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| author | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-01-22 09:15:18 -0800 |
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| committer | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-01-22 09:15:18 -0800 |
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margin:0 0; } + .literal { display:inline-block; text-align:left; } + </style> + <style type="text/css"> + h1 {font-size:1.2em; text-align:center; line-height:150%; margin-top:4em; word-spacing:.2em;} + h2 {font-size:1.2em; text-align:center; word-spacing:.2em;} + h3 {font-size:.9em; text-align:center; margin-bottom:1em; margin-top:1em;} + .literal-container { margin-top:.5em; margin-bottom:.5em } + div.lgc { margin-top:.5em; margin-bottom:.5em } + p { text-indent:0; margin-top:0.5em; margin-bottom:0.5em; text-align: justify; } + div.blockquote { margin-top:.5em; margin-bottom:.5em; } + .pindent {margin-top: 0.2em; margin-bottom: 0em; text-indent:2em; } + body { margin-left:8%; margin-right:10%; max-width:40em;} + </style> + </head> + <body> +<p style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 14, by Various</p> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> + +<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 14</p> +<p style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:0; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1em;'>Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946</p> + <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Various</p> +<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: December 24, 2021 [eBook #67006]</p> +<p style='display:block; text-indent:0; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</p> + <p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em; text-align:left'>Produced by: John Routh PM, Cindy Beyer, and the online Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net</p> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOLUME 14 ***</div> +<div class='figcenter' style='width:80%'> +<img src='images/cover.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0000' style='width:100%;height:auto;'/> +</div> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div class='lgc' style=''> <!-- rend=';' --> +<p class='line' style='margin-top:2em;font-size:1.5em;'>TRIAL</p> +<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;margin-bottom:.2em;font-size:.7em;'>OF</p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:1.5em;'>THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'>BEFORE</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>THE INTERNATIONAL</p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>MILITARY TRIBUNAL</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>NUREMBERG</span></p> +<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:.7em;'>14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<div class='figcenter'> +<img src='images/title.jpg' alt='' id='iid-0001' style='width:80px;height:auto;'/> +</div> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='margin-top:4em;font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY</span></p> +<p class='line' style='margin-top:.2em;font-size:.7em;'><span class='gesp'>1948</span></p> +</div> <!-- end rend --> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div class='literal-container' style='margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:20em;'><div class='literal'> <!-- rend=';fs:.8em;' --> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>This volume is published in accordance with the</p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>direction of the International Military Tribunal by</p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction</p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.</p> +</div></div> <!-- end rend --> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div class='lgc' style='margin-top:8em;margin-bottom:4em;'> <!-- rend=';' --> +<p class='line'>VOLUME XIV</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'><span class='gesp'>OFFICIAL TEXT</span></p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'><span class='gesp'>IN THE</span></p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'>ENGLISH LANGUAGE</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<hr class='tbk100'/> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:1.2em;'><span class='gesp'>PROCEEDINGS</span></p> +<p class='line'> </p> +<p class='line' style='font-size:.8em;'>16 May 1946—28 May 1946</p> +</div> <!-- end rend --> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<table id='tab1' summary='' class='center'> +<colgroup> +<col span='1' style='width: 6em;'/> +<col span='1' style='width: 22.5em;'/> +<col span='1' style='width: 2.5em;'/> +</colgroup> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col2 tdStyle0' colspan='2'><span style='font-size:larger'>CONTENTS</span></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'></td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-first Day, Thursday, 16 May 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_1'>1</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_32'>32</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-second Day, Friday, 17 May 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_63'>63</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_82'>82</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-third Day, Saturday, 18 May 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_107'>107</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-fourth Day, Monday, 20 May 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_143'>143</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_181'>181</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-fifth Day, Tuesday, 21 May 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_228'>228</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_261'>261</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-sixth Day, Wednesday, 22 May 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_287'>287</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_320'>320</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-seventh Day, Thursday, 23 May 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_357'>357</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_386'>386</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-eighth Day, Friday, 24 May 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_418'>418</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_450'>450</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Day, Monday, 27 May 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_494'>494</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_533'>533</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'> </td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'> </td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tab1c1-col3 tdStyle2' colspan='3'>One Hundred and Fortieth Day, Tuesday, 28 May 1946,</td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Morning Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_567'>567</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class='tab1c1 tdStyle2'></td><td class='tab1c2 tdStyle3'>Afternoon Session</td><td class='tab1c3 tdStyle1'><a href='#Page_601'>601</a></td></tr> +</table> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='1' id='Page_1'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST DAY</span><br/> Thursday, 16 May 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL (Col. Charles W. Mays): If it please the Tribunal, +the Defendants Sauckel and Von Papen are absent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Admiral, +yesterday we finished with the somewhat involved Document +C-32, and we had got as far as Point 11. We now come to Point 12, +“Ammunition stocks in excess of the armament permissible.” May +I remind the Tribunal that this is Document C-32, Exhibit USA-50, +in Document Book 10 a, Page 8, Point 12, which contains three +columns.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Defendant, may I ask what you have to say to the accusation +that you exceeded the permissible amount of ammunition?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>ERICH RAEDER (Defendant): Certain ammunition stocks were +in excess of the permissible amount and some were below it. +I cannot tell you at this date what the reason was in each particular +case. I assume that this depended to a considerable extent on the +amounts left over from the last World War.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the case of the first two items, the 17- and 15-centimeter +shells, the actual stocks rather exceeded the quantity permitted, +whereas the third item, the 10.5-centimeter, falls very far short of +it—instead of 134,000 there were 87,000. In the case of the 8.8-centimeter +shells there was an excess, then again a deficit, and the same +thing applies to the last item. But they are all very insignificant +amounts.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the copy before the Tribunal there appears +to be a note in the third column—on the next page in yours, +Defendant—saying that quantities of ammunition are partly manufactured +and partly in course of delivery, and that the total amount +permissible will soon be exceeded.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I only wanted to ask you: The list was made out in September +1933. Then are the figures stated correct for September 1933 or +autumn 1933?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not quite understand you. +<span class='pageno' title='2' id='Page_2'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If it says in this document that measures to be +taken later will bring the totals above the quantities permissible, +which—according to this statement—they had not yet reached, then +that is calculated as from autumn 1933.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That may be assumed, yes. Because new ammunition +as well as new guns were being manufactured, and old ammunition +then had to be scrapped.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It also must be noted that ammunition for heavy artillery, which +is not listed here, was in every case short of the permissible +amount. A comparatively large amount of heavy artillery ammunition +had been granted us for heavy coastal guns, and we had by +no means as much as we were allowed to have.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: For the assistance of the Tribunal, I may point +out that this last point is proved by the actual documents in the +hands of the Tribunal. In the Tribunal’s copy under the Figure 12, +Column 2, just beside the separate figures, there is a sentence which +says, “... that the whole quantity permitted for heavy artillery +has not been reached.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We now come to Number 13: “Exceeding the permissible stocks +of machine guns, rifles, pistols, and gas masks.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Here, too, it must be admitted that in isolated cases +stocks were a little higher than permitted. There were, for instance, +43,000 gas masks instead of the 22,500 permitted. Large numbers of +rifles and machine guns were taken away even by individuals after +the World War to farms, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. They were later collected, and +for that reason there was a comparatively large stock of them. +But we are not dealing here with any considerable quantities. +Similarly ammunition, bayonets, hand grenades, searchlights, fog +equipment, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, also exceeded the prescribed limits but not +to any great extent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, Figure 14: “Obtaining 337 M.G. C/30’s +without scrapping equally serviceable weapons.” As I did not ...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Surely, +Dr. Siemers, it would be possible to deal with all these various +points in the documents in one statement as to why there were +these excesses. We have a statement here which contains 30 different +items, and you have only got as far as 13, and you are dealing +with each one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, personally I agree entirely. I am +sorry that I caused the Tribunal so much trouble in connection with +this document. As I am not a naval expert, I had a great deal of +trouble finding my way through it; but I do not think that I was +the cause of the trouble. The Prosecution, you see, have made use +of the single points in evidence. +<span class='pageno' title='3' id='Page_3'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the question is—I am not +blaming you, but we want to get on. We are not blaming you. Can’t +it be done in one explanatory statement, one short statement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I will try, Mr. President, and I will shorten it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There is no need to say anything more about Numbers 15 to 17. +I think these were the most important points. The points planned +for a later date were not to be effective until the years ’33 and ’34. +I may perhaps just point out to the Tribunal that Number 17 refers +to the intended construction of reserve destroyers. The Versailles +Treaty permitted the construction of these.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I pass over Number 18 because we have already dealt with that. +Number 19, again, refers only to intended construction. Number 20 +I may consider irrelevant; it concerns only the arming of fishing +vessels. Numbers 21 to 29 ...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think, perhaps, you should ask the Defendant +to explain some of these observations in the third column. +I mean in Number 18, for instance: “Difficult to detect. If necessary +can be denied.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: These were explanations given to our League of +Nations representative at the Disarmament Conference by the +competent expert. It does not refer to local conditions. Construction +of submarine spare parts, for instance, took place abroad or +was to be prepared. It was actually carried out in 1934 and ’35, and +the first submarine was launched at the end of June 1935.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I may take it, Defendant, that only the construction +and purchase of submarines was prohibited.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, the construction in Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I cannot prove until a later stage that no violation +of the Treaty was involved by the construction of these spare +parts; but I think you will have to give some indication of your +reason for wishing to conceal it, in view of the fact that spare parts +were not forbidden. I may remind you that this took place in +September 1933 at a time when negotiations had already been +planned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that period, before the German-English Naval +Agreement was concluded on the basis of 35 to 100, Hitler was +particularly eager to avoid everything which might embarrass the +negotiations in any way. The construction and preparation of submarine +parts came under this heading as being a subject on which +England was peculiarly sensitive.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an additional reason for this +appendix and other remarks in this second column—namely, the +unfortunate experiences which the Navy had caused in home +<span class='pageno' title='4' id='Page_4'></span> +politics, the fact that whenever the slightest action was taken a +quarrel immediately ensued on the home political front?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; and that went so far that the Reichswehrminister +was attacked on occasions by Prussian ministers who disagreed +with the Reich Government—for instance, Müller, Severing, +Stresemann and later Brüning, who alleged to the Reich Chancellor +that he took steps which he was not authorized to take. In reality, +however, the Reich Government itself had sanctioned these things +already and had accepted the responsibility for them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So these things were kept secret for reasons of +home policy, so that they should not be apparent...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: With the approval of the Reich Government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: With the approval of the Reich Government. As +regards the firms, a number of firms...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I would prefer now to refer back to Column 2, +Number 20, as I see from the record that the Prosecution have also +expressly raised this point in connection with the arming of fishing +craft, emphasized it, and made it the basis of a charge, “Warning +shots, play it down.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The two fishing boats were quite small vessels and +were normally unarmed. They served to supervise the fishing boats +in the North Sea right up to Iceland, to help them in case of +emergency, to take sick men aboard and to afford protection against +fishermen of other nations. We thought it advisable to mount at +least a 5-centimeter gun on these ships since they were actually +warships. “Warning shots” means that they fired a salute when +they wanted to draw the fishermen’s attention to something; so it +was quite an insignificant affair and had no need to be artificially +reduced to a bagatelle but was in fact a bagatelle.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Numbers 21 to 28. This is a +list of various firms, including industrial firms working on armament +contracts. The Versailles Treaty admitted certain firms for +this type of work while it excluded others. In actual fact, other +firms had received contracts. Perhaps you can make a general +statement on this point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: This was at a time when we had strong hopes that +progress would be made at the Disarmament Conference. The +Macdonald Plan, which brought about a certain improvement, had +already been accepted; and we might have expected, in consequence, +that the few factories still left to us would have to increase their +output during the next few years. I may refer you to the shipping +replacement scheme. Consequently, factories producing specialized +<span class='pageno' title='5' id='Page_5'></span> +articles were better equipped and supplied. There was, however, +never any question of heavy guns or anything of that kind but of +automatic fuse-igniters, explosives—for instance, mine containers, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>, small items but special items which could be made only +by certain firms. But, apart from the firms admitted, other firms +which had been excluded were also employed. Thus, for instance, +the Friedrich Krupp Grusenwerke A.G. at Magdeburg, Number 25, +was equipped to manufacture antiaircraft guns and antiaircraft +barrels from 2-centimeters to 10.5-centimeters; similarly Number 26, +a firm manufacturing antiaircraft ammunition, explosives; Number +27...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I do not think we need the details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. And then engines for which there was also a +great demand.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have some questions which apply to all these +figures. Is this not offset to a certain extent by the fact that +some of the firms admitted had already dropped out for economic +reasons?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, you can certainly say that. These firms had +comparatively few deliveries which were not sufficient to keep +them going.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Defendant, I think one not only can—I think one +must—say so. May I draw your attention to Point 22, Column 3, +which reads, “The list in any case is out of date, as some firms have +dropped out.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That leaves us with Numbers 29 and 30. Number +29, “Preparations in the field of experiments with motorboats.” +I think that these were preparations in a very small field.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At the moment I cannot tell you exactly what this +means.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I do not believe in any case that the Prosecution +will attach any importance to it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then I only want you to make a final statement on Number 30, +“Probable further concrete violations becoming necessary in the +near future” up to 1934 inclusively. To all intents and purposes +you have already answered the question by your reference to the +negotiations planned with the British Government, some of which +were already in progress.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that was the point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: These are matters, therefore, which were in any +case due to be discussed in the course of the negotiations with the +British Government, or rather the Admiralty. +<span class='pageno' title='6' id='Page_6'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: You cannot say that of them all. For instance, +Points 1 to 3 deal with mines. The number of mines was to be +increased and modern material was to replace the old. It goes on +in the same way with the transfer of guns from the North Sea to +the Baltic “A” batteries, not with the scrapping of guns.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: To conclude the whole matter, may I ask you +to say what impression the whole thing made on a naval expert +like yourself. All things considered, would you say that these are +minor violations, and how far are these violations of an aggressive +nature?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As I said yesterday, most of them are very inadequate +improvements in defense of an almost entirely defenseless position. +The separate items, as I explained yesterday, are so insignificant +that it is really impossible to spend very much time on them. I +believe that the Control Commission also had the impression that +very little weight need be attached to all these matters; for in 1925 +when the Control Commission left its station at Kiel where it had +worked with the organizations of the Naval Command, Commander +Fenshow, Admiral Charlton’s chief of staff and head of the Commission, +whose main interest was guns and who had worked with +a Captain Raenkel, a gunner and a specialist in these matters, said:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“We must leave now, and you are glad that we are going. +You did not have a pleasant task, and neither did we. I must +tell you one thing. You need not think that we believed what +you have said. You did not say a single word of truth, but +you have given your information so skillfully that we were +able to accept it, and for that I am grateful to you.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-29, which is Exhibit +USA-46. Mr. President, it is in Raeder’s Document Book 10, Page 8 +of the Prosecution’s document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean 10a?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Number 10, Page 8. This document, too, was +submitted during the general Indictment made by the Prosecution +at the beginning of the Trial on 27 November. It consists of a +speech, a document signed by Raeder, dated 31 January 1933, +“General Directives for the Support of the German Armaments +Industry by the Navy.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution pointed this out; +and they have thought fit to conclude from it that on the day after +Hitler’s nomination as Chancellor of the Reich, you were already +acting positively in his support through this letter. Will you define +your attitude, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: There is no connection whatsoever between this letter +and Hitler’s accession to power. You must admit that it would be +<span class='pageno' title='7' id='Page_7'></span> +impossible to compile so long and complicated a document—which +was, after all, carefully prepared—between the evening of 30 and +the morning of 31 January. This document results from the hope, +which I mentioned before, that already under the Papen and Von +Schleicher Government the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and +the Disarmament Conference might be gradually relaxed, since the +British Delegation had repeatedly said that they favored the gradual +restoration of equal rights. We had, therefore, to get our industries +into the best possible condition, as far as the manufacture of armaments +was concerned, by increasing their output and enabling them +to overcome competition.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As I say in Paragraph c of this letter, almost every country was +at that time making efforts in the same direction, even those which, +unlike Germany, had no restrictions imposed on them. Great Britain, +France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy made the +most determined efforts to gain markets for their armaments +industry; and I wanted to follow them in this particular sphere. In +order to do this, there had to be an understanding between the +various departments of the Naval Command Staff to the effect +that industry must be given support in a way which avoided +the secrecy of technical matters and developments to too petty a +degree. That is why I explain in Paragraph c that secrecy in small +matters is less important than maintaining a high standard and +keeping the lead.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I state in the final sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“To sum up, I attach particular importance to the continued +support of the industry in question by the Navy, even after +the expected relaxation of the present restrictions, so that +the industry would command confidence abroad and would +find a market.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>This has nothing at all to do with Hitler nor with any independent +rearmament on my own behalf.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us when, approximately, you drafted +these directives?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: During the month of January. I may say that we had +a conference—perhaps at the beginning of January—and after that +I had it put in writing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That would be certainly 2 to 3 weeks before this +letter was written?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think it happens rarely that one receives a +letter from a government office one day after its being conceived +by the head of that office. +<span class='pageno' title='8' id='Page_8'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I ask you now to tell me one thing more in connection +with the “relaxation of the present restrictions.” That means the +relaxation of the Versailles Treaty, I presume, through the Disarmament +Conference. You have mentioned that four times in this +document, so that I assume that was your basis.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it was. The whole atmosphere at that time, +under both the governments I mentioned, was such that one could +expect an improvement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And this was the basis for which, to quote a +few names only, Stresemann, Brüning, fought.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As they felt it their duty to take certain advance +precautions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think there is no need for me to go into further +details. I have read this document again and again, and have been +unable to find any point on which the Prosecution could base the +conclusion that you had National Socialist ideas.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I now come to Document C-140. It is Exhibit USA-51, and is +in the Document Book 10a, Page 104.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I interrupt you, please? Would it not be appropriate +that I should say now what I wanted to say to supplement +the statement in C-156 regarding aircraft?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It might be practicable to finish with +the infringements of the Versailles Treaty before going on to +another subject. I had forgotten that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have submitted Document C-156. It is Captain +Schüssler’s book from the year 1937 and contains almost the same +list of infringements as Document C-32, so that that document +can be disposed of at the same time. In addition, it deals with +the case of the designing office for submarines in Holland, with +which we have already dealt. But there is still one point on which +I should like to have your comments, and that concerns certain +preparations in connection with navy aircraft which might be +permitted later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: All sorts of preparations had been made in the field +of aviation long before I came into office. A number of aircraft +had been purchased, as I see from this book. They were stored +with a firm called “Severa G.m.b.H.,” which was known to the +Reichswehrminister. The Versailles Treaty had permitted us antiaircraft +guns both on ships and on the coast, as was mentioned +yesterday; and for these antiaircraft, firing practice had to be +arranged. The Control Commission had allowed us a certain number +<span class='pageno' title='9' id='Page_9'></span> +of aircraft to tow the necessary targets. These aircraft were flown +by ex-naval pilots employed by this company. The company, in +turn, was managed by an old naval pilot.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Since we were not allowed to train naval pilots or were not +allowed to have any naval air force, we gave a year’s training in +the civil aviation school to a number of prospective naval officers +before they joined the Navy, so that through this 1-year training +they developed into very good pilots. Then they joined the Navy +and went through their ordinary naval training. The aircraft purchased +in this way was temporarily in the possession of the “Severa,” +which also had a good deal to do with the Lohmann affairs and +for that reason was dissolved by Reichswehrminister Gröner in the +summer of 1928. Reichswehrminister Gröner established a new +company with similar assignments in the autumn of 1928, soon +after I assumed office. But he had signed the agreement himself +in order to control the correct management of the whole affair.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this company, in addition to their ordinary work, the Navy +pilots carried out experiments in connection with the development +of aircraft for a later Navy air force. We had the Government’s +permission to manufacture a model of every type likely to be of +use, but we were not allowed to accumulate aircraft. The Government +had expressly forbidden that. The result was that in the +course of years the company developed a number of aircraft types +which would be useful at a later date when we were once more +allowed to have aircraft.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the early period exercises in the Navy were carried out by +the old naval pilots—that is to say, it was demanded that exercises +in observation be taken and that the crews of ships learn how +to act against aircraft. When these young naval pilots were assigned +to such exercises, they were discharged from the Navy for that +time. It was an awkward affair, but it was always carried out +punctiliously.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I may now turn to Document C-140, which is +in Document Book 10a, Page 104. It is a letter from Reich Defense +Minister Von Blomberg dated 25 October 1933. It is addressed to +the Chief of the Army, the Chief of the Navy, and the Reich +Minister for Aviation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On this document the Prosecution based their accusations that +you, Witness, prepared military plans for an armed resistance which +might become necessary in consequence of Germany’s withdrawal +from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Perhaps +you can briefly state your view.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I had no previous knowledge of our imminent withdrawal +from the League of Nations. This directive came out 11 days +after we had left the League of Nations, and it merely provides +<span class='pageno' title='10' id='Page_10'></span> +defensive measures in the event of sanctions being applied against +Germany by other powers in consequence of her departure from +the League of Nations. It says under 2c: “I prohibit any practical +preparations in the meantime.” So, at first, nothing was done in +consequence of this directive, and the Reich Defense Minister +merely asked for a report from me as to what should be done.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As far as I remember, no practical preparations of any kind +were carried out by the Navy at the time, because the situation +remained absolutely quiet and there was no reason to assume that +there would be any need for defense.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That is probably indicated by the words under +Point 2a, “Preparation for defense against sanctions.” It concerns +the defense only.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The defense only.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That the withdrawal from the League of Nations +occurred 14 October 1933, 11 days before the document was written, +is a well-known fact and has been mentioned by the Prosecution +on Page 257 of the record (Volume II, Page 304).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now we come to Document C-166. This is Exhibit USA-48. +Mr. President, this is in Document Book 10, on Page 36. It is a +document dated 12 March 1934. It emanates from the Command +Office of the Navy and refers to the preparation of auxiliary +cruisers for action. The Prosecution have quoted only the first two +paragraphs of this document and have pointed out that it shows +that auxiliary cruisers were to be built and describes transport +ships “O” for camouflage purposes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The two paragraphs sound incriminating, but they can very easily +be explained. May I refer to Lohmann’s affidavit, Document Number +Raeder-2, my Document Book 1, Page 5. I refer to Paragraph II. +I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Document C-166, submitted to me, a communication +from the Office of the Naval Command of 12 March 1934, +deals with the ‘availability of auxiliary cruisers’ which, as +stated in the document, were marked as ‘Transport Ships O.’ +These ships were not to be newly constructed but were to +be selected from the stock of the German merchant marine +in accordance with the demands enumerated in the document +and were to be examined as to their suitability for the tasks +to be assigned them. Then plans were made for reconstruction +in case of necessity, but the boats remained in the +merchant marine.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>May I state at this point that in the English translation the +word “Umbau” has been translated by the word “reconstruction.” +I have my doubts as to whether this is quite correct. I presume +<span class='pageno' title='11' id='Page_11'></span> +that the interpreter has now translated it as “Umbau” accordingly. +As far as I know, the German word “Umbau” only means much +the same thing as the English word “changes”—that is, “Veränderung.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I continue to quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The order to select such boats from German shipyards was +received, among others, by the Hamburg Office of the Naval +Command where I was serving at the time.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Thus far Admiral Lohmann.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, is Lohmann’s statement correct? Have you anything +to add?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I can only emphasize again that there was no +question of immediate construction but only of selecting suitable +ships and examining them with a view to ascertaining the alterations +necessary to enable them to function as auxiliary cruisers +in the case of a general mobilization. The preparation of the plans +and the plans themselves were to be ready by 1 April 1935, as +laid down in Number 12. They were to be submitted to the naval +administration so that in the case of mobilization the ship concerned +could be taken from the stock of the merchant marine and +converted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>All these proposals for mobilization were, of course, kept secret.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, that the +whole misunderstanding would not have arisen if the Prosecution +had translated two further sentences. The English version is very +short and Point 11 is missing. I quote the text of Point 11:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“ ‘B’ is requested in co-operation with ‘K,’ first of all, to select +suitable vessels and to ascertain how many 15-centimeter guns +have to be mounted to achieve the required broadside...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>The word “selected” is used here so that the intention is not—as +the Prosecution assert—the building of auxiliary cruisers but the +making of a selection from merchant vessels.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; and the ships continued to sail in the service +of the merchant marine.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The second sentence, which I find has been +unfortunately omitted from the English translation of the Prosecution, +reads as follows:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“As long as only a restricted number of guns—at present 24—can +be placed at our disposal for this purpose, preparations +are to be made for only four transport ships (O). An increase +of this number, presumably to six, will be postponed to a +date when more guns are available. Until then we must +await the results of the preparations for the first auxiliary +cruisers.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='12' id='Page_12'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The fact that only four, or at the most six, merchant navy +vessels were involved shows the insignificance of the whole matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I now come to Document C-189, USA-44. It is in Document +Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, Page 66.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like your comments.—I beg your pardon. I should +remind you that this concerns the conversation between Grossadmiral +Raeder and the Führer aboard the <span class='it'>Karlsruhe</span> in June 1934.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Grossadmiral, will you please state your views on the three +points mentioned in this brief document and which you discussed +with Hitler in June 1934.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>First question: Why was Hitler unwilling to reveal the increase +in displacement of D and E—that is, the <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> and the +<span class='it'>Gneisenau</span>—when, according to this document, these were defensive +weapons and every expert would notice the increased tonnage of +these ships and, as far as I know, did notice it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that time we were considering what we could do +with the two armored ships D and E, after the signing of the +impending naval pact with England—that is, the two ships which +Hitler had granted me for the Navy in the 1934 budget. We had +definitely decided not to continue building these armored ships as +such, since we could make better use of the material at our disposal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But surely you realized that every expert in the +British or American or any other Admiralty would see on a +voyage, as soon as he had sighted the ship, that the 10,000 tons +had now become 26,000?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that there was merely the intention...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, when you are examining a +witness directly, you are not to ask leading questions which put +into his mouth the very answer that you desire. You are stating +all sorts of things to this witness and then asking him “isn’t +that so?”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. I shall make every effort to +put my questions differently.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: My answer is different anyway.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: We are dealing here, in the first place, with plans: +I asked permission to revise the plans for these two armored ships; +first, by strengthening their defensive weapons—that is, the armor-plating +and underwater compartments—and then by increasing +their offensive armaments—namely, by adding a third 28-centimeter +instead of 26-centimeter tower. The Führer was not yet willing +<span class='pageno' title='13' id='Page_13'></span> +to sanction, a new 28-centimeter tower because, as I said before, +he did not in any circumstances want to prejudice the negotiations +going on with Great Britain. To begin with, therefore, he sanctioned +only a medium displacement of 18,000 to 19,000 tons; and we knew +that when matters reached the stage where a third 28-centimeter +tower could be mounted, the displacement would be about 25,000 +to 26,000 tons.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We saw no cause to announce it at this stage, however, because +it is customary in the Navy that new construction plans and +especially new types of ships should be announced at the latest +possible moment. That was the principal reason; and apart from +that, Hitler did not want to draw the attention of other countries +to these constructions by giving the figures mentioned or stating +the very high speed. There was no other reason for not announcing +these things.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like your comments on Number 2 of +the document. That has been specially held against you by the +Prosecution, because there you state the view that the fleet must +be developed to oppose England later on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At first—as I intended to explain later—we had taken +the new French ships as our model. The French Navy was developing +at that time the <span class='it'>Dunkerque</span> class with eight 33-centimeter +guns and a high speed, and we took that for our model, especially +since, in Hitler’s opinion—as you will hear later—there was no +question of arming against England. We intended to reconstruct +these two armored ships on this pattern as battleships with nine +28-centimeter guns and capable of a high speed. But then we heard +that the <span class='it'>King George</span> class was being designed in England with +35.6-centimeter guns and, therefore, stronger than the French type; +and so I said that we would in any case have to depart from the +French type eventually and follow the English model which is +now being built with 35-centimeter guns.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There is an error in the translation—namely, “oppose England.” +It says in my text that developments should follow the lines of +British developments—in other words, that we should design vessels +similar in type to the English ships. But they were out of date, +too, shortly afterwards, because France was then building ships of +the <span class='it'>Richelieu</span> class with 38-centimeter guns. Therefore, we decided +that we too would build ships with 38-centimeter guns. That was +how the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> came to be built. The word “oppose” would have +been quite senseless at a time when we intended to come to an +agreement with Britain on terms under which we could in no way +vie with her.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now we come to Point 3 of this document, +which the Prosecution regard as equally important. I quote: +<span class='pageno' title='14' id='Page_14'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer demands complete secrecy with regard to the +construction of U-boats—in consideration, also, of the Saar +plebiscite.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already referred to the Führer’s wish for +secrecy in connection with both the construction of submarines +and the preparations for that construction. This is one of the +points on which he was most sensitive, because in no circumstances +did he wish to prejudice the negotiations. He himself was generally +extremely cautious during this period and would not in any +circumstances do anything which might sabotage the naval pact +which he was so eager to conclude.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I do not quite understand the reference to secrecy +in connection with the construction of submarines. These were as +yet not under construction, were they?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I said secrecy in connection with the preparations +for the construction of submarines; that is just a short way of +expressing it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Document C-190, Exhibit +USA-45. It is in Document Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, +Page 67. This is a conversation which took place between +Hitler and Raeder on 2 November 1934 aboard the <span class='it'>Emden</span>. In +the document before you Hitler informs you that he considers it +necessary to enlarge and improve the Navy by 1938 and that, if +necessary, he would instruct Dr. Ley to place at the disposal of +the Navy 120 to 150 million marks from the Labor Front.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you have anything at all to do with raising funds for +rearmament?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not actually with the raising of funds. I applied +for funds to the Reich Defense Minister, who allocated them to me +for the purpose of this rearmament. I presume that this statement +was made because the allocation sanctioned for the Navy appeared +too small to me, and for this reason the Führer said that if necessary +he would get Ley to act. This did not actually happen. +I received my funds only through the Reich Defense Minister.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Although the charge made by the Prosecution +is not quite clear to me, since it is based on Hitler’s views—which +have nothing to do with you—I want to come back to this sum +once more. I may remind you that an armored cruiser of the old +10,000-ton class, which after all was small, cost 75 to 80 million. +Could this figure of 120 to 150 million be large enough to put the +Navy in a position to carry out rearmament on a large scale?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, certainly not. Two battleships were also under +construction, apart from those two armored cruisers. You can +imagine that the costs continually increased. +<span class='pageno' title='15' id='Page_15'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that this sum was not final?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it was not final.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Will you please go on, then, to Point 2. According +to Point 2 of the document, you pointed out to Hitler during this +conference that it might be necessary to assemble six submarines +during the first quarter of 1935.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I said this because I knew that at the beginning of +1935 we were going to aim at the re-establishment of the Armed +Forces; and I thought that this might create a critical situation +in respect to sanctions, which Hitler always expected, too. I assume +that we were talking about this and that is why I suggested that +if the necessity for any special preparations should arise out of +the re-establishment of the Armed Forces then six submarines +should be assembled, at a date previous to their proper date of +assemblage, from those parts which were obtained from abroad.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler actually give the order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, the order was not given.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We might break off now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-159, Exhibit USA-54. +This document may be found in the British Delegation’s Document +Book 10a, Page 110. This document is a letter written by +Von Blomberg on 2 March 1936, dealing with the demilitarized +zone. Did you, Witness, make lengthy military preparations for +the action which took place on 7 March 1936?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I made no lengthy preparations; I heard of the +plan only through this document of 2 March. I may refer you to +Point 6 which says, “To preserve the peaceful character of the +operation, no military security or advance measures are to be taken +without my express orders.” It was made clear, therefore, that +the entire action was to have a peaceful character.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You knew nothing at all about this entire action +until the beginning of March?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I believe that this action was kept especially +secret.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I will turn to Document C-194, Exhibit +USA-55, in the British Delegation’s Document Book 10a, Page 128. +This document is a communication from the High Command of the +Wehrmacht to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy dating from +<span class='pageno' title='16' id='Page_16'></span> +1936—the wording seems to indicate 6 March 1936. It deals, therefore, +with the same subject as the last document. May I have +your comments.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Reich Defense Minister had sanctioned a certain +air reconnaissance to take place over the North Sea on 6 March—that +is to say, the day before the occupation of the Rhineland. He +intended to withhold his decision as to whether U-boats were also +to be sent out on reconnaissance assignments in the West as far +as the Texel until the next day. I thereupon issued an order on +6 March 1936 and gave special instructions...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Tribunal.</span>] I would like to point out that +Raeder’s order of 6 March 1936 is appended to the same document +and that the text is therefore before the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Defendant.</span>] Please go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I prepared this decree of 6 March concerning the +planning of the U-boat line and the reconnaissance to take place +in the German bay on 7 March. I pointed out especially that +everything must be avoided which might create a false impression +of the Führer’s intentions and thus put difficulties in the way of +this peaceful action.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I would like to add to your statement that these +words taken from the decree of 6 March 1936 are to be found +under Point 5. They are in the last two lines.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Those were all precautionary measures in case of a +hostile counteraction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were there any preparations on a large scale?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the two last documents dealing +with the topic of the Versailles Treaty and rearmament, Document +C-135, Exhibit GB-213, Document Book 10, Page 20—that is the +British Delegation’s Document Book 10—which is headed, “History +of the War Organization”—that is, the “War Organization and +Mobilization Scheme.” This dates from 1938. This document was +read in its entirety by the Prosecution and a very grave charge +was based upon it, because the document contains a statement to +the effect that Hitler had demanded that in 5 years—that is, by +1 April 1938—a Wehrmacht should be created which he could +employ as a political instrument of power and also because the +document mentions the Establishment Organization Plan 1938 and +the Combat Organization Plan.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Considering the significance of this point, I asked Vice Admiral +Lohmann for his comments on this rather technical question. We +<span class='pageno' title='17' id='Page_17'></span> +are dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-2, in my Document Book 2, +under part III, on Page 5. I think the Prosecution have misunderstood +the meaning of certain terms. The terms “Kriegsgliederung” +(Combat Organization Plan) and “Aufstellungsgliederung” (Establishment +Organization Plan) have been misunderstood.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I ask permission, therefore, to read this affidavit in conjunction +with the documents I have submitted in evidence. I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“III. Referring to Documents C-135 and C-153, Armament +Plan, Mobilization Plan, Establishment Organization Plan—Aufstellungsgliederung, +A.G.—and Combat Organization +Plan—Kriegsgliederung, K.G....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I would like to add that C-153 and C-135 are connected. I have +taken them together for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, I would +like to state for the record that 153 is Exhibit USA-43 and may be +found in British Document Book 10a, Page 107. It is headed, +“Armament Plan (A.P.) for the Third Armament Period.” It is a +rather long document and is dated 12 May 1934.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I quote Lohmann’s affidavit on these two documents:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The above-named documents submitted to me deal with +the Establishment Organization Plan, the Combat Organization +Plan, the Mobilization Plan, and the Armament Plan. +The first three plans, or orders of distribution, deal with the +same matters and differ only in manner of composition. The +Armament Plan differs from the other plans inasmuch as it +deals with new construction and the required new materials +and is hence less extensive.</p> + +<p>“The German Navy, like the Armed Forces as a whole—and, +no doubt, the Armed Forces of every nation—made such +plans in order to be able, in the case of a conflict or of +military complications, to prepare in time and use efficiently +the means of combat available. Owing to changing conditions, +military developments, changes in personnel, and advances +in technique, such plans were revised every year. An essential +part of these preparations, self-evident in the case of any +Armed Forces, consisted of the establishment, mobilization, +or combat organization, which provided a survey of all naval +installations on land and sea, their local defenses, and tactical +subordination—as well as of all combat material on hand or +to be secured, increased, or reorganized by a specified date. +All operations envisaged by the military command were +based on this Combat Organization Plan, and it also served +the political leaders as an indication of the possibilities +according to the strength and number of the military resources +available. +<span class='pageno' title='18' id='Page_18'></span></p> + +<p>“The Combat Organization Plan always had to be prepared +with great foresight and was issued by the High Command +of the Navy generally 1½ years before it was to go into +effect, in order to enable the responsible offices to attend in +time to such necessary preliminaries, such as applying to the +Navy Budget Office for funds and materials—such as iron, +steel, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>—and for the preparation of accommodation +insofar as all this was not already covered by the peacetime +development of the Navy.</p> + +<p>“In 1933, when Hitler in his Five Year Plan demanded that +by 1 April 1938 an armed force should be created which he +could throw into the balance as an instrument of political +power, the Combat Organization Plan for 1938 was worked +out independently of the scheduled yearly Combat Organization +Plan, and up to 1935 it dealt mostly with the possibilities +of the Treaty of Versailles which had not yet been exhausted +and with the question of supplementing the naval strength +with craft not subject to limitation in type or number. After +the Naval Pact of 1935, the Combat Organization Plan 1938 +was replaced by a “Combat Organization Plan Ultimate +Goal” (K.G. Endziel), which regulated the number of warships +of all types existing or to be built in the proportion of +35:100 measured by the tonnage actually existing in the +English Fleet. In consideration of monetary and material +resources, the capacity of the shipyards, and the length of +time required to build large warships, this ultimate goal was +in the meanwhile fixed for the year 1944-45.</p> + +<p>“There remained always the possibility of postponing it +further, in accordance with the building program of the +English Fleet.</p> + +<p>“The various terminologies have only a naval technical +significance and do not permit conclusions as to political plans.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I would like to indicate a slight error in translation in the +English text. The translation of the word “Terminierungen” by +“terminology” is, in my opinion, not correct. It should probably be +“dates” or “deadlines.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, are Vice Admiral Lohmann’s statements correct? Can +you add anything to this basic point of view?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: These statements contain everything which can be +said on this matter. All these arrangements are, in my opinion, +preparations which must be made by every navy if it is to be +systematically equipped and made ready for operation.</p> + +<div class='figcenter' style='width:80%'> +<img src='images/png25.png' alt='' id='iid-0002' style='width:100%;height:auto;'/> +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='19' id='Page_19'></span> +It says somewhere—in Document Number C-135, Page 1, under +Point 2—that, “The growing tension between Germany and Poland +forced us to make practical instead of theoretical preparations for +a purely German-Polish conflict.” That was interpreted to mean +that at some time—I believe in 1930—we planned a war of +aggression against Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I testified yesterday that our main object was and had to be, +nor could it have gone any further than, to oppose with force any +aggression committed by Poland against East Prussia. That was the +object of our work—to protect Germany from an invasion by the +Poles. At that time, it would have been madness for German +forces, which were still very inadequately armed, to invade Poland +or any other country.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then too, since the dates 1938 and 1944-45 constantly recur, +I would like to point out again that the year 1938 first came into +question as the final date for the first phase of the Shipping Replacement +Plan. The last ship of this Shipping Replacement Plan was +to be built from 1936 to 1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Tribunal.</span>] I would like to call your attention to +the fact that this is Document Number Raeder-7.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: [<span class='it'>Continuing.</span>] Then Hitler decreed a Five Year Plan, +which happened also to cover the years 1933 to 1938 and in +accordance with which the Combat Organization Plan was to be +fixed for the year 1938. The Combat Organization Plan Ultimate +Goal was fixed for 1944-45; and the reason for fixing this date, as +stated in the document which you have just read, was the fact that +in fixing our program we had to take into consideration the funds +and material at our disposal, the capacity of our shipbuilding yards, +and the length of time needed to build big warships. A reasonably +strong fighting force could not be created before that date. Later +on the Combat Organization Plan appears again in several of my +letters. But there was no date given which, on our part, was +intended as the appointed time of attack.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The statements in Document C-135 are in accordance +with the German-English Naval Agreement. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Perhaps I did not formulate my question clearly. The statement +that a new program was set up implies then that it was done in +accordance with the German-English Naval Agreement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In any case, the reference to Document C-135, +Point 8, is probably to be interpreted in that way since it says, +“...A modern fleet, bound only by the clauses of the German-British +Naval Agreement.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course. +<span class='pageno' title='20' id='Page_20'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I turn to another topic and go back to the +year 1933.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Grossadmiral, when did you meet Hitler, and did you have any +connection with National Socialism before 1933?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I met Hitler on 2 February 1933 when I saw him and +talked to him for the first time. It was at an evening party arranged +by General Von Blomberg at the home of General Von Hammerstein, +the Chief of the Army Command Staff, at which Reich +Defense Minister Von Blomberg intended to present to Hitler senior +generals and admirals. I shall describe the proceedings later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Up to that time, I had had no connection whatsoever with +National Socialism. I knew Admiral Von Levetzow only from the +first World War. He was on the staff of Admiral Scheer whom I +knew well and who had obviously met Hitler at a comparatively +early date. It was through him, however, that I heard that Hitler +took a very active interest in naval matters and was surprisingly +well-informed about them. On the other hand, I believe that +Von Levetzow had also spoken to Hitler about the reputation of the +Navy and his own opinion of the Navy at that time. But I had +no connections beyond that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What were your reasons for remaining in office in +1933, Grossadmiral, when you had no connection with National +Socialism?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Reich President, Field Marshal Von Hindenburg, +at the same time Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, had +appointed the leader of the largest party as Chancellor of the +Reich. I think that, if I had gone to him and told him I wanted to +resign—or intended to resign—because he had appointed a new +Chancellor, he would quite certainly have taken it as an insult +and would then really have dismissed me. I had not the slightest +reason to ask my Supreme Commander to release me from my +military post because he, in his capacity of Reich President, had +appointed a new Reich Chancellor of whom I, perhaps, might not +approve.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When and where did you first hear Hitler state +his basic political principles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I heard him for the first time on the afore-mentioned +2 February, after the dinner at General Von Hammerstein’s home. +I was introduced to him before dinner, and after dinner he made +a speech. He was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, +Herr Von Neurath. There were no other members of the Party +present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In his speech, he first of all spoke of his career and of his social +and national aims. He said that he wanted to regain equal rights +<span class='pageno' title='21' id='Page_21'></span> +for the German Reich and that he would try to rid the country of +the shackles of the Versailles Treaty and restore to Germany her +internal sovereignty; and he also discussed his social aims: the +establishment of true community among the people, the raising of +the workers’ standard of living, assistance to be given to the +farmers, and the promotion of agriculture, the establishment of a +labor service, and the elimination of unemployment. He specially +emphasized—and this was really the main point—that both domestic +and foreign policy were to be left entirely in his hands, that the +Wehrmacht was to have nothing at all to do with this, that the +Wehrmacht was not to be used even to deal with unrest at home, +and that he had other forces to deal with these affairs. He wanted +to insure an undisturbed period of development for the Wehrmacht +so that it could become the factor necessary to prevent the Reich +from becoming the sport of other nations; and for that reason it +would be necessary in the next few years for the Wehrmacht to +devote its entire attention to the preparation of its main objective, +training for the defense of the fatherland in the case of aggression. +The Wehrmacht would be the sole bearer of arms, and its structure +would remain unaltered. He spoke of no details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There was a comparatively large party assembled. As far as +schemes for war were concerned—none was mentioned, and all +those present were uncommonly pleased with this speech. He spoke +with particular respect of Reich President Von Hindenburg, the +Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, and we had the impression +that he would respect this much-revered personality.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This speech was the only account of his basic principles which +he gave me as Chief of the Naval Command Staff, as well as to the +Chief of the Army Command Staff and others.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, when did you report to Hitler for +the first time on the Navy; and what was Hitler’s general attitude +on this occasion—toward the Navy in particular?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The first naval report I gave was a few days later in +the presence of General Von Blomberg, who in his capacity of +Reich Defense Minister was my superior. I cannot give the exact +date, but it was shortly afterwards.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On this occasion, Hitler gave me a further account of the +principles on which I was to command the Navy. I reported to +Hitler first of all on the state of the Navy; on the rather slight +degree to which the provisions of the Versailles Treaty had been +carried out by the Navy, its inferior strength, the Shipping Replacement +Plan, and incidents concerned with naval policy, such as the +Treaty of Washington, the Treaty of London, 1930, the position of +the Disarmament Conference. He had already been fully informed +on all these matters. +<span class='pageno' title='22' id='Page_22'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>He said he wanted to make clear to me the principles on which +his policy was based and that this policy was to serve as the basis +of long-term naval policy. I still remember these words quite +clearly, as well as those which followed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>He did not under any circumstances wish to have complications +with England, Japan, or Italy—above all not with England. And +he wanted to prove this by fixing an agreement with England as to +the strength to be allotted to the German Fleet in comparison +with that of the English Navy. By so doing, he wanted to show +that he was prepared to acknowledge, once and for all, England’s +right to maintain a navy commensurate with the vastness of her +interests all over the world. The German Navy required expansion +only to the extent demanded by a continental European policy. +I took this as the second main principle on which to base my +leadership of the Navy. The actual ratio of strength between the +two navies was not discussed at the time; it was discussed later on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This decision of Hitler’s afforded extreme satisfaction both to +myself and to the whole of the Navy, for it meant that we no +longer had to compete senselessly with the first sea power; and +I saw the possibility of gradually building up our Navy on a solid +foundation. I believe that this decision was hailed by the whole +Navy with joy and that they understood its significance. The +Russian Pact was later greeted with the same appreciation, since +the combination of the Russian Pact and the naval agreement +would have been a guarantee of wonderful development. There +were people—but not in the Navy—who believed that this amounted +to yielding ground, but this limitation was accepted by the majority +of Germans with considerable understanding.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, what were your personal relations +with Hitler? How did you judge him in the course of the years, +and what was Hitler’s attitude toward you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I welcomed this vigorous personality who was +obviously most intelligent, had tremendous will power, was a +master in handling people, and—as I myself observed in the early +years—a great and very skillful politician whose national and +social aims were already well known and accepted in their entirety +by the Armed Forces and the German people...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this might be taken +more shortly. We have heard it from so many of the others.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Is the defendant not to describe his relations +with Hitler? Do the Tribunal consider them irrelevant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He might do it shortly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Good. Grossadmiral, please do it shortly. +<span class='pageno' title='23' id='Page_23'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I would just like to say what I thought of Hitler in +order to make clear my reasons for not at any time leaving him, +which fact the Prosecution have raised very strongly against me. +His first steps in both domestic and foreign policy undoubtedly +called forth admiration for his political ability and awakened the +hope that, since he had taken these first steps without bloodshed +or political complications, he would be able to solve in the same +way any problems, which might arise later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have heard this as I have pointed out—this +quality or power of Hitler’s ability from nearly every one of +the defendants and it is very cumulative, and if this defendant +wishes to say he was greatly impressed by Hitler’s qualities, that +is quite sufficient. All of the rest is cumulative.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Very well. Then I shall only say that during the +early years I had no reason to wonder whether I should remain in +my position or not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, we shall automatically come to +the later complications at a later stage of the hearing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I come now to the German-British Naval Agreement and would +like to ask you briefly how this Naval Agreement of 1935 came +about. I am referring to Document Number Raeder-11, Document +Book 1, Page 59, which contains the Naval Agreement in the form +of a communication from the German Foreign Minister to the +British Government. The actual content was fixed by the British, +as the first few words show:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Your Excellency, I have the honour to acknowledge the +receipt of your Excellency’s note of to-day’s date, in +which you were so good as to communicate to me on +behalf of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom +the following”:</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then come the following statements by the British:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“1. During the last few days the representatives of the German +Government and His Majesty’s Government in the +United Kingdom have been engaged in conversations, the +primary purpose of which has been to prepare the way for +the holding of a general conference on the subject of the +limitation of naval armaments. It now gives me great +pleasure to notify your Excellency of the formal acceptance +by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of the +proposal of the German Government discussed at those conversations, +that the future strength of the German Navy in +relation to the aggregate naval strength of the Members of +the British Commonwealth of Nations should be in the proportion +of 35:100. His Majesty’s Government in the United +<span class='pageno' title='24' id='Page_24'></span> +Kingdom regard this proposal as a contribution of the greatest +importance to the cause of future naval limitation. They +further believe that the agreement which they have now +reached with the German Government and which they regard +as a permanent and definite agreement as from to-day +between the two Governments...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This is a well-known document, and the +Tribunal will take judicial notice of it, of course. It is not necessary +to read it all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well. I should nevertheless like to point out +that, according to Point 2f of this document, the British Government +recognized that, as far as submarines were concerned, Germany +should be allowed the same number as Britain. At that time +that amounted to about 52,000 tons, or rather more than 100 U-boats. +The Government of the German Reich, however, voluntarily undertook +to restrict itself to 45 percent of the total submarine tonnage +of the British Empire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Did you and the Navy regard such +considerable restrictions as the basis for Germany’s peaceful +development, and was it received favorably by the Navy in general?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, as I have already said, it was received with +greatest satisfaction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Since a judgment formed some years ago carries +more weight than a declaration made now in the course of the +Trial, I wish to submit Document Number Raeder-12, Document +Book 1, Page 64. This document deals with a communication made +by Grossadmiral Raeder for the information of the Officers’ Corps. +It is dated 15 July 1935, a month after the signing of the naval +agreement. Raeder says—and I quote the second paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The agreement resulted from the Führer’s decision to fix the +ratio of the fleets of Germany and the British Empire at +35:100. This decision, which was based on considerations of +European politics, formed the starting point of the London +conferences. In spite of initial opposition from England, we +held inflexibly to our decision; and our demands were granted +in their entirety. The Führer’s decision was based on the +desire to exclude the possibility of antagonism between Germany +and England in the future and so to exclude forever +the possibility of naval rivalry between the two countries.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>A sentence on Page 66 is also important. I wish to ask the High +Tribunal to take judicial notice of the rest of it:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“By this agreement, the building-up of the German Navy to +the extent fixed by the Führer was formally approved by +England.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='25' id='Page_25'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>This is followed by individual statements as to tonnage.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then I should like to call attention to the final sentence, which +is indicative of Raeder’s attitude at the time:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“This agreement represents a signal success in the political +sphere since it is the first step towards a practical understanding +and signifies the first relaxation of the inflexible +front so far maintained against Germany by our former +opponents and implacably demonstrated again at Stresa.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Grossadmiral, were the lines of peaceful development +laid down by you at that time followed in the next years?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I should like to submit Document +Raeder-13. This is a document which enables me—in order +to save time—to dispense with the testimony here in Court of +Vice Admiral Lohmann. This document will be found in Document +Book 1, Page 68, and is entitled, “The New Plan for the Development +of the German Navy,” and is a standard work. It is a speech +made by Vice Admiral Lohmann in the summer of 1935 at the +Hanseatic University in Hamburg. I ask the High Tribunal to take +judicial notice of the essential points of this document; and as this +is an authoritative work done at the request of the High Command, +I may perhaps just quote the following. Admiral Lohmann sets +forth first of all that since we now had the liberty to recruit and +arm troops, the Navy was then free of restrictions, but that that +was not Hitler’s view. I now quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer, however, chose another way. He preferred to +negotiate on German naval armament direct with Britain +which, as our former adversary”—I beg your pardon; I am +quoting from Page 70—“has tried for years to show understanding +for our difficult position.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And on Page 71 Lohmann speaks about misleading reports +published in the press, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and continues literally:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“All the more surprising, then, was the ratification of the +treaty which expressed the full agreement of both governments +and did not, like some armament treaties of former +time, leave more embitterment than understanding in its +wake. The sense of fairness which British statesmen have +retained, despite the frequently dirty ways of higher politics, +came through when confronted with the unreserved sincerity +of the German declarations, the dignified firmness of the +German representatives, and the passionate desire for peace +inspiring the speeches and acts of our Führer. Unlike former +times, the speeches of the British leaders expressed respect +and recognition. We have acknowledged this as a sign of +<span class='pageno' title='26' id='Page_26'></span> +honest willingness to understand. The voices from the circles +of British war veterans are hardly less valuable than the +attitude of the official leaders. In November 1918, for instance, +when the German Fleet was taken by British squadrons to be +interned in Scapa Flow, the British Commander-in-Chief, +Lord Beatty, the great foe of our Admiral Hipper, sent the +famous signal, ‘Do not forget that the enemy is a contemptible +beast.’ This Grand Admiral expressed his dislike for Germany +on many occasions, but on 26 June this same Lord Beatty +stated in the House of Lords, ‘I am of the opinion that we +should be grateful to the Germans. They came to us with +hands outstretched, announcing that they agreed to the ratio +of 35:100.’ If they had submitted other proposals, we could +not have prevented them. We may be truly grateful for the +fact that there is at least one country in the world whose +competition in regard to armament we do not need to fear.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then I should like to refer to Page 73, which limits battleships +to 35,000 tons. This limitation plays a part in the Prosecution +Document C-23. The fact that in this document next to the words +“Panama Canal” are placed the words “battleships 35,000 tons” has +a certain significance. The limitation to 35,000 tons is not so +decisive and important as the Prosecution would like us to believe. +This is the origin: The United States of America at that time wanted +to limit the tonnage to 35,000 tons on account of the width and +depth of the Panama Canal, for the Panama Canal would have +had to be enlarged in order to admit ships of greater tonnage. +I shall return to this point later since this limit of 35,000 tons +was not maintained.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then as evidence of the basis for comparison with German +U-boats, I should like to point to Page 76 where the figure +mentioned is 52,700 tons. It is a historical fact—which is set down +here—that France took no part in this limitation and at that time +was the strongest U-boat power with her 96,000 tons, 96 ready +and 15 under construction. It is also a historical fact that Germany—and +this is shown on the same page—had agreed to abolish +submarines, having had to destroy 315 after the first World War.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Grossadmiral, did this accord with the British Fleet apparent +in these documents show itself on another, or on any particular +occasion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I tried to maintain this good understanding and to +express these sentiments to the British Navy as, for instance, when +I was informed of the death of Admiral Jellicoe through a phone +call from an English news agency. He stood against us as the +head of the English Fleet in the first World War, and we always +<span class='pageno' title='27' id='Page_27'></span> +considered him a very chivalrous opponent. Through this agency +I gave a message to the English Fleet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I doubt if this really has any effect on the +issues we have to consider.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In any event, I tried to bring about a good understanding +with the British Navy for the future and to maintain +this good understanding.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On 17 July 1937 a further German-English Naval +Agreement was signed. I am submitting this document as Document +Raeder-14, Document Book 1, Page 81. This is a rather +lengthy document only part of which has been translated and +printed in the document book; and in order to understand the +violation with which the Prosecution charge us, I must refer to +several of the points contained in this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The agreement concerns the limitation of naval armaments and +particularly the exchange of information on naval construction. In +Article 4 we find the limitation of battleships to 35,000 tons, which +has already been mentioned; and in Articles 11 and 12—which I will +not read because of their technical nature but would ask the Tribunal +to take note of—both governments are bound to report +annually the naval construction program. This must be done during +the first 4 months of each calendar year, and details about certain +ships—big ships in particular—4 months before they are laid down. +For a better understanding of the whole matter, which has been +made the basis of a charge against the defendants in connection +with the naval agreement, I may refer to Articles 24 to 26. The +three articles show...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Can you summarize these articles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I did not intend to read them, Your Honor. +I just want to quote a point or two from them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>These articles enumerate the conditions under which either +partner to the agreement could deviate from it. From the start, +therefore, it was considered permissible under certain conditions +to deviate from the agreement, if, for instance, (Article 24) one +of the partners became involved in war, or (Article 25) if another +power, such as the United States or France or Japan, were to build +or purchase a vessel larger than those provided for in the agreement. +In this article express reference is made to Article 4—that +is, to battleships of 35,000 tons—in the case of deviation, the only +obligation was to notify one’s partner. Article 26 states a very +general basis for deviation from the agreement—namely, in cases +where the security of the nation demands it such deviation is held +to be justified. No further details are necessary at this point. +<span class='pageno' title='28' id='Page_28'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the +United Kingdom): My Lord, the deviation is subject to notification +of the other party under Subarticle 2. It was just relevant in +Article 26—any deviation is subject to notification to the other +party of the deviation to be embarked on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it, Dr. Siemers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, of course. I believe...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution say that this agreement +was broken?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. With reference to the remarks just made +by Sir David, I would like to say that I pointed out that such +deviation was permitted under these conditions, but that there +was an obligation to notify the other partners. Perhaps that did +not come through before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Was this agreement concluded, Admiral, +in 1937, from the same point of view which you have already +stated? Are there any other noteworthy facts which led to the +agreement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In 1936, as well as I remember, the treaties so far +made by England with other powers expired, and England was +therefore eager to renew these treaties in the course of 1936. The +fact that we were invited in 1937 to join in a new agreement by +all powers meant that Germany would henceforth be completely +included in these treaties.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have accused you of violating +this German-English Naval Agreement, and this charge is based +on Document C-23, Exhibit USA-49, in the British Delegation’s +Document Book 10, Page 3. This document is dated 18 February +1938. It has been mentioned repeatedly in these proceedings and +begins as follows, “The actual displacement of the battleships +<span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span>, <span class='it'>Gneisenau</span> and <span class='it'>F/G</span> is in both cases 20 percent greater +than the displacement stated to the British.” Then we find a list +which shows that the displacement of the <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> was given +as 26,000 tons but was actually 31,300 tons, and that the draught +stated one meter less than was actually the case. And the “F” class, +that is, the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> and <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>, were listed as 35,000 tons but +had an actual displacement of 41,700 and a difference of 80 centimeters +in draught. Therefore, according to what we have seen, +there is an evident infringement of the treaty. Grossadmiral, I am +assuming that you do not dispute this violation of the treaty?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, in no way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Certainly, at the time of this document there +were only four battleships in question: <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span>, <span class='it'>Gneisenau</span>, +<span class='it'>Bismarck</span>, and <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>... +<span class='pageno' title='29' id='Page_29'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It seems you are again stating these things +to the Tribunal, making statements instead of asking questions +of the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Mr. President, that I was incorporating +my documentary evidence in order to show the connection, so as +to make clear what we are dealing with. I was about to put the +question: Were the four battleships mentioned actually in commission +when this document was drawn up?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, they had not yet been commissioned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: None of these four battleships?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If I am permitted to do so, I may say that the +exact dates on which these ships were commissioned—dates which +the defendant can hardly repeat from memory—can be seen from +Point IV of Lohmann’s affidavit, Document Number Raeder-2.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think you must prove them. You cannot +state them without proving them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, certainly, Your Honor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am referring to Document Number Raeder-2, which has been +submitted to the Tribunal already. This is the affidavit by Lohmann, +on Page 5. I quote from Document Book 1, Page 8:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Within the limits defined by the German-English Naval +Agreement, the German Navy commissioned four battleships. +I append the dates of laying down the keel, launching, and +commissioning, as far as I can still determine them. <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span>: +laid down keel, exact date cannot be determined; +launched, 3 October 1936; commissioned, 7 January 1939. +<span class='it'>Gneisenau</span>: laid down keel, date cannot be determined; +launched, 8 December 1936; commissioned, 31 May 1938. +<span class='it'>Bismarck</span>: laid down keel, 1936; launched, 14 February 1939; +commissioned, 2 August 1940. <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>: laid down keel, 1936; +launched, 1 April 1939; commissioned, 1941.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Admiral Lohmann was unable to ascertain the exact date. The +“H”—I may add that the other ships mentioned under Document +C-23 were planned but were broken up later. They had already +been broken up in the summer of 1939, and this applies only to +the first “H.” So far there is no question of final preparation or +construction. Since an obvious violation of the treaty exists, we +now have to consider in what light this violation should be regarded. +The Prosecution have said that this violation of the treaty is +criminal since it implies intended aggression. In order to save +time, especially since technical problems are involved, I should like, +before questioning the defendant further, to submit Document +<span class='pageno' title='30' id='Page_30'></span> +Number Raeder-15, within the scope of the documentary evidence +which I have submitted with the Tribunal’s permission. In my +opinion, this document proves that there was no intention of +aggression.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document Number Raeder-15 is an affidavit—I beg your pardon—it +is in Document Book 1, Page 94. This document deals +with an affidavit deposed before a notary at Hamburg by Dr. Ing. +h.c. Wilhelm Süchting and is important for the refutation of Document +C-23, and for that purpose I should like to quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I am the former Director of the shipbuilding yard of Blohm +& Voss in Hamburg. I was with this firm from 1937 to +1945”—pardon me—“from 1907 to 1945 and I am conversant +with all questions concerning the construction of warships +and merchant ships. In particular, as an engineer I had +detailed information about the building of battleships for +the German Navy. Dr. Walter Siemers, attorney at law of +Hamburg, presented to me the Document C-23, dated 18 February +1938, and asked me to comment on it. This document +shows that the Navy, contrary to the previous agreement, +informed the British that the battleships <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> and +<span class='it'>Gneisenau</span>—as well as other intended constructions—had a +displacement and draught of about 20 percent less than was +actually the case.</p> + +<p>“I can give some details to explain why this information was +given. I assume that the information given to the British—information +which according to naval agreement 4 had to +be supplied 4 months before the keel was laid down—was +based on the fact that the battleships <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> and +<span class='it'>Gneisenau</span> were originally intended to have a displacement of +26,000 tons and a draught of 7.50 meters and the battleship +“F” (<span class='it'>Bismarck</span>) a displacement of 35,000 tons and a draught +of 7.90 meters, as stated.</p> + +<p>“If these battleships were afterwards built with a greater +displacement and a greater draught, the changes were the +result of orders given or requests made by the Navy while +the plans were being drafted and which the construction +office had to carry out. The changes were based upon the +viewpoint repeatedly expressed by the Navy—namely, to +build the battleships in such a way that they would be as +nearly unsinkable as possible. The increase of the tonnage +was not meant to increase the offensive power of the +ship”—I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I shall be finished +in a moment—“The increase of the tonnage was not meant +to increase the offensive power of the ship but was done for +defensive and protective purposes.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='31' id='Page_31'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>I may perhaps point out that in the English text there is a +mistake in translation. In this text the word “not” is missing. It +should read, “was not meant,” and not “meant.”</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“As time went on, the Navy attached more and more +importance to dividing the hull of the battleship into a +greater number of compartments in order to make the ship +as unsinkable as possible and to afford the maximum protection +in case of leakage. The new battleships were therefore +built broad in the beam with many bulkheads, only +about ten meters apart, and many longitudinal and latitudinal +bulkheads outside the torpedo bulkhead. At the same time, +both the vertical and the horizontal armor-plating were, as +far as my information goes, heavier and composed of larger +plates than those used by other navies. In order...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: In other words, his explanation is that they +were altered in the course of construction for technical reasons. It +does not matter what the technical reasons are.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, but I do +believe that when we are dealing with a clearly-established violation +of a treaty, the manner of this violation is of some importance. +I do not believe that each and every violation of a treaty can be +described as a war crime. The point is whether this violation of +the treaty was a war crime in the sense of the Charter—in other +words, whether it was motivated by the intention of waging a +war of aggression. An insignificant violation of a kind which, after +all, is found in every commercial lawsuit cannot be a crime.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The affidavit is before us. We shall read it. +In fact, you have already read the material parts of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I think we had better adjourn. How long do you expect +to be?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is very difficult for me to judge +that accurately, but I imagine I shall be able to conclude sometime +tomorrow. I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be able to conclude +at noon; but I am asking Your Honor to take into consideration +the fact that I am incorporating my documentary proof in the +interrogation and that this documentary proof, which in many other +cases has taken hours to present, is thus dealt with simultaneously.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope that you will make your +presentation as short as you possibly can. We have already been +so long a time over this defendant.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='32' id='Page_32'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I must first make a formal request, +namely, that in addition to my own secretary I may have another +here in Court. She was here this morning but has just been told +that she may not come into the courtroom, and she is now standing +outside the door.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Grossadmiral, you just saw the affidavit +of Dr. Süchting. I ask you: Is it true, or rather—not to confuse you +I will ask—on what did the Navy base its ideas about enlarging +the battleships by about 20 percent?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Originally there was no intention to enlarge the +ships by 20 percent. But at the time when we resumed battleship +construction, when we could see that we would have a very small +number of battleships in any case, it occurred to us that the +resistance to sinking of ships should be increased as much as +possible to render the few we had as impregnable as possible. It +had nothing to do with stronger armament or anything like that, +but merely with increasing the resistance to sinking and to enemy +guns. For this reason a new system was worked out at that time +in order to increase and strengthen the subdivision of the space +within the ship. This meant that a great deal of new iron had +to be built into the ships. Thereby the draught and the displacement +were enlarged. This was unfortunate from my point of view, +for we had designed the ships with a comparatively shallow +draught. The mouths of our rivers, the Elbe, Weser, Jade, are so +shallow that ships with a deep draught cannot navigate all stages +of the rivers. Therefore, we had these ships built broad, intending +to give them a shallow draught; but by building in these many +new latitudinal and longitudinal bulkheads, we increased the +draught and also the displacement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were these disadvantageous changes, which took +place during construction, due in part to a comparatively limited +experience in battleship construction?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Since the designers in the High Command of +the Navy and the designers and engineers in the big shipyards had +not built any heavy warships for a very long time, they lacked +experience. As a result, the High Command of the Navy had to +issue supplementary orders to the shipyards. This in itself was a +drawback which I tried hard to overcome.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did the construction of these four battleships +surpass the total tonnage accorded by the naval agreement? +<span class='pageno' title='33' id='Page_33'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, the total tonnage was not overstepped until the +beginning of the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Your Honors, in this connection I should like to +refer to Document Raeder-8, which has already been submitted in +Raeder Document Book 1, Page 40, under II. In this affidavit +Lohmann gives comparative figures which show how much battleship +tonnage Germany was allowed under the naval agreement. +Please take notice of it without my reading all the figures. What +is important is that, according to comparison with the British +figures, Germany was allowed to have 183,750 tons. At that time +she had three completed armored cruisers with 30,000 tons—which +is shown here—so that according to this affidavit 153,750 tons still +remained.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With reference to Document Raeder-127, I should like to submit +a short correction, because Grossadmiral Raeder, in looking through +the affidavit, observed that Vice Admiral Lohmann made a mistake +in one figure. The mistake is unimportant in terms of the whole, +but in order to be absolutely fair and correct I thought it necessary +to point it out to Vice Admiral Lohmann. Instead of 30,000 it +should actually read about 34,000 tons, so that there is a difference, +not of 153,750 tons but of 149,750. According to the naval agreement, +we were allowed to build 146,000, the final figure, so that +the result is not changed. Admiral Lohmann’s mistake—as the +Tribunal know—can be attributed to the fact that we were very +limited in our material resources.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I add a remark to what I said before? The +statement of these displacements deviated from the terms of the +treaty insofar as only the original construction displacement or +draught was reported and not the draught and displacement which +gradually resulted through these changes in the course of the +planning of the construction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In addition, may I refer the honorable Court to +the following: The Naval Agreement of 1937 was changed by the +London Protocol of 30 June 1938. I refer to Exhibit Raeder-16. +My secretary just tells me it is not here at the moment; I will +bring it up later. It is the last document in Raeder Document +Book 1, Page 97.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I remind the Court that Document C-23 is of February 1938. +By this London Protocol, at the suggestion of the British Government, +the limitation on battleship tonnage to 35,000 tons was +changed because the British Government, as well as the German +Government, realized that 35,000 tons was too low. As the protocol +shows, effective 30 June 1938, the battleship tonnage was raised +to 45,000 tons. Thereby this difference in the battleships, referred +to in Document C-23, was settled a few months later. +<span class='pageno' title='34' id='Page_34'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I shall take up a new subject, the question of your +participation in the planning and conspiracy to wage wars of +aggression. This is the question of the so-called key documents +which the Prosecution presented. Since you, Admiral, were present +during these speeches of Hitler’s to the commanders-in-chief, +I must ask you to comment on these documents. The first document +is Document 386-PS, the so-called Hossbach Document, +Exhibit USA-25, in the Document Book of the British Delegation, +Number 10, Page 81. It is Hitler’s speech of 5 November 1937.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Herr Grossadmiral, did you ever see this document of Hossbach +before the Trial began?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I saw no document and no protocol of any +speeches which Hitler made. No minutes were taken officially. +Only in later years—I believe since 1941—were stenographers +present who wrote down every word. These are really not minutes +at all, since the document is written in indirect discourse. It was +written down by the author 5 days after the speech itself, as we +have heard.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Although it is a very important document, +I have noted that in contrast to other documents it has no distribution +list; it was written down 5 days after the speech and is not +even marked “secret.” Can you explain where these minutes were +set down?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot recollect in detail the conditions that +prevailed. I can only imagine that the adjutant in question kept +the minutes in his safe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then you have only an over-all impression of +this speech, after 8 or 9 years?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The document was read in full here by the +Prosecution and, as cannot be denied at all, it contains serious +references to a war of aggression. It mentions, for instance, +something bequeathed by will, the problem of space, the hatred +against England and France; it says that, armament now being +completed, the first goal is the overthrow of Czechoslovakia and +Austria.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Please explain to the Court what effect the speech had on you +at that time, and how it happened that you ascribed no such +importance to the speech as did Herr Von Neurath, for example, +who was also present? And in spite of the speech how did you +retain your opinion that Hitler would hold the old line and not +seek a solution by force?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: By way of introduction I may say that the assertion +contained in the trial brief, that an influential group of Nazis met +<span class='pageno' title='35' id='Page_35'></span> +in order to examine the situation, does not give a correct picture +of the situation at all. Hitler called together the persons mentioned +in the document to explain to them the possibilities for political +development and in order to give them any instructions he +might have.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And here I should like to say something in general—since there +are quite a number of Hitler’s speeches coming—about the nature +of his speeches. Hitler spoke at great length, going very far in +retrospect. Above all, in every speech he had a special purpose +depending on the audience. Just as he was a master of dialectics, +so he was also a master of bluff. He used strong expressions again +according to the objective he was pursuing. He afforded his +imagination full play. He also contradicted himself frequently in +successive speeches. One never knew what his final goals and +intentions were. At the end of such a speech it was very difficult +to determine them. As a rule, his speeches made a greater impression +on people who heard him infrequently than on those already +acquainted with his whole manner of speaking on such occasions. +It was never a question of taking counsel but, as has been said, +always of giving undisputed orders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The purpose of the speech on 5 November 1937 was, as Reich +Marshal Göring said at the beginning...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is at the beginning of this +speech of 5 November?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, at the beginning of the speech.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>He told me he had spoken with the Führer beforehand. The +Führer wanted to spur on the Army to carry out its rearmament +somewhat faster. It was going too slowly for the Führer. The +subject of the speech was Austria and Czechoslovakia, which he +said in one place he wanted to overthrow. He said that the latest +date would be 1943-1945, because after that our situation would +become worse. But the case could come up earlier due to two +conditions: In the first place, if internal unrest occurred in France; +in the second place, in the event of the outbreak of a Mediterranean +war in which England, France, Italy, and probably Spain, would +participate, which in my opinion was fantastic.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The assertion that the arming of the Army, Navy, and Air Force +was as good as completed in November 1937, I could not understand. +The Navy still had not a single battleship in service. The +situation was similar in the Air Force and Army. In no way were +we armed for war, and a war against England, for example, would +have been sheer madness. For me, the decisive sentences in his +speech were that first, England and France—I believe—had already +written off Czechoslovakia, and secondly, that he was convinced +<span class='pageno' title='36' id='Page_36'></span> +that France and England would not interfere. In the third place +was the fact that just a few months before, in July 1937, the second +naval agreement had been signed. These three facts seemed to +me to make it certain that Hitler would not seek a warlike solution +to these problems of Austria and Czechoslovakia. At that time it +was a question of the Sudetenland under any circumstances and it +seemed he would strive for a peaceful solution. For that reason +the speech did not impress me with the fact that Hitler at that +time wanted to change his policy—that he wanted to turn from a +policy of peace to one of war. I can imagine that Herr Von Neurath, +not knowing the purpose of this speech, received a different +impression. But, as I now think back over the matter, I can imagine +that the exaggerated character of the speech was specifically +intended to force Von Neurath out of the Cabinet, because I have +learned that at that time the Führer was already inclined to replace +Von Neurath by Von Ribbentrop. That was only an assumption +which I made afterwards.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>For me the conclusions to be drawn from the speech were none +other than these: The construction of the fleet in the ratio of one +to three, relative to England, was to be continued, and a friendly +relationship with England was still to be striven for. The ratio +agreement which had just been reached was to be observed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And, it is obvious at the end of the document—namely +in the fourth paragraph from the end—that Field Marshal +Von Blomberg and Colonel General Von Fritsch, in giving their +estimate of the situation, repeatedly pointed out the necessity of +England and France not playing the role of our enemies. This is +commented on further, and one sees that Blomberg and Fritsch +were disturbed and for once opposed Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After the speech you talked to Blomberg. Is it true that Blomberg, +who can unfortunately not be examined and Fritsch, who is +also dead, saw through this exaggeration of Hitler’s and therefore +pointed out their misgivings and in this way intended to intervene? +About what did you talk to Blomberg after this speech?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In the first place, Blomberg and Fritsch...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You must try not to put leading questions, +Dr. Siemers. You are putting into the witness’ mouth what you +want him to answer. If you want to...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry if I did so. It is a little difficult when +the two men who were there, Blomberg and Fritsch, are dead. +I can only point out that they are not alive now. My final +question is...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That cannot be helped, the fact that they +are dead. But, if you want to get anything in about that, you must +get it from the witness, not from yourself. +<span class='pageno' title='37' id='Page_37'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What impression did Blomberg have after this +speech? What did he say to you afterwards?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I believe Blomberg himself in a questionnaire stated +to Field Marshal Keitel that when we military men left the room +Blomberg, who was with the Führer frequently, said that this +again had not been meant so earnestly and was not to be judged +so seriously. He believed that the Führer would settle these +questions peacefully, too. And as Dr. Siemers said, Blomberg and +Fritsch had both already called the attention of the Führer to the +fact that under no circumstances should England and France be +allowed to intervene, since the German Wehrmacht would not be +able to cope with them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I may add that in this case I intentionally did not make any +such objections because it was, after all, a daily occurrence that +whenever I met the Führer, I told him, “<span class='it'>Ceterum censeo</span>, we must +stay on the course in order to avoid entanglements with England.” +And the Führer repeatedly confirmed this intention of his. It is +typical that as soon as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, +Colonel General Von Fritsch, said that after these remarks he +would not be able to take the vacation in Egypt in the winter of +1937-38 which he had planned for his health, the Führer immediately +retracted his statement and said that the affair was not so urgent, +that he could go ahead on his vacation undisturbed, which he +then did.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This shows that it was again a question of exerting pressure. +That was the speech of 5 November 1937. In fact he did not crush +either Austria or Czechoslovakia at that time; but in 1938 the +question was settled peacefully without bloodshed, and even with +the agreement of the other powers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection may I submit the document +dating from the following year, Exhibit Raeder-23, Raeder Document +Book 2, Page 127. On 30 September 1938—I need not say +anything further about Munich, because the defendant was not +directly participating—Hitler and Chamberlain jointly declared that +the agreement signed the previous night and the Anglo-German +Naval Agreement were considered symbols of the desires of both +nations never again to wage war against each other. The rest of +the contents is well known.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then I come to the second key document which the Prosecution +submitted—namely, Document L-79, the so-called “Little Schmundt.” +It is Exhibit USA-27, Number 10 in the document book of the +British Delegation, Page 24. The document in spite of its +astonishing length was also presented in full by the Prosecution, so +that I shall not read from it. May I remind the Court that it states +that further successes could not be achieved without bloodshed, and +<span class='pageno' title='38' id='Page_38'></span> +on 23 May 1939 with reference to Poland it states that not Danzig +but the readjustment of Lebensraum was the issue at stake.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It speaks of the readjustment of Lebensraum and of the fact +that the Polish problem could not be separated from the conflict +with the West. Thereupon Hitler said that the only way out was +to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. Unfortunately, +this is again a document which is undated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you know when Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt prepared this +report?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, unfortunately I cannot say that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say it is undated?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, there is no date stating when the +document was prepared. There is only the date referring to the +minutes of the conference of 23 May. In the case of the Hossbach +Document the conference was on 5 November, but it was written +down by Hossbach 5 days later from memory, on 10 November. In +the case of Schmundt, we do not know whether it was written +down after 1 day, 5 days, or 4 weeks.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it in evidence that the document of +5 November was written down 5 days later?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No. The document of 5 November shows that +it was prepared 5 days later. The document is dated at the top, +“Berlin, 10 November 1937; Notes of the Conference in the Reich +Chancellery on 5 November 1937....”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is right, then there is evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In the case of +Schmundt, there is no indication?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You do not know when it was written down?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I never heard when.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you ever see this document before this Trial?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Does this document contain a correct reproduction +in all points of Hitler’s speech, or does what you said about +the Hossbach Document apply here also?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It applies even more here. In my opinion it is the +most abstruse document concerning a Hitler speech in existence, +for a large part of the statements in my opinion makes no sense +whatsoever, as I have tried to show. The adjutant stated that he +was only paraphrasing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: This is on the first page in the center where it is +written, “Reproduced in Substance.” +<span class='pageno' title='39' id='Page_39'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Please explain to the Court what impression this speech made +on you at the time and why you believed, in spite of this speech, +that Hitler was not planning any war of aggression.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should like to point out again here that the trial +brief makes the comment that consultation took place regarding +the scale on which the plan should be executed. Particularly in this +case this does not at all represent the character of the speech +correctly. The meaning of the whole first part of the speech, as +I said, is extremely vague. Whereas in the 1937 speech he gave +1943 to 1945 as the latest deadline and the possibility of an earlier +date under certain improbable circumstances, here Hitler speaks +of a solution as being possible in 15 to 20 years. He says that +Poland is always on the side of the enemy, in spite of the treaty +of friendship, that her secret intention is to take advantage of any +opportunity to act against us, and that he, therefore, wants to attack +Poland at the first opportunity. The Polish problem cannot be +separated from the conflict in the West, but a conflict in the West +must not be permitted to arise simultaneously. If it is uncertain +as to whether a war with the West will or will not take place in +the wake of the German-Polish conflict, then a line of battle first +against England and France is perhaps of greater importance. Then +again, he says that we cannot allow ourselves to be drawn into a +war with England on account of Poland, a war on two fronts such +as the incapable men of 1914 had brought about.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then again, England—and that is comparatively new here—is +the driving force against Germany. We must prepare for a long +war in addition to a surprise attack, obviously against England. It +is astonishing that we were to endeavor, at the beginning of such +a war, to strike a destructive blow against England. The goal is +to force England to her knees. Then follows quite a new part...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the defendant appears to be +reading from a document an argument about this document. That +is not giving evidence. If he can tell us anything about what +happened at this meeting, it is open to him to do so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: He is repeating, with the aid of this document, +the involved thoughts which Hitler expressed at that time, and he +is pointing out the contradictions contained in Hitler’s speech at +that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of argument, to point out +that there are conflicts between one part of the document and +another. That is not the subject of evidence. He has already told +us that Hitler’s speeches generally were—that one speech generally +contradicted another, but we can see for ourselves from the document +if one part of it conflicts with another. +<span class='pageno' title='40' id='Page_40'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is it not of importance, Mr. President, that the +abstruse statements of Hitler at that time had such an effect on the +witness that he says so and so many points are false? Then the +whole tendency which we read out of it cannot be true. As I understand +the witness, Hitler must have had mental reservations back +of such conflicting remarks to commanders. But I believe we can +shorten this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Herr Grossadmiral, according to the wish of the Court, just +explain what the effect was on you and what in your opinion were +the special designs connected with this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: By contrasting these sentences, I wanted only to +show how muddled the speech was. At the end there is a second +part in which a number of doctrinaire, academic opinions on warfare +are expressed and a conclusion to the effect that it was also +a wish of Hitler to have formed in the OKW a research staff to +work out all these plans for war preparation, evaluation of individual +weapons, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, without the participation of the general staffs, +with which he did not like to collaborate. He wanted these things +to be in his own hands. Thus it was the formation of a research +staff which motivated this speech.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemens, I have already told you that +the Tribunal thinks that argument is not evidence. This seems to +be purely argument upon this document. If there is anything in +the shape of recollection as to what passed at this meeting, that +would be evidence; but merely to argue upon the document is not +in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may the witness not say what +effect Hitler’s processes of thought had on him? The Prosecution +say that Hitler and Raeder entered upon a conspiracy together.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He can say he did not understand it or did +not think it was sincere.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I should like to point out that +the witness referred to this point because this is the only passage +from this document which the Prosecution have not read. In this +document the sentences about the research staff, as I noticed immediately, +were not read. This research staff was what Hitler +wanted to obtain.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Herr Grossadmiral, after this speech, was anything changed in +your department?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. The conclusion drawn was: First, that the ship +construction program was to be continued in the same way as in +the past—so Hitler himself said—and in the second place, he said +that the armament programs were to be geared for the year +<span class='pageno' title='41' id='Page_41'></span> +1943-1944. That was the positive thing which I could conclude +for myself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At that time, moreover, I was strongly impressed by the speech +which Hitler himself made at the launching of the battleship +<span class='it'>Bismarck</span> in Hamburg. There he said that the Wehrmacht, as the +keenest instrument of war, had to protect and help to preserve the +peace founded on true justice. That made the greatest impression +on me at that time with regard to Hitler’s intentions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was the fleet at that time in a position to do this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. It was completely incapable.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, if there are any passages in this +document which have not been read and to which you attach +importance, you may read them now; and for the rest, all that +the Tribunal thinks you ought to do is to ask the defendant, what +his recollection was or what happened at that meeting, and if he +can supplement the document as to what happened at the meeting, +he is entitled to do so. The Tribunal does not intend to prevent +your reading anything from the document which has not yet been +read nor from getting from the witness anything which he says +happened at the meeting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I understood the witness to mean +that he recalled the research staff which the Prosecution had not +mentioned. Thus it came about that the witness, since he too knows +the document, at the same time pointed out that the research staff +was also mentioned in the document. I believe that can explain +the misunderstanding. The situation is clear to me, and perhaps +I may read this sentence in that connection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Under Number 3, toward the end of the Document +L-79, it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“To study weak points of the enemy.</p> + +<p>“These studies must not be left to the general staffs. Secrecy +would no longer be guaranteed. The Führer has, therefore, +decided to order the formation of a small research staff within +the OKW composed of representatives of the three branches +of the Wehrmacht and, as occasion arises, the three commanders-in-chief—that +is to say, general staff chiefs.</p> + +<p>“The staff shall keep the Führer constantly informed.</p> + +<p>“The research staff shall undertake the planning of operations +from the theoretical side and the preparations which of +necessity arise therefrom...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. A passage is left out in the +English translation. The copy I have before me says, “These studies +<span class='pageno' title='42' id='Page_42'></span> +must not be left to the general staffs; secrecy would no longer +be guaranteed.” And then it goes on, “This staff shall keep the +Führer informed and shall report to him.” I do not think it is +very important. Go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Apparently the paragraph about the research +staff in the Armed Forces High Command was left out in the +English. Continuing the document:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The purpose of certain regulations concerns no one outside +the staff; however great the increase in armament of our +adversaries may be, they must at some time come to the end +of their resources and ours will be greater. The French have +120,000 men in each class! We shall not be forced into a war, +but we shall not be able to avoid one.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>This research staff, in effect, eliminated the commanders-in-chief +and that was what Hitler wanted to achieve.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If I am correctly informed, the rest has been read by the Prosecution—namely, +the subsequent aim and the principle, to be specific, +the well-known order to keep everything secret and, at the end, +that which the witness remembered, that the shipbuilding program +should not be changed and the armament program should be fixed +for 1943-1944.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Had Hitler at this time intended a +war of aggression, would he have had to speed up any particular +part of the Navy’s armament?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, indeed. He would have had to speed up all naval +construction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Would not the construction of submarines especially +have had to be speeded up?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course, particularly because they could be +built most quickly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: How many submarines did you have at this time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot say exactly. I think about 26.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If I remember rightly, Admiral Dönitz has already +answered that there were 15 capable of sailing in the Atlantic—by +the way, there were altogether 26.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, in the winter of 1938-1939, did you +have a talk with Sir Nevile Henderson on relations between Germany +and England?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, a very short talk at an evening reception in the +Führer’s house, where I stood near Ambassador Henderson and +Herr Von Neurath, and wherein the question was discussed—it was +<span class='pageno' title='43' id='Page_43'></span> +brought up by me—as to whether England had not welcomed Germany’s +offer to set the proportion of strength at 1 to 4 and would not +draw certain conclusions from this reciprocal relationship. Ambassador +Henderson answered, without anyone else having brought +up this question, “Yes, that would be shown in the future when the +colonial question was settled.” I later reported this answer to the +Führer in order to use it to maintain a friendly policy toward +England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We are now at the summer of 1939. Admiral, in +the course of the summer, after the speech of 23 May 1939, did +you talk to Hitler in view of the generally known danger of war, +and what did he tell you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Whenever I talked to the Führer, I always brought up +the question of England, whereby I annoyed him to a certain extent. +I tried to convince him that it would be possible to carry out the +peace policy with England which he himself had urged at the +beginning of his regime. Then he always reassured me that it +remained his intention to steer a policy of peace with England, +always leaving me in the belief that there was no danger of a +clash with England—in any case, that at this time there was no +such danger.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the third key document—namely, +Hitler’s speech before the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939, +at Obersalzberg. There are two documents: Document 1014-PS and +Document 798-PS. Document 1014-PS is Exhibit USA-30, in Raeder +Document Book 10a, Page 269; and Document 798-PS is Exhibit +USA-29, in Document Book 10a, Page 266. In regard to this +Document 1014-PS, which I have here in the original in the form +submitted by the Prosecution, I should like to make a formal +request. This Number 1014-PS was read into the record in the +afternoon session of 26 November 1945 (Volume II, Page 286). +I object to the use of this document. I request that this document +be stricken from the trial record for the following reason...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What document are you speaking about now, +1014-PS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In Raeder Document Book 10a, Page 269, Exhibit +USA-30.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, what are your reasons?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The deficiencies which were already mentioned +in the other transcripts are much greater here. This document is +nothing but two pieces of paper headed “Second Speech by the +Führer, on 22 August 1939.” The original has no heading, has no +file number, no diary number, and no notice that it is secret; no +signature, no date, no... +<span class='pageno' title='44' id='Page_44'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the +original. Yes, Dr. Siemers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It has no date, no signature—in the original in +the folder, it has no indication of where the document comes from. +It is headed “Second Speech...” although it is certain that on this +date Hitler made only one speech, and it is hardly 1½ pages long, +although...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you say it has no date, it is part of +the document itself which says that it is the second speech of the +Führer on the 22d of August 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I said, Mr. President, it has a heading but no date.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But you said it has no date.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It has no date as to when these notes were put +in writing. It has only the date of when the speech is supposed to +have been made. On all documents which the Prosecution submitted, +also in the case of minutes, you will find the date of the +session and the date on which the minutes were set up; also the +place where the minutes were set up, the name of the person who +set it up, an indication that it is secret or something like that. +Furthermore, it is certain that Hitler spoke for 2½ hours. I believe +it is generally known that Hitler spoke very fast. It is quite out +of the question that the minutes could be 1½ pages long if they +are to give the meaning and the content, at least to some extent, +of a speech which lasted 2½ hours. It is important—I may then +refer to still another point. I will submit the original of Document +798-PS afterwards. I am no expert on handwriting or typewriters, +but I notice that this document, which is also not signed, +whose origin we do not know, is written on the same paper with +the same typewriter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You say we do not know where it has come +from—it is a captured document covered by the affidavit which was +made with reference to all other captured documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Well, but I would be grateful to the Prosecution +if, in the case of such an important document, the Prosecution +would be kind enough in order to determine the actual historical +facts to indicate more exactly where it originates. Because it is +not signed by Schmundt or Hossbach or anyone and has no number, +it is only loose pages.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether the Prosecution can +do that, but it seems to me to be rather late in the day to ask for it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United +States): Mr. President, I do not know what the exact origin of this +document is offhand, but I expect that we could probably get some +<span class='pageno' title='45' id='Page_45'></span> +information before the Tribunal if the Tribunal wishes us to do so. +But as the President pointed out, it is a captured document and +everything that counsel says about it seems to go to its weight +rather than to its admissibility.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know where the +document was found, if that is possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I will make an effort to find that out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd just pointed out that +my objection comes rather late. I believe I recall correctly that +repeated objections were raised...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it was I who pointed it out, not +Mr. Dodd.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. I believe I recall correctly that the +Defense on several occasions raised objection during the Prosecution’s +case, and it was said that all statements could be made +during the Defense’s case at a later time—namely, when it is the +defense counsel’s turn to speak.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I only meant that it might not be possible +at this stage to find out exactly where the document came from, +whereas, if the question had been asked very much earlier in the +Trial, it might have been very much easier. That is all I meant. +Have you anything more to add upon why, in your opinion, this +document should be stricken from the record?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like to point out, Mr. President, that +I do not do it for formal reasons but rather for a very substantial +reason. Most important words in this document have constantly +been repeated by the Prosecution during these 5 or 6 months—namely, +the words “Destruction of Poland, main objective... Aim: +elimination of vital forces, not arrival at a certain line.” These +words were not spoken, and such a war aim the German commanders-in-chief +would not have agreed to. For that reason it is +important to ascertain whether this document is genuine.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this connection, may I remind the Court that there is a third +version of this speech as mentioned in this courtroom—namely, +Document L-3, which is even worse than these and which was +published by the press of the whole world. Wherever one spoke +to anyone, this grotesque and brutal speech was brought up. For +that reason it is in the interest of historical truth to ascertain +whether Hitler spoke in this shocking way at this time. Actually, +I admit he used many expressions which were severe, but he did +not use such words, and this is of tremendous significance for the +reputation of all the commanders who were present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Let me point out the next words. They say expressly, “close +your hearts against pity, brutal measures.” Such words were not +<span class='pageno' title='46' id='Page_46'></span> +used. I will be in a position to prove this by another witness, +Generaladmiral Böhm.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I therefore request the Court to decide on my request for striking +this document from the record. I should like to point out that the +document is mentioned in the record at many points. Should the +honorable Court so wish, I would have to look for all the points. +I have found only four or five in the German record. If necessary, +I would give all the points in the English record. It was submitted +on 26 November 1945, afternoon session (Volume II, Page 286).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need bother to do that. +You are now only upon the question of whether the document +should be stricken from the record. If it were to be stricken from +the record, we could find out where it is. Is that all you wish +to say?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: One question to Admiral Raeder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The words which I just read, “brutal measures, elimination of +vital forces”—were these words used in Hitler’s speech at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In my opinion, no. I believe that the version submitted +by Admiral Böhm, which he wrote down on the afternoon +of the same day on the basis of his notes, is the version nearest +to the truth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to achieve clarity on this +question, I submit as Exhibit Raeder-27, in Raeder Document Book 2, +Page 144, an orderly reproduction of this speech.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I also have Document Book 2?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: This is the speech according to the manuscript of +Generaladmiral Hermann Böhm. Generaladmiral Böhm was present +at Hitler’s speech on 22 August 1939 at Obersalzberg. He made +the notes during the speech. He transcribed them in the present +form on the same evening—that is, on 22 August 1939—in the Vier +Jahreszeiten Hotel in Munich. I have certified the correctness of the +copy. The original is in the handwriting of Generaladmiral Böhm. +Böhm has been called by me as a witness for various other questions. +He will confirm that the speech was made in this form as I +have submitted here. A comparison of the two documents shows +that all terms, such as “brutal measures,” are not contained in this +speech. It shows further...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Surely this part of Dr. Siemers’ +argument must go to weight. He has said that a comparison of +the two documents shows such and such. I have just looked at the +end of Admiral Böhm’s affidavit and it contains, I should argue, +every vital thought that is contained in Document 1014-PS. But +whether it does or not, that is a matter of weight, surely. We +<span class='pageno' title='47' id='Page_47'></span> +cannot, in my respectful submission, go into intrinsic comparisons to +decide the admissibility of the document. As I say, on that I should +have a great deal to say by comparing the documents in detail. +That is not before the Tribunal now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal was only wanting to hear +whatever Dr. Siemers has got to say upon the subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: A comparison of the document with Document +798-PS, in the longer and better version, as the Prosecution submitted...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, as Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has +just pointed out, a mere comparison of the documents—of the two +or three documents does not help us as to its admissibility. We +know the facts about the document. It is a document in German, +captured among German documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I understand. I made the statement only in order +to show that I am not raising objections for formal reasons, but +because the thing is actually of great importance. In proof of my...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you will be able to urge that +when you make your speech in criticism of the document as to +its weight. You will be able to point out that it does not bear +comparison with a fuller document taken down by Admiral Böhm +or with the other document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Absolutely right. To explain my formal request, +I refer to my statement on the formal character of the document +which I submitted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The application to strike out Document 1014-PS is denied.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has Counsel for the Prosecution understood +that the Tribunal wishes to have information as to where that +document was found?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord; we will do our +best to get it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and also the other, Document 798-PS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, if Your Lordship pleases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I submitted Document Raeder-27, which +is the Böhm version, to you. You have read the speech in this +version. Is this reproduction correct on the whole, in your recollection? +<span class='pageno' title='48' id='Page_48'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. In my opinion, this version is that one which +corresponds most closely to reality. I remember especially that +Hitler devoted a large portion of his remarks to the point that +England and France would not intervene, giving reasons why they +would not. He mentioned a number of reasons, and I missed just +that portion, in its elaboration, in the other reproductions of +the speech.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the version of the speech Document 798-PS +or Exhibit USA-29 it says verbatim: “I am only afraid that at the +last moment some swine will offer me some plan of arbitration.” +Were those words used in the speech at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In my recollection, certainly not. The Führer was not +accustomed to using expressions like that in speeches which he +made to the generals.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On the other hand, the version put forth by +Böhm shows that Hitler had, by this time, decided to attack +Poland. I am asking you to give us briefly the impression, which +the speech made on you at the time. Tell me also why, despite +this speech which even in this version is severe, you retained your +office as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Without doubt, I had the impression that the situation +was serious and tremendously tense. The fact, however, that Hitler +in his speech put too great a stress on proving that France and +England would not intervene, and the second fact that Herr Von +Ribbentrop, the Reich Foreign Minister, left for Moscow on the +same day to sign a pact there, as we were told—these things filled +not only me but all listeners as well with the strong hope that +here again was a case of a clever move by Hitler, which in the +end he would successfully solve in a peaceful way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Therefore I saw no reason to resign my office at that moment. +I would have considered that pure desertion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection +I would like, because of their chronological correspondence, to +submit the two documents Exhibits Raeder-28 and 29, and I ask +that the Tribunal only take judicial notice without my making +further reference to them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution have cited Document C-155 and have accused +you, through this document...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, of the documents to +which Dr. Siemers has just referred—Documents Raeder-28 and 29—the +first is a memorandum of General Gamelin and the second +is a letter from General Weygand to General Gamelin of 9 September +1939. +<span class='pageno' title='49' id='Page_49'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Your Lordship will remember that the Prosecution objected to +these documents as being irrelevant, and, My Lord, the Prosecution +maintain that objection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not wish to interrupt Dr. Siemers’ examination any more +than is necessary. If at the moment he is merely asking the Tribunal +to take judicial notice of the documents and does not intend +to use them, it would probably be convenient—in order not to +interrupt the examination-in-chief—that I merely indicate formally +that we are maintaining our objection to the document. Of course, +I am at the disposal of the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is this the position, that they were allowed +to be translated and put in the document book but that no further +order of the Tribunal has been given?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No further order has been given +and therefore, My Lord, it is still open to us to object, as I understand +the position.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better deal with it +now, then.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I make a few remarks on this point? +I believe...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But we had better hear the objection first, +had we not? And then we will hear you afterwards.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, as you wish. This is a purely +formal point. I believe that Sir David erred slightly in referring +to Document Raeder-28. There was no objection to this document +by the Prosecution, but only against Document Raeder-29.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My friend is quite right; we did +not object to the translation of 28. However, My Lord, it falls +into the same category as 29, and I would still raise an objection. +I apologize to Your Lordship if I conveyed the impression that +we had made an objection before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, the Number 28 is a letter from General Gamelin to +M. Daladier on the 1st of September 1939, in which General Gamelin +gives his views as to the problem of the neutrality of Belgium +and Luxembourg and contrasts that view with the view of the +French Government.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, My Lord, I submit that that expression of opinion on the +part of General Gamelin is in itself intrinsically too remote from +the issues of this Trial to be of any relevance or probative value.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, apart from its intrinsic nature, the position is that this +was a document which, as I understand from Dr. Siemers’ verification +on Page 158, is taken from the <span class='it'>White Book of the German +<span class='pageno' title='50' id='Page_50'></span> +Foreign Office</span>, from the secret files of the French General Staff, +which could not have been captured until sometime after June 1940. +Therefore, as a secondary reason, it can have no relevance to any +opinion formed by the Defendant Raeder in September of 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, the second document is, as I said to the Tribunal, +a letter to General Gamelin from General Weygand, who was then +the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army in the Levant. It +describes a plan which General Weygand had in mind with regard +to possible operations in Greece. Nothing came of these operations +before June 1940 when an armistice was made by Marshal Pétain +on behalf of part of the French people—although not, of course, of +the whole—and it can have no relevance to October 1940 when +Greece was invaded by Italy, or to the position at the end of 1940 +and the beginning of 1941 when the invasion of Greece begins to +be considered in the German directives and operational orders +which have been put in before the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is the first point. And the same secondary point applies, +that it was also a captured document which could not have been +captured before June 1940; therefore, it can have no relevance to +this defendant’s state of mind in August or September of 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, as a matter of convenience, I have just made a list of +the documents to which objections will be made and, My Lord, +there are one or two additions which my French and Soviet +colleagues have asked me to make, and I will deal with them +when they arise.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, I would just like the Tribunal to have in mind that +there are four geographical groups of documents as opposed to the +groups under which they are arranged here, which the Tribunal +will have to consider. One is formed by documents relating to +the Low Countries, the second, which is Group G on the list which +I have just put before the Tribunal, deals with Norway; a third +deals with Greece, of which Document Raeder-29 is an example; +and a fourth is Group E in the list which I have just put in, dealing +with tentative proposals and suggestions made by various military +figures with regard to the oil field in the Caucasus or operations +on the Danube.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, the same objections which I have made particularly +with regard to Documents Raeder-28 and 29 will apply generally +to these groups, and I thought that I ought to draw the Tribunal’s +attention to that fact. In addition, my friend Colonel Pokrovsky has +intimated to me some special objections which we will have to +certain documents on which he can assist the Tribunal himself +when they arise.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But, My Lord, I do take these specific cases, 28 and 29, as +objectionable in themselves, and I draw the Tribunal’s attention +<span class='pageno' title='51' id='Page_51'></span> +to the fact that they are also typically objectionable as belonging +to certain groups.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The decision of the Tribunal, Your Lordship, is given in the +morning session of 2 May 1946. Your Lordship said, “The question +of their admissibility will be decided after they have been +translated.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French +Republic): May it please the Tribunal, I would ask the Tribunal +for an opportunity to associate myself publicly with the declaration +just made by Sir David and to propose a few examples which will +show the degree of importance which should be attached to the +documents in question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Defense is asking that the Tribunal take into account a +document published in the German <span class='it'>White Book</span> Number 5, under +Number 8. This document reports a statement by a French prisoner +of war who is supposed to have said that he had been in Belgium +since 15 April. However, the German <span class='it'>White Book</span> gives neither +the name of this prisoner nor any indication of his unit. We have +none of the information which we need in order to judge whether +the statement is relevant. We are therefore faced with a document +which is not authentic and which has no value as evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Defense is asking that Document Raeder-102 of the same +document book be admitted by the Tribunal. I ask the Tribunal +to let me make a few observations to show the one-sided manner +in which these documents have been assembled by the German +authorities in the <span class='it'>White Book</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I would say, first of all, that this Document Raeder-102 has not +been quoted at length. The French Delegation has referred to the +text of the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>. We have read it carefully. This +document is only a preparatory order in view of defensive preparations +organized by the Belgians on the French-Belgian frontier +facing France. We have consulted the Belgian military authorities. +This order was a manifestation of the Belgian Government’s determination +to defend Belgium’s neutrality on all its frontiers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is therefore contrary to the truth to try to prove by means +of this document the existence of staff contacts between Brussels, +London, and Paris, which, if they had existed, would have been +contrary to the policy of neutrality.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The commentary made by the German Minister for Foreign +Affairs in the introduction to the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>, Page 11 of +the French text, took the counsel by surprise and certainly did not +mislead Admiral Raeder, who is a serviceman. In fact, it is at +the price of a lie that the official commentator affirms, on the one +hand, that the expression “les forces amies” (friendly forces) used +<span class='pageno' title='52' id='Page_52'></span> +in this document means French and British troops, whereas in +reality it is a regular expression used in the Belgian Army to describe +Belgian units in the immediate vicinity of those actually fighting. +On the other hand, the German commentator claims, and I quote, +“The general line Tournai-Antoing, of the canal from Mons to +Condé, Saint Ghislain and Binche, is partly in Belgian and partly +in French territory.” It is sufficient to look at a map to see that +all those localities are in Belgian territory and they are all at +least some dozens of kilometers distant from the French-Belgian +frontier, and in places, 60 kilometers from the French frontier.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to excuse this interruption. I thought it was +advisable to enlighten them by giving a convincing example of +the value of the evidence furnished by the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks the most +convenient course would be to hear your argument now upon these +documents, not only upon 28 to 29, but upon the other documents +specified in Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe’s list, and then the Tribunal +would consider these documents after the adjournment and would +give its decision tomorrow morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I should be very +grateful if it would be possible to proceed in a somewhat different +manner. I should like to call attention to the fact that a rather +lengthy debate regarding documents has already taken place, and +the decision of the Court followed. I believe that if I comment +upon all the documents at this point a great deal of time will be +lost, since the coherence of the documents will emerge of itself +later during my presentation of evidence. If I now deal with the +list submitted by Sir David, I would, in order to show my reasons, +have to set forth all that which will appear again in the regular +course of testimony later on. I thought that the decision of the +Tribunal first to present the documents in the document book was +specifically to save time, and then objections could be made one by +one as individual documents are presented.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I know; but there are a very great number +of documents. The Tribunal will have to hear an argument upon +each document if we do what you suggest, reading the list of Sir +David. There are 30 or 40 documents, I suppose.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has already stated that +he will be guided according to different geographical groups. Therefore, +there will not be objections with regard to each document but +rather with regard to each group of documents and each group of +questions—for instance, an objection in the Norway case against +all Norwegian documents or in the Greek case against all Greek +documents. It would be easier to deal with matters that way, since +<span class='pageno' title='53' id='Page_53'></span> +in my testimony I shall be dealing with Greece and Norway +anyway, whereas if I do so now I shall have to say everything +twice. But I shall of course be guided by the decision of the +honorable Tribunal. I only fear that an unnecessary amount of +time will be lost that way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I only want to say +one word on procedure. I did hope that Dr. Siemers and I had +already occupied sufficient of the Tribunal’s time in arguing this +point because, of course, the arguments as to relevancy must be +the same. Whether they are so obviously irrelevant as not to be +translatable, or whether they are inadmissible, at any rate my +arguments were the same, and I did not intend to repeat the argument +which I had made before the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Dr. Siemers already assisted the Tribunal for an hour and a half +on this point, which we discussed before, and I hoped that if I stated +as I did state that I have maintained the points which I put before +the Tribunal in my previous argument, that Dr. Siemers might be +able on this occasion to shorten matters and to say that he relied +on the—if I may say so—very full argument which the Tribunal +had on the other occasion. That is why I thought it might be +convenient if we dealt with them now and put this problem out of +the need for further consideration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks that you +must argue these questions now, and it hopes that you will argue +them shortly, as your arguments have already been heard in favor +of them. But we think that you must argue them now and not +argue each individual document as it comes up, and it will consider +the matter. It already has these documents, but it will consider +the matter again and decide the matter tonight.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for +the U.S.S.R.): My Lord, inasmuch as the Tribunal decided to have +Dr. Siemers argue the point which was expressed by Sir David +Maxwell-Fyfe and other prosecutors, I think it is my duty to name +three documents to which our Prosecution object.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Soviet Prosecution would like to object altogether to five +documents. Two of them—I have in mind Documents Raeder-70 +and 88—have already been included by my friend Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe +in the list which has been given to the Tribunal. So all +I have to do now is to name the three remaining numbers, so that +Dr. Siemers would have it easier in answering all together. I name +Documents Raeder-13, 27, and 83.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document Raeder-13 is a record of a report of Captain Lohmann. +There is an idea expressed in this report which I cannot call other +than a mad and propagandist idea of a typical Nazi. The idea +<span class='pageno' title='54' id='Page_54'></span> +is that the aim of the Red Army is world revolution, and that the +Red Army is really trying to incite world revolution. I consider +that it would not be proper if such nightmares and politically +harmful ideas were reflected in the documents which are to be +admitted by the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My second objection is in connection with the Document +Raeder-27. This is a record which was made by a voluntary +reporter, Böhm, of an address of Hitler’s at Obersalzberg. The +Tribunal already rejected Dr. Siemers’ application to include two +documents pertaining to the same questions and emphasized the +fact that the Tribunal does not wish to compare the authenticity +of different documents pertaining to or dealing with the same +question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I consider that inasmuch as the Tribunal already has at its +disposal among documents which were admitted two records +dealing with Hitler’s address at Obersalzberg, therefore, there is +no necessity to admit the third record of his speech, especially +since in this third version there are altogether shameless, +slanderous, and calumnious remarks against the Armed Forces of +the Soviet Union and the leaders of the Soviet Government. Neither +the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union nor we as representatives +of the Soviet State would ever agree to have such remarks included +in the record.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The third document is Document Raeder-83. Document 83 is +an excerpt from the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>. Since the authenticity +of this <span class='it'>White Book</span> has already been questioned by Dr. Dubost, +I consider it material which cannot be relied upon, and in particular +with regard to the Document Raeder-83. There are several remarks, +harmful to the Soviet Union, which have absolutely no political +basis—that is, the passage pertaining to the relations between the +Soviet Union and Finland. So on the grounds of such general +political motives, I would ask the High Tribunal to exclude as +evidence Document Raeder-83 from the list of documents which +were presented to the Tribunal by Defense Counsel Siemers. +Furthermore, strictly speaking, it is absolutely clear that this document +is irrelevant. That is all I want to say.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I note to my regret +that we are back at the beginning again in our debate about documents; +for we are disputing about documents now which were not +mentioned at all in the original debate concerning documents, +which took place on 1 May. I had believed, however, that I could +rely on this one principle, that at least those documents which at +that time were not objected to would be considered granted. Now, +however, I find that those documents which were not discussed at +that time at all are under dispute. It is extremely difficult... +<span class='pageno' title='55' id='Page_55'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks you are +entirely in error in that, because it is obvious that a document +which has not been translated cannot be finally passed on by the +Prosecution or by the Tribunal, and the fact that the Prosecution +does not object to it at that stage does not prevent it from objecting +at a later stage when it has been translated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: There were some documents to which I was +told that the Prosecution did not object, and with regard to them +I believed at any rate that that was final, just as with reference +to some documents...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought I had made myself clear. What +I said was this: The Prosecution in objecting or not objecting to +a document before it is translated does not in any way bind them +not to object to it after it is translated. Is that clear?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall take these documents one by one. +First of all, I would like to start with those documents which +Colonel Pokrovsky...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, no, Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal will not +listen to these documents taken one by one. If they can be treated +in groups they must be treated in groups. They have been treated +in groups by Sir David, and I am not saying you must adhere +exactly to the same groups, that the Tribunal is not proposing to +hear each document one by one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Then it is a misunderstanding. +I wanted to discuss those documents at the beginning, because +there are some things which are not clear and which were objected +to by Colonel Pokrovsky. I did not realize that Colonel Pokrovsky +mentioned the documents in groups. I believe he mentioned five +documents—three of them individually—and I believe that, though +I have not understood everything, I can deal with these individually +mentioned documents one by one. However, I shall be glad to start +with the group laid down by Sir David if that is to be dealt with +first. Shall I first...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you said you were going to deal with +the documents one by one, you meant all the documents one by +one? I am not suggesting that you...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Honor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You can deal with Colonel Pokrovsky first +if you like.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Colonel Pokrovsky has as his first objection +Document Raeder-13. This deals with a document dated 1935. +Certainly Colonel Pokrovsky can offer some objection to the +contents of this document, but how a document can be classed as +<span class='pageno' title='56' id='Page_56'></span> +irrelevant just because a certain sentence allegedly contains propaganda +is not quite clear to me. I believe I could find sentences in +other documents which have been submitted during these past +6 months which might be interpreted in some way as propaganda. +I cannot quite imagine that that is an objection, and I would like +to remind the Tribunal that right at the beginning of the proceedings, +when we were dealing with Austria, the Tribunal rejected an +objection made by the Defense regarding a letter. The Defense +objected because the author of the letter was available as a witness. +Thereupon, the Tribunal, and justly so, decided that the letter was +evidence. The only matter for debate is the probative value. The +Tribunal admitted this document. And in connection with this I +should like to mention that a lecture at a university which is set +down in writing is a document. The lecture deals with the naval +agreement, and I believe that therewith the relevancy...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, have you not made your point +on Number 13? You said the majority of the thing is clearly +relevant, though there is one sentence which may be alleged to be +propaganda, and, therefore, the document ought not be struck out. +Is that not your point?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, I am saying that it is a document which has +a bearing on the evidence used in this Trial, and the Soviet Prosecution +cannot dispute it because it was a lecture given in 1935. +I cannot at all understand the use of the word “propaganda” by +Colonel Pokrovsky in connection with this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I do not understand what you say in +the least. I thought I put the point you had made. I thought you +made it clear that the document in itself was relevant and could +not be rejected because it contained one sentence which was +alleged propaganda. That is your point, and I shall want it stated +in one or two sentences, and the Tribunal will consider it. I do +not see why the time of the Tribunal should be taken up with a +long argument about something else.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Colonel Pokrovsky secondly, if I understood the +interpreter, objected to Document Number Raeder-27. In this +instance we are concerned with the speech of Hitler at Obersalzberg +on 22 August 1932. It is Exhibit Raeder-27. It is very hard +for me to comment on this document since I do not understand the +objections of Colonel Pokrovsky. It deals...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The objection was that there was no necessity +for a third record of the speech. There were two records which +you objected to, and he said there was no necessity for a third.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I would like to add to that then, Your Honor, +that the Soviet Delegation does not agree with the Delegation of +<span class='pageno' title='57' id='Page_57'></span> +the United States. In the record at that time the representative of +the American Delegation said that if any one had a better version +of that speech, he should present it. Therefore, I agree with the +opinion of the American Prosecution and I believe, aside from that, +that not a word about the relevancy of a speech which was made +shortly before the outbreak of the war is necessary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document Raeder-83 is the third document objected to by +Colonel Pokrovsky. This contains the sixth session of the Supreme +Council on 28 March 1940, the drafting of a resolution with the +heading “Strictly Secret.” In this document the Supreme Council—that +is, the constituents of the Allied leadership—agreed that the +French and British Governments on Monday, 1 April, would tender +a note to the Norwegian and Swedish Governments. The contents +of this note is then given, and there is a reference to the point of +view of vital interests, and it says there then the position of the +neutrals would be considered by the Allies as one contrary to their +vital interests, and that it would evoke an appropriate reaction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Under Figure 1c of this document, it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Any attempt by the Soviet Union which aimed at obtaining +from Norway a position on the Atlantic Coast would be +contrary to the vital interests of the Allies and would provoke +the appropriate reaction.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You do not need to read the document, do +you? I mean you can tell us what the substance of it is. It appears +to be an objection to any further attack upon Finland, which would +be considered by the Allies to be contrary to their vital interests. +That is all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, just this expression “vital interests” +is the decisive one. I do not wish, as the Prosecution always seem +to think, to bring up some sort of objection from the point of view +of <span class='it'>tu quoque</span>. I want to show only what the situation was according +to international law, and that at the same time when Admiral +Raeder was entertaining certain thoughts regarding Norway, +Greece, and so forth, the Allied agencies had the same thoughts +and were basing these thoughts on the same concept of international +law which, as I recently said, was upheld by Kellogg—namely +that the right of self-preservation still exists. Now I can +prove my point through these documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The point made against you by Sir David +was that the document could not have come into the hands of the +German authorities until after the fall of France.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall deal with the groupings designated +by Sir David. +<span class='pageno' title='58' id='Page_58'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Sir David made certain fundamental statements. Regarding +Document Numbers Raeder-28 and 29, he pointed out specifically +that in one case they were the thoughts of General Gamelin and +in the other case those of General Weygand, and that these ideas +were not known to the Germans at that time since these documents +were not yet in our hands. The latter point is correct. The concept +and the plan of occupying Greece, of destroying Romanian oil +wells, those thoughts were known to the Germans—namely, through +their intelligence service. The Prosecution did not present the +data of the German High Command which show these reports. +Since I do not have these documents, I believe it would be just +if I am given the possibility of presenting the actual facts which +were known to Germany and in this way prove them. I have no +other proofs. That it is agreeable to the Prosecution to deprive +me of the documents which I need for the defense, I can understand; +but the Prosecution must also understand the fact that I +consider it important that those documents which are definite proof +of certain plans remain at my disposal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The charge has been made against Admiral Raeder that it was +an aggressive war—a criminal war of aggression—to formulate +plans for the occupation of Greece. Document Raeder-29 shows +that General Weygand and General Gamelin on 9 September 1939 +concern themselves with planning the occupation of neutral +Salonika. So if this is the case, I cannot understand how one can +point an accusing finger at Admiral Raeder, on the German side, for +having concerned himself with such plans a year and half later. +I believe, therefore, that these and similar documents must be +granted me, for only from them can the military planning and the +value of the military planning, or the objectionable side—that is +the criminal side of the planning, be understood. The strategic +thinking of the defendant can be understood only if one knows +approximately what strategic thinking prevailed at the same time +with the enemy. The strategic reasoning of Admiral Raeder was +shut up in an airtight compartment but depended on the reports +received about the strategic planning of the opposition. It is a +reciprocal activity. This reciprocal activity is necessary for an +understanding. Therefore, in view of this very essential point, I ask +to be granted this kind of document since, as I have recently stated, +I do not know how I can carry on my defense at all in the face +of these grave accusations regarding Greece and Norway if all of +my documents are stricken. I believe that I am understood correctly +when I do not assert that we were cognizant of these documents. +But Germany knew the contents of these documents, and I believe +that is sufficient.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May it please the Tribunal, we are once again at Document +Raeder-66 in Group A. This Document Raeder-66 is the opinion +<span class='pageno' title='59' id='Page_59'></span> +of Dr. Mosler, an expert in international law, about the Norwegian +operation as judged from the standpoint of international law.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Since we are always talking about saving time in this courtroom, +I would have my doubts about rejecting this article, for a refusal +would force me to set forth the trend of thought point by point in +detail, and I believe that it is much easier for the Tribunal, for the +Prosecution and for me, if I submit general legal arguments in this +connection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this is a document +which is a matter of legal argument. If the Tribunal thinks it +would be of any assistance to have the argument in documentary +form, I willingly withdraw my objection to that. That is on quite a +different project than the other one, and I want to help in any +way I can.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>While I am before the microphone: I did mention that there +were two other documents that fall into the same group. Document +Raeder-34 falls into Group B, and Document Raeder-48 into +the Group E.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, I did mention 28 when I was addressing the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I do not wish to +dispute Document Raeder-66, I have really done this just to ease +the situation for everyone. The additional documents in this group +are Raeder-101 to 107. I cannot say that this is a homogeneous +group. One document deals with Norway, another deals with +Belgium, a third deals with the Danube. The unity of this group +escapes me. Basically these documents have this point in common: +that, as I have already stated, a plan existed in the Allied General +Staff, as well as in the German, and all were based on the tenet +of international law regarding the right of self-preservation and +vital interests.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In order to be brief at this point I should like to refer to Document +Raeder-66 particularly, and to save time I ask that the +quotations from this document be considered the basis for my +remarks today on the right of self-preservation. I am referring +to the quotations on Page 3 and Page 4 of this expert opinion. The +legal situation is made very clear therein, and it is set forth very +clearly in this expert opinion that, with regard to the question of +the occupation of Norway, we are not concerned with whether the +Allies had actually landed in Norway but only whether such a plan +existed, that we are not concerned with the fact whether Norway +agreed or did not agree. The danger of a change of neutrality +according to international law gives one the right to use some +compensating measure or to attack on one’s own accord; and this +basic tenet has been maintained in the entire literature which is +<span class='pageno' title='60' id='Page_60'></span> +quoted in this document, and to which I shall refer later in my +defense speech.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Out of group 101 to 107, I have to mention Document Raeder-107 +especially. Document Raeder-107 is not concerned at all with the +<span class='it'>White Books</span> as the other documents are. 107 is an affidavit by +Schreiber. Schreiber was naval attaché at Oslo from October 1939 +onward. From the beginning I have said that I needed Schreiber +as a witness. In the meantime, I dispensed with Schreiber because +even though we tried for weeks, we could not find him. I discussed +this matter with Sir David and with Colonel Phillimore. I was +advised that there would be no objection on this formal point since +Schreiber suddenly and of his own accord reappeared again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If, as the Prosecution wish, this piece of evidence is taken from +me—namely, the affidavit of Schreiber about the reports which +Admiral Raeder received from Oslo and, in addition to that, the +documents from which the authenticity of these reports may be +shown—then I have no evidence for this entire question at all. +Besides, Schreiber was in Oslo during the occupation and he has +commented in his affidavit with regard to the behavior of the Navy +and the efforts of Admiral Raeder in connection with the regrettable +civil administration of Terboven. Therefore, I am asking the High +Tribunal to grant this affidavit to me or to grant Schreiber as a +witness so that he can testify personally. This latter course, +however, would take up more time. I have limited my evidence +through witnesses to such a degree that I believe that, in view of +the entire span of 15 years with which we are dealing, in the case +of the Defendant Raeder at least, such an affidavit should be +granted me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With regard to Group B, I should like to refer to the remarks +which I have already made. As far as I can see, the group seems +to be thoroughly heterogeneous, but I believe they are all documents +taken from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>. The same ideas should be +applied which I have recently expressed to the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think Sir David recognized that there was +a certain degree of lack of identity in these groups, but he suggested +that they all fall into geographical groups: one group, the Low +Countries; one group, Norway; one group, Greece; and one group, +the Caucasus and the Danube—which agrees with “E.” That is +what he said. Could you not deal with them in those geographical +groups?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have already talked about Norway and in that connection +I therefore refer to the remarks I have already made. I have +already briefly mentioned Greece. I would like to say that there +<span class='pageno' title='61' id='Page_61'></span> +was a double accusation made: One, that neutral ships were sunk—namely, +neutral Greek ships, and secondly, the accusation of an +aggressive war against Greece—that is, the occupation of all Greece.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With regard to the last point, I have already made a few statements. +Dealing with the Greek merchantmen I would like to say +only that in this case the action and attitude of the defendant +appears justified in that he received reports which coincided with +the documents which were found a month later in France. The +same reports were received by Raeder when he expressed his views +to Hitler. I would like to prove that these reports which came to +him through the intelligence service were not invented by the +intelligence service but were actual facts. The same applies to the +oil regions. Plans existed to destroy the Romanian oil wells and +furthermore there was a plan to destroy the Caucasian oil wells; +both had the object of hurting the enemy; in the one case Germany +alone—as far as Romania was concerned—and in the second case +Germany and Russia, because at that time Russia was on friendly +terms with Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>These plans are—and this is shown by the documents—in the +same form as all other documents presented by the Prosecution. +These documents as well, in their entirety, are “top secret,” +“personal,” “confidential.” Just as the Prosecution have always said, +“Why did you do everything secretly? That is suspicious.” These +documents contain ideas based on strategic planning just as do the +documents presented by the Prosecution. That is something which +arises from the nature of war and which is not meant to be an +accusation on my part, nor should it be construed as an accusation +against Admiral Raeder by the Prosecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then the group of Ribbentrop documents follows. I can say +only what I said recently. And as I glance at it cursorily now, the +documents in the Ribbentrop document book are not as complete +as they are here. Therefore, I believe it is important to take the +documents and to investigate their complete content from the point +of view of Raeder rather than the point of view of Ribbentrop. +That perhaps may have taken place, as the High Tribunal +suggested the other day. Then I believe, however, it is not an +objection which can be used by the Prosecution to say that in the +case of Ribbentrop they were partially admitted and partially +rejected. For some documents which were granted Ribbentrop were +refused me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then we turn to Group “E,” and that is <span class='it'>tu quoque</span>. I believe +I have already spoken sufficiently on that point just recently. +I dispute it again and I cannot understand why the Prosecution +will not agree with me on that. I do not wish to object. I am not +saying <span class='it'>tu quoque</span>; I am only saying that there is strategic planning +<span class='pageno' title='62' id='Page_62'></span> +which is carried on in every army and there are tenets in international +law which applied to the Allies exactly in the same way +as to us, and I beg to be granted these possibilities of comparison in +foreign politics.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe herewith that I have dealt with all points so far as it +is possible for me to define my position in such a brief period of +time with regard to about 50 documents, and I am asking the High +Tribunal not to make my work more difficult by refusing these +documents to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will carefully consider these +documents and your arguments.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 17 May 1946, at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='63' id='Page_63'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND DAY</span><br/> Friday, 17 May 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have given careful and prolonged +attention to the consideration of the documents offered by +Dr. Siemers on behalf of the Defendant Raeder; and they, therefore, +do not wish the documents which they propose to admit to be read +because they have already read them all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I will now deal with the documents individually.