now. I understand there -will be a cross-interrogation so that... - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but presumably you know what questions you are going -to ask; I don’t. - -DR. SIEMERS: I cannot say exactly what answer the witness is going to -give. It might take perhaps another 10 minutes, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn now till a quarter past 2 -o’clock. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Saturday morning. - -Now, Mr. Dodd, could you tell us what the position is with reference to -the documents of the Defendants Von Schirach, Sauckel, and Jodl? - -MR. DODD: As far as Von Schirach is concerned, we are waiting for a -ruling on those documents concerning which we were heard on Saturday. -I’m sorry, that was on Seyss-Inquart. I wasn’t sure the documents were -ready. - -These documents are all ready; they are all translated and in book form. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will it be necessary to have any further discussion of -them? - -MR. DODD: I believe not, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then, we can take it that we needn’t have -another argument about those documents. - -MR. DODD: No, Sir, I comprehend no need for any further argument on Von -Schirach’s documents. - -With reference to Sauckel, I have asked our French colleagues what the -situation is, since they have the primary responsibility. And so far as -the Prosecution is concerned, I am told that Mr. Herzog of the French -Prosecution staff is on his way here and he will be able to report more -accurately. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we can mention that at a later stage then. Schirach -at any rate then is ready to go on? - -MR. DODD: He is ready to go on. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. DODD: Sir David has the information about the Defendant Jodl. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Roberts. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the position with regard to Jodl’s documents is -that Dr. Jahrreiss produced for me a draft book, just before Easter, -which had a certain number of documents, all except four of which had -already been exhibited, and therefore no objection could be taken to -them. - -My Lord, the other four were all short. Two, I thought, were -objectionable on the ground that they referred to alleged war crimes by -one of the Allies. But, My Lord, they were so short that I thought the -best course would be for them to be translated—they were only a page or -so, each of them—so that when the books had been translated any -objection could be taken, and then the Tribunal could shortly decide the -matter. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, as there are only four of them and only two which -might be objected to, that can be dealt with when we come to hear the -case. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there are only two. - -THE PRESIDENT: We needn’t have any special hearing for it. - -MR. ROBERTS: No, My Lord, certainly not. It could be disposed of in a -very few minutes. - -PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Mr. President, I -should like to say one more word about these Jodl documents. We are -having difficulties over one document. It is the affidavit of Lohmann, -which we submitted in German, but which was not translated into English -for us on the grounds that only such documents could be translated which -the Prosecution had already accepted; and the Prosecution had adopted -the standpoint that it cannot express any opinion on that document as it -has not been translated into English. - -I have mentioned this in a brief petition to the Tribunal, and I hope -that the Tribunal will settle the matter. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Lohmann’s affidavit which is very short—it goes -principally to character—and it is really not objectionable, but I had -to point out that it hadn’t actually been allowed by the Tribunal in -their order. The Tribunal ordered it in regard to... - -THE PRESIDENT: If it is accepted in the translation, that is all that is -necessary. - -MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I entirely agree, and it is all on one page. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Let it be translated. - -MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, it may be convenient for me to -indicate to the Tribunal at this stage of Raeder’s case that with regard -to the witness Lohmann, the Prosecution does not now desire to -cross-examine that witness in view of the documents which are before the -Court, and the fact that the matters his affidavit dealt with were dealt -with yesterday by my learned friend Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in his -cross-examination of Raeder, and finally, in view of the passages of -time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the Prosecution want to -cross-examine Lohmann? - -MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any -questions of Lohmann? - -Very well, then I understand that the witness Lohmann is being kept here -and perhaps a message could be given to the Marshal that he needn’t -remain. - -M. JACQUES B. HERZOG (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr. -President, in the name of the French Prosecution I should like to say a -word about the documents presented by Sauckel’s defense. I have no -objection to the presentation of these documents with the reservation, -of course, that a ruling on them be made after they are presented. We -have no objection to the documents being translated or presented. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary or desirable for there to be -a special hearing with reference to the admissibility, or can that be -done in the course of the Defendant Sauckel’s case? At the moment I -apprehend that the documents have been looked at for the purpose of -translation. They have now been translated. If you think it necessary -that there should be any special hearing before the case begins, as to -admissibility, we should like to know. Otherwise they would be dealt -with in the course of the case, in the course of Sauckel’s case. - -M. HERZOG: I think, Mr. President, it will be sufficient if the Tribunal -deals with these documents during the course of the defendant’s case. I -do not think we need a special hearing as far as these documents are -concerned. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, as far as I have been able to ascertain, -you have inadvertently not yet answered one of my questions clearly. - -With reference to the concentration camps you said that you had heard of -certain individual cases, and you named the individual cases. In order -to avoid any misunderstanding, I just want to ask you in conclusion: did -you hear of the mass murders which have been mentioned in this Trial, -whereby at Auschwitz, for instance, an average of about 2,000 persons a -day were exterminated in the gas chambers? Were you in possession of -this knowledge before the collapse, or did you not know anything about -that either? - -SEVERING: I knew nothing whatsoever about these mass murders, which only -became known in Germany after the collapse of the Hitler regime, partly -through announcements in the press and partly through trials. - -DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, what could you and your friends in the -Party do during the National Socialist regime, against the National -Socialist terror which you have partly mentioned, and did anyone abroad -support you in any way in this respect? - -SEVERING: If you will limit the question to asking what I and my -political friends could do and did do after 30 January to combat the -Hitler regime, then I can only say—but little. If there was any -question of resistance against the Hitler regime, then that resistance -was not a centrally organized one. It was restricted to the extent that -in various cities the opponents of the Nazis met to consider how one -might, at least by propaganda, overcome the mental terror. No open -resistance was possible. - -But perhaps I should here draw your attention to the following: On 30 -January I personally made a decisive attempt—or rather an attempt -which, in my opinion, might have proved decisive—to oppose the Hitler -regime. In the autumn of 1931 I had an interview with the Chief of the -Army Command, Von Hammerstein, during which Von Hammerstein explained to -me that the Reichswehr would not allow Hitler to usurp the seat of the -President of the State. I remembered that conference, and on 30 January -1933 I inquired whether Von Hammerstein would be prepared to grant me an -interview. I wanted to ask him, during that interview, whether he was -still of the opinion that the Reichswehr would not only declare itself -to be against the Hitler regime, but would oppose such a regime by force -of arms. - -Herr Von Hammerstein replied to the effect that, in principle, he would -be prepared to have such an interview with me, but that the moment was -not a propitious one. The interview never took place. - -If you were to ask me whether in their efforts to fight the Hitler -regime, at least by propaganda, my political friends had received any -support from foreign personalities whom one might have called -anti-Fascists, then I must say—unfortunately no. On the contrary, we -quite often noticed, with much sorrow, that members of the English Labor -Party, not officials but private individuals, were Hitler’s guests and -that they returned to England to praise the then Chancellor Hitler as a -friend of peace. I mention Philipp Snowden in that connection and the -_doyen_ of the Labor Party, Lansbury. In this connection I would like to -draw your attention to the following facts: In the year... - -THE PRESIDENT: The attitude of political parties in other countries has -nothing to do with any question we have to decide, absolutely nothing. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this is sufficient. I have no further -questions to ask, Herr Minister, and I thank you. - -DR. LATERNSER: Minister Severing, during your term of office was the -figure of 100,000 men, conceded by the Peace Treaty of Versailles for a -normal army, ever exceeded? - -SEVERING: I have no official knowledge of that. I would assume, however, -that that was not the case. - -DR. LATERNSER: Do you know at all whether, at the end of 1932, the -League of Nations made a promise or held out prospects that this Army of -100,000 could be increased to 300,000 men? - -SEVERING: Here too I am unable to give you any official information. I -can, however, give the following explanation: In 1932 I received a -letter from a party friend of mine, Dr. Rudolf Breitscheid, who was a -member of the League of Nations Delegation and in which he mentioned -rumors of that kind; but he also added other information... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we don’t think that rumors are relevant in -the Trial. He says he can’t give us any official information. He then -begins to give us rumors. Well, we don’t want to hear rumors. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, what the witness is now saying is rather -more than a rumor and I think you will probably be able to judge for -yourself when he has entirely answered the question. - -THE PRESIDENT: He is speaking of rumors. If you have any fresh question -to ask him, you can ask him. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did the increase of the Army from 100,000 to 300,000 men -ever assume any palpable shape in the sense that the question was -discussed elsewhere, too? - -SEVERING: I have just told you that Dr. Breitscheid was a member of the -League of Nations Delegation and that his information to me was not a -fabric of his own invention. That information stated that an extension -of the Army had been envisioned but that this extension would probably -be made at the expense of the police. Dr. Breitscheid informed me -accordingly. - -DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much, I have no further questions to ask. - -DR. HAENSEL: You have just told us that you had no knowledge of the -Jewish mass murders in Auschwitz before the collapse. Did you have any -knowledge of other measures or deeds perpetrated against Jews which you -could define as criminal? - -SEVERING: I experienced one such case personally. In 1944 a friend of -mine in Bielefeld, Karl Henkel, was arrested and transferred to a labor -camp near Emden, and he was shot on the third day. - -DR. HAENSEL: Do you know who arrested him, what authority? - -SEVERING: He was arrested by the Bielefeld Gestapo. - -DR. HAENSEL: Did that occur in connection with some large scale action -or was it an individual case? - -SEVERING: It appeared to me to be an individual case. - -DR. HAENSEL: Did you hear of a number of such individual cases at that -time, that is in 1944? - -SEVERING: In 1944 I did not hear of any individual cases of murder, but -I did hear of deportations from Westphalian towns to unknown -destinations. - -DR. HAENSEL: What authorities dealt with these deportations? - -SEVERING: I cannot say for certain, but I assume that it was the -Gestapo. - -DR. HAENSEL: Are you of the opinion that considerable sections of the -population knew of these occurrences? - -SEVERING: You mean, of the deportations? - -DR. HAENSEL: Yes. - -SEVERING: They usually took place quite publicly. - -DR. HAENSEL: Are you of the opinion that the people were generally just -as well acquainted with these events as the members of the organizations -as, for instance, the ordinary SS man, or would you say that the -ordinary SS man knew more than other people? - -SEVERING: Oh yes. He was informed of the places of destination of these -transports. - -DR. HAENSEL: But I understood you to say, that the convoys were not -escorted by the SS; you said it was the Gestapo. - -SEVERING: Yes, I have just stated that I assumed that the Gestapo had -conducted the arrests and the lootings, but I did not receive any -assurances that this was exclusively the work of the Gestapo. - -DR. HAENSEL: And as to the other measures—apart from such -deportations—which might be called a kind of local pogrom, have I -understood you to say that you did not hear of them often? - -SEVERING: Local pogroms occurred in November 1938. - -DR. HAENSEL: Did you, during the execution of such measures, of which we -have frequently heard, make your own observations or did you remain at -home? - -SEVERING: I remained at home. I only saw the results of these pogroms -afterwards in the shape of destroyed Jewish firms, and in the remains of -the synagogues. - -DR. HAENSEL: And to which organizations or groups do you attribute these -events of November 1938? - -SEVERING: My own judgment would not have any decisive value, but I tell -you quite frankly, it was the SA or the SS. - -DR. HAENSEL: And what makes you think that it was precisely these two -groups? - -SEVERING: Because the members of these groups, in my home town of -Bielefeld, were called the instigators of the synagogue fires. - -DR. HAENSEL: By whom? - -SEVERING: They were indicated by name by the population in general. - -DR. HAENSEL: You knew about the concentration camps. Can you still -remember when you heard about them for the first time? It is important -at least to determine the year. - -SEVERING: No. I cannot tell you that at the present moment. I can only -reply to your question by referring to individual dates. The first -murder in a concentration camp became known to me when I heard that, in -the Papenburg Concentration Camp, the former member of the German -Reichstag and Police President of Altona had been shot. That could have -been either in 1935 or 1936, I am no longer sure when. - -DR. HAENSEL: And later, did you hear of many other such cases, or did -you have personal knowledge of them? - -SEVERING: From personal knowledge which is so certain that I could give -it with a clear conscience to the Tribunal only in the cases I mentioned -this morning. - -DR. HAENSEL: Were you told that concentration camps were places in which -the political opponents of the regime were to be interned without -anything worse happening to them than loss of liberty? - -SEVERING: Whether I was told that? - -DR. HAENSEL: Whether you were told that, whether you heard that? - -SEVERING: No. On the contrary, I heard that concentration camps meant to -the population the very incarnation of all that is terrible. - -DR. HAENSEL: What do you mean by “population”? Do you also mean those -sections of the population who had some official connection with the -Party: small Party members, small SA men and small members of the SS? - -SEVERING: I cannot say anything about that since I conversed nearly -exclusively with opponents of the system. - -DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that these opponents with whom you conversed -presented a united front against anyone who wore a party emblem or a -badge of some organization? - -SEVERING: No. This question upon which you are dwelling affects wide -sections of the population, their general humanitarian feeling, and -their feeling of indignation about conditions in the camps, as and when -the facts became known. - -DR. HAENSEL: I asked my question with the intention of hearing whether -this feeling of indignation was noticeable even in people who actually -wore the emblem of the Party. - -SEVERING: I assume so, but I cannot offer it to the Tribunal as a fact. - -DR. HAENSEL: But were even these people exposed to the considerable -pressure which you have alluded to? - -SEVERING: They probably felt that their Party membership rendered them, -in a certain sense, immune. - -DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that many people became members in order to -benefit by this immunization? - -SEVERING: Yes, I believe so. - -DR. HAENSEL: I heard that you yourself were a member of the NSV; is that -true? - -SEVERING: No. - -DR. HAENSEL: Is it true that you were arrested after 20 July 1944? - -SEVERING: I have already answered that question this morning. I was not -arrested. - -DR. HAENSEL: You were never arrested at all? - -SEVERING: No, with the exception of the one case which I also mentioned -this morning. - -DR. HAENSEL: Did you at any time express the opinion that what had been -achieved in Germany in the social sphere after 1933 did, to a -considerable extent, represent the ideal of previous governments? - -SEVERING: Yes, I expressed this as follows: “What was new was not good, -and what was good was not new.” - -DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that any German, be he a Party member, a -member of the SS or not, must have had any knowledge of events at -Auschwitz of which you yourself knew nothing at all? - -SEVERING: No. He would not necessarily have to possess this knowledge. I -would not go so far as to say that. But he might, perhaps, have known -about it. - -DR. HAENSEL: And what exactly do you mean by “He might, perhaps, have -known about it”? - -SEVERING: Through guards escorting the transport echelons. They did not -always remain in the area of the concentration camps; they usually -returned. - -DR. HAENSEL: And if they were sworn to the strictest secrecy? - -SEVERING: Then they could not tell anything. - -DR. HAENSEL: Do you know of cases where people were condemned for -speaking of such matters? - -SEVERING: No. - -DR. HAENSEL: Did you ever hear anything about the activities of the -“special courts”? - -SEVERING: No, in any case I heard nothing in connection with these -particular activities of the “special courts.” - -DR. HAENSEL: But the sentences pronounced against people who listened to -foreign broadcasts (Schwarzhörer) and to people accused of spreading -so-called false rumors, were published very often in the papers. Did you -never read them? - -SEVERING: No. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I have only one question to ask you. You told -us this morning that in 1919 you were a member of the Weimar National -Assembly. May I ask what the attitude of the National Assembly -was—particularly of the faction of the Social Democrats of whom you too -were a leader—towards the problem of the Austrian “Anschluss”? - -SEVERING: During the time of the sessions of the Weimar National -Assembly I was Reich and State Commissioner for the Rhineland and -Westphalia, and was seldom able to participate in the debates of the -Weimar National Assembly. I therefore have no detailed knowledge as to -how these matters were formulated or expressed. But one thing I do know -and that is, that it was practically the unanimous wish of the Assembly -to include a paragraph, or an article in the Constitution, ratifying the -“Anschluss” of Austria to Germany. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -MAJOR JONES: Herr Minister, you have told the Tribunal that in 1928 the -Defendant Raeder assured you solemnly that there would be no further -violations of the Treaty of Versailles without the knowledge of the -Reich Cabinet. Did Raeder fulfill that assurance? - -SEVERING: I have already stated this morning that I cannot answer that -in any positive sense. I can only state that violations of the agreement -of 18 October 1928 by the Naval Command did not come to my knowledge. - -MAJOR JONES: Did you know, for instance, of the construction in Cadiz, -in Spain, of a 750-ton U-boat under German direction between the years -1927 and 1931? - -SEVERING: No, no. - -MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the authority for that statement of fact is the -Document D-854. - -And, Herr Minister, did you know that after its completion in 1931 that -U-boat carried out trial runs under German direction and with German -personnel? - -SEVERING: No, I did not know anything about that either. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think he said he didn’t know of any violations. - -MAJOR JONES: I am putting to you certain matters, and I suggest to you, -Herr Minister, that it may well be that you were being deceived during -this time. Do you agree with me about that? - -SEVERING: I would not deny the possibility of deception, but I must very -definitely declare that I did not know anything of the construction of a -submarine. - -MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at the Document C-156. This is a new -extract from Captain Schüssler’s _Fight of the Navy against Versailles_. -You will see that the following entry appears on Pages 43 and 44. - - “In 1930 Bartenbach succeeded, in Finland also, in making - preparations for the construction of a U-boat answering to the - military demands of the German Navy. The Naval Chief of Staff, - Admiral Dr.h.c. Raeder, decided, as a result of the reports of - the Chief of the General Naval Office, Konteradmiral Heusinger - Von Waldegg, and of Captain Bartenbach, to supply the means - required for the construction of the vessel in Finland. A - 250-ton plan was chosen for this U-boat, so that the amount of - 1½ million Reichsmark was sufficient for carrying out the - project. - - “The fundamental intention was to create a type of U-boat which - would permit the inconspicuous preparation of the largest - possible number of units which could be assembled at shortest - possible notice.” - -Herr Minister, did you know that 1½ million Reichsmark were spent in -1930 in connection with this U-boat construction? - -SEVERING: I have stated this morning that I was Minister in the Reich -Ministry of the Interior from 1928 to 1930. I consider it necessary to -determine these dates a bit more precisely. I resigned on 30 March 1930. -If the year 1930 is mentioned in a general way, then it is not -impossible that everything mentioned here was carried out after 30 March -1930. - -MAJOR JONES: You have said that the rearmament that went on when you -were connected with the Government of Germany was purely defensive. When -did you realize that the Nazi Government’s rearmament was not defensive -but aggressive? At what date did you come to that conclusion? - -SEVERING: From 30 January 1933 on. That both the choice and the -appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of the Reich meant war, was not in -the least doubted by me and my political friends. - -MAJOR JONES: So that you realized from the first day of Nazi power that -the Nazi Government intended to use force or the threat of force to -achieve its political aims; is that right? - -SEVERING: I do not know if knowledge and conviction are identical. I was -convinced of it, and so were my political friends. - -MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about the Defendant -Von Papen. Did Papen use force in carrying out the Putsch which brought -him to power in July 1932? - -SEVERING: Von Papen did not personally exercise such force, but he did -order it. When, on the morning of 20 July 1932, I refused to surrender -voluntarily the office of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to the -man who had been appointed by Von Papen as my successor, I explained to -him that I had no intention of doing so and in order to make my protest -more emphatic, I pointed out that I would only give way to force. And -then force was used in the evening of 20 July in my office. The newly -appointed police president of Berlin appeared in my office, accompanied -by two police officers. I asked these gentlemen whether they were -authorized by the President of the Reich or by the Reich Chancellor to -carry out this mission. When they answered “yes,” I stated that I would -leave my office rather than cause the shedding of blood. - -MAJOR JONES: Did the Defendant Papen, when he secured power, purge the -police and the government of anti-Nazis? - -SEVERING: Yes. There are numerous indications that the intention existed -to purge the police of all republican elements and to replace them with -men who were first devoted to Von Papen and then to the National -Socialists. - -MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about the Defendant -Göring. - -The Defendant Göring has stated, and the entry is on Page 5837 of the -transcript of the proceedings (Volume IX, Page 258), that the -institution of protective custody existed in Germany before the Nazis -came into power. Is that true? - -SEVERING: I would say that the institution of protective custody did -exist, theoretically, and it was last formulated in the Prussian Police -Administrative Law, in Paragraph 15. During my term of office protective -custody was never applied in normal civilian life. The regulations in -Paragraph 15 of the Police Administrative Law stipulated quite -definitely that if anybody was taken into protective custody the police -administration was obliged to bring him before the courts within 24 -hours. This procedure is in no way identical with that protective -custody, the threat of which for decades remained suspended over the -peaceful citizens of the State. - -MAJOR JONES: And, of course, there were no concentration camps in -pre-Nazi Germany, I take it? - -SEVERING: Never. - -MAJOR JONES: How many of your political associates and colleagues of the -Social Democratic Party were murdered in concentration camps while -Göring was still Chief of the Gestapo? - -SEVERING: It is very difficult to make an estimate. You might say 500, -you might also say 2,000. Reliable information is now being collected. -My estimate is that at least 1,500 Social Democrats, or trade-union -officials, or editors were murdered. - -MAJOR JONES: And how many Communist leaders do you think were murdered -during Göring’s period of power over the Gestapo? - -SEVERING: I would assume that if you include among the Communist leaders -also such trade union officials, who considered themselves members of -the Communist Party, then approximately the same figure would be -reached. - -MAJOR JONES: Did Göring personally have any knowledge of these murders? - -SEVERING: That I cannot say. If I were to answer that question, then I -should have to ask myself what I would have done in case it had been one -of my functions to administer camps in which the fate of tens of -thousands was being decided. - -I am not sure whether it is of any interest to the Tribunal if I were to -give you one or two examples from my own experience. - -In 1925 I had to create a camp for refugees from Poland. - -MAJOR JONES: You need not trouble to go into that, Herr Minister. - -SEVERING: No? At any rate I would have considered it my first and -foremost task to inquire whether, in the camps which I had installed, -the principles of humanitarianism were being adhered to. I was under the -impression that this was not being done. I always reminded my police -officials that they were servants of the people and that everyone in -those camps should be humanely treated. I told them that never again -should the call resound in Germany, “Protect us from the police.” -(“Schutz vor Schutzleuten”). I myself demanded punishment for police or -other officials when I was under the impression that defenseless -prisoners were being ill-treated by members of the police. - -MAJOR JONES: As Minister of the Interior, did you become familiar with -the organized terror of the SA against the non-Nazi population of -Germany in the years after 1921? - -SEVERING: Oh yes. Keeping an eye on the so-called armed organizations -was one of my most important tasks during my term of office in Prussia. -The roughest of all the armed organizations proved to be the SA. They -sang songs such as: “Clear the streets for the Brown Battalions” and -with the same arrogance with which they sang these songs, they forcibly -became masters of the streets, wherever they encountered no adversary -worth mentioning. Another rowdy song of theirs seemingly illustrated -their program: “Hang the Jews and shoot the bigwigs.” Wherever the SA -could exercise terror unhindered, they raged and blustered in such -style. They waged beer-hall battles with people of different opinion. -These were not the customary skirmishes between political opponents -during election fights. No, this was organized terror. During the first -Jewish boycott in 1933, they stood on guard to frighten those customers -from buying in department stores who were accustomed to buy in these -stores. As the Tribunal already know, they organized the terror actions -of 8 November 1938. In 1930 they also damaged numerous Jewish shops in -Berlin, possibly as a worthy prelude to the convening of the Reichstag -into which 107 National Socialists entered at the time, as we know. - -MAJOR JONES: Finally, I want to ask you one or two questions about the -Defendant Schacht. - -When did you first hear of Schacht’s relations with the Nazi leaders? - -SEVERING: In 1931 I received information from the police administration -in Berlin, that interviews had been taking place between Mr. Schacht and -the leaders of the National Socialist German Workers Party. - -MAJOR JONES: Did you have any connections with Schacht in 1944? - -SEVERING: If the matter is of any interest here to anybody, I actually -refused these connections. Schacht—although I held him in high esteem -as an economic expert—was known to me as a rather unreliable person in -political matters. By joining the Harzburg Front, Schacht betrayed the -cause of democracy. This was not only an act of ingratitude, for it was -only through the Democrats that he ever reached the post of President of -the Reichsbank, but it was also a great mistake since he and others of -the same social standing by joining the Harzburg Front first made the -National Socialists—so to speak—socially acceptable. - -I could not, for this very reason, agree to any co-operation with -Schacht on 20 July 1944, and when in March 1943 I was asked to join a -government which was to overthrow Hitler, I categorically refused to do -so, giving Schacht’s machinations and sundry other circumstances as my -excuse. - -MAJOR JONES: What was your reason for that? - -SEVERING: I have just indicated these reasons. My friend Leuschner, who -was hanged, together with other young Social Democrats—Von Harnack, -Weber, Maas—my friend Leuschner and I discussed the composition of such -a government. Leuschner informed me that a general would probably be the -President of the Reich, and another general would be the Minister for -War. I pointed out that Schacht in all probability would become -financial or economic dictator, since Schacht was suitable for such a -post through his actual or alleged connections with American business -circles. But these connections between Schacht and—in National -Socialist parlance—between plutocracy and militarism, this connection, -I say, appeared to me so compromising to the cause of democracy, -especially to the cause of Social Democracy, that I was under no -circumstances prepared to become a member of any cabinet in which -Schacht would be the financial dictator. - -MAJOR JONES: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine? - -DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, the Prosecutor has just talked about the -construction of a U-boat in Finland and of a U-boat in Cadiz. With -regard to the construction of the U-boat in Cadiz, he has referred to -D-854. I presume that this document is unknown to you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, the witness said he knew nothing about -either of those instances. - -DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Do you not remember that during that -discussion Admiral Raeder and Reichswehrminister Gröner mentioned the -Finland U-boat? - -SEVERING: I do not remember. - -DR. SIEMERS: You do not know about it? And now—a leading question: Is -it true that the agreement made on 18 October 1928 stipulated that the -Chief of the Naval Command Staff was obligated to keep the -Reichswehrminister informed and the Minister of the Reichswehr, in his -turn, would inform the other Ministers of the Cabinet? - -SEVERING: As far as I can remember, the agreement or the promise of the -two Chiefs of the Command Staffs was that the Cabinet should, generally -speaking, be kept informed about all questions. That was technically -possible only in the manner in which you have just indicated, that is to -say, that the Reichswehrminister would be the first to be informed and -that he, in turn, would pass this information on to the Cabinet. - -DR. SIEMERS: So that there was no obligation, on Raeder’s part, -currently to report to you or to appear before the Cabinet? - -SEVERING: That would have been quite an unusual measure, just as the -meeting of 18 October was in itself unusual; the members of the Cabinet -consisted either of the Ministers or of their official representatives. - -DR. SIEMERS: So that the further management of the matter would -technically be handled by the Reichswehrminister? - -SEVERING: Technically by the Reichswehrminister and politically by the -Cabinet. - -DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. I have no further questions to put to -the witness. - -DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): On what legal -regulation was your exemption from the duties of Minister of the -Interior in Prussia, on 20 July 1932, based? - -SEVERING: The release from my duties? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. The release from your duties. - -SEVERING: It was based on Article 48. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Who, on the strength of Article 48, issued emergency -decrees? - -SEVERING: This emergency decree was issued by the Reich President, who -alone was entitled to do so. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the fact that you were removed from office on 20 -July, under the circumstances which you have just described, based on -the fact that Von Papen and Hindenburg, who issued the decree, were of -the opinion that the emergency decree was legal, whereas it was your -point of view that the legal basis for the emergency decree did not -exist and in consequence you remained in your office? - -SEVERING: I was of the opinion, and it was later confirmed by the -Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) that the President of the Reich was -authorized on the strength of Article 48 to issue directives for the -maintenance of peace and order; and if he did not see in the Prussian -Ministers, and particularly in myself as Minister of Police, sufficient -guarantee that this peace and order would be insured in Prussia, he had -the right to relieve us of our police functions, and especially to -exclude us from all other executive measures. But he did not have the -right to discharge us as ministers. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it known to you that the highest court in Germany, the -State Court of Justice, on 25 October 1932 issued a statement to the -effect that the decree of the Reich President of 20 July 1932 was -compatible with the Constitution insofar as it had appointed the Reich -Chancellor as Reich Commissioner for Prussia and authorized him -temporarily to deprive Prussian Ministers of their official functions -and to assume these functions personally. - -SEVERING: I have just explained the meaning of that decision of the High -Court of Justice. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: One more question: Did Von Papen, then Reich -Commissioner, in carrying out certain changes in personnel, bring -National Socialists into the police force? - -SEVERING: I cannot say. The political character of the police officials -was not outwardly recognizable. That might be the case with -Oberpräsidenten, Regierungspräsidenten and police presidents, but not -with every simple police official. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it true that Von Papen gave the key position of police -president in Berlin to the former police president of Essen, Melcher, -who in your time was already police president of a large city? - -SEVERING: That is correct. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now then, the witness can retire and the Tribunal will -now adjourn. - -How many more witnesses have you got? - -DR. SIEMERS: I now have the witnesses, Freiherr Von Weizsäcker and Vice -Admiral Schulte-Mönting, the Chief of Staff. The examination of -Schulte-Mönting will take up some time, whereas I shall be through with -Freiherr Von Weizsäcker in a short while. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SIEMERS: If it please Your Honors, may the Witness Freiherr Von -Weizsäcker, be called? - -[_The witness Von Weizsäcker took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? - -ERNST VON WEIZSÄCKER (Witness): Ernst von Weizsäcker. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SIEMERS: Baron Von Weizsäcker, at the beginning of the war you were -State Secretary in the Foreign Office, is that correct? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: You will recollect that on 3 September 1939, that is on the -first day of the war between Germany and England—the English passenger -ship _Athenia_ was torpedoed northwest of Scotland. There were American -passengers on board. The sinking of the ship naturally caused a great -sensation. Please tell the Tribunal how this matter was treated -politically, that is, by you. - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I remember this incident, but I am not certain whether -it was a British or an American ship. In any case, the incident alarmed -me very greatly at the time. I inquired of the Naval Operations Staff -whether a German naval unit could have sunk the ship. After this was -denied, I begged the American Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Alexander Kirk, to -call on me and told him that no German naval unit could have -participated in the sinking of the _Athenia_. I asked the Chargé -d’Affaires to take cognizance of this fact and to cable this information -to Washington without delay, adding that it was most important in the -interests of our two nations—Germany and America. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you had contacted the Navy before -taking these steps? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you, at this first conversation, talk to Admiral Raeder -personally or did you speak with some other officer? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I could not say that now, but I did get definite -information. I am sorry I cannot give you the full details. But I did -receive a definite answer that no German naval unit was involved. That -satisfied me. - -DR. SIEMERS: In connection with this subject did you, on the same day or -shortly after, visit Admiral Raeder and discuss this matter further with -him? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that is true. I can recall. Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you on this occasion that it could not have -been a German U-boat, since reports coming in from the U-boats said that -the distance from the nearest U-boat was too great, that is—about 75 -nautical miles? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Raeder informed me that no German U-boat could have been -involved. He may also have mentioned details, concerning the distance of -the U-boats from the point where the ship went down, but I cannot today -tell you about this with any certainty. - -DR. SIEMERS: During this conversation with Raeder, did you declare that -everything should be done to avoid war with the United States, referring -particularly to incidents like the sinking of the Lusitania in the -previous war? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I certainly and emphatically did, for at that time -the recollections of similar past incidents during the first World War -were still very vivid in my mind. I am sure I drew his attention to the -urgent necessity of avoiding all naval operations which might cause a -spreading of the war and—as I used to say in those days—decrease the -“neutral substance.” - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder share your opinion? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: To the best of my recollections—yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Are you convinced, Herr Von Weizsäcker, that Raeder gave -you truthful answers in this report about the _Athenia_? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Of course. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now U-boat Number _30_ returned from her combat mission on -27 September 1939, that is—about three weeks after the sinking of the -_Athenia_, and her commander reported that he had inadvertently sunk the -_Athenia_. He had not noticed the fact at the time but was apprised of -the incident later by various wireless messages. Raeder heard about it -at the end of September, and discussed the matter with Hitler in order -to decide what attitude should be adopted. Hitler issued an order -enjoining silence. All this has already been discussed here. I would -like you to tell me if you were informed of the fact, subsequently -established, of the sinking by a German U-boat. - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: No, certainly not. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear of Hitler’s order enjoining silence? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I naturally did not hear of that either. - -DR. SIEMERS: I shall now have Document Number 3260-PS handed to you and -I must ask you to have a look at it. It is an article entitled -“Churchill Sinks the _Athenia_,” taken from the _Völkischer Beobachter_ -of 23 October 1939. Do you remember this article? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. Perhaps I may look through it. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I inform you, in order to assist the -Tribunal, that this is GB-218 in the British Document Book Number 10a, -Page 97, to be correct—Page 99. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Herr Von Weizsäcker, you have read this -article. May I ask you to tell me whether you recall having read this -article at the time of its appearance? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do recall that such an article did appear at that -time. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you further what your attitude was at the -time when you heard about this article? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I considered it a perverted fantasy. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then you condemned this article? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Naturally. - -DR. SIEMERS: Even though at the time you did not know yet that it was a -German U-Boat? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: The question of whether it was a German U-boat or not -could in no wise influence my opinion of the article. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then you considered this article objectionable, even if it -had not been a German U-boat? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Of course. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now the Prosecution asserts that Admiral Raeder had -instigated this article and is reproaching him very gravely on moral -grounds for this very reason, and the reproach is all the graver since, -as we have seen, Raeder at this time—unlike yourself—knew that it was -a German U-boat which had sunk the _Athenia_. Do you consider such an -action possible on Raeder’s part? That he could have instigated this -article? - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Siemers, you can only ask the witness -what he knew and what he did. You cannot ask him to speculate about what -Raeder has done. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I believed that, -according to this morning’s affidavit, it would be possible to voice an -opinion; but I shall, of course, retract my question. - -THE PRESIDENT: What affidavit are you talking about? - -DR. SIEMERS: The affidavit in which I suggested the expunging of any -expression of opinion, Dietmann’s affidavit. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is a perfectly different matter. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you at that time hear that Raeder -had instigated this article? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: No, I did not hear that; I would never have believed it -either. I consider it entirely out of the question that he could have -instigated an article of that sort or that he could have written it -himself. - -DR. SIEMERS: To your knowledge, could this article be traced exclusively -to the Propaganda Ministry? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only answer this question in the negative; not to -Raeder and not to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, are you in a position to judge whether -grave points were involved in the historically-known violations -committed by the Navy against the Treaty of Versailles? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only answer that question indirectly. The details -are unknown to me. But I can scarcely consider it possible that grave or -important violations could have occurred, for it is precisely in naval -matters that the observance of contract agreements is particularly easy -to control. Ships cannot be built without being seen. I must therefore -assume that these infringements were of an insignificant nature. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in your opinion, did the Defendant -Raeder prepare a war of aggression or do you know of any case from which -Raeder’s attitude... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is the very charge against the -Defendant Raeder which the Tribunal has got to decide. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in February 1939, when you traveled by -train from Hamburg to Berlin with Admiral Raeder, did you converse with -him? And what was the occasion and what did you discuss? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. It is quite true that I met Admiral Raeder on the -train from Hamburg to Berlin, after the launching of a ship at Hamburg. -On this occasion the Admiral told me that he had just made a report to -Hitler in which he said he had made it quite clear that the size of the -Navy would preclude any war against England for years to come. I presume -that this is the reply to the question which you wished to receive from -me. - -DR. SIEMERS: That was in February 1939? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was the launching of the _Bismarck_. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then it is known to the Tribunal, for the launching of the -_Bismarck_ is entered in the records. - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: It must have been in the spring—in February or March. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder’s declaration at that time have a calming -influence on you? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I heard Raeder’s declaration on the subject with very -great pleasure because there could be no other... - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do not care whether it had a calming influence -on him or not. - -DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, and to the best of your knowledge, did -Raeder—either as a politician or as a naval expert—exercise any -influence over Hitler? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the witness can tell us what Raeder said, -but he really cannot tell us in what capacity he was speaking, whether -as a politician or an admiral. If you want to know whether he had his -uniform on... - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you have any conversations with -Raeder or with any other high-ranking personages? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: About what? - -DR. SIEMERS: About Raeder’s influence on Hitler. - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was a well-known fact that political arguments -expressed by soldiers scarcely influenced Hitler at all, although -military arguments of a technical nature certainly did carry weight with -him, and in this sense Raeder may have exercised some influence over -Hitler. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in the winter of 1938 to 1939, the -usual large diplomatic dinner party took place in Berlin and you, as far -as I know, were present at this dinner. On this occasion Raeder spoke to -Sir Nevile Henderson about the probable return of Germany’s colonies... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, why do you not ask him instead of telling -him. You are telling him what happened. - -DR. SIEMERS: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you are. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; this was a conversation between Raeder -and Sir Nevile Henderson, not between Herr Von Weizsäcker and Henderson. - -I am now asking you, Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you have a conversation to -this effect with Sir Nevile Henderson or with other British diplomats? -And do you know anything about their attitude? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I cannot recall having spoken personally with any -British diplomats about the question of the colonies. On the other hand, -I do know that between 1934 and 1939 the question of the colonies was -repeatedly handled by the British Government either officially, -unofficially or semiofficially, and their attitude was expressed in a -friendly and conciliatory manner. I believe I can remember reading a -report on the visit of two British ministers to Berlin and that on this -occasion the question of the colonies was also discussed in a -conciliatory manner. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, can you tell us anything about the -behavior or the reputation of the Navy during the Norwegian occupation? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: An occupational force always finds it difficult to be -popular anywhere. But with this one reservation I should like to state -that the Navy, as far as I heard, enjoyed a good, even a very good, -reputation in Norway. This was repeatedly confirmed to me during the war -by my Norwegian friends. - -DR. SIEMERS: You made these Norwegian friendships at the time you were -Minister in Oslo? When was that? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was Minister in Oslo from 1931 to 1933. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question. A document, D-843, was submitted -yesterday, signed by Breuer who was with the Oslo Legation in March -1940. May I submit this document to you? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Am I to read the entire document? - -DR. SIEMERS: I think it would suffice if you were just to glance through -it, especially over the middle part of the document. - -[_Turning to the President._] Mr. President, it is GB-466 and the -document was submitted yesterday. - -[_Turning to the witness._] According to this document Breuer stated -that the danger of a British landing in Norway was not so great as was -assumed by the other side, and he speaks of measures only by which -Germany might be provoked. What can you tell us about these statements -of Breuer’s? Are these statements correct? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Breuer was not with the Legation—he was the Minister -himself—and I take it for granted that he reported correctly on the -subject from an objective or rather, if I may say so, subjective point -of view. Whether this was really correct from an objective point of view -or not, is quite another question. To put it in plain German, whether -Breuer was correctly informed of the intentions of the enemy forces is -another question. - -DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, according to the information you -subsequently received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, were -Raeder’s misgivings justified or was the picture, as painted by Breuer, -correct? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I must confess that my personal opinion tallied with the -opinion of Breuer, although both our opinions subsequently proved to be -incorrect and the conjectures of the Navy were justified, or—at -least—more justified than the opinion voiced by the Minister. - -DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much indeed. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions -of this witness? - -DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hess): Witness, on 23 August -1939, a nonaggression pact was concluded between Germany and the Soviet -Union. Were any other agreements concluded on that day by the two -governments, outside of this pact of nonaggression? - -GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the USSR): Mr. President, -the witness is called upon to answer certain definite questions which -are set forth in the application of counsel for the defendant, Dr. -Siemers. I consider that the question which is being put to him at this -moment by the defense counsel Seidl has no connection with the -examination of the case in hand and should be ruled out. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the question, Dr. Seidl, that you were going -to ask. - -DR. SEIDL: I ask you again, Herr Von Weizsäcker, whether on 23 August -1939, other agreements had been reached between the two governments, -which were not contained in the nonaggression pact? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Where were these agreements contained? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: These agreements were contained in a secret protocol. - -DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself read this secret protocol in your capacity -of State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: I have before me a text and Ambassador Gaus harbors no doubt -at all that the agreements in question are correctly set out in this -text. I shall have it put to you. - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment, what document are you putting to him? - -DR. SEIDL: The secret addenda to the protocol of 23 August 1939. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that not the document—what is this document that you -are presenting to the witness? There is a document which you have -already presented to the Tribunal and which has been ruled out. Is that -the same document? - -DR. SEIDL: It is the document which I submitted to the Tribunal in my -documentary evidence and which was refused by the Tribunal, presumably -because I refused to divulge the origin and source of this document. But -the Tribunal granted me permission to produce a new sworn affidavit by -Ambassador Gaus on the subject in question. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have not done it? You have not done it? - -DR. SEIDL: No, but I should, Your Honor, like to read this text in order -to stimulate the memory of the witness, and to ask him whether in -connection therewith, as far as he can remember, the secret agreements -are correctly reproduced in this document. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors! I would like to protest against these -questions for two reasons. - -First of all, we are examining the matter of the crimes of the major -German war criminals. We are not investigating the foreign policies of -other states. Secondly, the document which defense counsel Seidl is -attempting to put to the witness has been rejected by the Tribunal, -since it is—in substance—a forged document and cannot have any -probative value whatsoever. - -DR. SEIDL: May I in this connection say the following, Mr. President. -This document is an essential component of the nonaggression pact, -submitted by the Prosecution in evidence as GB-145. If I now submit the -text to the witness... - -THE PRESIDENT: The only question is whether it is the document which has -been rejected by the Tribunal. Is it the document which has been -rejected by the Tribunal? - -DR. SEIDL: It was rebutted as documentary evidence _per se_. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, then the answer is “yes.” - -DR. SEIDL: But it seems to me that there is a difference as to whether -this document may be put to the witness during the hearing of his -testimony. I should like to answer this question in the affirmative -since the Prosecution when cross-examining can put the document in their -possession to the witness, and on the basis of his testimony we should -then see which is the correct text or whether these two texts harmonize -at all. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where does the document which you are presenting come -from? - -DR. SEIDL: I received this document a few weeks ago from a man on the -Allied side who appeared absolutely reliable. I received it only on -condition that I would not divulge its origin, a condition which seemed -to me perfectly reasonable. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you say that you received it a few moments ago? - -DR. SEIDL: Weeks ago. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is the same document that you say just now that you -presented to the Tribunal and the Tribunal rejected? - -DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the Tribunal also decided that I might submit -another sworn affidavit from Ambassador Gaus on this subject, and this -decision only makes sense... - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but you have not done so. We do not know -what affidavit Dr. Gaus has made. - -DR. SEIDL: Ambassador Gaus’ sworn affidavit, the new one, is already in -my possession, but it has not yet been translated. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I certainly join General Rudenko in objecting -to the use of this document. We now know that it comes from some -anonymous source. We do not know the source at all, and anyway it is not -established that this witness does not remember himself what this -purported agreement amounted to. I do not know why he can not ask him, -if that is what he wants to do. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you may ask the witness what his recollection -is of the treaty without putting the document to him. Ask him what he -remembers of the treaty, or the protocol. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, please describe the contents of the agreement -insofar as you can remember them. - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: It is about a very incisive, a very far-reaching secret -addendum to the nonaggression pact concluded at that time. The scope of -this document was very extensive since it concerned the partition of the -spheres of influence and drew a demarcation line between areas which, -under given conditions, belonged to the sphere of Soviet Russia and -those which would fall in the German sphere of interest. Finland, -Estonia, Latvia, Eastern Poland and, as far as I can remember, certain -areas of Romania were to be included in the sphere of the Soviet Union. -Anything west of this area fell into the German sphere of interest. It -is true that this secret agreement did not maintain its original form. -Later on, either in September or October of the same year, a certain -change, an amendment was made. As far as I can recall the essential -difference in the two documents consisted in the fact that Lithuania, -or—at least—the greater part of Lithuania, fell into the sphere of -interest of the Soviet Union, while in the Polish territory the line of -demarcation between the two spheres of interest was moved very -considerably westwards. - -I believe that I have herewith given you the gist of the secret -agreement and of the subsequent addendum. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it true that in case of a subsequent territorial -reorganization, a line of demarcation was agreed upon in the territory -of the Polish State? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I cannot tell you exactly whether the expression “line -of demarcation” was contained in this protocol or whether “line of -separation of spheres of interest” was the actual term. - -DR. SEIDL: But a line was drawn. - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Precisely the line which I have just mentioned, and I -believe I can recall that this line, once the agreement became -effective, was adhered to as a general rule with possible slight -fluctuations. - -DR. SEIDL: Can you recall—this is my last question—if this secret -addendum of 23 August 1939 also contained an agreement on the future -destiny of Poland? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: This secret agreement included a complete redirection of -Poland’s destiny. It may very well have been that explicitly or -implicitly such a redirection had been provided for in the agreement. I -would not, however, like to commit myself as to the exact wording. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, did you see the original of the secret treaty? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I saw a photostat of the original, possibly the original -as well. In any case I had the photostatic copy in my possession, I had -a photostatic copy locked up in my personal safe. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you recognize a copy of it if it was shown to you? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Oh, yes, I definitely think so. The original signatures -were attached and they could be recognized immediately. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has been considering whether it ought to put -to the witness the document in the possession of Dr. Seidl, but in view -of the fact that the contents of the original have been stated by the -witness and by other witnesses and that it does not appear what is the -origin of the document which is in Dr. Seidl’s possession, the Tribunal -has decided not to put the document to the witness. The Tribunal will -now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 22 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH DAY - Wednesday, 22 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The witness Von Weizsäcker resumed the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think yesterday we got to the stage -whether any of the other defendants’ counsel wished to ask any -questions. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, indeed; I believe Dr. Von Lüdinghausen wishes to -examine the witness. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Witness, I -should like to put a few questions to you about the activity of Herr Von -Neurath in his capacity as Foreign Minister. You were at that time -Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office. What were -the dates? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe from late autumn of 1936, as a deputy, and -from the spring of 1937 until the spring of 1938 with full capacity. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But before then you had already had occasion to -work with Herr Von Neurath? In the autumn of 1932 were you not together -now and then at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What tendencies did Herr Von Neurath follow, and -what attitude did Von Neurath adopt at the Disarmament Conference? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: The attitude of Herr Von Neurath was dictated by the -provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations which provided for -disarmament. He followed those lines. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that he followed the same policy which his -predecessors had followed at the Disarmament Conference? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was always the same. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, all the previous governments pursued a policy -aimed at peace and unity, or understanding; and Herr Von Neurath -continued this policy wholeheartedly, is that not correct? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I never noticed anything to the contrary. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you at that time—that is in 1932—notice in -any way that he had National Socialist tendencies or that he was at all -in sympathy with the National Socialists? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that there was no common ground -between him and National Socialism. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you quite briefly summarize Herr Von Neurath’s -views with respect to foreign politics? Could he have been at that time -in favor of belligerent action, or was he the representative, the -acknowledged representative, of a policy of understanding and peace? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should say that Herr Von Neurath pursued a policy of -peaceful revision, the same policy that had been carried on by his -predecessors. His aim was good neighborliness with all, without binding -himself politically in any special direction. I never noticed any -bellicose tendencies in his policies. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was there any change in Herr Von Neurath’s views -in the year 1936, when you became one of his closest collaborators, or -did they always remain the same? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: They were always the same. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He was especially interested in bringing about an -understanding with England, but also with France; is that right? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath wanted to -bring about an understanding with all sides. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put a few more questions to you -which more or less concern his relations with Hitler. - -According to your knowledge of the circumstances, as his collaborator, -can it be said that he had the confidence of Adolf Hitler at all times -when he was Foreign Minister, and also that Hitler let himself be -advised and led by him altogether? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I am in a position to judge, he was the -adviser but not the confidant of Hitler. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But there was a certain contact between those -gentlemen; is that not right? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was hardly ever a witness of such contacts. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you observe, when Von Neurath and Hitler met, -whether they frequently discussed the political situation, what had to -be done, and what should be done? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only say that we of the Foreign Office regretted -that the contact was not closer; all the more so as Hitler was -frequently absent from Berlin. We considered the contact too loose. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then, one cannot speak of close relations or of -very close collaboration with Hitler in the case of Von Neurath? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: In my opinion, no. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And, in your opinion and according to your -observation, how did the activity of Von Neurath affect foreign policy? -Was he the leading man, or was he not perhaps a retarding element, that -is a brake, so to speak, where matters contrary to his convictions were -concerned? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I have no actual proof that important foreign political -actions of this period were influenced by Von Neurath. But I can well -imagine that certain actions in the sphere of foreign politics were -prevented... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think we can have the witness -imagine. We cannot have the witness telling us what he can imagine. I -think the question is too vague, and not a proper question to ask. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During the time when Herr Von Neurath was Foreign -Minister, did any authority in the Party also have an influence on the -foreign policy which in effect was contrary to the tendencies of Von -Neurath or at least was not shared by him? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe there was not only one but many who acted in -that way and had connection and influence with Hitler of course. That -could not be verified, but it could be concluded from the results. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know why, for what reason, the -Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in November 1935 was not signed by Von -Neurath but by the then Ambassador Von Ribbentrop in London? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Was not that in 1936? - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 1936; yes that is right. - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I assume for the reason that Hitler always liked to put -several persons on to certain work, and he would then select from among -them the one he considered best suited to carry the work through. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was Von Neurath at all in agreement with this -Anti-Comintern Pact? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Von Neurath’s policy regarding personnel? -Did he try to keep old officials in office, or did he bring in National -Socialist officials? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was very anxious to retain the old and -familiar Foreign Office staff, in the Foreign Office, as well as in -positions abroad. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But that changed the moment he resigned? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Not immediately, but later on to an increasing extent. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, just two more questions. What was the -attitude of Herr Von Neurath when he was no longer Foreign Minister and -the Sudeten questions became acute, in the autumn of 1938; and what part -did he play at the Munich Conference? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I recall a scene in the Reich Chancellery, a day before -the Munich Agreement, when Herr Von Neurath very strongly recommended -pursuing a policy of appeasement and following the suggestion of -Mussolini to hold a four-power conference. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that after Von Neurath had left the -Foreign Office that office was forbidden to give him any information -about foreign politics? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I think I remember that the successor of Herr Von -Neurath kept to himself information his predecessor received about -foreign political matters. - -DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions. - -DR. LATERNSER: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you were German Ambassador to the -Holy See in Rome from the summer of 1943? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: At the same time the commander-in-chief in the Italian -theater of war was Field Marshal Kesselring? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes; that is, he was the commander-in-chief in that -theater from 25 September 1943. Before that time an Italian general held -the post. - -DR. LATERNSER: Were you frequently called upon by Kesselring to settle -differences between the German Army on one hand and the civil -authorities on the other? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: There was constant communication between Field Marshal -Kesselring and my own office, not only in order to straighten out -differences, but above all to prevent differences. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you, through your frequent contacts with Field -Marshal Kesselring, gain a personal impression with regard to the -attitude of the military... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we are not trying Kesselring. What -relevance has this question got? - -DR. LATERNSER: This question is relevant because in the -cross-examination of Field Marshal Kesselring the Prosecution produced -incriminating material to the effect that the military leadership in -Italy did not observe the usages of war and the laws of humanity. I -distinctly remember that you, Mr. President—and this may be seen on -Pages 5803 and 5805 (Volume IX, Pages 234, 235)—said in reply to an -objection by Dr. Stahmer that it was material incriminating the General -Staff. I should like to ask the witness now present a few questions -about this incriminating material. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you wish to ask him anything that he knows about -accusations which have been made by the Prosecution against Kesselring -as a member of the General Staff, then you may do that. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. I started and that was to be a -preparatory question. - -Herr Von Weizsäcker, were the objects of art of Italy in the Italian -theater of war spared and put in safekeeping? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Wehrmacht, under the leadership of Field -Marshal Kesselring, made the greatest efforts to spare and protect -edifices, property, and objects of art belonging to the Church. This was -a large chapter in the activities of the staff of Field Marshal -Kesselring, and success was not wanting. - -DR. LATERNSER: Can you give us one or two especially significant -examples on this point? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes, there are a lot of examples. I would like to -mention that 6 months or a year ago an exhibition of manuscripts, -incunabula, and similar things, was held in the Vatican. The German -Wehrmacht is to be thanked for having saved a large part, if not the -greater part of these objects. - -DR. LATERNSER: That is sufficient, Herr Von Weizsäcker. The high -military command in Italy is accused of having treated the Italian -population with especial harshness and cruelty. Can you tell us anything -about the fact that precisely on the part of the high military command -in Italy special measures were taken for the feeding of the population -at a period when the food problem was difficult? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Does this question refer especially to the food problem? - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes, the food problem in Rome. - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, my field of observation was only Rome. But there I -can say that Field Marshal Kesselring told me one day that half his time -was taken up with the question of feeding Rome. And I knew one of the -higher military officials—I believe his name was Seifert or something -like that—who with great devotion concerned himself with this task and -carried it through with success. - -DR. LATERNSER: Now my last question, Herr Von Weizsäcker: Through your -observations of the activities of the high military leaders in Italy you -must have gained a personal impression of these people. Did you get the -impression that there was a sincere effort on the part of these military -leaders to observe the laws of war and the laws of humanity? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is a matter of course, for otherwise certain -results could not have come about. Perhaps it is not known here that in -the autumn of 1943 the Holy See published a communiqué, an official -communiqué, which especially praised the behavior of the German soldiers -in Rome. Besides that, the sparing of the Eternal City could not have -been realized if the German Wehrmacht had not behaved as it did. - -DR. LATERNSER: And that was a special merit of Field Marshal Kesselring -in particular? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I would say that when the history of this time comes to -be written first in the list of merit will be Pope Pius XII. Then praise -will be accorded, in the second place to the German Wehrmacht under the -leadership of Kesselring. - -DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further questions. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: It has been asserted once that the Defendant Von Papen, -who in the summer of 1934 had been appointed ambassador to Vienna, -directed from that office a policy of aggressive expansion taking in the -entire southeast up to Turkey; and that he, among other things, had -offered neighboring states like Hungary and Poland territory to be -gained from the intended partitioning of Czechoslovakia. Did this policy -actually exist? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry. I did not quite understand your question. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy, which I just outlined, actually exist? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: My observation dates only from the late summer of 1936, -as before that time I was abroad. I did not notice later that Herr Von -Papen had carried on a southeastern policy for Vienna, or that he was -commissioned to do so. The Foreign Office could not entrust him with -such a mission, for he did not come under the Foreign Office. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: And this policy, as just outlined, did that exist at all -when you entered the Foreign Office? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Please repeat the question. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy of expansion on the part of Germany... - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Which policy? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: The aggressive policy of expansion on the part of Germany -to the southeast as far as Turkey, the partitioning of Czechoslovakia, -and the cession of parts of Czechoslovakia to Poland and Hungary. - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. In 1939, no doubt? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: 1936—in 1936. - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution? - -MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you one or two questions about the -_Athenia_ matter. You have told the Tribunal that you, yourself, saw the -American chargé d’affaires and informed him, about the middle of -September, that the _Athenia_ could not have been sunk by a German -U-boat. That is so, is it not? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not see the American chargé d’affaires in the -middle of September, but on the day on which I heard of the sinking, and -that must have been, perhaps, 3, 4, or 5 of September. - -MAJOR JONES: Were you already assuring the American representatives as -early as that that a U-boat could not have been responsible? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is correct. - -MAJOR JONES: And did you recommend, or rather, did the German Foreign -Office recommend that the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy should -receive the American naval attaché and tell him the same thing, namely, -that a U-boat could not have sunk the _Athenia_? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know. I only dealt with the chargé -d’affaires. - -MAJOR JONES: I would like you to look at a new document, Document. -Number D-804, which will be Exhibit GB-477, which is an extract from the -SKL on the _Athenia_ case. You will see that that is a report from -Neubauer to the naval attaché and it reads as follows: - - “The Foreign Office has had a report of the meeting between the - Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and the American naval - attaché, on 13 September 1939, passed on to it by telephone. It - is worded as follows: - - “‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the - Commander-in-Chief of...’” - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry; I have not found the place as yet. - -MAJOR JONES: Perhaps you would like to follow the English copy, Witness, -if you would like. - -I read the second paragraph: - - “‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the - Commander-in-Chief of the Navy received the American naval - attaché on the advice of the Reich Foreign Minister and told him - more or less the following: He had intended for some days - already—as he knew—to write him that he should visit him in - order to tell him his opinion about the sinking of the - _Athenia_, in view of the continued agitation about it. However, - he had waited for the return of those of the submarines that had - been employed in waging war against merchant ships at the time - in question and which might possibly be concerned, in order to - receive reports about their activity personally. He repeated - most emphatically that the sinking of the _Athenia_ was not - caused by a German submarine. The ship nearest to the place of - the incident was at the time actually situated about 170 sea - miles away from the place of the sinking. Besides this, the - instructions as to how the commanders were to wage war against - merchant shipping, had after all been published. Up to date, in - no case had these instructions been even slightly disregarded. - On the contrary, an American captain reported a short time - before about the particularly courteous and chivalrous behavior - of the submarine commanders.’” - -Well, now, it is clear from that, is it not, that the German Foreign -Office was most anxious to cover up this matter of the _Athenia_ as best -it could; was it not? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: No; there was nothing to be covered up. - -MAJOR JONES: When you discovered at the end of September that in fact it -was the _U-30_ that had sunk the _Athenia_, there was then a good deal -to be covered, was there not? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that I stated already yesterday that I had -heard nothing to that effect. - -MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you did not know at the end of -September, on the return of the _U-30_, that the _U-30_ had in fact sunk -the _Athenia_? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not remember that in any way at all. - -MAJOR JONES: When did you first discover that the _U-30_ had sunk the -_Athenia_? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I remember, not at all during the war. - -MAJOR JONES: But I understood you to say yesterday that you thought that -the publication in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, accusing Mr. Winston -Churchill of sinking the _Athenia_, was a piece of perverse imagination; -is that right? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Completely. - -MAJOR JONES: Are you really saying to the Tribunal that—though you were -in a responsible job—are you saying to the Tribunal that you did not -discover the true facts about the _Athenia_ until the end of the war, -when you were directly concerned in the Foreign Office with this matter? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I told you already yesterday what I know about this. It -seems, does it not, that it was realized later by the Navy that the -sinking of the _Athenia_ was due to the action of a German submarine, -but I cannot at all remember that I or the Foreign Office were informed -of this fact. - -MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder took no steps to correct -the information that had been passed to the American diplomatic -representatives, did he? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder advised me or -the Foreign Office of the fact. - -MAJOR JONES: Now, with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath. - -If it please the Tribunal, I am not proposing to question the witness as -to the earlier diplomatic history, as this Tribunal has indicated that -it is desirable to reserve the matter for the defendants as they go into -the witness box later. - -[_Turning to the witness._] But I want to ask you a general question. -What was the earliest date at which responsible officials of the Foreign -Office, like yourself, first realized that Hitler intended to wage -aggressive war? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: That the foreign policy of Hitler’s Government was a -dangerous one I realized clearly for the first time in May 1933; the -fact that an aggressive war was planned, perhaps, in the summer of 1938, -or at least that the course pursued in foreign policy might very easily -lead to war. - -MAJOR JONES: Already in April 1938, the foreign political situation was -so tense that you sent a special memorandum to all German diplomatic -representatives dealing with the situation—the critical situation of -Germany. - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: That may be. May I be permitted to read the document? - -MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at Document Number 3572-PS, which is a -memorandum of the 25th of April 1938, signed by yourself, and a copy of -which was sent to all the German diplomatic representatives. It will be -Exhibit GB-478. That document reads: - - “Since the work in the field of preparation for the mobilization - has made further progress within Germany in the Armed Forces and - in all civil administrations including the Foreign Office, it is - necessary now that in the case of government offices abroad - corresponding measures also be taken in their area of - jurisdiction without delay.” - -And then there follows a series of instructions as to the actions that -are to be taken on the commencement of the period of crisis, or of -actual mobilization, and there is an insistence in the last paragraph -but one: - - “I request the heads of offices, without waiting for further - instructions, to start considering now the measures to be taken - in their sphere of activity in the case of an emergency. In the - interest of absolute secrecy it must be observed strictly that - the number of people informed remains as restricted as - possible.” - -That suggests, does it not, that as early as April 1938 you were -conscious of the imminent approach of actual mobilization; is that so? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: May I ask, is this document really dated the year 1938, -or is it 1939? I cannot quite distinguish the date. - -MAJOR JONES: It is dated the 25th of April 1938. - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, that may be. - -MAJOR JONES: Now, you yourself were opposed to Hitler’s aggressive -foreign policy, were you not? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not quite understand your question. - -MAJOR JONES: You yourself were opposed to Hitler’s aggressive foreign -policy, were you not? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I personally, completely. - -MAJOR JONES: Did you endeavor to persuade the Defendant Von Neurath also -to oppose Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was not Foreign Minister at that time. - -MAJOR JONES: But he continued to be a very important functionary of the -Nazi State, did he not? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that his influence in that period was even -smaller than before; but I kept in touch with him, and I think I agreed -with his opinion and he with mine. - -MAJOR JONES: And yet he continued to serve the Nazi State, in -particular, in a territory which was acquired as a result of this policy -of aggression; is that not so? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should be grateful if this question would be put to -Herr Von Neurath rather than to me. - -MAJOR JONES: If you please. Now, you were in Italy and in Rome, were you -not, in March of 1944? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. - -MAJOR JONES: You have given me some evidence as to the behavior of the -German forces in Italy. Were you in Rome at the time of the massacres in -the Hadrian Cave? You remember the incident, Witness, do you not? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. - -MAJOR JONES: When 325 Italians were murdered and 57 Jews were thrown in -as a bit of makeweight. You were there when that happened, were you not? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe it was 320 prisoners who were murdered in this -cave which you just mentioned. - -MAJOR JONES: Yes. Were you consulted about that matter? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: No. - -MAJOR JONES: That was an action by German forces, was it not? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe by the German Police, and not by the German -Armed Forces. - -MAJOR JONES: And you know, Witness, that there were many murders of that -kind carried out by the SS during the period of German activity in -Italy, do you not? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not know about many murders having taken place, but -I believe that the German Police were quite capable of such things. - -MAJOR JONES: You know that they left a record of terror and brutality -wherever they left their mark upon Italy; is that not so? - -VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Police, yes. - -MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine? - -DR. SIEMERS: I have no more questions, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I now call the witness Vice Admiral -Schulte-Mönting. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go ahead. - -[_The witness Schulte-Mönting took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -ERICH SCHULTE-MÖNTING (Witness): Erich Schulte-Mönting. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, please tell us briefly what positions you held -from 1925 to 1945, particularly in what positions you served immediately -under Admiral Raeder. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1925 to 1928 I was naval adjutant to -Reichspräsident Hindenburg and, as such, simultaneously second adjutant -to the Chief of the Naval Command Staff. Consequently my first -collaboration with Raeder dates back to 1928. - -From 1929 until 1933 I had several front commands. From 1933 to 1937 I -was first adjutant to Raeder. From 1937 to 1939 I had several front -commands. From 1939 to 1943 I was Admiral Raeder’s Chief of Staff; and -up to 1944 I remained Admiral Dönitz’ Chief of Staff. In January 1944 I -was naval commander in southern France until the invasion; subsequently -commanding general in North Trondheim. After the collapse I was employed -for some months with the British Navy in winding up activities. Then in -the autumn I was interned in a camp for generals in England. - -DR. SIEMERS: Please tell me, if you can remember, in which month of 1939 -you started to work with Raeder. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The first of January 1939. - -DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us briefly anything about Raeder’s prestige as -a navy expert, especially abroad? I mean only with regard to technical -naval questions. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I believe that through the many years of service I -had with Raeder, and the many conversations I had with foreigners, I -have been able to form some idea. After all, Raeder was head of the Navy -for 15 years. He was known, or rather had a name, as a naval officer and -as Chief of Staff of the last Commander-in-Chief of the German Imperial -Navy, Admiral Hipper, the opponent of the famous British Admiral Beatty -in the Skagerrak battle. He was known... - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you kindly observe that light. When the -yellow light goes on, you are talking too fast. When the red light goes -on, you must stop. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was known through his literary activity at the time -of the “Tirpitz Era,” when he edited the _Nautikus_, and later, after -the first World War, through his two works on cruiser warfare in the -last World War, for which he received an honorary doctor’s degree and -which, I should say, gained him a reputation among experts. - -DR. SIEMERS: The defendant is accused of building up the Navy with the -intention of carrying on an aggressive war, and this even after the -Treaty of Versailles was already in force. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. Never in all my conversations -which I had with Raeder was the thought—much less the word—of an -aggressive war mentioned. I believe that all his actions and his -directives contradict this. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were there possibly any ideas of a strategic nature under -consideration, while the Versailles Treaty was in force, with a view to -an aggressive war? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Never. - -DR. SIEMERS: What was the basic reason for the maneuvers held by the -Navy from the years 1932 until 1939? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: They were held exclusively with a view to the security, -protection, and defense of the coastal waters and the coast itself. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was a war with England taken as a basis for any of these -maneuvers between 1932 and 1939? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that was never made a basis, and I believe that -would have appeared impossible and unreasonable to every naval officer. -I remember that even at the beginning of the year 1939 Raeder issued a -directive to the front commanders to hold maneuvers, in which he -excluded a maneuver directed against England as an impossibility. It was -forbidden to carry out that maneuver at all. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, it is now confirmed, as you know, that the Navy in -the twenties, with the knowledge of the then parliamentary government, -violated the Treaty of Versailles. These questions have been discussed a -great deal here, therefore, we can be brief. - -I should like to ask you generally: Is it possible from these -violations, which are known to you, to deduce aggressive intentions? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I consider that is completely out of the question. -The violations were so insignificant and were based so exclusively on -protection and defense that I think it is impossible to construe them as -aggressive intentions. - -DR. SIEMERS: Can you give us briefly a few instances or name a few cases -where violations took place? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, they were limited to the installation of -coastal batteries, antiaircraft batteries, the procuring of mines and -similar things, all of which were exclusively for the purpose of defense -or protection. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did these violations of the Treaty of Versailles—or, shall -we say, the slight deviations—become known to the Inter-Allied -Commission in whole or in part, and did that commission partly overlook -these things because they were really trifles? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I would say it was an open secret. - -DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you, Admiral, to pause between question and -answer so that the interpreters can keep up. Just pause a moment after -my questions before you reply. May I ask you to repeat the answer to my -question with regard to the commission? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I would say that it was an open secret. It was just -passed by. - -DR. SIEMERS: As proof that these violations of the treaty were made with -the intention of waging aggressive war the Prosecution has several times -presented the book by Post Captain Schüssler entitled _The Navy’s Fight -against Versailles_. It is Document C-156. I will have this document -submitted to you in the original. In order to save time and not to -burden the Tribunal again with details—I do not want to go into -details—I shall just ask you: What do you know about this book, and -what caused it to be written at all? When was it written and what is -your general opinion about it? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I know this book. It came about as a result of the -attacks of the National Socialist regime in the years 1934 and 1935, -which blamed the preceding government and the Navy for not having done -enough in the past to arm the nation and for not even having exhausted -the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles. Consequently, the idea -arose at that time of publishing a sort of justification. This brochure -is to be considered in that light; a sort of justification for, I might -say, sins of omission. - -This booklet was later never actually published, or rather it was -withdrawn from circulation because it was, I might say, a rather poor -attempt, for, after all, it contains no challenging points which might -be classified as rearmament. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was this booklet distributed within the Navy later on? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. As I said, it was withdrawn from the circles which -had already had it and it was also severely criticized. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was the book withdrawn on Raeder’s orders? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe so, yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Through this book and another document, by Assmann, a -charge has been brought concerning the known endeavors made with a -construction firm in Holland. And it was also said yesterday that, by -order of Admiral Raeder, U-boats were built for Germany in Finland and -in Spain. Is that correct? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. The U-boats which were designed by -the Dutch firm, and which were built abroad, were not built for the -German Navy, but for foreign countries. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you know for whom they were built? Who received the boat -which was built in Finland? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe Turkey received one, and one went to Finland. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then the ships were constructed for foreign orders and for -a foreign country? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: What advantages at all did the Navy have from their -collaboration in the construction? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We were only interested in keeping alive the -experiences gained in U-boat warfare during the last World War. -Consequently the Navy was interested in seeing that constructors of -U-boats continued along those lines. - -DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, was that prohibited according to the -Treaty of Versailles? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I know of no paragraph which prohibits our activity -in foreign countries along those lines. - -DR. SIEMERS: In the beginning of February 1933 Admiral Raeder made his -first naval report to Hitler. Do you know what Hitler, on that occasion, -gave Raeder as the basis for rebuilding the Navy? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I remember it exactly, because it was the first -report which the then Chief of the Naval Command Staff, Admiral Raeder, -made to the Reich Chancellor Hitler. - -Hitler said to Raeder that the basis of his future policy was to live in -peace with England and that he intended to demonstrate that by trying to -conclude a naval agreement with England. In this he wanted the German -Navy to be kept relatively small. He wished to recognize Britain’s naval -superiority because of her position as a world power. He would -accordingly suggest an appropriate ratio of strength. He wanted an -understanding with regard to the construction of our Navy; and we should -take these, his political points of view, into consideration. Raeder was -impressed with the statements, for they were completely in accordance -with his own basic attitude. - -DR. SIEMERS: Within the framework of this policy the German-British -Naval Agreement was then concluded in 1935. Was the Navy as a whole and -Raeder in particular pleased with this agreement, or did they see -certain disadvantages in it? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder and the Navy were very pleased with this -agreement, although we had to impose voluntarily upon ourselves severe -limitations for a certain length of time. By this agreement, in -comparison with the Washington conference, I should say we ranged among -the smallest sea powers. In spite of that, this agreement was generally -welcomed, because friendly relations with the British Navy were desired, -and it was believed that if we followed a wise and moderate policy, -England in return would show her appreciation. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you know whether at that time Hitler as well approved of -the agreement in that form and was pleased about it? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I can affirm that. Raeder and I happened to be -together with Hitler in Hamburg the day this agreement was concluded, -and Hitler said to Raeder when this fact was reported to him: - - “This is the happiest day of my life. This morning I received - word from my doctor that my throat trouble is insignificant, and - now this afternoon I receive this very gratifying political - news.” - -DR. SIEMERS: You have already stated, Admiral, that the naval agreement -was welcomed by the Navy. You will recall that in the year 1937 a -modified naval agreement was concluded with England. Was the attitude of -the Navy to that question still the same at that time? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The Naval Agreement of 1937 brought -merely one, I might say, additional clause. This was for an exchange of -information; and we had also reached an agreement with the British Navy -with regard to a fixed U-boat tonnage. We had no reason... - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, referring to the U-boat tonnage, I remember the -1935 agreement: 100 percent of the British U-boat tonnage; Germany -limited herself to 45 percent, but reserved the right to increase the -tonnage up to possibly 100 percent, in which case she must, however, -notify England and discuss it with the British Admiralty. - -Was this notification about the increase to 100 percent given, and if -so, when and in what way? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After we had reached 100 percent, Admiral Cunningham -was in Berlin and on that occasion the fact was discussed once more. -Whether a written confirmation was made in addition I no longer recall. -I take it for granted because that was the purpose of the agreement of -1937. On the occasion of his visit in December 1938, Admiral Cunningham -explicitly gave Britain’s agreement to the final 100 percent equality in -U-boats. That is the way I, or rather all of us, interpreted his visit. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember whether there was a special conversation, -or a conversation between Admiral Cunningham and Raeder, on the occasion -of this visit, in which Admiral Cunningham discussed generally the -relations between the German and the British Navy, and between Germany -and England? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I had the personal impression that Cunningham and -Raeder parted on very friendly terms. At Cunningham’s departure there -was a breakfast for a rather limited circle, and on that occasion -Cunningham expressed his pleasure at the conclusion of the naval -agreement, concluding his speech with a toast to the effect that now all -these questions had been settled at last, and it was to be hoped that in -the future there would be no war between our navies. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this incident? - -DR. SIEMERS: December 1938. I believe that is correct, Admiral? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As far as I remember, December 1938. - -DR. SIEMERS: I remember the date from the testimony given by Admiral -Raeder. I myself knew only that it took place in 1938. - -THE PRESIDENT: What Admiral Cunningham is it? - -DR. SIEMERS: I do not know, I am not a naval expert. Perhaps Admiral -Schulte-Mönting can tell us. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not understand the question, Doctor. - -DR. SIEMERS: Which Admiral Cunningham is that? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The present Lord Cunningham. The elder of the two. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that it must have been on 30 -or 31 December 1938, as far as we, or rather as far as Raeder recalls. - -[_Turning to the witness._] From 1933 until 1939 was Raeder confident -that Hitler would not start a war? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. Raeder was completely confident of that. As proof -of this I may say that actually nothing was changed in our building -program within that period. That would have been necessary if one had -had to prepare oneself, at least mentally, for an armed conflict. - -DR. SIEMERS: In what respect would the building program have had to be -changed if one had wanted to wage an aggressive war? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It would have been necessary to give priority at least -to the U-boat building program. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was it clear to you and to the leading naval officers that -a real aggressive war started by Germany would perforce result in a war -with England? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. The knowledge of this fact is proof in my opinion -that a war of aggression was not planned. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, now in 1938 and 1939 incidents took place which -perhaps justified a certain amount of skepticism. I should like to -remind you of the crisis in the autumn of 1938 concerning the -Sudetenland which almost led to war, which was then prevented only at -the last moment through the Munich Agreement. I should like to call your -attention specifically to the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia -in March of 1939, which was contradictory to the Munich Agreement. - -Now, what was the attitude of Raeder to this incident, which you must -know as you spoke to him practically every day. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As Hitler had stated expressly at Munich that he was -interested only in the German areas of Czechoslovakia; and, even though -perhaps he seemed exceedingly determined to the outside world, was -actually willing to negotiate, Raeder and the leading circles in the -Navy believed that these things would be adjusted politically. - -With the occupation of Czechoslovakia a great disquiet certainly did -arise among us. But we were firmly convinced that Hitler would not make -any exaggerated demands, and that he would be prepared to settle these -matters politically, because we could not imagine that he would expose -the German people to the danger of a second world war. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you know that before the agreement with Hacha was made, -under rather strange circumstances, a bombardment of Prague had -allegedly been threatened; or did Raeder know anything about that? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Raeder knew anything about this. -I am hearing about it for the first time now. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the Document L-79. This is a speech -delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939; that is the so-called “Little -Schmundt File.” - -Mr. President, this is Exhibit USA-27, and is to be found in Document -Book Number 10, Page 74, of the British Delegation. I am submitting this -document to the witness. - -[_Turning to the witness._] This speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May -1939 was recorded by the adjutant on duty, Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt. -As far as I know, Raeder, on the same day, discussed this speech with -you in detail. At that time you had been Chief of Staff for a period of -about 6 months. From your later activity are you familiar with the type -of recording which was customary for military speeches? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This record can really not be considered a true -account. I have from this record... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, in the first place, your question was very -much leading. You did not ask him a question. You put into his mouth -what had happened. That is altogether wrong. You ought to have asked -him, if you wanted to prove a conversation he had with Raeder, whether -he did have a conversation with Raeder. You have told him that he had a -conversation with Raeder. The purpose of examination is to ask -questions, and then he could tell us if he had a conversation with -Raeder. He cannot tell us whether this is a true account or a true form -of the account when he was not at the meeting himself. - -DR. SIEMERS: I wish to thank the High Tribunal, and I shall try to put -the questions properly. The witness... - -THE PRESIDENT: Not only that, but the Tribunal cannot listen to this -witness’ account, or his opinion as to whether this is a true account of -a meeting at which he was not present. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, the witness, as Chief of Staff, has always -seen the exact minutes on important meetings. They were delivered to him -in accordance with the distribution list. Therefore, as this document is -of a decisive nature, I should like to determine whether -Schulte-Mönting, as Chief of Staff, received the minutes or whether he -just received knowledge of the contents through Admiral Raeder’s -immediate reporting. That was the purpose of my question. - -THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, you mean you want to ask him whether -he ever saw this document. Yes, you may certainly ask him that. Ask him -if he saw the document. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Your Honor, but I believe the answer of -the witness was lost in the interpretation, and if I am correct... - -THE PRESIDENT: Never mind about his answer; the question is what -question you are to put to him, and he can answer whether he ever saw -the document. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I shall put that question. - -Admiral, did you get to see this document at the time? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I am just seeing it now for the first time, here in -Nuremberg. - -DR. SIEMERS: How did you hear about the contents of the speech of 23 -May? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, as a matter of principle, -after every speech or conference, confidential or otherwise. Immediately -after the speech, Raeder gave me his impressions which are in -contradiction to these so-called minutes. Raeder did not have this, I -might say, exaggerated bellicose impression which is apparent in this -document. But, on the other hand... - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness must tell us what Raeder said to him. That is -what I told you before. He may tell us what Raeder said to him. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I should like you to tell us just what Raeder said -to you. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder told me that Hitler in his speech said there was -a prospect of a future conflict with Poland, and that this was in -contradiction to those things which he had discussed with him alone. -That the speech in itself was contradictory, was the impression he -expressed to me at that time. He also told me that after the speech he -had had a conversation with Hitler alone during which he called his -attention to the contradictions contained in the speech. At the same -time he reminded Hitler of what he had told him previously, namely that -he would settle the Polish case under all circumstances in a peaceful -way; and now he was considering a warlike solution possible. Hitler, he -said, had reassured him and had told him that politically he had things -firmly in hand. Then when Raeder asked him, or rather called his -attention to this contradiction and asked him just what he really -intended to do, Hitler had answered, Raeder told me, the following: - - “I, Hitler, have three ways of keeping secrets. The first, when - we two speak alone; the second, when I, Hitler, keep them to - myself; the third, for problems of the future, which I do not - think out to an end.” - -Raeder called his attention to the impossibility of a warlike conflict. -To that, according to Raeder, Hitler replied: - - “It is as if you and I had agreed on a settlement of one mark. - Now, I, Hitler, have already paid you 99 pfennig. Do you think - that because of this last 1 pfennig you would take me to court?” - -And Raeder said “No.” - - “You see”—Hitler said to Raeder—“I have got what I want by - political means, and I do not believe that because of this last - political question”—the solution of the Polish Corridor, as we - called it—“we will have to anticipate a war with England.” - -DR. SIEMERS: And that was in a conversation between Hitler and Raeder -after this speech had been made? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That took place after this speech. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with regard to the minutes which I have shown you, -I have one final question: Did you personally, as Chief of Staff, also -receive and read all minutes which were sent to Raeder? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, as a rule I saw all minutes and reports before -they were given to Raeder. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was Admiral Reader of the opinion—excuse me, I should like -to put the question differently. - -What was Raeder’s point of view concerning the Navy and politics? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder’s opinion was that we, the Navy, had nothing to -do with politics. He adopted that attitude as an order and a trust -received from the old Reich President, Von Hindenburg, who, when -appointing Raeder to be head of the Navy, imposed that as a duty upon -him. - -DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Norway. What were the reasons which induced -Raeder, in September and October 1939, to consider a possible occupation -of Norway? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The reasons were the reports which came from various -sources about alleged intentions of an occupation of Norway by the -Allies. These reports came from the following sources: First, Admiral -Canaris, who was the chief of our intelligence service. He reported to -Raeder, in my presence, once a week, the information that had come in. -Secondly, the reports that came from the naval attaché in Oslo, -Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, which indicated that rumors were increasing -that the Allies intended to drag Scandinavia into the war in order to -prevent, if possible, the iron ore exports from Sweden to Germany. We -did not consider these reports altogether impossible, because, as -documentary evidence from the last World War proves, Churchill had -seriously considered the occupation of Norway. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was there a further source for reports of that kind? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Admiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North, -had received similar reports which he passed on orally and in writing. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember any details from these reports which you -could give us quite briefly? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. There were reports concerning the presence of -British air crews in Oslo, allegedly posing as civilians. There were -reports about Allied officers making surveys of Norwegian bridges, -viaducts, and tunnels all the way to the Swedish border, which was taken -as an indication that the transportation of heavy material and equipment -was planned. And last but not least there were reports about a secret -mobilization of Swedish troops because of the alleged danger to the ore -areas. - -DR. SIEMERS: What danger arose for Germany on account of that? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If Norway were to have been actually occupied, the -conduct of the war in the North Sea would have become almost impossible, -and it would have been very difficult in the Baltic Sea. The ore imports -most probably would have been stopped. The danger from the air would -have become terrible for north Germany and the eastern territories. In -the long run the North Sea and the Baltic would have been blocked -completely, which eventually would have led to the total loss of the -war. - -DR. SIEMERS: What did Admiral Raeder do on the basis of these -considerations? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He reported to Hitler about his misgivings and called -his attention to the dangers. - -DR. SIEMERS: When was that report made? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If I remember correctly, in the autumn of ’39. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, until the adjournment, will you go very -slowly because, owing to the power of the electrical recording being -off, what is happening here in Court is impossible to take and therefore -we have to rely solely upon the shorthand notes which cannot be checked -back against the electrical recording. Do you understand? Therefore I -want you to go rather more slowly than usual. - -DR. SIEMERS: When was the conference between Hitler and Raeder in which -Raeder for the first time pointed out these dangers? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In October 1939. - -DR. SIEMERS: According to the War Diary that conference took place, -which of course you cannot remember offhand, on 10 October. At any rate -you probably mean that conference. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler then, as a result of that conference, make a -final decision? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, in no way at all. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did discussions about that subject then take place -continually between Hitler and Raeder? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. No further discussions along that line took place -then until perhaps the end of the year. Only when the reports which I -mentioned before were received in increasing numbers was that subject -taken up again. - -DR. SIEMERS: Is it known to you that in December 1939 Quisling came to -Berlin and also talked with Raeder? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is known to me, and I took part in that -meeting. - -DR. SIEMERS: What did Quisling tell Raeder? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Quisling came on a recommendation from Rosenberg and -said he had important news of a military and political nature. He -confirmed, more or less, the things which we knew already. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were only the military dangers discussed in this -conference? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Only these things were discussed; the conference was -very short. - -DR. SIEMERS: No political questions were discussed? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Raeder met Quisling for the first time? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the occasion of that visit. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have at that time any close connections with -Rosenberg? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, he knew him casually, having just seen him a few -times. - -DR. SIEMERS: Had Rosenberg informed Raeder before about the relations -between Rosenberg and Quisling? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not to my knowledge. - -DR. SIEMERS: What did Raeder do when Quisling confirmed the reports -received from Canaris and other sources? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As the things we suspected were confirmed from Norway, -Raeder considered this so serious that he went immediately to Hitler. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you also know what he suggested to Hitler? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Hitler wanted to talk to Quisling himself. - -DR. SIEMERS: And that took place? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it did. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was a final decision made then concerning Norway, in -December 1939? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Hitler directed that as a countermeasure, -theoretical preparations should be made for a German landing in Norway. -The order, the final order, as far as I know was not given until March. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was the landing in Norway an undertaking which you and -Raeder considered a risky one or was it considered absolutely safe to do -so? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Raeder and the gentlemen from the Naval Operations -Staff and also the front commanders considered that undertaking very -risky. I remember Churchill’s speech in Parliament when he said, after -he had been questioned about that matter, that he did not believe the -German Navy would undertake that risk in face of the British Navy. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Churchill made that statement, -approximately? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe it was between 7 and 9 April. - -DR. SIEMERS: 1940? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, 1940. - -DR. SIEMERS: What was your estimate at the Naval Operations Staff of the -risks of losses? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder had told Hitler that he would have to reckon on -the possible complete loss of the fleet, and that if the operations were -carried out successfully he would have to be prepared for the loss of -about 30 percent of the forces used. - -DR. SIEMERS: And how much was lost? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: About 30 percent. - -DR. SIEMERS: In view of the risk of losing the entire fleet, was Raeder -at first in favor of that operation? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. He considered a neutral attitude on the part of -Norway as much better than having to take this risk. - -DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder and the Naval -Operations Staff recommended the occupation of Norway out of the desire -for fame and conquest. What do you say about that? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The desire for fame was not in Raeder’s character. The -plans for operations which came from his desk bore the mark of bold -daring, but also of thorough planning. One does not work out plans to -the minutest detail covering the distance from German ports up to -Narvik, which is about that from Nuremberg to Madrid, and one does not -use the Navy against a superior British fleet for the sake of fame. - -Raeder had told the Naval Operations Staff and the front commanders that -he had to carry out that operation against all the rules of warfare -because there was a compelling necessity to do so. - -DR. SIEMERS: When did the actual drafting of the military operation take -place at the Naval Operations Staff? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: February 1940. - -DR. SIEMERS: During the period from December 1939 until March 1940 did -you continue to receive reports from the sources you have mentioned? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did these later reports contain a clearer indication as to -the place of the landings, or did you not see the details about that? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, they covered the areas between Narvik via Bergen -to Trondheim, from Bergen to Oslo. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder—excuse me, I want to put the question -differently: What was the basis which Raeder suggested to Hitler for the -relations between Germany and Norway? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To that I would like to... - -DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, I mean in the period after the operation was -carried out and Germany had occupied Norway. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder in speaking to Hitler advocated a policy of -peace. He suggested repeatedly that attempts should be made for peace -with Norway. He was in agreement in that respect with the German -Commander-in-Chief in Norway, Generaladmiral Böhm, while Terboven, who -was directing political matters, was of a somewhat different opinion. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did serious conflicts arise in that respect between -Terboven and his civil administration on the one side, and Raeder and -Böhm and his colleague, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, on the other? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, there were serious differences and quarrels all -the way up the line to Hitler. Hitler at that time told Raeder that he -could not make peace with Norway because of France. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said, “because of France.” Was it not possible -to make peace with France also, and what was Raeder’s attitude in that -regard? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder advocated the same thing concerning France. - -DR. SIEMERS: And what did he say? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He tried to arrange a conference with Admiral Darlan in -an effort to forward these matters. He had pointed out to Hitler, when -the Atlantic Coast was fortified, that it would be better and more -practical to make peace with France than to make great though inadequate -sacrifices for defense. Hitler replied that he fully agreed but out of -consideration for Italy he could not conclude a peace treaty with -France. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did the conversations between Raeder and Darlan take place? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, near Paris. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were you present? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Admiral Schultze, the Commanding Admiral in France. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you whether the results of the conversation -were favorable? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he told me about the very favorable results. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder report on that to Hitler? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: And in spite of that, Hitler refused? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Out of consideration for Mussolini. - -DR. SIEMERS: According to your knowledge, did the Party or the -leadership of the SS through Heydrich attempt to fight Raeder? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Heydrich repeatedly attempted to bring Raeder and the -Navy into discredit with Hitler through defamatory remarks and by -spying, either by posting spies in the officers corps or the casinos, or -by misrepresenting or distorting news. Against these attacks, Raeder -defended himself tenaciously and successfully. - -DR. SIEMERS: Why was the Party against Raeder? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a question which is very difficult to answer. I -believe mainly because, first of all, there were differences in the -religious field. Many commanders before they put to sea for combat -turned to Raeder for help so that during their absence their relatives -would not have their religious freedom curtailed. - -DR. SIEMERS: When did the first differences occur between Raeder and -Hitler, and during what period did Raeder ask for his dismissal? - -THE PRESIDENT: We have had that from that defendant himself, have we -not? Raeder told us when he asked for it. No cross-examination about it. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you for what reasons Raeder remained? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First, because Hitler himself had asked him to stay, -and gave him assurances for the integrity of the Navy. Furthermore, at -that time, there were discussions about combining the Navy and the -merchant marine into one ministry and putting Party people into that -ministry. In that event we did not see a strengthening but a weakening -of our fighting force. Besides, during that period there occurred a gap -in the line of successors, due to illness and losses. - -And last but not least, Raeder remained in the war out of a sense of -responsibility and patriotism. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you yourself ask Raeder to remain in office? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I had to ask Raeder frequently and very seriously. -I myself was once ordered by Hitler to come to the Reich Chancellery. - -DR. SIEMERS: When was that? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the beginning of 1939, when he explained his -standpoint to me in a long conversation and asked me to convince Raeder -that he had to stay. Moreover, he enjoyed the confidence of the Navy. -The senior officers and officials of the Navy had asked me orally and in -writing to try to persuade Raeder not to leave his office prematurely. -Since 1928 he had led the Navy with a firm hand through all political -vicissitudes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I return again to your conversation with -Hitler in the beginning of 1939? Did you speak with Hitler alone? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that was a private conversation of about an hour -and a half. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler tell you anything about his political plans on -that occasion? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; not about political plans in the sense of what is -called politics, but he tried once more to bridge political differences -with Raeder. He told me one should not weigh each individual word of -his. His visitors were right, but only after they had left; he would put -forward records and witnesses; all he wanted was to appeal to the -emotions of his listeners and to stir them up to do their utmost, but -not to commit himself with words. In the future he promised he would try -to give the Navy independence in all technical questions. - -DR. SIEMERS: You just said “not to weigh each individual word.” Admiral, -were the speeches of Hitler ever taken down accurately, that is, by -stenographers? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, but as far as I know only in the later part of the -war. Hitler was against having his words put on record, because everyone -who listened to him returned home with his own opinion. He himself did -not stick to his text; he thought out loud and wanted to carry his -listeners away, but he did not want his individual words to be taken -literally. I spoke about that to Raeder very frequently. We always knew -what was expected of us, but we never knew what Hitler himself thought -or wanted. - -DR. SIEMERS: If Hitler did not want to be taken at his word, how did it -come about that he agreed in the war to have his speeches taken down by -stenographers? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I told you before that too many misunderstandings had -occurred, and that Hitler as well as those who reported to him believed -that everyone had convinced the other of his opinion. Thereupon they -started keeping minutes. The minutes kept up to then were personal -impressions of those who were not instructed to keep them but who did so -on their initiative. - -THE PRESIDENT: What time is the witness speaking of? He said up to then -the minutes had been kept on the personal initiative of the person who -took them. What time is he speaking of? - -DR. SIEMERS: From what time, according to your recollection, were these -minutes taken by the stenographers? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1942, I believe. - -DR. SIEMERS: From 1942? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It might also be 1941. During the war, at any rate. - -DR. SIEMERS: But your conversation with Hitler was in January 1939? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, January 1939. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what did the stenographic minutes look like later -on? Did you ever see them? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We repeatedly asked for excerpts from the minutes and -tried to compare them with the prepared text and they too contained -contradictions. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now, I come to the period when Hitler prepared for war -against Russia, and I am going to show you the Directive Number 21, of -18 December 1940, concerning the Case Barbarossa. - -Mr. President, that is Document Number 446-PS, Exhibit USA-31, in the -Document Book of the British Prosecution Number 10a, Page 247. - -[_Turning to the witness._] The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder or -the Naval Operations Staff had taken part in the drafting of that -directive; is that correct? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. The Navy had nothing to do -with the drafting of that directive. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have any previous knowledge of Hitler’s plan to -attack Russia, before he received that directive? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, by an oral communication from Hitler to Raeder, -about the middle of August 1940—or October 1940. - -DR. SIEMERS: October 1940. Did Raeder inform you about his conferences -with Hitler concerning Russia, and what attitude did he adopt in these -conferences? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, because the prospect of war -with Russia was much too serious to be taken lightly. Raeder opposed -most energetically any plan for a war against Russia; and, I should like -to say, for moral reasons because Raeder was of the opinion that the -pact with Russia should not be broken as long as the other side gave no -cause for it. That, as far as Raeder knew, was not the case in October. -That economic treaty—as we called it at that time—to our knowledge was -about 90 percent at the expense of the Navy. We gave Russia one heavy -cruiser, heavy artillery for battleships, artillery installations, -submarine engines, submarine installations, and valuable optical -instruments for use on submarines. Besides, Raeder was of the opinion -that the theater of operations should not be allowed to be carried into -the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea was our drill field, I might say. All our -recruits were trained there; all our submarine training took place in -the Baltic Sea. - -We had already partly stripped the Baltic coast of batteries and -personnel for the purpose of protecting the Norwegian and the French -coasts. We had very small oil reserves at our disposal, the synthetic -oil production was not yet in full swing. The Navy had to turn over some -of its reserves to industry and agriculture. Consequently, Raeder was -strongly opposed to waging war against Russia. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution believe that Raeder was only -opposed to the date set for the war against Russia and concludes this -from the War Diary in which actually the entries refer to the date. Is -that correct? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. After the receipt of Directive -21, called Barbarossa, Raeder approached Hitler again with reference to -the war against Russia, and also put down his thoughts in a memorandum. -He tried to convince Hitler of the following: Poland had been crushed, -France had been occupied, and, for military reasons, an invasion of -England was out of the question. He said clearly that now the time had -arrived when the further conduct of the war could not be decisive on the -Continent, but in the Atlantic. Therefore, he told him that he had to -concentrate all forces at his disposal on one objective: To hit the -strategic points of the Empire, especially the supply lines to the -British Isles in order to compel England to sue for negotiations or, if -possible, to make peace. He suggested, as has been mentioned before, -that the policy of peace with Norway should be pursued, peace with -France, and closer co-operation with the Russian Navy, such as was -provided for in the economic treaty, and the repurchase of submarine -equipment or submarines. He said that the decision or the date for a -decision no longer rested with us because we did not have the necessary -sea power and that in case of a long duration of the war the danger of -the participation of the United States had also to be considered; that -therefore the war could not be decided on the European continent and -least of all in the vastnesses of the Russian steppes. That point of -view he continued to present to Hitler as long as he was in office. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said at first that Raeder had protested, in -principle as you have expressed it, for moral reasons, that is, for -reasons of international law. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Why was not that entered into the War Diary when the other -reasons that you have mentioned can be found in the War Diary? At least -they are alluded to. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I can answer, or at least give you an explanation. -Raeder, as a matter of principle, never criticized the political -leadership in the presence of the gentlemen of the Naval Operations -Staff or the front commanders. Therefore, he did not speak to me and the -others about the private conversations which he had with Hitler, except -when it was necessary for military reasons. - -DR. SIEMERS: When were the preparations by the Navy, on the basis of -Directive 21 that you have in front of you, made? Do you remember that? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe about 3 months later. - -DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, certainly after the directive? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, after the directive. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were they made on the basis of that directive? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the basis of that, yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was that directive already a final order or was it just a -precautionary strategic measure? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my estimation it should not be considered as an -order, and that can be seen from Points IV and V. - -DR. SIEMERS: In what way? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Point V says that Hitler was still waiting for reports -from commanders-in-chief. And Raeder still reported to Hitler after he -had received the directive. - -DR. SIEMERS: Is Point IV, if you will look at it once more, also in -accordance with your opinion? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The words “precautionary measures” are -underlined. - -DR. SIEMERS: Precautionary measures for what? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In case of war against Russia. - -DR. SIEMERS: Well, I think, Admiral, since you have mentioned it -yourself, you should read the sentence which follows the words -“precautionary measures.” - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: “In case Russia should change her attitude, she is...” - -THE PRESIDENT: You cannot argue with your own witness about the meaning -of the words. He has given his answer. - -DR. SIEMERS: Very well. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Was Raeder of the opinion, at any time, that -he had succeeded in dissuading Hitler from the unfortunate plans against -Russia? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. After he had made his report at that time, he -returned and said, “I believe I have talked him out of his plan.” And at -first we did have that impression because in the following months there -were no more conferences about it, to my knowledge, not even with the -General Staff. - -DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you quite briefly then about Greece. According to -Document C-152, which I will have shown to you, Raeder made a report to -Hitler on 18 March 1941, in which he asked that the whole of Greece -should be occupied. What were the reasons that caused the High Command, -that is, Raeder and you, to make that suggestion? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: When Raeder asked for authorization, as it says here in -the War Diary, for the occupation of the whole of Greece, even in the -event of a peaceful settlement, we, according to my recollection, had -already been for 3 months in possession of the directive which was -concerned with the occupation of Greece, and when... - -DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. Was that Directive Number 20? I will have it -shown to you. Is that the one you mean? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, “Marita,” that is the one. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is Document Number 1541-PS, Exhibit -GB-13, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution 10a, Page 270. -That is Directive Number 20, Case Marita of 13 December 1940. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Admiral, what caused Raeder, apart from that -point which Hitler had already explained, to ask that specific question -again in the month of March, that is to say, on 18 March? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: A British landing had already occurred in the south of -Greece a few days before. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did this landing make it necessary to occupy the whole of -Greece? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, for strategic reasons, absolutely. The menace of -an occupation from the sea or from the air, or the formation of a Balkan -front against Germany, or the menace from the air to the oil fields, had -to be eliminated under all circumstances. May I only remind you of the -Salonika operation in the first World War. I believe that was a similar -situation. - -DR. SIEMERS: Here again the Prosecution say this was governed by the -desire for conquest and fame. Is that correct? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to answer that fame requires -achievements, and I do not know what the Navy could have conquered in -the Mediterranean. We did not have a single man or a single ship down -there; but Raeder, of course, for the strategic reasons I have -mentioned, had to advise Hitler in that direction. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were breaches of neutrality on the part of Greece known to -you before this time, before we occupied Greece? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We had been informed that in 1939, certain Greek -political and military circles had been in the closest connection with -the Allied General Staff. We knew that Greek merchantmen were in British -service. Therefore we were compelled to consider the Greek merchantmen -which sailed through the prohibited zone to England as enemy ships. And, -I believe, in the beginning of 1940, or the middle of 1940, we received -information that the Allies intended to land in Greece or to establish a -Balkan front against Germany. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, as the last point in my questions dealing with -Russia, I should like to show you the document submitted by the Soviet -Prosecution, Document USSR-113. This document is a communication from -the Naval Operations Staff of 29 September 1941 to Group North, that is, -Generaladmiral Carls. Under II it states as to the result of a -conversation between Admiral Fricke and Hitler: “The Führer is -determined to make the city of St. Petersburg disappear from the face of -the earth.” Raeder has been accused of not having done anything to -oppose such a monstrous intention and has been accused because the Naval -Operations Staff passed on this communication. I ask you, Admiral, did -you know of this communication in 1941? - -[_Turning to the President._] I beg your pardon, Mr. President, I should -like to remark that at this moment, I am sorry to say, I have no -photostatic copy of this document. I tried to procure it. I have this -very moment received it, and I should like to submit the photostatic -copy at this point, instead of the written copy. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This seems to be the original which I have before me? - -DR. SIEMERS: No, Admiral, it is a copy, an exact copy of the photostatic -copy with all paragraphs and names, made for my own special use. - -Were you acquainted with this piece of writing in 1941? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not know it in 1941, it is submitted to me at -this moment for the first time. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe that Admiral Raeder saw this communication -before it was sent off, even though you yourself had not seen it? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That would have been a miracle. Communications which -were submitted to Admiral Raeder all went through my hands. They always -had the notation, either “the Commander-in-Chief has taken due note,” -and were initialed by me personally in order to certify this notation, -or “this order or this directive is to be submitted to the -Commander-in-Chief,” and in this case too my initials were affixed. This -order and this copy which you have just shown to me I have never seen -before; I am not acquainted with it; and I consider it impossible that -Admiral Raeder should have seen it, because on 29 September 1941 I was -in good health and exercising my duties in Berlin. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what do you know about this question of Leningrad -and the Navy? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I recall that at the so-called daily discussions -regarding the general situation one of the officers of the Naval -Operations Staff reported on the intentions of the Army regarding the -future of Leningrad—not Petersburg. Whereupon Raeder expressed the -desire that it be kept in mind during the operations that Leningrad -should, under all circumstances, fall intact into our hands, for he -needed shipyards and adjoining territory for naval construction; and he -wished that the Army be informed of the urgency of this desire, because -in view of the ever-increasing danger of air attacks, we intended to -shift part of our shipyard facilities to the East. - -At that time we had already begun, if I remember correctly, to move -installations from Emden to the East and wanted, furthermore, as Raeder -wished, to evacuate Wilhelmshaven subsequently and move the -installations there as far to the East as possible. He emphasized -expressly that the city should also be left as undamaged as possible -because otherwise there would be no place for the workers to live. This -is all I can truthfully tell you about the case of Leningrad. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you know that this wish of Raeder’s was rejected by -Hitler because he said it was not possible? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not recall that this case was taken up again. -For the operations in the North soon came to a standstill, I believe. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did other high officers tell you anything at all about this -document? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I never heard anything about this document, nor did -I see any reason to discuss it with anyone. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, if it is agreeable to the Tribunal, I should -like to submit a document which was granted me, Exhibit Raeder-111, -because of its connection with this problem. It is to be found in my -Document Book 6, Page 435. It is an affidavit by Rear Admiral Hans -Bütow, dated 21 March 1946. I should like to read this document since it -is very brief. - -THE PRESIDENT: What page is this? - -DR. SIEMERS: Page 435 in Document Book 6, Exhibit Number Raeder-111. It -reads as follows: - - “During the period from 20 June 1941 to 20 October 1941, namely, - the period to which Document USSR-113, (1), UK-45, refers, I was - stationed in Finland as Naval Commander. I was under - Generaladmiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North. I - declare that the document in question, USSR-113, (1), UK-45, a - communication of 29 September 1941 sent by the Naval Operations - Staff to Group North, and its contents have never come to my - knowledge, as it doubtless would have if Generaladmiral Carls - had passed on the letter to the offices subordinate to him. As - far as I know, no one else in my command received this - communication. - - “I myself first obtained knowledge of this order of Hitler’s in - November 1945 on the occasion of a conversation with Dr. - Siemers, the defense counsel for Admiral Raeder. - - “Other officers, especially other naval commanders, have never - spoken to me about this order. It is thus clear that the other - commanders likewise had no knowledge of this order.” - -Then there is the certification and the signature of the senior naval -judge before whom this affidavit was made. - -Admiral, then I should like to turn to a new topic, the alleged war of -aggression which Raeder is supposed to have planned against America. Did -Raeder at any time try to instigate Japan to a war against America? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, never. We never had any military discussions with -Japan at all before her entry into the war. Quite on the contrary, he -warned Hitler against war with America in view of England’s naval -superiority and her co-operation with America. - -DR. SIEMERS: For what reasons did you, Raeder, and the High Command -especially, warn Hitler? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, for the reasons which I outlined before, -reasons of over-all strategy which motivated Raeder during the entire -course of the war. Raeder considered the enemy on the sea primarily, and -not on land. If the largest sea power in the world were added to -England, which was already superior, then the war would have taken on -unbearable proportions for us. - -Besides, through the reports of our naval attaché in Washington, Vice -Admiral Witthöft, Raeder was very well informed about the tremendous -potential at the disposal of the United States. - -I might also say with reference to the conversion of the normal economy -into a war economy, that the tremendous outlay of shipyards and -installations, as Witthöft stated a few months before the war, permitted -the construction of a million tons of shipping each month. These figures -were very eloquent and were naturally at the same time a terrible -warning to us not to underestimate the armament potential of the United -States. - -DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution believes it must draw a contrary conclusion -from the fact that Raeder on 18 March 1941, according to the War Diary, -proposed that Japan should attack Singapore. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, that was an absolutely correct measure -and a correct proposal, which was in line with Raeder’s reasoning. He -was interested in dealing blows to England’s important strategic -centers. That he tried to ease our situation is understandable and -self-evident. But at no time did he propose that Japan should enter into -a war against America, but rather against England. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were there any discussions about these strategic questions -at that time between you and Raeder on the one hand and Japanese -military authorities on the other? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I have already stated that before Japan’s entry -into the war no military discussions with Japan had ever taken place. -The Japanese attitude was very reserved. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder ever discuss the fact that Japan should attack -Pearl Harbor? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. We heard about this for the first time over the -radio. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, during the time of your activity in the High -Command of the Navy or during your activity as a commanding admiral at -Trondheim did you have any knowledge about the treatment of Allied -prisoners of war by the German Navy? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might reply that I know of no case in which Allied -prisoners of war, as long as they were under the control of the Navy, -were treated other than properly and chivalrously. I could refer to the -testimony given by the English commander of the midget U-boat, which -attacked the _Tirpitz_ in the Alta Fjord, who after his return to -England from imprisonment, gave a press interview on the occasion of his -being awarded the Victoria Cross. In this interview he mentioned the -particularly chivalrous and correct treatment he had received at the -hands of the commander of the _Tirpitz_. - -From my own command in Norway I could mention a case in which members of -the Norwegian resistance movement dressed in civilian clothing were -treated just as chivalrously and correctly. I had to investigate these -cases in the presence of British authorities, and the correctness of the -treatment became evident. - -DR. SIEMERS: When did you have to investigate this at the order of the -British Military Government? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After the capitulation. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, not the Military Government, but the -British Navy. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The British Navy at Trondheim, while I was a commanding -admiral. - -DR. SIEMERS: And the cases which were investigated there, first by you -and then by the competent British admiral, were not contested? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Were not contested. The naval officer handed them over -to me for safekeeping, and I had to present the findings of the courts -of inquiry in writing. - -DR. SIEMERS: And the result... - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The result was good, proper, and occasioned no -protests. - -DR. SIEMERS: And the result was presented to the competent British -officer? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it was on his very order that I had to do it. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the case of the _Athenia_ has been dealt with here -in detail and is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, in order to save -time, I should like merely to touch this case in passing. I should like -you to tell me: Did the High Command know, did you and Raeder know, at -the beginning of September 1939 that the _Athenia_ had been sunk by a -German U-boat? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. The Commander of U-boats reported on the 3d that -the _Athenia_ could not have been sunk by a German U-boat since, if I -remember correctly, the nearest boat was about 70 nautical miles away. - -DR. SIEMERS: When did you learn that a German U-boat had sunk the -_Athenia_? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe 2 or 3 weeks afterwards, after this U-boat -returned. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I should like to refer to a document, -according to which the date was 27 September. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know that a declaration had been made -by State Secretary Von Weizsäcker on 3, 4, or 5 September to the effect -that it was not a German U-boat? When it was established that it -actually had been a German U-boat, what did Raeder do about it? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The assumption that it had not been a German U-boat was -at first justified and State Secretary Von Weizsäcker therefore acted in -the best of faith, as did we. After this regrettable mistake became -known, Raeder reported this fact to Hitler. Hitler then gave the order -that he did not want the statement which had been made by the Foreign -Office denied. He ordered that the participants, that is those who knew, -should give their oath to remain silent until, I believe, the end of the -war. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did you give your oath of silence? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I personally did not give my oath of silence, and -neither did Admiral Raeder. In the High Command we were the only ones, I -believe, with the exception of Admiral Fricke who had knowledge of that, -and we should probably have taken the oath. - -DR. SIEMERS: At Hitler’s order you were obliged to administer an oath to -the others who knew about this? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I am of the opinion that it was the crew of the -U-boat, insofar as they knew about this mistake. - -DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not having gone -to Freiherr Von Weizsäcker to tell him that it actually was a German -U-boat and of not having said to the American naval attaché, “I am -sorry; it was a German U-boat after all.” - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Such thoughts occurred to us as well, but we thought -that any discrepancies which might arise and lead to political ill-humor -in America were to be avoided as much as possible. Stirring up this case -once more would have greatly aroused public feeling. I remember, for -instance, the _Lusitania_ case during the first World War. To have -stirred up this case again after a few weeks and to arouse public -opinion, and then to force entry into the war would have had little -sense. - -DR. SIEMERS: And that was the train of thought which caused Hitler to -issue this decree? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It was the train of thought which we also shared. - -DR. SIEMERS: You said it was not to be stirred up again but regrettably, -as you know, this case was stirred up again. On 23 October 1939 in the -_Völkischer Beobachter_ a very unfortunate article appeared with the -heading “Churchill Sinks the Athenia.” Do you remember that article? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. That article was published without -Raeder’s knowledge and without the knowledge or complicity of the Navy. -Even today I do not know yet who the author of the article was. It -originated in the Propaganda Ministry, and Raeder and the rest of us in -the High Command of the Navy were most indignant, not so much because -this topic was being stirred up again, but rather because of the tenor -of the article for whether deliberately or unintentionally—we did not -know which it was—there was a misrepresentation. - -We were obliged to keep silence. To what extent the Propaganda Ministry -had been informed about this matter by Hitler, we did not know. We also -had no opportunity to speak with the Propaganda Ministry about this case -and we were completely surprised when this article appeared several -weeks later in the _Völkischer Beobachter_. We were therefore deeply -indignant, especially Raeder, because it was fundamentally against his -principles that leading foreign statesmen be attacked in a caustic -manner; and, in addition, the facts were completely distorted. And -besides—this may also be important—this involved Raeder’s opponent -whom Raeder did not in the least wish to disparage before the German -public, for Raeder took him only too seriously; and this was, I believe, -no other than Churchill. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question: Did the Propaganda Ministry call -you or Raeder up before this article appeared? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, no. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to turn to the last question of my -examination. This is the last point. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is about the sixth final question you -have asked. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, the translation must have -been wrong. The previous question was the final question on the -_Athenia_ problem. Now, this is actually the final question which I wish -to put. - -[_Turning to the witness._] The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of -not supporting Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch after the latter had -been exonerated and acquitted in court and accuses Raeder of not having -used his influence to reinstate Fritsch in office and restore his -dignity. Is that correct? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. Raeder gave me all the files -of the legal proceedings against Generaloberst Von Fritsch sometime in -the beginning of 1939 to be kept in the safe. At that time he told me -how the course of the proceedings had impressed him and also of the fact -that he had made Generaloberst Von Fritsch the offer of a complete -reinstatement, going so far as to have him reinstated in his previous -office. Von Fritsch thanked him for that and told him personally that he -would never assume his former office again, that he would not even -consider returning after what had happened, for which reason he was -requesting Raeder not to make any efforts in this direction. - -Besides, Fritsch and Raeder were on good personal terms—to say that -they were friends is going perhaps too far, but I have often seen -Fritsch at Raeder’s house even after his dismissal. - -DR. SIEMERS: Thank you, Admiral. - -Mr. President, I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel want to -ask any questions? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Schulte-Mönting, you just spoke -about the correct treatment of prisoners in connection with a U-boat -attack on the _Tirpitz_. Do you mean by that the attack in November 1943 -in the Alta Fjord? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is the one I mean. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it a two-man U-boat? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Whether it was a two-man or three-man U-boat, I do not -know, but it was a midget U-boat. Several U-boats attacked -simultaneously. Some of them were sunk, and the commander who -successfully, I believe, placed his magnetic mine was taken prisoner. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And this commander was treated according to -the Geneva convention? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Absolutely. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you first about the _Athenia_ -episode. I take it you agree that the article in the _Völkischer -Beobachter_ was thoroughly dishonorable, lying, and discreditable. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I heard nothing at all in German. - -MAJOR JONES: I will repeat my question. With regard to the _Athenia_—do -you hear me now? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. - -MAJOR JONES: With regard to the _Völkischer Beobachter_ article on the -_Athenia_, do you agree that it was a thoroughly dishonorable -publication? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I agree that it was a dishonorable publication, -untrue and dishonorable. - -MAJOR JONES: Perhaps if you keep your headphones on—I have a number of -questions to ask you, I am afraid—it might be more convenient for the -work we have to do. - -And you say that the Defendant Raeder thought it was dishonorable? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he did as well. - -MAJOR JONES: What action did he take to manifest his displeasure? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In this case he valued the interests of the State more -than a newspaper article. The interests of the State required that in -any event all complications with the United States were to be avoided. - -MAJOR JONES: That appears to be a characteristic on the part of Raeder -that runs throughout the history from 1928 to 1943, that throughout he -put what he thought were the interests of the Nazi State before -conditions of morality, honor, and public decency, is that not so? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I do not believe. I believe that in this he acted -consistently as a good patriot would act. - -MAJOR JONES: You see, with regard to the invasion of Russia, for -example, you said to the Tribunal that on both moral and strategic -grounds, Raeder was against the invasion of Russia. Why did he not -resign? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: By way of reply I must mention first Hitler’s answer to -Raeder’s statements against a war with Russia. This answer was to the -effect that he saw no possibility of avoiding a conflict for the -following reasons: - -First, because of the personal impression which he, Hitler, had received -from Molotov’s visit, which had taken place in the meantime. By “in the -meantime” I mean between the directive and the carrying through of the -directive. - -Secondly, the fact that allegedly the economic negotiations had not only -been dragged out by the Russians but, as Hitler expressed it, had been -conducted with blackmail methods. - -Thirdly, as he had been informed by the German General Staff. Russian -troop deployment had taken on such threatening proportions that he, -Hitler, could not wait for the first blow from the other side because of -the air threat to Brandenburg and the capital and to the Silesian -industry. Raeder then, of course, had to realize that he could not -refute these arguments or prove the opposite. - -MAJOR JONES: You are not suggesting that you thought that the war -between Germany and Russia was a defensive war so far as Germany was -concerned, are you? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, we were of the opinion that the deployment of -troops on both sides had reached such an extreme point that it would not -take long for the storm to burst, and that from the military point of -view anyone who sees that a conflict is inevitable, naturally likes to -have the advantages which result from dealing the first blow. - -MAJOR JONES: The invasion of Russia was a brutal aggression on the part -of Nazi Germany, you admit that now, do you not? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I do admit that. - -MAJOR JONES: I want you to turn your mind for a moment, if you will, to -Document L-79, which is in the British Document Book 10, Page 74. Those -are the minutes of the Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 which you -discussed in your evidence-in-chief this morning. I take it that you -have read those minutes, Witness? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I look at them now? I have never seen these minutes -before. If I were to be asked about them, I would first have to read -them in toto. - -MAJOR JONES: Well, you need not trouble to do that, Witness. You gave -evidence this morning as to Raeder’s discussion with you about this -conference. Did Raeder tell you that Hitler had said on 23 May 1939, for -instance: - - “There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with - the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. - We cannot expect a repetition of the Czechoslovakian affair. - There will be war.” - -Then further, Page 76 of the report: - - “The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with - England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict... England - is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a - life and death struggle.” - -And then the next paragraph but one: - - “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed - force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.” - -Now, I am suggesting to you that those statements of Hitler’s -represented Hitler’s considered policy, and that that policy was in fact -carried out in the field of action. Is that not so? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, I must correct a mistake. I thought that -you had shown me a record on Russia and not the one on Poland. I saw it -in different writing, and I thought it was another record. If it is the -same record which I mentioned this morning, then I must state again that -Raeder did not agree with the belligerent wording of these minutes as -written down by Schmundt. - -MAJOR JONES: Just one moment, Witness, if you please. I have read out -certain extracts from that document, which I take it that you heard -interpreted. Do you agree with me that those extracts represented -Hitler’s considered policy at the time and that that policy was in fact -carried out in the field of action? - -If you keep your headphones on—I know it is difficult. Just move them -back if you wish to talk. Now, see if you can answer my question. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to remark in this connection that Hitler -in his speeches pursued a certain purpose. In preparations for war he -saw a means of political pressure, and in the phrase “war of nerves” -(which was not used in Germany only, but went everywhere through the -ether far beyond Europe’s boundaries) he tried to find a means of -preventing war as well as a means of exerting pressure. This document -itself contains contradictions which lead to the conclusion that he -himself could not seriously have thought that a war would develop. I can -prove this by saying, for example, that he states that the General Staff -or the general staffs are not to concern themselves with this question; -but toward the end he says that all the branches of the Wehrmacht must -get together to study the problem. He says that a war with Poland must -in no event result in war with England; politics must see to that. But -in the next paragraph one reads: “But if a war actually does arise, I -shall deal short sharp blows for a quick decision.” In the next -paragraph it says again, “But I need 10 to 15 years to prepare,” and in -the concluding paragraph it says: “The construction program of the Navy -will in no wise be changed.” - -If, therefore, Hitler at that time had really been serious in his -speech, that is, that an armed conflict with Poland would result -shortly, then he would not have exclaimed first that we would have time -until 1943 and, secondly, that there were to be no changes as far as the -Navy was concerned. Rather he would have said to Raeder, privately at -least: “In all haste prepare a strong U-boat program because I do not -know what course events will take.” - -MAJOR JONES: But it is a fact that at about this time, the Fall Weiss -operation was being prepared to the very last detail, was it not? That -is the operation against Poland. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The operation was prepared to such a stage that when it -was canceled at the last minute we thought that we would not be able to -reach our forces at sea by wireless. We considered this an extreme -policy of exerting pressure in the form of a war of nerves. Since at the -last minute everything was canceled we believed without doubt that it -was only a means of pressure and not an entry into war. Not until we -heard the cannons were we convinced that the war was no longer to be -prevented. I personally believe... - -MAJOR JONES: If you would shorten your answers as best you can, it would -be very convenient. - -I want to go from Poland to Norway. The first conference of the -Defendant Raeder with regard to Norway took place on 10 October, you -have told us. I want you to hear the record of that conference, which is -found in Admiral Assmann’s headline diary. It is dated 10 October 1939: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states conquering the - Belgian coast no advantage for U-boat warfare; refers to value - of Norwegian bases.” - -I suggest to you that the interests of the German Navy in Norway from -the point of view of requiring submarine bases was manifesting itself at -that time; is that not so? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I look at this document first? It is unknown to me. - -MAJOR JONES: You shall see the original diary, if you want to reassure -yourself that I am reading it correctly. - -[_The document was handed to the witness._] - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In this sentence, I do not see any belligerent -intentions. It says expressly that he attaches importance to the winning -of Norwegian bases. - -MAJOR JONES: That is all I am putting to you at the moment. And do you -know that on 3 October the Defendant Raeder was sending out a -questionnaire upon the possibility of extending the operational base to -the north, and upon the bases that it would be desirable for German -power to acquire? - -I am referring to Document C-122, My Lord. The document C-122 is in -Document Book 10a at Page 91. - -If you will look at that document, Witness, you will see in the second -sentence: - - “It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in - Norway with the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with - the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational - position. The following questions are to be examined...” - -And then there follow these questions: - - “What places in Norway can be considered as bases? - - “Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s will, if - it is impossible to achieve this without fighting? - - “What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation? - - “Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases, or - do they possibly have decisive advantages simply as supply - centers? (The Commander of U-boats considers such harbors - extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic - U-boats on temporary stops.)” - -And then finally: - - “What decisive advantages would there be for the conduct of the - war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, for instance, - Skagen?” - -Now, I suggest to you that those documents are the clue to the German -invasion of Norway. Do you not agree with that? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not see any aggressive intentions in these -purely operational plans and considerations when thinking of what bases -might come into consideration for the conduct of the war. This morning I -said that, to the best of my knowledge, Generaladmiral Carls as early as -September sent a letter to this effect to Raeder in which he expressed -his concern and stated his strategical ideas and plans in case of an -Allied occupation of Norway. - -MAJOR JONES: The source of the information which the Defendant Raeder -was receiving you discussed this morning, but one source that you did -not give wets the Norwegian traitor Quisling. The relations between the -Defendant Raeder and him were very close, were they not? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: There was no contact at all between Raeder and Quisling -until December 1939; then Raeder met Quisling for the first time in his -life and never saw him again. - -MAJOR JONES: But after December Quisling’s agent Hagelin was a very -frequent visitor of the Defendant Raeder, was he not? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Hagelin ever went to Raeder -before Quisling’s visit, unless I am very mistaken. I think he visited -Raeder for the first time when he accompanied Quisling. - -MAJOR JONES: Yes, but thereafter Raeder was in very close touch with the -Quisling movement, the Quisling treachery, was he not? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. Raeder had nothing at all to do with the Quisling -movement. - -MAJOR JONES: Do you know a man, Erich Giese, Walter Georg Erich Giese, -who was an administrative employee of the adjutancy of the supreme -commander of the Navy in Berlin? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not quite catch the name. - -MAJOR JONES: Giese, G-i-e-s-e. He was a—part of his duties were to -receive the visitors of the supreme commander. He was an assistant of -the supreme commander’s adjutant and he was dismissed from his post in -April 1942. And no doubt you recollect the man. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Will you please tell me the name again? Although it was -spelled to me I did not catch it. Is this a Norwegian? - -MAJOR JONES: This is a German subject, an employee of the supreme -command of the Navy. Part of his duties were to receive all the supreme -commander’s visitors, to accept applications for interviews, and draw up -the list of callers for the supreme commander. Now you are looking at an -affidavit from this man, Document D-722, to be Exhibit GB-479. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness answered the question yet? - -MAJOR JONES: Not yet, My Lord. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Now I have the name. The man of whom you are talking -was in the reception room of the adjutant’s office. It was not up to -this man, who was to be admitted to the Admiral; that was up to me. I -asked the callers for what reason they had come. Mr. Hagelin did not -visit Raeder before Quisling’s visit, that is, not before December 1939. - -MAJOR JONES: I am not suggesting that but what I am suggesting is that -after December 1939 there was a very close link between Raeder and the -Quisling movement. I just read out to you this extract from the -affidavit of this man. From Page 3, My Lord, of the English text: - - “I can state the following about the preparations which led up - to the action against Denmark and Norway: An appointment with - the Commander-in-Chief was frequently made for a Mr. Hagelin and - another gentleman, whose name I cannot recall at present, by a - party official of Rosenberg’s Foreign Political Office; as a - rule they were received immediately. I also had received - instructions that if a Mr. Hagelin should announce himself - personally, I should always take him to the Commander-in-Chief - at once. Shortly afterwards I learned from the minute book and - from conversations in my room that he was a Norwegian - confidential agent. The gentleman from the Foreign Political - Office who frequently accompanied him and whose name I do not - remember at the moment also conversed with me and confided in - me, so that I learned about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and - about the preparations for the Norway campaign. According to all - I heard I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated - from Raeder and met with Hitler’s heartiest approval. The whole - enterprise was disguised by the pretense of an enterprise - against Holland and England. One day Quisling, too, was - announced at the Commander-in-Chief’s by Hagelin and was - received immediately. Korvettenkapitän Schreiber of the Naval - Reserve, who was later naval attaché in Oslo and knew the - conditions in Norway very well, also played a role in all these - negotiations. He collaborated with the Quisling party and its - agents in Oslo.” - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It is not true that Mr. Hagelin was received by Admiral -Raeder. Herr Giese cannot possibly have any information about that -because he was stationed two rooms away. If he had perhaps noted down -that he was received by me, that would in a certain sense be correct. -The fact is that at the time, after the Quisling-Hagelin visit, I had -said that if he were to pass through Berlin again and he had any naval -political information in this connection, I should like him to make this -information available to me. - -MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that Defendant Raeder never met Hagelin? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He did not meet him before Quisling’s visit in -December. Later he did not receive him any more. - -MAJOR JONES: But he in fact received Hagelin and took him to Hitler on -14 December 1939, did he not? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was accompanied by Quisling, that is correct. But he -did not have any special discussion with Raeder alone. - -MAJOR JONES: You said—you spoke this morning as to a conference between -Quisling and Raeder on 12 December 1939 and suggested that politics were -not discussed at that conference. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: By the word “politics” I mean politics in the National -Socialistic sense, that is, National Socialistic politics on the -Norwegian side and on our side. The matters discussed were only naval -political questions. - -MAJOR JONES: But I will not go into a discussion of the question of -politics with you. I will consider the familiar German definition that -politics is a continuation of war by other means. But if you look at the -Document C-64 you will see that political problems were discussed on 12 -December. You see that is a report of Raeder to Hitler. It is found on -Page 31 of the Document Book 10a, in which Raeder writes in Paragraph 2: - - “As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling - in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England’s influence is - very great, especially because of Hambro, the President of the - Storting (a Jew and a friend of Hore-Belisha) who is - all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that - there is an agreement between England and Norway for the - possible occupation of Norway, in which case Sweden would also - stand against Germany. Danger of Norway’s occupation by England - is very great—possibly very shortly. From 11 January 1940 on, - the Storting and thereby the Norwegian Government is - unconstitutional since the Storting, in defiance of the - constitution, has prolonged its term for a year.” - -Politics was very much under discussion at that conference, was it not? -You have said that the Defendant Raeder was anxious for peace with -Norway. Was it for peace with a Norway ruled by the traitor Quisling? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In reply to your first question I should like to say -that in the minutes it says: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out that in - connection with such offers we can never know to what extent the - persons involved want to further their own party aims, and to - what extent they are concerned about German interests. Hence - caution is required.” - -This entry in the document which you have just presented to me -corroborates what I was trying to say, that is, that no party matters or -matters depending on agreement along ideological lines were to be -settled between Admiral Raeder and Quisling. For this reason I said that -Raeder did not discuss politics with him, but merely factual matters. -That Quisling, at the time of his introduction, should mention certain -things as a sort of preamble is self-evident. But he points out the -factor of caution and asks: “What does this man want? Does he want to -work with the Party or does he really want to remain aloof?” - -MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder was preferring the -reports of Quisling to the reports of the German Ambassador in Oslo -which were entirely different from the reports of the traitor Quisling. -That is so, is it not? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe that Raeder never saw the reports from the -German Ambassador in Oslo. I at any rate do not know these reports. - -MAJOR JONES: Now the Tribunal has the documents with regard to that -matter. I will not pursue it. I want to ask you next about the relations -with the United States of America. When did the German Admiralty first -know of Japan’s intention to attack the United States? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I can speak only for Raeder and myself. As far as I -know, it was not until the moment of the attack on Pearl Harbor. - -MAJOR JONES: But you had received a communication from your German naval -attaché at Tokyo before the attack on Pearl Harbor, indicating that an -attack against the United States was pending, had you not? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Pearl Harbor? No. - -MAJOR JONES: But against the United States forces. Just look at the -Document D-872, which will be Exhibit GB-480. You see that those are -extracts from the war diary of the German naval attaché in Tokyo. The -first entry is dated 3 December 1941: - - “1800 hours. The naval attaché extended an invitation to several - officers of the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires from the - conversation that the negotiations in Washington must be - regarded as having broken down completely and that, quite - obviously, the beginning of actions to the south by the Japanese - Armed Forces is to be expected in the near future.” - -And then on 6 December 1941: - - “Conversation with Fregattenkapitän Shiba.” - -The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the following -telegram: - - “Naval Attaché, 1251. Military Secret: - - “1. Last week America offered a nonaggression pact between the - United States, England, Russia and Japan. In view of the - Tripartite Pact and the high counterdemands, Japan rejected this - offer. Negotiations have therefore completely broken down. - - “2. The Armed Forces foresaw this development and consented to - Kurusu’s being sent only to impress the people with the fact - that all means had been exhausted. - - “3. The Armed Forces have already decided 3 weeks ago that war - is inevitable, even if the United States at the last minute - should make substantial concessions. Appropriate measures are - under way.” - -And then—I will not read the whole document, and at the end it says: - - “A state of war with Britain and America would certainly exist - by Christmas.” - -Assuming that signal reached you before 8 December, you became familiar -with the plans of the perfidious Japanese attack upon the United States, -did you not? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not quite grasp it. I have already said that we -had no contact with the Japanese experts or attachés in Berlin. I -asserted that we first learned of the Pearl Harbor incident by radio, -and I cannot quite see what difference it makes whether on 6 December -the attaché in Tokyo told us his predictions, or whether he was drawing -conclusions about a future conflict from information sources which we -could not control. That has nothing to do with our having advised the -Japanese in Berlin to attack America. - -MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you had no conversations in Berlin with -the Japanese attaché? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To my knowledge there were no official conferences -between the two admiralty staffs, that is, official operational -conferences between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese -admiralty staff. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, before you part from that document, I -think you ought to read Paragraph 5. - -MAJOR JONES: Paragraph 5, My Lord, reads: - - “5. Addition—Naval Attaché. - - “No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the - commencement of the southern offensive. All the evidence, - however, indicates that it may be expected to start within 3 - weeks, with simultaneous attacks on Siam, the Philippines and - Borneo. - - “6. The Ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of the - telegram, but is acquainted with its contents.” - -Now I want to... - -THE PRESIDENT: With reference to what the witness has just said, I do -not know whether I understood him right before, but what I took down he -said was that the German Admiralty first knew of Japan’s intention to -attack, after Pearl Harbor, not that it first knew of Pearl Harbor by -radio. It was the first indication they had of an intention to attack. - -MAJOR JONES: That is so, My Lord. - -[_Turning to the witness._] I am suggesting to you, Witness, that you -knew perfectly well of the Japanese intention to attack the United -States before the incident of Pearl Harbor. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not know whether you are stressing Pearl Harbor, -or the fact that 2 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor we received a -telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conflict was to be counted on. -I was asked whether we had known of the fact of the attack on Pearl -Harbor, and to that I said: “No.” I said that we had had no conferences -in Berlin between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty -staff. What you are presenting to me... - -MAJOR JONES: I just want to deal with that, but I want to read out to -you what your Commander-in-Chief said about that, because it is not what -you are saying, you know. On the interrogation of Admiral Raeder on 10 -November 1945 (Document D-880, GB-483) he was asked: - - “Question: Would such matters be accomplished by Foreign Office - people alone, or would that be in collaboration with the High - Command of the Navy and OKW?” - -And Defendant Raeder’s answer was: - - “No, the negotiations were conducted by the Foreign Office and - on the part of the Japanese diplomats there was this delegate, - Oshima, who was an officer. He negotiated with the Foreign - Office in his capacity as delegate, but apart from that he was - enough of an expert to look at this thing from a military - standpoint as well. Military authorities had long before that - carried on negotiations with military and naval attachés about - the needs and other things that the Japanese needed... This was - all talked about and thrashed out with the military and naval - attachés.” - -That is a very different version of the fact from the version you have -given, Witness, is it not? Now, there are two more matters which I want -to deal with. - -I do not know whether it will be convenient, My Lord, to have a brief -adjournment. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the extract from -the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder which I read I wanted to be -clear that the defendant was then dealing with the relationship -generally between the German authorities in Berlin and the Japanese -representatives. I do not want to have given the Court the impression it -was a direct negotiation with regard to intervention against America -itself. I do not want to mislead the Court in any way with regard to -that matter. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Did you know of the shooting in December -1942 by a naval unit belonging to the German naval officer in command at -Bordeaux of two British Royal Marines who took part in a raid on -shipping in the Gironde estuary? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I learned of that later. - -MAJOR JONES: Did you see the entry with regard to that shooting in the -SKL War Diary? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, here in Nuremberg the defendant’s counsel showed me -an entry, but I do not know whether it was the War Diary of the Naval -Operations Staff. - -MAJOR JONES: It has been suggested by both counsel for the Defendant -Dönitz and counsel for the Defendant Raeder that the entry in D-658 -which contained the sentence: “The measure would be in accordance with -the Führer’s special order, but is nevertheless something new in -international law since these soldiers were in uniform,” that that entry -was not from the SKL War Diary. Now, you are familiar with the initial -of the Defendant Raeder, are you not? - -I want you now to look at the original of D-658, so that it may be -established beyond peradventure that this matter was entered in the SKL -War Diary. I will put in a photostatic copy of the original if the -Tribunal will allow me, because the original is required for other -purposes. D-658 was GB-229, and it may be convenient to call the -photostats of the originals D-658(a) and GB-229(a). That is the War -Diary of the SKL, is it not? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I recognize it as such. - -MAJOR JONES: And the SKL was perfectly familiar with that dreadful -murder of the men at Bordeaux, was it not? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From the War Diary I can see—such is my -impression—that afterward on 9 December they were informed about the -fact of the shooting. - -MAJOR JONES: And their laconic comment was... - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the Armed Forces communiqué it says: “According to -the Armed Forces communiqué, the two soldiers have been shot in the -meantime.” This can be seen in the War Diary of the SKL and I -acknowledged it. - -MAJOR JONES: And the humane comment of the SKL is, “It is something new -in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform.” - -There is one final matter which I wish to ask you about: Is it your -contention that the German Navy fought a clean war at sea? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I contend that the German Navy fought a very clean war -and that has nothing to do with the fact that it is said here in the -Diary of the SKL, as taken from the Armed Forces communiqué, that two -soldiers were shot and that this was in accordance with the special -order given by the Führer which has been cited but, as the Naval -Operations Staff adds, was something new in the history of naval -warfare. This too... - -MAJOR JONES: I am turning to another matter, but you say generally... - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I just say in conclusion that this postscript has -been confirmed and that the Navy, in this case Raeder, had no influence -on these matters. If you ask me whether I approved that order or -something of the sort I would give you my personal opinion of the -matters which Raeder and I discussed. - -MAJOR JONES: But you know Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and -who would have influence in Germany if the commanders-in-chief did not -have influence? Here was a matter directly reflecting on the honor of -German Armed Forces and despite that deliberate denial of the protection -of the Geneva Convention for those British marines he continued in -office, after they were deliberately murdered. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a matter of opinion. I may take the following -stand: The fact is that in this war, for the first time, a form of -sabotage was applied, whether behind the lines by means of air landings -or otherwise. - -MAJOR JONES: Just a moment. These were marines in uniform. Your own -report in the SKL War Diary says so. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have to comment on that order which was issued -earlier. The preamble of that order said that, since there was knowledge -of orders to the Allied soldiers or—I do not remember the exact wording -any more—since these soldiers were given orders not to bother taking -German prisoners but rather to shoot them while carrying out their work -in the so-called Commando raids, the following directives had to be -issued. - -At that time I discussed this matter with Raeder, of course, and I can -merely state my personal opinion. I felt that I could believe this -preamble because I am of the opinion that if I resorted to, let us say, -sabotage behind the lines then of course I could not be bothered with -taking prisoners, because then the element of surprise would be -excluded. If, therefore, a troop of three to five men, a so-called -Commando undertaking, is sent behind the lines in order to destroy enemy -installations, then of course they cannot burden themselves with -prisoners without running the risk of being killed themselves or of -being recognized before they can carry out their undertaking. Therefore -I considered this preamble quite credible and I expressly said so at -that time. - -MAJOR JONES: And you think that that shooting of those two marines was -therefore perfectly justified? That is your position on this matter, is -it not? Just say “yes” or “no” on that; I will not argue with you. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have not asserted that in any way. Rather I said, -here is a fact of which we were informed only by the Armed Forces -communiqué, and that Raeder and the High Command had not been heard on -this point. That is what I stated. - -MAJOR JONES: Now, the final matter I wanted to ask you about, you have -indicated that in your opinion Germany fought a clean war at sea. I want -you to look at the new Document D-873 which will be GB-481, which is the -log book of U-boat _U-71_, under the date line 21 June 1941, when the -Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. You see the -entry reads: - - “Sighted lifeboat of the Norwegian motor tanker _John P. - Pederson_ drifting under sail. Three survivors were lying - exhausted under a tarpaulin and only showed themselves as the - U-boat was moving away again. They stated that their ship had - been torpedoed 28 days before. I turned down their request to be - taken aboard, provisioned the boat with food and water and gave - them the course and distance to the Icelandic coast. Boat and - crew were in a state that, in view of the prevailing weather, - offered hardly any prospects of rescue.”—Signed: - “Flachsenberg.” - -Is that your conception of a clean war at sea? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I observe that the commanding officer did what he -could, in view of the weather which he described when he said that in -view of the bad weather he could not rescue them. He threw provisions to -them in a sack and gave them the course to the coast. I do not know what -there is about that that is inhumane. If he had left without giving them -food and the course, then you might make that accusation. - -MAJOR JONES: But he could have taken them aboard, you know. These were -three men who did... - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I believe you cannot judge that. Only the -commanding officer himself can judge that, the man in charge of the -U-boat. I would have to look at the weather, because it says here -“Medium swell.” That could also... - -MAJOR JONES: But you see here the U-boat commander must have spoken to -these people and physically it must have been possible to take them -aboard, but he left them to their fate, you know, knowing quite well he -was leaving them to die. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all. Then he would not have needed to give -them any food and to give them the course to the coast. What makes you -think that they had to die? By the way... - -MAJOR JONES: The last sentence is a clear indication that the U-boat -captain knew he was leaving them to die. I am suggesting to you that he -could have taken them aboard and should have done so if he had the -elements of humanity in him. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; I do not know the condition of the U-boat, whether -the boat was in a position to take prisoners on board. I believe that -you have never seen conditions on a U-boat; otherwise you would not -judge it like that. Considering that the crew of a U-boat is under water -for weeks and uses every last bit of space and is exposed to the -greatest dangers day and night, one cannot simply say that it would have -been a humane act to take these additional men aboard. Besides, the -commander himself says there was hardly a chance of rescue in view of -the prevailing weather. - -MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions, My Lord. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I have some questions concerning a few points -which Mr. Elwyn Jones put to you. An entry was shown to you from the -document by Assmann of 10 October 1939 with the assertion that from this -it can be seen that Raeder wanted to occupy Norway only in order to have -Norwegian bases. I should like to read to you the full entry and I -should like you then to take position to the entire document: - - “The Führer agrees that full use of the only two battleships - which we have at the time should not be made for the time being. - Russia offered bases near Murmansk... - - “Question of siege of England: Führer and Commander-in-Chief of - Navy agree that all objections by neutrals have to be rejected, - even in view of the danger of entry of U.S.A. into the war which - seems certain if the war keeps on. - - “The more brutally the war is conducted the sooner the effect, - the shorter the war. - - “Capacity for large U-boat production program. Führer rejects - suggestion to have submarines built by or bought from Russia for - political reasons. Commander-in-Chief of Navy states no - advantages to be won for the U-boat war by conquest of Belgian - coast; refers to the value of winning Norwegian - bases—Trondheim—with the help of Russian pressure. Führer will - consider the question.” (Document D-879, Exhibit GB-482) - -Admiral, according to the entire contents, is this a complete -clarification of the Norwegian problem? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all. - -DR. SIEMERS: Am I right in concluding that here a great number of -questions are treated and only one strategic question with reference to -Norway... - -MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship pleases, the translation came through as, -“no advantage of occupation of Norwegian bases” and the translation -which is in the document is “Raeder stresses importance of obtaining -Norwegian bases.” Perhaps if there might be a careful—I am not saying -this in any critical sense—a very careful translation of the entry, it -might be important. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the—did you give that an exhibit number? - -MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord. That is the entry from Assmann’s headline -diary. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is. But I want to know the exhibit number. - -MAJOR JONES: I will have an extract made and the exhibit number given -this evening, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: It would be GB-482, would it not? - -MAJOR JONES: Yes, My Lord, that is it; GB-482. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is the same date; I beg your pardon if it -does not agree; but the document from which I read I received through -the courtesy of Mr. Elwyn Jones. - -THE PRESIDENT: You had better go into the question of translation and -get that settled. - -MAJOR JONES: Yes, Your Lordship. - -DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, Admiral, both entries are 10 October, that is, -of the same conference. Am I right in saying that consequently there -were many strategic questions, not one of which can be said to have been -treated completely and conclusively? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I believe that this complex of questions has -nothing to do with the comprehensive discussion between Hitler and -Raeder concerning the occupation of Norway. The Norwegian question was -touched upon, the occupation of Norway, and then a few points brought up -for discussion which Raeder usually jotted down in his notebook. Apart -from the question whether an occupation of Norway was necessary or not, -the possibility of conquering bases outside German territory was -accidentally touched on the same day. - -DR. SIEMERS: Therefore, Murmansk which had been offered by Russia was -discussed. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From Russia to Belgium—all along the coast, wherever -there were possibilities and advantages for our submarine strategy. - -DR. SIEMERS: If in the War Diary a sentence in connection with a -conference between Raeder and Hitler is in quotation marks, does that -mean that these words were used by Hitler? Can one assume that? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If it says... - -MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship please, the translation has now been -checked, and the original reading of “Raeder stresses the importance of -obtaining Norwegian bases” appears to be a perfectly correct -translation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Siemers. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I understood, Dr. Siemers; shall I speak about that? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, did you want to add something to that point? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I understand that the other gentleman just pointed -out that Raeder allegedly called Hitler’s attention to the necessity of -acquiring submarine bases and in that connection once spoke about -Russian assistance and also about the possibility of acquiring bases -from Norway. But that does not reveal any aggressive intentions. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to save time, I also asked Dr. -Kranzbühler to check the translation. The German text as I should like -to point out right now says: “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points -out the value of winning Norwegian bases.” That is something different -from the English translation. But I should like to come back to this -later. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Admiral, Mr. Elwyn Jones then submitted the -affidavit of Walter Giese. I should be grateful if you would look at it -again. It is D-722. The first line reads: - - “I was born at Stettin on 24 November 1900, the son of a - bricklayer’s foreman, Ernst Giese.” - -Then it says: - - “I sat in the reception room of the Commander-in-Chief as - assistant to the adjutant.” - -Then it says, in the same paragraph: - - “I received the minute book from the adjutant at midday after - the conferences had ended and locked it up in the general safe.” - -Then it says on the second page: - - “I did not have much contact with the Commander-in-Chief - personally. This consisted merely in my submitting to him or - fetching from him top-secret correspondence.” - -Admiral, am I right in assuming, therefore, that Giese was a sort of -messenger? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. In order to save officers we filled a large number -of unimportant positions with civilians, people who we thought were -worthy of our confidence. The care of a safe or guarding the key was -really the task of the second adjutant, who later had to be used -elsewhere. - -Giese had been a sergeant in the Navy for many years and for 12 years -had been a clerk in the Navy, and therefore had had a certain amount of -practice in keeping files. - -THE PRESIDENT: All this is stated in the document. If there is anything -inaccurate in the document, you can put it to him. But it all is set out -in the document, exactly as the Admiral said. You are wasting the time -of the Tribunal by repeating it. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe what Mr. Elwyn Jones presented was -also in the document. What matters is the question of interpretation and -the witness has been referred to very definite points. If I should be -mistaken, I beg your pardon. I believed that I also had the right in -re-examination to refer to certain points in the document. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you want to, you can draw our attention to the -paragraphs. - -SCHUJLTE-MÖNTING: I can be very brief. - -Giese had no inside information about the facts, and even if he had, -without permission, looked into the minutes of the adjutant, which -were not a shorthand record but merely notes to aid the memory of -the adjutant, he could never have received the right impression -without having taken part in the conference. And it was not up to -him in the reception room to decide who should be admitted to the -Commander-in-Chief, but rather up to the adjutant or to me. He did not -even know who was to be admitted. And it is a bold statement or -assumption when he says that a man like Hagelin saw Raeder each time -instead of seeing me first. By the way, Hagelin came to me perhaps four -or five times. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe Giese was present when Raeder talked to -Hitler? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Giese? No, never. Giese sat in the reception room and -took care of Raeder’s telephone calls. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, nobody here suggests that he was. Mr. Elwyn -Jones was not putting it that this man Giese was present at talks -between Raeder and the Führer or Raeder and Hagelin. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is his affidavit, and in the affidavit, -it says, as I should like to point out now, on Page 5, “According to all -I heard, I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from -Raeder and met with Hitler’s joyous agreement.” - -How could he know that? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might stress that even I as chief of staff was not -present at these private conferences, and Herr Giese had to stay with -the telephone and had no other way of gaining an insight than by giving -his imagination free rein. - -DR. SIEMERS: That is enough, thank you. I come now to Document D-872. -That is the war diary of the naval attaché in Japan, in connection with -which you were told that you must have known that Japan would attack -America on 7 December. The telegram which is mentioned here is of 6 -December. When could that telegram have arrived in your office? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean, when could I have received it personally? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes; or Raeder. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Not before the next morning. - -DR. SIEMERS: That would be 7 December. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: At the earliest. In this case, the Chief of Staff of -the Naval Operations Staff would decide whether for operational reasons -that telegram should be presented at once, or not. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you remember that document? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Is Pearl Harbor mentioned in the document? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. I tried to explain that Pearl Harbor had no -connection with that telegram from Admiral Wennecker at all and that -Wennecker depended on sources of information and on his assumptions or -formulated his assumptions in a telegram on the basis of his information -without having any definite facts. Such telegrams were received -continuously. Sometimes these assumptions were correct; sometimes they -were incorrect. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted it to prove that -military negotiations had taken place with Japan. Am I correct in saying -that that was only a message concerning possible developments? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. I have tried before to explain that -there were no military negotiations between the admiralty staffs. Rather -the naval attaché was charged with examining and transmitting all -information of value which came to him. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then a document was shown you which was not submitted, an -interrogation of Raeder of 10 November 1945. May I ask to look at the -bottom of Page 5 of this document which I am handing to you and the -passage which was read on Page 6? - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, that ought to have a number, ought it -not? - -MAJOR JONES: That will be GB-483, My Lord. - -DR. SIEMERS: On that document, Page 5 at the bottom, is Document C-75 -mentioned? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe you are mistaken, Admiral, or else I have made a -mistake. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have an English copy—do you mean the English one? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the English copy because it does not exist in German. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean the last paragraph? - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe the last line or the line before the last. The -page numbers are very hard to read. Maybe you have the wrong page. - -This interrogation, Mr. President, concerns Document C-75. I believe the -witness will find it soon. Mention has been made of this document -recently and in accordance with the wish recently expressed by the -Tribunal, I am submitting C-75; that is Directive Number 24 about the -co-operation with Japan, and the full text is Document Number -Raeder-128. The Tribunal will recall that the British Delegation... - -THE PRESIDENT: Has it already been put in, C-75, has it already been put -in? - -DR. SIEMERS: I submit it now, C-75. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, has it already been put in? Has it already been -offered in evidence? - -DR. SIEMERS: You may recall that the Prosecution has submitted Document -C-75 as USA-151... - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is all I wanted to know. If it has already -been put in, it does not need a new number, is that not the position? - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that it needs a new number -because only the first part was submitted by the Prosecution. - -MAJOR JONES: It has already been exhibited as USA-151, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we are not giving fresh numbers, Dr. -Siemers, to parts of documents which had already been put in. If the -document has been put in, then where you want to use a fresh part of the -document it has the same number as the old number; that is all. - -DR. SIEMERS: But, Mr. President, if the Prosecution in their document -put in only the first three paragraphs then I cannot... - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; I know that perfectly well, but you are -perfectly entitled to put in any part of the document. It is only a -question of what number is to be given to it and I think—I may be -wrong—that up to the present we have not given new numbers to documents -once that they have been put in, although fresh parts of the documents -are put in. - -MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the position with regard to C-75 is that the whole -of the original has been put in as USA-151, but only an extract from the -original was included in the English document which was put before the -Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. All I was concerned with was the number of -the thing. It has got the number USA-151 and I thought our practice had -been that it should continue to have that number. You can put in any -part of it you like, and if it is a question of translation, no doubt -the Prosecution will hand it to the translation department and have it -translated for you; but you are attempting to give it a new number, that -is all. - -DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, once more, but I was asked recently to -submit the document anew and that is where the misunderstanding arose. -Under these circumstances, now that I hear that it has been submitted in -its entirety, I can withdraw it; I should be grateful if the Tribunal -were also to receive the complete translation of the document in English -and not only the first two paragraphs. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Admiral, have you found it in the meantime? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it is on Page 7 as you thought and not on Page 5. -The document refers... - -DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It is right then that the interrogation refers -to Document C-75? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Document C-75, Admiral, is Directive Number 24 concerning -collaboration with Japan, and it says: “The following rules apply: Our -common war aim is to defeat England quickly and thereby keep the U.S.A. -out of the war.” - -Besides that the document also mentions the fact I referred to recently, -that Singapore should be occupied by Japan. - -Now Raeder, on 10 November ’45 stated his position in respect to this -and, according to the next page of the document, he said that which Mr. -Elwyn Jones has just put to you. May I ask you to look at it again? It -says there, on Page—I thought it was at the top of Page 6, maybe it is -at the top of Page 8... - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The top of Page 8. I do not know English as well as -German, but I would translate it: “If that which Japan needs...” - -DR. SIEMERS: If I remember correctly, the word is “need.” - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he uses the word “need”—“and other things, things -that the Japanese need.” - -DR. SIEMERS: That is to say, Japan’s needs and other things which Japan -requires. Therefore, the conversations mentioned by Raeder were not -concerned with strategic points? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, these are two entirely different things. - -DR. SIEMERS: So that Raeder’s answer is concerned purely with questions -of supplies and material. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, purely questions of supplies and material... - -DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: ...which we had with all the navies, not only with the -Japanese. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then I come to the Commando Order about which you testified -already. I want to put to you the following: You have been shown -Document D-658, which says that according to the Armed Forces communiqué -the soldiers were executed, that the soldiers wore uniforms and that the -Führer’s Order was something new in international law. I believe that -the naval commander in western France reported this and that this was -contained in the Armed Forces communiqué. The man who compiled the War -Diary wrote: “A new thing in international law.” I am not a military -man, but I should like to ask you, would you consider such a reference a -criticism of the order? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe that I have to answer the question in the -following manner: Normally, the fact of an execution is not entered in a -war diary on operational matters. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that is really a matter which we can go -into, whether he thinks this is an entry which is a criticism of the -order. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe he wanted to establish that it was something -new. - -DR. SIEMERS: Never mind, Admiral. A factual question. The Prosecution -asserts again that it concerns soldiers in uniform. The Wehrmacht -communiqué announced the execution on 9 December. The execution, as I -have already shown in another connection, did not take place until 11 -December. I am presenting to you now Document UK-57, and ask you to look -at the second paragraph under Figure 4. The heading Figure 4 reads: -“Sabotage against German ships near Bordeaux”; then it says: “December -12, 1942”; and further on we read: - - “From the submarine the participants went two by two in paddle - boats up the Gironde estuary. They wore special olive gray - uniforms. After carrying out the blastings they sank their boats - and tried, with the aid of French civilians, to escape to Spain - in civilian clothes.” - -Did these soldiers behave correctly according to the provisions of -international law? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, no. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then I have no more questions. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If they had had a clear conscience, they would not have -needed to wear civilian clothes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, just this final question: - -Did you personally in the High Command receive an inquiry or any -information before this execution which was carried out at the direct -order of the Führer? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, neither an inquiry nor any information. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, the question as to whether a -document concerning Norway had been translated correctly was just -discussed. I shall find out what number it is. The English translation -which I have before me is not identical with the German original. It -deviates considerably. It is Document GB-482. - -I shall read the German text which in my opinion differs from the -English translation. - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states: Conquest of Belgian - coast provides no advantage for our submarine warfare; points - out value of winning Norwegian bases (Trondheim) with the help - of Russian pressure. The Führer will consider the question.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, would it not save time, really, if we -have the sentence which is said to have been wrongly translated referred -to a committee of experts in the translating division? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President... - -THE PRESIDENT: It really is not a matter which it is worth while wasting -time over. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, I did not know that it -was to be examined again. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better have it examined and then the -translation certified to. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I, myself, -have a question to put to the witness. - -Admiral, Document D-873 has been put to you before. That was a war diary -of _U-71_ and concerned the supplying of three Norwegians in a lifeboat. -The entry was on 21 June. I have already submitted it to the Tribunal -under Dönitz Number 13, on Page 23 of my document book, a statement by -the above-mentioned commanding officer Flachsenberg. According to that -statement this submarine put to sea on 14 June. It was west of Norway. -Can you tell me if that U-boat, therefore, on 21 June, was putting out -for operations or returning from operations? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean from memory? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, considering the dates, put out to sea on -14 June, this entry on 21 June. - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Putting out. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Putting out. As you know, this submarine was -a 500-ton vessel. Is a boat of that size in a position to carry out an -operation over several weeks with three additional people on board? - -SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe not. I am not enough of an expert to be able -to judge definitely what the extra weight of additional persons on board -might mean as far as trimming experiments and such things are concerned; -but aside from that, I do not believe that such a small boat, which is -putting out to sea for an operation, can load itself on the way with -prisoners. I do not consider that possible. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the Court, the witness may -retire. - -[_Turning to the President._] Mr. President, in accordance with my -statement at the beginning of this case, I have already submitted the -majority of my documents during the examination. With the permission of -the Tribunal, may I proceed now to submit as quickly as possible the -remainder of the documents with a few accompanying statements. - -I submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number Raeder-18, an excerpt from the -Document Book 2, Page 105, an excerpt from a book which Churchill wrote -in 1935 called _Great Contemporaries_. I ask the Tribunal to take -official notice of the contents. Churchill points out that there are two -possibilities, that one cannot say whether Hitler will be the man who -will start another world war or whether he will be the man who will -restore honor and peace of mind to the great German nation and bring it -back serene, helpful and strong to a galaxy of the European family of -nations. - -As Exhibit Number Raeder-20 I submit a short excerpt from Adolf Hitler’s -_Mein Kampf_ with reference to the fact that the Prosecution has said -that from that book one could see that Hitler intended to wage -aggressive wars. I shall show in my final pleadings how much one can see -from that book. I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the -short excerpt on Page 154: “For such a policy there was but one ally in -Europe, England.” - -Exhibit Number Raeder-21, a speech made by Hitler to the German -Reichstag on 26 April 1942, is to show how rights were increasingly -limited in Germany and how the dictatorship became more and more -powerful. - -Document Book 4, Exhibit Number Raeder-65, intended to facilitate my -arguments, is the Hague Agreement about the rights and duties of -neutrals in naval warfare. I need that for my final pleadings in -connection with Exhibit Number Raeder-66, the statement of opinion by -Dr. Mosler in Document Book 4, Page 289, the first document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Can you give us the pages? - -DR. SIEMERS: Page 289, Mr. President. It is the first page of the -Document Book 4. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then I ask the Tribunal to be kind enough to take up -Document Book 5, since the remaining documents have already been -submitted. I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-100, Document Book 5, Page -437, a document from the _White Book_ concerning the “top-secret” -meeting of the French War Commission on 9 April 1940, with Reynaud, -Daladier, Gamelin, General Georges, the Minister of the Navy, the -Minister of the Colonies and the Air Minister present. It concerns the -suggestion by Admiral Darlan of moving into Belgium. The suggestion was -supported by General Gamelin and also by the Minister for National -Defense and War. On Page 442 there is mention of the march into Holland -and finally of Luxembourg. Since the High Tribunal has knowledge of the -contents from the discussion of the documents, I do not want to read any -details. I simply ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. I -should also like to point out that on Page 443 of this very long -document mention is made of the occupation of the harbor of Narvik and -of the intention to get hold of the mines of Gallivare. - -I now submit Exhibit Number Raeder 102, in the same document book, Page -449. This is an order of the 2d Belgian Infantry Regiment of 13 April -1940 concerning information about friendly troops and the building of a -fortified position. It can be seen from the document that the friendly -troops mentioned are the Allies. - -Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-103, Page 452, which is a French document -of 16 April 1940 from headquarters concerning measures about the rail -transportation of French troops in Belgium. - -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of all these documents, which -I shall not read in detail. - -The same applies to Exhibit Number Raeder-104, Document Book 5, Page -455, which is the order of 19 April 1940 of the 2d British Division -concerning security measures in Belgium. There we find a directive -similar to one in a document which has been submitted by the -Prosecution, a directive to establish contact with Belgian civilian -authorities. - -Exhibit Number Raeder-105, Document Book 5, Page 459, is the statement -of a Luxembourg citizen which shows that 200 men, French soldiers in -uniform, entered Belgium in armored cars 7 days before the outbreak of -the German-Belgian hostilities. - -May it please the Tribunal, I originally intended not to submit anything -in this Trial concerning the character of my client because I was of the -opinion that Admiral Raeder, both at home and abroad, enjoyed great -respect. The first trial brief against Raeder did not affect that -intention. Shortly before the presentation of that trial brief it was -changed, becoming considerably more severe and containing moral -accusations which seriously injure and insult Raeder’s honor. I have no -doubt that the High Tribunal will understand why under these -circumstances I ask to be permitted to submit some of the documents -granted me which concern Raeder’s character. I submit Exhibit -Raeder-119, Document Book 6, Page 514. That is a letter from Frau Von -Poser addressed to me. It is not an affidavit and quite purposely I have -submitted the original because in my opinion it will make a more -immediate and direct impression than an affidavit which I would first -have to ask for in my capacity as defendant’s counsel. - -Similarly, there is a fairly long letter from Professor Dr. Seibt who -approached me on his own initiative. I submit Exhibit Number Raeder-120, -Document Book 6, Page 517. I would be grateful to the Tribunal if it -would take judicial notice of that letter. In order to save time I -refrain from reading it since it is six pages long. - -Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-122, Document Book 6, Page 526, a letter -from Herr Erich Katz, which I submit with its appendices and I ask the -Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. This presents one of the cases -in which Raeder intervened personally, using his influence and -position—he used the official stationery of the Commander-in-Chief of -the Navy to intervene on behalf of Herr Katz who had been attacked as a -Jew—and actually succeeded in protecting him. Herr Katz has sent me -these documents on his own initiative in order to show his gratitude. - -As Exhibit Raeder-123 I submit a letter from Günter Jacobsen that -concerns a similar case. Jacobsen also, without my asking it, approached -me in order to testify that Raeder rescued his father, who as a Jew had -been accused of race defilement, from the concentration camp -Fuhlsbüttel—I believe it was still a prison at that time—so that -Jacobsen could emigrate to England where he is living now. - -I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-124, an affidavit... - -GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, I must make the following statement. All -four exhibits mentioned just now by Dr. Siemers are personal letters -from various persons to Dr. Siemers. They are not sworn affidavits. They -are not interrogations. Therefore these documents have little probative -value, and I hold the view that they ought not to be admitted as -evidence. Many letters are received, and if they were all to be -submitted to the Tribunal, the Tribunal would have great difficulty in -establishing the truth and how far they are of probative value. In that -connection, I personally object to the fact that these documents should -be accepted as evidence in Raeder’s case. - -DR. SIEMERS: My Lord, may I... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that the matter is of -sufficient importance to insist upon evidence being upon oath. The -documents are admitted. - -DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-124 I submit an affidavit by -Konrad Lotter. The affidavit is very short and with the permission of -the Tribunal, I should like to read this one page: - - “Grand Admiral Raeder has always appeared to me a man who - embodied the finest traditions of the old Imperial Navy. This - was true particularly in regard to his philosophy of life. As a - man and as an officer he was at all times the best model - imaginable. - - “In 1941, when the anti-Christian policy of the Hitler regime - was in full force in Bavaria, when cloisters were closed and in - the education of the youth intolerance against every creed - became crassly manifest, I sent a memorandum of 12 pages to the - Admiral in which I presented to him my objections to this - policy. Admiral Raeder intervened at once. Through his - mediation, I was called to the Gauleiter and Minister of the - Interior, Wagner, in Munich. After a series of discussions - between the clerical, governmental, and Party authorities an - agreement was reached which had the following results: The - school prayer was retained, the crucifix was allowed to remain - in the schools, _et cetera_; furthermore, 59 clergymen who had - been fined 500 marks each were pardoned. - - “The closing down of cloisters was also stopped at that time. - Gauleiter Wagner had to...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, all these documents have been read by us -very recently. - -DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then I just ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of the remainder. - -I submit also the two documents, Exhibit Number Raeder-125 and Exhibit -Number Raeder-126. Number 125 is an affidavit by the former Reich -Defense Minister, Dr. Otto Gessler, and Number Raeder-126 is an -affidavit by the Navy Chaplain Ronneberger. I ask you to take judicial -notice of this latter document. - -I should like to be permitted to read the short affidavit by Dr. Gessler -since it contains not only something of a purely personal nature, but -also remarks concerning the accusations against Raeder. - - “I, Gessler, have known the former Admiral Dr. Raeder personally - since about the middle of the 20’s when I was - Reichswehrminister. Raeder was then inspector of the educational - system in the Navy. I have always known Raeder as a man of - irreproachable, chivalrous character, as a man fully conscious - of his duty. As to the subject of the Indictment, I know very - little. - - “Raeder visited me repeatedly after my release from imprisonment - by the Gestapo in March 1945 when I lay in the Hedwig Hospital - in Berlin and he also made arrangements for me to get home, as I - was ill and completely exhausted. I told him then about the - ill-treatment I had suffered, especially the torture. He was - obviously surprised and incensed about this. He said he would - report this to the Führer. I asked him at once to refrain from - that, for I had been told before the torture, and officially, - that all of this was taking place at the explicit order of - Hitler. Moreover, I knew definitely that I would immediately be - rearrested, since on my release I had signed the well-known - declaration and could not even obtain a confirmation of my - detention in order to get a ticket for my trip home. - - “I heard nothing about secret rearmament in the Navy, neither - during my term of office nor later. During my term of office, - until January 1928, Admiral Raeder would not have been - responsible either, for at that time he was not Chief of the - Naval Command. - - “At the time of the National Socialist regime I was ignored by - my former department and snubbed. One of the few exceptions was - Dr. Raeder. Before 1939 among other things he invited me three - times to visit on the cruiser _Nürnberg_ although I had refused - twice. During the visit in June 1939 he came to Kiel personally - to pay his respects to me. At that time we also discussed the - political situation. I expressed the apprehension that an attack - on Poland would mean a European war. Raeder declared positively - that he considered it out of the question that Hitler would - attack Poland. When this did happen later, I explained this to - myself on the grounds that Hitler liked to place even the - highest military leaders face to face with accomplished facts.” - -Then there is the statement “under oath” and the signature of the -notary. - -As to the last Exhibit Number Raeder-126, from the Navy Chief Chaplain -Ronneberger, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it since it -is too late to read it. It is a factual description and survey of church -questions and of religious matters in the Navy. - -Mr. President, with that, with the exception of three points, I can -conclude my case. There are still two interrogatories missing which have -not yet been returned. I ask permission to submit these as soon as they -are received. - -Then, there is the witness Generaladmiral Böhm, who has already been -approved, but who on account of illness has not yet been able to appear. -The British Delegation, through Sir David, has been kind enough to agree -that if necessary this witness can be interrogated at a later date. May -I be permitted to ask the Tribunal to keep this open, and if possible to -permit Admiral Böhm to be questioned at a later date. I want to point -out now that it will not be so large a complex of questions as in the -case of Admiral Schulte-Mönting, which the Tribunal knows from the -material I have submitted. - -This concludes my case Raeder. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 23 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH DAY - Thursday, 23 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the documents of the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart, the Tribunal admits the following documents which were -objected to: Number 11, Number 47, Number 48, Number 50, Number 54, and -Number 71. - -The remainder of the documents which were objected to are rejected. I -will enumerate them: Number 5, Number 10, Number 14, Number 19b, Number -21, Number 22, Number 27, Number 31, Number 39, Number 55, Number 60, -Number 61, Number 68, Number 69. - -That is all. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, last night at the end of the session the -counsel for Admiral Raeder submitted a certain number of documents -including Document Raeder-105 of Document Book 5. This document is an -excerpt from the German _White Book_, Number 5. It is the testimony of -an old man of 72, a native of Luxembourg, who had lived in Belgium for -only 6 months, and who affirms that in April 1940 he saw 200 French -soldiers in Belgium. These soldiers, who he said were French, were in -armored cars. - -I must ask the Tribunal to allow me to make objection to this Document -Number 7 of the _White Book_ Number 5, the original of which has never -been submitted and has not even been reproduced in the _White Book_, as -is the case with a certain number of documents in the German _White -Book_. It is necessary that in the name of France and of Belgium a -protest—a formal, categorical protest—be made against such an -assertion. At no time before the invasion of Belgium by the German -forces did any French troops set foot on Belgian soil. The reading of -this document, Number Raeder-105 of Document Book 5 of Admiral Raeder, -enables us to understand how there came to be the error in the testimony -by Grandjenet that is cited. - -I have already told the Tribunal that this man is 72 years old and was -from Luxembourg. To the question put to him by the German authorities as -to how he recognized the soldiers he had seen as being of French -nationality, he answered: - - “I was quite sure that they were French soldiers because I know - their uniform well. Moreover, I recognized the soldiers because - of the language they used when they spoke to me.” - -Now, as far as the uniform is concerned, the Tribunal knows that at the -time when these events took place, the Belgian Army had a uniform of the -same color as the French Army and a helmet of the same shape. As for the -language, the Tribunal knows that a great part of the Belgian population -who live along the Luxembourg frontier speak French, and the Belgian -soldiers recruited in these districts speak French. - -The Tribunal will certainly remember that this witness, who is a very -old man, had only been living for 6 months in Belgium and probably had -only a limited experience with things Belgian—and especially with the -Belgian Army. - -At any rate, we assert in the name of France and in the name of Belgium -that before 10 May 1940 no French troops, no organized French troops, -penetrated Belgium, and that the isolated individuals who did go into -Belgium were interned there. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Siemers? - -DR. SIEMERS: If it please the Tribunal, may I reply very briefly? - -This matter concerns a document from the _White Book_, on which a -decision has already been handed down once and which was granted me. I -propose that the Prosecution be requested to submit the original if they -dispute the correctness of this document. In this I am in agreement with -a decision of the Tribunal according to which the application is to be -made for the presentation of the original if it is available, or -application should be made so that whoever has the original should -produce it. As far as I know the Prosecution have the original, since -all original documents were located in the Foreign Office in Berlin, or -in the alternative place of safekeeping, and all the originals of these -_White Books_ fell into the hands of the Allies. - -THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “original”? The original, I suppose, -is the original of the _White Book_. Is that what you mean? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I mean now, Mr. President, the original of this court -record. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, this comes from a _White Book_. That is a printed -document, I suppose, I do not suppose it contains the original of the -statement of this Luxembourg man. - -DR. SIEMERS: The _White Book_ is a collection of numerous documents, and -the single original documents are in the possession of the Foreign -Office; in part they were from the files of the French General Staff, -and partly they were records of court proceedings. Regarding the -contents of this document... - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, you are not proposing that we should strike -the document out, but the Tribunal will certainly take into account the -facts to which you have drawn our notice. - -M. DUBOST: This is an application that the Tribunal shall refuse to -admit that document, Mr. President. At the same time this is a protest -against the assertion made by the Defense that French soldiers violated -Belgian neutrality in the course of the month of April. I hope the -Tribunal will allow me to add a few words of explanation. The _White -Book_, which we have here, comprises two parts. The first part -reproduces texts and the second part gives photostatic copies of these -texts. In the first part, which simply reproduces the texts, is found -the document which I ask the Tribunal to strike from the record. We have -searched in the second part which gives the photostatic copies of the -documents in the first part, and we do not find it. We state to the -Tribunal that the original of the document, which we ask the Tribunal to -strike out, has not been reproduced in the German _White Book_, since it -is not to be found in the second part. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe that M. Dubost’s entire -explanation refers to the question of the value of the document as -evidence and not to the question of the admissibility of the document. -That this document is in order appears to me to be quite clear, since it -is a record of court proceedings where a certain person, namely -Grandjenet, has been interrogated. Everything said by M. Dubost referred -more to the contents of the document than to the question of its value -as evidence. May I ask therefore that the document be admitted, as has -been done up to now, and ask that consideration be given to the fact -that the document has value in connection with the other documents which -have been granted to me and to Dr. Horn in his document book with -reference to Holland and Belgium. - -If, in the second part of the document book there is no photostatic -copy... - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, and M. Dubost, the Tribunal will -consider the objection that has been made. - -DR. SIEMERS: May I merely mention, Mr. President, that if the photostat -is not in the book, as M. Dubost states, then this is due to the fact -that this court record in its original text was German, and the -facsimiles are those prepared from the original text in French, that is -to say, of those documents which in their original version were in -French. If necessary I would appeal to Geheimrat Von Schnieden as a -witness regarding this record, since he at the time was informed about -all the records of this type and helped in the work of compiling the -book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will consider the objection. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, with the permission of the -Tribunal I should like to say that the interrogatory put to the American -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Nimitz, is available. I received -it the day before yesterday and in the meantime it has gone in to the -interpreters for translation. With the permission of the Tribunal, I -should like to submit it now, in connection with the cases of Admiral -Dönitz and Admiral Raeder. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution seen it? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you got copies for us? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I had been informed that the copies for the -Tribunal would be handed on by the General Secretary. - -THE PRESIDENT: Unless we have copies, the document must not be read. It -must be put off until we have copies. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There are two copies in English and one in -French. - -I present the document as Number Dönitz-100. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Soviet members of the Tribunal do -not have a copy of the document translated into their language, so you -will present it at a later date. - -Will the counsel for the Defendant Von Schirach present his case? - -DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for the Defendant Von Schirach): Gentlemen of -the Tribunal, I propose first of all to conduct the examination of the -Defendant Schirach himself, and in the course of this examination I will -bring to your attention the passage of the document book concerned, as -the individual points come up. Following the examination of the -defendant I shall then call my four witnesses, and at the end I intend -to submit the remaining documents, insofar as these documents have not -by that time been presented during the examination of the Defendant Von -Schirach. I presume, Mr. President, that you agree to this procedure. - -I now call to the witness stand, first, Baldur von Schirach. - -[_The Defendant Baldur von Schirach took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the following oath after me: I swear by -God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and -will withhold and add nothing. - -[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, what is the date of your birth? - -BALDUR VON SCHIRACH (Defendant): 9 May 1907. - -DR. SAUTER: That means that a few days ago you were 39. You have been -married for 14 years; is that correct? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: And you have four children, whose ages are... - -VON SCHIRACH: 4, 8, 11, and 13 years. - -DR. SAUTER: In the Third Reich you were mainly active as Youth Leader? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: What offices did you fill in that connection, that is, -offices in the Party and in the Government—please state also how long -you held these various offices? - -VON SCHIRACH: To start with, in 1929 I was the leader of the National -Socialist Students’ Union. In 1931 I became Reich Youth Leader of the -NSDAP, at first on the staff of the SA Supreme Command; in 1932, Reich -Leader for Youth Education of the NSDAP; in 1933, Youth Leader of the -German Reich, at first under the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick. In -1934, I held the same position under the Reich Minister of Education, -Rust. In 1936 the Reich Youth Leader became a leading Reich official, -and in that capacity I came directly under the Führer and Reich -Chancellor. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, which of your offices were Party positions and which of -the ones you have mentioned were offices of the Reich? - -VON SCHIRACH: Party positions were the office of Reich Youth Leader of -the NSDAP, and that of Reich Leader for Youth Education. Government -positions: The Youth Leader of the German Reich, at first subordinate to -the Minister of the Interior as I have described or under the Minister -for Education, and then in an independent position. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you were removed from some of these offices in -1940. What positions in Youth Leadership did you lose in 1940, and what -positions did you still continue to fill to the end? - -VON SCHIRACH: In 1940 I left the position as the leader of Youth, that -is, I left the office of the Reich Youth Leadership of the NSDAP, but I -retained the office of Reichsleiter for Youth Education and with that -the entire responsibility for German youth. I received as an additional -new post that of Gauleiter of Vienna, which was combined with the -governmental post of Reichsstatthalter of Vienna and also that of Reich -Defense Commissioner for Wehrkreis XVII. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, we want now to come back to your activity as Youth -Leader. There is an affidavit by you here dated 4 December 1945, -3302-PS. In this affidavit you stated to the Prosecution in December -that you acknowledge yourself to be responsible for all youth education -in the Third Reich. - -VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. - -DR. SAUTER: Were you, when you gave the statement of guilt, under the -impression that your successor, the late Reich Youth Leader Axmann, was -dead? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: You thought that he died in the last battles of the war? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I was convinced that he had died in Berlin. - -DR. SAUTER: In the meantime, Witness, you have learned from newspaper -reports that your successor as Reich Youth Leader, this man Axmann, is -still alive. Is that correct? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you want then, today, to support your affidavit regarding -your personal responsibility as Youth Leader without reservation; or do -you want to limit it in any respect today? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not want to limit this affidavit in any way. Although -during the last years of his life Hitler gave orders to the Youth of -which I do not know and also my successor, Axmann, particularly in 1944, -gave orders with which I am not acquainted since the relationship -between us had been broken off due to the events of the war, I stand by -the statement that I have made in the expectation that the Tribunal will -consider me the only person responsible in Youth Leadership and that no -other Youth Leader will be summoned before a court for actions for which -I have assumed responsibility. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I would now be interested in knowing whether -possibly principles and directives which you received from Hitler or -from any Party office or from any governmental quarter were the formula -for your youth education; or whether, for your youth education, the -principles were derived from the experiences which you had during your -own youth and among the youth leaders of that time. - -VON SCHIRACH: The latter is correct. Of course, the education of the -Hitler Youth was an education on the basis of the National Socialist -idea. But the specifically educational ideas did not originate with -Hitler, they also did not originate with other leaders in the Party; -they had their origin in youth itself, they originated with me, and they -originated with my assistants. - -DR. SAUTER: Perhaps you will be good enough now to explain to the -Tribunal somewhat more in detail how you, yourself, arrived at those -principles and that type of youth education, based on your own -education, your personal development, and so forth? - -VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the simplest way for me to do this would be -for me here, very briefly, to sketch the story of my youth and describe -also in that connection the youth organizations with which I came in -contact. I can in that way save much time for my further statements. - -My father was a professional officer in the Garde-Kürassier Regiment of -the Kaiser. I was born in Berlin and one year later my father retired -and moved to Weimar, where he took over the management of the Court -Theater there, which later became the Weimar National Theater. Thus I -grew up in Weimar, and that town, which in a certain sense is the native -city of all Germans, I regard as my native city. My father was well off; -our home offered a great deal of intellectual and artistic stimulation, -above all in the literary and musical field, but apart from and beyond -the educational opportunities of our home, it was the atmosphere of the -town itself, that atmosphere of the classic and also the postclassic -Weimar which influenced my development. It was most of all the genius -loci, which early captured my imagination. It is directly due to those -experiences of my youth that later on I led the youth back again, year -after year, to Weimar and to Goethe. - -And the first document which is important in this connection for my -case, which is Document Schirach-80, will prove just that. There is a -brief reference in that document to one of the many speeches which I -made in the course of my activity as Youth Leader to the leaders of the -young generation, and in which I directed the youth to Goethe... - -DR. SAUTER: May I interrupt you for a moment, Herr Von Schirach? - -In this Document Number Schirach-80, Mr. President, there is—on Page -133 of Schirach’s document book—a brief report on a Reich Cultural -Convention (Reichskulturtagung) of the Hitler Youth in Weimar. This -happens to be a report from 1937, but the defendant has already told you -that such cultural conventions of the Hitler Youth took place every year -in Weimar, the city of Schiller and Goethe. In this report, Document 80 -of document book Schirach, there is, for instance, discussion of a -speech of the defendant on the importance of Goethe for the National -Socialist education of youth. It is said, in this connection, that at -that time Schirach stated, and I quote... - -THE PRESIDENT: You need not read it to us, Dr. Sauter. It refers to -Goethe, that is all. - -DR. SAUTER: In that case, Herr Von Schirach, will you continue? - -VON SCHIRACH: It was not only the annual cultural convention but the -annual meeting of the leaders of the Hitler Youth which took place in -Weimar. Apart from that there were also what we called the “Weimar -Festivals of German Youth.” - -What is important in this connection is that in this speech I quoted a -sentence of Goethe which, to a certain extent, became the leitmotiv of -all my educational work: “Youth fashions itself afresh from youth.” - -Even my worst enemy cannot deny the fact that I was to the young -generation of the German people at all times not only the propagandist -of National Socialism but also the propagandist of Goethe. A certain -Herr Ziemer has submitted a lengthy affidavit against me in which he -quarrels with the youth education for which I am responsible. I believe -that Herr Ziemer did his work a little too superficially. In his -description of German national education he should at least have taken -into consideration my educational efforts designed to guide youth toward -the life work of Goethe. - -I joined my first youth organization when I was 10 years old. I was then -just the age of the boys and girls who later on entered the Jungvolk. -That youth organization which I joined was the so-called “Young German -League,” (Jungdeutschland Bund), which Count von der Goltz had founded, -a Boy Scout organization. Count von der Goltz and Haeseler, impressed by -the British Boy Scout movement, had formed Pathfinder units in Germany, -and one of these Pathfinder organizations was the Jungdeutschland Bund -just mentioned. It played an important part in the education of German -youth until about 1918 or 1919. - -Much more significant in my development, however, was the time which I -spent in a country boarding school (Waldpädagogium). This was an -educational institution directed by an associate of the well-known -educator, Hermann Lietz. There I was educated in the way which I later, -on an entirely different basis... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, do you think the education of the defendant -himself is in any way material for the Tribunal to hear? It is the -education which he imparted which is the matter that is material. What -he imparted, not what he himself took in. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the defendant would nevertheless ask you to -allow him these statements, particularly, from the point of view that -with them he wants to show you that the principles according to which he -led youth education came to him not from Hitler and not from any Party -source, but that they resulted from his own experiences in his own -youth. It is, indeed, of some importance for the Tribunal to examine the -question: According to what principles did the defendant direct youth -education and how did he arrive at these principles? The defendant is -asking permission to explain that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Sauter, the defendant has already taken some -considerable time in telling us about his early youth and his education, -and the Tribunal thinks that it ought to be cut short, and that not much -more time ought to be taken up in dealing with the education of the -defendant. As I have pointed out to you, what is material for us is the -education he imparted to German youth and not the education which he -received himself. - -DR. SAUTER: We shall, of course, comply with your wish, Mr. President. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Herr Von Schirach, will you please make -your statements as brief as possible? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I can be very brief. - -DR. SAUTER: Please, go on. - -VON SCHIRACH: Lietz’ idea was to give youth an education in which they -have in the school an image of the state. The school community was a -miniature state and in this school community was developed a -self-administration of youth. I only want to point out in passing that -he, too, was applying ideas which long before him had been developed by -Pestalozzi and the great Jean Jacques. All modern education, of course, -goes back somehow to Rousseau, be it a question of Hermann Lietz or the -Boy Scouts, the Pathfinder movement or the German Wandervogel movement. -At any rate, that idea of self-administration of youth in a school -community gave me my idea of the self-leadership of youth. - -My thought was to attract the younger generation in school to ideas that -Fröbel had originated 80 years before. Lietz wanted to win over youth -from early school days onward. - -I may perhaps mention very briefly that when in 1898 Lietz began his -educational work, the British Major Baden-Powell was being surrounded by -rebels in a South African town, and was training youngsters to scout in -the woods and with this laid the groundwork for his own Boy Scout -movement, and that in that same year, in 1898, Karl Fischer from -Berlin-Steglitz founded the Wandervogel movement. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I think that this chapter, which is merely the -historic background, might perhaps, in accordance with the wish of the -President, be terminated now. If I understand you rightly then, you mean -that those principles which you applied later on as Reich Youth Leader -had become familiar to you in your own youth and in the youth movement -of the time. Is that right? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes; basically, yes. The basic principles of my later work -originate there. - -DR. SAUTER: There is one more point I want to know in this connection. -Did this education at that time have any political or anti-Semitic -tendencies and how did you happen to get into politics? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, that educational work had no political and most -certainly no anti-Semitic tendencies, because Lietz came from the -circles around the Democrat Naumann, from the Damaschke circle. - -DR. SAUTER: But how did you get into politics? - -VON SCHIRACH: In the meantime the revolution had broken out. My -father... - -DR. SAUTER: The revolution of 1918-1919? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, the revolution of 1918-1919. My father had been -thrown out of his position by the Reds. The National Assembly in Weimar -had convened. The Weimar Republic had been founded. We had a -parliamentary system, we had a democracy, or what we in Germany thought -was a democracy—I doubt that it was one. It was about 1923. I was at -home at the time. It was a period of general insecurity, want, and -dissatisfaction; many respectable families had become beggars through -the inflation, and the worker and the citizen had lost their savings. -The name “Hitler” made its appearance in connection with the events of 9 -November 1923. I was not able at the time to gain any exact information -about him. This Trial has informed me and people of my generation for -the first time what Hitler actually wanted. At that time I was not a -National Socialist. Together with some boys of my age I joined a youth -organization which had the name “Knappenschaft.” It was in some way -connected with the people’s movement, but it was not bound to any party. -The principles of that organization were simply comradeship, patriotism, -and self-control. There were about 100 boys from my city in it at the -time who, in this youth organization, fought against the shallow -tendencies of youth in the postwar period and against the dissipation -indulged in by growing youngsters. - -In that circle, as a 16-year-old, I first came in contact with -socialism, for here I found youths from every level, working boys, -craftsmen, young office employees, sons of farmers. But there were some -older ones among us too, who were already settled in life, and some also -who had been in the World War. From discussions with these comrades I -came to grasp for the first time the consequences of the Versailles -Treaty in their full import. The situation of the youth at the time was -this: The school boy had the prospect of struggling through somehow or -other as a working student, and then he would in all probability become -a member of the academic proletariat for the possibility of an academic -career practically did not exist for him at all. The young worker had no -prospect of finding an apprenticeship. For him there was nothing other -than the grim misery of unemployment. It was a generation nobody would -help unless it helped itself. - -DR. SAUTER: And that circle to which you belonged as a 16-year-old boy, -then, gradually drifted into the currents of National Socialism? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and in quite a natural way. - -DR. SAUTER: How did it happen? - -VON SCHIRACH: In central Germany there were disturbances. I need only -mention the name of the Communist bandit leader, Max Hölz, to indicate -what conditions obtained at the time. And even after outward calm had -come, conditions still prevailed that made it impossible to hold -patriotic meetings because they were usually broken up by Communists. -There came an appeal to us young people to furnish protection for these -patriotic meetings, and we did. Some of us were wounded in doing this. -One of us, a certain Garschar, was killed by Communists. In that manner -a large number of national meetings took place which otherwise could not -have been held in the Weimar Republic, National Socialist meetings, too; -and to an increasing degree it was exactly such meetings that we had to -protect because the Communist terror was directed against them -particularly. - -Through this protective activity I met leading National Socialists—at -first as speakers, naturally, not personally. I heard Count Reventlow -speak; I think I heard Rosenberg then too; I heard Streicher speak and -heard the first oratorical efforts of Sauckel, who soon after became -Gauleiter of the National Socialist Party in Thuringia. In this way... - -THE PRESIDENT: What date is he speaking of? - -DR. SAUTER: This is the period around 1924, that is, a year after the -Hitler Putsch. - -In that way, Witness, the circle of which you were then a member came -under National Socialist influences. Was this also supported with -reading, reading of National Socialist literature? - -VON SCHIRACH: Of course, I do not know what my comrades read, with the -exception of one book which I shall give you directly. I know only what -I read myself; I was interested at that time in the writings of the -Bayreuth thinker, Chamberlain, in _The Foundations of the Nineteenth -Century_, in the writings of Adolf Bartels, in his _Introduction to -World Literature_ and _History of German National Literature_. There -were works... - -THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that we do not want to know the -full story of the defendant’s education. He is now giving us a series of -the books which he has read, but we are not interested. - -DR. SAUTER: Very well, Mr. President. - -VON SCHIRACH: I shall only say in one sentence that these were works -which had no definite anti-Semitic tendencies, but through which -anti-Semitism was drawn like a red thread. The decisive anti-Semitic -book which I read at that time and the book which influenced my -comrades... - -DR. SAUTER: Please... - -VON SCHIRACH: ...was Henry Ford’s book, _The International Jew_; I read -it and became anti-Semitic. In those days this book made such a deep -impression on my friends and myself because we saw in Henry Ford the -representative of success, also the exponent of a progressive social -policy. In the poverty-stricken and wretched Germany of the time, youth -looked toward America, and apart from the great benefactor, Herbert -Hoover, it was Henry Ford who to us represented America. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks, as I have said twice -now, that the educational influences of the defendant are quite -irrelevant to us. I do not want to say it again and, unless you can -control the defendant and keep him to the point, I shall have to stop -his evidence. - -DR. SAUTER: But, Mr. President, is it not of interest to the Tribunal -when judging this defendant and his personality that they know how the -defendant became a National Socialist and how the defendant became -anti-Semitic? I had thought... - -THE PRESIDENT: No, it is not of interest to the Tribunal. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, how did you then meet Hitler and how did you happen -to join the Party? - -VON SCHIRACH: I must say that I did not become a National Socialist -because of anti-Semitism but because of Socialism. I met Hitler as early -as 1925. He had just left Landsberg on the Lech, his imprisonment was -ended, and he came to Weimar and spoke there. It was on that occasion -that I was introduced to him. The program for the national community -which he developed appealed to me so enormously because in it I found on -a large scale something I had experienced in a small way in the -camaraderie of my youth organization. He appeared to me to be the man -who would pave the way into the future for our generation. I believed -that through him there could be offered to this younger generation the -prospect of work, of happiness. And in him I saw the man who would -liberate us from the shackles of Versailles. I am convinced that without -Versailles the rise to power of Hitler would never have happened. That -dictate led to dictatorship. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, when did you then become a member of the Party? - -VON SCHIRACH: I became a member of the Party in 1925. I joined the SA at -the same time, with all my comrades. - -DR. SAUTER: You were 18 at the time? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Why did you join the SA? - -VON SCHIRACH: The SA furnished the protection for the meetings, and we -simply continued in the SA, as part of the Party, the activities which -we had carried out before in our youth organization. - -DR. SAUTER: In 1926, Witness, that is when you were 19 years old, there -was a Party rally in Weimar? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, you talked to Hitler personally on that -occasion; is that correct? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I was to have talked personally to Hitler one year -earlier. On this occasion there was another meeting. He was making -speeches at various mass meetings in Weimar, and he came back to Weimar -again during the same year to speak before a smaller circle. Together -with Rudolf Hess he paid a visit to the home of my parents and on that -occasion he suggested that I should study in Munich. - -DR. SAUTER: Why? - -VON SCHIRACH: He thought I ought to know the Party at its very core and -thought I would become acquainted with the Party work in that way. But I -want to say here that at that time I did not have any intention at all -of becoming a politician. Nevertheless, I was very much interested, of -course, in getting acquainted with the Movement at the place where it -had been founded. - -DR. SAUTER: You went, then, to Munich, and studied there? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I then went to Munich. At first I did not concern -myself with the Party. I was occupied with Germanic studies, history, -and the history of art; I wrote and I came into contact with many people -in Munich who were not actually National Socialists but who belonged, I -should say, to the periphery of the National Socialist movement. At that -time I lived in the house of my friend, the publisher Bruckmann... - -DR. SAUTER: Then in 1929 you became the head of the Movement within the -universities. I think you were elected, not nominated, to that post? - -VON SCHIRACH: The situation at the beginning was this: I attended Party -meetings in Munich; in Bruckmann’s salon I met Hitler and Rosenberg and -many other men who later played an important role in Germany. And at the -university I joined the university group of the National Socialist -German Students League. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on. - -DR. SAUTER: Go on, Herr Von Schirach, you have just told us that you -joined this university group in Munich. Will you please continue? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and I also started to take an active part in this -group. I spoke there before my comrades, at first about my own work in -the literary field, and then I began to give lectures to the students -also about the National Socialist movement. I organized Hitler student -meetings among the students in Munich, and then I was elected a member -of the General Students Committee, the ASTA, and through this activity -among the students I came more and more into contact with the Party -leadership. In 1929, the man who was the then so-called Reich Leader of -the National Socialist Students Union retired, and the question arose of -who should be given the leadership of all the university groups. At that -time Rudolf Hess, on behalf of the Führer, questioned all university -groups of the National Socialist University Movement and the majority of -all these groups cast their vote for me to head the National Socialist -Students Union. This accounts for the curious fact that I am the only -Party leader who was elected into the Party leadership. That is -something which has otherwise never occurred in the history of the -Party. - -DR. SAUTER: You mean to say by that, that all the others were nominated, -and you alone were elected? - -VON SCHIRACH: I was elected, and then I was confirmed in office. - -DR. SAUTER: And if I am right, you were elected at the students’ meeting -at Graz in 1931. - -VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. That is wrong. I am now talking only -of the National Socialist University Movement; I will come back to this -point later. - -Now I was leader of the National Socialist University Movement, and I -reorganized this movement. I began my work as a speaker. In 1931 I -was... - -THE PRESIDENT: Surely it is sufficient that he became the leader. It -really does not matter very much to us whether he was elected or not. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I am making every effort all the time to -abbreviate this speech. But perhaps I may ask just one more question -with reference to this subject. - -Witness, then in 1931 you were, as far as I know, elected to the -presidency of the General Congress of Austrian and German Students, -comprising all parties, and elected, I think, unanimously. Is that -correct? - -VON SCHIRACH: It is not correct. - -DR. SAUTER: Then explain briefly, Herr Von Schirach. - -VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. At the meeting of the General German -Students Congress in 1931, at which all German students and all Austrian -students and Sudeten-German students were represented, one of my -collaborators whom I had suggested as leader was unanimously elected -head of the entire student group. This was a very important affair for -the youth and for the Party. Two years before the seizure of power the -entire academic youth had unanimously given their vote to a National -Socialist. After this students’ rally at Graz, I had with Hitler a... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a convenient time to adjourn. - -DR. SAUTER: Very well. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, before the recess we stopped at the fact that in -1929 you had been elected the leader of the academic youth. Two years -later, Hitler made you Reich Youth Leader. How did that appointment come -about? - -VON SCHIRACH: After the student meeting at Graz in 1931, the success of -which was very surprising to Hitler, I had a conference with him. In the -course of that meeting, Hitler mentioned a conversation we had had -previously. At that time he had asked me how it came about that the -National Socialist University Movement was developing so quickly, -whereas the other National Socialist organizations lagged behind in -their development. - -I told him at that time that one cannot lead youth organizations as an -appendix of a political party; youth has to be led by youth, and I -developed for him the idea of a youth state, that idea which had come to -me from experiencing the school community, the school state. And -thereupon in 1931 Hitler asked me whether I would like to assume the -leadership of the National Socialist Youth Organization. This included -youth cells, then the Hitler Youth and the National Socialist Students -Organization, which also was in existence at that time. Several men had -already tried their hand at the leadership of these organizations: the -former Oberstführer SA Leader Pfeffer, the Reichsleiter Buch, actually -without much result. - -I agreed and became then Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP, temporarily a -member of the staff of the Oberst SA Leader Röhm. In that position, as -Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP in the staff of Röhm, I had the rank of -an SA Gruppenführer and kept that rank also when, half a year later, I -became independent in my position. That explains also the fact that I am -an SA Obergruppenführer. I got that rank many years later, _honoris -causa_. However, I did not possess an SA uniform—even after 1933. - -DR. SAUTER: Then in 1931 you became Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: That, of course, was a Party office? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Then in 1932 you became Reichsleiter? At that time you were -25 years old. How did that come about? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have already said that I had expressed the opinion to -Hitler that youth could not be the appendix of another organization, but -youth had to be independent; it had to lead itself; it had to become -independent; and it was in fulfillment of a promise which Hitler had -already given me that, half a year later, I became an independent -Reichsleiter. - -DR. SAUTER: Independent Reichsleiter, so that you were subordinate -directly to the Party leader Hitler? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: With what material means was that youth organization created -at that time? - -VON SCHIRACH: With the means furnished by the young people themselves. - -DR. SAUTER: And how were those funds raised? By collections? - -VON SCHIRACH: The boys and girls paid membership fees. A part of these -membership fees was kept at the so-called district leadership offices, -which corresponded to the Gauleitung in the Party or to the SA -Gruppenführung in the SA. Another part went to the Reich Youth Leader. -The Hitler Youth financed its organization with its own means. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, I am interested in the following: Did the Hitler -Youth, which you created and which was given Hitler’s name, get its -importance only after the seizure of power and by the seizure of power -only, or what was the previous size of this youth organization which you -created? - -VON SCHIRACH: Before the seizure of power, in 1932 the Hitler Youth was -already the largest youth movement of Germany. I should like to add here -that the individual National Socialist youth organizations which I found -when I took over my office as Reich Youth Leader were merged by me into -one large unified youth movement. This youth movement was the strongest -youth movement of Germany, long before we came to power. - -On 2 October 1932, the Hitler Youth held a meeting at Potsdam. At that -meeting more than 100,000 youth from all over the Reich met without the -Party’s providing a single pfennig. The means were contributed by the -young people themselves. Solely from the number of the participants, it -can be seen that that was the largest youth movement. - -DR. SAUTER: That was, therefore, several months before the seizure of -power, and at that time already more than 100,000 participants were at -that rally at Potsdam? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution has made the accusation, Witness, that -later, after the seizure of power—I believe in February 1933—you took -over the Reich Committee of German Youth Organizations. Is that correct, -and against whom was that action directed? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. The Reich Committee of Youth -Organizations was practically no more than a statistical office which -was subordinate to the Reich Minister of the Interior. That office was -managed by a retired general, General Vogt, who later became one of my -ablest assistants. The taking over of that Reich Committee was a -revolutionary act, a measure which youth carried out for youth, for from -that day on dates the realization of the idea of the Youth State within -the State. I cannot say any more about that. - -DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution further accuses you, Witness, of having -dissolved the so-called “Grossdeutscher Bund” in 1933, that is, after -the seizure of power. What was the Grossdeutscher Bund, and why did you -dissolve it? - -VON SCHIRACH: The Grossdeutscher Bund was a youth organization, or -rather a union of youth organizations, with pan-German tendencies. - -I am surprised, therefore, that the Prosecution has made the dissolution -of that organization an accusation at all. - -DR. SAUTER: Many members of this Grossdeutscher Bund were National -Socialists. There was no very essential difference between some of the -youth groups associated in that organization and the Hitler Youth. Is -that correct? - -VON SCHIRACH: I wanted youth to be united, and the Grossdeutscher Bund -wanted to continue a certain separate existence. I objected to that, and -there was agitated public controversy between Admiral Von Trotha, the -leader of the Grossdeutscher Bund and me, and in the end the -Grossdeutscher Bund was incorporated into our youth organization. I do -not recall exactly whether I banned the organization formally; I know -only that the members came to me, and that between Admiral Von Trotha -and me a discussion took place, a reconciliation. Admiral Von Trotha -until his death was one of the warmest sponsors of my work. - -DR. SAUTER: How did the suppression of the Marxist youth organization -come about? - -VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the suppression of the Marxist youth -organizations, if I remember correctly, came about in connection with -the suppression of trade unions. I have no exact documents any more -regarding that. But at any rate, from the legal point of view, I was not -authorized in 1933 to order a suppression of that kind. The Minister of -the Interior would have had to do that. I had the right to ban youth -organizations, _de jure_, only after 1 December 1936. That the Marxist -youth organizations had to disappear was a foregone conclusion for me, -and in speaking about this suppression order as such, I can only say -that the German working youth found the realization of its socialistic -ideas, not under the Marxist governments of the Weimar Republic, but in -the community of the Hitler Youth. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, at first you were Reich Führer of the NSDAP; that -was a Party office. And after the seizure of power, you became Youth -Leader of the German Reich; that was a State office. On the basis of -this State or national office, did you also have jurisdiction over and -responsibility for the school system, for the elementary schools, for -instance? - -VON SCHIRACH: For the school system in Germany the Reich Minister for -Science, Education, and Culture was the only authority. My field was -education outside the schools, along with the home and the school, as it -says in the law of 1 December 1936. However, I had some schools of my -own, the so-called Adolf Hitler Schools, which were not under national -supervision. They were creations of a later period. And during the war, -through the Child Evacuation Program that is, the organization by which -we took care of evacuating the young people from the big cities -endangered by bombing—I was in charge of education within the camps -where these children were housed. But on the whole I have to answer the -question about competence for the school system in Germany in the -negative. - -DR. SAUTER: This youth which you had to educate outside of the schools -was called the Hitler Youth, the HJ. - -Was membership in the Hitler Youth compulsory or voluntary? - -VON SCHIRACH: The membership in the Hitler Youth was voluntary until -1936. In 1936 the law already mentioned concerning the HJ was issued -which made all the German youth members of the HJ. The stipulations for -the carrying out of that law, however, were issued only in March 1939, -and only during the war, in May 1940, was the thought of carrying out a -German youth draft considered within the Reich Youth Leadership and -discussed publicly. May I point out that my Deputy Lauterbacher, at the -time when I was at the front, stated in a public meeting—I believe at -Frankfurt in 1940—that now, after 97 percent of the youngest age group -of youth had volunteered for the Hitler Youth, it would be necessary to -draft the remaining 3 percent by a youth draft. - -DR. SAUTER: In this connection, Mr. President, may I refer to two -documents of the document book Schirach. That is Number Schirach-51. - -THE PRESIDENT: I did not quite understand what the defendant said. He -said that the membership was voluntary until 1936, that the HJ Law was -then passed, and something to the effect that the execution of the law -was not published until 1939. Was that what he said? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, that is correct. Until 1936—if I may explain that, Mr. -President—membership in the Hitler Youth was absolutely voluntary. Then -in 1936 the HJ Law was issued, which provided that boys and girls had to -belong to the Hitler Youth. But the stipulations for its execution were -issued by the defendant only in 1939 so that, in practice, until 1939 -the membership was nevertheless on a voluntary basis. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that right, Defendant? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is right. - -DR. SAUTER: And these facts which I have just presented, Mr. President, -can also be seen from two documents of the document book Schirach, -Number Schirach-51, on Page 91, and Number Schirach-52 on Page 92. In -the latter document... - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Sauter, I accept it from you and from the -defendant. I only wanted to understand it. You can go on. - -DR. SAUTER: And in the second document mention is also made of the 97 -percent which the defendant has said had voluntarily joined the HJ, so -that now there were only 3 percent missing. May I continue: - -[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, what was the attitude of the -parents of the children on the question of whether the children should -join the HJ or not? What did the parents say? - -VON SCHIRACH: There were, of course, parents who did not like to have -their children join the HJ. Whenever I made one of my radio speeches to -the parents or to the youth, many hundreds of parents sent me letters. -Among these letters, there were many in which the parents voiced their -objections to the HJ, or expressed their dislike for it. I always -considered that a special proof of the confidence which the parents had -in me. I should like to say here that never, when parents restrained -their children from joining, have I exerted any compulsion or put them -under pressure of any kind. In doing that I would have lost all the -confidence placed in me by the parents of Germany. That confidence was -the basis of my entire educational work. - -I believe that on this occasion I have to say also that the concept that -any youth organization can be established and carried on, and -successfully carried on, by coercing youth, is absolutely false. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, did youngsters who did not join the Hitler Youth -suffer any disadvantage for that reason? - -VON SCHIRACH: Youngsters who did not join the Hitler Youth were at a -disadvantage in that they could not take part in our camping, in our -trips, in our sporting meets. They were in a certain sense outsiders of -the youth life, and there was a danger that they might become -hypochondriacs. - -DR. SAUTER: But were there not certain professions in which membership -in the HJ was a prerequisite for working in those professions? - -VON SCHIRACH: Of course. - -DR. SAUTER: What were the professions? - -VON SCHIRACH: For instance, the profession of teacher. It is quite clear -that a teacher cannot educate youth unless he himself knows the life of -that youth, and so we demanded that the young teachers, that is those in -training to teach, had to go through the HJ. The junior teacher had to -be familiar with the ways of life of the pupils who were under his -supervision. - -DR. SAUTER: But there were only a few such professions, whereas for -other professions membership in the HJ was not a prerequisite for -admission. Or what was the situation? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that in detail. I believe that a -discussion about that is not even possible, because the entire youth was -in the Hitler Youth. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you know that the Prosecution has also accused the -defendants of having advocated the Führer Principle. Therefore, I ask -you: - -Was the Führer Principle also valid in the HJ, and in what form was it -carried out in the HJ? I should like to remind you that I mean that kind -of Führer Principle of which we have heard in the testimony. - -VON SCHIRACH: Of course, the HJ was built up on the Führer Principle; -only the entire form of leadership of youth differed basically from that -of other National Socialist organizations. For instance, we had the -custom in youth leadership of discussing frankly all questions of -interest to us. There were lively debates at our district leader -meetings. I myself educated my assistants even in a spirit of -contradiction. Of course, once we had debated a measure and I had then -given an order or a directive, that ended the debate. The youth -leaders—that is the young boy and girl leaders—through years of -working together and in serving the common purpose, had become a unity -of many thousands. They had become friends. It is evident that in a -group of that kind the carrying out of orders and directives takes place -in ways entirely different from those in a military organization or in -any other political organization. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness... - -VON SCHIRACH: May I add something? - -Leadership based on natural authority such as we had in the youth -organization is something which is not alien to youth at all. Such -leadership in the youth organization never degenerated into -dictatorship. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have been accused of training the youth in a -military way, and in that connection, the fact has been pointed out that -your HJ wore a uniform. Is that correct, and why did the HJ wear a -uniform? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have stated my opinion about that in many instances. I -believe there are also documents to illustrate it. I have always -described the uniform of the HJ as the dress of comradeship. The uniform -was the symbol of a community without class distinctions. The worker’s -boy wore the same garb as the son of the university professor. The girl -from the wealthy family wore the same garb as the child of the day -laborer. Hence the uniform. This uniform did not have any military -significance whatsoever. - -DR. SAUTER: In that connection, Mr. President, may I ask you to take -judicial notice of Document Number Schirach-55 of the document book -Schirach, then of Numbers Schirach-55a and 117, where the Defendant Von -Schirach, many years ago, expressed in writing and repeatedly the same -trends of thought which he is expressing today. - -I should only like to ask, Mr. President, for permission to correct an -error in Document 55, on Page 98. Rather far down, under the heading -“Page 77,” is a quotation from a book by Schirach. There it says: - - “Even the son of the millionaire has no other power...” - -I do not know whether you have found the passage. It is on Page 77 of -the book quoted, and Page 98 of the document book, Number Schirach-55. -There is a quotation near the bottom of the page: - -“Even the son of the millionaire has no other power...” It should read -“dress,” not “power.” The German word “Macht”, is an error, and should -be the word “Tracht.” - -So I ask now to have the word “Macht” (power), changed to the word -“Tracht” (dress). - -Witness, I shall then continue with the interrogation. You have been -accused of having prepared youth for the war, psychologically and -pedagogically. You are alleged to have participated in a conspiracy for -that purpose, a conspiracy by which the National Socialist movement -acquired total power in Germany, and finally planned and carried out -aggressive wars. What can you say about that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I did not participate in any conspiracy. I cannot consider -it participation in a conspiracy if I joined the National Socialist -Party. The program of that party had been approved; it had been -published. The Party was authorized to take part in elections. Hitler -had not said—neither he nor any of his collaborators—“I want to assume -power by a _coup d’état_.” Again and again he stated in public, not only -once but a hundred times: “I want to overcome this parliamentary system -by legal means, because it is leading us, year by year, deeper into -misery.” And I myself as the youngest deputy of the Reichstag of the -Republic told my 60,000 constituents similar things in electoral -campaigns. - -There was nothing there which could prove the fact of a conspiracy, -nothing which was discussed behind closed doors. What we wanted we -acknowledged frankly before the nation, and so far as printed paper is -read around the globe, everyone abroad could have been informed also -about our aims and purposes. - -As far as preparation for war is concerned, I must state that I did not -take part in any conferences or issuing of orders which would indicate -preparation for an aggressive war. I believe that can be seen from the -proceedings in this Court up to now. - -I can state only that I did not participate in a conspiracy. I do not -believe either that there was a conspiracy; the thought of conspiracy is -in contradiction to the idea of dictatorship. A dictatorship does not -conspire; a dictatorship commands. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, what did the leadership of the Hitler Youth do to -prepare the youth for war and to train it for warlike purposes? - -VON SCHIRACH: Before I answer that question, I believe I will have to -explain briefly the difference between military and premilitary -training. - -Military training, in my opinion, is all training with weapons of -war, and all training which is conducted by military personnel, -that is, by officers, with and without weapons of war. Premilitary -education—premilitary training is, in the widest sense, all training -which comes before the time of military service; in particular cases it -is a special preparation for military service. We, in the Hitler Youth, -were opponents of any military drills for youth. We disliked such drills -as not youthful. I am not giving my personal opinion here, but the -opinion of thousands of my co-workers. - -It is a fact that I rejected the Wehrjugend (the Youth Defense Groups), -which had formerly existed in Germany, and did not allow any -continuation of Wehrjugend work within the HJ. I had always been -strongly opposed to any soldier-playing in a youth organization. With -all my high esteem for the profession of an officer, I still do not -consider an officer capable of leading youth because in some way or -other, he will always apply the tone of the drill field and the forms of -military leadership to youth. - -That is the reason why I did not have any officers as my assistants in -the Hitler Youth. Just on account of my refusal to use officers as youth -leaders, I was severely criticized by the Wehrmacht on occasion. I -should like to stress that that did not come from the OKW; Field Martial -Keitel, especially, had a great deal of understanding for my ideas. -However, in the Wehrmacht, now and again, criticism was heard on account -of the general attitude of opposition of the Youth Leadership corps -toward having officers used as leaders of a youth organization. The -principle of “youth leading youth” was never broken in Germany. - -If I am now to answer definitively the question of whether the youth was -prepared for the war and whether it was trained in a military sense, I -shall have to say, in conclusion, that the main efforts of all youth -work in Germany culminated in trade competition, in the trade schools, -in camping, and competition in sports. Physical training, which perhaps -in some way could be considered a preparation for military service, took -only a very small part of our time. - -I should like to give as an example here: A Gebiet, or district, of the -Hitler Youth, for instance the Gebiet of Hessen-Nassau which is about -the same as a Gau in the Party, contributed from its funds in 1939 as -follows: For hikes and camping, 9/20; for cultural work, 3/20; for -sports and physical training, 3/20; for the Land Service (Landdienst), -and other tasks and for the offices, 5/20. - -The same area spent, in 1944—that is, 1 year before the end of the -war—for cultural work, 4/20; for sports and defense training, 5/20; for -Landdienst and other tasks, 6/20; and for the evacuation of children to -the country, 5/20. - -In that connection I should like to mention briefly that the same area, -in the time from 1936 until 1943, made no expenditures for -racial-political education; in 1944 there was an entry of 20 marks under -the heading of racial-political education for the acquisition of a -picture book about hereditary and venereal diseases. However, in that -same district, in one single town, during the same time, 200,000 marks -were given to have youth visit the theaters. - -The question concerning premilitary or military education cannot be -answered by me without describing small-caliber shooting practice. -Small-caliber firing was a sport among the German youth. It was -practiced on the lines laid down in the international rules for sport -shooting. Small-caliber shooting, according to Article 177 of the Treaty -of Versailles, was not prohibited. It states expressly in that article -of the treaty that rifle clubs, sporting, and hiking organizations are -forbidden to train their members in the handling and use of war weapons. -The small-caliber rifle, however, is not a war weapon. For our sport -shooting we used a rifle similar to the American 22-caliber. It was used -with the 22-caliber Flobert cartridge for short or long distance. - -I should like to say here that our entire marksmanship training and -other so-called premilitary training have been collected in a manual -entitled “HJ Service.” That book was printed and sold not only in -Germany but was also available abroad. - -The British Board of Education in 1938 passed judgment on that book, in -the educational pamphlet, Number 109. With the permission of the -Tribunal, I should like to quote briefly what was said about it in this -educational pamphlet. I quote in English: - - “It cannot fairly be said to be in essence a more militaristic - work than any thoroughgoing, exhaustive, and comprehensive - manual of Boy Scout training would be. Some forty pages are, to - be sure, devoted to the theory and practice of shooting - small-bore rifle and air gun, but there is nothing in them to - which exception can reasonably be taken, and the worst that one - can say of them is that they may be confidently recommended to - the notice of any Boy Scout wishing to qualify for his - marksmanship badge.” - -As to the mental attitude of the Hitler Youth, I can only say that it -was definitely not militaristic. - -DR. SAUTER: We will perhaps come back to that later with another -question. You say the Hitler Youth had been trained with Flobert rifles, -or small-caliber rifles, as they are also called. Was the Hitler Youth -also trained with infantry rifles, or even machine guns or machine -pistols? - -VON SCHIRACH: Certainly not. - -DR. SAUTER: Not at all? - -VON SCHIRACH: Not a single German boy, until the war, had been trained -with a war weapon, a military weapon, be it an infantry rifle, machine -gun, or infantry gun; nor with hand grenades in any form. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in the document book Schirach are several -documents which will show that the attitude of the Defendant Von -Schirach concerning the question of military or premilitary education of -the Hitler Youth was exactly the same as he has stated it today, -particularly, that he expressed himself against any military drill, -barracks language, and all such things. - -These are mainly documents in the document book Schirach: 55, then 122, -123, 127, 127a, 128, and 131. I ask you to take judicial notice of these -documents. They contain, on the whole, the same statements which Herr -Schirach has made briefly already. - -Herr Von Schirach, in connection with the so-called military training of -the youth, I should like to know what influence the SA had on the -training of youth? - -VON SCHIRACH: None at all. The SA tried to have an influence on the -education and training of youth. - -DR. SAUTER: In what way? - -VON SCHIRACH: It was in January of 1939. At that time I was in Dresden, -where I arranged a performance which presented modern gymnastics for -girls. I still remember it distinctly. While I was there, a newspaper -was shown to me which carried a decree by Hitler, according to which the -two oldest age groups of the Hitler Youth were to receive premilitary -training from the SA. I protested against that at once and after my -return to Berlin I succeeded not in having the decree withdrawn for that -could not be done for reasons of prestige since Hitler’s name was on -it—but invalidated as far as the youth were concerned. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, that incident is contained in a document in -the document book Schirach, Number Schirach-132. That is a statement -from _Das Archiv_, a semiofficial news periodical. I should like to -refer to that as evidence; and in regard to the question of training in -shooting I should like to ask the defendant one more question. - -What part of the entire training did the shooting practice have in the -HJ? Was it a very essential part or the essential part? - -VON SCHIRACH: Unfortunately, I do not have the documentary material here -which would enable me to answer that exactly. But at any rate, it was -not an essential part of the training in the HJ. - -DR. SAUTER: Did that marksmanship training go any further, according to -your experiences and observations, than the marksmanship training of -youth in other nations? - -VON SCHIRACH: The marksmanship training of youth in other nations went -much further, much beyond that which we had in Germany. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you know that from your own observation? - -VON SCHIRACH: I know that from many of my assistants who constantly made -a detailed study of the training in other countries, and I know about it -from my own observation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you think that is relevant, the fact that other -nations trained in marksmanship? I am not sure it is true either, but -anyhow, it is not relevant. - -DR. SAUTER: Then I come to another question, Witness. The Prosecution -have asserted and I quote: - - “...that thousands of boys were trained militarily by the HJ in - the work of the Navy, of the naval aviation and of the armored - troops, and that over seven thousand teachers trained over a - million Hitler Youth in rifle marksmanship.” - -That is the citation of the Prosecution referring to some meeting of the -year 1938. I should like to have you state your position with regard to -the question here, the question of the special units of the Hitler -Youth. - -VON SCHIRACH: The Prosecution refers, if I am not mistaken, to a speech -which Hitler made. How Hitler arrived at the figures concerning -training, I cannot say. Concerning training in the special units I can -only say, and prove with documents, the following: - -In the year 1938 the motorized Hitler Youth—that is that special unit -of our youth organization which the Prosecution think received -preliminary training in the tank branch—in 1938 the motorized Hitler -Youth had 328 vehicles of their own. - -DR. SAUTER: In all Germany? - -VON SCHIRACH: In all Germany. There were 3,270 private cars of their -family members which, of course, were at their disposal for their work; -and 2,000 cars of the NSKK (National Socialist Motor Corps). In the year -1938 21,000 youth got their driving licenses. I believe, but I cannot be -sure about it, that that is twice the number of youngsters that received -a driving license in 1937—that is, the driving license for a passenger -car. These figures alone show that the motorized Hitler Youth did not -receive preliminary training for our armored forces. The motorized -Hitler Youth had motorcycles; they made cross-country trips. That is -correct. What they learned in this way was, of course, useful for the -Army too, when these boys later were drafted into the motorized units; -but it was not true that the boy who had been in the motorized Hitler -Youth went to the Army. There was no compulsion in that respect at all. -The motorized Hitler Youth was not created upon the request of the -Wehrmacht, but it was already created in the fighting years—long before -the seizure of power, simply from the natural desire of the boys who -owned a motorcycle and wanted to drive it. So we formed our motorized -HJ; we used these boys as messengers between tent camps and we used them -as drivers for our minor leaders, and later, in order to give them a -regular training, especially knowledge of motors, of engines, we made an -arrangement with the NSKK, which had motor schools and could train the -boys. - -Other units were created in the same way. The Flieger HJ, for example, -never had any airplanes. We had only gliders. The entire Hitler Youth -had but one airplane and that was my own, a small Klemm machine. Aside -from that, the Hitler Youth had only model airplanes and gliders. The -Hitler Youth not only taught their own members the use of gliders in the -Rhön Hills and elsewhere, but also thousands of youth from England and -other countries. We had glider camps where young Englishmen were our -guests and we even had camps in England. - -DR. SAUTER: The Navy HJ, did they perhaps have warships? - -VON SCHIRACH: The Navy HJ, of course, had not a single warship, but from -time to time our former Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder, kindly -gave us an old cutter and with that we put to sea. - -The boys, for instance, who lived in a city like Berlin, near the -Wannsee, and did some rowing, became members of the Navy HJ. When -entering the Wehrmacht they did not, just because they had been in the -Navy HJ, go into the Navy, but just as many went afterwards into the -Army or the Air Force, and it was the same with other special units. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you say therefore that in your opinion the Hitler -Youth was not educated in a military way for the war? - -VON SCHIRACH: I should like to be quite precise about that. The training -in these special units was carried out in such a manner that it really -had a premilitary value. That is to say that whatever the boy learned in -the Navy Hitler Jugend, regardless of whether he wanted to use it only -as a sportsman later, or whether he actually went into the Navy, the -basic principles were valuable as premilitary education. If one -considers these special units of the HJ, one can establish that here a -premilitary education actually took place, but not a military training. -The youth were not prepared for the war in any place in the HJ; they -were not even prepared for the military service, because the youth did -not go direct from the Hitler Youth into the Army. From the Hitler Youth -they went into the Labor Service. - -DR. SAUTER: And how long were they in the Labor Service? - -VON SCHIRACH: Half a year. - -DR. SAUTER: And only then did they get to the Wehrmacht? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: In that connection, however, the Prosecution has used an -agreement which was made between the HJ leadership and the OKW in August -1939, and which has been submitted as Document 2398-PS by the -Prosecution. What are the facts about that agreement between you and the -OKW? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember any details. Between Field Marshal -Keitel and myself, according to my recollection, there was no discussion -concerning that agreement, but I believe we arranged that by -correspondence. And I should just like to state that during the entire -time from 1933 to 1945, only one or two conversations of about half an -hour took place between Field Marshal Keitel and me. The agreement, -however, resulted from the following considerations: We endeavored in -the Hitler Youth, and it was also the endeavor of the leading men in the -Wehrmacht, to take nothing into our training which belonged to the later -military training. However, in the course of time, the objection was -raised on the part of the military, that youth should not learn anything -in its training which later would have to be corrected in the Wehrmacht. -I am thinking, for instance, of the compass. The Army used the infantry -compass; the Hitler Youth, in cross-country sports, used compasses of -various kinds. It was, of course, quite senseless that youth leaders -should train their boys, for instance, to march according to the Bèzar -compass if later, in their training as recruits, the boys had to learn -something different. The designation and the description of the terrain -should also be given according to the same principles in the Hitler -Youth as in the Army, and so this agreement was made by which, I -believe, thirty or sixty thousand HJ leaders were trained in -cross-country sports. In these cross-country sports no training with war -weapons was practiced. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, now I come to another chapter. It may be that -this is the best time to adjourn. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -[_The Defendant Von Schirach resumed the stand._] - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, before the adjournment we spoke about the question -of the military or premilitary education of the youth. And now I come to -a similar chapter; that is the question of whether you, as Youth Leader, -in your articles, speeches, and orders did in any way attempt to -influence young people psychologically towards an aggressive war in -order to make them war-minded by such means. - -VON SCHIRACH: No, never in my speeches to German youth, or in anything -which I laid down for youth in the way of orders and directives, did I -prepare German youth for war; nor have I ever, even in the smallest -circle of my collaborators, expressed myself in such terms. All my -speeches are contained in the collection _Das Archiv_, at least their -essential contents. A considerable part of my speeches is collected also -in a book _Revolution der Erziehung_ (_The Revolution in Education_), -which has been submitted to the Tribunal. - -All this evidence shows that I never spoke to the youth of the country -in that sense; it would have been in direct contradiction to all my aims -of co-operation with the youth of other nations. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, perhaps I may draw your attention in this -connection to the document which is in the Schirach document book under -Number Schirach-125, I repeat 125—and also 126, where Schirach -expresses his opinion about the question of preserving peace and -rejecting war. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these -documents as evidence. - -Witness, you have just spoken of co-operation between your Reich Youth -Leadership Office and the German Hitler Youth with the youth of other -nations. Could you give us a more detailed statement on that, in -particular which youth associations of other nations you co-operated -with, which you attempted to approach, and in which way and to what -degree? - -VON SCHIRACH: Starting in 1933, and in an increasing degree year by -year, I made efforts to bring about exchange camps with youth -organizations in other countries. Here in Germany these groups of -English youth, French youth, Belgian youth, and the youth of many other -countries, particularly, of course, from Italy, often came as our -guests. I remember that in one year alone, I think in 1936, there were -approximately 200,000 foreign youths who stayed overnight in our youth -hostels. - -Perhaps it is important in this connection to say that the youth hostel -system, which I took over in 1933, was developed by me and finally -formed a part of an international youth hostel system, the president of -which was sometimes a German, sometimes an Englishman. An international -youth hostel agreement made it possible that youngsters of our nations -could stay overnight in youth hostels of the guest nations. - -I myself took great pains to bring about an understanding with the youth -of France. I must say that this was a pet idea of mine. I think that my -former assistants will remember just how intensely I worked towards the -realization of that idea. I had my leaders’ periodical appear in the -French language; I do not know whether more than once, but certainly at -least once, so that the understanding between the French and the German -youth could be strengthened thereby. - -I went to Paris and I invited the children of one thousand veterans of -the first World War to come to Germany. I very often had young French -guests as visitors in Germany. But over and above this understanding -with France, which eventually also led to difficulties between the -Führer and myself, I co-operated with many, many other organizations. - -Perhaps I may add that German-French co-operation, as far as youth was -concerned, was supported particularly by Ambassador Poncet in Berlin, -Premier Chautemps, and other French personalities who wrote in my -leadership periodical on that particular subject. I exchanged views with -youth leaders all over the world, and I myself undertook long journeys -to visit youth organizations in other countries and establish contact -with them. The war terminated that work. I do not want to omit -mentioning here that for one whole year I put the entire youth program -under the slogan “Understanding,” and that in all my speeches before the -youth I tried to direct and educate it toward a better understanding of -other nations. - -DR. SAUTER: Is it true that, for instance, even during the last years -before the war, I think even in the winter of 1937-1938 and again -1938-1939, you received large delegations of English youth in skiing -camps of the Hitler Youth and that vice versa also during those years -considerable delegations of Hitler Youth leaders and Hitler Youth -members were sent to England so that the people could get to know and -understand each other? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is correct. There were innumerable encampments -of foreign youth in Germany and very many camps of German youth abroad, -and I myself often visited such camps or received delegations from them. - -I would like to add that as late as 1942 I made an attempt to co-operate -with the youth of France. At that time the difficulty lay in Mussolini’s -attitude. I went to Rome and, through Count Ciano’s intervention, had a -long conversation with Mussolini and succeeded in having him withdraw -his objections to having our youth invite all French groups to come to -Germany. - -Unfortunately, when I reported this result to our Foreign Minister, -Hitler turned it down. At any rate, that is what Herr Von Ribbentrop -said. - -DR. SAUTER: From an article in the paper _Das Archiv_ of 1938 I gather, -for instance, that during that year you invited among others, 1,000 -children of French war veterans to come into the Hitler Youth camps in -Germany and into the German-French youth skiing camps. Is that correct? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have already told you that. - -DR. SAUTER: Another article shows me that, for instance, I believe in -1939, you had a special memorial erected, I think in the Black Forest, -when some members of an English youth delegation were accidentally -killed there during games. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the defendant had mentioned earlier that near -Berlin he erected a special house for these purposes under the name “The -Foreign House of the Hitler Youth.” May I present to the Tribunal in the -original, pictures of this “Foreign House,” as Document Number -Schirach-120; and may I ask the Tribunal to look at these pictures, -because in them... - -THE PRESIDENT: We are quite prepared to take it from you without looking -at the house. The particular style of architecture will not affect us. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, but if you will not look at the pictures, then you will -not know how the house was furnished; and you will not see that in the -house, for instance, there was not a single swastika, not a single -picture of Hitler, or any such things. That, again shows considerations -for the views of the foreign guests. - -In this connection, Mr. President, may I also ask you to take judicial -notice of a number of documents, all of which refer to the efforts of -the Defendant Von Schirach to bring about an understanding between -German youth and the youth of other nations. These are the documents in -Schirach’s document book which have the Numbers Schirach-99 up to and -including Schirach-107, then Documents Schirach-108 through 113, and -also Documents Schirach-114 up to and including 116, and then Documents -Schirach-117, 119, and 120. All these documents refer to the same -subject. - -Witness, when you invited such delegations from foreign youth -organizations to Germany, was anything concerning German institutions -and organizations, particularly with reference to the Hitler Youth, ever -kept secret from these delegations, or how was that? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, as a matter of principle, foreign youth leaders who -wished to get to know our institutions were shown everything without any -reservations whatever. There was, in fact, no institution of German -youth in the past which was not shown to our foreign guests. Also the -so-called premilitary education was demonstrated to them in every -detail. - -DR. SAUTER: And then in 1939 the second World War broke out. During the -last months before that happened, did you seriously expect a war; or -with what did you occupy yourself at the time? - -VON SCHIRACH: I was firmly convinced that Hitler would not allow a war -to break out. It was my opinion that he was in no way deceived about the -fact that the Western Powers were firmly resolved to be serious. Until -the day when war broke out, I firmly believed that the war could be -avoided. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you discuss with military leaders or political -personalities at that time the danger of war and the prospects of -maintaining the peace? - -VON SCHIRACH: No; in fact, I want to say something here and now about my -discussions with military personalities. - -I have already stated that over a period of 12 years—that is from 1933 -to 1944 or 1945; that is, 13 years—I had perhaps one or possibly two -half-hour conversations with Field Marshal Keitel. I remember that one -of them dealt entirely with a personal matter. - -During the same period I had, I think, only one single discussion with -Admiral Raeder, and Admiral Dönitz I met for the first time here in -Nuremberg. - -I never had any official discussions with Generaloberst Jodl at all, and -I talked to the late Field Marshal Von Blomberg, if I remember rightly, -possibly twice for half an hour. I had no official discussions at all -with the former Supreme Commander of the Army, Von Fritsch. I was his -guest on one occasion only, when he was running skiing competitions for -the army, and he kindly invited me because he knew that I was interested -in skiing. - -With his successor, Von Brauchitsch, I had a general chat on questions -of education when I talked before the youth of Königsberg in 1933. -Later, I believe, I visited him once on official business; and we -discussed a question which was of no particular importance for the -education of youth. It was some technical matter. - -These are the discussions which I have had with military personalities. -In fact, altogether I must say that I did not have time for conferences. -I led an organization comprising 8 million people; and my duties in that -organization were such that I did not possibly have the time to -participate in conferences and discussions in Berlin regarding the -situation, even if I had been admitted to them, which was not the case. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, from 1932 you were a Reichsleiter. That means that -you belonged to the highest level of leaders in the Party. Were you not, -in that capacity as Reichsleiter, informed by Hitler, his deputy, or -other political personalities about the political situation? - -VON SCHIRACH: I think that Hitler invited the Reichs- and Gauleiter, on -an average, twice a year to a conference, during which he -retrospectively discussed political events. Never at any time did Hitler -discuss before these men operations of the future, whether of a -political or military nature. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, if I understand your answer correctly, you were always -surprised by these foreign developments. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Does the same apply to the question of the Austrian -Anschluss? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I heard of the Anschluss of Austria, which of course -I hailed enthusiastically, through the radio, if I remember rightly, -during a trip by car from my Academy at Brunswick to Berlin. I continued -my journey to Berlin, boarded a train at once, and arrived the following -morning in Vienna. There I greeted the young people: youth leaders, some -of whom had been in prisons or in a concentration camp at Wöllersdorf -for a long time, and also many women youth leaders, who had also -experienced great hardships. - -DR. SAUTER: And what about the march into Czechoslovakia? - -VON SCHIRACH: Like every other German citizen, I heard of that through -the radio, and did not learn any more than any other citizen learned -from the radio. - -DR. SAUTER: Were you, in any capacity, a participant in the negotiations -regarding the Munich Pact with Chamberlain and Daladier in 1938? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -DR. SAUTER: And what was your opinion? - -VON SCHIRACH: I regarded that agreement as the basis for peace, and it -was my firm conviction that Hitler would keep that agreement. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you know anything about the negotiations with Poland in -1939? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I heard about the negotiations which led to the war, -only here in this courtroom. I was merely acquainted with that version -of the negotiations which was officially announced through the radio or -by the Ministry of Propaganda; and I know no more, therefore, than what -every other German citizen knows. The version which Hitler announced -before the Reichstag was considered by me to be absolutely true; and I -never doubted it, or at least I did not doubt it until about 1943, and -all I have heard about it here is new to me. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution, among other things, have made the -accusation against you that in your book, _Die Hitler-jugend—Idee und -Gestalt_ (_Hitler Youth—Idea and Form_)—which, Mr. President, is -Number 1458-PS—you used the expression “Lebensraum” (living space) and -“Ostraum” (eastern space) and that by doing so you welcomed or -considered as a necessity German conquests in the East, that is, at the -expense of Soviet Russia and Poland. - -What do you have to say about that? - -VON SCHIRACH: In this book of mine, _Die Hitler-jugend—Idee und -Gestalt_, the word “Lebensraum” (living space) is not used at all to my -knowledge. Only the word “Ostraum” (eastern space) is used, and I think -it is in connection with a press service in the East. In a footnote, in -connection with a description of the tasks of the Colonial Advisory -Board in the Reich Youth Leadership, there is a statement to the effect -that, as a result of the activities of this Colonial Advisory Board the -necessity of drawing the attention of youth to the exploitation of the -eastern territory—and by that is meant the thinly populated eastern -area of Germany—should not be overlooked. - -That was at a time when we in the youth organizations were particularly -concerned with the problem of the “flight from the land,” that is to -say, the migration of the second or third sons of farmers to the cities. -I formed a special movement of youth to combat that trend, the Rural -Service, which had the task of stopping this flow of youth from the -country to the towns and also of bringing home to youth in towns the -challenge of the country. - -Of course I never thought of a conquest of Russian territory because -ever since I occupied myself with history it was always my point of view -politically that the policy regarding mutual security with Russia, which -broke off with Bismarck’s dismissal, should be resumed. I considered the -attack against the Soviet Union as the suicide of the German nation. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, did you, as the Youth Leader of the German Reich, -have the right to report to Hitler directly? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is true; but this right to make reports was more -or less only on paper. To picture that precisely, before the seizure of -power I frequently reported to Hitler in person. In 1932 he quite often -announced his intention to dine with me in the evening, but it is clear -that in the presence of my wife and other guests political questions -were not discussed, particularly not the questions which fell into my -special sphere. Only now and then, perhaps, could I touch upon a subject -which interested me in connection with education. - -In 1933, as far as I can remember, I reported twice to him personally, -once regarding the financing of the youth movement, and the second time -in connection with the Party Rally of 1933. During the following years -my reports averaged one or two a year whereby I was treated in the same -way as most people who reported to Hitler. Of the 15 odd points on which -I wanted to report to him, I managed to deal with 3 or 4, and the others -had to be dropped because he interrupted me and very explicitly -elaborated on the things which interested him most. - -I then tried to help myself by taking along models of youth buildings, -views of the big stadiums and of youth hostels, which I had set up in a -hall in the Reich Chancellery, and when he looked at them I used the -opportunity to put two or three questions to him. - -I must state here—I think I owe it to German youth—that Hitler took -very little interest in educational questions. As far as education was -concerned, I received next to no suggestions from him. The only time -when he did make a real suggestion as far as athletic training was -concerned was in 1935, I believe, when he told me that I should see to -it that boxing should become more widespread among youth. I did so, but -he never attended a youth boxing match. My friend Von Tschammer-Osten, -the Reich Sports Leader, and I tried very often to persuade him to go to -other sporting events, particularly to skiing contests and ice hockey -championships in Garmisch, but apart from the Olympic Games, it was -impossible to get him to attend. - -DR. SAUTER: You have told us a little earlier about this so-called -military or premilitary education, stating that, as far as one could -talk about such education at all, it played only a minor part in the -training of the Hitler Youth. - -May I ask you to tell us, though not at length but only in condensed -phrases, what, in your mind, were the chief aims of your youth education -program. Be very brief. - -VON SCHIRACH: Tent encampments. - -DR. SAUTER: Tent encampments? - -VON SCHIRACH: Trips, construction of youth hostels and youth homes. - -DR. SAUTER: What do you mean by “trips”? - -VON SCHIRACH: Youth hikes, individually and in groups; also the -construction of more and more youth hostels. In one year alone, more -than 1,000 homes and youth hostels were built by me in Germany. Then -there was additional professional training, and then what I called the -“Labor Olympics,” namely, the annual Reich trade contests, voluntary -competition between all youth of both sexes who wanted to participate. -In fact millions participated. Then our great Reich sports contests, -championships in every type of sport, our cultural work, and the -development of our singing groups, our acting groups, youth concert -choirs, and the development of our youth libraries, and then something -which I mentioned in connection with combating the migration from the -country, the Rural Service with its rural help groups, those youths, who -for idealistic reasons were working in the country, even town boys—to -show the farmer boys that the country was really more beautiful than the -city, that even a city boy will give up his life in the city temporarily -to devote himself to the land and to tilling the soil. Then, as a great -communal accomplishment of youth, I must mention the dental improvement -and the regular medical examinations. - -These, in a few summary words, were the main tasks which our youth -organizations had, but they are by no means all. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, these ideas, these thoughts, and these aims -of the Defendant Von Schirach are contained in a number of documents -which are found in the Schirach document book, and which are extracts -from his works, speeches, and orders. I am referring to Schirach -document book, Numbers Schirach-32 through 39, 44 through 50, 66 through -74(a), 76 through 79, and, finally, 80 through 83. - -All these documents deal with the tasks which the Defendant Schirach has -just described to you, and I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of the details in these documents. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] There is only one point of that Hitler -Youth program, if I may call it that, with which I would like to deal, -because it has been particularly stressed against you in the Indictment. -That is your collaboration with the Lawyers’ League, that is to say, -your occupation with law. In that connection I would like to know why -you, the Reich Youth Leader, were interested in legal problems at all. -What were you striving for, and what did you achieve? Please, will you -tell us that briefly, because it has been emphasized in the Indictment. - -VON SCHIRACH: May I remind you that the youth of the state was regarded -by me as being a Youth State. In that Youth State all professions and -all tasks were represented. My collaboration with the Lawyers’ League -was due to the necessity of training legal advisers for our working -youth whom they could offer the necessary legal protection. I was -anxious that those Hitler Youth leaders who were studying law should -return to the organization to deal with just such tasks within the -organization. - -From this type of training a large organization developed within the -ranks of youth which was equivalent to the organization of doctors -within the youth organization; our medical organization comprised -approximately 1,000 doctors, men and women. These legal men assisted the -staff, in the districts and other units of our youth organization, -putting into practice those demands which I had first enunciated early -in our fighting days, before the seizure of power, and which I had -championed in the State later on, namely, the demand for free time and -paid vacations for the young worker. - -This legal work of our youth led to the founding of seminars for Youth -Law and Working Youth Law, _et cetera_, attached to the universities at -Kiel and Bonn. In particular it had the result that those demands which -I voiced in a speech in 1936, before the Committee for Juvenile Law of -the Academy for German Law, could be carried through. - -DR. SAUTER: Just one moment. - -[_Turning to the Tribunal._] This is the speech of which excerpts are -reproduced, in Schirach document book, Number Schirach-63. It is copied -from _Das Archiv_ of October 1936. - -Herr Von Schirach, perhaps you can tell us very briefly which social -demands you, as Reich Youth Leader, made regarding youth. You said -earlier, “free time.” What did you mean by that? - -VON SCHIRACH: In the first place, a shortening of working hours for -young people, the abolition of night work for young people, a -fundamental prohibition of child labor, extended weekends, and 3 weeks’ -paid vacation every year. - -In 1937 at Liegnitz I noticed that at that time 50 percent of the young -workers had no holidays at all and that only 1 percent had 15 to 18 days -per annum. In 1938, on the other hand, I had put through the Youth -Protection Law which prohibited child labor, raised the age of -protection for juveniles from 16 to 18 years, prohibited night work, and -realized my demand regarding the extended weekend, at the same time -stipulating at least 15 days’ vacation annually for youngsters. That was -all I could achieve. It was only part of what I wanted to achieve. - -DR. SAUTER: These are the demands which are contained in the following -documents in the document book: Schirach-40 to 41 and 60 to 64. I ask -the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these. - -Witness, I now come to another problem, and that is your position within -the Party. Some time ago we were shown a chart here giving a clear -picture of the organization of the Party. Was that plan correct, or what -was your position within the Party? - -VON SCHIRACH: My position in the Party was not correctly depicted in -that chart, at least not as far as the channels of command are -concerned. According to the chart which was exhibited here, the channel -of command would have been from the Reich Leader for Youth Education to -the Chief of the Party Chancellery, and from there to Hitler and from -Hitler to the Reich Youth Leadership Office of the Party. That, of -course, is an erroneous picture. - -I was not in the Party Directorate to give my orders via the Gauleiter -to the district leaders but as the representative and head of the youth -movement, so that if you want to describe my position and the position -of my organization in the framework of the NSDAP correctly, you would -actually have to draw a pyramid, the apex of which, that is to say my -position in the Party Directorate, would be above the Reichsleiter. I -was the only person in the youth movement who was connected with the -Party. - -DR. SAUTER: And the other leaders and subleaders of the youth movement? - -VON SCHIRACH: Some of them may have been Party members, but not all. At -any rate, they were not members of the Gauleitung or Kreisleitung. The -entire staff of the youth movement, the entire youth organization, stood -alongside the Party as a unit. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, as the Youth Leader of the German Reich, were you a -civil servant? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: And from 1 December 1936, I believe, you were the chief of a -high Reich office? - -VON SCHIRACH: I was a civil servant only from 1 December 1936. - -DR. SAUTER: With the title? - -VON SCHIRACH: Youth Leader of the German Reich. - -DR. SAUTER: As the chief of a high Reich office, were you actually -independent of the Minister of the Interior and the Minister for -Education? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that was, after all, the purpose of creating an -independent Reich office. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you thereby become a member of the Reich Cabinet, as has -been claimed? - -VON SCHIRACH: I am sure I did not. I heard here for the first time that -I was supposed to have been a member of the Cabinet. I never -participated in a Cabinet meeting. I never received a decree or anything -of the sort which would have made me a member of the Cabinet. I never -received invitations to attend Cabinet meetings. I never considered -myself a member of the Cabinet, and I believe that the Ministers did not -consider me a member either. - -DR. SAUTER: Were you in any way informed of the resolutions passed by -the Reich Cabinet, for instance, by having the minutes of the meetings -sent to you? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. Resolutions passed by the Reich Cabinet, insofar as -any were passed after 1 December 1936, only came to my attention in the -same way as they reached any other higher official or employee of the -Reich who read the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ or the _Reichsministerialblatt_. -Records and minutes: were never sent to me. - -DR. SAUTER: When you became a high Reich authority, did you receive the -staff which you needed through a ministry, or how did you obtain that -staff for yourself? - -VON SCHIRACH: A few youth leaders who had worked on my staff for a -number of years were made civil servants through me. I did not receive a -single official from any ministry to deal with matters relating to the -youth organization. The entire high Reich office, if I remember -correctly, consisted of no more than five officials. It was the smallest -of the high Reich offices, something I was particularly proud of. We -carried out a very large task with a minimum of personnel. - -DR. SAUTER: And now, Witness, I want to come to a subject which is going -to be rather extensive and that is the affidavit by Gregor Ziemer, which -you have already mentioned. It is a very lengthy affidavit which has -been presented by the Prosecution under Document Number 2441-PS. - -Witness, what do you have to say in detail with regard to that -affidavit? Do you know it? Do you know this man Gregor Ziemer? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Have you found out who he is and from where he gathered his -alleged knowledge? - -VON SCHIRACH: I gather from the affidavit that Herr Ziemer before the -war was headmaster of the American school in Berlin and that he has -written a book which apparently deals with youth and school education in -Germany. This affidavit is an extract from that book. - -The affidavit as such, if you regard it in its entirety, has, I believe, -more importance as propaganda than as an impartial judgment. - -I want to start by quoting something from the very first page, which is -the page containing Ziemer’s affidavit, and in the last paragraph it -says that street fights took place outside the American school between -the Jewish children going to this school and the local youngsters. I -need not deal with the difficulties which the school itself had, because -that was not part of my department. But these street fights took place -outside the school, and I think I ought to say something about them. I -never heard anything about these clashes, but I should have heard about -them under all circumstances, because during most of 1938 I was in -Berlin. I should have heard of them first through the youth organization -itself, because the senior youth leaders would have been obliged to -report to me if such incidents had taken place. - -Furthermore, I would have had to hear about it through the Foreign -Office, because if youngsters from the American colony had been -molested, protests would certainly have gone through the Embassy to the -Foreign Office, and these protests would without fail have been passed -on to me at once or reported to me by telephone. - -I can only imagine that the whole affair is a very gross exaggeration. -The American Ambassador Wilson even had breakfast with me—I think in -the spring of 1939, and I do not think I am wrong about the date—in -Gatow. - -DR. SAUTER: In the Foreign House? - -VON SCHIRACH: In the Foreign House. - -And we discussed a number of subjects privately. I believe that on that -occasion or afterwards he would most certainly have mentioned such -incidents if they had in reality occurred in the way Herr Ziemer -describes them. - -DR. SAUTER: I believe I can go over to Page 2, where... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, how much of this document has been read by -the Prosecution? As far as I know, very little. - -DR. SAUTER: I beg your pardon? - -THE PRESIDENT: How much of this affidavit has been read and put in -evidence by the Prosecution? - -DR. SAUTER: I cannot tell you that offhand, Mr. President. But judging -by practice, I must assume that if a document is submitted to the -Tribunal, judicial notice of the entire document is taken by the -Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not so. We have stated over and over again that -we take only judicial notice on documents which have been read to the -Tribunal, unless they are documents of which full translations have been -given. This document was, I suppose, presented in the course of the -Prosecution’s case, and probably one sentence out of it was read at the -time. I do not know how much was read; but you and the defendant ought -to know. - -MR. DODD: There was only one paragraph read, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: One paragraph? - -MR. DODD: One full paragraph and perhaps one short one on Page 21. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have it here. - -MR. DODD: I think the Prosecution covered the part having to do with the -speech at Heidelberg. - -THE PRESIDENT: And that is the only part of it that has been read, and -that is, therefore, the only part of it that is in evidence. - -VON SCHIRACH: Perhaps for the sake of credibility—and I shall not deal -in detail with the accusations contained in that affidavit—I might be -allowed to say, with one sole exception, all the annual slogans of the -Hitler Youth are reproduced falsely in this affidavit and that Gregor -Ziemer nevertheless swears to the correctness of his statement. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be the best, if you want to reply to his -affidavit, that you should direct the defendant’s attention to the part -which has been read? Then he can make an answer to that. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in Ziemer’s affidavit, which the defendant -has told me he regards as a clearly inflammatory piece of writing, the -annual slogans are mentioned which are supposed to have been issued by -the defendant, that is, the slogans for the work for the following year. - -THE PRESIDENT: One passage of this document has been put in. If you want -to put in the rest, you are entitled to do so. But I should have thought -that it would have been the best way for you to answer the passage which -has been put in. The rest of the affidavit is not in evidence. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in that case my client would get the worst -end of the bargain, because in other passages which have not been used -by the Prosecution... - -THE PRESIDENT: I said you could use the other passages if you want to. - -DR. SAUTER: Certainly, but I want to prove that Herr Ziemer’s statements -are not correct; that is why I have just been discussing the question of -annual slogans with the defendant. This is only one example. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the defendant is apparently saying that the -affidavit is unreliable because of the slogans which are referred to in -it. Is that not sufficient for your purpose? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes; but I intend to prove that Herr Ziemer’s statements are -untrue. The defendant maintains that the statements contained in that -affidavit are not true. But I am trying to prove to you that, in fact, -Herr Ziemer has deliberately stated and sworn to untruths. - -THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Sauter, there being one passage in this -affidavit which is in evidence, you can deal very shortly with the -question of the credit of the person who made the affidavit. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, this Herr Ziemer, in his affidavit, has made -statements regarding the annual slogans... - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: ...which you issued for the Hitler Youth. How these annual -slogans were worded can be easily seen by the Tribunal from the -affidavit. I now ask you to tell us how the annual slogans of the Hitler -Youth were worded during your time; that is, 1933 to 1940. - -VON SCHIRACH: Herr Ziemer mentions the slogan on Page 15 of the English -document. Herr Ziemer says that in 1933 the motto for German Youth had -been “One Reich, One Nation, One Führer.” He probably means “One People, -One Reich, One Führer.” Actually, the year 1933 was the year of “Unity.” - -DR. SAUTER: What do you mean by “Unity”? - -VON SCHIRACH: The year in which German youth joined ranks in one -organization. - -DR. SAUTER: I want to skip a few years now and come to the year 1938. -What was your slogan for the Hitler Youth in 1938? - -VON SCHIRACH: 1938 was the year of “Understanding.” - -DR. SAUTER: The year of “Understanding”? - -VON SCHIRACH: Herr Ziemer says the slogan was “Every Youth a Flyer.” - -DR. SAUTER: And then in 1939 what was your slogan? - -VON SCHIRACH: That was the year of “Duty Towards Health.” - -DR. SAUTER: The year of “Duty Towards Health”? - -VON SCHIRACH: According to Herr Ziemer, it was “Hitler Youth on the -March.” - -DR. SAUTER: And finally 1940, your last year? - -VON SCHIRACH: It was the year of “Instruction.” But he called it “We -March Against England.” - -But I want to add that the first slogan, “One People, One Reich, One -Führer,” which Ziemer says was the official slogan of the year 1933 for -German youth, arose first in 1938 when Hitler went into Austria. Before -that, that slogan did not exist at all. It was never the annual slogan -of German youth. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, we must comply with the wish of the Tribunal and -not go into the affidavit of Ziemer any further, with the exception of -the one point which has been used by the Prosecution in the Indictment -against you in connection with the accusation of anti-Semitism. I skip -Herr Ziemer’s further statements and come to this speech at Heidelberg. -Will you tell me first of all, what Ziemer said, and then make your own -comments on that. - -VON SCHIRACH: Ziemer said that during a meeting of students in -Heidelberg—I think either at the end of 1938 or the beginning of -1939—I had made a speech against the Jews in connection with a rally of -the National Socialist Student Union. He says that on that occasion I -praised the students for the destruction of the Heidelberg Synagogue, -and that following that I had the students file past me and gave them -decorations and certificates of promotion. - -First of all, I have already referred to my activity in the student -movement. Upon the request of the Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf Hess, I -handed the leadership of the student movement over to him in 1934. He -then appointed a Reich student leader; and after that I did not speak at -any student meetings. - -As far as I can remember, I visited Heidelberg during the summer of -1937; and there I spoke to the youth group. This was 1 or 1½ years -before Ziemer’s date. And on one occasion I attended a festival play at -Heidelberg. - -DR. SAUTER: All of this is irrelevant. - -VON SCHIRACH: I have no recollection of any meeting of this sort with -students, and I have no recollection of ever having publicly stated my -views about the Jewish pogrom of 1938. I will state at another point -what I said in my capacity as Youth Leader regarding this. - -Ziemer says—I am translating from the English text—he says that “the -day will come when the students of Heidelberg will take up their place -side by side with the legions of other students to win the world over to -the National Socialist ideology.” - -I have never spoken like that before youth, in public, or even in a -small circle. These are not my words; I did not say that. I had no -authority whatsoever to confer decorations or certificates, _et cetera_, -upon students. Medals of distinction for students did not exist. All -decorations were conferred by the head of the State. - -I personally had the right to confer the golden youth decoration, and I -think it was conferred by me about 230 times in all, almost entirely -upon people who earned distinction in the field of education, but not -upon unknown students. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the important point in your testimony is to tell us -whether it is correct that the speech made at the end of 1938 before the -students at Heidelberg, in which the speaker referred to the wreckage of -the synagogues, was not made by you, because at that time you had not -had anything to do with the student movement for years. Is that correct? - -VON SCHIRACH: I had nothing to do with the student movement, and I do -not remember having spoken before such a meeting. I consider it quite -out of the question that such a meeting of students took place at all. I -did not make those statements. - -DR. SAUTER: Have you got the affidavit before you? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I cannot find that particular passage at the moment. - -DR. SAUTER: It says something which I have translated into German, -namely, it mentions the “small, fat student leader.” Have you got that -passage? Does it not say so? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, it says so. - -DR. SAUTER: Well then, surely “small, fat student leader” cannot be -applied to you. - -May I, Mr. President, in this connection, draw your attention to an -affidavit which appears in Schirach’s document book under Number -Schirach-3, and which I herewith submit to the Tribunal. It is an -affidavit of a certain Hoepken, who, beginning with 1 May 1938, was the -female secretary of the Defendant Von Schirach and who, in this -affidavit under the Figure 16—which is Page 22 of the document -book—mentioning exact details—states under oath that during the time -with which we are here concerned the defendant was not at Heidelberg at -all. - -I do not suppose it is necessary for me to read that part of the -affidavit. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have spoken in another connection about the -fact that you did not consider officers suitable as youth leaders. I -would be interested to know how many members of the leadership corps of -the Hitler Youth in 1939 at the outbreak of the war were reserve -officers in the Armed Forces. - -VON SCHIRACH: I would judge that the leadership corps of the HJ had -about 1,300 leaders. Those were leaders of the Banne, leaders of the -districts or regions, and the corresponding staff of assistants. Of -these 1,300 youth leaders, 5 to 10 men were reserve officers. - -DR. SAUTER: And how many active officers did you have at that time on -your staff or in the leadership corps? - -VON SCHIRACH: Active officers were not youth leaders and could not be -youth leaders. - -DR. SAUTER: Why not? Was that contained in the regulations? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. An officer was not permitted to be a member of the -Party or any one of its organs or affiliated organizations. - -DR. SAUTER: Who was responsible to you for the physical education and -sports programs in the Hitler Youth? - -VON SCHIRACH: Obergebietsführer Von Tschammer-Osten, who was also Reich -Sports Leader. In the Olympic year he co-operated very closely with me -and voluntarily subordinated himself to me in December or November 1936. -He was responsible to me for the entire physical education of the boys -and girls. - -DR. SAUTER: This Herr Von Tschammer-Osten, who was very well known in -the international sports world, was he an officer by profession? - -VON SCHIRACH: According to my recollection he had been an officer during -the first World War. Then he left the Army and was a farmer by -profession. Later on he concerned himself only with questions of -physical education and sport. One of his brothers was an active officer. - -DR. SAUTER: Did Von Tschammer-Osten become an officer during the second -World War? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, he did not. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you remember that? A document has been submitted here by -the Soviet Prosecution, namely a report from Lvov, in which it is stated -that the Hitler Youth or the Reich Youth Leadership had conducted -courses for young people from Poland, and these young people were to be -trained as agents, spies, and parachutists. You have stated today that -you take the complete responsibility for the youth leadership. I ask you -to tell us something about that. - -VON SCHIRACH: We had absolutely no possibilities for espionage training -in our youth organization. Whether Heydrich on his part, without my -knowledge and without the knowledge of my assistants, had hired youthful -agents in Poland and used them within his intelligence service, it is -not possible for me to say. I myself did not conduct any espionage -training; I had no courses for agents, and courses for training -parachutists were out of the question because, after all, I had no air -force. Training of that kind could only have been conducted through the -Air Force. - -DR. SAUTER: Then you, as Reich Youth Leader or, as you were called -later, Reich Leader for Youth Education, have never known anything about -these things before this Trial? Can you state that under oath? - -VON SCHIRACH: That I can state upon my oath. I should like to add that -shortly before the war young refugees from Poland came to us in large -numbers, but they of course could not return to Poland. The persecution -of the Germans in Poland is a historical fact. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution has asserted that in the Hitler -Youth a song was sung, “Heute gehört uns Deutschland, und morgen die -ganze Welt” (Today Germany belongs to us, tomorrow the whole world); -that is the alleged title of that song, and that is supposed to have -expressed the will for conquest of the Hitler Youth; is that correct? - -VON SCHIRACH: The song says, in the original text which was written by -Hans Baumann and is also included in a document here: “Heute da hört uns -Deutschland und morgen die ganze Welt” (Germany hears us today and -tomorrow the whole world). But it had come to my knowledge also that the -song, from time to time, was being sung in the form which has been -mentioned here. For that reason I issued a prohibition against singing -the song which differed from the original text. I also prohibited, years -ago, the song “Siegreich wollen wir Frankreich schlagen” (Victoriously -we will conquer France) from being sung by the German Hitler Youth. - -DR. SAUTER: You prohibited the last mentioned song entirely? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Out of consideration for your French guests? - -VON SCHIRACH: Not out of consideration for guests but because it was -contrary to my political conceptions. - -DR. SAUTER: Thus, Mr. President, I submit the correct text which I got -from a song book. It is Number Schirach-95 of the Schirach document -book. - -In connection with the question of whether the Hitler Youth intended a -premilitary training of youth, I should like to put the following -additional questions. Did the physical and sport training of youth apply -only to the boys, Herr Von Schirach? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. Of course all young people received physical training. - -DR. SAUTER: Also the girls? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Is it correct that your efforts directed toward the physical -training and physical strengthening of youth also applied to the -physically handicapped and to the blind and other young people who from -the very outset could not be used for military purposes? - -VON SCHIRACH: Very early in our work I included the blind and deaf and -the cripples in the Hitler Youth. I had a periodical especially issued -for the blind and had books made for them in Braille. I believe that the -Hitler Youth was the only organization in Germany which took care of -these people, except for special organizations of the NSV (National -Socialist Welfare Organization) and so on. - -DR. SAUTER: I ask, in connection with that, Mr. President, that you take -notice of Document Schirach-27 of the Schirach document book. That is a -long article entitled “Admission of Physically Handicapped Young People -in the Hitler Youth,” where the deaf, dumb, and blind are especially -mentioned and their training to enable them to take up a professional -occupation. - -MR. DODD: I have refrained all day from making any objection, but I -think this examination has gone very far afield. We have made no charge -against this defendant with respect to the blind, the deaf, the lame, -and halt. He keeps going way back to the Boy Scouts and we haven’t -gotten to any of the relevant issues that are between us and this -defendant. At the present rate I fear we will never get through. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we have listened to this somewhat long -account of the training of the Hitler Youth. Don’t you think you can go -on to something more specific now? We have got a very fair conception, I -think, of what the training of the Hitler Youth was; and we have got all -these documents before us. - -DR. SAUTER: I shall try, Mr. President, to proceed according to your -wishes so far as it is at all possible. - -Witness, is it correct that you personally intervened with Hitler to -prevent the re-establishment of cadet academies as institutions for -purely military training? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is correct. I prevented the re-establishment of -cadet academies. - -DR. SAUTER: I come now to another chapter. The defendant has been -accused of wrecking the Protestant and Catholic youth organizations. -What can you say in answer to that? - -VON SCHIRACH: First, the following: I wanted, as I have already -explained, the unification of all our youth. I also wanted to bring the -Protestant organizations, which were not very large numerically, and the -numerically very large Catholic organizations into the Hitler Youth, -particularly because some of the organizations did not limit themselves -to religious matters but competed with the Hitler Youth in physical -training, hikes, camping, and so on. In this I saw a danger to the idea -of unity in German national education, and above all I felt that among -young people themselves there was a very strong tendency toward the -Hitler Youth. The desertion from the confessional organizations is a -fact. There were also many clergymen who were of the opinion that the -development should perhaps take the following direction: All youth into -the Hitler Youth; the religious care of the youth through clergymen; -sports and political work through youth leaders. - -In 1933 or 1934—but I think it was as early as 1933—Reich Bishop -Müller and the Protestant Bishop Oberheidt approached me on their own -initiative and proposed that I incorporate the Protestant youth -organizations into the Hitler Youth. Of course I was very happy about -that proposal and accepted it. At that time I had no idea that there was -opposition to Reich Bishop Müller within the Protestant Church. I found -out about that only much later. I believed that I was acting with the -authority and in the name of the Evangelical Church, and the other -bishop who accompanied him further strengthened this belief of mine. -Even today I still believe that with the voluntary incorporation of the -Protestant youth into the Youth State, Müller acted in accordance with -the will of the majority of the Protestant youth themselves; and in my -later activity as Youth Leader I frequently met former leaders from the -Protestant youth organizations, who had leading positions with me and -worked in my youth organization with great enthusiasm and devotion. - -Through that incorporation of Protestant youth—I should like to stress -this—spiritual ministration to youth was not limited or hindered in any -way; there never was a restriction of church services for youth in -Germany, either then or later. Since Protestant youth had been -incorporated on the basis of an agreement between the Church and the -Hitler Youth, there was practically only a dispute about youth education -between the Catholic Church and the Hitler Youth. - -In May or June 1934 I asked personally to participate in the -negotiations for the Reich Concordat because I wanted to eliminate -entirely the differences between the Catholic Church and the Hitler -Youth. I considered an agreement in this field to be very important and -in fact I was allowed to participate in these negotiations which took -place in June ’34 in the Reich Ministry of the Interior under the -chairmanship of Reich Minister for the Interior Frick. On the Catholic -side Archbishop Gröber and Bishop Berning took part in the negotiations; -and at that time I personally proposed a formula for co-operation, which -met with the approval of the Catholic side, and I believed that I had -found the basis for agreement in this sphere. - -The conferences were unfortunately interrupted on the evening of 29 -June; and on 30 June ’34 we experienced the so-called “Röhm Putsch,” and -the negotiations were never resumed. That is not my fault, and I bear no -responsibility for that. Hitler simply did not want to accept the -consequences of the Concordat. I personally desired to conclude that -agreement, and I believe that the representatives of the Church saw from -these negotiations and from certain later conferences with me that the -difficulties did not originate with me. At any rate Bishop Berning came -to me, I believe in 1939. We discussed current questions between the -youth leadership and the Church. I believe that he also got the -impression at that time that it was not I who wanted to make -difficulties. - -The difficulties arose at that time from the increasingly strong -influence of Martin Bormann, who tried to prevent absolutely any kind of -agreement between the Party offices and the Church or between the youth -leadership and the Church. - -In the course of the dispute about the leadership of confessional youth -organizations and their incorporation, animated public discussions -arose. I myself spoke at various meetings. Statements were issued by the -Church also, which according to the state of affairs, were more or less -sharp. But I did not make statements inimical to religion in connection -with that subject, nor did I at any time during my life. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, is it correct that in 1937 you concluded an -agreement with the Church to the effect that the Hitler Youth should, in -principle, not be on duty on Sundays during church time, so that the -children could attend religious services, and furthermore, that on -account of this agreement you ran into considerable difficulties? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. - -DR. SAUTER: Will you tell us very briefly about that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe one can say that it was an agreement with -the Church. If I remember correctly, I issued a decree based on various -letters I had received from clergymen—which to a very great extent took -into account the wishes expressed in these letters. I then issued that -decree and I gather from many affidavits which have been sent by youth -leaders to me recently that that decree was very carefully obeyed. - -Difficulties arose in the Party Chancellery on account of my attitude. -Bormann, of course, was an energetic enemy of such a basic concession to -the Church, and Hitler himself—I don’t know whether it was in -connection with this decree, but, at any rate, in connection with the -regulation of the dispute between the youth leadership and the -Church—also reprimanded me once. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have a small book here, entitled _A Good Year -1944_, with the sub-title “Christmas Gift of the War Welfare Service of -Reich Leader Von Schirach.” I submit that book as Document Number -Schirach-84 to the Tribunal for judicial notice. On Page 55 is a picture -of the Madonna. On Page 54 is a Christian poem written by the defendant, -with the title “Bavarian Christmas Crib.” On the lower half of Page 54 -there is the famous “Wessobrunner Prayer,” the oldest prayer in the -German language, dating from the eighth century. - -Witness, is it also correct that on account of the Christian content of -that book you had difficulties with Reichsleiter Bormann; and if so, -what were they? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. I had that Christmas gift made for, I -believe, 80,000 to 100,000 soldiers and sent to them at the front as -late as 1944. I did not hear anything directly from Bormann, but he -suddenly asked for 10 copies of that book; and I was informed by people -who were near the Führer in his headquarters that he used that book in -some way in order to incite Hitler against me. - -I should like to add that at all times of my life, at any rate insofar -as I have written poetry, I have expressed myself in the same way as in -this poem. Also in the collection of poems, _The Flag of the -Persecuted_, which I do not have here unfortunately but which was -distributed among the youth in a very large edition, where my -revolutionary poems can be found, there are poems of a Christian content -which, however, were not reprinted by the Party press in the newspapers -and therefore did not become so well-known as my other verses. But I -should like to express quite clearly that I was an opponent of -confessional youth organizations, and I wish to make it just as clear -that I was not an opponent of the Christian religions. - -DR. SAUTER: Not an opponent? - -VON SCHIRACH: Of course not. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you leave the Church? - -VON SCHIRACH: In spite of many hints by Bormann, I never left the -Church. - -DR. SAUTER: May I, Mr. President, ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of Documents Schirach-85 to 93, inclusive, of the Schirach -document book. All of these are documents from the period when he was -Reich Youth Leader and show his attitude toward the Church. - -VON SCHIRACH: May I add something to that? - -DR. SAUTER: If you please. - -VON SCHIRACH: As far as my religious attitude is concerned, I always -identified myself with the thoughts expressed in _Wilhelm Meisters -Wanderjahre_ about religions in general and the importance of the -Christian religion in particular. I should like to say here that in my -work as an educator I was mistaken in holding the opinion that positive -Christianity existed outside of the Church. - -However, I never made any anti-Christian statements; and I should like -to say here for the first time in public that in the closest circles of -the Hitler Youth I have always expressed a very unequivocal belief in -the person and teachings of Christ. Before educators of the Adolf Hitler -School—a fact which naturally was never allowed to come to the -knowledge of the Party Chancellery—I spoke about Christ as the greatest -leader in world history and of the commandment to “Love thy neighbor” as -a universal idea of our culture. I believe that there are also several -testimonials by youth leaders about that in your possession, Mr. -Attorney. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, I shall refer to that later. I should like to begin a -new chapter now. In 1940 you were dismissed as Reich Youth Leader? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: And you were succeeded by Axmann who has already been -mentioned. But you remained connected with youth education through what -office? - -VON SCHIRACH: Through the office of the Reichsleiter of Youth Education. - -DR. SAUTER: And in addition to that you received another title, I -believe? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I became Deputy of the Führer for the Inspection of -the Hitler Youth. - -DR. SAUTER: Was that only a title, or was that some kind of office? - -VON SCHIRACH: That was an office to the extent that the Reichsleiter -office was concerned with youth work in the Party sector. The Youth -Leader of the German Reich—that was Axmann as my successor—also had a -field of activity in the State, and I too became competent for that by -my appointment as inspector. - -DR. SAUTER: How did your dismissal as Reich Youth Leader come about, and -why were you called specifically to Vienna as Gauleiter? What can you -tell us about that? - -VON SCHIRACH: At the end of the French campaign, in which I participated -as an infantryman, I was in Lyon when a wireless message from the -Führer’s headquarters was received, and the chief of my company told me -that I had to report to the Führer’s headquarters. I went there at once; -and at the Führer’s headquarters, which was at that time situated in the -Black Forest, I saw the Führer standing in the open speaking to Reich -Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop. I waited a while, maybe a quarter of an -hour or 20 minutes, until the conversation had ended and then reported -at once to Hitler and there, outside, before the Casino building where -later we all had our meal together, he told me the following in about 10 -minutes: - -I should propose to him a successor for the leadership of the youth. He -intended for me to take over the Reich Gau Vienna. I at once suggested -my assistant, Axmann, who was not a man who advocated physical or -military training but was concerned with social work among the youth, -and that was most important to me. He accepted this proposal... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we need not go through Axmann’s -qualifications, need we? Is it material to the Tribunal to know what his -successor was like? - -DR. SAUTER: Axmann? Axmann was successor as Reich Youth Leader. - -THE PRESIDENT: What I was asking you was whether it was material for the -Tribunal to know the qualities of Axmann. We have nothing to do with -that. - -DR. SAUTER: Herr Von Schirach, you can be more brief about that point, -can you not? - -VON SCHIRACH: Hitler then said that I should keep my job as Reich Leader -of Youth Education and that I should assume at the same time the office -of the Inspector of Youth and that I should go to Vienna as the -successor to Bürckel. In Vienna, especially in the cultural field, -serious difficulties had arisen; and therefore I was to direct my -attention to the case of the institutions of culture, particularly of -theaters, art galleries, libraries, and so forth; and I was to be -especially concerned about the working class. I raised the objection -that I could carry out that cultural work only if independent of -Goebbels, and Hitler promised at that time that this independence would -be fully safeguarded; but he did not keep that promise later. - -And lastly he said that he was sending the Jewish population away from -Vienna, that he had already informed Himmler or Heydrich—I do not -remember exactly what he said—of his intentions, or at least would -inform them. Vienna had to become a German city, and in that connection -he even spoke of an evacuation of the Czech population. - -That concluded that conversation. I received no other instructions for -this office, and then we dined together as usual. I took my leave then -and went to Berlin to talk to my assistants. - -DR. SAUTER: Vienna was considered at that time, if I am correctly -informed, the most difficult Gau of the Reich; is that right? - -VON SCHIRACH: Vienna was by far the most difficult political problem -which we had among the Gaue. - -DR. SAUTER: Why? - -VON SCHIRACH: Because—I learned the details only from other persons in -Berlin, after I had received my mission from Hitler—in Vienna the -population had sobered considerably after the first wave of enthusiasm -over the Anschluss had subsided. Herr Bürckel, my predecessor, had -brought many officials to Vienna from the outside; and the German system -of administration, which was in no wise more practicable or efficient -than the Austrian, was introduced there. This resulted in a certain -over-organization in the administrative field, and Bürckel had started -on a Church policy which was more than unsatisfactory. Demonstrations -took place under his administration. On one occasion the palace of the -archbishop was damaged. Theaters and other places of culture were not -taken care of as they should have been. Vienna was experiencing a -feeling of great disillusionment. Before I got there I was informed that -if one spoke in the streetcars with a North-German accent, the Viennese -took an unfriendly attitude. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, what duties did you have or what offices did you -hold in Vienna? - -VON SCHIRACH: In Vienna I had the office of Reich Governor -(Reichsstatthalter), which included two administrations, the municipal -administration and the national administration. In addition, I was Reich -Defense Commissioner for Wehrkreis XVII, but only until 1942. In 1942, -the Wehrkreis was subdivided, and each Gauleiter of the Wehrkreis became -his own Reich Defense Commissioner. - -DR. SAUTER: And then you also were Gauleiter? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I was also Gauleiter, the highest official of the -Party. - -DR. SAUTER: In other words, you represented city, state, and Party, all -at once—the highest authority of city, state, and Party in Vienna? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. Now the situation was such in the administration that -there was an official representative to take charge of national affairs, -namely, the Regierungspräsident; for the municipal administration there -was another representative, the mayor; in the Party, the Deputy -Gauleiter in Vienna had the title of Gauleiter. - -I should not like to belittle my responsibility for the Gau by -explaining that, and I want to protect the exceptionally efficient -Deputy Gauleiter who was there. I just want to say that in order to -clarify my position. - -DR. SAUTER: What really was your position as Reich Defense Commissioner, -Witness? Was that a military position, or what was it? - -VON SCHIRACH: That was not a military position at all. The Reich Defense -Commissioner was simply the head of the civil administration, in -contrast to the situation prevailing during the first World War, where -the head of the civil administration was assigned to and subordinated to -the commanding general; in this war the Reich Defense Commissioner was -co-ordinate with him, not subordinate. - -The tasks of the Reich Defense Commissioner—at least, that is how I saw -my tasks—were at certain intervals, to co-ordinate the most pressing -problems of food economy, transportation—that is, local and distant -transportation, coal supplies, and price regulation for the Gaue of -Vienna, Upper Danube, and Lower Danube, all of which belonged to -Wehrkreis XVII. - -There were several meetings for that purpose—I believe three all -together. In 1942 the reorganization which I previously mentioned took -place. Bormann carried his point against the Reich Marshal. The Reich -Marshal was of the opinion that the Reich Defense Commissioner had to be -Defense Commissioner for the entire Wehrkreis. Bormann wanted each -Gauleiter to be Defense Commissioner, and so that led to the division. -From 1942 on I was only Reich Commissioner for Vienna. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, it seems that a decree was issued at that -time—will you please tell me when you were informed about it—namely, a -decree by Reichsleiter Bormann, that not more than two Gauleiter could -meet. - -VON SCHIRACH: That is not a decree by Bormann; that was an order by -Hitler. - -DR. SAUTER: What were its salient points? - -VON SCHIRACH: I must explain that briefly. Because of the fact that the -Reich Commissariat was subdivided, I had to meet from time to time with -the Reichsstatthalter of other provinces in order to discuss the most -important questions, especially concerning our food economy. However, I -believe it was in 1943, Dr. Ley came to me in Vienna and brought me an -official order from the Führer, according to which it was considered -illegal—that was the way he expressed it—for more than two Gauleiter -to meet for a conference. - -At that time I looked at Dr. Ley speechless; and he said: - - “Yes, that does not concern you alone. There is still another - Gauleiter who has called a conference of more than two, and that - fact alone is already considered as virtual mutiny or - conspiracy.” - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, when you were in Vienna, were you given a further -mission which took up much of your time? Please tell us briefly about -that. - -VON SCHIRACH: I had just started to work in Vienna when, in October -1940, I received an order to appear at the Reich Chancellery. - -DR. SAUTER: Will you please be very brief. - -VON SCHIRACH: And there Hitler personally gave me the mission of -carrying out the evacuation of all German youth from areas endangered by -aerial attack, and simultaneously to carry out the evacuation of mothers -and infants; and he said that that should begin in Berlin and then -gradually take in the entire Reich. He said that education was of -secondary importance now; the main thing was to maintain the nervous -energy of the youth and to preserve life. However, I asked at once that -I be given the possibility of establishing an educational organization, -and I did so. - -I do not wish to speak about details, but one of the demands, which I -made at once—this is important in connection with the Indictment—was -that there should be no difficulties placed in the way of young people’s -participation in church services. That was promised to me, and it was -expressed very clearly in my first directives for the children’s -evacuation. The youth leaders who were active in this field of my -organizational work will confirm this. - -DR. SAUTER: This evacuation of children to the country was a very -extensive task, was it not? - -VON SCHIRACH: It was the most difficult, and from a psychological point -of view, the most complicated work which I ever carried out. I -transferred millions of people in this way; I supplied them with food, -with education, with medical aid, and so on. Of course that work took up -my time fully or to a large extent only during the first years. After -that I had trained my assistants for that kind of work. - -DR. SAUTER: Later, as I have heard from you, you tried from time to time -to report to Hitler about your successes and about problems requiring -decision. How often during the entire years of the war were you admitted -to discuss that important field of work with Hitler? - -VON SCHIRACH: Mr. Attorney, I am afraid I have to correct you. I never -tried to report to Hitler about my successes, but only about my -problems. - -DR. SAUTER: Problems, yes. - -VON SCHIRACH: About that entire program of evacuation of children I -could only report to him twice; the first time in 1940, after I had got -the whole program under way, and the second time in 1941, when the -evacuation had reached very large proportions. - -And about Vienna I could only report on very rare occasions, and in 1943 -the possibility of reporting ceased altogether with the breach of -relations which I will describe later. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, during your period in Vienna you became the Chairman -of the Würzburg Bibliophile Society. - -VON SCHIRACH: That is an honorary office, the Würzburg Bibliophile -Convention had appointed me Chairman of the German Bibliophile Society. - -DR. SAUTER: Your Honor, Schirach—Number Schirach-1 of the document book -makes reference to that matter, and I submit it as a piece of evidence. -It it an affidavit by an old anti-Fascist, Karl Klingspor, an honorary -member of the society, who gives valuable information about the -character of the Defendant Von Schirach. - -And in addition, Herr Von Schirach, I believe you were the Chairman of -the Southeast Europe Society, is that correct? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: In brief, what was the mission of that society? - -VON SCHIRACH: It had as its purpose the improvement of trade relations, -economic relations, with the southeast. Its functions were essentially -in the field of research and representation. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, what were your main Viennese activities? - -VON SCHIRACH: My principal activities in Vienna were social work and -cultural work, as I have already explained before. - -DR. SAUTER: Social work and cultural work? - -VON SCHIRACH: These were the two poles which dominated my entire -political life. - -DR. SAUTER: I come now to the particular accusations which have been -made against you by the Prosecution concerning that period in Vienna. -Among other things you have been accused of participating in the -so-called slave-labor program, and I ask you to state your position -concerning that, and in that connection also to deal with Directive -Number 1 of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, of -6 April 1942, which was presented, I believe, as Document 3352-PS. -Please go ahead. - -VON SCHIRACH: Maybe I would do best to start with the decree by which -Gauleiter were appointed Plenipotentiaries for the Allocation of Labor -under the Plenipotentiary General. - -DR. SAUTER: 6 April 1942. - -VON SCHIRACH: In the way of documentary material that decree contains no -more than that the Gauleiter could make suggestions and submit requests -to the competent offices for the allocation of labor. But they were held -responsible—I do not know whether by this decree or another one—for -the supervision of the feeding and quartering, _et cetera_, of foreign -workers. This feeding and quartering, _et cetera_, of foreign workers -was—in my Gau and I believe also in all other Gaue of the Reich—mainly -in the hands of the German Labor Front. - -The Gauobmann of the German Labor Front in Vienna reported to me very -frequently about the conditions among German workers and foreign workers -in the Gau. He often accompanied me on inspection tours of industries; -and from my own observations I can describe my impressions here of the -life of foreign workers in Vienna as far as I could watch it. - -I well remember, for instance, my visit to a large soap factory where I -saw barracks in which Russian and French women were living. They had -better quarters there than many Viennese families which lived six or -eight people in the usual one-room apartments with kitchen. I remember -another inspection where I saw a billet of Russian workers. It was clean -and neat, and among the Russian women who were there I noticed that they -were gay, well-nourished, and apparently satisfied. I know about the -treatment of Russian domestic workers from the circle of my -acquaintances and from the acquaintances of many assistants; and here, -also, I have heard, and in part observed myself, that they were -extremely well treated. - -Let me say something in general about Vienna as a place for foreign -workers. For centuries foreign workers have worked in Vienna. To bring -foreign workers from the southeast to Vienna is no problem at all. One -likes to go to Vienna, just as one likes to go to Paris. I have seen -very many Frenchmen and French women working in Vienna, and at times I -spoke with them. I also talked to French foremen in the factories. They -lived as tenants somewhere in the city, just like any other private -person. One saw them in the Prater. They spent their free time just as -our own native workers did. - -During the time I was in Vienna, I built more factory kitchens than -there are in any other Gau in Germany. The foreign workers frequented -these kitchens just as much as the native workers. - -About treatment at the hands of the population, I can only say that the -population of a city which has been accustomed for centuries to work -together with foreign elements, will spontaneously treat any worker well -who comes from the outside. - -Really bad conditions were never reported to me. From time to time it -was reported that something was not going well here or there. It was the -duty of the Gauobmann of the Labor Front to report that to me. Then I -immediately issued a directive from my desk by telephone to the regional -food office or the quota office for the supply of material, for kitchens -or heating installations, or whatever it was. At any rate, I tried -within 24 or 48 hours to take care of all complaints that came to me. - -While we are on the subject I would like to give my impression of the -use of manpower in general. I am not responsible for the importation of -labor. I can only say that what I saw in the way of directives and -orders from the Plenipotentiary General, namely the Codefendant Sauckel, -always followed the line of humane, decent, just, and clean treatment of -the workers who were entrusted to us. Sauckel literally flooded his -offices with such directives. - -I considered it my duty to state that in my testimony. - -DR. SAUTER: These foreign workers, who were in the Gau Vienna and for -whom you do not consider yourself responsible, were they employed in the -armament industry or elsewhere? - -VON SCHIRACH: A large portion was employed in agriculture, some in the -supply industry. Whether there were some directly in the armament -industry I could not say. The armament industry was not accessible to me -in all its ramifications, even in my functions as Gauleiter, because -there were war production processes which were kept secret even from the -Reichsstatthalter. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, in connection with the subject of Jewish forced -labor, a letter was read, Document 3803-PS. It is, I believe, a -handwritten letter from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner to Blaschke. -Blaschke, I believe, was the second mayor of Vienna. - -VON SCHIRACH: He was the mayor of Vienna. - -DR. SAUTER: This is a letter of 30 June 1944. In that letter -Kaltenbrunner informs Blaschke that he had directed that several -evacuation transports should be sent to Vienna-Strasshof. “There are -four transports,” it says in the letter, “with about 12,000 Jews, which -will arrive in the next few days.” So much about the letter. Its further -content is only of importance because of what it says in the end—and I -quote: - - “I beg you to arrange further details with the State Police - Office, Vienna, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Ebner, and SS - Obersturmbannführer Krumey, of the Special Action Command - Hungary, who is at present in Vienna.” - -Did you have anything to do with that matter, and if so what? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not know of the correspondence between the -Codefendant Kaltenbrunner and the mayor of Vienna. To my knowledge Camp -Strasshof is not within Gau Vienna at all. It is in an altogether -different Gau. The designation, “Vienna-Strasshof,” is, therefore, an -error. The border runs in between the two. - -DR. SAUTER: And were you informed of the matter itself at that time, or -only here in the courtroom? - -VON SCHIRACH: I know of that matter only from this courtroom, but I -remember that mention was made about the use of Jewish workers in -connection with the building of the Southeast Wall or fortifications. -The Southeast Wall, however, was not in the area of Reich Gau Vienna. It -was a project in the area of Gau Lower Danube, Lower Austria, or Styria. -I had nothing to do with the construction of the Southeast Wall; that -was in the hands of Dr. Jury, that is, the O. T.... - -DR. SAUTER: O. T. is the Organization Todt? - -VON SCHIRACH: ...the Organization Todt. And in the other part of the -border it was in the hands of Dr. Uiberreither, the Gauleiter of Styria, -and his technical assistants. - -DR. SAUTER: So I can sum up your statement to mean that you had nothing -to do with these things because they were matters which did not concern -your Gau. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I cannot understand what connection there should be -with Gau Vienna. Whether the mayor intended to divert some of these -workers for special tasks in Vienna is not known to me. I do not know -about that matter. - -DR. SAUTER: In the same connection, Witness, another document has been -submitted, 1948-PS, a file note of 7 November 1940. That was a date on -which you had already been Gauleiter in Vienna for several months and -it, too, concerns forced labor of the Jews who were capable of work. -That file note was written on stationery with the heading “The -Reichsstatthalter in Vienna,” and apparently the note in question was -written by a Dr. Fischer. Who is Dr. Fischer? What did you, as -Reichsstatthalter, have to do with that matter? What do you know about -it? - -VON SCHIRACH: First of all, Dr. Fischer is not known to me personally. I -do not want to dispute the possibility that he may have been introduced -to me once and that I do not remember him; but I do not know who Dr. -Fischer is. At any rate, he was not an expert working in my central -office. I assume that he may have been an official, because his name -appears in connection with another document also. He was probably the -personal consultant of the Regierungspräsident. The note shows that this -official used my stationery, and he was entitled to do that. I believe -several thousand people in Vienna were entitled to use that stationery, -according to the usage of German offices. - -On this note he has put down a telephone conversation with the Gestapo -from which it can be seen that the Reich Security Main Office—that is -Heydrich—was the office which decided, by internal directives to the -Gestapo, on the use of Jewish manpower. - -The Regierungspräsident wanted to know more about that; but I believe -one cannot draw the conclusion from this that I was informed about -cruelties committed by the Gestapo, as the Prosecution has concluded. It -is doubtful whether I was in Vienna at all at that time. I want to -remind you of my other tasks, which I have described before. - -However, if I was there, I certainly did not concern myself with the -work of cleaning up the streets. But I should like to say that the -variety of my tasks caused me to establish an organizational structure -which did not exist in other Gaue, namely, the Central Office of the -Reich Leader. - -DR. SAUTER: Perhaps you will tell us, before concluding for today, -approximately how many officials in Vienna were subordinated to you. - -VON SCHIRACH: I guess it may have been about 5,000 officials and -employees. - -DR. SAUTER: Shall I continue, Mr. President? It is 5:00 o’clock. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned, until 24 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH DAY - Friday, 24 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Von Schirach resumed the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Is counsel for the Defendant Bormann present? - -DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would it be convenient to you to present your documents -on Tuesday at 10 o’clock? - -DR. BERGOLD: Yes, agreed. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would it be convenient to the Prosecution? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: Quite convenient, would it? - -DR. BERGOLD: Yes, indeed. - -DR. SAUTER: Your Honors, we left off yesterday with Document Number -1948-PS. That, as you will recall, is a memorandum by a certain Dr. -Fischer about a telephone conversation he had held with an official of -the Secret State Police, Standartenführer Huber, from Vienna, and refers -to forced labor of Jewish youth. Special mention is made of the -employment of Jews in the removal of ruined synagogues. In connection -with this memorandum I should like to put just one more question to the -Defendant Schirach. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] When were these synagogues destroyed in -Vienna? Was it in your time and on your responsibility, or at another -time? - -VON SCHIRACH: The synagogues in Vienna were destroyed 2 years before I -assumed office in Vienna. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I now proceed to the chapter on anti-Semitism -which—according to your admission yesterday—you followed in your -youth. I should like to know what your attitude was, when you joined the -Party and when you became an official in the Party, toward a practical -solution of this anti-Semitism? - -VON SCHIRACH: According to my opinion—in 1924-1925—Jews were to be -entirely excluded from the civil service. Their influence in economic -life was to be limited. I believed that Jewish influence in cultural -life should be restricted. But for artists of the rank of, for instance, -Max Reinhardt, I still envisioned the possibility of a free -participation in this cultural life. That, I believe, exactly reflects -the opinion which I and my comrades held on the solution of the “Jewish -Problem” in 1924-1925 and in the following years. - -Later, when I was leading the high-school youth movement, I put forward -the demand for the so-called _Numerus clausus_. It was my wish that the -Jews should be allowed to study only on a proportional basis -commensurate to their percentage of the total population. I believe one -can realize from this demand for the _Numerus clausus_, known to the -entire generation of students in that period, that I did not believe in -a total exclusion of the Jews from artistic, economic, and scientific -activities. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have submitted a document, Document Schirach-136, -in the Schirach document book, which contains statements by an official -of the Reich Youth Leadership about the treatment of Jewish youth as -contrasted with Christian youth. Do you know what attitude the Reich -Youth Leadership had adopted at that time toward the Jewish youth? - -VON SCHIRACH: I believe that we are dealing with the decree of the year -1936. - -DR. SAUTER: Autumn 1936? - -VON SCHIRACH: Autumn 1936. According to that, Jewish youth organizations -were to exist under the official supervision of the Reich Youth Leader, -who controlled all the youth of Germany, and Jewish youth would be able -to carry out their own youth education autonomously. - -DR. SAUTER: It says in that decree, _inter alia_—I quote one sentence -only from Document Schirach-136 of the Schirach document book: - - “Today in its youth, Judaism already assumes that special, - isolated position, free within its own boundaries, which at some - future date Judaism will occupy within the German State and in - the economy of Germany and which it has already occupied to a - great extent.” - -Witness, at about the same time, or shortly before then, the so-called -Nuremberg Laws had been promulgated, those racial laws which we have -frequently heard mentioned here. - -Did you help pass these laws, and how did you personally judge these -laws? - -VON SCHIRACH: I had no part in the drafting of these laws. In my room at -the Hotel Deutscher Hof, here in Nuremberg, I was surprised to find a -slip of paper stating that there would be a Reichstag meeting on the -next day and that it would take place in Nuremberg. At that Reichstag -meeting, at which I was present, the Nuremberg Laws were promulgated. I -do not know to this day how they were drafted. I assume that Hitler -himself determined their contents. I can tell you no more about them. - -DR. SAUTER: Can you state on your oath, and with a clear conscience, -that before these laws were published you had not known of the plan for -such laws, although you had been Reich Youth Leader and Reichsleiter? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: After these laws had been promulgated in Nuremberg, how did -you personally envisage the further development of the Jewish problem? - -VON SCHIRACH: I must say, first of all, that we had, as a matter of -fact, not expected these laws at all. I believe that the entire youth of -the country at that time considered the Jewish problem as solved, since -in 1935 there could be no more question of any Jewish influence. After -these laws had been published we were of the opinion that now, -definitely, the last word had been spoken on the Jewish problem. - -DR. SAUTER: Briefly, Witness, you are accused of having incited and -influenced the youth of the country. I therefore ask you: As Reich Youth -Leader did you incite youth to anti-Semitic excesses, or did you, as -Reich Youth Leader, and particularly at meetings of the Hitler Youth, -make any inflammatory anti-Semitic speeches? - -VON SCHIRACH: I did not make any inflammatory anti-Semitic speeches, -since I attempted, both as Reich Youth Leader and youth educator, not to -add fuel to the fire; for neither in my books nor in my speeches—with -the exception of one speech in Vienna, to which I shall refer later on -and which was not made at the time when I was Reich Youth Leader—have I -made any inflammatory statements of an anti-Semitic nature. - -I will not make myself ridiculous by stating here that I was not an -anti-Semite; I was—although I never addressed myself to the youth in -that sense. - -DR. SAUTER: The office of the Reich Youth Leader published an official -monthly entitled _Will and Power, Leadership Publication of the National -Socialist Youth_. Excerpts from this official publication have -previously been submitted to the Tribunal in the document book. - -Now I would be interested to know: Is it true that certain Party -authorities repeatedly demanded from you that you publish a special -anti-Semitic issue of this official Youth Leadership publication in -order to show the youth of the country the path to follow in the future, -and what was your attitude with regard to that demand? - -VON SCHIRACH: It is true that the Reich Minister for Propaganda -repeatedly demanded of my editor-in-chief that such an anti-Semitic -issue should be published. On receiving the report of the -editor-in-chief I invariably refused to comply with this request. I -believe that the editor-in-chief has already signed a sworn affidavit to -that effect. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the question of anti-Semitism would also include -your attitude to _Der Stürmer_, the paper issued by your -fellow-Defendant, Streicher. Did you distribute this anti-Semitic paper -_Der Stürmer_ within your youth organization, and did you in any way -further its distribution? - -VON SCHIRACH: _Der Stürmer_ was not distributed within the youth -organization. I believe that with the sole exception of those of the -young people who lived in this Gau... - -DR. SAUTER: Gau Franken? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, Gau Franken—that the rest of the German youth -organization never read _Der Stürmer_ at all. The paper was definitely -rejected by all the youth leaders—both boys and girls—in my -organization. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, Witness, I must point out to you that the Prosecution -have accused you of having given, on one occasion, an introduction to -this paper, this anti-Jewish paper _Der Stürmer_. Do you know about it, -and what have you got to say on the matter? - -VON SCHIRACH: I can say the following in this respect. I was always in -close collaboration with the press; in fact, I came from the press -myself. In my press office, as Reich Youth Leader, I gave definite -instructions that all requests from Gau papers for an introduction, or -something else of the kind from me should be granted on principle. -Therefore, whenever a Gau paper celebrated a jubilee—perhaps the tenth -or twentieth anniversary of its existence, or published some special -issue—then the experts in my press office would run up a draft and, -together with the considerable volume of evening mail presented to me -for my signature, these drafts and elaborations would be submitted to -me. In this way it might have happened that I signed that introduction -for _Der Stürmer_ which, of course, was the paper of the local Gau. -Otherwise I have no recollection of the episode. - -DR. SAUTER: Consequently you cannot remember whether you drafted that -short introduction yourself, or whether it was drafted by one of your -experts and presented to you for signature? - -VON SCHIRACH: I definitely believe that I did not draft it myself, -because such short introductions—as already stated—were always -submitted to me. I wrote my newspaper articles myself but never -introductions of this description. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, since we have just mentioned the name of Streicher, -I would remind you of a very ugly picture book which was submitted here -by the Prosecution. Was that picture book distributed among the youth -with your consent, or do you know anything else about it? - -VON SCHIRACH: Of course this book was not distributed among the young -people. It is quite out of the question that an office of the HJ (Hitler -Jugend) would have transmitted that book to the youth. Besides, the -picture books of the Stürmer Publishing Firm are unknown to me. I am, of -course, not competent to speak on education in the schools, but I should -also like to say on behalf of education in the schools that I do not -believe this picture book was ever introduced into any school outside of -this Gau. At any rate, that book and similar writings of the Stürmer -Publishing Firm were not, as a rule, distributed among the young people -and the youth organizations. What I have already said when judging _Der -Stürmer_ also holds good for these books—namely, that the leadership -corps of the Hitler Youth categorically rejected writings of this -description. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have also experienced how the anti-Semitic -question actually developed and how it eventually resulted in the -well-known anti-Jewish pogroms of November 1938. Did you yourself, in -any way, participate in these anti-Jewish pogroms of November 1938? - -VON SCHIRACH: I personally did not participate in any way, but I did -participate in the Munich session... - -DR. SAUTER: Which session? - -VON SCHIRACH: The session which was traditionally held on 9 November of -each year in memory of those who had fallen on 9 November 1923. I did -not take part in all the discussions of that day. But I do remember a -speech by Goebbels in connection with the murder of Herr Vom Rath. That -speech was definitely of an inflammatory nature, and one was free to -assume from this speech that Goebbels intended to start some action. He -is alleged—but that I only discovered later—to have given detailed -instructions for this action directly from his hotel in Munich to the -Reich Propaganda Ministry. I was present at the Munich session, as was -my colleague Lauterbacher, my chief of staff, and we both rejected the -action. The HJ, as the largest National Socialist organization, was not -employed at all in the anti-Jewish pogroms, of 9, 10, and 11 November -1938. I remember one incident where a youth leader, without referring to -my Berlin office and carried away by some local propaganda, took part in -a demonstration and was later called to account by me for so doing. -After 10 November I was again in Munich for a few days and visited, -_inter alia_, a few of the destroyed business houses and villas as well. -It made a terrible impression on me at the time, and under that -impression I instructed the entire Youth Leadership, the regional -leaders if I remember rightly—in other words, all the highest -responsible youth leaders—to come to Berlin and there, in an address to -these youth leaders, I described the incidents of the 9 and 10 November -as a disgrace to our culture. I also referred to it as a criminal -action. I believe that all the colleagues present on that occasion will -clearly remember how agitated I was and that I told them that my -organization, both now and in the future, would never have anything to -do with acts of this sort. - -DR. SAUTER: You previously mentioned one individual case where an HJ -leader, subordinate to you, participated in some action. Did you know of -other cases, in November 1938 and after, where units of the HJ were -factually supposed to have participated in the anti-Jewish pogroms? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I know of no other cases. The only thing I did hear -was that here and there individual lads, or groups of youths, were -called out into the streets by local authorities which were not of the -HJ. In the majority of cases these lads were promptly sent home again by -the youth leaders. The organization was never employed, and I attach -great importance to the statement that the youth organization, which -included more members than the Party itself with all its affiliated -organizations, was never involved in these incidents. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you saw at least, from the incidents in November -1938, that developments in Germany were taking a different trend to the -course you had expected—if we are to judge by your previous -description. How did you, after November 1938, envisage the further -solution of the Jewish problem? - -VON SCHIRACH: After the events of 1938 I realized that Jewry’s one -chance lay in a state-supported emigration; for in view of Goebbels’ -temper, it seemed probable to me that overnight similar actions could -arise from time to time, and under such conditions of legal insecurity I -could not see how the Jews could continue living in Germany. That is one -of the reasons why Hitler’s idea of a closed Jewish settlement in the -Polish Government General, of which he told me at his headquarters in -1940, was clear to me. I thought that the Jews would be better off in a -closed settlement in Poland than in Germany or Austria, where they would -remain exposed to the whims of the Propaganda Minister who was the -mainstay of anti-Semitism in Germany. - -DR. SAUTER: Is it true that you yourself, whenever you had a chance of -approaching Hitler, gave him your own positive suggestions for settling -the Jews in some neutral country, under humane conditions? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, that is not true. - -DR. SAUTER: Well? - -VON SCHIRACH: I should like fully to elucidate this matter. I mentioned -yesterday how I had reported to Hitler and how he had told me that the -Viennese Jews would be sent to the Government General. Before that, I -had never thought of an emigration of the Jews from Austria and Germany -for resettlement in the Government General. I had only thought of a -Jewish emigration to countries where the Jews wanted to go. But Hitler’s -plan, as it then existed—and I believe that at that time the idea of -exterminating the Jews had not yet entered his mind—this plan of -resettlement sounded perfectly reasonable to me—reasonable at that -time. - -DR. SAUTER: But I believe that in 1942 you are supposed to have tried, -through the kind offices of your friend, Dr. Colin Ross, to suggest to -Hitler that the Jews from Hungary and the Balkan States be allowed to -emigrate to some neutral country, taking their goods and chattels with -them. - -VON SCHIRACH: That was at a later date. I no longer remember exactly -when, but in any case it was after the occupation of Hungary. Among the -innumerable suggestions which I made to the Führer and to the Minister -for Foreign Affairs through Colin Ross, was one to the effect that the -entire Jewish population of Hungary be transferred to the neutral -countries. If the witness Steengracht has stated here that this idea had -been discussed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that it had -emanated from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then he probably spoke in -good faith. The idea originated in discussions held between Colin Ross -and myself, and Ross then put it down in the form of a memorandum. -But—and this is specially important—it was reported verbally to the -Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs who, in turn, informed Colin Ross, on -the occasion of a further visit, that the Führer had definitely turned -the suggestion down. - -DR. SAUTER: The emigration to neutral countries abroad? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, to neutral countries abroad. - -DR. SAUTER: The majority of the Viennese Jews, Witness, were—as you -yourself know—deported from Vienna. In 1940, when you became Gauleiter -in Vienna—or later on—did you ever receive a directive from Hitler to -the effect that you yourself should carry out this deportation of the -Jews from Vienna or that you should participate in the deportation? - -VON SCHIRACH: I never received any such directive. The only directive -which I received in connection with the deportation of the Jewish -population from Vienna was a question from Hitler asking about the -number of Jews living in Vienna at the time. That number, which I had -forgotten, was recalled to my memory by a document put to me by the -Prosecution. According to that document I reported to Hitler that 60,000 -Jews were then living in Vienna. That figure probably comes from the -registration office. In former times about 190,000 Jews, all told, lived -in Vienna. That, I believe, was the highest figure reached. When I came -to Vienna there were still 60,000 Jews left. The deportation of the Jews -was a measure immediately directed, on orders from Hitler, or by -Himmler; and there existed in Vienna an office of the Reich Security -Main Office, or local branch office under Himmler-Heydrich, which -carried out these measures. - -DR. SAUTER: Who was in charge of that office? - -VON SCHIRACH: The head of that office was—that I found out now; I did -not know his name at the time—a certain Brunner. - -DR. SAUTER: An SS Sturmführer? - -VON SCHIRACH: An SS Sturmführer, Dr. Brunner. - -DR. SAUTER: The one who, a few days ago, is supposed to have been -condemned to death? Did you know that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I heard it yesterday. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you have to issue any orders to this Brunner who was an -SS leader, or could you give him any kind of instructions? - -VON SCHIRACH: It was entirely impossible for me to stop the deportation -of the Jews or to have any influence thereupon. Once, as early as 1940, -I told the chief of my Regional Food Supply Office that he should see to -it that departing Jewish people be provided with sufficient food. -Frequently, when Jews wrote to me requesting to be exempted from -deportation, I charged my adjutant or some assistant to intervene with -Brunner so that possibly an exception might be made for these persons. -More I could not do. But I have to admit frankly, here and now, that I -was of the opinion that this deportation was really in the interests of -Jewry, for the reasons which I have already stated in connection with -the events of 1938. - -DR. SAUTER: Did the SS, which in Vienna too was charged with the -evacuation of the Jews, send continuous reports as to how and to what -extent this evacuation of the Jews was carried out? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. I am, therefore, also not in a position to state when -the deportation of the Jews was concluded and whether the entire 60,000 -were dragged out of Vienna or if only a part of them was carried off. - -DR. SAUTER: Did not the newspapers in Vienna report anything at all -about these deportations of the Jews, about the extent of the -deportations and the abuses occasioned in this connection? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Nothing? But, Witness, I must put a document to you which -has been submitted by the Prosecution. It is Document Number 3048-PS, an -excerpt from the Viennese edition of the _Völkischer Beobachter_, on a -speech which you, Witness, made on 15 September 1942 in Vienna, and in -which occurs the sentence—I quote from the newspaper: - - “Every Jew who operates in Europe is a danger to European - culture. If I were to be accused of having deported tens of - thousands of Jews from this city, once the European metropolis - of Jewry, to the Eastern ghetto, I would have to reply, ‘I see - in that an active contribution to European culture.’” - -Thus runs the quotation from your speech which otherwise contains no -anti-Semitic declarations on your part. Considering your previous -statements, Witness, I am compelled to ask you: Did you make that -speech, and how did you come to make it despite your basic attitude -which you have previously described to us? - -VON SCHIRACH: First, I want to say that I did make that speech. The -quotation is correct. I said that. I must stand by what I have said. -Although the plan of the deportation of the Jews was Hitler’s plan and I -was not charged with its execution, I did utter those words, which I now -sincerely regret; but I must say that I identified myself morally with -that action only out of a feeling of misplaced loyalty to the Führer. -That I have done, and that cannot be undone. If I am to explain how I -came to do this, I can only reply that at that time I was already -“between the Devil and the deep sea.” I believe it will also become -clear from my later statements that from a certain moment on I had -Hitler against me, the Party Chancellery against me, and very many -members of the Party itself against me. Constantly I heard from -officials of the Party Chancellery who expressed that to the Gauleiter -of Vienna, and from statements made in Hitler’s entourage that one was -under the impression—and that this could be clearly recognized from my -attitude and my actions—that I was no longer expressing myself publicly -in the usual anti-Semitic manner or in other ways, either; and I just -have no excuse. But it may perhaps serve as an explanation, that I was -trying to extricate myself from this painful situation by speaking in a -manner which today I can no longer justify to myself. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I should like to ask you, in this connection—you -have just spoken of a painful situation in which you found yourself in -Vienna. Is it true that Hitler himself, on various occasions, reproached -you personally and severely because your attitude in Vienna had not been -sufficiently energetic, that you had become too slack and too yielding; -that you should concern yourself more with the interests of the Party, -and that you should adopt far stricter methods? And what, Witness, did -you then do? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, I assume that you realize that you are -putting questions in the most leading form, that you are putting -questions which suggest the answer to the defendant, and such questions -cannot possibly carry—the answers to such questions cannot possibly -carry the weight which answers given to questions not in their leading -form would carry. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, did Hitler personally reproach you for your -behavior in Vienna, and what attitude did you adopt? - -I believe that is not a suggestive question. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think it is. I should have thought it is a leading -question. He says he was in a very difficult situation. You could ask -him if he would explain what was the difficulty of the situation. - -DR. SAUTER: Very well. Then will you answer this question, Witness? - -VON SCHIRACH: Counsel for the defense, I could not, in any case, have -accepted the question in the form in which you previously presented it. - -The difference between Hitler and myself arose primarily over an art -exhibition, and the breach between Hitler and myself in 1943 was in the -beginning the result of differences of opinion over the cultural policy. -In 1943 I was ordered to the Berghof where Hitler, in the presence of -Bormann, criticized me violently on account of my cultural work and -literally said that I was leading the cultural opposition against him in -Germany. And further, in the course of the conversation he said that I -was mobilizing the spiritual forces of Vienna and Austria and the -spiritual forces of the young people against him in cultural spheres. He -said he knew it very well indeed. He had read some of my speeches, -primarily the Düsseldorf speech; he had discovered that I had authorized -in Weimar and in Vienna art exhibitions of a decadent nature; and he -offered me the alternative, either to end this kind of oppositional work -immediately—then for the time being everything could remain as in the -past—or he would stop all Government subsidies for Vienna. - -This scene made a frightful impression on me, for it represented to me a -breach of Hitler’s promised word, since he had granted me absolute -freedom of action when he appointed me to the Vienna mission. I then -recognized that he nourished an icy hatred toward me, and that behind -these statements on cultural policies something else was concealed. -Whether he was dissatisfied in every detail with the way I conducted my -office in Vienna at the time, I do not know. He rarely expressed himself -directly about such matters. From his entourage I learned only of -occasional happenings. - -I then—and that led to the complete and final break between Hitler and -myself—a few weeks after I had received this order, if I may call it -so, received a strange invitation for myself and my wife to spend some -time on the Berghof. At that time I innocently believed that Hitler -wished to bridge the gap between us and to let me know, in one way or -another, that he had gone too far. In any case, at the end of a 3 days’ -visit—I cut my stay short—I discovered that this was a fundamental -error on my part. Here I will limit myself to a few points only. I had -intended—and I also carried out my intention—to mention at least three -points during my visit. One was the policy toward Russia, the second was -the Jewish question, and the third was Hitler’s attitude toward Vienna. - -I must state, to begin with, that Bormann had issued a decree addressed -to me, and probably to all the other Gauleiters, prohibiting any -intervention on our part in the Jewish question. That is to say, we -could not intervene with Hitler in favor of any Jew or half-Jew. That -too was stated in the decree. I have to mention this, since it makes -matters clearer. - -On the first evening of my stay at the Berghof, on what appeared to me a -propitious occasion, I told Hitler that I was of the opinion that a free -and autonomous Ukraine would serve the Reich better than a Ukraine ruled -by the violence of Herr Koch. That was all I said, nothing more, nothing -less. Knowing Hitler as I did, it was extremely difficult even to hazard -such a remark. Hitler answered comparatively quietly but with pronounced -sharpness. On the same evening, or possibly the next one, the Jewish -question was broached according to a plan I made with my wife. Since I -was forbidden to mention these things even in conversation, my wife gave -the Führer a description of an experience she had had in Holland. She -had witnessed one night, from the bedroom of her hotel, the deportation -of Jewish women by the Gestapo. We were both of the opinion that this -experience during her journey and the description of it might possibly -result in a change of Hitler’s attitude toward the entire Jewish -question and in the treatment of the Jews. My wife gave a very drastic -description, a description such as we can now read in the papers. Hitler -was silent. All the other witnesses to this conversation, including my -own father-in-law, Professor Hoffmann, were also silent. The silence was -icy, and after a short time Hitler merely said, “This is pure -sentimentality.” That was all. No further conversation took place that -evening. Hitler retired earlier than usual. I was under the impression -that a perfectly untenable situation had now arisen. Then the men of -Hitler’s entourage told my father-in-law that from now on I would have -to fear for my safety. I endeavored to get away from the Berghof as -quickly as possible without letting matters come to an open break, but I -did not succeed. - -Then Goebbels arrived on the next evening and there, in my presence and -without my starting it, the subject of Vienna was broached. I was -naturally compelled to protest against the statements which Goebbels at -first made about the Viennese. Then the Führer began with, I might say, -incredible and unlimited hatred to speak against the people of Vienna. I -have to admit, here and now, that even if the people of Vienna are -cursing me today, I have always felt very friendly toward them. I have -felt closely attached to those people. I will not say more than that -Joseph Weinheber was one of my closest friends. During that discussion, -I, in accordance with my duty and my feelings, spoke in favor of the -people under my authority in Vienna. - -At 4 o’clock in the morning, among other things, Hitler suddenly said, -something which I should now like to repeat for historical reasons. He -said, “Vienna should never have been admitted into the Union of Greater -Germany.” Hitler never loved Vienna. He hated its people. I believe that -he had a liking for the city because he appreciated the architectural -design of the buildings on the Ring. But everybody who knows Vienna -knows that the true Vienna is architecturally Gothic, and that the -buildings on the Ring are not really representative. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I consider that this subject has little to do with -the Indictment—please adhere to the Indictment. - -VON SCHIRACH: I shall now conclude. I only want to say that so total a -break resulted from that discussion—or, rather explosion—of Hitler’s -that on that very night at about 0430 I took my leave and left the -Berghof a few hours later. Since then I had no further conversations -with Hitler. - -I must now refer to something else in this connection. Reich Marshal -Göring, in the witness box, mentioned a letter of mine which Hitler had -shown him, and Herr Von Ribbentrop has stated here that he was present -at a conversation during which Himmler suggested to Hitler that I be -indicted before the People’s Court, which meant in reality that I should -be hanged. I must add one thing more: What Göring said about this letter -is mainly true. I wrote in quite a proper manner about family relations -in that letter. I also wrote one sentence to the effect that I -considered war with America a disaster. - -DR. SAUTER: When was that letter written? - -VON SCHIRACH: 1943, shortly after my stay at the Berghof. That statement -contained nothing special, since Hitler even without... - -THE PRESIDENT: He hasn’t given the date of his stay at the Berghof yet. - -DR. SAUTER: He has said 1943, Mr. President. He has just said 1943. - -THE PRESIDENT: There are 12 months in 1943. - -DR. SAUTER: I believe you ought to give us the month. - -VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the conversation on the Berghof was in the -spring, and that the letter, though I cannot tell you precisely when, -was written in the summer. - -DR. SAUTER: Summer of 1943? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, 1943; but I could not say precisely when the letter -was written. The letter was correct. It was written by hand, and no -secretary read it. It went by courier to the head of the State. - -DR. SAUTER: To Hitler personally? - -VON SCHIRACH: To Hitler. It is also possible that it was addressed in -care of Bormann. I cannot remember exactly. It went by courier, and that -letter contained nothing else but the clarification required for -replying to questions put to me in a circular which Göring mentioned in -his statement here. That letter caused Hitler to have an absolute -loathing for me; and at about the same time a file was started against -me in the Reich Security Main Office. That was due to the fact that I -had described in a small circle of political leaders—of high-ranking -political leaders—the foreign political situation such as I saw it, as -I was accustomed to do from the days of my youth. One of these leaders -was an SS intelligence officer and reported what I said, and then the -file was started. The material was compiled in order to eventually bring -me to trial. That I was never brought to trial I owe solely and -exclusively to the circumstance that both in the Army and at home my -comrades from the Youth Leadership stood solidly behind me, and any -proceedings against me would have led to trouble. After 20 July 1944 my -situation became very precarious. My friends in the Army, therefore, -placed a company of hand-picked men at my disposal. They were under the -orders of the former adjutant of Generaloberst Fromm. The company was -directly subordinate to me. It took over the protection of my person and -remained with me to the end. - -DR. SAUTER: Was that company of the Wehrmacht, which you have just -mentioned, placed at your disposal in place of the police protection -previously afforded you? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have to refer once more to your Vienna speech of -September 1942. In that speech you speak of the deportation of tens of -thousands of Jews to the Eastern ghetto. You did not speak about the -extermination or the murder of the Jews. When did you discover that -Hitler’s plan aimed at extermination or destruction? - -VON SCHIRACH: Counsel, if I at that time had known anything about the -destruction—that is the extermination of the Jews—I would not be -sitting here today. As far as I can recall, I heard about an -extermination of the Jews for the first time through the following -incident. - -Dr. Ross came to see me... - -DR. SAUTER: Who? - -VON SCHIRACH: Dr. Colin Ross came to Vienna in 1944 and told me that he -had received information, via the foreign press, that mass murders of -Jews had been perpetrated on a large scale in the East. I then attempted -to find out all I could. What I did discover was that in the Warthegau -executions of Jews were carried out in gas vans. These shootings in the -East... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, what was the Gau that he spoke of? The Wart -Gau? - -DR. SAUTER: The Warthegau, My Lord. - -VON SCHIRACH: The Warthegau. - -DR. SAUTER: That is a Gau, a district on the Polish border. That is an -area in the east of Germany,—W-a-r-t-h-e-g-a-u—in the west of Poland, -near Silesia. - -Please, Witness, will you continue briefly: - -VON SCHIRACH: The executions, the shootings on Russian territory, -mentioned in the documents submitted in the course of the -cross-examination in the Kaltenbrunner case, were not known to me at -that time. But at a later date—it was before 1944—I heard about -shootings in the ghettos of the Russian area and connected this with -developments on the front, since I thought of possible armed uprisings -in the ghettos. I knew nothing of the organized annihilation which has -been described to us in the Trial. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, if I have heard you correctly, you were informed about -these events for the first time in 1944 by your friend, Dr. Colin Ross, -who knew it from reports in the foreign papers? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you still remember the month? - -VON SCHIRACH: That I cannot say. - -DR. SAUTER: In any case it would be in 1944? - -VON SCHIRACH: That again I cannot say. But I believe I have to explain -something more about it. I asked myself what can one do to prevent it? -And I still ask myself, day after day, what did I do to prevent it? I -can only answer practically nothing, since from 1943 on I was -politically dead. Beyond what I had attempted in 1943 on the Berghof, I -could do nothing at all. - -DR. SAUTER: Nothing? - -VON SCHIRACH: Nothing. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I should in this connection like to ask you a -question of principle. You admitted yesterday that you had become an -anti-Semite—and that is according to your conception—in your very -early youth. You have, in the interim, heard the testimony of Hoess, the -Auschwitz commander, who informed us that in that camp alone, I believe, -2,500,000 to 3,000,000 innocent people, mostly Jews, had been done to -death. What, today, does the name of Auschwitz convey to you? - -VON SCHIRACH: It is the greatest, the most devilish mass murder known to -history. But that murder was not committed by Hoess; Hoess was merely -the executioner. The murder was ordered by Adolf Hitler, as is obvious -from his last will and testament. The will is genuine. I have held the -photostat copy of that will in my hands. He and Himmler jointly -committed that crime which, for all time, will be a stain in the annals -of our history. It is a crime which fills every German with shame. - -The youth of Germany is guiltless. Our youth was anti-Semitically -inclined, but it did not call for the extermination of Jewry. It neither -realized nor imagined that Hitler had carried out this extermination by -the daily murder of thousands of innocent people. The youth of Germany -who, today, stand perplexed among the ruins of their native land, knew -nothing of these crimes, nor did they desire them. They are innocent of -all that Hitler has done to the Jewish and to the German people. - -I should like to say the following in connection with Hoess’ case. I -have educated this generation in faith and loyalty to Hitler. The Youth -Organization which I built up bore his name. I believed that I was -serving a leader who would make our people and the youth of our country -great and happy and free. Millions of young people believed this, -together with me, and saw their ultimate ideal in National Socialism. -Many died for it. Before God, before the German nation, and before my -German people I alone bear the guilt of having trained our young people -for a man whom I for many long years had considered unimpeachable, both -as a leader and as the head of the State, of creating for him a -generation who saw him as I did. The guilt is mine in that I educated -the youth of Germany for a man who murdered by the millions. I believed -in this man, that is all I can say for my excuse and for the -characterization of my attitude. This is my own—my own personal guilt. -I was responsible for the youth of the country. I was placed in -authority over the young people, and the guilt is mine alone. The -younger generation is guiltless. It grew up in an anti-Semitic state, -ruled by anti-Semitic laws. Our youth was bound by these laws and saw -nothing criminal in racial politics. But if anti-Semitism and racial -laws could lead to an Auschwitz, then Auschwitz must mark the end of -racial politics and the death of anti-Semitism. Hitler is dead. I never -betrayed him; I never tried to overthrow him; I remained true to my oath -as an officer, a youth leader, and an official. I was no blind -collaborator of his; neither was I an opportunist. I was a convinced -National Socialist from my earliest days—as such, I was also an -anti-Semite. Hitler’s racial policy was a crime which led to disaster -for 5,000,000 Jews and for all the Germans. The younger generation bears -no guilt. But he who, after Auschwitz, still clings to racial politics -has rendered himself guilty. - -That is what I consider my duty to state in connection with the Hoess -case. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, is this perhaps a convenient moment to break -off? - -THE PRESIDENT: How long is the defendant’s examination going to -continue, Dr. Sauter? - -DR. SAUTER: I believe it will take about 1 hour. - -THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear that. - -DR. SAUTER: I believe it will take about one more hour—an hour at the -most. Did you hear me, Mr. President? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I hear you now. We have been hearing you for a very -long time now. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, after this declaration by the Defendant Von -Schirach I would gladly dispense with all further questions, but the -Prosecution have brought definite accusations against this defendant and -I fear that, if he does not briefly voice an opinion on the subject, -these accusations would be considered as tacitly accepted. I shall try -to be as brief as possible. - -Witness, you have just described the impressions you had gathered from -the proceedings of the Tribunal. Have you yourself ever visited a -concentration camp? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: When, and for what reason? - -VON SCHIRACH: As the witness Höllriegel has testified before this -Tribunal, I visited Mauthausen Concentration Camp in 1942. The testimony -given by another witness, Marsalek, to the effect that this visit took -place in 1944, is incorrect. I also mentioned it when I was interned, in -June 1945 and in the course of my preliminary interrogation in -Nuremberg. - -DR. SAUTER: Prior to Höllriegel’s testimony? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through “interned in June 1940.” Is -that right? - -DR. SAUTER: 1945, Herr Von Schirach, not 1940? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I went into voluntary internment in 1945. - -DR. SAUTER: Then you can confidently state that you visited Mauthausen -in 1942? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: For what reason and how... - -VON SCHIRACH: There had been a session... - -DR. SAUTER: Just one moment... - -THE PRESIDENT: What does he mean by “voluntary internment”? - -DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Von Schirach was, at that time, living in the -Tyrol under an assumed name, and in the place where he lived—perhaps -Defendant Schirach can himself, but very briefly, tell us how this -voluntary internment came about. - -VON SCHIRACH: I was then still at liberty and I sent a letter, through -my adjutant, to the local American commander, stating that I should like -to surrender voluntarily in order to be tried by an Allied court. That -was in June 1945. The CIC officer who later discovered where I lived -told me that I might have stayed there a good time longer. I personally -am convinced that I could have remained in hiding there, and elsewhere, -for years—as long as I wished. - -DR. SAUTER: Herr Von Schirach, we shall now revert to your visit to -Mauthausen, which you said with certainty and under oath took place in -1942. Is this right? - -VON SCHIRACH: I believe the date given by witness Höllriegel is correct. -I quite definitely know that the date given by Marsalek is not correct. - -DR. SAUTER: Then it was not in 1944? - -VON SCHIRACH: Probably 1942. I therefore confirm Höllriegel’s testimony. -There was a meeting at Linz at which various departments of the Ostmark -participated. There were conferences on economic or agrarian problems, -and in the late afternoon we went to Mauthausen Concentration Camp at -the request of Gauleiter Eigruber. At the time I was rather surprised -that the Gauleiter was even in a position to invite us there. I assumed -that he had previously been in touch with the SS offices, and that the -reason for Eigruber’s invitation was that he wished to erect a rifle -factory or something of the kind there. At any rate, though I can no -longer remember exactly, it was somehow connected with the production of -the Steyr Works. - -DR. SAUTER: Who showed you about and what did you see? - -VON SCHIRACH: We were shown about by the camp commandant. - -DR. SAUTER: Whose name was? - -VON SCHIRACH: His name—as has already been mentioned here—was Ziereis, -or something of the kind. - -DR. SAUTER: SS leader? - -VON SCHIRACH: SS Camp Commandant. And I should now like to give you my -first impressions. The camp area was very large. I immediately asked how -many internees there were. I believe I was told 15,000 or 20,000. At any -rate, the figure varied between 15,000 and 20,000. I asked what kind of -internees were imprisoned there and received the reply I was always -given whenever I inquired about concentration camps—namely, that -two-thirds of the inmates were dangerous criminals collected from the -prisons and penitentiaries and brought to work in the camp; that the -remaining third was allegedly composed of political prisoners and people -guilty of high treason and betrayal of their country, who, it is a fact, -are treated with exceptional severity in wartime. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you, in this camp, convince yourself as to the nature of -the treatment meted out to the prisoners, accommodations, the food -situation, _et cetera_? - -VON SCHIRACH: I witnessed one food distribution and gained the -impression that, for camp conditions, the food ration was both normal -and adequate. I then visited the large quarry, once famous and now -notorious, where the construction stone for Vienna had been quarried for -centuries. There was no work going on at the quarry since the working -day had come to an end, but I did, however, visit the works where the -stone was cut. I saw a building with an exceptionally well-equipped -dental clinic. This clinic was shown to me because I had questioned -Ziereis about the medical assistance afforded in the camp. I would add -that, during this visit, I asked in general the same questions which I -had been used to ask during all my visits to the camps of the youth -organizations—that is, questions pertaining to food, medical aid, the -number of people in the camp, _et cetera_. - -I was then taken to a large room in which music was being played by the -prisoners. They had gathered together quite a large symphony orchestra, -and I was told that on holiday evenings they could amuse themselves, -each man according to his own tastes. In this case, for instance, the -prisoners who wished to make music assembled in that room. A tenor was -singing on that occasion—I remember that particularly. - -I then inquired about the mortality rate and was shown a room with three -corpses in it. I cannot tell you here and now, under oath, whether I saw -any crematorium or not. Marsalek has testified to that effect. I would -not, however, have been surprised if there had been a crematorium or a -cemetery in so large a place, so far removed from the city. That would -be a matter of course. - -DR. SAUTER: Herr Von Schirach, during this official visit under the -guidance of Camp Commandant Ziereis, did you discover anything at all -about any ill-treatment, or atrocities, or of the tortures which were -allegedly inflicted in the camp? You can answer the question -briefly—possibly with “yes” or “no.” - -VON SCHIRACH: Had that been the case, I would of course have endeavored -to do something about it. But I was under the impression that everything -was in order. I looked at the inmates, for instance, and I remember -seeing, among others, the famous middle-distance runner Peltzer, who was -known as a sexual pervert. He had been punished because he had, on -innumerable occasions, freely committed sexual offences against youths -in his charge in a country school. - -I asked Ziereis, “How does one ever get out of these concentration -camps? Do you also release people continuously?” In reply he had four or -five inmates brought to me who, according, to him, were to be released -the very next day. He asked them in my presence, “Have you packed -everything, and have you prepared everything for your release?”—to -which, beaming with joy, they answered, “Yes.” - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, can you remember whether on this occasion you also -asked Camp Commander Ziereis whether political prisoners from your -Vienna district—that is, from the city of Vienna—were interned in the -camp? And did you then have a group of political prisoners from Vienna -brought before you? - -VON SCHIRACH: You have already, Counsel, put this question to me during -an interview, and I can only tell you the following under oath: I cannot -remember, but you may take it for granted that, on an occasion of this -kind, I would certainly ask after prisoners from my own Gau. But I -cannot remember. Herr Marsalek mentioned it in his testimony, and I -consider it probable. - -I should, in connection with this visit, like to add the following: I -have always been rather hampered in my recollections of Mauthausen... - -DR. SAUTER: What hampered you? - -VON SCHIRACH: After May 1945 I heard innumerable radio reports on -Mauthausen and other concentration camps, and I read everything I -could lay my hands on in the way of written reports about -Mauthausen—everything that appeared in the press—and I always pondered -on the question, “Did you see anything there which might have pointed to -a mass destruction of human beings?” I was, for instance, reading the -other day about running belts for the conveyance of corpses. I did not -see them. - -I must add that I also visited Dachau; I must not forget that. In 1935, -together with the entire Party leadership group, I paid a visit to -Dachau from Munich. This visit was a result of the objections against -existing preventive custody measures expressed by certain political -leaders to the Deputy of the Führer Hess who, in turn, passed these -objections on to Himmler who subsequently sent out an invitation to -inspect Dachau. I believe that there were, at that time, 800 or 1,000 -internees at Dachau. - -I did not participate in the entire official visit for I was conversing -with some of the Gauleiter who were being shown about the camp. I saw -quite excellent living quarters at Dachau and, because the subject -interested me particularly, I was shown the building which housed the -camp library. I saw that there were also good medical facilities. -Then—and I believe this fact is worthy of mention—after the visit I -spoke with many Gau- and Reichsleiter about the impression they had -formed of Dachau. All impressions gained were to the effect that all -doubts as to Himmler’s preventive custody measures were definitely -dispersed, and everybody said that the internees in the camp were, on -the whole, better accommodated than they would have been in a state -prison. Such was my impression of Dachau in 1935, and I must say that -ever since that visit my mind was far more at ease regarding conditions -in the concentration camps. In conclusion, I feel I must add the -following: - -Up to the moment of the final collapse I firmly believed that we had -20,000 people in the Mauthausen Camp, 10,000 at Oranienburg and -Dachau—two more large camps whose existence was known to me and one of -which I had visited—and possibly 10,000 more at Buchenwald, near -Weimar, a camp I knew by name but which I had never visited. I therefore -concluded that we had roughly 50,000 people in the German camps, of -which I firmly believed that two-thirds were habitual criminals, -convicts, and sexual perverts, and one-third consisted of political -prisoners. And I had arrived at this conclusion primarily because I -myself have never sent a single soul to the concentration camps and -nourished the illusion that others had acted as I did. I could not even -imagine, when I heard of it—immediately after the collapse—that -hundreds of thousands of people in Germany were considered political -offenders. - -There is something else to be said on the whole question of the -concentration camps. The poet Hans Carossa has deposed an affidavit for -me, and this affidavit contains a passage about a publisher whom I had -liberated from a concentration camp. I wish to mention this because it -is one of many typical cases where one exerted one’s entire influence to -have a man freed from a concentration camp, but then he never tells you -afterwards how he fared in the camp. In the course of the years, I have -received many letters from people having relatives in the concentration -camps. By establishing, in Vienna, a fixed day on which audience was -granted to anybody from the population who wished to speak to me, I was -able to talk to thousands of people from every class and standing. - -On one such occasion I was approached by someone who requested me -personally to free some friend or relative in a concentration camp. In -cases like that I usually wrote a letter to the Reich Security Main -Office—at first to Herr Heydrich and later to Herr Kaltenbrunner—and -after some time I would be informed that the internee in question had or -had not been released, according to the gravity of the charges brought -against him. But the internees released never told me their experiences -in the camp. One never saw anybody who had been ill-treated in the -camps, and that is why I myself, and many others in Germany with me, was -never able to visualize conditions in the concentration camps at all. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, this affidavit of the poet Hans Carossa, just -mentioned by the defendant, is Document Number Schirach 3(a). I repeat, -Schirach 3(a) of the Schirach document book. It is a sworn affidavit by -the poet Carossa, and I ask the Tribunal to put the entire contents of -the document into the evidence. In the last paragraph, mention is made -of the case about which the defendant has just been speaking—that is, -the liberation of a publisher named Suhrkamp from a concentration camp. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the page of it? - -DR. SAUTER: Page 25 of the document book, Document Number Schirach -3(a)—Hans Carossa. The remainder of this document deals with the humane -impression Dr. Carossa received of the defendant, and with Defendant Von -Schirach’s solicitude for the victims of political persecution. - -Witness, how many concentration camps did you know anything about? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have just enumerated them: Oranienburg, Dachau, -Buchenwald, and Mauthausen. - -DR. SAUTER: Was there a concentration camp in your own Gau? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -DR. SAUTER: In connection with this entire group of questions on the -treatment of the Jews, I turn to orders allegedly issued in your -presence to the camp commandant of Mauthausen in March 1945. It is -Document Number 3870-PS, submitted by the Prosecution. According to this -document, Himmler in March 1945 is supposed to have issued a directive -to the effect that the Jews from the Southeast Wall were to be sent on -foot to Mauthausen. Did you have anything at all to do with this? - -VON SCHIRACH: I can tell you exactly from memory what Himmler said at -that time. - -Himmler came to Vienna towards the middle, or the end of March, to talk -to the Commander of Army Group South. On this occasion—the Commander of -Army Group South was, of course, not stationed in Vienna, he had ordered -all the Reichsstatthalter of the Ostmark up to Vienna and granted them -full authority to enforce martial law in the future, since Vienna and -some of the other Ostmark Gaue had by that time become almost front-line -zones. At this conference Himmler told his adjutant to call Ziereis in, -while the papers for full powers were being typed in the next room. That -is how I came to meet Ziereis for the second time in my life. - -And now Himmler did not, as Marsalek said, tell Ziereis that the Jews -were to be marched on foot from the Southeast Wall to Mauthausen, but he -did say something else which surprised me enormously. He said: - - “I want the Jews now employed in industry to be taken by boat, - or by bus if possible, under the most favorable food conditions - and with medical care, _et cetera_, to Linz or Mauthausen.” - -I do not quite remember whether he said they should be taken to -Mauthausen, but he also said to Ziereis: - - “Please take care of these Jews and treat them well; they are my - most valuable assets.” - -From this declaration I assumed, in the very beginning—it was my very -first, fleeting impression—that Himmler wished to deceive me in some -way or another, and then it became clear to me that with these -instructions he was following certain foreign political intentions, in -the last moments of the war, in emphasizing the excellent treatment of -the Jews. - -What Marsalek therefore said about making them go on foot is not -correct. As I have already mentioned, Himmler, under all circumstances, -wanted the best possible treatment to be given to the Jews. I gained the -impression—and later on it was confirmed by other things we heard—that -he wished, at the last minute, to somehow redeem himself with this -treatment of the Jews. - -DR. SAUTER: That was the end of March 1945? - -VON SCHIRACH: That was the end of March 1945, on the occasion when -authority to apply martial law was granted to the Statthalter of the -Ostmark. - -DR. SAUTER: Therefore, immediately before the collapse? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: In connection with your activities in Vienna there is also -an accusation, Witness, brought against you by the Prosecution, to the -effect that you participated in the persecution of the Church. This -accusation is supported exclusively as far as I can see by Document -Number R-146. I repeat, R-146, which has already been submitted by the -Prosecution. - -This, Witness, is a letter addressed by the witness, Dr. Lammers, who -has been heard before the Tribunal, to the Reich Minister of the -Interior, dated 14 March 1941, and further, a circular from Bormann, -addressed to all the Gauleiter, dated 20 March 1941. - -I should like to hear your comments on both of these letters, especially -since Dr. Lammers’ letter speaks of property belonging to enemies of the -people and the state, whereas in Bormann’s circular of 20 March 1941 -mention is made of the confiscation of Church property—monastic -property—_et cetera_. Do you know what led to these letters, and what -part did you yourself play in the matter? - -VON SCHIRACH: The document written by Dr. Lammers is correct. Bormann’s -covering letter referred to Church property; I referred to property -belonging to enemies of the people and the State, for that was a -technical expression at the time. I should like to mention in this -matter that when I came to Vienna in 1940 the confiscation of such -property was already in full swing; an argument had arisen on the -subject between the Gauleiter and the Reich Minister for Finance. The -Reich Minister for Finance wanted the confiscated property taken over by -the Reich, while I considered that this property should remain -fundamentally the possession of the Gaue. - -So far as I can remember, I was involved in this question only through -the following confiscations: Prince Schwarzenberg possessed property, -the greater part of which lay in the region of the Upper Danube; the -smaller part was the famous Vienna Palace. Now this Prince Schwarzenberg -had refused, in the presence of some German consul general, or consul -abroad, to return to Germany and serve in the Army. Thereupon his -property was confiscated. In the interest of the Reich I endeavored to -maintain this property for the Vienna Reich Gau and to prevent it from -passing over to the Reich. I have no files before me, so I cannot from -memory give you any information about other, similar actions. - -I am not responsible for confiscations in the other Austrian Gaue. But I -may state one thing here—namely, that I put an end to all confiscations -throughout the entire Reich. When, through an intermediary, women from -an Austrian convent appealed to me for help, I asked my father-in-law to -act behind Bormann’s back and explain to Hitler the disastrous political -effects which these confiscations would have and to beg him to issue a -direct order for their suppression. This was achieved, and when the -order was put through, Bormann turned against my father-in-law as well. -From then on I never had any further opportunity to bring this question -to the Führer’s notice. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have not, so far, quite explained your attitude -toward Dr. Lammers’ letter of 14 March 1941. To refresh your memory I -should like to read out the first sentence of that letter. This letter -of Lammers’ dated 14 March 1941, Document Number R-146, states, and I -quote: - - “The Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Von Schirach, together with - Dr. Jury and Eigruber, has recently complained to the Führer - that the Reich Minister for Finance is still of the opinion that - the seizure of property belonging to enemies of the state and - people should be effected in favor of the Reich, and not in - favor of the Reich Gau.” - -Thus runs the quotation. - -And because of this incident the Prosecution have accused you of -participating in the persecution of the Church in Vienna. I must request -you to tell us what you really did do in the matter. - -VON SCHIRACH: Well, the Church in Vienna had actually been persecuted -under my predecessor, Bürckel, and this can be proved. I mentioned -yesterday the demonstrations before the Archbishop’s Palace. But from -the day of my arrival in Vienna, anti-Church demonstrations in the -nature of a political agitation no longer took place. Immediately upon -my arrival I gathered all the political officials and all my other -colleagues of the Gau and demanded that they should never, either in -writing or by word of mouth, express anything likely to offend the -religious sentiments of other people. I believe that this is a fact -which was gratefully noted by the entire population of Vienna. From that -day on there were no further actions against the Church. Just how much -Church property, though, was called in in compliance with the law for -special war contributions, a law which likewise applied to other -property—I cannot tell you without documentary evidence. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, we can see from this document that you must have -spoken on the subject to Hitler personally... - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: ...because it states that the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter Von -Schirach complained to Hitler on the subject. You have not said anything -to us about that so far. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I myself, during a visit by Hitler to Vienna where he -signed a southeast pact, told him I was of the opinion that the property -confiscated belonged to the Gaue and not to the Reich. That was my point -of view and one which I believed to be entirely correct. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Indictment further accuses you of having had -some kind of connection with the SS, thereby promoting the SS, _et -cetera_. Were you yourself ever a member of the SS? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Did Himmler, the leader of the SS, have any influence over -the youth organizations and over the education of the young people? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Were the replacements in the SS, especially in the SS -Leadership Corps, recruited from the HJ, and if so, why? - -VON SCHIRACH: The replacements in all the leadership corps in Germany -were recruited from the youth. Our youth organization was a state -institution. You now are probably referring to an agreement which I had -with Himmler on the patrol services? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, that too plays a part in this connection. - -VON SCHIRACH: Agreements of that sort... - -DR. SAUTER: Just one more moment, Herr Von Schirach. This agreement is -entered in the documents of the Prosecution as Number 2396-PS. I repeat -2396-PS, in which a special statement occurs—and I should appreciate -your comments on the subject—to the effect that the SS received their -replacements from the patrol service of the HJ, allegedly by an -agreement of October 1938. Please tell us about it and explain to us -what actually was this patrol service. - -VON SCHIRACH: The patrol service was one of the special units of the HJ -which I forgot to mention yesterday. The patrol service was a youth -service for keeping order. It consisted of outstandingly decent lads who -had no police duties—I now refer to documentary reports which I -procured—but who had to supervise the general behavior of the young -people, examine their uniforms, control the visits of the boys to the -taverns; and it was their duty to inspect the HJ hostels for cleanliness -and neatness, to supervise the hiking expeditions of the young people -and the youth hostelries in the country. They stood guard and were on -order duty at mass meetings and demonstrations. They watched over -encampments and accompanied the convoys. They were employed in the -search for youths who were lost. They gave advice to traveling youth, -attended to station service, were supposed to protect young people from -criminal elements, and, above all, to protect national property—that -is, woods, fields, for instance—and to see that they were safe from -fires, _et cetera_. - -Since Himmler might make trouble for this section of the youth -organization, I was interested in having the Police recognize my patrol -service; for in my idea of the State youth as a youth state, the Police -should not be employed against the youth, but these young people should -keep order among themselves. That this principle was a sound one can be -judged from the immense decline in juvenile delinquency from 1933 up to -the outbreak of the war. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness... - -VON SCHIRACH: One moment, I have not yet finished. After this -agreement... - -THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Sauter, we have heard enough about this unit. -The whole point of the document was that they were used for recruiting -for the SS, wasn’t it? That is the complaint of the Prosecution. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, the patrol service... - -THE PRESIDENT: We have heard, at considerable length the description of -what they did in the way of the protection of the youth. Surely we have -heard enough about that. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, these so-called special units were specially -mentioned by the Prosecution as a means for preparation for war—that -is, as a means for the military training of the young people. In this -connection all these special units were mentioned, and therefore we -considered it necessary that the defendant inform you what this patrol -service really was. But I can, Mr. President, set this topic aside -immediately. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have heard what they were at some considerable length. - -DR. SAUTER: Very well. - -Witness, from which departments did the SS mainly recruit its leader -replacements? - -VON SCHIRACH: In order to assure its leader replacements, the SS founded -its own training schools which were entirely outside my influence. They -were the so-called National Socialist Training Institutes. - -DR. SAUTER: In connection with the SS, the Prosecution, Witness, -mentioned a further agreement between you and Reichsführer SS Himmler, -an agreement of December 1938, submitted as Document Number 2567-PS, the -so-called “Landdienst” of the HJ. Why was this agreement concluded with -the Reichsführer SS? - -VON SCHIRACH: It is very hard to give a brief answer. The Reichsführer -SS was a farmer with an agronomical degree. In his student days he had -belonged to the so-called “Artaman Movement,” whose program it was to -prevent the flight from the land, and he was particularly keen to -collaborate within the SS with the farm labor service groups of the HJ -who were doing the same work as the “Artaman” groups in the past. - -In conclusion, I should like to say about the “Landdienst” and the -patrol service, that no coercion was ever brought to bear on the young -people to enter the SS. Any lad from the patrol service was, of course, -free to become a member of the SA or of the NSKK—and frequently did -so—or else become a political leader just like any other boy from the -farm labor service or the Hitler Youth. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Indictment states, _inter alia_, that a -directive was addressed to the political leaders demanding that the -Hitler Youth Leaders—that is, the leaders subordinate to you—be -employed on their staffs. What can you say to that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I can only say in reply that this is one of many attempts -by the Party Chancellery to bring the Youth Leadership into the -political leadership. The practical result of the directive was that a -number of youth leaders were given insignificant duties as adjutants. -They complained to me, and I withdrew them from these posts. It is a -historical fact that in Germany there was no real flow of people from -the youth organization into the political leadership. I can personally -name those youth leaders who came into the political leadership, there -were so few of them. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Soviet Prosecution have submitted a document, -Document Number USSR-6, which is a report from the Lemberg Commission. -Herein the following fact is mentioned. A French woman, Ida Vasseau, the -head of an asylum for old people in Lemberg, testified in writing—I am -only quoting the gist of the affidavit—that ghetto children were handed -over as presents to the Hitler Youth and that these children were then -used as living targets by the HJ for their drill practice. In all the -time that you were active in the Reich Youth Leadership, did you ever -hear of such misdemeanors or excesses? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. We are dealing here with the first and, so far, the -only accusation of crimes committed by the HJ which has been brought to -my notice. There were no HJ commandos, either in the East or in the -West, capable of committing such crimes. I consider the statements in -this affidavit as absolutely untrue, and that is all I can say on the -matter. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, in the course of his examination your -fellow-Defendant, Dr. Schacht, mentioned that a suggestion had been made -in his time to Mr. Eden, to divest the SS, the SA, and the HJ of their -military character if the other powers would consent to disarm. What do -you know of such proposals or negotiations? - -VON SCHIRACH: I know of no such offer, as far as the Hitler Youth is -concerned. I consider it entirely out of the question that any such -offer could have been received by Mr. Eden regarding the HJ; for Hitler -himself did not consider the HJ as a military or even a semimilitary -organization. The disarming of the HJ could factually never have taken -place since the only weapon carried by the Hitler Youth was the camping -knife, the equivalent of a Boy Scout’s bowie knife of the Jungvolk -Pimpfe (boys of 10-14 years of age). - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution further charge that you, in 1933, -concluded an agreement with the VDA—an abbreviation for the “Verein für -das Deutschtum im Ausland.” Is that true? And what was your intention in -concluding this agreement? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is true. I do not wish to express an opinion on the -aims and objects of the VDA. I believe that counsel for the Defendant -Frick has already done so. I refer to these statements and merely state -that it was my perfectly natural wish to incorporate in the HJ the -numerically powerful group of lads belonging to the VDA. The majority of -these youths, moreover, had graduated from the public schools, and it -was my second intention to place some of my collaborators on the board -of the VDA so as to be currently informed about the young people abroad. - -DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution further accuse you of having founded the -so-called Adolf Hitler Schools where the training of young leaders for -the National Socialist State and for the Party was carried out. What -have you to say to this accusation? - -VON SCHIRACH: There is a lot that I could say about that accusation, but -I shall limit myself to essential remarks only. - -The Adolf Hitler Schools were founded as scholastic units of the HJ. -They were founded with the means which Dr. Ley placed at my disposal -when I told him of my plans for the training I had envisaged. These -schools were not intended to train leaders for the Party exclusively but -served to prepare the youth for all the professions. I myself often -talked to these boys on their graduation and I always told them “You can -choose any profession you like. Your training in this school carries no -obligation, either moral or otherwise, to become a political leader.” -_De facto_, relatively few political leaders emerged from the Adolf -Hitler Schools. Very many of the boys became doctors, officials, _et -cetera_. I cannot quote any figures from memory, but the communications -I have received from the young people, including statements from -teachers in the Adolf Hitler Schools, show their attitude towards this -point of the Indictment. And I should like to ask that at least 50 to 60 -of these numerous affidavits, which confirm all that I have said, be -submitted in support of my declarations. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, one more question on a different topic. Did you -ever receive any so-called endowment funds, or anything of that kind, -from Hitler or from other sources? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I never received any endowment funds. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you ever receive gifts in kind, such as valuable -paintings or other costly gifts? - -VON SCHIRACH: The only thing Hitler ever gave me was his photograph on -the occasion of my thirtieth birthday. - -DR. SAUTER: His photograph—presumably with a few words of dedication? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Now I have a few final, very brief questions to ask -you—they refer to the last days of your activities in Vienna. You have -already mentioned, in connection with Himmler’s visit to Vienna at the -end of March 1945, that you had at that time received from Himmler the -so-called authority for the proclamation of martial law. If I have -understood you correctly, you, in your function of Reich Defense -Commissioner, were authorized to convene a drumhead court martial? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and that made me lord of life and death. - -DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, this drumhead court martial was only -supposed to pass death sentences? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you ever convene this drumhead court martial in Vienna, -and did you appoint the members? - -VON SCHIRACH: I appointed the members of the court martial. An -outstanding lawyer was the president. I never convened the drumhead -court martial and I never once imposed a death sentence. If I remember -rightly, the military court martial of the local military commandant -passed four death sentences on four military traitors. My court martial -never met and never passed a death sentence. - -DR. SAUTER: Had you any connection with the military drumhead court -martial? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. The Vienna commandant was, of course, president of -that particular court, and I was the head of court martial “Schirach.” - -DR. SAUTER: You said you had a distinguished lawyer as your president? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: What was his profession? - -VON SCHIRACH: I think he was president of a district court, of something -of the kind. I cannot quite remember; I have forgotten. - -DR. SAUTER: So he was an official Viennese judge? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you give the order, in Vienna, to have certain vitally -important factories either blown up or destroyed as so often happened in -other Gaue, as for instance, here in Nuremberg? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. It has escaped my knowledge, that much I must admit, -how far crippling and destructive measures were executed in the military -and armament sectors, pursuant to direct instructions from the Reich -Government. For instance, the dynamiting of bridges was a military -precaution. The order could never have emanated from me. Hitler reserved -for himself the right to issue the orders for blowing up the bridges -over the Danube. The Chief of Army Group South, Generaloberst Rendulic, -prior to giving the order for blowing up these bridges, had to consult -the Führer’s headquarters by telephone. - -DR. SAUTER: When did you yourself leave Vienna? - -VON SCHIRACH: I left Gau Vienna after the withdrawal of the last troops -from the city and after the command post of the 2d corps of the 6th SS -Panzer Army had been moved to the region of the Lower Danube. - -DR. SAUTER: When was that? - -VON SCHIRACH: That was—sorry, I cannot remember the date offhand. It -was toward the end of the battle for Vienna. - -DR. SAUTER: And now I have one last question to ask you. You know that -the order went out from the Party Leadership and from circles of the -Reich Chancellery to stage a “Werewolf” movement for fighting the -advancing troops. What was your attitude towards this movement? - -VON SCHIRACH: I prohibited any Werewolf organization in my Gau, but to -avoid misunderstandings I must tell you that there was a youth -battalion, a Volkssturm battalion, which bore the name of “Werewolf,” -but there was no Werewolf unit. I invariably refused, both for the young -people and the adults, permission to participate in any form of combat -contrary to the decrees of international law. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel want to -ask any questions? - -DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Witness, what was -the attitude of Rosenberg, as the Führer’s Plenipotentiary for the -Ideological Education of the Party, toward the Reich Youth Leadership? - -VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the Chief of the Department for Ideological -Education in the Reich Youth Leadership had to attend, on an average, -two, perhaps three, meetings per annum, also attended by educational -leaders from other Party organizations. These meetings took place under -the chairmanship of Reichsleiter Rosenberg. On these occasions, as I -have been told by the chief of the department, Rosenberg was wont to lay -down general instructions and directives and ask for reports on the -educational work of the individual organizations. - -DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg select specific subjects to be lectured on at -these meetings? - -VON SCHIRACH: That I do not know for certain. At these meetings of the -Youth Leadership representatives, at which Rosenberg spoke once a year, -he usually selected educational themes, themes dealing with character -training. He would, for instance, speak about solitude and comradeship -and, as far as I remember, about personality, honor, _et cetera_. - -DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg at these meetings mention the Jewish problem -and the confessional question? - -VON SCHIRACH: During these Youth Leadership sessions he never made any -speeches against the Jews, nor did he, as far as I can remember, ever -touch on the subject of the confession—at least, not in my presence. I -usually heard him speak on subjects such as I have just enumerated. - -DR. THOMA: Witness, did you read Rosenberg’s _Myth of the Twentieth -Century_? And if so, when? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I began to read it, but I did not read the whole book. - -DR. THOMA: Did this Rosenberg’s _Myth_ make any impression on the young -people or did other leaders have experiences similar to your own? - -VON SCHIRACH: The youth leaders certainly did not read the _Myth of the -Twentieth Century_. - -DR. THOMA: I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to ask questions? -Or perhaps we had better adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have already stated in connection with -Sauckel’s directive regarding employment of labor that you were flooded -with such directives. Were these directives carried out? - -VON SCHIRACH: As far as my own information goes, I can confirm that. I -had the impression that the functionaries of the labor employment -administration felt that they had to keep strictly to Sauckel’s orders, -and in those industrial plants which I visited I was able to ascertain -that the requirements stated in the directives were in fact fulfilled. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel himself take steps to insure that these -things were carried out? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I remember that Sauckel once came to Vienna—I think -in 1943—and that on that occasion he addressed all his labor employment -functionaries and repeated orally everything which he had stated in his -directives. He spoke of the foreign workers in particular, demanding -just treatment for them; and I remember that on this occasion he even -spoke of putting them on the same footing as German workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have a few more questions about the political leaders. -How were political leaders on the Gauleiter level informed? Did the -Gauleiter have individual interviews with the Führer, especially in -connection with the Gauleiter assemblies? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. After the Gauleiter assemblies the Führer always held -forth in a comparatively large circle just as he did in his speeches. -Interviews in the real sense of the word did not exist. He always made -speeches. Fixed dates on which Gauleiter could have interviews with -Hitler almost ceased to exist once the war had begun. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Could not a Gauleiter approach Hitler personally and ask -for an interview? - -VON SCHIRACH: He could ask for an interview, but he did not get it; he -received an answer from Bormann, usually in the form of a telegram. That -happened to me very frequently, because I made such requests; one was -asked to submit in writing the points one wanted to discuss, after which -one either received an answer or did not receive one. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, a letter has been submitted here as Document -D-728, signed or initialed by Gauleiter Sprenger. You were here when it -was submitted and you know the document. I have two questions concerning -it. - -Do you know anything about a list, which was to be compiled, containing -the names of those suffering from heart and lung diseases, who were to -be removed from the population? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I know nothing about that. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Or that you were to make suggestions for this to the -Führer? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In my opinion that document also contains an error which -has already been mentioned here, namely, the word “Herr” as a form of -address. This letter was addressed to the “Herren Ortsgrüppenleiter,” -and repeated mention is made of the “Herren Kreisleiter and -Ortsgrüppenleiter” in the text. I ask you now if the expression “Herr” -was customary in Party language? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I have never known a Party document with the exception -of this one, which I consider a fraud, in which the term “Herr” was -used. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You are therefore of the opinion that that designation -proves in itself that the document is false? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Herr Von Schirach, your predecessor as Gauleiter was -Josef Bürckel. What sort of relations existed between Bürckel and -Seyss-Inquart? - -VON SCHIRACH: I can only repeat what was generally known in the Party -about relations between them. They were extremely bad, and all of us had -the impression that from the very beginning Bürckel worked hard to push -Seyss-Inquart out. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Which one of the two really had the power in his hands? - -VON SCHIRACH: Bürckel, undoubtedly. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Who, in your opinion and according to the actual -information you obtained from the files, is responsible for the -persecution of Jews in Vienna? - -VON SCHIRACH: Hitler. - -DR. STEINBAUER: All right. You say Hitler; but Hitler was not in Vienna. -Who carried out these orders in Vienna? - -VON SCHIRACH: In my opinion, these orders were carried out—even during -Bürckel’s and Seyss-Inquart’s time—by the same man who has already been -mentioned here once today and who, in the meantime, has been condemned -to death in Vienna—Dr. Brunner. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Good. Are you aware that Seyss-Inquart repeatedly -protested to Bürckel about excessively severe measures and quarreled -with Bürckel on account of that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot say anything about that. I do not know. - -DR. STEINBAUER: My client has been accused in a document of presenting -to Adolf Hitler tapestries, among them Gobelins, formerly in the -Emperor’s possession. Do you know anything about that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I know this: In the large collection of Gobelins in -Vienna, there were two sets depicting Alexander’s victory. The inferior -series was loaned by Reich Governor Seyss-Inquart to the Reich -Chancellery, where it hung in the lobby. - -DR. STEINBAUER: So it was a loan and not a definite gift, which would -have entailed a loss for Vienna? - -VON SCHIRACH: In the catalog of the Gobelin collection this set was -marked as a loan. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Are you aware that other Gobelins were put at the -disposal of the Reich—that is to say, at Adolf Hitler’s disposal—by -Seyss-Inquart? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I was not aware of it. - -DR. STEINBAUER: But maybe you know who did take away other such Gobelins -and tapestries? - -VON SCHIRACH: I assume that you allude to Bürckel. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not know for certain whether Bürckel took Gobelins. -When I took up my appointment in Vienna, I found that Bürckel had taken -from the imperial furniture depot a number of pieces of furniture -including, I believe, some carpets, not for his personal use but for a -Viennese house which he intended to establish in Gau Saarpfalz as a sort -of clubhouse. - -I therefore approached the competent office in Berlin—I do not know -whether it was the Reich Finance Ministry or the Reich Ministry of -Culture—and when I was not successful there, I approached Hitler -himself. In the end I succeeded in having Bürckel ordered to return -these objects to Vienna at once; I cannot say with certainty whether -these objects were in fact returned. I know that he received injunctions -to return them and I assume that these objects were really returned -later. - -DR. STEINBAUER: All right. You know from statements which I have made to -your defense counsel that we Austrians always hated Bürckel intensely -for a number of very good reasons and that in fairness it must be -admitted that many things, including, for instance, the city’s food -supplies, improved after you took over. For this reason it seems to me -all the more important to clear up completely the most serious charge -against you. You have been made responsible in your capacity of Reich -Defense Commissioner for the destruction of the most valuable monuments -in Vienna. I ask you: On 2 April, when your deputy Scharizer and -Engineer Blaschke, the National Socialist mayor, wanted to declare -Vienna an open city as the Red Army approached, did you oppose them and -give orders that Vienna must be defended to the last? Or who gave that -order? - -VON SCHIRACH: Neither Blaschke nor Scharizer expressed the view that -Vienna should be declared an open city. There was... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal understands you are -appearing for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart? - -DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, because this is a War Crime and in the light of -conspiracy he is responsible for everything and the main charge made -against Herr Von Schirach must be clarified—that is, we must find out -who actually gave this order which did so much harm. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, but you just said that you were not asking the -questions in defense of Seyss-Inquart, but in defense of Von Schirach. I -do not think that the Tribunal really ought to have the defense of Von -Schirach prolonged by questions by other counsel. We have already had -his defense for a considerable time presented by Dr. Sauter. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Then I shall not put this question. - -Do you also remember what attitude Seyss-Inquart adopted on Church -matters when dealing with Bürckel? - -VON SCHIRACH: I know only that Dr. Seyss-Inquart, generally speaking, -was considered a man with Church ties. That this brought him into -conflict with Bürckel is quite obvious to me. I cannot go into details. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, we understood you this morning to make a -statement in the nature of a confession with respect to, at least, the -persecution of the Jews; and while that part of it that you gave was -perhaps bravely enough said, I think there is much of it that you -neglected to say, perhaps through oversight. - -Now, I wish you would tell the Tribunal whether or not it is a fact that -your responsibility for young people in Germany under the National -Socialists was fundamentally concerned with making really good National -Socialists out of them, in the sense of making them fanatical political -followers. - -VON SCHIRACH: I considered it my task as educator to bring up the young -people to be good citizens of the National Socialist State. - -MR. DODD: And ardent followers and believers in Hitler and his political -policies? - -VON SCHIRACH: I believe I already said this morning that I educated our -youth to follow Hitler. I do not deny that. - -MR. DODD: All right. And while you said to us that you did not have the -first responsibility for the educational system, I am sure you would not -deny that for all of the other activities with which young people may be -concerned you did have first responsibility? - -VON SCHIRACH: Out-of-school education was my responsibility. - -MR. DODD: And, of course, in the schools the only people who taught -these young people were those who were politically reliable in keeping -with Hitler’s opinions and beliefs and the teachings of National -Socialism? - -VON SCHIRACH: The teaching staffs of German schools were definitely not -homogeneous bodies. A large part of the teaching body belonged to a -generation which had not been educated on National Socialist lines and -did not adhere to National Socialism. The young teachers had been -educated on National Socialist principles. - -MR. DODD: Well, in any event, you are not saying, certainly, that young -people under the public educational system of Germany were not, at all -times, under the guidance of those who were politically reliable, -certainly after the first year or two of the administration of Hitler -and his followers, are you? - -VON SCHIRACH: Would you please repeat the question? I did not quite -understand. - -MR. DODD: What I am trying to say to you is that there is not any doubt -in your mind or in ours that the public school system of Germany was -supervised, for the most part at least, by people who were politically -sound insofar as National Socialism is concerned. - -VON SCHIRACH: I should not care to say that. Educational administration -in Germany was supervised by Reich Minister Rust, who—and this is a -fact—for reasons of ill health took very little interest in his -official duties. Many thousands of older men were employed in connection -with educational administration. They had received their appointments -long before the days of the National Socialist State and had retained -them throughout. - -MR. DODD: I do not care whether they were old or young or how long they -had been in office. They all took an oath to Hitler, did they not? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is correct; inasmuch as they were civil servants, -they all took their oath as such. - -MR. DODD: Rosenberg had a very considerable influence on young people in -Germany, did he not? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe that. I think you are estimating my -Codefendant Rosenberg’s influence on youth quite wrongly—meaning that -you are overestimating it. Rosenberg certainly had some influence on -many people who were interested in philosophical problems and were in a -position to understand his works. But I must dispute the extent of the -influence which you are ascribing to him. - -MR. DODD: You publicly said on one occasion that the way of Rosenberg -was the way of the Hitler Youth, did you not? - -VON SCHIRACH: That was, I believe, in 1934... - -MR. DODD: Never mind when it was. Did you say it or not? - -VON SCHIRACH: I did say it. - -MR. DODD: When was it? - -VON SCHIRACH: That was in Berlin, at a youth function there. But later I -myself led youth along an entirely different path. - -MR. DODD: Well, we will get around to that a little later. But in any -event, on this occasion in Berlin, when you had a large group of your -youth leaders present, you were doing your best, at least, to have them -understand that the way of Rosenberg was the way that they should -follow? - -VON SCHIRACH: But those were the same youth leaders who later received -different instructions from me. - -MR. DODD: Well, I dare say that may be so. We will get around to those -different instructions; but on this occasion and at that time, insofar -as you were concerned, you wanted them to understand that they were to -follow Rosenberg’s way, didn’t you? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but this way only affected one quite definite point, -which was under discussion at that time, namely, the question of -denominational youth organizations. Rosenberg and I agreed on this -point, whereas we differed on many others; and it was to this point that -the statement referred. - -MR. DODD: Rosenberg’s way certainly wasn’t the way of young people -remaining faithful to their religious obligations or teachings, was it? - -VON SCHIRACH: I would not like to say that. - -MR. DODD: What do you mean? You don’t know? - -VON SCHIRACH: I can say in so many words that I have never heard -Rosenberg make any statement to the effect that young people should be -disloyal to their religious convictions. - -MR. DODD: Well, I don’t know that he ever said it that way either; but I -think you do know perfectly well, as many other people who were outside -of Germany through all of these years, that Rosenberg was a violent -opponent of organized religious institutions. You don’t deny that, do -you? - -VON SCHIRACH: I certainly do not deny that in principle, but I do not -think that it can be expressed in these terms. Rosenberg in no way tried -to influence youth to withdraw from religious societies. - -MR. DODD: And later on, actually—aren’t you willing to now say that -later on, and perhaps at that time, in a secret and indirect sort of way -you played Rosenberg’s game by arranging youth affairs at hours when -Church ceremonies were going on? - -VON SCHIRACH: I deny absolutely that I worked against the Church in such -a way. In the years 1933-34, I was concerned mainly with the -denominational youth organizations. I explained that here yesterday. - -MR. DODD: I know. You garbled them up, and they all had to join your -organization sooner or later. But I am not talking about that now. What -I am trying to say is—and I think you must agree—that for a -considerable period of time you made it really impossible for young -people of certain religious belief to attend their Church services, -because you scheduled your youth affairs at which attendance was -compulsory. - -VON SCHIRACH: No, that is not correct. - -MR. DODD: You say that is not so? Didn’t the Catholic bishops publicly -object to this very sort of thing, and don’t you know it as well as I -do? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot recall that. - -MR. DODD: You do not recall any Catholic clerics objecting to the fact -that you were scheduling your youth affairs on Sunday mornings when -their clerics were holding services? - -VON SCHIRACH: In the course of time, as I explained yesterday, many -clergymen either approached me personally or complained in public that -they were hampered in their spiritual ministration by the youth service -and the forms which it took; and that is why I adjusted matters in the -way shown by the document which my counsel submitted to the Court -yesterday. - -MR. DODD: Well, I don’t think that is altogether an answer; and perhaps -I can help your memory by recalling for you that your organization -specifically provided that these young people, who were attending church -on Sunday, could not go in uniform; and that was a very purposeful -thing, wasn’t it, because they could not get out of church and get to -their youth attendance places at all if they had to go home and change -their clothes. - -VON SCHIRACH: But in many parishes the Church authorities forbade young -people wearing uniform to enter the church. - -MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to argue about it with you. Your answer -is that you don’t recall any frequent and strong criticism and objection -from churchmen about this particular Sunday morning program. Is that the -way you want to leave it? - -VON SCHIRACH: I certainly do not mean that. There were periods of great -tension, periods of heated argument, just as there was a stormy period -in youth organization generally. Later, all these things were -satisfactorily settled and put in order. - -MR. DODD: Now, I understood you also to say that, whatever else you may -have done with the young people of Germany during the years over which -you had control of them, you certainly did not prepare them militarily -in any sense, in any sense ordinarily accepted as being military; is -that so? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. - -MR. DODD: Well, now, let’s see. What was the name of your personal press -expert, or consultant, if you prefer that term? - -VON SCHIRACH: The press expert who worked with me longest was a Herr -Kaufmann. - -MR. DODD: And you have asked him—as a matter of fact, you do have an -interrogatory from him, don’t you, which will be submitted. I assume you -know about that, don’t you? - -VON SCHIRACH: I know that my counsel has applied for it, but I do not -know the answers which Kaufmann gave. - -MR. DODD: Well, you know the questions he asked, don’t you? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not remember them. - -MR. DODD: Well, perhaps if I remind you of one or two you will remember. -You asked him if he ever put out any press releases without your -authority. You asked him if he wasn’t your personal press consultant. -And you asked him if it wasn’t true that you personally gave him the -directive for what you wanted published in the press, and particularly -in the youth press. Do you remember those questions? - -[_There was no response._] - -MR. DODD: But you don’t know the answers; is that it? - -[_There was no response._] - -MR. DODD: Well, do you know that he published in the SS official -publication in September of 1942 an article about the young people and -the youth of Germany? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember that article. - -MR. DODD: Well, I think that you had better have a look at it. It is -Document 3930-PS. That becomes USA-853, Mr. President. - -Now, this document which I am showing you is a telegram, of course, a -teletype message, “Reich Governor in Vienna.” You will see at the top -that it was received by you on 10 September 1942, and it sets out a copy -of the subject for the body of this article for the editorial staff of -the _Schwarzes Korps_. That is the SS magazine, as you recall. - -Now, you will see from reading it, and in the very first part it states -that a high-ranking officer who had come back to Berlin from Sevastopol -said that the youngsters who had been seen some 4 years ago in short -pants marching through German cities singing “Yes, the flag is more than -death,” were the 19-year-olds who took that city of Sevastopol. - -The article goes on to say that the lads are fulfilling in fighting what -they promised in singing and that the National Socialist movement had -brought up a young generation, filling them with faith and self-denial, -and so on. And then the rest of it goes on in substance to say that -there were people who objected to your program at the time that you were -trying to make these youngsters strong. - -The clear meaning of it is that you are now claiming credit for having -had something to do with making them the good 19-year-old fighters who -took Sevastopol, isn’t that so? You are claiming credit, I say, in this -article for having produced this kind of 19-year-old boy. - -VON SCHIRACH: I had no knowledge of this article up to now. - -MR. DODD: Well, you do now. You can talk about it, certainly. - -VON SCHIRACH: That is just what I want to do. Herr Kaufmann at that time -had just returned from the Eastern Front, and under the impression of -what he had experienced out there he wrote down what appears in this -article, which I cannot possibly read now in its entirety. - -MR. DODD: Well, it isn’t very long. Really I read what I think are the -most important parts of it insofar as you are concerned. - -VON SCHIRACH: That the youth was trained in a military way I believe is -not mentioned in one single sentence in that entire article. - -MR. DODD: Oh, I know. I am simply asking if it isn’t a fact that you -were claiming credit in this article for having had something -considerable to do with the fact that these 19-year-old boys were such -good fighters in Russia. That is all I am asking you. - -VON SCHIRACH: I have already told you that I wanted to train the youth -to become good citizens, and that I wanted to train them to be good -patriots, who did their duty in the field later on. - -MR. DODD: All right. - -VON SCHIRACH: And should also do their duty in the field. - -MR. DODD: Well, your answer then is, yes, you were claiming credit for -the fact that they were such good fighters. Now, there is no trick in -this question. It is merely preliminary, and I want to get on, but I -think you might say “yes.” And incidentally, this song, “The flag is -more than death,” was a song that you wrote, wasn’t it? - -VON SCHIRACH: The “Flag Song” which I based on the refrain “The flag is -more than death.” That is true. - -MR. DODD: Now, you have also published a number of other songs for young -people, in the formative days before the war started, in a songbook. - -VON SCHIRACH: A great many songbooks for young people were published. I -do not know them all. - -MR. DODD: No, I don’t either, but I am asking you if it isn’t a fact -that you did publish songbooks for young people. - -VON SCHIRACH: Both the Cultural Service of the Reich Youth Leadership -and the Press Service published such books. Of course, I did not look at -each single song in them myself; but on the whole I believe that only -songs which were sung by young people appeared in these books. - -MR. DODD: All right. We have some extracts from one of your songbooks, -and there is only one that I wish to refer to. Do you remember the one -“Forward, Forward,” that you wrote, by the way; another one that you -wrote. Do you remember that song? - -VON SCHIRACH: “Forward, Forward” is the Flag Song of the youth -organization. - -MR. DODD: All right. Did you write it? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Well, now, certainly that also contains, does it not, highly -inciting words and phrases for young people with respect to their -military duty? - -VON SCHIRACH: The Flag Song of the youth organization? I cannot see -that? - -MR. DODD: Well, words, like these: “We are the future soldiers. -Everything which opposes us will fall before our fists. Führer, we -belong to you,” and so on. Do you remember that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I did not say: “We are the future soldiers,” as I hear now -in English, but “We are the soldiers of the future.” - -MR. DODD: All right. - -VON SCHIRACH: The soldiers of the future, the bearers of a future. - -MR. DODD: All right, but that is another one of your songs, isn’t it? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is a revolutionary song dating from the fighting -period; it does not refer to a war between, say, Germany and other -powers, but to the fight which we had to carry on inside the country in -order to achieve our revolution. - -MR. DODD: All right, we will see. Do you remember the one, “Can you see -the dawn in the East?” Do you remember that song? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is not one of my songs. - -MR. DODD: It is one of the songs in the Hitler Youth Songbook, is it -not? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is an old SA song dating from 1923-24. - -MR. DODD: Well, that may be. I am only asking you, isn’t it a fact that -it was in your official songbooks for your young people? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: It is in that song that you vilify the Jews, is it not? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not remember that. I would have to see the song. - -MR. DODD: Well, I can show it to you, but perhaps if you recall it we -can save a little time. Don’t you remember that the second stanza says, -“For many years the people were enslaved and misguided, traitors and -Jews had the upper hand?” Do you remember those words in that song? -“People to Arms” is the next one. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but I am not sure if that was published in a youth -songbook. - -MR. DODD: I can assure you that it was; and if you would like to see it, -we have it here. - -VON SCHIRACH: It is a very well-known SA song, which was sung by the -young people, and was therefore included in the youth songbook. - -MR. DODD: All right, that is all I wanted to find out. I don’t care -where it originated. It is the kind of song you had in your songbook for -young people. - -VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say one more thing. The songbook which I -have here was published in 1933. - -MR. DODD: Yes? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe that the youth organization which I built -up can be judged from the year 1933 only. - -MR. DODD: I don’t suggest that either, but we found it in 1945. - -VON SCHIRACH: Later we published other songbooks, with very different -songs. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I am going to get around to these in a minute. - -That songbook was 3764-PS, USA-854. It has just been called to my -attention that the last phrase in that fourth stanza says: “Germany -awake! Death to Jewry! People to arms!” - -VON SCHIRACH: One moment, please; where is that? - -MR. DODD: In the English text, in the fourth stanza. I don’t know where -it would be; it is on Page 19, I am told, of the German text. Did you -find it? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -MR. DODD: Well, maybe it is the wrong document. In any event, we will -find it for you. However, you remember the song, do you not? You don’t -deny that it says “Death to the Jews,” and so on, do you, in that song? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is the song that starts with the words, “Can you see -the dawn in the East?” - -MR. DODD: That is right. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: That is all I wanted to know. - -VON SCHIRACH: That song is not in this book. - -[_A book was handed to the defendant._] - -MR. DODD: We have quite a few of your songbooks here. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but there is a great difference between them. This -book, which does not contain the song, is an official edition published -by the Reich Youth Leadership. As I say, it does not contain the song. -It does appear, however, in a songbook published by Tonners, a firm of -music publishers in Cologne, under the title of “Songs of the Hitler -Youth.” This book is not, however, an official collection issued by the -Reich Youth Leadership. Any publishing firm in Germany can publish such -books. - -MR. DODD: All right, I will accept that, but certainly you won’t deny -that the book was used, will you? And that is all we are trying to -establish. - -VON SCHIRACH: That I do not know. I do not know whether that book was -used by the Hitler Youth. - -MR. DODD: Do you know that the one which it is contained in was -published by you? - -[_There was no response._] - -Well, in any event, I would like to point this out to you. I am not -claiming, or trying to suggest to you by questions, that any one of -these songs in themselves made young people in Germany fit for war; but -rather, what I am trying to show is that, as distinguished from the -testimony you gave here yesterday, you were doing something more than -just giving these boys and girls games to play. - -VON SCHIRACH: My statements of yesterday certainly did not imply that we -only gave them games to play. For every song of this kind there are -innumerable others. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I know, but these are the ones we are concerned with -right now. “Unfurl the Blood-Soaked Banners,” you remember that? “Drums -Sound Throughout the Land”? - -VON SCHIRACH: These are all songs of the “Wandervogel” and the Youth -League. They are songs which were sung at the time of the Republic, -songs which did not have anything to do with our time. - -MR. DODD: Just a minute. - -VON SCHIRACH: They are songs which had nothing to do with our period. - -MR. DODD: Do you think that anybody, in the days of the Republic, was -singing Hitler Youth marches? - -VON SCHIRACH: What song is that? I do not know it. - -MR. DODD: That is the one, “Drums Sound Throughout the Land.” Don’t you -remember any of these songs, actually? - -VON SCHIRACH: Of course, I know quite a number of these songs; but the -most important—the bulk of them—come from the old “Zupfgeigenhansl” of -the Wandervogel movement and from the Youth League. That the SA also -sang these songs goes without saying. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I don’t doubt that they did; but wherever they emanated -from, you were using them with these young people. And that one, “Drums -Sound Throughout the Land,” you wrote yourself; isn’t that so? - -VON SCHIRACH: “Drums Sound Throughout the Land?” Yes, I believe I did -write some such song. - -MR. DODD: All right; that certainly doesn’t have a very ancient origin -then, does it? - -VON SCHIRACH: It was long before the seizure of power. - -MR. DODD: Now, you also recall, perhaps, that on one occasion Field -Marshal Von Blomberg wrote an article for the Hitler Year Book. Do you -remember that? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -MR. DODD: Well, it wasn’t so very long ago. It was in 1938. I suppose -you read the Year Book of your organization for that year at that time, -anyway? - -VON SCHIRACH: That may be taken for granted; but I really cannot -remember what Field Marshal Von Blomberg wrote for it. - -MR. DODD: Well, all right. I would like you to look at this document; it -is 3755-PS. I think it is on Page 134 of the text that you have, Mr. -Witness; and on Pages 148 to 150 you will find an article, “Education -for War of German Youth,” or rather, it says, “The work ‘Education for -War of German Youth,’ by Dr. Stellrecht, contains a slogan of Field -Marshal Von Blomberg, in which the following passage is quoted.” And -then it goes on to give the quotation. Do you find that? “The fighting -spirit is the highest virtue of the soldier.” And so on. - -Have you found the quotation of Blomberg’s? That is what I want to know. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And then the article by Stellrecht is also contained there, -after the quotation. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Now certainly, when you move down a few lines, you will see -this sentence: “Therefore, it is a stern and unalterable demand which -Field Marshal Von Blomberg makes of the young men marching in the -columns of the Hitler Youth,” and so on. - -In those days, in 1938, Mr. Witness, you were at least thinking in terms -of future military service and so was Field Marshal Von Blomberg, with -respect to the Hitler Youth. That is the point I am trying to make. - -VON SCHIRACH: We had a State with compulsory military training. - -MR. DODD: I know. - -VON SCHIRACH: And it goes without saying that we as educators were also -anxious to train our youth to the highest degree of physical fitness so -that they would also make good soldiers. - -MR. DODD: You weren’t doing any more than that? Is that what you want -this Court to understand? - -VON SCHIRACH: I described to you yesterday what else we did in the way -of rifle training, cross-country sports, and the training of special -units. - -MR. DODD: That is USA-856, Mr. President. - -Yes, I know you told us yesterday that, whatever else it might have -been, it certainly was not any kind of military training. - -This man Stellrecht was associated with you, was he not? - -VON SCHIRACH: Dr. Stellrecht had the “Office for Physical Training” in -the Hitler Youth under Reich Sport Leader Von Tschammer-Osten. That -office was one of 21 offices within the Youth Leadership. - -MR. DODD: He was associated with you? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And you have also used something from him as part of your -defense; it is in your document book. Do you know about that? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, it is a statement made by Dr. Stellrecht, in which he -speaks of education for defense and physical training for youth; and -says that not a single boy in Germany is trained with weapons of war. - -MR. DODD: I know that, and therefore I want you to look at another -statement that he made on another date. - -That is Document 1992-PS, Mr. President, and we offer it as USA-439. - -Do you remember when he made the speech to the military men in January -of 1937, while he was affiliated with your Hitler Youth organization? Do -you know the speech to which I refer? - -VON SCHIRACH: I was not present on the occasion of that speech and I do -not consider myself responsible for any statement which he may have made -in it. - -MR. DODD: Well, that is your statement, but perhaps others feel -differently. At any event, I ask you whether or not you were aware of -and knew about the speech, and will you tell us whether you do know -about it before you look at it? You know the speech I am talking about, -don’t you? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember being informed of the fact that he spoke -at a national and political training course for the Armed Forces; but I -may have been informed of it. The speech, itself... - -MR. DODD: Well, it seems to me you were very anxious to deny -responsibility for it before you knew what he said. - -VON SCHIRACH: I did not want to make a statement on that. Disputes arose -between Dr. Stellrecht and myself on account of a certain tendency which -he showed with regard to defense training, because I felt that he -insisted too much on his office. Disputes arose also with the other -offices of the Reich Youth Leadership which finally led to his dismissal -from the Reich Youth Leadership. - -MR. DODD: Well, in any event, he was on your staff when he made this -speech and I wish now you would look at page—well, I have it Page 3 of -the English, and it is Page 169 of the text that you have; and it begins -at the very bottom of the English page. The paragraph reads: - - “As far as purely military education is concerned this work has - already been done in years of co-operation, and very - extensively. The result has been set down in a book written by - myself, regulating future work in military education down to the - last detail of training and which, with our mutual agreement, - included a foreword and preface by the Reich Defense Minister - and the Reich Youth Leader.” - -And then the next paragraph: - - “The basic idea of this work is always to present to the boy - that which belongs to the particular stage of his - development”—and so on. And I want you to come to the sentence - that says: - - “For that reason no boy is given a military weapon, simply - because it seems to serve no useful purpose for his development. - But, on the other hand, it seems sensible to give him guns of - small caliber for training. Just as there are certain tasks - occurring in military training which are only suitable for grown - men, so there are other training tasks more suited to boys.” - -And then moving down further in the English text, next to the last -paragraph, Page 170 of your text, you will find in the next to the last -paragraph that Dr. Stellrecht says: - - “This picture is the goal of a comprehensive education which - starts with the training of the boy in outdoor games and ends - with his military training.” - -And then moving on again to the fifth page of the English text, and I -think it is Page 171 of your text, the next to the last paragraph, in -talking about the hiking trip, he says that: - - “...has still a wider purpose...because it is the only way in - which the boy can get acquainted with the fatherland for which - he will have to fight one day.” - -Moving on through this article, finally, I want to direct your attention -to Page 6 of the English text and Pages 174 and 175 of your text. In the -last paragraph of the English text, you will find this sentence which -says: - - “All training, therefore, culminates in rifle training. It can - scarcely be emphasized enough; and because shooting is a matter - of practice, one cannot start too early. The result we want to - achieve in the course of time is that a gun should feel just as - natural in the hands of a German boy as a pen.” - -Now, move over to the next page, Page 7 of the English text and Page 176 -of your text. Your Dr. Stellrecht says there more about shooting and how -it “meets with the boys’ desire”; and then he goes on to say: - - “Along with the general training there is special training for - new replacements for Air Force, Navy, and motorized troops. The - training course for this has been established in conjunction - with the competent offices of the Armed Forces... on as broad a - basis as possible, and in the country cavalry training is - given.” - -And I suppose it is on the next page of your text, but it is the next to -the last paragraph of the English text—I want to call your attention to -this sentence—or it is two from the last paragraph in the English text: -“Military education and ideological education belong together.” The -English text says “philosophical,” but I think that’s a mistranslation -and actually in German it is “ideological.” And you see the sentence -that says in the next paragraph: - - “The education of youth has to take care that the knowledge and - the principles, according to which the State and the Armed - Forces of our time have been organized and on which they base, - enter so thoroughly into the thoughts of the individual that - they can never again be taken away and that they remain guiding - principles all through life.” - -And the last paragraph of that speech, Mr. Witness—I wish you would -look at it because I think you used the term “playful” yesterday, if I -am not mistaken, and Dr. Stellrecht, anyway, a little earlier in his -speech. Here is what he said to the military men that day: “Gentlemen, -you can see that the tasks of present youth education have gone far -beyond the ‘playful.’” - -Are you sure, now, that you didn’t have any kind of a program for -military training in your youth organization? - -VON SCHIRACH: I can see from this document, which I should really have -to read in its entirety in order to be able to answer correctly, that -Dr. Stellrecht, to put it mildly, considered himself very important. The -importance of Dr. Stellrecht for the education of youth and the -importance of the office which he held in the Youth Leadership were -definitely not as great as implied by this training course for men of -the Armed Forces. I have already said before that disputes arose between -Dr. Stellrecht and myself on account of his exaggerations and especially -because of the extent to which he overestimated the value of rifle -training and what he called “military training” and that these -differences of opinion finally led to his dismissal and departure from -the service of the Reich Youth Leadership. He was one of many heads of -offices, and the importance of his special activity was not as great as -he has represented it to be in his statement here. I think I explained -yesterday what a large number of tasks confronted the Youth Leadership. -I was also able to indicate the approximate proportion of premilitary -training or military training, as Herr Stellrecht calls it, as compared -with other forms of training. But this document also states clearly that -there was no intention of anticipating military training, as I said -yesterday. When he says that every German boy should learn to handle the -gun as easily as the pen, that is an expression of opinion with which I -cannot identify myself. - -MR. DODD: Well, of course, you have your view of him; but I think it is -well that we brought it out in view of the fact that you have yourself -offered before this Tribunal a statement by Stellrecht in your own -document book. You are aware of that, of course, aren’t you? You want, -of course, to have us understand that Stellrecht is reliable when you -quote him, but he is not reliable when we quote him; is that it? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not mean that at all. He is a specialist in -ballistics and outdoor sports and, of course, he represented his tasks, -as is natural to human nature, as being the most important in youth -training. Probably another office chief would have described cultural -work or occupational competition contests, as the case might be, as -being the most important aspects of youth training. At any rate, the -decisive pronouncement for the education of German youth was not the -remarks which Stellrecht made during a course for soldiers but my own -remarks to the youth leaders. - -MR. DODD: I just want to remind you that a year after he made this -speech you wrote a preface for his book, didn’t you? - -VON SCHIRACH: I believe this preface was written for the book “Hitler -Youth on Service.” - -MR. DODD: I say it was a year after he wrote this speech, which was put -out and published in Germany. He not only made the speech; but it was -put out in pamphlet form, wasn’t it? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember exactly. - -MR. DODD: Well, I can tell you if you look at the document that I handed -you. I think you will see that. Well, in any event, we will pass along. -You told the Tribunal yesterday that the statement in the _Völkischer -Beobachter_, attributed to Hitler, on 21 February 1938 was something of -a mystery to you; you did not know where he got his figures from. Did -you understand what I said, Mr. Witness? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And do you know to what I referred in your testimony of -yesterday, that quotation from Hitler in the _Völkischer Beobachter_? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: What is wrong with those figures? - -VON SCHIRACH: I think that these figures are exaggerated and I think -that there are errors in the text in my possession, which is a -translated text. He probably received these figures from Dr. -Stellrecht’s office, or so I assume. The statements regarding armored -troops were, I imagine, probably added by himself; for the conclusion -that some thousands or tens of thousands qualified for driving licenses -is really an incorrect one, just as it is incorrect to draw from the -fact that some tens of thousands of lads qualify for driving licenses -the conclusion that they were trained as tank troops. - -MR. DODD: Well, you see, we didn’t say so. You understand it was your -Führer who said so in February 1938, and what I asked you was that I -wish perhaps we can go through it and you can tell the Tribunal where -they are in error and to what extent. Now Hitler said, according to the -press, that your naval Hitler Youth comprised 45,000 boys. Would you say -that figure was too large and altogether untrue? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, that is correct. - -MR. DODD: That is correct? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. - -MR. DODD: He then said, the motor Hitler Youth 60,000 boys. What do you -say about that figure? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. - -MR. DODD: And then he said that, as part of the campaign to encourage -aviation, 55,000 members of the Jungvolk were trained in gliding for -group activities. What do you say about that figure? - -VON SCHIRACH: Glider training and model plane construction in the youth -organization with—may I have the figure again—50,000 youth airmen? - -MR. DODD: 55,000. - -VON SCHIRACH: 55,000—yes, that is correct. - -MR. DODD: That’s correct. Then he says, “74,000 of the Hitler Youth are -organized in its flying units.” Now, what do you say about that figure? - -VON SCHIRACH: You say “flying units”; those are “Fliegereinheiten,” -groups of Hitler youth airmen, who—as I must emphasize again—were -concerned only with gliding and the construction of model planes. There -may have been such a large number at the time. - -MR. DODD: Is the figure correct, 74,000? - -VON SCHIRACH: It may be. - -MR. DODD: Well, he lastly says, “15,000 boys passed their gliding test -in the year 1937 alone.” What do you say about that; is it too big or -too little or not true at all? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, that is probably correct. - -MR. DODD: Well, now, so far you haven’t disagreed with Hitler on any of -these, have you? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -MR. DODD: Then, he lastly says, “Today, 1.2 million boys of the Hitler -Youth receive regular instruction in small-bore rifle shooting from -7,000 instructors.” What’s wrong with that figure, if anything? - -VON SCHIRACH: It may be correct—of course, I have no documentary proof -that we had 7,000 young men who conducted training in small-bore rifle -shooting. I discussed this small-bore rifle shooting yesterday. It is -well known that we carried that out. - -MR. DODD: Actually you haven’t disputed any of these figures. They are -true, then, to the best of your knowledge, aren’t they? - -VON SCHIRACH: My objection concerned a remark, which I remember in -connection with the speech, mentioning tank force. - -MR. DODD: Well, we don’t have it but, if you have it, we’d be glad to -see it. But this is the _Völkischer Beobachter_ speech that was put in -by the Prosecution at the time that the case against you was put in; -there is nothing in that about the tanks. - -VON SCHIRACH: I believe the reason is that the retranslation of the -document from English back into German is incorrect. - -MR. DODD: Well, in any event, we agree that Hitler wasn’t very far off -on his figures when he made this speech or gave them out? - -VON SCHIRACH: No; I think the figures which you have just mentioned are -correct. - -MR. DODD: All right. Now, then, in the Year Book of your Hitler Youth -for 1939, Stellrecht, your man who had charge of training, uses that -same expression. Do you recall that? “To handle a rifle should be just -as natural for everybody as to handle a pen”? - -VON SCHIRACH: 1939? - -MR. DODD: Yes, sir. - -VON SCHIRACH: May I have the month? - -MR. DODD: Well, it’s in the Year Book of the Hitler Youth for the year -1939, at Page 227. If you’d like to see it, I’ll be glad to show it to -you. - -VON SCHIRACH: No, thank you. I do not have to see it. If he has already -mentioned it before, it is possible that he will repeat it. - -MR. DODD: Yes. You see, the importance of it to us is that this is 2 -years after he made this speech, 1 year after you wrote the preface to -his book, and I assume some time after you found him to be—what did you -say—unreliable? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I did not say that. On the contrary, he was a reliable -man, but differences of opinion arose between us because I did not agree -with him on the question of overemphasizing premilitary training. - -MR. DODD: Well... - -VON SCHIRACH: I considered the rifle training as constituting only a -part of our training, and not the most essential part; and he pushed it -too much into the foreground. - -MR. DODD: All right. But you let him write in the Year Book; and 2 -years, after he made the speech, he made this same kind of a statement -for young people to read, that they should be as handy with a rifle as -they were with a pen. Did you make any objection when that book went to -press? I assume you must have... - -VON SCHIRACH: I did not see the book before it went to press... - -MR. DODD: You did not proofread it? - -VON SCHIRACH: ...and I had no objections to raise in particular. - -MR. DODD: Did you object when you read in the same book and on the same -page that the Wehrmacht had presented to your Hitler Youth in 1937, -10,000 small-bore rifles? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I was very glad to have that gift from the Armed -Forces. As we in any case did small-bore shooting, I was grateful for -every rifle we received because we always had less than we needed for -training purposes. - -MR. DODD: And were you distressed when you also read in that same Year -Book that there was no shortage of shooting ranges: - - “Since organized rifle training was started in the autumn of - 1936, 10,000 shooting instructors have acquired the green - shooting license in weekend courses and special courses; and - this figure increases by some thousands every year.” - -Do you remember that in your Year Book for 1939? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not remember it, but I think you are probably -presenting the facts correctly; I will not dispute it. Switzerland gave -her young men a much more intensive rifle training than we did and so -did many other countries. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I know. - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not deny that our young men were trained in shooting. - -MR. DODD: I hope you’re not comparing yourself to Switzerland, either. - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -MR. DODD: This document is 3769-PS, Mr. President; it becomes USA-857. - -Now, we’ve heard about this agreement that you and the Defendant Keitel -drew up in 1939, not very long before the war against Poland started. It -was in August of 1939. - -It’s already in evidence, Mr. President, as USA-677. - -It was the 8th day of August, wasn’t it—or 11th day; I’m sorry. - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not know the exact date. The fact that the agreement -was concluded in August 1939 is enough to show that it did not have—and -could not have had—any connection with the war. - -MR. DODD: You say it had no relation to the war, 3 weeks before the -attack on Poland? - -VON SCHIRACH: If that agreement had had any significance for the war, it -would have had to be concluded much earlier. The fact that it was only -concluded in August shows in itself that we were not thinking of war. If -we had wanted to train youth for the war, we would have made an -agreement of this kind in 1936 or 1937. - -MR. DODD: Well, in any event, will you agree to this: That this -agreement between you and Keitel certainly was related to your shooting -practice and related to the Army? - -VON SCHIRACH: As far as I remember, the agreement referred to training -for outdoor sports. - -MR. DODD: Well, then I had better show it to you and read from it to -you, if you have forgotten insofar that you don’t remember that it had -something to do with your shooting practice. - -VON SCHIRACH: I believe that it says—and to that extent a connection -with rifle shooting does exist—that in future field sports are to -receive the same attention which has hitherto been given to shooting. I -do not know if I am giving that correctly from memory. - -MR. DODD: I’ll tell you what it says and you can look at it in a minute. -It says that you already have 30,000 Hitler Youth leaders trained -annually in field service. And in the whole sentence it says: - - “In the Leadership Schools of the Hitler Youth, particularly in - the two Reich schools for shooting practice and field sports and - in the District Leadership Schools, 30,000 Hitler Youth leaders - are being trained every year in field service...” - -and that this agreement gives you the possibility of roughly doubling -that number. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And it goes on to say how you will quarter these people and -billet them, and so on. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And it does have some relationship to your shooting training -program, doesn’t it? - -VON SCHIRACH: I explained that before I even saw it. - -MR. DODD: Well, I misunderstood you then. I thought that you said that -it didn’t have... - -VON SCHIRACH: No, no, I explained that. I said that field service should -have the same prominence as rifle training in the program; but, here -again, we are not concerned with training youth leaders to become -officers. It was not a question of military training, but of training in -field sports for the youth leaders who, after short courses—I believe -they lasted 3 weeks—went back again to their units. A young man of 16 -cannot be trained along military lines in that period of time, nor was -that the purpose of the agreement. - -MR. DODD: Surely you are not asking us to believe that you and Keitel -were entering into an agreement over cross-country sports, are you, in -August of 1939? Are you serious about that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I am perfectly serious when I say that at that time I knew -nothing about a war—the war to come. I said yesterday... - -MR. DODD: Well, but you... - -VON SCHIRACH: And I do not believe either that Field Marshal Keitel -drafted that agreement; I think one of his assistants worked it out -along with Dr. Stellrecht. If it had had any significance for the war, -it would certainly not have been announced in August in an official -publication. - -MR. DODD: Well, now, listen. You just look at the first paragraph of -this and read what it says the purpose of this agreement is, and perhaps -we can put an end to this discussion. - - “An agreement was made between the High Command of the Wehrmacht - and the Reich Youth Leadership representing the result of close - co-operation between the Chief of the High Command of the - Wehrmacht, General Keitel, and the Youth Leader of the German - Reich, Von Schirach, and promising the co-operation of the - Wehrmacht in the military education of the Hitler Youth.” - -You don’t see anything there about cross-country running, do you, or -training? - -VON SCHIRACH: I should like to give an explanation as to that. What you -have just quoted is not part of the text of the agreement, but -represents a commentary by the editor of the collection _Das Archiv_. - -MR. DODD: Well, I’m not going on; but I’ll leave it up to the Tribunal -to decide whether that has to do with sports or has any relation to -military education. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think it is a convenient time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the -Defendant Raeder is absent. - -MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, would you agree that from time to time members of -your Hitler Youth sang songs and otherwise conducted themselves in a -manner which certainly was hostile to organized religious institutions? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not intend to deny that isolated members behaved in -that way during the early years of the National Socialist State, but I -should like to add a short explanation. - -In the early years I took into my movement millions of young people from -Marxist organizations and the atheist movement, _et cetera_; and, of -course, it was not possible in the space of 2 or 3 or 4 years’ time to -discipline all of them completely. But I think I may say that after a -certain date, say 1936, things of that sort no longer happened. - -MR. DODD: Well, I thought perhaps we could say, anyway, that in 1935 -this sort of thing was going on and perhaps save some time. Would you -agree to that? They were singing songs such as, “Pope and Rabbi shall -yield, we want to be pagans again” and that sort of business. Are you -familiar with that? Do you know that kind of thing that came to the -attention of the Minister of Justice from the prosecuting authority in -Baden. - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -MR. DODD: Do you know that they sang a song published in the songbook -“Blut und Ehre,” a song saying, “We want to kill the priest, out with -your spear, forward; set the red cock on the cloister roof.” You know -that old song? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is a song dating back to the Thirty Years’ War and -sung by the youth movement for many, many years, even before the first -World War. - -MR. DODD: I know, you have told me that before. I am trying to cut that -down. Will you agree that your people were singing it in 1933, 1934, and -1935, to the extent that when clerics objected they were subjected -themselves to the prosecuting authorities for interfering and -criticizing? That is how important it was. - -VON SCHIRACH: I know, as I have already said, that this song dates back -to the Thirty Years’ War. It was sometimes sung by young people in the -years 1933-1934. I tried to abolish this song, but I cannot give you any -information as to special complaints which were lodged about it. - -MR. DODD: I do not think that we have made clear that these songs were -put out in a book which you published for the Hitler Youth to sing in -these days. Do you agree to that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I think it is possible, as for many years this song was -included in every collection. It is a song which appeared in the first -songbooks of the Wandervogel movement in 1898. - -MR. DODD: I am not really interested in the history. All I am trying to -establish is that in your songbook for your young people this song was -present, that it was sung, that when the Church people complained, they -were subjected to the prosecuting authorities for complaining. - -VON SCHIRACH: I must dispute the last point. - -MR. DODD: Well, I will have to put this document in. - -It is Number 3751-PS. These are extracts from the diary of the -prosecuting authorities, the diary of the Minister of Justice. And that -becomes USA-858. - -Now, the very first entry that is shown to you is a note from the diary -of the Minister of Justice on the Catholic Vicar Paul Wasmer concerning -criminal proceedings against him, and it is a question of whether a -penal sentence should be proposed by Rosenberg because of libel. The -vicar in his sermon cited a song being sung by young people. I quoted a -few words of it a moment ago about “Pope and Rabbi shall yield, out with -the Jews,” and so on. The Minister of Justice in his diary goes on to -say that this Catholic vicar also quoted from “the little book of songs -published by Baldur von Schirach” a verse with the following text: - - “To the Lord in Heaven we’ll surely say - That we his Priest would gladly slay.” - -and so on: - - “Out with your spear, forward march.” - -And he further quoted you as saying, “The path of German youth is -Rosenberg.” Now, that is what he got into trouble for doing, and all I -am asking you—and all I did ask—is if you won’t admit that people who -criticized the use of this kind of stuff by your young people under your -leadership were subjected to possible, and in many cases actual, -prosecution? You see, you told the Tribunal yesterday that you never did -anything directly to interfere with the Church, Catholic or Protestant. - -VON SCHIRACH: The song quoted, which has the refrain “Kyrieleis,” which -in itself shows it is a very old song... - -MR. DODD: May I interrupt you to say... - -VON SCHIRACH: ...may possibly be included in the songbook “Blood and -Honor.” I am, of course, unaware that a clergyman was prosecuted for -criticizing it. That is something new which I learn for the first time. - -MR. DODD: All right. Look at Page 192 of that same diary, and you will -see where the Archbishop of Paderborn reported the incident of 12 May. -In this case he was asking that something be done to stop this sort of -thing, and there is a rather nasty little song there about a monk and a -nun, and so on, which your young people were singing; and then it goes -on to say what happened to the Archbishop when he came out into the -square and what the Hitler Youth did, what names they called him, and it -says there were seven Hitler Youth leaders from outside present in that -city that day and they were in civilian clothing. Do you mean to say you -never heard of these things? - -VON SCHIRACH: I know of this incident. I called the competent leader of -the area, Langanke by name, to account for this. I had a good deal of -trouble in connection with the incident. I shall therefore ask my -counsel to question the witness Lauterbacher, who then held the rank of -Stabsführer and is acquainted with the details. Some lines of the song -you quoted just now caused a good deal of violent feeling among the -population at the time—some of those lines are quoted here—on account -of the foreign currency racketeering indulged in by some clergymen. That -is why this satirical song was sung. - -I should like to say in conclusion that I thoroughly and obviously -disapproved of the attitude of these youth leaders. The whole affair is, -as I have already said, one of those incidents dating back to the years -when I had to take into my organization an enormous number of youths -from other organizations and with an entirely different intellectual -background. - -MR. DODD: All right, turn to Page 228 of that diary, and you will see -where a Chaplain Heinrich Müller and a town clergyman Franz Rümmer were -under suspicion because they said in a circle of Catholic clergy that a -certain song was sung by the Hitler Youth at the Party Rally in 1934: - - “We are the rollicking Hitler Youth; - We have no need of Christian truth; - For Adolf Hitler is our Leader - And our Interceder. - - “No evil old priest these ties can sever; - We’re Hitler’s children now and ever.” - -Wait until I get through. - -VON SCHIRACH: I have not found the place. - -MR. DODD: It is Page 228, a and b, I’m sorry. Maybe you will remember -the song anyway if I read it to you. Do you remember the lines that -said, “We don’t follow Christ but instead Horst Wessel”? - -VON SCHIRACH: This is the first time I have seen this song. I do not -know this song. - -MR. DODD: All right; I will not go on reading it. You noticed that in an -entry in the diary, the last paragraph, it says: - - “The Advocate General notes that there is no doubt that the song - in question was sung or circulated in Hitler Youth circles; he - thinks that the statement that this song was sung at the Party - Rally, that is, to a certain extent under the eyes and with the - consent of the highest Party officials, can be refuted.” - -VON SCHIRACH: The third stanza reads: - - “I am no Christian, no Catholic; - I follow the SA through thin and thick.” - -We gather that it is not a youth song. If the young people sang that -song, I very much regret it. That song was certainly not sung at a youth -festival at the Party Rally in 1934, as stated here. - -MR. DODD: All right. - -VON SCHIRACH: I myself read through all the programs for youth events at -the Party Rally. - -I do not know this song; I have never heard it; and I do not know the -text. - -MR. DODD; You will notice that the last line says: “Baldur von Schirach, -take me too!” - -The only point to all this is that certainly it is a surprise to the -Prosecution to hear you say, as the Youth Leader, that you did not know -that there was a great difficulty between the churchmen of all the -churches in Germany and the youth organization in Germany, certainly -during these years. - -VON SCHIRACH: The point that I should like to make clear to the Tribunal -is that in the youth movement there was a period of storm and stress, a -period of development, and that the organization must not be judged by -the actions of a few individuals or groups in the same year in which -these individuals or groups became members of the organization. The -result of educational work cannot be judged until some years have -elapsed. It is possible that a group of youths who entered our ranks -from the atheist movement in 1934 composed and sang these songs. In 1936 -they would certainly no longer have done it. - -MR. DODD: Well, let’s see what you were doing in 1937. You know the -publication “Enjoyment, Discipline, Faith”? Do you know that handbook -for cultural work in your youth camps? - -VON SCHIRACH: I should like to see it, please. - -MR. DODD: I’ll show it to you, but I wanted to ask you, first of all: Do -you know the publication? Do you know what I am talking about when I -refer to it? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not know all our publications. We had such an -enormous number of publications that unless I have the book in front of -me I cannot make any statement on the subject. - -MR. DODD: All right; I’ll take your answer that you don’t know this one -without seeing it. We’ll show it to you. This one, among other things, -has the program for a week in one of your camps, a suggested series of -programs. And again I’ll ask you a question and maybe we can cut this -down. - -Isn’t it a fact that in your camps you tried to make Hitler and God more -than partners and particularly tried to direct the religious attitudes -of young people to the belief that Hitler was sent to this earth by God -and was his divinely appointed in Germany? - -Well, just answer that first of all, and then we can look at the -program. - -VON SCHIRACH: No. I never made any comparison between Hitler and God; -and I consider it blasphemous and have always considered such a -comparison blasphemous. - -It is true that during the long period of years in which I believed in -Hitler, I saw in him a man sent by God to lead the people. That is true. -I believe any great man in history—and in the past I considered Hitler -such a man—may be regarded as being sent by God. - -MR. DODD: This is Document 2436-PS, USA-859. - -I am not going to go all through it with you, but I do want to call your -attention to some specific parts. - -First of all, on Page 64 you have the names of people suggested as -mottoes, I guess you would say, for the day. They are all political or -military heroes of Germany, I expect, aren’t they? - -VON SCHIRACH: Arminius, Geiserich, Braunschweig... - -MR. DODD: You don’t need to read them all. If they are not, say they -aren’t, and if they are, say “yes.” I merely asked you if they were not -all military or political heroes of Germany. - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not know whether Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia -can be characterized simply as a war hero here. He was certainly an -artist as much as an officer. - -MR. DODD: All right, I’ll pass that and take your answer that they are -not. - -Let’s move on to the Sunday morning celebration on Page 70 of your text, -near the end of it. I wanted particularly to direct your attention to -this in view of what you said about Rosenberg earlier this afternoon: - - “If there is no one who can make a short formal address—it must - be good and command attention—extracts from ‘Mein Kampf’ or - from the Führer’s speeches or Rosenberg’s works should be read.” - -Do you find that? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have found it. - -MR. DODD: Well, do you still say that Rosenberg and his works had -nothing to do with your Hitler Youth? You were suggesting that, for -Sunday morning reading, they might listen to this benign philosopher’s -works, weren’t you? - -VON SCHIRACH: Nothing is proved by the fact that such a reference is -made in one of the numerous handbooks of cultural work to one of the -training staff who attended those biannual discussions of Rosenberg’s -which I have already mentioned. I think you will look a long time before -you find this particular passage in one of the many youth handbooks. - -MR. DODD: Let me ask you something about this. You find one line in here -for the Sunday morning celebration about a churchman, a chaplain, Holy -Scripture, or anything related to religious institutions and tell the -Tribunal where it is. - -VON SCHIRACH: I take it as certain that nothing like that occurs there. - -MR. DODD: That is your Sunday morning program? - -VON SCHIRACH: The Hitler Youth was a state youth organization, and my -aim was to separate religious and state education. A young man who -wanted to go to church could go after the morning celebration—it was a -camp function—or before it, according to whether he wanted to attend -mass or go to a Protestant service; and on these Sundays on which he was -not in camp—the whole camp lasted 3 weeks at the outside—he was -completely free to attend church at home with his parents or other -friends. - -MR. DODD: All right. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think it is fair to say that immediately -before the words “Page 71” there are three lines which might be said to -refer to religion. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I intend to quote it. I was saving that for a little -later. I will be glad to do it now if Your Honor prefers to have it. - -THE PRESIDENT: No. - -MR. DODD: I want to call your attention to a historical moral ballad -that is suggested for the youth of this camp, on Page 89 of your text or -90, and on Page 6 of the English text. - -Now, I am not going to read this whole ballad, but I think you will -agree that it ridicules, to put it mildly, the Jews, other political -parties in Germany. It refers to “Isidor, Isidor” in the opening lines, -and it goes on down, “Poor Michael was a wretched man; he had to serve -the Jewish clan.” In another line, “He gave the gang and the Jew a -kick.” - -And then your Party youth leaders suggest that now they have a—what is -it—a shadow show: - - “The nose of Isidor must be strongly exaggerated; the German - Michael should be presented in the conventional manner; the - Communist as a wild stormer of barricades; the Social Democrat - with a balloon cap; the Center Party man with a Jesuit cap, and - the reactionary with top hat and monocle.” - -Did you ever see one of those shows, by the way? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot find the text you have just quoted on Page 89. - -MR. DODD: I probably have given you the wrong page. I have just been -told it is Page 154 of your text—155, rather. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Well, I just want to know about this suggested part of the -program for these young people of yours. - -VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say something about the whole question as -far as this book is concerned. I wrote the preface and I accept -responsibility for the contents. I did not read every detail of this -book beforehand; and I do not wish to dispute the fact that in the camps -forming part of the camp circus, as it was called, political caricatures -were presented in the form of shadow-shows. - -MR. DODD: You know one of your youngsters wrote Streicher a letter -telling him that he saw this kind of a show. Do you know about that? I -am going to show you that letter in a little while, just to show you -that it did happen, and that your young people wrote to Streicher about -it. - -And on the last page of the English text, for Sunday, 19 July—I think -it is Page 179 of your text—the motto for the day is “Our service to -Germany is divine service.” And that was a slogan you used on other -Sundays, and as the Tribunal has pointed out, on Page 70 of your text -you say: - - “...that this Sunday morning ceremony does not aim at presenting - arguments or conflicts with confessional points of view, but at - imbuing life and men with courage and strength to fulfill their - greater and lesser tasks through unqualified faith in the divine - power and the ideology of the Führer and his movement.” - -Now, in no place where you ever made any reference to God did you ever -fail also to mention Hitler or the leaders of the Party, did you? - -VON SCHIRACH: Will you please indicate the passage that you quoted just -now? - -MR. DODD: It is on Page 70, right at the bottom of your Page 70. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, it says here: - - “It does not aim at presenting arguments or conflicts with - confessional points of view, but at imbuing life and men with - courage and strength to fulfill their greater and lesser tasks - through unqualified faith in the divine power and the ideology - of the Führer and his Party. - -That does not, after all, mean that Hitler is compared to God, but I -believe that in the answer I gave a few minutes ago I did define my -attitude. - -MR. DODD: Let’s see if you don’t. In your book _Revolution of -Education_, on Page 148, do you remember this statement: “The flag of -the Third Reich”—we’ll begin the whole sentence: - - “On the contrary, the service of Germany appears to us to - be...the service of God. The banner of the Third Reich appears - to us to be His banner; and the Führer of the people is the - savior whom he sent to save us from the calamity and peril into - which we were actually plunged by the most pious parties of the - defunct German Republic.” - -VON SCHIRACH: I should like to see the original of this text, please. - -MR. DODD: All right. - -VON SCHIRACH: Here I write: - - “We consider that we are serving the Almighty when with our - youthful strength we seek to make Germany once more united and - great. In acknowledging loyalty to our Homeland we see nothing - which could be construed as a contradiction of His eternal will. - On the contrary, the service of Germany appears to us to be - genuine and sincere service of God; the banner of the Third - Reich appears to us to be His banner; and the Führer of the - people is the savior whom He sent to rescue us from the calamity - and peril into which we were actually plunged by the most pious - parties of the defunct German Republic.” - -This is the Center Party of the old Republic and other similar -organizations of a confessional and political nature. I wrote this. I -really do not see anything in that which could be construed into a -deification of the Führer. For me, service to my country was service to -the Almighty. - -MR. DODD: All right, if that is your answer—I see it differently. Let’s -go on to something else so that we can get through. I don’t want to -neglect to show you, if you care to be shown, that communication to -Streicher. It has already been presented to the Tribunal by the British -Delegation, the British prosecutor. I think it was read from, but not -put in, I am told. - -In any event, do you know about that, Mr. Witness? Do you know about the -letter that the boys and girls of the Youth Hostel at Grossmöllen wrote -to Streicher in April of 1936, when they told him about seeing the Jews, -“Every Sunday our leader shows a play about the Jews with his puppet -theater.” - -I just want to know if you are aware of it. - -VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say in this connection that the National -Socialist Youth Home at Grossmöllen, which is mentioned here, was not a -Hitler Youth institution but was, I believe, a kindergarten run by the -National Socialist Public Welfare Organization or some other -organization. - -This is typical of the letters ordered by the publisher of _Der Stürmer_ -for recruiting purposes. - -MR. DODD: Just a moment. Didn’t you take over every youth hostel in -1933? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Well, what do you mean by saying that in 1936 this National -Socialist Youth Hostel at Grossmöllen was not a part of the Hitler Youth -organization? - -VON SCHIRACH: It says here youth home (Heimstätte), not hostel -(Herberge). I am not familiar with the expression “Heimstätte.” That -must refer to a home run by the National Socialist Public Welfare -Organization or the National Socialist Women’s League. We had only -“Jugendheime” and “Herbergen.” - -MR. DODD: Well, doesn’t it strike you as being strangely coincidental -that in your program for one of your youth camps you suggest a show -which portrays a Jewish man with a great nose and ridicules him and -teaches children to dislike him and laugh at him and that from a youth -camp a youngster writes to Streicher saying that she and boys and girls -saw such a show? - -VON SCHIRACH: This letter was not written from any youth camp. - -MR. DODD: Well, I accept it if that is your answer. - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not deny that this puppet play was shown and that -this letter was written; but I believe the connection is pulled in by -the hair, so to speak. The connection is a very remote one. - -MR. DODD: You think the connection about the ridiculing of the Jews is -very far afield and pulled in by the hair. - -VON SCHIRACH: No. I dispute the statement that this is a Hitler Youth -institution. I believe actually it is a day nursery run by the National -Socialist Public Welfare Organization or something similar. - -MR. DODD: Well, maybe the explanation is that all the young people in -Germany saw one of those shows. But, in any event, I want to take up the -last matter on this subject with you. - -This morning your counsel examined you about the confiscation of a -monastery, I believe it was in Austria while you were there, -Klosterneuburg. Do you remember? - -VON SCHIRACH: We discussed Count Schwarzenberg’s palace this morning. -That was not a monastery. It was the property of a private citizen. - -MR. DODD: Well, the document that Counsel Dr. Sauter referred to was -R-146, USA-678. It was a letter from Bormann to all Gauleiter, and it -began by saying that valuable Church properties had to be seized in -Italy and in Austria. It was signed by Bormann. And then also on that -document was a letter from Lammers saying that there had been some -dispute as to whether the seized Church property should go back to the -Reich or should remain in your Gau. You remember that, don’t you? Well, -now, you seized the monastery down there, didn’t you, in 1941, at -Klosterneuburg? Klosterneuburg, you know what I am referring to. I may -mispronounce it. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. The well-known foundation Klosterneuburg, the famous -monastery, served as a receiving office for collections of works of art -taken from our art museum. - -MR. DODD: Yes. Now, what excuse did you have for seizing the monastery -at that time? - -VON SCHIRACH: I can no longer give you exact details with regard to -this. I believe there were very few people in the monastery, that the -large building was not being used to the fullest possible extent, and -that we urgently needed more space for the expansion of the experimental -station run in conjunction with our State School of Viniculture. I -believe that is why this monastery was confiscated. - -MR. DODD: All right. I am going to ask that you look at Document -3927-PS, and I wish you would remember that this morning you told the -Tribunal that you stopped the confiscation of churches and Church -property in Austria. When you look at this document I wish you to recall -your testimony. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you offer M-25 in evidence or not? - -MR. DODD: I wish to do so, Mr. President. It is USA-861. And this one, -3927-PS, becomes USA-862. - -Now, the first page of this document shows that it is marked secret. It -is dated 22 January 1941. It is a letter addressed to Dellbrügge in your -organization in Vienna. - -He says that he hears there is a possibility of getting a Hitler School, -which the city of Hamburg is also trying to get, and that he wants the -monastery Klosterneuburg considered as the place for the Hitler School -in Vienna. This letter is written by Scharizer, your deputy, as you -described him yesterday. - -Now, he enclosed a communication, a teletype letter, from Bormann; and -if you turn the page, you will see that it is dated 13 January. Bormann -says it is strictly confidential: - - “It is learned that the population does not show any indignation - when monastery buildings are used to serve what appears to be a - generally appropriate purpose.” - -He goes on to say: - - “Their conversion into hospitals, convalescent homes, - educational institutes, Adolf Hitler Schools, may be considered - as serving a generally appropriate purpose.” - -Now, that communication was dated the 13th of January, and your deputy -wrote the letter on the 22d. - -Now turn another page, and you will find a Gestapo report on the -monastery, dated 23 January 1941, addressed to your assistant -Dellbrügge. I wish you would look where it says, “Oral order of 23 -January 1941.” Apparently somebody in your organization, you or your -assistants, orally asked the Gestapo to get up a report on this -monastery the very day that you wrote to Berlin asking that it be -considered as a Hitler School. - -There are some charges against the inhabitants of that monastery in this -Gestapo report, but I ask you to turn over further and you will find -where you wrote an order for the taking over of the monastery as an -Adolf Hitler School on 22 February 1941. I will show it to you if you -like to see it, but that order bears your initials, the original -does—Pages 15 to 17 of the photostat that you have. - -Now, you framed up an excuse to seize that monastery, didn’t you, when -you really wanted it for a Hitler School; and you didn’t have any just -grounds for seizing it. And you get the Gestapo to write a report and -then you never referred to the reason that the Gestapo framed up for -you. - -VON SCHIRACH: I myself as head of these schools was naturally extremely -anxious to have such a school established in Vienna. At one time the -idea expressed here of taking Klosterneuburg and housing one of the -Adolf Hitler Schools in it did occur to me, and I probably did discuss -it with Herr Scharizer; but I dropped the idea completely. -Klosterneuburg was never converted into an Adolf Hitler School. - -MR. DODD: No. But it never was turned back to the Church people, either, -was it? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. Since the museum space available in Vienna was not -sufficient for the very large collections, we wanted to turn this -monastery into an additional large museum which would be open to the -public. We began to carry out this plan, and a great part of the -collections was transferred to the building. In addition, we needed the -strongly built cellars of this monastery for the safekeeping of the many -art treasures which we had to protect against bombing attacks. - -It occurred to me that we might house an Adolf Hitler School in this -building and I discussed the possibility with one or two of my -colleagues and then abandoned it: Firstly, because it would have caused -some ill-feeling if we had housed an Adolf Hitler School in a building -which had formerly been consecrated ground, and secondly, because we -badly needed the monastery for these other purposes. - -I have nothing to add to my explanation. - -MR. DODD: You will notice the date of that whole transaction and the -communication from Bormann. When did you first discover that Bormann was -so antireligious and anti-Church as you told the Tribunal he was? - -VON SCHIRACH: Bormann... - -MR. DODD: Just tell us when you found that out. - -VON SCHIRACH: I was just about to. Bormann showed his antireligious -views most clearly in 1943; but they had already begun to appear in -1937. - -MR. DODD: And this telegram from him was when? 1941? - -VON SCHIRACH: 1941. - -MR. DODD: Witness, when did you first start to do business with Himmler? - -VON SCHIRACH: I met Hitler... - -MR. DODD: Himmler. - -VON SCHIRACH: I met Himmler in 1929 when I visited the offices of the -Party Leadership. At that time he was the propaganda chief of the Party. -That was our first meeting. - -MR. DODD: I did not really want to know, although it’s of interest, when -you first met him. What I really wanted to know was when you with your -youth groups started really to do business with him for the first time. -And by “business” I mean arrangements such as the recruitment of young -men into the Death’s-Head Brigade of the SS. - -VON SCHIRACH: I think I explained that this morning. One of the first -agreements laid down was, I think, contained in the agreement regarding -the patrol service, the date of which I do not recall. This was not, by -the way, a guarantee of reinforcements for Death’s-Head units, but for -police units generally. These were special troops to be at the disposal -of the Police. - -MR. DODD: How long did you continue to channel or divert young men from -your Youth organization to the SS? When was the last time that you -remember this program being effective? - -VON SCHIRACH: I did not artfully drive young people into the SS. But I -permitted the SS to recruit among young people like any other -organization. - -MR. DODD: I did not ask you that. I asked you when you would say was the -latest date when you were effectively helping, at least, Himmler to get -young candidates from the young people of Germany through your Hitler -Youth organization. I do not expect an exact date. Approximately? - -VON SCHIRACH: From 1940 on I tried constantly to have youth taken into -Army units. The SS, the Waffen-SS, carried on very active recruitment -among youth up to the last day of the war. I could not prevent this -recruitment. - -MR. DODD: And you knew what use they were being put to in the last days -of the war and in the mid-days of the war, did you not? - -VON SCHIRACH: I did know that all young people who were drafted or who -volunteered had to fight. - -MR. DODD: I am talking about something other than fighting. You knew -what was going on in the East, and you knew who the guards were in the -concentration camps, did you not? - -VON SCHIRACH: This morning I testified on what I knew about events in -the East. I did not know that young men who volunteered to go into the -Waffen-SS were used during the war to guard concentration camps. - -MR. DODD: You did not know who were the guards there, although you -visited two of them yourself? - -VON SCHIRACH: Those guards did not belong to the Waffen-SS. - -MR. DODD: I know, but your agreement with Himmler provides specifically -for recruitment for SS Death’s-Head troops. - -VON SCHIRACH: When I concluded that agreement, I did not know that he -effected the supervision of concentration camps chiefly by means of -Death’s-Head units. Besides, I thought at that time that concentration -camps were something quite normal. I said so this morning. - -MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal yesterday that it was in 1944, I think, -that you found out about the extermination. And I want to talk to you -about that a little bit, and ask you some questions. And the first one -is, how did you find out? Was it only through this man Colin Ross? - -VON SCHIRACH: I said that I heard of it through Colin Ross... - -MR. DODD: All right. - -VON SCHIRACH: And, furthermore, that I asked numerous questions of -everyone I could reach, in order to get definite information. - -MR. DODD: Really I asked you if, from any other source, you found out? -And you can answer that pretty simply. We know that you found out -through Ross. Was there anyone else from whom you found out? - -VON SCHIRACH: I could not obtain any really definite information. - -MR. DODD: All right. - -VON SCHIRACH: Most people had no information. I only received -positive—that is, detailed—information by way of the Warthegau. - -MR. DODD: Now, as a matter of fact, you got regular reports about the -extermination of the Jews, did you not? - -VON SCHIRACH: These... - -MR. DODD: Written reports, I mean. - -VON SCHIRACH: These reports, two of which have been submitted in this -Court, were sent to the Reich Defense Commissioner for the attention of -the expert in question. This expert passed the copies on to the -inspector—I believe—or the commander of the regular Police. - -I have looked at the copy which was submitted here in Kaltenbrunner’s -case but I had never seen it before (Document 3876-PS). - -MR. DODD: You mean you did not know that it was arriving in your office? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have never seen this text before. - -MR. DODD: All right. - -VON SCHIRACH: My office was the Central Office; it was not the office of -the Reich Defense Commissioner. The affairs of the Reich Defense -Commissioner were officially in charge of the Regierungspräsident, whose -personal adviser took care of routine matters. My mail was delivered at -the Central Office. - -MR. DODD: You were the Reich Defense Commissioner for that district, -were you not? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: This was an SS report of a highly confidential nature, was it -not? They were not just peddling this all over Germany? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not know how many copies of this were sent out, I -cannot say. - -MR. DODD: 100, and you got the sixty-seventh copy. - -VON SCHIRACH: And these copies, as I gathered from the original which I -saw, were not sent to me but to the competent adviser, a Herr Fischer. - -MR. DODD: And who was Herr Fischer? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have already told you this morning that I have no idea -who this Herr Fischer was. I assume that he was the expert attached to -the Regierungspräsident, the expert on defense matters. - -MR. DODD: Now, I am going to show you some documents from your own -files. - -We don’t have a full translation, Mr. President, because some of this we -located too late (Document 3914-PS). - -But I think you will readily recognize this original is from your files. -And in there you will find—and I will direct your attention to the -page—something that I think will recall to your mind who Dr. Fischer -is. - -Now, I think it is on Page 29, you will find the names of persons to -serve on the Reich Defense Council submitted; and you will find the name -of Fischer, together with General Stülpnagel, Major General Gautier, Dr. -Förster—do you find that? This was your own Reich Defense Council, -before which you appeared from time to time, and with whom you met -frequently. And I will show you documents on that, if you care to deny -it. - -VON SCHIRACH: Just a moment, please. Will you please repeat the page to -me? - -MR. DODD: Page 29; it is a memorandum dated 28 September 1940. - -VON SCHIRACH: I have it now. - -MR. DODD: Do you find the name of Dr. Fischer? You found Dr. Fischer’s -name as one of those suggested to your defense council? His is the last -name, by the way, and his signature. He is the one that suggested the -others to you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, will you go a little bit more slowly? - -MR. DODD: Yes. - -VON SCHIRACH: His name is the twentieth name on the list: “Regierungsrat -Dr. Fischer, Expert for Reich Defense Matters”—in other words, expert -attached to the Regierungspräsident. I have probably seen him at some -meeting or other. I take it that he kept the minutes. However, I must -admit that I have no personal recollection of this gentleman. I cannot -attach any owner to that name; but it is clear to me now that he was the -person who took charge of incoming mail for the Reich Defense -Commissioner and probably kept the minutes as well. - -MR. DODD: All right. - -VON SCHIRACH: In view of his junior status—he is only a -Regierungsrat—he cannot have held any other appointment on this -council. - -MR. DODD: On Page 31 of that same file you will find another reference -to him, and your initials on the paper this time. It is the membership -list of the Reich Defense Council. There are 20 persons on there, and -the last name is Fischer’s. And at the bottom of the page are your -initials, apparently approving the list. Do you see that? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes; I had to initial this list. - -MR. DODD: And you approved the membership, did you not? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot swear that I would not recognize Dr. Fischer -again if I were confronted with him. He seems to have been the official -who kept the minutes. However, among the large circle of people who -attended meetings of this kind, he did not come to my attention. Only -very few Reich defense meetings of this sort actually took place. What -seems to me the decisive point is that he did not report to me -personally but to the Regierungspräsident. - -MR. DODD: How could you fail to meet him? You met regularly in 1940 with -this Reich Defense Council. We have some documents here, and I will be -glad to show them to you, showing exactly what you said before that -council. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, as I said, he probably kept the minutes of the -meetings. - -MR. DODD: Well surely, then, you saw him certainly on some occasions, -between 1940, the date of these files, and 1942, the date of the SS -reports on the exterminations. He apparently was with you for 2 years -before the first report that we have, which is dated 1942, and he was 1 -of 20 on your council. - -VON SCHIRACH: I believe I must describe the exact composition of this -Reich Defense Council. There were the leading commanding generals of the -Army and the Luftwaffe; there were various Gauleiter; there were the -people mentioned here; there was Dr. Putt, the representative of the -Economic Management Staff and all the others who are listed here. In -this large circle of people, whom I had to welcome, there was an -official who kept the minutes and who was one of many officials in my -office. These meetings, as you have probably ascertained, took place -very infrequently. Dr. Fischer did not report to me currently, nor did -he submit to me the minutes of these sessions; the Regierungspräsident -reported to me. - -MR. DODD: Do you think that Heinrich Himmler or Reinhard Heydrich were -sending these reports to inferior people around Germany in these Gaue -about the exterminations in the East? - -VON SCHIRACH: If these reports had been meant for me, they would have -been sent to me directly. Moreover, I said today that I do not dispute -having been informed of the shooting of Jews in the East, but at a later -period. I mentioned that in connection with the war. However, the -reports themselves were not in my hands. If these reports had been -before me, they would have had a certain note, which I would recognize -immediately. - -MR. DODD: Well, let’s see. Of course they are addressed to you, to the -attention of Fischer. - -But I am going to move on a little bit. Now I am going to tell you that -you got weekly reports. You haven’t seen these. What do you say to that? - -VON SCHIRACH: Weekly reports? - -MR. DODD: Yes. - -VON SCHIRACH: I received innumerable weekly reports from every possible -office. - -MR. DODD: No, I am talking about one kind of report. I am talking about -the reports from Heydrich and Himmler. - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not know what you mean. - -MR. DODD: Well, you had better take a look (Document 3943-PS). We have -55 of them, for 55 weeks. They are all here, and they run consecutively, -and Dr. Fischer is not involved in these. And each one bears the stamp -of your office having received it on it, and the date that it was -received. - -They tell, by the way—and you can look at them—what was happening to -the Jews in the East. - -VON SCHIRACH: All these probably—I cannot look at them all just now. -These reports went from the Chief of the Security Police to the Office -of the Reich Defense Commissioner. They were not, as I can tell from the -first document, initialed by myself, but bear the initials of the -Regierungspräsident. I did not receive these reports; otherwise my -initial would have to be there. - -MR. DODD: Dr. Dellbrügge was the man who received them, according to the -note, and he was your chief assistant. Incidentally, I think we ought to -make this clear to the Tribunal, both of your chief assistants were SS -Brigadeführer, were they not? - -VON SCHIRACH: I should in any case have stated that Dr. Dellbrügge was -one of Himmler’s confidants; but I believe... - -MR. DODD: And he was your chief assistant, that is the point I am -making. And so was your other chief assistant, also an SS Brigadeführer. - -VON SCHIRACH: I believe that this statement proves the opposite of what -you want to prove against me. - -MR. DODD: Well, I am going to go on with these weekly reports in a -minute, but there is one thing I do want to ask you. - -Were you pretty friendly with Heydrich? - -VON SCHIRACH: I knew Heydrich, and while he was Reich Protector in -Prague he extended an invitation to me as President of the Southeastern -Europe Society to hold a meeting there which I accepted. However, I did -not have close personal contact with Heydrich. - -MR. DODD: Did you think he was a good public servant at the time that he -was terrorizing Czechoslovakia? - -VON SCHIRACH: I had the impression that Heydrich, as he said himself -during my stay in Prague, wanted to carry out a policy of conciliation, -especially in regard to Czech workers. I did not see in him an exponent -of a policy of terror. Of course, I have no practical knowledge of the -incidents which took place in Czechoslovakia. I made only this one -visit, or possibly one further visit. - -MR. DODD: You sent a telegram to “Dear Martin Bormann” when Heydrich was -assassinated; do you remember that—the man who was, I understand, not -in your good standing in 1942? Do you remember when Heydrich was -assassinated by some Czech patriots in Prague? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Do you remember what you did when you heard about it? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not remember exactly. - -MR. DODD: Perhaps if I read you this telegram you will remember it. - - “To Reichsleiter Bormann, Berlin, Party Chancellery; Express. - Urgent. Immediate attention. - - “Dear Martin Bormann: - - “I request that the following be submitted to the Führer. - - “Knowing the Czech population and its attitude in Vienna as well - as in the Protectorate, I would draw your attention to the - following: - - “The enemy powers and the British cliques around Beneš have for - a long time felt bitter about the co-operation generally found - among the Czech workers and their contribution to the German war - economy. They are seeking for a means to play off the Czech - population and the Reich against each other. The attack on - Heydrich was undoubtedly planned in London. The British arms of - the assailant suggest parachuted agents. London hopes by means - of this murder to induce the Reich to take extreme measures with - the aim of bringing about a resistance movement among Czech - workers. In order to prevent the world from thinking that the - population of the Protectorate is in opposition to Hitler, these - acts must immediately be branded as of British authorship. A - sudden and violent air attack on a British cultural town would - be most effective and the world would have learned of this - through the headline ‘Revenge for Heydrich.’ That alone should - induce Churchill to desist immediately from the procedure begun - in Prague of stirring up revolt. The Reich replies to the attack - at Prague by a counterattack on world public opinion. - - “It is suggested that the following information be given the - press tomorrow regarding the attempt on Heydrich’s life.” - -And then you go on to say that it was the work of British agents and -that it originated in Britain. You sign it, “Heil Hitler, Dein -Schirach.” - -Do you remember sending that telegram to Bormann? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have just been listening to the English translation. I -should like to see the German original, please. - -MR. DODD: Very well. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you read, I thought, a British “coastal” town, -did you not? - -MR. DODD: No, “cultural” I meant to say, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is what I have got. - -MR. DODD: Yes, it is “cultural.” - -Incidentally, I call your attention, Mr. Witness, to the word -“cultural.” You have expressed such a great interest in culture. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would it be all right to break off now, or do you want to -go on? - -MR. DODD: I had hoped I could finish. I won’t be many minutes, but I do -have one or two rather important documents that I would like to put to -the witness. - -Mr. President, if we recess, may I ask that the witness not be talked to -by his counsel overnight? I think it is only fair, when a witness is -under cross-examination, that he not have conversations with his -counsel. - -VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say to this document... - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I should like to have this question clarified -as to whether as defense counsel I am entitled to talk with my client or -not. Mr. Dodd forbade me to talk to my client some time ago; and, of -course, I acquiesced. But, if I am told that I must not speak to my -client until the end of the cross-examination and the cross-examination -is to be continued on Monday, that means that I cannot speak with my -client tomorrow or the day after. But, in order to carry on his defense, -I must have an opportunity of discussing with my client all the points -raised here today. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I will withdraw my request. I really forgot we -were going over until Monday. I do think it is the ordinary rule, but I -do think it might present some difficulty for the counsel here. - -I want to be fair with the Tribunal. During the recess Dr. Sauter -approached the witness stand and I did tell him then that I did not -think he should talk to him during the recess while he was under -cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is the British rule, but I think in the -circumstances we had better let Dr. Sauter... - -MR. DODD: I quite agree. I was thinking we would go on tomorrow, but I -do not want to interfere with his consultation over the weekend. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 27 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINTH DAY - Monday, 27 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Von Schirach resumed the stand._] - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I would like to make certain that I did offer -the following documents in evidence: 3914-PS, which becomes USA-863; -3943-PS, USA-864; and 3877-PS, USA-865. - -MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, at the close of the session on Friday we had just -handed to you a copy of the teletype message to Martin Bormann. I had -read it to you over this transmission system. I wish to ask you now if -you sent that message to Bormann. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I dispatched that teletype message, and I should like -to give an explanation in this connection. First... - -MR. DODD: May I interrupt you just for a minute and ask that for the -little while that we will be talking today, that you wait just a minute -after your answer. I think it would help a little bit with the -interpreting. I do not think we will have any trouble this morning. I -will try to do the same thing, and perhaps we will work a little better -together. - -VON SCHIRACH: First of all, then, I want to explain why I addressed -Bormann with “Du,” in the friendly form. Bormann and I come from the -same town; I knew him from Weimar, but only slightly. And when in 1928 -or ’29 he came to Munich, he paid me a visit, and because he was the -elder of us he suggested to me that we should call one another “Du.” We -maintained that form until 1943, when on his own initiative he dropped -it and addressed me in his letters only with “Sie.” - -Now, the text of this teletype message: We were in the third year of the -war; the Czech population both in the Protectorate of Bohemia and -Moravia and in Vienna had remained perfectly quiet; in the Protectorate -conditions were almost like those in peacetime. I had a very large Czech -population in Vienna, and as a result of the attempt on Heydrich’s life -I feared that in the Protectorate there might be unrest which would no -doubt have serious repercussions in Vienna. This was the time when -German troops were advancing on the peninsula of Kerch; it was a time -when we could not afford to have anything happen behind our front. And -simultaneously with the news of the murder of the Protector I received -official notification that the attempt, as is mentioned in this -document, had been carried out by British agents and with British -weapons. - -During the same month we heard, and it was also mentioned in the -Wehrmacht communiqués, that British bombers had bombed residential areas -in Hamburg and Paris and had attacked German cultural sites at Kiel. And -so I suggested a reprisal measure to establish before the world British -guilt in this attempt and to prevent serious unrest in Czechoslovakia. -That is all I have to say. This teletype message is genuine. - -May I at this point also comment on a difficulty of translation which -occurred during the last cross-examination on Friday? The German word -“Retter” was at that time translated into the English “savior.” It is an -expression which I used in my book when I described the Führer as a -“Retter,” and the difficulty lies in the translation of that word into -English: it can only be translated into English as “savior.” But -retranslated into German, “savior” means “Heiland.” In order to make -quite clear what the German “Retter” is meant to express in English, I -should have to use an explanatory phrase. If I say that the exact -translation is “rescuer,” then the real meaning of the word “Retter” is -clearly set forth; and there is nothing blasphemous in the comparison or -the description of the head of the State as a “rescuer.” But if I had -written in German that the head of the State was a “Heiland,” then, of -course, that would be blasphemy. - -THE PRESIDENT: This sort of explanation should be kept for -re-examination. It is not a matter which ought to interrupt the -cross-examination. - -MR. DODD: Now, I have only one or two questions to ask you in addition -about this message. - -Were you thinking of some particular cultural city in Britain, like -Cambridge, Oxford, Stratford, Canterbury? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I had no definite plan in mind. I thought that one -ought to choose an objective corresponding to the sites hit by British -bombers in Germany. - -MR. DODD: As long as it was a cultural city. Were you thinking of what -happened in Germany or of what happened to Heydrich? - -VON SCHIRACH: I was thinking of the cultural buildings in Germany which -had been attacked, and I wanted to suggest this as an opportunity to -make clear unmistakably that the murder of Heydrich had not been -committed by the Czech population but by the Czech emigrants in London -with British support. This retaliation in the third year of the war was -to be a reply both to the attempt against Heydrich and to the attacks on -German cultural monuments. - -MR. DODD: You did not make any reference in this telegram to any -so-called or alleged bombings of cultural objects in Germany, did you? - -VON SCHIRACH: The Wehrmacht communiqués had already announced them, and -they were generally known. - -MR. DODD: That is not what I asked you. I asked if it is not a fact that -in this teletype you made no reference at all to the alleged bombing of -cultural objects in Germany, nor did you relate your suggestion for the -bombing of a cultural town in England to any alleged cultural bombing in -Germany, but rather, you made it perfectly clear that you wanted to -strike at a cultural town in England because of what had happened to -Heydrich. That is so, is it not? - -VON SCHIRACH: It was not at all necessary for me to point to the bombing -of German cultural sites. It was a fact known to the entire German -population from the daily attacks of British bombers. - -MR. DODD: I suppose by this time you knew very well the general -reputation of Heydrich, did you not? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, that is not correct. I considered Heydrich in this -particular case as the representative of the Reich in Bohemia and -Moravia and not as the Chief of the Gestapo. - -MR. DODD: Did you know his general reputation in Germany at least at -that time? - -VON SCHIRACH: I knew that he was the Chief of the Gestapo. I did not -know that he had committed the atrocities which have meanwhile become -known. - -MR. DODD: You had no knowledge that he was considered “the terror of the -Gestapo”? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is an expression which enemy propaganda used against -him. - -MR. DODD: You mean you still think it is propaganda? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -MR. DODD: Well, was it through enemy propaganda that you heard that he -was called a terror before he was killed in 1942? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not want to say that... - -MR. DODD: How did you know it? - -VON SCHIRACH: I merely want to state here that for me the Reich -Protector Heydrich was during this third year of the war a person other -than the Chief of the Gestapo. This was a political matter. - -MR. DODD: You did not content yourself with this suggestion to bomb -England, did you? Do you recall what else you suggested not long -afterwards? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not know. - -MR. DODD: Do you recall anything that you either suggested or did by way -of further so-called retaliation for the assassination of Heydrich? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. I have no recollection. - -MR. DODD: You suggested evacuating all the Czechs out of Vienna, did you -not? - -VON SCHIRACH: This is a suggestion which did not originate with me -personally, but which goes back to a remark about Vienna which the -Führer himself had made in 1940 while I was reporting to him at his -headquarters. I think I already mentioned during my own testimony that -he said, “Vienna must become a German city and the Jews and Czechs must -gradually be evacuated from Vienna.” I already said that during my own -testimony here. - -MR. DODD: My question is: Is it not a fact that a few days after the -assassination of Heydrich you suggested the evacuation of the Czechs -from Vienna as a retaliatory measure for the assassination of Heydrich? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have no recollection of it, but it is possible that in -the excitement of this event, which disquieted me greatly, I said -something like that. - -MR. DODD: I suggest that you take a look at Document 3886-PS, which -becomes USA-866, Mr. President. - -Now, this document consists of excerpts from the record of a meeting of -the Vienna City Council on 6 June 1942, as you will see on Page 9 of the -original. You were present, and according to these notes, you spoke as -Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach and, moving down towards the bottom of -that page, you will find this statement: - - “Finally, he”—meaning you—“disclosed that already in the - latter part of summer or in the fall of this year all Jews would - be removed from the city, and that the removal of the Czechs - would then get under way, since this is the necessary and right - answer to the crime committed against the Deputy Reich Protector - of Bohemia and Moravia.” - -Do you remember saying that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have no exact recollection, but I consider that these -records here are genuine, and they probably represent the sense of what -I said at the time. I was very much perturbed by Heydrich’s death. I was -afraid of serious trouble in Bohemia and Moravia, and I expressed my -fears. The essential thing is that after calm consideration of this plan -I dropped it, and did nothing more about it. - -MR. DODD: Well, in any event, I think it is perfectly clear—and I ask -you if you do not agree—that you made two suggestions at least: one for -the bombing of a cultural English town and the other for the wholesale -evacuation of the Czechs from Vienna, because of the assassination of -this man Heydrich. - -VON SCHIRACH: It is true that I put the idea of such an evacuation of -the Czechs into words. It is equally true, and a historical fact, that I -dropped the idea and that it was never carried out. It is correct that I -suggested the bombing of a British cultural site as an answer to the -attempt against Heydrich and to the innumerable bombardments of German -cultural places in the third year of the war, at a time when vital -interests of the German people were at stake. - -MR. DODD: Incidentally, Hitler also suggested the wholesale evacuation -of the Czechs from Czechoslovakia as a punishment for the murder of -Heydrich, did he not? - -VON SCHIRACH: That I do not know. - -MR. DODD: Now I want to turn to something else and see if we can get -through here rather soon this morning. You recall that on Friday we -talked a little bit about your relationship with the SS and with -Himmler, and I want to ask you this morning if it is not a fact, Mr. -Witness, that you worked very closely with Himmler and his SS from -almost the earliest days right down to almost the last days of your -regime in Vienna. I wish you would answer that question. - -VON SCHIRACH: I should very much like to answer that question in great -detail. - -MR. DODD: It does not require great detail in the first answer, but -later, if you feel that you have some necessary explanation, I am sure -you will be permitted to do so. Will you tell the Tribunal first of all, -rather, if it is not a fact that you did closely co-operate with Himmler -and his SS from the earliest days of your public office to the very late -days of your public office? - -VON SCHIRACH: Close collaboration in the sense that Himmler had -considerable influence upon education did not exist. - -MR. DODD: Let us stop right there and inquire a little bit. Is it not a -fact that Himmler assigned his SS personnel to your youth organization -for the training purpose of your young people? You can answer that very -simply. Did he or did he not? - -VON SCHIRACH: For training purposes? - -MR. DODD: Yes. - -VON SCHIRACH: I am not aware of anything like that. The fact that there -might have been liaison officers would not be unusual, because -practically all ministries and organizations had liaison officers. What -you have just suggested, however, I do not recall. - -MR. DODD: I think we had better clear this up first, and I ask you that -you look at Document 3931-PS, which is a new document which becomes -USA-867, Mr. President. - -Now, Mr. Witness, if you will look at this document, you will observe -that it is a message which you sent to “Dear Party Member Bormann” in -August of 1941. It is quite long, and there will not be any necessity, I -am sure, for reading all of it, but I want to direct your attention to -some parts of it that might help your memory with respect to the SS. - -By way of preliminary question, the SA apparently had suggested that it -take over some of the training of young people, had it not, some time in -the summer of 1941? - -VON SCHIRACH: I said in my testimony—I think on Thursday—that already -in the spring of 1939, I believe, the SA had attempted to take over the -premilitary training of the youth of the two older age classes, and such -attempts were probably repeated in 1941. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I knew you were complaining to Bormann about it when you -wrote this message. You recall now, do you not, from just looking at the -letter, that that is the whole substance of the letter—a complaint -about the attempt of the SA to directly control the training of some -young people in the Hitler Youth organization. - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot speak about this long teletype letter without -having read through it. - -MR. DODD: Well, let us see. If you will turn to the second page of the -English text—you do not have any pages there; I think it is all one. It -is all a teletype, but it will be not too far down on the first part of -it. First of all, I want to have you see if you can find the statement -that “the Hitler Youth has considered it necessary from the very -beginning to make the Party itself the agency for the direction and -administration of its military training.” Do you find that passage? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -MR. DODD: Well, you will find the paragraph numbered (1) on your -teletype, small Arabic number one. You will find they start to be -numbered (1), (2), (3), and so on. Do you find that, Mr. Witness? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have Roman numeral I. - -MR. DODD: All right. That is what I want to call your attention to. If -we hit some place that we agree on, then we can move on. You found that -Number (1) that says that “for more than one year an agreement in draft -form has been submitted to the SA which requests that the SA cadre be -furnished for the military training of the youth,” and that the SA -leadership did not comply with this request. - -Now, will you move down further, let me see, in Number (3), and then -following (3), probably down another whole length three or four -paragraphs, you will find—it is in capital letters, by the way—what I -want to call your attention to; I assume it is in capital letters in the -German: - - “I would be happy if the SA would put personnel at my disposal - for support for this purpose, similar to the way in which the SS - and the Police have been doing for a long time already.” - -In the English, Mr. President, that is at the bottom of Page 4 and the -top of Page 5. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you find that sentence? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You say there that you would be happy if the SA would put -personnel at your disposal for support of this purpose, similar to the -way in which the SS and the Police have been doing for a long time -already, and you are referring—if you will read back to the paragraph -just ahead of that sentence—to the training of the young people. You -talk about Hitler Schools and the training of Hitler Youth. Now, it is -perfectly clear, is it not, that you did have assistance from the SS, -according to your own words, from the SS and Police, for a long time -before you sent this message? - -VON SCHIRACH: During the war, yes; since the beginning of the war in -1939 we had premilitary training camps and I wanted youth instructors -for these camps. Neither the Army nor the SA could supply sufficient -instructors; the SS and the Police could place a few young officers at -my disposal. - -MR. DODD: So it was only from the beginning of the war that you had -personnel from the SS and Police for the training of young people, was -it? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not think that there would have been need for SS -instructors otherwise. As I have said, we selected youth leaders from -among youth itself. - -MR. DODD: I ask you again, do you want the Tribunal to understand that -it was only from the beginning of the war that you had the assistance of -SS and Police personnel assigned to your youth organization for the -training of young people? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that question definitely for this reason: -we had for example a training camp for skiing practice, and it was quite -possible that one of the instructors was an SA man or an SS man only -because by chance he happened to be one of the best sportsmen in that -field. But I cannot think where such collaboration existed elsewhere. - -MR. DODD: Are you able to say that you did not have SS personnel -assigned for training purposes; and I am not talking about some isolated -skimaster, I am talking about a regular program of assistance from the -SS to you in your training of young people. - -VON SCHIRACH: As far as premilitary training is concerned, it was only -through this teletype message that I requested help for training -purposes. Apart from that, I do not recollect any collaboration. - -MR. DODD: Do you know the term “Heuaktion”? - -VON SCHIRACH: Heuaktion? I do not remember it. I do not know what is -meant by that. - -MR. DODD: Well, you have been in the courtroom every day. Do you not -remember that there was proof offered here by the Prosecution concerning -the Defendant Rosenberg and an action termed Heuaktion? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not remember it at the moment; I do not know it. - -MR. DODD: Do you not remember that there was some talk here in the -courtroom about the seizing of young people in the East and forcing them -to be brought to Germany, 40,000 or 50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to -14? You remember that, don’t you, and that one of the purposes was to -destroy the biological potentiality of these people? You do not know -what I refer to? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is an action which I now remember in connection -with this Trial. The only thing I can say on this in an official -capacity is what Axmann told me during the war—I cannot recall the -exact year—namely, that he had placed a large number of young Russians -in apprentice hostels and apprentice workshops at the Junkers works in -Dessau, and that these youths were extremely well accommodated and -looked after there. I had not been in any way concerned with this action -before, but as I stated at the beginning of my testimony here, I assume -responsibility for the actions of youth in this war; I adhere to that -statement. I do not think, however, that youth is responsible in this -case, and I recall the Defendant Rosenberg’s statements that he was -complying with the wishes of the Army and an army group in this affair. - -MR. DODD: Well, we have the document here. It is already in evidence as -USA-171—the Tribunal is familiar with it—and I would like to call your -attention to the fact that in this document, which says that Rosenberg -agreed to the program of seizing or apprehending 40,000 to 50,000 youths -at the ages of 10 to 14 and the transportation of them to the Reich, it -also said that this program can be accomplished with the help of the -officers of the Hitler Youth through the Youth Bureau of Rosenberg’s -Ministry; and it also said that a number of these young people were to -be detailed to the SS and SS auxiliaries. Now, what I want to ask you -particularly is what you know about that program and how the Hitler -Youth co-operated in it? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot add to what I have already said about this -program. - -MR. DODD: You were in charge of the war commitment of the Hitler Youth, -were you not, the “Kriegseinsatz”? - -VON SCHIRACH: The war commitment of German youth was under immediate -direction of the Reich Youth Leader. From my own knowledge I can give -only general but no detailed information. - -MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, I ask you again, were you not appointed and did -you not serve as the person responsible for the war commitment of youth -in Germany? Now, I have got the document to show your appointment if you -want to see it. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes; I do not want to deny it at all. In 1939 and 1940, as -long as I was Reich Youth Leader, I myself directed that war commitment. - -MR. DODD: I am talking about an appointment that was made even later -than 1939 or 1940. You were appointed the person in charge of the war -commitment of German youth by the Führer at his headquarters in March of -1942, were you not? - -VON SCHIRACH: Will you be good enough to show me the document. I -consider it possible, but I have no exact recollection. - -MR. DODD: All right. It is 3933-PS, which becomes USA-868. But first of -all: You do not know you were appointed in charge of the war commitment -for youth without being shown the document? - -VON SCHIRACH: No; only I cannot tell you the exact date from memory. I -was under the impression that I had been responsible for the war -commitment beginning in 1939. - -MR. DODD: All right, that is all I wanted to establish, that you were in -fact responsible for it and continued to be responsible for it right up -to the end of the war. I understood you to say a minute ago that the -Reich Youth Leader was the man responsible rather than yourself? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. I said that I could give you only general but no -special information, because the practical application of the war -commitment was a matter for Axmann; I do not, however, want to minimize -my own responsibility in any way. - -MR. DODD: Very well. I think we are sufficiently clear about the fact -that you were certainly named to the position no matter how you now wish -to “water” your responsibility. What do you say is the date when you -first became responsible for the war commitment of youth? - -VON SCHIRACH: As far as I remember, I was responsible for it beginning -1939, at the outbreak of war, but I now see that this decree was not -signed until 1942. - -MR. DODD: All right; we will agree then that from that date, March 1942, -you were responsible. Now, I want to ask you to look at another -document. - -VON SCHIRACH: One moment, may I explain something in this connection? I -do not know whether Hitler signed this decree in March 1942; I do not -know when it was signed. In this document Axmann tells me: the draft of -the decree is now going to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, who will -request the official approval of the higher Reich authorities concerned, -and then Bormann... - -MR. DODD: You do not need to read it, really. What do you want to say -now? Are you saying that maybe it was not signed, or maybe you were not -appointed, or are you going to say that you were appointed? Will you -please give us an answer? - -VON SCHIRACH: Not at all. But I really cannot say that the date of the -publication of this decree was March 1942. It may not have been -published until May. - -MR. DODD: I am not attaching any great importance to the date. I want -you to look at 345-PS, which we offer as USA-869. This may help you on -this Heuaktion program; that is, with respect to your memory. - -Now, this is a telegram that the Defendant Rosenberg sent to Dr. Lammers -at the Reich Chancellery for the Führer’s headquarters on 20 July 1944. -You will observe that in the first paragraph there is stated: - - “In accordance with an agreement between the Reich Marshal as - Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, the Reichsführer SS, the - Youth Führer of the German Reich, and the Reich Minister for the - Occupied Eastern Territories, the recruiting of young Russians, - Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Lithuanians, and Tartars, between - 15 and 20 years of age, ‘will take place on a volunteer basis - for Kriegseinsatz in the Reich’”—“Kriegseinsatz” being a - program that you were responsible for clearly at that time. - -Now, moving down, I want to call your attention to Paragraph 3, and I -want to remind you of the Heuaktion document that is already in -evidence. This telegram says: - - “On the basis of a suggestion by military offices, the seizing - and turning over of youths between the ages of 10 to 14 to the - Reich territories will take place (Heuaktion) in a part of the - operational territory, since the youths in the operational - territory present a not insignificant burden.” - -It goes on to say: - - “The aim of the action is a further disposal of the youths by - placing them in the Reich Youth Movement, and the training of - apprentices for German economy in a form similar to that which - has been effected in agreement with the Plenipotentiary General - for the Allocation of Labor with White Russian Youths, which - already shows results.” - -I particularly call your attention to that last phrase, “which already -shows results.” - -Then the last clause in the next sentence, which says, “...these youths -are to be used later in the Occupied Eastern Territories as especially -reliable construction forces.” - -You will observe that the last paragraph says that “the actions under -Points 1 and 3”—which I have just been reading—“are known to the -Führer.” And there is something about SS help in regard to this action. -You had set a time limit on that. - -The next page of the document has the distribution, to the Reich -Marshal, the Reichsführer SS, the Reich Youth Führer, and the Reich -Minister of Interior, and down at the bottom, a Gauleiter bureau, among -others. - -What do you know about this seizing of young people between 10 and 14 -and the turning over of them to your youth organization in Germany -during these war years, and about how many thousands of them were so -kidnaped, if you know? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have already said that I do not wish to minimize my -responsibility in this connection. But it was not until later that I was -informed of this matter. Not I, but somebody else was Youth Leader of -the German Reich in that year; and he made the agreement with the -Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and the Reichsführer SS. But my own -measures were... - -MR. DODD: Later you were the Youth Reichsleiter of Germany, were you -not? And you were also the war commitment officer of Youth in Germany at -this very time? - -VON SCHIRACH: I was at Vienna, and the date was 20 July 1944. You will -remember that the history-making events of that time were occupying all -officials in Germany to a very great extent. Later I heard about this -matter from Axmann, and I know that the accommodation, training, -feeding, and the whole treatment of these Russian youths was actually -excellent. - -MR. DODD: You also know that even at this hour the Allied forces are -trying to find thousands of these young people to return them to their -proper place? Do you know that this morning’s press carried an account -of 10,000 people that are still unlocated? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe that those are these young people who -were accommodated in apprentice hostels and who under exceptionally -well-ordered conditions received very good professional training. - -MR. DODD: You see, it is perfectly clear from this Document 345-PS that -this program was in fact in operation. The letter from Rosenberg says -so. He says it had “already shown results.” And so your youth -organization must have had something to do with it before this message -was sent. - -VON SCHIRACH: I have not at all denied that. Youth leaders were active -within the framework of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern -Territories. And on the basis of what I have heard here during the -Trial, I can perfectly well understand that the generals in the East -said that the young people must be taken out of the combat zone. The -point was that these youngsters from 10 to 14 years of age had to be -taken away from the front. - -MR. DODD: With the help of the SS? - -Now, I want to show you another document, 1137-PS, which will give you -some idea, if you do not recall, of what was done with these young -people, and how many of them are involved. - -That will become USA-870. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, there is a paragraph at the bottom of Page 1 of -that document which relates to another defendant. - -MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor, I am sorry; I overlooked that. I will read it -for the benefit of the record, if I may, at this time. - -Mr. Witness, I direct your attention back, if I may, to this Document -345-PS, so that you will be aware of what I am reading. You will observe -that in the last paragraph of Rosenberg’s communication to Dr. Lammers -we find this sentence: - - “I have learned that Gauleiter Sauckel will be at the Führer’s - headquarters on 21 July 1944. I ask that this be taken up with - him there and then a report made to the Führer.” - -Sauckel was participating in this kidnaping of 10- to 14-year-olds as -well, was he? Do you know about that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have no knowledge of it. I cannot give any information -on that subject. - -MR. DODD: Now, this Document 1137-PS begins with a letter from a -general, a message rather, an interoffice memorandum, dated 27 October -1944, and it closes with a report by the brigadier general of the Hitler -Youth, a man named Nickel. - -Do you know Nickel, by the way? N-i-c-k-e-l? - -VON SCHIRACH: The name is known to me, and probably I know the man -personally; but at the moment I do not recall more than just the name. -At any rate, he was not a brigadier general; he was a Hauptbannführer. - -MR. DODD: Well, all right. Whatever he was, he was an official of the -youth organization. That is all I am trying to establish. I may have his -title wrong. We have it brigadier general. - -But in any event, if you look over this document, you will see that he -is reporting about the seizing of these youths in the Occupied Eastern -Territory. This is October 1944. And he begins by saying that on 5 March -he “received an order to open an office for the recruitment of youths -from 15 to 20 years of age from the Occupied Eastern Territories for war -employment in the Reich.” - -Then he goes on to cite figures, and he tells where he began his work: -Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, the middle sector of the Eastern front, the -southern sector of the Eastern front. And then on the next page of the -English—and I imagine it is also on your next page—it tells how they -were classified, those that were brought back: - -“1,383 Russian SS Auxiliaries, 5,953 Ukrainian SS Auxiliaries, 2,354 -White Ruthenian SS Auxiliaries, 1,012 Lithuanian SS Auxiliaries.” - -Then he gets into the Air Force: “3,000 Estonian Air Force Auxiliaries,” -and so on. Some went to the Navy. - -I am not going to read all of it; but it gives you an idea of what -distribution was made of these men, or young boys and girls rather than -men. You will notice that a considerable number went to the SS. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but Hauptbannführer Nickel’s letter bears a stamp -with the words “Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories.” That -means he was not acting on behalf of the Reich Youth Leader’s department -but on behalf of the Reich Ministry for the East. - -MR. DODD: Yes. I also want to ask you if you will look at Page 6. I -think it is Page 5 of the original of your German. You will find what -personnel Hauptbannführer Nickel had for the purpose of carrying out his -task. He had members of the Hitler Youth, so he says: 5 leaders, 3 BDM -leaders, 71 German youth leaders as translators and assistant -instructors, 26 SS leaders, 234 noncommissioned officers and troops, -drivers, and translators of the SS. And of the Air Force personnel, he -had 37 officers, 221 non-coms, and so on. - -Does that help your memory any with this program that your youth people -were engaging in? Do you recall any more of it now? - -VON SCHIRACH: It does not help my memory at all, because I hear this for -the first time from this document. I was not informed of the activities -of the Eastern Ministry in Russia, and I do not know what assignment the -Eastern Ministry gave to Hitler Youth Leader Nickel. I assume -responsibility for what was done on my orders, but anything done on the -orders of others must be their responsibility. - -MR. DODD: Let me show you something with respect to your answer that you -have just made. That personnel that I read out, you know, was only in -one part of the program. And on the last page of the document you will -see on how wide an area Nickel was operating. He was operating in -co-operation with the Netherlands Hitler Youth Operational Command, the -Adria Hitler Youth Operational Command, the Southern Hitler Youth -Operational Command in Slovakia and Hungary, the Lieutenant Nagel -Special Command in refugee camps within the Reich, and then, -interestingly enough, the field offices in Vienna. - -That is where you were located at the time, is it not? And you are -telling the Tribunal you did not know anything about this program and -the participation of your Hitler Youth Leaders? - -VON SCHIRACH: I received no written or verbal report from Nickel. His -report, as can be seen from the letter, went to the Reich Ministry for -the Occupied Eastern Territories, and to what extent the Reich Youth -Leader was being informed is not known to me. I myself do not know what -took place. What I do know of the entire affair I very clearly stated in -my testimony with reference to the Junkers works and the professional -training which these youngsters were given in Germany. Apart from that I -have no further knowledge. - -MR. DODD: Observe also, if you will, Mr. Witness, that your Hitler Youth -Operational Command was in Poland, and even in northern Italy. And now I -ask you once again, as the long-time Hitler Youth Leader, as the leader -for the War Commitment of Youth, then Gauleiter in Vienna, with part of -this program being carried on in Vienna and the whole program being -carried on on this vast scale, do you want the Tribunal to believe that -you knew nothing about it? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have no knowledge of it, but I assume responsibility for -it. - -MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal in your direct examination that you -wrote the letter to Streicher’s _Stürmer_. - -I would like to submit this in evidence, Mr. President, so that the -Tribunal will have an idea of what it appeared like on the front page of -_Der Stürmer_. - -Perhaps—if you would like to look at it, you may, of course, Mr. -Witness. It is USA-871. I just wanted you to have a look at it before it -was submitted. You know about it anyway. - -VON SCHIRACH: I already made a statement about that the other day. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I did not wish to go into it further. What I do want to -ask you, Mr. Witness, is: Do I understand you clearly when I say that -from your testimony we gathered that it was Hitler who ordered the -evacuation of the Jews from Vienna and that you really did not suggest -it or wish to see it carried out? Is that a fair understanding of your -testimony of a day or two ago? - -VON SCHIRACH: I stated the other day, and I repeat this, that the idea -of evacuating the Jews from Vienna was Hitler’s idea which he -communicated to me in 1940 at his headquarters. Furthermore, and I want -to make this quite clear, I stated that after the events of those -November days in 1938 I was actually of the opinion that it would be -better for the Jewish population to be accommodated in a closed -settlement than to be regularly singled out by Goebbels as a target for -his propaganda and his organized actions. I also said that I identified -myself with that action suggested by Hitler, but did not carry it out. - -MR. DODD: Now you had a meeting at the Führer’s headquarters in October -1940. Present was the Defendant Frank and the now notorious Koch whom we -have heard so much about. Do you remember that meeting? - -VON SCHIRACH: I no longer recall it exactly. - -MR. DODD: Now, you mean you do not recall that meeting at all? - -VON SCHIRACH: In October 1940 I was in the Reich Chancellery because -that was the time when I was organizing the evacuation of youth. It is -possible that at lunch... - -THE PRESIDENT: You were asked whether you recalled a particular meeting -in October 1940 with certain particular people. Do you remember it or do -you not? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have no recollection of it. If I am shown a document, -then I can confirm it. - -MR. DODD: Very well; that is what I wanted to know. I will now show you -the document USSR-172. A part of this document was read over the system -for the Tribunal by Colonel Pokrovsky. Now you will observe that on 2 -October—this is a memorandum, by the way, made up of the meeting. Herr -Martin Bormann compiled these notes, so I assume he was there too. After -a dinner at the Führer’s apartment there developed a conversation on the -nature of the Government General: - - “The treatment of the Poles and the incorporation already - approved by the Führer for the districts Petrikau and Tomassov.” - -Then it says: - - “The conversation began when Reich Minister Dr. Frank informed - the Führer that the activities in the Government General could - be termed very successful. The Jews in Warsaw and other cities - were now locked up in the ghettos and Kraków would very shortly - be cleared of them. Reichsleiter Von Schirach, who had taken his - seat at the Führer’s other side, remarked that he still had more - than 50,000 Jews in Vienna whom Dr. Frank would have to take - over. Party Member Dr. Frank said this was impossible. Gauleiter - Koch then pointed out that he, too, had up to now not - transferred either Poles or Jews from the District of Ziechenau, - but that these Jews and Poles would now, of course, have to be - accepted by the Government General.” - -And it goes on to say that Dr. Frank protested against this also. He -said there were not housing facilities—I am not quoting directly, I do -not want to read all of it—and that there were not sufficient other -facilities. Do you remember that conference now? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have refreshed my memory now. - -MR. DODD: Yes. And you suggested that you wanted to get 50,000 Jews -moved into Frank’s territory out of Vienna, didn’t you? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. The Führer asked me how many Jews -were still in Vienna, and at that time—I mentioned this during my own -testimony the other day and it is contained in the files—there were -still 60,000 Jews in Vienna. During that conversation, in which the -question of settling Jews in the Government General was discussed, I -also said that these 60,000 Jews from Vienna were still to be -transferred to the Government General. I told you earlier that as a -result of the events of November 1938 I was in favor of the Führer’s -plan to take the Jews to a closed settlement. - -MR. DODD: Well now, later on, as you know from USA-681 concerning which -your own counsel inquired, Lammers sent you a message in Vienna and he -said the Führer had decided, after receipt of one of the reports made by -you, that the 60,000 Jews in Vienna would be deported most rapidly, and -that was just 2 months after this conference that you had with Frank and -Koch and Hitler, wasn’t it? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, since 1937—and I think that becomes clear from the -Hossbach minutes—the Führer had the idea of expatriating the Jewish -population. This plan, however, did not become known to me until August -1940 when I took over the Vienna district. I reported to Hitler on that -occasion, and he asked me how many Jews there were in Vienna. I answered -his question, and he told me that he actually wanted all of them to be -settled in the Government General. - -MR. DODD: How many Jews did you, in fact, deport out of your district -while you were the Gauleiter? - -VON SCHIRACH: First of all, the practical measures of that action were -not in my hands. I do not know how many of these 60,000 Jews were -actually transported out of Vienna. - -MR. DODD: Do you have any idea where they went to? - -VON SCHIRACH: I was informed that the aged were being taken to -Theresienstadt and the others to Poland, to the Government General. On -one occasion—it was either when I took my oath of office as Governor or -when I made a speech about the evacuation of children—I even asked -Hitler how these Jews were being employed, and he told me: in accordance -with their professions. - -MR. DODD: We will get around to that. You remember, don’t you, that they -were sent, at least some of them were sent, to the cities of Riga and -Minsk, and you were so notified. Do you remember receiving that -information? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -MR. DODD: Now take a look at Document 3921-PS, which becomes USA-872. -Now this is a communication concerning the evacuation of Jews, and it -shows that 50,000 Jews were to be sent to the Minsk-Riga area, and you -got a copy of this report as the Commissar for the Defense of the Reich, -and if you will look on the last page you will see an initial there of -your chief assistant, the SS man Dellbrügge, and also the stamp of your -own office as having received it. - -VON SCHIRACH: I can only see that Dr. Dellbrügge marked the matter for -filing. It shows the letters “z. d. A.” to the files. - -MR. DODD: And he did not tell you about this report concerning the Jews? -Even though you had been talking to Hitler about it? That they were -being moved out of your area? I suppose your chief assistant did not -bother to tell you anything about it. Is that what you want us to -understand? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Now then, take a look at another document which will shed some -light on this one. It is USA-808, already in evidence. It tells you what -happened to the Jews in Minsk and Riga, and this was also received in -your office if you recall. Maybe it is not necessary to show it to you -again. You remember the document—that is one of those monthly reports -from Heydrich wherein he said that there were 29,000 Jews in Riga and -they had been reduced to 2,500, and that 33,210 were shot by the special -unit, and “Einsatz” group. Do you remember that? - -VON SCHIRACH: During the last 2 days I looked at these monthly reports -most carefully. The bottom right-hand corner of the cover of these -monthly reports—and I want to make this categorically clear—bears -initials something like “Dr. FSCH.,” that is Dr. Fischer’s initials. At -the top the reports are not initialed by me, but by the Government -President, with the notation that they should be put into the files. If -I had read them... - -MR. DODD: I am not suggesting that you had your initials on any document -like this, but I am claiming that these documents came into your -organization and into the hands of your principal assistant. - -VON SCHIRACH: But I must point out that if they had been submitted to -me, then there would have been on them the notation, “submitted to the -Reichsleiter,” and the official submitting them would have initialed -this notation. If I myself had seen them, then my own initials would be -on them with the letters “K.g.,” noted. - -MR. DODD: Yes. I want to remind you that the date of that report is -February 1942, and I also want to remind you that in there as well -Heydrich tells you how many Jews they had killed in Minsk. Now you made -a speech one time in Poland about the Polish or the Eastern policy of -Germany. Do you remember it, Mr. Witness? - -VON SCHIRACH: In Poland? - -MR. DODD: In Poland, yes. - -VON SCHIRACH: In 1939 I spent a short time in Poland, but I do not think -I was there again later. - -MR. DODD: Your memory seems particularly poor this morning. Don’t you -remember speaking in Katowice on 20 January 1942? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is Upper Silesia. - -MR. DODD: Upper Silesia, all right. Do you remember that speech? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I made a speech at Katowice. - -MR. DODD: And did you talk about Hitler’s policy for the Eastern -Territories? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot say from memory what I spoke about there. I have -made many speeches. - -MR. DODD: Well, I will ask that you be shown D-664, which becomes -USA-873. You were speaking to a group of Party leaders and German youth -leaders. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: In Paragraph 7, you dealt with the tasks of German youth in -the East. The Hitler Youth had carried out political schooling along the -line of the Führer’s Eastern policy and you went on to say how grateful -you were to the Führer for having turned the German people toward the -East, because the East was the destiny of your people. What did you -understand to be the Führer’s Eastern policy, or did you have a good -understanding of it at that time? - -VON SCHIRACH: I said this in Upper Silesia out of gratitude for the -return of that territory to us. - -MR. DODD: Well, I didn’t ask you that, really. I asked you if you then -understood the Führer’s policy when you made that speech? - -VON SCHIRACH: On the basis of our victory over Poland and the recovery -of German soil, I naturally affirmed Germany’s policy. - -MR. DODD: You not only affirmed it, but I want to know if you really -understood it. - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not quite know how I should answer that question. -Probably Hitler’s conception of the term Eastern policy was quite -different from mine. - -MR. DODD: But my point is that he had told you about it, hadn’t he, some -time before you made this speech? - -You had better look back at that document you have in your hands, -USSR-172, and you will find that, after you and Frank and Koch and -Hitler finished talking about deporting the Jews from Vienna, the Führer -then told you what he intended to do with the Polish people, and it is -not a very pretty story, if you will look at it. - -VON SCHIRACH: Hitler says here: - - “The ideal picture would be that a Pole in the Government - General had only a small parcel of land sufficient to feed - himself and his family fairly well. Anything else he might - require in cash for clothing, additional food, and so on he - would have to earn by working in Germany. The Government General - would be the central office for providing untrained workers, - particularly agricultural workers. The livelihood of these - workers would be assured, for they could always be used as cheap - labor. There would be no question of further agricultural labor - for Poland.” - -MR. DODD: Let me read a few excerpts that I think you have missed: - - “The Führer further emphasized that the Poles, in direct - contrast to our German Workmen, are born for hard labor...” and - so on. “The standard of living in Poland has to be and to remain - low.” - -Moving over to the next page: - - “We, the Germans, had on one hand overpopulated industrial - districts, while there was also a shortage of manpower for - agriculture. That is where we could make use of Polish laborers. - For this reason, it would be right to have a large surplus of - manpower in the Government General so that every year the - laborers needed by the Reich could in fact be procured from - there. It is indispensable to keep in mind that there must be no - Polish land owners. However cruel this may sound, wherever they - are, they must be exterminated. Of course, there must be no - mixing of blood with the Poles.” - -Further on, he had to stress once more that: - - “There should be one master only for the Poles, the Germans. Two - masters side by side cannot exist. All representatives of the - Polish intelligentsia are to be exterminated. This sounds cruel, - but such is the law of life.” - -Stopping there for a minute, by the way, Mr. Witness—you are a man of -culture, so you have told the Tribunal—how did that sentiment expressed -by the Führer impress you? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have never agreed with these opinions of the Führer, and -I said here that I approached him in 1943 on the subject of this policy -in the Ukraine. When in 1942 I talked about Eastern policy in Katowice, -the German town of Katowice, to the German population of Upper Silesia, -then, of course, I did not mean this brutal Polish policy of Hitler. - -MR. DODD: But you knew about it when you made the speech, did you not? - -VON SCHIRACH: I did not recollect it on that occasion 2 years later, and -my speech did not mean it either. - -MR. DODD: You forgot that Hitler said he must exterminate the -intelligentsia, that you must be masters of these people, that they must -remain at a low standard of living? Did that pass out of your mind so -easily? - -VON SCHIRACH: I remember that speech in Katowice; I spoke there about -completely different matters. I assume that the Prosecution even has the -shorthand record of that speech and need only submit it here. This is -just a short extract. - -MR. DODD: But, you see, Mr. Witness, the point is, knowing what the -policy was, I would like to have you tell the Tribunal how you could -urge and praise that policy to a group of young people and party leaders -on the occasion of this speech in Katowice. - -VON SCHIRACH: The policy which I was recommending to youth leaders there -was not the policy which Hitler developed in his table talk. - -MR. DODD: Of course, you said it was the Führer’s policy in your speech, -and you know what it was, but I won’t press it further if that is your -answer. - -VON SCHIRACH: Very often probably—and I once said this here—I -supported the policy of the Führer out of erroneous loyalty to him. I -know that it was not right. - -MR. DODD: That is what I want to know. You were, weren’t you, acting -under an impulse of loyalty to the Führer. Now you recognize it to be -erroneous, and that is all I am inquiring for, and if you tell the -Tribunal that, I shall be perfectly satisfied. - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I am prepared to admit that. - -MR. DODD: Very well. And, Mr. Witness, now we are getting to it; that -goes for all these things that went on. - -VON SCHIRACH: Not at all. - -MR. DODD: Don’t you have to say to the Tribunal, concerning your letter -to _Der Stürmer_, and all these things you said about the Jewish people -to the young people, and this slow building up of race hatred in them, -the co-operation with the SS, your handling of the Jews in Vienna, that -for all these things you are, and for all of them, responsible? - -VON SCHIRACH: No. - -MR. DODD: Finally, I want to offer in evidence, Mr. President, some -excerpts from these weekly SS reports to which I referred briefly on -Friday, so that they shall be before the Tribunal. There are 55 of them, -Mr. President, and they run consecutively by weeks, and they all bear -the stamp of this defendant’s office as having been received there, and -they supplant the monthly report which was received up to the time that -weekly reports began arriving. - -We have not had all of them translated or mimeographed, and if the -defendant wishes to put in any others, we will make them available, of -course. We have selected a few as samples to illustrate the kind of -report that was contained in these weekly reports, and I wish to offer -them. - -The first one is Number 1, beginning on 1 May 1942, and Numbers 4, 6, 7, -9, 38, 41, and 49. - -Now I want to make this clear to you, Mr. Witness, out of fairness. -Besides statements concerning what was happening to the Jews, you will -find in these weekly reports a number of statements about the partisan -affairs in the East as well. These excerpts have mostly to do with what -happened to the Jews, and we have not, Mr. President, drawn out a great -number that had to do with the partisans. There are a number, however, -that do have to do with partisans and not with the Jews, so we wish -there to be no doubt about how we offer these weekly reports. I just -want to ask you, with respect to these weekly reports: Do you this -morning recall that you did receive them every week in your office? - -VON SCHIRACH: But that is not my office. My office is the Central -Office. That office was directed by the Government President, and one of -his officials initialed the files, as appears from the marking on them, -and as any official trained in German office routine can confirm. They -were then put before the Government President who marked them “for the -files” and initialed them. I could not know these documents at all. - -MR. DODD: Now just a minute. You were the Reich Commissioner for the -defense of that territory; weren’t you? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And that is the stamp that is on these weekly reports, isn’t -it? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Well, what do you mean by saying that it was not your office? - -VON SCHIRACH: Because the mail, by a procedure similar to that in a -ministry, where it goes to the office of the minister, reached me in the -Central Office; and a corresponding notation had to be made on these -files. I can understand perfectly well why the Government President, -since I was overburdened with work, did not submit to me material which -had no connection at all with Vienna or my activities, but which was -merely informatory and concerned with events in Russia, mostly guerrilla -fighting in Russia. - -MR. DODD: I am going to ask you again, as I have so many times in the -course of this examination: Dellbrügge, who initialed these, was your -principal assistant, wasn’t he? Yes or no? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, he was one of my three deputies. - -MR. DODD: And he was also an SS man, and so was your other principal -assistant, as we asked the other day. - -VON SCHIRACH: Dellbrügge was a high SS leader. He was a special -confidant of the Reichsführer SS. - -MR. DODD: How did he happen to be working for you? - -VON SCHIRACH: He was assigned to me there. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I don’t think it is necessary to read any -excerpts from these weekly reports. They have been translated into four -languages, and—well, I am misinformed. I thought they were translated. -Then I think it would be better if we do have them translated and submit -them at a later date rather than take the time to read them now. - -I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine? We had better adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): -Do you admit that the Hitler Jugend had the task of inculcating German -youth and children, starting from 9 years of age, with Fascist ideology? - -Do you hear me? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I understood you to ask, whether, I would admit -having inculcated Fascist ideas into 10- to 14-year-old children of the -Hitler Youth? - -As I said in my testimony a few days ago, I saw my mission and my duty -in educating German youth to be citizens of the National Socialist -State... - -THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] That is not an answer to the question. -It is not necessary for you to tell us what you said in your previous -evidence. Will you just answer the question: Do you admit that you -inculcated in the Hitler Youth Hitler’s ideology? You can answer that -“yes” or “no.” - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that question with “yes,” because it -referred to Fascism. There is a great difference between Fascism and -National Socialism. I cannot answer that question with “yes.” I did -educate German youth in the spirit of National Socialism, that I can -admit. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like you to confirm the evidence which you gave -on 16 November 1945, during your interrogation. You defined your -personal attitude to Hitler in the following way; and I quote your -evidence: “I was an enthusiastic adherent of Hitler and I considered -everything that he wrote and stated to be a manifestation of -truth.”^{[*]} Do you confirm this statement? - -VON SCHIRACH: I did not say that, and that is not a record which was -submitted to me. I never spoke of Hitler as a deity, never. I remember -exactly, General, that you interrogated me on this point, and I was -asked whether I had been an enthusiastic follower. I confirmed that, and -I spoke about the time when I joined the Movement; but I never set up -the comparison with which I am now confronted in the translation; I -never said that I believed in Hitler as a deity, never. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You do not understand me correctly. Nothing is said -here about deity. Your evidence has been taken down, and I will repeat -it: “I was an enthusiastic adherent of Hitler, and I considered -everything that he wrote and stated to be a manifestation of -truth.”^{[*]} - -Do you confirm this statement? Answer the question directly. - -VON SCHIRACH: The translation is quite inexact. May I ask you to put the -exact question again? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will quote your statement again: “I was an -enthusiastic adherent of Hitler, and I considered everything that he -wrote and stated to be a manifestation of truth.”^{[*]} Is that right? - -VON SCHIRACH: I am accused now of having said: “I was an enthusiastic -adherent of Hitler, and I considered everything that he wrote and stated -to be the personification of truth.” That is how I understood it, and I -must say I could never have uttered such nonsense. - ------ - -^{[*]} The interpreter mistranslated this “and looked upon him as a -deity.” - ------ - -DR. SERVATIUS: May I give an explanation of this translation? I think -the correct German would have to be: “I considered what Hitler said to -be a manifestation of truth,” and not “the personification of truth”; -then it would be intelligible. There is a mistake in the interpretation. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel has perhaps helped you to answer -my question. - -VON SCHIRACH: General, that was not my defense counsel, but the defense -counsel for the Defendant Sauckel. If it is translated “manifestation of -truth,” then of course the whole passage makes sense, and also -corresponds roughly to what I said to you when I described the period of -my youth. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Very well. - -In your book entitled the _Hitler Jugend_ it said, and I quote Page 17: -“Hitler’s book, _Mein Kampf_, is our bible.” Do you confirm this? Did -you write that? - -VON SCHIRACH: But I added something to that in my book _The Hitler -Youth, Its Faith and Organization_. I want to say, first of all, that I -did write this book. I wrote it... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like to interrupt you. I do not need such -detailed explanations, and I would like you to answer the question: Is -that sentence contained in your book? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have just confirmed that, but I would like to add an -explanation. In this book—which I wrote in 1933, and which was -published in 1934—I said: “We could not yet offer detailed reasons for -our belief, we simply believed. But when Hitler’s _Mein Kampf_ appeared, -it was like a bible, which we almost learned by heart so as to answer -the questions of doubtful and deliberating critics.” - -That is how I worded it at the time; that is correct. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like to put another more precise question to -you. Do you admit that the Hitler Jugend was a political organization -which, under the leadership of the NSDAP, carried out the policy of this -Party among German youth? - -VON SCHIRACH: The Hitler Youth was a large educational community on a -political basis, but I cannot admit that it was led by the Party; it was -led by me. I was a member of the Executive Committee of the Party, and -in that sense one might speak of a Party influence. But I can see no -reason for having to confirm this, since I have already testified to it. -It is correct that the Hitler Youth was the youth organization of the -Party. - -If that is the sense of your question, I will confirm it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, I just had that in view. - -I would like to remind you of the tasks which Hitler had assigned for -the education of German youth. That is set out in Rauschning’s book, -which has already been submitted as documentary evidence before the -Tribunal as USSR-378. I quote Page 252 of that book: - - “In my schools we will bring up youth who will make the world - shudder with fear, youth that is hard, exigent, unafraid, and - cruel. That is my wish. Youth must have all these qualities; - they must be indifferent to sufferings; they must have neither - weakness nor softness. I would like to see in their eyes the - proud, self-sufficient glitter of a beast of prey.” - -You educated German youth in accordance with these demands of Hitler. Do -you admit that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I will not admit what Herr Rauschning wrote. Just by -accident I was present at a conversation between Hitler and Rauschning -and, judging by it, I must say that the statements in Rauschning’s book -represent an unfaithful record of what Hitler said. Just by accident I -witnessed a conversation between them. - -Hitler did not give me the directives which Rauschning sets forth here -as the guiding principles laid down by Hitler himself for the training -of the Hitler Youth. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I did not ask you to give such a detailed explanation. -I would like you to answer the question I put to you briefly in order to -shorten the time of interrogation. You have stated the Hitler Youth did -not educate German youth in the militaristic spirit and did not prepare -German youth for future aggressive wars. I would like to remind you of -certain statements you made in that very same book of yours, “Hitler -Youth,” right here on Page 83 of that book. Talking of the younger -generation, the so-called Jungvolk, you wrote: - - “They carry the National Socialist characteristics. The toy - merchants are worried because these children no longer need - toys; they are interested in camp tents, spears, compasses and - maps. It is a particular trait of our youth. Everything that is - against our unity must be thrown to the flames.” - -And these also were the directives which German soldiers, trained in the -Hitler Youth, followed when they set on fire houses of the peaceful -population in occupied territories, isn’t that true? Is that contained -in the book, the passage I have just read? - -VON SCHIRACH: What is in front of me now, is contained in my book. What -I heard from the interpreter is not in my book. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Well, then make your corrections. - -VON SCHIRACH: May I read the correct passage? - - “The toy merchants have complained to me that the boys”—they - mean the Jungvolk—“no longer want toys, but are interested only - in tents, spears, compasses, and maps. I cannot help the toy - merchants, for I agree with the boys that the times of the - Indians are finally gone. What is ‘Old Shatterhand,’ what is a - trapper in the backwoods of America compared to our troop - leader? A miserable, dusty remnant from the lumber chest of our - fathers. Not only the toy merchants are complaining but also the - school-cap manufacturers. Who wears a school cap nowadays? And - who nowadays is a high-school boy or girl? In some towns the - boys have banded together and publicly burned such school caps. - Burning is, in fact, a specialty of new youth. The border fences - of the minor states of the Reich have also been reduced to ashes - in the fires of your youth. - - “It is a simple but heroic philosophy; everything that is - against our unity must be thrown to the flames.” - -That, General, is the expression of the “storm and stress” of youth -which has found its special unity. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: According to your opinion, the philosophy implies that -children must no longer play with toys, but must do other things. Did I -understand you correctly? I do not see any essential difference between -my quotation and yours. - -VON SCHIRACH: May I say that I think the military training of the youth -of Germany falls much behind that of the Soviet Union. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: This is an irrelevant comparison. On Page 98 of your -book, speaking of the Hitler Youth, you wrote: - - “They strive to be political soldiers. Their model is Adolf - Hitler.” - -Did you write that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I have not found the place; is it Page 98? - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness has admitted he wrote the whole book, hasn’t -he? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In order not to lengthen the proceedings we will pass -to the next question. - -You have already spoken here of a specially created organization of -motorized Hitler Youth; you assert this organization had sport as its -aim; is that right? - -VON SCHIRACH: In connection with the training of the motorized Hitler -Youth I spoke also of ground and driving exercises, and I admitted that -the motorized Hitler Youth had premilitary significance. I did not -dispute this point at all. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd cross-examined the witness at very considerable -length on these matters about the special units of the Hitler Youth, and -it really is not any good to go over it all again. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, several points which are still -unexplained will be clarified through the following questions. - -Did you have knowledge of the fact that at the end of 1938 the -organization of motorized Hitler Youth consisted of 92 detachments, that -is of 100,000 young men? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot tell you from memory whether there were 92 -detachments, because the word “Abteilung”—that was the translation—was -not a designation for any unit of the Hitler Youth. I gave the exact -strength of the motorized Hitler Youth for 1938 in one of my statements -here either to my defense counsel or to Mr. Dodd. I gave exact figures -of its strength in 1938. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, I am speaking of 1938, and you give the number of -100,000 Hitler Youths who formed the motorized youth organization. Do -you have knowledge of this? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot tell you from memory whether there were 100,000 -members of the motorized Hitler Youth in 1938. There might have been -60,000 or 120,000. I cannot say; I do not know. I have not the documents -to prove it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, but I am quoting this number from data given by -the magazine _Das Archiv_. I would like to recall to you the tasks of -these organizations as they were set out in this magazine in -November-December 1939. I quote: - - “The preliminary training of the motorized Hitler Youth must be - carried out in special training groups, and later in special - motorization schools of the National Socialist Motor Corps.” - -I quote this excerpt according to the document book of the Defense, -Document 20, Page 50 of the Russian text. I repeat: - - “The preliminary training of the motorized Hitler Youth must be - carried out in special training groups, and later in special - motorization schools of the National Socialist Motor Corps, but - this applies only to youths who have reached the age of 17 or - more. The course of instruction includes motor mechanics, a - driving license test, field driving exercises, and also - ideological schooling. Those who successfully participate in - this course of instruction will be admitted into the National - Socialist Motor Corps.” - -This does not quite agree with your statement that the aim was sport, -does it? - -THE PRESIDENT: We heard a long commentary about these special units, and -we really do not want to hear it any more. If you have any questions on -new matters which have not been dealt with by Mr. Dodd, we shall be glad -to hear them, but we do not want to hear about whether there are 60,000 -or 70,000 or 100,000 or 120,000 Hitler Youths in the motorized units. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am only quoting what has not been mentioned yet. - -THE PRESIDENT: General, we do not want to hear it. We do not want to -hear it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will pass on to the next question. - -You issued a directive for a nation-wide training scheme of the members -of the Hitler Youth, known as “Hitler Youth on Duty.” This directive -foresaw the following kind of education for the Hitler Youth: the theory -of weapons, the theory of firing, target shooting, rifle practice, -military drill, topography, and field exercises; also instruction in the -use of the field compass and the goniometer. Are you acquainted with -this directive? Do you consider that this also did not constitute -military training of German youth? - -VON SCHIRACH: I spoke in great detail about the training of “Hitler -Youth on Duty” in my testimony last Thursday, and I particularly -discussed rifle training which takes up 40 pages of this book. I -mentioned in that connection that this rifle training was carried out -according to the rules of international rifle sport and that the British -Board of Education recommended this rifle training, and also the entire -book, to all Boy Scouts. I do not dispute that I published this book -_Hitler Youth_ and that it served as a guiding directive for this -training. But I already said that here the other day. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have denied that the Hitler Youth played an -important part in the Fifth Column in Poland. Similar methods were -carried out especially in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government has put at -the disposal of the Soviet Prosecution documents which estimated the -part of the “Hitler Youth on Duty,” under the leadership of the Hitler -Jugend, in the organization of the Fifth Column on Yugoslav territory. -Do you have any knowledge of this? Do you know anything about this? - -VON SCHIRACH: The Hitler Youth was never active in the Fifth Column -either in Yugoslavia or anywhere else. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will then quote excerpts from the official report of -the Yugoslav Government. This has already been submitted to the Tribunal -as Exhibit USSR-36. I quote from Page 3 of the Russian text of this -document: - - “The Reich Government and the Hitler Party have secretly - organized the German minority. From 1930 they had their own - organization, the ‘Union of Culture.’ Already in 1932 Dr. Jacob - Awender held the view that the ‘Union of Culture’ should be - Fascist in its outlook. In 1935 he was put at the head of an - active youth organization which shortly afterwards received the - name of ‘Organization of Revival.’” - -Do you know anything about this? - -VON SCHIRACH: I cannot comment on the information which you have just -mentioned. I heard that Bohle had some youth leaders there as his -representatives, but I do not know any details. On the subject of -Yugoslavia I can tell you from my previous activity that my relations -with Yugoslav youth were very amiable and friendly in the period before -the war. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am not interested in that. I will try to help your -memory by quoting a few excerpts from a supplementary report of the -Yugoslav Government, which is submitted to the Tribunal as Yugoslav -Exhibit, Document Number USSR-357. On Page 5, in the third line of the -Russian text of this document, it says: - - “In 1937 there began among the Volksdeutsche in our country an - orientation towards National Socialism, and the first groups of - youth started going to Germany for special courses of - instruction.” - -Further down on Page 8, we read that later on, but before the war with -the Soviet Union, the greater part of these members became officers of -the German Army. In addition, a special SS division, “Prinz Eugen,” was -formed from among members of the youth organizations. Do you deny these -facts? - -VON SCHIRACH: I can admit some; others I must deny. May I explain this? -Since 1933 I tried to bring about good relations with Yugoslav youth. -Starting in 1936 or 1937 I extended invitations to Yugoslav youth -groups, as well as to youth groups of all European countries, to visit -and inspect German youth institutions. Yugoslav youth groups actually -came to Germany in reply to my invitation. But I know nothing about the -enlisting of Yugoslav youths in the German Army; I do not believe that. -I can only say that at the time of the regency of Prince Regent Paul -there was very close collaboration with Yugoslav youth. During the war -we maintained good relations with both Serbian and Croatian youth. -German youth visited Serbia and Croatia, while Serbian and Croatian -youth came to German youth camps, German youth leader training schools, -and so on, and looked at our institutions. That, I think, is everything -I can say about this. But we had friendly relations not only with -Yugoslavia but also with many other countries. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You did not understand me correctly. I was not speaking -of Yugoslav or Croatian youth. I am speaking of the youth of the German -minority in Yugoslavia who are mentioned in this report and who, with -the help of the Hitler Youth, created centers of Fifth Column activity -to engage in subversive operations and recruit for the SS units and the -Wehrmacht. That is what I am speaking about. Are these facts known to -you? - -VON SCHIRACH: I know that there were young people among the German -minority in Yugoslavia, just as in Romania and Hungary. I know that this -German youth felt that it belonged to the Hitler Youth, and I think it -is perfectly natural that these young people welcomed the German troops -on their arrival. I cannot give information on the extent to which -collaboration existed between the troops and the youth, but that it did -exist is also quite natural. Of course, it could not be considered -military collaboration, but rather the kind of co-operation which will -always exist between an occupying force and the youth of the same -country or nationality as the members of that force. But that has -nothing to do with espionage or the like. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: But the major part of the SS Division “Prinz Eugen” -which was formed on Yugoslav territory was made up of Hitler Youth -members from the German national minority in Yugoslavia; and this was -the result of the preparatory work of the Hitler Youth. Do you admit -that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not know how the divisions of the Waffen-SS, of which -there were very many, were recruited. It is possible that some members -of the German minority were recruited then and there, but I have no -definite information on this. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will quote a few excerpts from two German documents. -They have not yet been submitted to the Tribunal. The first excerpt is -from a book by Dr. Sepp Janko who was the youth leader in Yugoslavia, -entitled _Speeches and Articles._ He wrote: - - “All our national work before 1 September 1939 depended on the - help of the Reich. When on 1 September 1939 the war began and it - at first appeared impossible to receive further aid, there was a - danger that all our work would be interrupted....” - -And later: - - “The fact that in this cause, so decisive for a nation and its - worth, I put at the disposal of the Führer almost the entire - German national group in the former State of Yugoslavia and gave - him so many volunteers as soldiers, is to me a subject of great - pride....” - -I submit this to the Tribunal as evidence; Exhibit USSR-459. - -The next excerpt is from an article, “We in the Batchka,” written in -1943 by Otto Kohler who was leader of German youth in that territory. I -submit this document to the Tribunal as Exhibit USSR-456. Otto Kohler -wrote in that article: - - “Ninety percent of our youth are members of the Hitler Youth, - the youth organization for Germans abroad.” - -The statements ought to convince you that the subversive activity and -organization of the Fifth Column, the “nazification” of the German -minority and its enlistment in military units were actually carried out -on Yugoslav territory through the Hitler Youth. Please answer “yes” or -“no.” - -VON SCHIRACH: No. But I should like to comment on these documents. This -Dr. Sepp Janko who is said to have been the leader of the Volksdeutsche -in Yugoslavia is not known to me either by name or personally. I have -visited Yugoslavia several times in the past, but neither in 1937, when -I believe I was there for the first time, nor later in 1938 when I -visited Prince Regent Paul, did I concern myself with the Volksdeutsche -youth there or with their leaders. On those visits I spoke only with -youth of Yugoslav nationality. That is all I have to say about the first -document, which on the whole does not refer to youth at all. - -The second document, which is signed by one Otto Kohler, who calls -himself the “D. J. leader”—probably German youth leader—in Subdivision -7, to that document I can only say that it was taken from a book about -German youth in Hungary which appeared in 1943. In the Batchka we had a -very large settlement of Germans, people who had been living there for -150 or 200 years, and this youth leader organized the German youth there -with the approval of the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian Minister -of Education and in collaboration with other Hungarian authorities. It -was an entirely legal measure, and no controversy existed about it -between the two countries. These young people were not members of the -German Hitler Youth, but they belonged to Hungarian youth groups of the -German minority in Hungary. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: And did the Reich Leadership of Hitler Youth have no -connection at all with such organizations abroad? - -VON SCHIRACH: Of course we visited these youths. When, for instance, I -was a guest in Budapest, the Hungarians themselves asked me whether I -would like to visit the villages and the youth of the German minority. -Neither the Regent nor any other government authority had any objections -to this. There was no reason why I should ask German youth leaders to -engage in espionage in Hungary. I could just as easily have asked -Hungarian youth leaders with whom I was on very good terms. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Who was the leader of the Hitler Youth organizations -abroad? There was a special foreign section in the Reich Leadership of -the Hitler Youth. Its task was the direction of the German youth -organizations abroad, was it not? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. The foreign office of the Reich Youth -Leadership was, if I may say so, the “foreign office” of the younger -generation. It was the task of the foreign office to maintain contact -with other national youth organizations, to invite youth leaders from -abroad, to organize tours of foreign youth organizations through -Germany, and to arrange visits of German youth to other countries, in -co-operation with the foreign offices of those countries; in a case like -this, the foreign office of the Reich Youth Leadership would approach -the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office would approach the ambassador -or representative of the country involved. The Organization of Youth -Abroad to which you are referring was an organization subordinate to the -Organization of Germans Abroad, the head of which was Gauleiter Bohle, -who has already been heard in this court. This youth abroad consisted of -German nationals who formed units of the Hitler Youth in the countries -where they were living. For instance in Budapest the children of the -German colony, starting with the children of the German Minister... - -THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Defendant, it is not necessary to make such a -long speech about it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You are giving too many details. The next question: - -In the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories, a special youth -department was created in the first main office. What do you know about -the work of this department and what was its relationship to the Reich -Leadership of the Hitler Youth? Please answer briefly. - -VON SCHIRACH: From my knowledge, I can say that when the Reich Ministry -for the Occupied Eastern Territories was created, Reichsleiter Rosenberg -expressed a wish that the Reich Youth Leader should put at his disposal -an official for the youth department in the new Ministry. This official -was appointed; he was taken into the Ministry and directed its youth -department. He was, of course, responsible to the Eastern Minister. I -cannot say more about this point. Reports from this department did not -reach me. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You mean that the Reich Leadership of the Hitler Youth -appointed a representative to a post in the Ministry for Eastern -Occupied Territories, and that this gentleman did not send in any report -to the Reich Youth Leadership; is that right? - -VON SCHIRACH: General, I meant that the head of this department or -whatever he was, this official in the Eastern Ministry who came from the -Hitler Youth, did not report to me. He naturally reported to his -immediate superiors in the Reich Youth Leadership. The Reich Youth -Leadership was located in Berlin, and I assume that the officials of its -staff were in constant touch with him. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: As I understand it, the measures that were carried out -by the youth department in the Reich Ministry for Eastern Occupied -Territories were carried out with the knowledge of the Reich Youth -Leadership; is that right? - -VON SCHIRACH: The measures taken there were carried out according to -directions laid down by the Reich Minister, who was the immediate -superior of his officials. If actual youth measures, the treatment of -youth, and so on, were dealt with, I am sure that this official or youth -leader discussed the matter with the Reich Youth Leadership and made a -report to it. The Minister is always responsible for the youth official -in his Ministry, and not the organization from which the youth official -happens to come. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I understand. To the question put to you by your -defense counsel regarding the participation of the Hitler Youth in the -atrocities committed in Lvov, you answered that the testimony of the -French citizen, Ida Vasseau, supplied by the Extraordinary State -Commission, is not true. - -Mr. President, the Soviet Prosecution has had occasion to interrogate -the witness Ida Vasseau. The defense counsel for the Defendant Schirach -also requested an interrogation. I now submit to the Tribunal excerpts -from the testimony of the witness Vasseau, dated 16 May 1946, and I -would like to submit it as Exhibit USSR-455. I shall now read the -excerpts into the record: - - “The atrocities against the Jewish and the Soviet population of - Lvov were perpetrated not only by adult Germans and old Nazis, - but also by the German youth of the Fascist youth organization - in Lvov. These youngsters, dressed in uniforms, armed with heavy - sticks, hunting knives, and often with pistols, ran about the - streets, broke into Jewish apartments and destroyed everything - in them. They killed all the inhabitants of these apartments, - including the children. Very often they stopped children who - looked suspicious to them in the streets, shouted: “Stop, you - damned Jew!” and shot them on the spot. This Hitlerite youth was - often active in locating Jewish apartments, hunting Jews in - hiding, setting traps, and assaulting innocent people on the - streets, killing them if they were Jews and dragging others away - to the Gestapo. Often their victims were Russians, Poles, - Ukrainians, and people of other nationalities. This terror of - adult and young Germans continued until the last day of the - German occupation of Lvov. The intention of completely - annihilating the Jews was especially apparent in the “Ghetto - actions” in which Jewish children of various ages were - systematically killed. They were put into houses specially set - up for Jewish children and when sufficient children had been - assembled, the Gestapo accompanied by the Hitler Youth broke in - and killed them.” - -I end the reading of the statement of Ida Vasseau. - -Thus, the Hitler Youth in the service of the German army, SS and the -Gestapo took part in these atrocities. Do you admit that? - -VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe a word of what is contained in this -document. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Well, that is your affair. - -Mr. President, I am submitting to the Tribunal another document, -USSR-454, excerpts from the testimony of the German prisoner of war Gert -Bruno Knittel. - -Gert Bruno Knittel, a hatter by trade, was born in 1924 in Saxony. After -1938 he was a member of the Hitler Youth. His sister Ursula was also a -member of the National Socialist League of German Girls (BDM). In 1942, -when he was 18 years old, he was called up for the German Army. Thus, he -is a typical representative of the Hitler Youth, and his testimony is -therefore of interest. This is what he relates about his service in the -German Army. I quote: - - “Not less than twice a week we were called upon to comb out the - forests.” - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I must object against the use of this -document of which we have just received a copy. It does not appear from -this copy whether the document was actually signed, whether it was sworn -or who drew up this document, which seems to be a report. I must object -to this document until these questions have been clarified. - -Perhaps in this connection, Mr. President, I might comment on the other -document which contains the testimony of Ida Vasseau—the writing is -difficult to read. I assume that this witness is identical with the -French national Ida Vasseau to whom a questionnaire was sent a long time -ago with the permission of the Tribunal. We have been constantly waiting -for the answers to this questionnaire, and now today we receive this -report dated 16 May 1946, which apparently refers to the same witness. -It is obvious that... - -THE PRESIDENT: I am not following quite what you are saying. Are you -saying that you have issued a questionnaire to the person who is alleged -to have made this document? - -DR. SAUTER: The High Tribunal approved a questionnaire to a French -woman, Ida Vasseau; I will spell the name, V-a-s-s-e-a-u. This is the -French woman, Ida Vasseau, who was working in an establishment in Lvov, -and who is mentioned in the Lvov Commission report. Perhaps you -remember, Mr. President, that one of these reports says that children -were taken from the ghetto and given to the Hitler Youth and that the -Hitler Youth used these children as live targets. That is the statement -of the witness Ida Vasseau, and I am sure that she is the same person -who is now mentioned in the report of 16 May 1946. The remarkable thing -is that in the report of 16 May 1946, she does not answer the questions -which are set down in the questionnaire, but makes further allegations -which are obviously not contained in the earlier Lvov Commission report. -This is a very mysterious matter, and I believe it would not be just to -the Defendant Von Schirach if I did not call your attention to these -contradictions. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: May I give my explanation? - -THE PRESIDENT: We would like to hear you in detail, General, in answer -to what Dr. Sauter has said. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Ida Vasseau, excerpts from whose statement I have read, -is certainly the person of whom Dr. Sauter is speaking. I do not know to -whom and through what channels the interrogatory was sent; it was not -sent through our office. Ida Vasseau was interrogated on our own -initiative and we could do so only on 16 May. A special interrogatory -was not received by us, and we could not have sent it because the -evidence was given only... - -THE PRESIDENT: I have only got this document here in German and it -doesn’t appear to be a document signed or made by a person called -“Vasseau” at all. I don’t know whether it is dealing with something that -Ida Vasseau is alleged to have said. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: This document is signed. - -THE PRESIDENT: I said it wasn’t signed by Vasseau. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: This document is signed by Ida Vasseau-Thom and also by -the interrogating officials, namely the Chief of the Investigation -Branch, Public Prosecutor’s Department for the Lvov Region, Kryzanovsky, -and the public prosecutor for the Lvov Region, Kornetov. The -interrogation took place on 16 May 1946. - -THE PRESIDENT: Look at this document and see if it is the right -document. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, these are excerpts from the interrogation of Ida -Vasseau. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that the same document? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, yes, that is the same document which we are now -submitting to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that the original you have got before you? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, this is an excerpt from the record, certified by -the Chief of Documentation of the Soviet Delegation, Colonel Karev. This -is not the original record of the interrogatory. These are excerpts from -it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that it is a document which is admissible -under Article 21 or what are you saying about it? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: We are submitting it. If the Tribunal considers that it -is necessary to bring out the original of the record, which at the -present moment is at Lvov, we will be able to do so in a short time. If -the Tribunal is not satisfied with these excerpts, we will very easily -be able to submit the record in full. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell us what the document is? Is it an -affidavit? Is it sworn to? Is it made before an official of the Soviet -Union? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: There is a note on the record referring to the -responsibility for false testimony, as set forth under Article 89 of the -Penal Code of the Ukrainian S.S.R. This warning is in accordance with -the requirements for legal procedure in the Soviet Union, and this -warning was given to Ida Vasseau, as a special certification on the -record shows. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that it is a document which falls within -Article 21 of the Charter? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, but if the Tribunal consider it necessary, we will -later be able to submit the complete original record. - -I am now asking the Tribunal to accept the excerpts from this record -which have been certified by the Chief of our Documentation Division. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, what is the date on which your interrogatory -was allowed by the Tribunal and what was the date on which it was sent -out to this person? - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the interrogatory bears the date of 11 April. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: The interrogatory could not be sent because we did not -know where the witness Vasseau was. We only discovered it recently. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the interrogatory has not been administered -to the person who made this statement? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: This interrogatory could not have reached its -destination because, I repeat, until quite recently the whereabouts of -the witness Vasseau was unknown. - -THE PRESIDENT: When you did find out where the witness was, the -interrogatory could have been administered. - -GEN; ALEXANDROV: Yes, yes, it can be sent to her. It can be done now if -it is necessary. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I point out the following: This woman, -Ida Vasseau, was in Lvov when this statement which is mentioned in the -Commission Report was made; that is clear from the report. I believe it -is USSR-6, but I am not quite certain. Now, on 16 May of this year, this -woman, Ida Vasseau, was also at Lvov; and her whereabouts were not -unknown, since she was interrogated on that day. I had discussed the -interrogatory which was sent to Vasseau with the Prosecution; it was at -first said that the questions were suggestive or that something was not -in order. But we came to terms and I altered the questions which I -submitted to the High Tribunal according to the wishes of the -Prosecution; so if the Soviet Delegation were willing, Ida Vasseau could -be interrogated at any time. It is remarkable that in this later -statement, this woman testified on something entirely different from -what is set forth in her previous statement, and something entirely -different from what she was asked in the interrogatory. I think it would -be useful if Ida Vasseau were examined here. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, what previous statement do you mean? What -previous statements do you mean? - -DR. SAUTER: The statement in the commission report of the City of Lvov. -This commission report was read here once and it says that the Hitler -Youth committed these outrages against the children; my questionnaire, -which the Tribunal approved, deals with this point. - -THE PRESIDENT: General, was the interrogatory submitted by Dr. Sauter -shown to the witness Vasseau? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, it was not sent to her. May I, to clarify the -matter, come back to the history of this interrogatory? The Soviet -Prosecution submitted a document, the Report of the Extraordinary State -Commission on German Atrocities in the Lvov Region, and this document -contained a statement by the witness Ida Vasseau; no one interrogated -her at that time. In this statement she said that she witnessed how the -Hitler Youth used small children as targets. That was her statement in -the Report of the Extraordinary State Commission. This document was -accepted by the Tribunal. Then, on our own initiative—Dr. Sauter’s -interrogatory did not come to us and we did not send it out—the -whereabouts of Ida Vasseau was established. She was examined by -interrogating officers and supplemented the testimony which she had -given before the Extraordinary State Commission. I am now submitting to -the Tribunal excerpts from her interrogatory on 16 May in which she -dwelt on certain details of the treatment of children by the Hitler -Youth. - -THE PRESIDENT: We all understand that, General, but the question is: -Why, if interrogatories had been allowed by the Tribunal and had been -seen by the Prosecution and were dated sometime in April, why was the -witness interrogated in May without having seen these interrogatories? -This document is dated 16 May 1946, isn’t it, Dr. Sauter?—Dr. Sauter -tells us that interrogatories allowed by the Tribunal were dated in -April. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not know where Dr. Sauter sent his interrogatory. -He did not send it through our office. I repeat that we did not send -this interrogatory and could not have sent it on, for we did not know -where Ida Vasseau lived. On our initiative steps were taken to establish -her whereabouts, and when we found her she was interrogated, namely on -16 May. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: General, the Tribunal will not admit this document at the -present time, but it would wish that you should present the original -document and at the same time the answers to the interrogatories which -the Tribunal has ordered; and the Tribunal will call upon the Secretary -General for a report upon the whole matter. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, during the recess I had a chance to talk -this over with Dr. Sauter. He will give me the interrogatory and -measures will be taken to get the necessary replies from the witness in -the shortest possible time. Besides this the request of the Tribunal to -get the original of the document will be complied with as soon as -possible. - -May I continue now with my interrogation? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, please. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I stopped at the testimony of Gert Bruno Knittel. Here -is what he relates about his service in the German Army: - - “Not less than twice a week we were sent to comb the forests, to - round up guerrillas and to look for discontent against the - German regime, so that these people could be arrested and shot - immediately. Our 3d Company, Field Depot Battalion 375, caught - and shot five persons in the woods. Most possibly these persons - were not even partisans or guerrillas, but merely citizens who - went into the woods for personal matters. But we had orders to - shoot all who crossed our path in the woods. I did this together - with the other soldiers of my company. - - “One day in June 1943, in a roundup in the village of Lishaysk, - we surrounded the whole place with three to four companies so - that no one could leave or enter the village. Outside each house - that had to be searched...” - -THE PRESIDENT: You are cross-examining the Defendant Von Schirach who -was in Vienna. What has this document got to do with him? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: This is the testimony of one of the members of the -Hitler Jugend regarding his participation in atrocities during his -service in the German Army in the occupied territory. This document is -translated into German. I need not read it. However, I would like the -witness Von Schirach to familiarize himself with this document. Did you -read this document? I am asking you this now, Witness, have you read -that document? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have read the document. This man Knittel who is -testifying here was not a member of the Hitler Youth, but belonged -either to the Labor Service or to a unit of the Army. Earlier in his -life, just like all the other young Germans, he had been a member of the -Hitler Youth. He states that; but in this case he was acting as a member -of some unit of the Armed Forces, not as a member of the Hitler Youth. -The entire testimony seems to be of little credibility. For example, he -mentions a Hitler Youth Party... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you read all the testimony that is given there? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you read all this testimony? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In connection with this, do you admit that -participation of German youth in similar atrocities was the effect of -the special education and preparation of the Hitler Youth? - -VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not admit that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have two more questions, and that will be all. Up to -what time did you hold the post of Reichsstatthalter of Vienna and -Reichsleiter of Youth Education? - -VON SCHIRACH: I was head of Youth Education from 1931 and Reich Governor -of the city of Vienna since 1940. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am interested in knowing to what date, to what -moment? - -VON SCHIRACH: I held both of these offices until the collapse. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You were telling here in detail about your break with -Hitler in 1943. You stated that from that time on you were politically -dead. However, you continued to hold your posts to the very end. -Therefore your break with Hitler was only theoretical, and in effect -entailed no consequences for you. Is that correct? - -VON SCHIRACH: That is wrong. I described the consequences which it had -for me in my statement either on Thursday or Friday, and I also -mentioned at that time that up to the very last moment I kept my oath -which I had given to Hitler as Youth Leader, as an official, and as an -officer. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have no more questions, Mr. President. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in order to expedite the proceedings, I -should like to put two brief questions to Defendant Von Schirach. - -The first question, Witness: in the course of the cross-examination you -were asked whether you gave the order to hold Vienna until the very last -moment and to defend the city to the last man. As far as I remember, you -answered that question in the negative. Now, I am interested in knowing -in this connection what orders you gave to your subordinates during the -last days in Vienna—I mean to the Deputy Gauleiter Scharizer and the -then Mayor Blaschke? - -VON SCHIRACH: The order for the defense of Vienna originated with -Hitler. The defense of Vienna was a matter for the military authorities, -that is, the commandant of the city of Vienna, the military commander -who was in charge of the 6th SS Panzer Division.... - -DR. SAUTER: What was his name? - -VON SCHIRACH: Sepp Dietrich, and the officer commanding the Army Group -South, Generaloberst Rendulic. - -DR. SAUTER: Did they give the orders? - -VON SCHIRACH: In carrying out the order which Hitler had given them -regarding the defense of Vienna, they defended Vienna. - -DR. SAUTER: What orders did you, Witness, give your subordinates in this -connection? - -VON SCHIRACH: For the defense of Vienna I gave only such orders as -related to the Volkssturm, or those dealing with the food supply of the -city and similar matters with which I was charged. I personally had -nothing to do with the actual defense of the city. For even the work of -destruction which was necessary in the course of the military defense of -the city is to be traced back to orders which originated from the -Führer’s headquarters and had been transmitted to the officer commanding -the Army group, and to the city commandant. - -DR. SAUTER: My second question, Witness: In your cross-examination you -were questioned about Document 3763-PS. This is a document which deals -with the songs of youth, into which the Prosecution seems to read a -different attitude from the one you set forth. Do you wish to supplement -your testimony on this point? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I must supplement it briefly. - -DR. SAUTER: Please do. - -VON SCHIRACH: The Prosecution accuses me concerning a certain song, a -song which begins, “We are the black swarms of Geyer, hey, ho”; the -chorus of which goes, “Spear them, spike them, put the red cock on the -cloister roof,” and one verse runs, “We will cry to Him on high that we -want to kill the priest.” - -This is a Christian song. - -DR. SAUTER: How is that? - -VON SCHIRACH: This can be seen in the fourth and fifth verses. It is the -song of the Protestant peasants under the leadership of Florian Geyer. - -The fourth verse goes: “No castle, abbey, and monastery matters. Nothing -but the Holy Scripture is of value to us.” The next verse goes: “We want -the same law from prince down to peasant.” - -Protestantism, too, was once a revolution. The rebel peasants sang this -song; and it may serve as an example, this song of the 16th century, -like some of the songs of the French revolution. This song may be used -as an example to show how, in the beginning, revolutions are radical -rather than tolerant. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, with this point I should like to conclude my -direct examination of the Defendant Von Schirach. Thank you very much. I -have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Who were your principal assistants in your office at -Vienna? - -VON SCHIRACH: First of all, the chief of my Central Office, Hoepken; -secondly, the Regierungspräsident Dr. Dellbrügge; thirdly, the Mayor, -Blaschke; and fourthly, the Deputy Gauleiter, Scharizer. They were my -chief collaborators. - -THE PRESIDENT: That makes four, does it? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And did they occupy the whole of their time working for -you in your office? - -VON SCHIRACH: Not all of them. The Deputy Gauleiter had already been -functioning under my predecessor, Bürckel. Mayor Blaschke, as far as I -recall, first became mayor in 1943. His predecessor as mayor was a Herr -Jung. The District President, Dr. Dellbrügge, assumed his office in -1940, after my arrival in Vienna. He was sent to me from the Reich. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well then, from the time that you took over the office in -Vienna these four men were working for you, is that right? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I should like to mention also that the head of the -Central Office, Hoepken, was first of all active under me as adjutant -and assumed his position as chief only when the former chief of this -office, Obergebietsführer Müller, lost his life in an air raid. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which of the four was it who initialed those weekly -reports which were received in your office? - -VON SCHIRACH: That was the District President, Dr. Dellbrügge. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dellbrügge? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And at the time that he received them he was working in -your office as one of your principal assistants? - -VON SCHIRACH: He was my deputy in the State Administration. - -THE PRESIDENT: That was your office? - -VON SCHIRACH: That was one of my offices. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, one department in your office? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. May I add, by way of explanation, that there were -various branches: The State Administration, the Municipal -Administration, the Party Management and the Reich Defense Commissariat. -The Reich Defense Commissariat and the State Administration were -combined as far as their representation was concerned. Everything was -co-ordinated in the Central Office. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, in which department was this principal assistant -who initialed these documents? Which department was he head of? - -VON SCHIRACH: He held a key position in the office of the -Reichsstatthalter as Chief of the State Administration. - -THE PRESIDENT: Civil administration? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes, Civil State Administration. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was he the Deputy Reich Defense Commissioner? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And you were the Reich Defense Commissioner for the -Military District Number XVII, were you not? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And he was your deputy in that military district? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: He received and initialed those reports in that office, -did he not? - -VON SCHIRACH: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock. - -[_The Defendant Von Schirach left the stand._] - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, with your permission I should like to call to -the witness box the witness Lauterbacher. - -[_The witness Lauterbacher took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -HARTMANN LAUTERBACHER (Witness): Hartmann Lauterbacher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that your full name? - -LAUTERBACHER: Lauterbacher. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down. - -DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, I have already discussed this matter with -you in the prison; is that right? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Please pause after each question before you answer so that -the interpreters may keep up. - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: When were you born? - -LAUTERBACHER: On 24 May 1909. - -DR. SAUTER: 1909? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes, 1909. - -DR. SAUTER: Are you married? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: You have three children? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: What is your profession? - -LAUTERBACHER: Druggist. - -DR. SAUTER: Retail druggist? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: You are in an American prison? - -LAUTERBACHER: In an English prison. - -DR. SAUTER: Since when? - -LAUTERBACHER: Since 29 May 1945. - -DR. SAUTER: Have you been interrogated by the Prosecution on this -matter? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. - -DR. SAUTER: When did you become an official, that is to say, a paid -employee of the Hitler Youth? - -LAUTERBACHER: I became a paid employee of the Hitler Youth when -appointed District Leader (Gebietsführer) of the Westphalia-Lower Rhine -area. - -DR. SAUTER: And when was that? - -LAUTERBACHER: In April 1932: - -DR. SAUTER: April 1932. That was at the age of 23? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes, at the age of 23. - -DR. SAUTER: Before then had you been a member of the HJ? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. I was... - -DR. SAUTER: Slowly, please, and always wait until the question has been -completed before you answer. - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: I was asking you if you were already a member of the Hitler -Youth when you took up your paid appointment in the year 1932. - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. When I was 13 years old, in the year 1922, I joined -what was then known as the National Socialist Youth Organization. Then, -when I was 18 years old, in the year 1927, I accepted the duties of an -Unterführer in my home province of the Tyrol... - -DR. SAUTER: And officially you were... - -LAUTERBACHER: ...then I worked in an honorary capacity in Brunswick from -1929 until 1932; and later on I had a paid appointment. - -DR. SAUTER: That is to say from 1932? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: What was your status in the year 1932? What position did you -get then? - -LAUTERBACHER: In the year 1932 I was entrusted with the leadership of -the area then known as Westphalia-Lower Rhine. - -DR. SAUTER: When were you assigned to the Defendant Von Schirach? - -LAUTERBACHER: On 22 May 1934. - -DR. SAUTER: What was your position under him? - -LAUTERBACHER: Stabsführer. - -DR. SAUTER: How long did you remain a Stabsführer? - -LAUTERBACHER: Until August 1940. - -DR. SAUTER: I suppose until the time he resigned his office as Reich -Youth Leader? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: When you took up your paid appointment with the HJ, had you -already served with the Army? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Then you had not been an officer? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. - -DR. SAUTER: You told us, I believe, that since 1934 you had been -Stabsführer of the Reich Youth Leadership. What tasks did the -Stabsführer of the Reich Youth Leadership have? Please tell us briefly, -so we may have an idea of what your jurisdiction was. - -LAUTERBACHER: As the title of Stabsführer indicates, I was in the first -place the chief of the staff of the Reich Youth Leadership. As such, I -had the task of dealing with the general directives of the Reich Youth -Leader, particularly those concerning the Hitler Youth offices and -regions insofar as the Youth Leader did not do that himself. I had to -co-ordinate the various departments of the Reich Youth Leadership and in -particular to deal with matters of an organizational and personal -nature. - -Furthermore, in the years 1935 to 1939 I made a number of journeys -abroad at Von Schirach’s request. - -DR. SAUTER: Who was the deputy of the Reich Youth Leader when he could -not act personally? - -LAUTERBACHER: I was his deputy on occasions when he was prevented from -acting personally. - -DR. SAUTER: Then apparently you were the first man in the Reich Youth -Leadership after Schirach? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Were your relations with Von Schirach purely official, or -were you friends as well? - -LAUTERBACHER: Our association was not limited only to official matters; -we were also personal friends, and so our personal relationship was not -interrupted by Schirach’s appointment in Vienna. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you believe, Herr Lauterbacher—regarding this friendly -relationship that you had with Von Schirach—that he concealed certain -things from you; or are you of the conviction that so far as official -matters were concerned he had no secrets from you? - -LAUTERBACHER: I always have been, and still am today, convinced of the -fact that Von Schirach made all his intentions and educational measures -known to me. - -DR. SAUTER: So he kept nothing from you? - -LAUTERBACHER: No, he kept nothing from me. If Schirach had discussions -with Adolf Hitler during the earlier years he always informed me -immediately afterwards. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, in the year 1939 the second World War broke out. -Did the Defendant Von Schirach, in the last few years prior to the -outbreak of the World War, have any discussions with you in which he -expressed the view that youth should be educated for war—in other -words—that in educating youth the necessities and requirements of -future war must be taken into account? What transpired on this point -between you and Von Schirach before the war? - -LAUTERBACHER: The possibility of war was never discussed. Occasionally I -attended Party rallies in the company of Von Schirach; and on these -occasions, when Adolf Hitler delivered a speech, I only—on the occasion -of these rallies I had the definite and unalterable impression that -Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Reich were determined to -maintain peace and to allow matters to follow a peaceful course. That is -why it never occurred to me that youth should be trained specifically -for war. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, in your capacity as Stabsführer of the Reich Youth -Leadership, did you have any knowledge about the mail as a whole which -either came to Schirach or was dispatched by him? - -LAUTERBACHER: I always saw all the official mail. - -DR. SAUTER: In the mail which reached Schirach in his office, did you -see anything about directives for the Reich Youth Leadership received -from Hitler, from the Party leadership, from the OKW, or from any other -agency, either State or Party, regarding the preparations for war? - -LAUTERBACHER: No, neither open nor camouflaged. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, we have already heard about the main functions of -youth education in the course of the last few days. I do not believe, -Mr. President, that I need go into these subjects in detail. The witness -is the person best qualified to give us information, but I think I may -take the subject of youth education as clarified. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think so. I think the facts about it have been -sufficiently stated. - -DR. SAUTER: Thank you. Then I can pass on to another subject -immediately. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You said that you had not been a soldier. -Did not Schirach attach importance to the inclusion among his -collaborators of a certain number of officers, or at least of men who -had served their term of military service and who might be enrolled as -instructors? Please be brief. - -LAUTERBACHER: No, at first, that is, during the early years of the -period of development, Von Schirach rejected officers as youth leaders -on ideological and educational grounds. The aim and mission of the -Hitler Youth were those of a socialist community and of a socialist -state; and the old type of officer of the period, the representative of -a reactionary epoch, would have been absolutely incompatible. - -DR. SAUTER: Absolutely incompatible? Do you mean with the... - -LAUTERBACHER: With the principles of education which Schirach had laid -down for the Hitler Youth. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, have you any idea whether Schirach always rejected -the proposal, or to put it the other way round, do you know whether he -agreed when any military authorities tried to influence the character of -the Youth Leadership? Perhaps you could also answer this point briefly. - -LAUTERBACHER: Even in 1933 attempts were made to introduce officers into -the Hitler Youth as leaders. As far as my information goes, two officers -had been given appointments in the Hitler Youth before my period of -office as Stabsführer, under more or less direct orders from Hitler. -They were entirely unable to cope with youth as such; and I think I am -justified in saying that their appearance was a complete failure. - -DR. SAUTER: What happened to them? - -LAUTERBACHER: Schirach went to Adolf Hitler and succeeded in having -these gentlemen dismissed; also through him, a directive was drawn up by -Hitler which said that officers were not to hold positions in the Hitler -Youth. - -DR. SAUTER: Were no further attempts of the kind made to force officers -from somewhere or other upon him? - -LAUTERBACHER: Oh, yes. In 1936 and 1937, and then again in 1938, -attempts were made to influence the education of the Hitler Youth -through so-called liaison officers. But these attempts also failed; and -up to the very end there were no officers working with the Hitler Youth -who were responsible to any other authority except Schirach, apart from -former Hitler Youth leaders who had served in the Army and received -officers’ commissions. - -DR. SAUTER: If I understand you correctly, Witness, you wish to say—and -please confirm whether I have understood you correctly—that Schirach -rejected these attempts. Is that correct? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, why did the Hitler Youth wear uniform—the girls as -well? - -LAUTERBACHER: Uniform is perhaps not quite the correct term for the -clothing worn by the members of the Hitler Youth. It was more in the -nature of a national costume which was worn by members of youth -organizations before the existence of the Hitler Youth, not only in -Germany but in other countries as well. Moreover, Schirach was anxious -that all boys and girls should, as he expressed himself, wear the dress -of the socialist community. - -DR. SAUTER: Of the socialist community. Does that mean a community of -all—of all the boys and girls of every class of German society without -any distinction? - -LAUTERBACHER: Without any distinction as to descent or creed or anything -else. - -DR. SAUTER: Or rich or poor? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Were the Hitler Youth in possession of weapons and were they -trained in the use of military weapons? You must know that. - -LAUTERBACHER: No, they were not trained in the use of military weapons -during the period in which Schirach and I held office. - -DR. SAUTER: Did the Hitler Youth have, in particular, tanks, armored -cars, and so forth, since reference was made to the training of the -young men in the so-called “motorized Hitler Youth” in connection with -the question of the special unit (Sonderformation)—tanks, armored cars? - -LAUTERBACHER: No, to my knowledge the Hitler Youth never received any -training in armored cars, tanks, or anything of the kind, even after -Schirach’s term of office. At any rate... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the facts stated by the defendant as to the -weapons of the Hitler Youth and their formations were not -cross-examined. You need not go into that. Mr. Dodd did not suggest that -they had tanks. - -DR. SAUTER: Thank you, Mr. President. Then I can perhaps be more brief. - -I now come, Herr Lauterbacher, to the Defendant Von Schirach’s attitude -toward the Jewish question. Was the Hitler Youth involved in any way in -the Jewish pogroms of November 1938? - -LAUTERBACHER: I think I can answer your question with a definite “no.” - -DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, you told me something about a speech made -by the Defendant Von Schirach a few days after 9 November 1938, on the -subject of these Jewish pogroms. Tell me when and to whom he delivered -this speech and what the contents of the speech were. - -LAUTERBACHER: Von Schirach was in Munich on 10 November 1938 and I was -in Berlin. Schirach instructed me by telephone to tell the district -leaders of the Hitler Youth that their organizations were in no -circumstances to take part in these anti-Jewish demonstrations, and to -call a meeting of all these leaders to hear a specific declaration on -this point. This meeting took place about 15 November 1938. - -DR. SAUTER: Where? - -LAUTERBACHER: In Berlin. Schirach asked these district leaders to report -to him and expressed his satisfaction at having in the meantime received -reports to the effect that the Hitler Youth had not been involved in -these excesses. He then described the said excesses in his speech. I -still remember this speech extraordinarily well, for it was particularly -impressive. He described these pogroms as a disgrace to our culture and -as amounting to self-defamation. He said that such things might be -expected of an uncivilized people but not of the German people. He went -on to say that we had antagonized not only the world in general but also -all decent people in Germany itself by these demonstrations. He was -afraid that serious political difficulties would arise at home, as well -as difficulties within the Party itself. As we know, the Party was not -at all unanimous in its judgment of these happenings. A very large -section of the Party members and of the Party leadership condemned these -excesses. - -DR. SAUTER: Please tell us more of what Schirach said at that time. I -should be more interested in that. - -LAUTERBACHER: Von Schirach then gave the Youth Leadership special -instructions to keep out of demonstrations of this or a similar kind in -the future, no matter what the circumstances might be, and condemned -every use of violence on educational grounds alone. He concluded the -proceedings by prohibiting the reading of the newspaper _Der Stürmer_ by -the Hitler Youth at club evenings or on any other occasions. - -DR. SAUTER: On this occasion, Herr Lauterbacher, did he say anything -about the needless destruction of so many cultural treasures, art -treasures, property belonging to the people, _et cetera_, and did he not -give certain instances of this? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. As an especially glaring instance, he quoted the case -of the attempt, which was at least partially carried through, to loot -the Jewish firm of Bernheimer, art dealers in Munich. - -DR. SAUTER: Munich? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. He quoted this example to the Youth Leadership to -illustrate the dangerous and irreparable inroads made on the reservoir -of our culture and our cultural treasures by these demonstrations. - -DR. SAUTER: Is it true that immediately after this Berlin speech about -which you have just told us, the Defendant Von Schirach caused definite -directives to be issued by telephone from Berlin, through your agency, -to the individual Hitler Youth offices? - -LAUTERBACHER: This took place as early as 10 November, the day after the -Munich meeting. It had nothing to do with the district leaders’ meeting, -which only took place about 15 November. - -DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, I assume that, as time went on, you were -present at a good many speeches made by the Defendant Von Schirach to -his subleaders, or to the Hitler Youth, and that you listened to many of -these speeches yourself. Did the Defendant Von Schirach engage in -Jew-baiting on these or other occasions? Did he suggest that violence be -used against the Jews? What was his attitude? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes; I must have listened to all the important speeches -delivered by Von Schirach before the Leadership Corps of the Hitler -Youth, and on the occasion of these speeches I never heard him urge the -use of violence, which would in any case have been completely foreign to -his nature. At any rate, I cannot recall that Von Schirach ever called -upon the Youth Leadership, either directly or indirectly, to take part -in acts of violence of any kind against anyone. - -DR. SAUTER: What did Schirach usually talk about in delivering one of -his many speeches addressed to youth? Just the main topic, briefly. - -LAUTERBACHER: One must certainly differentiate between the long speeches -which he delivered at public demonstrations and the speeches which he -made before the leaders of the Hitler Youth. - -In the speeches he addressed to the leaders he always discussed the main -political and ideological tasks and the tasks of social policy, cultural -policy, and professional training which he had assigned to the Hitler -Youth. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, we shall turn to a different topic, Herr Lauterbacher. -Did Schirach cause you to leave the Church? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you leave the Church? - -LAUTERBACHER: I do not believe that Herr Von Schirach even knew to what -religious denomination I belonged or whether I left the Church or not. I -left the Church in 1937 or 1938, without being influenced or forced to -do so by anyone. - -DR. SAUTER: Did Von Schirach urge his other collaborators to leave the -Church, as far as you know? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Did Schirach abuse Christianity or incite others to attack -it on the occasion of the numerous speeches made by him, to which you -have just told us that you listened? - -LAUTERBACHER: On those occasions Schirach always told the youth to -respect religious convictions, and characterized atheism as an evil, not -only once but many times. In his speeches, Von Schirach vigorously -criticized, for instance, the athletic clubs existing both before and -after 1933 in connection with the various churches and demanded the -unity of youth; but on these occasions he did not attack Christianity or -the religious convictions of others either in public or in private. - -DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, during the time the Defendant Von -Schirach was Reich Youth Leader, negotiations were pending with the -Roman Catholic Church with a view to concluding a concordat, so that -relations between the State and the Church would be regulated by an -agreement. Do you know whether Von Schirach took part in these concordat -negotiations and whether he took much trouble to effect an understanding -with the Church on a basis satisfactory to both sides? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. In 1933 and 1934 Schirach had numerous discussions -with representatives of the Church, Reich Bishop Müller of the -Protestant Church and the representative of the Fulda Conference of -Bishops, Bishop Berning of Osnabrück. I remember that Schirach strove to -draw a dividing line between their respective powers and jurisdiction on -some such basis as: “Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s -and unto God the things which are God’s.” - -DR. SAUTER: I have another question, Witness: Do you know whether Von -Schirach actually tried to bring about an understanding between the -Hitler Youth, of which he was the leader, and the youth of other -countries, and can you tell us, for instance, what he did and what steps -he took to that end? - -LAUTERBACHER: The establishment of a cordial understanding between -German youth and world youth generally was undoubtedly one of those -tasks the importance of which Schirach constantly emphasized to his -youth leaders, and I always had the impression that this task was, as I -might almost say, his particular passion. I myself, on his orders—and -perhaps I am a cardinal witness on precisely this point—visited the -various European countries, from 1935 onwards, at least once a year and -sometimes even two or three times a year, so that I could get in touch -with existing youth organizations and with organizations of combatants -of the first World War, in order to establish contact with them. - -DR. SAUTER: Which countries? - -LAUTERBACHER: It can truthfully be said that the Hitler Youth sought -contacts with all the countries of Europe; and I myself, at the direct -order of Von Schirach, visited England several times. There I met the -leader of the British Boy Scouts and his colleague, but also... - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think those facts are in dispute. It is merely -the inference that is to be drawn from the facts that the Prosecution -will rely upon. Therefore it is not necessary for you to go into the -facts again, as to the connection of the Hitler Youth with the foreign -youth. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President. - -Witness, you have just heard that these facts are not in dispute. We can -therefore turn to another topic. You were the Stabsführer of the Hitler -Youth in the Reich Youth Leadership. Do you know whether the Leadership -of the Hitler Youth maintained spies or agents abroad, or whether it -trained people for the so-called Fifth Column—and I take it you know -what that is—in other countries, or whether it brought young people -over to be trained as parachutists in Germany and then sent them back to -their own countries. During your whole period of office as Stabsführer, -did you ever learn of anything like that? - -LAUTERBACHER: The Hitler Youth did not have spies, agents, or -parachutists to operate in any country in Europe. I would have been -bound to learn of such a fact or such an arrangement in any -circumstances. - -DR. SAUTER: Even if Schirach had made such an arrangement behind your -back, do you believe that you would have been bound to learn of it in -any case through the channels of reports from district leaders and -similar channels? - -LAUTERBACHER: I would inevitably have learned of this or have observed -it in these districts on some of my many official trips. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, Witness, I should like to turn to another topic. The -other day you told me about a certain discussion. After the Polish -campaign—that would be, presumably, at the end of September or -beginning of October 1939—and before the actual campaign in France you -had a meeting with the Defendant Von Schirach in your residence in -Berlin-Dahlem, on which occasion the Defendant Von Schirach voiced his -attitude to the war. Will you describe this conversation briefly to the -Court? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. Von Schirach came to see me at the end of September -or beginning of October 1939. He visited me in the house which I -occupied at the time in Berlin. The conversation very quickly turned to -war, and Schirach said that, in his opinion, this war should have been -prevented. He held the Foreign Minister of that time responsible for -having given Hitler inadequate or false information. He regretted the -fact that Hitler and the leading men of the State and the Party knew -nothing about Europe and the world generally and had steered Germany -into this war without having any idea of the consequences. - -At that time he was of the opinion that if the war could not be brought -to an end in the shortest possible time, we should lose it. In this -connection he referred to the enormous war potential of the United -States and England. He said—and I remember the expression very -well—that this war was an unholy one and that if the German people were -not to be plunged into disaster as a result of it, the Führer must be -informed of the danger which would arise for Germany if America were to -intervene, either through deliveries of goods or through actual entry -into the war. - -We considered at the time who could inform Hitler, who, in fact, could -even obtain access to him. Schirach suggested trying in some way to -introduce Colin Ross into Adolf Hitler’s presence. Colin Ross was to -call Hitler’s attention to the threatening catastrophe and to inform -Hitler of the facts. This was to be done outside the competency of the -Foreign Minister and without the Foreign Minister being present. At that -time Colin Ross was not yet in Germany. I remember that when he returned -he was introduced into Hitler’s presence by way of Schirach. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, will you tell us more about the discussion which -you mentioned as having taken place in 1939. I should like you to answer -this question: How did he come to choose Dr. Colin Ross in particular? -How did you happen to think of him? - -LAUTERBACHER: I have already mentioned that the leaders of the National -Socialist State and of the Party were almost totally lacking in -knowledge of the world and foreign countries generally, and had -consequently hit upon this man, who had seen so much of the world. Colin -Ross had occasionally attended meetings of the Hitler Youth Leaders -before 1939 and had addressed them... - -DR. SAUTER: What about? - -LAUTERBACHER: ...and thus he was known to Schirach and the Hitler Youth. - -DR. SAUTER: What were the topics he discussed before the Hitler Youth? - -LAUTERBACHER: Colin Ross spoke of his experiences in every continent. - -DR. SAUTER: How did Colin Ross become known to the Hitler Youth? On this -occasion did you also speak of whether an attempt should be made to find -a solution of the Jewish problem, so that it would be easier to reach an -understanding with other countries, and if so, on what basis? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. In the course of this conversation Schirach referred -to the excesses of 9 November 1938 and to the speech he made immediately -afterwards, and said that in the circumstances it would naturally be -extremely difficult to start discussions with America; that we might -have to try beforehand—if circumstances permitted—and he wished to -suggest this to Hitler during an interview... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal does not think it is really -sufficiently important to go into Schirach’s private discussions with -this witness. If he can say anything as to what Schirach did, it may be -different, but now the witness is simply reciting the discussions which -he had with Schirach, nothing more than private discussion. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, what steps did Schirach actually take towards -peace, or to shorten the war, as a result of these discussions with you? -Did he take any steps; and what were these steps? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes, as he told me at a later discussion, Schirach made -use of every opportunity at the beginning of the war to convince Hitler -of the need for discussions with America, and with this purpose in view, -he actually brought Colin Ross to Hitler, as he told me later. Colin -Ross was with Hitler for several hours. When Colin Ross visited me at -Hanover he told me about this discussion and on this occasion he said -that Hitler was very thoughtful. He did say also, however, that a second -discussion which had been planned with Hitler had not materialized, for, -according to his version, the Foreign Office had protested against this -kind of information. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks that this witness is -dealing in great detail with matters which are of very little importance -and the Tribunal wishes you to bring his attention to something which is -of real importance. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have in any case only one more question. - -One last question, Witness. You have not been with Schirach since 1940. -I believe you became a Gauleiter. - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Schirach went to Vienna. But in 1943 you again had a long -talk with him, mainly about why Schirach did not resign from his post. -My reason for putting this question to you is that one member of the -Prosecution has already discussed the question today. Will you tell us -briefly what reasons Schirach gave at the time for retaining his office -or why he did not resign, and what his views on the war were in 1943—at -that time, I mean? - -LAUTERBACHER: In March 1943, when I made an unofficial visit to Vienna, -a very long conversation took place between Von Schirach and myself. At -that time, Von Schirach talked very pessimistically about the prospects -of the war and told me that we should soon be fighting outside Vienna, -in the Alps and along the Rhine. On that occasion he said that he had -not been able to see Adolf Hitler for a very long time; that he had had -no further opportunity of reporting to him, as had formerly been the -case; and that the Chief of the Party Chancellery, Bormann, had -consistently prevented him from seeing the Führer and talking to him -alone; and that he therefore no longer had any opportunity whatsoever of -discussing Viennese questions or general questions with Hitler. In this -connection he also stated that Bormann came to him with objections and -complaints every day, cancelling orders and directives he had issued in -his capacity of Gauleiter in Vienna, and that in view of all this, it -was no longer possible for him to remain in office and to shoulder the -responsibility. - -At a later stage of that conversation, in the course of which we -considered all kinds of possibilities, he said that, as he had sworn an -oath of allegiance to Hitler, he felt bound to remain in office whatever -happened and that, above all, he could not take the responsibility in -the present military situation for abandoning the population over which -he had been appointed Gauleiter. - -He saw the catastrophe coming but said that even his resignation or any -action that he might take would not have any influence on the leaders of -the State or on Hitler himself and that he would, therefore, remain true -to his oath, as a soldier would, and retain his appointment. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, that concludes my examination of this -witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defense counsel want to ask him any -questions? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, were you Gauleiter in Hanover from 1940? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes, from December 1940. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You were also Plenipotentiary for Labor in that capacity? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were there many foreign laborers in your Gau? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes, there were a great many foreign laborers in my -district. This was mainly due to the Hermann Göring Works, which had -been established near Brunswick. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have to look after them? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes, my assignments as Plenipotentiary for Labor were -confined to looking after foreign civilian workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive instructions from Sauckel on that point? - -LAUTERBACHER: I, like all other Gauleiter of the NSDAP, constantly -received instructions from Sauckel with regard to the recruitment of -labor; that is to say, regarding the welfare of these civilian workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What type of instructions were they? - -LAUTERBACHER: The instructions which I received as Gauleiter consisted -almost exclusively of repeated demands to do everything to satisfy the -foreign workers in matters of accommodation, food, clothing, and -cultural welfare. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was that carried out in practice? - -LAUTERBACHER: It was naturally carried out within the limits of existing -possibilities. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you inspect camps or factories where these workers -were employed? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes, I myself inspected such camps and especially such -factories on my official trips. Apart from that I had, as my Gau -supervisor of the German Labor Front, a man who assisted me in this task -on such occasions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you or your Gau supervisor discover the existence of -shocking conditions? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. After the air raids from which Hanover and Brunswick -suffered particularly badly from 1943 onwards, I found conditions in -foreign civilian labor camps—just as I did in the living quarters of -German people—to be what I would call, perhaps not shocking, but -certainly very serious; and after that I tried as far as possible to -have these destroyed dwellings repaired, for instance, or to have new -ones built. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you see any abuses for which these industrial -enterprises of the supervisory agencies were directly responsible? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes, I do remember two such cases. - -Several firms in Hanover had formed a kind of industrial association—a -kind of union—and had established a camp for their foreign civilian -workers. The trustees of these firms were responsible for this camp. One -day the Gau supervisor of the German Labor Front reported to me that -living conditions did not comply with instructions received and asked my -permission to intervene, that is to say, to be allowed to assume -responsibility through the German Labor Front for that collective camp. -I gave him this assignment; and sometime afterwards he reported that -these difficulties had been overcome. - -The Hermann Göring Works constitute another example of this kind. Since -I am speaking under oath here, I must mention the fact that that firm -disregarded Sauckel’s instructions in many respects. On one occasion -they recruited workers independently, outside the jurisdiction of the -labor administration through their branches in the Ukraine and other -countries. These laborers came to Watenstedt, in the area supervised by -the Executive Board of the Party, outside the quota fixed by the -Plenipotentiary for Labor, and consequently outside of his jurisdiction. - -I myself had very considerable difficulty in obtaining entry to the -works and the camp. For although Gauleiter and Plenipotentiary, I was -not by any means in a position simply to... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What has this got to do with the Defendant -Sauckel? - -DR. SERVATIUS: I asked him about any abuses which he had found, for as -plenipotentiary for the recruitment of foreign workers it was his duty -to ascertain where such bad conditions existed and to report them so -that they would finally be brought to Sauckel’s notice. He has digressed -rather widely and has just been describing the Hermann Göring Works. - -THE PRESIDENT: You should stop him, Dr. Servatius. You know the question -you were asking. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you discover the existence of abuses in the -camp? - -LAUTERBACHER: I was unable to enter the camp, because entry was -forbidden. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel himself address the workers in your Gau? - -LAUTERBACHER: No, not during my period of office. But he frequently sent -representatives. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have now got some questions to put on behalf of the -political leaders whom I represent. - -Did you receive special instructions from the Führer on your appointment -as Gauleiter? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. When I was appointed Gauleiter I was merely introduced -by Herr Hess as Gauleiter, during an assembly of Gauleiter. But I -received no special instructions on the occasion of that meeting, and -during my... - -THE PRESIDENT: Witness, the answer was “no” and you did not need to add -to it at all. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you talk to the Führer later on? Did you receive -special or secret instructions? - -LAUTERBACHER: I only saw the Führer now and again at Gauleiter meetings -and I never had any official discussions with him. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know anything about the activities of block -leaders? In particular, I want to ask you: Were they used as spies? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS: But there seems to be a widespread belief that in fact -block leaders did act as spies and informers and that has been brought -up by the Prosecution. Perhaps the SD used block leaders for that -purpose? - -LAUTERBACHER: The SD had its own agents who were not known to the Party. -At any rate, the block leaders had no instructions to work for the SD. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was no card index kept of Party opponents? - -LAUTERBACHER: Not in the Party organizations. As far as I know this card -index was kept by the Secret Police, as was made known in connection -with the plot of 20 July 1944. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Party use agents for spying who may not have been -block leaders but who worked for you in your capacity of Gauleiter? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. - -MR. DODD: When did you join the SS, Witness? - -LAUTERBACHER: I was made an SS Brigadier General on 2 August 1940, on -the occasion of my appointment as Deputy Gauleiter. - -MR. DODD: I did not hear your answer as to when you first joined the SS. -Would you repeat it, please? - -LAUTERBACHER: On 2 August 1940. - -MR. DODD: You had not belonged before that date to the organization at -all? - -LAUTERBACHER: I was not a member of the SS before that date; but I -served in the Waffen-SS as a soldier, from 26 May 1940 to September -1940. - -MR. DODD: And then you later became an SS Obergruppenführer, did you -not? - -LAUTERBACHER: On 20 April 1944. - -MR. DODD: And when did you join the staff of Himmler? - -LAUTERBACHER: I was never a member of Himmler’s staff. - -MR. DODD: Did you not join it in January of 1944, or what would you say -that you did join in the Reichsführer SS Organization? Perhaps I have -used the wrong term “staff.” There is some other name for it. Were you -not affiliated in some way with Himmler? - -LAUTERBACHER: No, I never had any SS assignments. - -MR. DODD: Did you have any connection with the Reichsführer SS from -January 1944 on? - -LAUTERBACHER: In October 1944 the Reichsführer SS had gone in his -special train to Bad Pyrmont, on the occasion of a meeting of West -German Gauleiter and Higher SS and Police Leaders. I had orders to be -present at that function; and in the course of the meeting I had a talk -with him. - -MR. DODD: That is not what I asked; but I will pass it. Did you become -an SA Obergruppenführer in 1944, as well as SS Obergruppenführer? - -LAUTERBACHER: I became an SA Obergruppenführer, I think, in 1944 or -1943. - -MR. DODD: You were also a member of the Reichstag in 1936, were you not? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And a member of the Party, I guess you said, since 1927; is -that right? - -LAUTERBACHER: Since 1927. - -MR. DODD: And a member of the Hitler Youth, or NSDAP, since 1923? - -LAUTERBACHER: I joined the Hitler Youth in 1927. The Hitler Youth was -not established until 1927. - -MR. DODD: Well, whenever it was, the youth organization of the Party, -that is what I mean. How many people did you have hanged publicly while -you were the Gauleiter up in Hanover? - -LAUTERBACHER: I did not understand the question. - -MR. DODD: I said: How many people did you have hanged publicly while you -were the Gauleiter up in Hanover? - -LAUTERBACHER: I never hanged anyone publicly. - -MR. DODD: Are you sure about that? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: How many people did you send to concentration camps? - -LAUTERBACHER: I might have handed over 5 or 10 persons to ordinary -courts for violating war economy regulations. And in one case which I -remember particularly well, there were two people who refused... - -MR. DODD: Well, I do not care about the details. Just tell me how many -you sent. - -LAUTERBACHER: There were two. I do not know if they were sent to -concentration camps, because I myself could not intern them. The -internment was decided in Berlin. - -MR. DODD: Do you know a man by the name of Huck, H-u-c-k, Heinrich Huck? - -LAUTERBACHER: Huck—no. At the moment I cannot remember that name. - -MR. DODD: The police commissar under your Gau, or in your Gau? - -LAUTERBACHER: No, I do not know him. - -MR. DODD: I want to ask: Did you not have a foreign worker from one of -the eastern countries hanged, publicly hanged in the market square, and -to remain there a whole day, at one time, while you were the Gauleiter -up there? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. Where is that supposed to have happened? - -MR. DODD: It is supposed to have happened in Hildesheim. - -LAUTERBACHER: No. - -MR. DODD: In March of 1945, just before the war ended. - -LAUTERBACHER: No. That is unknown to me. I never gave any such -instructions. - -MR. DODD: Did you order 400 or 500 prisoners poisoned or shot just -before the city was taken by an Allied army? - -LAUTERBACHER: No, that was put to me in London, and I think I cleared up -the matter. - -MR. DODD: You know what I am talking about, then? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes, the penitentiary at Hameln. - -MR. DODD: You know that your Kreisleiter says that you ordered them -poisoned with either prussic acid or strychnine, or else they were to be -shot? - -You know about that, do you not? - -LAUTERBACHER: I was told about that in London. - -MR. DODD: And not only does your Kreisleiter say that but Richard -Rother, who was an inspector at the prison at Hameln, confirms that the -order was passed on, that either they were to be poisoned or shot; do -you know about that as well? - -LAUTERBACHER: I never gave any such order. - -MR. DODD: I am asking you if you know that these people associated with -you have sworn under oath that you did. You have seen these affidavits, -have you not? - -LAUTERBACHER: I was told of it in London; but I was also told that the -inmates of that penitentiary were neither poisoned nor shot, but sent -back. - -MR. DODD: Yes, they were, but not because of you, but because your -people refused to carry out your orders, is not that so? - -LAUTERBACHER: I know nothing about that, because I was no longer in -Hameln and no longer a Gauleiter. - -MR. DODD: You have seen these affidavits, so I do not think there is any -need to hand them to you, but I am going to offer them in evidence. - -LAUTERBACHER: I received the statement of the commissioned Kreisleiter, -Dr. Krämer, in London, and I replied to it. - -MR. DODD: Very well. You know what he says, then? - -I offer this D-861 as Exhibit USA-874, Mr. President. It is a document -consisting of 7 affidavits from persons associated with this witness -when he was the Gauleiter, and having to do with his conduct while he -was Gauleiter there. - -THE PRESIDENT: How do you suggest that that evidence is relevant? - -MR. DODD: I offer them in relation to this man’s credibility, or rather -lack of it. I do not think that they have anything to do directly with -the case, other than they show the kind of individual he is, as we -claim, and that the Tribunal should have this information before it when -it considers the weight it will give to his testimony. - -I have also just been reminded by my friend, Mr. Elwyn Jones, that of -course it would have a bearing on the issue of the Leadership Corps of -the Nazi Party, of which he is a member. That had not occurred to me, -however. However, I do wish to claim it as a ground, also, for this -document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where are the people who made these affidavits? - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I will have to inquire. I do not know. They are -in custody, some of them at least, in the British zone here in Germany. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, you have just inquired where these people are -who made these affidavits. Perhaps I can assist you in clarifying these -questions. This Josef Krämer, whom the Prosecution have just quoted as -the leading witness against the witness Lauterbacher, was sentenced to 7 -years’ imprisonment by an English court some 8 or 10 days ago, and this -for the very reason which the prosecutor has just mentioned. Herr -Lauterbacher knows nothing about this matter, but quite accidentally I -read a report of this trial in a German newspaper and I have the report -here. In that article, dated 2 May of this year, it is stated that the -former Kreisleiter of Hameln, Dr. Josef Krämer, was sentenced by the -court of the 5th British Division to 7 years’ imprisonment. I quote from -that article: - - “Upon the approach of the Allied troops Krämer had given the - order to liquidate the inmates of the penitentiary at Hameln. - ‘No dangerous prisoner and no foreigner is to be allowed to fall - into the hands of the enemy,’ was his order. ‘They must all be - poisoned with prussic acid, or, if that is not possible, they - will have to be shot.’” - -That was the wording of the order given by ex-Kreisleiter Josef Krämer; -and he is now being used as a witness against my witness here. The -report goes on to say that officials at the penitentiary, who appeared -as witnesses, stated that in spite of this order from Dr. Krämer they -had refused to liquidate the prisoners. The rest is of no interest but I -thought that perhaps it might be important for the Tribunal, when -dealing with this question, to see from a document how this former -Kreisleiter behaved in reality. If you are interested, Mr. President, -the newspaper clipping, although it is in German, can be admitted to you -at once. - -MR. DODD: May I say, Mr. President, that perfectly substantiates the -document; that is, Krämer says in here that is what he did, that he -passed orders on but that he got them from this man. If anything, it -supports us. It does not hurt us one whit insofar as the value of this -document is concerned. - -In looking them over, I think it is perhaps best if I only offer the -first one and the last one. There are some others in this group that are -not particularly helpful, I expect, for the Court. I shall withdraw all -but the first and last and offer only the affidavit of Krämer and the -affidavit of Huck. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal does not think that these -documents ought to be admitted. In the first place, so far as the credit -of the particular witness is concerned, they do not think that his -answers on questions of credit ought to be challenged by other evidence. -So far as the Leadership Corps is concerned, they think that these -documents are only evidence of one individual crime. - -MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. - -Witness, I understood you to say that you never heard the Defendant Von -Schirach say anything really derogatory of the Jewish people, and, on -the contrary, you heard him speak out quite openly after the events of 9 -November 1938. Did I understand you correctly? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes, he criticized the atrocities in no uncertain terms at -the meeting of Gauleiters. He had no doubt that... - -MR. DODD: Do not go all through it again. I just wanted to be sure that -I understood you correctly. - -I suppose you read the Hitler Youth yearbook for the year 1938, as the -Deputy to the Reich Leader. - -LAUTERBACHER: At the moment I do not remember this book. If I could have -a look at it? - -MR. DODD: Of course I do not expect you to. I merely wanted to ascertain -that you did read it. I suppose you always read your yearbook? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. - -MR. DODD: What, you did not read it? - -LAUTERBACHER: I cannot remember, no. - -MR. DODD: Well, would it not be customary for you to read the yearbook? -Let us put it that way. - -LAUTERBACHER: The yearbook was compiled by the Press Department and I -had no influence on the details of the journalistic make-up of our -newspapers, periodicals or yearbooks. I do not remember this book, at -least as far as it concerns demands for anti-Semitic atrocities, or a -policy of force. - -MR. DODD: Well, I will show it to you in any event and call your -attention to an article in the yearbook concerning the Jewish people. Do -you know what I refer to? Where they were charged with having spilled -the blood of millions of dead in history. That was put out, I assume, -after the brave statements by the defendant in November of 1938, since -it is for the whole year of 1938. You will find the article that I refer -to on Page 192. - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Have you seen that article before? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. That yearbook had no official character; it was a -private enterprise on the part of the publishers. - -MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. What do you mean, “it had no official -character”? It was the yearbook of the Hitler Youth, was it not? - -LAUTERBACHER: This yearbook was not officially edited by the Hitler -Youth or by the Party. I never saw it until after it was published. - -MR. DODD: It was published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, -was it not? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes, that is correct; I see that. - -MR. DODD: It was called _The Yearbook of the Hitler Youth_, and you put -it out for a good many years consecutively, did you not? I do not mean -you personally, but I mean the Party and the Hitler Youth. - -LAUTERBACHER: No. This yearbook was compiled and published every year by -the gentleman mentioned there, or by others, as the case might be. - -MR. DODD: I know that. I am simply trying to establish this, that this -was the yearbook of the Hitler Youth and the only one that was put out, -and it was put out each year. Now is that not so? - -LAUTERBACHER: This book appeared every year, but I repeat again that it -had no official character, nor do I believe that... - -MR. DODD: Well, what would you say would give it an official character? - -LAUTERBACHER: If it said here, “Published by the Reich Youth Leader’s -Office,” it would have an official character. - -MR. DODD: And the fact that it said, “Published by the Central -Publishing House of the NSDAP” would not give it one, is that it? - -LAUTERBACHER: Certainly not. - -MR. DODD: You did not put out any other publications in the nature of a -yearbook, did you, except this one? - -LAUTERBACHER: A calendar was published every year. - -MR. DODD: Well, I am certainly not talking about a calendar; I am -talking about a report or a book. - -LAUTERBACHER: No. - -MR. DODD: And you are still telling this Tribunal that this was not the -yearbook of the Hitler Youth and the only one that was published in -Germany? - -LAUTERBACHER: I repeat that this yearbook did not have any official -character. - -MR. DODD: Well, after having read that quotation, do you still think -that Schirach, as leader of the Reich Youth, was not actively speaking -about the Jews in a derogatory sort of way, or that talk of this kind -was not going on under his leadership? - -LAUTERBACHER: Von Schirach never left any doubt regarding his -anti-Semitic attitude as long as he was Reich Youth Leader. - -MR. DODD: Do you know the speech he made in 1942 when he took credit for -deporting the Jews from Vienna? Are you familiar with that speech? - -LAUTERBACHER: No, I do not know that speech. During that time I was in -Hanover, and Schirach was in Vienna. - -MR. DODD: Yes. He was a fellow Gauleiter at that time. - -Did you ever get any SS reports on what was happening to the Jews in the -East? - -LAUTERBACHER: Never. I never had access to SS reports, SS circulars, or -orders. - -MR. DODD: Did you deport any Jews from your Gau? - -LAUTERBACHER: When I came to the Gau in December 1940, the Jews had -already emigrated. - -MR. DODD: They were already out by the time you got there? - -LAUTERBACHER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Did you ever hear of Gauleiters getting reports from Heydrich -or from Himmler about what was happening to the Jews in the East? Did -any of your fellow Gauleiter ever tell you that they got reports -regularly, say by the month or by the week? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. Himmler’s reports were no more accessible to the -Gauleiter than they were to the honorary leaders of the SS. As -Obergruppenführer of the SS I never received a report or an instruction -from Himmler. - -MR. DODD: Those Himmler reports were handled pretty carefully, were they -not? - -I am now asking you—as an SS Obergruppenführer I suppose you know -something about it—were those reports handled very carefully, those -Himmler and Heydrich reports? - -LAUTERBACHER: As an SS Obergruppenführer I never received any of -Himmler’s reports, and I know that Himmler sent all reports dealing with -confidential or internal SS matters only to SS and Police, that is, SS -leaders in the service of the SS, but never to the honorary leaders. - -MR. DODD: Now, what I really asked you was whether or not the reports, -when they were sent out, were very carefully handled. Do you know the -answer to that? - -LAUTERBACHER: I do not know. I do not know how these reports were -handled. - -MR. DODD: What was Heydrich’s reputation, so far as you were concerned, -in 1942? Did you think very well of him or did you think very poorly of -him before he was killed? - -LAUTERBACHER: I only knew Heydrich from meeting him a few times in the -Reich Youth Leader’s Office, and I had a good impression of him -personally. I am forced to have a different opinion of him now; but only -because I now know of his measures. - -MR. DODD: What was he doing in the Reich Youth Leader’s Office the few -times that you met him? What business did he have there? - -LAUTERBACHER: He had intervened on his own initiative and through his -own agencies in cases of homosexuality. Schirach forbade that and told -him that these matters too were first of all subject to his own -jurisdiction. - -MR. DODD: You sat in on all of these conferences with Heydrich, no -matter how many there were, did you not? - -LAUTERBACHER: I participated in one conference on the question of -homosexuality in the Hitler Youth. - -MR. DODD: Tell us this: Did it appear to you, from what you saw and -heard there, that Heydrich and Schirach were very friendly, or on a very -friendly basis? - -LAUTERBACHER: That conference did not take place with Von Schirach, but -with one of the officials from the Reich Youth Leader’s Office who, as -Chief of the Hitler Youth Legal Administration, conducted the discussion -with Heydrich. - -MR. DODD: Were you ever present when Heydrich talked to Von Schirach? -Were you ever present? - -LAUTERBACHER: No. - -MR. DODD: Did Heydrich ever talk to you, or rather, did Von Schirach -ever talk to you about Heydrich? - -LAUTERBACHER: No, I cannot remember that. - -MR. DODD: We have no further questions, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter? - -DR. SAUTER: Thank you, I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. - -DR. SAUTER: With the permission of the President, I shall now call my -next witness, Gustav Hoepken. - -[_The witness Hoepken took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? - -GUSTAV DIETRICH HOEPKEN (Witness): Gustav Dietrich Hoepken. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SAUTER: Herr Hoepken, I have already examined you on the case of -Schirach when you were in prison? - -HOEPKEN: Yes, you have already examined me. - -DR. SAUTER: How old are you? - -HOEPKEN: I am 36. - -DR. SAUTER: What is your father’s occupation? - -HOEPKEN: My father is a dock laborer. - -DR. SAUTER: And yourself? - -HOEPKEN: I was a newspaper boy, a dock laborer, a spare-time student, -and sports instructor. - -DR. SAUTER: Sports instructor. You are now in American hands, are you -not? - -HOEPKEN: Yes, I am a prisoner in American hands. - -DR. SAUTER: Since when? - -HOEPKEN: Since 19 May 1945. - -DR. SAUTER: Has the Prosecution interrogated you on this matter? - -HOEPKEN: Up to now the Prosecution has not interrogated me. - -DR. SAUTER: When did you join the Hitler Youth? - -HOEPKEN: I joined the Hitler Youth in 1933. - -DR. SAUTER: You joined the Hitler Youth in 1933? How old were you at -that time? - -HOEPKEN: I was 23. - -DR. SAUTER: And in what capacity did you join? - -HOEPKEN: First as an ordinary member. In September 1933 I became an -Unterbannführer in the Hitler Youth. - -DR. SAUTER: Unterbannführer in 1933? - -HOEPKEN: Yes, in September 1933. - -DR. SAUTER: Was that a salaried position or an honorary appointment? - -HOEPKEN: From 1933 to 1935 I worked as a sports instructor in the Hitler -Youth. - -DR. SAUTER: And in 1935? - -HOEPKEN: In 1935 I joined the government offices at Potsdam as an expert -on PT in schools. - -DR. SAUTER: But that had nothing to do with the Hitler Youth, had it? - -HOEPKEN: At Potsdam I also commanded the Potsdam unit and local -headquarters of the Hitler Youth. - -DR. SAUTER: So you were a civil servant—or rather, an employee of the -State and apart from that an honorary leader of the Hitler Youth? - -HOEPKEN: From 1935 until 1939 I was a civil servant in the government -offices at Potsdam and I also commanded the Hitler Youth unit and local -headquarters at Potsdam in an honorary capacity. - -DR. SAUTER: Therefore in the summer of 1939 you joined the Reich Youth -Leadership, did you? - -HOEPKEN: In June 1939 I joined the Reich Youth Leadership and became -adjutant to Baldur von Schirach who was Reich Youth Leader at the time. - -DR. SAUTER: And how long did you hold that office? - -HOEPKEN: Until August 1939, and then I became a soldier. - -DR. SAUTER: Before you joined Schirach’s staff, had you not served in -the Armed Forces? - -HOEPKEN: Up to joining Schirach in 1939 I had done 8 weeks’ obligatory -training in the Air Force. - -DR. SAUTER: Apart from that, you had no training? - -HOEPKEN: Apart from that I had no military training. - -DR. SAUTER: Were you an officer? - -HOEPKEN: I had not been an officer up to that time. - -DR. SAUTER: So far as his other collaborators were concerned, did -Schirach attach importance to their being officers or trained soldiers? - -HOEPKEN: So far as I know, Von Schirach did not care whether his -collaborators were soldiers or officers, on the contrary, it was his -view, as he told me repeatedly, that soldiers and officers, as far as he -could see, were less suitable as youth leaders. - -DR. SAUTER: I do not want to go into the general question of the -training of the Hitler Youth, but I wish to ask you one single question -on this point, especially because you are a sports instructor by -profession. It is a question about the training of the Hitler Youth in -shooting. Were they trained with military weapons, or how were they -trained in firing? - -HOEPKEN: The Hitler Youth were trained in shooting with air guns or -small arms. They did not shoot with military weapons. - -DR. SAUTER: In that case I will not put any further questions to you on -the subject of uniform as these questions have already been clarified. -But there is one other thing in which I am interested and that is the -relationship to the Church: Do you know, Witness, whether the Defendant -Von Schirach in 1937, that is in the issue of the Berlin paper, the -_Berliner Tageblatt_ of 14 January 1937, published an article written by -his press adviser Günther Kaufmann, headed “Can the Gap be Bridged”? -That article, a copy of which I have before me, deals with a problem in -which I am interested, and that is why I want to ask you: Do you know -what Schirach made his press adviser write in that article on the -question of whether the Hitler Youth leaders should consider the young -people’s need for church services or not? - -HOEPKEN: I know the article. - -DR. SAUTER: You know it? - -HOEPKEN: I also know the order issued by the Reich Youth Leader of that -time stating that on Sundays there should be no Hitler Youth duty for -all those boys and girls who wanted to attend church. Every boy and girl -in the Hitler Youth at that time was supposed to be able to attend -religious services of his or her own free will; and it was made part of -the duty of the Hitler Youth leaders at the time to refrain from -entering into any arguments or controversies about the Hitler Youth and -the Church. He prohibited that. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, that is the main point of that article of 14 -January 1937. But you know that the Defendant Schirach had certain -difficulties with Hitler because of this article. Will you tell us -briefly what you know about it? - -HOEPKEN: As soon as the agreement between the Church and the Hitler -Youth was made, the article mentioned appeared in the _Berliner -Tageblatt_. On the day that article appeared, Schirach was at a meeting -in Rosenberg’s office. Hitler called Schirach to the telephone at that -time. Hitler took Schirach sternly to task, firstly, for making an -agreement between the Church and the Hitler Youth and, secondly, for -publishing this article. His intention was to cancel the agreement and -to ban any further issue of the newspapers. Neither of these things -happened. - -DR. SAUTER: Did Schirach refuse to withdraw the article? - -HOEPKEN: So far as I know he did. - -DR. SAUTER: In 1940 you went to Vienna with Schirach? - -HOEPKEN: No, I did not. - -DR. SAUTER: When did you go? - -HOEPKEN: I went to Vienna for the first time in September 1941. - -DR. SAUTER: Where had you been in the meantime? - -HOEPKEN: I have already told you that I joined the Luftwaffe in August -1939 and served during that time as a service flying instructor in a -Luftwaffe training school. - -DR. SAUTER: And you did not rejoin Schirach until 1941, and then in -Vienna? - -HOEPKEN: Yes; I joined Schirach in Vienna in September 1941. - -DR. SAUTER: The highest dignitary of the Catholic Church in Vienna is -Cardinal Innitzer, right? - -HOEPKEN: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you know what Von Schirach’s attitude to Cardinal -Innitzer was? I will tell you at once why I am asking you this question; -I want to know if it is true that Schirach objected to Cardinal -Innitzer’s being molested by the Hitler Youth, and what steps he took, -_et cetera_. - -HOEPKEN: Schirach told me repeatedly that he would like to have a talk -with Cardinal Innitzer, but that he was not allowed to do so, firstly, -because of a decree issued by the former head of the Party Chancellery, -Martin Bormann, prohibiting the Gauleiter from contacting Church -dignitaries and, secondly, because Schirach knew that he himself was -under surveillance. - -DR. SAUTER: Who, Schirach? - -HOEPKEN: That Schirach was under surveillance and thought that if he -forced such a discussion, Bormann would be certain to know of it on the -next day, which would have had most unpleasant consequences both for -Schirach and Cardinal Innitzer. On the other hand, it was Schirach’s -view that Cardinal Innitzer also would certainly have liked to have a -talk with Schirach and Schirach thought that certainly would not have -been the case if Cardinal Innitzer had not known of his tolerant -attitude toward the Church and the Christian religion. It is furthermore -known to me—and I think this happened in the winter of 1944 to -1945—that Cardinal Innitzer was molested by youthful civilians while -returning from mass. Cardinal Innitzer had the police find out the names -of these youngsters, and they turned out to be Hitler Youth leaders. -Schirach ordered the competent district leader of the Hitler Youth to -him the same day, took him severely to task, and demanded that the youth -leaders in question be relieved of their duties at once. As far as I -know, this was actually done. I believe I also remember that Schirach -had a letter of apology sent to Cardinal Innitzer, either personally or -through one of his officials. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better break off now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 28 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH DAY - Tuesday, 28 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant -Göring is absent. - -THE PRESIDENT: We were going to deal with Defendant Bormann’s documents, -were we not? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, two witnesses only have arrived so far for -the Defendant Sauckel. Three essential witnesses are still missing. -Perhaps the Court can help to bring these witnesses quickly so that the -case will not be delayed. They are the witnesses Stothfang, Dr. Jäger, -and Hildebrandt. I have repeatedly asked the Prosecution to get them but -they are not here yet. I have not yet spoken to the witnesses. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have they been located? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. One is in a camp in Kassel, which is only a few -hours from here, and the other is in Neumünster. That is a little -farther, perhaps 6 or 7 hours from here. Dr. Jäger is free. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not in accordance with the information which the -Tribunal has. The Tribunal has the information that they cannot be -found. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I received the information that their whereabouts has -been ascertained. - -THE PRESIDENT: From whom did you receive that information? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Officially, from the General Secretary. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will make inquiries into it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, first, with regard to the witnesses -applied for for the Defendant Bormann. They are, as I understand it, -Fräulein Krüger, to whom we have no objection. The witness Müller is no -longer applied for? - -DR. BERGOLD: Yes, I have dispensed with that witness. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, Klopfer, and lastly, Friedrich. These are -with regard to Bormann’s law-making activities, and the Prosecution have -no objections. - -DR. BERGOLD: Your Lordship, in place of the witness Müller, whom I have -withdrawn, I have an additional request for the witness Gerta Christian -on the same subject for which I had requested the witness Müller. - -THE PRESIDENT: The first witness, Miss Krüger, is going to speak to -exactly the same facts, is she not, to the death of Bormann? - -DR. BERGOLD: Yes, Your Lordship. The circumstances concerning Bormann’s -death are not very clear. It is very necessary to hear all the available -witnesses on this subject because only in this way can one be convinced -of the fact, which I am trying to establish, that the Defendant Bormann -is already dead. - -THE PRESIDENT: It does not seem to be a very relevant fact. It is very -remotely relevant whether he is dead or whether he is alive. The -question is whether he is guilty or innocent. - -DR. BERGOLD: Your Lordship, my point of view is that sentence cannot be -passed against a dead man. That is not provided for in the Charter. -According to the Charter, the Court can only sentence an absent person, -but a dead person cannot be included under the term “absent.” If the -defendant is dead, the Charter does not provide the possibility of -continuing proceedings against him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you any objection to that other witness? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, the Prosecution does not make any -objections. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, My Lord, with regard to the documents, the -first batch of documents is a series of treaties and diplomatic -pronouncements and documents to counteract the statement of Sir Hartley -Shawcross as to the position of international law before the Charter, -the statement that the law of nations had constituted aggressive war an -international crime before this Tribunal was established and this -Charter became part of the public law of the world. The position of the -Prosecution is that evidence on that point is really irrelevant because -after all, the Tribunal is covered by the Charter, and it seems -unnecessary to translate and publish, by way of document books, all -these matters which the learned counsel has set out in his application. -That is, shortly, the position of the Prosecution with regard to that -first batch of documents. Especially, I do not want to discuss the -problem for the reason that I have given. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What are the numbers of them? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are 1 to 11—no, 7, in the application. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Are they long documents? - -DR. BERGOLD: Your Lordship, I have not seen them yet. I applied for -these documents 3 months ago in order to look them over, but -unfortunately I have not received them yet and therefore I cannot give -the Court any information as to whether they are long or not and what -parts of them I will need for my defense. - -THE PRESIDENT: Number 2 looks like a long document. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. - -DR. BERGOLD: But I will not use all these documents if I receive them. I -shall probably take some of them, Your Lordship; I shall only... - -THE PRESIDENT: When you say you applied for them 3 months ago, you do -not mean you applied to the Tribunal, do you? - -DR. BERGOLD: I applied to the General Secretary, but perhaps it was put -aside when Your Lordship decided that my case should be postponed to the -end. Perhaps it was forgotten. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was there any order on your application? - -DR. BERGOLD: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: You applied, I think, for an adjournment, did you not, in -order that the matter might be brought up later? - -DR. BERGOLD: Yes, Your Lordship; I am in an especially difficult -situation. I have questioned many witnesses and have tried very hard, -but I can find nothing exonerating. All the witnesses are filled with -great hatred toward the Defendant Bormann, and they want to incriminate -him in order to exonerate themselves. That makes my case especially -difficult. The man himself is probably dead and can give me no -information. Any day now I might get new information. For example, a few -days ago one of Bormann’s co-workers, a Dr. Von Hummeln, was arrested in -Salzburg. I will go to see him and perhaps I shall get fresh -information—perhaps none. I must also assume... - -THE PRESIDENT: We need not bother about that now. We are only inquiring -about your application with reference to the documents. - -Sir David, have you anything further you want to say about the -documents? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is my short point. I do not want to -discuss the merits of my points because that is the issue, that I am -saying is irrelevant. - -THE PRESIDENT: What about Number 11? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not disposed to object to any of the other -documents, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are there any others besides... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Number 11—I can see a possible argument on -that, My Lord; therefore I am not going to object to it. The other -documents we certainly have no objection to; the ordinances of the -Führer’s Deputy and... - -THE PRESIDENT: All under “B”? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The Prosecution makes no objection to -these. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -Now, what do you say to Sir David’s objection to these documents, 1 to -7? - -DR. BERGOLD: Well, Your Lordship, I have already made my point of view -clear in my application. In order to save the time of the Court, I will -merely refer to this written application. I will not say any more at the -moment on the subject, but if Your Lordship wants me to explain it here -now I am ready to do so. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the matter. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did Your Lordship wish to deal with the other -outstanding applications or would Your Lordship prefer to deal with that -later on at the end of the case of Von Schirach? - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we have the papers here. We were only -going to deal with Bormann this morning. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, we have got a document here, D-880, said to be -extracts from testimony of Admiral Raeder, taken at Nuremberg on 10 -November 1945 by Major John Monigan. Have you offered that document in -evidence or not? - -MR. DODD: May I have just a minute to check it? I am not certain. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we will give you the document. - -MR. DODD: I believe not, Mr. President; I do not believe it has been -offered in evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: It seems to have been handed up yesterday or the day -before... - -MR. DODD: I think through a mistake. - -THE PRESIDENT: ...or last week. Yes. But you will find out about that -and let us know. - -MR. DODD: Very well, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, you were still examining Gustav Hoepken, were -you not? - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I shall continue my examination of the -witness Hoepken. - -[_The witness Hoepken resumed the stand._] - -DR. SAUTER: Herr Hoepken, we stopped yesterday when discussing the -question whether the Defendant Von Schirach during his time in Vienna -was opposed to the Church or was tolerant in this connection. The last -answer you gave me yesterday referred to the relations of the Defendant -Von Schirach to the Viennese Cardinal, Innitzer. Is it correct, Witness, -that at the suggestion and with the knowledge of the Defendant Von -Schirach during his time in Vienna you periodically had talks with a -Catholic priest there, a Dean, Professor Ens, for the purpose of -discussing Church questions with him and removing any differences which -might arise? - -HOEPKEN: Yes, that is true. Professor Ens was not, as you assume, -Catholic, but Protestant. He was Dean of the faculty of theology of the -University of Vienna. When he visited me he submitted many Church and -religious questions to me. I discussed them with him. He then asked me -to report on them to Herr Von Schirach so that, if it were in his power, -he could make redress. This was done as far as possible. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you know, Witness, that the Defendant Von Schirach, for -example, ordered that at the Party Christmas celebrations new National -Socialist Christmas songs were not to be sung, but the old Christian -Christmas hymns? - -HOEPKEN: Yes, I know that at the Christmas celebrations of the Party and -of the Hitler Youth, and the Christmas celebration for wounded soldiers, -the old Christian Christmas carols, such as “Es ist ein Ros’ -entsprungen,” and “Silent Night, Holy Night...” - -THE PRESIDENT: This is surely not a matter which is worthy to be given -in evidence. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know that the Defendant Von Schirach, in the -official magazine of the Hitler Youth, had a special number published -which was in favor of humane treatment of the people of the Eastern -Territories, and when was that? - -HOEPKEN: I know that it was the quarterly number for April to June 1943. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you know that in the same official magazine of the Hitler -Youth, at the request of the Defendant Bormann, a special anti-Semitic -number was to appear, but that Von Schirach refused it? - -HOEPKEN: I know that it was requested at that time by the Propaganda -Ministry and also by the Party Chancellery. Von Schirach refused each -time. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know that Von Schirach once inspected a -concentration camp? - -HOEPKEN: Yes, I know that. - -DR. SAUTER: Which one? - -HOEPKEN: The concentration camp Mauthausen. - -DR. SAUTER: In regard to this point, which has already been more or less -cleared up by the testimony of other witnesses, I am interested only in -one question. When was this visit to Mauthausen? - -HOEPKEN: I cannot say exactly. I can say with certainty, however, that -it was not after April 1943. - -DR. SAUTER: Why can you say that? - -HOEPKEN: In April 1943 I was discharged from hospital and began my -service in Vienna. From that day on until April 1945 I knew every day -where Von Schirach was. Moreover, immediately after my arrival in Vienna -in April 1943, when I asked him, as I was rather run-down physically -because of my wound and was also a sports teacher, whether I might do -some sports between 7 and 8 in the morning... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we do not want to know about the witness’ -health, do we? - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you heard what the President just said. I have -already told you I am interested in when this visit to Mauthausen was. -You said, if I understood you correctly... - -THE PRESIDENT: He said he could not say when it was and it was after -April 1943. He said he could not say when it was. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I believe you misunderstood the witness. -Witness, please pay attention as to whether this is correct. I -understood the witness to say that it was before April 1943. The visit -must have been before April 1943. It could not have been later. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, he also said, according to the conversation I -heard and took down, that he could not say when the particular time was. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, but through the testimony of the witness I should like -to settle the fact that it was not later than April 1943. - -THE PRESIDENT: He said that already. He said it. He said, “I cannot say -when it was, but it was not after April 1943.” He said: “In April 1943 I -was discharged from the hospital and began my service in Vienna. I knew -every day where Schirach was.” I have got that all written down. - -DR. SAUTER: Very well. Witness, in this conversation about his visit to -Mauthausen did the Defendant Von Schirach tell you anything to the -effect that on this visit he got to hear of any atrocities, -ill-treatment, and such things? - -HOEPKEN: No, he said nothing about that. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I now turn to the question of the deportation of -Jews from Vienna. As far as I know you were an ear-witness of a -conversation between the Reichsführer SS Himmler and the Defendant -Schirach. Will you tell us what was said in this conversation on the -question of the deportation of Jews? - -HOEPKEN: I believe it was in November 1941; Himmler and Schirach were -motoring through East Prussia from Himmler’s quarters to his special -train. In the car Himmler asked Von Schirach: “Tell me, Von Schirach, -how many Jews are still in Vienna?” Von Schirach answered, “I cannot say -exactly. I estimate 40,000 to 50,000.” And Himmler said: “I must -evacuate these Jews as quickly as possible from Vienna.” And Schirach -said: “The Jews do not give me any trouble, especially as they are now -wearing the yellow star.” Then Himmler said: “The Führer is already -angry that Vienna, in this matter as in many others, is made an -exception, and I will have to instruct my SS agencies to carry this out -as speedily as possible.” That is what I remember of this conversation. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you know anything about the anti-Semitic speech made by -the Defendant Von Schirach in September 1942 at a Congress in Vienna, -which the Prosecution submitted to the Court? - -HOEPKEN: Yes, the contents of the speech are known to us. - -DR. SAUTER: I want to know whether you know anything about it, -especially whether Schirach said anything to you about why he made this -anti-Semitic speech? - -HOEPKEN: I know from the press officer Günther Kaufmann, who was -mentioned yesterday, that directly after this speech Von Schirach -instructed Kaufmann that every point in the speech should be telephoned -to the DNB (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro) in Berlin, with the remark that -he had every reason to make a concession to Bormann on this point. - -DR. SAUTER: Why a concession? - -HOEPKEN: I assume that Schirach knew that his position in Vienna was -precarious, and that he constantly heard, especially from the Party -Chancellery, that he must take a stricter course in Vienna. - -DR. SAUTER: You were Chief of the Central Bureau with Schirach in -Vienna. In this capacity, did all Schirach’s incoming mail go through -you? - -HOEPKEN: Not all of his mail, but the great majority of it. Mail stamped -“only direct” and “personal” did not go through my hands. - -DR. SAUTER: But the other mail? - -HOEPKEN: That went through my office. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, we have here a number of documents which have been -submitted to the Court. They are the activity and situation reports -which the Chief of the Security Police made, I believe, monthly or -weekly and which have been submitted to the Court under Number 3943-PS. -These reports came from Vienna, and since you know the situation in the -Central Bureau in Vienna and are well-informed about its activity, I -will now hand you several of these documents. Please look at the -documents and then tell us whether from these documents, which are -photostat copies, you can determine whether these reports of the SS came -to you or to the Defendant Von Schirach, or whether they went to a -different office. I call your special attention to the manner in which -these documents are annotated. Please note on the individual documents -who initialed the document and what was done with the document after -that. And then please tell us who these officials are who figure in the -documents as officials of the Reich Defense Commission; for instance, a -Dr. Fischer, _et cetera_. - -Those are the documents, Mr. President, about which the Court asked -questions the other day. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know they are, but I do not know what the question -is exactly. It seems to me there are a great number of questions. Well, -let us get on, Dr. Sauter. We shall have to consider these documents, -you know, and the witness ought to be able to give his answer. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President. Of course, the witness has to look at -the documents first. He must especially note which officials initialed -the documents and what the officials did with them. That is what I must -ask the witness, in order to ascertain what the documents... - -THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought that he had seen these documents -before. - -DR. SAUTER: No; they were just handed over in cross-examination. I could -not discuss them previously with the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: They were certainly handed over before this morning. - -DR. SAUTER: Not to the witness—to me, yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, get on, Dr. Sauter, get on. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, what do these documents tell you? Did they come to -the knowledge of the Defendant Von Schirach, or how were they dealt -with? - -HOEPKEN: These documents did not go through the Central Bureau. I see -here that they are initialed by a Dr. Felber. I know him. He was the -expert assigned to the Regierungspräsident in Vienna for all matters -concerning the Reich Defense Commissioner. - -From the treatment given these documents, I must assume that the Berlin -SD agency sent them directly to the office of the Regierungspräsident, -and from there they were entered into the files, as I see here. I do not -see Von Schirach’s initials here. - -DR. SAUTER: The Regierungspräsident was a certain Dellbrügge? - -HOEPKEN: Dr. Dellbrügge. - -DR. SAUTER: And this Dr. Felber whom you mentioned was an official of -the Regierungspräsident? - -HOEPKEN: Yes, an official of the Regierungspräsident. - -DR. SAUTER: And when such a document as you have there arrived, where -did the post office or any other agency deliver it? Was it delivered to -you or did the Regierungspräsident have his own office for incoming -mail, or how was it? - -HOEPKEN: I already said that they must have been sent directly to the -office of the Regierungspräsident, who had his own office for incoming -mail. - -DR. SAUTER: How can you tell that the Defendant Von Schirach had no -knowledge of these documents? - -HOEPKEN: Because he did not initial these documents. If documents were -submitted to him, they were initialed “z.K.g.”—noted—“B.v.S.,” and -that does not appear on these documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, I do not think the Prosecution suggested that -they were initialed by Von Schirach. It was quite clearly brought out in -Von Schirach’s evidence that he had not initialed them, and that fact -was not challenged by Mr. Dodd. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I believe it is a decisive point whether -Defendant Von Schirach had any knowledge of these documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Why do you keep asking whether they were initialed by him -or not? That fact, as I have pointed out, has already been proved and -not challenged. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have here an additional collection of documents -under Number 3876-PS. They are additional reports from the Chief of the -Security Police. There is another address on these. It says here, among -other things: “To the Reich Defense Commissioner for the Defense -District XVII”—that was Vienna—“for the attention of Oberregierungsrat -Dr. Fischer in Vienna.” - -I am interested in knowing who Dr. Fischer was. Was he in the Central -Bureau, or who was he? - -HOEPKEN: I do not know a Dr. Fischer either in the Central Bureau or in -the Reichsstatthalterei. - -DR. SAUTER: Then how do you explain the fact that in these reports it -always says, “To the Reich Defense Commissioner for the Defense District -XVII, for the attention of Oberregierungsrat Dr. Fischer?” - -HOEPKEN: I assume he was a colleague of Oberregierungsrat Dr. Felber, -who specialized in these matters. Also I see they were secret letters, -and were therefore addressed to him personally. - -DR. SAUTER: As far as you know, did not the Regierungspräsident -Dellbrügge report to the Defendant Von Schirach on these reports which -reached him, or have one of his officials report about them? - -HOEPKEN: The Regierungspräsident reported directly to Herr Von Schirach -about matters concerning the Reich Governor and the Reich Defense -Commissioner. I was not present at these conversations; consequently I -cannot say to what extent he reported to Von Schirach on these matters. - -DR. SAUTER: If the Regierungspräsident or one of his officials reported -to the Defendant Von Schirach on these reports, would that be shown in -the documents? - -HOEPKEN: Probably yes. In that case the Regierungspräsident or the -officials would have had to write on them “To be filed after being -reported to the Reich Governor,” or “for further action.” - -DR. SAUTER: On the documents which I submitted to you there is no such -indication? - -HOEPKEN: On these documents, no. - -DR. SAUTER: And on the documents which I have here, there is no such -note either. Do you conclude from this that the Defendant Von Schirach -received no report on them? - -HOEPKEN: I must conclude that Von Schirach was not informed on these -matters. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Defendant Von Schirach was chief of the state -administration in Vienna in his capacity as Reich Governor, as well as -chief of the local administration to a certain extent as mayor, and -finally chief of the Party as Gauleiter. Now, we hear that in each of -these capacities he had a permanent representative. - -I should like to know who normally administered the affairs of the Reich -Defense Commissioner and the Reich Governor; that is, the affairs of the -state administration? - -HOEPKEN: I have already said that it was the Regierungspräsident, Dr. -Dellbrügge. - -DR. SAUTER: And then what did the Defendant Von Schirach do in the field -of state administration? - -HOEPKEN: He was given regular reports by the Regierungspräsident. Von -Schirach then made his decision, and these decisions were then carried -out by the officials or departments. - -DR. SAUTER: If I understand you correctly, the Defendant Von Schirach -concerned himself only with such matters as were reported to him by the -Regierungspräsident or which were brought to his special attention in -writing; is that true? - -HOEPKEN: Yes, that is true. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, were you yourself a member of the SS? - -HOEPKEN: No, I was never a member of the SS. - -DR. SAUTER: Of the SA? - -HOEPKEN: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you know that these three permanent representatives, -whom the Defendant Von Schirach had in Vienna, namely the -Regierungspräsident, the Deputy Gauleiter, and the Mayor, were -all three SS Führer? - -HOEPKEN: Yes, I know that. - -DR. SAUTER: How was that? Did the Defendant Von Schirach select these -men himself, or how do you explain the fact that all three of his -representatives were SS Führer? - -HOEPKEN: The Deputy Gauleiter, Scharizer, was an honorary SS Führer and, -as far as I recall, he was Oberbefehlsleiter of the Party. When Von -Schirach came to Vienna, Scharizer had already been active for several -years in Vienna. - -DR. SAUTER: As what? - -HOEPKEN: As Deputy Gauleiter. I do not know when the -Regierungspräsident, Dr. Dellbrügge, came to Vienna; but I assume either -before or at about the same time as Von Schirach. Moreover, the -Regierungspräsidenten were appointed by the Ministry of the Interior, so -that I think he could hardly have had sufficient influence to refuse or -select a particular Regierungspräsident. - -As for the mayor, the situation was similar. - -DR. SAUTER: He was a certain Blaschke? - -HOEPKEN: Yes. He was SS Brigadeführer Blaschke, he was also appointed by -the Ministry of the Interior as acting mayor. - -DR. SAUTER: By the Ministry of the Interior? - -HOEPKEN: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: When was that? - -HOEPKEN: I believe that was in 1944, in January or February of 1944. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you know that this SS Brigadeführer, or whatever he was, -this Blaschke, before the time of the Defendant Von Schirach, was active -in Vienna as a town councillor, and I believe also as vice mayor? - -HOEPKEN: He was a town councillor before; and I believe he was vice -mayor before I came to Vienna. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you know that the Defendant Von Schirach for a long time -opposed this SS Oberführer or Brigadeführer Blaschke being appointed -mayor of Vienna? - -HOEPKEN: I should say he opposed this for about 6 or 9 months, and I -believe later he refused to allow the Minister of the Interior finally -to confirm his appointment as mayor. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, what were the relations between the Defendant Von -Schirach and the SS and the SS officers? Were they especially friendly -and cordial or what were they like? - -HOEPKEN: As far as I know, Schirach associated with the SS Führer as far -as was officially necessary and no more. - -DR. SAUTER: Was he friendly with SS men? - -HOEPKEN: No; I do not know. In any case I knew of no such friendship. - -DR. SAUTER: Did he not express to you his attitude toward the SS? - -HOEPKEN: I have already said that he always had the feeling that he was -under a certain supervision from them and for that reason he was rather -distrustful. - -DR. SAUTER: Distrustful of... - -HOEPKEN: Of the SS. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know how the Defendant Von Schirach received -his information about the foreign press and foreign press reports? - -HOEPKEN: He received them from the Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna. -They were excerpts which the Propaganda Ministry issued in collaboration -with the Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich. As far as I know, however, -they were selected and screened. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you live for a long time with Von Schirach in Vienna? - -HOEPKEN: From 1944 on I lived in Schirach’s house. - -DR. SAUTER: You also took your meals with him? - -HOEPKEN: Yes, I also took meals with him. - -DR. SAUTER: Did not the Defendant Von Schirach obtain information from -the foreign radio? - -HOEPKEN: No, I am almost certain he did not, because after every meal he -listened to the official German news services with me and a few other -co-workers. Besides, if he had done so it would in my opinion have -become known very soon for, as I said already, he had the feeling that -he was being watched. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the witness can only tell us what he knows. -How could he know whether Von Schirach ever listened to any foreign -news? If he does not know, why do you not take him on to something else? - -DR. SAUTER: The witness said, Mr. President, that during the latter part -of his time in Vienna, from the spring of 1944 I believe he said, he -lived in the house of the Defendant Von Schirach. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know he said that, and he said that he did not -think he heard foreign news. What more can he give? What more evidence -can he give on that subject? - -DR. SAUTER: I wanted to hear that, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: But he said it already. I have taken it down. Why do you -not go on to something else? - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know that in the last weeks of the -resistance an order came to Vienna from Berlin according to which all -defeatists, whether men or women, were to be hanged? What attitude did -Schirach take toward this order? - -HOEPKEN: I know that so-called courts martial were to be set up with the -purpose of speedily sentencing people who objected to the conduct of the -war or who showed themselves to be defeatists. This court martial was -set up in Vienna, or rather appointed, but it did not meet once, and -thus did not pronounce any sentences. - -DR. SAUTER: Did the court martial of the Defendant Von Schirach carry on -any proceedings at all? - -HOEPKEN: No, not to my knowledge. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you know anything about it? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, that fact, again, was given in evidence by -Von Schirach and was not cross-examined to—that that court martial did -not meet. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know anything about the fact that in the -last weeks an order came to form _franc-tireur_ units? What was Von -Schirach’s attitude to that? - -HOEPKEN: I do not know that _franc-tireur_ units were to be formed, but -I do know that a “Freikorps Hitler” was to be formed. They were to be in -civilian clothes. Schirach ordered that no people from the Reichsgau -Vienna were to be assigned to this “Freikorps.” - -DR. SAUTER: Why not? - -HOEPKEN: Because at that time he considered resistance senseless. -Secondly, because he considered it contrary to international law. - -DR. SAUTER: My last question to you, Witness. You were with Schirach to -the last, until he left Vienna? - -HOEPKEN: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Did Schirach give an order to destroy bridges or churches, -residential quarters, and so forth, in Vienna? - -HOEPKEN: No, I do not know of that. - -DR. SAUTER: What was the position he took? - -HOEPKEN: That orders to blow up bridges or to take any defense measures -were given only by the military authorities, as far as I know. - -DR. SAUTER: But not by Schirach? - -HOEPKEN: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no more questions to put to this -witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to ask questions? -The Prosecution? - -MR. DODD: Witness, would you see all of the files that were in Von -Schirach’s office during the time that you were his adjutant? - -HOEPKEN: I have already told you, or I told the defense counsel, that -most of the mail went through the Central Bureau. - -MR. DODD: I want to show you a document that is in evidence here and ask -you if you can tell us whether or not you have seen this before. - -[_A document was handed to the witness._] - -Have you ever seen that document before? - -HOEPKEN: I do not know this document officially, as I see it is dated 28 -May 1942, at which time I was an officer in the Luftwaffe. - -MR. DODD: I see, you did not mean the Tribunal to understand that you -were familiar with everything that was in Von Schirach’s files, because -certainly this document was there during the years that you were his -adjutant. You never saw it. It is marked “Central Bureau,” and you had -charge of these very files, yet you never saw this teletype to Bormann? -So you certainly did not know everything that was in his files, did you? - -HOEPKEN: I said that the majority of the mail went through my offices -but, of course, since I was not in Vienna at this time but only came to -Vienna in April 1943, I was not able to look through all the back -documents and letters in the files of the Reich Governor. That would -have taken years. - -MR. DODD: Let me ask you something else. You were there in the last -days, I assume, when the city was taken by the Allied Forces, were you -not? - -HOEPKEN: I was in Vienna until April 1945. - -MR. DODD: What was done with Von Schirach’s files when the end was very -obviously coming? What did you do with all those files over which you -had control? - -HOEPKEN: I was not in charge of any files. I was chief of the bureau, -and I... - -MR. DODD: Well, you know what I mean—chief of the bureau or of the -office where these files were kept. What I want to know is what did you -do with the files? - -HOEPKEN: I gave no orders in this connection. - -MR. DODD: Do you know what became of the files? - -HOEPKEN: No, I do not. - -MR. DODD: They were taken out of the office sometime before the city was -captured; do you not know that? - -HOEPKEN: No, I did not know that. - -MR. DODD: Were the files there the last day that you were there? - -HOEPKEN: Probably, yes. - -MR. DODD: I do not want a “probably.” I want to know if you know and if -you do, to tell us. Were they there or not the last day that you were in -the office? - -HOEPKEN: I gave no orders to destroy them or to remove them. - -MR. DODD: I did not ask you if you gave orders. I asked you if you know -what became of them and whether or not they were in the office the last -day that you were there? - -HOEPKEN: I do not know what happened to them. Nor can I say whether they -were still there on the last day. - -MR. DODD: Do you not know that they were all moved to a salt mine in -Austria? - -HOEPKEN: No, I do not know that. - -MR. DODD: You have never heard that, or that they were taken out of the -office and were later found by the Allied Forces in a salt mine? - -HOEPKEN: No, I do not know that. - -MR. DODD: I do not mean that you heard they were found there, but you -certainly knew that they were taken out of the office? - -HOEPKEN: No, I do not know. I also gave no orders. - -MR. DODD: Well, now, let me put this proposition to you, and then -perhaps you can give an explanation of it to the Tribunal. This document -that I have just shown to you and these reports that you examined for -Dr. Sauter were all found in Schirach’s files in a salt mine. Would you -have any explanation for that? - -HOEPKEN: No, I cannot explain that. - -MR. DODD: They were found together. Would that mean anything to you, or -would you have any explanation for it? - -HOEPKEN: No, I have not. I can only explain that by saying that probably -the Chief of the Reich Governor’s office or one of his officials who was -in charge of these things gave the order to that effect, of course -without my knowledge and without any order from me. - -MR. DODD: Tell the Tribunal exactly what day you closed up your office -in Vienna, or the last day that you were in this office. - -HOEPKEN: It might have been the 3d or 4th of April. - -MR. DODD: When was the city taken? - -HOEPKEN: I read in the newspaper afterwards that the city finally fell -into the hands of the Allies on 13 April. - -MR. DODD: Did you all leave your office on the 3d or 4th of April? Did -Von Schirach leave as well, and all the clerical staff, _et cetera_? - -HOEPKEN: Schirach and I and his adjutant left the office on this day, or -rather, Schirach had previously set up his office at his home and was -working there. - -MR. DODD: Had he taken any files from his office to his home? - -HOEPKEN: Only what he needed immediately to carry on his business; that -is, the matters which were being dealt with at the moment. - -MR. DODD: Did you leave someone in charge of the files when you left -there, you and Von Schirach on the 3d of April; and if you did, who was -it that you left in charge? - -HOEPKEN: I did not leave anyone to supervise. The file clerks did that -of their own accord. - -MR. DODD: I am trying to understand—and I think it would be helpful to -the Tribunal—whether or not you just walked out of this office and left -everything there, or whether just you and Von Schirach left and left -other people there, or whether the place was in such chaos that nobody -remained. I have not any accurate picture of it, and I think it is of -some importance. You ought to be able to tell us. You left there with -him. What was the situation on the 3d or 4th of April? The city was -practically to be taken in another 10 days. It was under siege. There -was much confusion. What were you doing about your files and all of your -other papers in your office when you walked out of there that day? You -certainly just did not walk out and not give some directions. - -HOEPKEN: I believe that we are not clear about the character of the -Central Bureau. The Central Bureau, of which I was in charge for the -last few months, had no powers, no executive powers, but all of these -things were done by the competent Reich Governor, that is, the -Regierungspräsident, and he probably... - -MR. DODD: I do not need any explanation of how your office was set up. I -want to know if the papers were left there or not, or if anybody was -left with them. - -HOEPKEN: The papers, as far as I know, were left there, and the -archivists were instructed to take care of them. - -MR. DODD: Did you order any papers to be destroyed before you walked out -that day, the 3d or 4th of April, anything at all? - -HOEPKEN: I gave no orders to destroy anything in the Reich Governor’s -Office; I had no authority to do that. - -MR. DODD: Did anybody to your knowledge order anything destroyed, -whether you did or not? - -HOEPKEN: Whether such an order was given and who gave it, I do not know. - -MR. DODD: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the document you put to him? - -MR. DODD: Number USA-865. It is Document 3877-PS, a teletype to Bormann -from Von Schirach on 28 May 1942. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine the witness, Dr. Sauter? - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I should like to go back to what the Prosecution -just asked you. - -The documents of the Reich Governor’s office apparently are supposed to -have been found in a salt mine. Did you have any supervision over the -documents of the Reich Governor’s office? - -HOEPKEN: No, I had no supervision over these documents. I just explained -that. For that reason, I could not give any order to remove them. I know -that valuable objects, pictures, and so on, were removed, but much -earlier. - -DR. SAUTER: And the other employees of the Central Bureau, were they -Viennese? Did they stay in the office, or what do you know about that? - -HOEPKEN: Most of them were Viennese, of course, and probably remained -behind. I shook hands and said goodbye to them, and then we separated. I -also asked whether I could do anything for them, and then I left Vienna. - -DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -Perhaps we had better adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the application on behalf of the -Defendant Bormann the Tribunal allows witness Number 1, Miss Else -Krüger. - -The Tribunal allows witnesses Numbers 3 and 4, Dr. Klopfer and Helmuth -Friedrich. - -The Tribunal also allows the witness whose name I have got inserted -instead of Number 2, Christians, I think it was. - -With reference to the documents applied for, Numbers 1 to 7, the -application is refused. But the Tribunal will consider any application -for documents which the defendants’ counsel, who may be appointed to -argue the general questions of law on behalf of all the defendants, may -wish to have translated. - -Document Number 11 may be translated. - -Counsel for the Defendant Bormann may see the documents which are -mentioned under Roman Number III in the application and counsel for the -Defendant Bormann may also use the documents contained under heading -“B.” - -The final decision upon the admissibility of all these documents is, of -course, a matter which will be decided at the time the documents are -presented. - -There is one other thing that I want to announce, and it is in answer to -the application of Dr. Servatius on behalf of the Defendant Sauckel. - -I am told that the witness Timm is in Nuremberg prison. The witness -Biedemann is also in Nuremberg prison. The witness Hildebrandt will -probably arrive in Nuremberg today. His whereabouts had been lost and he -has only just been rediscovered. The witness Jäger is in the British -zone, and the British secretary is trying through the military -authorities to obtain his attendance; The witness Stothfang has not been -located. There appears to be a mistake in the identity of the person who -was reported to the General Secretary previously. The witness Mitschke -has never been located, although every effort is now being made to -locate him. - -That is all. - -DR. SAUTER: I ask permission to call a further witness, Fritz Wieshofer. -I shall examine this witness only very briefly, because most points have -already been clarified through the other witnesses. - -[_The witness Wieshofer took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -FRITZ WIESHOFER (Witness): Fritz Wieshofer. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SAUTER: Herr Wieshofer, how old are you? - -WIESHOFER: 31 years old. - -DR. SAUTER: Married? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Children? - -WIESHOFER: One son. - -DR. SAUTER: Were you a member of the Party? - -WIESHOFER: I applied for membership in 1938. - -DR. SAUTER: You only applied for membership? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Were you a member of the SS or the SA? - -WIESHOFER: I was in the Waffen-SS. - -DR. SAUTER: Since when? - -WIESHOFER: Since June 1940. - -DR. SAUTER: Are you Austrian by birth? - -WIESHOFER: I am Austrian. - -DR. SAUTER: When did you join the Reich Youth Leader’s Office? - -WIESHOFER: I joined Herr Von Schirach on 3 October 1940. - -DR. SAUTER: And what did you do before that? - -WIESHOFER: Before that I had a temporary post in the Foreign Office. - -DR. SAUTER: For how long? - -WIESHOFER: Only from May until October 1940. - -DR. SAUTER: And before that? - -WIESHOFER: Before that I was employed in the Gauleiter’s office in -Carinthia. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you have anything to do with the Hitler Youth? - -WIESHOFER: No. - -DR. SAUTER: In October of 1940, then, you came to Vienna to join Von -Schirach? - -WIESHOFER: Yes, to Vienna. - -DR. SAUTER: In what capacity did you go there? - -WIESHOFER: I went there as Von Schirach’s adjutant. - -DR. SAUTER: And what did your duties mostly consist of? - -WIESHOFER: As adjutant I was responsible for the handling of the mail, -engagements for conferences, seeing to it that files were presented on -time at conferences, travel arrangements, and so on. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you only work for Schirach in his capacity as Reich -Governor, as Gauleiter, or did you act for him only as mayor? - -WIESHOFER: I was adjutant for Herr Von Schirach in all his capacities. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you also have access to the secret files? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I shall only have a very few brief questions to put -to you. First of all, I am interested in this: Who was responsible for -the forced evacuation of Jews from Vienna? - -WIESHOFER: The forced evacuation of Jews from Vienna, as far as I know, -was handled by the RSHA. The representative in Vienna was a certain Dr. -Brunner, an Obersturmführer in the SS. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you often visit Dr. Brunner officially in connection -with the forced evacuation of Jews, and for what reason? - -WIESHOFER: In some cases, Jews who were affected by this forced -evacuation made written applications to Von Schirach to be left out of -the transport. In such cases, Von Schirach, through the Chief of his -Central Bureau, took the matter up with Dr. Brunner’s office and asked -that the request of the applicant be granted. I would say that generally -this was done by the Chief of the Central Bureau. I remember two cases -where I myself received instructions to intervene with Dr. Brunner, not -by writing or telephoning, but by going to see him personally. - -DR. SAUTER: And what did this SS Sturmführer Dr. Brunner tell you about -what was actually going to happen to the Jews when they were taken away -from Vienna? - -WIESHOFER: Dr. Brunner only told me, on the occasion of one of these -interventions, that the action of resettling the Jews would be a -resettlement from the district of Vienna into the zone of the former -Government General. He also told me in what way this was being carried -out. For instance he said that women and small children would travel in -second-class carriages; that sufficient rations for the journey and milk -for small children would be provided. He also told me that these -resettled persons, upon arrival at their destination, insofar as they -were capable of working, would immediately be put to work. First of all, -they would be put into assembly camps, but that as soon as accommodation -was available, they would be given homes, _et cetera_. He also told me -that because of the numerous interventions by Herr Von Schirach his work -had been made very difficult. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you, or have you—I will put my next question this way: -Did you ever see an order in which Gauleiter were forbidden to intervene -in any way on behalf of Jews, and did you discuss that order with Von -Schirach? - -WIESHOFER: I recollect a written order which we received either at the -end of 1940 or at the beginning of 1941. It stated that “There are -reasons which make it necessary once more to point out,” _et cetera_. It -obviously was a repetition of an order which had already been given. The -purport of the order was that because of certain reasons, Gauleiter were -prohibited from intervening on behalf of Jews in the future. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you talk about that with Schirach? - -WIESHOFER: I talked to Herr Von Schirach about it. - -DR. SAUTER: What did he say? - -WIESHOFER: As far as I can recollect, Von Schirach wrote on the order -“To be filed.” He did not say anything more about it. - -DR. SAUTER: I have another question, Witness. The Defendant Von Schirach -was once in the concentration camp at Mauthausen. Can you tell us when -that was? - -WIESHOFER: I cannot tell you that exactly. All I can say on that subject -is that when I came back from the front—and this was either in the -autumn of 1942 or in June 1943—the adjutant who was on duty at the time -told me that he had accompanied Herr Von Schirach to a concentration -camp, Mauthausen Camp. Some time afterwards—it must have been when I -came back from the front the second time, at the end of 1943—Herr Von -Schirach also told me that he had been to Mauthausen. I only recollect -that he said that he had heard a symphony concert there. - -DR. SAUTER: Well, we are not interested in that; we have heard that. I -am only interested in one thing: Did he visit Mauthausen or another -concentration camp again later on? Can you give us reliable information -on that or not? - -WIESHOFER: I can give you reliable information on that. That is quite -out of the question, because from November 1943 until the collapse I was -continuously on duty and I knew where Von Schirach was, day and night. - -DR. SAUTER: Did he go to Mauthausen again in 1944? - -WIESHOFER: No, certainly not, that is out of the question. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you remember that toward the end of the war there -were orders coming from some source or other stating that enemy airmen -who had been forced to land were no longer to be protected. Do you know -of that? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: That somewhere such orders were issued? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: What was the attitude of Defendant Von Schirach regarding -such orders, and how do you know about it? - -WIESHOFER: I talked about these orders with Herr Von Schirach. Von -Schirach was always against the idea contained in the order, and he -always said that these airmen, too, should be treated as prisoners of -war. Once he said: “If we do not do that, then there is the danger that -our enemies, too, will treat their prisoners, that is Germans, in the -same manner.” - -DR. SAUTER: Do you yourself know of cases where Defendant Von Schirach -actually intervened on behalf of enemy airmen in that way? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Will you please tell us about it? - -WIESHOFER: During one of the last air attacks on Vienna, in March 1945, -an American plane was shot down and crashed near the headquarters of the -Gau command post. That command post was on a wooded hill in Vienna to -which part of the population used to go during air attacks. Von Schirach -was watching from a 32-meter high iron structure on which he would -always stand during air attacks, and he observed that a member of the -American crew bailed out of the aircraft. He immediately ordered the -commander in charge of this command post to drive to the place of the -landing so as to protect the American soldier against the crowd and -bring him to safety. The American soldier was brought to the command -post and after the air attack he was handed over to the Air Force -Command XVII as a prisoner of war. - -DR. SAUTER: When did you leave Vienna? - -WIESHOFER: I left Vienna with Herr Von Schirach on 13 April 1945. - -DR. SAUTER: On 13 April together with the Defendant Von Schirach? - -WIESHOFER: Together with Herr Von Schirach. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, this is the last question I have to put to you: -Witness, have you ever heard from Schirach’s lips anything to the effect -that Vienna was to be held “to the last man” at all costs, or that -destruction should be carried out in Vienna? - -WIESHOFER: I have never heard him say either the one or the other. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put this -witness. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, do you know the Prater in Vienna? - -WIESHOFER: Yes, of course, I am Viennese. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of an institution is that? - -WIESHOFER: The Prater is, or at least was, a pleasure park. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was it closed during the war? - -WIESHOFER: The Prater was not closed during the war. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of people used to go there? - -WIESHOFER: During the war you mean? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -WIESHOFER: Workers, employees, civil servants, that is the Viennese, the -whole of Vienna. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you also see foreign workers there? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: A great many or just a few? - -WIESHOFER: The situation in Vienna was such that we used to say that if -you wanted to go to the Prater then you would have to be able to speak -French and Russian, because with Viennese alone you could not get along. -The Prater was overcrowded with foreign workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How were these foreigners dressed, badly or well? - -WIESHOFER: These foreigners were well dressed, so that you could not -distinguish them from the population. Only when they talked could you -recognize that they were foreigners. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How did they look otherwise? As regards food, did they -look starved? - -WIESHOFER: As far as I myself could see, the workers looked perfectly -well fed. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did the people have money? - -WIESHOFER: They had lots of money. It was known that the “black market” -in Vienna was almost entirely dominated by foreign workers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Could foreigners be seen only in the Prater or were they -to be seen everywhere in the town? - -WIESHOFER: Not only in the Prater, but also in the rest of the town, in -cafés, of which there are so many in Vienna, in restaurants, and in -hotels. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. - -MR. DODD: Whom, besides the Defendant Von Schirach, do you know of these -defendants? And by “know” I mean know personally, or have some -acquaintanceship with the person, or had something to do with the -person? - -WIESHOFER: Personally, I only know Herr Funk. - -MR. DODD: Do you know Sauckel? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Well, who else? - -WIESHOFER: I know Herr Seyss-Inquart, but I did not have any personal -dealings with him. I was the adjutant of Von Schirach. - -MR. DODD: How do you know Funk? - -WIESHOFER: I was invited by Herr Funk a few times. Officially, as -adjutant of Herr Von Schirach, I had some dealings with him, and apart -from that, he invited me several times privately. - -MR. DODD: Were you in the SS at that time, when you were invited by -Funk? - -WIESHOFER: At that time I was in the Waffen-SS as an officer. - -MR. DODD: By the way, when did you first join the SS? - -WIESHOFER: I joined the Waffen-SS on 26 June 1940. - -MR. DODD: Were you in any other branch of the SS besides the Waffen-SS? - -WIESHOFER: I was also in the General SS. - -MR. DODD: When did you join the General SS? - -WIESHOFER: In June or July 1939. - -MR. DODD: So you were actually in the SS from as far back as 1939? - -WIESHOFER: In the General SS; yes. - -MR. DODD: Now, you also became an SS Obersturmführer at one time, did -you not? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: When was that? - -WIESHOFER: I became Obersturmführer about 21 June 1944. - -MR. DODD: When did you join the SA? - -WIESHOFER: I joined the SA on 9 May 1932. - -MR. DODD: Did you know the Strasshof Camp, S-t-r-a-s-s-h-o-f? - -WIESHOFER: This is the first time I have heard that name. - -MR. DODD: Well, it may have been mispronounced. It was a camp located -outside Vienna. - -WIESHOFER: I do not know which camp you mean. I understood Strasshof. I -do not know of any such camp. - -MR. DODD: Yes, something like that. You never heard of that camp? - -WIESHOFER: Never. - -MR. DODD: And you were in Vienna from what year?—19...? - -WIESHOFER: I was born in Vienna. - -MR. DODD: Well, I know you were, but I am talking about your service -with the Defendant Schirach. You were there with him for how long? - -WIESHOFER: From the beginning of October 1940. - -MR. DODD: And you never heard of Strasshof? - -WIESHOFER: No. - -MR. DODD: Did you have much to do with the files of this Defendant Von -Schirach? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: What would you say you had to do with them? What was your -responsibility? - -WIESHOFER: I merely had to see to it that files were presented in good -time for the conference, and that after they had been used they were -returned to the Central Bureau. - -MR. DODD: Where would you go to get a file for Von Schirach that had to -do with the Reich Defense Commission for that district or that defense -district? Where would you go to get a file that had to do with matters -concerning the Reich Defense Commission? Now, let us assume a -situation—let me make it clear to you. Say that Von Schirach tells you -he wants a file about a certain matter that has to do with the Reich -Defense Commission. You had to have it on his desk by a certain hour and -see that it was there, as you say. Tell the Tribunal just what you would -do, where you would go, who you would talk to, and how you would get -that for him. - -WIESHOFER: That would be simple for me. I would apply to the Chief of -the Central Bureau, knowing that he would probably have to go to the -Regierungspräsident to obtain that file. That is what I assume. I myself -would only have gone to the Central Bureau. - -MR. DODD: You had a central filing place, did you not, for all of your -files, whether they were under the Reich Defense Commission or the -Gauleiter or the civil government of Vienna; is that not so? They were -all kept in one place? - -WIESHOFER: They were not all together in one place; only a part of the -files were in the Central Bureau. I cannot tell you which part because I -have never had anything to do with that. - -MR. DODD: You left Vienna on 13 April, you say, with Von Schirach? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: I suppose, as his adjutant, you had to make considerable -preparations for leaving for some days previously, did you not? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: What did you pack up? What did you take with you? - -WIESHOFER: We did not take anything with us from Vienna. Von Schirach -went by car, and the gentlemen on his staff went in two or three other -cars. Nothing else was taken along from Vienna. - -MR. DODD: Well, what did you do in the office; how did you leave it? - -WIESHOFER: We had not used the office since, I think, the spring or -early summer of 1944, because the “Ballhausplatz,” that is, the office -of the Reich Governor, had a direct hit and Von Schirach could no longer -work there. He was working in his apartment. - -MR. DODD: In his apartment? And did he have all his files in his -apartment or somewhere near at hand? - -WIESHOFER: He had no files whatever in his apartment. They remained in -the office, in that part of the Reich Governor’s building which was -still being used and in which one could still work. - -MR. DODD: Were any files taken out of the filing department of the Reich -Governor’s Office when you left Vienna, or before you left Vienna? - -WIESHOFER: I do not know anything about that. I know that an order -existed, both for the State Administration as well as for the Party, -that files must be destroyed when the enemy approached. Whether that was -done or what actually happened to the files, I do not know. - -MR. DODD: Who got that order? - -WIESHOFER: The order, as far as the Party channels were concerned, went -to the deputy Gauleiter, and as far as the State Administration was -concerned, to the Regierungspräsident. - -MR. DODD: Did you also receive an order to start moving your files to -places of safety some time in the spring of 1945 or even the late winter -of 1944? - -WIESHOFER: I have no recollection of such an order. - -MR. DODD: Do you know that some 250 folders of your files were moved to -a salt mine outside Vienna? Do you know anything about that? - -WIESHOFER: No, I hear that for the first time. - -MR. DODD: Do you know that there is such a mine near Vienna? You have -lived there quite a while, I gather. - -WIESHOFER: No. It is not near Vienna—if I may be permitted to put this -matter right—but near Salzburg; we never lived there. I only know that -this mine exists. - -MR. DODD: How far is it from Vienna? - -WIESHOFER: Approximately 350 kilometers. - -MR. DODD: You do not know anything about any files being taken there. -You are sure about that, are you? - -WIESHOFER: I am absolutely certain; I do not know anything about that. - -MR. DODD: I have just one other question to ask. I suppose you knew the -defendant pretty well. He is a little older than you, but you had worked -for him for some time. Is that not so? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Why did you not join the Army instead of the SS when you -wanted to do something for your country? - -WIESHOFER: When I was called up, the Waffen-SS was considered the elite -unit and I preferred to serve in such a guards unit, if I may say so, -than in the general Armed Forces. - -MR. DODD: Was it partly due to the fact that you had been in the General -SS since 1939? - -WIESHOFER: No. That had nothing to do with it. Many members of the -General SS went to the Forces. - -MR. DODD: Did you talk this matter over with your superior, the Youth -Leader Von Schirach, before you joined the SS in 1939, and the Waffen-SS -later on? - -WIESHOFER: No. Might I remind you that I did not join Von Schirach until -October 1940, whereas I joined the Waffen-SS on 26 June 1940. - -MR. DODD: Yes, but you were, I suppose, a young man and you were in -touch with the Reich Youth organization in 1939 when you joined the -General SS. Is that not a fact? Were you not a part of the Youth -organization in 1939? - -WIESHOFER: No. I was not taken into the Youth Officers Corps until April -1944 when I became Bannführer. Before that I had nothing to do with it. - -MR. DODD: Well, I do not think you understand me. It is not too -important, but how old were you in 1939? You were 24, approximately, -were you not? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And were you not then in some way affiliated with the Hitler -Youth or the Youth organization in Germany, either as a member, or -having something to do with it? - -WIESHOFER: No. Neither as a member nor in any other way. Of course I -knew Youth Leaders in Carinthia, yes. - -MR. DODD: You were quite a speech maker for the Party, were you not, -during your lifetime? - -WIESHOFER: I spoke at several meetings in Carinthia between April 1938 -and May 1940. - -MR. DODD: At about how many meetings would you say you spoke in that -period of 2 years? - -WIESHOFER: During that time I spoke at about 80 meetings. - -MR. DODD: Before an average of about, say, 3,000 persons per meeting? - -WIESHOFER: I also spoke in very small villages. I would say that the -average attendance would be about 200. - -MR. DODD: That is all I have. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine? - -DR. THOMA: What were the subjects you talked about at these meetings? - -WIESHOFER: Our subject was given to us by the Reich Propaganda Ministry. -The meetings were conducted in such a way that every speaker was able to -talk on general matters. For instance the subject might have been “With -the Führer to Final Victory,” or “Why Welfare for the Nation?” or “Why -Winter Relief?” Such subjects were always given. - -DR. THOMA: Did you spread Rosenberg’s _Myth of the 20th Century_? - -WIESHOFER: No. - -DR. THOMA: Did you speak about such subjects? - -WIESHOFER: Never; in view of my education I would not have been in a -position to do so. - -DR. THOMA: Have you ever read this _Myth_? - -WIESHOFER: I have not read the _Myth_. - -DR. THOMA: Did you speak to youth at these meetings? - -WIESHOFER: I did not speak to youth—that is, not particularly to youth. - -DR. THOMA: Thank you. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I do not wish to put any questions to the -witness; thank you very much. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Witness, did Schirach have any authority to -intervene in case of Jews who were being deported from Vienna? - -WIESHOFER: He had no authority to do so, but he did it. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many times did he intervene? - -WIESHOFER: I cannot recollect a single case where Von Schirach did not -intervene when he received a petition. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask that; I asked how many times he -intervened. - -WIESHOFER: I cannot give you any figure without being inaccurate. It is -difficult to say. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did he intervene many times, or a few? - -WIESHOFER: No. He intervened often. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you see the order to the Police not to -protect aviators? You said it was in writing, did you not? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Who signed it? - -WIESHOFER: The order was signed by Bormann. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And was it distributed to the Police in -Vienna? - -WIESHOFER: By the Police? If I have understood you rightly, you were -talking about the order that Gauleiter must not intervene on behalf of -Jews. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No. This was the order about not protecting -aviators who had crashed. You said you saw that order, did you not? - -WIESHOFER: I did see the order, yes. I can no longer remember whom it -came from and to whom it was addressed. It was merely sent to our office -for our information. We were not called upon to take any action. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you not know whether or not the Police had -a copy of it? - -WIESHOFER: Please, will you be good enough to repeat the question? - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know whether or not the Police in -Vienna had copies of the order? - -WIESHOFER: That I do not know. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you ever know Himmler? - -WIESHOFER: I have seen him. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did he give you any instructions? - -WIESHOFER: No. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you get any instructions from the SS? - -WIESHOFER: In which way do you mean? - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Any instructions from the SS directly when -you were in Von Schirach’s office? - -WIESHOFER: No. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): None at all? - -WIESHOFER: None at all. I cannot recollect any. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think you said once that Schirach sent a -command to save American aviators from the crowd, did you not? Do you -not understand? - -WIESHOFER: Yes, I understand, and I did say that. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And what other efforts did Von Schirach make -to protect aviators from the crowd? Did he make any other efforts? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did he issue any orders to the Police or take -it up with the Police? - -WIESHOFER: Von Schirach’s opinion was known. In the circles... - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you the opinion. Did he issue -any orders to the Police or talk to the Police? - -WIESHOFER: I have no recollection of that. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you would know if he had, would you -not? - -WIESHOFER: If I had been present when he gave the orders then I would -know it, but it is possible that he talked when I was not there. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you say you had access to the secret -files? - -WIESHOFER: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What was kept in the secret files? - -WIESHOFER: I did not understand the question. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I asked you what was kept, what was put in -the secret files, what sort of papers? - -WIESHOFER: There were secret files which came from the Supreme Party -Headquarters, secret files which came from the Minister of the Interior; -there were things which made one wonder why they were called “secret.” -But as far as details of these files are concerned, I cannot, of course, -today remember them. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I suppose any documents, any reports, -that were marked “secret” would be put in those secret files, would they -not? - -WIESHOFER: Reports from us to higher departments, or do you mean from -the top downwards? - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Reports coming in to you. - -WIESHOFER: They would then have been filed in the secret archives. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And SS secret reports would go in the secret -files, would they not? - -WIESHOFER: SS reports did not come to us, because we were not a service -department of the SS. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you have no questions yourself, Dr. Sauter, then the -witness may retire. - -DR. SAUTER: No. - -[_The witness Wieshofer left the stand._] - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in Schirach’s document book there are still a -few documents which, up to now, have not been expressly presented; but I -believe it is not necessary to read these documents to you. To save -time, I should like, if I may, to refer to the documents and ask you to -take judicial notice of them; for instance, of the affidavit of Frau -Hoepken, which is incorporated in the document book under Number 3 and -which has already been submitted somewhere else. - -There is only one document, Mr. President, about which I want to give a -very brief explanation. In the Schirach document book, under Number -118(a), there is the farewell letter of the explorer Dr. Colin Ross. -With reference to this Dr. Colin Ross, when the documents were dealt -with, the Prosecutor said that the body of Dr. Ross had not been -discovered. My first reaction was of course surprise, and I made -inquiries as to what actually had been done with these bodies and I -discovered that in fact on 30 April 1945, the day before the arrival of -American troops, the bodies of Dr. Colin Ross and his wife were found in -the house of Defendant Von Schirach at Urfeld, on Lake Walchen. They had -both first taken poison and then, to be quite sure, Dr. Ross shot his -wife and then himself. German soldiers who were still at Urfeld on Lake -Walchen as patients at the time then buried the bodies quite close to -the house of the Defendant Von Schirach. - -In the autumn the American Governor ordered that the bodies were to be -transferred to the cemetery, but eventually he rescinded that order and -permitted the bodies to remain where they had originally been buried. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, can you indicate in what way you will submit -this document has any relevance at all? We have read the document. It -does not appear to have any striking relevance. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, we have submitted this document because it is -to prove, or at least indicate, that the Defendant Von Schirach, -together with this Dr. Colin Ross, continuously worked to maintain -peace, and later on to limit the war. Therefore it is submitted only to -show that the Defendant Von Schirach worked for peace. - -THE PRESIDENT: The document does not mention Von Schirach or in any way -indicate that he had worked for peace. - -DR. SAUTER: But it says in the document, “We have done everything in our -power to prevent this war, or...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the word “We” must mean the people who “leave -this world by our own will,” namely Dr. Colin Ross and his wife. It does -not refer to Von Schirach. - -DR. SAUTER: We do not know that. Why should it not also refer to Von -Schirach? - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, because there is such a thing as grammar. The -document begins “We leave this world by our own will.” - -DR. SAUTER: As to that, Mr. President, may I remind you that this name, -Dr. Colin Ross, has been mentioned very often during this trial in -connection with the peace efforts of the Defendant Von Schirach, and -that Dr. Colin Ross, together with his wife, was living in Schirach’s -apartment when they committed suicide. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, very well, Dr. Sauter, if you wish to draw our -attention to it, you may do so. - -DR. SAUTER: Thank you. Mr. President, this letter was not really meant -for the public; the original of the letter was left behind by Dr. Ross, -and a number of carbon copies were sent to personal friends. In this way -we found this letter of Dr. Colin Ross. I do not think there is anything -else I have to say. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have not said anything critical of the letter. If you -want to read some sentences of it, read them; if you do not we will take -judicial notice of it. As I tell you, we have already read this letter. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am not stopping your reading a sentence of it, if you -want to read a sentence of it. - -DR. SAUTER: It is of course not necessary, Mr. President, if you have -taken cognizance of it. I have nothing else to say, and at this point I -can end my case for the Defendant Von Schirach. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, have you offered in evidence all the -documents which are in these books? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then they will be numbered with the numbers which are in -the books. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then we will take judicial notice of them all. - -MR. DODD: Well, Mr. President, there is one here which the Tribunal -expressly ruled on—the affidavit of Uiberreither. The Defendant Von -Schirach was told he would have to present Uiberreither if he were to -use this affidavit. He has not been presented here and now the affidavit -is being offered. We expressly asked that he be called here if this -affidavit was to be submitted to the Tribunal. - -DR. SAUTER: I am not making any reference to Uiberreither’s affidavit, -and I will forego calling the witness Uiberreither. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Sauter. - -MR. DODD: Then the affidavit is not offered? - -THE PRESIDENT: No, it is not being offered. - -MR. DODD: That is Page 135. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then it will not be admitted, and we will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, during the presentation of the case involving -the Defendant Funk, there was a number of documents that we did not -submit in evidence at the time; and I asked the Tribunal’s permission to -do so at a later time. I am prepared to do so now if the Tribunal would -care to have me. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it would be quite convenient now. - -MR. DODD: Very well, Sir. - -The first one is a matter of clarifying the record with respect to it. -It is Document 2828-PS. It has already been offered in evidence as -Exhibit USA-654. But the excerpt, or the extract, which was read will be -found on Page 105 of the document. We cited another page, which was in -error. Reference to this Document USA-654 will be found on Page 9071 -(Volume XIII, Page 141) of the record. - -We also offered our Document EC-440, which consisted of a statement made -by the Defendant Funk, and we quoted a sentence from Page 4 of that -document. I wish to offer that as Exhibit USA-874. - -Then Document 3952-PS was an interrogation of the Defendant Funk dated -19 October 1945. We wish to offer that as USA-875. - -I might remind the Tribunal that the excerpt quoted from that -interrogation had to do with the statement made by Funk that the -Defendant Hess had notified him of the impending attack on the Soviet -Union. That excerpt has been translated into the four languages, and -therefore will be readily available to the Tribunal. - -Then there is also another interrogation dated 22 October 1945. We read -from Pages 15 and 16 of that interrogation, as it appears in the record -at Page 9169 for 7 May (Volume XIII, Page 214). The document is Number -3953-PS; we offer it as Exhibit USA-876. - -We next referred to Document Number 3894-PS, the interrogation of one -Hans Posse. We offered it as Exhibit USA-843 at the time, as appears on -Page 9093 of the record for 6 May (Volume XIII, Page 158). At that time -I stated to the Tribunal that we would submit the whole interrogation in -French, Russian, German, and English. We are now prepared to do that, -and do so. - -Then we have Document 3954-PS. This is an affidavit by one Franz B. -Wolf, one of the editors of the _Frankfurter Zeitung_. Reference to it -will be found at Page 9082 of the transcript, where we stated that we -would have more to say about the reason for the retention of the -editorial staff of the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ (Volume XIII, Page 150). -That Document, 3954-PS, is also now available to the Tribunal in French, -Russian, German, and English; and we offer it as Exhibit USA-877. - -Then, Mr. President, a motion picture film was shown during this -cross-examination of the Defendant Funk; and the Tribunal inquired as to -whether or not we would be prepared to submit affidavits giving its -source, and so on. We are now prepared to do so; and we offer first an -affidavit by Captain Sam Harris who arranged to have the pictures taken, -which becomes Exhibit USA-878. The second affidavit is by the -photographer who actually took the picture. We offer that as Exhibit -USA-879. - -Finally, I should also like to clear up one other matter. On March 25, -during the cross-examination of the witness Bohle, witness for the -Defendant Hess, Colonel Amen quoted from the interrogation of Von -Strempel, as appears in the record beginning at Page 6482 (Volume X, -Page 40). We have had the pertinent portions translated into the -operating languages of the Tribunal, and we ask that this interrogation, -which bears our Document Number 3800-PS, be admitted in evidence as -Exhibit USA-880. - -I believe, Mr. President, that clears up all of the documents that we -have not offered formally, up to this date. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, counsel for the Defendant Sauckel. - -DR. SERVATIUS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I will now call -Defendant Sauckel to the witness stand. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. - -[_The Defendant Sauckel took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -FRITZ SAUCKEL (Defendant): Ernst Friedrich Christoph Sauckel. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The defendant repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, please describe your career to the Tribunal. - -SAUCKEL: I was the only child of the postman Friedrich Sauckel, and was -born at Hassfurt on the Main near Bamberg. I attended the elementary -school at Schweinfurt and the secondary school. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How long were you at the secondary school? - -SAUCKEL: For 5 years. As my father held only a very humble position, it -was my mother, a seamstress, who made it possible for me to go to that -school. When she became very ill with heart trouble, I saw that it would -be impossible for my parents to provide for my studies, and I obtained -their permission to go to sea to make a career for myself there. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you join the merchant marine, or where did you go? - -SAUCKEL: First of all I joined the Norwegian and Swedish merchant marine -so that I could be thoroughly trained in seamanship on the big sailing -vessels and clippers. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How old were you at the time? - -SAUCKEL: At that time I was 15½. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What were you earning? - -SAUCKEL: As a cabin boy on a Norwegian sailing ship I earned 5 kronen in -addition to my keep. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And then, in the course of your career at sea, where did -you go next? - -SAUCKEL: In the course of my career as a sailor, and during my training -which I continued afterwards on German sailing vessels, I sailed on -every sea and went to every part of the world. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you come into contact with foreign families? - -SAUCKEL: Through the Young Men’s Christian Association, principally in -Australia and North America, as well as in South America, I came into -contact with families of these countries. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Where were you when the first World War started? - -SAUCKEL: It so happened that I was on a German sailing vessel on the way -to Australia when the ship was captured, and on the high seas I was made -prisoner by the French. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How long did you remain prisoner? - -SAUCKEL: Five years, until November 1919. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And did you return home then? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I returned home then. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And then what did you do? - -SAUCKEL: Although I had finished my training and studies in seamanship -required of me, I could not go to sea again and take my examination, -since my savings made during those years at sea had become worthless -because of the German inflation. There were also few German ships and -very many unemployed German seamen, so I decided to take up work in a -factory in my home town of Schweinfurt. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you remain in your home town? - -SAUCKEL: At first I remained in my home town. I learned to be a turner -and engineer in the Fischer ball-bearing factory in order to save money -so that I later could attend a technical school, an engineering college. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were you already interested in politics at that time? - -SAUCKEL: Although as a sailor I despised politics—for I loved my -sailor’s life and still love it today—conditions forced me to take up a -definite attitude towards political problems. No one in Germany at that -time could do otherwise. Many years before I had left a beautiful -country and a rich nation and I returned to that country 6 years later -to find it fundamentally changed and in a state of upheaval, and in -great spiritual and material need. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you join any party? - -SAUCKEL: No. I worked in a factory which people in my home town -described as “ultra-Red.” I worked in the tool shop, and right and left -of me Social Democrats, Communists, Socialists, and Anarchists were -working—among others my present father-in-law—and during all the rest -periods discussions went on, so that whether one wanted to or not one -became involved in the social problems of the time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You mention your father-in-law. Did you marry then? - -SAUCKEL: In 1923 I married the daughter of a German workman I had met at -that time. I am still happily married to her today and we have 10 -children. - -DR. SERVATIUS: When did you join the Party? - -SAUCKEL: I joined the Party definitely in 1923 after having already been -in sympathy with it before. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What made you do it? - -SAUCKEL: One of those days I heard a speech of Hitler’s. In this speech -he said that the German factory worker and the German laborer must make -common cause with the German brain worker. The controversies between the -proletariat and the middle class must be smoothed out and bridged over -by each getting to know and understand the other. Through this a new -community of people would grow up, and only such a community, not bound -to middle class or proletariat, could overcome the dire needs of those -days and the splitting up of the German nation into parties and creeds. -This statement took such hold of me and struck me so forcibly, that I -dedicated my life to the idea of adjusting what seemed to be almost -irreconcilable contrasts. I did that all the more, if I may say so, -because I was aware of the fact that there is an inclination to go to -extremes in German people, and in the German character generally. I had -to examine myself very thoroughly to find the right path for me -personally. As I have already said, I had hardly taken any interest in -political questions. My good parents, who are no longer alive, brought -me up in a strictly Christian but also in a very patriotic way. However, -when I went to sea, I lived a sailor’s life. I loaded saltpeter in -Chile. I did heavy lumber work in Canada, in Quebec. I trimmed coal on -the equator, and I sailed around Cape Horn several times. All of this -was hard work; I ask... - -DR. SERVATIUS: Please, come back to the question of the Party. - -SAUCKEL: This has to do with the question of the Party, for we must all -give some reasons as to how we got there. I myself... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I stated at the beginning of the -defendant’s case that we had heard this account from the Defendant -Göring and that we did not propose to hear it again from 20 defendants. -It seems to me that we are having it inflicted upon us by nearly every -one of the defendants. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I believe, Mr. President, that we are interested in -getting some sort of an impression of the defendant himself. Seen from -various points of view, the facts look different. I will now briefly... - -THE PRESIDENT: It is quite true, Dr. Servatius, but we have had half an -hour, almost, of it now. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I shall limit it now. - -The Party was dissolved in 1923, and refounded in 1925. Did you join it -again? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you take an active part in the Party or were you just -a member? - -SAUCKEL: From 1925 on I took an active part in it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what position did you hold? - -SAUCKEL: I was then Gauleiter in Thuringia. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you do that to get work, to earn your living, or for -what reason? - -SAUCKEL: As Gauleiter in Thuringia I earned 150 marks. In any other -profession I would have had accommodations and earned more money. - -DR. SERVATIUS: When did you make Hitler’s acquaintance? - -SAUCKEL: I met him briefly in 1925. - -DR. SERVATIUS: When did you become Gauleiter? - -SAUCKEL: I became Gauleiter in 1927. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And how were you appointed? - -SAUCKEL: I was appointed by letter. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any special instructions which pointed to -secret intentions of the Party? - -SAUCKEL: At that time we were very definitely told that under no -circumstances should there be any secret chapters or any other secrecy -in the life of the Party, but that everything should be done publicly. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Who was your predecessor? - -SAUCKEL: Dr. Dinter. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Why was he relieved of his post? - -SAUCKEL: Dr. Dinter was dismissed because he wanted to found a new -religious movement within the Party. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In 1929 you became a member of the Thuringian Diet? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were you elected to that? - -SAUCKEL: I was elected to the Diet in the same way as at every -parliamentary election. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was dictatorship in power there already at the time? - -SAUCKEL: That was not possible; the province was governed in accordance -with the Thuringian constitution. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How long were you a member of the Diet? - -SAUCKEL: I was a member of the Diet as long as it existed, until May -1933. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How was it dissolved? - -SAUCKEL: The Diet was dissolved by a Reich Government decree. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Then in 1932, you were a member of the Provincial -Government of Thuringia. How did you get into that position? - -SAUCKEL: In 1932, in the month of June, new elections took place for the -Thuringian Diet, and the NSDAP obtained 26 out of 60 seats. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was any mention made of a dictatorship which was to be -aimed at? - -SAUCKEL: No, a government was elected according to parliamentary -principles. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Well, you had a majority in the Thuringian Government, -had you not, and you could use your influence? - -SAUCKEL: Together with the bourgeois parties, by an absolute majority, a -National Socialist government was elected. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What happened to the old officials? Were they dismissed? - -SAUCKEL: I myself became the President and Minister of the Interior in -that government; the old officials, without exception, remained in their -offices. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And with what did that first National Socialist -government concern itself in the field of domestic politics? - -SAUCKEL: In the field of domestic politics there was only one question -at that time, and that was the alleviation of an indescribable distress -which is only exceeded by that of today. - -DR. SERVATIUS: In this connection, Mr. President, may I submit two -government reports from which I only wish to draw your attention briefly -to two passages. One is the report contained in Document Number 96, -which shows the activity of the government and its fight against social -distress. What is particularly important when you run through it, is -what is not mentioned, that is, there is no mention of the question of -war or other such matters, but again and again the alleviation of -distress is mentioned. And important, too, is the work that was carried -out. That is in Document Number 97. In this book, on Page 45, there is a -statement of the work undertaken by the government—bridge-building, -road-making, and so on—and in no way had this work anything to do with -war. - -Then I am submitting Document Number 95 from the same period. It is a -book called _Sauckel’s Fighting Speeches_. Here, too, the book is -remarkable for what does not appear in it, namely preparations for war. -Instead it emphasizes the distress which must be alleviated. It becomes -clear from the individual articles that these are speeches made during a -number of years, which show in a similar way what the preoccupations -were of the Defendant Sauckel. It begins in 1932 with a speech dealing -with the misery of the time, and ends with the final questions where -reference is made once again to the alleviation of social need and the -preservation of peace. The Tribunal will be able to read these articles -in the document book. - -In 1933 you also became Reich Regent of Thuringia. How did you manage to -get to that position? - -SAUCKEL: I was appointed Reich Regent of Thuringia by Field Marshal Von -Hindenburg, who was Reich President at that time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What were the instructions you received when you took up -your offices? - -SAUCKEL: When I took over my office as Reich Regent I received -instructions to form a new Thuringian Government, as the Reich Regent -was to keep out of the administrative affairs of a German state... - -DR. SERVATIUS: You need not tell us these technical details. I mean what -political task were you given? - -SAUCKEL: I was given the political task of administering Thuringia as -Reich Regent within the existing Reich law and prevailing Constitution, -and of guaranteeing the unity of the Reich. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And did the words “guarantee the unity of the Reich” mean -the overpowering of others, in particular the authorities in Thuringia? - -SAUCKEL: No, the authorities remained. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now, you held both the position of Gauleiter and that of -Reich Regent. What was the aim of that? - -SAUCKEL: Both positions were entirely separate in their organizations. -Under the Regent were officials in office, and under the Gauleiter were -employees of the Party. Both positions were administered absolutely -separately, as is the case in any other state where members of a party -are at the same time party officials or leaders and exercise both these -functions simultaneously. - -DR. SERVATIUS: So you received no order that one position should absorb -the other? - -SAUCKEL: No, I had no such orders. The tasks were entirely different. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were you a member of the SA? - -SAUCKEL: I myself was never an SA man. I was an honorary -Obergruppenführer in the SA. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How did you receive that appointment? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you. It was honorary. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were you appointed SS Obergruppenführer by Himmler? - -SAUCKEL: No, the Führer made me honorary SS Obergruppenführer for no -special reason and without functions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were you a member of the Reichstag? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, from 1933 on. - -DR. SERVATIUS: As a member of the Reichstag, did you know anything in -advance about the beginning of the war? Were you informed? - -SAUCKEL: I was never informed in advance about the start of the war or -about foreign political developments. I merely remember that quite -suddenly—it may have been during the days between 24 August and the end -of August—we were called to a session of the Reichstag in Berlin. This -session was canceled at the time, and we were later ordered to go to the -Führer, that is, the Gauleiter and Reichsleiter. But a number had -already left so that the circle was not complete. The conference, or -Hitler’s speech, only lasted a short time. He said, roughly, that the -meeting of the Reichstag could not take place as things were still in -the course of development. He was convinced that there would not be a -war. He said he hoped there would be some settlement in a small way and -meant by that, as I had to conclude, a solution without the parts of -Upper Silesia lost in 1921. He said—and that I remember exactly—that -Danzig would become German, and apart from that Germany would be given a -railway line with several tracks, like a Reichsautobahn, with a strip of -ground to the right and left of it. He told us to go home and prepare -for the Reich Party Rally, where we would meet again. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any close connections with the Führer? - -SAUCKEL: I personally, as far as I know the Führer, had a great deal of -admiration for him. But I had no close connection with him that one -could describe as personal. I had a number of discussions with him about -the administration of my Gau and in particular about the care he wished -to be given to cultural buildings in Thuringia—in Weimar, Eisenach, and -Meiningen; and later on there were more frequent meetings because of my -position as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: We shall come to that later. What connections did you -have with the Reichsleiter? - -SAUCKEL: My connections with the Reichsleiter were no different from my -connections with the Führer. They were of an official and Party nature. -As regards personal relationships I cannot say that I had any -particularly personal intercourse with anyone. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What about your connection with the Reich Ministers? - -SAUCKEL: My connection with the Reich Ministers was of a purely official -nature and was very infrequent. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What about the Wehrmacht? - -SAUCKEL: I could not have the honor of being a German soldier because of -my imprisonment in the first World War. And in this World War the Führer -refused to allow me to serve as a soldier. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have held a number of high positions and -offices. You knew the Reich Ministers and Reichsleiter. Will you please -explain why you went aboard the submarine at that time? - -SAUCKEL: I had repeatedly made written requests to the Führer that I -might be allowed to join the Wehrmacht as an ordinary soldier. He -refused to give me this permission. So I arranged in secret for someone -to take my place and went aboard Captain Salmann’s submarine with his -agreement. As a former sailor and now a politician in a high position I -wanted to give these brave submarine men a proof of my comradeship and -understanding and of my sense of duty. Apart from that I had 10 children -for whom, as their father, I had to do something too. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I should like now, in a number of questions, to refer to -your activities. Were you a member of a trade union? - -SAUCKEL: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know what the aims of German trade unions were? - -SAUCKEL: Yes, I do. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were they economic or political? - -SAUCKEL: As I, as a worker, came to know them, the aims of German trade -unions were political, and there were a number of different trade unions -with varied political views. I considered that a great misfortune. As -workman in the workshop I had had experience of the arguments among the -trade unionists—between the Christian Socialist trade unions and the -Red trade unions, between the syndicalist, the anarchist and the -communist trade unions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The trade unions in your Gau were then dissolved. Were -the leaders arrested at the time? - -SAUCKEL: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you approve of the dissolution of the trade unions? - -SAUCKEL: The dissolution of the trade unions was in the air then. The -question was discussed in the Party for a long time and there was no -agreement at all as to the position trade unions should hold, nor as to -their necessity, their usefulness and their nature. But a solution had -to be found because the trade unions which we, or the Führer, or Dr. -Ley, dissolved all held different political views. From that time on, -however, there was only one party in Germany and it was necessary, I -fully realize, to come to a definite decision as to the actual duties of -the trade unions, the necessary duties indispensable to every calling -and to workers everywhere. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was not the purpose of removing the trade unions to -remove any opposition which might stand in the way of an aggressive war? - -SAUCKEL: I can say in all good conscience that during those years not -one of us ever thought about a war at all. We had to overcome such -terrible need that we should have been only too glad if German economic -life could have been started again in peace and if the German worker, -who had suffered the most during that frightful depression, could have -had work and food once more. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did members of trade unions suffer economically through -the dissolution? - -SAUCKEL: In no way. My own father-in-law, who was a member of a trade -union and still is today, and whom I repeatedly asked for information, -whom I never persuaded to join the Party—he was a Social Democrat and -never joined the Party—confirmed the fact that even when he was getting -old and could no longer work, the German Labor Front never denied him -the rights due to him as an old trade unionist and by virtue of his long -trade-union membership, but allowed him full benefits. On the other -hand, the German State—since in Germany old age and disability -insurance and the accident insurance, _et cetera_, were paid and -organized by the State—the National Socialist State guaranteed him all -these rights and made full payment. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were all Communist leaders arrested in your Gau after the -Party came to power? - -SAUCKEL: No. In my Gau, as far as I know, only Communists who had -actually worked against the State were arrested. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what happened to them? - -SAUCKEL: The State Police arrested and interrogated them and detained -them according to the findings. - -DR.. SERVATIUS: Did you have Kreisleiter in your Gau who had been -members of a former opposition party? - -SAUCKEL: The Party’s activity was recruiting. Our most intensive work -was the winning over of political opponents. I am very proud of the fact -that many workers in my Gau, numerous former Communists and Social -Democrats, were won over by us and became local group leaders and Party -functionaries. - -DR. SERVATIUS: But were there not two Kreisleiter from the extreme left -appointed by you? - -SAUCKEL: One Kreisleiter from the extreme left was appointed. Also, -besides a number of other leaders, the Gau sectional manager of the -German Labor Front had belonged to the extreme left for a long time. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How did you personally deal with your political -opponents? - -SAUCKEL: Political opponents who did not work against the State were -neither bothered nor harmed in my Gau. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the Socialist Deputy Fröhlich? - -SAUCKEL: The Socialist Deputy August Fröhlich was my strongest and most -important opponent. He was the leader of the Thuringian Social Democrats -and was for many years the Social Democrat Prime Minister of Thuringia. -I had great respect for him as an opponent. He was an honorable and -upright man. On 20 July 1944, through my own personal initiative, I had -him released from detention. He had been on the list of the conspirators -of 20 July, but I had so much respect for him personally that, in spite -of that, I asked for his release and obtained it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you treat other opponents similarly? - -SAUCKEL: I also had a politician of the Center Party I knew in my home -town of Schweinfurt released from detention. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The Concentration Camp of Buchenwald was in your Gau. Did -you establish it? - -SAUCKEL: The Buchenwald Camp originated in the following manner: The -Führer, who came to Weimar quite often because of the theater there, -suggested that a battalion of his SS Leibstandarte should be stationed -at Weimar. As the Leibstandarte was considered a picked regiment I not -only agreed to this but was very pleased, because in a city like Weimar -people are glad to have a garrison. So the State of Thuringia, the -Thuringian Government, at the request of the Führer, prepared a site in -the Ettersburg Forest, north of the incline outside the town. - -After some time Himmler informed me, however, that he could not bring a -battalion of the SS Leibstandarte to Weimar, as he could not divide up -the regiment, but that it would be a newly established Death’s-Head -unit, and Himmler said it would amount to the same thing. It was only -some time later, when the site had already been placed at the disposal -of the Reich, that Himmler declared that he now had to accommodate a -kind of concentration camp with the Death’s-Head units on this very -suitable site. I opposed this to begin with, because I did not consider -a concentration camp at all the right kind of thing for the town of -Weimar and its traditions. However, he—I mean Himmler—making use of -his position, refused to have any discussion about it. And so the camp -was set up neither to my satisfaction nor to that of the population of -Weimar. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the administration of -the camp later on? - -SAUCKEL: I never had anything to do with the administration of the camp. -The Thuringian Government made an attempt at the time to influence the -planning of the building by saying that the building police in Thuringia -wished to give the orders for the sanitary arrangements in the camp. -Himmler rejected this on the grounds of his position, saying that he had -a construction office of his own and the site now belonged to the Reich. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you visit the camp at any time? - -SAUCKEL: As far as I can remember, on one single occasion at the end of -1937 or at the beginning of 1938, I visited and inspected the camp with -an Italian commission. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you find anything wrong there? - -SAUCKEL: I did not find anything wrong. I inspected the -accommodations—I myself had been a prisoner for 5 years, and so it -interested me. I must admit that at that time there was no cause for any -complaint as such. The accommodations had been divided into day and -night rooms. The beds were covered with blue and white sheets; the -kitchens, washrooms, and latrines were beyond reproach, so that the -Italian officer or officers who were inspecting the camp with me said -that in Italy they would not accommodate their own soldiers any better. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Later on did you hear about the events in that camp which -have been alleged here? - -SAUCKEL: I heard nothing about such events as have been alleged here. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the evacuation of the -camp at the end of the war, before the American Army approached? - -SAUCKEL: When the mayor of Weimar informed me that they intended to -evacuate the camp at Buchenwald and to use the camp guards to fight the -American troops, I raised the strongest objections. As I had no -authority over the camp, and since for various reasons connected with my -other office I had had considerable differences with Himmler and did not -care to speak to him, I telephoned the Führer’s headquarters in Berlin -and said that in any case an evacuation or a transfer of prisoners into -the territory east of the Saale was impossible and madness, and could -not be carried through from the point of view of supplies. I demanded -that the camp should be handed over to the American occupation troops in -an orderly manner. I received the answer that the Führer would give -instructions to Himmler to comply with my request. I briefly reported -this to some of my colleagues and the mayor, and then I left Weimar. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The witness Dr. Blaha has stated that you had also been -to the concentration camp at Dachau on the occasion of an inspection. - -SAUCKEL: No, I did not go to the Dachau Concentration Camp and, as far -as I recollect, I did not take part in the visit of the Gauleiter to -Dachau in 1935 either. In no circumstances did I take part in an -inspection in Dachau such as Dr. Blaha has described here; and -consequently, above all, I did not inspect workshops or anything of the -sort. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not, as Gauleiter, receive official reports -regarding the events in the concentration camp, that is to say, orders -which passed through the Gau administrative offices both from and to the -camp? - -SAUCKEL: No. I neither received instructions for the Buchenwald Camp, -nor reports. It was not only my personal opinion but it was the opinion -of old experienced Gauleiter that it was the greatest misfortune, from -the administrative point of view, when Himmler as early as 1934-35 -proceeded to separate the executive from the general internal -administration. There were continual complaints from many Gauleiter and -German provincial administrations. They were unsuccessful, however, -because in the end Himmler incorporated even the communal fire brigades -into the Reich organization of his Police. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any personal relations with the Police and -the SS at Weimar? - -SAUCKEL: I had no personal relations with the SS and the Police at all. -I had official relations inasmuch as the trade police and the local -police of small boroughs still remained under the internal -administration of the State of Thuringia. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did not the Police have their headquarters near you, at -Weimar? - -SAUCKEL: No, it was the ridiculous part of the development at that time -that, as I once explained to the Führer, we had been changed from a -Party state, and a state made up of provinces, into a departmental -state. The Reich ministries had greatly developed, their departments -being fairly well defined, and the individual district departments of -the various administrations did not agree among one another. Until 1934 -Thuringia had its own independent police administration in its Ministry -for Home Affairs. But from that time the headquarters of the Higher SS -and the Police Leader were transferred to Kassel, so that Himmler, in -contrast to the rest of the State and Party organizations, obtained new -spheres for his Police. He demonstrated this in Central Germany where -for example the Higher SS and Police Leader for Weimar and the State of -Thuringia was stationed in Kassel, whereas for the Prussian part of the -Gau of Thuringia—that is to say the town of Erfurt which is 20 -kilometers away from Weimar—the Higher SS and Police Leader and the -provincial administration had their seat in Magdeburg. It is obvious -that we, as Gau authorities, did not in any way agree with such a -development and that there was great indignation among the experienced -administrators. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The question is: Did you co-operate with these offices -and did you have a friendly association with the officials in the regime -and therefore know what was going on in Buchenwald? - -SAUCKEL: On the contrary, it was a continual battle. Each separate -organization shut itself off from the others. At such a period of world -development this was most unfortunate. For the people it was -disadvantageous and it made things impossible for any administration. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was there persecution of the Jews in your Gau? - -SAUCKEL: No. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What about the laws concerning the Jews and the execution -of those laws? - -SAUCKEL: These Jewish laws were proclaimed in Nuremberg. There were -actually very few Jews in Thuringia. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were there no violations in connection with the -well-known events, following the murder of the Envoy Vom Rath in Paris, -which have repeatedly become the subject of discussion in this Trial? - -SAUCKEL: I cannot recollect in detail the events in Thuringia. As I told -you, there were only a few Jews in Thuringia. The Gauleiter were in -Munich at the time, and had no influence at all on that development, for -it happened during the night, when all the Gauleiter were in Munich. - -DR. SERVATIUS: My question is this: What happened in your Gau of -Thuringia, and what instructions did you give as a result? - -SAUCKEL: There may have been a few towns in Thuringia where a window was -smashed or something of that sort. I cannot tell you in detail. I cannot -even tell you where or whether there were synagogues in Thuringia. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now one question regarding your financial position. - -On the occasion of your fiftieth birthday the Führer made you a -donation. How much was it? - -SAUCKEL: On my fiftieth birthday in October 1944 I was surprised to get -a letter from the Führer through one of his adjutants. In that letter -there was a check for 250,000 marks. I told the adjutant that I could -not possibly accept it—I was very surprised. The Führer’s adjutant—it -was little Bormann, the old Bormann, not Reichsleiter Bormann—told me -that the Führer knew quite well that I had neither money nor any landed -property and that this would be a security for my children. He told me -not to hurt the Führer’s feelings. The adjutant left quickly and I sent -for Demme who was both a colleague and a friend of mine and the -president of the State Bank of Thuringia. He was unfortunately refused -as a witness as being irrelevant ... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think it is enough if we know whether he ultimately -accepted it or not. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Let us drop that question. What happened to the money? - -SAUCKEL: Through the president of the State Bank in question the money -was placed into an account in the State Bank of Thuringia. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What other income did you receive from your official -positions? - -SAUCKEL: The only income I had from my official positions was the salary -of a Reich Regent. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How much was that? - -SAUCKEL: The salary of a Reich Minister; I cannot tell you exactly what -it was. I never bothered about it. It was something like 30,000 marks. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what means have you today apart from the donation in -that bank account? - -SAUCKEL: I have not saved any money and I never had any property. - -DR. SERVATIUS: That, Mr. President, brings me to the end of those -general questions and I am now coming to the questions relating to the -Allocation of Labor. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SERVATIUS: To aid the Court I have prepared a plan showing how the -direction of labor was managed, which should help to explain how the -individual authorities co-operated and how the operation was put into -motion. - -I will concern myself mainly with the problem of meeting the demand, -that is with the question of how the labor was obtained. I shall not -concern myself much with the question of the use made of the labor and -the needs of industry. That is more a matter for Speer’s defense, which -does not quite fit in with my presentation of things. But those are -details which occurred in error because I did not go into such matters -thoroughly when the plan was being prepared. Fundamentally there are no -differences. - -If I may explain the plan briefly: At the top there is the Führer, in -red; under him is the Four Year Plan; and under that, as part of the -Four Year Plan, there is the office of Sauckel, who was Plenipotentiary -General for the Allocation of Labor and came directly under the Four -Year Plan. He received his instructions and orders from the Führer -through the Four Year Plan, or, as was the Führer’s way, from him -direct. - -Sauckel’s headquarters were at the Reich Ministry of Labor. It is the -big space outlined in yellow to the left, below Sauckel’s office which -is in brown. Sauckel only became included in the Reich Labor Ministry by -having a few offices put at his disposal. The Reich Minister of Labor -and the whole of the Labor Ministry remained. - -In the course of time Sauckel’s position became somewhat stronger, -individual departments being necessarily incorporated into his, over -which, to a certain extent, he obtained personal power; but the Reich -Ministry of Labor remained until the end. - -I should now like to explain how the “Arbeitseinsatz” was put into -operation. Owing to operations in Russia and the great losses in the -winter, there arose a need for 2 million soldiers. The Wehrmacht, OKW, -marked in green at the top next to the Führer, demands soldiers from the -industries. It is marked here in the green spaces which run downwards -below the OKW. The line then turns left downwards to the industries -which are marked as having 30 million workers. The Wehrmacht withdraws 2 -million workers but can only do so when new labor is there. It was at -that moment that Sauckel was put into office in order to obtain this -labor. - -The number of men needed was determined by the higher authorities -through the so-called “Requirements Board,” marked at the top in yellow, -which represented the highest offices: the Armaments and Production -Ministries, the Ministry of Air, Agriculture, Shipping, Traffic, and so -on. They reported their requests to the Führer and he decided what was -needed. - -Sauckel’s task was carried out as follows: Let us go back to the brown -square. On the strength of the right of the Four Year Plan to issue -orders, he applied to the space on the right where the squares are -outlined in blue. They are the highest district offices in the occupied -territories, the Reich Ministry for the Eastern Territories, that is, -Rosenberg; then come the military authorities; and as things were -handled a little differently in each country, here are the various -countries, Belgium, Northern France, Holland, _et cetera_, marked in -yellow. These agencies received the order to make labor available. Each -through its own machinery referred the order to the next agency below -and so on down to the very last, the local labor offices which are under -the district authorities, and here the workers were assigned to the -factories. That is the reserve of foreigners. Beside that there are two -other sources of labor available, the main reserve of German workers, -which is marked in blue to the left at the bottom, and the reserve of -prisoners of war. - -Sauckel had to deal with all these three agencies. I will now put -relevant questions to the witness. This is only to refresh our memories -and to check the explanation. - -I will submit other charts later. There is a list of the witnesses drawn -up according to their offices so that we know where they belong; and -later there will be another chart showing the inspection and controls -which were set up. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you will no doubt be asking the witness -whether he is familiar with the chart and whether it is correct. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have seen this chart. Is it correct? Do you -acknowledge it? - -SAUCKEL: To the best of my memory and belief it is correct, and I -acknowledge it. - -DR. SERVATIUS: On 21 March 1942 you were made Plenipotentiary General -for the Allocation of Labor. Why were you chosen for this office? - -SAUCKEL: The reason why I was chosen for this office was never known to -me and I do not know it now. Because of my engineering studies and my -occupation I took an interest in questions concerning labor systems, but -I do not know whether that was the reason. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was your appointment not made at Speer’s suggestion? - -SAUCKEL: Reichsleiter Bormann stated that in the preamble to his -official decree. I do not know the actual circumstances. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I beg to refer to Sauckel Document Number 7. It is in -Document Book 1, Page 5. - -SAUCKEL: I should like to add that this appointment came as a complete -surprise to me, I did not apply for it in any way. I never applied for -any of my offices. - -THE PRESIDENT: What number are you giving to this document? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number 7. - -THE PRESIDENT: I mean the chart. What number are you giving to the -chart? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Document 1. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see, and Document Number 7, Page 5. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. This document is a preamble added by Reichsleiter -Bormann to the decree and which shows that it was Speer who suggested -Sauckel for this position. - -Was it an entirely new office which you then entered? - -SAUCKEL: No. The Arbeitseinsatz had been directed by the Four Year Plan -before my appointment. A ministerial director, Dr. Mansfeld, held the -office then. I only learned here, during these proceedings, that the -office was already known before my time as the office of the -Plenipotentiary General. - -DR. SERVATIUS: On taking up your office did you talk to Dr. Mansfeld, -your so-called predecessor? - -SAUCKEL: I neither saw Dr. Mansfeld nor spoke to him, nor did I take -over any records from him. - -DR. SERVATIUS: To what extent was your office different from that of the -previous Plenipotentiary General? - -SAUCKEL: My office was different to this extent: The department in the -Four Year Plan was given up and was no longer used by me. I drew -departments of the Reich Labor Ministry more and more closely into this -work as they had some of the outstanding experts. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the reason for this reconstruction of the -office? - -SAUCKEL: The reason was to be found in the many conflicting interests -which had been very prominent up to the third year of the war in the -political and state offices, internal administration offices, Party -agencies and economic agencies, and which now for territorial -considerations opposed the interdistrict equalization of the labor -potential, which had become urgent. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of task did you have then? What was your sphere -of work? - -SAUCKEL: My chief sphere of work was in directing and regulating German -labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What task were you given then? - -SAUCKEL: I had to replace with suitably skilled workers those men who -had to be freed from industry for drafting into the German Wehrmacht, -that is, into the different branches of the Wehrmacht. Moreover, I also -had to obtain new labor for the new war industries which had been set up -for food production as well as for the production of armaments, of -course. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was your task definitely defined? - -SAUCKEL: It was at first in no way definitely defined. There were at -that time about 23 or 24 million workers to be directed, who were -available in the Reich but who had not yet been fully employed for war -economy. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you look on your appointment as a permanent one? - -SAUCKEL: No. I could not consider it as permanent. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Why not? - -SAUCKEL: Because in addition to me the Reich Labor Minister and his -state secretaries were in office and at the head of things; and then -there was the whole of the Labor Ministry. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What sources were at your disposal to obtain this labor? - -SAUCKEL: First, there were the workers who were already present in the -Reich from all sorts of callings who, as I have said, had not yet been -directed to war economy, not yet completely incorporated in the way that -was necessary for the conduct of the war. Then further there were the -prisoners of war as far as their labor was made available by the army -authorities. - -DR. SERVATIUS: At first then, if I have understood you correctly, proper -distribution, and a thrifty management of German labor? - -SAUCKEL: When my appointment ... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I do not understand the German language, but -it appears to me that if you would not make pauses between each word it -would make your sentences shorter; and pause at the end of the sentence. -It would be much more convenient for the interpreter. I do not know -whether I am right in that. That is what it looks like. You are pausing -between each word, and therefore it is difficult, I imagine, to get the -sense of the sentence. - -SAUCKEL: I beg your pardon, Your Lordship. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Servatius. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What did you do to carry out your task? - -SAUCKEL: I will repeat. First, as I had received no specific -instructions I understood my task to mean that I was to fill up the gaps -and deficiencies by employing labor in the most rational and economic -way. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the order you received? How many people were you -to obtain? - -SAUCKEL: That question is very difficult to answer, for I received the -necessary orders only in the course of the development of the war. Labor -and economy are fluid, intangible things. However I then received the -order that if the war were to continue for some time I was to find -replacements in the German labor sector for the Wehrmacht, whose -soldiers were the potential of peacetime economy. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You drew up a program. What was provided for in your -program? - -SAUCKEL: I drew up two programs, Doctor. At first, when I took up my -office, I drew up one program which included a _levée en masse_, so to -speak, of German women and young people, and, another, as I already -said, for the proper utilization of labor from the economic and -technical point of view. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was the program accepted? - -SAUCKEL: The program was rejected by the Führer when I submitted it to -him and, as was my duty, to the Reich economic authorities and -ministries which were interested in the employment of labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Why? - -SAUCKEL: The Führer sent for me and in a lengthy statement explained the -position of the German war production and also the economic situation. -He said that he had nothing against my program as such if he had the -time; but that in view of the situation, he could not wait for such -German women to become trained and experienced. At that time 10 million -German women were already employed who had never done industrial or -mechanical work. Further, he said that the results of such a -rationalization of working methods as I had suggested, something like a -mixture of Ford and Taylor methods ... - -DR. SERVATIUS: One moment. The interpreters cannot translate your long -sentences properly. You must make short sentences and divide your -phrases, otherwise no one can understand you and your defense will -suffer a great deal. Will you please be careful about that. - -SAUCKEL: In answer to my proposal the Führer said that he could not wait -for a rationalization of the working methods on the lines of the Taylor -and Ford systems. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what did he suggest? - -SAUCKEL: May I explain the motives which prompted the Führer’s decision. -He described the situation at that time, at the end of the winter of -1941-42. Many hundreds of German locomotives, almost all the mechanized -armed units, tanks, planes, and mechanical weapons had become useless as -a result of the catastrophe of that abnormally hard winter. - -Hundreds of thousands of German soldiers had suffered terribly from the -cold; many divisions had lost their arms and supplies. The Führer -explained to me that if the race with the enemy for new arms, new -munitions, and new dispositions of forces was not won now, the Soviets -would be as far as the Channel by the next winter. Appealing to my sense -of duty and asking me to put into it all I could, he gave me the task of -obtaining new foreign labor for employment in the German war economy. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have no scruples that this was against -international law? - -SAUCKEL: The Führer spoke to me in such detail about this question and -he explained the necessity so much as a matter of course that, after he -had withdrawn a suggestion which he had made himself, there could be no -misgivings on my part that the employment of foreign workers was against -international law. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You also negotiated with other agencies and there were -already workers within the Reich. What were you told about that? - -SAUCKEL: None of the higher authorities, either military or civilian, -expressed any misgivings. Perhaps I may add some things which the Führer -mentioned as binding upon me. On the whole, the Führer always treated me -very kindly. On this question, he became very severe and categorical and -said that in the West he had left half the French Army free and at home, -and he had released the greater part of the Belgian Army and the whole -of the Dutch Army from captivity. He told me that under certain -circumstances he would have to recall these prisoners of war for -military reasons, but that in the interests of the whole of Europe and -the Occident, so he expressed himself, only a united Europe, where labor -was properly allocated, could hold out in the fight against Bolshevism. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you know the terms of the Hague land warfare -regulations? - -SAUCKEL: During the first World War I myself was taken prisoner as a -sailor. I knew what was required and what was laid down with regard to -the treatment and protection of prisoners of war and prisoners -generally. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did foreign authorities—I am thinking of the -French—ever raise the objection that what you planned with your -Arbeitseinsatz was an infringement of the Hague land warfare -regulations? - -SAUCKEL: No. In France, on questions of the Arbeitseinsatz, I only -negotiated with the French Government through the military commander and -under the presidency of the German Ambassador in Paris. I was convinced -that as far as the employment of labor in France was concerned, -agreements should be made with a proper French Government. I negotiated -in a similar manner with the General Secretary in Belgium. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Now a large part—about a third—of the foreign workers -were so-called Eastern Workers. What were you told about them? - -SAUCKEL: With regard to the employment of workers from the East I was -told that Russia had not joined the Geneva Convention, and so Germany -for her part was not bound by it. And I was further told that in the -Baltic countries and in other regions, Soviet Russia had also claimed -workers or people, and that in addition about 3 million Chinese were -working in Soviet Russia. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what about Poland? - -SAUCKEL: As regards Poland I had been told, just as in the case of other -countries, that it was a case of total capitulation, and that on the -grounds of this capitulation Germany was justified in introducing German -regulations. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you consider the employment of foreign labor -justifiable from the general point of view? - -SAUCKEL: On account of the necessities which I have mentioned, I -considered the employment of foreign workers justifiable according to -the principles which I enforced and advocated and to which I also -adhered in my field of work. I was, after all, a German and I could feel -only as a German. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Herr Sauckel, you must formulate your sentences -differently, the interpreters cannot translate them. You must not insert -one sentence into another. - -So you considered it justifiable, in view of the principles you wished -to apply and, which as you said, you enforced in your field of work? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you also think of the hardships imposed on the -workers and their families through this employment? - -SAUCKEL: I knew from my own life even if one goes to foreign countries -voluntarily, a separation is very sad and heartbreaking and it is very -hard for members of a family to be separated from each other. But I also -thought of the German families, of the German soldiers, and of the -hundreds of thousands of German workers who also had to go away from -home. - -DR. SERVATIUS: The suggestion has been made that the work could have -been carried out in the occupied territories themselves, and it would -not then have been necessary to fetch the workers away. Why was that not -done? - -SAUCKEL: That is, at first sight, an attractive suggestion. If it had -been possible, I would willingly have carried out the suggestion which -was made by Funk and other authorities, and later even by Speer. It -would have made my life and work much simpler. On the other hand, there -were large departments in this system which had to provide for and -maintain the different branches of German economy and supply them with -orders. As the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor I -could not have German fields, German farming, German mass-production -with the most modern machinery transferred to foreign territories—I had -no authority for that—and those offices insisted that I should find -replacements for the agricultural and industrial workers and the -artisans whose places had become vacant in German agriculture or -industry because the men had been called to the colors. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You said before that the manner in which you had planned -the employment of workers was such that it could have been approved. -What then were your leading principles in carrying out your scheme for -the employment of labor? - -SAUCKEL: When the Führer described the situation so drastically, and -ordered me to bring foreign workers to Germany, I clearly recognized the -difficulties of the task and I asked him to agree to the only way by -which I considered it possible to do this, for I had been a worker too. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was not your principal consideration the economic -exploitation of these foreign workers? - -SAUCKEL: The Arbeitseinsatz has nothing to do with exploitation. It is -an economic process for supplying labor. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You said repeatedly in your speeches and on other -occasions that the important thing was to make the best possible -economic use of these workers. You speak of a machine which must be -properly handled. Did you want to express thereby the thought of -economic exploitation? - -SAUCKEL: At all times a regime of no matter what nature, can only be -successful in the production of goods if it uses labor economically—not -too much and not too little. That alone I consider economically -justifiable. - -DR. SERVATIUS: It was stated here in a document which was submitted, the -French Document RF-22, a government report, that the intention existed -to bring about a demographic deterioration, and in other government -reports mention is made that one of the aims was the biological -destruction of other peoples. What do you say about that? - -SAUCKEL: I can say most definitely that biological destruction was never -mentioned to me. I was only too happy when I had workers. I suspected -that the war would last longer than was expected, and the demands upon -my office were so urgent and so great that I was glad for people to be -alive, not for them to be destroyed. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the general attitude toward the question of -foreign workers before you took office? What did you find when you came? - -SAUCKEL: There was a controversy when I took up my office. There were -about two million foreign workers in Germany from neutral and allied -states and occupied territories of the East and the West. They had been -brought to the Reich without order or system. Many industrial concerns -avoided contacting the labor authorities or found them troublesome and -bureaucratic. The conflict of interests, as I said before, was very -great. The Police point of view was most predominating, I think. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And propaganda? What was the propaganda with regard to -Eastern Workers, for example? - -SAUCKEL: Propaganda was adapted to the war in the East. I may point out -now—you interrupted me before when I was speaking of the order given me -by the Führer—that I expressly asked the Führer not to let workers -working in Germany be treated as enemies any longer, and I tried to -influence propaganda to that effect. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What else did you do with regard to the situation which -confronted you? - -SAUCKEL: I finally received approval from the Führer for my second -program. That program has been submitted here as a document. I must and -will bear responsibility for that program. - -DR. SERVATIUS: It has already been submitted as Document 016-PS. It is -the Program for the Allocation of Labor of 20 April 1942, Exhibit -USA-168. - -In this program you made fundamental statements. I will hand it to you -and I ask you to comment on the general questions only, not on the -individual points. - -There is a paragraph added to the last part, “Prisoners of War and -Foreign Workers.” Have you found the paragraph? - -SAUCKEL: Yes. - -DR. SERVATIUS: If you will look at the third paragraph you will find -what you want to explain. - -SAUCKEL: I should like to say that I drew up and worked out this program -independently in 1942 after I had been given that difficult task by the -Führer. It was absolutely clear to me what the conditions would have to -be if foreign workers were to be employed in Germany at all. I wrote -those sentences at that time and the program went to all the German -authorities which had to deal with the matter. I quote: - - “All these people must be fed, housed, and treated in such a way - that with the least possible effort”—here I refer to economics - as conceived by Taylor and Ford, whom I have studied - closely—“the greatest possible results will be achieved. It has - always been a matter of course for us Germans to treat a - conquered enemy correctly and humanely, even if he were our most - cruel and irreconcilable foe, and to abstain from all cruelty - and petty chicanery when expecting useful service from him.” - -DR. SERVATIUS: Will you put the document aside now, please. What -authority did you have to carry out your task? - -SAUCKEL: I had authority from the Four Year Plan to issue instructions. -I had at my disposal—not under me, but at my disposal—Sections 3 and 5 -of the Reich Labor Ministry. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What departments did they represent? - -SAUCKEL: The departments, “Employment of Labor” and “Wages.” - -DR. SERVATIUS: Could you issue directives and orders? - -SAUCKEL: I could issue directives and orders of a departmental nature to -those offices. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Could you carry on negotiations with foreign countries -independently? - -SAUCKEL: I could carry on negotiations with foreign countries only -through the Foreign Office or, when I had received permission, with the -ambassadors or ministers in question. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Could you give your orders independently or was agreement -and consultation necessary? - -SAUCKEL: My field of work, as in every large branch of an -administration, made it absolutely necessary for me to discuss the -questions and have consultations about them with neighboring -departments. I was obliged to do so according to instructions. - -DR. SERVATIUS: With whom did you have to consult, apart from the Four -Year Plan under which you were placed? - -SAUCKEL: I had first of all to consult the departments themselves from -which I received the orders, and in addition the Party Chancellery, the -office of Reich Minister Lammers—the Reich Chancellery, the Reich -Railways, the Reich Food Ministry, the Reich Defense Ministry. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did things go smoothly, or were there difficulties? - -SAUCKEL: There were always great difficulties. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any dealings with Himmler? - -SAUCKEL: I had dealings with Himmler only insofar as he gave -instructions. He was Reich Minister and was responsible for security, as -he said. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was not that a question which was very important for you -in regard to the treatment of workers? - -SAUCKEL: During the first months or in the first weeks, I believe, of my -appointment I was called to see Heydrich. In a very precise way, -Heydrich told me that he considered my program fantastic, such as it had -been approved by the Führer, and that I must realize that I was making -his work very difficult in demanding that barbed wire and similar fences -should not and must not be put around the labor camps, but rather taken -down. He then said curtly that I must realize that if it was I who was -responsible for the allocation of labor, it was he who was responsible -for security. That is what he told me. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you accept the fact that these strict police measures -now existed? - -SAUCKEL: Through constant efforts I had these police measures gradually -reduced as far as they concerned the workers who were employed in -Germany through my agency and my office. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What did your authority to issue instructions consist of? -Could you issue orders or had you to negotiate, and how was this carried -out in practice? - -SAUCKEL: The authority I had to issue instructions was doubtful from the -beginning because, owing to the necessities of war, the lack of -manpower, and so on, I was forbidden to establish any office of my own -or any other new office or organization. I could only pass on -instructions after negotiation with the supreme authorities of the Reich -and after detailed consultation. These instructions were, of course, of -a purely departmental nature. I could not interfere in matters of -administration. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How was this right to issue instructions exercised with -regard to the high authorities in the occupied territories? - -SAUCKEL: It was exactly the same, merely of a departmental nature. In -practice it was the passing on of the Führer’s orders which were to be -carried out there through the individual machinery of each separate -administration. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Could you give binding instructions to military -authorities, to the Economic Inspectorate East, for example? - -SAUCKEL: No, there was a strict order from the Führer that in the Army -areas, the operational areas of the Commanders-in-Chief, the latter only -were competent, and when they had examined military conditions and the -situation, everything had to be regulated according to the needs of -these high military commands. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did that apply to the military commander in France, or -could you act directly there? - -SAUCKEL: In France I could, of course, proceed only in the same way, by -informing the military commander of the instructions which I myself had -received. He then prepared for discussions with the German Embassy and -the French Government, so that with the Ambassador presiding, and the -military commander taking an authoritative part, the discussion with the -French Government took place. - -DR. SERVATIUS: And what happened as far as the Ministry for the Occupied -Eastern Territories was concerned? - -SAUCKEL: In the case of that Ministry I had to transmit my orders to the -Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and had to consult -with him. With Reich Minister Rosenberg we always succeeded in arranging -matters between ourselves in a way that we considered right. But in the -Ukraine there was the Reich Commissioner who was on very intimate terms -himself with headquarters, and, as is generally known, he was very -independent and acted accordingly by asserting this independence. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How did these authorities in the occupied territories -take your activities at first? - -SAUCKEL: In the occupied territories there was naturally much opposition -at the start of my work, because I brought new orders and new -requirements and it was not always easy to reconcile conflicting -interests. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was there any apprehension that you would intervene in -the administration of the territories? - -SAUCKEL: From my own conviction I refrained entirely from any such -intervention and I always emphasized that in order to dispel any such -apprehensions, since I myself was not the administrator there; but there -were many selfish interests at work. - -DR. SERVATIUS: We will discuss this on another occasion. Now I should -like to ask you: You had deputies for the Arbeitseinsatz—when did you -obtain them? - -SAUCKEL: I was given these deputies for the occupied territories through -a personal decree of the Führer on 30 September 1942, as far as I -remember. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the reason? - -SAUCKEL: The reason for appointing these deputies was to do away more -easily with the difficulties and the lack of direction which prevailed -to some extent in these areas. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I refer in this connection to Document 12, “The Führer’s -Decree Concerning the Execution of the Decree of the Plenipotentiary -General for the Allocation of Labor.” No, it is Document 13. “Decree -Concerning the Appointment of Deputies”—on Page 13 of the English -document book, and I also refer to Document 12 which has already been -submitted as 1903-PS, Exhibit USA-206. - -Did you not have two different kinds of deputies, I mean, were there -already some deputies previously? - -SAUCKEL: There were previously deputies of the Reich Labor Ministry who -in allied or neutral countries were assigned to the German diplomatic -missions. They must be distinguished from those deputies who were -assigned to the chiefs of the German military or civilian administration -in the occupied territories. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What position did the deputies hold in the occupied -territories? - -SAUCKEL: In the occupied territories the deputies had a dual position. -They were the leaders of the labor sections in the local government -there—a considerable burden for me—and at the same time my deputies -who were responsible for the uniform direction and execution of the -principles of the allocation of labor as laid down by me. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have your own organization with the deputy at the -head, or was that an organization of the local government? - -SAUCKEL: I did not have any organization of my own. The local -governments were independent separate administrations with an -administrative chief as head to whom the various departments were -subordinated. - -DR. SERVATIUS: How many such deputies were there in one area? - -SAUCKEL: In the various countries I had one deputy in each of the -highest offices. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the task of the deputy? - -SAUCKEL: The task of the deputy, as I have already said, was to -guarantee that German orders were carried out in a legal way and, as -member of the local administration, to regulate labor questions which -arose there. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What tasks did they have as regards the interest of the -Reich and the distribution of labor for local employment and in the -Reich? - -SAUCKEL: It was expressly pointed out that they were to produce labor in -reasonable proportions with consideration for local conditions; they -also had to see to it that my principles were observed with respect to -the treatment, feeding, and so forth of workers from the occupied zones. -That is laid down in the form of a directive. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not have your own recruiting commissions? - -SAUCKEL: There were no recruiting commissions in the sense in which the -expression is often used here and in our own documents. It was a -question of reinforcements of experts which were requested by the local -government, in order to carry out the tasks in the countries concerned. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions did these recruiting commissions have? - -SAUCKEL: They received the instructions which are frequently and clearly -expressed in my orders and which, as they have been laid down, I need -not mention. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I refer here to Document 15 which has already been -submitted as 3044-PS; Exhibit Number USA-206, and also USSR-384. - -That is the Order Number 4 of 7 May 1942, which settles in principle all -the problems relating to this question, and gives the necessary -directives to the deputies regarding recruitment. - -Were those directives which you issued always adhered to? - -SAUCKEL: The directives I issued were not always adhered to as strictly -as I had demanded. I made every effort to impose them through constant -orders, instructions, and punishment which, however, I myself could not -inflict. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Were these orders meant seriously? The French Prosecution -has submitted in the government report one of your speeches, which you -made at that time in Posen. It was termed a speech of apology. I ask you -whether these principles were meant seriously or whether they were only -for the sake of appearances, since you yourself believed, as the -document stated, that they could not be carried out? - -SAUCKEL: I can only emphasize that in my life I had worked so much -myself under such difficult conditions that these instructions expressed -my full conviction as to their necessity. I ask to have witnesses heard -as to what I thought about it and what I did in order to have these -instructions carried out. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Was there any noticeable opposition to your principles? - -SAUCKEL: I have already said that to a certain extent my principles were -considered troublesome by some authorities and injudicious as far as -German security was concerned. - -When I was attacked on that account, I took occasion, in addition to a -number of instructions to the German Gauleiter, to issue a manifesto to -all the highest German government offices concerned. - -DR. SERVATIUS: May I remark that this is Document S-84, in Document Book -3, Page 215. - -I submit the document once more in German because of the form in which -it is printed. It is in the form of an urgent warning and was sent to -all the authorities. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it Document Number 84? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -Witness, did you, in a meeting of the Central Planning Board ... - -SAUCKEL: May I be allowed to say a word with regard to this manifesto? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. - -SAUCKEL: When I issued the manifesto, I was met with the objection, -mainly from Dr. Goebbels, that a manifesto should really be issued only -by the Führer and not by a subordinate authority such as myself. Then I -found that I was having difficulties in getting the manifesto printed. -After I had had 150,000 copies printed for all the German economic -offices, for all the works managers and all the other offices which were -interested, I had it printed again myself in this emphatic form and -personally sent it once more, with a covering letter, to all those -offices. - -In this manifesto, in spite of the difficulties which I encountered, I -especially advocated that in the occupied territories themselves the -workers should be treated in accordance with my principles and according -to my directives and orders. - -I respectfully ask the Court to be allowed to read a few sentences from -it: - - “I therefore order that for all the occupied territories, for - the treatment, feeding, billeting, and payment of foreign - workers, appropriate regulations and directives be issued - similar to those valid for foreigners in the Reich. They are to - be adjusted to the respective local conditions and applied in - accordance with prevailing conditions. - - “In a number of the Eastern Territories indigenous male and - female civilian labor working for the German war industry or the - German Wehrmacht is undernourished. In the urgent interests of - the German war industry in this territory this condition should - be remedied. It is checking production and is dangerous. And - endeavor must therefore be made by all means available to - provide additional food for these workers and their families. - This additional food must be given only in accordance with the - output of work. - - “It is only through the good care and treatment of the whole of - the available European labor on the one hand, and through its - most rigid concentration”—here I mean - organizational—“leadership and direction on the other hand, - that the fluctuation of labor in the Reich and in the occupied - territories can be limited to a minimum, and a generally stable, - lasting and reliable output be achieved.” - -May I read one more sentence: - - “The foreign workers in the Reich and the population in the - occupied territories who are being employed for the German war - effort must be given the feeling that it is to their own - interests to work loyally for Germany and that therein alone - will they see and actually find their one real guarantee of - life.” - -May I read still one sentence in the next paragraph: - - “They must be given absolute trust in the justness of the German - authorities and of their German employers.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better not go further in this document. -Can you indicate to us at all how long you are likely to be with this -defendant? - -DR. SERVATIUS: I shall probably need the whole day tomorrow. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, would it be convenient for you some time to -deal with the documents of the remaining defendants? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Mr. President, any time that you might set aside. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know how far the negotiations and agreements -with reference to documents have gone. - -MR. DODD: I do with some, but not with all. I can ascertain the facts -tonight, or before the morning session, and advise you at that time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and you will let us know tomorrow what time will be -convenient? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; -however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus -“Defence”. 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