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document 66 is admitted for the purposes of argument, and not +as evidence; Document 101 is denied; Documents 102 to 105 are +admitted; Document 106 is denied; Document 107 is admitted; Document +39 is denied; Document 63 is admitted; Document 64 is denied; +Document 99 is denied; Document 100 is admitted; Documents 102 +to 107 are admitted; Document 38 is denied; Document 50 is denied; +Document 55 is denied; Document 58 is denied; Documents 29, 56, +57, 60, and 62 are denied. I should have included in that group +Document 28, which is also denied. Documents 31, 32, 36, 37, and 39 +are denied; Document 41 is admitted; Document 99 has already been +denied, and Document 101 has already been denied; Document 59 +is admitted; Document 68 is denied; Document 70 is denied; Document +72 is denied; Document 74 is denied; Document 75 is admitted; +Document 77 is admitted; Document 79 is admitted; Document 80 +is admitted; Document 84 is admitted; Document 85, which is on +Page 82 of Volume V, is admitted; Document 87 is denied; Document +88 is admitted; Document 91 is admitted; Document 13 is +admitted; Document 27 is admitted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution may, if they wish it, apply to cross-examine the +witness who made that document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United +States): That is Admiral Böhm.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Admiral Böhm, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document 83 is admitted; Document 34 is admitted; Document 48 +is denied.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Have I gone too quickly for you, Dr. Siemers? You have the +last few?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I heard everything. +<span class='pageno' title='64' id='Page_64'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, yesterday afternoon the Tribunal +asked that we ascertain the origins, if possible, of Document 1014-PS. +Some question was raised about it by Dr. Siemers. It is Exhibit +USA-30.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have had a search made, and I have some information that +we are prepared to submit concerning this document. I should +like to point out that 1014-PS and 798-PS and L-3 are documents +all concerning this same speech made at Obersalzberg on 22 August +1939. They were offered in evidence by Mr. Alderman of the +American staff on the 26th day of November 1945.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to point out that L-3, to which Dr. Siemers made +reference yesterday, was offered only for identification, as the +record shows for the proceedings of that day on the 26th of November, +and has received the mark Exhibit Number USA-28 for +identification only. Mr. Alderman pointed out, as appears in the +record, that he was not offering it in evidence, that it was a paper +which came into our hands originally through the services of a +newspaperman, and that later on the Documents 798-PS and +1014-PS were found among captured documents. They referred to +the same speech in Obersalzberg. Mr. Alderman offered these two +at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now Document 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29, and Document +1014-PS, Exhibit Number USA-30, were both found by the +forces of the United States in this fashion:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>They had been taken from the OKW headquarters in Berlin, +and in the course of various journeys in those days they finally +arrived at one place and were stored, it now appears, at various +places by the OKW under the control of a General Winter of the +German forces; and they were transported in three railway trains +to Saalfelden in the Austrian Tyrol. Subsequently, General Winter +ordered that all documents in his possession be turned over to the +Allied forces and they were. These particular documents, together +with some other papers, were turned over by General Winter and +members of his staff at that time; and on the 21st day of May 1945, +they were removed from Saalfelden where they were under the +control of General Winter and taken to the Third U.S. Army Document +Center at Munich. While at Munich they were sorted and +cataloged by Department G-2 Supreme Headquarters of the +American Expeditionary Force with the assistance of clerks from +the OKW and OKH. On the 16th of June 1945 these documents, +together with others, were removed on six trucks from the headquarters +of the Third Army at Munich and were taken to the U.S. +Group Control Council Number 32 at Seckenheim, Germany, which +was located in the former offices of the I.G. Farben Company, and +were placed on shelves on the third floor of the building and kept +<span class='pageno' title='65' id='Page_65'></span> +under guard. Between the 16th of June 1945 and the 30th of August +1945, the task of collecting, sorting, assembling and cataloging these +documents was carried out under the supervision of the British +Colonel Austin, with personnel of the Supreme Headquarters and +the G-2 Document Center of the G-2 Operational Intelligence +Section, 6889 Berlin Document Section, and the British Enemy +Document Unit, and the British Military Intelligence Research +Section. Beginning on the 5th day of July 1945, and continuing +until the 30th of August 1945, these documents were screened at +that place by members of the staff of the United States Chief +Counsel. Lieutenant Margolies, who is here in the courtroom and +a member of our staff, personally picked these documents out of +your file 798-PS and 1014-PS from the OKW captured files, brought +them to Nuremberg, and lodged them in the document room where +they have been kept under strict security ever since.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, that is the history of these two documents about which +Dr. Siemers raised some question yesterday—a considerable question +I might say—and inferred there was something strange about +their contents. I think the story which I have given in the form +of a statement over the signature of Lieutenant Commander Hopper +clearly establishes the source and where they have been ever since; +and I think it is only fair to say that, since Dr. Siemers saw fit +to point out that this language sounded extremely harsh and was +attributed to Hitler, these documents were offered to show these +people were actually talking about aggressive war. The reading +of the three documents by the Tribunal will clearly show they are +all in agreement in substance; of course, there are differences in +phraseology, but the important thing and purpose for which they +were offered was to show that these people were talking aggressive +war. I might say I am not surprised to find my friend is sensitive +about the remark, but I think the unanswered proof in the case +thus far shows that not only were these things said but they +were done.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: May it please the Court. No doubt it is a mistake +in translation. We understood 106 had been rejected the first time +and admitted the second time in the Group 102 to 107.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was my mistake. I did say +that the Group 102 to 107 were admitted; but I have also said 106 +was rejected, and it is rejected. It is entirely my mistake. 106 is +rejected.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: 106 is thrown out and 102 to 107 are also rejected, +are they?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, I will state the exact numbers: 102, 103, +104, 105, and 107 are admitted. +<span class='pageno' title='66' id='Page_66'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: Very good. Mr. President, we want to offer further +explanations on 102 to 107 during the course of the proceedings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I say a few words concerning +the statement made by Mr. Dodd?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I had no doubts, and I certainly have no doubt now, that since +these documents were found they have been handled very correctly +and Mr. Dodd spoke only about that. I believe it is important to +establish: Whether one can determine the connection these documents +had with other documents, because in that way one can see +whether these were documents belonging to a certain adjutant. For +instance, were they together with the Hossbach papers or together +with the Schmundt file? If, for instance, the documents were with +the Schmundt documents it is probable that they belonged to the +adjutant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That all goes to the weight of the document, +does it not? No doubt, a document which is signed has more weight +than a document which is not signed. All those matters the Tribunal +will take into account when considering the documents, but +the admissibility of the document depends upon its being a German +document found and captured.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I wanted to say this only because +it is unpleasant to have the American Delegation misunderstand +my motion concerning the document. I make no charges concerning +the manner in which the document was found, I merely say that +it is undecided among which papers it was found. It came to my +attention that Mr. Dodd treated the three documents concerned in +quite the same way, whereas Mr. Alderman on Page 188 of the +record (Volume II, Page 286), states that one of these three documents, +L-3, was evidently not in order because of its doubtful +origin. And therefore he withdrew the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I then, if it please the Court, continue with the examination +of the Defendant Raeder?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, we have a few final questions +concerning the conspiracy. I believe it will not take much time. +I ask you to look at the Document C-155. That is Exhibit GB-214, +in Document Book 10, Page 24—Document Book 10 of the British +Delegation, Page 24.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is your letter of 11 June 1940, which was sent to 74 Navy +offices and which the Prosecution has called a letter of justification. +The Prosecution wants to deduce from this that you knew that a war +was to be expected as early as the summer of 1939. I should like +you to answer this charge very briefly. +<span class='pageno' title='67' id='Page_67'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: There is manifold proof to show that I was not +expecting a war in the fall at all, and in view of the small extent +of rearmament of the German Navy this was quite natural. I have +stated quite clearly in my speech before the U-boat officers in +Swinemünde that we could not count on it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And what was the reason for that letter, C-155?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The reason was that a number of torpedo boats had +misfired and this could be traced to the fact that torpedoes had +not yet been as perfectly developed as they should have been at +the beginning of a war. An additional reason was that, now that +the war had so suddenly broken out, many officers believed that +it would have been better to have developed the submarine weapon +as much as possible first, so that at least this weapon would be +ready in large numbers in the event of a war. I objected to that +opinion precisely because such a war was not to be expected. And +on Page 6, 8th paragraph, I emphasize again—in the second line—that +the Führer hoped until the end to postpone the imminent +dispute with England until 1944 or 1945. I am speaking here of +an imminent dispute. An imminent dispute is not exactly something +to strive for, it is rather to be feared.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: There is another key document, that is, Document +789-PS, Exhibit USA-23, the very long speech made by Hitler +on 23 November 1939 before the commanders-in-chief.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The document, Mr. President, is in Document Book 10a on +Page 261. This is again a Hitler speech where there is no indication +of who recorded it. Signature and date are missing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Since this is similar to the other +documents I do not have to question you on that point. I would +merely like to know, Admiral, did that speech also betray a +definite background, a certain mental reservation on the part of +Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. There was at that time a rather severe conflict +between Hitler and the commanders-in-chief of the Army, and also +a difference of opinion with the leading generals concerning the +offensive in the West. The Führer assembled all the leaders in +order to give them his opinion about this whole matter. He stated—and +I was present myself—that up to that time he had always +been right in his decisions and that he would also be right in the +opinion that the western offensive had to be undertaken in the +fall if possible. Toward the end he used very harsh words; in the +third from the last paragraph of the document he states: “I shall not +be afraid of anything and I shall destroy everyone who is against +me.” That was directed against the generals. Actually the western +offensive did not take place until the spring because the weather +conditions delayed them. +<span class='pageno' title='68' id='Page_68'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We have heard details of that during previous +proceedings, and I believe we do not have to go into that now. +In this connection we come to the last document, that is C-126, +which you also have in front of you, GB-45. It is in Document +Book 10a on Page 92.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With regard to the preparation of the war against Poland, the +Prosecution has submitted this document of the High Command +of the Armed Forces dated 22 June 1939 and signed by Keitel, +because that document contained a timetable for “Case White”; +that is, the case of Poland. Did that document or that directive +indicate to you a definite aggressive intention?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. Not a definite intention of aggression at all. In +all cases certain long-range questions had to be cleared up, such +as, for instance, whether our training ships which used to put to +sea in summer should leave, or whether they should wait. This +decision, however, was only to be made in the beginning of August. +In connection with that order I issued the order of 2 August also +pertaining to that document, to the individual higher Naval offices, +namely, an operational directive for the use of Atlantic submarines +in the Case White. May I be permitted to read the first lines, +because the wording is important:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Attached is an operational directive for the employment of +U-boats which are to be sent out into the Atlantic by the +way of precaution in the event that the intention to carry +out Case White should remain unchanged. F.d.U. (Commander +of the U-boat fleet) is to hand in his operation orders to SKL +by 12 August. The decision regarding the sailing of U-boats +for the Atlantic will probably be made before the middle +of August.</p> + +<p>“If the operations are not carried out, this directive must be +destroyed by 1 October 1939 at the latest.” (Document C-126, +Exhibit GB-45)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Thus it was not definite that such operations would take place. +It was rather a precautionary measure which had to be taken under +all circumstances in connection with the Case White.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have said that Hitler assured you +repeatedly, particularly when you spoke to him personally, that +there would not be a war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Particularly there would be no war against +England?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='69' id='Page_69'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, then, on 3 September 1939 war did start +with England. In connection with this did you speak to Hitler +about that question—and if so, when?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: On the 3 September in the morning, I believe between +10 and 11 o’clock—I cannot remember the exact hour—I was called +into the Reich Chancellery. The SKL had already informed me +that the ultimatum had been received from England and France. +I came into the study of the Führer where a number of persons +were assembled. I only remember that Deputy of the Führer +Hess was present. I could not say who else was there. I noticed +that Hitler was particularly embarrassed when he told me that +despite all his hopes, war with England was imminent, and that +the ultimatum had been received. It was an expression of embarrassment +such as I had never noticed on Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the charge made by the Prosecution +that you, Admiral, agreed with National Socialism and +strongly supported it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal to look at Document +D-481, which is GB-215 in Document Book 10a, Page 101. This deals +with the oath of civil servants and the oath of soldiers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution, with reference to +this document, has stated that on 2 August 1934, in a special +ceremony, you took an oath to Adolf Hitler, and not to the +fatherland. In the transcript, of 15 January 1946, Page 2719 +(Volume V, Page 262), we read, “The Tribunal will see that Raeder”—in +his oath—“put Führer in the place of fatherland.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not understand this and I will ask you to explain, whether +it is correct that you had any part in changing the oath from +“fatherland” to “Hitler.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I cannot understand that accusation at all. The +entire matter was not particularly a ceremony. I do not know who +is supposed to have observed it so that he could make such a +statement. The Commander-in-Chief, Von Blomberg, and the three +commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces were called to Hitler +on the morning of 2 August. We were in his study and Hitler +asked us to come to his desk without ceremony or staging. There +we took the oath which he, as Chief of State and Supreme Commander +of the Armed Forces, read to us. We repeated that oath. +None of us participated in the writing of that oath and no one +had asked us to do so. That would have been quite unusual. The +oath referred to the person of Hitler. No previous oath had ever +been rendered to the fatherland as far as the words were concerned. +Once I took an oath to the Kaiser as Supreme War Lord, once to +the Weimar Constitution, and the third oath to the person of the +<span class='pageno' title='70' id='Page_70'></span> +Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces—Hitler. +In all three cases I took the oath to my people, my fatherland. +That is a matter of course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when you were ordered to that meeting +on 2 August, did you know before what it was to deal with?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Well, I would assume that his adjutant informed my +adjutant that I was to come in connection with the taking of the +oath. I could not speak with certainty now, but I assume so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It was the morning after the death of Hindenburg?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On the day after the death of Hindenburg?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you know about the wording of the oath?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, but the oath was written on a piece of paper +and I assume that we were informed of the wording before, at the +desk, there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I say at this time, Mr. President, that the +wording is contained in the document that I have mentioned and +represents a Reich law.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution asserts that on +30 January 1937 you became a Party member by virtue of the +fact that you received the Golden Party Badge. Will you answer +briefly to this point, which has been discussed previously in other +cases?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: When the Führer gave me the Golden Party Badge +he said, specifically, that this was the highest decoration which +he could give at the time. I could not become a Party member at +all because it had been stated that soldiers could not be members +of the Party. That was generally known, and for this reason that +assertion likewise is incomprehensible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The membership of soldiers was prohibited by +the Constitution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, prohibited. May I say one more thing to prevent +any misunderstanding? It was prohibited both by the Weimar +Constitution and the decrees which Hitler had issued.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were you in opposition to the Party because of +your staunch Christian and Church attitude, which was generally +known? Briefly, how did it work out? Did you have any difficulties +with the Party because of it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In general I had no great difficulties with the Party, +which I think is best explained by the fact that the Navy had +<span class='pageno' title='71' id='Page_71'></span> +considerable prestige in the Party, as it did in all Germany. I always +had the higher officers, at least the chiefs of bases and fleet commanders, +settle any friction which occurred in the lower echelons, +through the proper authorities. If they were more important they +were brought to my attention and I took care of them; if they +dealt with matters of principle I passed them on to the OKW. +Since I never let anything slip through, in case of incitement by +the Party, the entire relations soon became very smooth and +I could prevent all sorts of friction, so that before long they rarely +occurred. In that respect we had the advantage in the Navy because +there were no territorial matters to administer. We were concerned +with the sea and only worked in the coastal cities where actually +everything concerned the Navy. I did have difficulties because of +Heydrich, whom I had removed from the Navy in 1928 or 1929 +after a court of honor had sentenced him for unscrupulous treatment +of a young girl. He was very resentful toward me for a long +time and he tried on various occasions to denounce me to the +leadership of the Party or to Bormann and even to the Führer. +However, I was always able to counteract these attacks so that +they had no effect on my situation in general.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This attitude of Heydrich communicated itself in some way to +Himmler, so that here also, from time to time, I had to write a +strongly worded letter; but it was precisely the strong wording +of those letters which was of help in most cases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should not like to waste any time by mentioning various +instances, such as the one with the SD; however, there were no +direct attacks because of my position in regard to the Church. +There was only the statement made by Goebbels, which I learned +of through my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche, that I was in disfavor +with the Party on account of my attitude toward the Church; but, +as I have said, I was not made to feel it in a disagreeable way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe I do not need to ask you to waste any +time in explaining the importance which you placed on religious +matters in the Navy. I will submit an affidavit to this effect without +reading it. It was made by Chief Navy Chaplain Ronneberger, +whom you have known for many years and who described the +situation and thus clarified everything. In that connection, however, +may I put one question: Did you emphasize repeatedly to Hitler +that a religious attitude was necessary for the soldiers and the +Navy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that happened frequently, and I kept to this +course in the Navy until the end without hesitation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, Mr. President, I might submit +Exhibit Number Raeder-121 (Document Raeder-121). It is in my +<span class='pageno' title='72' id='Page_72'></span> +Document Book Raeder Number 6, Page 523. I should not like to +take the time of the Tribunal by asking questions about the +contrasting views between the Party and the Navy in matters of +the Church. I believe that this document makes it sufficiently clear +that a bond between Church and National Socialism was not +possible. In this field Bormann is the most outstanding figure, and +I should like to read only the first paragraph of the exposé which +I have submitted:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“National Socialistic and Christian concepts are incompatible. +Christian churches are built on the ignorance of man and +are at pains to sustain the ignorance of as large a part of +the population as possible, for only in this way can the +Christian churches maintain their power. In contrast to this, +National Socialism rests on scientific foundations.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>In the second paragraph, the last sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“If therefore in the future our young people do not learn +anything more about Christianity, the teachings of which +are far inferior to our own, then Christianity will disappear +of itself.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And, on the second page at the end:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Just as the harmful influence of astrologers, soothsayers, +and other swindlers are eliminated and suppressed by the +State, so the possibilities for the Church to exert its influence +must also be entirely removed. Only when this has happened +will the State leadership have full influence over the individual +citizen. Only then will the existence of the people and +the Reich be guaranteed for all time.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Since the religious and Christian attitude of the defendant is +generally known, I believe this is enough to show the contrast +between the Party and the defendant in these matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Concerning the conspiracy, the Prosecution +has also accused you of being a member of the Secret +Cabinet Council and the Defense Council. Will you please answer +quite briefly, because these questions have been discussed so often +that I assume that no one in this Court wishes to hear anything +further about these things. Were you a member of the Reich +Government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: According to Document 2098-PS, which is GB-206, +Document Book 10, Page 39, a decree of the Führer of 25 February +1938, you and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army were made +equal in rank to the Reich Ministers. The Prosecution asserts that +therefore you were a member of the Cabinet and were permitted +to and did participate in the meetings. Is that correct? +<span class='pageno' title='73' id='Page_73'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I was not a Reich Minister but only equivalent +in rank. The reason for that was, I believe, that General Keitel +was made equal in rank with the Reich Ministers because, in +administering the affairs of the War Ministry, he was frequently +in contact with them and had to be on the same level in order +to negotiate with them. And since Brauchitsch and myself had +seniority over General Keitel we also received the same rank. +I was not a member of the Cabinet at all, but the decree states +that on the order of the Führer I could participate in a Cabinet +meeting. It was probably intended that I was to come to the +Cabinet when technical matters had to be explained. However, that +never occurred, since after that time there were no Cabinet +meetings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that in Paragraph 2 of that +decree by Hitler it states: “The commanders-in-chief... on my +orders shall participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. And as far as the Secret Cabinet Council is +concerned I need only confirm that, as Hitler told me himself the +Secret Cabinet Council had only been formed in order to honor +the retiring Foreign Minister, Von Neurath, in order to give the +impression abroad and at home that Von Neurath would still be +consulted on foreign policy in the future. However, that Secret +Cabinet Council never met.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has made the charge that on +12 March 1939, on the day commemorating the heroes, you made +a speech and that in that speech you came forth with a ruthless +challenge to fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I state, if it please the Court, that unfortunately the speech +was entered in the document book by the Prosecution only from +an excerpt which was selected from a certain point of view; and +I believe that it would be well to know the context of the entire +speech. Of course, I shall not read it, but I should like to submit +it as Exhibit Number Raeder-46. The sentence is in my Document +Book Number 3, Page 235, the page from which the Prosecution +took the quotation. Will you please briefly express your opinion +of that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I in doing so read a few short sentences which +will characterize the entire speech?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have no doubt that the Tribunal will permit +that. I only ask you to use only a few significant sentences, just +as the Prosecution have done.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: On Page 7, Line 6, it says...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is on Page 235, the same page +which contains the quotation of the Prosecution. +<span class='pageno' title='74' id='Page_74'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Shortly before the quotation of the Prosecution we +read on Line 6:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“He has given back self-confidence and confidence in their +own ability to the German people, and thereby enabled them +to retake, by their own strength, their sacred right refused +to them during the time of their weakness and, beyond that, +to approach the tremendous problems of the times with +courage, and to solve them. Thus the German people and +the Führer have done more for the peace of Europe and the +world than some of our neighbors are able to realize today.” +(Document Number Raeder-46)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then we come to the sentence where I speak about the announcement +of the fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry which +has been quoted by the Prosecution. I should like to state briefly +in connection with it that after the experiences of the years 1917 +to 1919, communism and international Jewry had destroyed the +resistance of the German people to a considerable degree and had +gained an excessively large and oppressive influence in German +affairs, in affairs of state as well as in economic affairs, as for +example also in the legal field. Therefore, in my opinion, one could +not be surprised that the National Socialist Government tried to +loosen and, as far as possible, remove this large and oppressive +influence. Although in pursuing this course the National Socialist +Government took rather severe steps which led to the Nuremberg +Laws—the exaggerations of which I regretted, of course—nevertheless, +in the course of the speech which I made in public at the +orders of the Reich Government, I could not find it compatible with +my conscience to express my personal opinions, which were basically +different. It must also be considered that such a speech had to fit +into a general framework. That, however, was only one short +sentence, whereas other points were considerably more in the +foreground. In that connection I ask for permission to read two +more short sentences:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“And this is the reason for the demand for equal rights and +equal respect with all other nations which alone can guarantee +that the nations will live peacefully together on this earth.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then the last sentence, on Page 235:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Within the bounds of German national community the +Führer has assigned us our tasks as soldiers to protect our +homeland and our peaceful national reconstruction and to +train the young manhood, fit for military service, which was +entrusted to us and which has to pass entirely through our +hands.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>The next sentence was quoted by the Prosecution, because there +I spoke of the fact that we should not only train these young people +<span class='pageno' title='75' id='Page_75'></span> +technically in the sense of the technical use of arms but also +educate them in the sense of National Socialist ideology and +philosophy, and I stated that we had to march shoulder to shoulder +with the Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have always taken the view that the Armed Forces should not +be a completely extraneous body in the State. It would be impossible +to have a republican armed force in a monarchist state or an armed +force with monarchist tendencies in a democratic state. Thus our +Armed Forces would have to be incorporated into the National +Socialist State to the extent necessary to create a real people’s +community, and it would be the task of the commanders of the +Armed Forces to educate their branches of the forces in such a way +that they would recognize and live up to the good national and +socialist ideals of the National Socialist State. This would be done +in the same way as I did it as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. +In this way it was possible to incorporate the Armed Forces in an +orderly manner, to keep them from all exaggeration and excesses, +and at the same time to form a people’s community within the State.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And then on the bottom of Page 236:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“This nation needed a new, a true peace, the peace of justice +and honor, peace without hatred. The world also needs +peace. Because a weak Germany could not obtain peace, +a strong one has won it for herself. It is the proud task +of the German Wehrmacht, to secure this peace for the +German nation against everybody.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And quite at the end of the document, the 11th or 12th line from +the bottom of the page:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“But the soldier over there, whom we respect as the valiant +representative of his country, may accept a soldier’s word: +What Germany needs and wants is peace. These are not +just words but it has been proved by practical examples. +The construction work of Germany requires many years of +quiet development.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I think that this is sufficient...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I point out to the High Tribunal that in the English translation, +on Page 236, as far as I remember, one sentence was underlined. +That is: “The Wehrmacht and Party are one indivisible +entity.” The Prosecution has submitted that. Apart from that, +nothing is underlined.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I wish to say in passing that in reality, in the original, many +other passages are underlined, particularly those sentences which +Admiral Raeder has just read which deal with peace. +<span class='pageno' title='76' id='Page_76'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, the Prosecution has accused +you with having connections with all the political activities of +National Socialism. Therefore I am compelled to ask you briefly +concerning your participation in actions in those countries where +participation by the Navy is certainly surprising.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In what way were you connected with the measures concerning +the annexation of Austria?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Navy had nothing to do with the Anschluss of +Austria at all and did not take part in any way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you make any preparations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. In the case of Austria, no preparations were +needed. The case of Austria was mentioned in Document C-175, +but that dealt only with the directive of 1 July 1937 for the unified +preparation of the Armed Forces for war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that C-175 is USA-69, in the +Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 117.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution considers this +document important and therefore I should like you to say a few +words about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It deals with a statement, which, according to my +knowledge, is made in every state for every year and in which, +according to the political situation, such cases are mentioned which +may arise in the course of the year and for which, of course, certain +preparations have to be made. For the Navy, however, that document +had no sequel as far as Austria was concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So it is a document which numerous...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we have the reference +to that right. It came through, I thought, C-157, USA-69, 10a, and +then I did not get the page.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Page 117.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that C-157 or 175?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: C-175.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Does this concern strategic preparations +for various eventualities?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; various cases are mentioned here, for instance, +the “Case Red” and the special “Case Extension Red-Green.” All +these had to be dealt with but they did not necessarily lead to any +consequences.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection I wanted to +submit various documents, Raeder exhibits, from which it can be +seen that the same type of preparations, since they are necessary +for military and strategic reasons, were also undertaken by the +<span class='pageno' title='77' id='Page_77'></span> +Allies—only to show their necessity. At this moment I should like +to forego that because I cannot determine so quickly which of these +documents are admitted and which have been rejected. Perhaps +I may therefore submit the connected documents at the end in +order that no misunderstanding may occur now by my quoting the +wrong figures.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In what way did you and the Navy +participate in measures concerning the Sudetenland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In a directive...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. May I ask you to look at the +document of the Prosecution 388-PS. It is USA-126—no, excuse +me—USA-26. It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation, +10a, Page 147. It is a draft for the new directive “Grün” of +20 May 1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have the directive here. It is of 20 May 1938 +and says with regard to the Navy:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Navy participates in the operations of the Army by +employing the Danube flotilla. That flotilla is put under the +command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In regard +to the conduct of naval warfare, at first only those measures +are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful +protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden +intervention in the conflict by other states. Those measures +must be confined to what is absolutely necessary, and must +be carried out inconspicuously.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>The entire course of action at the end of September and +beginning of October made the special measures unnecessary, so +the Danube flotilla which we had taken over from Austria was +put under the command of the Army.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What was the size of the Danube flotilla?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It consisted of some small river craft, one small gunboat +and minesweepers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That is the total extent to which the Navy +participated?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, in which the Navy participated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In what way did you and the Navy participate +in the preparations for the occupation of what the document calls +the “remainder of Czechoslovakia”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This concerns Document C-136, USA-104 in the Document Book +of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 101. It is of 21 October 1938. +The Prosecution points out that according to that you had already +been informed in October that Czechoslovakia was to be occupied +<span class='pageno' title='78' id='Page_78'></span> +after some time, that is in March, as actually happened. Will you +please tell us something about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That directive looks suspicious at first but the way +in which it is drafted shows that this again refers to possible cases. +Point 1 deals with the securing of the borders of the German Reich +and protection against surprise air attacks.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Points 2 and 3 are “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia,” +“Occupation of the Memel Country.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 2, “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia”: +The first sentence reads, “It must be possible to shatter the +remainder of Czechoslovakia at any time if her policy should +become hostile toward Germany.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is the prerequisite in case of any action against Czechoslovakia; +that did not mean that it was certain that any action +would be taken.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the same manner, under Number 3, mention is made of the +occupation of the Memel country, where it says: “The political +situation, particularly warlike complications between Poland and +Lithuania, may make it necessary for the German Armed Forces +to occupy the Memel country.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. May I point out that, according to +my document, the part which the witness has just read is +missing in the English translation—so that you will not look for it +unnecessarily.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] So here again this is a possible +eventuality?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On 3 September 1939, at the beginning of the +war, the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was sunk. From the military point of view that +case has already been clarified by Herr Kranzbühler, but I should +like you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to state your position +and give an explanation of the incident with special consideration +of the fact that the Prosecution, especially in this case, has raised +a very severe and insulting accusation. They have made the +accusation that you, purposely and in violation of the truth, held +England and Churchill responsible for the sinking of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, +although you knew perfectly well that the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> had been sunk +by a German U-boat. As proof, the Prosecution has submitted the +article of 23 October 1939 from the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, that is Document Number 3260-PS, GB-218. +Document Book 10 of the British Delegation on Page 97.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I would like you to explain that +point. +<span class='pageno' title='79' id='Page_79'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The fact is that on 3 September at dusk the young +submarine commander of the submarine <span class='it'>U-30</span> met an English +passenger ship which had its lights dimmed and torpedoed it +because he assumed, by mistake, that it was an auxiliary cruiser. +In order to avoid misunderstanding I should like to state here that +the deliberations of Kapitänleutnant Fresdorf, which have been +mentioned here concerning the torpedoing of dimmed ships in the +Channel, did not yet play any part in the Naval Operations Staff +at that time and that this commanding officer could not have +known anything about these deliberations. He knew only that +auxiliary cruisers had their lights blacked out, and he assumed that +this was an auxiliary cruiser at the entrance of the northwest +channel, England-Scotland. He did not make a report since it was +not necessary. The information that a German U-boat had torpedoed +the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was broadcast by the British radio, and we probably +received the news during the night of the 3d to the 4th, and +transmitted it to the various news services.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the morning of 4 September we received that news at the +offices of the Naval Operations Staff, and I requested information +as to how far our nearest submarine was from the place of the +torpedoing. I was told, 75 nautical miles. At about the same time, +State Secretary Von Weizsäcker in the Foreign Office, who had +been a naval officer in the first World War, learned of this situation +and made a telephone call to the Naval Operations Staff, +asking whether it was true. He did not call me personally. He +received the answer that, according to our information, it could +not be right. Thereupon he sent for the American Chargé d’Affaires—I +believe Mr. Kirk—in order to speak to him about the matter +because the radio broadcast had also mentioned that several Americans +had been killed in that accident. From his experiences in the +first World War it was clear to him how important it was that +there should be no incident involving America. Therefore, he told +him what he had heard from the Naval Operations Staff. I personally +told the same thing to the American Naval Attaché, +Mr. Schrader, and that certainly in good faith. I believed that I could +tell him that in good faith because we had no other information. +State Secretary Von Weizsäcker then came to see me personally, if +I remember correctly. We were very close friends, and he told me +what he had told the American Chargé d’Affaires. He apologized, +I believe, for not having spoken to me personally and that +concluded the case for the time being.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The matter was such that, if it had been reported in a normal +way, we would not have hesitated to admit and to explain the +reason. We would not have hesitated to apologize to the nations +concerned. Disciplinary measures would have been taken against +<span class='pageno' title='80' id='Page_80'></span> +the officer. I also reported the incident to the Führer himself in +his headquarters and told him that we were convinced such was +not the case, and the Führer ordered that it should be denied. This +was done by the Propaganda Ministry, which had been informed +of the order by my press department.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The submarine returned on 27 September...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me if I interrupt. That date, Mr. President, +is identified by Document D-659, which was submitted by the +Prosecution, it is Exhibit GB-221 in Document Book 10 on Page 110.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The submarine commander returned on 27 September +to Wilhelmshaven. Admiral Dönitz has already described how he +received him and how he immediately sent him to me to Berlin by air.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The U-boat commander reported the entire incident to me and +confirmed that it was a sheer mistake, that it was only through all +these messages he had heard that he himself discovered that it was +not an auxiliary cruiser that was concerned but a passenger steamer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I reported the facts to the Führer because they could have had +severe political consequences. He decided that, as it had been +denied once, we had to keep it utterly secret, not only abroad but +also within official circles and government circles. Consequently, +I was not in a position to tell State Secretary Von Weizsäcker or +the Propaganda Ministry that the facts were different. My order to +the Commander of the U-boat fleet reads:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“1. The affair is to be kept strictly secret upon orders of the +Führer.</p> + +<p>“2. On my part, no court-martial will be ordered because +the commanding officer acted in good faith and it was a +mistake.</p> + +<p>“3. The further political handling of the matter is to be +attended to by the High Command of the Navy, as far as +anything has to be done.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>With that the commander returned to Wilhelmshaven and +Admiral Dönitz has already reported that he was punished by +disciplinary procedure. To our great surprise, about one month +later that article appeared in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> in which +Churchill was accused of being the author of that incident. I knew +absolutely nothing about that article beforehand. I would certainly +have prevented its appearance because, knowing that our submarine +had torpedoed that ship, it was out of the question to lay +the blame on the enemy, on the First Lord of the Admiralty of +all people.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I found out later that the order to publish such an article was +issued by Hitler and reached the Propaganda Ministry through the +Reich Press Chief. As far as I remember I was told that the +<span class='pageno' title='81' id='Page_81'></span> +Propaganda Minister had himself drafted that article. Later I could +not prevent it. I did not see the article nor did any of my officers +of the High Command of the Navy see it. They would certainly +have come to me at once so that I could have prevented its publication. +We had no reason to expect such an article 4 weeks after the +torpedoing of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>. That is the case of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You just said that you had discovered that Hitler +knew about the article. When did you discover this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Here, from my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Not at that time then?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, by no means.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit again at a quarter +past two.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='82' id='Page_82'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the meantime I have perused my documents +and I am therefore in a position to carry out the original plan, that +is, of submitting the documents during the examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In connection with the documents which we dealt with last, +Document C-126, “Strategic Preparations,” I should like to submit +the following documents which are contained in the <span class='it'>White Books</span>, +documents which have been granted me for my use and which also +concern strategic preparations on the part of the Allies. We are +dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-33. It is the document dated +9 November 1939; and also Exhibit Number Raeder-34, General +Gamelin to General Lelong, 13 November 1939; and also Exhibit +Number Raeder-35, two extracts from the Diary of Jodl, 1809-PS, +which concern the measures taken by the Luftwaffe regarding the +Caucasus. It is not necessary for me to comment on this. I would +just like to call your attention to the questions which I put to the +witness Reich Marshal Göring on 18 March; he has already testified +regarding the plans of the Allies for the destruction of the Caucasian +oil fields. And finally in this connection, Exhibit Number Raeder-41, +to be found in the Document Book 3, Page 205, and the following +pages, a report of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, +General Gamelin, dated 16 March 1940, it deals with the war plans +for the year 1940 concerning the tightening of the blockade, the +plans regarding the Scandinavian countries and, in addition, the +plans for the destruction of the Russian oil wells in the Caucasus.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, before I deal with the +separate campaigns of Greece, Norway, and so forth, I would like to +ask you to answer a question which relates to you personally. What +decorations did you receive from Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I received from Hitler in the autumn of 1939 in addition +to the Golden Emblem, which I have already mentioned, the +Knight’s Order to the Iron Cross. Furthermore, in the year 1941 on +the occasion of my 65th birthday I received a donation of 250,000 +marks. This donation was given to me by Hitler through an adjutant +and in connection with that he sent a document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>When I thanked him on the very first occasion, he told me that +he was giving me this donation as a means of decoration in the same +manner as the former rulers of Prussia had given their generals +similar donations, whether as sums of money or as a country estate; +then he emphasized that Field Marshals Von Hindenburg and Von +Mackensen had received donations from him as well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the passage “Greece.” With +regard to Greece, the Prosecution has quoted Document C-12, which +<span class='pageno' title='83' id='Page_83'></span> +is GB-226. This is to be found in Document Book Number 10, Page 1. +This document deals with the decision on the part of Hitler which +was transmitted through the OKW, dated 30 December 1939, signed +by Jodl, and we read under Number 1.:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Greek merchant ships in the area around England, declared +by the United States to be a barred zone, are to be treated +as enemy vessels.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>This decision on the part of Hitler was made on the basis of +a report by the SKL. What caused you to make this report even +though Greece was neutral at the time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that time we had received a large number of intelligence +reports from our intelligence service that Greek shipping +companies apparently with the knowledge of the Greek Government +were allowing Greek ships to be chartered by England under favorable +conditions. Therefore, these Greek ships were in the service of +England and thus were to be treated in the same way as we were +treating the English merchantmen. These intelligence reports were +confirmed later on to an even greater degree than had been the case +in the beginning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I would like to submit to the +High Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-53, to be found in my Document +Book 3, Page 258. This document deals with the War Diary kept +by the SKL in the month of December 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On Page 259, under the date of 19 December, the following entry +is made:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>“Greece has hired out about 20 vessels to ply between the United +States, Le Havre and Liverpool.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This is confirmed by the reports just mentioned by the defendant. +The next entry, on the same page under the date 30 December:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Justified by the sales and chartering of numerous Greek ships +to England it has been decreed, with the agreement of the +Führer, that Greek ships in the zone from 20 degrees West +to 2 degrees East and from 44 degrees North to 62 degrees +North shall be considered as hostile craft by U-boats. Attacks +to be made invisibly as far as possible.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I also submit the following document, Number Raeder-54. This +document is taken from the <span class='it'>White Books</span>. It is dated 23 January +1940, and it is a report from the German Embassy at the Hague to +the Foreign Office. The heading is: “The Contemplated Chartering +of 50 to 60 Greek Ships to the British Government.” It is not necessary +for me to read it. I should like merely to quote the beginning +of the first sentence:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>“After the British press brought reports at the end of November +last year”—that is, 1939—“about the alleged charterings of Greek +<span class='pageno' title='84' id='Page_84'></span> +vessels to British companies”—and so forth—then follows the statement +that these 50 to 60 ships are now chartered by British companies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Even though it is not quite accurate historically, I would now +like first of all to conclude the question of Greece. In historical +sequence Norway should follow now first, but for the sake of +coherence I should like to deal with Greece and the occupation of +Greece first.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the Document C-152, identical with C-167 or Exhibit GB-122, +in the Document Book of the British Delegation Number 10, Page 23, +the Prosecution has charged you with the Figure 9 of this lengthy +document, specifically Figure 9.)B.)f.). It says there:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy requests confirmation +of the fact that the whole of Greece is to be occupied even in +the case of a peaceful solution. The Führer: Complete occupation +is a stipulation for any settlement.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>This document concerns your report to Hitler of 18 March 1941. +What were the reasons for your making this proposal?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In the beginning I had but little knowledge of the +political intentions of the Führer as far as Greece was concerned, +but I did know of his Directive Number 20, dated 13 December 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, I would like to mention for +the assistance of the Court that we are dealing with Document +1541-PS, that is GB-117, Document Book of the British Delegation +10a, Page 270. This directive is dated 13 December 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In this directive the Führer, for the reasons given in +Paragraph 1, said that his intention was, as set forth in Paragraph 2:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“b.) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in +March, to employ this group of forces to occupy the north +coast of the Aegean by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to +occupy the entire Greek mainland (‘Operation Marita’). The +support of Bulgaria is to be expected.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>The next time I heard about these things again was when I heard +that the British had landed in southern Greece on 3 March. We +learned that on about 5 or 6 March. For this reason I asked the +Führer that he occupy all of Greece in order to prevent the British +from attacking us from the rear, by air, and from erecting air bases, +all of which would hamper the conduct of our war not only in +Greece but also in the eastern Mediterranean.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The fact was that when a political decision had been made by +Hitler of his own accord and without having consulted anyone, I, +as Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, always had to draw my +strategic conclusions from this political decision and then had to +<span class='pageno' title='85' id='Page_85'></span> +make to him my proposals on naval and on other warfare as far as +they concerned me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Since in December he had already considered the possibility that +all of Greece would have to be occupied, the case had now actually +arisen for me to make this proposal to him for the reason I have +already mentioned. When I said “all of Greece,” that implied to me +and the Naval Command the entire Greek coast, where the British +forces might land.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Your proposal was made about 2 weeks after +British troops had landed in Greece?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection I would like to submit +Exhibit Raeder-58, in my Document Book 3, Page 271. This is a +document contained in the <span class='it'>White Book</span>, according to which on 4 January—I +beg the Tribunal’s pardon. Sir David is right. Document +58 has been rejected and I withdraw it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this connection I would like to submit Exhibit Number +Raeder-59. It is to be found in Document Book 3, Page 273 and is +an extract from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>: It is the minutes of the French +War Committee of 26 April 1940. This document deals with the +decision of the War Committee regarding Norway, the Caucasus, +Romania, and Greece.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I also submit Exhibit Number Raeder-63, in Document Book 3, +Page 285, which is an address by the British Secretary of State for +India, Amery, dated 1 December 1940. This document also shows +plans regarding Greece, a year and a quarter before the time just +mentioned by the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now I shall turn to the topic of Norway.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The British prosecutor, Major Elwyn +Jones, considers the attack against Norway a special case in the +series of aggressive wars waged by the Nazi conspirators. In this +connection he pointed out that, in this case, Hitler did not think of +this himself but rather was persuaded by you. Since his point is +very important, I should like to ask you to describe this event +exactly, and therefore I ask you first of all: When was the first conversation +about this matter between you and Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The first conversation between Hitler and myself +concerning the question of Norway was on 10 October 1939, and that +was at my request. The reason for this was that we had received +reports at various times during the last week of September through +our intelligence service of the offices of Admiral Canaris that the +British intended to occupy bases in Norway. +<span class='pageno' title='86' id='Page_86'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>I recall that after reports to this effect had reached me several +times Admiral Canaris visited me himself on one occasion—something +he did in very important cases only. And, in the presence of +my chief of staff, he gave me a coherent explanation concerning the +intelligence reports which had been received. In this connection air +bases were constantly mentioned, as well as bases in the south of +Norway. Stavanger was mentioned constantly with the airport Sola, +and Trondheim was usually mentioned and occasionally Christiansand.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>During the last days of September I had a telephone conversation +with Admiral Carls who was the commander of Navy +Group North and was therefore in charge of operations in the +Skagerrak, the Kattegat and in the North Sea. This man had +obviously received similar reports. He informed me that he had +composed a private letter addressed to me, in which he dealt with +the question of the danger of Norway’s being occupied by British +forces and in which he was in a general way dealing with the +question as to what disadvantages such a step would have for us, and +whether we should have to forestall such an attempt, and also what +advantages or disadvantages the occupation of Norway—that is, of +the Norwegian coast and the Norwegian bases—by our forces would +have.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Up until that point I had not concerned myself with the Norwegian +question at all, except for the fact I had received these +reports. The arrival of this letter at the end of September or the +beginning of October, it must have been about then, impelled me to +show it to the Chief of Staff of the SKL and to instruct him to deal +with all dispatch with the question of the occupation of Norwegian +bases by England, and the other questions which Admiral Carls had +dealt with, and to have the questions discussed in the SKL. The +advantages and disadvantages of an expansion of the war towards +the North had to be considered, not only of an expansion on our part +but, above all, an expansion on the part of England; what value, +what advantage would accrue to us if we acted first; what disadvantages +would result if we had to defend the Norwegian coast?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The result of this was the questionnaire mentioned in C-122, +GB-82, where the questions were asked: What places were to be +used as bases; what the possibility of defense by us would be; +whether these ports would have to be developed further; and also, +what advantages would result so far as our U-boats were concerned?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>These questions, as I have already stated, were put to Admiral +Dönitz as well, but his answers arrived only after I had made the +report on 10 October. I would like to say, by way of introduction, +that it was entirely clear to me that if we undertook to occupy these +bases we would violate neutrality. But I also knew of the agreement +<span class='pageno' title='87' id='Page_87'></span> +which existed between the German and Norwegian Governments of +2 September regarding neutrality, and I knew the concluding +sentence, in this <span class='it'>aide memoire</span>, which is Document TC-31, GB-79, +dated 2 September 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, but I should like to point out, +Mr. President, that this document is found in the Document Book of +the British Delegation 10a, at Page 330.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You have that document before you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have it before me, and I would like to quote +the concluding sentence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It is the last document in the book, Your Honor, +at Page 329.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: [<span class='it'>Continuing.</span>] The last sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government +change so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party +recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled +to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way +as would be forced upon the Reich Cabinet by the resulting +situation.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, within the next few days, I asked the Chief of Staff of the +SKL to submit to me the data which the SKL had prepared during +the preceding days and I reported to Hitler on 10 October, because I +considered this problem particularly important. It was entirely +clear to me that the best possible solution for us would be that +Norway should maintain a steadfast neutrality, and I expressed my +opinion, as may be seen in Document C-21, GB-194.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This is an extract from the War Diary of the SKL.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation +10a, Page 6.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It says here, on Page 3 of the German version, the next +but last paragraph, under the date of 13 January: “Situation discussion +with the Chief of the SKL.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. C-21 was not +entirely translated by the Prosecution. This document may be found +in my document book under Exhibit Number Raeder-69, and I +should like to submit it herewith. It is in Document Book 3, Page 62.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Document Book 3 only goes to 64, is that not +right? It must be Document Book 4.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: There must be a mistake in the document book +then. At first, due to an oversight, the table of contents was only +completed as far as 64 by the Translation Section, but since that +<span class='pageno' title='88' id='Page_88'></span> +time it has been corrected and supplemented. It is in Document +Book 4, Page 317.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Page 317, at the top.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Please comment on +this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In the next but last paragraph, it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In complete agreement with this point of view, the Chief +of the Naval Operations Staff is therefore also of the opinion +that the most favorable solution would doubtless be the maintenance +of the present situation which, if strictest neutrality +is exercised by Norway, will permit the safe use of Norwegian +territorial waters for the shipping vital to Germany’s war +effort without the attempt being made on the part of England +to seriously endanger this sea lane.” (Document Number +Raeder-69)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I maintained this point of view when reporting to Hitler. In that +report I first mentioned the intelligence reports which we had at +hand. Then I described the dangers which might result to us from a +British occupation of bases on the Norwegian coast and might affect +our entire warfare, dangers which I considered tremendous. I had +the feeling that such an occupation would gravely prejudice and +imperil the whole conduct of our war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If the British occupied bases in Norway, especially in the South +of Norway, they would be able to dominate the entrance to the Baltic +Sea from those points, and also flank our naval operations from the +Helgoland Bight and from the Elbe, Jade and Weser. The second +outlet which we had was also gravely imperiled, affecting the +operations of battleships as well as the courses of our merchantmen.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In addition to that, from their air bases in Norway, they might +endanger our air operations, the operations of our pilots for reconnaissance +in the North Sea or for attacks against England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Furthermore, from Norway they could exert strong pressure on +Sweden, and that pressure would have been felt in this respect, that +the supplies of ore from Sweden would have been hindered or +stopped by purely political pressure. Finally, the export of ore from +Narvik to Germany could have been stopped entirely, and it is +known how much Germany depended on supplies of ore from +Sweden and Norway. They might even have gone so far—and we +learned about this subsequently that such plans were discussed—as +to attack and destroy the ore deposits at Lulea, or to seize them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>All of these dangers might become decisive factors in the outcome +of the war. Aside from the fact that I told Hitler that the best +thing for us would be to have strict neutrality on the part of +Norway, I also called his attention to the dangers which would +<span class='pageno' title='89' id='Page_89'></span> +result to us from an occupation of the Norwegian coast and Norwegian +bases, for there would have been lively naval operations +near the Norwegian coast in which the British, even after our +occupation of bases, would try to hamper our ore traffic from +Narvik. A struggle might ensue which we, with our inadequate +supply of surface vessels, would be unable to cope with in the +long run.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Therefore, at that time I did not make any proposal that we +should occupy Norway or that we should obtain bases in Norway. +I only did my duty in telling the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht +about this grave danger which was threatening us, and against +which we might have to use emergency measures for our defense. +I also pointed out to him that possible operations for the occupation +of Norwegian bases might be very expensive for us. In the course +of later discussions I told him that we might even lose our entire +fleet. I would consider it a favorable case if we were to lose only +one-third, something which actually did happen later on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There was, therefore, no reason for me to expect that I would +gain prestige by such an enterprise—I have been accused of this +ambition by the Prosecution. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite +might easily result.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal +to the fact that these things may be seen in documents which date +from the time of the war, one of which is Exhibit Number Raeder-69, +of 13 January 1940, which has just been handed over. This document +is a study, and it is claimed that this study is based on the +consideration that if England were to have the bases in Norway, the +situation would be impossible for the conduct of the war by Germany +and such a situation could be prevented only if we forestalled +England by occupying Norway ourselves. What the witness has just +said is stated in exactly the same way in the War Diary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the same connection, I should like to refer to the document of +the Prosecution, Document C-66, GB-81, which may be found in +British Document Book 10a, Page 35. This document is dated +10 January 1944. May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of +the fact that there, under the code name “Weserübung” (Weser +Maneuver)—that was the name covering this action—the substance +of the statements the witness has just made is to be found. I do not +wish to read all of them since we would lose valuable time thereby.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean C-66? That is about the Plan +Barbarossa. Is that the one you mean?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The last page, under the heading “Weserübung,” +Page 39 of the English document book. Mention is made there of +the letter by Admiral Carls, spoken of by the witness, and of his +<span class='pageno' title='90' id='Page_90'></span> +thoughts in connection with this matter. In the German original +there is the heading, “Appendix 2.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>A clearer version is found in Document Raeder-69, since that +dates from January 1940, 3 months later, and in the meantime new +reports had come in. This, on the other hand, is a description dating +from October 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, I must once more refer to +Document C-122, which you have already mentioned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution, in that document, accuses you of saying:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Chief of SKL deems it necessary to tell the Führer as +soon as possible of the ideas of the SKL on the possibility of +expanding the sphere of operations in the North.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>They think they may conclude therefrom that your primary +thought was to expand the operational sphere of the Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already said that by the possibility of expansion +of the operational zone to the North I meant an expansion of +British operations and its consequences, and also the possibility of +our forestalling this, thus gaining bases which would be of certain +importance to us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Hitler reply at this discussion on 10 October +1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Hitler had not yet concerned himself with this question. +The question was very far from his mind, for he knew very +little about matters of naval warfare. He always remarked that he +did not have an over-all picture of these things, and therefore felt +somewhat uncertain. He said that he would deal with this question +and that I should leave the notes with him, which I had worked out +on the basis of statements made by the SKL, so that he might use +them as a basis for his deliberations on this problem.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It was typical and really speaks very much against the character +of the conspiracy, that on this occasion Hitler, when confronted with +the problem of Norway, did not say a single word about the fact +that previously, the last time evidently in the summer of that year, +he had already dealt with Norwegian questions prompted by Rosenberg. +I gather from a document which I saw for the first time here +that on 20 June 1939, Rosenberg had submitted to the Führer a +comprehensive report about his connections with Norwegian political +circles, but I heard of these connections for the first time on +11 December.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It would have been a matter of course for me if the Führer, who +was dealing with Norwegian strategical matters, had told me on this +occasion: “I have such and such information about Norwegian +matters.” But he did not do that—there was always a considerable +lack of collaboration. The Führer told me that we should await the +<span class='pageno' title='91' id='Page_91'></span> +arrival of further reports and that he would deal with these questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the subsequent period of October and November, +up until 11 December, did you discuss this question with Hitler +again?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, the question was not discussed at all during those +months, but in September Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, who had first +been appointed assistant attaché in Oslo and later, naval attaché, +gave me further reports at that time about conditions in Norway, +and so did the intelligence service. He told me of reports which +were circulating there about a possible British landing. Later on +Kapitän Schreiber was actually my chief collaborator in these Norwegian +problems, and he showed a particular understanding of the +whole situation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to submit to the +Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-107, an affidavit of the naval attaché who +has just been mentioned, Richard Schreiber. This may be found in +my Document Book 5, Page 464.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>According to that document, Schreiber was drafted on 7 September +1939 as a reserve officer and was sent to Oslo as a naval attaché. +He states that he held that post there since the autumn of 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read a +portion of this, under I, on Page 465, at the bottom.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We told you that we had read all these documents +which were objected to. We let in this document, so it is not +necessary for you to read it again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then in this connection, may I refer +to the first part of this affidavit, Part I?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, I should like to point out a small but misleading +error in translation on Page 466. In the second paragraph, second +line, the word “deutsch,” (German) is missing: “...there were clear +directives of the German Foreign Office that Norwegian neutrality +should be particularly respected by the Germans...” In the English +text it says: “of the Foreign Office.” It should read “of the German +Foreign Office.” I should be very grateful if this mistake would be +rectified.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, you know the affidavit +given by Schreiber?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Different reports are contained therein. You have +already referred to them in part. Did any additional special reports +come in during those 2 months? Was Narvik mentioned in addition +to the other ports already mentioned? +<span class='pageno' title='92' id='Page_92'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as I remember it was Kapitän Schreiber who +expressly mentioned Narvik for the first time. Kapitän Schreiber +had very quickly made himself acquainted with conditions there. +He had established good connections in Norwegian circles. A confirmation +of all that I had known up to that point came on 11 December.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, would you please describe your meeting +with Quisling on 11 December 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I first ask whether the Documents 004-PS and +007-PS, which I believe were submitted by the Prosecution, may be +used in this connection? For example, the minutes of the conference +of 11 and 12 December, an accompanying letter by Rosenberg +referring to these minutes, and similar matters?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I believe that you will be permitted to +use these documents. But since they are known you only need to +mention the points that you remember.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On this occasion I should merely like to ask +whether you did not know the documents by Rosenberg, 004-PS +and 007-PS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I did not know those documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you see them for the first time here?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I saw them for the first time here. But the reports +contained in these documents were already known to us at that time +as is proved by the dates of the documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Please tell us only what you heard at that time +from Quisling.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Up until 11 December I had neither connections with +Herr Rosenberg—except for the fact that I had seen him on occasion—nor, +above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about +whom I had heard nothing up to that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On 11 December my Chief of Staff, Schulte-Mönting, reported to +me that Major Quisling, a former Norwegian Minister of War, had +arrived from Oslo. He was asking for an interview with me through +a Herr Hagelin, because he wished to tell me about Norwegian +conditions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Herr Hagelin had been sent to my chief of staff by Herr Rosenberg. +Rosenberg had already known Hagelin for some time as I +have mentioned before. Since reports from such a source on Norwegian +conditions seemed to be of great value to me, I declared +myself ready to receive Herr Quisling. +<span class='pageno' title='93' id='Page_93'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>He arrived on the same morning and reported to me at length +about the conditions in Norway, with special reference to the relations +of the Norwegian Government to England and the reports +on the intention of England to land in Norway, and he characterized +the whole situation as especially critical for, according to his reports, +the danger seemed to be imminent. He tried to fix a date. He +thought it should occur before 10 January, because then a favorable +political situation would arise.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I told him that I was not really concerned with the political +situation, but I would try to arrange to have him give his +information to the Führer. I would be concerned only with the +military and strategic situation, and in that connection I could tell +him right away that it would not be possible to take any measures +from 11 December until 10 January, first because the time was too +short and secondly because it was winter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I considered his expositions to be of such importance that I told +him I would try to arrange for him to report to the Führer personally, +so that these reports would reach and influence him directly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then on the 12th—that is on the next day—I went to Hitler and +informed him of the conversation between Quisling and me, and I +asked him to receive Quisling personally so that he might have a +personal impression of Quisling. On this occasion I told him—and +this is written down in one of the documents—that in cases of this +kind one would have to be especially cautious, since one could not +know to what degree such a party leader would try to further the +interest of his party. Therefore our investigations would have to be +especially careful. And I again called the attention of the Führer to +the fact that an attempt to occupy Norway would bring with it +greatest risks as well as certain disadvantages for the future situation. +In other words, I carefully presented both sides of the picture +in a neutral manner.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Hitler then decided to receive Quisling together with Hagelin +on one of the following days. The two gentlemen then were obviously +in touch with Rosenberg. I believe they stayed with him, +and Rosenberg sent me, by letter, a record of a meeting which had +apparently been drawn up by Quisling and Hagelin and also a +description of Quisling’s personality.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this letter, which is here as a document but which was not +read by the Prosecution, it says specifically that Rosenberg knew +what the political conditions were but that, of course, he would +have to leave the military side entirely to me since I was the competent +authority on that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If it please the High Tribunal, in this connection +I would like to submit Exhibit Raeder-67, to be found in my Document +Book 4, Page 309. That is the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder +<span class='pageno' title='94' id='Page_94'></span> +dated 13 December 1939, which was not mentioned by the Prosecution. +The Prosecution merely mentioned the appendix mentioned +in the letter—that is, a note by Rosenberg, under Number C-65, the +same as GB-85. According to its contents C-65 belongs to Exhibit +Raeder-67.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You say there was another besides Raeder-67 +which you were referring to?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes; I am referring to Raeder-67.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I got that. But you said some other document +as well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the document submitted by the Prosecution, +C-65, and that is an appendix to this letter; the two belong together. +The latter document, C-65, is to be found in the Document Book of +the British Delegation 10a, Page 33. If these two documents are +taken together, it can be seen that the political side is not mentioned +in either document; and this explains what the witness meant when +he said that he was not concerned with the political side of the +question but only with the military side. It is for that reason that +Rosenberg had sent it to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it would be a good time to break off.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the case of the +Defendant Seyss-Inquart, counsel and representatives of the Prosecution +have been conferring with respect to his application for documents. +We have agreed on a great number, but there are 20 upon +which we are unable to agree.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 20?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: 20. I think we could do it in 30 minutes if the Tribunal +will set some time aside; it might take a little more. Sir David +has reminded me that the translators are waiting on us to go ahead +with their translation work.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think the best thing would be +to take it tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. It has been suggested also +that the case of Seyss-Inquart precede that of Defendant Von Papen. +I understand that is the wish of the counsel, and it is very satisfactory +to us as well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. +<span class='pageno' title='95' id='Page_95'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: We have to refer briefly to Document 1809-PS, +the Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. It is GB-88 in the Document Book +of the British Delegation 10a, Page 289.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I first ask when were the plans for the occupation of +Norway drafted?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I may say that on the basis of the conference which +Quisling had with the Führer in my presence on 14 December the +Führer ordered the OKW to deal with the matter and study it. The +Führer had two more conferences with Quisling on 16 and 18 December +at which I was not present. The matter was then handled +by the OKW according to the directives and an initial plan known +as “North” was drafted. Document C-21, which I have mentioned +before, shows that this Plan North was received by SKL on 13 January +and then, in the course of January, the date 27 January was +mentioned, the draft of a directive for the Plan North was made. +That draft was made in the OKW in the usual way. Kapitän zur +See Krancke as expert for the Navy took part in it. The directive +was completed on 1 March 1940, and was issued to the three branches +of the Armed Forces. In the meantime, a large number of reports +had been received, and it was possible to use these as a basis for the +drafting of the directive. These reports besides coming from Kapitän +Schreiber now also came direct from Quisling, who sent them to the +Führer. They mentioned the preparatory work carried out by the +English and the French—special mention was made of the Navy +Attaché Kermarrec—in Norwegian ports for finding out the possibilities +of landing, measurements of quays, and the height of the +bridges between Narvik and the Swedish border and similar things.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>These reports which reached us showed clearly that within a +reasonable time a landing was intended. Also political reports +reached us which Hagelin received through his connections in Norwegian +circles, reports which in part came directly from members +of the Storting—and from members of the Government and their +entourage.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>All of these reports confirmed that the pretext of aid for Finland +in the dispute between Finland and Russia played a certain role. +The danger was discussed that England under pretext of aid for +Finland would proceed to a bloodless occupation of Norway. The +directive for the case Norway, therefore, was issued on 1 March. In +the further course of the month of March more reports were received. +In the meantime, the <span class='it'>Altmark</span> incident had occurred, and it was observed +by Hagelin too that the behavior of the Norwegian commander +was a pretense, and it was clear that in the case of any +encroachment on the part of Great Britain, the Norwegian Government +would protest only on paper. +<span class='pageno' title='96' id='Page_96'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You said just now the directive is dated 1 March. +This is correct. The Prosecution submitted a quotation of 5 March +from Document 1809-PS. That is an entry in Jodl’s Diary: “1500 +hours big conference with the three commanders-in-chief regarding +Weserübung. Field Marshal, having no knowledge about plans, is +furious.” How is it possible, Admiral, that Reich Marshal Göring +had not been consulted at a time when the directive was already +issued?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot explain that at all. I had no authority to +speak about it and I cannot say why he was not consulted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It is in the nature of conspiracy that the second +man in the Reich would be informed about it from the beginning. +Has he not ever spoken to you about that matter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not that I remember, but that shows how little, +especially in the Führer’s entourage, one can speak of a conspiracy. +The Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, also was not present during +any of the Quisling conferences or receptions and I had no authority, +to speak to him about these matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to know your position regarding +Jodl’s entry of 13 March, in which he stated: “Führer does not +give the order for ‘W’ (Weserübung). He is still trying to find a +justification.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I ask you to explain these words to us as you understand them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. The English translation as far as I can remember +says “Looking for an excuse.” But he needed neither justification +nor excuse, because in the first paragraph of the directive of 1 March—that +is to say, 2 weeks before that—he had stated what circumstances +made it necessary to occupy Norway and Denmark with +certain forces of the Wehrmacht. British encroachments in Scandinavia +and the Baltic were to be prevented thereby, our ore deposits +in Sweden safeguarded, and the bases against England for the Navy +and the Air Force were to be expanded.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that is the Document +C-174; that is, GB-89, Document Book of the British Delegation +10a, Page 113. That is the directive for case “Weserübung” +of 1 March 1940, which as the witness has mentioned, already contains +the justification for it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May it please the Tribunal, to prove that the information received +by the witness through the intelligence service of Admiral +Canaris, through Kapitän Schreiber and so on, is objective and in +agreement with facts, may I be permitted to submit several documents—and +that Exhibit Number Raeder-75 from the <span class='it'>White Book</span> +dated 17 February 1940, which mentions the landing of British troops +<span class='pageno' title='97' id='Page_97'></span> +in Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik, and several appendices to it, +which show the trends of thoughts at that time in regard to the +Swedish ore; Document Exhibit Raeder-77...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This is 75, Pages 43 and 44?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Not page, but Exhibit +Raeder-75. It is Page 340. Document Book 4.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then Exhibit Number Raeder-77, also from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>: +“The French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs Daladier to +the French Ambassador in London, Corbin.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In Document Book 4, Page 352. I have seen that there is a +mistake in the English document book. On Page 353 the heading +is missing or rather on Page 354. I may point out that this document +bears the date 21 February 1940. That is contained in the +original document under the heading “Intervention in Scandinavia.” +It concerns the occupation of the most important Norwegian ports, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and mentions again the question of the Swedish ore.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then I come to the Document Exhibit Raeder-78; Document +Book 4, Page 357, an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval +Operations Staff of 4 March in which in connection with the case +of the <span class='it'>Altmark</span> it is explained that a defense by Norway against +British military action is not possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then Exhibit Raeder-79, Document Book 4, Page 359, note by the +Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin. Here +also there is a mistake in the translation. The heading of the document +was omitted on Page 360. I would be grateful if the Tribunal +would note that the original document bears the date 10 March +1940. It is top secret and is based on the fact that the general plan +for armed intervention in Finland existed since 16 January and +therefore as a precautionary measure the ports and airfields on the +Norwegian coast should be occupied. I refer to the remaining contents +of document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then may I submit Exhibit Number Raeder-80, a report about +negotiations of the Scandinavian Commission of the Inter-Allied +Military Study Commission of 11 March 1940, top secret, concerning +landing at Narvik.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Then, Admiral, we are finished with +Norway. I believe you said already that the reports increased considerably +in the month of March. When did Hitler give the final +order for the occupation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At the end of March or beginning of April. I cannot +recall the exact date.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient. +<span class='pageno' title='98' id='Page_98'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I also mention a particularly important report +which I remember now. Quisling reported in February that Lord +Halifax had told the Norwegian Ambassador in London that an +operation on the part of the British for the acquisition of bases in +Norway was planned for the near future. That report also reached +us at that time. I should like to add, as I emphasized before, that +being fully conscious of my responsibility I always tried to show +the Führer both sides of the picture and that the Führer would have +to be guided by my documentary proof when deciding, to take or +refrain from taking that tremendous step. But that does not mean +to say that because I pointed out to my Supreme Commander of the +Armed Forces that particular danger, I in any way decline to accept +responsibility. Of course, I am in some measure responsible for the +whole thing. Moreover, I have been accused because in a letter submitted +here under C-155 I had told my officers’ corps that I was +proud of the way in which this extraordinarily dangerous enterprise +had been executed. I should like to confirm this, because I believe +I was entitled to be proud that the Navy had carried out that operation +with such limited means and in the face of the entire British +fleet; I still stick to that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did reports reach the SKL in March about violations +of the neutrality of Norway? That is incidents in territorial +waters?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. In the second half of March repeated attacks +were made by British planes and naval forces against our merchant +ships bringing the Swedish ore down from Narvik.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection may I submit +some more documents? Exhibit Raeder-81, Document Book 5, +Page 372, War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff which contains +several entries showing that towards the end these incidents became +more and more frequent and that the Norwegian neutrality was +violated by British air and naval forces. As that document is known +there is no need to read anything from it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then Exhibit Raeder-82 in Document Book 5, Page 377, also War +Diary of 27 March, also concerning violations of neutrality. Furthermore, +Exhibit Raeder-83, Page 379, a draft resolution of the sixth +session of the Supreme Council, dated 28 March 1940, which was +already mentioned yesterday. It deals with vital interests from the +standpoint of international law and with the laying of mines in +territorial waters on 5 April.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then Exhibit Raeder-84, Page 384, and Exhibit Raeder-85, +Page 386, both of which are documents from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>. May +I only point out that it mentions that the first transport is to leave +on J.1. day, that is actually on 5 April; in other words, 4 days before +the occupation by Germany. +<span class='pageno' title='99' id='Page_99'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Raeder-86 is an excerpt from the War Diary, of which +I ask you to take official notice and which concerns the chartering +by England of 90 percent of the Norwegian tankers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>To conclude Norway, may I ask you to look at two Documents, +C-151 and C-115. Those are Exhibits GB-91 and GB-90, respectively, +Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, on Pages 106 and 62. +The dates are 30 March 1940 and 4 April 1940. The documents show +that the ships which were to carry out the landing should carry the +British flag for camouflage reasons. The Prosecution uses that document +also to support its accusation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] What do you say about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is quite a regular ruse of war, that warships +carry a foreign flag. A requisite for the legality of that act, however, +is that at the moment of an enemy action, the moment fire is +opened, their own flag must be hoisted in time. That has always +been done in the German Navy, especially in the case of our auxiliary +cruisers, which frequently sailed under a foreign flag in order +to avoid being reported by merchant ships, but which always +lowered that flag in time. That is a matter of honor. It must be +added that in this case, as the War Diary shows...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: 8 April.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: ...that on 8 April, on account of certain considerations, +we rescinded that order, because we had the report that an +English action was under way, and we feared that complications +would arise from that. So this order was not carried out in the long +run. I believe the document can be found which contains that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I submit, in this connection, Exhibit +Number Raeder-89 (Document Raeder-89), Document Book 5, +Page 400, where we find under 8 April: “The previous order is +rescinded, the British flag is not to be used.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: You also asked about Document C-115, which says +that the blockade runners camouflaged as merchant ships with +dimmed lights should enter Oslo Fjord unobtrusively. This too is +quite a regular ruse of war against which, from the legal point of +view, no objection can be made. Likewise there is nothing to be +said against English names given in answer to signals of identity.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I did not finish answering one question because I was interrupted. +That was the question concerning the expression “justification” +or “excuse” in the War Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. As I +have shown, it was not a question of the justification, which had +been expressed a long time before by Hitler, but I believe that I +am right in saying that the question was that the diplomatic note +which, at the moment of the execution of the enterprise, had to be +presented to the Norwegian and Danish governments, giving the +<span class='pageno' title='100' id='Page_100'></span> +reason for his action, had not yet been drafted, especially as he had +not yet spoken to the Foreign Minister at that time at all. The +Foreign Minister received the information, as he has said himself, +only on 3 April.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: With this I should like to conclude the question +of the occupation of Norway. May I still submit the approved document, +Exhibit Raeder-66, which was approved for the purpose of +argument? It is an opinion expressed by Dr. Mosler, and it can be +found in Document Book 4, Page 291; and in this connection, concerning +the use of flags, may I draw special attention to Figure 7, +Page 304, from which we may see the legal reasoning. Furthermore, +may I submit Exhibit Raeder-90, Document Book 5, Page 402, and +the series of documents as far as they are approved: Exhibit +Raeder-91, Admiral Darlan to the French War Minister Daladier on +12 April 1940; Exhibit Raeder-92, Page 412. This document contains +the English-French note to the Norwegian Government of 8 April +1940. I have submitted that document because this note expresses +the same legal points of view as expressed in the legal opinion of +Dr. Mosler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Number Raeder-97 and Exhibit Number Raeder-98: +Number 97 concerns the <span class='it'>White Book</span> and the planning of 7 February +1940, concerning the Allied bases in Norway; and Number 98 is an +excerpt from the War Diary concerning the orders which, at the +time of the occupation of Norway, were found and from which it +could be seen that an English landing was imminent and the so-called +plan under the camouflage name “Stratford Plan,” which was +prepared by the British Admiralty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Concerning Norway, may I ask you +the following: During and after the occupation did you intervene to +see that the Norwegian population was treated decently, and what +was your view of the political question in Norway with regard to +the attitude of Germany to Norway?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: From the very beginning I was for good treatment of +the Norwegian population. I knew that Hitler had given Gauleiter +Terboven, whom he had unfortunately appointed Reich Commissioner +for Norway and to whom he had entrusted the civil administration, +instructions that he, Terboven, should bring the Norwegian +people to him; that is to say, make them favorably disposed, and +that he had the intention, finally, to maintain Norway as a sovereign +state in a North Germanic Empire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Terboven was opposed to that. He treated the Norwegian population +in a very unfriendly manner, and by his treatment he actually +sabotaged the aims of Hitler. In close understanding with +Admiral Böhm, who became the naval commander in Norway and +<span class='pageno' title='101' id='Page_101'></span> +who had taken Kapitän Schreiber, the former attaché, on his staff +as liaison officer to the Norwegian population, I tried to counteract +these intentions of Terboven. On the basis of the reports of Admiral +Böhm I repeatedly approached the Führer and told him that with +Terboven he would never achieve his purpose. The Führer designated +Quisling chief of the Government. I cannot remember exactly +when he became Minister President, but Terboven also sabotaged +Quisling in his activities by making it extremely difficult for him, +and even discredited him among the population. Terboven’s chief +reason was, in my opinion, that he wanted to remain Gauleiter of +Norway. All our endeavors were unsuccessful, in spite of the fact +that Admiral Böhm tried very hard to achieve with the help of the +Navy what Hitler had expected, that is, to win over the Norwegian +people.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I did not understand how on the one side one wanted to gain the +sympathy of the Norwegians and on the other hand one sabotaged +Hitler’s intentions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That went on until 1942, at which time Böhm made a final report +to me, in which he explained that things could not go on like that, +and that Hitler’s intentions would never be realized. I submitted +that report to Hitler, but since it did not bring about any change—it +was in the late autumn of 1942—this failure of mine became one +of the reasons which finally led to my retirement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you ask Hitler specifically to dismiss +Terboven?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Several times. And I suggested that he should +appoint General Admiral Böhm as commander of the armed +forces for Norway and give him far-reaching powers so that he +could carry out his—Hitler’s—aims. I suggested that the Führer +should as soon as possible conclude a peace with Norway because +only in that way could he bring about co-operation between Norway +and Germany and make the population turn to him. I told him the +attempts of sabotage by the Norwegian emigrants would lose their +meaning and cease and that possibly the Norwegian emigrants who +were leaning toward England at that time could be induced to +return, because they might be afraid that they might “miss the bus”; +especially from the point of view of economic advantages. The task +of defending Norway would be considerably easier if a state of +peace could be brought about.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In conclusion, may I refer to Exhibit Raeder-107 +which is already known to the Tribunal. It is the affidavit by +Schreiber under Roman Numeral II. There Schreiber has mentioned +in detail the utmost endeavors of the Navy to prevent the regrettable +terror regime of Terboven and explained that Raeder, for the last +<span class='pageno' title='102' id='Page_102'></span> +time in 1942, used all his efforts to get Hitler to conclude a peace +between Norway and Germany. I believe that the Navy had a good +reputation in Norway, that I can assume this is historically known +without my having to prove it. To be on the safe side I applied for +a witness, but consent was not given.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I also submit Exhibit Raeder-108 (Document Raeder-108), +Document Book 6, Page 473, a letter from Raeder to Admiral Böhm +of 23 October 1942. Raeder writes:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“To my regret I have to send you enclosed, for your personal +information, a letter from Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to +Prime Minister Quisling.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>On Page 476 there is the letter from Lammers to Quisling which +says—I quote only one sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer, therefore, desires that during the war there +shall be no conferences or discussions concerning a final or a +preliminary peace between the Greater German Reich and +Norway, or concerning other measures fixing or anticipating +Norway’s position to the Reich after the end of the war.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>This is the letter which the witness mentioned, which finally +brought to nought all his endeavors and those of Admiral Böhm.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Admiral, you had little to do with France, and therefore we can +be very brief. May I merely ask you, did you attempt at any time +to influence the political relations between Germany and France?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: This influence, when there was any, was in the first +place directed as much as possible towards improving the defense of +the country. In the second place, there were above all humanitarian +reasons. I often visited naval and submarine bases in France. During +these journeys I got some knowledge of conditions in France. I saw +that in 1940 and still in 1941 the population lived just as if it were +at peace, completely undisturbed. Consequently I believed, since the +Führer had shown so much moderation on the occasion of the +Armistice, that a basis could be found which would draw France—whose +government was after all collaborationist—closer to us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I was informed that Laval was really sincere in his opinion that +only co-operation between France and Germany could guarantee a +lasting peace in Europe for the future. Therefore I suggested to him +whether he himself could not try to do something in that direction. +He did not intend to do this, and I referred to it again when I heard +that Admiral Darlan was trying to work more closely with our +naval commander in France, Admiral Schultze. That was first +achieved in the field of intelligence, where his services were very +useful to us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At the end of the year 1941 he mentioned that he would like to +speak to me. Admiral Schultze reported that to me and I told Hitler +<span class='pageno' title='103' id='Page_103'></span> +about it and recommended such a conversation because I thought Lt +would do some good.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It would do what?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That it might bring some advantage. The Führer +approved this meeting and instructed me as to his views. The +meeting took place near Paris on the occasion of an official trip +which I made to the French bases at the end of January or beginning +of February 1942. I had the impression that the meeting +was very satisfactory, inasmuch as Darlan was of the opinion that +a peace would be of advantage to both nations and he also appeared +to be inclined to co-operate. He stressed, however, that the whole +political situation would have to be settled before peace could be +concluded. I also showed that I was prepared to meet him concerning +the negotiations with the Armistice Commission with respect +to heavy guns for big French ships. I reported to the Führer on the +results of the meeting. But in this case too the Führer was again +hesitant and did not want to make a decision. He said he had to see +first how the war went before he could decide upon his final attitude +toward France. Besides, that would be a precedent which might +have an effect on other nations. So that also was a failure. I did not +obtain the relief in the defense of France which I had hoped for and +so, in the case of France, this failure was the second reason which +contributed later to my asking for my release, because I could not +carry my plans through.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the next subject where accusations +are made against you, and that is Russia. When did you hear for +the first time that Hitler intended to wage war against Russia, +although he had concluded a Nonaggression Pact with Russia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I first remind you that in the summer of 1940, +that is to say, July, August, and September, we in the Navy were +very much occupied with preparations for a landing in England; +therefore it never entered our heads that there could be any plans +for action in another direction. In August I heard from some Army +office, possibly that of the Commander-in-Chief, that considerable +troop transports were going to the East. I asked Hitler what that +meant and he told me it was a grandiose camouflage for his intentions +to invade England. He knew that I would be against it right +away if he were to speak about an enterprise against Russia. In +September—I cannot recall the date exactly—he finally admitted to +me that he had certain intentions against Russia. In September I +reported to him at least twice, my more important report was +26 September, when I did everything I could to dissuade him from +any undertaking against Russia. In that report which I made in the +presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl I emphasized +particularly the strategic military side; first, because I could do +<span class='pageno' title='104' id='Page_104'></span> +that in all clarity in the presence of other people, and then because +I assumed that such military reasons, that is, the possibility of +failure of an operation against Russia at a time when the struggle +was on against England, would impress him and dissuade him from +that plan. On 26 September, after making this official report, I asked +for a personal conference alone with Hitler. Keitel and Jodl can +testify that I always did this when I wanted to discuss something +particularly important with the Führer, where I had to go beyond +the conventional procedure and which I could only do if nobody else +was present. One could tell Hitler a lot of things if one was alone +with him, but one could not make any such statements in a larger +group. Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl know that +very well, particularly well, because they were the ones who in such +cases always had to leave the room. On that occasion I gave Hitler +my views in detail; first, that it was not possible to break the pact +with Russia, that it would be morally wrong, that it would serve no +purpose because the pact gave us great advantages and was a basis +for a sound policy for Germany later on. Then I told him that under +no circumstances could he start a two-front war, as it was he who +had always emphasized that he would not repeat the stupidity of +the government of 1914 and that, in my opinion, it could never be +justified. Then I put to him again the difference of the forces on +each side, the absolute necessity for the Navy to concentrate on the +war against England and particularly at that moment when all +resources were strained to the utmost to carry out the invasion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On that day I had the impression that Hitler was inclined to listen +to my argument because later, or the next day, the naval adjutant, +Kapitän Von Puttkamer, reported to me that Hitler had spoken in +very much the same vein as I had spoken, and had appreciated my +argument.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That went on for several months. I presented many such reports, +returning always with the same arguments. I believed again in +November that I had been successful. To my utter surprise, however, +on 18 December, Directive Number 21 (Barbarossa) came out, which +dealt with the case of a war with the Soviet Union before the termination +of the war against England. It is true, of course, that it +was a directive for an eventuality. It is Document 446-PS, USA-31, +of 18 December 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is in Document Book 10a, +Page 247.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, the Prosecution asserted +that the Navy and you assisted in drawing up this directive. Is +that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is in no way correct. Such directives were +drafted in the OKW after the Führer had taken his political decision, +<span class='pageno' title='105' id='Page_105'></span> +in the Armed Forces Operations Staff; and in that Armed Forces +Operations Staff there was also one naval officer and one or more +Air Force officers who, under the Chief of the Armed Forces +Operations Staff, dealt with matters concerning the Navy and Air +Force when such directives were being drafted. The directive then +went to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and they +were ordered, for their part, to work out and present suggestions for +the execution of the orders of the Führer. They had no influence on +the directive itself and did not see it at all beforehand.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I add one more thing? I have been accused by the Prosecution +that I used my influence with the Führer not for moral and +ethical reasons but that I tried in a cynical way first to settle the +account with England and then to assail Russia. I have said before +that I told all my reasons to the Führer whenever I had the chance, +but that I could not do that in a public meeting or in the presence +of other people, nor could I write it down in my war diary, because +the sharp words which fell there must not become known to +other people by means of the war diary. I want to point to Document +C-170, Exhibit USA-136, which dates from 23 August 1939 to +22 June 1941. It is a compilation of many excerpts from the War +Diary of the Naval Operations Staff—and from my minutes of conferences +with Hitler in which the Russian question was dealt with. +This is not a literal reproduction of my statements or word for word +excerpts from the War Diary, but it is a summary of excerpts by the +naval archivist, Admiral Assmann. I will not read details from +these many entries, but I should like to point out that precisely this +document, C-170, shows in a large number of entries contained +therein that, since the beginning of the war in 1939, I continuously +used my influence with the Führer to maintain good relations with +Russia for the reasons which I have previously mentioned. It would +lead us too far if I were to start quoting several entries here. But +the document, I would like to emphasize, is entirely convincing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You had nothing to do with the Directive 21, +which is signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Absolutely nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But following that, you made some preparations +in accordance with the directive? As they concerned the Navy they +were in any case not so important here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. We had the first conference in January, as can be +seen from one of these entries in C-170. I had reported to the Führer +on 4 February about our intentions and in March the Navy began +with certain preparations. I have said already that the Navy +throughout the first period was hardly concerned with major +operations, but only with the cutting off of the Gulf of Finland by +<span class='pageno' title='106' id='Page_106'></span> +mines and light naval forces. I do not know whether that is in +Directive 21 or somewhere else but the Führer, at my urgent +request, had ordered that the center of gravity of the naval warfare +should still be in the direction of England. Consequently, we could +use only relatively small forces for the war against Russia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we had better break off now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal rather understood that you hoped to finish by +midday today. We realize that you had 2 hours of today taken up +with your documents, but when do you think you will be able to +finish now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe I will need only about three-quarters of +an hour, between half an hour and an hour.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Tomorrow at 10 o’clock we shall deal with +the documents of Seyss-Inquart, and we are told that will only last +30 minutes.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 18 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='107' id='Page_107'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD DAY</span><br/> Saturday, 18 May 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the application for +documents of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, 87 documents altogether +have been submitted to the Prosecution, and we have gone over +them in the German. After numerous conferences with counsel for +the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, we find we are unable to agree now +on 17 of these documents. As of yesterday the number was 20, as +I so stated, but we have now reduced it to 17.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document Number 5 in the defendant’s list is a copy of a resolution +of the German National Assembly on the 21st of February +1919, advocating Anschluss between Austria and Germany. We have +told counsel we object to it as being really irrelevant here and immaterial. +It is a resolution of a German parliamentary body, and +it doesn’t seem to us to make any difference what they were thinking +of Anschluss in 1919.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document Number 10 is an extract from a newspaper article +published in October 1945 and written by a man named Walford +Selby. It is a critical article criticizing the Treaty of St. Germain +for not avoiding the obliteration of the Austro-Hungarian economic +entity, and it discusses what it describes as the mistakes of 1919, +and so on. We understand that it is intended to explain, with other +documents, the economic background of the Anschluss movement. +Whatever may be said for that type of proof, there are at least five +other documents on the same basis and we made no objection to +them. But we did feel that somewhere this sort of thing, even if +relevant, certainly became cumulative. Documents 7, 12, 26, and 33 +are all on the same subject, the economic background of Anschluss, +and this is a long one. Therefore, we feel that it certainly is not +necessary, doesn’t add very much, merely creates a lot of paper +work, and is cumulative.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document Number 11 is a speech delivered by a Dr. Schober, +giving the area and population of the Republic of Austria. We +haven’t any very serious objection to this type of thing excepting +that there probably are better sources if the defendant wishes to +establish the area and population of Austria in 1921. Further, it +<span class='pageno' title='108' id='Page_108'></span> +seems to us that the Tribunal could very well take judicial knowledge +of the area and population of Austria as of that date from +reliable publications.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document Number 14 is a statement by the former Chancellor +of Austria in 1922 to the effect that Austria belongs to Germany. +Our objection is again based on the cumulative feature of this document, +because there are at least three other documents with almost +identical statements by Dr. Renner to which we have made no +objection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document 19 is an extract from a book written by a man called +Kleinschmied, and the extract purports to show that a number of +politicians lived or prospered on the Anschluss movement in Austria. +That doesn’t seem to us to be very important here or likely to help +the Tribunal very much.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, what exactly does “lived from the +propaganda” mean? That they made their living by reason of propaganda, +or what?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. It purports to show that they made it a vehicle +for carrying on political activities, and made an issue of it and +sustained themselves politically.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 21 is an extract from Kunschak’s book <span class='it'>Austria 1918-1934</span>, +and it gives the increase in the National Socialist votes in Austria +between 1930 and 1932. That didn’t seem to us to be very +material or very helpful or likely to be helpful to the Tribunal. We +objected to it on the grounds that it was irrelevant and immaterial.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document Number 22 is an extract from an article in the <span class='it'>New +Free Press</span> of August 1932, opposing the League of Nations loan. +This again is submitted to prove the flow or the continuity of the +Anschluss movement. There is at least one other document, Number +23, which purports to establish the same principle on the same +kind of proof.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 27 is an extract from an article written by Martin Fuchs, +“Un Pacte avec Hitler,” and it discusses the Yugoslav policy with +respect to Anschluss between Germany and Austria. Again that +doesn’t seem to the Prosecution to have any direct bearing or any +helpful bearing upon the issues here, whatever the Yugoslavs thought +about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 31 is an extract from the <span class='it'>Neue Zeitung</span> of the 11th of +January of this year wherein Gordon Walker states that the celebration +in Austria after the Anschluss was genuine. Well, that is +Mr. Walker’s opinion, and there is some other substantial opinion on +the other side. We doubt very much that his opinion is material +here or competent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Who is he? +<span class='pageno' title='109' id='Page_109'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I understand he is a member of the Labor Party in +Great Britain, and a writer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 39 is an extract from the <span class='it'>Archiv</span> of 1938. This sets forth +a statement made by Senator Borah, of the United States, that the +Anschluss was a natural and inevitable affair and had nothing to +do with the United States. This was not a speech made by the late +Senator Borah in the Senate; it was his own opinion, and it does +not seem to us that it would be very helpful. Some later opinions +of Senator Borah were not so helpful, and this doesn’t seem to be +very likely to be helpful to the Tribunal with respect to this issue.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 47 is an extract from Zernatto’s book <span class='it'>The Truth about +Austria</span>. Zernatto was one of the State Under Secretaries of Austria, +as the Tribunal knows. He left the country after the Anschluss +and went to the United States and wrote this book. He makes a +number of statements, I might say, about the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. +The Tribunal would be interested in knowing that this +Document 47, and Documents 48, 50, 54, 55, 60, and 61 are all +extracts from the same book. Now, we felt that wherever he reports +a conversation with Seyss-Inquart, that would have bearing and +relevancy before the Court; but where he expresses his opinion, we +have more doubt about its relevancy. This one statement, Number +47, seems to be his opinion. He doesn’t cite any conversation or +anything other than what appears to be his impression that Seyss-Inquart +disassociated himself from Leopold’s efforts.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, we do not object to 48, and to 50, or to 54, because although +we originally thought we would object, on reviewing them they +appeared to set out actual conversations between Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart, +and it might be helpful to the Tribunal. Therefore, we do +not object to the next three.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But 55, again, is a statement in Zernatto’s book that, in Zernatto’s +opinion, Seyss-Inquart was a figure on the chess board and +was double-crossed by the Nazi or new Party leadership. We object +to that for the reason that I have stated; it is the author’s opinion. +He is deceased, by the way, and is certainly not available. In any +event, we do not think his opinion can be very helpful.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 60 is also a statement from Zernatto’s book and it sets +out a conversation with an unnamed Austrian Nazi. We felt that +was altogether too vague and would not be of value or helpful. In +Number 61, again, the author Zernatto expresses his opinion that +Seyss-Inquart was afraid of shouldering responsibility. I don’t want +to stress our objections too heavily to these extracts. I don’t think +they are very harmful, certainly, but I rather object because we +would like to cut down some of this printing, and I do not think +they will be very helpful to Seyss-Inquart. +<span class='pageno' title='110' id='Page_110'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Number 68 is the first document on anti-Semitism, and it is an +excerpt from the publication entitled <span class='it'>The Elements of National +Socialism</span> by Bishop Alois Hudal. It explains anti-Semitism in Germany +and Austria; and it goes on to discuss matters that the Tribunal +has heard very much about through other defendants, the +disproportionate position of the Jewish population in Germany, and +so on. We object to it as not being helpful and not material.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Again 69 is another extract from Zernatto’s book on the causes, +as some of these people see it, of anti-Semitism. It is his opinion +and does not to us seem to be helpful or material here. Number 71 +is on the Slovak question. I doubt that there has been any serious +claim made anywhere in this case that at various times the Slovaks +have not claimed autonomy. This extract from the <span class='it'>Archiv</span> of 1938, +insofar as we can discover, seeks to establish that they did want +autonomy. Well, we don’t think that is very important here, and +it will not be helpful to the Tribunal or to Seyss-Inquart.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it a document of state?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it is a document from the <span class='it'>Archiv</span>, and in that +sense it is a public document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: After Slovakia had been taken over by the +Reich?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, not afterwards, it’s in 1938, and it preceded the +taking over.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: These are our objections, Mr. President. I do think +we have tried to be rather...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Of course, Mr. Dodd, we are only considering +now the question of objections to translation. We are not considering +the question of admissibility, nor are we binding you not to +object to them after they have been translated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I am aware of that, Mr. President. We tried to +be, I think, fairly generous about this list. The excerpts, or most +of them, are not too long. We did think we would have to call a +halt somewhere, and I do not think our 17 objections out of the +87 listed are very strict or are pinching, really, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): +Your Lordship, High Tribunal, I know that you value my +small country, Austria, not only because of its ancient culture and +its scenic beauty, but also because it was the first country which +lost its freedom through Hitler. However, with all respect which +you have for this country, I cannot expect of you that, as representative +of great powers, you know the history of my country to +<span class='pageno' title='111' id='Page_111'></span> +the last detail. I do believe that it is of the utmost importance for +the defense of Seyss-Inquart that you understand fully on the basis +of what background and what motives this man acted the way +he did.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I myself can see three reasons which led to the Anschluss.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>First of all, the desperate economic situation which runs like a +red thread from 1918 right up to—I am sorry to say—and through +the year 1946.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The second reason, and I shall be very brief with regard to the +documents...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, will you come to the actual +documents as soon as possible, because you will remember we are +only discussing the question of whether they should be translated +or not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. The second reason was the disunity of +the democratic parties. The third reason was the attitude of the +surrounding powers. From these points of view I have assembled +my documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The first document is a resolution of the Weimar National +Assembly, and I am of the point of view that it is important in +respect to a final judgment that the Anschluss was not only a wish +of the Austrian population, but an all-German postulate. It is very +short and I request that it be admitted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The second document is by Selby, who for many years was the +British Ambassador in Vienna, a genuine friend of our country. In +this article he refers to the economic background and conditions in +Austria, which led to the Anschluss. That was the reason for my +including this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next document is a speech delivered by Federal Chancellor +Schober who was held in great esteem by the world. In this speech +he refers to the fact that the burdens imposed on Austria are too +great for her to carry. He described the situation as a whole as a +case of bankruptcy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next document is a statement by the present Federal Minister, +Dr. Karl Renner, in 1922. At that time Dr. Seipel went to +Geneva and with great difficulty put through a loan at the League +of Nations which was of great importance to us because at the same +time it was demanded of Austria that we should forego independence +for 10 years’ duration. That meant that we were not to take any +steps to change the conditions for an Anschluss. Renner opposed +Seipel in Parliament at that time. This document is in no way +cumulative to Document 33, since in Document 33 I want merely +to describe the economic situation as it obtained in the year 1938. +<span class='pageno' title='112' id='Page_112'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next document is Point 2 of my evidence; namely, the strong +political propaganda for the Anschluss. In any event, I must dispute +most strongly the assertion that Document Number 21, which is very +short, is irrelevant. I consider it extremely important to prove that +this new, very young party, which grew in the fertile soil of a desperate +economic situation, increased tenfold, as far as the number +of votes was concerned, in the years 1930 to 1932; thus all the time +there existed a recognized political opposition to the government.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next Document, Number 22, is an article which again illustrates +the economic situation in Austria at a very essential period +of history, namely, the moment when Federal Chancellor Dollfuss +went to Lausanne in order to negotiate another loan from the +League of Nations, and we again were forced to suppress thoughts +of an Anschluss for another 10 years. This Document, Number 22, +as well as the next one, Number 23, is not cumulative, since the +one shows the political and the other the economic position of the +members of Parliament with respect to the League of Nations’ loan +of the year 1932.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next document is only an extract from the views taken by +the various surrounding states to the Anschluss question. I selected +only Yugoslavia, for Yugoslavia was the country which most strongly +supported the idea of Anschluss in her foreign policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As far as Document 31 is concerned, I should like to remark, +supplementing the remarks made by the Prosecution, that Gordon +Walker is not only a member of the Labor Party, but—and this +point is much more important—during the entire war years he was +head of the British Radio Division Austria, and he was himself in +Austria in the year 1938 and he witnessed the Anschluss. His judgment +therefore is of extraordinary importance since it is the judgment +of a prominent foreigner.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The same remark also applies to the following document, the +statement by Senator Borah who for 25 years was the Chairman of +the American Committee on Foreign Affairs. His opinion is surely +deserving of notice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next documents concern statements made by Dr. Zernatto. +I should like to add that Dr. Zernatto was Federal Minister, General. +Secretary of the Fatherland Front and Schuschnigg’s right-hand +man during the period of the Anschluss. He was one of the spiritual +fathers of the Schuschnigg plebiscite. I am sorry to say that +he died an emigrant in 1940, and I cannot produce him as a witness +here; but his book is a document and actually tells what this man +experienced in those critical days.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I urgently request that the remaining three documents, which are +very brief, be left in the book. +<span class='pageno' title='113' id='Page_113'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next two documents, which concern anti-Semitism, I included +very unwillingly in order to avoid any accusation of anti-Semitic +propaganda. I included them because in the trial brief my client is +accused of being a member of an anti-Semitic organization. This +accusation is unjustifiable insofar as more importance is attached to +this organization than it actually deserves. If this matter is not +further emphasized by the Prosecution, I shall not attach any particular +importance to these two documents myself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The last document which is being objected to, Number 71, contains +the Agreement of Pittsburgh which was concluded between +Masaryk and Hlinka, the Slovak leader, at which occasion Masaryk +solemnly promised autonomy to the Slovaks, a promise which was +not kept according to the letter of the agreement and which gave +rise to a strong demand for autonomy in Slovakia, which was supported +by Hitler. For these reasons I ask that this document also +be approved.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal will consider +the question of these documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, Dr. Siemers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday in connection +with Norway I submitted on one occasion Documents 81, +82, 83, 84, 85, and 86. I beg the Tribunal’s pardon, but I forgot +to submit one document pertinent to this matter, and I should like +to remedy this omission.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The document, which has already been granted me, is Exhibit +Number Raeder-88, which likewise is an extract from the <span class='it'>White +Book</span> and is printed in my Document Book Number 5, on Pages 392 +and following. This document shows the British order of 6 April +1940, regarding the plans for the occupation of northern Swedish +ore fields, proceeding from Narvik.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Since the Tribunal is familiar with this document, it will not +be necessary for me to read from it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, yesterday we had arrived +at the topic of Russia. You had answered my question regarding +Directive Number 21, Document 446-PS, of 18 December 1940, to the +effect that the Navy had not worked on this directive. You further +stated that the Navy undertook preparations in January in accordance +with the command.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I make a brief remark on this directive to the +effect that yesterday I believe you made a mistake when you said +that this directive was signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl. This was +the copy of the operational staff which Hitler had signed; but +Keitel and Jodl only countersigned. Thus there is no question of +<span class='pageno' title='114' id='Page_114'></span> +a signature of these two; when such directives were issued they +were signed only by Hitler, and the others could merely countersign.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, and I thank you for the +correction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this connection, I should like to ask the Tribunal to consider +Document C-35, USA-132. This document is found in the Document +Book of the British Delegation, Number 10a, on Page 16. It +is an extract from the War Diary with the date of 30 January 1941. +It describes the preparations by the Navy, in accordance with +Hitler’s command of 18 December, where Hitler under Number IV +of the directive commanded that precautionary measures be taken +in case Russia should alter her previous attitude toward Germany, +that is, only in case of this possibility.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, in connection with your +representation of the Russian situation, the Prosecution has submitted +Document C-66, which corresponds to GB-81. This is your +report of 10 January 1944 to Admiral Assmann for the historical +archives of the Navy. The document will be found in the Document +Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, Page 13. There you +will find the basic position taken by Raeder with respect to “Fall +Barbarossa.” This is set forth under “a” of the document under +Number 1...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have just heard that this document is also to be found in the +Document Book 10a, on Page 35. There you wrote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“At this time the Führer had made known his ‘unalterable +decision’ to conduct the eastern campaign in spite of all +remonstrances. Accordingly, further warnings, as long as +completely new situations had not arisen, were completely +without purpose, as one knew from experience. As Chief +of the Naval Operations Staff I was never convinced of the +‘compelling necessity’ for Barbarossa.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you have anything to add to these statements which you +made at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should like to say in this connection that despite +the fact that the directive had been issued on 18 December, I made +a comprehensive report at the end of December, as can be seen +from Document C-170, which I mentioned yesterday on several +occasions, in order to convince the Führer of the wrongness of this +decision. This shows that I have gone very far, for when the +Führer had issued a directive, even if it applied only to a hypothetical +case, it was generally impossible to approach him with +basic considerations against this directive. Everything else I mentioned +already yesterday. +<span class='pageno' title='115' id='Page_115'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday, in connection with your +counterproposals made to Hitler with respect to Russia, you mentioned +that in the autumn the plan was still to carry through the +action “Seelöwe,” that is, to land in England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When, according to your strategic opinion, or +the opinion of the Navy, did this possibility cease to exist? When +did you have to dispense with this plan?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In the course of the month of September we still +believed that the landing could be carried through. As a necessary +condition the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and I, too, always +insisted—and he realized this fully—that for a landing air superiority +would have to be on our side; and therefore we were waiting +to see whether we could actually produce this air superiority in +time for the landing, which due to weather conditions could not be +carried out later than the beginning of October. If it were not +possible by then, it would have to be postponed until May of the +following year. It developed that air superiority could not be +produced to the necessary extent; consequently it was said that the +landing was to be postponed until the spring of the following year. +Further preparations were to be taken and they actually were +taken. But in the course of the winter the idea of a landing was +completely abandoned, and Hitler decreed that preparations in the +harbors along the Channel should be carried on only to such an +extent as would give the British the impression that this landing +actually was to take place. In September I had the impression that +Hitler no longer had any great interest in this landing and that in +his own mind he was completely committed to the Russian campaign +in conjunction with which he, of course, could not carry out +the landing in England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, I turn to the accusation raised against you +by the Prosecution that you demanded that war be waged against +America. The Prosecution has submitted in this connection Document +C-152, or GB-122, which is to be found in the Document Book +of the British Delegation, Number 10, Page 23. This is an extract +from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff dealing with a +report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy—that is, you—to +the Führer on 18 March 1941. Under Figure 11 of this document, +it is stated, and I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Japan must proceed to take Singapore as soon as possible, +since the opportunity will never again be so favorable (preoccupation +of the entire British fleet elsewhere; the unreadiness +of the United States to carry on a war against Japan; +the inferiority of the United States fleet to the Japanese +<span class='pageno' title='116' id='Page_116'></span> +fleet). Japan is, indeed, preparing for this action but will +carry it out, according to statements of Japanese officers, only +at the moment when Germany proceeds with the landing in +England. All efforts on Germany’s part must therefore aim +to incite Japan to immediate action. If Japan captures Singapore, +then all other Eastern Asiatic problems relating to the +United States and England will be solved (Guam, Philippines, +Borneo, and Dutch East Indies).</p> + +<p>“Japan wants to avoid a war against the United States of +America, if at all possible, and can do so if she takes Singapore +promptly.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>The Prosecution has construed this statement of yours to mean +that you wanted to lead Japan into a war against America. Is that +correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It is one of the most incorrect assertions contained in +the Indictment against me. It is entirely clear that, since I was +involved in a naval war with England with my small German Navy, +I did not want, under any circumstances, to have America on my +neck as well; and it has been discussed here repeatedly that my +most urgent effort during the entire first few years of the war was +to avoid, under all circumstances, being involved with the United +States. Admiral Wagner described here in detail the limitations +which I had imposed on the German Navy in order to prevent any +clashes with the United States. I imposed limitations which actually +I could hardly justify when I carried on U-boat warfare with such +relatively small means. On the other hand, the United States from +the end of 1940 on, at the latest, and during the entire year of 1941, +exerted pressure on us in our naval warfare wherever possible and +committed actions which could be interpreted as definitely not neutral. +I remind you merely of the repairing of British warships in +the United States, something which up until that time was completely +impossible and unheard of; and Roosevelt’s orders to shoot +given in July and in September 1941; attacks by the American +destroyers <span class='it'>Greer</span> and <span class='it'>Kearney</span> in the Atlantic on our U-boats. In +two cases U-boats were pursued with depth charges for 2 hours +until finally they surfaced and fired, in one case damaging one +destroyer. Despite all this, in June 1941 I reported to Hitler that +we were continuing not to disturb the merchantmen of the United +States in any way—with the result that United States merchantmen +were crossing the Atlantic completely unmolested on sea lanes of +their own choosing, were in a position to give reports about our +U-boats and our sea warfare without our preventing them from doing +so; because of this the British were in a position to camouflage their +ships as American ships. That they did. The first time our pocket +battleship <span class='it'>Admiral Scheer</span>, while crossing the Atlantic, searched a +<span class='pageno' title='117' id='Page_117'></span> +ship flying the American flag it turned out to be the British ship +<span class='it'>Canadian Cruiser</span>. Despite all this I recommended to the Führer, +and he fully approved my suggestion, that we should take no measures +against American ships. That we did not go to Halifax to lay +mines Admiral Wagner has already mentioned. I need not mention +that any further.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was this proposal that Japan capture Singapore +only for the purpose of having assistance and an ally against England, +with whom we were already at war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is actually the case, and I should like to picture +very briefly the development which led to this proposal. This was +not anything that I did on my own initiative, but rather at the +beginning of the year 1941 political negotiations were carried on +with Japan partly by the Führer and partly by the Foreign Minister. +I was not even called into these negotiations, and I must say +regrettably so, for at these negotiations many things were discussed +which were not correct. However on the other hand this shows +again that there can be no talk about a conspiracy. Contact was +made, and then the visit of the Foreign Minister Matsuoka took +place, I believe, in March.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On the basis of this entire development the Führer, on 5 March +1941, issued Directive Number 24. That is Document C-75, USA-151, +of 5 March.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the High +Tribunal to Document C-75, which is the same as USA-151, to be +found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10a, +Page 58. In this Directive, Number 24, it says under Figure 3a:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“As the joint object in the war it is important to defeat England +quickly and in that way keep the United States out of +the war.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>And three paragraphs farther down, under “d,” it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The capture of Singapore...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That on Page 58 is Instruction Number 54, +concerning collaboration with Japan.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised—to my surprise—that +only a part of this directive is to be found in the English translation. +I ask that the Tribunal grant me permission, under these +circumstances, to submit the complete directive later as a Raeder +document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your Raeder book, +Dr. Siemers? +<span class='pageno' title='118' id='Page_118'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, not up until now; for I did not know that +only a part had been translated. I am asking for permission to +submit this whole document later as a Raeder document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. This may be found under Figure 3a, +and the next quotation will be found under Figure 3d, and it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The capture of Singapore, which is the key position of England +in the Far East, would be a decisive achievement in the +war effort of the three powers. Beyond that, attacks on other +bases of British and American sea power, if the entry of the +United States into the war cannot be prevented, will serve to +shatter the might of the enemy in that zone....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to note the fact that already on 5 March, which +is the date of this directive, Hitler decreed the capture of Singapore. +Consequently, the suggestion made by Admiral Raeder in Document +C-152, dated 18 March, cannot be considered decisive, since a Hitler +decree was already in existence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I make a brief remark about that? The same +thing seems to apply to all the cases which are being mentioned +here: First of all, the political decision by Hitler, the head of the +State; then the directive of the Supreme Commander of the Armed +Forces to the Armed Forces; then the conclusions drawn by the +commanders-in-chief of the separate branches of the Wehrmacht. +So, after I received the directive of 5 March, I had to contemplate +how Japan, after entering the war, could strategically be used with +the best results. And that depended on how we could most effectively +wound our main opponent, England, on the sea. In this connection +I had to insist most urgently that Japan move against Singapore +since there were also circles who were of the opinion that Japan +should attack Vladivostok, which would have been a grave mistake.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>England’s power center in East Asia had to be attacked. But the +very fact that I believed that the capture of Singapore would cause +the United States of America to shy away from the war occasioned +this proposal of mine, and not the opposite.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection, I refer to Document +1877-PS which was submitted in the special Indictment against you. +It is USA-152 and may be found in the Document Book of the British +Delegation, Number 10, Page 320. It is a conversation between +the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka—I am just told now +that 320 is incorrect. It should be 319.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And it should be 10a, I think.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: 10a, I beg your pardon. +<span class='pageno' title='119' id='Page_119'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is a conversation between Matsuoka and Von Ribbentrop on +29 March 1941. We have already discussed this matter. On Page 8 +of this document, the following is said:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Reich Foreign Minister again referred to the problem of +Singapore. Because of the fear expressed by Japan that there +might be U-boat attacks from the Philippines and that the +British Mediterranean Fleet and Home Fleet would join the +attack he had discussed the situation once more with Admiral +Raeder. The latter told him that the British fleet would be so +completely occupied in the home waters and in the Mediterranean +this year that she would not be able to dispatch even +a single ship to the Far East.</p> + +<p>“The American U-boats were described by Admiral Raeder +as being so inferior that Japan would not have to concern +herself about them at all.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Herr Von Ribbentrop, in reply to +my question on 1 April 1946, declared that he had been mistaken, +that the statement was probably made by Hitler. Will you please +clarify this statement once and for all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I can only confirm that I never discussed such questions +with Herr Von Ribbentrop, for unfortunately there was no +connection between the Foreign Office and the High Command of +the Navy especially since the Führer had forbidden that any information +be given by the Foreign Office to the military authorities. +I would never have made such statements since they were in direct +opposition to my own opinion, and especially since in this case I had +no basis for any such statements.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, were not, on the other hand, questions +frequently dealt with in the Naval Operations Staff as to the industrial +and military strength of the United States, and that for these +reasons any entrance of the United States was to be feared?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: This was fully clear to us, even to the last detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you at any time during the war see this +Document 1877-PS, which is before you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were you advised about these discussions between +Herr Von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Minister Matsuoka or the discussion +with Oshima?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No; I was merely told by the Führer, and that is +shown in the Document C-170, dealing with the results of this +discussion with Matsuoka. But I had no discussions with Herr +Von Ribbentrop. +<span class='pageno' title='120' id='Page_120'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I have just been +asked to correct a word which I have just used; in order to be fair, +I should like to do so. I said that Hitler, in his directive of 5 March +1941, “decreed” that Singapore be taken. The expression is not correct. +He naturally could not give any orders to Japan. The mistake +arises because the directive starts with the words: “The Führer has +commanded the following for our co-operation.” And under Figure 3 +it says: “The following directives apply in this case.” And among +these directives the taking of Singapore is mentioned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Admiral, in any conversation did you suggest to anyone at any +time that Japan attack Pearl Harbor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, we never talked about that at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear anything about this plan before +Japan attacked Pearl Harbor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Never. It was a complete surprise for me and the +Naval Operations Staff that this attack took place; and it is a complete +mistake in judging the mentality of the Japanese to assume +that they would have spoken of such a plan to anyone, even inside +Japan, who was not directly connected with it. In 1904 they likewise +attacked Russian ships “out of the blue” without anyone suspecting +anything at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I +should like to submit three documents which have been granted me, +first Exhibit Number Raeder-19, to be found in Document Book 2, +Page 108. This document deals with the report by the American +General Marshall which has been placed at my disposal through the +help of the Court.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this report, dated 1 September 1945, General Marshall stated +the following; and I refer to Page 116:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In order to establish for the historical record where and how +Germany and Japan failed I asked General Eisenhower to +have his Intelligence officers promptly interrogate the ranking +members of the German High Command who are now our +prisoners of war. The results of these interviews are of +remarkable interest. They give a picture of dissension among +the enemy nations and lack of long-range planning that may +well have been decisive factors of this world struggle at its +most critical moments.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And two paragraphs further:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command +had any over-all strategic plan. Although the High +Command approved Hitler’s policies in principle, his impetuous +strategy outran German military capabilities and ultimately +led to Germany’s defeat. The history of the German +<span class='pageno' title='121' id='Page_121'></span> +High Command from 1938 on is one of constant conflict of +personalities in which military judgment was increasingly +subordinated to Hitler’s personal dictates. The first clash +occurred in 1938 and resulted in the removal of Blomberg, +Von Fritsch, and Beck and of the last effective conservative +influence on German foreign policy.</p> + +<p>“The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, and the Low +Countries developed serious diversions between Hitler and +the General Staff as to the details of execution of strategic +plans. In each case the General Staff favored the orthodox +offensive, Hitler an unorthodox attack with objectives deep +in enemy territory. In each case Hitler’s views prevailed and +the astounding success of each succeeding campaign raised +Hitler’s military prestige to the point where his opinions were +no longer challenged. His military self-confidence became +unassailable after the victory in France, and he began to disparage +substantially the ideas of his generals, even in the +presence of junior officers. Thus no General Staff objection +was expressed when Hitler made the fatal decision to invade +Soviet Russia.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And on Page 118, there is an extract dealing with Germany and +Japan. I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Nor is there evidence of close strategic co-ordination between +Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized +that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but +hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and +American land, sea, and air forces in the Far East.</p> + +<p>“In the absence of any evidence so far to the contrary, it is +believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance +with a unified strategic plan.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And further, in the documents which were also granted me, +Exhibit Raeder-113 and 114, in the Document Book 6, Page 491 and +Page 497...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think you should ask the witness +whether he agrees with General Marshall’s appreciation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you agree with the opinions of the +American General Marshall?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have not completely absorbed these statements. In +general they are the lines of thought which we also had pursued, +but I cannot vouch for each single point. In order to speak with +certainty I would have to look at them or they would have to be +read to me again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe the general confirmation is sufficient. +In Document Raeder-113 I should like to refer to the heading: +<span class='pageno' title='122' id='Page_122'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Army Foresaw Japan’s Move, Marshall Says:</p> + +<p>“Washington, December 11 (AP)—General George C. Marshall, +formerly Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged last night that +the Army knew more than 10 days before December 7, 1941, +that a Japanese move toward Pearl Harbor might take them +past the deadline where the American chiefs believed the U.S. +should fight.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>In order to save time I shall not read the particulars; but it can +be gathered from the report by Marshall that the American Army +knew about it and later the date of November 25 and 26 is mentioned. +In addition Marshall testifies that preparations had been +worked out in the United States before the war for the construction +of landing strips for American bombers in Rabaul, Port Moresby, +and Singapore.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In Exhibit Number Raeder-114, which I am also submitting, +Henry L. Stimson, the former United States Secretary of War, made +a statement under date of 21 March.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Henry L. Stimson, former U.S. Secretary of War, disclosed +that the late President Roosevelt’s War Cabinet had discussed +and rejected—9 days before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor—an +American attack on the Japanese forces without further +warning...</p> + +<p>“Stimson related that he had received on November 28, 1941 +information of Japanese movements along the Asiatic coast. +On the same day, he said, the Cabinet met and discussed the +possible meaning of the Japanese move.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>He further said that:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“...if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British +would fight, and that if the British fought we would have to +fight.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>According to this, Admiral, did the United States know about +these Japanese plans before you did?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Apparently, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall turn to the last accusation by the +Prosecution, and that concerns Brazil. In this connection, the Prosecution +has submitted Document 1807-PS, GB-227, to be found in the +Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 288. This is +Jodl’s diary, the entry of 16 June 1942. I have to beg your pardon, +I am told it is Page 287, not 288. This entry reads:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Naval Operations Staff applied on 29 May for permission +to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. It considers +that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant +ships is expedient at this moment when defensive measures +are still incomplete and there is the possibility of surprise, +<span class='pageno' title='123' id='Page_123'></span> +since Brazil is to all intents and purposes waging naval warfare +against Germany.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] The Prosecution is accusing you of +violating neutrality and violating international law because you +made that proposal at a time when Brazil was neutral. I call your +attention to the fact that the war with Brazil broke out 2 months +later on 22 August 1942. Please tell me briefly from memory just +how you came to make this proposal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The relations between Brazil and Germany at this +time could not have been worse. The Germans were very much +persecuted and treated very badly. Germany’s economic interests +were heavily impaired. The Brazilians were already completely on +the side of the United States. They had allowed United States air +bases to be established along the Brazilian coast, and also intelligence +stations. They themselves confirmed that they had destroyed +a German U-boat; and, on the other side, the German U-boats had +also attacked Brazilian ships, for the Brazilian ships were not illuminated +according to regulations and consequently could not be +recognized as Brazilian ships. Germany had previously asked all of +the South American countries to illuminate their ships in such a +way that their nationality could be distinguished at night. Then +there were air attacks on U-boats of the Axis Powers, and they +could have been carried out only from Brazilian bases. At this +request of the Naval Operations Staff to the Führer, the Führer +decreed that once again we should ask the Italians what intelligence +reports they had received; and Italy in turn confirmed that some +weeks before Italian U-boats, which had been operating together +with ours, had been attacked near the Brazilian coast. Likewise the +Brazilian Air Ministry had made known the fact that Brazilian aircraft +or United States aircraft coming from Brazilian air bases had +attacked Axis U-boats.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On the basis of that confirmation the Führer permitted the use +of weapons against Brazilian ships along the Brazilian coast. A plan +was worked out, according to which a certain wave of U-boats, +which left the French coast in June to proceed into the Atlantic, +was to go to the Brazilian coast. The Führer had ordered in particular +that this was not to be mere pin-pricks but rather a serious +enterprise. This operation was later stopped and not carried through. +I am sorry that I am not able to say for what reason. But it can +be seen from our document which gives the statements made in the +War Diary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I believe that the +entire accusation of the Prosecution regarding this planning would +not have been raised if Document 1807-PS, Jodl’s diary entry of +<span class='pageno' title='124' id='Page_124'></span> +16 June, had been submitted <span class='it'>in toto</span>. Only the first part was submitted. +Therefore, I submit this entry as Exhibit Number Raeder-115, +to be found in Document Book 6, Page 500. From the further statements +made by General Jodl in his diary we may conclude that the +situation was correctly investigated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The first part, which was submitted by the Prosecution, that is, +the first two sentences, I have already read. The rest of the entry +is as follows:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office declares that an +aggravation of the conflict with Brazil is undesirable in view +of the attitude of Argentina and Chile and that, previous to +measures of war against Brazil, consultations must be held +with Italy and Japan. Acting on the report of the Chief of +the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Führer has ordered +on 30 May, that the Naval Operations Staff is to ascertain, by +inquiring in Rome, whether the Brazilian reports about warlike +actions against Axis U-boats are correct. The inquiry by +the Naval Operations Staff shows that Italian U-boats were +attacked on 22 and 26 May at the northeast corner of Brazil +by airplanes which beyond a doubt had started from a Brazilian +air base. The Naval Operations Staff transmit, moreover, +the text of the official communiqué of the Brazilian Air +Ministry about the fighting and propose to put into action +near the main Brazilian harbors during the period from +3-8 August 10 U-boats to sail from 22 June to 4 July from +ports in western France, along with the tanker <span class='it'>U-460</span>. The +order for execution must be given to the U-boats by 15 June +at the latest. After the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had +reported this to the Führer at the Berghof on the afternoon of +15 June, the Führer declared himself in agreement with the +intentions of the Naval Operations Staff but ordered, however, +that before any final decision is made, the political situation +be examined once again by the Foreign Office.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe that this proves that we were careful enough; and I +refer further to Exhibit Number Raeder-116 which I should like to +submit herewith, in the same document book, Page 503, which is an +extract from the War Diary. Under date 6 June there is an entry +which states that the development has gone so far that:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“...a latent state of war is practically already in existence, +(Brazil entirely on the side of USA; most severe damage to all +German interests; individual Brazilian steamers not properly +illuminated sunk by U-boats; increasing agitation in Brazil; +Brazilians claim they have already sunk German U-boat +while patrolling the coast).”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='125' id='Page_125'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>And a further extract from the War Diary, Exhibit Raeder-117, +which I should like to submit herewith, to be found in the same +document book, Page 509. I ask the High Tribunal to take notice of +this document and its contents and I refer only to Figures 3 and 4 +in detail. Under Figure 3 it reads:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“When Brazilian ships began to provide themselves with +camouflage paint and to arm, the order was given on 15 May +1942 to use arms at once against recognizable armed South +Americans.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And under Figure 4 it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“On the basis of the fact that Axis submarines were attacked +by vessels along the Brazilian coast and that the Brazilian Air +Ministry officially made known that attacks had been made +by the Brazilian Air Force, the Naval Operations Staff on +29 May 1942, in Document 12938/42, Top Secret, asked the +Armed Forces Operations Staff for permission to use arms +against Brazilian military forces and merchant ships.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I submit also Exhibit Number Raeder-118, Document Book 6, +Page 510. I ask the High Tribunal to take notice of this document. +I do not wish to quote it, since it repeats the facts we have already +heard. I believe that Figure 4 of Document 117 which I have just +read clarifies the matter completely and refutes every accusation +against the Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, do you have anything to +add to these extracts from the War Diary?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I have nothing to add. It is entirely clear.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I ask you now to describe to the +High Tribunal—and with this I am coming to the conclusion, of my +examination—how it came about that you resigned in January 1943?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Your Honors, shall we have a recess first?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It depends on whether you hope to finish in a +few minutes. If you hope to finish in a few minutes we will sit on +so that you may finish your examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe it will take perhaps 10 minutes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Please describe how +it came about that you resigned in January of 1943; but first I should +like to ask you one more question: Did you, even before this, have +the idea of resigning?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should like to say briefly that on several occasions +before the war I asked the Führer to relieve me of my post, or I +presented him with an ultimatum. I should like briefly to cite two +cases as examples. In November 1938 in the presence of General +<span class='pageno' title='126' id='Page_126'></span> +Keitel I made a report to the Führer about the type of ships and our +plans as to how the ships should be developed further. On this occasion +the Führer, in a manner defying explanation, began to attack +everything that we had built and were building, including the plans +for the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span>, and to declare them wrong. Later I found out +that things like that happened whenever some persons of his entourage, +who knew very little about such things, gave him their +opinion, that he always followed it up, probably wanting—as I told +myself later—to check whether the things he had been told were +actually correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This case, however, was so extreme that I could not do anything +else but simply pick up my plans, put them in my brief case, and +leave the room. General Keitel was present. The Führer followed +me to the door, asked me to come in again, softened his accusations, +and asked me not to resign now under any circumstances.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The second case was a purely personal one, but it is rather +typical. His naval adjutant, who had just been appointed, wanted +to marry a young girl who had a very unsavory reputation at the +University of Kiel. I told him I would never consent to the marriage. +The Führer had the girl introduced to him and decided he had +nothing against the marriage; I left the Berghof and sent the Führer +a letter via a staff officer in which I told him that I would refuse +my consent, that the officer would not remain in the Navy should +he marry, or else I would not remain. I asked the officer who acted +as my courier to bring back the answer since I wanted to reach a +decision at once. The Führer had the officer wait 2 days at the +Berghof and then sent him back to me with a letter saying:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Very well, the officer cannot marry and remain in the Navy +and he will not be used further as a naval adjutant; someone +else will be put in his place. He will become some sort of +leader in my National Socialist Motor Corps and will then +serve as one of my Party adjutants.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>It was also typical of the Führer that, to a certain degree, he +wanted to see his will carried through; but this man was out of +the Navy, and I could make my conviction felt in this case. +Under these circumstances I declared myself ready to continue in +office. That was at the beginning of 1939; in the course of the +spring, however, I asked again whether I could not be relieved of +my position now, since I had served for many years in the Navy and +I did not believe I would be able to maintain the dignity of the office +much longer. I suggested to him that perhaps in October 1939 +I should leave my post. The Führer refused at the time, and on +1 October we were at war, and in time of war I did not believe that +I could leave the Navy under any circumstances unless it was very +urgent, especially since I considered myself totally responsible for +<span class='pageno' title='127' id='Page_127'></span> +all preparations and for the training of the Navy. In the course of +the war our co-operating which up until then, aside from such +incidents, had been quite congenial, since the Führer had always +made an effort to show me respect, our connection gradually became +very strained during the war. The Führer became more nervous +when I made reports, flared up in rage when there were divergences +of opinion or if there had been any incidents, as, for instance, a +technical defect or poor performance by a ship. It happened again +and again that his entourage influenced him before I could actually +explain matters to him, and I was called in subsequently to set him +straight on these matters. In that way unpleasant scenes ensued +which wore me out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>One point about which the Führer was especially sensitive was +the large ships. He was always uneasy when our large ships were +out on the high seas and were carrying on raids against shipping. +The loss of a ship, such as the <span class='it'>Graf Spee</span> or later the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span>, he +considered a tremendous loss of prestige; and matters like that, +therefore, excited him tremendously. That went on until the end of +1942. Then there came—and this particularly impressed me—my +defeat in the consultation with the Führer on questions dealing with +Norway, France, and above all, Russia. In the final analysis he +always listened more to the Party people as, for example, Terboven, +than to an old officer. That led to a situation which could not be +tolerated for any length of time. One of the basic characteristics of +the Führer was a tremendous suspicion toward anyone and everyone, +but especially directed against old officers who had come from the +old Wehrmacht and of whom he always assumed—despite all well-intentioned +treatment—that in their hearts they did not share these +feelings which he had to demand of them. Especially the case of +Russia had led me to so many conflicts with him that our relations +were strongly influenced thereby. Indeed, the man who compiled all +these war diaries and minutes, Admiral Assmann, summed it up on +one occasion at the conclusion of such a discussion with the words: +“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, therefore, is in complete +opposition to the Führer in this matter.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At the end of 1942, just after I had had to put an end to the +entire Norwegian question, an incident occurred which led to the +end. There was to have been an attack on a convoy which was going +to Murmansk or Archangel from England. It was in December at +a time when in those northern regions there are just 1 or 2 hours +of light and hence no favorable weather for fighting by large ships +when up against large numbers of destroyers. The ships, together +with the destroyers, had started on their journey and had reached +the convoy while it was still light. But since daylight soon disappeared +and darkness fell and since the convoy was guarded by +<span class='pageno' title='128' id='Page_128'></span> +many destroyers, the admiral considered it expedient to withdraw +the big ships from the battle. That was the only correct decision +for he might have lost them all by torpedo attack. This fact, and +secondly the fact that unfortunately the radio connection between +this admiral and the Naval Operations Staff was made difficult +and at times completely broken off by static, caused the Führer +to become extremely excited in his headquarters where I reported +to him everything I found out myself. The whole day was spent +with questions back and forth, and even in the evening I could +not give him a clear picture. This excited him extremely. Through +Admiral Krancke he had all sorts of insults transmitted to me +and demanded that I report to him immediately; and I could see +that very strong friction would result. I arranged it so that I did +not need to report to him until 6 days later on 6 January so that +the atmosphere could first cool off a little. On 6 January I could +go to him with a complete report; and in the evening, at a discussion +at which Field Marshal Keitel was also present, he made a speech +of about an hour’s duration in which he made derogatory remarks +about everything that the Navy had done so far, in direct contrast +to every judgment passed on the Navy up until this time. From this +I saw that he was anxious to bring about a break.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I personally was firmly prepared to seize this opportunity to +resign, especially as it became ever clearer that the war was becoming +a pure U-boat war, and I could therefore feel that I could +leave at this moment with a clear conscience.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After the Führer had concluded his speech I asked to be permitted +to speak with him alone. Field Marshal Keitel and the +stenographers left and I told him that I was asking for my resignation +as I could see from his words that he was entirely dissatisfied +with me and therefore this was the proper moment for me +to leave. As always, he tried at first to dissuade me but I remained +adamant and told him that a new Commander-in-Chief of the +Navy who would have complete responsibility would definitely +have to be appointed. He said that it would be a great burden for +him if I were to leave now since for one thing the situation was +very critical—Stalingrad was impending—and secondly, since he +had already been accused of dismissing so many generals. In the +eyes of the outside world it would incriminate him if I were to +leave at this point. I told him that I would do everything I could +to prevent that happening. If he wanted to give the appearance as +far as the outside world was concerned that I had not resigned +because of a clash, then he could make me a general inspector +with some sort of nominal title, which would create the impression +that I was still with the Navy and that my name was still connected +with the Navy. This appealed to him at once and I told +<span class='pageno' title='129' id='Page_129'></span> +him on 6 January that I wanted to be dismissed on 30 January. At +this point I had concluded 10 years of service as Commander-in-Chief +of the Navy under him. He agreed to this proposal and asked +me to suggest two successors so that he could make a choice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On 30 January he then personally dismissed me by appointing +me Admiral Inspector of the Navy. He said that he would still +on occasion ask me for advice; but that never happened. I was +merely sent out twice, once to Bulgaria when the King of Bulgaria +was buried and once to Hungary, to the Hungarian Regent Horthy +to bring him a gift from the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you otherwise performed no tasks as +Admiral Inspector?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I had no functions and received no orders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then my last question: Did you have the impression, +on the occasion of your conversation of 6 January 1943 +with Hitler, that he in a way was glad to get rid of you in view +of the many differences of opinion and the fact that you contradicted +him frequently on technical naval and political matters concerning +Norway, France, Russia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do believe that he wanted to get rid of me at this +time, for I was in a certain way an inconvenience for him. This +one case which I described, where I had my way in the end, he had +never forgotten.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This concludes my examination of Admiral Raeder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit today until half past +one. It will adjourn now for 10 minutes.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to +ask questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant +Dönitz): Admiral, you recall the memorandum of the Naval +Operations Staff of 15 October concerning possibilities for an intensification +of the economic war. That is in the Document Book of +the British Delegation, Number 10, on Pages 96 and 97 of the +English text. Admiral Wagner has already testified about it here. +Can you add anything to that statement concerning the purpose +and the meaning of that memorandum? +<span class='pageno' title='130' id='Page_130'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Since the war against England came as a complete +surprise to us, we had up until then dealt very little with detailed +questions of submarine warfare. Among other things we had not +yet discussed the question of so-called unrestricted submarine warfare +which had played such a very important part in the previous +war. And from that fact it developed that on 3 September that +officer who was recently mentioned here was sent to the Foreign +Office with some points for discussion on the question of unrestricted +submarine warfare, so that we could clarify with the +Foreign Office the question as to just how far we could go. And +that is the document which recently played a role here, D-851, +GB-451, of 3 November.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: 3 September, you mean.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, 3 September. This touches upon all these questions. +Then discussions with the Foreign Office took place and +this U-boat memorandum mentioned by you was worked out in the +High Command of the Navy on the basis of these discussions and +released on 15 October. I believe that on 15 October I presented +it to the Führer who in principle agreed to the contents. But the +very fact that a memorandum about submarine warfare concerning +possibilities for an intensification of submarine warfare was issued +only on 15 October shows how little we were prepared for that +eventuality.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That memorandum contains near the beginning that sentence +which has been quoted by the Prosecution concerning our position +with respect to international law, where reference is made to +highest ethics of warfare, adherence to international law, and the +desire to base all military measures on existing laws wherever +possible. But if this is not possible or when by deviation it is possible +to achieve decisive military results, and we could take the +responsibility for this deviation, then in case of necessity we must +depart from existing international law. That means that also a +new international law may have to be developed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>However, this entire memorandum represents merely a constant +search for possibilities for conducting submarine warfare with the +least damage to neutrals and the greatest possible adherence to +international law and in such a way that it would become a decisive +factor in the outcome of the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Various cases are discussed as to how an intensification can be +reached, but it always was a question of finding countermeasures +against enemy measures. Such possibilities as blockade or the new +concept to lay siege to England by submarine warfare are examined +in all directions; but the draft always states the conclusion that in +view of the number of submarines and other misgivings it is not +yet possible to conduct such operations. +<span class='pageno' title='131' id='Page_131'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>And the final result of that entire memorandum, as set down +in that document, can be found in the two last pages. Unfortunately +I have only the German copy in front of me where under +the last Paragraph D the final opinion, the following sentences +which I should like to quote, are worthy of notice...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where is the extract?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On Pages 99 and 100 in +the Document Book 10, GB-224.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, another excerpt from the same document has +already been mentioned and that is in the Document Book Dönitz 3, +on Pages 199 to 203; but I do not believe that it is necessary to +refer to it because the witness will only read one or two sentences.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: [<span class='it'>Continuing.</span>] Now, the last paragraph “Conclusions” +reads:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“1.) The manner in which economic warfare has been conducted +until now, in accordance with Prize Regulations, does +not meet with military demands for ruthless severity.</p> + +<p>“A large part of enemy mercantile trade including all exports +in neutral ships is not covered.</p> + +<p>“The requirements of naval law that neutral merchantmen +be stopped and searched can no longer be fulfilled, in view +of the strength of aerial reconnaissance and U-boat countermeasures +in the enemy’s coastal approaches. Economic warfare +according to Prize Regulations has therefore to be limited +and in the North Sea and the Baltic must be left to surface +craft only. In the Atlantic the U-boats in enemy coastal +waters will limit their activities to attacks without warning +on convoys, troop transports, and once it has been approved, +armed and all enemy merchantmen, and will conduct economic +warfare according to the law governing prizes only in +exceptional cases. The use of the Operational Air Force for +economic warfare is not possible. Economic warfare is conducted +within the framework of international law. A possibility +of controversy with neutral states is ruled out.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Then one more sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“If the Supreme War Command for political reasons should +not be able at present to decide to wage the economic war in +the most vigorous form possible by having recourse to a siege, +it will be possible to increase the effectiveness of the policy +of stopping enemy trade by a ruthless increase in the use of +mines and by air attacks on enemy port installations. One +cannot, however, expect a decisive result from the economic +war in its present form.” (Document C-157, Exhibit GB-224)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='132' id='Page_132'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The immediate result of +that memorandum and of your report to the Führer was the order +of 17 October?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, and that provided: Firstly, that all enemy merchantmen +could be torpedoed; and secondly, as a severer measure, +that passenger ships in convoys could be torpedoed a short time +after an announcement to that effect had been made. That was all +done in connection with the intensification, measure for measure, +which we had brought about in answer to individual acts of the +enemy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, that long passage that the +defendant has just read, if it has not been put in evidence yet, +must be offered in evidence by you. I understand it is not in evidence +at present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I can help. I shall +be using this document and I shall put it in.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has it been offered in evidence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Only part of it, not the part +that the defendant has referred to. But, in view of that I shall +refer to it later on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you mentioned +that before 1935 certain preparations were made for the construction +of a German submarine weapon. Did Admiral Dönitz participate +in any way in these preparations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. As was said before, he was +abroad during the last year; but even before that he had nothing +to do with it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You have reported about +your dismissal as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Would you +please tell me how it came about that Admiral Dönitz became your +successor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Führer had ordered that I propose two admirals +as successors. I suggested in writing first, as the elder...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, how does this arise? I +mean, what relevancy has it to anything we have to decide as to +how Admiral Dönitz became head of the Navy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That has significance, +Mr. President, in view of the Prosecution’s assertion that Admiral +Dönitz became the successor of Admiral Raeder on the basis of +political relations or services rendered.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right. +<span class='pageno' title='133' id='Page_133'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please continue, Admiral.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I’ll be very brief. I suggested, first, Admiral Carls, +who was the senior and has vast knowledge of the entire conduct +of naval policy. In the event that the Führer should want to manifest +that he now was placing U-boat warfare in the foreground +I suggested Admiral Dönitz, who was the greatest authority in that +field. Political considerations of any kind were not mentioned at +all; it was purely an official, technical appointment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no more questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, +the Tribunal, through its letter of 26 March, has consented that an +affidavit be submitted by the Codefendant Raeder for the Defendant +Keitel, provided the Prosecution has an opportunity to question +Admiral Raeder on his statements in cross-examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have sent the affidavit to the Prosecution, and the Prosecution +has raised no objection. I ask to be permitted to submit this +affidavit which is concerned with the functions and position of the +Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, as Exhibit Number Keitel-19, +after Admiral Raeder has confirmed that he signed this affidavit +and that he agrees to its being submitted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, you are acquainted with the +questions which I put to you and which, after a conference with +your counsel, you answered and signed on 19 March?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is about the position of Field Marshal Keitel +in the OKW?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am quite familiar with that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Then, may I submit this affidavit? The Prosecution +has a copy of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have a few more questions for Admiral Raeder, the answers +to which can be greatly simplified with the permission of the Court. +These are the same questions which on 9 May, a week ago, I put to +Admiral Dönitz and which refer to the assertion made by the witness +Dr. Gisevius about Keitel’s tremendous influence and the +circle of silence which Keitel is said to have drawn around Hitler. +I merely want to ask the witness Admiral Raeder, with the permission +of the Tribunal, whether he can confirm as correct for the +period before 1943 as well—that is, for the period during which +Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy—the answers to my +questions given by Admiral Dönitz in Raeder’s presence. I ask for +the decision of the Tribunal whether I may put this general question +in order to save time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. +<span class='pageno' title='134' id='Page_134'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: You heard what I said, and I ask you, can you +confirm the answers given by Admiral Dönitz to my questions on +9 May for the period before 1943 as well?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that I can do.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Now, I have one final question. During your testimony +Document L-79, the “Little Schmundt” file, was treated. You +objected to this document as inaccurate and not of probative value?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Dr. Siemers then quoted a part of that document +which the Prosecution, at the time when it submitted the document, +had not read. In that part of the document there is mention of a +research staff in the OKW.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: I ask you now to tell me whether such a research +staff in the OKW was ever actually created.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Not to my knowledge. The work was done by the +Armed Forces Operations Staff in which there were officers representing +all three branches of the Armed Forces.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: So there was no change in the scope of tasks and +in the division of jurisdiction?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, definitely not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: That also concerns the question of working out +strategic and operational matters between the OKW and the Armed +Forces Operations Staff on one hand and the general staffs of the +Armed Forces branches, including the Naval Operations Staff, on +the other?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as the Naval Operations Staff is concerned, yes, +there was no change.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: And as far as the other branches of the Armed +Forces are concerned do you know of no change or...?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That I cannot say. I do not know about that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and Halder have +testified about that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Thank you. I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, is the affidavit that you referred +to contained in your document book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: No, not yet. It will be Number Keitel-19.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Will you have translations supplied to +the Tribunal?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. NELTE: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='135' id='Page_135'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High +Command of the German Armed Forces): Admiral, you are the +senior member of the group of the General Staff of the OKW, and +you belonged to this so-called group for the longest time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: In what manner did you become a member of +this so-called group?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I was appointed Chief of the Naval Command Staff +by Reich President Field Marshal Von Hindenburg. I did not join +that group by doing so; rather I became Chief of the Navy. One +was not aware of any group.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Joining and remaining in this group the Prosecution +maintains was voluntary. Was there any possibility at all +for military leaders to apply for any vacant posts?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, there was nothing of the sort.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: In other words, military accomplishments +were the decisive factor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It was a military order. There was no question, of +it being voluntary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did you know the various members of the +group at the time when you belonged to it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I certainly did not know all individuals from the +other branches. Of course, I knew a large number.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Within the purely military leadership was +there ever a conference about a plan which had as its purpose the +launching of aggressive wars?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, there was never such a conference. Frequently +it has been mentioned here how the various enterprises came +about—the political decision of the Führer, a directive issued by +him, and then the working out of the final order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Admiral, I do not mean now by this question +the meetings which took place under Hitler’s leadership. I mean +meetings of purely military officers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Do you mean within the various branches of the +Armed Forces?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, within the various branches.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, within the Naval Operations Staff there +were meetings about various questions, but not about aggressive +wars.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, my questions referred only to that. The +Prosecution asserts, furthermore, that this indicted group was first +established by the National Socialist Regime. Is that correct? +<span class='pageno' title='136' id='Page_136'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. There was no group at all, +but the organization was such as has frequently been described.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: And such as has always existed in all armies +of the world?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, as has always existed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has furthermore asserted +that, after the seizure of power by Hitler, the high military leaders +had the choice either of co-operating or of accepting the consequence +that the new regime would establish new armed forces, +that is armed forces of their own, and that on the basis of this +situation the generals decided to co-operate. Is that assertion by +the Prosecution correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. It is not true that thereupon any joining of forces +took place. I know that such tendencies existed. For instance, once +in 1934 I reported to the Führer that I had been informed that +SA Gruppenführer Killinger, who had formerly been in the Navy +and had advanced to prominence (in the SA), had the intention of +becoming the Chief of Naval Operations Staff. But I was not aware +of any further efforts. But above all, there was no coalition of +the generals for defensive action against such an intention.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: So the assertion made by the Prosecution is +not correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not correct. That was not in the least a method +which would have been in accordance with the sentiments of the +soldier—that such a coalition be formed to avert something.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution furthermore asserts that the +group, above all, the generals, let themselves be won over by the +regime because of the chance of conquest. Is that assertion correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is an absolutely incorrect and farfetched assertion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Was the effort of the Party to acquire for +itself supreme authority ever supported or promoted by the +military?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do not know that that ever happened. Do you +mean the seizure of power?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: After the seizure of power was the Party +supported by military leaders, as far as you know, in its efforts to +attain sole domination in Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday, in reply to the question of your +counsel, you described how you came to swear your oath to Hitler. +<span class='pageno' title='137' id='Page_137'></span> +If such an intention had existed in the mind of one of the commanders-in-chief, +would it have been possible for him to refuse +the oath?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That I cannot say, but I believe that not one of us +saw any necessity for refusing that oath.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has further asserted that +the high military chiefs agreed completely with the principles and +aims of National Socialism. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I explained here yesterday how far one could agree +with the principles of National Socialism and to what extent one +trained one’s soldiers according to these principles. Anything that +went beyond that was rejected and found no acceptance in the +Navy. Here I can speak only for the Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did the officers who were subordinate to you +and who were in the group ever have an insight into the political +situation and Hitler’s intention so that one could speak about participation +or membership in the plan?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. There was an absolute prohibition on speaking +to anyone about speeches in which Hitler mentioned intentions and +possible developments. The officers below the rank of Armed Forces +commander were informed only when things had gone so far that +the directive was to be issued.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution further asserts...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have to qualify that. That directive was first worked +out by the High Command of the Army and the Navy. Thus they +received information as soon as the directive of the individual +branches of the Armed Forces was issued and that always happened +sometime later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution also asserts that the high +military leaders were not military experts but that they knew +Hitler’s intentions of aggression and willingly co-operated. Can you +name any military leaders who, before they had received orders, +took a positive attitude toward any aggressive action?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot answer that. I explained yesterday how +Admiral Carls pointed out to me the danger imminent in Norway; +but he did not do anything more than give me the information, +point out the danger, and elucidate the situation there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: The attitude of the former Commander-in-Chief +of the Armed Forces, Von Fritsch, and of the Chief of the +General Staff Beck to the question of a war is known. I just wanted +to ask you, did the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal +Von Brauchitsch, have the same attitude concerning the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I believe so, yes. +<span class='pageno' title='138' id='Page_138'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Concerning the conference on 5 November +1937, you have already made detailed statements yesterday. I would +like...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you have been putting this +class of question to every naval and military witness who has been +called, and what the Tribunal desires me to point out to you is that +there has been no cross-examination by any member of the Prosecution +challenging any of these points, so this evidence is entirely +repetitive and cumulative and is not bound to be put by you to +every military and naval witness who comes into the witness box, +and it is simply a waste of time to the Tribunal. When questions +are answered by a witness and are not cross-examined to by the +other side, it is the practice to assume that the answers are accepted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for me this is an extremely +important question which has just been touched upon, namely, the +question of whether a question is inadmissible because in the opinion +of the Court it is cumulative. I should like to make a few +statements concerning whether or not a question is cumulative.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Laternser, you can understand +what the Tribunal has said to you, that it is now desired, in view +of the directives of the Charter, that this Trial should be as expeditious +as it can reasonably be; and it does not desire to have the +same evidence adduced to it over and over again. Is that not clear?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I can assume that the Tribunal +accepts as true these proofs which I want to bring by means +of my question, then I can of course forego these questions. But I +cannot determine whether that is the case unless I know that I +have succeeded in bringing definite proof...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What I wanted to point out to you was that +you asked the same question of a great number of witnesses and +that those questions have not been cross-examined, and in such circumstances +you can assume that answers given by the witnesses +are accepted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: If I am justified in drawing this conclusion, +then of course I shall dispense with such questions in the future. +I have only a few more questions, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In support of the Indictment of the +group of the General Staff and the OKW two affidavits have been +presented by the Prosecution, one by Field Marshal Von Blomberg +and one by Generaloberst Blaskowitz. In these two affidavits both +generals state that as a whole, within the circle of generals before +the war, the opinion existed that the question of the Corridor +would have to be decided unconditionally and, if necessary, with +<span class='pageno' title='139' id='Page_139'></span> +force. Is that opinion stated by the two generals correct? Was that +the general attitude at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I never heard of such an opinion. In my presence +General Von Blomberg never made any statement of that kind. +The Polish question was discussed by us in the Navy only to the +extent already mentioned here during the last few days, namely +that an attack on Poland by Germany would have to be prevented +under all circumstances. The political treatment of this question...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The defendant says he has never heard of +this suggestion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: That was the reason why I put the question +to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: After 1933 political questions were handled and decided +by Hitler exclusively, and he said that he made all policies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: It is therefore correct that this opinion which +Blomberg and Blaskowitz have mentioned does not apply for the +circle of generals?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Well, at any rate, I have never heard it expressed by +the generals. It did not exist in the Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: You were present at the conferences of +23 November 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put one supplementary question +concerning those conferences. Admiral, do you remember that +in the course of these conferences Hitler reproached the generals +because they still had old-fashioned ideas of chivalry and that these +ideas had to be rejected?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That I cannot say with certainty. I believe that I can +recall having once heard it said that Hitler was of that opinion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question concerning the +document which your defense counsel already put to you in the +course of your examination. It is Document C-66 submitted by the +British Prosecution under GB-81. It is in Document Book 10, on +Page 13, or 10a, Page 35. On Page 5, in the last paragraph of that +page, you said the following and I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It can be seen from my statements and plans that the Führer +reckoned with a definite conclusion of the eastern campaign +in the fall of 1941, whereas the High Command of the Army +(General Staff) was very skeptical.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Admiral, I wanted to ask you of what this skepticism consisted?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as I know, the High Command of the Army +was of the opinion that it was impossible to conclude such a +<span class='pageno' title='140' id='Page_140'></span> +tremendous campaign in so short a time; and many others shared +that opinion, whereas the Führer believed that because of the new +weapons and his strategy he could conclude that campaign very +quickly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about whether the +High Command of the Army had any fundamental objections before +the beginning of the Russian campaign?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as I know, the Commander-in-Chief of the +Army was very much against it; but that too, I cannot say definitely.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no more questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Representing Dr. Von +Lüdinghausen, Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Admiral, in +the course of the proceedings it has been testified, I believe by the +Codefendant Göring, that Field Marshal Von Hindenburg had expressly +desired that Herr Von Neurath become Foreign Minister. +Do you know anything about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I learned at the time that Hindenburg had expressed +that wish, and it caught my attention because Field Marshal +Von Hindenburg until that time had always considered merely the +appointment of the Minister of Defense and the Chiefs of Staff of +the Army and Navy as his privilege in the Reich Government. This +was the first time that he expressed such a wish in the case of a +Foreign Minister.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: So it was not the practice of the Field Marshal to +make any suggestions regarding the appointments of Ministers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. He had merely acted according to his own wish +to appoint the Defense Minister, even in the previous Social Democratic, +Democratic, and other cabinets.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: What may have been the reason for Field Marshal +Von Hindenburg’s making that exception in the case of Neurath?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He probably wanted to make sure under all circumstances +that the peaceful policies which had prevailed in Germany +up to that time would be continued. He was sure that Herr Von Neurath +would continue these policies in the same direction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: So he had particular confidence in Herr Von Neurath’s +attitude up to that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, beyond a doubt.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: You knew Von Neurath very well, and you were +informed about his political principles, weren’t you? What were +the main lines of his policies? +<span class='pageno' title='141' id='Page_141'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Herr Von Neurath wanted to see the gradual recovery +of the German people to normal conditions and he wanted to strive +with peaceful means for equal rights for the German Reich. Above +all, he wanted to have good relations with England, which was also +in conformity with Hindenburg’s intentions, and on this very point +both of us agreed completely.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: So one can say that you considered Von Neurath +an exponent of a policy of understanding with England and a peaceful +policy of compromise.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: Then I have a second question for you, Admiral. +A Fritz Wiedemann, who was Hitler’s adjutant from 1935 to 1939, +has submitted an affidavit. The Prosecution has submitted that affidavit +under 3037-PS. In this affidavit Herr Wiedemann states that +on 28 May 1938 a conference took place in the winter garden of the +Reich Chancellery with all important people of the Foreign Office, +the Army, and the Operational Staffs present, a meeting so large +that one almost doubts whether all these people could get into the +winter garden.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And here, he says, in addition to Göring, General Beck, General +Keitel, and Von Brauchitsch, there were also present Von Neurath, +Von Ribbentrop, and yourself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this meeting Hitler spoke among other things about Czechoslovakia +and stated that it was his unshakeable intention that +Czechoslovakia must disappear from the map. Do you know anything +about that meeting?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Although I can otherwise recall every large or more +important meeting, I do not have the slightest recollection of this +meeting at that time. The list of those present also seems very unlikely. +I have never seen Herr Von Neurath and Herr Von Ribbentrop +together at the same meeting. I should also doubt whether +Herr Von Neurath at that time was in Berlin at all. He was quite +definitely not present at that meeting. But I also do not remember +any meeting at which Von Ribbentrop was present as Foreign Minister +when military matters were discussed. I think this Herr +Wiedemann is mistaken because I believe also that I have never +seen him at a meeting in which such matters are supposed to have +been discussed. The Führer always sent this personal adjutant of +his out of the room beforehand. I believe there is some mistake.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: Such an important statement by the Führer you +would doubtless have remembered.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. During that summer the Führer’s opinions fluctuated +greatly. I believe that at the end of May a mobilization took +<span class='pageno' title='142' id='Page_142'></span> +place in Czechoslovakia, or something of the sort—I do not remember +exactly what. But I attended no meeting, as far as I know, at +which such a statement was made.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KRAUS: Thank you. I have no more questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendants’ counsel wish to +ask any questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Sir David, it seems scarcely worthwhile starting the cross-examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, +I entirely agree.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 20 May 1946, at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='143' id='Page_143'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH DAY</span><br/> Monday, 20 May 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dr. Horn wishes to ask some +questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): +With the permission of the Tribunal I should like to put a few more +questions to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Admiral, is it true that on 24 April 1941 the so-called neutrality +patrol of North American warships was extended past the 300-mile +limit to a distance of at least 1,000 miles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot remember the date, but such an extension +did take place at some time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Is it true that at the beginning of June 1941 a law +was passed in the United States confiscating foreign ships immobilized +in North American harbors as a result of the war and +including 26 Italian and 2 German ships?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Here again I cannot tell you the date for certain. It +happened in the summer of 1941. The ships were mostly Italian, +with a few German ships. I cannot swear to the exact figures.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In June 1941 the United States publicly declared its +willingness to give the Soviet Union every possible aid. Did you +discuss this with Hitler, and what was his attitude towards it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is correct. There were some questions of +a loan without interest, or some such thing. Very probably I did +speak to Hitler about it, but I cannot tell you what his attitude +was. I can say only that all these measures at that time in no way +deterred us from the course we had pursued until then. In June +I had the conversation with Hitler at which I explained to him +that up to that time we had allowed American warships to go +completely unmolested, and that we would continue to do so in +spite of the considerable disadvantages entailed which I mentioned +recently. +<span class='pageno' title='144' id='Page_144'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: In 1941 the American Secretary of War Mr. Stimson +and the Secretary of the Navy Mr. Knox, as well as Secretary of +State Mr. Hull, repeatedly advocated in public the use of the United +States fleet to safeguard English transports of war material to Great +Britain. On 12 July 1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox informed +the representatives of the press of Roosevelt’s order to shoot at +German ships. How did Hitler and you react to these actions, which +were contrary to neutrality?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Your facts are correct. They will go down in the +annals of history. Hitler did subsequently issue an express order +that we were in no circumstances to open fire of our own accord, +but only in self-defense. This situation actually did arise later in +the case of the two destroyers <span class='it'>Greer</span> and <span class='it'>Kearny</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: Your Honor, the report is made that Defendant +Göring is absent this morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you had read at the +time of its publication the book by Captain Schüssler, <span class='it'>The Fight +of the Navy against Versailles</span>, had you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at it on Page 26 +of Document Book 10, Page 123 of the German document book? +Captain Schüssler had told you that he was going to write such a +work, had he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. And I might add that this book was written +because we in the Navy had been accused by National Socialist +circles of not having done enough to strengthen the Navy in the +period previous to 1933. That is why all these things were mentioned +in that book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the book was circulated +among senior officers in the Navy, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; at any rate, any of the senior officers who +wanted it could have it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you just turn to +Page 127, or to Page 27 of the English book, which gives the +preface? You will see at the end of the first paragraph it says that +it is to give a reliable picture of the fight of the Navy against the +unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And in the third paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“This memorandum is also meant to distinguish more clearly +the services of those men who, without being known to wide +<span class='pageno' title='145' id='Page_145'></span> +circles, were ready to accept extraordinary responsibility in +the service of the fight against the peace treaty.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree, Defendant, that +that preface represents generally but accurately the feeling of the +Navy with regard to invading the provisions of the Treaty of +Versailles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, as regarding circumventing the Versailles Treaty +as far as necessary to improve our defenseless position, for reasons +which I explained recently here. To do this was a matter of honor +for every man.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just turn over—it is +Page 28, My Lord, and it is Page 126 of your copy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] It gives a summary of contents. You +see, it is in four sections. The first section deals with the first +defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles, +and then enumerates what they were. Don’t trouble about that. +The second is independent armament measures behind the back of +the Reich Government and legislative bodies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In both cases it says: From the end of the war until +taking over the Ruhr in 1923; from 1923 until the Lohmann case +in 1927. I had nothing to do with either case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see. From 1922 to +1924 you were inspector of naval training at Kiel, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Inspector of the training system; the schools, the +further training of officer candidates, the complete training of +assistants of the Chief of Staff, that is, chief-of-staff assistants, a +sort of general staff officer, and similar matters. I had nothing +to do with affairs of the front.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is what you were asked. You were +asked whether you were inspector of training. The answer was +“yes,” was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As inspector of training, are +you telling the Tribunal that you did not have a very complete +knowledge of the weapons available for your service?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no. It was not a question of weapons visible for +all to see. As I explained to you recently, that was a matter of +setting up gun platforms and transferring guns from the North Sea to +the Baltic. This was done by a special command, which worked +under the direct order of the Chief of Navy; among others, there +was this Kapitänleutnant Raenkel, for instance, who was the +specialist dealing with all gunnery questions at the time. I myself +<span class='pageno' title='146' id='Page_146'></span> +was in Kiel, and there were no guns or anything of the kind in +Kiel and its neighborhood.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Take the next period from 1923 +to 1927. From 1925 to 1928 you were Chef der Marine Station der +Ostsee, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal +that you did not know about the independent armament measures +taken behind the back of the Reich Government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No; I had nothing at all to do with these affairs. +I have already said that was done by the Chief of the Naval +Command Staff. I knew in a general way...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you whether +you ever had to do with them, I am asking you whether you are +saying that you did not know about them. You knew all about +them, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I knew it in a general way, that such measures were +being taken.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, take the next, Number III: +“Planned armament works tolerated by the Reichskabinet, but +behind the back of the legislative bodies.” The legislative bodies +would be the Reichstag and the Reichsrat, would they not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. But I already said recently that it was not the +military commander-in-chief’s business to negotiate these matters +with the Reichstag. This was a matter for the Government. Herr +Severing will also testify to that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will hear Herr Severing +when he comes. At the moment I want you to tell the Tribunal +this...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] I say the same...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just wait a minute; you have +not heard my question yet. What did you say to Captain Schüssler? +Did you tell him you are giving an entirely false picture in suggesting +that the Navy had anything to do with going behind the +back of the Reichstag? Did you make any effort to correct what +Captain Schüssler was saying?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No; I did not correct his book. I had no time for that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just before we come to +Number IV, if you just look, it’s page—</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, it is Page 32 of the English book, and Page 186 of your +book. This is part of Captain Schüssler’s description of Section II +<span class='pageno' title='147' id='Page_147'></span> +dealing with economic rearmament; it comes under the heading, +“Difficult Working Conditions.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Do you see that? It begins: “There +were often difficult working conditions.” Do you see that? The +heading is “Difficult Working Conditions.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes I see, “Difficult Working Conditions.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to look at the +last part of it. Now, I want it quite clear, Defendant. This is +dealing with the period from 1923 to 1927, before you were head +of the Navy; so I want to ask you about it.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“There were often many external difficulties besides these +for the Tebeg—the camouflaging of the task and the work, +the distance separating them, the impossibility of settling any +questions even of minor importance by telephone, and the +necessity of avoiding if possible any written correspondence, +and of carrying it out in any case as private correspondence +with false names and disguised expressions.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you not know that that was the method by which it was +being carried on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No; I really knew very little about the Tebeg—the +Tebeg, the Navis—any of these things. But I think it was quite +right for these people to work like that, because at that time the +attitude of a large percentage of the German people was unreliable, +and there was great danger if these things leaked out. In any +case, the Tebeg had been dissolved when I arrived.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you kindly turn +back to Page 126, in Book 4, Page 28 of the English book, and +just look at Captain Schüssler’s description of the fourth period: +“Armament under the direction of the Reich Government in +camouflaged form (from 1933 to 1935 when we were free to recruit +on an unrestricted basis.)”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you agree that Captain Schüssler was giving an accurate +description of your methods from 1933 to 1935?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: How does he describe it? Where is that passage?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Number 4.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: “Armament under the leadership of the Reich Government +in camouflaged form”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that it is a correct +description of your activities from 1933 to 1935?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course. I did that on orders from the head of the +State; and before all the head of the State was very anxious to +see that no exaggerated measures should be taken, so that it would +<span class='pageno' title='148' id='Page_148'></span> +not interfere in any way with his plans for making an agreement +with Great Britain. He allowed very little to be done with regard +to the Navy. He could at once have built eight armored ships, so +many destroyers, and so many torpedo boats, none of which had +yet been built, but he did none of these things because he said, +“We do not want to create the impression that we are arming on +a large scale.” He approved only two...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have explained that; so +note, Defendant, the point is this—the “camouflaged form” when +you were negotiating the naval agreement. You did not want +anyone to know what steps you had taken contrary to the treaty +and how far you had gone. That is the plain fact of it—you wanted +to get the naval agreement without disclosing what you had done, +isn’t that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that distorts the sense of what I said. We did not +want the announcement of these measures to cause strained relations +between Germany and Britain. The measures as such were +completely justifiable and were extremely minor ones.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will come to that in a moment. +I only do want, before we leave these naval works, to ask you +one question about another book. You know that Oberst Scherff +projected a history of the German Navy. I don’t want any misunderstanding +about it. As I understand the position, you permitted +Oberst Scherff to have recourse to the archives of the Navy but +beyond that you hadn’t seen anything of his work, isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not see his book at all. I saw the table of +contents here the first time I was interrogated. I did not give him +the order, either; he received it from the Führer; and for that +reason I allowed the Chief of the Navy Archives to assist him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is exactly what I put +to you. I want you to turn to Book 10a. It starts at Page 1 in the +English version and also Page 1 in the German. And if you would +look at Page 3 you will find the proposed table of contents of +Oberst Scherff’s book, Page 3 in the English version. I think it must +be about Page 3 in the German version, too. Now would you look +at the heading of Section 2. It is: “Incorporation of the Navy in +the National Socialist State.” And then he describes, “(a) National +Socialism in the Navy before 1933”...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Where is that? I have not found it yet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Section 2 of the table of contents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that must be something quite different. I have +not got it here...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have got it now. +<span class='pageno' title='149' id='Page_149'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Section 2, +which is: “Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist +State.” And you can see the proposed headings which were to cover +some 30 pages: “National Socialism in the Navy before 1933.” Then: +“The oath of the Navy to the Führer; the taking over of the National +Insignia; the first alteration of the flag and the New War flag.” Do you +agree with Oberst Scherff’s description? You agree that this is a +correct description, that the proceedings could be described as the +incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course—I explained that here recently—the Navy—the +Armed Forces—had to have some connection with the National +Socialist State. A democratic Navy in a monarchy is impossible. The +basic principles must agree. But I myself decided the extent to +which these principles were adopted—that is to the degree where +the Navy maintained its internal independence and yet occupied +its appropriate position with regard to the National Socialist State.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Apart from that, I do not see any text here; I can only see the +headings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that doesn’t offend you +as a description. That is all I wanted to get clear. I do not want +to spend a great deal of time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But the headings mean nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>For instance, it might say in the actual text that the Navy did +not fit into the National Socialist State properly. I do not know. +The same holds good of the fleet. Of course...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to waste time +on it. There were three matters which you dealt with in your +examination-in-chief, and I am not going to deal with them in +detail; but I just want to remind you of them and put one general +question. You can put that document away; I am not going to +pursue it further. Would you mind putting that document away +and giving me your attention for the next question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You were asked about the E-boats, your survey list, that long +document, in September 1933, and the question of disguised auxiliary +cruisers as transport ships O. Is this a fair summary of your +answer: That you admitted that these breaches of the Treaty took +place, but said in each case that the breach was only a little one. Is +that a fair summary of your answer? Is it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s take it in bits, then. +Are you disputing that any of these matters with regard to the +E-boats, the matters on the survey lists or the transport ships +O—are you disputing that any of these matters took place? I understood, +you admitted they all did take place... +<span class='pageno' title='150' id='Page_150'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, they took place in the way I described. For +instance, these auxiliary cruisers were not built. We were not +allowed to do that. But we were allowed to make plans and we +were allowed to select those ships which, in the event of war—if +a war had broken out in which Germany was attacked by another +state—could have been used as auxiliary cruisers. That was not +a violation. If it were I would admit it. The U-boat designing +office in Holland was not a violation of the Versailles Treaty either. +The wording was quite different; I do not remember the third case +which you mentioned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember there was +a long list in a document, from yourself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I understood, maybe +wrongly, that you admitted these things took place, but you said +“it is only a little one.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course. Those were small things, but they +were urgently necessary in Germany’s defense interests.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about +an officer of yours, Vice Admiral Assmann. Was he an officer in +whom you had confidence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He was a very able historian.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you answer my question? +Was he an officer in whom you had confidence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I had confidence that he would write history correctly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all I wanted. Now, would +you have a look at a new document, which is Document Number +D-854, which, My Lord, will be Exhibit Number GB-460. Now, that +is an extract from one of a series of essays on the operational and +tactical considerations of the German Navy and consequent measures +taken for its expansion between 1919 and 1939, contained among +the files of Vice Admirals Assmann and Gladisch, who were in the +historical section of the German Admiralty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, would you mind not looking at it for a moment, Defendant? +I want to ask you some questions and then you can look at it with +pleasure afterwards. Do you agree that in nearly all spheres of +armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles +was violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit? Do you +agree with that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, by no means in every sphere. In the most important +sphere we were far behind the Versailles Treaty, as I explained +to you very clearly. Possibly we infringed on it the other way +round, by not doing as much as we could have done. +<span class='pageno' title='151' id='Page_151'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you just look at this document. +At the beginning of the first quotation your officers say:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“But if—as was stated—in nearly all spheres of armament +where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was +violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit—or at +least its violation was prepared—a long time before the +16th of March 1935...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Are your admirals wrong in stating that? Is that what you are +telling the Tribunal?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I please see which page this is on? I have not +seen it yet. Yes, he says, “in nearly all spheres of naval armament...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is not the case, for in the sphere of...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That’s what I put to you; is +that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it is not right. We had not even built as many +ships as we could have built, but—as I have explained repeatedly, +the violations were concerned with...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You’ve explained that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: ...violations were...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, we do know the position +of your shipbuilding yards. You’ve given that explanation and it’s +a matter of discussion whether it’s of any value. I am not going +to argue with you. I am asking you this question: Are you saying +that the admirals of your historical section are wrong in that +sentence that I read out to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I am stating that. It is wrong as it stands.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now let’s pass on—the +Tribunal will judge that—to the statement of Admiral Assmann. +It goes on:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“This probably took place in no other sphere, on the one +hand so early, and on the other hand under such difficult +circumstances, as in the construction of a new submarine +arm. The Treaty of Versailles had only been in force a few +months (since 10 January 1920) when it was already violated +in this point.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you agree with Admiral Assmann on that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, he is wrong. It was not violated at all in this +point, and the reason it started so early was because all the +ex-U-boat commanders and U-boat officers and technicians were +out of a job and offered their services to maintain technical developments +in U-boats abroad; that is why it was so early. But that has +<span class='pageno' title='152' id='Page_152'></span> +nothing to do with me because I had no say in these matters then. +At that time I was working on the Navy Archives.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, how are you able to be so +confident today that Admiral Assmann is wrong? I thought you +said that he was a good historian. He had not to go back very +far. He only goes back 20 years.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: A good historian can make mistakes too if his information +is wrong. I merely said I had confidence in him...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say quite in detail—the first +paragraph is about Japan.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; what he says about the building of U-boats is +wrong.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let’s just see how far he +was wrong. We needn’t go into the first paragraph which deals +with shipbuilding for Japan, but take the second one: “In 1922...” +Do you see the paragraph which begins:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“As early as 1922, three German shipbuilding yards established +a German U-boat designing office in Holland under a Dutch +cover name with about 30 engineers and designers. In 1925 +a Dutch shipbuilding yard built two 500-ton U-boats for +Turkey according to the plans of this bureau, which enjoyed +the financial and personal support of the Naval Command. +In the solution of this question, too, Kapitän zur See Lohmann +was concerned decisively.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: We have admitted that. That was in no way a +violation of the Versailles Treaty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We’ll not argue that, but it’s +right anyway. Admiral Assmann’s right about that. Then he deals +with Finland and with Spain. And, if you look at the end of the +paragraph after dealing with Spain, he says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Already in the autumn of 1927 the Naval Designing Department +was commissioned to carry out construction in Spain by +the Chief of the Naval Command Staff, Admiral Zenker, +who accepted the responsibility despite all the difficulties +in the field of home politics. The working out of the project +and the drawing up of the construction plans took place in +the Dutch Bureau. After completion in 1931, the ship carried +out trial runs and diving exercises from Cadiz to Cartagena, +under German direction and with German personnel, consisting +of officers, engineers, naval construction students +and foremen.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That’s all. That’s quite right, isn’t it? +<span class='pageno' title='153' id='Page_153'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but the shipbuilding designer from our designing +office, in particular, as well as the above-named other persons +employed on U-boat construction, were discharged from the Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at the last +sentence: “This boat which is now the Turkish submarine <span class='it'>Gür</span> +became the prototype for the <span class='it'>U-25</span> and <span class='it'>U-26</span>.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the 250-ton submarines +which were made in Finland. And, if you look at the last sentence +of the next paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Finnish U-boat was the first U-boat plan to be worked +out in Germany and successfully carried out; the Dutch +bureau was called upon only to work out the details.</p> + +<p>“The Finnish 250-ton vessel became the prototype for <span class='it'>U-1</span> +to <span class='it'>U-24.</span>”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And now the next paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The building and the thorough trial of the prototype vessel +made it possible to obtain the parts for <span class='it'>U-1</span> to <span class='it'>U-24</span> in 1933 +to 1935, long before the order for the assembly of the vessels; +and the latter was prepared beforehand as far as was possible +without endangering secrecy.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you turn on to +Page 156. You see where the next quotation is from:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“At the beginning of 1935”—that is 6 months before the +Anglo-German Treaty—“there were probably six 250-ton +boats ready for assembly, six 275-ton and two 750-ton boats +on which preparatory work was being done. About 4 months +were needed for assembling the small ships and about +10 months for the big ones, dating from 1 February 1935, +but everything else was still quite uncertain.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, look at the next words:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction +that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the German-British +Treaty.</p> + +<p>“Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been +ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up +to 1938. In reality 118 were completed and under construction.</p> + +<p>“The preparations for the new U-boat arm were made so +early, so thoroughly and so carefully, that already 11 days +after the conclusion of the German-British Naval Treaty, +<span class='pageno' title='154' id='Page_154'></span> +which permitted the construction of U-boats, the first German +U-boat could be put into commission on 29 June 1935.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, take that sentence, which is written by Admiral Assmann, +and we’ve seen what your connections with Assmann were through +about 100 documents. He said: “It is probably in this very sphere +of submarine construction that Germany adhered least to the +restrictions of the German-British Treaty.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, you’ve told this Tribunal for about several hours of your +evidence that that was a freely negotiated treaty of which you +were very proud and which you were ready to support. Are you +telling the Tribunal that your admirals are wrong in saying that +in submarine construction Germany adhered the least to the +restrictions of that freely negotiated treaty?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is a completely false judgment. I have stated +here that, as long as no negotiations with Great Britain had taken +place with regard to the pending agreement, all the preparations +which we did make were exclusively attended to abroad—that in +the proportion which probably...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you can make your +explanation...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Will you please stop interrupting me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We’ll take it in this order, and +don’t get cross about it. You answer my question, and then you +make your explanation. Now answer my question first. Are you +saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong in saying in that first +sentence that it was just in the “sphere of submarine construction +that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the German-British +Treaty.” Is Admiral Assmann wrong when he says that, is +that what you’re telling the Tribunal? Well, that is my question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He is wrong. I said so; I have already said so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe these are not questions +relating to facts. They are questions for legal decisions. It is a +legal argument as to just how Article 191 of the Versailles Treaty +is to be interpreted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the question is +quite proper. In his explanation, of course, he can explain that in +his view it was not a breach of the Treaty and he has already +explained that. He can give us his opinion about it. He was the +head of the German Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you take the +second sentence...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But I should like to finish if I may. I can give an +explanation of that. +<span class='pageno' title='155' id='Page_155'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>All these things were only preparations made outside Germany. +The point under discussion is whether the Finnish U-boats were +constructed with the help of German designers. That is true. +German designers were not forbidden to help Finnish designers to +draft designs for U-boats. It is also true that this U-boat later...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m awfully sorry to interrupt +you, but you know this isn’t dealing—this sentence isn’t dealing +with this early period. This is dealing with the period after the +Anglo-German Treaty in 1935 and that’s what I want you to +answer me about. This Finnish matter was long before that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am still speaking of the period preceding the agreement, +for I was accused of manufacturing U-boat parts abroad. +And the fact is that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I know, but don’t you +see that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have not given my answer yet. No...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you about that. +I like you to answer the right question. I’m not asking you about +the question of Versailles any longer. I’m asking you about +Admiral Assmann’s assertion that you did not adhere to the restrictions +of the German-British Treaty in 1935, and what you did in +Finland in the 20’s has nothing to do with that. Now, that’s all. +You can give your explanation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is entirely wrong. We particularly restricted +ourselves with regard to the construction of U-boats; and in 1938 +we had still not built the 45 percent which we were entitled to +build, so we made an application for permission to build up to +100 percent; and this was agreed on, and came into effect, as appears +from the text of the English treaty, after a friendly discussion with +the British Admiralty at the end of 1938. At the beginning of the +war we still did not have 100 percent. We were always behind +with the construction of submarines.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Admiral Assmann, who probably had no up-to-date knowledge +of these matters, is quite wrong. I can swear to that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next sentences. +This is dealing...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: What page are you speaking of?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 156. I will read it very +slowly again:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been +ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for +up to 1938. In reality 118 were completed and under +construction.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='156' id='Page_156'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong when he +states that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am awfully sorry; I still have not got the passage +from which you are reading, that is quite—which line...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the sentence, +Defendant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have found it now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you see what Admiral +Assmann says, that:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Considering the size of the U-boats which had already been +ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up +to 1938.” That is before there was any mention of going from +45 to 100. “In reality 118 were completed and under construction.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you saying that Admiral Assmann is wrong in giving these +figures?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Certainly. In 1939 we entered the war with 40 submarines—I +do not know the exact number. This is either a +misprint or quite an incredible figure. As you know, we started +the war with—I think—26 U-boats capable of sailing the Atlantic, +and in addition a number of smaller boats. I cannot tell you for +certain now what was under construction at the beginning of the +war but there was no intention of this kind. That was precisely +the accusation made against me—that I did not have sufficient +U-boats built in good time. I dispute the whole of that sentence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree then, Defendant, that +Admiral Assmann’s figures are quite incompatible with what you +have told the Tribunal about the number of U-boats with which +you started the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I should be grateful to Sir David if he would +read the entire sentence; that is, if he would also read Note 6, which +appears after the Number 118 and after the word “ordered.” Note 6 +which, as I have just observed, is not included in the English translation +is worded as follows: “Chief of the Naval Budget Department, +B. Number E 311/42, Top Secret, of 19 November 1942.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The figure, Mr. President, refers to a much later period, not +1938 at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should be extremely grateful if, after the experience we have +just had, I could in future have not only the German document but +also the English translation from Sir David. I should be very +grateful to Sir David if he could have this done.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Could you not have the passage you want +translated from the German into English by the time you want +<span class='pageno' title='157' id='Page_157'></span> +to re-examine? As I understand it, you are referring to some note +which is an addition to what has been translated into English. Will +you read it again, would you read the passage again?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Sir David has been reading the following: “In +reality 118 were completed and under construction.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is as far as Sir David has read. After the word “ordered” +there is the figure 6. This refers to Note 6. Note 6 is worded as +follows: “Chief of the Naval Budget Department, B. Number E 311/42, +Top Secret, of 19 November 1942. (Page 19).”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In other words, this shows that the Number 118 must have been +mentioned on Page 19 of this document of the Naval Budget +Department in 1942. The figure therefore does not refer to the year +1938 but to a later date.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I can add another explanation to that which is quite +possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will look into that, +but the text says—and there is no difference in the German text—exactly +what I read—that “about 55 could have been provided up +to 1938 and that in reality 118 were ready and ordered.” That is +Admiral Assmann’s text.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But not 1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, My Lord, my friend, +Dr. Siemers, will have ample opportunity—if there is any point, +I shall consider it, but there is the text, and the text includes that. +What the footnote says, Dr. Siemers, can be put in re-examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Sir David, will you look at the +note and see if the report was made in 1942, rather than the +construction? I suggest that you ask him whether or not the note +doesn’t show that the report was made in 1942.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Really, my translation of this +note is “Chief of the Naval Budget Department.” Then it gives +the reference to his note, dated 19 November 1942. It seems +entirely to bear out the suggestion of the learned American Judge, +that this is the reference to the report, nothing more. It is only +suggesting that the date of construction was 1942, and I think it +really would be a matter of convenience that, unless Dr. Siemers +has got something to say on the text that I am putting, if he +reserved these argumentative points to re-examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you can raise it all in re-examination. +You can have a translation of this note laid before us by +that time. +<span class='pageno' title='158' id='Page_158'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I am perfectly agreeable. I have +merely requested that one copy of the English translation of the +newly submitted documents should be given to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, you will admit that it is a considerable handicap +to me to ascertain during the cross-examination what passages are +missing from the translation and translate them myself when the +British Delegation have an English translation on hand. I think it +might be easier if Sir David would be good enough to let me have +an English translation for my own use.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you will be able to let him have +an English translation of any new document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. The Tribunal has +ordered that. That is prepared. Surely you got the English translation? +Certainly, My Lord. As I put each document, a translation +will be given to Dr. Siemers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There may have been some mistake.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will certainly get it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, we will pass to another gentleman +on your staff. You told us a good deal about the naval budgets. +Do you remember a Flottenintendant in your department, Secretary +Flottenintendant Thiele, of the OKM Department E, the Budget +Department of the German Admiralty? Do you remember?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Mr. Prosecutor, may I just say one more thing +about the question of 118? I have just remembered something in +connection with this Number 6, Chief of the Naval Budget Department. +It is perfectly possible that in this case Admiral Assmann +has taken two things together. All U-boats and ships were, of +course, included in the budget and in this way sanctioned. This +budget was drafted at the end of the year and published before +the year to which it applied. As this large figure suddenly appears +in this document, it is perfectly possible that here the Figure 118 +originates on the basis of the agreement with England made on +30 or 31 December. It is perfectly natural that we should include +in the budget all the other U-boats which we were allowed to +build to complete the 100 percent. This does not necessarily mean +that we started to build the U-boats in 1938. Incidentally I think +we might have perhaps begun, because one can only build so and +so many U-boats in any one year.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I think that this explanation, which occurred to me when I saw +the words “Naval Budget Department,” is a perfectly correct one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal has the wording; +that is, “up to 1938,” and I am not going to argue the point with +you. The words speak for themselves. +<span class='pageno' title='159' id='Page_159'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>I would like you to look at Document Number D-855, which +becomes Exhibit Number GB-461, and it is an extract from a lecture +by the gentleman I have just mentioned, Herr Thiele, which was +given at the German Naval Training Center for Administrative +Officers in Prague on 12 July 1944. The extract I want to put to +you is on Page 22, and it is headed “Ship Construction Plan.” Have +you got that—Page 22, and the heading is “Ship Construction +Plan”? You see the paragraph beginning:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The era of the very large development of the Navy had +therefore come at the moment of the seizure of power. +Already in the first year after this, in March 1935, the construction +of battle cruisers with a displacement of 27,000 tons +was undertaken. Such a vessel was ordered to be constructed. +Thus one of the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which was +the most important for us was at once violated in the naval +sphere in a manner which in a short time could no longer +be camouflaged.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right when he says that in his +lecture?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course it was a violation, but I have explained +here at length that there was no question of building new battle +cruisers but of utilizing the two armored ships which had already +been granted us; and I said that in 1934 Hitler had only given me +permission to enlarge somewhat the plans for these ships, so that +the armor might be heavier. I see from this that it was not until +March 1935, when it was certain that the treaty would be concluded +and also that England would allow us to build such ships through +this treaty in a few months’ time that the Führer sanctioned the +plans projected for the 26,500 ton ships which were to be the first +of the battleships in the new program; and they were then begun. +So that the three 28 cm turrets—that is, the offensive weapons +which he had not yet approved in 1934—were thrown in.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This gentleman seems to agree +with you more than the other. Just look at what he says about +U-boats two sentences further on. He says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The U-boats were completed in separate parts, as their +construction was under no circumstances to be apparent to +the outside world. These parts were stored in sheds for the +time being and needed only to be assembled after the declaration +of freedom to rearm.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that point?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, he is right. We have admitted that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at his next point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Perhaps I can complete my explanation? We... +<span class='pageno' title='160' id='Page_160'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do try to keep it as short as +you can. I don’t want to cut you out, but keep it as short as you can.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, but I must complete my defense.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We had U-boat parts manufactured abroad and only at the +beginning of 1935 did we bring them in and assemble them, when +the naval treaty was certain.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You say you were anticipating +the treaty; well now, just look at what he says after that:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The third also of those clauses of the Treaty of Versailles +that was most disadvantageous for us, the limitation of +personnel to 15,000 men, was immediately ignored after the +seizure of power. The total personnel of the Navy was +already 25,000 in 1934, and in 1935, the year of the London +Naval Agreement, 34,000 men.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is not Flottenintendant Thiele right on that? Is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is admitted. It was clear that we had to +train personnel in good time so that crews might be available for +our increased naval forces.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now I just want you to +look for a moment at the document which is on Page 3 of Document +Book 10, which you did refer to in your examination-in-chief. That +is Document C-23, about the displacement of the <span class='it'>Scharnhorst</span> and +the <span class='it'>Gneisenau</span> and the <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span> and the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> and the other ships.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, you are familiar with that document; we have discussed it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I know the documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, that is dated the +18th of February, 1938. Germany didn’t denounce the Anglo-German +Naval Treaty until after the British guarantee to Poland +in April 1939, which is 14 months later. Why didn’t you simply +send a notification to Great Britain that the displacements had +come out 20 percent bigger because of defensive matters in +construction? Why didn’t you do it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot tell you that today. We explained recently +how the displacements gradually increased through quite insignificant +changes to our own detriment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Really, Defendant, I have +got that well in mind. We have got the reason why the displacements +came out bigger, and I don’t think you are prejudicing +yourself if you don’t repeat it, but just look at the bottom of that +page, because I think you will find the reason which you can’t +remember there; won’t you?</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In the opinion of A IV, it would be quite wrong to report +a larger tonnage than that which will probably be published +<span class='pageno' title='161' id='Page_161'></span> +shortly, for instance, by England, Russia, or Japan, so as not +to bring upon ourselves the odium of an armament race.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Isn’t that the reason?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that was intended for a future date. We wished +in no circumstance to create the impression that we were increasing +the offensive power of our ships.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I am going to pass +to another subject, and I want to put quite shortly and bluntly, +as you will appreciate, the point the Prosecution puts to you, that +for 20 years, from 1918 to 1938, you and the German Navy had +been involved in a course of complete, cold and deliberate deception +of your treaty obligations. That is what I am putting to you. Do +you understand? After these documents, do you deny that +that is so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course. It was not a cold-blooded affair. All our +evasions of the Versailles Treaty were due to our desire to be able +to defend our country more efficiently than we had been allowed +to. I have proved here that in the Versailles regulations the only +points restricted were those unfavorable to the defense of our +country and favoring aggression from without. As regards the ships, +I may add that we could never complete any very great number +of ships, and consequently we were interested in increasing as far +as possible the power of resistance, that is, their seagoing security, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. At no time did we increase the offensive power above +the strength which was permitted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I want you to understand +what my next series of questions is directed to. I don’t want +there to be any misapprehension. I am now going to suggest to +you that these breaches of treaty and your naval plans were +directed toward the possibility, and then the probability of war. +I would just like you to take the same document that I have been +dealing with, C-23. We will use that to pass from one to the other.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Would you turn to Page 5 of Document Book 10, and there you +will see that there is a memorandum, I think of the Planning Committee +to the Flottenchef, Admiral Carls. We have heard your view +of Admiral Carls, that you thought he was a very good officer, and +in fact he was your first choice for your successor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, that is in September 1938, and it is a top secret opinion +on the strategic study of naval warfare against England, and you +see “A” says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, look at Paragraph 1:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to acquire +a position as a world power, she needs not only sufficient +<span class='pageno' title='162' id='Page_162'></span> +colonial possessions, but also secure naval communications +and secure access to the oceans.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you agree with that, Defendant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is correct. I know the whole document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at 2:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Both these requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition +to Anglo-French interests, and would limit their position as +world powers. It is unlikely that this can be achieved by +peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world +power, therefore, forces upon us the necessity of making +corresponding preparations for war.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you agree with that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is all quite correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s take 3:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“War against England means at the same time war against +the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well, +and a large number of countries overseas—in fact, against +half to two-thirds of the whole world.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I needn’t ask you about that, because the facts have shown it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, look at the next: “It can only be justified....”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but I must be allowed to comment on that +document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh certainly, I’m sorry. We got +on so quickly I thought we were not going to have any explanation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In 1938, as has been stated here quite often, the +Führer’s attitude towards Great Britain became more difficult in +spite of all the efforts of General Von Blomberg and myself to tell +him that it was not so on England’s side, and that it was possible +to live in peace with England. In spite of that the Führer ordered +us to prepare for possible opposition by England to his plans. He +for his part never contemplated a war of aggression against Great +Britain; and we in the Navy still much less; in fact, I have proved +that I did nothing but try to dissuade him from that. In 1938 he +ordered us to make a study similar to those we had already made +in the case of other possibilities of war—which it was the duty +of the Wehrmacht Command to do—but dealing with the course +which a war against England might take and what we would +require for it. This study was prepared, and I reported to the +Führer that we could never increase our fighting forces to such +an extent that we could undertake a war against England with +any prospect of success—it would have been madness for me to +say such a thing. I told him—that has repeatedly been mentioned—that +by 1944 or 1945 we might build up a small naval force with +<span class='pageno' title='163' id='Page_163'></span> +which we could start an economic war against England or seize +her commercial shipping routes, but that we would never really be +in a position to defeat England with that force. I sent this study, +which was compiled under my guidance in the Naval Operations +Staff, to Generaladmiral Carls who was very clear-sighted in all +such questions. He thought it his duty to explain in this introduction +of his reply, which agreed with our opinion, the consequences +which such a war against Great Britain would have for ourselves, +namely, that it would bring about a new world war, which neither +he nor we in the Navy nor anyone in the Armed Forces wanted—in +my opinion, not even Hitler himself, as I proved the other +day—hence this statement. He said that if we must have war with +England, it was essential that we should first of all have access to +the ocean and, secondly, that we should attack English trade on +the sea route of the Atlantic. Not that he proposed that we, on our +part, should embark on such a venture. He was only thinking of +the case of such a war breaking out very much against our will. +It was our duty to go thoroughly into the matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He says that, “The war against +it”—that is the war against England—“can only be justified and +have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as +politically and militarily.” Then you go on to say “waged with the +aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I just want to see how you prepared.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is quite clear and quite correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s just look how you had +begun to prepare economically. Let’s take that first, as you put +it first.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Would you look at Document C-29, which is Page 8.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, hadn’t we better break off now +before going into this?</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I told you, Defendant, that I was +next going to ask you a question about Document C-29, which is +on Page 8 of the English Document Book 10 and on Pages 13 and 14 +of the German document book. You will remember, this document +gives general directions for export given by the German Navy to +the German armament industry...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...and you told us when you +were dealing with the document that you wanted your service not +<span class='pageno' title='164' id='Page_164'></span> +to be small-minded about matters of a not very high secrecy but, +in addition to that, your general policy was that the German +armament firms should develop a foreign trade so that they would +have the capacity to deal with the increased demands of the +German Navy as soon as possible. Is that right, is that a fair +summary, or shall I repeat it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but it must be added that I said in two places +that we hoped at that time that the Treaty of Versailles would be +relaxed, because it was a comparatively favorable period for +negotiations for disarmament and we already had the governments +headed by Von Papen and Von Schleicher, both of whom showed +great understanding for the needs of the Armed Forces and therefore +fought hard for that at the disarmament conference. So a +definitely legal development might be hoped for in this direction; +and on the other hand, our entire industry was unable to cope with +armaments production except on an insignificant scale and had +therefore to be increased. I again stress the fact that it had nothing +to do with the Hitler regime. That decree just happened to come out +on 31 January.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think you are really disagreeing +with me that your policy, your broad economic policy for +the German armament industry, was to develop its export trade +so as to be able to deal with increased home requirements in future +years; that is what you advocated, isn’t it, that the German +armament industry should at once increase its export trade so as +to be able to deal with increased home requirements when these +requirements arose? Isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is correct but I do not quite understand that +expression. Did you say “Eigenhandel” or “Eisenhandel”—internal +trade or iron trade? I did not quite hear the expression—“Eigenhandel” +or “Eisenhandel”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Aussenhandel” (Foreign Trade).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: “Aussenhandel”—yes, undoubtedly we wanted to be +able to compete industrially with other nations, so that our industry +would be in favorable position, and would gain strength.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I will ask you to turn to +Document Number C-135, which is Page 21 of the—sorry My Lord, +Page 20 of the English document book and Page 73 of the German +document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Book 10.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Book 10, My Lord, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, you remember that document, +you dealt with it? You said... +<span class='pageno' title='165' id='Page_165'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it was dealt with in the Lohmann affidavit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is a document of the—I +think, in April 1933, judging by the dates which I put to you +a moment ago, and you said to the Tribunal in giving your evidence +that it was mere chance that the year 1938 was mentioned; that +that was the same period as has been dealt with.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It has already been stated several times that the year +1938 was mentioned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Has it been mentioned in some +Weimar Republic document? Will you just look at the second last +paragraph; that will be on your Page 74, Page 21 of the English +document. It is in the middle paragraph of Paragraph 3:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Now Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler had made the clear political +request to build up for him in 5 years, that is, by the first +of April 1938, armed forces which he could place in the +balance as an instrument of political power.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Is that sure, that Hitler had made a clear political request?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, as far as I remember, he demanded a sort of +five year plan in 1933 the last year of which, 1938, happened to +coincide with the 1938 mentioned in our substitute plan for +subsurface construction, and that directive had obviously been given +for the whole of the Armed Forces; since the naval agreement, +which gave us the right to arm only in the proportion of 1:3 and +not in accordance with any special plans, had become the basis +for the Navy as early as 1935.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The point that I want to deal +with is this: Did Hitler tell you that he wanted these forces to +place in the balance as an instrument of political power, did he +tell you that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I can no longer tell you that; but I believe that it is +a perfectly ordinary expression to say that one uses one’s armed +forces as an instrument which could also be thrown into the scales at +political negotiations, so that we need no longer be kicked around +by the different nations, as had so far been the case. In my opinion, +no suspicion attaches to the expression.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To put it bluntly, Hitler was +telling you, “by 1938 I want armed forces that I can use in war, +if war should become necessary.” That is what it means, isn’t it? +That is what you understood it to mean, isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. There was no word about a war, only about the +fact that we had to keep our position among the other nations so +that we could no longer be tossed aside, as had hitherto been +the case. +<span class='pageno' title='166' id='Page_166'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If anyone tried to push you over, +you could fight; that is it, wasn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is obvious. That would be the case, of course, +if we were attacked. We wanted to be in a position to defend +ourselves if we were attacked. Up till that point we were unable +to do this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let us take the first +example, when you contemplated fighting. If you look at Document +Book 10a, Document Number C-140, Page 104 of the English translation +and Page 157 of the German version, you remember that is +the directive of Field Marshal Von Blomberg on Germany leaving +the disarmament conference and League of Nations. And there, +there is a pretty full general directive as to what military measures +you would take if the members of the League of Nations applied +sanctions against you; in other words you were quite prepared...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...for a war happening on that +peace policy; that is so, isn’t it, and that is what it says, it gives +all preparations ready for fighting?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: These preparations were made, if I remember correctly, +11 days after we had left the League of Nations, and it was +quite natural that, if the Führer believed that in consequence of +our leaving the League of Nations, which was quite a peaceful +action in itself, warlike measures or sanctions would be applied +against us, we would have to defend ourselves; and if such an +attack was probable we had to take these preparatory steps.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you realized, Defendant, that +as early as October 1933 the course of Hitler’s foreign policy might +have brought about an immediate war, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I did not expect at all that such a measure as the +secession from the League of Nations, where we had always been +treated unjustly because we had no power behind us, would result +in a war with any other power. Nevertheless, it was right to take +such eventualities into consideration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is good enough +for me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, just let us look at the same document book, Document +Number C-153, on Page 107 of the English version and Page 164 +to 167 of the German version. That is, you will remember, your +armament plan for the third armament phase, and I would just +like you first of all to look at Paragraph 3.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In (a) and (b) of Paragraph 3 you give the general basis for +your arrangements: +<span class='pageno' title='167' id='Page_167'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“(a) For the military leaders a sound basis for their strategic +considerations, and</p> + +<p>“(b) For the political leaders a clear picture of what may be +achieved with the military means available at a given time.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it is quite obvious that such a plan would have +this purpose.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that your political leaders +were to make their plans on what armed forces you had available +for war, if necessary. That was what you were contemplating +then, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is a matter of course; I reported to the +Führer that I could put a certain military strength at his disposal +during that year. The Chief of State must know that in order +to know what he can count on. But that has nothing to do with +plans for war. That is the case in every state. On the other hand, +I cannot influence the political leader as to what he wants. I can +only report what I could have. Therefore, I had nothing to do +with political matters. I only did what is necessary and what is +done in every state.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at Paragraph 7.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am not going to argue with you as to whether states base +their foreign politics on things other than war as a matter of +argument, but look at Paragraph 7: “All theoretical and practical +R-preparations (armament) are to be drawn up with a primary +view to readiness for a sudden war.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is that you, as far as the Navy was concerned, you had +to be ready then for an immediate war footing, have the Navy on +an immediate war footing, isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no. This concerns the sequence of the things to +be taken for granted. The armament plan listed the most important +immediate requirements of the Navy and at that point I say here +that this applied to weapons to be used in a war where there was +no time to prepare and that is, in plain language, the mobile fleet, +which must be in a state of constant readiness. It had to be kept +ready for action at a moment’s notice and it had to receive priority. +All other matters, such as quarters, and things that had nothing +to do with direct combat, were attended to afterwards.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought that is what I put to +you, that the fleet had to be ready and ready for war. However, +you have given your account of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Just turn over, if you will be so good, to Page 66 of Document +Book 10, Page 285 of the German document book; Document +Number C-189, My Lord. +<span class='pageno' title='168' id='Page_168'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, I want to raise just this one +point on which you made a point in your examination and which +I must challenge. You say in Paragraph 2:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy expresses the opinion +that later on”—and I ask you to note the words “later on”—“the +fleet must anyhow be developed against England and +that therefore from 1936 onwards the large ships must be +armed with 35 centimeter guns.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, are you telling the Tribunal, that “gegen England” does +not mean “against” in the sense of in antagonism to, directed +against, in opposition to—that it merely means in comparison to? +Are you seriously saying that, are you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I explained the other day that we are dealing here +with the question of keeping up with other navies. Up to that +time we were keeping up with the French Navy which had 33 cm +guns. Then England went beyond that in mounting 35.6 cm guns +on her ships and then, as I said before, France went beyond +England in using 38 cm guns. Thus I said to the Führer that our +28 cm guns which we believed we could use against the French +<span class='it'>Dunkerque</span> class would not be heavy enough, and that we would +have to take the next bigger caliber, that is 35.6 like those of the +English ships. That was never done because the French began to +use 38 cm guns and our <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> class followed the French lines.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That comparison of calibers and classes of vessels was at that +time quite customary and was also...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told us all that before and +my question is a perfectly simple one; that this document in the +original German, when you say “gegen England” is exactly the +same as in your song <span class='it'>Wir fahren gegen England</span>. It means against, +in antagonism and directed against, and not in comparison. That +is what I am putting to you and it is a perfectly short point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you telling this Tribunal that “gegen England” means in +comparison with England?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is what I want to say; because it says “develop +gegen England” and at that time we had not even signed the Naval +Agreement. It is hardly likely that I would consider following an +anti-British policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look to the next page, Document +Number C-190, Page 67 of the English document book, +Page 284 of the German document book. That is your conversation +with Hitler, on the 2nd November 1934, when you are discussing +bigger naval estimates and the availability of more money. I want +you to look at the end of the first paragraph which gives Hitler’s +reasons. +<span class='pageno' title='169' id='Page_169'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>“He considers it vital that the Navy be increased as planned”—now +look—“as no war could be carried on if the Navy were not +able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you still telling the Tribunal you were not from 1934 +onwards contemplating war? Well, if so, why does Hitler say that? +That is one of the most vital points of German naval strategy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>“No war could be carried on if the Navy were not able to safeguard +the ore imports from Sweden.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Were you not contemplating war in November? Were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Hitler said that a navy is built so that, if war becomes +necessary, the navy can use its weapons to defend the country. +A navy is established for no other purpose, and that was definitely +one of the general reasons for the existence of a German Navy. +There were many people who thought a navy was unnecessary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, what I am putting to +you is this. You have told the Tribunal that the Navy was purely +defensive, all your preparations were purely defensive. I am +suggesting to you that Hitler there is contemplating a war and +contemplating the task of a navy during a war, a few months +before he intended to denounce the military clauses of Versailles.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You were all set for a war if it should become necessary, and +you knew that. Was that not the position?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is a complete misrepresentation of the facts, +Mr. Prosecutor. Of course it is necessary during peacetime to +contemplate the circumstances which might arise to make it +necessary to call on the Armed Forces for defense. At that time +nobody thought of a war of aggression, and the individual tasks +must be understood. One of the Navy’s tasks was undoubtedly to +secure the Swedish and Norwegian ore exports in case of war; +and it had to be developed with a view to that end.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you just look at the next +sentence in Paragraph-2: “When I pointed out that in the critical +political situation in the first quarter of 1935, it would be desirable +to have six U-boats already assembled....”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You were preparing for the critical political situation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s look at what you were +doing in 1936. Would you give the defendant and Dr. Siemers +Document Number D-806.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is a report of yours dated the 11th of November 1936, +dealing with the U-boat construction program, and after the first +paragraph you say this in the second paragraph: +<span class='pageno' title='170' id='Page_170'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The military and political situation urgently demands that +the extension of our U-boat fleet should be taken in hand +immediately and completed with the greatest energy and +dispatch, as it is a particularly valuable part of our armament +at sea and possesses special striking power.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you saying that what you were urging there was purely +defensive and that you had no idea of the special striking powers +that would be needed in a war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The entire political situation, or so I seem to remember, +made me consider it necessary to put the construction of +submarines in the foreground. But I never expected that we would +start a war on our own account. Hitler himself had told me that +again and again, but he had made his political moves which could +undoubtedly lead us into war if the other powers intervened +against such a political move. The charge made against me was that +I did not push the construction of U-boats sufficiently far ahead.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are stressing it sufficiently +there, aren’t you? “On the military and political situation”—you +were kept fully informed of the political situation and were +adjusting your naval armament accordingly; isn’t that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that time I not only knew nothing about what was +going to happen, but I knew that we had occupied the Rhineland +during that year, and that in consequence of the clouds which +appeared on the horizon as a result of the occupation of the Rhineland +Hitler maintained an attitude of greatest caution and said +that we must be prepared for further complications. For that reason +a special directive was issued in 1936, and I took precautions along +the lines suggested by these considerations. My main duty was +to watch; and on the basis of my observations and the conclusions +which I drew from them, I had to strengthen myself as much as +possible. This document, about which you did not question me, +had the same connotation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I asked whether—should political tension develop at the beginning +of 1935, before the signing of the Naval Agreement, and that would +not be done till June—we should perhaps assemble six U-boats. +That was also in the case of tension arising; and I knew at that +time that the declaration of freedom of territorial defense was +intended to be made in 1935.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, you have told us +what you knew in 1936. Now, just let’s pass on to 1937. I want +to know exactly what you say. That of course, as you remember, +turns on the Hossbach Document, 386-PS, which is at Page 81 of +Document Book 10, Page 314 of the German document book. +<span class='pageno' title='171' id='Page_171'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, did you give the number of that +last document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful, My Lord. It +is Exhibit GB-462.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, I want you just—have you got +that, Page 314 of the German document book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Can you tell me the paragraph? I have...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, the first thing I want to ask +you about is the third paragraph, the last sentence, where Hitler +is reported as saying: “The German future is therefore dependent +exclusively on the solution of the need for living space.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And then I wanted you, if you would be so good, to turn over two +pages to 316. My Lord, it is Page 83 of the English document book. +That is repeated. My Lord, it is about seven lines down. Where +Hitler says: “The only way out, and one which may appear +imaginary, is the securing of greater living space.” And then he +says that: “The history of all times has proved that every space +expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance.” And then +in a separate paragraph he says: “The question for Germany is +where the greatest possible conquest could be made at the +lowest cost.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you see that, on Page 316?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I begin with the last one? It is wrongly translated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that’s what I’m really going +to ask you. I want you to just tell us, did you hear Hitler say +that that was the general problem, “the greatest possible conquest +to be made at the lowest cost.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. The English document has the word “conquest” +(Eroberung), but that is not in the German document. The German +text reads: “the highest possible gain (Gewinn) with the smallest +risk.” That is a phrase borrowed from sport. There is no mention +of conquest.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’m quite prepared to accept that +it comes after the passage which I have referred to you in quite +some detail, because I don’t want to select anything out of the +context. Did you appreciate that Hitler there was saying, “The +only possibility for Germany is to get extra living space,” and that +had to be got at the expense of other nations? He said that, +didn’t he?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He did say that; and I explained recently how that +is to be understood. He was speaking of Austria and Czechoslovakia, +<span class='pageno' title='172' id='Page_172'></span> +of the Sudetenland. We were of the opinion that no change was +intended in that policy; nor did one take place later. War was not +waged against Austria or Czechoslovakia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We were all convinced that he would solve that question peacefully, +like all other political questions. I explained that in great +detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what I was +going to ask you about. You have taken my second point yourself. +The rest of the document deals with action against Austria and +Czechoslovakia. Would you look at Page 86?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I think you will agree with me that Field Marshal Von Blomberg +and General Von Fritsch rather poured cold water on Hitler’s ideas. +Isn’t that a fair way of putting it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They rather thus showed a certain +antipathy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was in November 1937.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: We all of us told him constantly that in no circumstances +might he start a war with England and France, and he +always agreed. But I explained that this entire speech had a +definite purpose; and that for this purpose he exaggerated a great +deal and at once withdrew that exaggeration when a hint was +given to him about the danger of a war with France and England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was what I was going to +ask you. That was in November. By January, Field Marshal Von +Blomberg had made his unfortunate marriage, hadn’t he?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I believe it was in January. I do not know exactly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took the view, didn’t +you, that he had been encouraged to do that by the Defendant +Göring?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I never said that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, didn’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not that I know of. I never thought that at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember making a statement +in Moscow on this point? Let me read it to you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: To whom, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In Moscow to the Russians.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“At the beginning of the year 1938 I had experiences of a +personal nature, which although they did not concern the +<span class='pageno' title='173' id='Page_173'></span> +Navy directly caused me to lose confidence, not only in +Göring but also in the sincerity of the Führer. The situation +in which Field Marshal Von Blomberg found himself as a +result of his unfortunate marriage made his position as a +Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces impossible. I came +to the belated conclusion that Göring was making every +effort to obtain the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht +in place of Blomberg.</p> + +<p>“He favored the marriage because it made Blomberg ineligible +for this post, while Blomberg believed—and even stated +repeatedly—that such a marriage was possible under the +present system. Göring had already had him shadowed in +the past, as I learned from later remarks.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Didn’t you say that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In Moscow, immediately after the collapse, I made +a note of the causes of the collapse as seen in the light of my own +experience. I wrote this document under the conditions there—where +I was treated very chivalrously—and I had no hesitation in +informing the highest general of the Commissariat of the Interior +of this when I was asked what I was doing there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All I want to know is, is that +true, what you said?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I wrote these notes, and it is also true that it +occurred to me afterwards that Göring might have favored the +marriage. I believe that he himself told me that here. He had +assisted Blomberg in such a way that, I think, he did not know +what the true state of affairs was or how serious the matter was.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you see, your view at that +time was that Göring was encouraging the marriage because he +knew that it would put Blomberg off the map as Commander-in-Chief +because he, Göring, wanted the position. Was that the view +that you held last summer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I believed that last summer, yes. And it is also true +that Göring certainly wanted to become Commander-in-Chief of +the Armed Forces, but the Führer himself thwarted him in that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was Von Blomberg. +We know what happened to him. Your second choice, after Von +Blomberg, was Von Fritsch, was it not? You thought that Von +Fritsch would have been the best Commander-in-Chief if Von +Blomberg went, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mentioned that to Hitler? +And... +<span class='pageno' title='174' id='Page_174'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He asked me, and I said that if I were consulted, +I would suggest Baron von Fritsch. But the Führer said that that +was out of the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. But there were some of +them bringing a charge of homosexuality against Von Fritsch; isn’t +that right? That was why it could not be done?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. He said, in general terms, that some kind of +moral crime existed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were one of the court who +inquired into that charge, were you not? Göring, as president, you +and General Von Brauchitsch?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you came to the conclusion +that the charge of homosexuality against Von Fritsch was a frame-up +by the Gestapo, did you not? Do you know what I mean? +I am afraid “frame-up” is rather difficult to translate.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The whole thing gave me that impression. Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is because the denunciation +had been by some shady character who you thought was a “hang-around” +of the Gestapo; and at the trial, the co-operation of the +Gestapo with the accuser was brought to light; that is right, is +it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You were satisfied, from sitting at the trial?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you agree that there had +been—not a confusion—but that the guilty party was a cavalry +captain, Rittmeister Von Fritsch, and not this general at all; isn’t +that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I agree absolutely. We acquitted Baron von Fritsch +because his innocence was proved. There was no suspicion of any +kind remaining against him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You acquitted him, but his +reinstatement did not follow? His reinstatement in command did +not follow?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I went to him, as I knew him very well, and +asked him if he would agree to my going to Hitler and suggesting +that he, Baron von Fritsch, be reinstated. But Fritsch replied that +he considered that quite impossible. He thought that his authority +was so much impaired that he would no longer care to resume his +position as Commander-in-Chief of the Army.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After that, unfortunately, I could do no more about it. I reported +this to the Führer, but there were no further developments. All +<span class='pageno' title='175' id='Page_175'></span> +that happened was that the Führer confirmed the absolute innocence +of Baron von Fritsch in a large assembly of generals and admirals.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you say this with +regard to the Von Fritsch incident:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I was convinced that Göring had a hand in this well-prepared +situation, since in order to attain his goal it was +necessary to eliminate every possible successor to Von +Blomberg”?</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember saying that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do not remember that now; but I believe that I held +that opinion. To be quite just, I must say that Baron von Fritsch’s +acquittal was due principally to the way in which Göring conducted +the proceedings. The witness who was brought up told so +many lies and made so many contradictory statements every +few minutes, that only Göring could cope with him. After seeing +that, I was very thankful that I had not been appointed president, +as suggested by the Minister of Justice. I could not have coped +with those people. It was entirely due to Göring’s intervention +that he was acquitted without any difficulties.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But of course, I think you have +said, Witness, that whether he was acquitted or not, the authority +of Von Fritsch in the German Army was in his own view destroyed +by the fact that this charge had been brought against him. That +was the result of it, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Herr Von Fritsch thought so. I would have insisted +on being reinstated after I had been acquitted in that manner.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did it not strike you as curious +that the two people who on the 5th of November had tried to head +Hitler off from a course that might have meant war were both +disgraced in 2 months? Didn’t it strike you as curious?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That did not strike me as curious at all; and there +is certainly no connection. If Hitler had thought it necessary to +remove the men in high positions who opposed him in such matters, +he would have had to remove me long ago. But he never said +anything about it to me, and I have never noticed that he said +anything like that because I contradicted him. I have frequently +pointed out, with regard to that very question of England and +France, that no war should be caused there; and I never had the +impression that he ever took it amiss.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just let us take it very +shortly. Within 6 weeks of the disgrace of Blomberg and the +removal of Von Fritsch, the Anschluss with Austria took place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not know that there +were pretended military preparations for the Anschluss with +<span class='pageno' title='176' id='Page_176'></span> +Austria, the ones described by General Jodl in his diary and also +described by Field Marshal Keitel? Did you know that these threats +of military action would have been made?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do not believe that I ever took part in a military +discussion concerning the Austrian Anschluss, because actually +I had nothing to do with it. But I should like to emphasize here, +once and for all, that I learned of such enterprises as, for instance, +the annexation of Austria through a directive issued by the Führer, +and not before, because one copy of these directives, regardless of +whether or not they concerned the Navy, was always sent to me +as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. So, of course, I must have +received a directive in this case, too. Unfortunately, I cannot tell +you the date of it; but I confirm that a directive came to my +knowledge.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, the point that I am +putting—and I do not want to waste time on it—is this: That on +the 5th of November Hitler said that he was going to get Austria +in 1943 to 1945 at the latest, and earlier if an opportunity arises. +Four months later, in March 1938, he takes Austria after having +got rid of the people who threw cold water on his plans. But if +you did not know about it, we shall not waste time, but shall look +at Czechoslovakia, because there you did get the decree.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You will find that on Page 163 of Document Book 10a, Page 276 +of the German document book. That is the distribution of the +directive for operations against Czechoslovakia. It is bringing up +to date the one of the 24th of June, and you will see that its +execution must be assured as from the 1st of October 1938, at the +latest, and Copy Number 2 goes to you as Commander-in-Chief of +the Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, if you will turn over the page to the actual directive, +146 of the English document book, 277 to 278, you see the first +sentence of Paragraph 1, “Political Prerequisites”:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by +military action in the near future. It is the job of the +political leaders to await or bring about the politically or +militarily suitable moment.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I ask where it is? I do not seem able to find it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The first sentence in the directive, +Paragraph 1, Political Prerequisites—Sentence 1: “It is my +unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in +the near future.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The numbering is confused here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very sorry. Page 277, 278. +<span class='pageno' title='177' id='Page_177'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Now I have found it. What was the date?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 28th of May 1938, that is +approximately six months after the meeting which you had attended +at which Hitler had said he would attack Czechoslovakia at the +earliest opportunity that he could. Didn’t that make you think +that Hitler’s speech in November was not merely froth but was +stating his plans?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, because he kept on changing his decisions all the +summer. He made a fresh decision every month. That can be seen +from Document 388-PS. And it was like this, I believe: on 10 September +troops began to assemble and on the same day negotiations +were started. On 1 October the peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland +took place, after the other powers had agreed to that at +Munich. After the Munich negotiations...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We all know that. The point is +perfectly clear...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should like to finish.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In May, here were the plans, +and the Führer had mentioned—in his speeches he had expressed +this: that it was his determination at the end of May to smash +Czechoslovakia by military action. Are you telling the Tribunal +that you read that directive and still took the view that Hitler +had not got aggressive intentions? That is the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, at the end of May.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why, what more proof could +you want than his own determination to smash it? What clearer +proof could you want?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He frequently said that he intended to smash something +and then did not do it. The question was peacefully solved +then. I should like to add that on 30 May—I believe that was the +date—after mobilization had just been carried out in Czechoslovakia, +and that had led him to use such stern words then, and from +this—I think he was justified in doing so, for this mobilization +could only be directed against Germany, and as I said, he changed +his opinion at least three or four times in the course of the summer, +saying again and again that he would reserve his decision and—or +that he did not wish to use military force.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Tribunal have gotten +the whole of the 388-PS document in mind. I won’t argue it. You +say that didn’t convince you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>When Hitler went into Prague on the 15th of March 1939, did +it then occur to you that there might be something in what he said +in the interview on the 5th of November 1937 when he occupied +<span class='pageno' title='178' id='Page_178'></span> +the Slav part of Bohemia and Moravia and broke his own rule +about keeping Germany for the Germans? Did it then occur to +you that he might not then have been joking or merely talking +froth in November? Did it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He had issued a directive saying that the aims for +that year were:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>1) The defense of Germany against outside attack.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>2) The settlement of the rest of Czechoslovakia in case she +adopted a line of policy hostile to Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I heard nothing at all about his negotiations with Hacha and +his decision following them to occupy Czechoslovakia. I only knew +that he wanted to take action against Czechoslovakia according to +his directive, in case Czechoslovakia should adopt a line of policy +hostile to Germany; and according to the propaganda at that period, +that actually did occur. I had nothing at all to do with the occupation +of Czechoslovakia; nor with the occupation of the Sudeten +area, because the only service which we could have rendered in +these operations was our small Danube Flotilla which was subordinated +to the Army for this purpose so that I had nothing at +all to do with it. There were no other military orders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your answer that even +when Hitler went into Prague on the 15th of March 1939, you still +thought he had no aggressive intentions? Is that what you want +the Tribunal to believe from you? Is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I ask the Tribunal to do so because I believe that +he did not want to fight a war, to conduct a campaign against +Czechoslovakia. By means of his political measures with Hacha he +succeeded so far that war did not break out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, you heard the Defendant +Göring give his evidence that he told President Hacha that his +armed forces would bomb Prague if he didn’t agree. If that is not +war, it is next door to it, isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It is very close to it. Yes, a threat.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let’s go further on for +another 2 months. If you didn’t see it, on March—on the 23rd of +May—when you came to the Reich Chancellery there were six +high-ranking officers, of which you were one. And Hitler said that +he would give you an indoctrination on the political situation. And +his indoctrination was that, “We are left with a decision to attack +Poland at the first opportunity.” When you heard him say that +on the 25th of May, did you still think he had no aggressive +intentions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I thought so for a long time after that. Just as +Generaloberst Jodl said, since he had solved the Czech problem +<span class='pageno' title='179' id='Page_179'></span> +by purely political means, it was to be hoped that he would be +able to solve the Polish question also without bloodshed; and +I believed that up to the last moment, up to 22 August.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just take one glance—I shan’t +keep you long—at Document L-79, which you will find on Page 74, +I think it is, of Document Book 10. I am sorry. Page 298 of the +German document book. I beg your pardon. I am not going to ask +you about the document because the Tribunal has dealt with that. +I want you to look at the people who were there—298 in the +German document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I know the people who were there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s look: Lieutenant Colonel +Schmundt; he was afterwards General, Hitler’s principal adjutant, +and killed on the 20th of July, 1944, isn’t that right? Then the +Defendant Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; yourself +as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; Colonel General Von +Brauchitsch who was Commander-in-Chief of the Army; General +Keitel who was head of the OKW; General Milch who was Göring’s +Deputy; Halder who was Chief of Staff; Schniewind who was your +Chief of Staff; and Jeschonnek who was I think a Chief of Staff +or a high...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. And Colonel Warlimont, +who was General Jodl’s assistant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, what do you think Hitler got these high-ranking generals +for, and told them, “We are left with a decision to attack Poland +at the first opportunity,” if he hadn’t any aggressive intentions? +What were these people there for if it wasn’t to develop a war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already explained that the main purpose of +that speech, as may be seen from the last part of it, was to give +a purely academic lecture on the conduct of war, and on the basis +of that lecture to create a special study staff, a project which the +chiefs of the Armed Forces had so far strongly opposed. I also +explained at the start that his explanations were at first the most +confused that I have ever heard regarding the matter, and that +he issued no directives in regard to them but that the last lines +read: “The branches of the Wehrmacht determine what will be +built. There will be no alteration in the shipbuilding program. The +armament programs are to be fixed for 1943 or 1944.” When he +said that, he could certainly not have intended to solve the Polish +question by a war in the near future.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal +that when he said, “We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech +affair; further successes cannot be obtained without the shedding +<span class='pageno' title='180' id='Page_180'></span> +of blood,” you paid no attention to it at all? You are seriously +telling the Tribunal that you paid no attention to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I certainly did not at all, because by this time +I was getting to know Hitler and was familiar with the exaggerations +contained in his speeches.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At this time you had already +had the directives for a surprise attack on Danzig, in November +1938. You had had the directive on the 3rd of April for the Fall +Weiss, and you know this whole matter was <span class='it'>en train</span>. Are you +seriously, Defendant, telling the Tribunal that you had any doubt +after the 23rd of May that Hitler intended war against Poland and +was quite prepared to fight England and France, if they carried out +their guarantee? I mean, seriously, I give you this chance before +we adjourn: Do you say that you had any doubt at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course; I have surely explained that even in August +I was still doubtful. For instance, in estimating this speech, +I must compare it, as has already been done here, with the speech +which Hitler had made a few weeks earlier at the launching of +the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span>, where he spoke only of the peace of true justice. +Those speeches were decisive for me. I did not base my conclusions +on this particular speech which is reproduced in such an extremely +confused manner; and that I proved by the fact that during the +whole of the summer I never said a word to the Navy to suggest +that war might break out in the autumn. Confirmation of that was +given here; and anybody can give further confirmation. I thought +very highly of Hitler’s political ability and even on 22 August, +when we were informed of the pact with Russia, I was still +convinced that we should again be able to find a peaceful solution +of the problem. That was my definite conviction. I may be accused +of faulty judgment, but I thought I had formed a correct estimate +of Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I understand you to say +that even on the 22nd of August you didn’t think that Hitler had +any aggressive intentions. Do you really mean that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, and there is a perfectly good reason for it, +because there was every prospect of our forming an alliance with +Russia. He had given all sorts of reasons why England and France +would not intervene; and all those who were assembled there drew +from that the sincere hope that he would again be successful in +getting out of the affair without fighting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will this be a convenient time +to adjourn, My Lord?</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='181' id='Page_181'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am most anxious not +to take up unnecessary time. With regard to the meeting of the 22d +of August, Your Lordship may remember that Dr. Siemers raised a +point as to the two accounts of the meeting, one in Documents +1014-PS and 798-PS and the other in the account by Admiral Böhm. +I have had a comparison made out in English and German showing +the points which are similar to both, and I thought it would be more +convenient just to put that in. Let Dr. Siemers see the German copy +and make any suggestion at the appropriate time rather than spend +any time in cross-examining the witness as to any differences in the +accounts. My Lord, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will put +that in now and hand Dr. Siemers a copy so that he can draw the +Tribunal’s attention to any points at a convenient stage.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did not Admiral Böhm make the accounts?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution’s +account is in two documents, 798-PS and 1014-PS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There was another document +which was mentioned by my friend, Mr. Alderman, but not put in. +It was an account by a journalist which was the first account the +Prosecution had had, but when they got the two accounts from the +OKW files, they did not use their first one; so I had only taken the +two accounts from the OKW files and Admiral Böhm’s account.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But does not that make three documents +in all, apart from the one which has been left out?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, and I have taken +each of the two and compared it with Admiral Böhm’s.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So, on that I shall not pursue +this interview. I thought that it would save time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I’d like you, therefore, +Defendant, to look at Document Number 789-PS, which is at +Page 261 of Book 10a and Pages 438 to 440 of the German book—438 +to 440. This is the note, Defendant, of a conference on the 23d +of November 1939 with Hitler, to which all Supreme Commanders +were ordered. Do you see that at the beginning, Pages 438 to 440? +Do you see what it says, “to which all Supreme Commanders are +ordered”? Were you present? +<span class='pageno' title='182' id='Page_182'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it is the conference during the war on 23 November +1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Were you present?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I was present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who were the other commanders-in-chief +who were present?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The commanders-in-chief of the Army, the Air Force, +and a considerable number of generals of the Army.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The “Oberbefehlshaber”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but in the Army...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, I want you to look at +a passage. The paragraph begins: “One year later, Austria came. +This step also was considered very hazardous.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you see that? Do you see that paragraph?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have got it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Much obliged. Now, I just want +you to look at the next few sentences.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It brought about a considerable strengthening of the Reich. +The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. But this +step was not to be accomplished in one move. First of all, the +West Wall had to be finished in the West. It was not possible +to reach the goal in one bound. It was clear to me from the +first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German +territory. It was only a partial solution. The decision +to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the establishment +of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the +conquest of Poland was laid, but I was not yet clear at that +time whether I should start first against the East and then +against the West or vice-versa. Moltke often had to ponder +over the same things in his time. Of necessity it came to a +fight with Poland first. I shall be accused of wanting to fight +and fight again; in struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody +can avoid a struggle if he does not want to go under. The increasing +population requires a larger living space. My goal +was to create a logical relation between the population and +the living space.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Whatever you had understood up to that time, you appreciated +then, that Hitler himself had had a consistent and clear aim of +aggression throughout these matters that I put to you this morning; +did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but now we were already in the middle of a war +and he was looking at these things retrospectively. Also, he wanted +<span class='pageno' title='183' id='Page_183'></span> +to make it clear to the generals, with whom he had a conflict at that +time, that he had always been right in his political conceptions. That +is the reason why he quoted all these detailed points again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you turn over +to Pages 445-448, which is Page 264 of the English document book, +German document book Pages 445-448. Have you got that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Perhaps you would be good enough to read, I have +here a...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the paragraph that begins: +“We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look about halfway +down that paragraph. You will see: “England cannot live without +its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines +off the English coasts will bring England to her knees.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Have you got that passage?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. Now, if you would +just listen.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“However, this”—that is bringing England to her knees—“can +only occur when we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It +is a difficult decision for me. Nobody has ever achieved what +I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have +led the German people to a great height, even if the world +does hate us now. I am setting this work at stake. I have to +choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory, the +greatest historical choice—to be compared with the decision +of Frederick the Great before the first Silesian War. Prussia +owes its rise to the heroism of one man.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And there is some more about Frederick the Great and Bismarck:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England +at the most favorable and quickest moment. Violation of +the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is unimportant. No one +will question that when we have won. We shall not give such +idiotic reasons for the violation of neutrality as were given +in 1914. If we do not violate the neutrality, then England and +France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended +victoriously.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, do you remember, Defendant, that this was just 3 weeks +after the plans for “Fall Gelb,” that is plans for the attack on +Holland and Belgium, had been issued on 10 November? Do you +remember that? +<span class='pageno' title='184' id='Page_184'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I know that this was discussed here. But we were +already at war with England, therefore at that stage it was no +longer necessary to discuss an attack against England and France +and...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR. DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were not at war with +Holland and Belgium, were you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Please, I would like to finish.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, I thought you had +finished.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Here it says: “If the French Army marches into Belgium +to attack us, then it will be too late for us. We must be first.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Hitler at that time stated that he had received definite news that +Belgium would not respect her neutrality and that he also had news +already that certain preparations for the reception of French and +British troops <span class='it'>et cetera</span> had already been made. For that reason, he +wanted to forestall an attack from Belgium against us. Apart from +that, in his speech of 22 August 1939, he had made a statement +entirely to the opposite effect. He had said that Belgium and +Holland would not break their neutrality.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with what he +said, that the “Violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland +is unimportant. No one will question that when we have won.” +Did you agree with that view?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it is not exactly my opinion, but I had no cause +on my part to raise any objection against that statement of his at +that moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The view of the Naval War +Command was put up to him a month later with regard to U-boat +warfare, was it not? Do you remember that on 30th December you +had a meeting with Hitler, at which Colonel General Keitel and +Fregattenkapitän Von Puttkamer were present?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I was with him on 30 December.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like you to look at the +new document, which is Document Number C-100, Exhibit Number +GB-463.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought not this document be identified?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship, of course, is +right. I think we had perhaps better give them two numbers, one +for each of the original PS documents. My Lord, the comparison...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 1014-PS has a number already, has it not? +<span class='pageno' title='185' id='Page_185'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. That has a +number.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought perhaps the comparative document +ought to have a number.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. Shall we call one +comparison Exhibit Number GB-464, the comparison of Document +Number 798-PS; and the comparison of Document Number 1014-PS, +Exhibit Number GB-465?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have only got one here, as far as I can see.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am going to get +some more done. I am afraid I have passed out only a limited +number at the moment, but I will have some more run off.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>464, 798; GB-465 will be 1014-PS. It will be the comparison of +Document Number 798-PS with the Raeder Document, and Exhibit +Number GB-465 will be the comparison of Document Number +1014-PS in the Raeder document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now you are going to give us Document +Number C-100?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: C-100, My Lord, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Defendant, I will be grateful if you will turn over a few pages +to where it comes to a report, the date of 30 December 1939, and +then after that there is an enclosure to the report to the Führer of +30 December 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Would you look at Paragraph IV, which says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“With regard to the form and the moment for the commencement +of further intensification of the war at sea, the decision +of the supreme war command to begin the general intensification +of the war with an offensive in the West is of decisive +importance.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Have you got that, Paragraph IV?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Page?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am afraid the paging is different.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: “With regard to the form”—yes.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “With regard to the form +and the moment for the commencement of further intensification +of the war at sea, the decision of the supreme war +command to begin the general intensification of the war with +an offensive in the West is of decisive importance. +<span class='pageno' title='186' id='Page_186'></span></p> + +<p>“I. Possibility: The decision of the Führer is made in favor +of a Western offensive, beginning very shortly, within the +framework of the instructions issued for this to date, by +violating the neutrality of other states:</p> + +<p>“In this case the intensified measures for the war at sea will +in their political effect only represent a small part of the +entire intensification of the war. The gradual change-over to +the intensified form of waging the war at sea within the +American restricted zone, with the ultimate aim of a ruthless +employment of all means of warfare to interrupt all commerce +with England, is therefore proposed with the start of the +offensive.</p> + +<p>“Immediate anticipation of individual intensified measures for +the war at sea is not necessary and may be postponed until +the start of the general intensification of the war. The benevolent +neutrals Italy, Spain, Japan and Russia as well as +America, are to be spared as far as possible.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Isn’t that right, that you contemplated that Hitler’s violation of +the neutrality of the Low Countries would cover, by being a more +important matter, your adopting the most ruthless methods of war +at sea? Isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What does that mean if it does +not mean that? What does that mean if it does not mean what I +have put to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: With the beginning of the offensive in the West, Hitler +also wanted a certain more energetic pursuit of the war at sea. For +that reason, he asked me to introduce only at this point the intensified +measures which I considered already justified because of the +attitude of the British forces. These intensifications were very +carefully considered in that memorandum, and they followed step +by step the different steps taken by Britain.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal with the memorandum. +You need not be afraid that I will omit that, but what I +am putting to you at the moment is this: That so far from disapproving +of the violation of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium, +you on behalf of the Navy were quite prepared to accompany it by +the intensification of submarine warfare; isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is twisting my words. I had nothing to do with +this violation of neutrality for we were not there when they marched +into these two countries. The only thing I was interested in was to +intensify the submarine war step by step, so as to meet the measures +introduced by the British, which also violated international law. +<span class='pageno' title='187' id='Page_187'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to come to submarine +warfare, but at the moment I want to try to keep in compartments. +There are only two more points on this aggressive war. +I am now going to pass—you can leave that document for the +moment. I will come back to it, Defendant; you need not be afraid, +and I want you to help me on one or two points in Norway.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With regard to Norway, you were quite content to leave Norway +neutral, not occupied, so long as you had a protected channel up the +Norwegian coast in neutral waters, is that right? That was an important +point for you, to have a channel in neutral waters so that +not only your ships, but also your submarines, could go up and +start out from neutral waters, is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I have very clearly explained the origin of the +Norwegian campaign in documents. There was the danger that the +British might occupy Norway, and information of all sorts indicated +that. Of course, if we were forced to occupy the Norwegian coast, +then, apart from all the numerous disadvantages which I have explained, +we had the advantage that we would gain this or that base +for our Atlantic submarines.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal +that the Navy seriously thought that the British wanted to occupy +Norway?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I most certainly thought that. We had so much information +about it that I could have no doubt whatever, and it was +fully confirmed later on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just ask you, then, to look at +just one or two typical Navy reports. We won’t refer to the document +again, but we will start from there, just to get the time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You remember, on the 13th of March 1940, General Jodl entered +in his diary that the Führer was still looking for justification; do +you remember that? You remember that, don’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already explained once that the expression just +used, “justification,” is wrong, wrongly translated, Jodl wrote “Begründung,” +“reason.” But that is also wrong—please will you let +me finish—even that is incorrect, because the Führer had an abundance +of reasons, which he laid down in the instruction issued on the +1st of March, and it was known to all of us. I have said that by +the expression “Begründung,” “reason,” he probably meant that he +had not yet had a diplomatic note compiled. He had not told the +Foreign Minister anything about it at that stage. I told you that +recently under oath and I repeat it under oath today.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is the meaning that +you have given to it. Well now, will you look at your own Raeder +Exhibit Number 81, in Raeder Document Book 5, Page 376. +<span class='pageno' title='188' id='Page_188'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I have Document Book 5?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, you have not got it. I’m +sorry. I will get you one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, that is dealing with the first point, encroachment by the +English into Norwegian territorial waters, and it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“An examination of the question as to whether a mass encroachment +by the English into the Norwegian territorial +waters was so immediately imminent that it might represent +a danger to present German shipping produces the opinion +that this is not to be expected at the present time. The ore +transports are to be continued, as no losses have yet occurred.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Was that your information, that no mass encroachment of Norwegian +territorial waters was to be expected on the 22d of March?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That was not at all my conception. It was the view of +Kapitän zur See Fricke, who was at that time the Chief of the +Operations Department. He did not quite agree with me about the +whole of this question. He was of the opinion that the British should +be allowed to enter Norway first, and then we should throw them +out through Sweden, a completely distorted idea which I could not +approve of in any way. I had such clear information from Quisling +and Hagelin, particularly at that time, the second half of March, +that there was no longer any doubt whatever that within a reasonable +time the British would intervene on a big scale.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that that was Admiral +Fricke’s view, and you didn’t pay attention to it. Well, now, let me +look...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not concern myself with it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know, Admiral Assmann, +whom you have described as a sound historian, kept a headline +diary, and on the next day he gives an account of a meeting between +you and Hitler, and he says this. This is the same day. You may +have read it, because he turns down your proposal to use U-boats +off Halifax. It is the same day, the 23d of February. Then, at +that date, you are quoted as saying that to insure the supply of ore +from Narvik, it would be best to preserve the neutrality of Norway.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, on the 26th of March, Admiral Assmann in his report of +the meeting between you and Hitler records your answers as +follows. It is quite short: “British landing in Norway not considered +imminent—Raeder suggests action by us at the next new moon—to +which Hitler agrees.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is Admiral Assmann’s report of the meeting between you +and Hitler on the 26th of March: “British landing in Norway not +<span class='pageno' title='189' id='Page_189'></span> +considered imminent—Raeder suggests action by us at the next new +moon, the 7th of April—to which Hitler agrees.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I mean, it is quite improbable that at that moment +I should not have been fully convinced of the imminent landing +about which the whole of Documents 004-PS and 007-PS gave me +reliable information. I did not see the documents, but the information +contained in them was fully available.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Admiral Assmann compiled his notes from all sorts of war +diaries and records. I most certainly never said that because at that +time I reported to Hitler again and again that our preparations +which had already been started a time ago would be complete at +the end of January, and that that would be the time when the +landings had to be carried out for the reasons I always put forward. +It is completely wrong to assume that at that time I had the slightest +doubt. Later everything was proved right...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now really we must...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: And later on, it all turned out to be correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must get down to this +matter. You have told us that Admiral Assmann was a trustworthy +officer and good at naval history.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He is not a deceiver, but he compiled the document +from all sorts of papers and I cannot imagine how he could have +arrived at that statement, I certainly never made it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, but the second part of it, +the second sentence, is right, isn’t it? “Raeder suggests action by us +at the next new moon, the 7th of April.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is right; that is when you did invade. That was when your +armada started off to arrive there on the 9th, wasn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But yes, of course. I was in favor of carrying out the +landings in Norway at the earliest possible time, after ice conditions +had improved, as we had previously decided and as had been ordered +by Hitler. For that I assume full responsibility. There was every +reason for that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well. Again I mustn’t argue +with you, but the point comes to this, that you are saying that +Admiral Assmann, who is right in his second sentence, is not only +wrong but entirely wrong—I mean, stating the opposite of the truth—when +he says that the British landing in Norway was not considered +imminent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Well now, we will just pursue that a little. +<span class='pageno' title='190' id='Page_190'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I only submitted to the Führer this matter of landing +in Norway on the supposition that this information was available +and would continue to be available.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, what was that document of the +26th of March 1940?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was an extract from the +Assmann Diary which I have used before, and I will have one made +up and put in for identification. I haven’t got it copied yet, My +Lord, I am sorry. I shall have it done.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I should be grateful if perhaps you could show me the +document. You have shown me all the others, but not this one, the +one I contest.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is such +a short extract I thought you would take it from me, but the last +thing I want is not to show you any documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You see the entry for the 26th of March:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“British landing in Norway not considered imminent. Raeder +suggests action by us at next new moon, 7th of April, to which +Hitler agrees. Further discussions about laying of mines at +Scapa before German invasion of Norway. Hitler agrees with +Raeder and will issue instructions accordingly.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I come back to it now. Here it says, the 26th of +March 1940: “Occupation of Norway by British was imminent when +the Russian-Finnish peace was concluded.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That very Russian-Finnish affair was making it particularly +urgent for us to carry out a landing because the danger existed that +the British, under the pretext of supporting the Finns, would carry +out a bloodless occupation of Norway.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then I go on to the question of the Führer, whether a landing +by the British in Norway might be imminent. One must consider +that Assmann had summarized all that from war diaries, and this +question is explained by the fact that the Führer wanted to know +whether the situation had changed in any way, because the peace +had been signed. However, the situation had not changed at all, +because we knew in reality that the landings by the British were +not to be carried out to help the Finns, but for other reasons. That +question, therefore, whether at the time, because of the peace treaty, +the British landings might be particularly imminent, was answered +by me in the negative. Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action +by us at next new moon, 7th April—Führer agrees. Everything +remained as before. Only the question whether because of this +peace treaty we ought to land at once, I answered “no.” That is +completely different from what you have been telling me. +<span class='pageno' title='191' id='Page_191'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You read out the entry for the +26th of March. What is the entry for the 26th of March? You read +it out in German and we can translate it.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>RAEDER: “Occupation of Norway by the British was imminent +when the Russian-Finnish peace treaty was signed. +Apparently, because of the treaty, it was postponed. Question +by the Führer, whether at that moment a landing by the +British in Norway was imminent, was answered in the +negative by the Commander-in-Chief Navy....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Yes, that did not mean that because of that we had to renounce +the idea.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>“Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action by us at next new +moon.” The reasons for our landing remained the same as before; +only the Finnish business could no longer be used by the British.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The peace treaty, the end of +the war with Finland, had taken place in the middle of March. That +was off the map at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, it was no longer important for us, but our +reasons remained as before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, will you look at +Document Number D-843. This will be Exhibit Number GB-466. +This is a report from your diplomatic representative in Norway, +dated the 29th of March, and at the end of the first paragraph you +will see:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The British apparently did not want to take upon themselves +the responsibility for openly violating Norwegian territory +and Norwegian territorial waters without cause, and for +carrying out warlike operations in them.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That is a quotation from the Norwegian Foreign Minister. Then +your diplomatic representative takes it up:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees +things quite right. It definitely appears, however, as I”—that’s +the German Foreign Minister’s representative—“have +frequently pointed out, that the British have no intentions of +landing, but that they want to disturb shipping in Norwegian +territorial waters perhaps, as Koht thinks, in order to provoke +Germany. Of course, it is also possible that the British behavior +of last week, which I have pointed out as well, will +grow into more or less regular and increasing interference +in territorial waters to attack our ore traffic off the Norwegian +coast.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then Paragraph 3: +<span class='pageno' title='192' id='Page_192'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The firm intention of Norway to maintain her neutrality and +to insure that Norway’s neutrality rules be respected can be +accepted as a fact.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Were you told that your diplomatic representative in Oslo was +reporting that the British had no intentions of landing?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Dr. Breuer, the Minister to Norway, held a +completely wrong view. He believed Foreign Minister Koht’s assurances +even though our naval attaché kept reporting that Koht was +completely on the side of the British and his assurances were not to +be believed. At the same time, information had been received from +Hagelin that the Norwegians were giving assurances on paper but +they themselves had said that they were doing that only as subterfuge +and that they would continue to co-operate with the British. +That is contained in the documents which we have submitted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at another document. +Look at Document Number D-844. This is what your diplomatic +representative in Sweden was saying at the same time. That will +be Exhibit Number GB-467, that is from your representative in +Sweden and you will notice that he quotes Foreign Minister +Guenther of Sweden, as first of all—about ten lines down, just +after the name of “Weizsäcker,” you will see:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Swedish Government had no reason at all to believe in +an impending action by the Western Powers against Scandinavia. +On the contrary, on the strength of all official reports +and other information, they considered the situation lately to +be much calmer.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>And then he says there is no prospect of a coup against Swedish ore. +Then he goes on to deal with Norway. Without being Anglophile, +Guenther did not believe in a British act of war against Norway +either, but, of course, he could not speak of this with as much certainty +as with regard to Sweden. At any rate, however, the Norwegian +Government, with whom he was in close contact, was of the +same opinion. And if you look two paragraphs farther on, it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In conclusion, Guenther requested me to report his statements +to my government, and repeated that the Swedish +Government attached the greatest value to the German +Government not erroneously getting the impression of the +existence of circumstances which might evoke the possibility—he +would not use the word necessity at all—of special +measures by Germany with regard to Scandinavia.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>And then he says in the last paragraph that the Swedish Foreign +Minister had probably heard of the German preparations. +<span class='pageno' title='193' id='Page_193'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, would you look at Document Number D-845 which will be +Exhibit Number GB-468—that is the next day—from your diplomatic +representative in Stockholm:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Serious anxiety exists in Swedish military and government +circles regarding possible German military preventive measures +in Scandinavia against the announced intensification of +war measures by the Western Powers. Swedish and Norwegian +military and government authorities consider it +unlikely that military measures will be taken against Scandinavia +by the Western Powers. Press reports on this subject +by the Western Powers are attempting to provoke Germany.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That is from your military attaché in Stockholm. Were you told +about these reports from Stockholm, were you told of that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I assume the Führer told me this. But we had no +reason at all to believe these assurances because obviously, quite +obviously, Sweden had considerable interest in our not going to +Norway, because Sweden believed that by so doing we would be +able to exercise pressure on Sweden also. That was what the +British wanted, according to the information we received later. Our +minister was completely misinformed and as a result was not informed +by us because it was known that he sided with Foreign +Minister Koht. Our information was so clear, so frequent and so +unequivocal, that we could certainly carry out our landing with a +clear conscience and in fact this proved to be true. Therefore, there +is no point in discussing whether the order on the part of the +British to land in Norway—it was Trondheim, Stavanger and, I +believed, Kristiansand—whether this order was given on 5 April. +On the 7th, during the night of the 7th to 8th, as the British +reported in a wireless message, the mine-laying in Norwegian +waters was completed by British ships and on the 7th, troops were +shipped on cruisers, the names of which I forget.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Therefore, this actually took place and my conception was correct +and not Herr Breuer’s who was dismissed immediately after this +because he was a failure. Thereupon, we carried out the landings +on the strength of quite positive information which we can prove +in detail. Sweden’s action is thoroughly understandable.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with +you although you ought to know and I think you do know that +there was no British order for an invasion at all; there was an order +for laying mines; but you took this course as I suggested, you, knowing +quite well that no British invasion was imminent, contrary to +your own Chief of Operations, Captain Fricke, and contrary to all +the information from your diplomatic representatives in Norway. +Now, I want to come to another point with regard to Norway and +<span class='pageno' title='194' id='Page_194'></span> +then I am finished with that. You told the Tribunal that in your +view, using the enemy’s colors was a permissible <span class='it'>ruse de guerre</span> so +long as you stopped before you went into action. Do you remember +saying that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not understand.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember telling the +Tribunal that morning that using the enemy’s colors on a warship +was a permissible <span class='it'>ruse de guerre</span> so long as you stopped before you +went into action. Do you remember saying that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes; of course, that is the principle which is absolutely +recognized in naval warfare, that at the moment of firing you have +to raise your own flag.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal +that it is a recognized procedure in naval warfare to use another +country’s colors in making an attack on a neutral country, an unannounced +attack on a neutral country? There was no war between +you and Norway and there was no reason for there to be any ruse. +You were at peace with Norway. Are you saying that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It was all a question of pulling down the flag and +raising the German flag if we met the British. We did not want to +fight with the Norwegians at all. It says somewhere that we should +first of all try to effect a peaceful occupation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you give me a precedent +even where the German Navy, before this operation, had ever +attacked a neutral country with which it was at peace, using enemy +colors? You tell me when you did it before?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I do not know. I cannot tell you whether any other +navy did it. I have...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can assume any other +navy—I even ask—have you ever done it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, we have not done it and apart from that, we did +not do it because on 8 April, we gave the order by wireless—and +you know from our War Diary—that this should not be done, so it +is quite useless to talk here about what might have been done if it +has not been done.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to get clear on what +your views on the permissibility of naval warfare were. I want to +come to one other point, and then I am finished with this section +of the case. With regard to the attack on the Soviet Union, I am +not going to ask you about all your own views and what you said +to Hitler, because you told us that at length; but I would just like +you to look at Document Book 10a, Page 252 of the English book +and Page 424 of the German book. +<span class='pageno' title='195' id='Page_195'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Which document is it, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The big one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have not got that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Document Number 447-PS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am so sorry, My Lord, this is entirely my fault. I beg the +Tribunal’s pardon. I have given the wrong reference. I really +wanted him to look at Page 59 in Document Book 10, Document +Number C-170. I am very sorry, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, that is the extract from the +Naval War Diary, the one that I want you to look at is on Page 59, +for the 15th of June. “On the proposal of the Naval Operations Staff +(SKL) the use of arms against Russian submarines south of the +northern boundary of Öland warning area...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Have you got it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “...is permitted immediately, +and ruthless destruction is to be aimed at.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, would you mind, before I ask you a question, turning back +to Document Number C-38, which is on Page 11, which is Page 19 of +your own document book, German document book, Document Number +C-38; Page 11 of the British document book, and Page 19 of the +German. That is an order of the same date, signed by Defendant +Keitel, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel +to the southern tip of Öland is authorized if the boats cannot +be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by +German naval forces. The reason to be given up to ‘B’ Day”—that +is Barbarossa—“is that our naval forces are believed to +be dealing with penetrating British submarines.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Why did you suggest that you should attack the Soviet submarines +6 days before your own invasion when they wouldn’t be +expecting any attack and there was no question of any war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As it has already been explained once here, it had +happened just before, that is before the 15th of June, that a submarine +had penetrated into the area of Bornholm, which is a long +way to the west, and then had given wrong recognition signals +when the patrol boat near Bornholm called it. If the wrong recognition +signals are given, then it means that it could not be a German +submarine but it must be a foreign one. In this case, the course of +the ship and the location would bring us to the conclusion that it +must be a Russian boat. Apart from that, Russian submarines at +that time had repeatedly been located and reported off German +ports—Memel, for instance, and others. Consequently, we had the +<span class='pageno' title='196' id='Page_196'></span> +impression that Russian submarines were already occupying positions +outside German ports, either to lay mines or to attack merchant +or warships. For that reason, as a precaution, I had to report this +and I had to propose that we should take action against non-German +submarines in these areas outside German ports. That suggestion +was passed on the same day and this additional statement was made, +which, in my opinion, was not necessary at all, but which prevented +complications from arising.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is still not an answer to my +question. I will put it this way. You considered it right to attack +and urge the ruthless destruction of Soviet submarines 6 days before +you attacked the Soviet Union? You consider that right? And then, +to blame it on penetrating British submarines—this is Keitel’s +suggestion—is that your view of proper warfare?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Well, I consider the first point right because it is +always important to get in before one’s opponent, and this was +happening under certain definite conditions. The second point was +ordered by the Führer. Neither of the two points was ever carried +out, and therefore it is useless, in my opinion, to discuss this matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is something for the +Tribunal, and I will decide what is useful to discuss.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do I take it, then, that you entirely approve of attacking Soviet +submarines and ruthlessly destroying them 6 days before you start +the war? That is what the Tribunal is to understand, is it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, if they appeared in our waters to reconnoiter or +to carry out some other war action, then I considered it right. I considered +that better than that our ships should run into Russian mines.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, let us just come, for +a short time, to your views on U-boat warfare. Do you remember +the document which I put to the Defendant Dönitz about the memorandum +of the Foreign Office, Document Number D-851, which +became Exhibit Number GB-451?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have it before me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Right. Well, I will ask about +that in a moment. This is what you said about it when you were +answering Dr. Kranzbühler, I think on Saturday. You said:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Since the war against England came as a complete surprise +to us, we had up until then dealt very little with detailed +questions of submarine warfare. Among other things, we had +not yet discussed the question of so-called unrestricted submarine +warfare which had played such a very important part +in the previous war. And from that fact it developed that on +3 September, that officer who was recently mentioned here +<span class='pageno' title='197' id='Page_197'></span> +was sent to the Foreign Office with some points for discussion +on the question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that +we could clarify with the Foreign Office the question as to +how far we could go.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, do you think that is...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: So far as I can recollect, that is the way it happened. +Unrestricted warfare had not been considered.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the document in +front of you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: You mean the one regarding the Foreign Office, Document +Number D-851?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dönitz 851, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think this is in any copy, +My Lord. Has Your Lordship a copy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, I don’t think so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did put it in when +I was cross-examining the Defendant Dönitz.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is very likely with our Dönitz papers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps Your Lordship will +allow me to just read it slowly, for the moment. The document +says this:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The question of an unrestricted U-boat warfare against +England is discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the +High Command of the Navy.</p> + +<p>“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum +damage to England which can be achieved with the forces +available can only be attained if the U-boats are permitted +an unrestricted use of arms without warning against enemy +and neutral shipping in the prohibited area indicated on the +enclosed map. The Navy does not fail to realize that:</p> + +<p>“(a) Germany would thereby publicly disregard the agreement +of 1936 regarding the conduct of economic war.</p> + +<p>“(b) Conduct of the war on these lines could not be justified +on the basis of the hitherto generally accepted principles of +international law.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, I ought to read this, or point it out. I have dealt with it +before, it is the second last paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using +the method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England +<span class='pageno' title='198' id='Page_198'></span> +gives us a justification by her method of waging war to order +this form of warfare as a reprisal.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Now, I want you to take it by +stages. You see the paragraph that says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum +damage to England which can be achieved with the forces +available can only be attained if U-boats are permitted an +unrestricted use of arms without warning in the area...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is that your view? Was that your view on the 3d of September?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it is not my view; it is a conditional view. We +had given submarines the order to wage economic war according to +the Prize Ordinance, and we had provided in our War Diary that if +the British were to arm merchant ships or something like that, then +certain intensifications...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please give me an +answer to the question I asked you? It is a perfectly easy question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, isn’t it your view?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In theory, of course, considering the small resources +that we had, the greatest possible damage to England could only be +achieved through—we had to discuss with the Foreign Office just +how far we could go with this intensification. For this reason, this +officer was sent there. The discussions with the Foreign Office resulted +in the submarine memorandum which shows, from beginning +to end, that we were trying to adhere to the existing law as far as +possible. The whole memorandum is nothing more than just that +sort of discussion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you answer my question? +When this document says “the Navy has arrived at the conclusion,” +is it true that the Navy had arrived at that conclusion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But of course, everybody would arrive at that conclusion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is much easier to say “yes” +than to give a long explanation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, let us come to another point. Is it true that you had arrived +at that conclusion without consulting the Flag Officer, U-boats, as +the Defendant Dönitz said when he gave evidence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Regarding these matters? We only agreed before the +submarines put to sea that they should wage war according to the +Prize Ordinance. I did not ask him whether he wanted to carry out +<span class='pageno' title='199' id='Page_199'></span> +unrestricted U-boat warfare, because I did not want that. First of +all I had to discuss it with the Foreign Office to find out how far +we could go. That was the purpose of this affair, which was to give +individual orders, such orders which we were entitled to give, step +by step, in accordance with the behavior of the British. This was a +question of international law, which I had to discuss with the expert +on international law in the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Isn’t it correct that you continued +to press this point of view, the conclusion of which you had +arrived at, with the Foreign Office for the next 3 months? Isn’t it +correct that you continued to press for an unrestricted U-boat warfare +within the area for the next 3 months?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I hardly think so; otherwise I would not have issued +the memorandum of 3 September. Maybe we did go to the Foreign +Office and put on pressure, but what we did is contained in the +memorandum and our measures were intensified step by step, +following steps taken by the British.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the next step with +the Foreign Office was a conference with Baron Von Weizsäcker, on +the 25th of September, which you will see in Document Number +D-852, Exhibit Number GB-469. You see Paragraph 3 of that document:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The High Command of the Navy will submit to the Foreign +Office a proposal, as a basis for a communication to the +neutral powers, in which those intensifications of naval warfare +will be communicated, the ordering of which has already +taken place or is impending in the near future. This includes, +particularly, a warning not to use wireless on being stopped, +not to sail in convoy, and not to black-out.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That was your first step, was it not? That was put up to the +Foreign Office, with a number of other proposals?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course! The first measure was that armed merchant +ships could be attacked because as early as 6 or 8 September, a +submarine had stopped a merchant ship, the <span class='it'>Manar</span>, had fired a +warning shot, and had at once been fired on by the British steamer. +Thereupon the submarine started firing at the merchant ship. Such +cases were known. And since one cannot recognize in every case +whether the ship is armed or not, we assumed that it would lead to +all ships being fired at. However, at that time it was ordered that +only armed British merchant ships should be fired at. Secondly, +that ships which sent a wireless message when stopped could also +be shot at, because this use of wireless which was done by order of +the Admiralty would immediately bring to the spot both naval and +air forces, especially the latter which would shoot at the U-boat. +<span class='pageno' title='200' id='Page_200'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The first step, therefore, was firing on armed merchant ships—the +passenger steamers were still excepted—and secondly, firing on +blacked-out vessels and firing on those who made use of wireless. +Blacked-out vessels are...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you look at +Document Number D-853. I only want you to look at the next document, +which will be Exhibit Number GB-470. I want you to come as +soon as possible to this memorandum of which you talked.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>D-853, if you will look at Section II, is a report by the Under +Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, dated the 27th of September, +which goes through these matters which you talked about just +now, the sinking at sight of French and British ships, under the +assumption that they are armed. In Paragraph II it is said:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Naval Operations Staff indicated anew that the Führer +will probably order ruthless U-boat warfare in the restricted +area in the very near future. The previous participation of +the Foreign Office remains guaranteed.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Were you still pressing for absolutely unrestricted warfare within +a large area to the west of Britain and around Britain?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. Insofar as we took intensification actions step by +step on the basis of our observations regarding the attitude of +enemy forces, and that is in those cases where intensification was +perfectly justified and was legally proved.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Baron +Weizsäcker’s minutes of the 14th of October which is Document +Number D-857, which will be Exhibit Number GB-471.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, you see, this is after these measures have been taken, which +you have just explained to the Tribunal. Baron von Weizsäcker +reports to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“According to my information, the decision on unrestricted +U-boat warfare against England is imminent. This is at least +as much a political decision as it is a technicality of war.</p> + +<p>“A short while ago I submitted my personal view in writing, +that unrestricted U-boat warfare would bring new enemies +upon us at a time when we still lack the necessary U-boats +to defeat England. On the other hand, the Navy’s attitude of +insisting on the opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare is +backed by every convincing reason.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then he says that it is necessary to ask for certain information. +On that you put in—on that point you put in your memorandum +of the 15th of October, which, My Lord, is Document Number C-157, +and Exhibit Number GB-224.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: First of all, may I say something about the previous +document? This expression “unrestricted U-boat warfare...” +<span class='pageno' title='201' id='Page_201'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can do it later on, because +we have got a lot of ground to cover here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks he ought to +be allowed to say what he wants to say on that document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, if Your +Lordship pleases. Please go on, Defendant, my fault.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Now the two documents are gone. What I wanted to +say was that the expression “unrestricted submarine warfare” on +the part of the Foreign Office originated from the previous World +War. In reality, and during the entire war, we did not wage unrestricted +U-boat war in the sense of the unrestricted submarine +warfare of the first World War. Even there, where he says “unrestricted +submarine warfare might be imminent”—are only ordered +very restricted measures, which always were based on the fact that +the British had ordered something on their part. The chief action +on the part of the British was that of militarizing the entire merchant +fleet to a certain extent. That is to say, the merchant fleet was being +armed, and they received the order to use these arms.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t see how that arises out +of the last document at all. Unless the Tribunal wants to go into it, +I think we might pass on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Doesn’t Your Lordship think so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Out of both documents. Not out of one only...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have put that point, I +should think, at least seven times this afternoon. I am going to +suggest to you that your real object of the submarine war was set +out in the first paragraph of the memorandum. Would you just look +at it? You see “Berlin, 15 October...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I must still say that there was not any unrestricted +U-boat warfare but merely an intensification of measures, step by +step, as I have repeatedly said, and these were always taken only +after the British took some measure. The British...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest that that is an entire +untruth, and that I will show you out of this document. Look at +your own document, this memorandum. In the first paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer’s proposal for the restoration...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am not telling untruths, I would not think of doing +it. I do not do that sort of thing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is what I am suggesting +to you, and I will show it out of this document.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer’s proposal for the restoration of a just, honorable +peace and the new adjustment of the political order in Central +<span class='pageno' title='202' id='Page_202'></span> +Europe had been turned down. The enemy powers want the +war, with the aim of destroying Germany. In this fight, in +which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and +her rights, she must use her weapons with the utmost ruthlessness, +at the same time fully respecting the laws of military +ethics.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, let’s see what you were suggesting.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Germany’s principal enemy in this war is Britain. Her most +vulnerable spot is her maritime trade. The war at sea against +Britain must therefore be conducted as an economic war, with +the aim of destroying Britain’s fighting spirit within the +shortest possible time and forcing her to accept peace.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, miss one paragraph and look at the next.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The principal target of our naval strategy is the merchant +ship”—now, let’s look—“not only the enemy’s, but in general +every merchant ship sails the seas in order to supply the +enemy’s war industry, both by way of imports and exports. +Side by side with this the enemy warship also remains an +objective.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, wasn’t that the object which you in the Naval Command +were putting up to Hitler and to the Foreign Office, to use utmost +ruthlessness to destroy Britain’s fighting spirit, and to attack every +merchant ship coming in or going out of Britain? Wasn’t that your +object?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, but attacks on neutrals only insofar as they +were warned and advised not to enter certain zones. Throughout the +centuries in economic warfare the enemy merchant ship as well as +the neutral merchant ship has been the object of attack.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are not telling the Tribunal +that you were suggesting use of warnings. Are you seriously +suggesting to the Tribunal that what you meant by that paragraph +was that neutral ships were only to be attacked with warning?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course, and that happened. Afterwards we issued +the warning to neutral ships, after our blockade zone was established +in accordance with the American blockade zone. We warned them +that they should not enter this zone because they would run into +most serious danger. That I am saying, and I can prove it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest to you that that is +untrue, and I will show it out of the document. Now, just turn +to page...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: On 24 November that warning was issued.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you will turn to Section C of +the document, “Military requirements for the decisive struggle +against Great Britain.” +<span class='pageno' title='203' id='Page_203'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Our naval strategy will have to employ to the utmost advantage +every weapon at our disposal. Military success can +be most confidently expected if we attack British sea communications +where they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness; +the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports +into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the +interest of neutrals, insofar as this is possible without detriment +to military requirements. It is desirable to base all +military measures taken on existing international law; however, +measures which are considered necessary from a military +point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected +from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not +covered by existing international law.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Wasn’t that the view you were putting up to the Foreign Office +and the Führer, “Use international law as long as you can, but if +international law conflicts with what is necessary for military +success, throw international law overboard.” Wasn’t that your +view?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that is quite incorrectly expressed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then explain these words. +Explain these words:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“We should try to consider the interest of neutrals insofar as +this is possible without detriment to military requirements. +However, measures which are considered necessary from a +military point of view, provided a decisive success can be +expected from them, will have to be carried out even if they +are not covered by international law.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>What did you mean by that if you didn’t mean to throw international +law overboard?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It says “If the existing rules of land warfare cannot +be applied to them.” It is generally known that international law +had not yet been co-ordinated with submarine warfare, just as the +use of aircraft at that time. It says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective +in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some +legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new +code of naval warfare”—that is, a new code of naval warfare +on the basis of actual developments.</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Throughout the war a new code of naval warfare was developing, +starting with the neutrals themselves. For instance, the Pan-American +Security Conference defined a safety zone 300 miles around +the American coast, thereby barring a tremendous sea area for +overseas trade. +<span class='pageno' title='204' id='Page_204'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Likewise, the United States fixed a fighting zone around the +British Isles which was not at all to our liking, and on 4 November +1939, the United States themselves maintained that it would be +extremely dangerous for neutral ships to enter it, and they prohibited +their own ships and their own citizens to enter this area.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We followed that up by asking the neutrals that they too should +proceed in the same way as the United States, and then they would +not be harmed. Then only those neutrals sailed to Great Britain +which had contraband on board and made a lot of money out of it, +or which were forced by the British through their ports of control +to enter that area and nevertheless submit themselves to those +dangers. Of course, they were quite free to discontinue doing that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now tell me, what changes had +taken place in the development of either airplanes or submarines +from the time that Germany signed the Submarine Protocol of 1936 +to the beginning of the war? You say that international law had +to adapt itself to changes in weapons of war. What changes had +taken place between 1936 and 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The following changes took place: The Submarine +Protocol of 1936 was signed by us because we assumed that it concerned +peaceful actions...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not an answer to my +question. My question is quite clear. It is: What changes in weapons +of war, either in the air or in the submarines, had taken place +between 1936 and 1939? Now, there is a question. You are a naval +officer of 50 years’ experience. Tell me, what were the changes?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It turned out that because of the airplane the submarine +was no longer in a position to surface and to investigate +enemy ships or any other merchant ships, particularly near the +enemy coast where the U-boats carried on their activities at first. +There was no regulation at all issued about airplanes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is not an answer to the question. +The question you were asked was, what changes had taken +place in the weapons of war, either airplanes or submarines.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But Mr. President, the changes took place in the airplane. +The ever-increasing efficiency of the airplanes and the extension +of their activities also over the seas led to the situation +where it became impossible to examine any merchant vessel without +aircraft being called to threaten the submarine. That got worse +and worse, so that later on even rescuing had to be restricted +because of enemy aircraft, and the entire submarine warfare was +completely turned upside down in that manner.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the only change that you +can say in order to justify your statement that international law +<span class='pageno' title='205' id='Page_205'></span> +was to be thrown overboard where it didn’t fit in with military +necessities? Is that the only change, the increase in the power of +aircraft between 1936 and 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already said once it was not thrown overboard. +It was to be limited and changed and that was done by others too.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you just look +at the next paragraph. You talked about your consideration for +neutrals. At the top of Page 5 in the English text; it is the paragraph +that follows the one that I have just read. You say:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective +in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some +legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new +code of naval warfare.</p> + +<p>“The Supreme War Command, after considering the political, +military and economic consequences within the framework of +the general conduct of the war, will have to decide what +measures of a military nature are to be taken, and what our +attitude to the usage of war is to be. Once it has been decided +to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in +fulfillment of military requirements, this decision is definitely +to be adhered to under all circumstances. On no account may +such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, +once it has been made, be dropped or subsequently relaxed +under political pressure from neutral powers, as took place in +the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by +neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats from +other countries, especially the United States, to come into the +war, which can be expected with certainty should the war +last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of +economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly +economic warfare is waged, the earlier will it show results and +the sooner will the war come to an end.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now agree with that +suggestion and that point of view expressed in the paragraph which +I have just read to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It has to be understood quite differently from the way +you are trying to present it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite differently from what it +says...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not what it says. This is the point. We had the +experience during the first World War that, as soon as the order for +intensification had been given and communicated, as soon as the first +<span class='pageno' title='206' id='Page_206'></span> +neutral had raised a finger to object, these measures were immediately +cancelled, particularly when the United States had a hand +in it. And here I am saying that under all circumstances it must be +avoided that we always withdraw our measures at once; and I give +a warning to the effect that we should consider our measures as +carefully as possible. That is the reason for the discussion with the +Foreign Office and others, namely, to avoid the situation where later +on they might be withdrawn, which would mean a considerable loss +of prestige and the results would not be achieved.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is the reason. Numerous protests were received by Britain +too, and in most cases they were unanswered. I can quote from the +Document Number C-170, Exhibit Number USA-136, where there +are a lot of figures, Number 14, where it says: “Sharp Russian note +against the British blockade warfare on 20 October 1939;” and +Number 17, on 31 October, where it states: “Political Speech of +Molotov.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All that I ask is, was that a +proper procedure?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I must give an explanation on that matter, and I was +just about to do that. Sharp attacks on the British blockade, in +violation of international law—these attacks were made by +M. Molotov. Here too, protests were made which were turned down. +But I wanted to prevent protests and the entire document shows +that our deliberations always aimed at taking measures in such a +way that they could not be objected to, but were always legally +justified.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you tell me, Defendant, +how it was going to prevent protests if you suggest in this +paragraph to use the most ruthless measures and disregard every +protest that neutrals made? How is that going to prevent protests?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: These measures were to be taken in such a way that +no objection was possible. If I tell the neutrals: “This is a dangerous +area in every way,” and nevertheless they go there because they +want to make money or because they are being forced by the +British, then I need not accept any protest. They are acting for +egotistical reasons, and they must pay the bill if they die. I must +also add...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is true. They must pay +the bill if they die. That was what it came to, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: They received large premiums for exposing themselves +to that risk, and it was their business to decide about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we might break off now for +10 minutes.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='207' id='Page_207'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to be much longer, Sir David?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought about half an hour, +My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Defendant, in this document the +Naval Command suggests that it calls for a siege of England, that +is, the sinking without warning of all ships that come into a big +area around England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Didn’t you hear? Sorry. In this document the Naval Command +suggests what is called the siege of England, on Pages 10 to 13. +And that is, the sinking of all merchant ships, including neutrals +and tankers, which come into an area around England. Isn’t that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that is not true. The Navy Command does not +suggest that, but discusses the idea of a siege after the blockade +had been discussed and rejected. It likewise comes to a conclusion +why the siege, which until that time had not been accepted as a +recognized idea by international law, should not be undertaken; +and it draws the inference from all these discussions by setting +out on the last page, the last page but one, what shall now be +considered the final conclusion. These are only those measures +which can be justified by the actions already taken by the British. +And during the entire discussion about blockading, the consideration +was always in the foreground as to whether the neutrals would +not suffer too much damage by that. And the whole idea of a siege +is based on the fact that Prime Minister Chamberlain had already +said—on 26 September—that there would not be any difference +between a blockade on the seas and a siege on land, and the commander +of a land siege would try to prevent with all means the +entry of anything into the fortress. Also, the French press had +mentioned that Germany was in the same situation as a fortress +under siege.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am suggesting is that +you come down in favor of a siege, but you do not want any siege +area declared. Will you look at Paragraph 2 of the conclusions, +and then I will leave the document to the Tribunal. That is the +point I suggest. In paragraph 2 of the conclusions you say:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“For the future conduct of economic war, the basic military +requirements demand the utmost ruthlessness. The employment +of the siege by sea as the most intensified form of economic +warfare meets this demand. Even without the public +announcement of a state of siege, after it has been clearly +defined as a concept, a declaration which would have drawbacks +militarily and from the point of view of international +law, and even without the declaration of a prohibited zone, +<span class='pageno' title='208' id='Page_208'></span> +it seems perfectly possible at the moment, as has been explained +in this memorandum, to take military measures to +introduce the most intensive form of economic warfare, and +to achieve what are at present the greatest possible results +in the interruption of enemy trade”—now the last words—“without +the Naval Operations Staff being tied in all cases, +to special forms and areas.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That is your final conclusion, that you should have as effective +a siege as possible without proclaiming any area. Isn’t that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that is not the conclusion. The conclusion is that +we cannot carry out a siege, and that it would be a matter for +the political leadership of the State to decide. The political leadership +of the State has never suggested to decree a siege, and it +can be seen here quite clearly what, on the basis of the memorandum, +is suggested for the time being, and then how the intensification +gradually took place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must not take time arguing +about it, I want you to make clear...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me finish. My suggestion +to you is—and there I leave it—that you rejected a formal siege, +but you claimed the right to sink at sight, without warning, all +neutral vessels in an area which the High Command may choose.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I want to pass on to another subject, because I am afraid +time is getting on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is no siege, however. That was a directive issued +after neutral ships did not heed our warning and continued to +enter the sea around Britain in order to support Britain in the +economic warfare which she, with the greatest ruthlessness and +severity, was conducting against us. It was a measure of self-defense.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it that the document +speaks for itself, now that the attention of the Tribunal has been +drawn to it. I want to come to another point. You have mentioned +certain matters, in answer to Dr. Horn this morning, with regard +to the treatment of American ships in the summer of 1941. In +April 1941 you were pressing for German naval forces to operate +freely up to three miles of the American coast instead of the +300-mile safety limit which the Americans were suggesting, were +you not? Well to save time I will give the witness Document +Number D-849, Exhibit Number GB-472.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was handed to the defendant.</span>] +<span class='pageno' title='209' id='Page_209'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>That says you couldn’t get in touch with the Defendant Von +Ribbentrop and therefore you asked Baron Von Weizsäcker to get +a decision on these points:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“1) Authorization for the German naval forces in the western +part of the Atlantic Ocean to operate freely as far as the +international customary 3-mile boundary.</p> + +<p>“2) The cancellation of the preferential treatment which +American merchant vessels have been enjoying so far in our +warfare at sea.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I hand you Document Number 850, that will be Exhibit +Number GB-473. Your suggestion, which had been made in April, +was turned down by Hitler in June. It is a memorandum from +Ritter in the Foreign Office and it reads:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“General Jodl informs me that at the recent report of Grossadmiral +Raeder to the Führer, the more far-reaching orders +to the naval forces, as they were discussed in connection +with the Raeder interview, have been postponed until further +notice.</p> + +<p>“In the same way, permission to attack United States’ +merchant vessels within the framework of the prize law +has not been granted.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Your suggestion was to abandon the policy then existing and +attack up to the 3-mile limit. Now, I want you to come to another +point...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, please may I make a statement concerning that? +I should like to say something, even if you do not put a question +to me. It is not right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At that time, in March 1941, and on the 1st of April and the +following dates in 1941, a whole number of intensifications were +introduced by the United States, which I mentioned this morning, +from the document which I had before me. Therefore, it was +clear that I, on behalf of the Naval Operations Staff, which was +supposed to conduct the most effective naval war, urged that also +with respect to the United States those steps should be taken which +were permissible according to international law, and that we should +start slowly. Those steps included:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>First: that we should no longer respect that 300-mile limit, +but go as far as the 3-mile limit, where according to existing +international law, it was possible to attack. That is to say, not +against international law, but it was just discontinuing certain +favorable conditions which we had granted the United States. And +Point 2: The cancellation of the preferential treatment... +<span class='pageno' title='210' id='Page_210'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That’s exactly what I suggest +to you. There is no dispute between us. I was just establishing +that point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes—no...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want you to come...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I only wanted to say that during the hearing of +Grossadmiral Dönitz the Prosecution demanded of us that we +should not treat certain neutrals better than others, but we should +treat them all alike; that is to say in plain language, we must +sink them all, no matter whether we wanted to do so or not, and +of course we were not bound to do that. The second thing: it +was a matter of course that a thoroughly justified suggestion on my +part from the point of view of the Naval Operations Staff had +been rejected by the Führer if, with regard to the political situation, +he decided that at that time he did not desire to adopt a +more severe attitude towards the United States.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to +quite a different point. Do you say that you did not know anything +about the extermination of Jews in the Eastern Territories?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you say that you did not know about the extermination of +Jews in the Eastern Territories?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I say clearly under oath that I had not the slightest +inkling about it. I might add in explanation that on no account +would Hitler have spoken about such things to a man like myself, +whose opinion he knew, especially because he was afraid that on +my part there would be very serious objections. I explained the +other day why I used the word “Jews” in my memorial speech. In +my opinion, I was obliged to do so. But that had nothing at all +to do with an extermination of Jews. About the Jewish matter +I have only learned...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Excuse me, please, one moment. I only learned +something about the Jewish matter when Jews who were known +to me, mostly friends of my old parents, approached me and told +me that they were about to be evacuated from Berlin. And then +I intervened for them. That was the only thing I knew. On +occasions I was told in answer to my questions that they were to +be evacuated to cities where ghettos had been established. I always +understood that a ghetto was a district in a city where all the Jews +lived together, so that they would not have to mingle with the +rest of the population. +<span class='pageno' title='211' id='Page_211'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you know, my question +was only: Did you know or did you not, and you could have answered +that yes or no. I want you now to answer about that +point...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but I must—so many questions have been asked +about this very point and as every man in my position who held +the same views says the same, that he does not know anything +about it, I should like to explain once for all that one did not +hear about these things, because civilians certainly did not talk +to us about that, because they were always afraid that they would +get into difficulties. The Führer did not speak about it. I had no +connection with Himmler nor with other agents of the Gestapo. I +did not know anything about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you just to +tell the Tribunal your chain of command for the Baltic coast. Is +this right that you had the naval chief command, and then the +Flag Officer of the East Baltic coast Tallinn and, under him, you +had a command at Libau; is that right? Was that your chain of +command?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not understand that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was your chain of command +for the East Baltic coast, Kiel, Flag Officer Tallinn, and a detachment +under him at Libau? You had...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I assume, so—that depends on various things. If +they were operational matters, then it had to do with the Naval +Group Commander East or North; and as far as matters of organization +were concerned, then it might have gone through the Station +Chief of the Baltic Sea.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, at any rate, you +had got in 1941 a naval command at Libau, had you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, of course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like you +just to look at Document Number D-841, which is a deposition on +oath by one of the naval employees at Libau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, that will be Exhibit Number GB-474.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This witness says: “Deposition on oath of Walter Kurt Dittmann.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And then it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I was Naval Administration Inspector and officer in charge +of the Naval Clothing Depot at Libau in Latvia.</p> + +<p>“I held this position from the beginning of August 1941 to +the end of March 1942. +<span class='pageno' title='212' id='Page_212'></span></p> + +<p>“The Jewish population of Libau at that time was supposed +to be about 7,000 people.</p> + +<p>“Up to the end of March 1942 many thousands of them had +already been ‘evacuated’ by the Gestapo and the Latvian +Police.</p> + +<p>“ ‘Evacuated’ was the local expression for the annihilation +of these people.</p> + +<p>“All Jews were registered. When a new lot was to be evacuated +it happened in the following way:</p> + +<p>“The Latvian Police fetched the Jews out of their houses, +put them on lorries and drove them to the Naval Port about +six to seven kilometers outside the town. Later on these +people had to march and were not taken there in lorries.</p> + +<p>“In the Naval Port these people were then shot with machine +guns. This was done by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police. +The police, of course, got their orders from the German +Gestapo.</p> + +<p>“I personally did not witness these incidents, but comrades +told me all about them.</p> + +<p>“Some of the Jews before they were shot worked for the +Navy.</p> + +<p>“About 80-100 people worked in the Clothing Depot every +day.</p> + +<p>“About 100-150 people worked in the Garrison Administration +every day.</p> + +<p>“About 50 people worked in the Garrison Building Office +(Navy) every day.</p> + +<p>“Through these contacts and through personal visits to the +houses of Jews I heard a lot regarding the terrible happenings +in Libau during these months.</p> + +<p>“I personally went to my superior, Festungs-Intendant +Dr. Lancelle, and before that I also went to another superior, +the officer in charge of the Hospital Administration, named +Müller, both were Naval Administration Officials. I pointed +out to them these abuses which have already been described. +The answer I got was that they could not do anything and +that things like that were best overlooked.</p> + +<p>“The Marineverwaltungsassistent Kurt Traunecker accompanied +a consignment of clothing from Kiel to Libau. He +stayed a few weeks in Libau and he expressed his displeasure +at the conditions there regarding the annihilation of the +Jews.</p> + +<p>“He then went back to Kiel to the local clothing office. There +again he expressed his displeasure and was ordered to appear +<span class='pageno' title='213' id='Page_213'></span> +at the Naval Administration Headquarters (Marine-Intendantur). +Whom he saw there, I do not know, but it was made +clear to him that these occurrences were not true, and therefore +he should not talk about them any more, otherwise he +would get into most serious trouble.</p> + +<p>“My personal opinion is that the higher offices of the Navy +in Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had +knowledge of these terrible conditions.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you saying, Defendant, that with your naval detachments +on the East coast of the Baltic and with these things happening, +that nobody reported to you that the Jews were being slaughtered +by the thousands in the Eastern Territories, you are still saying it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I knew nothing about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your staff doing, if +they were not telling you about this? Had you an efficient staff? +Do you say you had an efficient staff?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is a question which is not relevant here. Of +course I had only efficient officers around me. But here we are +dealing with things which were not done at all by the Navy. It +says here in all places that it was the police and so on. I even +was in Libau once and I was told—and this is the only thing in +connection with this matter—that the peculiar thing was that the +Jews in Libau, contrary to their custom, were craftsmen and +therefore they were doing useful work there. That was the only +thing I heard about it. As regards any extermination...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When were you in Libau?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot say that now. It was after it was occupied, +probably immediately afterwards.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were you there in 1941 or 1942?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I said just now that I do not know exactly when; +I have to look it up somewhere. It does not say here that +anything was reported, only that it was apparently discussed in +the Navy Headquarters and with the Navy Quartermaster (Marine-Intendantur), +who does not report to me. Of course I would have +intervened if I had heard about such happenings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You think you would? Well, +I’ll leave that. Now, tell me about the Commando Order of the +18th of October 1942. You received Hitler’s Commando Order and +passed it on to your various divisions of the Navy, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I passed it on through the Naval Operations +Staff.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you approve of it? +<span class='pageno' title='214' id='Page_214'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not recommend it, but I passed it on. I have +to make a statement if you want to know what I thought about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that’s not what I’m asking +you. I’m asking you—first answer my question—did you approve +of an order to shoot Commandos or to hand them over to the SD +to be shot, did you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not recommend the order, but I received it as +drafted by the Führer, and as it came into my hands, I passed it +on as ordered with the same remark as to how far it has to be +passed on and how it has to be returned. It was all ordered by +Hitler in detail. It was decisive for me that in one of the first +paragraphs the reason for this order was given, and the reasons +why Hitler considered a deviation from international law justified. +Moreover, a short time before I had been in Dieppe in France, +and there I was informed that on the occasion of the Commando +action of the British in France, the prisoners, I believe they were +from the Labor Service, who were working along the coast, had +been shackled with a noose around their neck and the other end +of the noose around the bent-back lower leg, so that when the +leg weakened, the noose tightened and the man choked.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, will you answer +my question: Did you approve of the order or not? You haven’t +answered it yet. Did you approve of the order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I always said—yes, I did—no, I do not want to say—I +said that twice already. I passed it on because it was an order +from my Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, in one of the last paragraphs +it said that that order should not be applied for the treatment +of prisoners taken after a naval action or after large scale +landing operations and I, as well as many others in the Navy, +concentrated our attention on this point because that was our +main activity. But I saw no reason to raise objections to the +Führer on account of this order which I thought justified in this +way. And I would like to state very clearly that I, as a soldier, +was not in a position to go to my Supreme Commander and Chief +of State to tell him, “Show me your reasons for this order,” that +would have been mutiny and could not have been done under +any circumstances.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, do you remember that one +example which we have discussed a great deal in this Trial, which +you must have listened to, was the case of naval men coming in +with a two-man torpedo, trying to sink the <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>. Do you +remember that case? Surely you can answer that “yes” or “no,” +because either you remember or you do not. We have discussed +it about six times. +<span class='pageno' title='215' id='Page_215'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I remember. If I remember I will say “yes.” +The contrary does not have to be assumed at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that during the +time that you were Inspector General, or Admiral Inspector of +the German Navy, that there was started a “Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände,” +under Vice Admiral Helmut Heye, which included +in its command one-man torpedoes, one-man U-boats, explosive +motor boats, and had personnel, starting at about 5,000 and rising, +I think, as far as 16,000? Did you know that there was that Kommando +in the Navy, “Kommando der Kleinkampfverbände”? Did +you know that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I knew that of course and that it operated quite +openly on the French coast and later on, I believe, also on the +North coast.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you have approved if +the Allies had shot any one of your thousands of personnel in that +Kommando that was dealing with one-man and two-man torpedoes +and explosive motor boats? Would you have approved if we had +shot them out of hand?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: First, I cannot give any information about what I +would have done in a particular case with which I had nothing +to do any more. Secondly, here it is...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, if you don’t want to +answer, it is good enough for me. I will point it out in due course +to the Tribunal with...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But you interrupted me again. I should like to make +a second point after what I said first. Secondly, these units fought +quite openly, just below the coast, and had no civilians on board +and also no murderous instruments or instruments for sabotage +with them, so they were fighters just like the fighters in a submarine. +I know...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly the point that I +have put with our Commandos, so I will not argue.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I want to pass to one other point. Was it under your orders +that the log on the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was falsified? Was it by your direct +order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, not at all. I have explained the other day here +that my order was, “First: absolute secrecy upon the order of the +Führer. Secondly: politically it will be dealt with by the High +Command of the Navy. Thirdly”—there was a third point—I will +find it in a second—“I do not intend to punish the commander +because he acted in good faith and committed an error.” That is +what I ordered. I did not order anything further concerning that. +<span class='pageno' title='216' id='Page_216'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you know under whose +orders the log was falsified? I am very anxious to know. The log +was falsified. I have asked the Defendant Dönitz. He cannot tell +me. He has put in an affidavit that the matter was to be left +to you, and now I am asking you whether you can tell me. I think +the commander is dead, as far as I remember, so he cannot tell +me. Do you say that you cannot tell me under whose orders the +log of the Submarine <span class='it'>U-30</span>, that sank the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, was falsified?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already said that I had nothing to do with +it, because in fact I did not have anything to do with such details. +I did not order such details. The other day—I do not know whether +Admiral Wagner said it—it was discussed who did it. I assumed +that it was within the flotilla.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me just this about the +<span class='it'>Athenia</span>. You told us the other day that you gave these orders, +and then washed your hands of the matter. Nearly a month later...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I have already said I had nothing further to do with +it, for you know...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had nothing to do with it. +Nearly a month later the Propaganda Ministry put out this suggestion, +I think you said on Hitler’s orders—that the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> had +been sunk by Churchill. Did you not feel that it was your duty +as Grand Admiral and head of the German Navy to make any +protests against this disgraceful, lying suggestion, that the First +Lord of the British Admiralty had deliberately sent to their deaths +a lot of British and American subjects? Did you not think it was +your duty to do that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I spoke to Hitler about it—but it had happened without +our having any idea about it. I was extremely embarrassed +about it when the First Lord of the Admiralty was attacked in that, +one can say, boorish manner but I could not change anything subsequently +and Hitler did not admit that he...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you did not bother about +that, as I understand it, you didn’t bother at all...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I had misgivings about it, and I was very indignant +about it. Please do not keep twisting what I say...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you translate your indignation +into actions? That is what I am asking.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Into what kind of action?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Any action.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that Hitler should get Goebbels to contradict +that article? That Hitler would not do if he himself had been the +author of the article. +<span class='pageno' title='217' id='Page_217'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to get it clear. +You did nothing when you knew that Von Blomberg and +Von Fritsch, who were old friends and comrades of yours, had been +framed up by sections of these Nazi plotters; you did nothing about +that? You did nothing to protest against the treatment meted out +to Von Blomberg or Von Fritsch? You did nothing, did you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, but at that time I did not know anything about +the background, as you yourself said this morning. I knew nothing +about the background. Later when I became acquainted with the +details I gradually put the whole picture together. At that time +I was not in a position to assume that such methods would be at +all possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I put to you your own +statement that you made a year ago. I just want to get it quite +clear that the first time in your life that you were moved to protest +was, I think, in March 1945, when you saw the actual marks of +torture on the hands of your friend, Herr Gessler, and at that +time the Soviet troops were over the Oder and the Allies were +over the Rhine, and that was the first time that you made any +protest when you took off your Party Golden Emblem, wasn’t it? +That was the first protest you ever made in your naval, military, +political career; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Not a bit of it. I did not really know what was +going on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then—I put it again. In +March 1945 you took off the Party Golden Emblem when you saw +the marks of torture on your friend Gessler’s hands. Isn’t that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: When Dr. Gessler, who in spite of my objections had +been kept for several months in a concentration camp, returned +from the concentration camp and informed me that he was in +extremely pitiful condition, and that in spite of my request in +August, when he was sent to the concentration camp and when +I had asked the Führer through Admiral Wagner for Dr. Gessler +to be questioned quickly because he was certainly innocent in +connection with the assassination attempt, so that he could be +released as soon as possible, then...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, my question is, was it then +that you took off the Party Emblem. You can answer that. You +can give your explanation later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but wait a moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But up to then you did not +make any protest against anything that Hitler did, except the +purely military one on the invasion of the Soviet Union? +<span class='pageno' title='218' id='Page_218'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I always made serious protests, and that I have proved +here, and the adjutant, General Schmundt, told me, “You will +be most successful if you try to influence the Führer personally +when you are alone with him and tell him quite openly what you +think.” This is important enough to mention and I must say it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Well, Dr. Gessler came back from the concentration camp and +told me that during his first interrogation—at that time I had not yet +had a chance to intervene—he had been tortured. That was the +first time that I heard that anywhere in Germany anybody was +tortured. There is a letter from Dr. Gessler about that—that I told +him immediately, “I am going to the Führer at once to tell him +about this because I cannot imagine that he knows about that.” +Gessler begged me—when he confirmed that letter—for goodness +sake not to go to the Führer then, because that would endanger +his, Gessler’s, life. I said I would answer for it that nothing would +happen to him, and that I would still try to approach the Führer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>During the whole of the ensuing period I attempted to approach +the Führer, who was not at headquarters. When I was informed in +April that he was in Berlin, which was already under heavy attack, +I tried to approach the Führer day after day by calling Admiral +Voss over the telephone. That was no longer possible, and after I +received that information the first thing I did was that I went, +together with my wife, to the lake which was behind our house and +tore off my Party Emblem and threw it into the lake. I told that +to Admiral Voss but unfortunately I could not tell it to the Führer +any more. That can be seen from the letter which Dr. Gessler +wrote, and we would have liked to have him as a witness, but his +state of health did not permit it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was your first protest.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It was not my first protest. That is twisting my words.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross-examination?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: On 18 May 1946, during the morning session +of the Tribunal you testified that during your service as Commander-in-Chief +of the Navy you twice made application to resign. The +first time you tried to resign was in November 1938 when you were +dealing with the building up of the Navy, and Hitler was not pleased +with your plans, and the second time was when Hitler, without your +knowledge, permitted his adjutant who was a naval officer to marry +a certain young girl. Is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but I put in further applications for resignation +which were not so sensational, once in 1937, and I believe even in +1935, when I was not in good health. But these were two typical +examples which show how such things came about. +<span class='pageno' title='219' id='Page_219'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I understood that in the first of these two +cases Hitler finally persuaded you not to resign.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: And in the second case, he complied with +your wish but he never forgot it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In fact, you resigned only in January 1943, +is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In actual fact, yes. But I must add that during the +war I felt I could not leave the Navy, which was already in such a +difficult situation, and I believed I enjoyed its confidence to a certain +extent so that I could be useful.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: On the morning of 18 May you said here in +the Court in regard to your resignation, that it seemed to you then +that Hitler, at that particular moment, wanted to get rid of you. +Is that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: At that moment I had the impression, when he made +such serious accusations and when he considerably contradicted his +previous judgments, that maybe he wanted to get rid of me, and I +therefore considered that that was a particularly favorable moment +to leave.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: The question of successors was solved by +your naming a few people to Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: And among them was the Defendant Dönitz. +Did you mention his name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I mentioned his name. I informed the Führer of +that in writing, first Carls, second, in case he wanted to concentrate +on submarine warfare, Grossadmiral Dönitz, who was the highest +authority in that field.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: And does it not seem to you, after your +answer to my questions, that the answer which you gave to +Dr. Laternser on 18 May, when you mentioned the absolute impossibility +of resigning from the general staff, was not a proper answer? +It was possible to resign, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but in this case, of course, there were two prerequisites. +The first was that Hitler himself did not like me any more +and I knew it, so that it would not be insubordination if I threw +up my post for some reason or other.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Secondly, because it was possible, as I pointed out in that conversation, +for the change to take place under peaceful conditions so +<span class='pageno' title='220' id='Page_220'></span> +that the Navy would not suffer by it. If I had left because of a +quarrel, then that would have had a very bad effect on the Navy +because it might have meant a certain split between the Navy and +Hitler, and I had particularly to preserve unity, at that critical +moment of the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to understand my question +correctly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I understand...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I am not asking you about the prerequisites +which might have been required for granting an application for +resignation. I am asking you a question in principle:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Was it possible or was it not possible to resign? After all, you +did resign. You resigned from your post as Commander-in-Chief +of the Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, but I had been in the service for 15 years, and I +could tell him, “If that is the way you yourself judge me, then there +is no sense in your continuing to work with me.” That was a favorable +opportunity which made it permissible for me to ask him to +release me. But what one could not do was to throw up the job +and give the impression of being insubordinate. That had to be +avoided at all costs, I would never have done that. I was too much +of a soldier for that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I have already heard what I wanted to +hear from you in reply to my question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I will pass on to the next question. You maintain that all +the time you were striving towards normalizing relations with the +Soviet Union, is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I am sorry; I could not understand what you said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: You maintain that during your service you +always strove to make the relations between Germany and the +Soviet Union quite normal, is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I was always in favor of the Bismarck policy, that we +should have a common policy with Russia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: If I understood your testimony correctly +the day before yesterday and on Friday, in 1940, already, you had +knowledge of the fact that Hitler intended to attack the Soviet Union.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: In September 1940 for the first time I heard certain +statements from Hitler himself that he was thinking of a war with +Russia, given certain circumstances. Even in the directive he +mentioned one of these prerequisites, one of these circumstances. +He did not say to me at that time that in any circumstances he +wanted to wage war, but that we had to be prepared, as it says in +<span class='pageno' title='221' id='Page_221'></span> +Paragraph 1, that before crushing England we might have to fight +against Russia. And from September on I began to make objections +to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Was there not a case of an incident when +you maintained that the explanations which had been given by +official governmental organs or agencies for an attack on the Soviet +Union gave you and the others the impression that it was a +deliberate propaganda, and in fact they were quite repulsive in +their effect? Do you remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The propaganda made by Hitler made an impression? +I did not quite get it...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I believe that you once expressed in writing +the view that the OKW and the Foreign Ministry explained to the +German people the reasons for attacking the Soviet Union in such a +way as to give the impression that it was deliberate propaganda, +and the total effect was repulsive. Do you not remember it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Oh, you mean the broadcasts emanating from the +Foreign Office when the war started? Yes, that was Hitler’s propaganda +to make the German people understand the reason for this +war. That is right. As regards breaking the Pact...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to take a look at one document. +This is a document written by you, and I would like you to +tell us whether this document contains the precise subject matter +of my question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Where is it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: “The propagandistic...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: “The propagandistic”—shall I read it?</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The propagandistic, political and military announcements +given out at the beginning of the war by the Foreign Office +and the High Command of the Armed Forces, which were to +justify the breaking of the Pact because of breaches by the +Soviet Union, found very little credence among the people as +well as among the Armed Forces. They showed too clearly +that they were propaganda for a certain purpose and had a +repulsive effect.” (USSR-460.)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I know that at that time Hitler himself drafted these documents, +together with Goebbels.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In connection with this question I have +another question for you. Am I to understand you in this way; that +your divergence of opinion with Hitler over foreign policy, and in +particular in regard to aggressive wars, was less strongly defined +than your difference of opinion about the question of the marriage +of a naval officer with a certain girl? Did you understand me? +<span class='pageno' title='222' id='Page_222'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, they were two quite different things. Those were +military questions where the political decisions remained with the +Führer. I was very insistent about the moral issues also, where +they concerned the Pact, but I did not send him any written ultimatum +because in this matter it would have been unsoldierly. I did +not have the final decision, he had it; whereas in the case of Albrecht, +it was up to me to decide—to say yes or no—and not to sign that +which I was supposed to sign.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: You are saying now that this is a question +of morals. Does it not seem to you that an unprovoked attack +on a country with which Germany had a nonaggression treaty—do +you not think that such a question is always connected with the +question of morals?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course; that is what I said myself, that in this case +too I laid special stress on the moral issue. But in spite of that, as +the highest man of the Navy, I was not in a position to hold out the +threat of resignation at that moment. I was too much of a soldier to +be able to do that, to be able to leave the Navy at a moment like that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In answer to questions put to you by your +counsel here in this courtroom you testified that your speech, which +was delivered by you on 12 March 1939—that is Page 169 of the +Russian text in the Raeder document book, My Lord—the speech +where you praised Hitler and Hitler’s policies—you mentioned that +this speech was not in accord with your true opinion. Is it so or +is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, that is not correct. I said that we had had the +experience that the Communists and Jews, from 1917 to 1920, had +strongly undermined our power of resistance, and that for this +reason it could be understood, if a National Socialist government +took certain measures against both of them in order to stem their +influence, which was excessive. That was the sense of my statements +and I made absolutely no mention of any further steps which +might come into question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: In short, you are saying now that when +you delivered that speech on 12 March 1939, that this speech was +fully in accord with your ideas and your views. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it was, or I would not have made it. It was in +accord insofar as I had to recognize that the National Socialist Government +had in some way to stem that influence which was generally +recognized to be excessive, and as I said yesterday, the National +Socialist Government had issued the Nuremberg Laws, which I did +not entirely approve of where they went to extremes. But if the +Government was so disposed, it was not possible for me in an official +public speech, which I gave on the orders of that Government, to +<span class='pageno' title='223' id='Page_223'></span> +express my personal views which were different. That had to be +considered within this address to the nation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish in a very few +moments? It is now five minutes past five.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I think, My Lord, that only about 10 minutes +will be sufficient for me. I have only about three or four more +questions left.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In order to save +time I am not going to argue with you in regard to the motives +which made you deliver the speech. It was important for me that +you should confirm what you said, and that is, that this speech +was in accord with your views and ideas. Now I will pass on to +the next question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On 29 September 1941, your Chief of Staff, Admiral Fricke—do I +pronounce his name correctly? Is it Fricke or Fricker?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Fricke, yes, Chief of the Staff of the Naval Operations +Staff.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Admiral Fricke published a directive in +regard to the future fate of Leningrad. Do you know what document +I mean, or must this document be shown to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. I know that document very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: This directive was published with your +consent?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I did not give a specific order for it because there was +no necessity for passing it on. May I just explain briefly how it was. +I had...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, and I would like you to be brief.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Quite briefly, yes. I had requested Hitler when I heard +that he intended in the course of the war to bombard Leningrad, +that he should spare the port and dock installations because they +would be useful for us later, as we had to keep moving our bases +back to the East on account of the British air attacks in the Baltic. +Shortly before the date which you have mentioned Admiral Fricke +had been at the Führer’s headquarters—I do not know for what +reason—and had there spoken with the Führer in my absence, and +the Führer had explained to him that plan to bombard Leningrad, +especially with aircraft, and he used those very exaggerated words +which were then written down in the document. The Navy had +absolutely nothing to do with the shelling of Leningrad. We received +no orders for that. We were only interested in that one thing which +I mentioned before, that the shipyards and port installations should +<span class='pageno' title='224' id='Page_224'></span> +be spared. The Führer had informed Fricke that unfortunately he was +not in a position to do that because the attack, especially if made +with aircraft, could not be directed quite so precisely. All we could +do was to inform Generaladmiral Carls that Leningrad, in case it +should be taken, could not be used as a base, and Generaladmiral +Carls had to stop the preparations which he had already begun by +allocating German workers and probably also machinery which was +intended to be used in Leningrad later on. Carls had to know of that +and, as the document says, the so-called Quartermaster Department +of the Navy had to know about it, and that was why Admiral Fricke +passed on that paper. Unfortunately he included in this paper the +expressions used by Hitler, which had nothing to do with the whole +affair as far as we were concerned, because we had nothing to do +with the shelling. By so doing he did not assume in any way the +responsibility, in the sense that he approved it. He only believed +that he had to pass on Hitler’s wording of the order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Navy had nothing to do with the matter. It would not have +been necessary to pass it on, and unfortunately and very clumsily +that expression used by Hitler was entered in that document. However, +nothing happened and that document was not passed on from +Generaladmiral Carls to our Finland Commander. That is the +whole story.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me the question is becoming +more complicated. I asked you a simple question. Your Chief of +Staff, Chief of Operations, published a directive. Did you know +about the directive?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. That is not a directive—that can be seen also +from the photostat—because the letter had not been submitted to +me for passing on, and that shows that it was not considered to be +very important. It was not a directive to undertake any operation +or anything important. It was just a directive to stop anything that +might have been done with regard to bases; so that really nothing +happened. Thus, when that document was passed on by Admiral +Fricke, nothing happened at all. It was quite superfluous.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: You are talking about the destruction of +one of the biggest cities of the Soviet Union. You are talking in +this document about razing the city to the ground, and you maintain +now that it is a more or less trifling question, that this question +was not important enough to be reported to you, as Fricke’s Chief? +Do you want us to believe that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Of course. It is not a question of the shelling of +Leningrad, with which we had nothing to do at all. It was the minor +question which concerned us, the question as to whether we would +later be able to establish a naval base there, and whether we could +<span class='pageno' title='225' id='Page_225'></span> +bring workers and machines and such things to Leningrad. That +was a minor issue. The shelling of Leningrad was a major issue.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I think that the Tribunal will be able to +understand you correctly and to draw the necessary conclusions, +both from this document and from your testimony.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I have one last question for you. On 28 August 1945, in +Moscow, did you not write an affidavit as to the reasons for Germany’s +defeat?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I took special pains with that after the collapse.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, we submit this document to the +Tribunal in the form of excerpts, Document Number USSR-460. In +order to save time I would like you to hear several excerpts from +this affidavit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] You will be shown where they can +be found on the original, and you can say whether it was correctly +read into the record and whether you acknowledge and confirm it.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“My Attitude Towards Adolf Hitler and the Party. Disastrous +influence on the fate of the German State...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you find this place?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I have it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Would you be kind enough to give me a copy so +that I can follow?</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable +ambition were his main peculiarities; running after popularity +and showing off, untruthfulness, vagueness, and selfishness, +which were not restrained for the sake of State or People. He +was outstanding in his greed, wastefulness, and effeminate +unsoldierly manner.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, a little further on:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It is my conviction that Hitler very soon realized his character, +but made use of him where it suited his purpose, and +burdened him perpetually with new tasks in order to avoid +his becoming dangerous to himself.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>On Page 24 of your document you give another characteristic:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer continued to attach importance to the fact that +from the outside his relations to me seemed normal and good. +He knew I was well thought of in all the really respectable +circles of the German people, and that in general everybody +had great faith in me. This cannot be said of Göring, Von +Ribbentrop, Dr. Goebbels, Himmler and Dr. Ley.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now I will ask you to find Page 27. +<span class='pageno' title='226' id='Page_226'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: But there is something missing. “In the same way, +as for instance, Baron Von Neurath, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, +Schacht, Dorpmüller and others,” who were on the other side.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Evidently it was not correctly translated to +you. I will read this passage into the record. Now, on Page 27, +this place is underlined in red pencil: “Dönitz’ strong political inclination +to the Party...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] I think the Tribunal could +read this themselves if the defendant says that it is true that he +wrote it. Probably Dr. Siemers could check it over and see that +there are no inaccuracies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, My Lord. Then I shall have the +opportunity to put a very brief question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I will ask you to take a look at a +place on Page 29, which is marked with pencil, where the paragraph +deals with Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Will you confirm that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: What am I supposed to do? Yes, well...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I am asking you with regard to everything +that I read into the record and what you say just now in this paragraph. +I would like to have an answer from you. Do you confirm +all that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I quite agree with the suggestion +by the Tribunal. However, I should like to ask that the entire document +be submitted. I have only short excerpts before me, and I +would be grateful if I could see the entire document. I assume that +Colonel Pokrovsky agrees to that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Siemers, one part of the document +having been put in evidence, you can refer to the remainder +of the document. You can put the remainder of the document in, +if you want to.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I said that at the time I tried to find an explanation +for the cause of our collapse.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: First, I ask you to give the answer, yes or no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. On the whole, I agree entirely with this judgment. +But I should like to add that I wrote those things under +entirely different conditions. I do not wish to go into details, and I +never expected that that would ever become public. These were +notes for myself to help me form my judgment later on. I also want +to ask especially that what I said about Generaloberst Jodl should +also be read into the record, or where it belongs, that is, right after +the statement about Field Marshal Keitel. With regard to Field +Marshal Keitel, I should like to emphasize that I intended to convey +<span class='pageno' title='227' id='Page_227'></span> +that it was his manner towards the Führer which made it possible +for him to get along with him for a long time, because if anybody +else had been in that position, who had a quarrel with the Führer +every day or every other day, then the work of the whole of the +Armed Forces would have been impossible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is the reason and the explanation of what I wanted to +express by that statement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution has no further questions +to ask the defendant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, have you got the whole document +before you? Was that the original document you had before you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: In your writing?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, it is typewritten. But it is signed by me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the document can be handed to +Dr. Siemers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Dr. Siemers, do you want to re-examine beyond putting in that +document? Have you any questions you want to ask in addition to +putting in that document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, on account of the cross-examination made +by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, I should like to re-examine, and I should +like to ask for permission to do that after I have read this document, +so that I can also cover the document tomorrow in this connection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, the thought occurs to me with +respect to this document—do I understand that the Tribunal +will order copies to be distributed to all of the Defense Counsel? +There are matters with respect to the defendants on which the +Counsel might want to examine. They might be surprised.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I thought it was fair that Dr. Siemers should +see the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. I have no objection to that. But my point is, +that in the document there is reference to defendants other than the +defendant represented by Dr. Siemers. And at a later date, if this +document is not made known to the others by the reading of it or +by the turning over to them in translated form, they may claim +surprise, and lack of opportunity to examine on it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think some photostatic copies of the document +should be made so that all the defendants referred to therein +may be acquainted with the terms of the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I just thought I would make that suggestion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 21 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='228' id='Page_228'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH DAY</span><br/> Tuesday, 21 May 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with reference to your examination +yesterday, I have to put the following questions to you in +re-examination. Sir David was talking about the fact that before +1933 you had carried out rearmament behind the backs of the law-making +bodies. I think that question, as such, has been clarified; +but there is one supplementary question. On whom did it depend +just what was submitted to the Reichstag?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: On the Reichswehrminister.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And who was the Reichswehrminister at that +time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: He was a member of the government and my direct +superior. I had to submit everything to him which I wished to get.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And his name was Gröner, wasn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I draw the Tribunal’s attention to the +extract from the Constitution which I have recently submitted as +Exhibit Number Raeder-3, according to which Article 50 lays down +that the Reich President gives all orders and decrees even where +the Armed Forces are concerned. For their validity decrees +require to be countersigned by the Chancellor or the Minister +concerned. By the act of countersigning responsibility is accepted. +In this, our case, the Reichswehrminister was the competent Reich +Minister; and anything that was done afterwards with reference to +the law-making bodies was a matter for the government to decide.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Sir David has submitted to you +Document C-17. It is the index of a book written by Colonel +Scherff, called <span class='it'>The History of the German Navy from 1919 to 1939</span>. +Was this book ever written?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: As far as I know, only the index was compiled. +I assume that if anything had been written, then it would have +been submitted to me a long time ago, but I never heard of that +at all. +<span class='pageno' title='229' id='Page_229'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that the American +Prosecution, at the time when they submitted the document, +pointed out that as far as they knew the book was not written.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] I believe that it is very difficult to +base accusations on an index, but I want you to tell me, Defendant, +when did you learn of this index?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It became known to me during my first interrogation +by an American prosecutor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Furthermore, Document D-854, which is GB-460, +was put to you yesterday. May I come back to one question put by +Sir David. On Page 1 Sir David had been reading as follows:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“But if—as was stated—in nearly all spheres of armament +where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was +violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit—or at +least its violation was prepared—a long time before the +16th of March 1935....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then Sir David asked you: “Do you want to say that this is +untrue?” You answered but you did not quite finish your reply, at +least it never became quite clear what you said in the German or +the English record. I want you to tell me why you are of the +opinion that Assmann was not quite right in this respect?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It is an utter exaggeration. First of all, violations—as +have been proved here in detail—were mostly of a very minor +nature; and only the number of deviations may have given the +impression that there were many violations. Secondly, in its essential +points, we never actually filled the quotas allowed by the Versailles +Treaty; in fact, we remained below the figures granted. Besides, +only defense measures are involved, very primitive defense +measures—Assmann’s representations are just a great exaggeration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What you are trying to say, therefore, is that +Assmann’s way of putting it “in practically every sphere of rearmament” +is wrong?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, probably Document C-32 will have led him to +that conclusion because there were so many points. However, on +closer examination they turn out to be very minor points.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: With regard to the important points of rearmament, +that is to say construction of large ships, the Navy did not +violate the Treaty, did it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: By repeating it three times, Sir David emphasized +the fact that you had a great deal of confidence in Assmann. I have +nothing to say against it, but beyond that I would like to put a +supplementary question to you: Did you have that much confidence +<span class='pageno' title='230' id='Page_230'></span> +in him, that in your opinion Assmann could pass a proper legal +judgment? Was he a lawyer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. Assmann was a naval officer who was not used +at the front any more. He was a very clever writer who had +written a few volumes about the first World War. He wrote very +well, but even the volumes on the naval warfare during the first +World War were corrected a great deal by the persons concerned; +but against him and his ability to write history nothing can be said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think you remember this document from +yesterday. Is it a final historical work? Is it a final and corrected +edition?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. So far as I know, he had not got that far. He +was making summaries and extracts from war diaries and records.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Assmann has written (Document D-854, GB-460):</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“If, in this light, there were plans for ‘preparing the construction’ +in 1935 of twelve 275-ton submarines, six 550-ton +submarines, and four 900-ton submarines, then one will have +to consider the strategic points of view valid at that time.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Added together 22 were planned, and for the following year +14 submarines—by no means built, just planned. Are these figures +correct in your opinion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: They are correct in my opinion. The only thing I am +not sure about is the 900-ton type; I cannot quite explain that. +I cannot remember that at that time we were building 900-ton +boats. Apart from the 250-ton type, our first types were 550-tons, +and only then did the 740-ton boats come. Perhaps he is thinking +of those when he says 900-tons. We did not actually build +900-ton boats.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On Page 158, Sir David has read to you the +following sentence, which I want to repeat because it needs +clarification.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction +that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the +German-British Treaty. Considering the size of U-boats +which had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have +been provided for up to 1938. In reality, 118 were completed +and constructed.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I want to remind you that in the original there is the Note +Number 6 referring to a letter of the Chief of the Naval Budget +Department...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='231' id='Page_231'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: ...from the year 1942, presumably containing +statistics on the construction of submarines as the years went by. +I believe that these figures need to be clarified.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>According to material at my disposal, it appears that these 55 +U-boats were in accordance with the London Agreement; that is to +say, in accordance with the 45 percent agreed on in 1935. You +probably have not got the exact figure in mind, but is that roughly +correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is probably right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And now, the Figure 118. That, according to +material at my disposal, is also well-founded. That is the figure +which corresponds to the 100 percent equality in regard to the +tonnage of submarines. If we had 118 submarines, then our +submarine equipment corresponded to that of Britain at that time. +Is that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it is correct; and it is also correct that we +included these later boats in the budget and had ordered them +after we had seen Admiral Cunningham and his staff in Berlin on +30 December and had reached a friendly understanding in accordance +with the agreement, allowing us to build 100 percent. The +remark read at the beginning, saying that we had committed most +violations in this sphere, is a complete untruth. Until the beginning +of the war we only built such U-boats as we were allowed to build; +that is to say, first 45 percent and later 100 percent. It was a great +mistake, of course, that we did it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have just said that it was a +complete untruth. I think that, even if Sir David used that word +against you, one ought not to pass such sharp judgment against +Assmann. Do you not think, Admiral, that there was possibly a +legal error on his part when...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that may be.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: ...he wrote these details and that he was not +really thinking of what you have just told us had happened; +namely, that in 1938 there had been an agreement between England +and Germany, according to which Germany could now build +100 percent?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: That is quite probable. When I said “untruth,” +I meant incorrectness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that in the Naval +Agreement of 1935, 100 percent was planned from the beginning +and that Germany at first renounced that but had the right at any +time to increase to 100 percent, provided that Great Britain was +notified. The notification is presumably what you described, +Witness; that is the negotiation with Admiral Cunningham? +<span class='pageno' title='232' id='Page_232'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that was on 30 December 1938, or it may have +been 31 December.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant saying that there was a +notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938? +Is that what you said; that there was notification to Admiral +Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Admiral Cunningham came to Berlin, to this friendly +negotiation which had been provided for in the agreement. On that +30 December we arranged with him that from now on, instead of +45 percent, 100 percent would be built.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Was that an oral arrangement or a written one?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: It was a conference between the Chief of Staff of the +Naval Operations Staff and Admiral Cunningham, and certain other +individuals, but I cannot remember the details. However, I am +pretty certain that minutes were taken.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, unfortunately, I have not been +able to trace any written evidence. I only know from Exhibit +Number Raeder-11, that is the agreement of 1935, that Germany +could increase the tonnage, and the agreement of ’37, that Germany +had the duty to give notification. Generally, notification is only in +writing in diplomatic relations, although, in my opinion, it was +not necessarily a duty in this case. Negotiations, as the witness said, +did take place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: May I, perhaps, add that apart from the submarine +problem, the question of two heavy cruisers, which we had +originally dropped, was also settled. We only wanted to build three +for the time being; and now we were asking for assent to build +the other two, to which we were entitled. That was also agreed +upon in accordance with the agreement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Document C-140 was put before you yesterday; +it is USA-51. You will find it in the British Document Book 10a on +Page 104. I want to put one sentence from that document to you +again, which has not been quoted by the Prosecution, neither in +November nor yesterday. It appears under Figure 2-c. There is +the following statement—I want to add that this is the question of +sanctions and the possible preparation of a defense against sanctions +in 1935. I quote from 2-c: “For the time being I prohibit any +practical preparations.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, I want to ask you...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is not 10a, 104.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. Elwyn Jones has just been kind enough to +point out to me the English translation. It appears from it that—as +<span class='pageno' title='233' id='Page_233'></span> +I have also the English translation before me—that there are two +documents C-140; one has one page and the other has two. One +has not got a heading and is dated, Berlin, 25 October 1933. In my +opinion it is the document...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is the one on Page 104?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, on Page 104 there is, as I just heard from +Major Elwyn Jones, the other document, C-140, which has the +heading, “Directive for the Armed Forces in Case of Sanctions.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and the date of it is 25 January 1933?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: 25 October 1935, but that is a clerical error. It +is 1933.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United +Kingdom): There appears to be another document which is not in +the document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, perhaps I may point out that the +Document C-140, USA-51, presented by the Prosecution, must be the +one I have referred to, because it tallies with the record; I mean +the record of the session of 27 November. That is the document +to which I have just now referred.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it C-140 or C-141?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: C-140, the same number, and that is the same +as USA-51.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, perhaps to simplify matters, I may later, after +today’s session or tomorrow submit the Document C-140 in the, +here presented, English and German text.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Read the document now and you can settle +with Mr. Elwyn Jones about the proper notation of the document, +whether it should be C-140 or whatever the exhibit number +ought to be.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: [<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] In the version +submitted by the Prosecution, preparation for the defense against +sanctions is mentioned. I shall now read a further sentence to you, +and I quote, “For the time being, I prohibit all practical preparations.” +Would it be right, therefore, that in 1933 nothing whatever +was prepared by you in the Navy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No. Apart from the ordinary state of preparedness, +nothing was allowed to be done, in accordance with this order. +This was merely a precaution on the Führer’s part in order to take +preparative measures in case the opponent might do something.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You see, the reason why I am asking you this +is that yesterday in the cross-examination the preparations that +you were supposed to have made in this connection were held +against you. +<span class='pageno' title='234' id='Page_234'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>I now come to Document C-189, which is USA-44. I beg to +apologize for troubling the Tribunal in that I am asking them, if +possible, to look at the document again. It is contained in Document +Book Raeder 10, Page 14; and, incidentally, Sir David +re-submitted it yesterday. Sir David attached great importance to +the two words “against England.” There under Figure 2 it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Ob.d.M. expresses the opinion that later on the fleet +must anyhow be developed against England and that, therefore, +from 1936 onward, the large ships must be armed with +35 centimeter guns like those of the <span class='it'>King George</span> class.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Would this mean that you were using the plans of the English +for building ships of the <span class='it'>King George</span> class?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The only reason, therefore, why you were pointing this out was +that you were considering the 35 centimeter guns used in the +<span class='it'>King George</span> class by the British Admiralty?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it was the aim of every navy at that time to +know as early as possible which was the largest caliber of guns +being used by other navies. I said yesterday that, to start with, +we had chosen as a model the French <span class='it'>Dunkerque</span> type, but later +on we discovered that the British used up to 35.6 centimeters. Ships +have to be used, if war breaks out, in their actual state; their gun +caliber cannot be changed any more. Therefore we always went as +high as possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Would I be right, therefore—please excuse me—if +I said that the expression “against Britain” in this connection is +not correct grammatically, that according to German language +usage it should have said “with reference to England”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, it should have said “developing with regard to +England.” I said yesterday that it would have been quite senseless +if I were to do something against Great Britain before the conclusion +of the pact.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that was fully gone into in +cross-examination, and the defendant stated his explanation of the +words used.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: From Document C-190, which is the conversation +on 2 November 1934 aboard the <span class='it'>Emden</span> between you and Hitler, +Sir David has held up to you that Hitler, in a discussion with you +and Göring, said that he considered the expansion of the Navy in +the planned manner an absolutely vital necessity, since war could +not be conducted unless the Navy safeguarded the ore imports from +Scandinavia. It was said that this would have to be understood to +mean that the Navy was planned in view of a war and in view of +safeguarding the ore imports, which really meant aggressive intentions. +Are you of the opinion that the British Navy was not planned +<span class='pageno' title='235' id='Page_235'></span> +to safeguard imports to England or for the event of war and was +not equipped accordingly?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, there is not the slightest doubt about that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Six submarines are mentioned in this document. +Considering that figure, may I ask you to tell me the number of +submarines that Germany would have needed in order to conduct +an aggressive war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Well, at any rate, many more than we had in October +1939, a multiple of that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: From a document, Mr. President, which was +submitted yesterday, D-806, I want to quote, in addition to the +second paragraph which has been quoted, the first paragraph and +put it to the witness. It is D-806, GB-462, submitted yesterday +at noon.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] There it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“1.) Reference: Submarine Construction Program. On 27 October +1936 I made decision regarding the full utilization of the +still available U-boat tonnage according to the Naval Agreement +of 1935 and regarding the immediate ordering of the +construction of <span class='it'>U-41</span> to <span class='it'>U-51</span>.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Were these the rest of the submarines within the 45 percent +limit to which we were entitled according to the Naval Agreement +of 1935?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is right, judging from the figures.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And then, Admiral, you have been very +thoroughly questioned about Austria and Czechoslovakia. Since +that subject has been gone into in detail, I shall confine myself to +just one question: Did you, at any time, receive any tasks or orders +of a foreign political nature from Hitler? And did he ask you for +your advice especially in foreign political matters?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I was never asked for advice, and I had no foreign +political tasks, unless you consider the duties which I had to fulfill +in Bulgaria and Hungary after my resignation of a foreign political +nature.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Regarding Czechoslovakia, that is, concerning +the document about the “Rest Tschechei,” you were asked whether +Hitler had aggressive intentions against Prague at that time. I think +the question ought to have been whether his intentions were for +an aggressive war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In connection with that, you have been asked about Göring’s +threat to bombard Prague, and you quite rightly admitted to Sir +David that such a bombing would be a threat. Sir David commented +on it as being near to aggressive war; but in order to be +<span class='pageno' title='236' id='Page_236'></span> +quite clear, I want you to tell the Tribunal when you learned of +this planned bombing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Only after the whole matter had been settled, and +only by way of conversation. I heard no announcement and +I knew nothing else of it beforehand.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So you knew nothing of it before the occupation +of Prague?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, because military undertakings against Prague +were altogether unknown to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then there is the Document C-100. Mr. President, +it was presented yesterday under the Number GB-464.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: 463, I’ve got it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; 463.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] From that document I want to +quote to you from Page 10. It is Page 3 of the attached document. +I want to put the following sentence to you. I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Führer asked Ob.d.M. whether there were any special +wishes of the Navy with reference to bases on Dutch-Belgian +coast. Ob.d.M. says no, since bases are within reach of the +British coast and are therefore useless as submarine bases.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>According to this, Witness, you were not in favor of an +occupation of Belgian and Dutch bases, nor did you in any way +occupy yourself with this question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: This was always my point of view, that from the +experience of the first World War Belgium and Holland, as far as +the Navy was concerned, could not offer any useful bases, since all +forces were under the control of the British Air Force. In the first +World War serious fighting occurred between the submarines +leaving their ports and destroyers stationed nearby. Therefore +I declared myself not to be interested in Belgium and Holland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Skipping various documents, I now come to +D-843, GB-466. This is a document in which Dr. Breuer from the +Oslo Embassy expresses the view that the danger of a British +occupation of Norway was not really very great and that certain +actions were only taken in order to provoke Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have one more question on that. Did the Embassy in Oslo, +that is to say Breuer, know about the information that Admiral +Canaris was supplying to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I cannot tell you that, as far as I am concerned. +I was never in direct contact with Dr. Breuer, only with the naval +attaché; but I must add that Dr. Breuer had only been in Oslo +for a comparatively short period and that apparently he was not +<span class='pageno' title='237' id='Page_237'></span> +particularly well informed. The statements made by Norwegian +Ministers were certainly not properly judged by him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an order from Hitler that the +Foreign Office should not be informed about probable plans concerning +Norway?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, he expressly ordered that, and it is obvious that +for that reason the Reich Foreign Minister himself was informed +very late.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In other words, as far as you can see, the +ambassador could not have had Canaris’ information through +military sources.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, hardly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then there were several documents, D-844 and +D-845. It was put to you from those that there was no danger in +Scandinavia. Was the information that you received at the time +different?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I had continual information...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All this was gone into yesterday, and the +witness gave the same answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that the following has never been +mentioned before. Did you know whether as early as 5 April +mines had been laid in the territorial waters off Norway?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: The Allies had announced it on 7 April, but the +actual operations must have taken place a few days earlier.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>Interposing</span>] Dr. Siemers, the only purpose +of re-examination is to bring out matters which are favorable to +your client which have not been raised in cross-examination, that +is to say, to explain anything which has not been given in cross-examination. +When he has given this account in cross-examination +it is no good putting it to him again in re-examination. We have +heard it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think that on this particular point one explanation +is missing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Yesterday you were asked, rather +unexpectedly, what had been the technical changes since 1936 and +how the legal situation regarding submarine warfare would have +been influenced thereby.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: It is a somewhat difficult question to answer in +two seconds. You have mentioned aircraft. Can you not supplement +your statement? +<span class='pageno' title='238' id='Page_238'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, I forgot the most important point due to the fact +that there was a rather lively controversy. The important point +is that the spotting of vessels at sea by aircraft was something +quite new and had been developed very efficiently. That development +continued very rapidly during the war, until submarines could +very quickly be located and pursued.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Regarding D-841, which is the affidavit from +Dietmann, may I, with the Tribunal’s permission, make a formal +application? In this affidavit, there is the following sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It is my personal opinion that the higher authorities of the +Navy in Kiel and other places in Germany had knowledge of +these dreadful things.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It isn’t “had knowledge” but “must have had +knowledge.” It seems to me it is in the translation “must have +had knowledge.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I have not got the German and I do not +know how the original is worded. I only have the English translation. +It is not quite clear to me how the German version was +worded. May I ask the Tribunal...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is the document put in in the original German +or is it put in in the English? The deposition is in German +presumably.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I presume that originally the statement was in +German. The copy I have states that this is a translation and that +is English, but I have not seen the German original.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there must have been +a German copy for the witness yesterday. I don’t know whether +or not it is the original. I didn’t see it but I assume it was.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It isn’t the case that the deposition was made +in German, then translated into English, and then translated back +into German, was it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is why I assume +it was the original. I am sorry this was done. I haven’t got the +original document in front of me but I assume that was so. I will +find out in a moment for you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What is the point, Dr. Siemers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this sentence should be struck from +the document. It does not record a fact.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean you are asking to have it struck +out or...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What do you say, Sir David? +<span class='pageno' title='239' id='Page_239'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the witness sets out +fully the facts in the preceding paragraphs of the affidavit and +then it is true that he introduces the sentence “By my personal +opinion....” but the gist of the statement is that from these facts +which I have stated the higher formations of the Navy in Kiel +and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of these +terrible conditions. A man who has been working in that detachment +of the German Navy and knows the communications between +that detachment and the headquarters is in a position to say +whether headquarters would have knowledge from the facts he +has stated. His inference has a greater probative value than the +inference which the Court can draw. The objection to the statement +of a matter of opinion is where the witness gives his opinion +on a matter on which the Court is equally capable of drawing an +opinion from the same facts, but the importance of that statement +is that he is saying “working in the bow and being familiar with +the chain of command and communications.” I say that anyone at +Kiel must have been able to learn from these facts what was going +on at these places—so that is the narrow point, whether his special +knowledge entitles him to express a view which the Court, without +that special knowledge, would not be in a position to draw.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But ought he not theoretically to state all +the facts; and if he does state all the facts, then the Tribunal will +be in the same position as he is to form a judgment; and it is for +the Tribunal to form the judgment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is exactly the +point to which I was addressing my argument, that there is the +additional fact, that because he was working there, was part of +the chain of naval command and he is speaking of the knowledge +of the naval command from the point of view of somebody who +was working in it, and, therefore, he has on that point his opinion +as to the sources of knowledge; and the necessity of constructive +knowledge is an additional fact. My Lord, the state of a man’s +mind and the expression of his knowledge may be a fact in certain +circumstances, just as much a fact as that stated, as Lord Bowen +once put it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if the state of his knowledge is directly +relevant to an issue.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the +point here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is a form of expert evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, in a sense, it is not +as Your Lordship says, in a form, it is not in a usual form, but +it is the evidence of somebody who has special knowledge. My +<span class='pageno' title='240' id='Page_240'></span> +Lord, it is a well-known distinction, for example, in the laws of +libel between the persons who have expert knowledge and the +public at large; and, My Lord, the opinion of someone with a +special knowledge of the facts must have probative value within +Article 19 of the Charter. My Lord, if the provision that this +Tribunal is not bound by the technical rules of evidence is to mean +anything at all, I submit it should cover the expression of opinion +on a point such as this; that is the ability to have knowledge, +which is given by somebody who is in a special position to state +such an opinion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is a very small point, Sir David, and we +have got to decide the matter and form our own opinion about it; +and this man isn’t here for the purpose of being cross-examined +for anything of that sort.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is so, My Lord, but, +of course that, with respect, cuts both ways. I mean here he gives +an affidavit and part of it as the basis leads up to that conclusion. +I should respectfully submit that that conclusion is a statement +of fact—but, if Your Lordship says so, the time will come when +we can ask Your Lordship to draw that conclusion as a matter +of argument ourselves; but, My Lord, on the general position, the +only reason that I have occupied even this much of the Tribunal’s +time is that Article 19 is an important matter in the view of the +Prosecution and, therefore, we have to argue against its being +whittled down. It is the only reason that I’ve taken up the Tribunal’s +time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I just draw your attention to +one point. Sir David has just been mentioning the well-known +legal difference. That is just what I want to base my argument +on, the difference between facts and opinions. Here it is a question +of opinion and please note the following sentence does even go +further; there, the witness is coming to a legal opinion and he is +stating who is responsible; therefore, he is passing some sort of +judgment. Furthermore, I beg you to consider that this is quite +a minor official who, after all, cannot possibly make statements of +such portent to the effect that higher formations in Kiel and some +other places in Germany—he is quite vague—had some sort of +knowledge.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, before the Tribunal +adjourn, might I make a correction and an apology? My Lord, +I thought that a copy in German had been put to the witness +yesterday—of this affidavit; and apparently it was a copy in English. +The original affidavit was sent off on the 6th of May; it was verified +<span class='pageno' title='241' id='Page_241'></span> +over the telephone by Colonel Phillimore and it has not yet arrived. +An English copy was sent and has been processed and the original +will be put in as soon as it arrives. My Lord, I thought that we had +got the original but apparently it has not yet arrived, but it is +an English document put to the defendant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you let Dr. Siemers see the original as +soon as it arrives?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered +Dr. Siemers’ application and it has decided that the passage to +which he objects and which he asks the Tribunal to strike out in the +affidavit of Walter Kurt Dietmann shall not be struck out in view +of Article 19 of the Charter. The passage contains an opinion only, +and the Tribunal will consider that opinion in relation to the whole +of the evidence when it is before the Tribunal and will decide at +that time the probative value of this opinion as well as the probative +value of the other evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I just have...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, may I remind you that you told +us that your re-examination would take, you hoped, about half +an hour?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, I shall conclude very shortly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, in connection with this +Commando decree which we discussed a good deal, Sir David +yesterday put a case to you regarding the attack on the ship <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>. +In this connection I should like to ask you: Do you recall that in +the testimony of Wagner there was the question of a British sailor +named Evans?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And do you recall also that, according to the +affidavit of Flesch, Number D-864, GB-457, Flesch declared, “I am +unaware of the fact that Evans wore a uniform”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I do not need to submit the document +to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, I recall it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall further that it is said in Document +UK-57, submitted on the same day as Wagner’s testimony: +“The British sailor Evans was captured wearing civilian clothing”? +<span class='pageno' title='242' id='Page_242'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. I have the document here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And that was one case where the SD, obeying +the Commando order, committed a murder without the knowledge +of the Navy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes. This man had been apprehended by the SD or +the Police, not by the Navy. He had only been interrogated in the +meantime by the admiral.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The second case of which you are accused is the +sabotage attack on German ships near Bordeaux. I clarified this +situation in Wagner’s testimony the other day.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you recall that his document also states that these men +tried to escape to Spain in civilian clothes?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, that is true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when using the small fighter craft mentioned +yesterday under the command of Vice Admiral Heye, did +our soldiers ever wear civilian clothing?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: No, never.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Always in uniform?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes, always in uniform. These craft were a weapon +just like submarines, speed boats, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As my last point, Mr. President, I should like to +point out that yesterday Colonel Pokrovsky submitted a document, +USSR-460, which deals with the Moscow notes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, the point is that yesterday the +Tribunal made a decision about submitting to the attorneys for +the Defense extracts from USSR-460. Today the prosecutors have +exchanged opinions among themselves; and the Prosecution of the +United States, represented by Mr. Dodd; Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe +for Great Britain; and myself for Russia, have agreed that it is +necessary for us to request you to permit us to read into the record +here today the three brief extracts referring to Dönitz, to Keitel, +and to Jodl so that they will be included in the record. These +are the excerpts which yesterday the Tribunal did not allow to +have read into the record as evidence. If we understood the Tribunal +rightly it was due to lack of time as the session was dragging +on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Due to these circumstances these three extremely important +excerpts—important from our point of view—the accuracy of which +was confirmed yesterday by the Defendant Dönitz, have not been +included in the transcript of the session. For that reason I am +requesting just about 5 minutes time to read these excerpts into +the record today, on behalf of the Prosecution of the three countries. +<span class='pageno' title='243' id='Page_243'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What would be the most convenient course, +Dr. Siemers? Would you like to have them read now so that you +can put any questions upon them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I make some remarks about +this document? The Soviet Delegation has been kind enough to put +the original at my disposal. I perused the original yesterday, and +I looked at the extracts. The Soviet Delegation desires to retain +the original but has also been kind enough to put instead a photostatic +copy of the extracts involved at the disposal of the High +Tribunal. I am completely in agreement with the suggestion, but +I personally do not have the intention of putting any questions +on this document, which is clear to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And so I would like to ask that the resolution +put forth by the High Tribunal yesterday be upheld, that this +should not be read, just as other documents were not read out +either.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the document was originally +in German. Presumably it has been translated into Russian; +it has certainly been translated into English. Unless the French +members of the French Prosecution want it read if it hasn’t been +translated into French there doesn’t seem to be any use in taking +up the time of the Tribunal by reading it into the record. We have +got the document in English, and we have all read it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I think there is one reason. Even if +it is read into the record, it will at least be tomorrow before the +transcript is available for the defendants who are referred to, and +this witness, or this defendant, will be off the stand. If they want +to cross-examine about what he has said about them, then we will +have, I suppose, to bring this defendant back on the stand. I think +we will lose far more time by doing that, rather than now having +Colonel Pokrovsky take 5 minutes to read it. They will all hear +it, and then if they want to examine about it, they can do so +promptly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Dr. Siemers, if you don’t want to ask any questions about it, +you can conclude your re-examination now, and then Colonel +Pokrovsky can read the document. Then any of the other defendants +can question the witness if they want to, upon it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would that not be the best way, Colonel +Pokrovsky?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, certainly. +<span class='pageno' title='244' id='Page_244'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I agree, Mr. President, but I do believe that this +document need not be read, because Mr. Dodd was somewhat +mistaken when he said that the defendants are not familiar with +this document. They and their counsel are thoroughly familiar +with it. I believe everyone knows it, and I do not think that it +needs to be read. However, in the final analysis, it really makes +very little difference to me personally.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If the defendants’ counsel do not want it +read then the Tribunal does not want to have it read unless defendants’ +counsel want to ask questions upon it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I, as defense +counsel for Admiral Dönitz, am not interested in having the +document read. I know the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised that the Defense Counsel +know the document and do not put any value on having it read +nor do they wish to put any questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well then, Mr. Dodd and Colonel Pokrovsky, +it does not seem that it serves any useful purpose to have it read.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, I am satisfied, Your Honor. I have not heard +from Keitel’s attorney; I assume he is satisfied. I am just concerned +that at some later date—a very interesting document to us, of +course—and I am just concerned some question may be raised and +I am also sympathetic to the desires of these defendants not to have +it read publicly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Schacht’s counsel has not spoken either. I think +it might be well, Mr. President, if we had a careful statement from +counsel for each of these men that they do not want to question +or, if so, that we can be completely sure that it will not be +raised again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the defendants’ counsel are all +here or all the defendants are represented and they must clearly +understand what I am saying and I take it from their silence that +they acquiesce in what Dr. Siemers has said, that they do not +wish the document to be read and they do not wish to ask any +questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: I have not understood your decision, My +Lord. Are you permitting me to read into the record these few +excerpts or are you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, Colonel Pokrovsky; I am saying that as +the defendants’ counsel do not wish the document to be read it +need not be read.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>COL. POKROVSKY: We do give a great deal of importance and +significance to this document as it involves not only the interests +<span class='pageno' title='245' id='Page_245'></span> +of the Defense but also the interests of the Prosecution. The document +was accepted by the Tribunal yesterday but for some reason +only a very small part of the characterization given therein by +Admiral Raeder was included in the stenographic record for the +day. I do not see any reason why these excerpts should not be +read into the record now, and why the witness Raeder, who +intimately knew the Defendants Dönitz, Keitel, and Jodl, should +not hear the excerpts here and now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky and Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal +ruled yesterday that it was unnecessary that the document +should be read and the Tribunal adheres to that decision in view +of the fact that the defendants’ counsel do not wish it to be read +and have no questions to put upon it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Yes, Dr. Siemers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I will now conclude my examination +of Admiral Raeder. I do not know whether other questions +will be put to Admiral Raeder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is there any question which has arisen out +of the cross-examination which the defendants’ counsel want to put?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to put two +questions, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Admiral, in cross-examination you +were confronted with orders and memoranda as to the U-boat +warfare.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider yourself +responsible for these decrees dealing with the U-boat warfare which +you issued during your term as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I consider myself fully responsible for all decrees +issued as to the U-boat warfare which took place under my +responsibility as well as every naval operation which I ordered. In +the Naval Operations Staff and together with the officers of the +Naval Operations Staff I worked out these directives; I approved +memoranda and in accordance therewith I gave my orders. The +Commander of the U-boat fleet was solely the tactical commander +of U-boats. He transmitted the orders and he carried through the +details of the operations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, yesterday Sir +David charged you that he could not determine who actually gave +the orders to change the log book of the U-boat which sank the +<span class='it'>Athenia</span>. Admiral Godt testified in answer to my question that he +had issued this order at the request of Admiral Dönitz. Do you +know of any facts which would show this testimony of Admiral +Godt to be incorrect? +<span class='pageno' title='246' id='Page_246'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: Actually I was never concerned with this case. I only +decreed the three points which have come up here several times.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Therefore, you consider +Admiral Godt’s testimony as being correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>RAEDER: I assume that it is correct since everything else he +said was very reliable.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions, +Your Honor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the High Tribunal +I should like to call my first witness, the former Reich Minister +of the Interior, Severing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Severing took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>KARL SEVERING (Witness): Karl Severing. I am 70 years old +and I live at Bielefeld.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait one minute. Will you repeat this oath +after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that +I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You may sit down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, please tell the High Tribunal what +role you played in the Social Democratic Party up until the year +1933 and the principal ministerial posts you held up until the +year 1933.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: At the age of 16½ I entered the labor union movement +and when I was 18 years old I entered the Social Democratic +Party and as a result of that fact I held honorary positions in the +Party at a relatively early age.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the year 1905 I became councillor in the city of Bielefeld. +I was member of the Reichstag from 1907 until 1912; and I again +became a member of the Reichstag and at the same time a member +of the Prussian Diet in 1919. I was in the Reichstag and in the +Prussian Diet until 1933. I was Minister in Prussia from 1920 +until 1921; then again from 1921 to 1926, and from 1930 until 1933; +from 1928 until 1930 I was Reich Minister of the Interior.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When and why did you leave public life?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I retired from official public life in July 1932, and +from political life when the Social Democratic Party was prohibited.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were you arrested when leaving public life in +1933, or perhaps at a later date and, if so, at whose order? +<span class='pageno' title='247' id='Page_247'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I was arrested on the very same day on which the +Enabling Act was scheduled to be read and passed in the Reichstag. +The order for my arrest was signed by the then Minister of the +Interior, Herr Göring, who at that time was also President of the +Reichstag and, if I may utter an opinion, who would have had +the obligation, as President of the Reichstag, to protect the +immunity of the members of the Reichstag. Under breach of this +immunity I was arrested the moment I entered the Reichstag +building.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But you participated in the vote on the Enabling +Act?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The Chairman of the Social Democratic Reichstag +faction had complained to Göring against the treatment to which +I was subjected with the result that I was given leave to vote. But +the voting had already come to a close. However, Reichstag +President Göring still permitted me to give my “no” vote for the +Enabling Act.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You were arrested thereafter but only for a very +short time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: On the next day I had to appear for further interrogations. +I was permitted to leave Berlin on the second day and +was given the order to hold myself ready at my home in Bielefeld +for further interrogations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Despite your well-known anti-Nazi attitude, you +were not arrested later and put in a concentration camp, if I am +not mistaken.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I was never in a concentration camp, thanks to the +respect—and I say this with all modesty—which the old Prussian +officials, my previous subordinates, had for me. At the end of +October 1933 I heard from the Police Chief in Bielefeld that +trouble was brewing for me. The police notified me that they +would not be able to give me any protection and advised me, therefore, +to leave Bielefeld for several months. I followed this advice +and, from October 1933 until the end of March 1934, I lived in +Berlin using a false name. I first stayed with friends, and then +I went to a small Jewish sanatorium at Wannsee. I feared another +arrest in August 1944; according to someone whom I knew in the +police my name was on a list of people who were to be arrested +summarily—men and women who were suspected of having plotted +against Hitler in July 1944.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did you say ’44 or ’34?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: ’44. After the attempted assassination of Hitler +of July 1944. +<span class='pageno' title='248' id='Page_248'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: May I continue?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Please do.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: After the attempted assassination of Hitler orders +were given to the police to arrest certain people. My name was +on the Bielefeld list. Then a police official whom I knew from +the past pointed out that I was close to my seventieth year and +had lost my son in the war. Thus he succeeded in having my name +struck off the list.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Aside from what you have told us now, did +you suffer any further disadvantage at the hands of the National +Socialists?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Well, I was considerably hindered in my movements. +I was not especially surprised that my mail was censored +and my telephone tapped. I considered that as a matter of course. +But I could not even take a trip without being followed and +watched by the police.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If you do not mind, I should like to call your attention to the +fact that in addition to material damages there is also harm to one’s +ideals (ideelle Schädigungen), and in this respect I suffered a great +deal at the hands of the National Socialist Party after it assumed +power. A political measure, taken in connection with the polls of +1932, was used against me, I might say, in a criminal way. They +talked about me and my friend Braun as the “thieves of millions,” +and this epithet was also applied to the members of my family.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, is this witness going to give +any evidence which has relevancy to the defendant’s case?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, bring him to it then as quick as possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Herr Minister, try to be as brief as +possible in this connection. It is of course true that with respect to +your ideals you suffered harm as well, but as the basis of my +examination and your testimony I would like to ascertain whether +serious harm was caused to you and I would like to have you tell +us, but briefly, whether National Socialism...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, what relevancy has this got to +Raeder’s case?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, my intention is to show that +Minister Severing, after a brief description of his life during Nazism +can, without bias, give entirely impartial answers in reference to +Raeder. Since he had no advantages but rather disadvantages at +the hands of the Nazis and on the other side... +<span class='pageno' title='249' id='Page_249'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have dealt sufficiently with the +disadvantages now. Go to the matter which relates to Raeder. He +has given us, from 1933 to 1944, a fairly general account of his life +and that ought to be sufficient.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses the Defendant Raeder, +that in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he violated +the Treaty of Versailles, in the intention of carrying on aggressive +wars, and that behind the back of the Reich Government. In order +to shorten the testimony, I would like to point out to you that it is +an undisputed historical fact that Germany, in developing her +Navy within the framework of the Versailles Treaty, violated the +stipulations of the Versailles Treaty. All that is known to the +Tribunal. Even before this time, the government applied for the +construction of armored cruiser A within the compass of the Versailles +Treaty. A great inner political conflict arose over the +construction of this cruiser and, in connection with a debate before +the Reichstag on this cruiser, the witness made a speech. I have a +brief excerpt from this speech which I should like to submit to you +and which I should like to read. Mr. President, this is Exhibit +Number Raeder-5, to be found in Document Book 1, Page 13. This +is an extract from a speech by the former Reichsminister Karl +Severing before the German Reichstag on 20 January 1928.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Herr Minister, at this period of time +you were not a Minister; rather, you gave this speech as a deputy +of the Social Democratic Party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The extract reads:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Now the armored cruiser. The fact that a government, which +knows precisely what gigantic sums we must raise during +the coming year, should make such demands, is, to say the +least, quite surprising. It says, the Peace Treaty permits it—yes, +but the Peace Treaty also decrees the payment of +reparations. The 9,300,000 marks demanded for this year +will play their decisive part only in the consequences entailed +which would require the raising of several hundred million +marks, which during the next few years seems to me +absolutely impossible. Considering the development of weapons +for naval warfare, I am not convinced of the military value +of armored cruisers. It may be that armored cruisers are the +backbone of the defense at sea, as the government says. But, +to form an active fighting unit (Gefechtskörper), the backbone +must also be made up of other elements, of U-boats +and airplanes; and as long as we are not allowed to build +these, armored cruisers are of very little value even for +defense.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='250' id='Page_250'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Is that extract from the speech correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, that, extract is reproduced correctly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is it right to conclude here that the Social +Democratic Party and you, personally, at that time, were of the +opinion that the Wehrmacht which was granted Germany by the +Versailles Treaty might not be sufficient for a defensive war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Will you please comment on that a little more +extensively.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That the 100,000-man army granted to Germany +was not sufficient even for a defensive war was and is known +today possibly to everyone in Germany concerned with politics. +Germany got into a very bad situation with regard to her eastern +neighbors since the establishment of the Corridor. The insular +position of East Prussia forced Germany even at that time to take +measures which I reluctantly helped to carry out; but the population +of East Prussia had a right to be protected against attacks +which were threatening from the East. I am not speaking about an +aggressive war and I am not speaking of any plans of the Polish +Government; but I would like to refer you to the fact that in the +years 1919, 1920, and 1921, there were aggressive groups in Poland +who set foot on German soil, possibly with the idea of establishing +a <span class='it'>fait accompli</span>...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, this evidence is all a matter +of argument. Not only is it a matter of argument, but we have had +it over and over again from nearly all the defendants and a good +many of their witnesses; and, surely, it is not assisting the Tribunal +in the very least to know what this witness said in 1928 or what +view he took in 1928.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I believe this +will become clear in the following. Minister Severing was a +member of the government that held this cabinet meeting of +18 October 1928. I agree with the High Tribunal that the matters +have been heard frequently—these things only once, however—but +I should like to point out that Sir David even yesterday in cross-examination +accused the defendant, despite his testimony, that, +against the will of the Reich Government and against the wish of +the Parliament, he had violated the Treaty of Versailles. If, therefore, +after the testimony of Raeder, the Prosecution persists in +their opinion, I have no other possibility to prove the incorrectness +of the opinion of the Prosecution than by questioning a +witness who...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The question whether the Treaty of Versailles +was violated is a question of fact and, of course, upon that +<span class='pageno' title='251' id='Page_251'></span> +you can give evidence and you did give evidence through the +Defendant Raeder; but this witness is not talking about the question +of fact. He is arguing that Germany was entitled to defend herself +in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. That is what I understood +his evidence to be and that is a question of argument, not a question +of fact.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, as far as I know juridically...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the class of evidence which has +just been given by this witness will not be listened to by the +Tribunal. If you want to prove facts by him, you can prove them, +but you cannot prove arguments or his views upon arguments.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Could Germany with her Wehrmacht protect +herself against the incursions in Silesia by Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In the year 1920 the Wehrmacht would not have +been able to protect Germany in East Prussia; therefore, it was +necessary to protect the population of East Prussia, and this was +achieved in that I, personally, agreed that all weapons which were +found in East Prussia were to be given to the population. Under +conditions which applied at that time, it was, even for purposes of +inspection, very hard to pass through the Corridor by rail; so that +in 1920, I had to make a tour of inspection by way of water from +Stolpmünde to Pillau. I am mentioning this fact to show the +difficulties of transportation through the Corridor. In 1920 and ’21, +it was not possible for the German Wehrmacht to prevent attacks +of Polish insurgents in Upper Silesia and, I am sorry to say, and +I emphasize “I am sorry” that a certain self-defense had to be +created in order to protect and defend German life and German +property.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, were the measures with regard +to rearmament as they were wanted and accounted for since +January 1928 by Reichswehrminister Gröner based on defensive or +offensive ideas as far as you know Gröner?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: As far as I am acquainted with Gröner and his +own personal way of carrying on his office, everything that he +conceived and carried out was in view of defense.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then this should also apply to the armored +cruiser A. I should like to know why the Social Democratic Party, +which was interested in the idea of defense, was against the +building of this armored cruiser.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In 1928 the Social Democratic Party was against +the building of the armored cruiser as the economic situation did +not warrant expenses which were not absolutely necessary. And +the Social Democratic Party wanted to prove and to show that +<span class='pageno' title='252' id='Page_252'></span> +they did everything within their power in order to make the much-discussed +disarmament a reality. They did not believe that the +building of an armored cruiser would be a favorable gesture for the +bringing about of appropriate negotiations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On 28 June 1928 a new Reich Government was +formed. Müller was Reich Chancellor; Stresemann was Foreign +Minister, and you were Minister of the Interior. What position +did your government take to the then pending problem of universal +disarmament stipulated in Versailles, or to the then pending +problem of rearmament by Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have just made a reference to this problem. We +were of the opinion in the Social Democratic Party, even after +entering the Müller government, that we would have to use all +our efforts in order to solve just this problem. In September of +1928 the then Reich Chancellor Müller, replacing the Foreign +Minister Stresemann who was ill, went to Geneva in order to +bring this problem up before the League of Nations. Müller made +a very resolute speech which, if I remember correctly, was received +very coolly by Allied statesmen; so that any practical suggestions +for the realization of disarmament could not be hoped for in the +near future.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, in July 1928 you spoke with +Reichswehrminister Gröner about the budget and specifically about +the fact that secret budgets of the Wehrmacht, on the armored +cruiser and so forth, had become known. What attitude did you +take in this connection and what were the results following your +agreement with Gröner?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In order to answer this question I would like to +touch again on the extract from my speech, which you just submitted +to the High Tribunal. In the same Reichstag session in which +I gave this speech, the Reichswehrminister Gröner appeared for +the first time as successor of Gessler. I had said a few farewell +words in honor of Gessler who was leaving. I greeted the new +Minister with the remark that my political friends would show +him respect, but that he would have to earn our confidence first. +It was probably while thinking of this remark that Gröner came +up to me in the first session of the Müller Government and said +that he was looking forward to a sincere collaboration with me. +I quoted a passage from <span class='it'>Iphigenie</span> on that occasion, “May there be +truth between us.” Only complete sincerity would make possible +fruitful co-operation, I said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks that this +is an absolute waste of time and this speech of the witness is +entirely irrelevant. Why do you not ask him some questions which +have some bearings on the case of Raeder? +<span class='pageno' title='253' id='Page_253'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that the Prosecution +has made the accusation that the rebuilding was undertaken +by means of a secret budget and that a secret rearmament was +carried on with the idea of starting wars of aggression. It is not +quite clear to me how I can cross-examine the witness in any +other way than by asking him how these secret budgets, which to +a certain extent are practically identical with violations of the +Versailles Treaty, were dealt with in his government. That is +exactly what I just questioned the witness on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This speech that you have drawn our attention +to is simply a speech in which he said that he did not think that +armored cruisers were of any use. That is the only meaning of +the speech, except insofar as it refers to the fact that reparations +had not been paid. For the rest it simply says that armored +cruisers, in his opinion, are of no use.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I may not and do not wish to +make a plea here. In the speech which I read something else is said. +It says there that the Social Democratic Party was against the +building of this armored cruiser, because of economic reasons and +not because of strategic reasons, and that if an armored...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What has that got to do with a charge of +making an aggressive war in 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I did not raise the accusation of +an aggressive war; the Prosecution did that, but I have to protect +my client against the accusation that in 1928 he had intentions of +carrying on an aggressive war; I assert that he had no intention of +that sort, that the Reich Government knew about the violations of +the Treaty, that the Reich Government took the responsibility for +them, and the testimony of the Minister will show that these are +actual facts which were challenged only yesterday.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Ask him some direct questions on issues of +fact. Then the Tribunal will listen to them if they are relevant, but +the Tribunal considers that the evidence of his speech that you +have been dealing with is an utter waste of time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I shall try to be brief. As a result I shall put +questions to the witness which he will answer one by one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] You just said that you demanded of +Gröner confidence and absolute truthfulness. Did you ask him in +this connection for enlightenment on the secret budgets and the +violations of the Treaty of Versailles which had taken place up to +that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I specifically asked him for enlightenment since, +in January of 1928, the then Reich Chancellor Marx had frankly +admitted that under Kapitän Lohmann in the Navy Department +<span class='pageno' title='254' id='Page_254'></span> +there had been misrepresentations in the budget which could not +be in accordance with good bookkeeping and political honesty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Gröner reply?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Gröner then told me that he had the intention of +discussing these matters at a cabinet meeting and of clarifying all +these matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were the commanders-in-chief of the two +branches of the Wehrmacht to be present at this meeting?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: On 18 October they were to appear and did appear.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, when did you meet Admiral +Raeder for the first time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The first official contact, according to my recollection, +was made the beginning of October 1928, probably on the day +when he paid me an official visit on my assuming office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-6, I submitted to the +High Tribunal, as the High Tribunal will probably recall, a speech +by Raeder dated 23 January 1928. There was a covering letter with +this document. This letter will now be submitted to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] According to this document, did your +meeting with Raeder take place on 5 October 1928, 5 days after the +appointment of Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: This discussion probably took place on that day. +May I mention...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Just a moment, Herr Minister. I think it will be +safer if you look at the letter. There it says: “Following our discussion +of 5 October...” May I ask you to confirm to the High Tribunal +that this report made by Raeder was saved by you and that it is +a true and authentic copy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The letter which I put at your disposal is the +original of the letter by Raeder. It is in accordance with the +incidents which you just mentioned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then, on 5 October this conversation with Raeder +did take place. Were the conversations between you and Raeder +basically in accordance with the ideas expressed in this speech?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall that in this speech Raeder declared +emphatically that a war of aggression was a crime?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I remember that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you on the occasion of this conversation tell +Raeder that you had agreed with Gröner that the actual violations +of the Treaty of Versailles would have to be discussed and +clarified and that a cabinet meeting would have to be held? +<span class='pageno' title='255' id='Page_255'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not recall this detail, but it was quite probable.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you demand of Raeder that between yourself +and him there should be absolute sincerity and truthfulness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Of Raeder, too, but especially of the chiefs of +the Army.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As a result of this discussion with Raeder, did +you have the impression that you could work with Raeder in a +satisfactory manner and that he would tell you the truth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I had that impression.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On 18 October 1928 the cabinet meeting which +we have already mentioned took place. May I ask you to describe +briefly that cabinet meeting, provided it is agreeable to the High +Tribunal to have the witness picture this session. I believe that a +description of this session would save time, rather than to have +me ask single questions. Therefore, Herr Minister, be brief in +telling us what happened.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: At this session, members of the cabinet were +familiarized with the details of what might be considered a concealment +of the budget or violations of the Versailles Treaty. Both +gentlemen, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Commander-in-Chief +of the Navy, spoke, if I remember rightly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did the entire cabinet attend?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, perhaps with the exception of one or two +members who were ill, but it was a session which in general might +be called a plenary session.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The principal members were present?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were Müller, Stresemann present?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot tell you whether Stresemann was present. +He was still ill in September and whether he had recovered by +18 October, I cannot say. But I might add, that if Herr Stresemann +was not present, certainly someone else was present as an +authorized deputy from the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Admiral Raeder and General Heye at this +meeting expressly give the assurance to the cabinet—as I remember, +in form of an affidavit—that only those violations had occurred +which were mentioned by them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Whether that was proclaimed in a solemn manner +by affidavit or by word of honor, I cannot say; but, in any event, +at the request of the Reich Chancellor and especially at my own +request, they said that no further violations would take place. +<span class='pageno' title='256' id='Page_256'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: They assured you specifically that there would +be no further violations without the knowledge of the Reich +Government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, exactly that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And over and above that, they stated that now +the Cabinet knew about everything?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: A declaration to that effect was made?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, such a declaration was made.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were important matters connected with these +secret budgets or violations of the Treaty of Versailles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I may state here and have to admit even that +since I was used to violations of the Versailles Treaty, I was +especially interested in the extent of the violations with regard to +the sum. I wanted to know what I could do in my new capacity +against secret arms-bearers and against illegal organizations; and +I asked what was the total sum involved. I was thereupon told—and +I believe that this was set down and confirmed in writing later—that +perhaps 5½ to 6 million marks was the amount involved in +these secret budgets.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you remember the budget figures +of those days better than I do. What can we gather from these +figures? Must we conclude that they were grave violations involving +aggressive intentions or may we gather that in the final analysis +they were just trifles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not have the figures as they apply to the +budget plans of the Navy and the Army. I cannot quote the figures +from memory. But the impression I gained from the reports of +the two Wehrmacht leaders was that only trifles were involved. +It was this impression which caused me to assume a certain political +responsibility for these things, and especially in view of the fact +that we were assured that further concealment of budget items or +other violations were not to occur in future.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember that Gröner at this session +declared that the small infringements of the Treaty dealt purely +with defense measures, with antiaircraft guns, coastal fortifications, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot give you the details today, but I might +remind you that all the speeches which Gröner made at the time +when he was Defense Minister were along these general lines. In +all of his speeches in the Reichstag, Herr Gröner expressly declared +that he was an advocate of sound pacifism. In answer to your +<span class='pageno' title='257' id='Page_257'></span> +question I reply that Gröner’s statements, and also my own, were +based on defense and defensive measures.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In other words at the end of this session, the +Reich Government expressly accepted the responsibility for these +infringements and the small secret budget items?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: To the extent that we have mentioned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder in the future adhere to the clear +directives of the Reich Government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot answer that in a positive manner, but +I can say that I did not observe any violations on the part of the +Navy in respect to the agreements during my term of office as +Minister of the Interior.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Are you personally of the opinion, since you +know Raeder sufficiently well, that he kept the promise he made to +you not to resort to secret violations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Raeder gave me the impression that he was an +honest man and I believed that he would keep his word.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Just one more question, Herr Minister. Of +course, you cannot remember the details, but do you perhaps recall +that on the occasion of the cabinet meeting of 18 October there +was discussion about a Dutch firm which was designing U-boats?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, I cannot give you details of the discussion; but +I do know that at that period of time, there was much talk—either +in another cabinet meeting or by a subcommittee of the Reichstag +or by a different parliamentarian body—of experimental workshops +which had been established for the Army and the Navy in Russia, +Sweden, and Holland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Purely experimental workshops?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I can say only that there was talk to this effect. +Whether these experimental workshops had been established I +cannot tell you from my own experience.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, could Germany, by reason of +governmental discussions going on at the time, hope that some +day, despite the Versailles Treaty, she would be permitted to +build U-boats?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The leading statesmen...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, how can he answer that there +was a hope that they would be allowed to build U-boats? That is +what your question was, was it not; was there a hope?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I know, Mr. President, these questions were +already dealt with by the governments which obtained through the +years 1928 to 1932; and I believe that Stresemann carried on these +<span class='pageno' title='258' id='Page_258'></span> +discussions. Since Stresemann is no longer alive, I would like to +ask Herr Severing on this point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It seems to the Tribunal that it is mere +political gossip.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, on whom did it depend what was +brought up in the Reichstag? Raeder is accused of acting behind +the back of the Reichstag. Who submitted this to the Reichstag? +Did Raeder do that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not quite follow you. Who submitted the +budget, you mean?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The budget went through the hands of the experts +of the various Ministries and the entire Cabinet, and the budget +was submitted to the Reichstag by the Cabinet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The matter of dealing with the budget before +the Reichstag was a matter for the Reich Government and not for +the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Inasmuch as a budget item was submitted to the +Reichstag, the competent Reich Minister took care of it in the main +committee and the plenary session of the Reichstag, but the political +responsibility was assumed by the entire Reich Cabinet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It was never alleged as to the Defendant +Raeder that he had submitted the budget to the Reichstag; it was +never put to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, yesterday it was asserted...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Don’t argue! Go on with any other questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall whether at the end of 1929 you +talked with a member of the government with regard to the +various leading personalities in the Wehrmacht, and that you made +a comment which subsequently became known concerning certain +personalities?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, it is correct that on one occasion I had been +asked to give a personal estimate of certain military personalities. +I named Gröner and Raeder in this connection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, how many concentration camps +do you know of?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: How many do I know of now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry; not now. How many did you know +of before the collapse of Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Perhaps 6 to 8. +<span class='pageno' title='259' id='Page_259'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you know before the collapse +of Germany or rather did you know in 1944 already about the mass +murders which have been dealt with so frequently in this +proceeding?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I gained knowledge of concentration camps when +murder, if I may say so, became professional and when I heard of +a few cases which affected me personally very deeply. First of all, +I was told that the Police President of Altona, a member of the +Reichstag and a Social Democrat of the right wing of the Party, +had been murdered in the concentration camp at Papenburg. +Another friend of mine, the chairman of the Miners Union, Fritz +Husemann, is said to have been murdered shortly after his being +committed to the same concentration camp. Another friend of +mine, Ernst Heimann, was beaten to death in the Oranienburg +Camp according to the reports received by his family.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Dachau was known even in the north of Germany as a concentration +camp. Some Jewish inmates returned from Buchenwald +in the spring of 1939, and in that way I learned of this camp. +Columbia House at Berlin I figured to be a concentration camp also.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That was my only knowledge of camps and their horrors up +until the time when the London radio started to report about concentration +camps. I perhaps might mention another case. In 1944 +a friend of mine, a member of the Reichstag, Stefan Meier, who +had served 3 years in the penitentiary, was put into a concentration +camp in or near Linz. After a brief stay there he was murdered, +according to reports received by his family.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you just heard of these and similar +individual cases?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You were not familiar with the fact that thousands +were murdered every day in gas chambers or otherwise in the +East?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I believed I should tell the High Tribunal only of +those cases which were, so to say, authentically reported to me. +Everything I learned of later through indirect reports, from my +friend Seger or from the book of the now Generalintendant Langhoff, +had been told me but I had no possibility of checking up on +their accuracy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you and your Party friends +have the possibility...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, are you going to finish this +examination, or are you going on? Do you see the clock? +<span class='pageno' title='260' id='Page_260'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I should like to leave the decision to the +High Tribunal as to whether we shall have a recess now. I understand +there will be a cross-interrogation so that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but presumably you know what +questions you are going to ask; I don’t.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I cannot say exactly what answer the witness is +going to give. It might take perhaps another 10 minutes, Your Honor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn now till a quarter +past 2 o’clock.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='261' id='Page_261'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Saturday +morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, Mr. Dodd, could you tell us what the position is with +reference to the documents of the Defendants Von Schirach, Sauckel, +and Jodl?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: As far as Von Schirach is concerned, we are waiting +for a ruling on those documents concerning which we were heard on +Saturday. I’m sorry, that was on Seyss-Inquart. I wasn’t sure the +documents were ready.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>These documents are all ready; they are all translated and in +book form.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will it be necessary to have any further +discussion of them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I believe not, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then, we can take it that we +needn’t have another argument about those documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, Sir, I comprehend no need for any further argument +on Von Schirach’s documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With reference to Sauckel, I have asked our French colleagues +what the situation is, since they have the primary responsibility. +And so far as the Prosecution is concerned, I am told that Mr. Herzog +of the French Prosecution staff is on his way here and he will +be able to report more accurately.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, we can mention that at a later stage +then. Schirach at any rate then is ready to go on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: He is ready to go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Sir David has the information about the Defendant +Jodl.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Roberts.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the position with regard to Jodl’s +documents is that Dr. Jahrreiss produced for me a draft book, just +before Easter, which had a certain number of documents, all except +four of which had already been exhibited, and therefore no objection +could be taken to them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My Lord, the other four were all short. Two, I thought, were +objectionable on the ground that they referred to alleged war crimes +by one of the Allies. But, My Lord, they were so short that I thought +the best course would be for them to be translated—they were only +<span class='pageno' title='262' id='Page_262'></span> +a page or so, each of them—so that when the books had been translated +any objection could be taken, and then the Tribunal could +shortly decide the matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, as there are only four of them and only +two which might be objected to, that can be dealt with when we +come to hear the case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there are only two.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We needn’t have any special hearing for it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: No, My Lord, certainly not. It could be disposed +of in a very few minutes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): +Mr. President, I should like to say one more word about these Jodl +documents. We are having difficulties over one document. It is the +affidavit of Lohmann, which we submitted in German, but which +was not translated into English for us on the grounds that only such +documents could be translated which the Prosecution had already +accepted; and the Prosecution had adopted the standpoint that it +cannot express any opinion on that document as it has not been +translated into English.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have mentioned this in a brief petition to the Tribunal, and I +hope that the Tribunal will settle the matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Lohmann’s affidavit which is very +short—it goes principally to character—and it is really not objectionable, +but I had to point out that it hadn’t actually been allowed +by the Tribunal in their order. The Tribunal ordered it in +regard to...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If it is accepted in the translation, that is all +that is necessary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I entirely agree, and it is all on one +page.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Let it be translated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, it may be convenient +for me to indicate to the Tribunal at this stage of Raeder’s +case that with regard to the witness Lohmann, the Prosecution does +not now desire to cross-examine that witness in view of the documents +which are before the Court, and the fact that the matters his +affidavit dealt with were dealt with yesterday by my learned friend +Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in his cross-examination of Raeder, and +finally, in view of the passages of time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the Prosecution +want to cross-examine Lohmann?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord. +<span class='pageno' title='263' id='Page_263'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to +ask any questions of Lohmann?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Very well, then I understand that the witness Lohmann is being +kept here and perhaps a message could be given to the Marshal +that he needn’t remain.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. JACQUES B. HERZOG (Assistant Prosecutor for the French +Republic): Mr. President, in the name of the French Prosecution +I should like to say a word about the documents presented by +Sauckel’s defense. I have no objection to the presentation of these +documents with the reservation, of course, that a ruling on them +be made after they are presented. We have no objection to the +documents being translated or presented.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary or desirable for +there to be a special hearing with reference to the admissibility, +or can that be done in the course of the Defendant Sauckel’s case? +At the moment I apprehend that the documents have been looked +at for the purpose of translation. They have now been translated. +If you think it necessary that there should be any special hearing +before the case begins, as to admissibility, we should like to know. +Otherwise they would be dealt with in the course of the case, +in the course of Sauckel’s case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. HERZOG: I think, Mr. President, it will be sufficient if the +Tribunal deals with these documents during the course of the +defendant’s case. I do not think we need a special hearing as far +as these documents are concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, as far as I have been able to +ascertain, you have inadvertently not yet answered one of my +questions clearly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With reference to the concentration camps you said that you +had heard of certain individual cases, and you named the individual +cases. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I just want to ask +you in conclusion: did you hear of the mass murders which have +been mentioned in this Trial, whereby at Auschwitz, for instance, +an average of about 2,000 persons a day were exterminated in +the gas chambers? Were you in possession of this knowledge before +the collapse, or did you not know anything about that either?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I knew nothing whatsoever about these mass +murders, which only became known in Germany after the collapse +of the Hitler regime, partly through announcements in the press +and partly through trials.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, what could you and your +friends in the Party do during the National Socialist regime, against +<span class='pageno' title='264' id='Page_264'></span> +the National Socialist terror which you have partly mentioned, and +did anyone abroad support you in any way in this respect?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: If you will limit the question to asking what I and +my political friends could do and did do after 30 January to combat +the Hitler regime, then I can only say—but little. If there was any +question of resistance against the Hitler regime, then that resistance +was not a centrally organized one. It was restricted to the extent +that in various cities the opponents of the Nazis met to consider +how one might, at least by propaganda, overcome the mental terror. +No open resistance was possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But perhaps I should here draw your attention to the following: +On 30 January I personally made a decisive attempt—or rather an +attempt which, in my opinion, might have proved decisive—to +oppose the Hitler regime. In the autumn of 1931 I had an interview +with the Chief of the Army Command, Von Hammerstein, during +which Von Hammerstein explained to me that the Reichswehr +would not allow Hitler to usurp the seat of the President of the +State. I remembered that conference, and on 30 January 1933 +I inquired whether Von Hammerstein would be prepared to grant +me an interview. I wanted to ask him, during that interview, +whether he was still of the opinion that the Reichswehr would not +only declare itself to be against the Hitler regime, but would +oppose such a regime by force of arms.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Hammerstein replied to the effect that, in principle, +he would be prepared to have such an interview with me, but +that the moment was not a propitious one. The interview never +took place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If you were to ask me whether in their efforts to fight the Hitler +regime, at least by propaganda, my political friends had received +any support from foreign personalities whom one might have called +anti-Fascists, then I must say—unfortunately no. On the contrary, +we quite often noticed, with much sorrow, that members of the +English Labor Party, not officials but private individuals, were +Hitler’s guests and that they returned to England to praise the then +Chancellor Hitler as a friend of peace. I mention Philipp Snowden +in that connection and the <span class='it'>doyen</span> of the Labor Party, Lansbury. In +this connection I would like to draw your attention to the following +facts: In the year...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The attitude of political parties in other +countries has nothing to do with any question we have to decide, +absolutely nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this is sufficient. I have no further +questions to ask, Herr Minister, and I thank you. +<span class='pageno' title='265' id='Page_265'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Minister Severing, during your term of office +was the figure of 100,000 men, conceded by the Peace Treaty of +Versailles for a normal army, ever exceeded?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have no official knowledge of that. I would +assume, however, that that was not the case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Do you know at all whether, at the end of +1932, the League of Nations made a promise or held out prospects +that this Army of 100,000 could be increased to 300,000 men?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Here too I am unable to give you any official +information. I can, however, give the following explanation: In +1932 I received a letter from a party friend of mine, Dr. Rudolf +Breitscheid, who was a member of the League of Nations Delegation +and in which he mentioned rumors of that kind; but he also added +other information...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we don’t think that rumors +are relevant in the Trial. He says he can’t give us any official +information. He then begins to give us rumors. Well, we don’t +want to hear rumors.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, what the witness is now saying +is rather more than a rumor and I think you will probably be able +to judge for yourself when he has entirely answered the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He is speaking of rumors. If you have any +fresh question to ask him, you can ask him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did the increase of the Army from 100,000 +to 300,000 men ever assume any palpable shape in the sense that +the question was discussed elsewhere, too?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have just told you that Dr. Breitscheid was a +member of the League of Nations Delegation and that his information +to me was not a fabric of his own invention. That information +stated that an extension of the Army had been envisioned but +that this extension would probably be made at the expense of the +police. Dr. Breitscheid informed me accordingly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much, I have no further +questions to ask.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: You have just told us that you had no knowledge +of the Jewish mass murders in Auschwitz before the collapse. +Did you have any knowledge of other measures or deeds perpetrated +against Jews which you could define as criminal?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I experienced one such case personally. In 1944 a +friend of mine in Bielefeld, Karl Henkel, was arrested and transferred +to a labor camp near Emden, and he was shot on the +third day.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you know who arrested him, what authority? +<span class='pageno' title='266' id='Page_266'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: He was arrested by the Bielefeld Gestapo.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did that occur in connection with some large scale +action or was it an individual case?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: It appeared to me to be an individual case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did you hear of a number of such individual +cases at that time, that is in 1944?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In 1944 I did not hear of any individual cases of +murder, but I did hear of deportations from Westphalian towns to +unknown destinations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: What authorities dealt with these deportations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot say for certain, but I assume that it was +the Gestapo.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Are you of the opinion that considerable sections +of the population knew of these occurrences?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: You mean, of the deportations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: They usually took place quite publicly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Are you of the opinion that the people were +generally just as well acquainted with these events as the members +of the organizations as, for instance, the ordinary SS man, or would +you say that the ordinary SS man knew more than other people?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Oh yes. He was informed of the places of destination +of these transports.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: But I understood you to say, that the convoys +were not escorted by the SS; you said it was the Gestapo.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I have just stated that I assumed that the +Gestapo had conducted the arrests and the lootings, but I did not +receive any assurances that this was exclusively the work of the +Gestapo.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And as to the other measures—apart from such +deportations—which might be called a kind of local pogrom, have +I understood you to say that you did not hear of them often?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Local pogroms occurred in November 1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did you, during the execution of such measures, +of which we have frequently heard, make your own observations +or did you remain at home?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I remained at home. I only saw the results of these +pogroms afterwards in the shape of destroyed Jewish firms, and +in the remains of the synagogues.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And to which organizations or groups do you +attribute these events of November 1938? +<span class='pageno' title='267' id='Page_267'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: My own judgment would not have any decisive +value, but I tell you quite frankly, it was the SA or the SS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And what makes you think that it was precisely +these two groups?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Because the members of these groups, in my home +town of Bielefeld, were called the instigators of the synagogue fires.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: By whom?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: They were indicated by name by the population in +general.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: You knew about the concentration camps. Can +you still remember when you heard about them for the first time? +It is important at least to determine the year.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No. I cannot tell you that at the present moment. +I can only reply to your question by referring to individual dates. +The first murder in a concentration camp became known to me +when I heard that, in the Papenburg Concentration Camp, the +former member of the German Reichstag and Police President of +Altona had been shot. That could have been either in 1935 or 1936, +I am no longer sure when.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And later, did you hear of many other such +cases, or did you have personal knowledge of them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: From personal knowledge which is so certain that +I could give it with a clear conscience to the Tribunal only in the +cases I mentioned this morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Were you told that concentration camps were +places in which the political opponents of the regime were to be +interned without anything worse happening to them than loss of +liberty?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Whether I was told that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Whether you were told that, whether you heard +that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No. On the contrary, I heard that concentration +camps meant to the population the very incarnation of all that is +terrible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: What do you mean by “population”? Do you +also mean those sections of the population who had some official +connection with the Party: small Party members, small SA men +and small members of the SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot say anything about that since I conversed +nearly exclusively with opponents of the system. +<span class='pageno' title='268' id='Page_268'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that these opponents with whom +you conversed presented a united front against anyone who wore +a party emblem or a badge of some organization?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No. This question upon which you are dwelling +affects wide sections of the population, their general humanitarian +feeling, and their feeling of indignation about conditions in the +camps, as and when the facts became known.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: I asked my question with the intention of +hearing whether this feeling of indignation was noticeable even in +people who actually wore the emblem of the Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I assume so, but I cannot offer it to the Tribunal +as a fact.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: But were even these people exposed to the considerable +pressure which you have alluded to?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: They probably felt that their Party membership +rendered them, in a certain sense, immune.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that many people became members +in order to benefit by this immunization?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I believe so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: I heard that you yourself were a member of the +NSV; is that true?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Is it true that you were arrested after 20 July +1944?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have already answered that question this morning. +I was not arrested.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: You were never arrested at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, with the exception of the one case which +I also mentioned this morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did you at any time express the opinion that +what had been achieved in Germany in the social sphere after +1933 did, to a considerable extent, represent the ideal of previous +governments?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes, I expressed this as follows: “What was new +was not good, and what was good was not new.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you believe that any German, be he a Party +member, a member of the SS or not, must have had any knowledge +of events at Auschwitz of which you yourself knew nothing at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No. He would not necessarily have to possess this +knowledge. I would not go so far as to say that. But he might, +perhaps, have known about it. +<span class='pageno' title='269' id='Page_269'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And what exactly do you mean by “He might, +perhaps, have known about it”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Through guards escorting the transport echelons. +They did not always remain in the area of the concentration camps; +they usually returned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: And if they were sworn to the strictest secrecy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Then they could not tell anything.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Do you know of cases where people were condemned +for speaking of such matters?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: Did you ever hear anything about the activities +of the “special courts”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, in any case I heard nothing in connection with +these particular activities of the “special courts.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. HAENSEL: But the sentences pronounced against people +who listened to foreign broadcasts (Schwarzhörer) and to people +accused of spreading so-called false rumors, were published very +often in the papers. Did you never read them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I have only one question to ask +you. You told us this morning that in 1919 you were a member +of the Weimar National Assembly. May I ask what the attitude +of the National Assembly was—particularly of the faction of the +Social Democrats of whom you too were a leader—towards the +problem of the Austrian “Anschluss”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: During the time of the sessions of the Weimar +National Assembly I was Reich and State Commissioner for the +Rhineland and Westphalia, and was seldom able to participate in +the debates of the Weimar National Assembly. I therefore have +no detailed knowledge as to how these matters were formulated or +expressed. But one thing I do know and that is, that it was practically +the unanimous wish of the Assembly to include a paragraph, or +an article in the Constitution, ratifying the “Anschluss” of Austria +to Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Herr Minister, you have told the Tribunal that +in 1928 the Defendant Raeder assured you solemnly that there +would be no further violations of the Treaty of Versailles without +the knowledge of the Reich Cabinet. Did Raeder fulfill that +assurance? +<span class='pageno' title='270' id='Page_270'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have already stated this morning that I cannot +answer that in any positive sense. I can only state that violations +of the agreement of 18 October 1928 by the Naval Command did +not come to my knowledge.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did you know, for instance, of the construction +in Cadiz, in Spain, of a 750-ton U-boat under German direction +between the years 1927 and 1931?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the authority for that statement of +fact is the Document D-854.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And, Herr Minister, did you know that after its completion in +1931 that U-boat carried out trial runs under German direction +and with German personnel?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No, I did not know anything about that either.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think he said he didn’t know of any +violations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I am putting to you certain matters, and I suggest +to you, Herr Minister, that it may well be that you were being +deceived during this time. Do you agree with me about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I would not deny the possibility of deception, but +I must very definitely declare that I did not know anything of the +construction of a submarine.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at the Document C-156. +This is a new extract from Captain Schüssler’s <span class='it'>Fight of the Navy +against Versailles</span>. You will see that the following entry appears +on Pages 43 and 44.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In 1930 Bartenbach succeeded, in Finland also, in making +preparations for the construction of a U-boat answering to +the military demands of the German Navy. The Naval Chief +of Staff, Admiral Dr.h.c. Raeder, decided, as a result of the +reports of the Chief of the General Naval Office, Konteradmiral +Heusinger Von Waldegg, and of Captain Bartenbach, +to supply the means required for the construction of the +vessel in Finland. A 250-ton plan was chosen for this U-boat, +so that the amount of 1½ million Reichsmark was sufficient +for carrying out the project.</p> + +<p>“The fundamental intention was to create a type of U-boat +which would permit the inconspicuous preparation of the +largest possible number of units which could be assembled at +shortest possible notice.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Herr Minister, did you know that 1½ million Reichsmark were +spent in 1930 in connection with this U-boat construction? +<span class='pageno' title='271' id='Page_271'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have stated this morning that I was Minister in +the Reich Ministry of the Interior from 1928 to 1930. I consider it +necessary to determine these dates a bit more precisely. I resigned +on 30 March 1930. If the year 1930 is mentioned in a general way, +then it is not impossible that everything mentioned here was +carried out after 30 March 1930.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You have said that the rearmament that went +on when you were connected with the Government of Germany +was purely defensive. When did you realize that the Nazi Government’s +rearmament was not defensive but aggressive? At what +date did you come to that conclusion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: From 30 January 1933 on. That both the choice and +the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of the Reich meant war, +was not in the least doubted by me and my political friends.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: So that you realized from the first day of Nazi +power that the Nazi Government intended to use force or the threat +of force to achieve its political aims; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not know if knowledge and conviction are +identical. I was convinced of it, and so were my political friends.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about +the Defendant Von Papen. Did Papen use force in carrying out the +Putsch which brought him to power in July 1932?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Von Papen did not personally exercise such force, +but he did order it. When, on the morning of 20 July 1932, I refused +to surrender voluntarily the office of the Prussian Ministry of the +Interior to the man who had been appointed by Von Papen as my +successor, I explained to him that I had no intention of doing so +and in order to make my protest more emphatic, I pointed out +that I would only give way to force. And then force was used in +the evening of 20 July in my office. The newly appointed police +president of Berlin appeared in my office, accompanied by two +police officers. I asked these gentlemen whether they were authorized +by the President of the Reich or by the Reich Chancellor to carry +out this mission. When they answered “yes,” I stated that I would +leave my office rather than cause the shedding of blood.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did the Defendant Papen, when he secured +power, purge the police and the government of anti-Nazis?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Yes. There are numerous indications that the intention +existed to purge the police of all republican elements and to +replace them with men who were first devoted to Von Papen and +then to the National Socialists.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one or two questions about +the Defendant Göring. +<span class='pageno' title='272' id='Page_272'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Defendant Göring has stated, and the entry is on Page 5837 +of the transcript of the proceedings (Volume IX, Page 258), that +the institution of protective custody existed in Germany before the +Nazis came into power. Is that true?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I would say that the institution of protective custody +did exist, theoretically, and it was last formulated in the Prussian +Police Administrative Law, in Paragraph 15. During my term of +office protective custody was never applied in normal civilian life. +The regulations in Paragraph 15 of the Police Administrative Law +stipulated quite definitely that if anybody was taken into protective +custody the police administration was obliged to bring him before +the courts within 24 hours. This procedure is in no way identical +with that protective custody, the threat of which for decades +remained suspended over the peaceful citizens of the State.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And, of course, there were no concentration +camps in pre-Nazi Germany, I take it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Never.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: How many of your political associates and colleagues +of the Social Democratic Party were murdered in concentration +camps while Göring was still Chief of the Gestapo?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: It is very difficult to make an estimate. You might +say 500, you might also say 2,000. Reliable information is now +being collected. My estimate is that at least 1,500 Social Democrats, +or trade-union officials, or editors were murdered.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And how many Communist leaders do you +think were murdered during Göring’s period of power over the +Gestapo?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I would assume that if you include among the Communist +leaders also such trade union officials, who considered +themselves members of the Communist Party, then approximately +the same figure would be reached.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did Göring personally have any knowledge of +these murders?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That I cannot say. If I were to answer that question, +then I should have to ask myself what I would have done +in case it had been one of my functions to administer camps in +which the fate of tens of thousands was being decided.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am not sure whether it is of any interest to the Tribunal if +I were to give you one or two examples from my own experience.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In 1925 I had to create a camp for refugees from Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You need not trouble to go into that, Herr +Minister. +<span class='pageno' title='273' id='Page_273'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: No? At any rate I would have considered it my +first and foremost task to inquire whether, in the camps which +I had installed, the principles of humanitarianism were being +adhered to. I was under the impression that this was not being +done. I always reminded my police officials that they were servants +of the people and that everyone in those camps should be humanely +treated. I told them that never again should the call resound in +Germany, “Protect us from the police.” (“Schutz vor Schutzleuten”). +I myself demanded punishment for police or other officials when +I was under the impression that defenseless prisoners were being +ill-treated by members of the police.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: As Minister of the Interior, did you become +familiar with the organized terror of the SA against the non-Nazi +population of Germany in the years after 1921?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Oh yes. Keeping an eye on the so-called armed +organizations was one of my most important tasks during my term +of office in Prussia. The roughest of all the armed organizations +proved to be the SA. They sang songs such as: “Clear the streets +for the Brown Battalions” and with the same arrogance with which +they sang these songs, they forcibly became masters of the streets, +wherever they encountered no adversary worth mentioning. Another +rowdy song of theirs seemingly illustrated their program: “Hang +the Jews and shoot the bigwigs.” Wherever the SA could exercise +terror unhindered, they raged and blustered in such style. They +waged beer-hall battles with people of different opinion. These +were not the customary skirmishes between political opponents +during election fights. No, this was organized terror. During the +first Jewish boycott in 1933, they stood on guard to frighten those +customers from buying in department stores who were accustomed +to buy in these stores. As the Tribunal already know, they organized +the terror actions of 8 November 1938. In 1930 they also damaged +numerous Jewish shops in Berlin, possibly as a worthy prelude to +the convening of the Reichstag into which 107 National Socialists +entered at the time, as we know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Finally, I want to ask you one or two questions +about the Defendant Schacht.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>When did you first hear of Schacht’s relations with the Nazi +leaders?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: In 1931 I received information from the police +administration in Berlin, that interviews had been taking place +between Mr. Schacht and the leaders of the National Socialist +German Workers Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did you have any connections with Schacht +in 1944? +<span class='pageno' title='274' id='Page_274'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: If the matter is of any interest here to anybody, +I actually refused these connections. Schacht—although I held him +in high esteem as an economic expert—was known to me as a +rather unreliable person in political matters. By joining the Harzburg +Front, Schacht betrayed the cause of democracy. This was not +only an act of ingratitude, for it was only through the Democrats +that he ever reached the post of President of the Reichsbank, but it +was also a great mistake since he and others of the same social +standing by joining the Harzburg Front first made the National +Socialists—so to speak—socially acceptable.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I could not, for this very reason, agree to any co-operation with +Schacht on 20 July 1944, and when in March 1943 I was asked to +join a government which was to overthrow Hitler, I categorically +refused to do so, giving Schacht’s machinations and sundry other +circumstances as my excuse.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: What was your reason for that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have just indicated these reasons. My friend +Leuschner, who was hanged, together with other young Social +Democrats—Von Harnack, Weber, Maas—my friend Leuschner and +I discussed the composition of such a government. Leuschner +informed me that a general would probably be the President of +the Reich, and another general would be the Minister for War. +I pointed out that Schacht in all probability would become financial +or economic dictator, since Schacht was suitable for such a post +through his actual or alleged connections with American business +circles. But these connections between Schacht and—in National +Socialist parlance—between plutocracy and militarism, this connection, +I say, appeared to me so compromising to the cause of +democracy, especially to the cause of Social Democracy, that I was +under no circumstances prepared to become a member of any +cabinet in which Schacht would be the financial dictator.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Minister Severing, the Prosecutor has just talked +about the construction of a U-boat in Finland and of a U-boat in +Cadiz. With regard to the construction of the U-boat in Cadiz, +he has referred to D-854. I presume that this document is +unknown to you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, the witness said he knew +nothing about either of those instances.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Do you not remember that during that +discussion Admiral Raeder and Reichswehrminister Gröner mentioned +the Finland U-boat? +<span class='pageno' title='275' id='Page_275'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I do not remember.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You do not know about it? And now—a leading +question: Is it true that the agreement made on 18 October 1928 +stipulated that the Chief of the Naval Command Staff was obligated +to keep the Reichswehrminister informed and the Minister of the +Reichswehr, in his turn, would inform the other Ministers of the +Cabinet?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: As far as I can remember, the agreement or the +promise of the two Chiefs of the Command Staffs was that the +Cabinet should, generally speaking, be kept informed about all +questions. That was technically possible only in the manner in +which you have just indicated, that is to say, that the Reichswehrminister +would be the first to be informed and that he, in turn, +would pass this information on to the Cabinet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that there was no obligation, on Raeder’s part, +currently to report to you or to appear before the Cabinet?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That would have been quite an unusual measure, +just as the meeting of 18 October was in itself unusual; the members +of the Cabinet consisted either of the Ministers or of their official +representatives.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that the further management of the matter +would technically be handled by the Reichswehrminister?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: Technically by the Reichswehrminister and politically +by the Cabinet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. I have no further questions +to put to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): +On what legal regulation was your exemption from the duties of +Minister of the Interior in Prussia, on 20 July 1932, based?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: The release from my duties?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. The release from your duties.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: It was based on Article 48.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Who, on the strength of Article 48, issued +emergency decrees?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: This emergency decree was issued by the Reich +President, who alone was entitled to do so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the fact that you were removed from +office on 20 July, under the circumstances which you have just +described, based on the fact that Von Papen and Hindenburg, who +issued the decree, were of the opinion that the emergency decree +was legal, whereas it was your point of view that the legal basis +<span class='pageno' title='276' id='Page_276'></span> +for the emergency decree did not exist and in consequence you +remained in your office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I was of the opinion, and it was later confirmed by +the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) that the President of the Reich +was authorized on the strength of Article 48 to issue directives for +the maintenance of peace and order; and if he did not see in the +Prussian Ministers, and particularly in myself as Minister of Police, +sufficient guarantee that this peace and order would be insured +in Prussia, he had the right to relieve us of our police functions, +and especially to exclude us from all other executive measures. But +he did not have the right to discharge us as ministers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it known to you that the highest court in +Germany, the State Court of Justice, on 25 October 1932 issued a +statement to the effect that the decree of the Reich President of +20 July 1932 was compatible with the Constitution insofar as it +had appointed the Reich Chancellor as Reich Commissioner for +Prussia and authorized him temporarily to deprive Prussian Ministers +of their official functions and to assume these functions +personally.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I have just explained the meaning of that decision +of the High Court of Justice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: One more question: Did Von Papen, then +Reich Commissioner, in carrying out certain changes in personnel, +bring National Socialists into the police force?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: I cannot say. The political character of the police +officials was not outwardly recognizable. That might be the case +with Oberpräsidenten, Regierungspräsidenten and police presidents, +but not with every simple police official.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Is it true that Von Papen gave the key +position of police president in Berlin to the former police president +of Essen, Melcher, who in your time was already police president +of a large city?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SEVERING: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now then, the witness can retire and the +Tribunal will now adjourn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>How many more witnesses have you got?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I now have the witnesses, Freiherr Von Weizsäcker +and Vice Admiral Schulte-Mönting, the Chief of Staff. The examination +of Schulte-Mönting will take up some time, whereas I shall +be through with Freiherr Von Weizsäcker in a short while.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All right.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='277' id='Page_277'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If it please Your Honors, may the Witness Freiherr +Von Weizsäcker, be called?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Von Weizsäcker took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>ERNST VON WEIZSÄCKER (Witness): Ernst von Weizsäcker.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear +by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Baron Von Weizsäcker, at the beginning of the +war you were State Secretary in the Foreign Office, is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You will recollect that on 3 September 1939, +that is on the first day of the war between Germany and England—the +English passenger ship <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was torpedoed northwest +of Scotland. There were American passengers on board. The +sinking of the ship naturally caused a great sensation. Please tell +the Tribunal how this matter was treated politically, that is, by you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I remember this incident, but I am not +certain whether it was a British or an American ship. In any case, +the incident alarmed me very greatly at the time. I inquired of +the Naval Operations Staff whether a German naval unit could +have sunk the ship. After this was denied, I begged the American +Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Alexander Kirk, to call on me and told him +that no German naval unit could have participated in the sinking +of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>. I asked the Chargé d’Affaires to take cognizance of +this fact and to cable this information to Washington without +delay, adding that it was most important in the interests of our two +nations—Germany and America.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you had contacted the +Navy before taking these steps?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you, at this first conversation, talk to +Admiral Raeder personally or did you speak with some other +officer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I could not say that now, but I did get +definite information. I am sorry I cannot give you the full details. +But I did receive a definite answer that no German naval unit was +involved. That satisfied me. +<span class='pageno' title='278' id='Page_278'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In connection with this subject did you, on the +same day or shortly after, visit Admiral Raeder and discuss this +matter further with him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that is true. I can recall. Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you on this occasion that it +could not have been a German U-boat, since reports coming in +from the U-boats said that the distance from the nearest U-boat +was too great, that is—about 75 nautical miles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Raeder informed me that no German +U-boat could have been involved. He may also have mentioned +details, concerning the distance of the U-boats from the point where +the ship went down, but I cannot today tell you about this with +any certainty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: During this conversation with Raeder, did you +declare that everything should be done to avoid war with the +United States, referring particularly to incidents like the sinking +of the Lusitania in the previous war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I certainly and emphatically did, for +at that time the recollections of similar past incidents during the +first World War were still very vivid in my mind. I am sure I +drew his attention to the urgent necessity of avoiding all naval +operations which might cause a spreading of the war and—as I +used to say in those days—decrease the “neutral substance.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder share your opinion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: To the best of my recollections—yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Are you convinced, Herr Von Weizsäcker, that +Raeder gave you truthful answers in this report about the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Of course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now U-boat Number <span class='it'>30</span> returned from her +combat mission on 27 September 1939, that is—about three weeks +after the sinking of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, and her commander reported +that he had inadvertently sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>. He had not noticed +the fact at the time but was apprised of the incident later by +various wireless messages. Raeder heard about it at the end of +September, and discussed the matter with Hitler in order to decide +what attitude should be adopted. Hitler issued an order enjoining +silence. All this has already been discussed here. I would like +you to tell me if you were informed of the fact, subsequently +established, of the sinking by a German U-boat.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No, certainly not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear of Hitler’s order enjoining silence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I naturally did not hear of that either. +<span class='pageno' title='279' id='Page_279'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I shall now have Document Number 3260-PS +handed to you and I must ask you to have a look at it. It is an +article entitled “Churchill Sinks the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>,” taken from the +<span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> of 23 October 1939. Do you remember this +article?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. Perhaps I may look through it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I inform you, in order to +assist the Tribunal, that this is GB-218 in the British Document +Book Number 10a, Page 97, to be correct—Page 99.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Herr Von Weizsäcker, you have read +this article. May I ask you to tell me whether you recall having +read this article at the time of its appearance?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do recall that such an article did appear +at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you further what your attitude +was at the time when you heard about this article?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I considered it a perverted fantasy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then you condemned this article?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Naturally.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Even though at the time you did not know yet +that it was a German U-Boat?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: The question of whether it was a German +U-boat or not could in no wise influence my opinion of the article.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then you considered this article objectionable, +even if it had not been a German U-boat?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Of course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now the Prosecution asserts that Admiral Raeder +had instigated this article and is reproaching him very gravely on +moral grounds for this very reason, and the reproach is all the +graver since, as we have seen, Raeder at this time—unlike yourself—knew +that it was a German U-boat which had sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>. +Do you consider such an action possible on Raeder’s part? That +he could have instigated this article?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Siemers, you can only +ask the witness what he knew and what he did. You cannot ask +him to speculate about what Raeder has done.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I believed +that, according to this morning’s affidavit, it would be possible to +voice an opinion; but I shall, of course, retract my question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What affidavit are you talking about?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The affidavit in which I suggested the expunging +of any expression of opinion, Dietmann’s affidavit. +<span class='pageno' title='280' id='Page_280'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is a perfectly different matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you at that time hear +that Raeder had instigated this article?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No, I did not hear that; I would never +have believed it either. I consider it entirely out of the question +that he could have instigated an article of that sort or that he +could have written it himself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: To your knowledge, could this article be traced +exclusively to the Propaganda Ministry?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only answer this question in the +negative; not to Raeder and not to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, are you in a position to +judge whether grave points were involved in the historically-known +violations committed by the Navy against the Treaty of Versailles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only answer that question indirectly. +The details are unknown to me. But I can scarcely consider it +possible that grave or important violations could have occurred, +for it is precisely in naval matters that the observance of contract +agreements is particularly easy to control. Ships cannot be built +without being seen. I must therefore assume that these infringements +were of an insignificant nature.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in your opinion, did the +Defendant Raeder prepare a war of aggression or do you know of +any case from which Raeder’s attitude...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is the very charge against +the Defendant Raeder which the Tribunal has got to decide.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in February 1939, when +you traveled by train from Hamburg to Berlin with Admiral +Raeder, did you converse with him? And what was the occasion +and what did you discuss?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. It is quite true that I met Admiral +Raeder on the train from Hamburg to Berlin, after the launching +of a ship at Hamburg. On this occasion the Admiral told me that +he had just made a report to Hitler in which he said he had made +it quite clear that the size of the Navy would preclude any war +against England for years to come. I presume that this is the reply +to the question which you wished to receive from me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That was in February 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was the launching of the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then it is known to the Tribunal, for the launching +of the <span class='it'>Bismarck</span> is entered in the records. +<span class='pageno' title='281' id='Page_281'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It must have been in the spring—in +February or March.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder’s declaration at that time have a +calming influence on you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I heard Raeder’s declaration on the subject +with very great pleasure because there could be no other...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do not care whether it had a +calming influence on him or not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, and to the best of your knowledge, +did Raeder—either as a politician or as a naval expert—exercise +any influence over Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the witness can tell us what +Raeder said, but he really cannot tell us in what capacity he was +speaking, whether as a politician or an admiral. If you want to +know whether he had his uniform on...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you have any conversations +with Raeder or with any other high-ranking personages?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: About what?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: About Raeder’s influence on Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was a well-known fact that political +arguments expressed by soldiers scarcely influenced Hitler at all, +although military arguments of a technical nature certainly did +carry weight with him, and in this sense Raeder may have exercised +some influence over Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in the winter of 1938 to +1939, the usual large diplomatic dinner party took place in Berlin +and you, as far as I know, were present at this dinner. On this +occasion Raeder spoke to Sir Nevile Henderson about the probable +return of Germany’s colonies...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, why do you not ask him +instead of telling him. You are telling him what happened.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you are.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; this was a conversation +between Raeder and Sir Nevile Henderson, not between Herr +Von Weizsäcker and Henderson.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am now asking you, Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you have a +conversation to this effect with Sir Nevile Henderson or with other +British diplomats? And do you know anything about their attitude?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I cannot recall having spoken personally +with any British diplomats about the question of the colonies. On +<span class='pageno' title='282' id='Page_282'></span> +the other hand, I do know that between 1934 and 1939 the question +of the colonies was repeatedly handled by the British Government +either officially, unofficially or semiofficially, and their attitude +was expressed in a friendly and conciliatory manner. I believe +I can remember reading a report on the visit of two British ministers +to Berlin and that on this occasion the question of the colonies was +also discussed in a conciliatory manner.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, can you tell us anything +about the behavior or the reputation of the Navy during the +Norwegian occupation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: An occupational force always finds it +difficult to be popular anywhere. But with this one reservation +I should like to state that the Navy, as far as I heard, enjoyed a +good, even a very good, reputation in Norway. This was repeatedly +confirmed to me during the war by my Norwegian friends.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You made these Norwegian friendships at the +time you were Minister in Oslo? When was that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was Minister in Oslo from 1931 to 1933.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question. A document, D-843, was +submitted yesterday, signed by Breuer who was with the Oslo +Legation in March 1940. May I submit this document to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Am I to read the entire document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I think it would suffice if you were just to +glance through it, especially over the middle part of the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the President.</span>] Mr. President, it is GB-466 and the +document was submitted yesterday.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] According to this document Breuer +stated that the danger of a British landing in Norway was not so +great as was assumed by the other side, and he speaks of measures +only by which Germany might be provoked. What can you tell us +about these statements of Breuer’s? Are these statements correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Breuer was not with the Legation—he +was the Minister himself—and I take it for granted that he reported +correctly on the subject from an objective or rather, if I may say +so, subjective point of view. Whether this was really correct from +an objective point of view or not, is quite another question. To +put it in plain German, whether Breuer was correctly informed of +the intentions of the enemy forces is another question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, according to the information +you subsequently received from the Ministry for Foreign +Affairs, were Raeder’s misgivings justified or was the picture, as +painted by Breuer, correct? +<span class='pageno' title='283' id='Page_283'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I must confess that my personal opinion +tallied with the opinion of Breuer, although both our opinions +subsequently proved to be incorrect and the conjectures of the +Navy were justified, or—at least—more justified than the opinion +voiced by the Minister.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much indeed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to +ask any questions of this witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hess): Witness, on +23 August 1939, a nonaggression pact was concluded between Germany +and the Soviet Union. Were any other agreements concluded +on that day by the two governments, outside of this pact of nonaggression?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the USSR): +Mr. President, the witness is called upon to answer certain definite +questions which are set forth in the application of counsel for the +defendant, Dr. Siemers. I consider that the question which is being +put to him at this moment by the defense counsel Seidl has no +connection with the examination of the case in hand and should +be ruled out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the question, Dr. Seidl, that +you were going to ask.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I ask you again, Herr Von Weizsäcker, whether on +23 August 1939, other agreements had been reached between the +two governments, which were not contained in the nonaggression +pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Where were these agreements contained?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: These agreements were contained in a +secret protocol.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself read this secret protocol in your +capacity of State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I have before me a text and Ambassador Gaus +harbors no doubt at all that the agreements in question are correctly +set out in this text. I shall have it put to you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One moment, what document are you putting +to him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: The secret addenda to the protocol of 23 August 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that not the document—what is this document +that you are presenting to the witness? There is a document +<span class='pageno' title='284' id='Page_284'></span> +which you have already presented to the Tribunal and which has +been ruled out. Is that the same document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: It is the document which I submitted to the Tribunal +in my documentary evidence and which was refused by the Tribunal, +presumably because I refused to divulge the origin and +source of this document. But the Tribunal granted me permission +to produce a new sworn affidavit by Ambassador Gaus on the subject +in question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You have not done it? You have not done it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: No, but I should, Your Honor, like to read this text +in order to stimulate the memory of the witness, and to ask him +whether in connection therewith, as far as he can remember, the +secret agreements are correctly reproduced in this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors! I would like to protest against +these questions for two reasons.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>First of all, we are examining the matter of the crimes of the +major German war criminals. We are not investigating the foreign +policies of other states. Secondly, the document which defense +counsel Seidl is attempting to put to the witness has been rejected +by the Tribunal, since it is—in substance—a forged document and +cannot have any probative value whatsoever.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: May I in this connection say the following, Mr. President. +This document is an essential component of the nonaggression +pact, submitted by the Prosecution in evidence as GB-145. If I now +submit the text to the witness...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The only question is whether it is the document +which has been rejected by the Tribunal. Is it the document +which has been rejected by the Tribunal?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: It was rebutted as documentary evidence <span class='it'>per se</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, then the answer is “yes.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: But it seems to me that there is a difference as to +whether this document may be put to the witness during the hearing +of his testimony. I should like to answer this question in the +affirmative since the Prosecution when cross-examining can put the +document in their possession to the witness, and on the basis of his +testimony we should then see which is the correct text or whether +these two texts harmonize at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where does the document which you are +presenting come from?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: I received this document a few weeks ago from a +man on the Allied side who appeared absolutely reliable. I received +it only on condition that I would not divulge its origin, a condition +which seemed to me perfectly reasonable. +<span class='pageno' title='285' id='Page_285'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you say that you received it a few +moments ago?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Weeks ago.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is the same document that you say just +now that you presented to the Tribunal and the Tribunal rejected?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the Tribunal also decided that I might +submit another sworn affidavit from Ambassador Gaus on this +subject, and this decision only makes sense...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but you have not done so. We +do not know what affidavit Dr. Gaus has made.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Ambassador Gaus’ sworn affidavit, the new one, is +already in my possession, but it has not yet been translated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I certainly join General Rudenko in +objecting to the use of this document. We now know that it comes +from some anonymous source. We do not know the source at all, +and anyway it is not established that this witness does not remember +himself what this purported agreement amounted to. I do not +know why he can not ask him, if that is what he wants to do.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you may ask the witness what his +recollection is of the treaty without putting the document to him. +Ask him what he remembers of the treaty, or the protocol.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Witness, please describe the contents of the agreement +insofar as you can remember them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It is about a very incisive, a very far-reaching +secret addendum to the nonaggression pact concluded at +that time. The scope of this document was very extensive since it +concerned the partition of the spheres of influence and drew a +demarcation line between areas which, under given conditions, belonged +to the sphere of Soviet Russia and those which would fall +in the German sphere of interest. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Eastern +Poland and, as far as I can remember, certain areas of Romania +were to be included in the sphere of the Soviet Union. Anything +west of this area fell into the German sphere of interest. It is true +that this secret agreement did not maintain its original form. Later +on, either in September or October of the same year, a certain +change, an amendment was made. As far as I can recall the essential +difference in the two documents consisted in the fact that Lithuania, +or—at least—the greater part of Lithuania, fell into the sphere of +interest of the Soviet Union, while in the Polish territory the line +of demarcation between the two spheres of interest was moved very +considerably westwards.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe that I have herewith given you the gist of the secret +agreement and of the subsequent addendum. +<span class='pageno' title='286' id='Page_286'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Is it true that in case of a subsequent territorial +reorganization, a line of demarcation was agreed upon in the territory +of the Polish State?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I cannot tell you exactly whether the +expression “line of demarcation” was contained in this protocol or +whether “line of separation of spheres of interest” was the actual +term.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: But a line was drawn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Precisely the line which I have just mentioned, +and I believe I can recall that this line, once the agreement +became effective, was adhered to as a general rule with possible +slight fluctuations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Can you recall—this is my last question—if this +secret addendum of 23 August 1939 also contained an agreement on +the future destiny of Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: This secret agreement included a complete +redirection of Poland’s destiny. It may very well have been that +explicitly or implicitly such a redirection had been provided for in +the agreement. I would not, however, like to commit myself as to +the exact wording.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Witness, did you see the original of the secret +treaty?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I saw a photostat of the original, possibly +the original as well. In any case I had the photostatic copy in my +possession, I had a photostatic copy locked up in my personal safe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would you recognize a copy of it if it was +shown to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Oh, yes, I definitely think so. The original +signatures were attached and they could be recognized immediately.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has been considering whether +it ought to put to the witness the document in the possession of +Dr. Seidl, but in view of the fact that the contents of the original +have been stated by the witness and by other witnesses and that it +does not appear what is the origin of the document which is in +Dr. Seidl’s possession, the Tribunal has decided not to put the document +to the witness. The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 22 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='287' id='Page_287'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH DAY</span><br/> Wednesday, 22 May 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Von Weizsäcker resumed the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think yesterday we got to the +stage whether any of the other defendants’ counsel wished to ask +any questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, indeed; I believe Dr. Von Lüdinghausen +wishes to examine the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): +Witness, I should like to put a few questions to you about +the activity of Herr Von Neurath in his capacity as Foreign Minister. +You were at that time Director of the Political Department +of the Foreign Office. What were the dates?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe from late autumn of 1936, as a +deputy, and from the spring of 1937 until the spring of 1938 with +full capacity.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But before then you had already +had occasion to work with Herr Von Neurath? In the autumn of +1932 were you not together now and then at the Disarmament Conference +at Geneva?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What tendencies did Herr Von +Neurath follow, and what attitude did Von Neurath adopt at the +Disarmament Conference?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: The attitude of Herr Von Neurath was +dictated by the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations +which provided for disarmament. He followed those lines.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that he followed the same policy +which his predecessors had followed at the Disarmament Conference?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was always the same.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, all the previous governments +pursued a policy aimed at peace and unity, or understanding; and +Herr Von Neurath continued this policy wholeheartedly, is that not +correct? +<span class='pageno' title='288' id='Page_288'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I never noticed anything to the contrary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you at that time—that is in +1932—notice in any way that he had National Socialist tendencies +or that he was at all in sympathy with the National Socialists?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that there was no +common ground between him and National Socialism.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you quite briefly summarize +Herr Von Neurath’s views with respect to foreign politics? Could he +have been at that time in favor of belligerent action, or was he +the representative, the acknowledged representative, of a policy of +understanding and peace?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should say that Herr Von Neurath pursued +a policy of peaceful revision, the same policy that had been +carried on by his predecessors. His aim was good neighborliness +with all, without binding himself politically in any special direction. +I never noticed any bellicose tendencies in his policies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was there any change in Herr +Von Neurath’s views in the year 1936, when you became one of +his closest collaborators, or did they always remain the same?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: They were always the same.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He was especially interested in +bringing about an understanding with England, but also with +France; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath +wanted to bring about an understanding with all sides.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put a few more +questions to you which more or less concern his relations with +Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>According to your knowledge of the circumstances, as his collaborator, +can it be said that he had the confidence of Adolf Hitler +at all times when he was Foreign Minister, and also that Hitler let +himself be advised and led by him altogether?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I am in a position to judge, he +was the adviser but not the confidant of Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But there was a certain contact +between those gentlemen; is that not right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was hardly ever a witness of such contacts.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you observe, when Von Neurath +and Hitler met, whether they frequently discussed the political +situation, what had to be done, and what should be done?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only say that we of the Foreign Office +regretted that the contact was not closer; all the more so as Hitler +<span class='pageno' title='289' id='Page_289'></span> +was frequently absent from Berlin. We considered the contact +too loose.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then, one cannot speak of close +relations or of very close collaboration with Hitler in the case of +Von Neurath?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: In my opinion, no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And, in your opinion and according +to your observation, how did the activity of Von Neurath affect +foreign policy? Was he the leading man, or was he not perhaps +a retarding element, that is a brake, so to speak, where matters +contrary to his convictions were concerned?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I have no actual proof that important foreign +political actions of this period were influenced by Von Neurath. +But I can well imagine that certain actions in the sphere of +foreign politics were prevented...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think we can have +the witness imagine. We cannot have the witness telling us what +he can imagine. I think the question is too vague, and not a proper +question to ask.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During the time when Herr Von Neurath +was Foreign Minister, did any authority in the Party also have +an influence on the foreign policy which in effect was contrary to +the tendencies of Von Neurath or at least was not shared by him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe there was not only one but many +who acted in that way and had connection and influence with Hitler +of course. That could not be verified, but it could be concluded from +the results.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know why, for what reason, +the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in November 1935 was not +signed by Von Neurath but by the then Ambassador Von Ribbentrop +in London?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Was not that in 1936?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 1936; yes that is right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I assume for the reason that Hitler always +liked to put several persons on to certain work, and he would then +select from among them the one he considered best suited to carry +the work through.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was Von Neurath at all in agreement +with this Anti-Comintern Pact?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know. +<span class='pageno' title='290' id='Page_290'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Von Neurath’s policy +regarding personnel? Did he try to keep old officials in office, or +did he bring in National Socialist officials?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was very anxious to +retain the old and familiar Foreign Office staff, in the Foreign Office, +as well as in positions abroad.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But that changed the moment he +resigned?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Not immediately, but later on to an increasing +extent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, just two more questions. What +was the attitude of Herr Von Neurath when he was no longer Foreign +Minister and the Sudeten questions became acute, in the autumn +of 1938; and what part did he play at the Munich Conference?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I recall a scene in the Reich Chancellery, +a day before the Munich Agreement, when Herr Von Neurath very +strongly recommended pursuing a policy of appeasement and following +the suggestion of Mussolini to hold a four-power conference.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that after Von Neurath +had left the Foreign Office that office was forbidden to give +him any information about foreign politics?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I think I remember that the successor of +Herr Von Neurath kept to himself information his predecessor +received about foreign political matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you were German Ambassador +to the Holy See in Rome from the summer of 1943?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: At the same time the commander-in-chief in +the Italian theater of war was Field Marshal Kesselring?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes; that is, he was the commander-in-chief +in that theater from 25 September 1943. Before that time an +Italian general held the post.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Were you frequently called upon by Kesselring +to settle differences between the German Army on one hand +and the civil authorities on the other?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: There was constant communication between +Field Marshal Kesselring and my own office, not only in +order to straighten out differences, but above all to prevent differences. +<span class='pageno' title='291' id='Page_291'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Did you, through your frequent contacts with +Field Marshal Kesselring, gain a personal impression with regard +to the attitude of the military...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we are not trying Kesselring. +What relevance has this question got?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: This question is relevant because in the cross-examination +of Field Marshal Kesselring the Prosecution produced +incriminating material to the effect that the military leadership in +Italy did not observe the usages of war and the laws of humanity. +I distinctly remember that you, Mr. President—and this may be seen +on Pages 5803 and 5805 (Volume IX, Pages 234, 235)—said in reply +to an objection by Dr. Stahmer that it was material incriminating +the General Staff. I should like to ask the witness now present a +few questions about this incriminating material.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you wish to ask him anything that he +knows about accusations which have been made by the Prosecution +against Kesselring as a member of the General Staff, then you may +do that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. I started and that was to +be a preparatory question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Weizsäcker, were the objects of art of Italy in the +Italian theater of war spared and put in safekeeping?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Wehrmacht, under the leadership +of Field Marshal Kesselring, made the greatest efforts to spare +and protect edifices, property, and objects of art belonging to the +Church. This was a large chapter in the activities of the staff of +Field Marshal Kesselring, and success was not wanting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Can you give us one or two especially significant +examples on this point?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes, there are a lot of examples. I would +like to mention that 6 months or a year ago an exhibition of +manuscripts, incunabula, and similar things, was held in the Vatican. +The German Wehrmacht is to be thanked for having saved a large +part, if not the greater part of these objects.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: That is sufficient, Herr Von Weizsäcker. The +high military command in Italy is accused of having treated the +Italian population with especial harshness and cruelty. Can you +tell us anything about the fact that precisely on the part of the high +military command in Italy special measures were taken for the +feeding of the population at a period when the food problem was +difficult?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Does this question refer especially to the +food problem? +<span class='pageno' title='292' id='Page_292'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Yes, the food problem in Rome.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, my field of observation was only +Rome. But there I can say that Field Marshal Kesselring told me +one day that half his time was taken up with the question of feeding +Rome. And I knew one of the higher military officials—I believe +his name was Seifert or something like that—who with great devotion +concerned himself with this task and carried it through with +success.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Now my last question, Herr Von Weizsäcker: +Through your observations of the activities of the high military +leaders in Italy you must have gained a personal impression of +these people. Did you get the impression that there was a sincere +effort on the part of these military leaders to observe the laws of +war and the laws of humanity?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is a matter of course, for otherwise +certain results could not have come about. Perhaps it is not known +here that in the autumn of 1943 the Holy See published a communiqué, +an official communiqué, which especially praised the +behavior of the German soldiers in Rome. Besides that, the sparing +of the Eternal City could not have been realized if the German +Wehrmacht had not behaved as it did.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: And that was a special merit of Field Marshal +Kesselring in particular?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I would say that when the history of this +time comes to be written first in the list of merit will be Pope +Pius XII. Then praise will be accorded, in the second place to the +German Wehrmacht under the leadership of Kesselring.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further +questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: It has been asserted once that the Defendant +Von Papen, who in the summer of 1934 had been appointed ambassador +to Vienna, directed from that office a policy of aggressive +expansion taking in the entire southeast up to Turkey; and that he, +among other things, had offered neighboring states like Hungary +and Poland territory to be gained from the intended partitioning of +Czechoslovakia. Did this policy actually exist?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry. I did not quite understand +your question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy, which I just outlined, actually +exist?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: My observation dates only from the late +summer of 1936, as before that time I was abroad. I did not notice +later that Herr Von Papen had carried on a southeastern policy for +<span class='pageno' title='293' id='Page_293'></span> +Vienna, or that he was commissioned to do so. The Foreign Office +could not entrust him with such a mission, for he did not come +under the Foreign Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: And this policy, as just outlined, did that +exist at all when you entered the Foreign Office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Please repeat the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy of expansion on the part of +Germany...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Which policy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: The aggressive policy of expansion on the +part of Germany to the southeast as far as Turkey, the partitioning +of Czechoslovakia, and the cession of parts of Czechoslovakia to +Poland and Hungary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. In 1939, no doubt?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. KUBUSCHOK: 1936—in 1936.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you one or two questions +about the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> matter. You have told the Tribunal that +you, yourself, saw the American chargé d’affaires and informed +him, about the middle of September, that the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> could not +have been sunk by a German U-boat. That is so, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not see the American chargé d’affaires +in the middle of September, but on the day on which I heard +of the sinking, and that must have been, perhaps, 3, 4, or 5 of September.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Were you already assuring the American representatives +as early as that that a U-boat could not have been responsible?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And did you recommend, or rather, did the +German Foreign Office recommend that the Commander-in-Chief +of the German Navy should receive the American naval attaché and +tell him the same thing, namely, that a U-boat could not have sunk +the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know. I only dealt with the +chargé d’affaires.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I would like you to look at a new document, +Document. Number D-804, which will be Exhibit GB-477, which is +an extract from the SKL on the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> case. You will see that +<span class='pageno' title='294' id='Page_294'></span> +that is a report from Neubauer to the naval attaché and it reads +as follows:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Foreign Office has had a report of the meeting between +the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and the American +naval attaché, on 13 September 1939, passed on to it by +telephone. It is worded as follows:</p> + +<p>“ ‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief +of...’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry; I have not found the place +as yet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Perhaps you would like to follow the English +copy, Witness, if you would like.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I read the second paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“ ‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief +of the Navy received the American naval +attaché on the advice of the Reich Foreign Minister and told +him more or less the following: He had intended for some +days already—as he knew—to write him that he should visit +him in order to tell him his opinion about the sinking of the +<span class='it'>Athenia</span>, in view of the continued agitation about it. However, +he had waited for the return of those of the submarines +that had been employed in waging war against merchant +ships at the time in question and which might possibly be +concerned, in order to receive reports about their activity personally. +He repeated most emphatically that the sinking of +the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was not caused by a German submarine. The +ship nearest to the place of the incident was at the time +actually situated about 170 sea miles away from the place of +the sinking. Besides this, the instructions as to how the commanders +were to wage war against merchant shipping, had +after all been published. Up to date, in no case had these +instructions been even slightly disregarded. On the contrary, +an American captain reported a short time before about the +particularly courteous and chivalrous behavior of the submarine +commanders.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Well, now, it is clear from that, is it not, that the German Foreign +Office was most anxious to cover up this matter of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> +as best it could; was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No; there was nothing to be covered up.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: When you discovered at the end of September +that in fact it was the <span class='it'>U-30</span> that had sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, there was +then a good deal to be covered, was there not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that I stated already yesterday +that I had heard nothing to that effect. +<span class='pageno' title='295' id='Page_295'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you did not know at the +end of September, on the return of the <span class='it'>U-30</span>, that the <span class='it'>U-30</span> had +in fact sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not remember that in any way at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: When did you first discover that the <span class='it'>U-30</span> had +sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I remember, not at all during +the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But I understood you to say yesterday that you +thought that the publication in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, accusing +Mr. Winston Churchill of sinking the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, was a piece of perverse +imagination; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Completely.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Are you really saying to the Tribunal that—though +you were in a responsible job—are you saying to the Tribunal +that you did not discover the true facts about the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> +until the end of the war, when you were directly concerned in the +Foreign Office with this matter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I told you already yesterday what I know +about this. It seems, does it not, that it was realized later by the +Navy that the sinking of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> was due to the action of a German +submarine, but I cannot at all remember that I or the Foreign +Office were informed of this fact.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder took no +steps to correct the information that had been passed to the American +diplomatic representatives, did he?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder +advised me or the Foreign Office of the fact.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Now, with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If it please the Tribunal, I am not proposing to question the +witness as to the earlier diplomatic history, as this Tribunal has +indicated that it is desirable to reserve the matter for the defendants +as they go into the witness box later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] But I want to ask you a general question. +What was the earliest date at which responsible officials of +the Foreign Office, like yourself, first realized that Hitler intended +to wage aggressive war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That the foreign policy of Hitler’s Government +was a dangerous one I realized clearly for the first time in +May 1933; the fact that an aggressive war was planned, perhaps, +in the summer of 1938, or at least that the course pursued in foreign +policy might very easily lead to war. +<span class='pageno' title='296' id='Page_296'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Already in April 1938, the foreign political +situation was so tense that you sent a special memorandum to all +German diplomatic representatives dealing with the situation—the +critical situation of Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: That may be. May I be permitted to read +the document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at Document Number +3572-PS, which is a memorandum of the 25th of April 1938, signed +by yourself, and a copy of which was sent to all the German diplomatic +representatives. It will be Exhibit GB-478. That document +reads:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Since the work in the field of preparation for the mobilization +has made further progress within Germany in the +Armed Forces and in all civil administrations including the +Foreign Office, it is necessary now that in the case of government +offices abroad corresponding measures also be taken in +their area of jurisdiction without delay.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then there follows a series of instructions as to the actions +that are to be taken on the commencement of the period of crisis, +or of actual mobilization, and there is an insistence in the last +paragraph but one:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I request the heads of offices, without waiting for further +instructions, to start considering now the measures to be +taken in their sphere of activity in the case of an emergency. +In the interest of absolute secrecy it must be observed strictly +that the number of people informed remains as restricted as +possible.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That suggests, does it not, that as early as April 1938 you were +conscious of the imminent approach of actual mobilization; is that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: May I ask, is this document really dated +the year 1938, or is it 1939? I cannot quite distinguish the date.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: It is dated the 25th of April 1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, that may be.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Now, you yourself were opposed to Hitler’s +aggressive foreign policy, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not quite understand your question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You yourself were opposed to Hitler’s aggressive +foreign policy, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I personally, completely.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did you endeavor to persuade the Defendant +Von Neurath also to oppose Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy? +<span class='pageno' title='297' id='Page_297'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was not Foreign Minister +at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But he continued to be a very important functionary +of the Nazi State, did he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that his influence in that period +was even smaller than before; but I kept in touch with him, and I +think I agreed with his opinion and he with mine.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And yet he continued to serve the Nazi State, +in particular, in a territory which was acquired as a result of this +policy of aggression; is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should be grateful if this question would +be put to Herr Von Neurath rather than to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: If you please. Now, you were in Italy and in +Rome, were you not, in March of 1944?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You have given me some evidence as to the +behavior of the German forces in Italy. Were you in Rome at the +time of the massacres in the Hadrian Cave? You remember the +incident, Witness, do you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: When 325 Italians were murdered and 57 Jews +were thrown in as a bit of makeweight. You were there when that +happened, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe it was 320 prisoners who were +murdered in this cave which you just mentioned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Yes. Were you consulted about that matter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That was an action by German forces, was +it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe by the German Police, and not +by the German Armed Forces.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And you know, Witness, that there were many +murders of that kind carried out by the SS during the period of +German activity in Italy, do you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not know about many murders having +taken place, but I believe that the German Police were quite capable +of such things.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You know that they left a record of terror and +brutality wherever they left their mark upon Italy; is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Police, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions. +<span class='pageno' title='298' id='Page_298'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I have no more questions, Your Honor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I now call the witness Vice +Admiral Schulte-Mönting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go ahead.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Schulte-Mönting took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>ERICH SCHULTE-MÖNTING (Witness): Erich Schulte-Mönting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear +by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, please tell us briefly what positions you +held from 1925 to 1945, particularly in what positions you served +immediately under Admiral Raeder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1925 to 1928 I was naval adjutant +to Reichspräsident Hindenburg and, as such, simultaneously second +adjutant to the Chief of the Naval Command Staff. Consequently +my first collaboration with Raeder dates back to 1928.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>From 1929 until 1933 I had several front commands. From 1933 +to 1937 I was first adjutant to Raeder. From 1937 to 1939 I had +several front commands. From 1939 to 1943 I was Admiral Raeder’s +Chief of Staff; and up to 1944 I remained Admiral Dönitz’ Chief +of Staff. In January 1944 I was naval commander in southern +France until the invasion; subsequently commanding general in +North Trondheim. After the collapse I was employed for some +months with the British Navy in winding up activities. Then in +the autumn I was interned in a camp for generals in England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Please tell me, if you can remember, in which +month of 1939 you started to work with Raeder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The first of January 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us briefly anything about Raeder’s +prestige as a navy expert, especially abroad? I mean only with +regard to technical naval questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I believe that through the many +years of service I had with Raeder, and the many conversations I +had with foreigners, I have been able to form some idea. After all, +Raeder was head of the Navy for 15 years. He was known, or +rather had a name, as a naval officer and as Chief of Staff of the +<span class='pageno' title='299' id='Page_299'></span> +last Commander-in-Chief of the German Imperial Navy, Admiral +Hipper, the opponent of the famous British Admiral Beatty in the +Skagerrak battle. He was known...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you kindly observe that light. +When the yellow light goes on, you are talking too fast. When the +red light goes on, you must stop.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was known through his literary activity +at the time of the “Tirpitz Era,” when he edited the <span class='it'>Nautikus</span>, and +later, after the first World War, through his two works on cruiser +warfare in the last World War, for which he received an honorary +doctor’s degree and which, I should say, gained him a reputation +among experts.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The defendant is accused of building up the Navy +with the intention of carrying on an aggressive war, and this even +after the Treaty of Versailles was already in force.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. Never in all my conversations +which I had with Raeder was the thought—much less the +word—of an aggressive war mentioned. I believe that all his actions +and his directives contradict this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were there possibly any ideas of a strategic +nature under consideration, while the Versailles Treaty was in force, +with a view to an aggressive war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Never.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What was the basic reason for the maneuvers +held by the Navy from the years 1932 until 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: They were held exclusively with a view +to the security, protection, and defense of the coastal waters and +the coast itself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was a war with England taken as a basis for +any of these maneuvers between 1932 and 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that was never made a basis, and +I believe that would have appeared impossible and unreasonable +to every naval officer. I remember that even at the beginning of +the year 1939 Raeder issued a directive to the front commanders +to hold maneuvers, in which he excluded a maneuver directed +against England as an impossibility. It was forbidden to carry out +that maneuver at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, it is now confirmed, as you know, that +the Navy in the twenties, with the knowledge of the then parliamentary +government, violated the Treaty of Versailles. These questions +have been discussed a great deal here, therefore, we can +be brief. +<span class='pageno' title='300' id='Page_300'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to ask you generally: Is it possible from these violations, +which are known to you, to deduce aggressive intentions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I consider that is completely out of +the question. The violations were so insignificant and were based +so exclusively on protection and defense that I think it is impossible +to construe them as aggressive intentions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Can you give us briefly a few instances or name +a few cases where violations took place?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, they were limited to the +installation of coastal batteries, antiaircraft batteries, the procuring +of mines and similar things, all of which were exclusively for the +purpose of defense or protection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did these violations of the Treaty of Versailles—or, +shall we say, the slight deviations—become known to the Inter-Allied +Commission in whole or in part, and did that commission +partly overlook these things because they were really trifles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I would say it was an open secret.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you, Admiral, to pause between question +and answer so that the interpreters can keep up. Just pause +a moment after my questions before you reply. May I ask you to +repeat the answer to my question with regard to the commission?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I would say that it was an open secret. +It was just passed by.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As proof that these violations of the treaty were +made with the intention of waging aggressive war the Prosecution +has several times presented the book by Post Captain Schüssler +entitled <span class='it'>The Navy’s Fight against Versailles</span>. It is Document C-156. +I will have this document submitted to you in the original. In order +to save time and not to burden the Tribunal again with details—I +do not want to go into details—I shall just ask you: What do you +know about this book, and what caused it to be written at all? +When was it written and what is your general opinion about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I know this book. It came about as a result +of the attacks of the National Socialist regime in the years 1934 and +1935, which blamed the preceding government and the Navy for +not having done enough in the past to arm the nation and for not +even having exhausted the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles. +Consequently, the idea arose at that time of publishing a sort of +justification. This brochure is to be considered in that light; a sort +of justification for, I might say, sins of omission.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This booklet was later never actually published, or rather it was +withdrawn from circulation because it was, I might say, a rather +<span class='pageno' title='301' id='Page_301'></span> +poor attempt, for, after all, it contains no challenging points which +might be classified as rearmament.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was this booklet distributed within the Navy +later on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. As I said, it was withdrawn from the +circles which had already had it and it was also severely criticized.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was the book withdrawn on Raeder’s orders?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe so, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Through this book and another document, by +Assmann, a charge has been brought concerning the known endeavors +made with a construction firm in Holland. And it was also said +yesterday that, by order of Admiral Raeder, U-boats were built for +Germany in Finland and in Spain. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. The U-boats which +were designed by the Dutch firm, and which were built abroad, +were not built for the German Navy, but for foreign countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know for whom they were built? Who +received the boat which was built in Finland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe Turkey received one, and one +went to Finland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then the ships were constructed for foreign +orders and for a foreign country?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What advantages at all did the Navy have from +their collaboration in the construction?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We were only interested in keeping alive +the experiences gained in U-boat warfare during the last World +War. Consequently the Navy was interested in seeing that constructors +of U-boats continued along those lines.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, was that prohibited according +to the Treaty of Versailles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I know of no paragraph which prohibits +our activity in foreign countries along those lines.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In the beginning of February 1933 Admiral +Raeder made his first naval report to Hitler. Do you know what +Hitler, on that occasion, gave Raeder as the basis for rebuilding +the Navy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I remember it exactly, because it +was the first report which the then Chief of the Naval Command +Staff, Admiral Raeder, made to the Reich Chancellor Hitler. +<span class='pageno' title='302' id='Page_302'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Hitler said to Raeder that the basis of his future policy was to +live in peace with England and that he intended to demonstrate +that by trying to conclude a naval agreement with England. In +this he wanted the German Navy to be kept relatively small. He +wished to recognize Britain’s naval superiority because of her position +as a world power. He would accordingly suggest an appropriate +ratio of strength. He wanted an understanding with regard to the +construction of our Navy; and we should take these, his political +points of view, into consideration. Raeder was impressed with the +statements, for they were completely in accordance with his own +basic attitude.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Within the framework of this policy the German-British +Naval Agreement was then concluded in 1935. Was the +Navy as a whole and Raeder in particular pleased with this agreement, +or did they see certain disadvantages in it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder and the Navy were very pleased +with this agreement, although we had to impose voluntarily upon +ourselves severe limitations for a certain length of time. By this +agreement, in comparison with the Washington conference, I should +say we ranged among the smallest sea powers. In spite of that, this +agreement was generally welcomed, because friendly relations with +the British Navy were desired, and it was believed that if we followed +a wise and moderate policy, England in return would show +her appreciation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know whether at that time Hitler as well +approved of the agreement in that form and was pleased about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I can affirm that. Raeder and I +happened to be together with Hitler in Hamburg the day this agreement +was concluded, and Hitler said to Raeder when this fact was +reported to him:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“This is the happiest day of my life. This morning I received +word from my doctor that my throat trouble is insignificant, +and now this afternoon I receive this very gratifying political +news.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You have already stated, Admiral, that the naval +agreement was welcomed by the Navy. You will recall that in the +year 1937 a modified naval agreement was concluded with England. +Was the attitude of the Navy to that question still the same at +that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The Naval Agreement of +1937 brought merely one, I might say, additional clause. This was +for an exchange of information; and we had also reached an agreement +with the British Navy with regard to a fixed U-boat tonnage. +We had no reason... +<span class='pageno' title='303' id='Page_303'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, referring to the U-boat tonnage, I +remember the 1935 agreement: 100 percent of the British U-boat +tonnage; Germany limited herself to 45 percent, but reserved the +right to increase the tonnage up to possibly 100 percent, in which +case she must, however, notify England and discuss it with the +British Admiralty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Was this notification about the increase to 100 percent given, and +if so, when and in what way?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After we had reached 100 percent, Admiral +Cunningham was in Berlin and on that occasion the fact was +discussed once more. Whether a written confirmation was made in +addition I no longer recall. I take it for granted because that was +the purpose of the agreement of 1937. On the occasion of his visit +in December 1938, Admiral Cunningham explicitly gave Britain’s +agreement to the final 100 percent equality in U-boats. That is the +way I, or rather all of us, interpreted his visit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember whether there was a special +conversation, or a conversation between Admiral Cunningham and +Raeder, on the occasion of this visit, in which Admiral Cunningham +discussed generally the relations between the German and the British +Navy, and between Germany and England?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I had the personal impression that Cunningham +and Raeder parted on very friendly terms. At Cunningham’s +departure there was a breakfast for a rather limited circle, +and on that occasion Cunningham expressed his pleasure at the +conclusion of the naval agreement, concluding his speech with a +toast to the effect that now all these questions had been settled at +last, and it was to be hoped that in the future there would be +no war between our navies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this incident?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: December 1938. I believe that is correct, Admiral?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As far as I remember, December 1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I remember the date from the testimony given +by Admiral Raeder. I myself knew only that it took place in 1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What Admiral Cunningham is it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I do not know, I am not a naval expert. Perhaps +Admiral Schulte-Mönting can tell us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not understand the question, +Doctor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Which Admiral Cunningham is that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The present Lord Cunningham. The elder +of the two. +<span class='pageno' title='304' id='Page_304'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that it must have +been on 30 or 31 December 1938, as far as we, or rather as far as +Raeder recalls.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] From 1933 until 1939 was Raeder confident +that Hitler would not start a war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. Raeder was completely confident of +that. As proof of this I may say that actually nothing was changed +in our building program within that period. That would have been +necessary if one had had to prepare oneself, at least mentally, for +an armed conflict.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In what respect would the building program +have had to be changed if one had wanted to wage an aggressive +war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It would have been necessary to give +priority at least to the U-boat building program.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was it clear to you and to the leading naval +officers that a real aggressive war started by Germany would perforce +result in a war with England?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. The knowledge of this fact is proof +in my opinion that a war of aggression was not planned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, now in 1938 and 1939 incidents took +place which perhaps justified a certain amount of skepticism. I +should like to remind you of the crisis in the autumn of 1938 concerning +the Sudetenland which almost led to war, which was then +prevented only at the last moment through the Munich Agreement. +I should like to call your attention specifically to the occupation +of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, which was contradictory +to the Munich Agreement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, what was the attitude of Raeder to this incident, which +you must know as you spoke to him practically every day.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As Hitler had stated expressly at Munich +that he was interested only in the German areas of Czechoslovakia; +and, even though perhaps he seemed exceedingly determined +to the outside world, was actually willing to negotiate, +Raeder and the leading circles in the Navy believed that these +things would be adjusted politically.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With the occupation of Czechoslovakia a great disquiet certainly +did arise among us. But we were firmly convinced that Hitler +would not make any exaggerated demands, and that he would be +prepared to settle these matters politically, because we could not +imagine that he would expose the German people to the danger +of a second world war. +<span class='pageno' title='305' id='Page_305'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you know that before the agreement with +Hacha was made, under rather strange circumstances, a bombardment +of Prague had allegedly been threatened; or did Raeder know +anything about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Raeder knew anything +about this. I am hearing about it for the first time now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the Document L-79. This +is a speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939; that is the so-called +“Little Schmundt File.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, this is Exhibit USA-27, and is to be found in +Document Book Number 10, Page 74, of the British Delegation. +I am submitting this document to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] This speech delivered by Hitler on +23 May 1939 was recorded by the adjutant on duty, Lieutenant +Colonel Schmundt. As far as I know, Raeder, on the same day, +discussed this speech with you in detail. At that time you had +been Chief of Staff for a period of about 6 months. From your +later activity are you familiar with the type of recording which +was customary for military speeches?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This record can really not be considered +a true account. I have from this record...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, in the first place, your question +was very much leading. You did not ask him a question. You put +into his mouth what had happened. That is altogether wrong. You +ought to have asked him, if you wanted to prove a conversation +he had with Raeder, whether he did have a conversation with +Raeder. You have told him that he had a conversation with Raeder. +The purpose of examination is to ask questions, and then he could +tell us if he had a conversation with Raeder. He cannot tell us +whether this is a true account or a true form of the account when +he was not at the meeting himself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I wish to thank the High Tribunal, and I shall +try to put the questions properly. The witness...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Not only that, but the Tribunal cannot listen +to this witness’ account, or his opinion as to whether this is a +true account of a meeting at which he was not present.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, the witness, as Chief of Staff, +has always seen the exact minutes on important meetings. They +were delivered to him in accordance with the distribution list. +Therefore, as this document is of a decisive nature, I should like +to determine whether Schulte-Mönting, as Chief of Staff, received +the minutes or whether he just received knowledge of the contents +<span class='pageno' title='306' id='Page_306'></span> +through Admiral Raeder’s immediate reporting. That was the purpose +of my question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, you mean you want to +ask him whether he ever saw this document. Yes, you may certainly +ask him that. Ask him if he saw the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Your Honor, but I believe +the answer of the witness was lost in the interpretation, and if +I am correct...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Never mind about his answer; the question +is what question you are to put to him, and he can answer whether +he ever saw the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I shall put that question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Admiral, did you get to see this document at the time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I am just seeing it now for the first +time, here in Nuremberg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: How did you hear about the contents of the +speech of 23 May?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, as a matter +of principle, after every speech or conference, confidential or +otherwise. Immediately after the speech, Raeder gave me his +impressions which are in contradiction to these so-called minutes. +Raeder did not have this, I might say, exaggerated bellicose impression +which is apparent in this document. But, on the other +hand...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness must tell us what Raeder said +to him. That is what I told you before. He may tell us what Raeder +said to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I should like you to tell us just what +Raeder said to you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder told me that Hitler in his speech +said there was a prospect of a future conflict with Poland, and +that this was in contradiction to those things which he had discussed +with him alone. That the speech in itself was contradictory, +was the impression he expressed to me at that time. He also told +me that after the speech he had had a conversation with Hitler +alone during which he called his attention to the contradictions +contained in the speech. At the same time he reminded Hitler of +what he had told him previously, namely that he would settle +the Polish case under all circumstances in a peaceful way; and now +he was considering a warlike solution possible. Hitler, he said, +had reassured him and had told him that politically he had things +firmly in hand. Then when Raeder asked him, or rather called +<span class='pageno' title='307' id='Page_307'></span> +his attention to this contradiction and asked him just what he +really intended to do, Hitler had answered, Raeder told me, the +following:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I, Hitler, have three ways of keeping secrets. The first, +when we two speak alone; the second, when I, Hitler, keep +them to myself; the third, for problems of the future, which +I do not think out to an end.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Raeder called his attention to the impossibility of a warlike conflict. +To that, according to Raeder, Hitler replied:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It is as if you and I had agreed on a settlement of one +mark. Now, I, Hitler, have already paid you 99 pfennig. Do +you think that because of this last 1 pfennig you would +take me to court?”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And Raeder said “No.”</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“You see”—Hitler said to Raeder—“I have got what I want +by political means, and I do not believe that because of this +last political question”—the solution of the Polish Corridor, +as we called it—“we will have to anticipate a war with England.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And that was in a conversation between Hitler +and Raeder after this speech had been made?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That took place after this speech.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with regard to the minutes which I have +shown you, I have one final question: Did you personally, as Chief +of Staff, also receive and read all minutes which were sent to +Raeder?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, as a rule I saw all minutes and +reports before they were given to Raeder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was Admiral Reader of the opinion—excuse me, +I should like to put the question differently.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>What was Raeder’s point of view concerning the Navy and +politics?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder’s opinion was that we, the Navy, +had nothing to do with politics. He adopted that attitude as +an order and a trust received from the old Reich President, +Von Hindenburg, who, when appointing Raeder to be head of the +Navy, imposed that as a duty upon him. +<span class='pageno' title='308' id='Page_308'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Norway. What were the reasons +which induced Raeder, in September and October 1939, to consider +a possible occupation of Norway?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The reasons were the reports which came +from various sources about alleged intentions of an occupation of +Norway by the Allies. These reports came from the following +sources: First, Admiral Canaris, who was the chief of our intelligence +service. He reported to Raeder, in my presence, once a week, +the information that had come in. Secondly, the reports that came +from the naval attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, which +indicated that rumors were increasing that the Allies intended to +drag Scandinavia into the war in order to prevent, if possible, the +iron ore exports from Sweden to Germany. We did not consider +these reports altogether impossible, because, as documentary +evidence from the last World War proves, Churchill had seriously +considered the occupation of Norway.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was there a further source for reports of that +kind?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Admiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief +of Group North, had received similar reports which he passed on +orally and in writing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember any details from these reports +which you could give us quite briefly?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. There were reports concerning the +presence of British air crews in Oslo, allegedly posing as civilians. +There were reports about Allied officers making surveys of Norwegian +bridges, viaducts, and tunnels all the way to the Swedish +border, which was taken as an indication that the transportation +of heavy material and equipment was planned. And last but not +least there were reports about a secret mobilization of Swedish +troops because of the alleged danger to the ore areas.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What danger arose for Germany on account of +that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If Norway were to have been actually +occupied, the conduct of the war in the North Sea would have +become almost impossible, and it would have been very difficult +in the Baltic Sea. The ore imports most probably would have been +stopped. The danger from the air would have become terrible for +north Germany and the eastern territories. In the long run the North +Sea and the Baltic would have been blocked completely, which +eventually would have led to the total loss of the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Admiral Raeder do on the basis of +these considerations? +<span class='pageno' title='309' id='Page_309'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He reported to Hitler about his misgivings +and called his attention to the dangers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When was that report made?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If I remember correctly, in the autumn +of ’39.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, until the adjournment, will you +go very slowly because, owing to the power of the electrical +recording being off, what is happening here in Court is impossible +to take and therefore we have to rely solely upon the shorthand +notes which cannot be checked back against the electrical recording. +Do you understand? Therefore I want you to go rather more +slowly than usual.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When was the conference between Hitler and +Raeder in which Raeder for the first time pointed out these dangers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In October 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: According to the War Diary that conference took +place, which of course you cannot remember offhand, on 10 October. +At any rate you probably mean that conference.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler then, as a result of that conference, +make a final decision?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, in no way at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did discussions about that subject then take +place continually between Hitler and Raeder?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. No further discussions along that +line took place then until perhaps the end of the year. Only when +the reports which I mentioned before were received in increasing +numbers was that subject taken up again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is it known to you that in December 1939 Quisling +came to Berlin and also talked with Raeder?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is known to me, and I took part +in that meeting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Quisling tell Raeder?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Quisling came on a recommendation +from Rosenberg and said he had important news of a military +and political nature. He confirmed, more or less, the things which +we knew already.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were only the military dangers discussed in this +conference?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Only these things were discussed; the +conference was very short. +<span class='pageno' title='310' id='Page_310'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No political questions were discussed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Raeder met Quisling for the +first time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the occasion of that visit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have at that time any close connections +with Rosenberg?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, he knew him casually, having just +seen him a few times.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Had Rosenberg informed Raeder before about +the relations between Rosenberg and Quisling?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not to my knowledge.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What did Raeder do when Quisling confirmed +the reports received from Canaris and other sources?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As the things we suspected were confirmed +from Norway, Raeder considered this so serious that he went +immediately to Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you also know what he suggested to Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Hitler wanted to talk to Quisling himself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And that took place?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it did.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was a final decision made then concerning Norway, +in December 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Hitler directed that as a countermeasure, +theoretical preparations should be made for a German +landing in Norway. The order, the final order, as far as I know +was not given until March.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was the landing in Norway an undertaking which +you and Raeder considered a risky one or was it considered absolutely +safe to do so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Raeder and the gentlemen from the +Naval Operations Staff and also the front commanders considered +that undertaking very risky. I remember Churchill’s speech in +Parliament when he said, after he had been questioned about that +matter, that he did not believe the German Navy would undertake +that risk in face of the British Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Churchill made that statement, +approximately?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe it was between 7 and 9 April.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: 1940? +<span class='pageno' title='311' id='Page_311'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: What was your estimate at the Naval Operations +Staff of the risks of losses?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder had told Hitler that he would +have to reckon on the possible complete loss of the fleet, and that +if the operations were carried out successfully he would have to +be prepared for the loss of about 30 percent of the forces used.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And how much was lost?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: About 30 percent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In view of the risk of losing the entire fleet, +was Raeder at first in favor of that operation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. He considered a neutral attitude on +the part of Norway as much better than having to take this risk.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder and +the Naval Operations Staff recommended the occupation of Norway +out of the desire for fame and conquest. What do you say +about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The desire for fame was not in Raeder’s +character. The plans for operations which came from his desk +bore the mark of bold daring, but also of thorough planning. One +does not work out plans to the minutest detail covering the distance +from German ports up to Narvik, which is about that from Nuremberg +to Madrid, and one does not use the Navy against a superior +British fleet for the sake of fame.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Raeder had told the Naval Operations Staff and the front commanders +that he had to carry out that operation against all the +rules of warfare because there was a compelling necessity to do so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When did the actual drafting of the military +operation take place at the Naval Operations Staff?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: February 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: During the period from December 1939 until +March 1940 did you continue to receive reports from the sources +you have mentioned?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did these later reports contain a clearer indication +as to the place of the landings, or did you not see the details +about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, they covered the areas between +Narvik via Bergen to Trondheim, from Bergen to Oslo.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder—excuse me, I want to put the +question differently: What was the basis which Raeder suggested +to Hitler for the relations between Germany and Norway? +<span class='pageno' title='312' id='Page_312'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To that I would like to...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, I mean in the period after the +operation was carried out and Germany had occupied Norway.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder in speaking to Hitler advocated +a policy of peace. He suggested repeatedly that attempts should +be made for peace with Norway. He was in agreement in that +respect with the German Commander-in-Chief in Norway, Generaladmiral +Böhm, while Terboven, who was directing political matters, +was of a somewhat different opinion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did serious conflicts arise in that respect +between Terboven and his civil administration on the one side, +and Raeder and Böhm and his colleague, Korvettenkapitän +Schreiber, on the other?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, there were serious differences and +quarrels all the way up the line to Hitler. Hitler at that time +told Raeder that he could not make peace with Norway because +of France.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said, “because of France.” Was it +not possible to make peace with France also, and what was Raeder’s +attitude in that regard?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder advocated the same thing concerning +France.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And what did he say?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He tried to arrange a conference with +Admiral Darlan in an effort to forward these matters. He had +pointed out to Hitler, when the Atlantic Coast was fortified, that +it would be better and more practical to make peace with France +than to make great though inadequate sacrifices for defense. Hitler +replied that he fully agreed but out of consideration for Italy he +could not conclude a peace treaty with France.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did the conversations between Raeder and +Darlan take place?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, near Paris.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were you present?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Admiral Schultze, the Commanding +Admiral in France.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you whether the results of the +conversation were favorable?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he told me about the very favorable +results.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder report on that to Hitler? +<span class='pageno' title='313' id='Page_313'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And in spite of that, Hitler refused?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Out of consideration for Mussolini.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: According to your knowledge, did the Party or +the leadership of the SS through Heydrich attempt to fight Raeder?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Heydrich repeatedly attempted to bring +Raeder and the Navy into discredit with Hitler through defamatory +remarks and by spying, either by posting spies in the officers corps +or the casinos, or by misrepresenting or distorting news. Against +these attacks, Raeder defended himself tenaciously and successfully.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Why was the Party against Raeder?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a question which is very difficult +to answer. I believe mainly because, first of all, there were +differences in the religious field. Many commanders before they +put to sea for combat turned to Raeder for help so that during +their absence their relatives would not have their religious freedom +curtailed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When did the first differences occur between +Raeder and Hitler, and during what period did Raeder ask for his +dismissal?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have had that from that defendant himself, +have we not? Raeder told us when he asked for it. No cross-examination +about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you for what reasons Raeder +remained?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First, because Hitler himself had asked +him to stay, and gave him assurances for the integrity of the Navy. +Furthermore, at that time, there were discussions about combining +the Navy and the merchant marine into one ministry and +putting Party people into that ministry. In that event we did not +see a strengthening but a weakening of our fighting force. Besides, +during that period there occurred a gap in the line of successors, +due to illness and losses.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And last but not least, Raeder remained in the war out of a +sense of responsibility and patriotism.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you yourself ask Raeder to remain in office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I had to ask Raeder frequently and +very seriously. I myself was once ordered by Hitler to come to the +Reich Chancellery.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When was that? +<span class='pageno' title='314' id='Page_314'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the beginning of 1939, when he explained +his standpoint to me in a long conversation and asked me +to convince Raeder that he had to stay. Moreover, he enjoyed the +confidence of the Navy. The senior officers and officials of the +Navy had asked me orally and in writing to try to persuade Raeder +not to leave his office prematurely. Since 1928 he had led the Navy +with a firm hand through all political vicissitudes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I return again to your conversation +with Hitler in the beginning of 1939? Did you speak with +Hitler alone?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that was a private conversation of +about an hour and a half.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler tell you anything about his political +plans on that occasion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; not about political plans in the sense +of what is called politics, but he tried once more to bridge political +differences with Raeder. He told me one should not weigh each +individual word of his. His visitors were right, but only after they +had left; he would put forward records and witnesses; all he wanted +was to appeal to the emotions of his listeners and to stir them up +to do their utmost, but not to commit himself with words. In the +future he promised he would try to give the Navy independence +in all technical questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You just said “not to weigh each individual +word.” Admiral, were the speeches of Hitler ever taken down accurately, +that is, by stenographers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, but as far as I know only in the +later part of the war. Hitler was against having his words put on +record, because everyone who listened to him returned home with +his own opinion. He himself did not stick to his text; he thought +out loud and wanted to carry his listeners away, but he did not +want his individual words to be taken literally. I spoke about that +to Raeder very frequently. We always knew what was expected of +us, but we never knew what Hitler himself thought or wanted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If Hitler did not want to be taken at his word, +how did it come about that he agreed in the war to have his speeches +taken down by stenographers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I told you before that too many misunderstandings +had occurred, and that Hitler as well as those who +reported to him believed that everyone had convinced the other of +his opinion. Thereupon they started keeping minutes. The minutes +kept up to then were personal impressions of those who were not +instructed to keep them but who did so on their initiative. +<span class='pageno' title='315' id='Page_315'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What time is the witness speaking of? He +said up to then the minutes had been kept on the personal initiative +of the person who took them. What time is he speaking of?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: From what time, according to your recollection, +were these minutes taken by the stenographers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1942, I believe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: From 1942?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It might also be 1941. During the war, +at any rate.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But your conversation with Hitler was in January +1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, January 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what did the stenographic minutes look +like later on? Did you ever see them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We repeatedly asked for excerpts from +the minutes and tried to compare them with the prepared text and +they too contained contradictions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, I come to the period when Hitler prepared +for war against Russia, and I am going to show you the Directive +Number 21, of 18 December 1940, concerning the Case Barbarossa.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, that is Document Number 446-PS, Exhibit USA-31, +in the Document Book of the British Prosecution Number 10a, +Page 247.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] The Prosecution have asserted that +Raeder or the Naval Operations Staff had taken part in the drafting +of that directive; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. The Navy had +nothing to do with the drafting of that directive.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have any previous knowledge of +Hitler’s plan to attack Russia, before he received that directive?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, by an oral communication from +Hitler to Raeder, about the middle of August 1940—or October 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: October 1940. Did Raeder inform you about his +conferences with Hitler concerning Russia, and what attitude did +he adopt in these conferences?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, because the +prospect of war with Russia was much too serious to be taken +lightly. Raeder opposed most energetically any plan for a war +against Russia; and, I should like to say, for moral reasons because +Raeder was of the opinion that the pact with Russia should not be +broken as long as the other side gave no cause for it. That, as far +<span class='pageno' title='316' id='Page_316'></span> +as Raeder knew, was not the case in October. That economic treaty—as +we called it at that time—to our knowledge was about 90 percent +at the expense of the Navy. We gave Russia one heavy cruiser, +heavy artillery for battleships, artillery installations, submarine +engines, submarine installations, and valuable optical instruments +for use on submarines. Besides, Raeder was of the opinion that the +theater of operations should not be allowed to be carried into the +Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea was our drill field, I might say. All our +recruits were trained there; all our submarine training took place +in the Baltic Sea.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We had already partly stripped the Baltic coast of batteries and +personnel for the purpose of protecting the Norwegian and the +French coasts. We had very small oil reserves at our disposal, the +synthetic oil production was not yet in full swing. The Navy had +to turn over some of its reserves to industry and agriculture. Consequently, +Raeder was strongly opposed to waging war against Russia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution believe that Raeder was +only opposed to the date set for the war against Russia and concludes +this from the War Diary in which actually the entries refer +to the date. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. After the receipt +of Directive 21, called Barbarossa, Raeder approached Hitler again +with reference to the war against Russia, and also put down his +thoughts in a memorandum. He tried to convince Hitler of the following: +Poland had been crushed, France had been occupied, and, +for military reasons, an invasion of England was out of the question. +He said clearly that now the time had arrived when the further +conduct of the war could not be decisive on the Continent, but +in the Atlantic. Therefore, he told him that he had to concentrate +all forces at his disposal on one objective: To hit the strategic points +of the Empire, especially the supply lines to the British Isles in +order to compel England to sue for negotiations or, if possible, to +make peace. He suggested, as has been mentioned before, that the +policy of peace with Norway should be pursued, peace with France, +and closer co-operation with the Russian Navy, such as was provided +for in the economic treaty, and the repurchase of submarine equipment +or submarines. He said that the decision or the date for a +decision no longer rested with us because we did not have the necessary +sea power and that in case of a long duration of the war the +danger of the participation of the United States had also to be considered; +that therefore the war could not be decided on the European +continent and least of all in the vastnesses of the Russian steppes. +That point of view he continued to present to Hitler as long as he +was in office. +<span class='pageno' title='317' id='Page_317'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said at first that Raeder had protested, +in principle as you have expressed it, for moral reasons, that +is, for reasons of international law.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Why was not that entered into the War Diary +when the other reasons that you have mentioned can be found in +the War Diary? At least they are alluded to.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I can answer, or at least give you +an explanation. Raeder, as a matter of principle, never criticized +the political leadership in the presence of the gentlemen of the +Naval Operations Staff or the front commanders. Therefore, he did +not speak to me and the others about the private conversations +which he had with Hitler, except when it was necessary for military +reasons.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When were the preparations by the Navy, on the +basis of Directive 21 that you have in front of you, made? Do you +remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe about 3 months later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, certainly after the directive?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, after the directive.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were they made on the basis of that directive?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the basis of that, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Was that directive already a final order or was +it just a precautionary strategic measure?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my estimation it should not be considered +as an order, and that can be seen from Points IV and V.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: In what way?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Point V says that Hitler was still waiting +for reports from commanders-in-chief. And Raeder still reported +to Hitler after he had received the directive.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is Point IV, if you will look at it once more, also +in accordance with your opinion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The words “precautionary +measures” are underlined.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Precautionary measures for what?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In case of war against Russia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Well, I think, Admiral, since you have mentioned +it yourself, you should read the sentence which follows the words +“precautionary measures.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: “In case Russia should change her attitude, +she is...” +<span class='pageno' title='318' id='Page_318'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You cannot argue with your own witness +about the meaning of the words. He has given his answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Was Raeder of the opinion, at any +time, that he had succeeded in dissuading Hitler from the unfortunate +plans against Russia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. After he had made his report at +that time, he returned and said, “I believe I have talked him out +of his plan.” And at first we did have that impression because in +the following months there were no more conferences about it, to +my knowledge, not even with the General Staff.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you quite briefly then about Greece. +According to Document C-152, which I will have shown to you, +Raeder made a report to Hitler on 18 March 1941, in which he asked +that the whole of Greece should be occupied. What were the reasons +that caused the High Command, that is, Raeder and you, to make +that suggestion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: When Raeder asked for authorization, as +it says here in the War Diary, for the occupation of the whole of +Greece, even in the event of a peaceful settlement, we, according to +my recollection, had already been for 3 months in possession of the +directive which was concerned with the occupation of Greece, and +when...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. Was that Directive Number 20? I +will have it shown to you. Is that the one you mean?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, “Marita,” that is the one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is Document Number 1541-PS, +Exhibit GB-13, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution 10a, +Page 270. That is Directive Number 20, Case Marita of 13 December +1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Admiral, what caused Raeder, apart +from that point which Hitler had already explained, to ask that +specific question again in the month of March, that is to say, on +18 March?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: A British landing had already occurred +in the south of Greece a few days before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did this landing make it necessary to occupy the +whole of Greece?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, for strategic reasons, absolutely. +The menace of an occupation from the sea or from the air, or the +formation of a Balkan front against Germany, or the menace from +the air to the oil fields, had to be eliminated under all circumstances. +May I only remind you of the Salonika operation in the +first World War. I believe that was a similar situation. +<span class='pageno' title='319' id='Page_319'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Here again the Prosecution say this was governed +by the desire for conquest and fame. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to answer that fame requires +achievements, and I do not know what the Navy could have conquered +in the Mediterranean. We did not have a single man or a +single ship down there; but Raeder, of course, for the strategic +reasons I have mentioned, had to advise Hitler in that direction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were breaches of neutrality on the part of Greece +known to you before this time, before we occupied Greece?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We had been informed that in 1939, certain +Greek political and military circles had been in the closest +connection with the Allied General Staff. We knew that Greek +merchantmen were in British service. Therefore we were compelled +to consider the Greek merchantmen which sailed through the prohibited +zone to England as enemy ships. And, I believe, in the +beginning of 1940, or the middle of 1940, we received information +that the Allies intended to land in Greece or to establish a Balkan +front against Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='320' id='Page_320'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, as the last point in my questions dealing +with Russia, I should like to show you the document submitted by +the Soviet Prosecution, Document USSR-113. This document is a +communication from the Naval Operations Staff of 29 September +1941 to Group North, that is, Generaladmiral Carls. Under II it +states as to the result of a conversation between Admiral Fricke and +Hitler: “The Führer is determined to make the city of St. Petersburg +disappear from the face of the earth.” Raeder has been accused +of not having done anything to oppose such a monstrous intention +and has been accused because the Naval Operations Staff passed on +this communication. I ask you, Admiral, did you know of this communication +in 1941?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the President.</span>] I beg your pardon, Mr. President, I +should like to remark that at this moment, I am sorry to say, I have +no photostatic copy of this document. I tried to procure it. I have +this very moment received it, and I should like to submit the photostatic +copy at this point, instead of the written copy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This seems to be the original which I have +before me?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: No, Admiral, it is a copy, an exact copy of the +photostatic copy with all paragraphs and names, made for my own +special use.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Were you acquainted with this piece of writing in 1941?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not know it in 1941, it is submitted +to me at this moment for the first time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe that Admiral Raeder saw this +communication before it was sent off, even though you yourself had +not seen it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That would have been a miracle. Communications +which were submitted to Admiral Raeder all went +through my hands. They always had the notation, either “the +Commander-in-Chief has taken due note,” and were initialed by +me personally in order to certify this notation, or “this order or this +directive is to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief,” and in this +case too my initials were affixed. This order and this copy which +you have just shown to me I have never seen before; I am not +acquainted with it; and I consider it impossible that Admiral Raeder +should have seen it, because on 29 September 1941 I was in good +health and exercising my duties in Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what do you know about this question +of Leningrad and the Navy? +<span class='pageno' title='321' id='Page_321'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I recall that at the so-called daily discussions +regarding the general situation one of the officers of the Naval +Operations Staff reported on the intentions of the Army regarding +the future of Leningrad—not Petersburg. Whereupon Raeder expressed +the desire that it be kept in mind during the operations that +Leningrad should, under all circumstances, fall intact into our hands, +for he needed shipyards and adjoining territory for naval construction; +and he wished that the Army be informed of the urgency of +this desire, because in view of the ever-increasing danger of air +attacks, we intended to shift part of our shipyard facilities to +the East.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At that time we had already begun, if I remember correctly, to +move installations from Emden to the East and wanted, furthermore, +as Raeder wished, to evacuate Wilhelmshaven subsequently and +move the installations there as far to the East as possible. He +emphasized expressly that the city should also be left as undamaged +as possible because otherwise there would be no place for the +workers to live. This is all I can truthfully tell you about the case +of Leningrad.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you know that this wish of Raeder’s was +rejected by Hitler because he said it was not possible?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not recall that this case was +taken up again. For the operations in the North soon came to a +standstill, I believe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did other high officers tell you anything at all +about this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I never heard anything about this +document, nor did I see any reason to discuss it with anyone.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, if it is agreeable to the Tribunal, +I should like to submit a document which was granted me, Exhibit +Raeder-111, because of its connection with this problem. It is to be +found in my Document Book 6, Page 435. It is an affidavit by Rear +Admiral Hans Bütow, dated 21 March 1946. I should like to read +this document since it is very brief.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What page is this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Page 435 in Document Book 6, Exhibit Number +Raeder-111. It reads as follows:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“During the period from 20 June 1941 to 20 October 1941, +namely, the period to which Document USSR-113, (1), UK-45, +refers, I was stationed in Finland as Naval Commander. I was +under Generaladmiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of +Group North. I declare that the document in question, +USSR-113, (1), UK-45, a communication of 29 September 1941 +<span class='pageno' title='322' id='Page_322'></span> +sent by the Naval Operations Staff to Group North, and its +contents have never come to my knowledge, as it doubtless +would have if Generaladmiral Carls had passed on the letter +to the offices subordinate to him. As far as I know, no one +else in my command received this communication.</p> + +<p>“I myself first obtained knowledge of this order of Hitler’s +in November 1945 on the occasion of a conversation with +Dr. Siemers, the defense counsel for Admiral Raeder.</p> + +<p>“Other officers, especially other naval commanders, have +never spoken to me about this order. It is thus clear that the +other commanders likewise had no knowledge of this order.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then there is the certification and the signature of the senior +naval judge before whom this affidavit was made.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Admiral, then I should like to turn to a new topic, the alleged +war of aggression which Raeder is supposed to have planned against +America. Did Raeder at any time try to instigate Japan to a war +against America?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, never. We never had any military +discussions with Japan at all before her entry into the war. Quite +on the contrary, he warned Hitler against war with America in +view of England’s naval superiority and her co-operation with +America.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: For what reasons did you, Raeder, and the High +Command especially, warn Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, for the reasons which I outlined +before, reasons of over-all strategy which motivated Raeder +during the entire course of the war. Raeder considered the enemy +on the sea primarily, and not on land. If the largest sea power +in the world were added to England, which was already superior, +then the war would have taken on unbearable proportions for us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Besides, through the reports of our naval attaché in Washington, +Vice Admiral Witthöft, Raeder was very well informed about the +tremendous potential at the disposal of the United States.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I might also say with reference to the conversion of the normal +economy into a war economy, that the tremendous outlay of shipyards +and installations, as Witthöft stated a few months before the +war, permitted the construction of a million tons of shipping each +month. These figures were very eloquent and were naturally at the +same time a terrible warning to us not to underestimate the armament +potential of the United States.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution believes it must draw a contrary +conclusion from the fact that Raeder on 18 March 1941, according +to the War Diary, proposed that Japan should attack Singapore. +<span class='pageno' title='323' id='Page_323'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, that was an absolutely +correct measure and a correct proposal, which was in line with +Raeder’s reasoning. He was interested in dealing blows to England’s +important strategic centers. That he tried to ease our situation is +understandable and self-evident. But at no time did he propose that +Japan should enter into a war against America, but rather against +England.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Were there any discussions about these strategic +questions at that time between you and Raeder on the one hand +and Japanese military authorities on the other?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I have already stated that before +Japan’s entry into the war no military discussions with Japan had +ever taken place. The Japanese attitude was very reserved.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder ever discuss the fact that Japan +should attack Pearl Harbor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. We heard about this for the first time +over the radio.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, during the time of your activity in the +High Command of the Navy or during your activity as a commanding +admiral at Trondheim did you have any knowledge about +the treatment of Allied prisoners of war by the German Navy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might reply that I know of no case in +which Allied prisoners of war, as long as they were under the control +of the Navy, were treated other than properly and chivalrously. I +could refer to the testimony given by the English commander of the +midget U-boat, which attacked the <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span> in the Alta Fjord, who +after his return to England from imprisonment, gave a press interview +on the occasion of his being awarded the Victoria Cross. In +this interview he mentioned the particularly chivalrous and correct +treatment he had received at the hands of the commander of the +<span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>From my own command in Norway I could mention a case in +which members of the Norwegian resistance movement dressed in +civilian clothing were treated just as chivalrously and correctly. I +had to investigate these cases in the presence of British authorities, +and the correctness of the treatment became evident.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When did you have to investigate this at the +order of the British Military Government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After the capitulation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, not the Military Government, +but the British Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The British Navy at Trondheim, while I +was a commanding admiral. +<span class='pageno' title='324' id='Page_324'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And the cases which were investigated there, +first by you and then by the competent British admiral, were not +contested?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Were not contested. The naval officer +handed them over to me for safekeeping, and I had to present the +findings of the courts of inquiry in writing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And the result...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The result was good, proper, and occasioned +no protests.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And the result was presented to the competent +British officer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it was on his very order that I had +to do it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the case of the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> has been dealt +with here in detail and is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, in +order to save time, I should like merely to touch this case in +passing. I should like you to tell me: Did the High Command know, +did you and Raeder know, at the beginning of September 1939 that +the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> had been sunk by a German U-boat?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. The Commander of U-boats reported +on the 3d that the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> could not have been sunk by a German +U-boat since, if I remember correctly, the nearest boat was about +70 nautical miles away.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: When did you learn that a German U-boat had +sunk the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe 2 or 3 weeks afterwards, after +this U-boat returned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I should like to refer to a document, +according to which the date was 27 September.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Do you know that a declaration had +been made by State Secretary Von Weizsäcker on 3, 4, or 5 September +to the effect that it was not a German U-boat? When it was +established that it actually had been a German U-boat, what did +Raeder do about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The assumption that it had not been a +German U-boat was at first justified and State Secretary Von Weizsäcker +therefore acted in the best of faith, as did we. After this +regrettable mistake became known, Raeder reported this fact to +Hitler. Hitler then gave the order that he did not want the statement +which had been made by the Foreign Office denied. He ordered +that the participants, that is those who knew, should give their oath +to remain silent until, I believe, the end of the war. +<span class='pageno' title='325' id='Page_325'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Did you give your oath of silence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I personally did not give my oath of +silence, and neither did Admiral Raeder. In the High Command we +were the only ones, I believe, with the exception of Admiral Fricke +who had knowledge of that, and we should probably have taken +the oath.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: At Hitler’s order you were obliged to administer +an oath to the others who knew about this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I am of the opinion that it was the +crew of the U-boat, insofar as they knew about this mistake.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not +having gone to Freiherr Von Weizsäcker to tell him that it actually +was a German U-boat and of not having said to the American naval +attaché, “I am sorry; it was a German U-boat after all.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Such thoughts occurred to us as well, but +we thought that any discrepancies which might arise and lead to +political ill-humor in America were to be avoided as much as possible. +Stirring up this case once more would have greatly aroused +public feeling. I remember, for instance, the <span class='it'>Lusitania</span> case during +the first World War. To have stirred up this case again after a few +weeks and to arouse public opinion, and then to force entry into +the war would have had little sense.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: And that was the train of thought which caused +Hitler to issue this decree?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It was the train of thought which we also +shared.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You said it was not to be stirred up again but +regrettably, as you know, this case was stirred up again. On 23 October +1939 in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> a very unfortunate article +appeared with the heading “Churchill Sinks the Athenia.” Do you +remember that article?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. That article was published +without Raeder’s knowledge and without the knowledge or +complicity of the Navy. Even today I do not know yet who the +author of the article was. It originated in the Propaganda Ministry, +and Raeder and the rest of us in the High Command of the Navy +were most indignant, not so much because this topic was being +stirred up again, but rather because of the tenor of the article for +whether deliberately or unintentionally—we did not know which it +was—there was a misrepresentation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We were obliged to keep silence. To what extent the Propaganda +Ministry had been informed about this matter by Hitler, we +<span class='pageno' title='326' id='Page_326'></span> +did not know. We also had no opportunity to speak with the Propaganda +Ministry about this case and we were completely surprised +when this article appeared several weeks later in the <span class='it'>Völkischer +Beobachter</span>. We were therefore deeply indignant, especially Raeder, +because it was fundamentally against his principles that leading +foreign statesmen be attacked in a caustic manner; and, in addition, +the facts were completely distorted. And besides—this may also be +important—this involved Raeder’s opponent whom Raeder did not +in the least wish to disparage before the German public, for Raeder +took him only too seriously; and this was, I believe, no other than +Churchill.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question: Did the Propaganda +Ministry call you or Raeder up before this article appeared?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to turn to the last question +of my examination. This is the last point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is about the sixth final +question you have asked.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, the translation +must have been wrong. The previous question was the final question +on the <span class='it'>Athenia</span> problem. Now, this is actually the final question +which I wish to put.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] The Prosecution accuses Admiral +Raeder of not supporting Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch after +the latter had been exonerated and acquitted in court and accuses +Raeder of not having used his influence to reinstate Fritsch in office +and restore his dignity. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. Raeder gave me +all the files of the legal proceedings against Generaloberst Von +Fritsch sometime in the beginning of 1939 to be kept in the safe. At +that time he told me how the course of the proceedings had impressed +him and also of the fact that he had made Generaloberst +Von Fritsch the offer of a complete reinstatement, going so far as to +have him reinstated in his previous office. Von Fritsch thanked him +for that and told him personally that he would never assume his +former office again, that he would not even consider returning after +what had happened, for which reason he was requesting Raeder not +to make any efforts in this direction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Besides, Fritsch and Raeder were on good personal terms—to say +that they were friends is going perhaps too far, but I have often +seen Fritsch at Raeder’s house even after his dismissal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you, Admiral.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, I have no further questions. +<span class='pageno' title='327' id='Page_327'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ +counsel want to ask any questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Schulte-Mönting, +you just spoke about the correct treatment of prisoners in connection +with a U-boat attack on the <span class='it'>Tirpitz</span>. Do you mean by that the +attack in November 1943 in the Alta Fjord?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is the one I mean.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it a two-man +U-boat?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Whether it was a two-man or three-man +U-boat, I do not know, but it was a midget U-boat. Several U-boats +attacked simultaneously. Some of them were sunk, and the commander +who successfully, I believe, placed his magnetic mine was +taken prisoner.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And this commander +was treated according to the Geneva convention?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Absolutely.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you first about the +<span class='it'>Athenia</span> episode. I take it you agree that the article in the <span class='it'>Völkischer +Beobachter</span> was thoroughly dishonorable, lying, and discreditable.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I heard nothing at all in German.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I will repeat my question. With regard to the +<span class='it'>Athenia</span>—do you hear me now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: With regard to the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> +article on the <span class='it'>Athenia</span>, do you agree that it was a thoroughly dishonorable +publication?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I agree that it was a dishonorable +publication, untrue and dishonorable.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Perhaps if you keep your headphones on—I +have a number of questions to ask you, I am afraid—it might be +more convenient for the work we have to do.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And you say that the Defendant Raeder thought it was dishonorable?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he did as well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: What action did he take to manifest his displeasure?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In this case he valued the interests of the +State more than a newspaper article. The interests of the State +<span class='pageno' title='328' id='Page_328'></span> +required that in any event all complications with the United States +were to be avoided.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That appears to be a characteristic on the part +of Raeder that runs throughout the history from 1928 to 1943, that +throughout he put what he thought were the interests of the Nazi +State before conditions of morality, honor, and public decency, is +that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I do not believe. I believe that in +this he acted consistently as a good patriot would act.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You see, with regard to the invasion of Russia, +for example, you said to the Tribunal that on both moral and +strategic grounds, Raeder was against the invasion of Russia. Why +did he not resign?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: By way of reply I must mention first +Hitler’s answer to Raeder’s statements against a war with Russia. +This answer was to the effect that he saw no possibility of avoiding +a conflict for the following reasons:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>First, because of the personal impression which he, Hitler, had +received from Molotov’s visit, which had taken place in the meantime. +By “in the meantime” I mean between the directive and the +carrying through of the directive.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Secondly, the fact that allegedly the economic negotiations had +not only been dragged out by the Russians but, as Hitler expressed +it, had been conducted with blackmail methods.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Thirdly, as he had been informed by the German General Staff. +Russian troop deployment had taken on such threatening proportions +that he, Hitler, could not wait for the first blow from the other +side because of the air threat to Brandenburg and the capital and to +the Silesian industry. Raeder then, of course, had to realize that he +could not refute these arguments or prove the opposite.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You are not suggesting that you thought that +the war between Germany and Russia was a defensive war so far +as Germany was concerned, are you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, we were of the opinion that the +deployment of troops on both sides had reached such an extreme +point that it would not take long for the storm to burst, and that +from the military point of view anyone who sees that a conflict is +inevitable, naturally likes to have the advantages which result from +dealing the first blow.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: The invasion of Russia was a brutal aggression +on the part of Nazi Germany, you admit that now, do you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I do admit that. +<span class='pageno' title='329' id='Page_329'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I want you to turn your mind for a moment, if +you will, to Document L-79, which is in the British Document +Book 10, Page 74. Those are the minutes of the Hitler conference +on 23 May 1939 which you discussed in your evidence-in-chief this +morning. I take it that you have read those minutes, Witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I look at them now? I have never +seen these minutes before. If I were to be asked about them, I +would first have to read them in toto.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Well, you need not trouble to do that, Witness. +You gave evidence this morning as to Raeder’s discussion with you +about this conference. Did Raeder tell you that Hitler had said on +23 May 1939, for instance:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with +the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. +We cannot expect a repetition of the Czechoslovakian +affair. There will be war.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then further, Page 76 of the report:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement +with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict... +England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England +will be a life and death struggle.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then the next paragraph but one:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed +force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I am suggesting to you that those statements of Hitler’s +represented Hitler’s considered policy, and that that policy was in +fact carried out in the field of action. Is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, I must correct a mistake. I +thought that you had shown me a record on Russia and not the one +on Poland. I saw it in different writing, and I thought it was another +record. If it is the same record which I mentioned this morning, +then I must state again that Raeder did not agree with the belligerent +wording of these minutes as written down by Schmundt.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Just one moment, Witness, if you please. I have +read out certain extracts from that document, which I take it that +you heard interpreted. Do you agree with me that those extracts +represented Hitler’s considered policy at the time and that that +policy was in fact carried out in the field of action?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If you keep your headphones on—I know it is difficult. Just +move them back if you wish to talk. Now, see if you can answer my +question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to remark in this connection +that Hitler in his speeches pursued a certain purpose. In preparations +<span class='pageno' title='330' id='Page_330'></span> +for war he saw a means of political pressure, and in the phrase +“war of nerves” (which was not used in Germany only, but went +everywhere through the ether far beyond Europe’s boundaries) he +tried to find a means of preventing war as well as a means of +exerting pressure. This document itself contains contradictions +which lead to the conclusion that he himself could not seriously +have thought that a war would develop. I can prove this by saying, +for example, that he states that the General Staff or the general +staffs are not to concern themselves with this question; but toward +the end he says that all the branches of the Wehrmacht must get +together to study the problem. He says that a war with Poland must +in no event result in war with England; politics must see to that. +But in the next paragraph one reads: “But if a war actually does +arise, I shall deal short sharp blows for a quick decision.” In the +next paragraph it says again, “But I need 10 to 15 years to prepare,” +and in the concluding paragraph it says: “The construction program +of the Navy will in no wise be changed.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If, therefore, Hitler at that time had really been serious in his +speech, that is, that an armed conflict with Poland would result +shortly, then he would not have exclaimed first that we would have +time until 1943 and, secondly, that there were to be no changes as +far as the Navy was concerned. Rather he would have said to +Raeder, privately at least: “In all haste prepare a strong U-boat +program because I do not know what course events will take.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But it is a fact that at about this time, the +Fall Weiss operation was being prepared to the very last detail, was +it not? That is the operation against Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The operation was prepared to such a +stage that when it was canceled at the last minute we thought that +we would not be able to reach our forces at sea by wireless. We +considered this an extreme policy of exerting pressure in the form +of a war of nerves. Since at the last minute everything was canceled +we believed without doubt that it was only a means of pressure and +not an entry into war. Not until we heard the cannons were we +convinced that the war was no longer to be prevented. I personally +believe...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: If you would shorten your answers as best you +can, it would be very convenient.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I want to go from Poland to Norway. The first conference of +the Defendant Raeder with regard to Norway took place on 10 October, +you have told us. I want you to hear the record of that conference, +which is found in Admiral Assmann’s headline diary. It +is dated 10 October 1939: +<span class='pageno' title='331' id='Page_331'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states conquering the +Belgian coast no advantage for U-boat warfare; refers to +value of Norwegian bases.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I suggest to you that the interests of the German Navy in Norway +from the point of view of requiring submarine bases was manifesting +itself at that time; is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I look at this document first? It is +unknown to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You shall see the original diary, if you want to +reassure yourself that I am reading it correctly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The document was handed to the witness.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In this sentence, I do not see any belligerent +intentions. It says expressly that he attaches importance to +the winning of Norwegian bases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That is all I am putting to you at the moment. +And do you know that on 3 October the Defendant Raeder was +sending out a questionnaire upon the possibility of extending the +operational base to the north, and upon the bases that it would be +desirable for German power to acquire?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am referring to Document C-122, My Lord. The document +C-122 is in Document Book 10a at Page 91.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If you will look at that document, Witness, you will see in the +second sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases +in Norway with the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, +with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic +and operational position. The following questions are to be +examined...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then there follow these questions:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“What places in Norway can be considered as bases?</p> + +<p>“Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s will, +if it is impossible to achieve this without fighting?</p> + +<p>“What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?</p> + +<p>“Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases, +or do they possibly have decisive advantages simply as supply +centers? (The Commander of U-boats considers such harbors +extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic +U-boats on temporary stops.)”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then finally:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“What decisive advantages would there be for the conduct of +the war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, for +instance, Skagen?”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='332' id='Page_332'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I suggest to you that those documents are the clue to the +German invasion of Norway. Do you not agree with that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not see any aggressive intentions +in these purely operational plans and considerations when thinking +of what bases might come into consideration for the conduct of the +war. This morning I said that, to the best of my knowledge, Generaladmiral +Carls as early as September sent a letter to this effect +to Raeder in which he expressed his concern and stated his +strategical ideas and plans in case of an Allied occupation of Norway.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: The source of the information which the Defendant +Raeder was receiving you discussed this morning, but one +source that you did not give wets the Norwegian traitor Quisling. +The relations between the Defendant Raeder and him were very +close, were they not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: There was no contact at all between +Raeder and Quisling until December 1939; then Raeder met Quisling +for the first time in his life and never saw him again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But after December Quisling’s agent Hagelin +was a very frequent visitor of the Defendant Raeder, was he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Hagelin ever went +to Raeder before Quisling’s visit, unless I am very mistaken. I think +he visited Raeder for the first time when he accompanied Quisling.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Yes, but thereafter Raeder was in very close +touch with the Quisling movement, the Quisling treachery, was +he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. Raeder had nothing at all to do with +the Quisling movement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Do you know a man, Erich Giese, Walter Georg +Erich Giese, who was an administrative employee of the adjutancy +of the supreme commander of the Navy in Berlin?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not quite catch the name.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Giese, G-i-e-s-e. He was a—part of his +duties were to receive the visitors of the supreme commander. He +was an assistant of the supreme commander’s adjutant and he was +dismissed from his post in April 1942. And no doubt you recollect +the man.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Will you please tell me the name again? +Although it was spelled to me I did not catch it. Is this a Norwegian?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: This is a German subject, an employee of the +supreme command of the Navy. Part of his duties were to receive +all the supreme commander’s visitors, to accept applications for +<span class='pageno' title='333' id='Page_333'></span> +interviews, and draw up the list of callers for the supreme commander. +Now you are looking at an affidavit from this man, Document +D-722, to be Exhibit GB-479.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness answered the question yet?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Not yet, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Now I have the name. The man of whom +you are talking was in the reception room of the adjutant’s office. +It was not up to this man, who was to be admitted to the Admiral; +that was up to me. I asked the callers for what reason they had +come. Mr. Hagelin did not visit Raeder before Quisling’s visit, that +is, not before December 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I am not suggesting that but what I am suggesting +is that after December 1939 there was a very close link +between Raeder and the Quisling movement. I just read out to you +this extract from the affidavit of this man. From Page 3, My Lord, +of the English text:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I can state the following about the preparations which led up +to the action against Denmark and Norway: An appointment +with the Commander-in-Chief was frequently made for a +Mr. Hagelin and another gentleman, whose name I cannot +recall at present, by a party official of Rosenberg’s Foreign +Political Office; as a rule they were received immediately. +I also had received instructions that if a Mr. Hagelin should +announce himself personally, I should always take him to the +Commander-in-Chief at once. Shortly afterwards I learned +from the minute book and from conversations in my room +that he was a Norwegian confidential agent. The gentleman +from the Foreign Political Office who frequently accompanied +him and whose name I do not remember at the moment also +conversed with me and confided in me, so that I learned +about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and about the preparations +for the Norway campaign. According to all I heard +I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from +Raeder and met with Hitler’s heartiest approval. The whole +enterprise was disguised by the pretense of an enterprise +against Holland and England. One day Quisling, too, was +announced at the Commander-in-Chief’s by Hagelin and was +received immediately. Korvettenkapitän Schreiber of the +Naval Reserve, who was later naval attaché in Oslo and +knew the conditions in Norway very well, also played a role +in all these negotiations. He collaborated with the Quisling +party and its agents in Oslo.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It is not true that Mr. Hagelin was +received by Admiral Raeder. Herr Giese cannot possibly have any +<span class='pageno' title='334' id='Page_334'></span> +information about that because he was stationed two rooms away. +If he had perhaps noted down that he was received by me, that +would in a certain sense be correct. The fact is that at the time, +after the Quisling-Hagelin visit, I had said that if he were to pass +through Berlin again and he had any naval political information in +this connection, I should like him to make this information available +to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that Defendant Raeder never +met Hagelin?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He did not meet him before Quisling’s +visit in December. Later he did not receive him any more.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But he in fact received Hagelin and took him +to Hitler on 14 December 1939, did he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was accompanied by Quisling, that is +correct. But he did not have any special discussion with Raeder +alone.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: You said—you spoke this morning as to a conference +between Quisling and Raeder on 12 December 1939 and +suggested that politics were not discussed at that conference.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: By the word “politics” I mean politics in +the National Socialistic sense, that is, National Socialistic politics +on the Norwegian side and on our side. The matters discussed were +only naval political questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But I will not go into a discussion of the +question of politics with you. I will consider the familiar German +definition that politics is a continuation of war by other means. +But if you look at the Document C-64 you will see that political +problems were discussed on 12 December. You see that is a report +of Raeder to Hitler. It is found on Page 31 of the Document +Book 10a, in which Raeder writes in Paragraph 2:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling +in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England’s influence +is very great, especially because of Hambro, the President of +the Storting (a Jew and a friend of Hore-Belisha) who is all-powerful +in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there +is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible +occupation of Norway, in which case Sweden would also stand +against Germany. Danger of Norway’s occupation by England +is very great—possibly very shortly. From 11 January 1940 +on, the Storting and thereby the Norwegian Government is +unconstitutional since the Storting, in defiance of the constitution, +has prolonged its term for a year.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Politics was very much under discussion at that conference, was +it not? You have said that the Defendant Raeder was anxious for +<span class='pageno' title='335' id='Page_335'></span> +peace with Norway. Was it for peace with a Norway ruled by the +traitor Quisling?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In reply to your first question I should +like to say that in the minutes it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out that in connection +with such offers we can never know to what extent the +persons involved want to further their own party aims, and to +what extent they are concerned about German interests. +Hence caution is required.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>This entry in the document which you have just presented to +me corroborates what I was trying to say, that is, that no party +matters or matters depending on agreement along ideological lines +were to be settled between Admiral Raeder and Quisling. For this +reason I said that Raeder did not discuss politics with him, but +merely factual matters. That Quisling, at the time of his introduction, +should mention certain things as a sort of preamble is self-evident. +But he points out the factor of caution and asks: “What +does this man want? Does he want to work with the Party or does +he really want to remain aloof?”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder was preferring +the reports of Quisling to the reports of the German +Ambassador in Oslo which were entirely different from the reports +of the traitor Quisling. That is so, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe that Raeder never saw the +reports from the German Ambassador in Oslo. I at any rate do not +know these reports.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Now the Tribunal has the documents with +regard to that matter. I will not pursue it. I want to ask you next +about the relations with the United States of America. When did +the German Admiralty first know of Japan’s intention to attack the +United States?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I can speak only for Raeder and myself. +As far as I know, it was not until the moment of the attack on +Pearl Harbor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But you had received a communication from +your German naval attaché at Tokyo before the attack on Pearl +Harbor, indicating that an attack against the United States was +pending, had you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Pearl Harbor? No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But against the United States forces. Just look +at the Document D-872, which will be Exhibit GB-480. You see +that those are extracts from the war diary of the German naval +attaché in Tokyo. The first entry is dated 3 December 1941: +<span class='pageno' title='336' id='Page_336'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“1800 hours. The naval attaché extended an invitation to +several officers of the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires +from the conversation that the negotiations in Washington +must be regarded as having broken down completely and that, +quite obviously, the beginning of actions to the south by the +Japanese Armed Forces is to be expected in the near future.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then on 6 December 1941:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Conversation with Fregattenkapitän Shiba.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the +following telegram:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Naval Attaché, 1251. Military Secret:</p> + +<p>“1. Last week America offered a nonaggression pact between +the United States, England, Russia and Japan. In view of the +Tripartite Pact and the high counterdemands, Japan rejected +this offer. Negotiations have therefore completely broken +down.</p> + +<p>“2. The Armed Forces foresaw this development and consented +to Kurusu’s being sent only to impress the people with +the fact that all means had been exhausted.</p> + +<p>“3. The Armed Forces have already decided 3 weeks ago that +war is inevitable, even if the United States at the last minute +should make substantial concessions. Appropriate measures +are under way.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then—I will not read the whole document, and at the end +it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“A state of war with Britain and America would certainly +exist by Christmas.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Assuming that signal reached you before 8 December, you +became familiar with the plans of the perfidious Japanese attack +upon the United States, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not quite grasp it. I have already +said that we had no contact with the Japanese experts or attachés in +Berlin. I asserted that we first learned of the Pearl Harbor incident +by radio, and I cannot quite see what difference it makes whether +on 6 December the attaché in Tokyo told us his predictions, or +whether he was drawing conclusions about a future conflict from +information sources which we could not control. That has nothing +to do with our having advised the Japanese in Berlin to attack +America.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you had no conversations +in Berlin with the Japanese attaché?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To my knowledge there were no official +conferences between the two admiralty staffs, that is, official +<span class='pageno' title='337' id='Page_337'></span> +operational conferences between the Naval Operations Staff and the +Japanese admiralty staff.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, before you part from that +document, I think you ought to read Paragraph 5.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Paragraph 5, My Lord, reads:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“5. Addition—Naval Attaché.</p> + +<p>“No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the +commencement of the southern offensive. All the evidence, +however, indicates that it may be expected to start within +3 weeks, with simultaneous attacks on Siam, the Philippines +and Borneo.</p> + +<p>“6. The Ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of +the telegram, but is acquainted with its contents.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now I want to...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: With reference to what the witness has just +said, I do not know whether I understood him right before, but +what I took down he said was that the German Admiralty first +knew of Japan’s intention to attack, after Pearl Harbor, not that it +first knew of Pearl Harbor by radio. It was the first indication they +had of an intention to attack.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That is so, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] I am suggesting to you, Witness, that +you knew perfectly well of the Japanese intention to attack the +United States before the incident of Pearl Harbor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not know whether you are stressing +Pearl Harbor, or the fact that 2 days before the attack on Pearl +Harbor we received a telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conflict +was to be counted on. I was asked whether we had known of +the fact of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and to that I said: “No.” +I said that we had had no conferences in Berlin between the Naval +Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff. What you are +presenting to me...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I just want to deal with that, but I want to +read out to you what your Commander-in-Chief said about that, +because it is not what you are saying, you know. On the interrogation +of Admiral Raeder on 10 November 1945 (Document +D-880, GB-483) he was asked:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Question: Would such matters be accomplished by Foreign +Office people alone, or would that be in collaboration with +the High Command of the Navy and OKW?”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And Defendant Raeder’s answer was:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“No, the negotiations were conducted by the Foreign Office +and on the part of the Japanese diplomats there was this +<span class='pageno' title='338' id='Page_338'></span> +delegate, Oshima, who was an officer. He negotiated with +the Foreign Office in his capacity as delegate, but apart +from that he was enough of an expert to look at this +thing from a military standpoint as well. Military authorities +had long before that carried on negotiations with military +and naval attachés about the needs and other things that +the Japanese needed... This was all talked about and +thrashed out with the military and naval attachés.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That is a very different version of the fact from the version +you have given, Witness, is it not? Now, there are two more +matters which I want to deal with.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not know whether it will be convenient, My Lord, to have +a brief adjournment.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the +extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder which I +read I wanted to be clear that the defendant was then dealing +with the relationship generally between the German authorities +in Berlin and the Japanese representatives. I do not want to have +given the Court the impression it was a direct negotiation with +regard to intervention against America itself. I do not want to +mislead the Court in any way with regard to that matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Did you know of the shooting in +December 1942 by a naval unit belonging to the German naval +officer in command at Bordeaux of two British Royal Marines who +took part in a raid on shipping in the Gironde estuary?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I learned of that later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Did you see the entry with regard to that +shooting in the SKL War Diary?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, here in Nuremberg the defendant’s +counsel showed me an entry, but I do not know whether it was the +War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: It has been suggested by both counsel for +the Defendant Dönitz and counsel for the Defendant Raeder that +the entry in D-658 which contained the sentence: “The measure +would be in accordance with the Führer’s special order, but is +nevertheless something new in international law since these soldiers +were in uniform,” that that entry was not from the SKL War +Diary. Now, you are familiar with the initial of the Defendant +Raeder, are you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I want you now to look at the original of D-658, so that it may +be established beyond peradventure that this matter was entered +<span class='pageno' title='339' id='Page_339'></span> +in the SKL War Diary. I will put in a photostatic copy of the +original if the Tribunal will allow me, because the original is +required for other purposes. D-658 was GB-229, and it may be +convenient to call the photostats of the originals D-658(a) and +GB-229(a). That is the War Diary of the SKL, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I recognize it as such.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And the SKL was perfectly familiar with that +dreadful murder of the men at Bordeaux, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From the War Diary I can see—such is +my impression—that afterward on 9 December they were informed +about the fact of the shooting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And their laconic comment was...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the Armed Forces communiqué it +says: “According to the Armed Forces communiqué, the two soldiers +have been shot in the meantime.” This can be seen in the War +Diary of the SKL and I acknowledged it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And the humane comment of the SKL is, “It +is something new in international law, since the soldiers were in +uniform.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There is one final matter which I wish to ask you about: Is it +your contention that the German Navy fought a clean war at sea?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I contend that the German Navy fought +a very clean war and that has nothing to do with the fact that it +is said here in the Diary of the SKL, as taken from the Armed +Forces communiqué, that two soldiers were shot and that this was +in accordance with the special order given by the Führer which +has been cited but, as the Naval Operations Staff adds, was something +new in the history of naval warfare. This too...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I am turning to another matter, but you say +generally...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I just say in conclusion that this +postscript has been confirmed and that the Navy, in this case +Raeder, had no influence on these matters. If you ask me whether +I approved that order or something of the sort I would give you +my personal opinion of the matters which Raeder and I discussed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But you know Raeder was Commander-in-Chief +of the Navy, and who would have influence in Germany if +the commanders-in-chief did not have influence? Here was a matter +directly reflecting on the honor of German Armed Forces and +despite that deliberate denial of the protection of the Geneva Convention +for those British marines he continued in office, after they +were deliberately murdered. +<span class='pageno' title='340' id='Page_340'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a matter of opinion. I may take +the following stand: The fact is that in this war, for the first time, +a form of sabotage was applied, whether behind the lines by means +of air landings or otherwise.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Just a moment. These were marines in uniform. +Your own report in the SKL War Diary says so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have to comment on that order which +was issued earlier. The preamble of that order said that, since there +was knowledge of orders to the Allied soldiers or—I do not +remember the exact wording any more—since these soldiers were +given orders not to bother taking German prisoners but rather +to shoot them while carrying out their work in the so-called Commando +raids, the following directives had to be issued.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At that time I discussed this matter with Raeder, of course, and +I can merely state my personal opinion. I felt that I could believe +this preamble because I am of the opinion that if I resorted to, let +us say, sabotage behind the lines then of course I could not be +bothered with taking prisoners, because then the element of surprise +would be excluded. If, therefore, a troop of three to five +men, a so-called Commando undertaking, is sent behind the lines +in order to destroy enemy installations, then of course they cannot +burden themselves with prisoners without running the risk of being +killed themselves or of being recognized before they can carry out +their undertaking. Therefore I considered this preamble quite +credible and I expressly said so at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: And you think that that shooting of those two +marines was therefore perfectly justified? That is your position on +this matter, is it not? Just say “yes” or “no” on that; I will not +argue with you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have not asserted that in any way. +Rather I said, here is a fact of which we were informed only by +the Armed Forces communiqué, and that Raeder and the High +Command had not been heard on this point. That is what I stated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Now, the final matter I wanted to ask you +about, you have indicated that in your opinion Germany fought +a clean war at sea. I want you to look at the new Document D-873 +which will be GB-481, which is the log book of U-boat <span class='it'>U-71</span>, under +the date line 21 June 1941, when the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief +of the German Navy. You see the entry reads:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Sighted lifeboat of the Norwegian motor tanker <span class='it'>John +P. Pederson</span> drifting under sail. Three survivors were lying +exhausted under a tarpaulin and only showed themselves as +the U-boat was moving away again. They stated that their +ship had been torpedoed 28 days before. I turned down their +<span class='pageno' title='341' id='Page_341'></span> +request to be taken aboard, provisioned the boat with food +and water and gave them the course and distance to the Icelandic +coast. Boat and crew were in a state that, in view of +the prevailing weather, offered hardly any prospects of +rescue.”—Signed: “Flachsenberg.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Is that your conception of a clean war at sea?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I observe that the commanding officer +did what he could, in view of the weather which he described +when he said that in view of the bad weather he could not rescue +them. He threw provisions to them in a sack and gave them the +course to the coast. I do not know what there is about that that +is inhumane. If he had left without giving them food and the +course, then you might make that accusation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But he could have taken them aboard, you +know. These were three men who did...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I believe you cannot judge that. +Only the commanding officer himself can judge that, the man in +charge of the U-boat. I would have to look at the weather, because +it says here “Medium swell.” That could also...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: But you see here the U-boat commander must +have spoken to these people and physically it must have been possible +to take them aboard, but he left them to their fate, you know, +knowing quite well he was leaving them to die.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all. Then he would not have +needed to give them any food and to give them the course to the +coast. What makes you think that they had to die? By the way...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: The last sentence is a clear indication that the +U-boat captain knew he was leaving them to die. I am suggesting +to you that he could have taken them aboard and should have +done so if he had the elements of humanity in him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; I do not know the condition of the +U-boat, whether the boat was in a position to take prisoners on +board. I believe that you have never seen conditions on a U-boat; +otherwise you would not judge it like that. Considering that the +crew of a U-boat is under water for weeks and uses every last +bit of space and is exposed to the greatest dangers day and +night, one cannot simply say that it would have been a humane +act to take these additional men aboard. Besides, the commander +himself says there was hardly a chance of rescue in view of the +prevailing weather.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I have some questions concerning a +few points which Mr. Elwyn Jones put to you. An entry was shown +<span class='pageno' title='342' id='Page_342'></span> +to you from the document by Assmann of 10 October 1939 with +the assertion that from this it can be seen that Raeder wanted +to occupy Norway only in order to have Norwegian bases. I should +like to read to you the full entry and I should like you then to +take position to the entire document:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer agrees that full use of the only two battleships +which we have at the time should not be made for +the time being. Russia offered bases near Murmansk...</p> + +<p>“Question of siege of England: Führer and Commander-in-Chief +of Navy agree that all objections by neutrals have +to be rejected, even in view of the danger of entry of U.S.A. +into the war which seems certain if the war keeps on.</p> + +<p>“The more brutally the war is conducted the sooner the effect, +the shorter the war.</p> + +<p>“Capacity for large U-boat production program. Führer +rejects suggestion to have submarines built by or bought +from Russia for political reasons. Commander-in-Chief of +Navy states no advantages to be won for the U-boat war by +conquest of Belgian coast; refers to the value of winning +Norwegian bases—Trondheim—with the help of Russian +pressure. Führer will consider the question.” (Document +D-879, Exhibit GB-482)</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Admiral, according to the entire contents, is this a complete +clarification of the Norwegian problem?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Am I right in concluding that here a great +number of questions are treated and only one strategic question +with reference to Norway...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship pleases, the translation came +through as, “no advantage of occupation of Norwegian bases” and +the translation which is in the document is “Raeder stresses importance +of obtaining Norwegian bases.” Perhaps if there might be +a careful—I am not saying this in any critical sense—a very careful +translation of the entry, it might be important.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the—did you give that an exhibit +number?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord. That is the entry from Assmann’s +headline diary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is. But I want to know the +exhibit number.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: I will have an extract made and the exhibit +number given this evening, My Lord. +<span class='pageno' title='343' id='Page_343'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It would be GB-482, would it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Yes, My Lord, that is it; GB-482.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is the same date; I beg your +pardon if it does not agree; but the document from which I read +I received through the courtesy of Mr. Elwyn Jones.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You had better go into the question of translation +and get that settled.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: Yes, Your Lordship.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, Admiral, both entries are 10 October, +that is, of the same conference. Am I right in saying that consequently +there were many strategic questions, not one of which +can be said to have been treated completely and conclusively?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I believe that this complex of +questions has nothing to do with the comprehensive discussion +between Hitler and Raeder concerning the occupation of Norway. +The Norwegian question was touched upon, the occupation of +Norway, and then a few points brought up for discussion which +Raeder usually jotted down in his notebook. Apart from the +question whether an occupation of Norway was necessary or not, +the possibility of conquering bases outside German territory was +accidentally touched on the same day.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Therefore, Murmansk which had been offered +by Russia was discussed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From Russia to Belgium—all along the +coast, wherever there were possibilities and advantages for our +submarine strategy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If in the War Diary a sentence in connection +with a conference between Raeder and Hitler is in quotation marks, +does that mean that these words were used by Hitler? Can one +assume that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If it says...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship please, the translation has +now been checked, and the original reading of “Raeder stresses +the importance of obtaining Norwegian bases” appears to be a perfectly +correct translation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Siemers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I understood, Dr. Siemers; shall I speak +about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, did you want to add something to that +point?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I understand that the other gentleman +just pointed out that Raeder allegedly called Hitler’s attention +<span class='pageno' title='344' id='Page_344'></span> +to the necessity of acquiring submarine bases and in that connection +once spoke about Russian assistance and also about the possibility +of acquiring bases from Norway. But that does not reveal +any aggressive intentions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to save time, I also asked +Dr. Kranzbühler to check the translation. The German text as I +should like to point out right now says: “The Commander-in-Chief +of the Navy points out the value of winning Norwegian bases.” +That is something different from the English translation. But I +should like to come back to this later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Admiral, Mr. Elwyn Jones then submitted +the affidavit of Walter Giese. I should be grateful if you +would look at it again. It is D-722. The first line reads:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I was born at Stettin on 24 November 1900, the son of a +bricklayer’s foreman, Ernst Giese.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I sat in the reception room of the Commander-in-Chief as +assistant to the adjutant.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then it says, in the same paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I received the minute book from the adjutant at midday +after the conferences had ended and locked it up in the +general safe.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then it says on the second page:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I did not have much contact with the Commander-in-Chief +personally. This consisted merely in my submitting to him +or fetching from him top-secret correspondence.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Admiral, am I right in assuming, therefore, that Giese was a +sort of messenger?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. In order to save officers we filled +a large number of unimportant positions with civilians, people who +we thought were worthy of our confidence. The care of a safe +or guarding the key was really the task of the second adjutant, +who later had to be used elsewhere.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Giese had been a sergeant in the Navy for many years and for +12 years had been a clerk in the Navy, and therefore had had a +certain amount of practice in keeping files.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All this is stated in the document. If there +is anything inaccurate in the document, you can put it to him. But +it all is set out in the document, exactly as the Admiral said. You +are wasting the time of the Tribunal by repeating it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe what Mr. Elwyn Jones +presented was also in the document. What matters is the question +of interpretation and the witness has been referred to very definite +<span class='pageno' title='345' id='Page_345'></span> +points. If I should be mistaken, I beg your pardon. I believed +that I also had the right in re-examination to refer to certain points +in the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you want to, you can draw our attention +to the paragraphs.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHUJLTE-MÖNTING: I can be very brief.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Giese had no inside information about the facts, and even if he +had, without permission, looked into the minutes of the adjutant, +which were not a shorthand record but merely notes to aid the +memory of the adjutant, he could never have received the right +impression without having taken part in the conference. And it was +not up to him in the reception room to decide who should be +admitted to the Commander-in-Chief, but rather up to the adjutant +or to me. He did not even know who was to be admitted. And it +is a bold statement or assumption when he says that a man like +Hagelin saw Raeder each time instead of seeing me first. By the +way, Hagelin came to me perhaps four or five times.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe Giese was present when Raeder +talked to Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Giese? No, never. Giese sat in the reception +room and took care of Raeder’s telephone calls.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, nobody here suggests that he +was. Mr. Elwyn Jones was not putting it that this man Giese was +present at talks between Raeder and the Führer or Raeder and +Hagelin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is his affidavit, and in the +affidavit, it says, as I should like to point out now, on Page 5, +“According to all I heard, I can say that the idea of this undertaking +emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler’s joyous agreement.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>How could he know that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might stress that even I as chief of +staff was not present at these private conferences, and Herr Giese +had to stay with the telephone and had no other way of gaining +an insight than by giving his imagination free rein.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That is enough, thank you. I come now to Document +D-872. That is the war diary of the naval attaché in Japan, +in connection with which you were told that you must have known +that Japan would attack America on 7 December. The telegram +which is mentioned here is of 6 December. When could that telegram +have arrived in your office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean, when could I have received +it personally? +<span class='pageno' title='346' id='Page_346'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes; or Raeder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Not before the next morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That would be 7 December.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: At the earliest. In this case, the Chief +of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff would decide whether for +operational reasons that telegram should be presented at once, +or not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you remember that document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Is Pearl Harbor mentioned in the document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. I tried to explain that Pearl Harbor +had no connection with that telegram from Admiral Wennecker +at all and that Wennecker depended on sources of information and +on his assumptions or formulated his assumptions in a telegram on +the basis of his information without having any definite facts. Such +telegrams were received continuously. Sometimes these assumptions +were correct; sometimes they were incorrect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted it to +prove that military negotiations had taken place with Japan. Am I +correct in saying that that was only a message concerning possible +developments?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. I have tried before to +explain that there were no military negotiations between the admiralty +staffs. Rather the naval attaché was charged with examining +and transmitting all information of value which came to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then a document was shown you which was not +submitted, an interrogation of Raeder of 10 November 1945. May +I ask to look at the bottom of Page 5 of this document which I +am handing to you and the passage which was read on Page 6?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, that ought to have a +number, ought it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: That will be GB-483, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: On that document, Page 5 at the bottom, is +Document C-75 mentioned?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe you are mistaken, Admiral, or else I +have made a mistake.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have an English copy—do you mean the +English one?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the English copy because it does not exist +in German. +<span class='pageno' title='347' id='Page_347'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean the last paragraph?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I believe the last line or the line before the last. +The page numbers are very hard to read. Maybe you have the +wrong page.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This interrogation, Mr. President, concerns Document C-75. I +believe the witness will find it soon. Mention has been made of +this document recently and in accordance with the wish recently +expressed by the Tribunal, I am submitting C-75; that is Directive +Number 24 about the co-operation with Japan, and the full text is +Document Number Raeder-128. The Tribunal will recall that the +British Delegation...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Has it already been put in, C-75, has it +already been put in?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I submit it now, C-75.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, has it already been put in? Has it +already been offered in evidence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: You may recall that the Prosecution has submitted +Document C-75 as USA-151...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is all I wanted to know. If it +has already been put in, it does not need a new number, is that not +the position?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that it needs +a new number because only the first part was submitted by the +Prosecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: It has already been exhibited as USA-151, +My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we are not giving fresh numbers, +Dr. Siemers, to parts of documents which had already been +put in. If the document has been put in, then where you want to +use a fresh part of the document it has the same number as the +old number; that is all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: But, Mr. President, if the Prosecution in their +document put in only the first three paragraphs then I cannot...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; I know that perfectly well, but +you are perfectly entitled to put in any part of the document. It +is only a question of what number is to be given to it and I think—I +may be wrong—that up to the present we have not given new +numbers to documents once that they have been put in, although +fresh parts of the documents are put in.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the position with regard to C-75 is +that the whole of the original has been put in as USA-151, but only +<span class='pageno' title='348' id='Page_348'></span> +an extract from the original was included in the English document +which was put before the Court.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. All I was concerned with was +the number of the thing. It has got the number USA-151 and I +thought our practice had been that it should continue to have that +number. You can put in any part of it you like, and if it is a +question of translation, no doubt the Prosecution will hand it to the +translation department and have it translated for you; but you +are attempting to give it a new number, that is all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, once more, but I was asked +recently to submit the document anew and that is where the misunderstanding +arose. Under these circumstances, now that I hear +that it has been submitted in its entirety, I can withdraw it; I +should be grateful if the Tribunal were also to receive the complete +translation of the document in English and not only the first two +paragraphs.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Admiral, have you found it in the +meantime?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it is on Page 7 as you thought and +not on Page 5. The document refers...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It is right then that the interrogation +refers to Document C-75?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Document C-75, Admiral, is Directive Number 24 +concerning collaboration with Japan, and it says: “The following +rules apply: Our common war aim is to defeat England quickly and +thereby keep the U.S.A. out of the war.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Besides that the document also mentions the fact I referred to +recently, that Singapore should be occupied by Japan.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now Raeder, on 10 November ’45 stated his position in respect +to this and, according to the next page of the document, he said +that which Mr. Elwyn Jones has just put to you. May I ask you to +look at it again? It says there, on Page—I thought it was at the +top of Page 6, maybe it is at the top of Page 8...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The top of Page 8. I do not know English +as well as German, but I would translate it: “If that which Japan +needs...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If I remember correctly, the word is “need.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he uses the word “need”—“and +other things, things that the Japanese need.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: That is to say, Japan’s needs and other things +which Japan requires. Therefore, the conversations mentioned by +Raeder were not concerned with strategic points? +<span class='pageno' title='349' id='Page_349'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, these are two entirely different +things.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: So that Raeder’s answer is concerned purely +with questions of supplies and material.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, purely questions of supplies and +material...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: ...which we had with all the navies, not +only with the Japanese.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I come to the Commando Order about which +you testified already. I want to put to you the following: You have +been shown Document D-658, which says that according to the +Armed Forces communiqué the soldiers were executed, that the +soldiers wore uniforms and that the Führer’s Order was something +new in international law. I believe that the naval commander in +western France reported this and that this was contained in the +Armed Forces communiqué. The man who compiled the War Diary +wrote: “A new thing in international law.” I am not a military man, +but I should like to ask you, would you consider such a reference +a criticism of the order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe that I have to answer the question +in the following manner: Normally, the fact of an execution +is not entered in a war diary on operational matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that is really a matter which +we can go into, whether he thinks this is an entry which is a +criticism of the order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe he wanted to establish that it +was something new.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Never mind, Admiral. A factual question. The +Prosecution asserts again that it concerns soldiers in uniform. The +Wehrmacht communiqué announced the execution on 9 December. +The execution, as I have already shown in another connection, did +not take place until 11 December. I am presenting to you now +Document UK-57, and ask you to look at the second paragraph +under Figure 4. The heading Figure 4 reads: “Sabotage against +German ships near Bordeaux”; then it says: “December 12, 1942”; +and further on we read:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“From the submarine the participants went two by two in +paddle boats up the Gironde estuary. They wore special olive +gray uniforms. After carrying out the blastings they sank +their boats and tried, with the aid of French civilians, to +escape to Spain in civilian clothes.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='350' id='Page_350'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Did these soldiers behave correctly according to the provisions +of international law?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I have no more questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If they had had a clear conscience, they +would not have needed to wear civilian clothes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, just this final question:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you personally in the High Command receive an inquiry +or any information before this execution which was carried out at +the direct order of the Führer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, neither an inquiry nor any information.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, the question +as to whether a document concerning Norway had been translated +correctly was just discussed. I shall find out what number +it is. The English translation which I have before me is not identical +with the German original. It deviates considerably. It is Document +GB-482.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I shall read the German text which in my opinion differs from +the English translation.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states: Conquest of +Belgian coast provides no advantage for our submarine warfare; +points out value of winning Norwegian bases (Trondheim) +with the help of Russian pressure. The Führer will +consider the question.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, would it not save time, +really, if we have the sentence which is said to have been wrongly +translated referred to a committee of experts in the translating +division?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It really is not a matter which it is worth +while wasting time over.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, I +did not know that it was to be examined again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better have it examined and +then the translation certified to.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, +Mr. President. I, myself, have a question to put to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Admiral, Document D-873 has been put to you before. That was +a war diary of <span class='it'>U-71</span> and concerned the supplying of three Norwegians +in a lifeboat. The entry was on 21 June. I have already +<span class='pageno' title='351' id='Page_351'></span> +submitted it to the Tribunal under Dönitz Number 13, on Page 23 +of my document book, a statement by the above-mentioned commanding +officer Flachsenberg. According to that statement this +submarine put to sea on 14 June. It was west of Norway. Can +you tell me if that U-boat, therefore, on 21 June, was putting out +for operations or returning from operations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean from memory?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, considering the dates, +put out to sea on 14 June, this entry on 21 June.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Putting out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Putting out. As you +know, this submarine was a 500-ton vessel. Is a boat of that size in +a position to carry out an operation over several weeks with three +additional people on board?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe not. I am not enough of an +expert to be able to judge definitely what the extra weight of additional +persons on board might mean as far as trimming experiments +and such things are concerned; but aside from that, I do not believe +that such a small boat, which is putting out to sea for an operation, +can load itself on the way with prisoners. I do not consider that +possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the Court, the +witness may retire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the President.</span>] Mr. President, in accordance with my +statement at the beginning of this case, I have already submitted +the majority of my documents during the examination. With the +permission of the Tribunal, may I proceed now to submit as quickly +as possible the remainder of the documents with a few accompanying +statements.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number Raeder-18, an excerpt +from the Document Book 2, Page 105, an excerpt from a book +which Churchill wrote in 1935 called <span class='it'>Great Contemporaries</span>. I ask +the Tribunal to take official notice of the contents. Churchill points +out that there are two possibilities, that one cannot say whether +Hitler will be the man who will start another world war or whether +he will be the man who will restore honor and peace of mind to +the great German nation and bring it back serene, helpful and +strong to a galaxy of the European family of nations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As Exhibit Number Raeder-20 I submit a short excerpt from +Adolf Hitler’s <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> with reference to the fact that the Prosecution +has said that from that book one could see that Hitler +<span class='pageno' title='352' id='Page_352'></span> +intended to wage aggressive wars. I shall show in my final pleadings +how much one can see from that book. I ask that the Tribunal +take judicial notice of the short excerpt on Page 154: “For such a +policy there was but one ally in Europe, England.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Number Raeder-21, a speech made by Hitler to the +German Reichstag on 26 April 1942, is to show how rights were +increasingly limited in Germany and how the dictatorship became +more and more powerful.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document Book 4, Exhibit Number Raeder-65, intended to facilitate +my arguments, is the Hague Agreement about the rights and +duties of neutrals in naval warfare. I need that for my final pleadings +in connection with Exhibit Number Raeder-66, the statement +of opinion by Dr. Mosler in Document Book 4, Page 289, the first +document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Can you give us the pages?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Page 289, Mr. President. It is the first page of +the Document Book 4.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Then I ask the Tribunal to be kind enough to +take up Document Book 5, since the remaining documents have +already been submitted. I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-100, +Document Book 5, Page 437, a document from the <span class='it'>White Book</span> concerning +the “top-secret” meeting of the French War Commission +on 9 April 1940, with Reynaud, Daladier, Gamelin, General Georges, +the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of the Colonies and the Air +Minister present. It concerns the suggestion by Admiral Darlan +of moving into Belgium. The suggestion was supported by General +Gamelin and also by the Minister for National Defense and War. +On Page 442 there is mention of the march into Holland and finally +of Luxembourg. Since the High Tribunal has knowledge of the +contents from the discussion of the documents, I do not want to +read any details. I simply ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice +of it. I should also like to point out that on Page 443 of this very +long document mention is made of the occupation of the harbor of +Narvik and of the intention to get hold of the mines of Gallivare.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I now submit Exhibit Number Raeder 102, in the same document +book, Page 449. This is an order of the 2d Belgian Infantry +Regiment of 13 April 1940 concerning information about friendly +troops and the building of a fortified position. It can be seen from +the document that the friendly troops mentioned are the Allies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-103, Page 452, which is a French +document of 16 April 1940 from headquarters concerning measures +about the rail transportation of French troops in Belgium. +<span class='pageno' title='353' id='Page_353'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of all these documents, +which I shall not read in detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The same applies to Exhibit Number Raeder-104, Document +Book 5, Page 455, which is the order of 19 April 1940 of the 2d +British Division concerning security measures in Belgium. There +we find a directive similar to one in a document which has been +submitted by the Prosecution, a directive to establish contact with +Belgian civilian authorities.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Exhibit Number Raeder-105, Document Book 5, Page 459, is the +statement of a Luxembourg citizen which shows that 200 men, +French soldiers in uniform, entered Belgium in armored cars 7 days +before the outbreak of the German-Belgian hostilities.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May it please the Tribunal, I originally intended not to submit +anything in this Trial concerning the character of my client because +I was of the opinion that Admiral Raeder, both at home and abroad, +enjoyed great respect. The first trial brief against Raeder did not +affect that intention. Shortly before the presentation of that trial +brief it was changed, becoming considerably more severe and containing +moral accusations which seriously injure and insult Raeder’s +honor. I have no doubt that the High Tribunal will understand +why under these circumstances I ask to be permitted to submit some +of the documents granted me which concern Raeder’s character. I +submit Exhibit Raeder-119, Document Book 6, Page 514. That is +a letter from Frau Von Poser addressed to me. It is not an affidavit +and quite purposely I have submitted the original because in my +opinion it will make a more immediate and direct impression than +an affidavit which I would first have to ask for in my capacity as +defendant’s counsel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Similarly, there is a fairly long letter from Professor Dr. Seibt +who approached me on his own initiative. I submit Exhibit Number +Raeder-120, Document Book 6, Page 517. I would be grateful to the +Tribunal if it would take judicial notice of that letter. In order to +save time I refrain from reading it since it is six pages long.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-122, Document Book 6, Page 526, +a letter from Herr Erich Katz, which I submit with its appendices +and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. This presents +one of the cases in which Raeder intervened personally, using his +influence and position—he used the official stationery of the Commander-in-Chief +of the Navy to intervene on behalf of Herr Katz +who had been attacked as a Jew—and actually succeeded in protecting +him. Herr Katz has sent me these documents on his own +initiative in order to show his gratitude.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As Exhibit Raeder-123 I submit a letter from Günter Jacobsen +that concerns a similar case. Jacobsen also, without my asking it, +approached me in order to testify that Raeder rescued his father, +<span class='pageno' title='354' id='Page_354'></span> +who as a Jew had been accused of race defilement, from the concentration +camp Fuhlsbüttel—I believe it was still a prison at that +time—so that Jacobsen could emigrate to England where he is +living now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-124, an affidavit...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, I must make the following +statement. All four exhibits mentioned just now by Dr. Siemers +are personal letters from various persons to Dr. Siemers. They are +not sworn affidavits. They are not interrogations. Therefore these +documents have little probative value, and I hold the view that they +ought not to be admitted as evidence. Many letters are received, +and if they were all to be submitted to the Tribunal, the Tribunal +would have great difficulty in establishing the truth and how far +they are of probative value. In that connection, I personally object +to the fact that these documents should be accepted as evidence in +Raeder’s case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: My Lord, may I...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that the matter +is of sufficient importance to insist upon evidence being upon oath. +The documents are admitted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-124 I submit an +affidavit by Konrad Lotter. The affidavit is very short and with +the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read this one page:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Grand Admiral Raeder has always appeared to me a man +who embodied the finest traditions of the old Imperial Navy. +This was true particularly in regard to his philosophy of life. +As a man and as an officer he was at all times the best +model imaginable.</p> + +<p>“In 1941, when the anti-Christian policy of the Hitler regime +was in full force in Bavaria, when cloisters were closed and +in the education of the youth intolerance against every creed +became crassly manifest, I sent a memorandum of 12 pages +to the Admiral in which I presented to him my objections to +this policy. Admiral Raeder intervened at once. Through his +mediation, I was called to the Gauleiter and Minister of the +Interior, Wagner, in Munich. After a series of discussions +between the clerical, governmental, and Party authorities +an agreement was reached which had the following results: +The school prayer was retained, the crucifix was allowed to +remain in the schools, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>; furthermore, 59 clergymen +who had been fined 500 marks each were pardoned.</p> + +<p>“The closing down of cloisters was also stopped at that time. +Gauleiter Wagner had to...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='355' id='Page_355'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, all these documents have been +read by us very recently.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then I just ask the Tribunal to take +judicial notice of the remainder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I submit also the two documents, Exhibit Number Raeder-125 +and Exhibit Number Raeder-126. Number 125 is an affidavit by +the former Reich Defense Minister, Dr. Otto Gessler, and Number +Raeder-126 is an affidavit by the Navy Chaplain Ronneberger. I +ask you to take judicial notice of this latter document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to be permitted to read the short affidavit by +Dr. Gessler since it contains not only something of a purely personal +nature, but also remarks concerning the accusations against Raeder.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I, Gessler, have known the former Admiral Dr. Raeder +personally since about the middle of the 20’s when I was +Reichswehrminister. Raeder was then inspector of the educational +system in the Navy. I have always known Raeder +as a man of irreproachable, chivalrous character, as a man +fully conscious of his duty. As to the subject of the Indictment, +I know very little.</p> + +<p>“Raeder visited me repeatedly after my release from imprisonment +by the Gestapo in March 1945 when I lay in the +Hedwig Hospital in Berlin and he also made arrangements +for me to get home, as I was ill and completely exhausted. I +told him then about the ill-treatment I had suffered, especially +the torture. He was obviously surprised and incensed +about this. He said he would report this to the Führer. I +asked him at once to refrain from that, for I had been told +before the torture, and officially, that all of this was taking +place at the explicit order of Hitler. Moreover, I knew definitely +that I would immediately be rearrested, since on my +release I had signed the well-known declaration and could +not even obtain a confirmation of my detention in order to +get a ticket for my trip home.</p> + +<p>“I heard nothing about secret rearmament in the Navy, +neither during my term of office nor later. During my term +of office, until January 1928, Admiral Raeder would not have +been responsible either, for at that time he was not Chief +of the Naval Command.</p> + +<p>“At the time of the National Socialist regime I was ignored +by my former department and snubbed. One of the few +exceptions was Dr. Raeder. Before 1939 among other things +he invited me three times to visit on the cruiser <span class='it'>Nürnberg</span> +although I had refused twice. During the visit in June 1939 +he came to Kiel personally to pay his respects to me. At that +<span class='pageno' title='356' id='Page_356'></span> +time we also discussed the political situation. I expressed the +apprehension that an attack on Poland would mean a European +war. Raeder declared positively that he considered it +out of the question that Hitler would attack Poland. When +this did happen later, I explained this to myself on the +grounds that Hitler liked to place even the highest military +leaders face to face with accomplished facts.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then there is the statement “under oath” and the signature of +the notary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As to the last Exhibit Number Raeder-126, from the Navy Chief +Chaplain Ronneberger, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of +it since it is too late to read it. It is a factual description and survey +of church questions and of religious matters in the Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, with that, with the exception of three points, I +can conclude my case. There are still two interrogatories missing +which have not yet been returned. I ask permission to submit these +as soon as they are received.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, there is the witness Generaladmiral Böhm, who has +already been approved, but who on account of illness has not yet +been able to appear. The British Delegation, through Sir David, has +been kind enough to agree that if necessary this witness can be +interrogated at a later date. May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal +to keep this open, and if possible to permit Admiral Böhm to be +questioned at a later date. I want to point out now that it will not +be so large a complex of questions as in the case of Admiral +Schulte-Mönting, which the Tribunal knows from the material I +have submitted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This concludes my case Raeder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 23 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='357' id='Page_357'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH DAY</span><br/> Thursday, 23 May 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the documents of the +Defendant Seyss-Inquart, the Tribunal admits the following documents +which were objected to: Number 11, Number 47, Number 48, +Number 50, Number 54, and Number 71.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The remainder of the documents which were objected to are +rejected. I will enumerate them: Number 5, Number 10, Number 14, +Number 19b, Number 21, Number 22, Number 27, Number 31, Number +39, Number 55, Number 60, Number 61, Number 68, Number 69.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: Mr. President, last night at the end of the session +the counsel for Admiral Raeder submitted a certain number of +documents including Document Raeder-105 of Document Book 5. +This document is an excerpt from the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>, Number +5. It is the testimony of an old man of 72, a native of Luxembourg, +who had lived in Belgium for only 6 months, and who affirms +that in April 1940 he saw 200 French soldiers in Belgium. These +soldiers, who he said were French, were in armored cars.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I must ask the Tribunal to allow me to make objection to this +Document Number 7 of the <span class='it'>White Book</span> Number 5, the original of +which has never been submitted and has not even been reproduced +in the <span class='it'>White Book</span>, as is the case with a certain number of documents +in the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>. It is necessary that in the name +of France and of Belgium a protest—a formal, categorical protest—be +made against such an assertion. At no time before the invasion +of Belgium by the German forces did any French troops set foot on +Belgian soil. The reading of this document, Number Raeder-105 of +Document Book 5 of Admiral Raeder, enables us to understand how +there came to be the error in the testimony by Grandjenet that +is cited.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have already told the Tribunal that this man is 72 years old +and was from Luxembourg. To the question put to him by the +German authorities as to how he recognized the soldiers he had +seen as being of French nationality, he answered: +<span class='pageno' title='358' id='Page_358'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I was quite sure that they were French soldiers because I +know their uniform well. Moreover, I recognized the soldiers +because of the language they used when they spoke +to me.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, as far as the uniform is concerned, the Tribunal knows +that at the time when these events took place, the Belgian Army +had a uniform of the same color as the French Army and a helmet +of the same shape. As for the language, the Tribunal knows that +a great part of the Belgian population who live along the Luxembourg +frontier speak French, and the Belgian soldiers recruited in +these districts speak French.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal will certainly remember that this witness, who is +a very old man, had only been living for 6 months in Belgium and +probably had only a limited experience with things Belgian—and +especially with the Belgian Army.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At any rate, we assert in the name of France and in the name +of Belgium that before 10 May 1940 no French troops, no organized +French troops, penetrated Belgium, and that the isolated individuals +who did go into Belgium were interned there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Siemers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: If it please the Tribunal, may I reply very +briefly?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This matter concerns a document from the <span class='it'>White Book</span>, on which +a decision has already been handed down once and which was +granted me. I propose that the Prosecution be requested to submit +the original if they dispute the correctness of this document. In +this I am in agreement with a decision of the Tribunal according +to which the application is to be made for the presentation of the +original if it is available, or application should be made so that +whoever has the original should produce it. As far as I know the +Prosecution have the original, since all original documents were +located in the Foreign Office in Berlin, or in the alternative place +of safekeeping, and all the originals of these <span class='it'>White Books</span> fell into +the hands of the Allies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “original”? The original, +I suppose, is the original of the <span class='it'>White Book</span>. Is that what +you mean?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I mean now, Mr. President, the original of +this court record.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, this comes from a <span class='it'>White Book</span>. That +is a printed document, I suppose, I do not suppose it contains the +original of the statement of this Luxembourg man.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: The <span class='it'>White Book</span> is a collection of numerous documents, +and the single original documents are in the possession of +<span class='pageno' title='359' id='Page_359'></span> +the Foreign Office; in part they were from the files of the French +General Staff, and partly they were records of court proceedings. +Regarding the contents of this document...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, you are not proposing that we +should strike the document out, but the Tribunal will certainly take +into account the facts to which you have drawn our notice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>M. DUBOST: This is an application that the Tribunal shall refuse +to admit that document, Mr. President. At the same time this is a +protest against the assertion made by the Defense that French soldiers +violated Belgian neutrality in the course of the month of April. +I hope the Tribunal will allow me to add a few words of explanation. +The <span class='it'>White Book</span>, which we have here, comprises two parts. The +first part reproduces texts and the second part gives photostatic +copies of these texts. In the first part, which simply reproduces the +texts, is found the document which I ask the Tribunal to strike from +the record. We have searched in the second part which gives the +photostatic copies of the documents in the first part, and we do not +find it. We state to the Tribunal that the original of the document, +which we ask the Tribunal to strike out, has not been reproduced +in the German <span class='it'>White Book</span>, since it is not to be found in the second +part.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe that M. Dubost’s entire +explanation refers to the question of the value of the document as +evidence and not to the question of the admissibility of the document. +That this document is in order appears to me to be quite +clear, since it is a record of court proceedings where a certain person, +namely Grandjenet, has been interrogated. Everything said by +M. Dubost referred more to the contents of the document than to +the question of its value as evidence. May I ask therefore that the +document be admitted, as has been done up to now, and ask that +consideration be given to the fact that the document has value in +connection with the other documents which have been granted to +me and to Dr. Horn in his document book with reference to Holland +and Belgium.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If, in the second part of the document book there is no photostatic +copy...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, and M. Dubost, the Tribunal +will consider the objection that has been made.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SIEMERS: May I merely mention, Mr. President, that if the +photostat is not in the book, as M. Dubost states, then this is due +to the fact that this court record in its original text was German, +and the facsimiles are those prepared from the original text in +French, that is to say, of those documents which in their original +version were in French. If necessary I would appeal to Geheimrat +<span class='pageno' title='360' id='Page_360'></span> +Von Schnieden as a witness regarding this record, since he at the +time was informed about all the records of this type and helped +in the work of compiling the book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will consider the +objection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, with the +permission of the Tribunal I should like to say that the interrogatory +put to the American Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, +Admiral Nimitz, is available. I received it the day before yesterday +and in the meantime it has gone in to the interpreters for translation. +With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to submit +it now, in connection with the cases of Admiral Dönitz and Admiral +Raeder.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution seen it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got copies for us?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I had been informed that +the copies for the Tribunal would be handed on by the General +Secretary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Unless we have copies, the document must +not be read. It must be put off until we have copies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There are two copies in +English and one in French.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I present the document as Number Dönitz-100.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Soviet members of the +Tribunal do not have a copy of the document translated into their +language, so you will present it at a later date.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Will the counsel for the Defendant Von Schirach present his case?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for the Defendant Von Schirach): +Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I propose first of all to conduct the +examination of the Defendant Schirach himself, and in the course +of this examination I will bring to your attention the passage of the +document book concerned, as the individual points come up. Following +the examination of the defendant I shall then call my four +witnesses, and at the end I intend to submit the remaining documents, +insofar as these documents have not by that time been +presented during the examination of the Defendant Von Schirach. +I presume, Mr. President, that you agree to this procedure.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I now call to the witness stand, first, Baldur von Schirach.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Baldur von Schirach took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the following oath after me: +I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak +the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing. +<span class='pageno' title='361' id='Page_361'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The defendant repeated the oath in German.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what is the date of your birth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>BALDUR VON SCHIRACH (Defendant): 9 May 1907.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That means that a few days ago you were 39. You +have been married for 14 years; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And you have four children, whose ages are...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 4, 8, 11, and 13 years.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the Third Reich you were mainly active as +Youth Leader?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What offices did you fill in that connection, that +is, offices in the Party and in the Government—please state also how +long you held these various offices?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: To start with, in 1929 I was the leader of the +National Socialist Students’ Union. In 1931 I became Reich Youth +Leader of the NSDAP, at first on the staff of the SA Supreme Command; +in 1932, Reich Leader for Youth Education of the NSDAP; +in 1933, Youth Leader of the German Reich, at first under the Minister +of the Interior, Dr. Frick. In 1934, I held the same position +under the Reich Minister of Education, Rust. In 1936 the Reich +Youth Leader became a leading Reich official, and in that capacity +I came directly under the Führer and Reich Chancellor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Now, which of your offices were Party positions +and which of the ones you have mentioned were offices of the Reich?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Party positions were the office of Reich Youth +Leader of the NSDAP, and that of Reich Leader for Youth Education. +Government positions: The Youth Leader of the German +Reich, at first subordinate to the Minister of the Interior as I have +described or under the Minister for Education, and then in an independent +position.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you were removed from some of these +offices in 1940. What positions in Youth Leadership did you lose in +1940, and what positions did you still continue to fill to the end?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In 1940 I left the position as the leader of +Youth, that is, I left the office of the Reich Youth Leadership of +the NSDAP, but I retained the office of Reichsleiter for Youth +Education and with that the entire responsibility for German youth. +I received as an additional new post that of Gauleiter of Vienna, +<span class='pageno' title='362' id='Page_362'></span> +which was combined with the governmental post of Reichsstatthalter +of Vienna and also that of Reich Defense Commissioner for +Wehrkreis XVII.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we want now to come back to your activity +as Youth Leader. There is an affidavit by you here dated +4 December 1945, 3302-PS. In this affidavit you stated to the Prosecution +in December that you acknowledge yourself to be responsible +for all youth education in the Third Reich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you, when you gave the statement of guilt, +under the impression that your successor, the late Reich Youth +Leader Axmann, was dead?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You thought that he died in the last battles of +the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I was convinced that he had died in +Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the meantime, Witness, you have learned from +newspaper reports that your successor as Reich Youth Leader, this +man Axmann, is still alive. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you want then, today, to support your affidavit +regarding your personal responsibility as Youth Leader without +reservation; or do you want to limit it in any respect today?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not want to limit this affidavit in any +way. Although during the last years of his life Hitler gave orders +to the Youth of which I do not know and also my successor, Axmann, +particularly in 1944, gave orders with which I am not acquainted +since the relationship between us had been broken off due to the +events of the war, I stand by the statement that I have made in the +expectation that the Tribunal will consider me the only person +responsible in Youth Leadership and that no other Youth Leader +will be summoned before a court for actions for which I have +assumed responsibility.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I would now be interested in knowing +whether possibly principles and directives which you received from +Hitler or from any Party office or from any governmental quarter +were the formula for your youth education; or whether, for your +youth education, the principles were derived from the experiences +which you had during your own youth and among the youth leaders +of that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The latter is correct. Of course, the education +of the Hitler Youth was an education on the basis of the National +<span class='pageno' title='363' id='Page_363'></span> +Socialist idea. But the specifically educational ideas did not originate +with Hitler, they also did not originate with other leaders +in the Party; they had their origin in youth itself, they originated +with me, and they originated with my assistants.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Perhaps you will be good enough now to explain +to the Tribunal somewhat more in detail how you, yourself, arrived +at those principles and that type of youth education, based on your +own education, your personal development, and so forth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the simplest way for me to do +this would be for me here, very briefly, to sketch the story of my +youth and describe also in that connection the youth organizations +with which I came in contact. I can in that way save much time +for my further statements.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My father was a professional officer in the Garde-Kürassier +Regiment of the Kaiser. I was born in Berlin and one year later +my father retired and moved to Weimar, where he took over the +management of the Court Theater there, which later became the +Weimar National Theater. Thus I grew up in Weimar, and that +town, which in a certain sense is the native city of all Germans, +I regard as my native city. My father was well off; our home +offered a great deal of intellectual and artistic stimulation, above +all in the literary and musical field, but apart from and beyond the +educational opportunities of our home, it was the atmosphere of the +town itself, that atmosphere of the classic and also the postclassic +Weimar which influenced my development. It was most of all the +genius loci, which early captured my imagination. It is directly +due to those experiences of my youth that later on I led the youth +back again, year after year, to Weimar and to Goethe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And the first document which is important in this connection +for my case, which is Document Schirach-80, will prove just that. +There is a brief reference in that document to one of the many +speeches which I made in the course of my activity as Youth Leader +to the leaders of the young generation, and in which I directed the +youth to Goethe...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: May I interrupt you for a moment, Herr +Von Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this Document Number Schirach-80, Mr. President, there is—on +Page 133 of Schirach’s document book—a brief report on a +Reich Cultural Convention (Reichskulturtagung) of the Hitler Youth +in Weimar. This happens to be a report from 1937, but the defendant +has already told you that such cultural conventions of the Hitler +Youth took place every year in Weimar, the city of Schiller and +Goethe. In this report, Document 80 of document book Schirach, +there is, for instance, discussion of a speech of the defendant on +<span class='pageno' title='364' id='Page_364'></span> +the importance of Goethe for the National Socialist education of +youth. It is said, in this connection, that at that time Schirach +stated, and I quote...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You need not read it to us, Dr. Sauter. It +refers to Goethe, that is all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In that case, Herr Von Schirach, will you continue?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was not only the annual cultural convention +but the annual meeting of the leaders of the Hitler Youth which +took place in Weimar. Apart from that there were also what we +called the “Weimar Festivals of German Youth.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>What is important in this connection is that in this speech I +quoted a sentence of Goethe which, to a certain extent, became the +leitmotiv of all my educational work: “Youth fashions itself afresh +from youth.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Even my worst enemy cannot deny the fact that I was to the +young generation of the German people at all times not only the +propagandist of National Socialism but also the propagandist of +Goethe. A certain Herr Ziemer has submitted a lengthy affidavit +against me in which he quarrels with the youth education for which +I am responsible. I believe that Herr Ziemer did his work a little +too superficially. In his description of German national education +he should at least have taken into consideration my educational +efforts designed to guide youth toward the life work of Goethe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I joined my first youth organization when I was 10 years old. +I was then just the age of the boys and girls who later on entered +the Jungvolk. That youth organization which I joined was the +so-called “Young German League,” (Jungdeutschland Bund), which +Count von der Goltz had founded, a Boy Scout organization. Count +von der Goltz and Haeseler, impressed by the British Boy Scout +movement, had formed Pathfinder units in Germany, and one of +these Pathfinder organizations was the Jungdeutschland Bund just +mentioned. It played an important part in the education of German +youth until about 1918 or 1919.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Much more significant in my development, however, was the +time which I spent in a country boarding school (Waldpädagogium). +This was an educational institution directed by an associate of the +well-known educator, Hermann Lietz. There I was educated in the +way which I later, on an entirely different basis...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, do you think the education of the +defendant himself is in any way material for the Tribunal to hear? +It is the education which he imparted which is the matter that is +material. What he imparted, not what he himself took in. +<span class='pageno' title='365' id='Page_365'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the defendant would nevertheless +ask you to allow him these statements, particularly, from the point +of view that with them he wants to show you that the principles +according to which he led youth education came to him not from +Hitler and not from any Party source, but that they resulted from +his own experiences in his own youth. It is, indeed, of some importance +for the Tribunal to examine the question: According to +what principles did the defendant direct youth education and how +did he arrive at these principles? The defendant is asking permission +to explain that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Sauter, the defendant has already +taken some considerable time in telling us about his early youth +and his education, and the Tribunal thinks that it ought to be cut +short, and that not much more time ought to be taken up in dealing +with the education of the defendant. As I have pointed out to you, +what is material for us is the education he imparted to German +youth and not the education which he received himself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: We shall, of course, comply with your wish, +Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Herr Von Schirach, will you please +make your statements as brief as possible?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I can be very brief.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please, go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Lietz’ idea was to give youth an education +in which they have in the school an image of the state. The school +community was a miniature state and in this school community was +developed a self-administration of youth. I only want to point out +in passing that he, too, was applying ideas which long before him +had been developed by Pestalozzi and the great Jean Jacques. All +modern education, of course, goes back somehow to Rousseau, be it +a question of Hermann Lietz or the Boy Scouts, the Pathfinder +movement or the German Wandervogel movement. At any rate, +that idea of self-administration of youth in a school community gave +me my idea of the self-leadership of youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>My thought was to attract the younger generation in school to +ideas that Fröbel had originated 80 years before. Lietz wanted to +win over youth from early school days onward.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I may perhaps mention very briefly that when in 1898 Lietz +began his educational work, the British Major Baden-Powell was +being surrounded by rebels in a South African town, and was +training youngsters to scout in the woods and with this laid the +groundwork for his own Boy Scout movement, and that in that +same year, in 1898, Karl Fischer from Berlin-Steglitz founded the +Wandervogel movement. +<span class='pageno' title='366' id='Page_366'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I think that this chapter, which is merely +the historic background, might perhaps, in accordance with the +wish of the President, be terminated now. If I understand you +rightly then, you mean that those principles which you applied +later on as Reich Youth Leader had become familiar to you in +your own youth and in the youth movement of the time. Is that +right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes; basically, yes. The basic principles of +my later work originate there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: There is one more point I want to know in this +connection. Did this education at that time have any political or +anti-Semitic tendencies and how did you happen to get into politics?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that educational work had no political +and most certainly no anti-Semitic tendencies, because Lietz came +from the circles around the Democrat Naumann, from the Damaschke +circle.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But how did you get into politics?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the meantime the revolution had broken +out. My father...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The revolution of 1918-1919?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, the revolution of 1918-1919. My father +had been thrown out of his position by the Reds. The National +Assembly in Weimar had convened. The Weimar Republic had +been founded. We had a parliamentary system, we had a democracy, +or what we in Germany thought was a democracy—I doubt +that it was one. It was about 1923. I was at home at the time. It +was a period of general insecurity, want, and dissatisfaction; many +respectable families had become beggars through the inflation, and +the worker and the citizen had lost their savings. The name “Hitler” +made its appearance in connection with the events of 9 November +1923. I was not able at the time to gain any exact information +about him. This Trial has informed me and people of my generation +for the first time what Hitler actually wanted. At that time +I was not a National Socialist. Together with some boys of my age +I joined a youth organization which had the name “Knappenschaft.” +It was in some way connected with the people’s movement, but it +was not bound to any party. The principles of that organization +were simply comradeship, patriotism, and self-control. There were +about 100 boys from my city in it at the time who, in this youth +organization, fought against the shallow tendencies of youth in the +postwar period and against the dissipation indulged in by growing +youngsters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In that circle, as a 16-year-old, I first came in contact with +socialism, for here I found youths from every level, working boys, +<span class='pageno' title='367' id='Page_367'></span> +craftsmen, young office employees, sons of farmers. But there were +some older ones among us too, who were already settled in life, and +some also who had been in the World War. From discussions with +these comrades I came to grasp for the first time the consequences +of the Versailles Treaty in their full import. The situation of the +youth at the time was this: The school boy had the prospect of +struggling through somehow or other as a working student, and +then he would in all probability become a member of the academic +proletariat for the possibility of an academic career practically did +not exist for him at all. The young worker had no prospect of finding +an apprenticeship. For him there was nothing other than the +grim misery of unemployment. It was a generation nobody would +help unless it helped itself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And that circle to which you belonged as a +16-year-old boy, then, gradually drifted into the currents of National +Socialism?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and in quite a natural way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How did it happen?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In central Germany there were disturbances. +I need only mention the name of the Communist bandit leader, +Max Hölz, to indicate what conditions obtained at the time. And +even after outward calm had come, conditions still prevailed that +made it impossible to hold patriotic meetings because they were +usually broken up by Communists. There came an appeal to us +young people to furnish protection for these patriotic meetings, +and we did. Some of us were wounded in doing this. One of us, +a certain Garschar, was killed by Communists. In that manner a +large number of national meetings took place which otherwise could +not have been held in the Weimar Republic, National Socialist +meetings, too; and to an increasing degree it was exactly such +meetings that we had to protect because the Communist terror was +directed against them particularly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Through this protective activity I met leading National Socialists—at +first as speakers, naturally, not personally. I heard Count +Reventlow speak; I think I heard Rosenberg then too; I heard +Streicher speak and heard the first oratorical efforts of Sauckel, +who soon after became Gauleiter of the National Socialist Party +in Thuringia. In this way...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What date is he speaking of?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This is the period around 1924, that is, a year +after the Hitler Putsch.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In that way, Witness, the circle of which you were then a +member came under National Socialist influences. Was this also +supported with reading, reading of National Socialist literature? +<span class='pageno' title='368' id='Page_368'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course, I do not know what my comrades +read, with the exception of one book which I shall give you directly. +I know only what I read myself; I was interested at that time in +the writings of the Bayreuth thinker, Chamberlain, in <span class='it'>The Foundations +of the Nineteenth Century</span>, in the writings of Adolf Bartels, +in his <span class='it'>Introduction to World Literature</span> and <span class='it'>History of German +National Literature</span>. There were works...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that we do not want +to know the full story of the defendant’s education. He is now +giving us a series of the books which he has read, but we are not +interested.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I shall only say in one sentence that these +were works which had no definite anti-Semitic tendencies, but +through which anti-Semitism was drawn like a red thread. The +decisive anti-Semitic book which I read at that time and the book +which influenced my comrades...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: ...was Henry Ford’s book, <span class='it'>The International +Jew</span>; I read it and became anti-Semitic. In those days this book +made such a deep impression on my friends and myself because +we saw in Henry Ford the representative of success, also the exponent +of a progressive social policy. In the poverty-stricken and +wretched Germany of the time, youth looked toward America, and +apart from the great benefactor, Herbert Hoover, it was Henry Ford +who to us represented America.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks, as I have +said twice now, that the educational influences of the defendant +are quite irrelevant to us. I do not want to say it again and, unless +you can control the defendant and keep him to the point, I shall +have to stop his evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But, Mr. President, is it not of interest to the +Tribunal when judging this defendant and his personality that +they know how the defendant became a National Socialist and +how the defendant became anti-Semitic? I had thought...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, it is not of interest to the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, how did you then meet Hitler and how +did you happen to join the Party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I must say that I did not become a National +Socialist because of anti-Semitism but because of Socialism. I met +Hitler as early as 1925. He had just left Landsberg on the Lech, +his imprisonment was ended, and he came to Weimar and spoke +there. It was on that occasion that I was introduced to him. The +<span class='pageno' title='369' id='Page_369'></span> +program for the national community which he developed appealed +to me so enormously because in it I found on a large scale something +I had experienced in a small way in the camaraderie of my +youth organization. He appeared to me to be the man who would pave +the way into the future for our generation. I believed that through +him there could be offered to this younger generation the prospect +of work, of happiness. And in him I saw the man who would +liberate us from the shackles of Versailles. I am convinced that +without Versailles the rise to power of Hitler would never have +happened. That dictate led to dictatorship.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, when did you then become a member +of the Party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I became a member of the Party in 1925. +I joined the SA at the same time, with all my comrades.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You were 18 at the time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why did you join the SA?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The SA furnished the protection for the +meetings, and we simply continued in the SA, as part of the Party, +the activities which we had carried out before in our youth organization.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In 1926, Witness, that is when you were 19 years +old, there was a Party rally in Weimar?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, you talked to Hitler personally +on that occasion; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I was to have talked personally to +Hitler one year earlier. On this occasion there was another meeting. +He was making speeches at various mass meetings in Weimar, +and he came back to Weimar again during the same year to speak +before a smaller circle. Together with Rudolf Hess he paid a visit +to the home of my parents and on that occasion he suggested that +I should study in Munich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He thought I ought to know the Party at its +very core and thought I would become acquainted with the Party +work in that way. But I want to say here that at that time I did +not have any intention at all of becoming a politician. Nevertheless, +I was very much interested, of course, in getting acquainted +with the Movement at the place where it had been founded.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You went, then, to Munich, and studied there? +<span class='pageno' title='370' id='Page_370'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I then went to Munich. At first I did +not concern myself with the Party. I was occupied with Germanic +studies, history, and the history of art; I wrote and I came into +contact with many people in Munich who were not actually National +Socialists but who belonged, I should say, to the periphery of the +National Socialist movement. At that time I lived in the house +of my friend, the publisher Bruckmann...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then in 1929 you became the head of the Movement +within the universities. I think you were elected, not nominated, +to that post?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The situation at the beginning was this: I +attended Party meetings in Munich; in Bruckmann’s salon I met +Hitler and Rosenberg and many other men who later played an +important role in Germany. And at the university I joined the +university group of the National Socialist German Students League.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Go on, Herr Von Schirach, you have just told us +that you joined this university group in Munich. Will you please +continue?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and I also started to take an active part +in this group. I spoke there before my comrades, at first about my +own work in the literary field, and then I began to give lectures +to the students also about the National Socialist movement. I +organized Hitler student meetings among the students in Munich, +and then I was elected a member of the General Students Committee, +the ASTA, and through this activity among the students +I came more and more into contact with the Party leadership. +In 1929, the man who was the then so-called Reich Leader of the +National Socialist Students Union retired, and the question arose +of who should be given the leadership of all the university groups. +At that time Rudolf Hess, on behalf of the Führer, questioned all +university groups of the National Socialist University Movement +and the majority of all these groups cast their vote for me to head +the National Socialist Students Union. This accounts for the curious +fact that I am the only Party leader who was elected into the +Party leadership. That is something which has otherwise never +occurred in the history of the Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You mean to say by that, that all the others were +nominated, and you alone were elected?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was elected, and then I was confirmed in +office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And if I am right, you were elected at the +students’ meeting at Graz in 1931. +<span class='pageno' title='371' id='Page_371'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. That is wrong. I am now +talking only of the National Socialist University Movement; I will +come back to this point later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now I was leader of the National Socialist University Movement, +and I reorganized this movement. I began my work as a +speaker. In 1931 I was...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely it is sufficient that he became the +leader. It really does not matter very much to us whether he was +elected or not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I am making every effort all the +time to abbreviate this speech. But perhaps I may ask just one +more question with reference to this subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, then in 1931 you were, as far as I know, elected to +the presidency of the General Congress of Austrian and German +Students, comprising all parties, and elected, I think, unanimously. +Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is not correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then explain briefly, Herr Von Schirach.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. At the meeting of the +General German Students Congress in 1931, at which all German +students and all Austrian students and Sudeten-German students +were represented, one of my collaborators whom I had suggested +as leader was unanimously elected head of the entire student +group. This was a very important affair for the youth and for the +Party. Two years before the seizure of power the entire academic +youth had unanimously given their vote to a National Socialist. +After this students’ rally at Graz, I had with Hitler a...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a convenient time to +adjourn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, before the recess we stopped at the fact +that in 1929 you had been elected the leader of the academic youth. +Two years later, Hitler made you Reich Youth Leader. How did +that appointment come about?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: After the student meeting at Graz in 1931, +the success of which was very surprising to Hitler, I had a conference +with him. In the course of that meeting, Hitler mentioned +a conversation we had had previously. At that time he had asked +<span class='pageno' title='372' id='Page_372'></span> +me how it came about that the National Socialist University Movement +was developing so quickly, whereas the other National Socialist +organizations lagged behind in their development.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I told him at that time that one cannot lead youth organizations +as an appendix of a political party; youth has to be led by youth, +and I developed for him the idea of a youth state, that idea which +had come to me from experiencing the school community, the +school state. And thereupon in 1931 Hitler asked me whether I +would like to assume the leadership of the National Socialist Youth +Organization. This included youth cells, then the Hitler Youth +and the National Socialist Students Organization, which also was +in existence at that time. Several men had already tried their hand +at the leadership of these organizations: the former Oberstführer +SA Leader Pfeffer, the Reichsleiter Buch, actually without much +result.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I agreed and became then Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP, +temporarily a member of the staff of the Oberst SA Leader Röhm. +In that position, as Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP in the staff +of Röhm, I had the rank of an SA Gruppenführer and kept that +rank also when, half a year later, I became independent in my +position. That explains also the fact that I am an SA Obergruppenführer. +I got that rank many years later, <span class='it'>honoris causa</span>. However, +I did not possess an SA uniform—even after 1933.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then in 1931 you became Reich Youth Leader of +the NSDAP?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That, of course, was a Party office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then in 1932 you became Reichsleiter? At that +time you were 25 years old. How did that come about?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have already said that I had expressed the +opinion to Hitler that youth could not be the appendix of another +organization, but youth had to be independent; it had to lead itself; +it had to become independent; and it was in fulfillment of a promise +which Hitler had already given me that, half a year later, I became +an independent Reichsleiter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Independent Reichsleiter, so that you were subordinate +directly to the Party leader Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: With what material means was that youth organization +created at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: With the means furnished by the young +people themselves. +<span class='pageno' title='373' id='Page_373'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And how were those funds raised? By collections?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The boys and girls paid membership fees. A +part of these membership fees was kept at the so-called district +leadership offices, which corresponded to the Gauleitung in the +Party or to the SA Gruppenführung in the SA. Another part went +to the Reich Youth Leader. The Hitler Youth financed its organization +with its own means.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, I am interested in the following: Did the +Hitler Youth, which you created and which was given Hitler’s name, +get its importance only after the seizure of power and by the +seizure of power only, or what was the previous size of this youth +organization which you created?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Before the seizure of power, in 1932 the +Hitler Youth was already the largest youth movement of Germany. +I should like to add here that the individual National Socialist +youth organizations which I found when I took over my office as +Reich Youth Leader were merged by me into one large unified +youth movement. This youth movement was the strongest youth +movement of Germany, long before we came to power.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On 2 October 1932, the Hitler Youth held a meeting at Potsdam. +At that meeting more than 100,000 youth from all over the Reich +met without the Party’s providing a single pfennig. The means were +contributed by the young people themselves. Solely from the +number of the participants, it can be seen that that was the largest +youth movement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That was, therefore, several months before the +seizure of power, and at that time already more than 100,000 participants +were at that rally at Potsdam?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution has made the accusation, Witness, +that later, after the seizure of power—I believe in February +1933—you took over the Reich Committee of German Youth +Organizations. Is that correct, and against whom was that action +directed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. The Reich Committee of +Youth Organizations was practically no more than a statistical office +which was subordinate to the Reich Minister of the Interior. That +office was managed by a retired general, General Vogt, who later +became one of my ablest assistants. The taking over of that Reich +Committee was a revolutionary act, a measure which youth carried +out for youth, for from that day on dates the realization of the +idea of the Youth State within the State. I cannot say any more +about that. +<span class='pageno' title='374' id='Page_374'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution further accuses you, Witness, of +having dissolved the so-called “Grossdeutscher Bund” in 1933, that +is, after the seizure of power. What was the Grossdeutscher Bund, +and why did you dissolve it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Grossdeutscher Bund was a youth organization, +or rather a union of youth organizations, with pan-German +tendencies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am surprised, therefore, that the Prosecution has made the +dissolution of that organization an accusation at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Many members of this Grossdeutscher Bund were +National Socialists. There was no very essential difference between +some of the youth groups associated in that organization and the +Hitler Youth. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I wanted youth to be united, and the Grossdeutscher +Bund wanted to continue a certain separate existence. +I objected to that, and there was agitated public controversy +between Admiral Von Trotha, the leader of the Grossdeutscher +Bund and me, and in the end the Grossdeutscher Bund was +incorporated into our youth organization. I do not recall exactly +whether I banned the organization formally; I know only that the +members came to me, and that between Admiral Von Trotha +and me a discussion took place, a reconciliation. Admiral Von +Trotha until his death was one of the warmest sponsors of my work.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How did the suppression of the Marxist youth +organization come about?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the suppression of the Marxist +youth organizations, if I remember correctly, came about in connection +with the suppression of trade unions. I have no exact +documents any more regarding that. But at any rate, from the +legal point of view, I was not authorized in 1933 to order a suppression +of that kind. The Minister of the Interior would have had +to do that. I had the right to ban youth organizations, <span class='it'>de jure</span>, +only after 1 December 1936. That the Marxist youth organizations +had to disappear was a foregone conclusion for me, and in speaking +about this suppression order as such, I can only say that the +German working youth found the realization of its socialistic ideas, +not under the Marxist governments of the Weimar Republic, but +in the community of the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, at first you were Reich Führer of the +NSDAP; that was a Party office. And after the seizure of power, +you became Youth Leader of the German Reich; that was a State +office. On the basis of this State or national office, did you also +have jurisdiction over and responsibility for the school system, for +the elementary schools, for instance? +<span class='pageno' title='375' id='Page_375'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: For the school system in Germany the Reich +Minister for Science, Education, and Culture was the only authority. +My field was education outside the schools, along with the home +and the school, as it says in the law of 1 December 1936. However, +I had some schools of my own, the so-called Adolf Hitler Schools, +which were not under national supervision. They were creations +of a later period. And during the war, through the Child Evacuation +Program that is, the organization by which we took care of +evacuating the young people from the big cities endangered by +bombing—I was in charge of education within the camps where +these children were housed. But on the whole I have to answer +the question about competence for the school system in Germany +in the negative.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This youth which you had to educate outside of +the schools was called the Hitler Youth, the HJ.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Was membership in the Hitler Youth compulsory or voluntary?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The membership in the Hitler Youth was +voluntary until 1936. In 1936 the law already mentioned concerning +the HJ was issued which made all the German youth members +of the HJ. The stipulations for the carrying out of that law, however, +were issued only in March 1939, and only during the war, in +May 1940, was the thought of carrying out a German youth draft +considered within the Reich Youth Leadership and discussed publicly. +May I point out that my Deputy Lauterbacher, at the time +when I was at the front, stated in a public meeting—I believe at +Frankfurt in 1940—that now, after 97 percent of the youngest age +group of youth had volunteered for the Hitler Youth, it would be +necessary to draft the remaining 3 percent by a youth draft.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In this connection, Mr. President, may I refer +to two documents of the document book Schirach. That is Number +Schirach-51.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I did not quite understand what the defendant +said. He said that the membership was voluntary until 1936, +that the HJ Law was then passed, and something to the effect that +the execution of the law was not published until 1939. Was that +what he said?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, that is correct. Until 1936—if I may explain +that, Mr. President—membership in the Hitler Youth was absolutely +voluntary. Then in 1936 the HJ Law was issued, which provided +that boys and girls had to belong to the Hitler Youth. But the stipulations +for its execution were issued by the defendant only in 1939 +so that, in practice, until 1939 the membership was nevertheless on +a voluntary basis.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that right, Defendant? +<span class='pageno' title='376' id='Page_376'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And these facts which I have just presented, +Mr. President, can also be seen from two documents of the document +book Schirach, Number Schirach-51, on Page 91, and Number +Schirach-52 on Page 92. In the latter document...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Sauter, I accept it from you +and from the defendant. I only wanted to understand it. You +can go on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And in the second document mention is also made +of the 97 percent which the defendant has said had voluntarily +joined the HJ, so that now there were only 3 percent missing. May +I continue:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] Witness, what was the attitude of the +parents of the children on the question of whether the children +should join the HJ or not? What did the parents say?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: There were, of course, parents who did not +like to have their children join the HJ. Whenever I made one of +my radio speeches to the parents or to the youth, many hundreds +of parents sent me letters. Among these letters, there were many +in which the parents voiced their objections to the HJ, or expressed +their dislike for it. I always considered that a special proof of the +confidence which the parents had in me. I should like to say here +that never, when parents restrained their children from joining, +have I exerted any compulsion or put them under pressure of any +kind. In doing that I would have lost all the confidence placed in +me by the parents of Germany. That confidence was the basis of +my entire educational work.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe that on this occasion I have to say also that the concept +that any youth organization can be established and carried on, +and successfully carried on, by coercing youth, is absolutely false.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, did youngsters who did not join the +Hitler Youth suffer any disadvantage for that reason?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Youngsters who did not join the Hitler Youth +were at a disadvantage in that they could not take part in our +camping, in our trips, in our sporting meets. They were in a certain +sense outsiders of the youth life, and there was a danger that +they might become hypochondriacs.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But were there not certain professions in which +membership in the HJ was a prerequisite for working in those professions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What were the professions? +<span class='pageno' title='377' id='Page_377'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: For instance, the profession of teacher. It is +quite clear that a teacher cannot educate youth unless he himself +knows the life of that youth, and so we demanded that the young +teachers, that is those in training to teach, had to go through the +HJ. The junior teacher had to be familiar with the ways of life of +the pupils who were under his supervision.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But there were only a few such professions, +whereas for other professions membership in the HJ was not a +prerequisite for admission. Or what was the situation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that in detail. I believe that +a discussion about that is not even possible, because the entire +youth was in the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you know that the Prosecution has also +accused the defendants of having advocated the Führer Principle. +Therefore, I ask you:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Was the Führer Principle also valid in the HJ, and in what form +was it carried out in the HJ? I should like to remind you that I +mean that kind of Führer Principle of which we have heard in the +testimony.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course, the HJ was built up on the Führer +Principle; only the entire form of leadership of youth differed +basically from that of other National Socialist organizations. For +instance, we had the custom in youth leadership of discussing +frankly all questions of interest to us. There were lively debates +at our district leader meetings. I myself educated my assistants +even in a spirit of contradiction. Of course, once we had debated +a measure and I had then given an order or a directive, that ended +the debate. The youth leaders—that is the young boy and girl +leaders—through years of working together and in serving the common +purpose, had become a unity of many thousands. They had +become friends. It is evident that in a group of that kind the carrying +out of orders and directives takes place in ways entirely +different from those in a military organization or in any other +political organization.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I add something?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Leadership based on natural authority such as we had in the +youth organization is something which is not alien to youth at all. +Such leadership in the youth organization never degenerated into +dictatorship.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have been accused of training the +youth in a military way, and in that connection, the fact has been +pointed out that your HJ wore a uniform. Is that correct, and why +did the HJ wear a uniform? +<span class='pageno' title='378' id='Page_378'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have stated my opinion about that in many +instances. I believe there are also documents to illustrate it. I have +always described the uniform of the HJ as the dress of comradeship. +The uniform was the symbol of a community without class +distinctions. The worker’s boy wore the same garb as the son of +the university professor. The girl from the wealthy family wore +the same garb as the child of the day laborer. Hence the uniform. +This uniform did not have any military significance whatsoever.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In that connection, Mr. President, may I ask you +to take judicial notice of Document Number Schirach-55 of the +document book Schirach, then of Numbers Schirach-55a and 117, +where the Defendant Von Schirach, many years ago, expressed in +writing and repeatedly the same trends of thought which he is +expressing today.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should only like to ask, Mr. President, for permission to correct +an error in Document 55, on Page 98. Rather far down, under +the heading “Page 77,” is a quotation from a book by Schirach. +There it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Even the son of the millionaire has no other power...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not know whether you have found the passage. It is on +Page 77 of the book quoted, and Page 98 of the document book, +Number Schirach-55. There is a quotation near the bottom of +the page:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>“Even the son of the millionaire has no other power...” It +should read “dress,” not “power.” The German word “Macht”, is +an error, and should be the word “Tracht.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>So I ask now to have the word “Macht” (power), changed to the +word “Tracht” (dress).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, I shall then continue with the interrogation. You have +been accused of having prepared youth for the war, psychologically +and pedagogically. You are alleged to have participated in a conspiracy +for that purpose, a conspiracy by which the National Socialist +movement acquired total power in Germany, and finally +planned and carried out aggressive wars. What can you say about +that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not participate in any conspiracy. I cannot +consider it participation in a conspiracy if I joined the National +Socialist Party. The program of that party had been approved; it +had been published. The Party was authorized to take part in elections. +Hitler had not said—neither he nor any of his collaborators—“I +want to assume power by a <span class='it'>coup d’état</span>.” Again and again he +stated in public, not only once but a hundred times: “I want to +overcome this parliamentary system by legal means, because it is +leading us, year by year, deeper into misery.” And I myself as the +<span class='pageno' title='379' id='Page_379'></span> +youngest deputy of the Reichstag of the Republic told my 60,000 +constituents similar things in electoral campaigns.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There was nothing there which could prove the fact of a conspiracy, +nothing which was discussed behind closed doors. What we +wanted we acknowledged frankly before the nation, and so far as +printed paper is read around the globe, everyone abroad could have +been informed also about our aims and purposes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As far as preparation for war is concerned, I must state that I +did not take part in any conferences or issuing of orders which +would indicate preparation for an aggressive war. I believe that +can be seen from the proceedings in this Court up to now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I can state only that I did not participate in a conspiracy. I do +not believe either that there was a conspiracy; the thought of conspiracy +is in contradiction to the idea of dictatorship. A dictatorship +does not conspire; a dictatorship commands.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what did the leadership of the Hitler +Youth do to prepare the youth for war and to train it for warlike +purposes?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Before I answer that question, I believe I will +have to explain briefly the difference between military and premilitary +training.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Military training, in my opinion, is all training with weapons +of war, and all training which is conducted by military personnel, +that is, by officers, with and without weapons of war. Premilitary +education—premilitary training is, in the widest sense, all training +which comes before the time of military service; in particular cases +it is a special preparation for military service. We, in the Hitler +Youth, were opponents of any military drills for youth. We disliked +such drills as not youthful. I am not giving my personal opinion +here, but the opinion of thousands of my co-workers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is a fact that I rejected the Wehrjugend (the Youth Defense +Groups), which had formerly existed in Germany, and did not +allow any continuation of Wehrjugend work within the HJ. I had +always been strongly opposed to any soldier-playing in a youth +organization. With all my high esteem for the profession of an +officer, I still do not consider an officer capable of leading youth +because in some way or other, he will always apply the tone of +the drill field and the forms of military leadership to youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is the reason why I did not have any officers as my assistants +in the Hitler Youth. Just on account of my refusal to use +officers as youth leaders, I was severely criticized by the Wehrmacht +on occasion. I should like to stress that that did not come from the +OKW; Field Martial Keitel, especially, had a great deal of understanding +for my ideas. However, in the Wehrmacht, now and again, +<span class='pageno' title='380' id='Page_380'></span> +criticism was heard on account of the general attitude of opposition +of the Youth Leadership corps toward having officers used as leaders +of a youth organization. The principle of “youth leading youth” was +never broken in Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If I am now to answer definitively the question of whether the +youth was prepared for the war and whether it was trained in a +military sense, I shall have to say, in conclusion, that the main +efforts of all youth work in Germany culminated in trade competition, +in the trade schools, in camping, and competition in sports. +Physical training, which perhaps in some way could be considered +a preparation for military service, took only a very small part of +our time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to give as an example here: A Gebiet, or district, +of the Hitler Youth, for instance the Gebiet of Hessen-Nassau which +is about the same as a Gau in the Party, contributed from its funds +in 1939 as follows: For hikes and camping, 9/20; for cultural work, +3/20; for sports and physical training, 3/20; for the Land Service +(Landdienst), and other tasks and for the offices, 5/20.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The same area spent, in 1944—that is, 1 year before the end +of the war—for cultural work, 4/20; for sports and defense training, +5/20; for Landdienst and other tasks, 6/20; and for the evacuation +of children to the country, 5/20.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In that connection I should like to mention briefly that the same +area, in the time from 1936 until 1943, made no expenditures for +racial-political education; in 1944 there was an entry of 20 marks +under the heading of racial-political education for the acquisition +of a picture book about hereditary and venereal diseases. However, +in that same district, in one single town, during the same time, +200,000 marks were given to have youth visit the theaters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The question concerning premilitary or military education cannot +be answered by me without describing small-caliber shooting +practice. Small-caliber firing was a sport among the German youth. +It was practiced on the lines laid down in the international rules +for sport shooting. Small-caliber shooting, according to Article 177 +of the Treaty of Versailles, was not prohibited. It states expressly +in that article of the treaty that rifle clubs, sporting, and hiking +organizations are forbidden to train their members in the handling +and use of war weapons. The small-caliber rifle, however, is not +a war weapon. For our sport shooting we used a rifle similar to +the American 22-caliber. It was used with the 22-caliber Flobert +cartridge for short or long distance.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to say here that our entire marksmanship training +and other so-called premilitary training have been collected in a +manual entitled “HJ Service.” That book was printed and sold not +only in Germany but was also available abroad. +<span class='pageno' title='381' id='Page_381'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The British Board of Education in 1938 passed judgment on that +book, in the educational pamphlet, Number 109. With the permission +of the Tribunal, I should like to quote briefly what was said +about it in this educational pamphlet. I quote in English:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It cannot fairly be said to be in essence a more militaristic +work than any thoroughgoing, exhaustive, and comprehensive +manual of Boy Scout training would be. Some forty pages +are, to be sure, devoted to the theory and practice of shooting +small-bore rifle and air gun, but there is nothing in them +to which exception can reasonably be taken, and the worst +that one can say of them is that they may be confidently +recommended to the notice of any Boy Scout wishing to +qualify for his marksmanship badge.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>As to the mental attitude of the Hitler Youth, I can only say +that it was definitely not militaristic.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: We will perhaps come back to that later with +another question. You say the Hitler Youth had been trained with +Flobert rifles, or small-caliber rifles, as they are also called. Was +the Hitler Youth also trained with infantry rifles, or even machine +guns or machine pistols?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Certainly not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Not at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not a single German boy, until the war, had +been trained with a war weapon, a military weapon, be it an +infantry rifle, machine gun, or infantry gun; nor with hand grenades +in any form.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in the document book Schirach are +several documents which will show that the attitude of the Defendant +Von Schirach concerning the question of military or premilitary +education of the Hitler Youth was exactly the same as he has +stated it today, particularly, that he expressed himself against any +military drill, barracks language, and all such things.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>These are mainly documents in the document book Schirach: 55, +then 122, 123, 127, 127a, 128, and 131. I ask you to take judicial +notice of these documents. They contain, on the whole, the same +statements which Herr Schirach has made briefly already.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Schirach, in connection with the so-called military +training of the youth, I should like to know what influence the SA +had on the training of youth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: None at all. The SA tried to have an influence +on the education and training of youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In what way? +<span class='pageno' title='382' id='Page_382'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was in January of 1939. At that time I +was in Dresden, where I arranged a performance which presented +modern gymnastics for girls. I still remember it distinctly. While +I was there, a newspaper was shown to me which carried a decree +by Hitler, according to which the two oldest age groups of the +Hitler Youth were to receive premilitary training from the SA. +I protested against that at once and after my return to Berlin I +succeeded not in having the decree withdrawn for that could not +be done for reasons of prestige since Hitler’s name was on it—but +invalidated as far as the youth were concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, that incident is contained in a document +in the document book Schirach, Number Schirach-132. That +is a statement from <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>, a semiofficial news periodical. I +should like to refer to that as evidence; and in regard to the question +of training in shooting I should like to ask the defendant one +more question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>What part of the entire training did the shooting practice have +in the HJ? Was it a very essential part or the essential part?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Unfortunately, I do not have the documentary +material here which would enable me to answer that exactly. But +at any rate, it was not an essential part of the training in the HJ.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did that marksmanship training go any further, +according to your experiences and observations, than the marksmanship +training of youth in other nations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The marksmanship training of youth in other +nations went much further, much beyond that which we had in +Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that from your own observation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know that from many of my assistants who +constantly made a detailed study of the training in other countries, +and I know about it from my own observation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you think that is relevant, the fact that +other nations trained in marksmanship? I am not sure it is true +either, but anyhow, it is not relevant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then I come to another question, Witness. The +Prosecution have asserted and I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“...that thousands of boys were trained militarily by the +HJ in the work of the Navy, of the naval aviation and of the +armored troops, and that over seven thousand teachers trained +over a million Hitler Youth in rifle marksmanship.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That is the citation of the Prosecution referring to some meeting +of the year 1938. I should like to have you state your position with +<span class='pageno' title='383' id='Page_383'></span> +regard to the question here, the question of the special units of the +Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Prosecution refers, if I am not mistaken, +to a speech which Hitler made. How Hitler arrived at the figures +concerning training, I cannot say. Concerning training in the special +units I can only say, and prove with documents, the following:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the year 1938 the motorized Hitler Youth—that is that special +unit of our youth organization which the Prosecution think received +preliminary training in the tank branch—in 1938 the motorized +Hitler Youth had 328 vehicles of their own.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In all Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In all Germany. There were 3,270 private +cars of their family members which, of course, were at their disposal +for their work; and 2,000 cars of the NSKK (National Socialist +Motor Corps). In the year 1938 21,000 youth got their driving +licenses. I believe, but I cannot be sure about it, that that is twice +the number of youngsters that received a driving license in 1937—that +is, the driving license for a passenger car. These figures alone +show that the motorized Hitler Youth did not receive preliminary +training for our armored forces. The motorized Hitler Youth had +motorcycles; they made cross-country trips. That is correct. What +they learned in this way was, of course, useful for the Army too, +when these boys later were drafted into the motorized units; but +it was not true that the boy who had been in the motorized Hitler +Youth went to the Army. There was no compulsion in that respect +at all. The motorized Hitler Youth was not created upon the +request of the Wehrmacht, but it was already created in the +fighting years—long before the seizure of power, simply from the +natural desire of the boys who owned a motorcycle and wanted +to drive it. So we formed our motorized HJ; we used these boys +as messengers between tent camps and we used them as drivers +for our minor leaders, and later, in order to give them a regular +training, especially knowledge of motors, of engines, we made an +arrangement with the NSKK, which had motor schools and could +train the boys.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Other units were created in the same way. The Flieger HJ, for +example, never had any airplanes. We had only gliders. The entire +Hitler Youth had but one airplane and that was my own, a small +Klemm machine. Aside from that, the Hitler Youth had only model +airplanes and gliders. The Hitler Youth not only taught their own +members the use of gliders in the Rhön Hills and elsewhere, but +also thousands of youth from England and other countries. We had +glider camps where young Englishmen were our guests and we +even had camps in England. +<span class='pageno' title='384' id='Page_384'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Navy HJ, did they perhaps have warships?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Navy HJ, of course, had not a single +warship, but from time to time our former Commander-in-Chief +of the Navy, Raeder, kindly gave us an old cutter and with that +we put to sea.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The boys, for instance, who lived in a city like Berlin, near +the Wannsee, and did some rowing, became members of the Navy +HJ. When entering the Wehrmacht they did not, just because they +had been in the Navy HJ, go into the Navy, but just as many went +afterwards into the Army or the Air Force, and it was the same +with other special units.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you say therefore that in your opinion +the Hitler Youth was not educated in a military way for the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to be quite precise about that. +The training in these special units was carried out in such a +manner that it really had a premilitary value. That is to say +that whatever the boy learned in the Navy Hitler Jugend, regardless +of whether he wanted to use it only as a sportsman later, or +whether he actually went into the Navy, the basic principles were +valuable as premilitary education. If one considers these special +units of the HJ, one can establish that here a premilitary education +actually took place, but not a military training. The youth were +not prepared for the war in any place in the HJ; they were not +even prepared for the military service, because the youth did not +go direct from the Hitler Youth into the Army. From the Hitler +Youth they went into the Labor Service.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And how long were they in the Labor Service?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Half a year.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And only then did they get to the Wehrmacht?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In that connection, however, the Prosecution has +used an agreement which was made between the HJ leadership +and the OKW in August 1939, and which has been submitted as +Document 2398-PS by the Prosecution. What are the facts about +that agreement between you and the OKW?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember any details. Between +Field Marshal Keitel and myself, according to my recollection, +there was no discussion concerning that agreement, but I believe +we arranged that by correspondence. And I should just like to +state that during the entire time from 1933 to 1945, only one or +two conversations of about half an hour took place between Field +Marshal Keitel and me. The agreement, however, resulted from +the following considerations: We endeavored in the Hitler Youth, +<span class='pageno' title='385' id='Page_385'></span> +and it was also the endeavor of the leading men in the Wehrmacht, +to take nothing into our training which belonged to the later +military training. However, in the course of time, the objection +was raised on the part of the military, that youth should not learn +anything in its training which later would have to be corrected +in the Wehrmacht. I am thinking, for instance, of the compass. +The Army used the infantry compass; the Hitler Youth, in cross-country +sports, used compasses of various kinds. It was, of course, +quite senseless that youth leaders should train their boys, for +instance, to march according to the Bèzar compass if later, in their +training as recruits, the boys had to learn something different. The +designation and the description of the terrain should also be given +according to the same principles in the Hitler Youth as in the +Army, and so this agreement was made by which, I believe, thirty +or sixty thousand HJ leaders were trained in cross-country sports. +In these cross-country sports no training with war weapons was +practiced.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, now I come to another chapter. It +may be that this is the best time to adjourn.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='386' id='Page_386'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Schirach resumed the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, before the adjournment we spoke about +the question of the military or premilitary education of the youth. +And now I come to a similar chapter; that is the question of whether +you, as Youth Leader, in your articles, speeches, and orders did in +any way attempt to influence young people psychologically towards +an aggressive war in order to make them war-minded by such +means.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, never in my speeches to German youth, +or in anything which I laid down for youth in the way of orders +and directives, did I prepare German youth for war; nor have I +ever, even in the smallest circle of my collaborators, expressed +myself in such terms. All my speeches are contained in the collection +<span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>, at least their essential contents. A considerable part +of my speeches is collected also in a book <span class='it'>Revolution der Erziehung</span> +(<span class='it'>The Revolution in Education</span>), which has been submitted to the +Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>All this evidence shows that I never spoke to the youth of the +country in that sense; it would have been in direct contradiction +to all my aims of co-operation with the youth of other nations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, perhaps I may draw your attention +in this connection to the document which is in the Schirach document +book under Number Schirach-125, I repeat 125—and also 126, +where Schirach expresses his opinion about the question of preserving +peace and rejecting war. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial +notice of these documents as evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, you have just spoken of co-operation between your +Reich Youth Leadership Office and the German Hitler Youth with +the youth of other nations. Could you give us a more detailed +statement on that, in particular which youth associations of other +nations you co-operated with, which you attempted to approach, +and in which way and to what degree?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Starting in 1933, and in an increasing degree +year by year, I made efforts to bring about exchange camps with +youth organizations in other countries. Here in Germany these +groups of English youth, French youth, Belgian youth, and the youth +of many other countries, particularly, of course, from Italy, often +came as our guests. I remember that in one year alone, I think +in 1936, there were approximately 200,000 foreign youths who +stayed overnight in our youth hostels.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Perhaps it is important in this connection to say that the youth +hostel system, which I took over in 1933, was developed by me and +<span class='pageno' title='387' id='Page_387'></span> +finally formed a part of an international youth hostel system, the +president of which was sometimes a German, sometimes an Englishman. +An international youth hostel agreement made it possible that +youngsters of our nations could stay overnight in youth hostels of +the guest nations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I myself took great pains to bring about an understanding with +the youth of France. I must say that this was a pet idea of mine. +I think that my former assistants will remember just how intensely +I worked towards the realization of that idea. I had my leaders’ +periodical appear in the French language; I do not know whether +more than once, but certainly at least once, so that the understanding +between the French and the German youth could be +strengthened thereby.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I went to Paris and I invited the children of one thousand +veterans of the first World War to come to Germany. I very often +had young French guests as visitors in Germany. But over and +above this understanding with France, which eventually also led to +difficulties between the Führer and myself, I co-operated with +many, many other organizations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Perhaps I may add that German-French co-operation, as far as +youth was concerned, was supported particularly by Ambassador +Poncet in Berlin, Premier Chautemps, and other French personalities +who wrote in my leadership periodical on that particular +subject. I exchanged views with youth leaders all over the world, +and I myself undertook long journeys to visit youth organizations +in other countries and establish contact with them. The war terminated +that work. I do not want to omit mentioning here that for +one whole year I put the entire youth program under the slogan +“Understanding,” and that in all my speeches before the youth I +tried to direct and educate it toward a better understanding of +other nations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Is it true that, for instance, even during the last +years before the war, I think even in the winter of 1937-1938 and +again 1938-1939, you received large delegations of English youth in +skiing camps of the Hitler Youth and that vice versa also during +those years considerable delegations of Hitler Youth leaders and +Hitler Youth members were sent to England so that the people +could get to know and understand each other?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is correct. There were innumerable +encampments of foreign youth in Germany and very many camps +of German youth abroad, and I myself often visited such camps or +received delegations from them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I would like to add that as late as 1942 I made an attempt to +co-operate with the youth of France. At that time the difficulty lay +<span class='pageno' title='388' id='Page_388'></span> +in Mussolini’s attitude. I went to Rome and, through Count Ciano’s +intervention, had a long conversation with Mussolini and succeeded +in having him withdraw his objections to having our youth invite +all French groups to come to Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Unfortunately, when I reported this result to our Foreign +Minister, Hitler turned it down. At any rate, that is what Herr +Von Ribbentrop said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: From an article in the paper <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span> of 1938 I +gather, for instance, that during that year you invited among others, +1,000 children of French war veterans to come into the Hitler Youth +camps in Germany and into the German-French youth skiing camps. +Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have already told you that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Another article shows me that, for instance, I +believe in 1939, you had a special memorial erected, I think in the +Black Forest, when some members of an English youth delegation +were accidentally killed there during games.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the defendant had mentioned +earlier that near Berlin he erected a special house for these purposes +under the name “The Foreign House of the Hitler Youth.” May I +present to the Tribunal in the original, pictures of this “Foreign +House,” as Document Number Schirach-120; and may I ask the +Tribunal to look at these pictures, because in them...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We are quite prepared to take it from you +without looking at the house. The particular style of architecture +will not affect us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, but if you will not look at the pictures, then +you will not know how the house was furnished; and you will not +see that in the house, for instance, there was not a single swastika, +not a single picture of Hitler, or any such things. That, again shows +considerations for the views of the foreign guests.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this connection, Mr. President, may I also ask you to take +judicial notice of a number of documents, all of which refer to the +efforts of the Defendant Von Schirach to bring about an understanding +between German youth and the youth of other nations. +These are the documents in Schirach’s document book which have +the Numbers Schirach-99 up to and including Schirach-107, then +Documents Schirach-108 through 113, and also Documents Schirach-114 +up to and including 116, and then Documents Schirach-117, 119, +and 120. All these documents refer to the same subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, when you invited such delegations from foreign +youth organizations to Germany, was anything concerning German +<span class='pageno' title='389' id='Page_389'></span> +institutions and organizations, particularly with reference to the +Hitler Youth, ever kept secret from these delegations, or how was +that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, as a matter of principle, foreign youth +leaders who wished to get to know our institutions were shown +everything without any reservations whatever. There was, in fact, +no institution of German youth in the past which was not shown to +our foreign guests. Also the so-called premilitary education was +demonstrated to them in every detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then in 1939 the second World War broke +out. During the last months before that happened, did you seriously +expect a war; or with what did you occupy yourself at the time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was firmly convinced that Hitler would not +allow a war to break out. It was my opinion that he was in no +way deceived about the fact that the Western Powers were firmly +resolved to be serious. Until the day when war broke out, I firmly +believed that the war could be avoided.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you discuss with military leaders or political +personalities at that time the danger of war and the prospects of +maintaining the peace?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No; in fact, I want to say something here and +now about my discussions with military personalities.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have already stated that over a period of 12 years—that is +from 1933 to 1944 or 1945; that is, 13 years—I had perhaps one or +possibly two half-hour conversations with Field Marshal Keitel. I +remember that one of them dealt entirely with a personal matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>During the same period I had, I think, only one single discussion +with Admiral Raeder, and Admiral Dönitz I met for the first time +here in Nuremberg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I never had any official discussions with Generaloberst Jodl at +all, and I talked to the late Field Marshal Von Blomberg, if I +remember rightly, possibly twice for half an hour. I had no official +discussions at all with the former Supreme Commander of the +Army, Von Fritsch. I was his guest on one occasion only, when +he was running skiing competitions for the army, and he kindly +invited me because he knew that I was interested in skiing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With his successor, Von Brauchitsch, I had a general chat on +questions of education when I talked before the youth of Königsberg +in 1933. Later, I believe, I visited him once on official business; +and we discussed a question which was of no particular importance +for the education of youth. It was some technical matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>These are the discussions which I have had with military personalities. +In fact, altogether I must say that I did not have time for +conferences. I led an organization comprising 8 million people; and +<span class='pageno' title='390' id='Page_390'></span> +my duties in that organization were such that I did not possibly +have the time to participate in conferences and discussions in Berlin +regarding the situation, even if I had been admitted to them, which +was not the case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, from 1932 you were a Reichsleiter. That +means that you belonged to the highest level of leaders in the +Party. Were you not, in that capacity as Reichsleiter, informed by +Hitler, his deputy, or other political personalities about the political +situation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think that Hitler invited the Reichs- and +Gauleiter, on an average, twice a year to a conference, during +which he retrospectively discussed political events. Never at any +time did Hitler discuss before these men operations of the future, +whether of a political or military nature.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, if I understand your answer correctly, you +were always surprised by these foreign developments.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Does the same apply to the question of the +Austrian Anschluss?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I heard of the Anschluss of Austria, +which of course I hailed enthusiastically, through the radio, if I +remember rightly, during a trip by car from my Academy at +Brunswick to Berlin. I continued my journey to Berlin, boarded +a train at once, and arrived the following morning in Vienna. There +I greeted the young people: youth leaders, some of whom had +been in prisons or in a concentration camp at Wöllersdorf for a +long time, and also many women youth leaders, who had also +experienced great hardships.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what about the march into Czechoslovakia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Like every other German citizen, I heard of +that through the radio, and did not learn any more than any other +citizen learned from the radio.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you, in any capacity, a participant in the +negotiations regarding the Munich Pact with Chamberlain and +Daladier in 1938?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what was your opinion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I regarded that agreement as the basis for +peace, and it was my firm conviction that Hitler would keep that +agreement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you know anything about the negotiations +with Poland in 1939? +<span class='pageno' title='391' id='Page_391'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I heard about the negotiations which led +to the war, only here in this courtroom. I was merely acquainted +with that version of the negotiations which was officially announced +through the radio or by the Ministry of Propaganda; and I know no +more, therefore, than what every other German citizen knows. The +version which Hitler announced before the Reichstag was considered +by me to be absolutely true; and I never doubted it, or at least I +did not doubt it until about 1943, and all I have heard about it +here is new to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution, among other things, +have made the accusation against you that in your book, <span class='it'>Die Hitler-jugend—Idee +und Gestalt</span> (<span class='it'>Hitler Youth—Idea and Form</span>)—which, +Mr. President, is Number 1458-PS—you used the expression “Lebensraum” +(living space) and “Ostraum” (eastern space) and that by +doing so you welcomed or considered as a necessity German conquests +in the East, that is, at the expense of Soviet Russia and +Poland.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>What do you have to say about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In this book of mine, <span class='it'>Die Hitler-jugend—Idee +und Gestalt</span>, the word “Lebensraum” (living space) is not used at all +to my knowledge. Only the word “Ostraum” (eastern space) is used, +and I think it is in connection with a press service in the East. In +a footnote, in connection with a description of the tasks of the +Colonial Advisory Board in the Reich Youth Leadership, there is +a statement to the effect that, as a result of the activities of this +Colonial Advisory Board the necessity of drawing the attention of +youth to the exploitation of the eastern territory—and by that is +meant the thinly populated eastern area of Germany—should not +be overlooked.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That was at a time when we in the youth organizations were +particularly concerned with the problem of the “flight from the +land,” that is to say, the migration of the second or third sons of +farmers to the cities. I formed a special movement of youth to +combat that trend, the Rural Service, which had the task of stopping +this flow of youth from the country to the towns and also of bringing +home to youth in towns the challenge of the country.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Of course I never thought of a conquest of Russian territory +because ever since I occupied myself with history it was always my +point of view politically that the policy regarding mutual security +with Russia, which broke off with Bismarck’s dismissal, should be +resumed. I considered the attack against the Soviet Union as the +suicide of the German nation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, did you, as the Youth Leader of the +German Reich, have the right to report to Hitler directly? +<span class='pageno' title='392' id='Page_392'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is true; but this right to make +reports was more or less only on paper. To picture that precisely, +before the seizure of power I frequently reported to Hitler in +person. In 1932 he quite often announced his intention to dine with +me in the evening, but it is clear that in the presence of my wife +and other guests political questions were not discussed, particularly +not the questions which fell into my special sphere. Only +now and then, perhaps, could I touch upon a subject which interested +me in connection with education.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In 1933, as far as I can remember, I reported twice to him personally, +once regarding the financing of the youth movement, and +the second time in connection with the Party Rally of 1933. During +the following years my reports averaged one or two a year whereby +I was treated in the same way as most people who reported to +Hitler. Of the 15 odd points on which I wanted to report to him, +I managed to deal with 3 or 4, and the others had to be dropped +because he interrupted me and very explicitly elaborated on the +things which interested him most.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I then tried to help myself by taking along models of youth +buildings, views of the big stadiums and of youth hostels, which I +had set up in a hall in the Reich Chancellery, and when he looked +at them I used the opportunity to put two or three questions to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I must state here—I think I owe it to German youth—that Hitler +took very little interest in educational questions. As far as education +was concerned, I received next to no suggestions from him. +The only time when he did make a real suggestion as far as athletic +training was concerned was in 1935, I believe, when he told me that +I should see to it that boxing should become more widespread +among youth. I did so, but he never attended a youth boxing +match. My friend Von Tschammer-Osten, the Reich Sports +Leader, and I tried very often to persuade him to go to other +sporting events, particularly to skiing contests and ice hockey +championships in Garmisch, but apart from the Olympic Games, +it was impossible to get him to attend.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You have told us a little earlier about this so-called +military or premilitary education, stating that, as far as one +could talk about such education at all, it played only a minor part +in the training of the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I ask you to tell us, though not at length but only in condensed +phrases, what, in your mind, were the chief aims of your +youth education program. Be very brief.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Tent encampments.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Tent encampments? +<span class='pageno' title='393' id='Page_393'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Trips, construction of youth hostels and +youth homes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What do you mean by “trips”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Youth hikes, individually and in groups; also +the construction of more and more youth hostels. In one year alone, +more than 1,000 homes and youth hostels were built by me in +Germany. Then there was additional professional training, and +then what I called the “Labor Olympics,” namely, the annual Reich +trade contests, voluntary competition between all youth of both +sexes who wanted to participate. In fact millions participated. +Then our great Reich sports contests, championships in every type +of sport, our cultural work, and the development of our singing +groups, our acting groups, youth concert choirs, and the development +of our youth libraries, and then something which I mentioned in +connection with combating the migration from the country, the +Rural Service with its rural help groups, those youths, who for +idealistic reasons were working in the country, even town boys—to +show the farmer boys that the country was really more beautiful +than the city, that even a city boy will give up his life in the city +temporarily to devote himself to the land and to tilling the soil. +Then, as a great communal accomplishment of youth, I must mention +the dental improvement and the regular medical examinations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>These, in a few summary words, were the main tasks which our +youth organizations had, but they are by no means all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, these ideas, these thoughts, and +these aims of the Defendant Von Schirach are contained in a +number of documents which are found in the Schirach document +book, and which are extracts from his works, speeches, and orders. +I am referring to Schirach document book, Numbers Schirach-32 +through 39, 44 through 50, 66 through 74(a), 76 through 79, and, +finally, 80 through 83.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>All these documents deal with the tasks which the Defendant +Schirach has just described to you, and I am asking the Tribunal +to take judicial notice of the details in these documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] There is only one point of that +Hitler Youth program, if I may call it that, with which I would +like to deal, because it has been particularly stressed against you +in the Indictment. That is your collaboration with the Lawyers’ +League, that is to say, your occupation with law. In that connection +I would like to know why you, the Reich Youth Leader, were +interested in legal problems at all. What were you striving for, +and what did you achieve? Please, will you tell us that briefly, +because it has been emphasized in the Indictment. +<span class='pageno' title='394' id='Page_394'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I remind you that the youth of the +state was regarded by me as being a Youth State. In that Youth +State all professions and all tasks were represented. My collaboration +with the Lawyers’ League was due to the necessity of training +legal advisers for our working youth whom they could offer +the necessary legal protection. I was anxious that those Hitler +Youth leaders who were studying law should return to the organization +to deal with just such tasks within the organization.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>From this type of training a large organization developed within +the ranks of youth which was equivalent to the organization of +doctors within the youth organization; our medical organization +comprised approximately 1,000 doctors, men and women. These +legal men assisted the staff, in the districts and other units of our +youth organization, putting into practice those demands which I had +first enunciated early in our fighting days, before the seizure of +power, and which I had championed in the State later on, namely, +the demand for free time and paid vacations for the young worker.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This legal work of our youth led to the founding of seminars +for Youth Law and Working Youth Law, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, attached to the +universities at Kiel and Bonn. In particular it had the result that +those demands which I voiced in a speech in 1936, before the Committee +for Juvenile Law of the Academy for German Law, could +be carried through.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Just one moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the Tribunal.</span>] This is the speech of which excerpts +are reproduced, in Schirach document book, Number Schirach-63. +It is copied from <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span> of October 1936.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Herr Von Schirach, perhaps you can tell us very briefly which +social demands you, as Reich Youth Leader, made regarding youth. +You said earlier, “free time.” What did you mean by that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the first place, a shortening of working +hours for young people, the abolition of night work for young +people, a fundamental prohibition of child labor, extended weekends, +and 3 weeks’ paid vacation every year.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In 1937 at Liegnitz I noticed that at that time 50 percent of the +young workers had no holidays at all and that only 1 percent had +15 to 18 days per annum. In 1938, on the other hand, I had put +through the Youth Protection Law which prohibited child labor, +raised the age of protection for juveniles from 16 to 18 years, prohibited +night work, and realized my demand regarding the extended +weekend, at the same time stipulating at least 15 days’ vacation +annually for youngsters. That was all I could achieve. It was only +part of what I wanted to achieve. +<span class='pageno' title='395' id='Page_395'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: These are the demands which are contained in +the following documents in the document book: Schirach-40 to 41 +and 60 to 64. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, I now come to another problem, and that is your +position within the Party. Some time ago we were shown a chart +here giving a clear picture of the organization of the Party. Was +that plan correct, or what was your position within the Party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My position in the Party was not correctly +depicted in that chart, at least not as far as the channels of command +are concerned. According to the chart which was exhibited +here, the channel of command would have been from the Reich +Leader for Youth Education to the Chief of the Party Chancellery, +and from there to Hitler and from Hitler to the Reich Youth Leadership +Office of the Party. That, of course, is an erroneous picture.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I was not in the Party Directorate to give my orders via the +Gauleiter to the district leaders but as the representative and +head of the youth movement, so that if you want to describe my +position and the position of my organization in the framework of +the NSDAP correctly, you would actually have to draw a pyramid, +the apex of which, that is to say my position in the Party Directorate, +would be above the Reichsleiter. I was the only person in the youth +movement who was connected with the Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And the other leaders and subleaders of the youth +movement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Some of them may have been Party members, +but not all. At any rate, they were not members of the +Gauleitung or Kreisleitung. The entire staff of the youth movement, +the entire youth organization, stood alongside the Party +as a unit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, as the Youth Leader of the German +Reich, were you a civil servant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And from 1 December 1936, I believe, you were +the chief of a high Reich office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was a civil servant only from 1 December +1936.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: With the title?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Youth Leader of the German Reich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As the chief of a high Reich office, were you +actually independent of the Minister of the Interior and the Minister +for Education? +<span class='pageno' title='396' id='Page_396'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that was, after all, the purpose of creating +an independent Reich office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you thereby become a member of the Reich +Cabinet, as has been claimed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I am sure I did not. I heard here for the +first time that I was supposed to have been a member of the Cabinet. +I never participated in a Cabinet meeting. I never received a decree +or anything of the sort which would have made me a member of +the Cabinet. I never received invitations to attend Cabinet meetings. +I never considered myself a member of the Cabinet, and I believe +that the Ministers did not consider me a member either.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you in any way informed of the resolutions +passed by the Reich Cabinet, for instance, by having the minutes of +the meetings sent to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. Resolutions passed by the Reich Cabinet, +insofar as any were passed after 1 December 1936, only came to +my attention in the same way as they reached any other higher +official or employee of the Reich who read the <span class='it'>Reichsgesetzblatt</span> or +the <span class='it'>Reichsministerialblatt</span>. Records and minutes: were never sent +to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When you became a high Reich authority, did you +receive the staff which you needed through a ministry, or how did +you obtain that staff for yourself?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: A few youth leaders who had worked on +my staff for a number of years were made civil servants through +me. I did not receive a single official from any ministry to deal +with matters relating to the youth organization. The entire high +Reich office, if I remember correctly, consisted of no more than five +officials. It was the smallest of the high Reich offices, something I +was particularly proud of. We carried out a very large task with +a minimum of personnel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And now, Witness, I want to come to a subject +which is going to be rather extensive and that is the affidavit by +Gregor Ziemer, which you have already mentioned. It is a very +lengthy affidavit which has been presented by the Prosecution under +Document Number 2441-PS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, what do you have to say in detail with regard to that +affidavit? Do you know it? Do you know this man Gregor Ziemer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Have you found out who he is and from where +he gathered his alleged knowledge?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I gather from the affidavit that Herr Ziemer +before the war was headmaster of the American school in Berlin +<span class='pageno' title='397' id='Page_397'></span> +and that he has written a book which apparently deals with youth +and school education in Germany. This affidavit is an extract from +that book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The affidavit as such, if you regard it in its entirety, has, I +believe, more importance as propaganda than as an impartial +judgment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I want to start by quoting something from the very first page, +which is the page containing Ziemer’s affidavit, and in the last +paragraph it says that street fights took place outside the American +school between the Jewish children going to this school and the +local youngsters. I need not deal with the difficulties which the +school itself had, because that was not part of my department. But +these street fights took place outside the school, and I think I +ought to say something about them. I never heard anything about +these clashes, but I should have heard about them under all circumstances, +because during most of 1938 I was in Berlin. I should have +heard of them first through the youth organization itself, because +the senior youth leaders would have been obliged to report to me +if such incidents had taken place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Furthermore, I would have had to hear about it through the +Foreign Office, because if youngsters from the American colony +had been molested, protests would certainly have gone through the +Embassy to the Foreign Office, and these protests would without +fail have been passed on to me at once or reported to me by +telephone.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I can only imagine that the whole affair is a very gross exaggeration. +The American Ambassador Wilson even had breakfast +with me—I think in the spring of 1939, and I do not think I am +wrong about the date—in Gatow.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the Foreign House?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the Foreign House.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And we discussed a number of subjects privately. I believe that +on that occasion or afterwards he would most certainly have +mentioned such incidents if they had in reality occurred in the way +Herr Ziemer describes them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe I can go over to Page 2, where...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, how much of this document has +been read by the Prosecution? As far as I know, very little.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I beg your pardon?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How much of this affidavit has been read +and put in evidence by the Prosecution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I cannot tell you that offhand, Mr. President. But +judging by practice, I must assume that if a document is submitted +<span class='pageno' title='398' id='Page_398'></span> +to the Tribunal, judicial notice of the entire document is taken by +the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is not so. We have stated over and +over again that we take only judicial notice on documents which +have been read to the Tribunal, unless they are documents of +which full translations have been given. This document was, +I suppose, presented in the course of the Prosecution’s case, and +probably one sentence out of it was read at the time. I do not +know how much was read; but you and the defendant ought to +know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: There was only one paragraph read, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One paragraph?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: One full paragraph and perhaps one short one on +Page 21.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have it here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I think the Prosecution covered the part having +to do with the speech at Heidelberg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And that is the only part of it that has been +read, and that is, therefore, the only part of it that is in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Perhaps for the sake of credibility—and I +shall not deal in detail with the accusations contained in that affidavit—I +might be allowed to say, with one sole exception, all the +annual slogans of the Hitler Youth are reproduced falsely in this +affidavit and that Gregor Ziemer nevertheless swears to the correctness +of his statement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be the best, if you want to reply +to his affidavit, that you should direct the defendant’s attention to +the part which has been read? Then he can make an answer to that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in Ziemer’s affidavit, which the +defendant has told me he regards as a clearly inflammatory piece +of writing, the annual slogans are mentioned which are supposed +to have been issued by the defendant, that is, the slogans for the +work for the following year.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: One passage of this document has been put +in. If you want to put in the rest, you are entitled to do so. But I +should have thought that it would have been the best way for you +to answer the passage which has been put in. The rest of the affidavit +is not in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in that case my client would get +the worst end of the bargain, because in other passages which have +not been used by the Prosecution... +<span class='pageno' title='399' id='Page_399'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I said you could use the other passages if +you want to.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Certainly, but I want to prove that Herr Ziemer’s +statements are not correct; that is why I have just been discussing +the question of annual slogans with the defendant. This is only +one example.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the defendant is apparently +saying that the affidavit is unreliable because of the slogans which +are referred to in it. Is that not sufficient for your purpose?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes; but I intend to prove that Herr Ziemer’s +statements are untrue. The defendant maintains that the statements +contained in that affidavit are not true. But I am trying to prove +to you that, in fact, Herr Ziemer has deliberately stated and sworn +to untruths.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Sauter, there being one passage +in this affidavit which is in evidence, you can deal very shortly +with the question of the credit of the person who made the affidavit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, this Herr Ziemer, in his affidavit, has +made statements regarding the annual slogans...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: ...which you issued for the Hitler Youth. How +these annual slogans were worded can be easily seen by the Tribunal +from the affidavit. I now ask you to tell us how the annual +slogans of the Hitler Youth were worded during your time; that +is, 1933 to 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Herr Ziemer mentions the slogan on Page 15 +of the English document. Herr Ziemer says that in 1933 the motto +for German Youth had been “One Reich, One Nation, One Führer.” +He probably means “One People, One Reich, One Führer.” Actually, +the year 1933 was the year of “Unity.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What do you mean by “Unity”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The year in which German youth joined +ranks in one organization.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I want to skip a few years now and come to the +year 1938. What was your slogan for the Hitler Youth in 1938?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 1938 was the year of “Understanding.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The year of “Understanding”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Herr Ziemer says the slogan was “Every +Youth a Flyer.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then in 1939 what was your slogan?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was the year of “Duty Towards Health.” +<span class='pageno' title='400' id='Page_400'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The year of “Duty Towards Health”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: According to Herr Ziemer, it was “Hitler +Youth on the March.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And finally 1940, your last year?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was the year of “Instruction.” But he +called it “We March Against England.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But I want to add that the first slogan, “One People, One Reich, +One Führer,” which Ziemer says was the official slogan of the year +1933 for German youth, arose first in 1938 when Hitler went into +Austria. Before that, that slogan did not exist at all. It was never +the annual slogan of German youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we must comply with the wish of the +Tribunal and not go into the affidavit of Ziemer any further, with +the exception of the one point which has been used by the Prosecution +in the Indictment against you in connection with the accusation +of anti-Semitism. I skip Herr Ziemer’s further statements +and come to this speech at Heidelberg. Will you tell me first of all, +what Ziemer said, and then make your own comments on that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Ziemer said that during a meeting of students +in Heidelberg—I think either at the end of 1938 or the beginning of +1939—I had made a speech against the Jews in connection with a +rally of the National Socialist Student Union. He says that on that +occasion I praised the students for the destruction of the Heidelberg +Synagogue, and that following that I had the students file past me +and gave them decorations and certificates of promotion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>First of all, I have already referred to my activity in the student +movement. Upon the request of the Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf +Hess, I handed the leadership of the student movement over to him +in 1934. He then appointed a Reich student leader; and after that +I did not speak at any student meetings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As far as I can remember, I visited Heidelberg during the summer +of 1937; and there I spoke to the youth group. This was 1 or 1½ +years before Ziemer’s date. And on one occasion I attended a +festival play at Heidelberg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: All of this is irrelevant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no recollection of any meeting of this +sort with students, and I have no recollection of ever having +publicly stated my views about the Jewish pogrom of 1938. I will +state at another point what I said in my capacity as Youth Leader +regarding this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Ziemer says—I am translating from the English text—he says +that “the day will come when the students of Heidelberg will take +<span class='pageno' title='401' id='Page_401'></span> +up their place side by side with the legions of other students to win +the world over to the National Socialist ideology.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have never spoken like that before youth, in public, or even +in a small circle. These are not my words; I did not say that. I +had no authority whatsoever to confer decorations or certificates, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>, upon students. Medals of distinction for students did not +exist. All decorations were conferred by the head of the State.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I personally had the right to confer the golden youth decoration, +and I think it was conferred by me about 230 times in all, almost +entirely upon people who earned distinction in the field of education, +but not upon unknown students.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the important point in your testimony is +to tell us whether it is correct that the speech made at the end of +1938 before the students at Heidelberg, in which the speaker referred +to the wreckage of the synagogues, was not made by you, +because at that time you had not had anything to do with the +student movement for years. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had nothing to do with the student movement, +and I do not remember having spoken before such a meeting. +I consider it quite out of the question that such a meeting of students +took place at all. I did not make those statements.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Have you got the affidavit before you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I cannot find that particular passage at +the moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: It says something which I have translated into +German, namely, it mentions the “small, fat student leader.” Have +you got that passage? Does it not say so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, it says so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Well then, surely “small, fat student leader” cannot +be applied to you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I, Mr. President, in this connection, draw your attention to +an affidavit which appears in Schirach’s document book under +Number Schirach-3, and which I herewith submit to the Tribunal. +It is an affidavit of a certain Hoepken, who, beginning with 1 May +1938, was the female secretary of the Defendant Von Schirach and +who, in this affidavit under the Figure 16—which is Page 22 of the +document book—mentioning exact details—states under oath that +during the time with which we are here concerned the defendant +was not at Heidelberg at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not suppose it is necessary for me to read that part of the +affidavit. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to break off.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='402' id='Page_402'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have spoken in another connection +about the fact that you did not consider officers suitable as youth +leaders. I would be interested to know how many members of the +leadership corps of the Hitler Youth in 1939 at the outbreak of +the war were reserve officers in the Armed Forces.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I would judge that the leadership corps of +the HJ had about 1,300 leaders. Those were leaders of the Banne, +leaders of the districts or regions, and the corresponding staff of +assistants. Of these 1,300 youth leaders, 5 to 10 men were reserve +officers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And how many active officers did you have at +that time on your staff or in the leadership corps?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Active officers were not youth leaders and +could not be youth leaders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why not? Was that contained in the regulations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. An officer was not permitted to be a +member of the Party or any one of its organs or affiliated organizations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who was responsible to you for the physical +education and sports programs in the Hitler Youth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Obergebietsführer Von Tschammer-Osten, +who was also Reich Sports Leader. In the Olympic year he co-operated +very closely with me and voluntarily subordinated himself +to me in December or November 1936. He was responsible to me +for the entire physical education of the boys and girls.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This Herr Von Tschammer-Osten, who was +very well known in the international sports world, was he an officer +by profession?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: According to my recollection he had been an +officer during the first World War. Then he left the Army and was +a farmer by profession. Later on he concerned himself only with +questions of physical education and sport. One of his brothers was +an active officer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Von Tschammer-Osten become an officer +during the second World War?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, he did not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you remember that? A document has been +submitted here by the Soviet Prosecution, namely a report from +Lvov, in which it is stated that the Hitler Youth or the Reich +Youth Leadership had conducted courses for young people from +Poland, and these young people were to be trained as agents, spies, +<span class='pageno' title='403' id='Page_403'></span> +and parachutists. You have stated today that you take the complete +responsibility for the youth leadership. I ask you to tell us something +about that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: We had absolutely no possibilities for espionage +training in our youth organization. Whether Heydrich on his +part, without my knowledge and without the knowledge of my +assistants, had hired youthful agents in Poland and used them +within his intelligence service, it is not possible for me to say. I +myself did not conduct any espionage training; I had no courses for +agents, and courses for training parachutists were out of the question +because, after all, I had no air force. Training of that kind could +only have been conducted through the Air Force.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then you, as Reich Youth Leader or, as you were +called later, Reich Leader for Youth Education, have never known +anything about these things before this Trial? Can you state that +under oath?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I can state upon my oath. I should like +to add that shortly before the war young refugees from Poland +came to us in large numbers, but they of course could not return +to Poland. The persecution of the Germans in Poland is a historical +fact.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution has asserted that in the +Hitler Youth a song was sung, “Heute gehört uns Deutschland, und +morgen die ganze Welt” (Today Germany belongs to us, tomorrow +the whole world); that is the alleged title of that song, and that is +supposed to have expressed the will for conquest of the Hitler +Youth; is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The song says, in the original text which was +written by Hans Baumann and is also included in a document here: +“Heute da hört uns Deutschland und morgen die ganze Welt” +(Germany hears us today and tomorrow the whole world). But it +had come to my knowledge also that the song, from time to time, +was being sung in the form which has been mentioned here. For +that reason I issued a prohibition against singing the song which +differed from the original text. I also prohibited, years ago, the +song “Siegreich wollen wir Frankreich schlagen” (Victoriously we +will conquer France) from being sung by the German Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You prohibited the last mentioned song entirely?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Out of consideration for your French guests?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not out of consideration for guests but +because it was contrary to my political conceptions. +<span class='pageno' title='404' id='Page_404'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thus, Mr. President, I submit the correct text +which I got from a song book. It is Number Schirach-95 of the +Schirach document book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In connection with the question of whether the Hitler Youth +intended a premilitary training of youth, I should like to put the +following additional questions. Did the physical and sport training +of youth apply only to the boys, Herr Von Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. Of course all young people received +physical training.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Also the girls?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Is it correct that your efforts directed toward the +physical training and physical strengthening of youth also applied +to the physically handicapped and to the blind and other young +people who from the very outset could not be used for military +purposes?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Very early in our work I included the blind +and deaf and the cripples in the Hitler Youth. I had a periodical +especially issued for the blind and had books made for them in +Braille. I believe that the Hitler Youth was the only organization +in Germany which took care of these people, except for special +organizations of the NSV (National Socialist Welfare Organization) +and so on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I ask, in connection with that, Mr. President, that +you take notice of Document Schirach-27 of the Schirach document +book. That is a long article entitled “Admission of Physically +Handicapped Young People in the Hitler Youth,” where the deaf, +dumb, and blind are especially mentioned and their training to +enable them to take up a professional occupation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I have refrained all day from making any objection, +but I think this examination has gone very far afield. We have +made no charge against this defendant with respect to the blind, +the deaf, the lame, and halt. He keeps going way back to the Boy +Scouts and we haven’t gotten to any of the relevant issues that are +between us and this defendant. At the present rate I fear we will +never get through.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we have listened to this somewhat +long account of the training of the Hitler Youth. Don’t you +think you can go on to something more specific now? We have got +a very fair conception, I think, of what the training of the Hitler +Youth was; and we have got all these documents before us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I shall try, Mr. President, to proceed according to +your wishes so far as it is at all possible. +<span class='pageno' title='405' id='Page_405'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, is it correct that you personally intervened with Hitler +to prevent the re-establishment of cadet academies as institutions +for purely military training?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is correct. I prevented the re-establishment +of cadet academies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I come now to another chapter. The defendant +has been accused of wrecking the Protestant and Catholic youth +organizations. What can you say in answer to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First, the following: I wanted, as I have +already explained, the unification of all our youth. I also wanted +to bring the Protestant organizations, which were not very large +numerically, and the numerically very large Catholic organizations +into the Hitler Youth, particularly because some of the organizations +did not limit themselves to religious matters but competed with +the Hitler Youth in physical training, hikes, camping, and so on. +In this I saw a danger to the idea of unity in German national +education, and above all I felt that among young people themselves +there was a very strong tendency toward the Hitler Youth. The +desertion from the confessional organizations is a fact. There were +also many clergymen who were of the opinion that the development +should perhaps take the following direction: All youth into the +Hitler Youth; the religious care of the youth through clergymen; +sports and political work through youth leaders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In 1933 or 1934—but I think it was as early as 1933—Reich +Bishop Müller and the Protestant Bishop Oberheidt approached me +on their own initiative and proposed that I incorporate the Protestant +youth organizations into the Hitler Youth. Of course I was +very happy about that proposal and accepted it. At that time I +had no idea that there was opposition to Reich Bishop Müller within +the Protestant Church. I found out about that only much later. I +believed that I was acting with the authority and in the name of the +Evangelical Church, and the other bishop who accompanied him +further strengthened this belief of mine. Even today I still believe +that with the voluntary incorporation of the Protestant youth into +the Youth State, Müller acted in accordance with the will of the +majority of the Protestant youth themselves; and in my later +activity as Youth Leader I frequently met former leaders from the +Protestant youth organizations, who had leading positions with me +and worked in my youth organization with great enthusiasm and +devotion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Through that incorporation of Protestant youth—I should like to +stress this—spiritual ministration to youth was not limited or +hindered in any way; there never was a restriction of church +services for youth in Germany, either then or later. Since Protestant +<span class='pageno' title='406' id='Page_406'></span> +youth had been incorporated on the basis of an agreement between +the Church and the Hitler Youth, there was practically only a dispute +about youth education between the Catholic Church and the +Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In May or June 1934 I asked personally to participate in the +negotiations for the Reich Concordat because I wanted to eliminate +entirely the differences between the Catholic Church and the Hitler +Youth. I considered an agreement in this field to be very important +and in fact I was allowed to participate in these negotiations which +took place in June ’34 in the Reich Ministry of the Interior under +the chairmanship of Reich Minister for the Interior Frick. On the +Catholic side Archbishop Gröber and Bishop Berning took part in +the negotiations; and at that time I personally proposed a formula +for co-operation, which met with the approval of the Catholic side, +and I believed that I had found the basis for agreement in this +sphere.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The conferences were unfortunately interrupted on the evening +of 29 June; and on 30 June ’34 we experienced the so-called “Röhm +Putsch,” and the negotiations were never resumed. That is not my +fault, and I bear no responsibility for that. Hitler simply did not +want to accept the consequences of the Concordat. I personally +desired to conclude that agreement, and I believe that the representatives +of the Church saw from these negotiations and from certain +later conferences with me that the difficulties did not originate with +me. At any rate Bishop Berning came to me, I believe in 1939. We +discussed current questions between the youth leadership and the +Church. I believe that he also got the impression at that time that +it was not I who wanted to make difficulties.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The difficulties arose at that time from the increasingly strong +influence of Martin Bormann, who tried to prevent absolutely any +kind of agreement between the Party offices and the Church or +between the youth leadership and the Church.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the course of the dispute about the leadership of confessional +youth organizations and their incorporation, animated public discussions +arose. I myself spoke at various meetings. Statements were +issued by the Church also, which according to the state of affairs, +were more or less sharp. But I did not make statements inimical to +religion in connection with that subject, nor did I at any time +during my life.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, is it correct that in 1937 you concluded +an agreement with the Church to the effect that the Hitler Youth +should, in principle, not be on duty on Sundays during church time, +so that the children could attend religious services, and furthermore, +that on account of this agreement you ran into considerable +difficulties? +<span class='pageno' title='407' id='Page_407'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Will you tell us very briefly about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe one can say that it was an +agreement with the Church. If I remember correctly, I issued a +decree based on various letters I had received from clergymen—which +to a very great extent took into account the wishes expressed +in these letters. I then issued that decree and I gather from many +affidavits which have been sent by youth leaders to me recently that +that decree was very carefully obeyed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Difficulties arose in the Party Chancellery on account of my +attitude. Bormann, of course, was an energetic enemy of such a +basic concession to the Church, and Hitler himself—I don’t know +whether it was in connection with this decree, but, at any rate, in +connection with the regulation of the dispute between the youth +leadership and the Church—also reprimanded me once.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have a small book here, entitled +<span class='it'>A Good Year 1944</span>, with the sub-title “Christmas Gift of the War +Welfare Service of Reich Leader Von Schirach.” I submit that book +as Document Number Schirach-84 to the Tribunal for judicial notice. +On Page 55 is a picture of the Madonna. On Page 54 is a Christian +poem written by the defendant, with the title “Bavarian Christmas +Crib.” On the lower half of Page 54 there is the famous “Wessobrunner +Prayer,” the oldest prayer in the German language, dating +from the eighth century.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, is it also correct that on account of the Christian +content of that book you had difficulties with Reichsleiter Bormann; +and if so, what were they?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct. I had that Christmas gift +made for, I believe, 80,000 to 100,000 soldiers and sent to them at +the front as late as 1944. I did not hear anything directly from +Bormann, but he suddenly asked for 10 copies of that book; and I +was informed by people who were near the Führer in his headquarters +that he used that book in some way in order to incite +Hitler against me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to add that at all times of my life, at any rate +insofar as I have written poetry, I have expressed myself in the +same way as in this poem. Also in the collection of poems, <span class='it'>The Flag +of the Persecuted</span>, which I do not have here unfortunately but which +was distributed among the youth in a very large edition, where my +revolutionary poems can be found, there are poems of a Christian +content which, however, were not reprinted by the Party press in +the newspapers and therefore did not become so well-known as +my other verses. But I should like to express quite clearly that I +was an opponent of confessional youth organizations, and I wish to +<span class='pageno' title='408' id='Page_408'></span> +make it just as clear that I was not an opponent of the Christian +religions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Not an opponent?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you leave the Church?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In spite of many hints by Bormann, I never +left the Church.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: May I, Mr. President, ask the Tribunal to take +judicial notice of Documents Schirach-85 to 93, inclusive, of the +Schirach document book. All of these are documents from the +period when he was Reich Youth Leader and show his attitude +toward the Church.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I add something to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: If you please.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as my religious attitude is concerned, +I always identified myself with the thoughts expressed in <span class='it'>Wilhelm +Meisters Wanderjahre</span> about religions in general and the importance +of the Christian religion in particular. I should like to say here that +in my work as an educator I was mistaken in holding the opinion +that positive Christianity existed outside of the Church.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>However, I never made any anti-Christian statements; and I +should like to say here for the first time in public that in the closest +circles of the Hitler Youth I have always expressed a very unequivocal +belief in the person and teachings of Christ. Before educators +of the Adolf Hitler School—a fact which naturally was never +allowed to come to the knowledge of the Party Chancellery—I spoke +about Christ as the greatest leader in world history and of the +commandment to “Love thy neighbor” as a universal idea of our +culture. I believe that there are also several testimonials by youth +leaders about that in your possession, Mr. Attorney.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, I shall refer to that later. I should like to +begin a new chapter now. In 1940 you were dismissed as Reich +Youth Leader?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And you were succeeded by Axmann who has +already been mentioned. But you remained connected with youth +education through what office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Through the office of the Reichsleiter of Youth +Education.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And in addition to that you received another title, +I believe? +<span class='pageno' title='409' id='Page_409'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I became Deputy of the Führer for the +Inspection of the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was that only a title, or was that some kind of +office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was an office to the extent that the +Reichsleiter office was concerned with youth work in the Party +sector. The Youth Leader of the German Reich—that was Axmann +as my successor—also had a field of activity in the State, and I too +became competent for that by my appointment as inspector.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How did your dismissal as Reich Youth Leader +come about, and why were you called specifically to Vienna as +Gauleiter? What can you tell us about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: At the end of the French campaign, in which I +participated as an infantryman, I was in Lyon when a wireless +message from the Führer’s headquarters was received, and the chief +of my company told me that I had to report to the Führer’s headquarters. +I went there at once; and at the Führer’s headquarters, +which was at that time situated in the Black Forest, I saw the +Führer standing in the open speaking to Reich Foreign Minister +Von Ribbentrop. I waited a while, maybe a quarter of an hour or +20 minutes, until the conversation had ended and then reported at +once to Hitler and there, outside, before the Casino building where +later we all had our meal together, he told me the following in +about 10 minutes:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should propose to him a successor for the leadership of the +youth. He intended for me to take over the Reich Gau Vienna. I at +once suggested my assistant, Axmann, who was not a man who +advocated physical or military training but was concerned with +social work among the youth, and that was most important to me. +He accepted this proposal...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we need not go through Axmann’s +qualifications, need we? Is it material to the Tribunal to know what +his successor was like?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Axmann? Axmann was successor as Reich Youth +Leader.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What I was asking you was whether it was +material for the Tribunal to know the qualities of Axmann. We +have nothing to do with that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Von Schirach, you can be more brief about +that point, can you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Hitler then said that I should keep my job as +Reich Leader of Youth Education and that I should assume at the +same time the office of the Inspector of Youth and that I should +<span class='pageno' title='410' id='Page_410'></span> +go to Vienna as the successor to Bürckel. In Vienna, especially in +the cultural field, serious difficulties had arisen; and therefore I was +to direct my attention to the case of the institutions of culture, +particularly of theaters, art galleries, libraries, and so forth; and +I was to be especially concerned about the working class. I raised +the objection that I could carry out that cultural work only if +independent of Goebbels, and Hitler promised at that time that this +independence would be fully safeguarded; but he did not keep that +promise later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And lastly he said that he was sending the Jewish population +away from Vienna, that he had already informed Himmler or +Heydrich—I do not remember exactly what he said—of his intentions, +or at least would inform them. Vienna had to become a German +city, and in that connection he even spoke of an evacuation +of the Czech population.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That concluded that conversation. I received no other instructions +for this office, and then we dined together as usual. I took +my leave then and went to Berlin to talk to my assistants.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Vienna was considered at that time, if I am +correctly informed, the most difficult Gau of the Reich; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Vienna was by far the most difficult political +problem which we had among the Gaue.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Because—I learned the details only from +other persons in Berlin, after I had received my mission from +Hitler—in Vienna the population had sobered considerably after +the first wave of enthusiasm over the Anschluss had subsided. Herr +Bürckel, my predecessor, had brought many officials to Vienna from +the outside; and the German system of administration, which was +in no wise more practicable or efficient than the Austrian, was +introduced there. This resulted in a certain over-organization in the +administrative field, and Bürckel had started on a Church policy +which was more than unsatisfactory. Demonstrations took place +under his administration. On one occasion the palace of the archbishop +was damaged. Theaters and other places of culture were not +taken care of as they should have been. Vienna was experiencing a +feeling of great disillusionment. Before I got there I was informed +that if one spoke in the streetcars with a North-German accent, +the Viennese took an unfriendly attitude.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what duties did you have or what offices +did you hold in Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In Vienna I had the office of Reich Governor +(Reichsstatthalter), which included two administrations, the municipal +administration and the national administration. In addition, +<span class='pageno' title='411' id='Page_411'></span> +I was Reich Defense Commissioner for Wehrkreis XVII, but only +until 1942. In 1942, the Wehrkreis was subdivided, and each Gauleiter +of the Wehrkreis became his own Reich Defense Commissioner.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then you also were Gauleiter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I was also Gauleiter, the highest official +of the Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In other words, you represented city, state, and +Party, all at once—the highest authority of city, state, and Party in +Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. Now the situation was such in the administration +that there was an official representative to take charge of +national affairs, namely, the Regierungspräsident; for the municipal +administration there was another representative, the mayor; in the +Party, the Deputy Gauleiter in Vienna had the title of Gauleiter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should not like to belittle my responsibility for the Gau by +explaining that, and I want to protect the exceptionally efficient +Deputy Gauleiter who was there. I just want to say that in order +to clarify my position.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What really was your position as Reich Defense +Commissioner, Witness? Was that a military position, or what +was it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was not a military position at all. The +Reich Defense Commissioner was simply the head of the civil administration, +in contrast to the situation prevailing during the first +World War, where the head of the civil administration was assigned +to and subordinated to the commanding general; in this war the +Reich Defense Commissioner was co-ordinate with him, not subordinate.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The tasks of the Reich Defense Commissioner—at least, that is +how I saw my tasks—were at certain intervals, to co-ordinate the +most pressing problems of food economy, transportation—that is, +local and distant transportation, coal supplies, and price regulation +for the Gaue of Vienna, Upper Danube, and Lower Danube, all of +which belonged to Wehrkreis XVII.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There were several meetings for that purpose—I believe three +all together. In 1942 the reorganization which I previously mentioned +took place. Bormann carried his point against the Reich Marshal. +The Reich Marshal was of the opinion that the Reich Defense Commissioner +had to be Defense Commissioner for the entire Wehrkreis. +Bormann wanted each Gauleiter to be Defense Commissioner, and +so that led to the division. From 1942 on I was only Reich Commissioner +for Vienna. +<span class='pageno' title='412' id='Page_412'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, it seems that a decree was issued at that +time—will you please tell me when you were informed about it—namely, +a decree by Reichsleiter Bormann, that not more than two +Gauleiter could meet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not a decree by Bormann; that was an +order by Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What were its salient points?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I must explain that briefly. Because of the +fact that the Reich Commissariat was subdivided, I had to meet from +time to time with the Reichsstatthalter of other provinces in order +to discuss the most important questions, especially concerning our +food economy. However, I believe it was in 1943, Dr. Ley came to +me in Vienna and brought me an official order from the Führer, +according to which it was considered illegal—that was the way he +expressed it—for more than two Gauleiter to meet for a conference.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At that time I looked at Dr. Ley speechless; and he said:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Yes, that does not concern you alone. There is still another +Gauleiter who has called a conference of more than two, and +that fact alone is already considered as virtual mutiny or +conspiracy.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, when you were in Vienna, were you +given a further mission which took up much of your time? Please +tell us briefly about that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had just started to work in Vienna when, in +October 1940, I received an order to appear at the Reich Chancellery.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Will you please be very brief.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And there Hitler personally gave me the +mission of carrying out the evacuation of all German youth from +areas endangered by aerial attack, and simultaneously to carry out +the evacuation of mothers and infants; and he said that that should +begin in Berlin and then gradually take in the entire Reich. He said +that education was of secondary importance now; the main thing +was to maintain the nervous energy of the youth and to preserve +life. However, I asked at once that I be given the possibility of +establishing an educational organization, and I did so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not wish to speak about details, but one of the demands, +which I made at once—this is important in connection with the +Indictment—was that there should be no difficulties placed in the +way of young people’s participation in church services. That was +promised to me, and it was expressed very clearly in my first directives +for the children’s evacuation. The youth leaders who were +active in this field of my organizational work will confirm this. +<span class='pageno' title='413' id='Page_413'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This evacuation of children to the country was a +very extensive task, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was the most difficult, and from a psychological +point of view, the most complicated work which I ever +carried out. I transferred millions of people in this way; I supplied +them with food, with education, with medical aid, and so on. Of +course that work took up my time fully or to a large extent only +during the first years. After that I had trained my assistants for +that kind of work.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Later, as I have heard from you, you tried from +time to time to report to Hitler about your successes and about +problems requiring decision. How often during the entire years of +the war were you admitted to discuss that important field of work +with Hitler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Mr. Attorney, I am afraid I have to correct +you. I never tried to report to Hitler about my successes, but only +about my problems.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Problems, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: About that entire program of evacuation of +children I could only report to him twice; the first time in 1940, +after I had got the whole program under way, and the second time +in 1941, when the evacuation had reached very large proportions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And about Vienna I could only report on very rare occasions, +and in 1943 the possibility of reporting ceased altogether with the +breach of relations which I will describe later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, during your period in Vienna you became +the Chairman of the Würzburg Bibliophile Society.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is an honorary office, the Würzburg +Bibliophile Convention had appointed me Chairman of the German +Bibliophile Society.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Your Honor, Schirach—Number Schirach-1 of the +document book makes reference to that matter, and I submit it as +a piece of evidence. It it an affidavit by an old anti-Fascist, Karl +Klingspor, an honorary member of the society, who gives valuable +information about the character of the Defendant Von Schirach.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And in addition, Herr Von Schirach, I believe you were the +Chairman of the Southeast Europe Society, is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In brief, what was the mission of that society?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It had as its purpose the improvement of trade +relations, economic relations, with the southeast. Its functions were +essentially in the field of research and representation. +<span class='pageno' title='414' id='Page_414'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what were your main Viennese activities?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My principal activities in Vienna were social +work and cultural work, as I have already explained before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Social work and cultural work?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: These were the two poles which dominated +my entire political life.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I come now to the particular accusations which +have been made against you by the Prosecution concerning that +period in Vienna. Among other things you have been accused of +participating in the so-called slave-labor program, and I ask you to +state your position concerning that, and in that connection also to +deal with Directive Number 1 of the Plenipotentiary General for +the Allocation of Labor, of 6 April 1942, which was presented, I +believe, as Document 3352-PS. Please go ahead.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Maybe I would do best to start with the decree +by which Gauleiter were appointed Plenipotentiaries for the +Allocation of Labor under the Plenipotentiary General.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: 6 April 1942.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the way of documentary material that +decree contains no more than that the Gauleiter could make suggestions +and submit requests to the competent offices for the allocation +of labor. But they were held responsible—I do not know whether +by this decree or another one—for the supervision of the feeding +and quartering, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, of foreign workers. This feeding and +quartering, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, of foreign workers was—in my Gau and I +believe also in all other Gaue of the Reich—mainly in the hands of +the German Labor Front.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Gauobmann of the German Labor Front in Vienna reported +to me very frequently about the conditions among German workers +and foreign workers in the Gau. He often accompanied me on +inspection tours of industries; and from my own observations I can +describe my impressions here of the life of foreign workers in +Vienna as far as I could watch it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I well remember, for instance, my visit to a large soap factory +where I saw barracks in which Russian and French women were +living. They had better quarters there than many Viennese families +which lived six or eight people in the usual one-room apartments +with kitchen. I remember another inspection where I saw a billet +of Russian workers. It was clean and neat, and among the Russian +women who were there I noticed that they were gay, well-nourished, +and apparently satisfied. I know about the treatment of +Russian domestic workers from the circle of my acquaintances and +from the acquaintances of many assistants; and here, also, I have +<span class='pageno' title='415' id='Page_415'></span> +heard, and in part observed myself, that they were extremely well +treated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Let me say something in general about Vienna as a place for +foreign workers. For centuries foreign workers have worked in +Vienna. To bring foreign workers from the southeast to Vienna is +no problem at all. One likes to go to Vienna, just as one likes to +go to Paris. I have seen very many Frenchmen and French women +working in Vienna, and at times I spoke with them. I also talked +to French foremen in the factories. They lived as tenants somewhere +in the city, just like any other private person. One saw them in +the Prater. They spent their free time just as our own native +workers did.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>During the time I was in Vienna, I built more factory kitchens +than there are in any other Gau in Germany. The foreign workers +frequented these kitchens just as much as the native workers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>About treatment at the hands of the population, I can only say +that the population of a city which has been accustomed for centuries +to work together with foreign elements, will spontaneously +treat any worker well who comes from the outside.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Really bad conditions were never reported to me. From time to +time it was reported that something was not going well here or +there. It was the duty of the Gauobmann of the Labor Front to +report that to me. Then I immediately issued a directive from my +desk by telephone to the regional food office or the quota office for +the supply of material, for kitchens or heating installations, or +whatever it was. At any rate, I tried within 24 or 48 hours to take +care of all complaints that came to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>While we are on the subject I would like to give my impression +of the use of manpower in general. I am not responsible for the +importation of labor. I can only say that what I saw in the way of +directives and orders from the Plenipotentiary General, namely the +Codefendant Sauckel, always followed the line of humane, decent, +just, and clean treatment of the workers who were entrusted to +us. Sauckel literally flooded his offices with such directives.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I considered it my duty to state that in my testimony.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: These foreign workers, who were in the Gau +Vienna and for whom you do not consider yourself responsible, +were they employed in the armament industry or elsewhere?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: A large portion was employed in agriculture, +some in the supply industry. Whether there were some directly in +the armament industry I could not say. The armament industry was +not accessible to me in all its ramifications, even in my functions as +Gauleiter, because there were war production processes which were +kept secret even from the Reichsstatthalter. +<span class='pageno' title='416' id='Page_416'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, in connection with the subject of Jewish +forced labor, a letter was read, Document 3803-PS. It is, I believe, +a handwritten letter from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner to Blaschke. +Blaschke, I believe, was the second mayor of Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He was the mayor of Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: This is a letter of 30 June 1944. In that letter +Kaltenbrunner informs Blaschke that he had directed that several +evacuation transports should be sent to Vienna-Strasshof. “There +are four transports,” it says in the letter, “with about 12,000 Jews, +which will arrive in the next few days.” So much about the letter. +Its further content is only of importance because of what it says in +the end—and I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I beg you to arrange further details with the State Police +Office, Vienna, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Ebner, and SS +Obersturmbannführer Krumey, of the Special Action Command +Hungary, who is at present in Vienna.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you have anything to do with that matter, and if so what?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know of the correspondence between +the Codefendant Kaltenbrunner and the mayor of Vienna. To my +knowledge Camp Strasshof is not within Gau Vienna at all. It is in +an altogether different Gau. The designation, “Vienna-Strasshof,” +is, therefore, an error. The border runs in between the two.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And were you informed of the matter itself at +that time, or only here in the courtroom?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know of that matter only from this courtroom, +but I remember that mention was made about the use of +Jewish workers in connection with the building of the Southeast +Wall or fortifications. The Southeast Wall, however, was not in the +area of Reich Gau Vienna. It was a project in the area of Gau +Lower Danube, Lower Austria, or Styria. I had nothing to do with +the construction of the Southeast Wall; that was in the hands of +Dr. Jury, that is, the O. T....</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: O. T. is the Organization Todt?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: ...the Organization Todt. And in the other +part of the border it was in the hands of Dr. Uiberreither, the Gauleiter +of Styria, and his technical assistants.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So I can sum up your statement to mean that you +had nothing to do with these things because they were matters +which did not concern your Gau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I cannot understand what connection +there should be with Gau Vienna. Whether the mayor intended to +divert some of these workers for special tasks in Vienna is not +known to me. I do not know about that matter. +<span class='pageno' title='417' id='Page_417'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the same connection, Witness, another document +has been submitted, 1948-PS, a file note of 7 November 1940. +That was a date on which you had already been Gauleiter in Vienna +for several months and it, too, concerns forced labor of the Jews who +were capable of work. That file note was written on stationery with +the heading “The Reichsstatthalter in Vienna,” and apparently the +note in question was written by a Dr. Fischer. Who is Dr. Fischer? +What did you, as Reichsstatthalter, have to do with that matter? +What do you know about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First of all, Dr. Fischer is not known to me +personally. I do not want to dispute the possibility that he may +have been introduced to me once and that I do not remember him; +but I do not know who Dr. Fischer is. At any rate, he was not an +expert working in my central office. I assume that he may have +been an official, because his name appears in connection with +another document also. He was probably the personal consultant +of the Regierungspräsident. The note shows that this official used +my stationery, and he was entitled to do that. I believe several +thousand people in Vienna were entitled to use that stationery, +according to the usage of German offices.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On this note he has put down a telephone conversation with the +Gestapo from which it can be seen that the Reich Security Main +Office—that is Heydrich—was the office which decided, by internal +directives to the Gestapo, on the use of Jewish manpower.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Regierungspräsident wanted to know more about that; but +I believe one cannot draw the conclusion from this that I was informed +about cruelties committed by the Gestapo, as the Prosecution +has concluded. It is doubtful whether I was in Vienna at all at that +time. I want to remind you of my other tasks, which I have described +before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>However, if I was there, I certainly did not concern myself with +the work of cleaning up the streets. But I should like to say that +the variety of my tasks caused me to establish an organizational +structure which did not exist in other Gaue, namely, the Central +Office of the Reich Leader.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Perhaps you will tell us, before concluding for +today, approximately how many officials in Vienna were subordinated +to you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I guess it may have been about 5,000 officials +and employees.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Shall I continue, Mr. President? It is 5:00 o’clock.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned, until 24 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='418' id='Page_418'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH DAY</span><br/> Friday, 24 May 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Schirach resumed the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is counsel for the Defendant Bormann +present?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): +Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would it be convenient to you to present +your documents on Tuesday at 10 o’clock?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, agreed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would it be convenient to the Prosecution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Quite convenient, would it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, indeed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Your Honors, we left off yesterday with Document +Number 1948-PS. That, as you will recall, is a memorandum +by a certain Dr. Fischer about a telephone conversation he had +held with an official of the Secret State Police, Standartenführer +Huber, from Vienna, and refers to forced labor of Jewish youth. +Special mention is made of the employment of Jews in the removal +of ruined synagogues. In connection with this memorandum I should +like to put just one more question to the Defendant Schirach.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] When were these synagogues +destroyed in Vienna? Was it in your time and on your responsibility, +or at another time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The synagogues in Vienna were destroyed +2 years before I assumed office in Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I now proceed to the chapter on anti-Semitism +which—according to your admission yesterday—you +followed in your youth. I should like to know what your attitude +was, when you joined the Party and when you became an official +in the Party, toward a practical solution of this anti-Semitism?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: According to my opinion—in 1924-1925—Jews +were to be entirely excluded from the civil service. Their +<span class='pageno' title='419' id='Page_419'></span> +influence in economic life was to be limited. I believed that Jewish +influence in cultural life should be restricted. But for artists of +the rank of, for instance, Max Reinhardt, I still envisioned the +possibility of a free participation in this cultural life. That, I +believe, exactly reflects the opinion which I and my comrades held +on the solution of the “Jewish Problem” in 1924-1925 and in the +following years.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Later, when I was leading the high-school youth movement, I +put forward the demand for the so-called <span class='it'>Numerus clausus</span>. It was +my wish that the Jews should be allowed to study only on a proportional +basis commensurate to their percentage of the total population. +I believe one can realize from this demand for the <span class='it'>Numerus +clausus</span>, known to the entire generation of students in that period, +that I did not believe in a total exclusion of the Jews from artistic, +economic, and scientific activities.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have submitted a document, Document +Schirach-136, in the Schirach document book, which contains +statements by an official of the Reich Youth Leadership about the +treatment of Jewish youth as contrasted with Christian youth. +Do you know what attitude the Reich Youth Leadership had +adopted at that time toward the Jewish youth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that we are dealing with the decree +of the year 1936.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Autumn 1936?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Autumn 1936. According to that, Jewish +youth organizations were to exist under the official supervision of +the Reich Youth Leader, who controlled all the youth of Germany, +and Jewish youth would be able to carry out their own youth +education autonomously.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: It says in that decree, <span class='it'>inter alia</span>—I quote one +sentence only from Document Schirach-136 of the Schirach document +book:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Today in its youth, Judaism already assumes that special, +isolated position, free within its own boundaries, which at +some future date Judaism will occupy within the German +State and in the economy of Germany and which it has +already occupied to a great extent.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, at about the same time, or shortly before then, the +so-called Nuremberg Laws had been promulgated, those racial laws +which we have frequently heard mentioned here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you help pass these laws, and how did you personally judge +these laws? +<span class='pageno' title='420' id='Page_420'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had no part in the drafting of these laws. +In my room at the Hotel Deutscher Hof, here in Nuremberg, I was +surprised to find a slip of paper stating that there would be a +Reichstag meeting on the next day and that it would take place +in Nuremberg. At that Reichstag meeting, at which I was present, +the Nuremberg Laws were promulgated. I do not know to this +day how they were drafted. I assume that Hitler himself determined +their contents. I can tell you no more about them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Can you state on your oath, and with a clear +conscience, that before these laws were published you had not +known of the plan for such laws, although you had been Reich +Youth Leader and Reichsleiter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: After these laws had been promulgated in Nuremberg, +how did you personally envisage the further development +of the Jewish problem?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I must say, first of all, that we had, as a +matter of fact, not expected these laws at all. I believe that the +entire youth of the country at that time considered the Jewish +problem as solved, since in 1935 there could be no more question +of any Jewish influence. After these laws had been published we +were of the opinion that now, definitely, the last word had been +spoken on the Jewish problem.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Briefly, Witness, you are accused of having incited +and influenced the youth of the country. I therefore ask you: As +Reich Youth Leader did you incite youth to anti-Semitic excesses, +or did you, as Reich Youth Leader, and particularly at meetings +of the Hitler Youth, make any inflammatory anti-Semitic speeches?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not make any inflammatory anti-Semitic +speeches, since I attempted, both as Reich Youth Leader and youth +educator, not to add fuel to the fire; for neither in my books nor in +my speeches—with the exception of one speech in Vienna, to which +I shall refer later on and which was not made at the time when +I was Reich Youth Leader—have I made any inflammatory statements +of an anti-Semitic nature.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I will not make myself ridiculous by stating here that I was not +an anti-Semite; I was—although I never addressed myself to the +youth in that sense.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The office of the Reich Youth Leader published +an official monthly entitled <span class='it'>Will and Power, Leadership Publication +of the National Socialist Youth</span>. Excerpts from this official publication +have previously been submitted to the Tribunal in the +document book. +<span class='pageno' title='421' id='Page_421'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now I would be interested to know: Is it true that certain Party +authorities repeatedly demanded from you that you publish a special +anti-Semitic issue of this official Youth Leadership publication +in order to show the youth of the country the path to follow in the +future, and what was your attitude with regard to that demand?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is true that the Reich Minister for Propaganda +repeatedly demanded of my editor-in-chief that such an anti-Semitic +issue should be published. On receiving the report of the +editor-in-chief I invariably refused to comply with this request. I +believe that the editor-in-chief has already signed a sworn affidavit +to that effect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the question of anti-Semitism would also +include your attitude to <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, the paper issued by your +fellow-Defendant, Streicher. Did you distribute this anti-Semitic +paper <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> within your youth organization, and did you +in any way further its distribution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> was not distributed within the +youth organization. I believe that with the sole exception of those +of the young people who lived in this Gau...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Gau Franken?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, Gau Franken—that the rest of the German +youth organization never read <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> at all. The paper +was definitely rejected by all the youth leaders—both boys and +girls—in my organization.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, Witness, I must point out to you that the +Prosecution have accused you of having given, on one occasion, an +introduction to this paper, this anti-Jewish paper <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>. Do +you know about it, and what have you got to say on the matter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can say the following in this respect. I was +always in close collaboration with the press; in fact, I came from +the press myself. In my press office, as Reich Youth Leader, I gave +definite instructions that all requests from Gau papers for an introduction, +or something else of the kind from me should be granted +on principle. Therefore, whenever a Gau paper celebrated a jubilee—perhaps +the tenth or twentieth anniversary of its existence, or published +some special issue—then the experts in my press office would +run up a draft and, together with the considerable volume of evening +mail presented to me for my signature, these drafts and elaborations +would be submitted to me. In this way it might have happened that +I signed that introduction for <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> which, of course, was +the paper of the local Gau. Otherwise I have no recollection of the +episode. +<span class='pageno' title='422' id='Page_422'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Consequently you cannot remember whether you +drafted that short introduction yourself, or whether it was drafted +by one of your experts and presented to you for signature?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I definitely believe that I did not draft it +myself, because such short introductions—as already stated—were +always submitted to me. I wrote my newspaper articles myself but +never introductions of this description.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, since we have just mentioned the name +of Streicher, I would remind you of a very ugly picture book which +was submitted here by the Prosecution. Was that picture book +distributed among the youth with your consent, or do you know +anything else about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course this book was not distributed among +the young people. It is quite out of the question that an office of +the HJ (Hitler Jugend) would have transmitted that book to the +youth. Besides, the picture books of the Stürmer Publishing Firm +are unknown to me. I am, of course, not competent to speak on +education in the schools, but I should also like to say on behalf of +education in the schools that I do not believe this picture book was +ever introduced into any school outside of this Gau. At any rate, +that book and similar writings of the Stürmer Publishing Firm were +not, as a rule, distributed among the young people and the youth +organizations. What I have already said when judging <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> +also holds good for these books—namely, that the leadership corps of +the Hitler Youth categorically rejected writings of this description.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have also experienced how the anti-Semitic +question actually developed and how it eventually resulted +in the well-known anti-Jewish pogroms of November 1938. Did you +yourself, in any way, participate in these anti-Jewish pogroms of +November 1938?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I personally did not participate in any way, +but I did participate in the Munich session...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Which session?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The session which was traditionally held on +9 November of each year in memory of those who had fallen on +9 November 1923. I did not take part in all the discussions of that +day. But I do remember a speech by Goebbels in connection with +the murder of Herr Vom Rath. That speech was definitely of an +inflammatory nature, and one was free to assume from this speech +that Goebbels intended to start some action. He is alleged—but that +I only discovered later—to have given detailed instructions for this +action directly from his hotel in Munich to the Reich Propaganda +Ministry. I was present at the Munich session, as was my colleague +Lauterbacher, my chief of staff, and we both rejected the action. +<span class='pageno' title='423' id='Page_423'></span> +The HJ, as the largest National Socialist organization, was not +employed at all in the anti-Jewish pogroms, of 9, 10, and 11 November +1938. I remember one incident where a youth leader, without +referring to my Berlin office and carried away by some local propaganda, +took part in a demonstration and was later called to account +by me for so doing. After 10 November I was again in Munich for +a few days and visited, <span class='it'>inter alia</span>, a few of the destroyed business +houses and villas as well. It made a terrible impression on me at +the time, and under that impression I instructed the entire Youth +Leadership, the regional leaders if I remember rightly—in other +words, all the highest responsible youth leaders—to come to Berlin +and there, in an address to these youth leaders, I described the incidents +of the 9 and 10 November as a disgrace to our culture. I also +referred to it as a criminal action. I believe that all the colleagues +present on that occasion will clearly remember how agitated I was +and that I told them that my organization, both now and in the +future, would never have anything to do with acts of this sort.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You previously mentioned one individual case +where an HJ leader, subordinate to you, participated in some action. +Did you know of other cases, in November 1938 and after, where +units of the HJ were factually supposed to have participated in the +anti-Jewish pogroms?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I know of no other cases. The only thing +I did hear was that here and there individual lads, or groups of +youths, were called out into the streets by local authorities which +were not of the HJ. In the majority of cases these lads were +promptly sent home again by the youth leaders. The organization +was never employed, and I attach great importance to the statement +that the youth organization, which included more members than +the Party itself with all its affiliated organizations, was never involved +in these incidents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you saw at least, from the incidents in +November 1938, that developments in Germany were taking a different +trend to the course you had expected—if we are to judge +by your previous description. How did you, after November 1938, +envisage the further solution of the Jewish problem?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: After the events of 1938 I realized that +Jewry’s one chance lay in a state-supported emigration; for in view +of Goebbels’ temper, it seemed probable to me that overnight +similar actions could arise from time to time, and under such conditions +of legal insecurity I could not see how the Jews could continue +living in Germany. That is one of the reasons why Hitler’s +idea of a closed Jewish settlement in the Polish Government General, +of which he told me at his headquarters in 1940, was clear to +<span class='pageno' title='424' id='Page_424'></span> +me. I thought that the Jews would be better off in a closed settlement +in Poland than in Germany or Austria, where they would +remain exposed to the whims of the Propaganda Minister who was +the mainstay of anti-Semitism in Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Is it true that you yourself, whenever you had a +chance of approaching Hitler, gave him your own positive suggestions +for settling the Jews in some neutral country, under humane +conditions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is not true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Well?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like fully to elucidate this matter. +I mentioned yesterday how I had reported to Hitler and how he had +told me that the Viennese Jews would be sent to the Government +General. Before that, I had never thought of an emigration of the +Jews from Austria and Germany for resettlement in the Government +General. I had only thought of a Jewish emigration to countries +where the Jews wanted to go. But Hitler’s plan, as it then +existed—and I believe that at that time the idea of exterminating +the Jews had not yet entered his mind—this plan of resettlement +sounded perfectly reasonable to me—reasonable at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But I believe that in 1942 you are supposed to +have tried, through the kind offices of your friend, Dr. Colin Ross, +to suggest to Hitler that the Jews from Hungary and the Balkan +States be allowed to emigrate to some neutral country, taking their +goods and chattels with them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was at a later date. I no longer remember +exactly when, but in any case it was after the occupation of +Hungary. Among the innumerable suggestions which I made to the +Führer and to the Minister for Foreign Affairs through Colin Ross, +was one to the effect that the entire Jewish population of Hungary +be transferred to the neutral countries. If the witness Steengracht +has stated here that this idea had been discussed in the Ministry of +Foreign Affairs and that it had emanated from the Ministry of Foreign +Affairs, then he probably spoke in good faith. The idea originated +in discussions held between Colin Ross and myself, and Ross +then put it down in the form of a memorandum. But—and this is +specially important—it was reported verbally to the Reich Minister +for Foreign Affairs who, in turn, informed Colin Ross, on the occasion +of a further visit, that the Führer had definitely turned the +suggestion down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The emigration to neutral countries abroad?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, to neutral countries abroad. +<span class='pageno' title='425' id='Page_425'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The majority of the Viennese Jews, Witness, were—as +you yourself know—deported from Vienna. In 1940, when you +became Gauleiter in Vienna—or later on—did you ever receive a +directive from Hitler to the effect that you yourself should carry +out this deportation of the Jews from Vienna or that you should +participate in the deportation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I never received any such directive. The only +directive which I received in connection with the deportation of the +Jewish population from Vienna was a question from Hitler asking +about the number of Jews living in Vienna at the time. That number, +which I had forgotten, was recalled to my memory by a document +put to me by the Prosecution. According to that document +I reported to Hitler that 60,000 Jews were then living in Vienna. +That figure probably comes from the registration office. In former +times about 190,000 Jews, all told, lived in Vienna. That, I believe, +was the highest figure reached. When I came to Vienna there were +still 60,000 Jews left. The deportation of the Jews was a measure +immediately directed, on orders from Hitler, or by Himmler; and +there existed in Vienna an office of the Reich Security Main Office, +or local branch office under Himmler-Heydrich, which carried out +these measures.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who was in charge of that office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The head of that office was—that I found out +now; I did not know his name at the time—a certain Brunner.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: An SS Sturmführer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: An SS Sturmführer, Dr. Brunner.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The one who, a few days ago, is supposed to have +been condemned to death? Did you know that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I heard it yesterday.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you have to issue any orders to this Brunner +who was an SS leader, or could you give him any kind of instructions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was entirely impossible for me to stop the +deportation of the Jews or to have any influence thereupon. Once, +as early as 1940, I told the chief of my Regional Food Supply Office +that he should see to it that departing Jewish people be provided +with sufficient food. Frequently, when Jews wrote to me requesting +to be exempted from deportation, I charged my adjutant or some +assistant to intervene with Brunner so that possibly an exception +might be made for these persons. More I could not do. But I have +to admit frankly, here and now, that I was of the opinion that this +deportation was really in the interests of Jewry, for the reasons +which I have already stated in connection with the events of 1938. +<span class='pageno' title='426' id='Page_426'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did the SS, which in Vienna too was charged with +the evacuation of the Jews, send continuous reports as to how and +to what extent this evacuation of the Jews was carried out?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I am, therefore, also not in a position to +state when the deportation of the Jews was concluded and whether +the entire 60,000 were dragged out of Vienna or if only a part of +them was carried off.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did not the newspapers in Vienna report anything +at all about these deportations of the Jews, about the extent of the +deportations and the abuses occasioned in this connection?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Nothing? But, Witness, I must put a document +to you which has been submitted by the Prosecution. It is Document +Number 3048-PS, an excerpt from the Viennese edition of the +<span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, on a speech which you, Witness, made on +15 September 1942 in Vienna, and in which occurs the sentence—I +quote from the newspaper:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Every Jew who operates in Europe is a danger to European +culture. If I were to be accused of having deported tens of +thousands of Jews from this city, once the European metropolis +of Jewry, to the Eastern ghetto, I would have to reply, +‘I see in that an active contribution to European culture.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Thus runs the quotation from your speech which otherwise contains +no anti-Semitic declarations on your part. Considering your +previous statements, Witness, I am compelled to ask you: Did you +make that speech, and how did you come to make it despite your +basic attitude which you have previously described to us?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First, I want to say that I did make that +speech. The quotation is correct. I said that. I must stand by what +I have said. Although the plan of the deportation of the Jews was +Hitler’s plan and I was not charged with its execution, I did utter +those words, which I now sincerely regret; but I must say that I +identified myself morally with that action only out of a feeling of +misplaced loyalty to the Führer. That I have done, and that cannot +be undone. If I am to explain how I came to do this, I can only +reply that at that time I was already “between the Devil and the +deep sea.” I believe it will also become clear from my later statements +that from a certain moment on I had Hitler against me, the +Party Chancellery against me, and very many members of the Party +itself against me. Constantly I heard from officials of the Party +Chancellery who expressed that to the Gauleiter of Vienna, and from +statements made in Hitler’s entourage that one was under the impression—and +that this could be clearly recognized from my attitude +and my actions—that I was no longer expressing myself publicly +<span class='pageno' title='427' id='Page_427'></span> +in the usual anti-Semitic manner or in other ways, either; and I +just have no excuse. But it may perhaps serve as an explanation, +that I was trying to extricate myself from this painful situation by +speaking in a manner which today I can no longer justify to myself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I should like to ask you, in this connection—you +have just spoken of a painful situation in which you found +yourself in Vienna. Is it true that Hitler himself, on various occasions, +reproached you personally and severely because your attitude +in Vienna had not been sufficiently energetic, that you had become +too slack and too yielding; that you should concern yourself more +with the interests of the Party, and that you should adopt far +stricter methods? And what, Witness, did you then do?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, I assume that you realize that you +are putting questions in the most leading form, that you are putting +questions which suggest the answer to the defendant, and such questions +cannot possibly carry—the answers to such questions cannot +possibly carry the weight which answers given to questions not in +their leading form would carry.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, did Hitler personally reproach you for +your behavior in Vienna, and what attitude did you adopt?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe that is not a suggestive question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it is. I should have thought it is a +leading question. He says he was in a very difficult situation. You +could ask him if he would explain what was the difficulty of the +situation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well. Then will you answer this question, +Witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Counsel for the defense, I could not, in any +case, have accepted the question in the form in which you previously +presented it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The difference between Hitler and myself arose primarily over +an art exhibition, and the breach between Hitler and myself in 1943 +was in the beginning the result of differences of opinion over the +cultural policy. In 1943 I was ordered to the Berghof where Hitler, +in the presence of Bormann, criticized me violently on account of +my cultural work and literally said that I was leading the cultural +opposition against him in Germany. And further, in the course of +the conversation he said that I was mobilizing the spiritual forces +of Vienna and Austria and the spiritual forces of the young people +against him in cultural spheres. He said he knew it very well +indeed. He had read some of my speeches, primarily the Düsseldorf +speech; he had discovered that I had authorized in Weimar and in +Vienna art exhibitions of a decadent nature; and he offered me the +<span class='pageno' title='428' id='Page_428'></span> +alternative, either to end this kind of oppositional work immediately—then +for the time being everything could remain as in the +past—or he would stop all Government subsidies for Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This scene made a frightful impression on me, for it represented +to me a breach of Hitler’s promised word, since he had granted me +absolute freedom of action when he appointed me to the Vienna +mission. I then recognized that he nourished an icy hatred toward +me, and that behind these statements on cultural policies something +else was concealed. Whether he was dissatisfied in every detail with +the way I conducted my office in Vienna at the time, I do not know. +He rarely expressed himself directly about such matters. From his +entourage I learned only of occasional happenings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I then—and that led to the complete and final break between +Hitler and myself—a few weeks after I had received this order, if +I may call it so, received a strange invitation for myself and my +wife to spend some time on the Berghof. At that time I innocently +believed that Hitler wished to bridge the gap between us and to let +me know, in one way or another, that he had gone too far. In any +case, at the end of a 3 days’ visit—I cut my stay short—I discovered +that this was a fundamental error on my part. Here I will limit +myself to a few points only. I had intended—and I also carried out +my intention—to mention at least three points during my visit. One +was the policy toward Russia, the second was the Jewish question, +and the third was Hitler’s attitude toward Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I must state, to begin with, that Bormann had issued a decree +addressed to me, and probably to all the other Gauleiters, prohibiting +any intervention on our part in the Jewish question. That is +to say, we could not intervene with Hitler in favor of any Jew or +half-Jew. That too was stated in the decree. I have to mention +this, since it makes matters clearer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On the first evening of my stay at the Berghof, on what appeared +to me a propitious occasion, I told Hitler that I was of the opinion +that a free and autonomous Ukraine would serve the Reich better +than a Ukraine ruled by the violence of Herr Koch. That was all +I said, nothing more, nothing less. Knowing Hitler as I did, it was +extremely difficult even to hazard such a remark. Hitler answered +comparatively quietly but with pronounced sharpness. On the same +evening, or possibly the next one, the Jewish question was broached +according to a plan I made with my wife. Since I was forbidden +to mention these things even in conversation, my wife gave the +Führer a description of an experience she had had in Holland. She +had witnessed one night, from the bedroom of her hotel, the deportation +of Jewish women by the Gestapo. We were both of the +opinion that this experience during her journey and the description +of it might possibly result in a change of Hitler’s attitude toward +<span class='pageno' title='429' id='Page_429'></span> +the entire Jewish question and in the treatment of the Jews. My +wife gave a very drastic description, a description such as we can +now read in the papers. Hitler was silent. All the other witnesses +to this conversation, including my own father-in-law, Professor +Hoffmann, were also silent. The silence was icy, and after a short +time Hitler merely said, “This is pure sentimentality.” That was all. +No further conversation took place that evening. Hitler retired +earlier than usual. I was under the impression that a perfectly +untenable situation had now arisen. Then the men of Hitler’s +entourage told my father-in-law that from now on I would have +to fear for my safety. I endeavored to get away from the Berghof +as quickly as possible without letting matters come to an open break, +but I did not succeed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then Goebbels arrived on the next evening and there, in my +presence and without my starting it, the subject of Vienna was +broached. I was naturally compelled to protest against the statements +which Goebbels at first made about the Viennese. Then the +Führer began with, I might say, incredible and unlimited hatred +to speak against the people of Vienna. I have to admit, here and +now, that even if the people of Vienna are cursing me today, I have +always felt very friendly toward them. I have felt closely attached +to those people. I will not say more than that Joseph Weinheber +was one of my closest friends. During that discussion, I, in accordance +with my duty and my feelings, spoke in favor of the people +under my authority in Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At 4 o’clock in the morning, among other things, Hitler suddenly +said, something which I should now like to repeat for historical +reasons. He said, “Vienna should never have been admitted into +the Union of Greater Germany.” Hitler never loved Vienna. He +hated its people. I believe that he had a liking for the city because +he appreciated the architectural design of the buildings on the Ring. +But everybody who knows Vienna knows that the true Vienna is +architecturally Gothic, and that the buildings on the Ring are not +really representative.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I consider that this subject has little to +do with the Indictment—please adhere to the Indictment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I shall now conclude. I only want to say that +so total a break resulted from that discussion—or, rather explosion—of +Hitler’s that on that very night at about 0430 I took my leave +and left the Berghof a few hours later. Since then I had no further +conversations with Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I must now refer to something else in this connection. Reich +Marshal Göring, in the witness box, mentioned a letter of mine +which Hitler had shown him, and Herr Von Ribbentrop has stated +<span class='pageno' title='430' id='Page_430'></span> +here that he was present at a conversation during which Himmler +suggested to Hitler that I be indicted before the People’s Court, +which meant in reality that I should be hanged. I must add one +thing more: What Göring said about this letter is mainly true. I +wrote in quite a proper manner about family relations in that letter. +I also wrote one sentence to the effect that I considered war with +America a disaster.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When was that letter written?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 1943, shortly after my stay at the Berghof. +That statement contained nothing special, since Hitler even without...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He hasn’t given the date of his stay at the +Berghof yet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: He has said 1943, Mr. President. He has just +said 1943.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: There are 12 months in 1943.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe you ought to give us the month.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the conversation on the Berghof +was in the spring, and that the letter, though I cannot tell you precisely +when, was written in the summer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Summer of 1943?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, 1943; but I could not say precisely when +the letter was written. The letter was correct. It was written by +hand, and no secretary read it. It went by courier to the head of +the State.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: To Hitler personally?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: To Hitler. It is also possible that it was +addressed in care of Bormann. I cannot remember exactly. It +went by courier, and that letter contained nothing else but the +clarification required for replying to questions put to me in a circular +which Göring mentioned in his statement here. That letter +caused Hitler to have an absolute loathing for me; and at about +the same time a file was started against me in the Reich Security +Main Office. That was due to the fact that I had described in a +small circle of political leaders—of high-ranking political leaders—the +foreign political situation such as I saw it, as I was accustomed +to do from the days of my youth. One of these leaders was an SS +intelligence officer and reported what I said, and then the file was +started. The material was compiled in order to eventually bring me +to trial. That I was never brought to trial I owe solely and exclusively +to the circumstance that both in the Army and at home my +comrades from the Youth Leadership stood solidly behind me, and +any proceedings against me would have led to trouble. After 20 July +<span class='pageno' title='431' id='Page_431'></span> +1944 my situation became very precarious. My friends in the Army, +therefore, placed a company of hand-picked men at my disposal. +They were under the orders of the former adjutant of Generaloberst +Fromm. The company was directly subordinate to me. It +took over the protection of my person and remained with me to +the end.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was that company of the Wehrmacht, which you +have just mentioned, placed at your disposal in place of the police +protection previously afforded you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have to refer once more to your Vienna +speech of September 1942. In that speech you speak of the deportation +of tens of thousands of Jews to the Eastern ghetto. You did +not speak about the extermination or the murder of the Jews. +When did you discover that Hitler’s plan aimed at extermination +or destruction?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Counsel, if I at that time had known anything +about the destruction—that is the extermination of the Jews—I +would not be sitting here today. As far as I can recall, I heard +about an extermination of the Jews for the first time through the +following incident.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Dr. Ross came to see me...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Dr. Colin Ross came to Vienna in 1944 and +told me that he had received information, via the foreign press, that +mass murders of Jews had been perpetrated on a large scale in the +East. I then attempted to find out all I could. What I did discover +was that in the Warthegau executions of Jews were carried out in +gas vans. These shootings in the East...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, what was the Gau that he spoke +of? The Wart Gau?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Warthegau, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Warthegau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That is a Gau, a district on the Polish border. +That is an area in the east of Germany,—W-a-r-t-h-e-g-a-u—in the +west of Poland, near Silesia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Please, Witness, will you continue briefly:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The executions, the shootings on Russian territory, +mentioned in the documents submitted in the course of the +cross-examination in the Kaltenbrunner case, were not known to +me at that time. But at a later date—it was before 1944—I heard +about shootings in the ghettos of the Russian area and connected +<span class='pageno' title='432' id='Page_432'></span> +this with developments on the front, since I thought of possible +armed uprisings in the ghettos. I knew nothing of the organized +annihilation which has been described to us in the Trial.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, if I have heard you correctly, you were +informed about these events for the first time in 1944 by your friend, +Dr. Colin Ross, who knew it from reports in the foreign papers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you still remember the month?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I cannot say.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In any case it would be in 1944?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That again I cannot say. But I believe I have +to explain something more about it. I asked myself what can one +do to prevent it? And I still ask myself, day after day, what did I +do to prevent it? I can only answer practically nothing, since from +1943 on I was politically dead. Beyond what I had attempted in +1943 on the Berghof, I could do nothing at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Nothing?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I should in this connection like to ask you +a question of principle. You admitted yesterday that you had become +an anti-Semite—and that is according to your conception—in +your very early youth. You have, in the interim, heard the testimony +of Hoess, the Auschwitz commander, who informed us that +in that camp alone, I believe, 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 innocent people, +mostly Jews, had been done to death. What, today, does the name +of Auschwitz convey to you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is the greatest, the most devilish mass murder +known to history. But that murder was not committed by +Hoess; Hoess was merely the executioner. The murder was ordered +by Adolf Hitler, as is obvious from his last will and testament. The +will is genuine. I have held the photostat copy of that will in my +hands. He and Himmler jointly committed that crime which, for +all time, will be a stain in the annals of our history. It is a crime +which fills every German with shame.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The youth of Germany is guiltless. Our youth was anti-Semitically +inclined, but it did not call for the extermination of Jewry. +It neither realized nor imagined that Hitler had carried out this +extermination by the daily murder of thousands of innocent people. +The youth of Germany who, today, stand perplexed among the ruins +of their native land, knew nothing of these crimes, nor did they +desire them. They are innocent of all that Hitler has done to the +Jewish and to the German people. +<span class='pageno' title='433' id='Page_433'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to say the following in connection with Hoess’ case. +I have educated this generation in faith and loyalty to Hitler. The +Youth Organization which I built up bore his name. I believed that +I was serving a leader who would make our people and the youth +of our country great and happy and free. Millions of young people +believed this, together with me, and saw their ultimate ideal in +National Socialism. Many died for it. Before God, before the German +nation, and before my German people I alone bear the guilt of +having trained our young people for a man whom I for many long +years had considered unimpeachable, both as a leader and as the +head of the State, of creating for him a generation who saw him as +I did. The guilt is mine in that I educated the youth of Germany +for a man who murdered by the millions. I believed in this man, +that is all I can say for my excuse and for the characterization of +my attitude. This is my own—my own personal guilt. I was responsible +for the youth of the country. I was placed in authority over +the young people, and the guilt is mine alone. The younger generation +is guiltless. It grew up in an anti-Semitic state, ruled by +anti-Semitic laws. Our youth was bound by these laws and saw +nothing criminal in racial politics. But if anti-Semitism and racial +laws could lead to an Auschwitz, then Auschwitz must mark the +end of racial politics and the death of anti-Semitism. Hitler is dead. +I never betrayed him; I never tried to overthrow him; I remained +true to my oath as an officer, a youth leader, and an official. I was +no blind collaborator of his; neither was I an opportunist. I was a +convinced National Socialist from my earliest days—as such, I was +also an anti-Semite. Hitler’s racial policy was a crime which led to +disaster for 5,000,000 Jews and for all the Germans. The younger +generation bears no guilt. But he who, after Auschwitz, still clings +to racial politics has rendered himself guilty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is what I consider my duty to state in connection with the +Hoess case.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, is this perhaps a convenient moment +to break off?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How long is the defendant’s examination +going to continue, Dr. Sauter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe it will take about 1 hour.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I believe it will take about one more hour—an +hour at the most. Did you hear me, Mr. President?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I hear you now. We have been hearing +you for a very long time now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='434' id='Page_434'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, after this declaration by the +Defendant Von Schirach I would gladly dispense with all further +questions, but the Prosecution have brought definite accusations +against this defendant and I fear that, if he does not briefly voice +an opinion on the subject, these accusations would be considered as +tacitly accepted. I shall try to be as brief as possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, you have just described the impressions you had +gathered from the proceedings of the Tribunal. Have you yourself +ever visited a concentration camp?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When, and for what reason?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As the witness Höllriegel has testified before +this Tribunal, I visited Mauthausen Concentration Camp in 1942. +The testimony given by another witness, Marsalek, to the effect +that this visit took place in 1944, is incorrect. I also mentioned it +when I was interned, in June 1945 and in the course of my preliminary +interrogation in Nuremberg.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Prior to Höllriegel’s testimony?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through “interned in +June 1940.” Is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: 1945, Herr Von Schirach, not 1940?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I went into voluntary internment in 1945.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then you can confidently state that you visited +Mauthausen in 1942?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: For what reason and how...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: There had been a session...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Just one moment...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What does he mean by “voluntary internment”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Von Schirach was, at that time, +living in the Tyrol under an assumed name, and in the place where +he lived—perhaps Defendant Schirach can himself, but very briefly, +tell us how this voluntary internment came about.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was then still at liberty and I sent a letter, +through my adjutant, to the local American commander, stating that +I should like to surrender voluntarily in order to be tried by an +Allied court. That was in June 1945. The CIC officer who later discovered +where I lived told me that I might have stayed there a good +<span class='pageno' title='435' id='Page_435'></span> +time longer. I personally am convinced that I could have remained +in hiding there, and elsewhere, for years—as long as I wished.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Von Schirach, we shall now revert to your +visit to Mauthausen, which you said with certainty and under oath +took place in 1942. Is this right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe the date given by witness Höllriegel +is correct. I quite definitely know that the date given by Marsalek +is not correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then it was not in 1944?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Probably 1942. I therefore confirm Höllriegel’s +testimony. There was a meeting at Linz at which various departments +of the Ostmark participated. There were conferences on +economic or agrarian problems, and in the late afternoon we went +to Mauthausen Concentration Camp at the request of Gauleiter +Eigruber. At the time I was rather surprised that the Gauleiter was +even in a position to invite us there. I assumed that he had previously +been in touch with the SS offices, and that the reason for +Eigruber’s invitation was that he wished to erect a rifle factory or +something of the kind there. At any rate, though I can no longer +remember exactly, it was somehow connected with the production +of the Steyr Works.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who showed you about and what did you see?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: We were shown about by the camp commandant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Whose name was?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: His name—as has already been mentioned +here—was Ziereis, or something of the kind.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: SS leader?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: SS Camp Commandant. And I should now +like to give you my first impressions. The camp area was very +large. I immediately asked how many internees there were. I +believe I was told 15,000 or 20,000. At any rate, the figure varied +between 15,000 and 20,000. I asked what kind of internees were +imprisoned there and received the reply I was always given whenever +I inquired about concentration camps—namely, that two-thirds +of the inmates were dangerous criminals collected from the prisons +and penitentiaries and brought to work in the camp; that the +remaining third was allegedly composed of political prisoners and +people guilty of high treason and betrayal of their country, who, it +is a fact, are treated with exceptional severity in wartime.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you, in this camp, convince yourself as to the +nature of the treatment meted out to the prisoners, accommodations, +the food situation, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>? +<span class='pageno' title='436' id='Page_436'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I witnessed one food distribution and gained +the impression that, for camp conditions, the food ration was both +normal and adequate. I then visited the large quarry, once famous +and now notorious, where the construction stone for Vienna had +been quarried for centuries. There was no work going on at the +quarry since the working day had come to an end, but I did, however, +visit the works where the stone was cut. I saw a building +with an exceptionally well-equipped dental clinic. This clinic was +shown to me because I had questioned Ziereis about the medical +assistance afforded in the camp. I would add that, during this visit, +I asked in general the same questions which I had been used to +ask during all my visits to the camps of the youth organizations—that +is, questions pertaining to food, medical aid, the number +of people in the camp, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I was then taken to a large room in which music was being +played by the prisoners. They had gathered together quite a large +symphony orchestra, and I was told that on holiday evenings they +could amuse themselves, each man according to his own tastes. In +this case, for instance, the prisoners who wished to make music +assembled in that room. A tenor was singing on that occasion—I +remember that particularly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I then inquired about the mortality rate and was shown a room +with three corpses in it. I cannot tell you here and now, under +oath, whether I saw any crematorium or not. Marsalek has testified +to that effect. I would not, however, have been surprised if there +had been a crematorium or a cemetery in so large a place, so far +removed from the city. That would be a matter of course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Von Schirach, during this official visit under +the guidance of Camp Commandant Ziereis, did you discover anything +at all about any ill-treatment, or atrocities, or of the tortures +which were allegedly inflicted in the camp? You can answer the +question briefly—possibly with “yes” or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Had that been the case, I would of course +have endeavored to do something about it. But I was under the +impression that everything was in order. I looked at the inmates, +for instance, and I remember seeing, among others, the famous +middle-distance runner Peltzer, who was known as a sexual pervert. +He had been punished because he had, on innumerable occasions, +freely committed sexual offences against youths in his charge +in a country school.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I asked Ziereis, “How does one ever get out of these concentration +camps? Do you also release people continuously?” In reply +he had four or five inmates brought to me who, according, to him, +were to be released the very next day. He asked them in my +<span class='pageno' title='437' id='Page_437'></span> +presence, “Have you packed everything, and have you prepared +everything for your release?”—to which, beaming with joy, they +answered, “Yes.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, can you remember whether on this occasion +you also asked Camp Commander Ziereis whether political prisoners +from your Vienna district—that is, from the city of Vienna—were +interned in the camp? And did you then have a group of political +prisoners from Vienna brought before you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: You have already, Counsel, put this question +to me during an interview, and I can only tell you the following +under oath: I cannot remember, but you may take it for granted +that, on an occasion of this kind, I would certainly ask after prisoners +from my own Gau. But I cannot remember. Herr Marsalek +mentioned it in his testimony, and I consider it probable.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should, in connection with this visit, like to add the following: +I have always been rather hampered in my recollections of Mauthausen...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What hampered you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: After May 1945 I heard innumerable radio +reports on Mauthausen and other concentration camps, and I read +everything I could lay my hands on in the way of written reports +about Mauthausen—everything that appeared in the press—and I +always pondered on the question, “Did you see anything there which +might have pointed to a mass destruction of human beings?” I was, +for instance, reading the other day about running belts for the +conveyance of corpses. I did not see them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I must add that I also visited Dachau; I must not forget that. +In 1935, together with the entire Party leadership group, I paid a +visit to Dachau from Munich. This visit was a result of the objections +against existing preventive custody measures expressed by certain +political leaders to the Deputy of the Führer Hess who, in +turn, passed these objections on to Himmler who subsequently sent +out an invitation to inspect Dachau. I believe that there were, at +that time, 800 or 1,000 internees at Dachau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I did not participate in the entire official visit for I was conversing +with some of the Gauleiter who were being shown about +the camp. I saw quite excellent living quarters at Dachau and, +because the subject interested me particularly, I was shown the +building which housed the camp library. I saw that there were also +good medical facilities. Then—and I believe this fact is worthy of +mention—after the visit I spoke with many Gau- and Reichsleiter +about the impression they had formed of Dachau. All impressions +gained were to the effect that all doubts as to Himmler’s preventive +custody measures were definitely dispersed, and everybody said that +<span class='pageno' title='438' id='Page_438'></span> +the internees in the camp were, on the whole, better accommodated +than they would have been in a state prison. Such was my impression +of Dachau in 1935, and I must say that ever since that visit my +mind was far more at ease regarding conditions in the concentration +camps. In conclusion, I feel I must add the following:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Up to the moment of the final collapse I firmly believed that we +had 20,000 people in the Mauthausen Camp, 10,000 at Oranienburg +and Dachau—two more large camps whose existence was known to +me and one of which I had visited—and possibly 10,000 more at +Buchenwald, near Weimar, a camp I knew by name but which I had +never visited. I therefore concluded that we had roughly 50,000 +people in the German camps, of which I firmly believed that two-thirds +were habitual criminals, convicts, and sexual perverts, and +one-third consisted of political prisoners. And I had arrived at this +conclusion primarily because I myself have never sent a single +soul to the concentration camps and nourished the illusion that +others had acted as I did. I could not even imagine, when I heard +of it—immediately after the collapse—that hundreds of thousands +of people in Germany were considered political offenders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There is something else to be said on the whole question of the +concentration camps. The poet Hans Carossa has deposed an affidavit +for me, and this affidavit contains a passage about a publisher +whom I had liberated from a concentration camp. I wish to +mention this because it is one of many typical cases where one +exerted one’s entire influence to have a man freed from a concentration +camp, but then he never tells you afterwards how he fared +in the camp. In the course of the years, I have received many +letters from people having relatives in the concentration camps. +By establishing, in Vienna, a fixed day on which audience was +granted to anybody from the population who wished to speak to +me, I was able to talk to thousands of people from every class and +standing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On one such occasion I was approached by someone who requested +me personally to free some friend or relative in a concentration +camp. In cases like that I usually wrote a letter to the +Reich Security Main Office—at first to Herr Heydrich and later to +Herr Kaltenbrunner—and after some time I would be informed +that the internee in question had or had not been released, according +to the gravity of the charges brought against him. But the +internees released never told me their experiences in the camp. +One never saw anybody who had been ill-treated in the camps, and +that is why I myself, and many others in Germany with me, was +never able to visualize conditions in the concentration camps at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, this affidavit of the poet Hans +Carossa, just mentioned by the defendant, is Document Number +<span class='pageno' title='439' id='Page_439'></span> +Schirach 3(a). I repeat, Schirach 3(a) of the Schirach document book. +It is a sworn affidavit by the poet Carossa, and I ask the Tribunal +to put the entire contents of the document into the evidence. In the +last paragraph, mention is made of the case about which the defendant +has just been speaking—that is, the liberation of a publisher +named Suhrkamp from a concentration camp.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the page of it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Page 25 of the document book, Document Number +Schirach 3(a)—Hans Carossa. The remainder of this document deals +with the humane impression Dr. Carossa received of the defendant, +and with Defendant Von Schirach’s solicitude for the victims of +political persecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, how many concentration camps did you know anything +about?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have just enumerated them: Oranienburg, +Dachau, Buchenwald, and Mauthausen.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was there a concentration camp in your own Gau?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In connection with this entire group of questions +on the treatment of the Jews, I turn to orders allegedly issued in +your presence to the camp commandant of Mauthausen in March +1945. It is Document Number 3870-PS, submitted by the Prosecution. +According to this document, Himmler in March 1945 is +supposed to have issued a directive to the effect that the Jews +from the Southeast Wall were to be sent on foot to Mauthausen. +Did you have anything at all to do with this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can tell you exactly from memory what +Himmler said at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Himmler came to Vienna towards the middle, or the end of +March, to talk to the Commander of Army Group South. On this +occasion—the Commander of Army Group South was, of course, +not stationed in Vienna, he had ordered all the Reichsstatthalter +of the Ostmark up to Vienna and granted them full authority to +enforce martial law in the future, since Vienna and some of the +other Ostmark Gaue had by that time become almost front-line +zones. At this conference Himmler told his adjutant to call Ziereis +in, while the papers for full powers were being typed in the next +room. That is how I came to meet Ziereis for the second time in +my life.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And now Himmler did not, as Marsalek said, tell Ziereis that +the Jews were to be marched on foot from the Southeast Wall to +Mauthausen, but he did say something else which surprised me +enormously. He said: +<span class='pageno' title='440' id='Page_440'></span></p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I want the Jews now employed in industry to be taken by +boat, or by bus if possible, under the most favorable food +conditions and with medical care, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, to Linz or Mauthausen.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not quite remember whether he said they should be taken +to Mauthausen, but he also said to Ziereis:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Please take care of these Jews and treat them well; they are +my most valuable assets.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>From this declaration I assumed, in the very beginning—it was +my very first, fleeting impression—that Himmler wished to deceive +me in some way or another, and then it became clear to me that +with these instructions he was following certain foreign political +intentions, in the last moments of the war, in emphasizing the excellent +treatment of the Jews.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>What Marsalek therefore said about making them go on foot +is not correct. As I have already mentioned, Himmler, under all +circumstances, wanted the best possible treatment to be given to +the Jews. I gained the impression—and later on it was confirmed +by other things we heard—that he wished, at the last minute, to +somehow redeem himself with this treatment of the Jews.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That was the end of March 1945?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was the end of March 1945, on the +occasion when authority to apply martial law was granted to the +Statthalter of the Ostmark.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Therefore, immediately before the collapse?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In connection with your activities in Vienna there +is also an accusation, Witness, brought against you by the Prosecution, +to the effect that you participated in the persecution of the +Church. This accusation is supported exclusively as far as I can +see by Document Number R-146. I repeat, R-146, which has already +been submitted by the Prosecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This, Witness, is a letter addressed by the witness, Dr. Lammers, +who has been heard before the Tribunal, to the Reich Minister +of the Interior, dated 14 March 1941, and further, a circular from +Bormann, addressed to all the Gauleiter, dated 20 March 1941.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to hear your comments on both of these letters, +especially since Dr. Lammers’ letter speaks of property belonging +to enemies of the people and the state, whereas in Bormann’s +circular of 20 March 1941 mention is made of the confiscation of +Church property—monastic property—<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. Do you know what +led to these letters, and what part did you yourself play in the +matter? +<span class='pageno' title='441' id='Page_441'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The document written by Dr. Lammers is +correct. Bormann’s covering letter referred to Church property; +I referred to property belonging to enemies of the people and the +State, for that was a technical expression at the time. I should +like to mention in this matter that when I came to Vienna in 1940 +the confiscation of such property was already in full swing; an +argument had arisen on the subject between the Gauleiter and the +Reich Minister for Finance. The Reich Minister for Finance wanted +the confiscated property taken over by the Reich, while I considered +that this property should remain fundamentally the possession +of the Gaue.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>So far as I can remember, I was involved in this question only +through the following confiscations: Prince Schwarzenberg possessed +property, the greater part of which lay in the region of the +Upper Danube; the smaller part was the famous Vienna Palace. Now +this Prince Schwarzenberg had refused, in the presence of some German +consul general, or consul abroad, to return to Germany and serve +in the Army. Thereupon his property was confiscated. In the +interest of the Reich I endeavored to maintain this property for +the Vienna Reich Gau and to prevent it from passing over to the +Reich. I have no files before me, so I cannot from memory give +you any information about other, similar actions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am not responsible for confiscations in the other Austrian +Gaue. But I may state one thing here—namely, that I put an end +to all confiscations throughout the entire Reich. When, through an +intermediary, women from an Austrian convent appealed to me for +help, I asked my father-in-law to act behind Bormann’s back and +explain to Hitler the disastrous political effects which these confiscations +would have and to beg him to issue a direct order for their +suppression. This was achieved, and when the order was put +through, Bormann turned against my father-in-law as well. From +then on I never had any further opportunity to bring this question +to the Führer’s notice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you have not, so far, quite explained +your attitude toward Dr. Lammers’ letter of 14 March 1941. To +refresh your memory I should like to read out the first sentence +of that letter. This letter of Lammers’ dated 14 March 1941, Document +Number R-146, states, and I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Von Schirach, together +with Dr. Jury and Eigruber, has recently complained to +the Führer that the Reich Minister for Finance is still of +the opinion that the seizure of property belonging to enemies +of the state and people should be effected in favor of the +Reich, and not in favor of the Reich Gau.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Thus runs the quotation. +<span class='pageno' title='442' id='Page_442'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>And because of this incident the Prosecution have accused you +of participating in the persecution of the Church in Vienna. I +must request you to tell us what you really did do in the matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Well, the Church in Vienna had actually been +persecuted under my predecessor, Bürckel, and this can be proved. +I mentioned yesterday the demonstrations before the Archbishop’s +Palace. But from the day of my arrival in Vienna, anti-Church +demonstrations in the nature of a political agitation no longer took +place. Immediately upon my arrival I gathered all the political +officials and all my other colleagues of the Gau and demanded that +they should never, either in writing or by word of mouth, express +anything likely to offend the religious sentiments of other people. +I believe that this is a fact which was gratefully noted by the entire +population of Vienna. From that day on there were no further +actions against the Church. Just how much Church property, +though, was called in in compliance with the law for special war +contributions, a law which likewise applied to other property—I +cannot tell you without documentary evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we can see from this document that you +must have spoken on the subject to Hitler personally...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: ...because it states that the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter +Von Schirach complained to Hitler on the subject. You have +not said anything to us about that so far.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I myself, during a visit by Hitler to +Vienna where he signed a southeast pact, told him I was of the +opinion that the property confiscated belonged to the Gaue and +not to the Reich. That was my point of view and one which I +believed to be entirely correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Indictment further accuses you of +having had some kind of connection with the SS, thereby promoting +the SS, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. Were you yourself ever a member of the SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Himmler, the leader of the SS, have any +influence over the youth organizations and over the education of +the young people?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were the replacements in the SS, especially in +the SS Leadership Corps, recruited from the HJ, and if so, why?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The replacements in all the leadership corps +in Germany were recruited from the youth. Our youth organization +was a state institution. You now are probably referring to an +agreement which I had with Himmler on the patrol services? +<span class='pageno' title='443' id='Page_443'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, that too plays a part in this connection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Agreements of that sort...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Just one more moment, Herr Von Schirach. +This agreement is entered in the documents of the Prosecution as +Number 2396-PS. I repeat 2396-PS, in which a special statement +occurs—and I should appreciate your comments on the subject—to +the effect that the SS received their replacements from the patrol +service of the HJ, allegedly by an agreement of October 1938. +Please tell us about it and explain to us what actually was this +patrol service.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The patrol service was one of the special +units of the HJ which I forgot to mention yesterday. The patrol +service was a youth service for keeping order. It consisted of outstandingly +decent lads who had no police duties—I now refer to +documentary reports which I procured—but who had to supervise +the general behavior of the young people, examine their uniforms, +control the visits of the boys to the taverns; and it was their duty +to inspect the HJ hostels for cleanliness and neatness, to supervise +the hiking expeditions of the young people and the youth hostelries +in the country. They stood guard and were on order duty at mass +meetings and demonstrations. They watched over encampments +and accompanied the convoys. They were employed in the search +for youths who were lost. They gave advice to traveling youth, +attended to station service, were supposed to protect young people +from criminal elements, and, above all, to protect national property—that +is, woods, fields, for instance—and to see that they were +safe from fires, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Since Himmler might make trouble for this section of the youth +organization, I was interested in having the Police recognize my +patrol service; for in my idea of the State youth as a youth state, +the Police should not be employed against the youth, but these +young people should keep order among themselves. That this principle +was a sound one can be judged from the immense decline in +juvenile delinquency from 1933 up to the outbreak of the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: One moment, I have not yet finished. After +this agreement...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Sauter, we have heard enough +about this unit. The whole point of the document was that they +were used for recruiting for the SS, wasn’t it? That is the complaint +of the Prosecution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, the patrol service... +<span class='pageno' title='444' id='Page_444'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have heard, at considerable length the +description of what they did in the way of the protection of the +youth. Surely we have heard enough about that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, these so-called special units were +specially mentioned by the Prosecution as a means for preparation +for war—that is, as a means for the military training of the young +people. In this connection all these special units were mentioned, +and therefore we considered it necessary that the defendant inform +you what this patrol service really was. But I can, Mr. President, +set this topic aside immediately.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We have heard what they were at some +considerable length.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, from which departments did the SS mainly recruit +its leader replacements?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In order to assure its leader replacements, +the SS founded its own training schools which were entirely outside +my influence. They were the so-called National Socialist Training +Institutes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In connection with the SS, the Prosecution, Witness, +mentioned a further agreement between you and Reichsführer +SS Himmler, an agreement of December 1938, submitted as +Document Number 2567-PS, the so-called “Landdienst” of the HJ. +Why was this agreement concluded with the Reichsführer SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is very hard to give a brief answer. The +Reichsführer SS was a farmer with an agronomical degree. In +his student days he had belonged to the so-called “Artaman Movement,” +whose program it was to prevent the flight from the land, +and he was particularly keen to collaborate within the SS with the +farm labor service groups of the HJ who were doing the same work +as the “Artaman” groups in the past.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In conclusion, I should like to say about the “Landdienst” and +the patrol service, that no coercion was ever brought to bear on +the young people to enter the SS. Any lad from the patrol service +was, of course, free to become a member of the SA or of the +NSKK—and frequently did so—or else become a political leader +just like any other boy from the farm labor service or the Hitler +Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Indictment states, <span class='it'>inter alia</span>, that +a directive was addressed to the political leaders demanding that +the Hitler Youth Leaders—that is, the leaders subordinate to you—be +employed on their staffs. What can you say to that? +<span class='pageno' title='445' id='Page_445'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can only say in reply that this is one of +many attempts by the Party Chancellery to bring the Youth +Leadership into the political leadership. The practical result of the +directive was that a number of youth leaders were given insignificant +duties as adjutants. They complained to me, and I withdrew +them from these posts. It is a historical fact that in Germany +there was no real flow of people from the youth organization +into the political leadership. I can personally name those +youth leaders who came into the political leadership, there were +so few of them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Soviet Prosecution have submitted +a document, Document Number USSR-6, which is a report from the +Lemberg Commission. Herein the following fact is mentioned. A +French woman, Ida Vasseau, the head of an asylum for old people +in Lemberg, testified in writing—I am only quoting the gist of +the affidavit—that ghetto children were handed over as presents +to the Hitler Youth and that these children were then used as +living targets by the HJ for their drill practice. In all the time +that you were active in the Reich Youth Leadership, did you +ever hear of such misdemeanors or excesses?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. We are dealing here with the first and, +so far, the only accusation of crimes committed by the HJ which +has been brought to my notice. There were no HJ commandos, +either in the East or in the West, capable of committing such +crimes. I consider the statements in this affidavit as absolutely +untrue, and that is all I can say on the matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, in the course of his examination your +fellow-Defendant, Dr. Schacht, mentioned that a suggestion had +been made in his time to Mr. Eden, to divest the SS, the SA, and +the HJ of their military character if the other powers would consent +to disarm. What do you know of such proposals or negotiations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know of no such offer, as far as the Hitler +Youth is concerned. I consider it entirely out of the question that +any such offer could have been received by Mr. Eden regarding +the HJ; for Hitler himself did not consider the HJ as a military +or even a semimilitary organization. The disarming of the HJ +could factually never have taken place since the only weapon carried +by the Hitler Youth was the camping knife, the equivalent +of a Boy Scout’s bowie knife of the Jungvolk Pimpfe (boys of 10-14 +years of age).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution further charge that you, +in 1933, concluded an agreement with the VDA—an abbreviation +for the “Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland.” Is that true? +And what was your intention in concluding this agreement? +<span class='pageno' title='446' id='Page_446'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is true. I do not wish to express an +opinion on the aims and objects of the VDA. I believe that counsel +for the Defendant Frick has already done so. I refer to these statements +and merely state that it was my perfectly natural wish to +incorporate in the HJ the numerically powerful group of lads +belonging to the VDA. The majority of these youths, moreover, +had graduated from the public schools, and it was my second +intention to place some of my collaborators on the board of the +VDA so as to be currently informed about the young people abroad.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Prosecution further accuse you of having +founded the so-called Adolf Hitler Schools where the training of +young leaders for the National Socialist State and for the Party +was carried out. What have you to say to this accusation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: There is a lot that I could say about that +accusation, but I shall limit myself to essential remarks only.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Adolf Hitler Schools were founded as scholastic units of the +HJ. They were founded with the means which Dr. Ley placed +at my disposal when I told him of my plans for the training I had +envisaged. These schools were not intended to train leaders for the +Party exclusively but served to prepare the youth for all the +professions. I myself often talked to these boys on their graduation +and I always told them “You can choose any profession +you like. Your training in this school carries no obligation, either +moral or otherwise, to become a political leader.” <span class='it'>De facto</span>, relatively +few political leaders emerged from the Adolf Hitler Schools. +Very many of the boys became doctors, officials, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. I +cannot quote any figures from memory, but the communications I +have received from the young people, including statements from +teachers in the Adolf Hitler Schools, show their attitude towards +this point of the Indictment. And I should like to ask that at +least 50 to 60 of these numerous affidavits, which confirm all that +I have said, be submitted in support of my declarations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, one more question on a different topic. +Did you ever receive any so-called endowment funds, or anything +of that kind, from Hitler or from other sources?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I never received any endowment funds.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you ever receive gifts in kind, such as +valuable paintings or other costly gifts?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The only thing Hitler ever gave me was +his photograph on the occasion of my thirtieth birthday.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: His photograph—presumably with a few words +of dedication?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='447' id='Page_447'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Now I have a few final, very brief questions to +ask you—they refer to the last days of your activities in Vienna. +You have already mentioned, in connection with Himmler’s visit +to Vienna at the end of March 1945, that you had at that time +received from Himmler the so-called authority for the proclamation +of martial law. If I have understood you correctly, you, in +your function of Reich Defense Commissioner, were authorized to +convene a drumhead court martial?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, and that made me lord of life and +death.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, this drumhead court martial +was only supposed to pass death sentences?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you ever convene this drumhead court +martial in Vienna, and did you appoint the members?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I appointed the members of the court +martial. An outstanding lawyer was the president. I never convened +the drumhead court martial and I never once imposed a +death sentence. If I remember rightly, the military court martial +of the local military commandant passed four death sentences on +four military traitors. My court martial never met and never +passed a death sentence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Had you any connection with the military drumhead +court martial?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. The Vienna commandant was, of course, +president of that particular court, and I was the head of court +martial “Schirach.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You said you had a distinguished lawyer as your +president?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was his profession?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think he was president of a district court, +of something of the kind. I cannot quite remember; I have +forgotten.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So he was an official Viennese judge?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you give the order, in Vienna, to have certain +vitally important factories either blown up or destroyed as so often +happened in other Gaue, as for instance, here in Nuremberg?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. It has escaped my knowledge, that much +I must admit, how far crippling and destructive measures were +<span class='pageno' title='448' id='Page_448'></span> +executed in the military and armament sectors, pursuant to direct +instructions from the Reich Government. For instance, the dynamiting +of bridges was a military precaution. The order could never +have emanated from me. Hitler reserved for himself the right +to issue the orders for blowing up the bridges over the Danube. +The Chief of Army Group South, Generaloberst Rendulic, prior +to giving the order for blowing up these bridges, had to consult the +Führer’s headquarters by telephone.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you yourself leave Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I left Gau Vienna after the withdrawal of +the last troops from the city and after the command post of the +2d corps of the 6th SS Panzer Army had been moved to the +region of the Lower Danube.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When was that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was—sorry, I cannot remember the +date offhand. It was toward the end of the battle for Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And now I have one last question to ask you. +You know that the order went out from the Party Leadership and +from circles of the Reich Chancellery to stage a “Werewolf” movement +for fighting the advancing troops. What was your attitude +towards this movement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I prohibited any Werewolf organization in +my Gau, but to avoid misunderstandings I must tell you that there +was a youth battalion, a Volkssturm battalion, which bore the name +of “Werewolf,” but there was no Werewolf unit. I invariably refused, +both for the young people and the adults, permission to +participate in any form of combat contrary to the decrees of international +law.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ +counsel want to ask any questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): +Witness, what was the attitude of Rosenberg, as the Führer’s +Plenipotentiary for the Ideological Education of the Party, toward +the Reich Youth Leadership?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that the Chief of the Department +for Ideological Education in the Reich Youth Leadership had to +attend, on an average, two, perhaps three, meetings per annum, +also attended by educational leaders from other Party organizations. +These meetings took place under the chairmanship of Reichsleiter +Rosenberg. On these occasions, as I have been told by the chief +of the department, Rosenberg was wont to lay down general +<span class='pageno' title='449' id='Page_449'></span> +instructions and directives and ask for reports on the educational +work of the individual organizations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg select specific subjects to be lectured +on at these meetings?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I do not know for certain. At these +meetings of the Youth Leadership representatives, at which Rosenberg +spoke once a year, he usually selected educational themes, +themes dealing with character training. He would, for instance, +speak about solitude and comradeship and, as far as I remember, +about personality, honor, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg at these meetings mention the +Jewish problem and the confessional question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: During these Youth Leadership sessions he +never made any speeches against the Jews, nor did he, as far as +I can remember, ever touch on the subject of the confession—at +least, not in my presence. I usually heard him speak on subjects +such as I have just enumerated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Witness, did you read Rosenberg’s <span class='it'>Myth of the +Twentieth Century</span>? And if so, when?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I began to read it, but I did not read +the whole book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did this Rosenberg’s <span class='it'>Myth</span> make any impression +on the young people or did other leaders have experiences similar +to your own?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The youth leaders certainly did not read the +<span class='it'>Myth of the Twentieth Century</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: I have no more questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to +ask questions? Or perhaps we had better adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='450' id='Page_450'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have already stated in connection +with Sauckel’s directive regarding employment of labor that you +were flooded with such directives. Were these directives carried out?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as my own information goes, I can confirm +that. I had the impression that the functionaries of the labor +employment administration felt that they had to keep strictly to +Sauckel’s orders, and in those industrial plants which I visited I was +able to ascertain that the requirements stated in the directives were +in fact fulfilled.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel himself take steps to insure that +these things were carried out?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I remember that Sauckel once came to +Vienna—I think in 1943—and that on that occasion he addressed all +his labor employment functionaries and repeated orally everything +which he had stated in his directives. He spoke of the foreign workers +in particular, demanding just treatment for them; and I remember +that on this occasion he even spoke of putting them on the same +footing as German workers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have a few more questions about the political +leaders. How were political leaders on the Gauleiter level informed? +Did the Gauleiter have individual interviews with the Führer, especially +in connection with the Gauleiter assemblies?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. After the Gauleiter assemblies the Führer +always held forth in a comparatively large circle just as he did in +his speeches. Interviews in the real sense of the word did not exist. +He always made speeches. Fixed dates on which Gauleiter could +have interviews with Hitler almost ceased to exist once the war +had begun.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could not a Gauleiter approach Hitler personally +and ask for an interview?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He could ask for an interview, but he did not +get it; he received an answer from Bormann, usually in the form +of a telegram. That happened to me very frequently, because I made +such requests; one was asked to submit in writing the points one +wanted to discuss, after which one either received an answer or did +not receive one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, a letter has been submitted here as +Document D-728, signed or initialed by Gauleiter Sprenger. You were +here when it was submitted and you know the document. I have +two questions concerning it. +<span class='pageno' title='451' id='Page_451'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you know anything about a list, which was to be compiled, +containing the names of those suffering from heart and lung diseases, +who were to be removed from the population?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I know nothing about that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Or that you were to make suggestions for this +to the Führer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: In my opinion that document also contains an +error which has already been mentioned here, namely, the word +“Herr” as a form of address. This letter was addressed to the +“Herren Ortsgrüppenleiter,” and repeated mention is made of the +“Herren Kreisleiter and Ortsgrüppenleiter” in the text. I ask you +now if the expression “Herr” was customary in Party language?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I have never known a Party document +with the exception of this one, which I consider a fraud, in which +the term “Herr” was used.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You are therefore of the opinion that that +designation proves in itself that the document is false?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Herr Von Schirach, your predecessor as Gauleiter +was Josef Bürckel. What sort of relations existed between +Bürckel and Seyss-Inquart?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can only repeat what was generally known +in the Party about relations between them. They were extremely +bad, and all of us had the impression that from the very beginning +Bürckel worked hard to push Seyss-Inquart out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Which one of the two really had the power +in his hands?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Bürckel, undoubtedly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Who, in your opinion and according to the +actual information you obtained from the files, is responsible for the +persecution of Jews in Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: All right. You say Hitler; but Hitler was not +in Vienna. Who carried out these orders in Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In my opinion, these orders were carried out—even +during Bürckel’s and Seyss-Inquart’s time—by the same man +who has already been mentioned here once today and who, in the +meantime, has been condemned to death in Vienna—Dr. Brunner. +<span class='pageno' title='452' id='Page_452'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Good. Are you aware that Seyss-Inquart +repeatedly protested to Bürckel about excessively severe measures +and quarreled with Bürckel on account of that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot say anything about that. I do not +know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: My client has been accused in a document of +presenting to Adolf Hitler tapestries, among them Gobelins, formerly +in the Emperor’s possession. Do you know anything about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know this: In the large collection of Gobelins +in Vienna, there were two sets depicting Alexander’s victory. The +inferior series was loaned by Reich Governor Seyss-Inquart to the +Reich Chancellery, where it hung in the lobby.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: So it was a loan and not a definite gift, which +would have entailed a loss for Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the catalog of the Gobelin collection this +set was marked as a loan.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Are you aware that other Gobelins were put +at the disposal of the Reich—that is to say, at Adolf Hitler’s disposal—by +Seyss-Inquart?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I was not aware of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: But maybe you know who did take away +other such Gobelins and tapestries?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I assume that you allude to Bürckel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know for certain whether Bürckel +took Gobelins. When I took up my appointment in Vienna, I found +that Bürckel had taken from the imperial furniture depot a number +of pieces of furniture including, I believe, some carpets, not for his +personal use but for a Viennese house which he intended to establish +in Gau Saarpfalz as a sort of clubhouse.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I therefore approached the competent office in Berlin—I do not +know whether it was the Reich Finance Ministry or the Reich Ministry +of Culture—and when I was not successful there, I approached +Hitler himself. In the end I succeeded in having Bürckel ordered +to return these objects to Vienna at once; I cannot say with certainty +whether these objects were in fact returned. I know that he +received injunctions to return them and I assume that these objects +were really returned later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: All right. You know from statements which +I have made to your defense counsel that we Austrians always hated +Bürckel intensely for a number of very good reasons and that +in fairness it must be admitted that many things, including, for +<span class='pageno' title='453' id='Page_453'></span> +instance, the city’s food supplies, improved after you took over. +For this reason it seems to me all the more important to clear up +completely the most serious charge against you. You have been +made responsible in your capacity of Reich Defense Commissioner +for the destruction of the most valuable monuments in Vienna. I +ask you: On 2 April, when your deputy Scharizer and Engineer +Blaschke, the National Socialist mayor, wanted to declare Vienna +an open city as the Red Army approached, did you oppose them +and give orders that Vienna must be defended to the last? Or who +gave that order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Neither Blaschke nor Scharizer expressed the +view that Vienna should be declared an open city. There was...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal understands you +are appearing for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, because this is a War Crime and in the +light of conspiracy he is responsible for everything and the main +charge made against Herr Von Schirach must be clarified—that is, +we must find out who actually gave this order which did so +much harm.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, but you just said that you were not +asking the questions in defense of Seyss-Inquart, but in defense of +Von Schirach. I do not think that the Tribunal really ought to have +the defense of Von Schirach prolonged by questions by other counsel. +We have already had his defense for a considerable time presented +by Dr. Sauter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. STEINBAUER: Then I shall not put this question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you also remember what attitude Seyss-Inquart adopted on +Church matters when dealing with Bürckel?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know only that Dr. Seyss-Inquart, generally +speaking, was considered a man with Church ties. That this brought +him into conflict with Bürckel is quite obvious to me. I cannot go +into details.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, we understood you this morning to +make a statement in the nature of a confession with respect to, at +least, the persecution of the Jews; and while that part of it that +you gave was perhaps bravely enough said, I think there is much +of it that you neglected to say, perhaps through oversight.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I wish you would tell the Tribunal whether or not it is a +fact that your responsibility for young people in Germany under +the National Socialists was fundamentally concerned with making +really good National Socialists out of them, in the sense of making +them fanatical political followers. +<span class='pageno' title='454' id='Page_454'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I considered it my task as educator to bring +up the young people to be good citizens of the National Socialist +State.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And ardent followers and believers in Hitler and his +political policies?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe I already said this morning that I +educated our youth to follow Hitler. I do not deny that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. And while you said to us that you did not +have the first responsibility for the educational system, I am sure +you would not deny that for all of the other activities with which +young people may be concerned you did have first responsibility?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Out-of-school education was my responsibility.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And, of course, in the schools the only people who +taught these young people were those who were politically reliable +in keeping with Hitler’s opinions and beliefs and the teachings of +National Socialism?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The teaching staffs of German schools were +definitely not homogeneous bodies. A large part of the teaching +body belonged to a generation which had not been educated on +National Socialist lines and did not adhere to National Socialism. +The young teachers had been educated on National Socialist principles.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, you are not saying, certainly, +that young people under the public educational system of Germany +were not, at all times, under the guidance of those who were politically +reliable, certainly after the first year or two of the administration +of Hitler and his followers, are you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Would you please repeat the question? I did +not quite understand.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What I am trying to say to you is that there is not +any doubt in your mind or in ours that the public school system +of Germany was supervised, for the most part at least, by people +who were politically sound insofar as National Socialism is concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should not care to say that. Educational +administration in Germany was supervised by Reich Minister Rust, +who—and this is a fact—for reasons of ill health took very little +interest in his official duties. Many thousands of older men were +employed in connection with educational administration. They had +received their appointments long before the days of the National +Socialist State and had retained them throughout. +<span class='pageno' title='455' id='Page_455'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not care whether they were old or young or +how long they had been in office. They all took an oath to Hitler, +did they not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct; inasmuch as they were civil +servants, they all took their oath as such.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Rosenberg had a very considerable influence on +young people in Germany, did he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe that. I think you are estimating +my Codefendant Rosenberg’s influence on youth quite +wrongly—meaning that you are overestimating it. Rosenberg certainly +had some influence on many people who were interested in +philosophical problems and were in a position to understand his +works. But I must dispute the extent of the influence which you +are ascribing to him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You publicly said on one occasion that the way of +Rosenberg was the way of the Hitler Youth, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was, I believe, in 1934...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Never mind when it was. Did you say it or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did say it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When was it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was in Berlin, at a youth function there. +But later I myself led youth along an entirely different path.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, we will get around to that a little later. But +in any event, on this occasion in Berlin, when you had a large group +of your youth leaders present, you were doing your best, at least, +to have them understand that the way of Rosenberg was the way +that they should follow?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But those were the same youth leaders who +later received different instructions from me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I dare say that may be so. We will get around +to those different instructions; but on this occasion and at that time, +insofar as you were concerned, you wanted them to understand that +they were to follow Rosenberg’s way, didn’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but this way only affected one quite +definite point, which was under discussion at that time, namely, +the question of denominational youth organizations. Rosenberg and +I agreed on this point, whereas we differed on many others; and it +was to this point that the statement referred.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Rosenberg’s way certainly wasn’t the way of young +people remaining faithful to their religious obligations or teachings, +was it? +<span class='pageno' title='456' id='Page_456'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I would not like to say that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What do you mean? You don’t know?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can say in so many words that I have never +heard Rosenberg make any statement to the effect that young people +should be disloyal to their religious convictions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I don’t know that he ever said it that way +either; but I think you do know perfectly well, as many other people +who were outside of Germany through all of these years, that +Rosenberg was a violent opponent of organized religious institutions. +You don’t deny that, do you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I certainly do not deny that in principle, but +I do not think that it can be expressed in these terms. Rosenberg +in no way tried to influence youth to withdraw from religious +societies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And later on, actually—aren’t you willing to now say +that later on, and perhaps at that time, in a secret and indirect sort +of way you played Rosenberg’s game by arranging youth affairs at +hours when Church ceremonies were going on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I deny absolutely that I worked against the +Church in such a way. In the years 1933-34, I was concerned mainly +with the denominational youth organizations. I explained that here +yesterday.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know. You garbled them up, and they all had to +join your organization sooner or later. But I am not talking about +that now. What I am trying to say is—and I think you must agree—that +for a considerable period of time you made it really impossible +for young people of certain religious belief to attend their Church +services, because you scheduled your youth affairs at which attendance +was compulsory.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is not correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You say that is not so? Didn’t the Catholic bishops +publicly object to this very sort of thing, and don’t you know it as +well as I do?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot recall that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You do not recall any Catholic clerics objecting to +the fact that you were scheduling your youth affairs on Sunday +mornings when their clerics were holding services?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In the course of time, as I explained yesterday, +many clergymen either approached me personally or complained +in public that they were hampered in their spiritual ministration +by the youth service and the forms which it took; and that +is why I adjusted matters in the way shown by the document which +my counsel submitted to the Court yesterday. +<span class='pageno' title='457' id='Page_457'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I don’t think that is altogether an answer; and +perhaps I can help your memory by recalling for you that your +organization specifically provided that these young people, who were +attending church on Sunday, could not go in uniform; and that was +a very purposeful thing, wasn’t it, because they could not get out +of church and get to their youth attendance places at all if they had +to go home and change their clothes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But in many parishes the Church authorities +forbade young people wearing uniform to enter the church.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to argue about it with you. +Your answer is that you don’t recall any frequent and strong criticism +and objection from churchmen about this particular Sunday +morning program. Is that the way you want to leave it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I certainly do not mean that. There were +periods of great tension, periods of heated argument, just as there +was a stormy period in youth organization generally. Later, all these +things were satisfactorily settled and put in order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, I understood you also to say that, whatever +else you may have done with the young people of Germany during +the years over which you had control of them, you certainly did +not prepare them militarily in any sense, in any sense ordinarily +accepted as being military; is that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, let’s see. What was the name of your +personal press expert, or consultant, if you prefer that term?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The press expert who worked with me longest +was a Herr Kaufmann.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you have asked him—as a matter of fact, you +do have an interrogatory from him, don’t you, which will be submitted. +I assume you know about that, don’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know that my counsel has applied for it, +but I do not know the answers which Kaufmann gave.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you know the questions he asked, don’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not remember them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, perhaps if I remind you of one or two you will +remember. You asked him if he ever put out any press releases +without your authority. You asked him if he wasn’t your personal +press consultant. And you asked him if it wasn’t true that you +personally gave him the directive for what you wanted published +in the press, and particularly in the youth press. Do you remember +those questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>] +<span class='pageno' title='458' id='Page_458'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But you don’t know the answers; is that it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, do you know that he published in the SS +official publication in September of 1942 an article about the young +people and the youth of Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember that article.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I think that you had better have a look at it. +It is Document 3930-PS. That becomes USA-853, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, this document which I am showing you is a telegram, of +course, a teletype message, “Reich Governor in Vienna.” You will +see at the top that it was received by you on 10 September 1942, +and it sets out a copy of the subject for the body of this article +for the editorial staff of the <span class='it'>Schwarzes Korps</span>. That is the SS +magazine, as you recall.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, you will see from reading it, and in the very first part it +states that a high-ranking officer who had come back to Berlin from +Sevastopol said that the youngsters who had been seen some 4 +years ago in short pants marching through German cities singing +“Yes, the flag is more than death,” were the 19-year-olds who took +that city of Sevastopol.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The article goes on to say that the lads are fulfilling in fighting +what they promised in singing and that the National Socialist movement +had brought up a young generation, filling them with faith +and self-denial, and so on. And then the rest of it goes on in substance +to say that there were people who objected to your program +at the time that you were trying to make these youngsters strong.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The clear meaning of it is that you are now claiming credit for +having had something to do with making them the good 19-year-old +fighters who took Sevastopol, isn’t that so? You are claiming credit, +I say, in this article for having produced this kind of 19-year-old +boy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had no knowledge of this article up to now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you do now. You can talk about it, certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is just what I want to do. Herr Kaufmann +at that time had just returned from the Eastern Front, and +under the impression of what he had experienced out there he +wrote down what appears in this article, which I cannot possibly +read now in its entirety.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it isn’t very long. Really I read what I think +are the most important parts of it insofar as you are concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That the youth was trained in a military +way I believe is not mentioned in one single sentence in that entire +article. +<span class='pageno' title='459' id='Page_459'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Oh, I know. I am simply asking if it isn’t a fact +that you were claiming credit in this article for having had something +considerable to do with the fact that these 19-year-old boys +were such good fighters in Russia. That is all I am asking you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have already told you that I wanted to +train the youth to become good citizens, and that I wanted to train +them to be good patriots, who did their duty in the field later on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And should also do their duty in the field.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, your answer then is, yes, you were claiming +credit for the fact that they were such good fighters. Now, there is +no trick in this question. It is merely preliminary, and I want to +get on, but I think you might say “yes.” And incidentally, this song, +“The flag is more than death,” was a song that you wrote, wasn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The “Flag Song” which I based on the refrain +“The flag is more than death.” That is true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, you have also published a number of other +songs for young people, in the formative days before the war +started, in a songbook.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: A great many songbooks for young people +were published. I do not know them all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, I don’t either, but I am asking you if it isn’t a +fact that you did publish songbooks for young people.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Both the Cultural Service of the Reich Youth +Leadership and the Press Service published such books. Of course, +I did not look at each single song in them myself; but on the whole +I believe that only songs which were sung by young people appeared +in these books.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. We have some extracts from one of your +songbooks, and there is only one that I wish to refer to. Do you +remember the one “Forward, Forward,” that you wrote, by the +way; another one that you wrote. Do you remember that song?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: “Forward, Forward” is the Flag Song of the +youth organization.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. Did you write it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, certainly that also contains, does it not, +highly inciting words and phrases for young people with respect to +their military duty?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Flag Song of the youth organization? I +cannot see that? +<span class='pageno' title='460' id='Page_460'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, words, like these: “We are the future soldiers. +Everything which opposes us will fall before our fists. Führer, we +belong to you,” and so on. Do you remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not say: “We are the future soldiers,” +as I hear now in English, but “We are the soldiers of the future.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The soldiers of the future, the bearers of a +future.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, but that is another one of your songs, +isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is a revolutionary song dating from the +fighting period; it does not refer to a war between, say, Germany +and other powers, but to the fight which we had to carry on inside +the country in order to achieve our revolution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, we will see. Do you remember the one, +“Can you see the dawn in the East?” Do you remember that song?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not one of my songs.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is one of the songs in the Hitler Youth Songbook, +is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is an old SA song dating from 1923-24.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, that may be. I am only asking you, isn’t it +a fact that it was in your official songbooks for your young people?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is in that song that you vilify the Jews, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not remember that. I would have to see +the song.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I can show it to you, but perhaps if you recall +it we can save a little time. Don’t you remember that the second +stanza says, “For many years the people were enslaved and misguided, +traitors and Jews had the upper hand?” Do you remember +those words in that song? “People to Arms” is the next one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but I am not sure if that was published +in a youth songbook.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I can assure you that it was; and if you would like +to see it, we have it here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is a very well-known SA song, which was +sung by the young people, and was therefore included in the youth +songbook.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, that is all I wanted to find out. I don’t +care where it originated. It is the kind of song you had in your +songbook for young people. +<span class='pageno' title='461' id='Page_461'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say one more thing. The +songbook which I have here was published in 1933.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe that the youth organization +which I built up can be judged from the year 1933 only.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I don’t suggest that either, but we found it in 1945.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Later we published other songbooks, with +very different songs.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I am going to get around to these in a minute.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That songbook was 3764-PS, USA-854. It has just been called +to my attention that the last phrase in that fourth stanza says: +“Germany awake! Death to Jewry! People to arms!”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: One moment, please; where is that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In the English text, in the fourth stanza. I don’t +know where it would be; it is on Page 19, I am told, of the German +text. Did you find it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, maybe it is the wrong document. In any +event, we will find it for you. However, you remember the song, +do you not? You don’t deny that it says “Death to the Jews,” and +so on, do you, in that song?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is the song that starts with the words, +“Can you see the dawn in the East?”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is all I wanted to know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That song is not in this book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>A book was handed to the defendant.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: We have quite a few of your songbooks here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but there is a great difference between +them. This book, which does not contain the song, is an official +edition published by the Reich Youth Leadership. As I say, it does +not contain the song. It does appear, however, in a songbook published +by Tonners, a firm of music publishers in Cologne, under the +title of “Songs of the Hitler Youth.” This book is not, however, an +official collection issued by the Reich Youth Leadership. Any publishing +firm in Germany can publish such books.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, I will accept that, but certainly you won’t +deny that the book was used, will you? And that is all we are +trying to establish. +<span class='pageno' title='462' id='Page_462'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I do not know. I do not know whether +that book was used by the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know that the one which it is contained in +was published by you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>There was no response.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Well, in any event, I would like to point this out to you. I am +not claiming, or trying to suggest to you by questions, that any one +of these songs in themselves made young people in Germany fit for +war; but rather, what I am trying to show is that, as distinguished +from the testimony you gave here yesterday, you were doing something +more than just giving these boys and girls games to play.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My statements of yesterday certainly did not +imply that we only gave them games to play. For every song of +this kind there are innumerable others.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I know, but these are the ones we are concerned +with right now. “Unfurl the Blood-Soaked Banners,” you +remember that? “Drums Sound Throughout the Land”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: These are all songs of the “Wandervogel” +and the Youth League. They are songs which were sung at the +time of the Republic, songs which did not have anything to do with +our time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Just a minute.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: They are songs which had nothing to do with +our period.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you think that anybody, in the days of the Republic, +was singing Hitler Youth marches?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: What song is that? I do not know it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is the one, “Drums Sound Throughout the +Land.” Don’t you remember any of these songs, actually?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course, I know quite a number of these +songs; but the most important—the bulk of them—come from the +old “Zupfgeigenhansl” of the Wandervogel movement and from the +Youth League. That the SA also sang these songs goes without +saying.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I don’t doubt that they did; but wherever they +emanated from, you were using them with these young people. +And that one, “Drums Sound Throughout the Land,” you wrote +yourself; isn’t that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: “Drums Sound Throughout the Land?” Yes, +I believe I did write some such song.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right; that certainly doesn’t have a very ancient +origin then, does it? +<span class='pageno' title='463' id='Page_463'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was long before the seizure of power.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, you also recall, perhaps, that on one occasion +Field Marshal Von Blomberg wrote an article for the Hitler Year +Book. Do you remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it wasn’t so very long ago. It was in 1938. I +suppose you read the Year Book of your organization for that year +at that time, anyway?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That may be taken for granted; but I really +cannot remember what Field Marshal Von Blomberg wrote for it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, all right. I would like you to look at this +document; it is 3755-PS. I think it is on Page 134 of the text that +you have, Mr. Witness; and on Pages 148 to 150 you will find an +article, “Education for War of German Youth,” or rather, it says, +“The work ‘Education for War of German Youth,’ by Dr. Stellrecht, +contains a slogan of Field Marshal Von Blomberg, in which the +following passage is quoted.” And then it goes on to give the +quotation. Do you find that? “The fighting spirit is the highest +virtue of the soldier.” And so on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Have you found the quotation of Blomberg’s? That is what I +want to know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And then the article by Stellrecht is also contained +there, after the quotation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now certainly, when you move down a few lines, +you will see this sentence: “Therefore, it is a stern and unalterable +demand which Field Marshal Von Blomberg makes of the young +men marching in the columns of the Hitler Youth,” and so on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In those days, in 1938, Mr. Witness, you were at least thinking +in terms of future military service and so was Field Marshal Von +Blomberg, with respect to the Hitler Youth. That is the point I am +trying to make.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: We had a State with compulsory military +training.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And it goes without saying that we as educators +were also anxious to train our youth to the highest degree +of physical fitness so that they would also make good soldiers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You weren’t doing any more than that? Is that +what you want this Court to understand? +<span class='pageno' title='464' id='Page_464'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I described to you yesterday what else we +did in the way of rifle training, cross-country sports, and the training +of special units.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is USA-856, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Yes, I know you told us yesterday that, whatever else it might +have been, it certainly was not any kind of military training.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This man Stellrecht was associated with you, was he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Dr. Stellrecht had the “Office for Physical +Training” in the Hitler Youth under Reich Sport Leader Von +Tschammer-Osten. That office was one of 21 offices within the +Youth Leadership.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: He was associated with you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you have also used something from him as part +of your defense; it is in your document book. Do you know +about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, it is a statement made by Dr. Stellrecht, +in which he speaks of education for defense and physical training +for youth; and says that not a single boy in Germany is trained +with weapons of war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know that, and therefore I want you to look at +another statement that he made on another date.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is Document 1992-PS, Mr. President, and we offer it as +USA-439.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember when he made the speech to the military men +in January of 1937, while he was affiliated with your Hitler Youth +organization? Do you know the speech to which I refer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was not present on the occasion of that +speech and I do not consider myself responsible for any statement +which he may have made in it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, that is your statement, but perhaps others +feel differently. At any event, I ask you whether or not you were +aware of and knew about the speech, and will you tell us whether +you do know about it before you look at it? You know the speech +I am talking about, don’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember being informed of the fact +that he spoke at a national and political training course for the +Armed Forces; but I may have been informed of it. The speech, +itself...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it seems to me you were very anxious to deny +responsibility for it before you knew what he said. +<span class='pageno' title='465' id='Page_465'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not want to make a statement on that. +Disputes arose between Dr. Stellrecht and myself on account of a +certain tendency which he showed with regard to defense training, +because I felt that he insisted too much on his office. Disputes arose +also with the other offices of the Reich Youth Leadership which +finally led to his dismissal from the Reich Youth Leadership.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, he was on your staff when he +made this speech and I wish now you would look at page—well, I +have it Page 3 of the English, and it is Page 169 of the text that +you have; and it begins at the very bottom of the English page. The +paragraph reads:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“As far as purely military education is concerned this work +has already been done in years of co-operation, and very +extensively. The result has been set down in a book written +by myself, regulating future work in military education down +to the last detail of training and which, with our mutual +agreement, included a foreword and preface by the Reich +Defense Minister and the Reich Youth Leader.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then the next paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The basic idea of this work is always to present to the boy +that which belongs to the particular stage of his development”—and +so on. And I want you to come to the sentence +that says:</p> + +<p>“For that reason no boy is given a military weapon, simply +because it seems to serve no useful purpose for his development. +But, on the other hand, it seems sensible to give him +guns of small caliber for training. Just as there are certain +tasks occurring in military training which are only suitable +for grown men, so there are other training tasks more suited +to boys.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then moving down further in the English text, next to the +last paragraph, Page 170 of your text, you will find in the next to +the last paragraph that Dr. Stellrecht says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“This picture is the goal of a comprehensive education which +starts with the training of the boy in outdoor games and ends +with his military training.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then moving on again to the fifth page of the English text, +and I think it is Page 171 of your text, the next to the last paragraph, +in talking about the hiking trip, he says that:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“...has still a wider purpose...because it is the only way in +which the boy can get acquainted with the fatherland for +which he will have to fight one day.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Moving on through this article, finally, I want to direct your +attention to Page 6 of the English text and Pages 174 and 175 of +<span class='pageno' title='466' id='Page_466'></span> +your text. In the last paragraph of the English text, you will find +this sentence which says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“All training, therefore, culminates in rifle training. It can +scarcely be emphasized enough; and because shooting is a +matter of practice, one cannot start too early. The result we +want to achieve in the course of time is that a gun should +feel just as natural in the hands of a German boy as a pen.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, move over to the next page, Page 7 of the English text +and Page 176 of your text. Your Dr. Stellrecht says there more +about shooting and how it “meets with the boys’ desire”; and then +he goes on to say:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Along with the general training there is special training for +new replacements for Air Force, Navy, and motorized troops. +The training course for this has been established in conjunction +with the competent offices of the Armed Forces... +on as broad a basis as possible, and in the country cavalry +training is given.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And I suppose it is on the next page of your text, but it is the +next to the last paragraph of the English text—I want to call your +attention to this sentence—or it is two from the last paragraph in +the English text: “Military education and ideological education +belong together.” The English text says “philosophical,” but I think +that’s a mistranslation and actually in German it is “ideological.” +And you see the sentence that says in the next paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The education of youth has to take care that the knowledge +and the principles, according to which the State and the +Armed Forces of our time have been organized and on which +they base, enter so thoroughly into the thoughts of the individual +that they can never again be taken away and that +they remain guiding principles all through life.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And the last paragraph of that speech, Mr. Witness—I wish you +would look at it because I think you used the term “playful” +yesterday, if I am not mistaken, and Dr. Stellrecht, anyway, a little +earlier in his speech. Here is what he said to the military men +that day: “Gentlemen, you can see that the tasks of present youth +education have gone far beyond the ‘playful.’ ”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Are you sure, now, that you didn’t have any kind of a program +for military training in your youth organization?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can see from this document, which I should +really have to read in its entirety in order to be able to answer +correctly, that Dr. Stellrecht, to put it mildly, considered himself +very important. The importance of Dr. Stellrecht for the education +of youth and the importance of the office which he held in the +Youth Leadership were definitely not as great as implied by this +<span class='pageno' title='467' id='Page_467'></span> +training course for men of the Armed Forces. I have already said +before that disputes arose between Dr. Stellrecht and myself on +account of his exaggerations and especially because of the extent to +which he overestimated the value of rifle training and what he +called “military training” and that these differences of opinion +finally led to his dismissal and departure from the service of the +Reich Youth Leadership. He was one of many heads of offices, and +the importance of his special activity was not as great as he has +represented it to be in his statement here. I think I explained +yesterday what a large number of tasks confronted the Youth +Leadership. I was also able to indicate the approximate proportion +of premilitary training or military training, as Herr Stellrecht calls +it, as compared with other forms of training. But this document +also states clearly that there was no intention of anticipating military +training, as I said yesterday. When he says that every German +boy should learn to handle the gun as easily as the pen, that is an +expression of opinion with which I cannot identify myself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, of course, you have your view of him; but I +think it is well that we brought it out in view of the fact that you +have yourself offered before this Tribunal a statement by Stellrecht +in your own document book. You are aware of that, of course, +aren’t you? You want, of course, to have us understand that Stellrecht +is reliable when you quote him, but he is not reliable when +we quote him; is that it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not mean that at all. He is a specialist +in ballistics and outdoor sports and, of course, he represented his +tasks, as is natural to human nature, as being the most important +in youth training. Probably another office chief would have described +cultural work or occupational competition contests, as the +case might be, as being the most important aspects of youth training. +At any rate, the decisive pronouncement for the education of +German youth was not the remarks which Stellrecht made during +a course for soldiers but my own remarks to the youth leaders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I just want to remind you that a year after he made +this speech you wrote a preface for his book, didn’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe this preface was written for the +book “Hitler Youth on Service.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I say it was a year after he wrote this speech, which +was put out and published in Germany. He not only made the +speech; but it was put out in pamphlet form, wasn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot remember exactly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I can tell you if you look at the document +that I handed you. I think you will see that. Well, in any event, +<span class='pageno' title='468' id='Page_468'></span> +we will pass along. You told the Tribunal yesterday that the statement +in the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span>, attributed to Hitler, on 21 February +1938 was something of a mystery to you; you did not know +where he got his figures from. Did you understand what I said, +Mr. Witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And do you know to what I referred in your testimony +of yesterday, that quotation from Hitler in the <span class='it'>Völkischer +Beobachter</span>?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What is wrong with those figures?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think that these figures are exaggerated +and I think that there are errors in the text in my possession, +which is a translated text. He probably received these figures from +Dr. Stellrecht’s office, or so I assume. The statements regarding +armored troops were, I imagine, probably added by himself; for +the conclusion that some thousands or tens of thousands qualified +for driving licenses is really an incorrect one, just as it is incorrect +to draw from the fact that some tens of thousands of lads qualify +for driving licenses the conclusion that they were trained as tank +troops.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you see, we didn’t say so. You understand it +was your Führer who said so in February 1938, and what I asked +you was that I wish perhaps we can go through it and you can +tell the Tribunal where they are in error and to what extent. Now +Hitler said, according to the press, that your naval Hitler Youth +comprised 45,000 boys. Would you say that figure was too large +and altogether untrue?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: He then said, the motor Hitler Youth 60,000 boys. +What do you say about that figure?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And then he said that, as part of the campaign to +encourage aviation, 55,000 members of the Jungvolk were trained +in gliding for group activities. What do you say about that figure?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Glider training and model plane construction +in the youth organization with—may I have the figure again—50,000 +youth airmen?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: 55,000. +<span class='pageno' title='469' id='Page_469'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 55,000—yes, that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That’s correct. Then he says, “74,000 of the Hitler +Youth are organized in its flying units.” Now, what do you say +about that figure?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: You say “flying units”; those are “Fliegereinheiten,” +groups of Hitler youth airmen, who—as I must emphasize +again—were concerned only with gliding and the construction of +model planes. There may have been such a large number at the +time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Is the figure correct, 74,000?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It may be.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, he lastly says, “15,000 boys passed their gliding +test in the year 1937 alone.” What do you say about that; is it +too big or too little or not true at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is probably correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, so far you haven’t disagreed with Hitler +on any of these, have you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Then, he lastly says, “Today, 1.2 million boys of +the Hitler Youth receive regular instruction in small-bore rifle +shooting from 7,000 instructors.” What’s wrong with that figure, +if anything?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It may be correct—of course, I have no documentary +proof that we had 7,000 young men who conducted training +in small-bore rifle shooting. I discussed this small-bore rifle +shooting yesterday. It is well known that we carried that out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Actually you haven’t disputed any of these figures. +They are true, then, to the best of your knowledge, aren’t they?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My objection concerned a remark, which I +remember in connection with the speech, mentioning tank force.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, we don’t have it but, if you have it, we’d be +glad to see it. But this is the <span class='it'>Völkischer Beobachter</span> speech that +was put in by the Prosecution at the time that the case against +you was put in; there is nothing in that about the tanks.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe the reason is that the retranslation +of the document from English back into German is incorrect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, we agree that Hitler wasn’t very +far off on his figures when he made this speech or gave them out?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No; I think the figures which you have just +mentioned are correct. +<span class='pageno' title='470' id='Page_470'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. Now, then, in the Year Book of your +Hitler Youth for 1939, Stellrecht, your man who had charge of +training, uses that same expression. Do you recall that? “To handle +a rifle should be just as natural for everybody as to handle a pen”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, sir.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I have the month?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it’s in the Year Book of the Hitler Youth for +the year 1939, at Page 227. If you’d like to see it, I’ll be glad to +show it to you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, thank you. I do not have to see it. If +he has already mentioned it before, it is possible that he will +repeat it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. You see, the importance of it to us is that this +is 2 years after he made this speech, 1 year after you wrote the +preface to his book, and I assume some time after you found him +to be—what did you say—unreliable?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I did not say that. On the contrary, he +was a reliable man, but differences of opinion arose between us +because I did not agree with him on the question of overemphasizing +premilitary training.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I considered the rifle training as constituting +only a part of our training, and not the most essential part; and +he pushed it too much into the foreground.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. But you let him write in the Year Book; +and 2 years, after he made the speech, he made this same kind +of a statement for young people to read, that they should be as +handy with a rifle as they were with a pen. Did you make any +objection when that book went to press? I assume you must have...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not see the book before it went to +press...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not proofread it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: ...and I had no objections to raise in +particular.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you object when you read in the same book +and on the same page that the Wehrmacht had presented to your +Hitler Youth in 1937, 10,000 small-bore rifles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I was very glad to have that gift from +the Armed Forces. As we in any case did small-bore shooting, I +was grateful for every rifle we received because we always had +less than we needed for training purposes. +<span class='pageno' title='471' id='Page_471'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And were you distressed when you also read in +that same Year Book that there was no shortage of shooting ranges:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Since organized rifle training was started in the autumn of +1936, 10,000 shooting instructors have acquired the green +shooting license in weekend courses and special courses; and +this figure increases by some thousands every year.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember that in your Year Book for 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not remember it, but I think you are +probably presenting the facts correctly; I will not dispute it. +Switzerland gave her young men a much more intensive rifle training +than we did and so did many other countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not deny that our young men were +trained in shooting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I hope you’re not comparing yourself to Switzerland, +either.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: This document is 3769-PS, Mr. President; it becomes +USA-857.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, we’ve heard about this agreement that you and the Defendant +Keitel drew up in 1939, not very long before the war +against Poland started. It was in August of 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It’s already in evidence, Mr. President, as USA-677.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It was the 8th day of August, wasn’t it—or 11th day; I’m sorry.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know the exact date. The fact that +the agreement was concluded in August 1939 is enough to show +that it did not have—and could not have had—any connection with +the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You say it had no relation to the war, 3 weeks +before the attack on Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: If that agreement had had any significance +for the war, it would have had to be concluded much earlier. The +fact that it was only concluded in August shows in itself that we +were not thinking of war. If we had wanted to train youth for the +war, we would have made an agreement of this kind in 1936 +or 1937.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, will you agree to this: That this +agreement between you and Keitel certainly was related to your +shooting practice and related to the Army?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as I remember, the agreement referred +to training for outdoor sports. +<span class='pageno' title='472' id='Page_472'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, then I had better show it to you and read +from it to you, if you have forgotten insofar that you don’t remember +that it had something to do with your shooting practice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that it says—and to that extent a +connection with rifle shooting does exist—that in future field sports +are to receive the same attention which has hitherto been given to +shooting. I do not know if I am giving that correctly from memory.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I’ll tell you what it says and you can look at it in +a minute. It says that you already have 30,000 Hitler Youth leaders +trained annually in field service. And in the whole sentence it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In the Leadership Schools of the Hitler Youth, particularly +in the two Reich schools for shooting practice and field sports +and in the District Leadership Schools, 30,000 Hitler Youth +leaders are being trained every year in field service...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>and that this agreement gives you the possibility of roughly doubling +that number.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And it goes on to say how you will quarter these +people and billet them, and so on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And it does have some relationship to your shooting +training program, doesn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I explained that before I even saw it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I misunderstood you then. I thought that you +said that it didn’t have...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, no, I explained that. I said that field +service should have the same prominence as rifle training in the +program; but, here again, we are not concerned with training youth +leaders to become officers. It was not a question of military training, +but of training in field sports for the youth leaders who, after +short courses—I believe they lasted 3 weeks—went back again to +their units. A young man of 16 cannot be trained along military +lines in that period of time, nor was that the purpose of the agreement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Surely you are not asking us to believe that you +and Keitel were entering into an agreement over cross-country +sports, are you, in August of 1939? Are you serious about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I am perfectly serious when I say that at that +time I knew nothing about a war—the war to come. I said yesterday...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, but you... +<span class='pageno' title='473' id='Page_473'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And I do not believe either that Field +Marshal Keitel drafted that agreement; I think one of his assistants +worked it out along with Dr. Stellrecht. If it had had any +significance for the war, it would certainly not have been announced +in August in an official publication.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, listen. You just look at the first paragraph +of this and read what it says the purpose of this agreement +is, and perhaps we can put an end to this discussion.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“An agreement was made between the High Command of +the Wehrmacht and the Reich Youth Leadership representing +the result of close co-operation between the Chief of the High +Command of the Wehrmacht, General Keitel, and the Youth +Leader of the German Reich, Von Schirach, and promising +the co-operation of the Wehrmacht in the military education +of the Hitler Youth.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>You don’t see anything there about cross-country running, do you, +or training?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to give an explanation as to +that. What you have just quoted is not part of the text of the +agreement, but represents a commentary by the editor of the collection +<span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I’m not going on; but I’ll leave it up to the +Tribunal to decide whether that has to do with sports or has any +relation to military education.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it is a convenient time to break off.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that +the Defendant Raeder is absent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, would you agree that from time to +time members of your Hitler Youth sang songs and otherwise conducted +themselves in a manner which certainly was hostile to +organized religious institutions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not intend to deny that isolated members +behaved in that way during the early years of the National Socialist +State, but I should like to add a short explanation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the early years I took into my movement millions of +young people from Marxist organizations and the atheist movement, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>; and, of course, it was not possible in the space +of 2 or 3 or 4 years’ time to discipline all of them completely. But +I think I may say that after a certain date, say 1936, things of that +sort no longer happened. +<span class='pageno' title='474' id='Page_474'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I thought perhaps we could say, anyway, that +in 1935 this sort of thing was going on and perhaps save some time. +Would you agree to that? They were singing songs such as, “Pope +and Rabbi shall yield, we want to be pagans again” and that sort +of business. Are you familiar with that? Do you know that kind +of thing that came to the attention of the Minister of Justice from +the prosecuting authority in Baden.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know that they sang a song published in the +songbook “Blut und Ehre,” a song saying, “We want to kill the +priest, out with your spear, forward; set the red cock on the cloister +roof.” You know that old song?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is a song dating back to the Thirty Years’ +War and sung by the youth movement for many, many years, even +before the first World War.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know, you have told me that before. I am trying +to cut that down. Will you agree that your people were singing it +in 1933, 1934, and 1935, to the extent that when clerics objected they +were subjected themselves to the prosecuting authorities for interfering +and criticizing? That is how important it was.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know, as I have already said, that this song +dates back to the Thirty Years’ War. It was sometimes sung by +young people in the years 1933-1934. I tried to abolish this song, +but I cannot give you any information as to special complaints +which were lodged about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not think that we have made clear that these +songs were put out in a book which you published for the Hitler +Youth to sing in these days. Do you agree to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think it is possible, as for many years this +song was included in every collection. It is a song which appeared +in the first songbooks of the Wandervogel movement in 1898.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am not really interested in the history. All I am +trying to establish is that in your songbook for your young people +this song was present, that it was sung, that when the Church people +complained, they were subjected to the prosecuting authorities for +complaining.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I must dispute the last point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I will have to put this document in.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is Number 3751-PS. These are extracts from the diary of the +prosecuting authorities, the diary of the Minister of Justice. And +that becomes USA-858. +<span class='pageno' title='475' id='Page_475'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, the very first entry that is shown to you is a note from +the diary of the Minister of Justice on the Catholic Vicar Paul +Wasmer concerning criminal proceedings against him, and it is a +question of whether a penal sentence should be proposed by Rosenberg +because of libel. The vicar in his sermon cited a song being +sung by young people. I quoted a few words of it a moment ago +about “Pope and Rabbi shall yield, out with the Jews,” and so on. +The Minister of Justice in his diary goes on to say that this Catholic +vicar also quoted from “the little book of songs published by Baldur +von Schirach” a verse with the following text:</p> + + + <div class='poetry-container' style=''> + <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' --> +<div class='stanza-outer'> +<p class='line0'>“To the Lord in Heaven we’ll surely say</p> +<p class='line0'>That we his Priest would gladly slay.”</p> +</div> +</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend --> + +<p class='noindent'>and so on:</p> + + + <div class='poetry-container' style=''> + <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' --> +<div class='stanza-outer'> +<p class='line0'>“Out with your spear, forward march.”</p> +</div> +</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend --> + +<p class='pindent'>And he further quoted you as saying, “The path of German +youth is Rosenberg.” Now, that is what he got into trouble for +doing, and all I am asking you—and all I did ask—is if you won’t +admit that people who criticized the use of this kind of stuff by +your young people under your leadership were subjected to possible, +and in many cases actual, prosecution? You see, you told the Tribunal +yesterday that you never did anything directly to interfere +with the Church, Catholic or Protestant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The song quoted, which has the refrain “Kyrieleis,” +which in itself shows it is a very old song...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May I interrupt you to say...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: ...may possibly be included in the songbook +“Blood and Honor.” I am, of course, unaware that a clergyman was +prosecuted for criticizing it. That is something new which I learn +for the first time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. Look at Page 192 of that same diary, and +you will see where the Archbishop of Paderborn reported the incident +of 12 May. In this case he was asking that something be done +to stop this sort of thing, and there is a rather nasty little song there +about a monk and a nun, and so on, which your young people were +singing; and then it goes on to say what happened to the Archbishop +when he came out into the square and what the Hitler Youth did, +what names they called him, and it says there were seven Hitler +Youth leaders from outside present in that city that day and they +were in civilian clothing. Do you mean to say you never heard of +these things?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know of this incident. I called the competent +leader of the area, Langanke by name, to account for this. I +had a good deal of trouble in connection with the incident. I shall +<span class='pageno' title='476' id='Page_476'></span> +therefore ask my counsel to question the witness Lauterbacher, who +then held the rank of Stabsführer and is acquainted with the details. +Some lines of the song you quoted just now caused a good deal of +violent feeling among the population at the time—some of those +lines are quoted here—on account of the foreign currency racketeering +indulged in by some clergymen. That is why this satirical +song was sung.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to say in conclusion that I thoroughly and obviously +disapproved of the attitude of these youth leaders. The whole affair +is, as I have already said, one of those incidents dating back to the +years when I had to take into my organization an enormous number +of youths from other organizations and with an entirely different +intellectual background.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, turn to Page 228 of that diary, and you +will see where a Chaplain Heinrich Müller and a town clergyman +Franz Rümmer were under suspicion because they said in a circle +of Catholic clergy that a certain song was sung by the Hitler Youth +at the Party Rally in 1934:</p> + + + <div class='poetry-container' style=''> + <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' --> +<div class='stanza-outer'> +<p class='line0'>“We are the rollicking Hitler Youth;</p> +<p class='line0'>We have no need of Christian truth;</p> +<p class='line0'>For Adolf Hitler is our Leader</p> +<p class='line0'>And our Interceder.</p> +<p class='line'> </p> +</div> +<div class='stanza-outer'> +<p class='line0'>“No evil old priest these ties can sever;</p> +<p class='line0'>We’re Hitler’s children now and ever.”</p> +</div> +</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend --> + +<p class='pindent'>Wait until I get through.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have not found the place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is Page 228, a and b, I’m sorry. Maybe you will +remember the song anyway if I read it to you. Do you remember +the lines that said, “We don’t follow Christ but instead Horst Wessel”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This is the first time I have seen this song. I +do not know this song.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right; I will not go on reading it. You noticed +that in an entry in the diary, the last paragraph, it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Advocate General notes that there is no doubt that the +song in question was sung or circulated in Hitler Youth circles; +he thinks that the statement that this song was sung at the +Party Rally, that is, to a certain extent under the eyes and +with the consent of the highest Party officials, can be refuted.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The third stanza reads:</p> + + + <div class='poetry-container' style=''> + <div class='lgp'> <!-- rend=';' --> +<div class='stanza-outer'> +<p class='line0'>“I am no Christian, no Catholic;</p> +<p class='line0'>I follow the SA through thin and thick.”</p> +</div> +</div></div> <!-- end poetry block --><!-- end rend --> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='477' id='Page_477'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>We gather that it is not a youth song. If the young people sang +that song, I very much regret it. That song was certainly not sung +at a youth festival at the Party Rally in 1934, as stated here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I myself read through all the programs for +youth events at the Party Rally.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I do not know this song; I have never heard it; and I do not +know the text.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD; You will notice that the last line says: “Baldur +von Schirach, take me too!”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The only point to all this is that certainly it is a surprise to the +Prosecution to hear you say, as the Youth Leader, that you did not +know that there was a great difficulty between the churchmen of +all the churches in Germany and the youth organization in Germany, +certainly during these years.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The point that I should like to make clear to +the Tribunal is that in the youth movement there was a period of +storm and stress, a period of development, and that the organization +must not be judged by the actions of a few individuals or groups +in the same year in which these individuals or groups became members +of the organization. The result of educational work cannot be +judged until some years have elapsed. It is possible that a group of +youths who entered our ranks from the atheist movement in 1934 +composed and sang these songs. In 1936 they would certainly no +longer have done it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, let’s see what you were doing in 1937. You +know the publication “Enjoyment, Discipline, Faith”? Do you know +that handbook for cultural work in your youth camps?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to see it, please.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I’ll show it to you, but I wanted to ask you, first of +all: Do you know the publication? Do you know what I am talking +about when I refer to it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know all our publications. We had +such an enormous number of publications that unless I have the +book in front of me I cannot make any statement on the subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right; I’ll take your answer that you don’t know +this one without seeing it. We’ll show it to you. This one, among +other things, has the program for a week in one of your camps, a +suggested series of programs. And again I’ll ask you a question and +maybe we can cut this down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Isn’t it a fact that in your camps you tried to make Hitler and +God more than partners and particularly tried to direct the religious +<span class='pageno' title='478' id='Page_478'></span> +attitudes of young people to the belief that Hitler was sent to this +earth by God and was his divinely appointed in Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Well, just answer that first of all, and then we can look at the +program.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I never made any comparison between +Hitler and God; and I consider it blasphemous and have always considered +such a comparison blasphemous.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It is true that during the long period of years in which I believed +in Hitler, I saw in him a man sent by God to lead the people. That +is true. I believe any great man in history—and in the past I considered +Hitler such a man—may be regarded as being sent by God.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: This is Document 2436-PS, USA-859.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am not going to go all through it with you, but I do want to +call your attention to some specific parts.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>First of all, on Page 64 you have the names of people suggested +as mottoes, I guess you would say, for the day. They are all political +or military heroes of Germany, I expect, aren’t they?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Arminius, Geiserich, Braunschweig...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You don’t need to read them all. If they are not, +say they aren’t, and if they are, say “yes.” I merely asked you if +they were not all military or political heroes of Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know whether Prince Louis Ferdinand +of Prussia can be characterized simply as a war hero here. He was +certainly an artist as much as an officer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, I’ll pass that and take your answer that +they are not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Let’s move on to the Sunday morning celebration on Page 70 of +your text, near the end of it. I wanted particularly to direct your +attention to this in view of what you said about Rosenberg earlier +this afternoon:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“If there is no one who can make a short formal address—it +must be good and command attention—extracts from ‘Mein +Kampf’ or from the Führer’s speeches or Rosenberg’s works +should be read.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you find that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have found it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, do you still say that Rosenberg and his works +had nothing to do with your Hitler Youth? You were suggesting +that, for Sunday morning reading, they might listen to this benign +philosopher’s works, weren’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Nothing is proved by the fact that such a +reference is made in one of the numerous handbooks of cultural +<span class='pageno' title='479' id='Page_479'></span> +work to one of the training staff who attended those biannual discussions +of Rosenberg’s which I have already mentioned. I think +you will look a long time before you find this particular passage in +one of the many youth handbooks.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me ask you something about this. You find one +line in here for the Sunday morning celebration about a churchman, +a chaplain, Holy Scripture, or anything related to religious institutions +and tell the Tribunal where it is.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I take it as certain that nothing like that +occurs there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is your Sunday morning program?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Hitler Youth was a state youth organization, +and my aim was to separate religious and state education. +A young man who wanted to go to church could go after the morning +celebration—it was a camp function—or before it, according to +whether he wanted to attend mass or go to a Protestant service; and +on these Sundays on which he was not in camp—the whole camp +lasted 3 weeks at the outside—he was completely free to attend +church at home with his parents or other friends.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think it is fair to say that immediately +before the words “Page 71” there are three lines which +might be said to refer to religion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I intend to quote it. I was saving that for a +little later. I will be glad to do it now if Your Honor prefers to +have it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I want to call your attention to a historical moral +ballad that is suggested for the youth of this camp, on Page 89 of +your text or 90, and on Page 6 of the English text.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I am not going to read this whole ballad, but I think you +will agree that it ridicules, to put it mildly, the Jews, other political +parties in Germany. It refers to “Isidor, Isidor” in the opening +lines, and it goes on down, “Poor Michael was a wretched man; he +had to serve the Jewish clan.” In another line, “He gave the gang +and the Jew a kick.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And then your Party youth leaders suggest that now they have +a—what is it—a shadow show:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The nose of Isidor must be strongly exaggerated; the German +Michael should be presented in the conventional manner; the +Communist as a wild stormer of barricades; the Social Democrat +with a balloon cap; the Center Party man with a Jesuit +cap, and the reactionary with top hat and monocle.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='480' id='Page_480'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you ever see one of those shows, by the way?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot find the text you have just quoted +on Page 89.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I probably have given you the wrong page. I have +just been told it is Page 154 of your text—155, rather.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I just want to know about this suggested part +of the program for these young people of yours.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say something about the whole +question as far as this book is concerned. I wrote the preface and +I accept responsibility for the contents. I did not read every detail +of this book beforehand; and I do not wish to dispute the fact that +in the camps forming part of the camp circus, as it was called, political +caricatures were presented in the form of shadow-shows.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You know one of your youngsters wrote Streicher +a letter telling him that he saw this kind of a show. Do you know +about that? I am going to show you that letter in a little while, +just to show you that it did happen, and that your young people +wrote to Streicher about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>And on the last page of the English text, for Sunday, 19 July—I +think it is Page 179 of your text—the motto for the day is “Our +service to Germany is divine service.” And that was a slogan you +used on other Sundays, and as the Tribunal has pointed out, on +Page 70 of your text you say:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“...that this Sunday morning ceremony does not aim at +presenting arguments or conflicts with confessional points of +view, but at imbuing life and men with courage and strength +to fulfill their greater and lesser tasks through unqualified +faith in the divine power and the ideology of the Führer and +his movement.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, in no place where you ever made any reference to God +did you ever fail also to mention Hitler or the leaders of the Party, +did you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Will you please indicate the passage that you +quoted just now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is on Page 70, right at the bottom of your Page 70.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, it says here:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It does not aim at presenting arguments or conflicts with +confessional points of view, but at imbuing life and men with +courage and strength to fulfill their greater and lesser tasks +through unqualified faith in the divine power and the ideology +of the Führer and his Party.</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='481' id='Page_481'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>That does not, after all, mean that Hitler is compared to God, +but I believe that in the answer I gave a few minutes ago I did +define my attitude.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let’s see if you don’t. In your book <span class='it'>Revolution of +Education</span>, on Page 148, do you remember this statement: “The flag +of the Third Reich”—we’ll begin the whole sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“On the contrary, the service of Germany appears to us to +be...the service of God. The banner of the Third Reich +appears to us to be His banner; and the Führer of the people +is the savior whom he sent to save us from the calamity +and peril into which we were actually plunged by the most +pious parties of the defunct German Republic.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to see the original of this text, +please.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Here I write:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“We consider that we are serving the Almighty when with +our youthful strength we seek to make Germany once more +united and great. In acknowledging loyalty to our Homeland +we see nothing which could be construed as a contradiction +of His eternal will. On the contrary, the service of Germany +appears to us to be genuine and sincere service of God; the +banner of the Third Reich appears to us to be His banner; +and the Führer of the people is the savior whom He sent to +rescue us from the calamity and peril into which we were +actually plunged by the most pious parties of the defunct +German Republic.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>This is the Center Party of the old Republic and other similar +organizations of a confessional and political nature. I wrote this. +I really do not see anything in that which could be construed into +a deification of the Führer. For me, service to my country was +service to the Almighty.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, if that is your answer—I see it differently. +Let’s go on to something else so that we can get through. I don’t +want to neglect to show you, if you care to be shown, that communication +to Streicher. It has already been presented to the Tribunal +by the British Delegation, the British prosecutor. I think it +was read from, but not put in, I am told.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In any event, do you know about that, Mr. Witness? Do you +know about the letter that the boys and girls of the Youth Hostel +at Grossmöllen wrote to Streicher in April of 1936, when they told +him about seeing the Jews, “Every Sunday our leader shows a play +about the Jews with his puppet theater.” +<span class='pageno' title='482' id='Page_482'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>I just want to know if you are aware of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say in this connection that +the National Socialist Youth Home at Grossmöllen, which is mentioned +here, was not a Hitler Youth institution but was, I believe, +a kindergarten run by the National Socialist Public Welfare Organization +or some other organization.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>This is typical of the letters ordered by the publisher of <span class='it'>Der +Stürmer</span> for recruiting purposes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Just a moment. Didn’t you take over every youth +hostel in 1933?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, what do you mean by saying that in 1936 this +National Socialist Youth Hostel at Grossmöllen was not a part of +the Hitler Youth organization?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It says here youth home (Heimstätte), not +hostel (Herberge). I am not familiar with the expression “Heimstätte.” +That must refer to a home run by the National Socialist +Public Welfare Organization or the National Socialist Women’s +League. We had only “Jugendheime” and “Herbergen.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, doesn’t it strike you as being strangely coincidental +that in your program for one of your youth camps you +suggest a show which portrays a Jewish man with a great nose and +ridicules him and teaches children to dislike him and laugh at him +and that from a youth camp a youngster writes to Streicher saying +that she and boys and girls saw such a show?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This letter was not written from any youth +camp.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I accept it if that is your answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not deny that this puppet play was +shown and that this letter was written; but I believe the connection +is pulled in by the hair, so to speak. The connection is a very +remote one.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You think the connection about the ridiculing of the +Jews is very far afield and pulled in by the hair.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I dispute the statement that this is a +Hitler Youth institution. I believe actually it is a day nursery run +by the National Socialist Public Welfare Organization or something +similar.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, maybe the explanation is that all the young +people in Germany saw one of those shows. But, in any event, I +want to take up the last matter on this subject with you. +<span class='pageno' title='483' id='Page_483'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>This morning your counsel examined you about the confiscation +of a monastery, I believe it was in Austria while you were there, +Klosterneuburg. Do you remember?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: We discussed Count Schwarzenberg’s palace +this morning. That was not a monastery. It was the property of a +private citizen.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, the document that Counsel Dr. Sauter referred +to was R-146, USA-678. It was a letter from Bormann to all Gauleiter, +and it began by saying that valuable Church properties had +to be seized in Italy and in Austria. It was signed by Bormann. +And then also on that document was a letter from Lammers saying +that there had been some dispute as to whether the seized Church +property should go back to the Reich or should remain in your Gau. +You remember that, don’t you? Well, now, you seized the monastery +down there, didn’t you, in 1941, at Klosterneuburg? Klosterneuburg, +you know what I am referring to. I may mispronounce it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. The well-known foundation Klosterneuburg, +the famous monastery, served as a receiving office for collections +of works of art taken from our art museum.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. Now, what excuse did you have for seizing the +monastery at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can no longer give you exact details with +regard to this. I believe there were very few people in the monastery, +that the large building was not being used to the fullest +possible extent, and that we urgently needed more space for the +expansion of the experimental station run in conjunction with our +State School of Viniculture. I believe that is why this monastery +was confiscated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. I am going to ask that you look at Document +3927-PS, and I wish you would remember that this morning +you told the Tribunal that you stopped the confiscation of churches +and Church property in Austria. When you look at this document +I wish you to recall your testimony.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Did you offer M-25 in evidence or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I wish to do so, Mr. President. It is USA-861. And +this one, 3927-PS, becomes USA-862.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, the first page of this document shows that it is marked +secret. It is dated 22 January 1941. It is a letter addressed to Dellbrügge +in your organization in Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>He says that he hears there is a possibility of getting a Hitler +School, which the city of Hamburg is also trying to get, and that +he wants the monastery Klosterneuburg considered as the place for +the Hitler School in Vienna. This letter is written by Scharizer, +your deputy, as you described him yesterday. +<span class='pageno' title='484' id='Page_484'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, he enclosed a communication, a teletype letter, from Bormann; +and if you turn the page, you will see that it is dated 13 January. +Bormann says it is strictly confidential:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“It is learned that the population does not show any indignation +when monastery buildings are used to serve what appears +to be a generally appropriate purpose.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>He goes on to say:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Their conversion into hospitals, convalescent homes, educational +institutes, Adolf Hitler Schools, may be considered as +serving a generally appropriate purpose.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, that communication was dated the 13th of January, and +your deputy wrote the letter on the 22d.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now turn another page, and you will find a Gestapo report on +the monastery, dated 23 January 1941, addressed to your assistant +Dellbrügge. I wish you would look where it says, “Oral order of +23 January 1941.” Apparently somebody in your organization, you +or your assistants, orally asked the Gestapo to get up a report on +this monastery the very day that you wrote to Berlin asking that +it be considered as a Hitler School.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There are some charges against the inhabitants of that monastery +in this Gestapo report, but I ask you to turn over further and you +will find where you wrote an order for the taking over of the +monastery as an Adolf Hitler School on 22 February 1941. I will +show it to you if you like to see it, but that order bears your +initials, the original does—Pages 15 to 17 of the photostat that +you have.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, you framed up an excuse to seize that monastery, didn’t +you, when you really wanted it for a Hitler School; and you didn’t +have any just grounds for seizing it. And you get the Gestapo to +write a report and then you never referred to the reason that the +Gestapo framed up for you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I myself as head of these schools was naturally +extremely anxious to have such a school established in Vienna. At +one time the idea expressed here of taking Klosterneuburg and +housing one of the Adolf Hitler Schools in it did occur to me, and +I probably did discuss it with Herr Scharizer; but I dropped the idea +completely. Klosterneuburg was never converted into an Adolf +Hitler School.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No. But it never was turned back to the Church +people, either, was it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. Since the museum space available in +Vienna was not sufficient for the very large collections, we wanted +to turn this monastery into an additional large museum which would +be open to the public. We began to carry out this plan, and a great +<span class='pageno' title='485' id='Page_485'></span> +part of the collections was transferred to the building. In addition, +we needed the strongly built cellars of this monastery for the safekeeping +of the many art treasures which we had to protect against +bombing attacks.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>It occurred to me that we might house an Adolf Hitler School +in this building and I discussed the possibility with one or two of +my colleagues and then abandoned it: Firstly, because it would +have caused some ill-feeling if we had housed an Adolf Hitler School +in a building which had formerly been consecrated ground, and +secondly, because we badly needed the monastery for these other +purposes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have nothing to add to my explanation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You will notice the date of that whole transaction +and the communication from Bormann. When did you first discover +that Bormann was so antireligious and anti-Church as you told +the Tribunal he was?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Bormann...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Just tell us when you found that out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was just about to. Bormann showed his +antireligious views most clearly in 1943; but they had already +begun to appear in 1937.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And this telegram from him was when? 1941?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: 1941.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Witness, when did you first start to do business +with Himmler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I met Hitler...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Himmler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I met Himmler in 1929 when I visited the +offices of the Party Leadership. At that time he was the propaganda +chief of the Party. That was our first meeting.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not really want to know, although it’s of +interest, when you first met him. What I really wanted to know +was when you with your youth groups started really to do business +with him for the first time. And by “business” I mean arrangements +such as the recruitment of young men into the Death’s-Head +Brigade of the SS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I think I explained that this morning. One +of the first agreements laid down was, I think, contained in the +agreement regarding the patrol service, the date of which I do not +recall. This was not, by the way, a guarantee of reinforcements +for Death’s-Head units, but for police units generally. These were +special troops to be at the disposal of the Police. +<span class='pageno' title='486' id='Page_486'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How long did you continue to channel or divert +young men from your Youth organization to the SS? When was the +last time that you remember this program being effective?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not artfully drive young people into +the SS. But I permitted the SS to recruit among young people like +any other organization.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not ask you that. I asked you when you +would say was the latest date when you were effectively helping, +at least, Himmler to get young candidates from the young people +of Germany through your Hitler Youth organization. I do not +expect an exact date. Approximately?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: From 1940 on I tried constantly to have +youth taken into Army units. The SS, the Waffen-SS, carried on +very active recruitment among youth up to the last day of the war. +I could not prevent this recruitment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you knew what use they were being put to +in the last days of the war and in the mid-days of the war, did +you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did know that all young people who were +drafted or who volunteered had to fight.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am talking about something other than fighting. +You knew what was going on in the East, and you knew who +the guards were in the concentration camps, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This morning I testified on what I knew +about events in the East. I did not know that young men who +volunteered to go into the Waffen-SS were used during the war +to guard concentration camps.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not know who were the guards there, +although you visited two of them yourself?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Those guards did not belong to the Waffen-SS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know, but your agreement with Himmler provides +specifically for recruitment for SS Death’s-Head troops.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: When I concluded that agreement, I did not +know that he effected the supervision of concentration camps +chiefly by means of Death’s-Head units. Besides, I thought at that +time that concentration camps were something quite normal. I +said so this morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal yesterday that it was in +1944, I think, that you found out about the extermination. And I +want to talk to you about that a little bit, and ask you some +questions. And the first one is, how did you find out? Was it only +through this man Colin Ross? +<span class='pageno' title='487' id='Page_487'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I said that I heard of it through Colin Ross...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And, furthermore, that I asked numerous +questions of everyone I could reach, in order to get definite information.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Really I asked you if, from any other source, you +found out? And you can answer that pretty simply. We know that +you found out through Ross. Was there anyone else from whom +you found out?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I could not obtain any really definite information.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Most people had no information. I only received +positive—that is, detailed—information by way of the +Warthegau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, as a matter of fact, you got regular reports +about the extermination of the Jews, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: These...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Written reports, I mean.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: These reports, two of which have been submitted +in this Court, were sent to the Reich Defense Commissioner +for the attention of the expert in question. This expert passed +the copies on to the inspector—I believe—or the commander of the +regular Police.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have looked at the copy which was submitted here in Kaltenbrunner’s +case but I had never seen it before (Document 3876-PS).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You mean you did not know that it was arriving +in your office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have never seen this text before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: My office was the Central Office; it was not +the office of the Reich Defense Commissioner. The affairs of the +Reich Defense Commissioner were officially in charge of the +Regierungspräsident, whose personal adviser took care of routine +matters. My mail was delivered at the Central Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You were the Reich Defense Commissioner for that +district, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: This was an SS report of a highly confidential +nature, was it not? They were not just peddling this all over +Germany? +<span class='pageno' title='488' id='Page_488'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know how many copies of this were +sent out, I cannot say.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: 100, and you got the sixty-seventh copy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: And these copies, as I gathered from the +original which I saw, were not sent to me but to the competent +adviser, a Herr Fischer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And who was Herr Fischer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have already told you this morning that +I have no idea who this Herr Fischer was. I assume that he was +the expert attached to the Regierungspräsident, the expert on +defense matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, I am going to show you some documents from +your own files.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We don’t have a full translation, Mr. President, because some +of this we located too late (Document 3914-PS).</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But I think you will readily recognize this original is from your +files. And in there you will find—and I will direct your attention +to the page—something that I think will recall to your mind who +Dr. Fischer is.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I think it is on Page 29, you will find the names of persons +to serve on the Reich Defense Council submitted; and you will +find the name of Fischer, together with General Stülpnagel, Major +General Gautier, Dr. Förster—do you find that? This was your +own Reich Defense Council, before which you appeared from time +to time, and with whom you met frequently. And I will show +you documents on that, if you care to deny it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Just a moment, please. Will you please repeat +the page to me?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Page 29; it is a memorandum dated 28 September +1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have it now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you find the name of Dr. Fischer? You found +Dr. Fischer’s name as one of those suggested to your defense council? +His is the last name, by the way, and his signature. He is the +one that suggested the others to you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, will you go a little bit more +slowly?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: His name is the twentieth name on the list: +“Regierungsrat Dr. Fischer, Expert for Reich Defense Matters”—in +other words, expert attached to the Regierungspräsident. I have +probably seen him at some meeting or other. I take it that he +<span class='pageno' title='489' id='Page_489'></span> +kept the minutes. However, I must admit that I have no personal +recollection of this gentleman. I cannot attach any owner to that +name; but it is clear to me now that he was the person who took +charge of incoming mail for the Reich Defense Commissioner and +probably kept the minutes as well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In view of his junior status—he is only a +Regierungsrat—he cannot have held any other appointment on +this council.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: On Page 31 of that same file you will find another +reference to him, and your initials on the paper this time. It is the +membership list of the Reich Defense Council. There are 20 persons +on there, and the last name is Fischer’s. And at the bottom of the +page are your initials, apparently approving the list. Do you +see that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes; I had to initial this list.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you approved the membership, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot swear that I would not recognize +Dr. Fischer again if I were confronted with him. He seems to have +been the official who kept the minutes. However, among the large +circle of people who attended meetings of this kind, he did not +come to my attention. Only very few Reich defense meetings of +this sort actually took place. What seems to me the decisive point +is that he did not report to me personally but to the Regierungspräsident.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How could you fail to meet him? You met regularly +in 1940 with this Reich Defense Council. We have some documents +here, and I will be glad to show them to you, showing exactly +what you said before that council.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, as I said, he probably kept the minutes +of the meetings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well surely, then, you saw him certainly on some +occasions, between 1940, the date of these files, and 1942, the date +of the SS reports on the exterminations. He apparently was with +you for 2 years before the first report that we have, which is +dated 1942, and he was 1 of 20 on your council.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe I must describe the exact composition +of this Reich Defense Council. There were the leading commanding +generals of the Army and the Luftwaffe; there were +various Gauleiter; there were the people mentioned here; there +was Dr. Putt, the representative of the Economic Management Staff +and all the others who are listed here. In this large circle of people, +whom I had to welcome, there was an official who kept the minutes +<span class='pageno' title='490' id='Page_490'></span> +and who was one of many officials in my office. These meetings, +as you have probably ascertained, took place very infrequently. +Dr. Fischer did not report to me currently, nor did he submit to +me the minutes of these sessions; the Regierungspräsident reported +to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you think that Heinrich Himmler or Reinhard +Heydrich were sending these reports to inferior people around +Germany in these Gaue about the exterminations in the East?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: If these reports had been meant for me, +they would have been sent to me directly. Moreover, I said today +that I do not dispute having been informed of the shooting of Jews +in the East, but at a later period. I mentioned that in connection +with the war. However, the reports themselves were not in my +hands. If these reports had been before me, they would have had +a certain note, which I would recognize immediately.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, let’s see. Of course they are addressed to you, +to the attention of Fischer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But I am going to move on a little bit. Now I am going to tell +you that you got weekly reports. You haven’t seen these. What +do you say to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Weekly reports?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I received innumerable weekly reports from +every possible office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, I am talking about one kind of report. I am +talking about the reports from Heydrich and Himmler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know what you mean.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you had better take a look (Document +3943-PS). We have 55 of them, for 55 weeks. They are all here, +and they run consecutively, and Dr. Fischer is not involved in these. +And each one bears the stamp of your office having received it +on it, and the date that it was received.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>They tell, by the way—and you can look at them—what was +happening to the Jews in the East.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: All these probably—I cannot look at them +all just now. These reports went from the Chief of the Security +Police to the Office of the Reich Defense Commissioner. They +were not, as I can tell from the first document, initialed by myself, +but bear the initials of the Regierungspräsident. I did not receive +these reports; otherwise my initial would have to be there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Dr. Dellbrügge was the man who received them, +according to the note, and he was your chief assistant. Incidentally, +<span class='pageno' title='491' id='Page_491'></span> +I think we ought to make this clear to the Tribunal, both of your +chief assistants were SS Brigadeführer, were they not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should in any case have stated that +Dr. Dellbrügge was one of Himmler’s confidants; but I believe...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And he was your chief assistant, that is the point +I am making. And so was your other chief assistant, also an SS +Brigadeführer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I believe that this statement proves the +opposite of what you want to prove against me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I am going to go on with these weekly reports +in a minute, but there is one thing I do want to ask you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Were you pretty friendly with Heydrich?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I knew Heydrich, and while he was Reich +Protector in Prague he extended an invitation to me as President +of the Southeastern Europe Society to hold a meeting there which +I accepted. However, I did not have close personal contact with +Heydrich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you think he was a good public servant at the +time that he was terrorizing Czechoslovakia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I had the impression that Heydrich, as he said +himself during my stay in Prague, wanted to carry out a policy +of conciliation, especially in regard to Czech workers. I did not +see in him an exponent of a policy of terror. Of course, I have +no practical knowledge of the incidents which took place in Czechoslovakia. +I made only this one visit, or possibly one further visit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You sent a telegram to “Dear Martin Bormann” +when Heydrich was assassinated; do you remember that—the man +who was, I understand, not in your good standing in 1942? Do you +remember when Heydrich was assassinated by some Czech patriots +in Prague?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you remember what you did when you heard +about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not remember exactly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Perhaps if I read you this telegram you will +remember it.</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“To Reichsleiter Bormann, Berlin, Party Chancellery; Express. +Urgent. Immediate attention.</p> + +<p>“Dear Martin Bormann:</p> + +<p>“I request that the following be submitted to the Führer.</p> + +<p>“Knowing the Czech population and its attitude in Vienna +as well as in the Protectorate, I would draw your attention +to the following: +<span class='pageno' title='492' id='Page_492'></span></p> + +<p>“The enemy powers and the British cliques around Beneš +have for a long time felt bitter about the co-operation +generally found among the Czech workers and their contribution +to the German war economy. They are seeking for a +means to play off the Czech population and the Reich against +each other. The attack on Heydrich was undoubtedly planned +in London. The British arms of the assailant suggest parachuted +agents. London hopes by means of this murder to +induce the Reich to take extreme measures with the aim of +bringing about a resistance movement among Czech workers. +In order to prevent the world from thinking that the population +of the Protectorate is in opposition to Hitler, these acts +must immediately be branded as of British authorship. A +sudden and violent air attack on a British cultural town +would be most effective and the world would have learned of +this through the headline ‘Revenge for Heydrich.’ That alone +should induce Churchill to desist immediately from the procedure +begun in Prague of stirring up revolt. The Reich +replies to the attack at Prague by a counterattack on world +public opinion.</p> + +<p>“It is suggested that the following information be given the +press tomorrow regarding the attempt on Heydrich’s life.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And then you go on to say that it was the work of British +agents and that it originated in Britain. You sign it, “Heil Hitler, +Dein Schirach.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember sending that telegram to Bormann?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have just been listening to the English +translation. I should like to see the German original, please.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you read, I thought, a British +“coastal” town, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: No, “cultural” I meant to say, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is what I have got.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, it is “cultural.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Incidentally, I call your attention, Mr. Witness, to the word +“cultural.” You have expressed such a great interest in culture.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Would it be all right to break off now, or do +you want to go on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I had hoped I could finish. I won’t be many minutes, +but I do have one or two rather important documents that I would +like to put to the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, if we recess, may I ask that the witness not be +talked to by his counsel overnight? I think it is only fair, when +<span class='pageno' title='493' id='Page_493'></span> +a witness is under cross-examination, that he not have conversations +with his counsel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should like to say to this document...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I should like to have this question +clarified as to whether as defense counsel I am entitled to talk with +my client or not. Mr. Dodd forbade me to talk to my client some +time ago; and, of course, I acquiesced. But, if I am told that I +must not speak to my client until the end of the cross-examination +and the cross-examination is to be continued on Monday, that +means that I cannot speak with my client tomorrow or the day +after. But, in order to carry on his defense, I must have an opportunity +of discussing with my client all the points raised here today.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I will withdraw my request. I really +forgot we were going over until Monday. I do think it is the +ordinary rule, but I do think it might present some difficulty for +the counsel here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I want to be fair with the Tribunal. During the recess Dr. Sauter +approached the witness stand and I did tell him then that I did +not think he should talk to him during the recess while he was +under cross-examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is the British rule, but I think in +the circumstances we had better let Dr. Sauter...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I quite agree. I was thinking we would go on +tomorrow, but I do not want to interfere with his consultation +over the weekend.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 27 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='494' id='Page_494'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINTH DAY</span><br/> Monday, 27 May 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Schirach resumed the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I would like to make certain that I +did offer the following documents in evidence: 3914-PS, which +becomes USA-863; 3943-PS, USA-864; and 3877-PS, USA-865.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, at the close of the session on Friday we +had just handed to you a copy of the teletype message to Martin +Bormann. I had read it to you over this transmission system. I +wish to ask you now if you sent that message to Bormann.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I dispatched that teletype message, and +I should like to give an explanation in this connection. First...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May I interrupt you just for a minute and ask that +for the little while that we will be talking today, that you wait just +a minute after your answer. I think it would help a little bit with +the interpreting. I do not think we will have any trouble this +morning. I will try to do the same thing, and perhaps we will work +a little better together.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First of all, then, I want to explain why I +addressed Bormann with “Du,” in the friendly form. Bormann and +I come from the same town; I knew him from Weimar, but only +slightly. And when in 1928 or ’29 he came to Munich, he paid me a +visit, and because he was the elder of us he suggested to me that +we should call one another “Du.” We maintained that form until +1943, when on his own initiative he dropped it and addressed me +in his letters only with “Sie.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, the text of this teletype message: We were in the third +year of the war; the Czech population both in the Protectorate of +Bohemia and Moravia and in Vienna had remained perfectly quiet; +in the Protectorate conditions were almost like those in peacetime. +I had a very large Czech population in Vienna, and as a result of +the attempt on Heydrich’s life I feared that in the Protectorate +there might be unrest which would no doubt have serious repercussions +in Vienna. This was the time when German troops were +advancing on the peninsula of Kerch; it was a time when we could +<span class='pageno' title='495' id='Page_495'></span> +not afford to have anything happen behind our front. And simultaneously +with the news of the murder of the Protector I received +official notification that the attempt, as is mentioned in this document, +had been carried out by British agents and with British +weapons.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>During the same month we heard, and it was also mentioned in +the Wehrmacht communiqués, that British bombers had bombed +residential areas in Hamburg and Paris and had attacked German +cultural sites at Kiel. And so I suggested a reprisal measure to +establish before the world British guilt in this attempt and to +prevent serious unrest in Czechoslovakia. That is all I have to say. +This teletype message is genuine.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I at this point also comment on a difficulty of translation +which occurred during the last cross-examination on Friday? The +German word “Retter” was at that time translated into the English +“savior.” It is an expression which I used in my book when I described +the Führer as a “Retter,” and the difficulty lies in the translation +of that word into English: it can only be translated into +English as “savior.” But retranslated into German, “savior” means +“Heiland.” In order to make quite clear what the German “Retter” +is meant to express in English, I should have to use an explanatory +phrase. If I say that the exact translation is “rescuer,” then the +real meaning of the word “Retter” is clearly set forth; and there is +nothing blasphemous in the comparison or the description of the +head of the State as a “rescuer.” But if I had written in German +that the head of the State was a “Heiland,” then, of course, that +would be blasphemy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This sort of explanation should be kept for +re-examination. It is not a matter which ought to interrupt the +cross-examination.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, I have only one or two questions to ask you +in addition about this message.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Were you thinking of some particular cultural city in Britain, +like Cambridge, Oxford, Stratford, Canterbury?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I had no definite plan in mind. I thought +that one ought to choose an objective corresponding to the sites hit +by British bombers in Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: As long as it was a cultural city. Were you thinking +of what happened in Germany or of what happened to Heydrich?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was thinking of the cultural buildings in +Germany which had been attacked, and I wanted to suggest this as +an opportunity to make clear unmistakably that the murder of +Heydrich had not been committed by the Czech population but by +<span class='pageno' title='496' id='Page_496'></span> +the Czech emigrants in London with British support. This retaliation +in the third year of the war was to be a reply both to the +attempt against Heydrich and to the attacks on German cultural +monuments.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not make any reference in this telegram +to any so-called or alleged bombings of cultural objects in Germany, +did you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Wehrmacht communiqués had already announced +them, and they were generally known.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is not what I asked you. I asked if it is not a +fact that in this teletype you made no reference at all to the alleged +bombing of cultural objects in Germany, nor did you relate your +suggestion for the bombing of a cultural town in England to any +alleged cultural bombing in Germany, but rather, you made it perfectly +clear that you wanted to strike at a cultural town in England +because of what had happened to Heydrich. That is so, is it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It was not at all necessary for me to point +to the bombing of German cultural sites. It was a fact known to +the entire German population from the daily attacks of British +bombers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I suppose by this time you knew very well the +general reputation of Heydrich, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, that is not correct. I considered Heydrich +in this particular case as the representative of the Reich in Bohemia +and Moravia and not as the Chief of the Gestapo.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you know his general reputation in Germany at +least at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I knew that he was the Chief of the Gestapo. +I did not know that he had committed the atrocities which have +meanwhile become known.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You had no knowledge that he was considered “the +terror of the Gestapo”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is an expression which enemy propaganda +used against him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You mean you still think it is propaganda?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, was it through enemy propaganda that you +heard that he was called a terror before he was killed in 1942?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not want to say that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How did you know it? +<span class='pageno' title='497' id='Page_497'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I merely want to state here that for me the +Reich Protector Heydrich was during this third year of the war a +person other than the Chief of the Gestapo. This was a political +matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not content yourself with this suggestion to +bomb England, did you? Do you recall what else you suggested not +long afterwards?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you recall anything that you either suggested or +did by way of further so-called retaliation for the assassination of +Heydrich?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I have no recollection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You suggested evacuating all the Czechs out of +Vienna, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This is a suggestion which did not originate +with me personally, but which goes back to a remark about Vienna +which the Führer himself had made in 1940 while I was reporting +to him at his headquarters. I think I already mentioned during my +own testimony that he said, “Vienna must become a German city +and the Jews and Czechs must gradually be evacuated from +Vienna.” I already said that during my own testimony here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: My question is: Is it not a fact that a few days after +the assassination of Heydrich you suggested the evacuation of the +Czechs from Vienna as a retaliatory measure for the assassination of +Heydrich?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no recollection of it, but it is possible +that in the excitement of this event, which disquieted me greatly, +I said something like that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I suggest that you take a look at Document 3886-PS, +which becomes USA-866, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, this document consists of excerpts from the record of a +meeting of the Vienna City Council on 6 June 1942, as you will see +on Page 9 of the original. You were present, and according to these +notes, you spoke as Reichsleiter Baldur von Schirach and, moving +down towards the bottom of that page, you will find this statement:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Finally, he”—meaning you—“disclosed that already in the +latter part of summer or in the fall of this year all Jews +would be removed from the city, and that the removal of the +Czechs would then get under way, since this is the necessary +and right answer to the crime committed against the Deputy +Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you remember saying that? +<span class='pageno' title='498' id='Page_498'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no exact recollection, but I consider +that these records here are genuine, and they probably represent +the sense of what I said at the time. I was very much perturbed by +Heydrich’s death. I was afraid of serious trouble in Bohemia and +Moravia, and I expressed my fears. The essential thing is that after +calm consideration of this plan I dropped it, and did nothing more +about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, in any event, I think it is perfectly clear—and +I ask you if you do not agree—that you made two suggestions +at least: one for the bombing of a cultural English town and the +other for the wholesale evacuation of the Czechs from Vienna, +because of the assassination of this man Heydrich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It is true that I put the idea of such an +evacuation of the Czechs into words. It is equally true, and a +historical fact, that I dropped the idea and that it was never carried +out. It is correct that I suggested the bombing of a British cultural +site as an answer to the attempt against Heydrich and to the +innumerable bombardments of German cultural places in the third +year of the war, at a time when vital interests of the German people +were at stake.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Incidentally, Hitler also suggested the wholesale +evacuation of the Czechs from Czechoslovakia as a punishment for +the murder of Heydrich, did he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now I want to turn to something else and see if we +can get through here rather soon this morning. You recall that on +Friday we talked a little bit about your relationship with the SS +and with Himmler, and I want to ask you this morning if it is not +a fact, Mr. Witness, that you worked very closely with Himmler +and his SS from almost the earliest days right down to almost the +last days of your regime in Vienna. I wish you would answer that +question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I should very much like to answer that +question in great detail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It does not require great detail in the first answer, +but later, if you feel that you have some necessary explanation, I +am sure you will be permitted to do so. Will you tell the Tribunal +first of all, rather, if it is not a fact that you did closely co-operate +with Himmler and his SS from the earliest days of your public +office to the very late days of your public office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Close collaboration in the sense that Himmler +had considerable influence upon education did not exist. +<span class='pageno' title='499' id='Page_499'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let us stop right there and inquire a little bit. Is it +not a fact that Himmler assigned his SS personnel to your youth +organization for the training purpose of your young people? You +can answer that very simply. Did he or did he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: For training purposes?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I am not aware of anything like that. The +fact that there might have been liaison officers would not be +unusual, because practically all ministries and organizations had +liaison officers. What you have just suggested, however, I do not +recall.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I think we had better clear this up first, and I ask +you that you look at Document 3931-PS, which is a new document +which becomes USA-867, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, Mr. Witness, if you will look at this document, you will +observe that it is a message which you sent to “Dear Party Member +Bormann” in August of 1941. It is quite long, and there will not be +any necessity, I am sure, for reading all of it, but I want to direct +your attention to some parts of it that might help your memory +with respect to the SS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>By way of preliminary question, the SA apparently had suggested +that it take over some of the training of young people, had it not, +some time in the summer of 1941?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I said in my testimony—I think on Thursday—that +already in the spring of 1939, I believe, the SA had +attempted to take over the premilitary training of the youth of the +two older age classes, and such attempts were probably repeated +in 1941.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I knew you were complaining to Bormann +about it when you wrote this message. You recall now, do you not, +from just looking at the letter, that that is the whole substance of +the letter—a complaint about the attempt of the SA to directly +control the training of some young people in the Hitler Youth +organization.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot speak about this long teletype letter +without having read through it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, let us see. If you will turn to the second page +of the English text—you do not have any pages there; I think it is +all one. It is all a teletype, but it will be not too far down on the +first part of it. First of all, I want to have you see if you can find +the statement that “the Hitler Youth has considered it necessary +from the very beginning to make the Party itself the agency for the +<span class='pageno' title='500' id='Page_500'></span> +direction and administration of its military training.” Do you find +that passage?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you will find the paragraph numbered (1) on +your teletype, small Arabic number one. You will find they start to +be numbered (1), (2), (3), and so on. Do you find that, Mr. Witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have Roman numeral I.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. That is what I want to call your attention +to. If we hit some place that we agree on, then we can move on. +You found that Number (1) that says that “for more than one year +an agreement in draft form has been submitted to the SA which +requests that the SA cadre be furnished for the military training +of the youth,” and that the SA leadership did not comply with this +request.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, will you move down further, let me see, in Number (3), +and then following (3), probably down another whole length three +or four paragraphs, you will find—it is in capital letters, by the +way—what I want to call your attention to; I assume it is in capital +letters in the German:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I would be happy if the SA would put personnel at my +disposal for support for this purpose, similar to the way in +which the SS and the Police have been doing for a long time +already.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>In the English, Mr. President, that is at the bottom of Page 4 +and the top of Page 5.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the defendant.</span>] Did you find that sentence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You say there that you would be happy if the SA +would put personnel at your disposal for support of this purpose, +similar to the way in which the SS and the Police have been doing +for a long time already, and you are referring—if you will read +back to the paragraph just ahead of that sentence—to the training +of the young people. You talk about Hitler Schools and the training +of Hitler Youth. Now, it is perfectly clear, is it not, that you did +have assistance from the SS, according to your own words, from +the SS and Police, for a long time before you sent this message?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: During the war, yes; since the beginning of +the war in 1939 we had premilitary training camps and I wanted +youth instructors for these camps. Neither the Army nor the SA +could supply sufficient instructors; the SS and the Police could +place a few young officers at my disposal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: So it was only from the beginning of the war that +you had personnel from the SS and Police for the training of young +people, was it? +<span class='pageno' title='501' id='Page_501'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not think that there would have been +need for SS instructors otherwise. As I have said, we selected youth +leaders from among youth itself.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I ask you again, do you want the Tribunal to understand +that it was only from the beginning of the war that you had +the assistance of SS and Police personnel assigned to your youth +organization for the training of young people?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that question definitely for +this reason: we had for example a training camp for skiing practice, +and it was quite possible that one of the instructors was an SA man +or an SS man only because by chance he happened to be one of the +best sportsmen in that field. But I cannot think where such collaboration +existed elsewhere.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Are you able to say that you did not have SS +personnel assigned for training purposes; and I am not talking +about some isolated skimaster, I am talking about a regular program +of assistance from the SS to you in your training of young +people.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as premilitary training is concerned, +it was only through this teletype message that I requested help for +training purposes. Apart from that, I do not recollect any collaboration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know the term “Heuaktion”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Heuaktion? I do not remember it. I do not +know what is meant by that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you have been in the courtroom every day. +Do you not remember that there was proof offered here by the +Prosecution concerning the Defendant Rosenberg and an action +termed Heuaktion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not remember it at the moment; I do +not know it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you not remember that there was some talk +here in the courtroom about the seizing of young people in the East +and forcing them to be brought to Germany, 40,000 or 50,000 youths +at the ages of 10 to 14? You remember that, don’t you, and that one +of the purposes was to destroy the biological potentiality of these +people? You do not know what I refer to?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, that is an action which I now remember +in connection with this Trial. The only thing I can say on this in +an official capacity is what Axmann told me during the war—I +cannot recall the exact year—namely, that he had placed a large +number of young Russians in apprentice hostels and apprentice +workshops at the Junkers works in Dessau, and that these youths +<span class='pageno' title='502' id='Page_502'></span> +were extremely well accommodated and looked after there. I had +not been in any way concerned with this action before, but as I +stated at the beginning of my testimony here, I assume responsibility +for the actions of youth in this war; I adhere to that statement. +I do not think, however, that youth is responsible in this case, +and I recall the Defendant Rosenberg’s statements that he was +complying with the wishes of the Army and an army group in this +affair.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, we have the document here. It is already in +evidence as USA-171—the Tribunal is familiar with it—and I would +like to call your attention to the fact that in this document, which +says that Rosenberg agreed to the program of seizing or apprehending +40,000 to 50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 and the transportation +of them to the Reich, it also said that this program can be +accomplished with the help of the officers of the Hitler Youth +through the Youth Bureau of Rosenberg’s Ministry; and it also said +that a number of these young people were to be detailed to the SS +and SS auxiliaries. Now, what I want to ask you particularly is +what you know about that program and how the Hitler Youth +co-operated in it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot add to what I have already said +about this program.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You were in charge of the war commitment of the +Hitler Youth, were you not, the “Kriegseinsatz”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The war commitment of German youth was +under immediate direction of the Reich Youth Leader. From my +own knowledge I can give only general but no detailed information.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. Witness, I ask you again, were you not appointed +and did you not serve as the person responsible for the war +commitment of youth in Germany? Now, I have got the document +to show your appointment if you want to see it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes; I do not want to deny it at all. In 1939 +and 1940, as long as I was Reich Youth Leader, I myself directed +that war commitment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am talking about an appointment that was made +even later than 1939 or 1940. You were appointed the person in +charge of the war commitment of German youth by the Führer at +his headquarters in March of 1942, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Will you be good enough to show me the +document. I consider it possible, but I have no exact recollection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right. It is 3933-PS, which becomes USA-868. +But first of all: You do not know you were appointed in charge of +the war commitment for youth without being shown the document? +<span class='pageno' title='503' id='Page_503'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No; only I cannot tell you the exact date from +memory. I was under the impression that I had been responsible +for the war commitment beginning in 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right, that is all I wanted to establish, that you +were in fact responsible for it and continued to be responsible for +it right up to the end of the war. I understood you to say a minute +ago that the Reich Youth Leader was the man responsible rather +than yourself?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. I said that I could give you only general +but no special information, because the practical application of the +war commitment was a matter for Axmann; I do not, however, +want to minimize my own responsibility in any way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well. I think we are sufficiently clear about +the fact that you were certainly named to the position no matter +how you now wish to “water” your responsibility. What do you say +is the date when you first became responsible for the war commitment +of youth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: As far as I remember, I was responsible for it +beginning 1939, at the outbreak of war, but I now see that this +decree was not signed until 1942.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: All right; we will agree then that from that date, +March 1942, you were responsible. Now, I want to ask you to look +at another document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: One moment, may I explain something in +this connection? I do not know whether Hitler signed this decree in +March 1942; I do not know when it was signed. In this document +Axmann tells me: the draft of the decree is now going to the Chief +of the Reich Chancellery, who will request the official approval of +the higher Reich authorities concerned, and then Bormann...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You do not need to read it, really. What do you +want to say now? Are you saying that maybe it was not signed, or +maybe you were not appointed, or are you going to say that you +were appointed? Will you please give us an answer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not at all. But I really cannot say that the +date of the publication of this decree was March 1942. It may not +have been published until May.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am not attaching any great importance to the date. +I want you to look at 345-PS, which we offer as USA-869. This may +help you on this Heuaktion program; that is, with respect to your +memory.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, this is a telegram that the Defendant Rosenberg sent to +Dr. Lammers at the Reich Chancellery for the Führer’s headquarters +<span class='pageno' title='504' id='Page_504'></span> +on 20 July 1944. You will observe that in the first paragraph there +is stated:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In accordance with an agreement between the Reich Marshal +as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, the Reichsführer +SS, the Youth Führer of the German Reich, and the Reich +Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the recruiting +of young Russians, Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Lithuanians, +and Tartars, between 15 and 20 years of age, ‘will +take place on a volunteer basis for Kriegseinsatz in the +Reich’ ”—“Kriegseinsatz” being a program that you were +responsible for clearly at that time.</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, moving down, I want to call your attention to Paragraph 3, +and I want to remind you of the Heuaktion document that is +already in evidence. This telegram says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“On the basis of a suggestion by military offices, the seizing +and turning over of youths between the ages of 10 to 14 to +the Reich territories will take place (Heuaktion) in a part of +the operational territory, since the youths in the operational +territory present a not insignificant burden.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>It goes on to say:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The aim of the action is a further disposal of the youths by +placing them in the Reich Youth Movement, and the training +of apprentices for German economy in a form similar to that +which has been effected in agreement with the Plenipotentiary +General for the Allocation of Labor with White Russian +Youths, which already shows results.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I particularly call your attention to that last phrase, “which +already shows results.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then the last clause in the next sentence, which says, “...these +youths are to be used later in the Occupied Eastern Territories as +especially reliable construction forces.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You will observe that the last paragraph says that “the actions +under Points 1 and 3”—which I have just been reading—“are known +to the Führer.” And there is something about SS help in regard to +this action. You had set a time limit on that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next page of the document has the distribution, to the Reich +Marshal, the Reichsführer SS, the Reich Youth Führer, and the +Reich Minister of Interior, and down at the bottom, a Gauleiter +bureau, among others.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>What do you know about this seizing of young people between +10 and 14 and the turning over of them to your youth organization +in Germany during these war years, and about how many thousands +of them were so kidnaped, if you know? +<span class='pageno' title='505' id='Page_505'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have already said that I do not wish to +minimize my responsibility in this connection. But it was not until +later that I was informed of this matter. Not I, but somebody else +was Youth Leader of the German Reich in that year; and he made +the agreement with the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and +the Reichsführer SS. But my own measures were...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Later you were the Youth Reichsleiter of Germany, +were you not? And you were also the war commitment officer of +Youth in Germany at this very time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was at Vienna, and the date was 20 July +1944. You will remember that the history-making events of that +time were occupying all officials in Germany to a very great extent. +Later I heard about this matter from Axmann, and I know that the +accommodation, training, feeding, and the whole treatment of these +Russian youths was actually excellent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You also know that even at this hour the Allied +forces are trying to find thousands of these young people to return +them to their proper place? Do you know that this morning’s press +carried an account of 10,000 people that are still unlocated?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe that those are these young +people who were accommodated in apprentice hostels and who +under exceptionally well-ordered conditions received very good +professional training.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You see, it is perfectly clear from this Document +345-PS that this program was in fact in operation. The letter from +Rosenberg says so. He says it had “already shown results.” And so +your youth organization must have had something to do with it +before this message was sent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have not at all denied that. Youth leaders +were active within the framework of the Reich Ministry for the +Occupied Eastern Territories. And on the basis of what I have +heard here during the Trial, I can perfectly well understand that +the generals in the East said that the young people must be taken +out of the combat zone. The point was that these youngsters from +10 to 14 years of age had to be taken away from the front.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: With the help of the SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, I want to show you another document, 1137-PS, which will +give you some idea, if you do not recall, of what was done with +these young people, and how many of them are involved.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That will become USA-870.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, there is a paragraph at the bottom +of Page 1 of that document which relates to another defendant. +<span class='pageno' title='506' id='Page_506'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor, I am sorry; I overlooked that. I +will read it for the benefit of the record, if I may, at this time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. Witness, I direct your attention back, if I may, to this Document +345-PS, so that you will be aware of what I am reading. You +will observe that in the last paragraph of Rosenberg’s communication +to Dr. Lammers we find this sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I have learned that Gauleiter Sauckel will be at the Führer’s +headquarters on 21 July 1944. I ask that this be taken up +with him there and then a report made to the Führer.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Sauckel was participating in this kidnaping of 10- to 14-year-olds +as well, was he? Do you know about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no knowledge of it. I cannot give any +information on that subject.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, this Document 1137-PS begins with a letter +from a general, a message rather, an interoffice memorandum, +dated 27 October 1944, and it closes with a report by the brigadier +general of the Hitler Youth, a man named Nickel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you know Nickel, by the way? N-i-c-k-e-l?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The name is known to me, and probably I +know the man personally; but at the moment I do not recall more +than just the name. At any rate, he was not a brigadier general; +he was a Hauptbannführer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, all right. Whatever he was, he was an official +of the youth organization. That is all I am trying to establish. +I may have his title wrong. We have it brigadier general.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>But in any event, if you look over this document, you will see +that he is reporting about the seizing of these youths in the +Occupied Eastern Territory. This is October 1944. And he begins by +saying that on 5 March he “received an order to open an office for +the recruitment of youths from 15 to 20 years of age from the +Occupied Eastern Territories for war employment in the Reich.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then he goes on to cite figures, and he tells where he began his +work: Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, the middle sector of the Eastern +front, the southern sector of the Eastern front. And then on the next +page of the English—and I imagine it is also on your next page—it +tells how they were classified, those that were brought back:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>“1,383 Russian SS Auxiliaries, 5,953 Ukrainian SS Auxiliaries, +2,354 White Ruthenian SS Auxiliaries, 1,012 Lithuanian SS +Auxiliaries.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then he gets into the Air Force: “3,000 Estonian Air Force +Auxiliaries,” and so on. Some went to the Navy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am not going to read all of it; but it gives you an idea of what +distribution was made of these men, or young boys and girls rather +than men. You will notice that a considerable number went to the SS. +<span class='pageno' title='507' id='Page_507'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, but Hauptbannführer Nickel’s letter bears +a stamp with the words “Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories.” +That means he was not acting on behalf of the Reich Youth +Leader’s department but on behalf of the Reich Ministry for +the East.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. I also want to ask you if you will look at +Page 6. I think it is Page 5 of the original of your German. You +will find what personnel Hauptbannführer Nickel had for the +purpose of carrying out his task. He had members of the Hitler +Youth, so he says: 5 leaders, 3 BDM leaders, 71 German youth +leaders as translators and assistant instructors, 26 SS leaders, 234 +noncommissioned officers and troops, drivers, and translators of +the SS. And of the Air Force personnel, he had 37 officers, 221 non-coms, +and so on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Does that help your memory any with this program that your +youth people were engaging in? Do you recall any more of it now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: It does not help my memory at all, because I +hear this for the first time from this document. I was not informed +of the activities of the Eastern Ministry in Russia, and I do not +know what assignment the Eastern Ministry gave to Hitler Youth +Leader Nickel. I assume responsibility for what was done on my +orders, but anything done on the orders of others must be their +responsibility.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me show you something with respect to your +answer that you have just made. That personnel that I read out, +you know, was only in one part of the program. And on the last +page of the document you will see on how wide an area Nickel was +operating. He was operating in co-operation with the Netherlands +Hitler Youth Operational Command, the Adria Hitler Youth +Operational Command, the Southern Hitler Youth Operational +Command in Slovakia and Hungary, the Lieutenant Nagel Special +Command in refugee camps within the Reich, and then, interestingly +enough, the field offices in Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is where you were located at the time, is it not? And you +are telling the Tribunal you did not know anything about this +program and the participation of your Hitler Youth Leaders?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I received no written or verbal report from +Nickel. His report, as can be seen from the letter, went to the Reich +Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and to what extent +the Reich Youth Leader was being informed is not known to me. +I myself do not know what took place. What I do know of the entire +affair I very clearly stated in my testimony with reference to the +Junkers works and the professional training which these youngsters +<span class='pageno' title='508' id='Page_508'></span> +were given in Germany. Apart from that I have no further +knowledge.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Observe also, if you will, Mr. Witness, that your +Hitler Youth Operational Command was in Poland, and even in +northern Italy. And now I ask you once again, as the long-time +Hitler Youth Leader, as the leader for the War Commitment of +Youth, then Gauleiter in Vienna, with part of this program being +carried on in Vienna and the whole program being carried on on +this vast scale, do you want the Tribunal to believe that you knew +nothing about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no knowledge of it, but I assume +responsibility for it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal in your direct examination +that you wrote the letter to Streicher’s <span class='it'>Stürmer</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I would like to submit this in evidence, Mr. President, so that the +Tribunal will have an idea of what it appeared like on the front +page of <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Perhaps—if you would like to look at it, you may, of course, +Mr. Witness. It is USA-871. I just wanted you to have a look at it +before it was submitted. You know about it anyway.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I already made a statement about that the +other day.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, I did not wish to go into it further. What I do +want to ask you, Mr. Witness, is: Do I understand you clearly when +I say that from your testimony we gathered that it was Hitler who +ordered the evacuation of the Jews from Vienna and that you really +did not suggest it or wish to see it carried out? Is that a fair understanding +of your testimony of a day or two ago?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I stated the other day, and I repeat this, that +the idea of evacuating the Jews from Vienna was Hitler’s idea +which he communicated to me in 1940 at his headquarters. Furthermore, +and I want to make this quite clear, I stated that after the +events of those November days in 1938 I was actually of the opinion +that it would be better for the Jewish population to be accommodated +in a closed settlement than to be regularly singled out by +Goebbels as a target for his propaganda and his organized actions. +I also said that I identified myself with that action suggested by +Hitler, but did not carry it out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now you had a meeting at the Führer’s headquarters +in October 1940. Present was the Defendant Frank and the +now notorious Koch whom we have heard so much about. Do you +remember that meeting?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I no longer recall it exactly. +<span class='pageno' title='509' id='Page_509'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, you mean you do not recall that meeting at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In October 1940 I was in the Reich Chancellery +because that was the time when I was organizing the evacuation +of youth. It is possible that at lunch...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You were asked whether you recalled a +particular meeting in October 1940 with certain particular people. +Do you remember it or do you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have no recollection of it. If I am shown +a document, then I can confirm it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well; that is what I wanted to know. I will +now show you the document USSR-172. A part of this document +was read over the system for the Tribunal by Colonel Pokrovsky. +Now you will observe that on 2 October—this is a memorandum, by +the way, made up of the meeting. Herr Martin Bormann compiled +these notes, so I assume he was there too. After a dinner at the +Führer’s apartment there developed a conversation on the nature of +the Government General:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The treatment of the Poles and the incorporation already +approved by the Führer for the districts Petrikau and +Tomassov.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Then it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The conversation began when Reich Minister Dr. Frank +informed the Führer that the activities in the Government +General could be termed very successful. The Jews in Warsaw +and other cities were now locked up in the ghettos and +Kraków would very shortly be cleared of them. Reichsleiter +Von Schirach, who had taken his seat at the Führer’s other +side, remarked that he still had more than 50,000 Jews in +Vienna whom Dr. Frank would have to take over. Party +Member Dr. Frank said this was impossible. Gauleiter Koch +then pointed out that he, too, had up to now not transferred +either Poles or Jews from the District of Ziechenau, but that +these Jews and Poles would now, of course, have to be +accepted by the Government General.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And it goes on to say that Dr. Frank protested against this also. +He said there were not housing facilities—I am not quoting directly, +I do not want to read all of it—and that there were not sufficient +other facilities. Do you remember that conference now?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have refreshed my memory now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. And you suggested that you wanted to get +50,000 Jews moved into Frank’s territory out of Vienna, didn’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. The Führer asked me +how many Jews were still in Vienna, and at that time—I mentioned +<span class='pageno' title='510' id='Page_510'></span> +this during my own testimony the other day and it is contained in +the files—there were still 60,000 Jews in Vienna. During that conversation, +in which the question of settling Jews in the Government +General was discussed, I also said that these 60,000 Jews from +Vienna were still to be transferred to the Government General. I +told you earlier that as a result of the events of November 1938 I +was in favor of the Führer’s plan to take the Jews to a closed +settlement.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well now, later on, as you know from USA-681 +concerning which your own counsel inquired, Lammers sent you a +message in Vienna and he said the Führer had decided, after receipt +of one of the reports made by you, that the 60,000 Jews in Vienna +would be deported most rapidly, and that was just 2 months after +this conference that you had with Frank and Koch and Hitler, +wasn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, since 1937—and I think that becomes +clear from the Hossbach minutes—the Führer had the idea of +expatriating the Jewish population. This plan, however, did not +become known to me until August 1940 when I took over the +Vienna district. I reported to Hitler on that occasion, and he asked +me how many Jews there were in Vienna. I answered his question, +and he told me that he actually wanted all of them to be settled in +the Government General.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How many Jews did you, in fact, deport out of +your district while you were the Gauleiter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First of all, the practical measures of that +action were not in my hands. I do not know how many of these +60,000 Jews were actually transported out of Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you have any idea where they went to?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was informed that the aged were being +taken to Theresienstadt and the others to Poland, to the Government +General. On one occasion—it was either when I took my oath +of office as Governor or when I made a speech about the evacuation +of children—I even asked Hitler how these Jews were being +employed, and he told me: in accordance with their professions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: We will get around to that. You remember, don’t +you, that they were sent, at least some of them were sent, to the +cities of Riga and Minsk, and you were so notified. Do you remember +receiving that information?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now take a look at Document 3921-PS, which +becomes USA-872. Now this is a communication concerning the +evacuation of Jews, and it shows that 50,000 Jews were to be sent +<span class='pageno' title='511' id='Page_511'></span> +to the Minsk-Riga area, and you got a copy of this report as the +Commissar for the Defense of the Reich, and if you will look on +the last page you will see an initial there of your chief assistant, +the SS man Dellbrügge, and also the stamp of your own office as +having received it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can only see that Dr. Dellbrügge marked the +matter for filing. It shows the letters “z. d. A.” to the files.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And he did not tell you about this report concerning +the Jews? Even though you had been talking to Hitler about it? +That they were being moved out of your area? I suppose your chief +assistant did not bother to tell you anything about it. Is that what +you want us to understand?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now then, take a look at another document which +will shed some light on this one. It is USA-808, already in evidence. +It tells you what happened to the Jews in Minsk and Riga, and this +was also received in your office if you recall. Maybe it is not +necessary to show it to you again. You remember the document—that +is one of those monthly reports from Heydrich wherein he said +that there were 29,000 Jews in Riga and they had been reduced to +2,500, and that 33,210 were shot by the special unit, and “Einsatz” +group. Do you remember that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: During the last 2 days I looked at these +monthly reports most carefully. The bottom right-hand corner of +the cover of these monthly reports—and I want to make this +categorically clear—bears initials something like “Dr. FSCH.,” +that is Dr. Fischer’s initials. At the top the reports are not initialed +by me, but by the Government President, with the notation that +they should be put into the files. If I had read them...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am not suggesting that you had your initials on any +document like this, but I am claiming that these documents came +into your organization and into the hands of your principal assistant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But I must point out that if they had been +submitted to me, then there would have been on them the notation, +“submitted to the Reichsleiter,” and the official submitting them +would have initialed this notation. If I myself had seen them, then +my own initials would be on them with the letters “K.g.,” noted.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. I want to remind you that the date of that +report is February 1942, and I also want to remind you that in +there as well Heydrich tells you how many Jews they had killed in +Minsk. Now you made a speech one time in Poland about the Polish +or the Eastern policy of Germany. Do you remember it, Mr. +Witness? +<span class='pageno' title='512' id='Page_512'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In Poland, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In 1939 I spent a short time in Poland, but I +do not think I was there again later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Your memory seems particularly poor this morning. +Don’t you remember speaking in Katowice on 20 January 1942?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is Upper Silesia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Upper Silesia, all right. Do you remember that +speech?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I made a speech at Katowice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And did you talk about Hitler’s policy for the +Eastern Territories?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot say from memory what I spoke about +there. I have made many speeches.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I will ask that you be shown D-664, which +becomes USA-873. You were speaking to a group of Party leaders +and German youth leaders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In Paragraph 7, you dealt with the tasks of German +youth in the East. The Hitler Youth had carried out political +schooling along the line of the Führer’s Eastern policy and you +went on to say how grateful you were to the Führer for having +turned the German people toward the East, because the East was +the destiny of your people. What did you understand to be the +Führer’s Eastern policy, or did you have a good understanding of it +at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I said this in Upper Silesia out of gratitude +for the return of that territory to us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I didn’t ask you that, really. I asked you if +you then understood the Führer’s policy when you made that +speech?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: On the basis of our victory over Poland and +the recovery of German soil, I naturally affirmed Germany’s policy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You not only affirmed it, but I want to know if you +really understood it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not quite know how I should answer that +question. Probably Hitler’s conception of the term Eastern policy +was quite different from mine.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But my point is that he had told you about it, hadn’t +he, some time before you made this speech? +<span class='pageno' title='513' id='Page_513'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>You had better look back at that document you have in your +hands, USSR-172, and you will find that, after you and Frank and +Koch and Hitler finished talking about deporting the Jews from +Vienna, the Führer then told you what he intended to do with the +Polish people, and it is not a very pretty story, if you will look at it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Hitler says here:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The ideal picture would be that a Pole in the Government +General had only a small parcel of land sufficient to feed +himself and his family fairly well. Anything else he might +require in cash for clothing, additional food, and so on he +would have to earn by working in Germany. The Government +General would be the central office for providing untrained +workers, particularly agricultural workers. The livelihood +of these workers would be assured, for they could +always be used as cheap labor. There would be no question of +further agricultural labor for Poland.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me read a few excerpts that I think you have +missed:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Führer further emphasized that the Poles, in direct contrast +to our German Workmen, are born for hard labor...” +and so on. “The standard of living in Poland has to be and to +remain low.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Moving over to the next page:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“We, the Germans, had on one hand overpopulated industrial +districts, while there was also a shortage of manpower for +agriculture. That is where we could make use of Polish +laborers. For this reason, it would be right to have a large +surplus of manpower in the Government General so that +every year the laborers needed by the Reich could in fact be +procured from there. It is indispensable to keep in mind +that there must be no Polish land owners. However cruel this +may sound, wherever they are, they must be exterminated. +Of course, there must be no mixing of blood with the +Poles.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Further on, he had to stress once more that:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“There should be one master only for the Poles, the Germans. +Two masters side by side cannot exist. All representatives of +the Polish intelligentsia are to be exterminated. This sounds +cruel, but such is the law of life.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Stopping there for a minute, by the way, Mr. Witness—you are +a man of culture, so you have told the Tribunal—how did that +sentiment expressed by the Führer impress you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have never agreed with these opinions of +the Führer, and I said here that I approached him in 1943 on the +<span class='pageno' title='514' id='Page_514'></span> +subject of this policy in the Ukraine. When in 1942 I talked about +Eastern policy in Katowice, the German town of Katowice, to the +German population of Upper Silesia, then, of course, I did not mean +this brutal Polish policy of Hitler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But you knew about it when you made the speech, +did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not recollect it on that occasion 2 years +later, and my speech did not mean it either.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You forgot that Hitler said he must exterminate the +intelligentsia, that you must be masters of these people, that they +must remain at a low standard of living? Did that pass out of your +mind so easily?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I remember that speech in Katowice; I spoke +there about completely different matters. I assume that the Prosecution +even has the shorthand record of that speech and need only +submit it here. This is just a short extract.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: But, you see, Mr. Witness, the point is, knowing +what the policy was, I would like to have you tell the Tribunal +how you could urge and praise that policy to a group of young +people and party leaders on the occasion of this speech in Katowice.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The policy which I was recommending to +youth leaders there was not the policy which Hitler developed in +his table talk.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Of course, you said it was the Führer’s policy in +your speech, and you know what it was, but I won’t press it further +if that is your answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Very often probably—and I once said this +here—I supported the policy of the Führer out of erroneous loyalty +to him. I know that it was not right.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is what I want to know. You were, weren’t +you, acting under an impulse of loyalty to the Führer. Now you +recognize it to be erroneous, and that is all I am inquiring for, and +if you tell the Tribunal that, I shall be perfectly satisfied.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I am prepared to admit that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well. And, Mr. Witness, now we are getting to +it; that goes for all these things that went on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Don’t you have to say to the Tribunal, concerning +your letter to <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span>, and all these things you said about the +Jewish people to the young people, and this slow building up of +race hatred in them, the co-operation with the SS, your handling +<span class='pageno' title='515' id='Page_515'></span> +of the Jews in Vienna, that for all these things you are, and for all +of them, responsible?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Finally, I want to offer in evidence, Mr. President, +some excerpts from these weekly SS reports to which I referred +briefly on Friday, so that they shall be before the Tribunal. There +are 55 of them, Mr. President, and they run consecutively by weeks, +and they all bear the stamp of this defendant’s office as having been +received there, and they supplant the monthly report which was +received up to the time that weekly reports began arriving.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We have not had all of them translated or mimeographed, and +if the defendant wishes to put in any others, we will make them +available, of course. We have selected a few as samples to illustrate +the kind of report that was contained in these weekly reports, and +I wish to offer them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The first one is Number 1, beginning on 1 May 1942, and Numbers +4, 6, 7, 9, 38, 41, and 49.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now I want to make this clear to you, Mr. Witness, out of fairness. +Besides statements concerning what was happening to the +Jews, you will find in these weekly reports a number of statements +about the partisan affairs in the East as well. These excerpts have +mostly to do with what happened to the Jews, and we have not, +Mr. President, drawn out a great number that had to do with the +partisans. There are a number, however, that do have to do with +partisans and not with the Jews, so we wish there to be no doubt +about how we offer these weekly reports. I just want to ask you, +with respect to these weekly reports: Do you this morning recall +that you did receive them every week in your office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But that is not my office. My office is the +Central Office. That office was directed by the Government President, +and one of his officials initialed the files, as appears from the +marking on them, and as any official trained in German office +routine can confirm. They were then put before the Government +President who marked them “for the files” and initialed them. I +could not know these documents at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now just a minute. You were the Reich Commissioner +for the defense of that territory; weren’t you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And that is the stamp that is on these weekly reports, +isn’t it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, what do you mean by saying that it was not +your office? +<span class='pageno' title='516' id='Page_516'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Because the mail, by a procedure similar to +that in a ministry, where it goes to the office of the minister, reached +me in the Central Office; and a corresponding notation had to be +made on these files. I can understand perfectly well why the Government +President, since I was overburdened with work, did not +submit to me material which had no connection at all with Vienna +or my activities, but which was merely informatory and concerned +with events in Russia, mostly guerrilla fighting in Russia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am going to ask you again, as I have so many +times in the course of this examination: Dellbrügge, who initialed +these, was your principal assistant, wasn’t he? Yes or no?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, he was one of my three deputies.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And he was also an SS man, and so was your other +principal assistant, as we asked the other day.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Dellbrügge was a high SS leader. He was a +special confidant of the Reichsführer SS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How did he happen to be working for you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He was assigned to me there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I don’t think it is necessary to read +any excerpts from these weekly reports. They have been translated +into four languages, and—well, I am misinformed. I thought +they were translated. Then I think it would be better if we do +have them translated and submit them at a later date rather than +take the time to read them now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine? We had better +adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor +for the U.S.S.R.): Do you admit that the Hitler Jugend had the task +of inculcating German youth and children, starting from 9 years of +age, with Fascist ideology?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you hear me?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I understood you to ask, whether, I +would admit having inculcated Fascist ideas into 10- to 14-year-old +children of the Hitler Youth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As I said in my testimony a few days ago, I saw my mission +and my duty in educating German youth to be citizens of the +National Socialist State...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: [<span class='it'>Interposing.</span>] That is not an answer to the +question. It is not necessary for you to tell us what you said in +<span class='pageno' title='517' id='Page_517'></span> +your previous evidence. Will you just answer the question: Do you +admit that you inculcated in the Hitler Youth Hitler’s ideology? +You can answer that “yes” or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot answer that question with “yes,” +because it referred to Fascism. There is a great difference between +Fascism and National Socialism. I cannot answer that question with +“yes.” I did educate German youth in the spirit of National +Socialism, that I can admit.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like you to confirm the evidence +which you gave on 16 November 1945, during your interrogation. +You defined your personal attitude to Hitler in the following way; +and I quote your evidence: “I was an enthusiastic adherent of Hitler +and I considered everything that he wrote and stated to be a manifestation +of truth.”<a href='#fa'><span style='font-size:smaller'><sup>[*]</sup></span></a> Do you confirm this statement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I did not say that, and that is not a record +which was submitted to me. I never spoke of Hitler as a deity, +never. I remember exactly, General, that you interrogated me on +this point, and I was asked whether I had been an enthusiastic +follower. I confirmed that, and I spoke about the time when I +joined the Movement; but I never set up the comparison with which +I am now confronted in the translation; I never said that I believed +in Hitler as a deity, never.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You do not understand me correctly. +Nothing is said here about deity. Your evidence has been taken +down, and I will repeat it: “I was an enthusiastic adherent of Hitler, +and I considered everything that he wrote and stated to be a +manifestation of truth.”<a href='#fa'><span style='font-size:smaller'><sup>[*]</sup></span></a></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you confirm this statement? Answer the question directly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The translation is quite inexact. May I ask +you to put the exact question again?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will quote your statement again: “I was +an enthusiastic adherent of Hitler, and I considered everything that +he wrote and stated to be a manifestation of truth.”<a href='#fa'><span style='font-size:smaller'><sup>[*]</sup></span></a> Is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I am accused now of having said: “I was an +enthusiastic adherent of Hitler, and I considered everything that he +wrote and stated to be the personification of truth.” That is how I +understood it, and I must say I could never have uttered such +nonsense.</p> + +<hr class='footnotemark'/> + +<p class='pindent'><a id='fa'></a><span style='font-size:smaller'><sup>[*]</sup></span> The interpreter mistranslated this “and looked upon him as a deity.”</p> + +<hr class='footnotemark'/> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: May I give an explanation of this translation? +I think the correct German would have to be: “I considered +what Hitler said to be a manifestation of truth,” and not “the +<span class='pageno' title='518' id='Page_518'></span> +personification of truth”; then it would be intelligible. There is a +mistake in the interpretation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel has perhaps helped +you to answer my question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: General, that was not my defense counsel, +but the defense counsel for the Defendant Sauckel. If it is translated +“manifestation of truth,” then of course the whole passage +makes sense, and also corresponds roughly to what I said to you +when I described the period of my youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In your book entitled the <span class='it'>Hitler Jugend</span> it said, and I quote +Page 17: “Hitler’s book, <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span>, is our bible.” Do you confirm +this? Did you write that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: But I added something to that in my book +<span class='it'>The Hitler Youth, Its Faith and Organization</span>. I want to say, first +of all, that I did write this book. I wrote it...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like to interrupt you. I do not +need such detailed explanations, and I would like you to answer the +question: Is that sentence contained in your book?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have just confirmed that, but I would like +to add an explanation. In this book—which I wrote in 1933, and +which was published in 1934—I said: “We could not yet offer +detailed reasons for our belief, we simply believed. But when +Hitler’s <span class='it'>Mein Kampf</span> appeared, it was like a bible, which we almost +learned by heart so as to answer the questions of doubtful and +deliberating critics.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is how I worded it at the time; that is correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like to put another more precise +question to you. Do you admit that the Hitler Jugend was a +political organization which, under the leadership of the NSDAP, +carried out the policy of this Party among German youth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Hitler Youth was a large educational +community on a political basis, but I cannot admit that it was led +by the Party; it was led by me. I was a member of the Executive +Committee of the Party, and in that sense one might speak of a +Party influence. But I can see no reason for having to confirm this, +since I have already testified to it. It is correct that the Hitler +Youth was the youth organization of the Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If that is the sense of your question, I will confirm it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, I just had that in view.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I would like to remind you of the tasks which Hitler had assigned +for the education of German youth. That is set out in Rauschning’s +<span class='pageno' title='519' id='Page_519'></span> +book, which has already been submitted as documentary evidence +before the Tribunal as USSR-378. I quote Page 252 of that book:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In my schools we will bring up youth who will make the +world shudder with fear, youth that is hard, exigent, unafraid, +and cruel. That is my wish. Youth must have all these +qualities; they must be indifferent to sufferings; they must +have neither weakness nor softness. I would like to see in +their eyes the proud, self-sufficient glitter of a beast of prey.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>You educated German youth in accordance with these demands +of Hitler. Do you admit that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I will not admit what Herr Rauschning wrote. +Just by accident I was present at a conversation between Hitler +and Rauschning and, judging by it, I must say that the statements +in Rauschning’s book represent an unfaithful record of what Hitler +said. Just by accident I witnessed a conversation between them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Hitler did not give me the directives which Rauschning sets +forth here as the guiding principles laid down by Hitler himself for +the training of the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I did not ask you to give such a detailed +explanation. I would like you to answer the question I put to you +briefly in order to shorten the time of interrogation. You have +stated the Hitler Youth did not educate German youth in the militaristic +spirit and did not prepare German youth for future aggressive +wars. I would like to remind you of certain statements you +made in that very same book of yours, “Hitler Youth,” right here +on Page 83 of that book. Talking of the younger generation, the +so-called Jungvolk, you wrote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“They carry the National Socialist characteristics. The toy +merchants are worried because these children no longer need +toys; they are interested in camp tents, spears, compasses and +maps. It is a particular trait of our youth. Everything that +is against our unity must be thrown to the flames.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And these also were the directives which German soldiers, trained +in the Hitler Youth, followed when they set on fire houses of the +peaceful population in occupied territories, isn’t that true? Is that +contained in the book, the passage I have just read?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: What is in front of me now, is contained in +my book. What I heard from the interpreter is not in my book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Well, then make your corrections.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I read the correct passage?</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The toy merchants have complained to me that the boys”—they +mean the Jungvolk—“no longer want toys, but are +interested only in tents, spears, compasses, and maps. I cannot +help the toy merchants, for I agree with the boys that +<span class='pageno' title='520' id='Page_520'></span> +the times of the Indians are finally gone. What is ‘Old +Shatterhand,’ what is a trapper in the backwoods of America +compared to our troop leader? A miserable, dusty remnant +from the lumber chest of our fathers. Not only the toy +merchants are complaining but also the school-cap manufacturers. +Who wears a school cap nowadays? And who +nowadays is a high-school boy or girl? In some towns the +boys have banded together and publicly burned such school +caps. Burning is, in fact, a specialty of new youth. The +border fences of the minor states of the Reich have also been +reduced to ashes in the fires of your youth.</p> + +<p>“It is a simple but heroic philosophy; everything that is +against our unity must be thrown to the flames.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That, General, is the expression of the “storm and stress” of +youth which has found its special unity.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: According to your opinion, the philosophy +implies that children must no longer play with toys, but must do +other things. Did I understand you correctly? I do not see any +essential difference between my quotation and yours.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: May I say that I think the military training +of the youth of Germany falls much behind that of the Soviet Union.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This is an irrelevant comparison. On +Page 98 of your book, speaking of the Hitler Youth, you wrote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“They strive to be political soldiers. Their model is Adolf +Hitler.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>Did you write that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I have not found the place; is it Page 98?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness has admitted he wrote the whole +book, hasn’t he?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: In order not to lengthen the proceedings +we will pass to the next question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You have already spoken here of a specially created organization +of motorized Hitler Youth; you assert this organization had sport as +its aim; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In connection with the training of the motorized +Hitler Youth I spoke also of ground and driving exercises, and +I admitted that the motorized Hitler Youth had premilitary significance. +I did not dispute this point at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd cross-examined the witness at very +considerable length on these matters about the special units of the +Hitler Youth, and it really is not any good to go over it all again. +<span class='pageno' title='521' id='Page_521'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, several points which are +still unexplained will be clarified through the following questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you have knowledge of the fact that at the end of 1938 the +organization of motorized Hitler Youth consisted of 92 detachments, +that is of 100,000 young men?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot tell you from memory whether there +were 92 detachments, because the word “Abteilung”—that was the +translation—was not a designation for any unit of the Hitler Youth. +I gave the exact strength of the motorized Hitler Youth for 1938 +in one of my statements here either to my defense counsel or to +Mr. Dodd. I gave exact figures of its strength in 1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, I am speaking of 1938, and you give +the number of 100,000 Hitler Youths who formed the motorized youth +organization. Do you have knowledge of this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot tell you from memory whether there +were 100,000 members of the motorized Hitler Youth in 1938. There +might have been 60,000 or 120,000. I cannot say; I do not know. +I have not the documents to prove it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, but I am quoting this number from +data given by the magazine <span class='it'>Das Archiv</span>. I would like to recall to +you the tasks of these organizations as they were set out in this +magazine in November-December 1939. I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The preliminary training of the motorized Hitler Youth must +be carried out in special training groups, and later in special +motorization schools of the National Socialist Motor Corps.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I quote this excerpt according to the document book of the +Defense, Document 20, Page 50 of the Russian text. I repeat:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The preliminary training of the motorized Hitler Youth must +be carried out in special training groups, and later in special +motorization schools of the National Socialist Motor Corps, but +this applies only to youths who have reached the age of 17 or +more. The course of instruction includes motor mechanics, a +driving license test, field driving exercises, and also ideological +schooling. Those who successfully participate in this course +of instruction will be admitted into the National Socialist +Motor Corps.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>This does not quite agree with your statement that the aim was +sport, does it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We heard a long commentary about these +special units, and we really do not want to hear it any more. If you +have any questions on new matters which have not been dealt with +by Mr. Dodd, we shall be glad to hear them, but we do not want +to hear about whether there are 60,000 or 70,000 or 100,000 or +120,000 Hitler Youths in the motorized units. +<span class='pageno' title='522' id='Page_522'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am only quoting what has not been mentioned +yet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General, we do not want to hear it. We do +not want to hear it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will pass on to the next question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You issued a directive for a nation-wide training scheme of the +members of the Hitler Youth, known as “Hitler Youth on Duty.” +This directive foresaw the following kind of education for the Hitler +Youth: the theory of weapons, the theory of firing, target shooting, +rifle practice, military drill, topography, and field exercises; also +instruction in the use of the field compass and the goniometer. Are +you acquainted with this directive? Do you consider that this also +did not constitute military training of German youth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I spoke in great detail about the training of +“Hitler Youth on Duty” in my testimony last Thursday, and I particularly +discussed rifle training which takes up 40 pages of this +book. I mentioned in that connection that this rifle training was +carried out according to the rules of international rifle sport and +that the British Board of Education recommended this rifle training, +and also the entire book, to all Boy Scouts. I do not dispute that +I published this book <span class='it'>Hitler Youth</span> and that it served as a guiding +directive for this training. But I already said that here the other day.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have denied that the Hitler Youth +played an important part in the Fifth Column in Poland. Similar +methods were carried out especially in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav +Government has put at the disposal of the Soviet Prosecution documents +which estimated the part of the “Hitler Youth on Duty,” +under the leadership of the Hitler Jugend, in the organization of the +Fifth Column on Yugoslav territory. Do you have any knowledge +of this? Do you know anything about this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Hitler Youth was never active in the Fifth +Column either in Yugoslavia or anywhere else.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will then quote excerpts from the official +report of the Yugoslav Government. This has already been submitted +to the Tribunal as Exhibit USSR-36. I quote from Page 3 +of the Russian text of this document:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The Reich Government and the Hitler Party have secretly +organized the German minority. From 1930 they had their +own organization, the ‘Union of Culture.’ Already in 1932 +Dr. Jacob Awender held the view that the ‘Union of Culture’ +should be Fascist in its outlook. In 1935 he was put at the +head of an active youth organization which shortly afterwards +received the name of ‘Organization of Revival.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='523' id='Page_523'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Do you know anything about this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I cannot comment on the information which +you have just mentioned. I heard that Bohle had some youth leaders +there as his representatives, but I do not know any details. On the +subject of Yugoslavia I can tell you from my previous activity that +my relations with Yugoslav youth were very amiable and friendly +in the period before the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am not interested in that. I will try to +help your memory by quoting a few excerpts from a supplementary +report of the Yugoslav Government, which is submitted to the Tribunal +as Yugoslav Exhibit, Document Number USSR-357. On Page 5, +in the third line of the Russian text of this document, it says:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“In 1937 there began among the Volksdeutsche in our country +an orientation towards National Socialism, and the first groups +of youth started going to Germany for special courses of +instruction.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>Further down on Page 8, we read that later on, but before the +war with the Soviet Union, the greater part of these members became +officers of the German Army. In addition, a special SS division, +“Prinz Eugen,” was formed from among members of the youth +organizations. Do you deny these facts?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I can admit some; others I must deny. May +I explain this? Since 1933 I tried to bring about good relations with +Yugoslav youth. Starting in 1936 or 1937 I extended invitations to +Yugoslav youth groups, as well as to youth groups of all European +countries, to visit and inspect German youth institutions. Yugoslav +youth groups actually came to Germany in reply to my invitation. +But I know nothing about the enlisting of Yugoslav youths in the +German Army; I do not believe that. I can only say that at the +time of the regency of Prince Regent Paul there was very close +collaboration with Yugoslav youth. During the war we maintained +good relations with both Serbian and Croatian youth. German youth +visited Serbia and Croatia, while Serbian and Croatian youth came +to German youth camps, German youth leader training schools, and +so on, and looked at our institutions. That, I think, is everything +I can say about this. But we had friendly relations not only with +Yugoslavia but also with many other countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You did not understand me correctly. I +was not speaking of Yugoslav or Croatian youth. I am speaking of +the youth of the German minority in Yugoslavia who are mentioned +in this report and who, with the help of the Hitler Youth, created +centers of Fifth Column activity to engage in subversive operations +and recruit for the SS units and the Wehrmacht. That is what I am +speaking about. Are these facts known to you? +<span class='pageno' title='524' id='Page_524'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I know that there were young people among +the German minority in Yugoslavia, just as in Romania and Hungary. +I know that this German youth felt that it belonged to the +Hitler Youth, and I think it is perfectly natural that these young +people welcomed the German troops on their arrival. I cannot give +information on the extent to which collaboration existed between +the troops and the youth, but that it did exist is also quite natural. +Of course, it could not be considered military collaboration, but +rather the kind of co-operation which will always exist between an +occupying force and the youth of the same country or nationality +as the members of that force. But that has nothing to do with +espionage or the like.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: But the major part of the SS Division +“Prinz Eugen” which was formed on Yugoslav territory was made +up of Hitler Youth members from the German national minority in +Yugoslavia; and this was the result of the preparatory work of the +Hitler Youth. Do you admit that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not know how the divisions of the +Waffen-SS, of which there were very many, were recruited. It is +possible that some members of the German minority were recruited +then and there, but I have no definite information on this.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will quote a few excerpts from two +German documents. They have not yet been submitted to the Tribunal. +The first excerpt is from a book by Dr. Sepp Janko who was +the youth leader in Yugoslavia, entitled <span class='it'>Speeches and Articles.</span> He +wrote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“All our national work before 1 September 1939 depended on +the help of the Reich. When on 1 September 1939 the war +began and it at first appeared impossible to receive further +aid, there was a danger that all our work would be interrupted....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>And later:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The fact that in this cause, so decisive for a nation and its +worth, I put at the disposal of the Führer almost the entire +German national group in the former State of Yugoslavia and +gave him so many volunteers as soldiers, is to me a subject +of great pride....”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I submit this to the Tribunal as evidence; Exhibit USSR-459.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The next excerpt is from an article, “We in the Batchka,” written +in 1943 by Otto Kohler who was leader of German youth in that +territory. I submit this document to the Tribunal as Exhibit USSR-456. +Otto Kohler wrote in that article:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Ninety percent of our youth are members of the Hitler Youth, +the youth organization for Germans abroad.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'><span class='pageno' title='525' id='Page_525'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The statements ought to convince you that the subversive activity +and organization of the Fifth Column, the “nazification” of the German +minority and its enlistment in military units were actually +carried out on Yugoslav territory through the Hitler Youth. Please +answer “yes” or “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No. But I should like to comment on these +documents. This Dr. Sepp Janko who is said to have been the leader +of the Volksdeutsche in Yugoslavia is not known to me either by +name or personally. I have visited Yugoslavia several times in the +past, but neither in 1937, when I believe I was there for the first +time, nor later in 1938 when I visited Prince Regent Paul, did I concern +myself with the Volksdeutsche youth there or with their leaders. +On those visits I spoke only with youth of Yugoslav nationality. +That is all I have to say about the first document, which on the +whole does not refer to youth at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The second document, which is signed by one Otto Kohler, who +calls himself the “D. J. leader”—probably German youth leader—in +Subdivision 7, to that document I can only say that it was taken +from a book about German youth in Hungary which appeared in +1943. In the Batchka we had a very large settlement of Germans, +people who had been living there for 150 or 200 years, and this +youth leader organized the German youth there with the approval +of the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian Minister of Education +and in collaboration with other Hungarian authorities. It was +an entirely legal measure, and no controversy existed about it +between the two countries. These young people were not members +of the German Hitler Youth, but they belonged to Hungarian youth +groups of the German minority in Hungary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: And did the Reich Leadership of Hitler +Youth have no connection at all with such organizations abroad?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Of course we visited these youths. When, for +instance, I was a guest in Budapest, the Hungarians themselves +asked me whether I would like to visit the villages and the youth +of the German minority. Neither the Regent nor any other government +authority had any objections to this. There was no reason +why I should ask German youth leaders to engage in espionage in +Hungary. I could just as easily have asked Hungarian youth leaders +with whom I was on very good terms.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Who was the leader of the Hitler Youth +organizations abroad? There was a special foreign section in the +Reich Leadership of the Hitler Youth. Its task was the direction +of the German youth organizations abroad, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is not correct. The foreign office of the +Reich Youth Leadership was, if I may say so, the “foreign office” +<span class='pageno' title='526' id='Page_526'></span> +of the younger generation. It was the task of the foreign office to +maintain contact with other national youth organizations, to invite +youth leaders from abroad, to organize tours of foreign youth +organizations through Germany, and to arrange visits of German +youth to other countries, in co-operation with the foreign offices of +those countries; in a case like this, the foreign office of the Reich +Youth Leadership would approach the Foreign Office, and the Foreign +Office would approach the ambassador or representative of the +country involved. The Organization of Youth Abroad to which you +are referring was an organization subordinate to the Organization +of Germans Abroad, the head of which was Gauleiter Bohle, who +has already been heard in this court. This youth abroad consisted +of German nationals who formed units of the Hitler Youth in the +countries where they were living. For instance in Budapest the +children of the German colony, starting with the children of the +German Minister...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Defendant, it is not necessary to make +such a long speech about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You are giving too many details. The +next question:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories, a special +youth department was created in the first main office. What do you +know about the work of this department and what was its relationship +to the Reich Leadership of the Hitler Youth? Please answer +briefly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: From my knowledge, I can say that when the +Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories was created, +Reichsleiter Rosenberg expressed a wish that the Reich Youth Leader +should put at his disposal an official for the youth department in +the new Ministry. This official was appointed; he was taken into +the Ministry and directed its youth department. He was, of course, +responsible to the Eastern Minister. I cannot say more about this +point. Reports from this department did not reach me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You mean that the Reich Leadership of +the Hitler Youth appointed a representative to a post in the Ministry +for Eastern Occupied Territories, and that this gentleman did +not send in any report to the Reich Youth Leadership; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: General, I meant that the head of this department +or whatever he was, this official in the Eastern Ministry who +came from the Hitler Youth, did not report to me. He naturally +reported to his immediate superiors in the Reich Youth Leadership. +The Reich Youth Leadership was located in Berlin, and I assume +that the officials of its staff were in constant touch with him. +<span class='pageno' title='527' id='Page_527'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: As I understand it, the measures that +were carried out by the youth department in the Reich Ministry +for Eastern Occupied Territories were carried out with the knowledge +of the Reich Youth Leadership; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The measures taken there were carried out +according to directions laid down by the Reich Minister, who was +the immediate superior of his officials. If actual youth measures, the +treatment of youth, and so on, were dealt with, I am sure that this +official or youth leader discussed the matter with the Reich Youth +Leadership and made a report to it. The Minister is always responsible +for the youth official in his Ministry, and not the organization +from which the youth official happens to come.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I understand. To the question put to you +by your defense counsel regarding the participation of the Hitler +Youth in the atrocities committed in Lvov, you answered that the +testimony of the French citizen, Ida Vasseau, supplied by the +Extraordinary State Commission, is not true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, the Soviet Prosecution has had occasion to interrogate +the witness Ida Vasseau. The defense counsel for the Defendant +Schirach also requested an interrogation. I now submit to the +Tribunal excerpts from the testimony of the witness Vasseau, dated +16 May 1946, and I would like to submit it as Exhibit USSR-455. +I shall now read the excerpts into the record:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The atrocities against the Jewish and the Soviet population +of Lvov were perpetrated not only by adult Germans and old +Nazis, but also by the German youth of the Fascist youth +organization in Lvov. These youngsters, dressed in uniforms, +armed with heavy sticks, hunting knives, and often with +pistols, ran about the streets, broke into Jewish apartments +and destroyed everything in them. They killed all the inhabitants +of these apartments, including the children. Very often +they stopped children who looked suspicious to them in the +streets, shouted: “Stop, you damned Jew!” and shot them on +the spot. This Hitlerite youth was often active in locating +Jewish apartments, hunting Jews in hiding, setting traps, and +assaulting innocent people on the streets, killing them if they +were Jews and dragging others away to the Gestapo. Often +their victims were Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, and people of +other nationalities. This terror of adult and young Germans +continued until the last day of the German occupation of +Lvov. The intention of completely annihilating the Jews was +especially apparent in the “Ghetto actions” in which Jewish +children of various ages were systematically killed. They were +put into houses specially set up for Jewish children and when +<span class='pageno' title='528' id='Page_528'></span> +sufficient children had been assembled, the Gestapo accompanied +by the Hitler Youth broke in and killed them.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>I end the reading of the statement of Ida Vasseau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Thus, the Hitler Youth in the service of the German army, SS +and the Gestapo took part in these atrocities. Do you admit that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I do not believe a word of what is contained +in this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Well, that is your affair.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Mr. President, I am submitting to the Tribunal another document, +USSR-454, excerpts from the testimony of the German prisoner of +war Gert Bruno Knittel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Gert Bruno Knittel, a hatter by trade, was born in 1924 in +Saxony. After 1938 he was a member of the Hitler Youth. His sister +Ursula was also a member of the National Socialist League of German +Girls (BDM). In 1942, when he was 18 years old, he was called +up for the German Army. Thus, he is a typical representative of +the Hitler Youth, and his testimony is therefore of interest. This is +what he relates about his service in the German Army. I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Not less than twice a week we were called upon to comb +out the forests.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I must object against the use of this +document of which we have just received a copy. It does not appear +from this copy whether the document was actually signed, whether +it was sworn or who drew up this document, which seems to be a +report. I must object to this document until these questions have +been clarified.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Perhaps in this connection, Mr. President, I might comment on +the other document which contains the testimony of Ida Vasseau—the +writing is difficult to read. I assume that this witness is identical +with the French national Ida Vasseau to whom a questionnaire was +sent a long time ago with the permission of the Tribunal. We have +been constantly waiting for the answers to this questionnaire, and +now today we receive this report dated 16 May 1946, which apparently +refers to the same witness. It is obvious that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am not following quite what you are saying. +Are you saying that you have issued a questionnaire to the person +who is alleged to have made this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The High Tribunal approved a questionnaire to a +French woman, Ida Vasseau; I will spell the name, V-a-s-s-e-a-u. +This is the French woman, Ida Vasseau, who was working in an +establishment in Lvov, and who is mentioned in the Lvov Commission +report. Perhaps you remember, Mr. President, that one of these +reports says that children were taken from the ghetto and given to +<span class='pageno' title='529' id='Page_529'></span> +the Hitler Youth and that the Hitler Youth used these children as +live targets. That is the statement of the witness Ida Vasseau, and +I am sure that she is the same person who is now mentioned in the +report of 16 May 1946. The remarkable thing is that in the report +of 16 May 1946, she does not answer the questions which are set +down in the questionnaire, but makes further allegations which are +obviously not contained in the earlier Lvov Commission report. This +is a very mysterious matter, and I believe it would not be just to +the Defendant Von Schirach if I did not call your attention to these +contradictions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: May I give my explanation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We would like to hear you in detail, General, +in answer to what Dr. Sauter has said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Ida Vasseau, excerpts from whose statement +I have read, is certainly the person of whom Dr. Sauter is +speaking. I do not know to whom and through what channels the +interrogatory was sent; it was not sent through our office. Ida +Vasseau was interrogated on our own initiative and we could do +so only on 16 May. A special interrogatory was not received by +us, and we could not have sent it because the evidence was given +only...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have only got this document here in German +and it doesn’t appear to be a document signed or made by a +person called “Vasseau” at all. I don’t know whether it is dealing +with something that Ida Vasseau is alleged to have said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This document is signed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I said it wasn’t signed by Vasseau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This document is signed by Ida Vasseau-Thom +and also by the interrogating officials, namely the Chief of +the Investigation Branch, Public Prosecutor’s Department for the +Lvov Region, Kryzanovsky, and the public prosecutor for the Lvov +Region, Kornetov. The interrogation took place on 16 May 1946.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Look at this document and see if it is the +right document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, these are excerpts from the interrogation +of Ida Vasseau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that the same document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, yes, that is the same document which +we are now submitting to the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that the original you have got before you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, this is an excerpt from the record, +certified by the Chief of Documentation of the Soviet Delegation, +<span class='pageno' title='530' id='Page_530'></span> +Colonel Karev. This is not the original record of the interrogatory. +These are excerpts from it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that it is a document which +is admissible under Article 21 or what are you saying about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: We are submitting it. If the Tribunal considers +that it is necessary to bring out the original of the record, +which at the present moment is at Lvov, we will be able to do so +in a short time. If the Tribunal is not satisfied with these excerpts, +we will very easily be able to submit the record in full.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell us what the document is? Is it +an affidavit? Is it sworn to? Is it made before an official of the +Soviet Union?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: There is a note on the record referring to +the responsibility for false testimony, as set forth under Article 89 +of the Penal Code of the Ukrainian S.S.R. This warning is in +accordance with the requirements for legal procedure in the Soviet +Union, and this warning was given to Ida Vasseau, as a special certification +on the record shows.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that it is a document which +falls within Article 21 of the Charter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, but if the Tribunal consider it necessary, +we will later be able to submit the complete original record.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am now asking the Tribunal to accept the excerpts from this +record which have been certified by the Chief of our Documentation +Division.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, what is the date on which your +interrogatory was allowed by the Tribunal and what was the date +on which it was sent out to this person?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the interrogatory bears the date of +11 April.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: The interrogatory could not be sent +because we did not know where the witness Vasseau was. We only +discovered it recently.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the interrogatory has not been +administered to the person who made this statement?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This interrogatory could not have reached +its destination because, I repeat, until quite recently the whereabouts +of the witness Vasseau was unknown.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you did find out where the witness was, +the interrogatory could have been administered.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN; ALEXANDROV: Yes, yes, it can be sent to her. It can be +done now if it is necessary. +<span class='pageno' title='531' id='Page_531'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I point out the following: This +woman, Ida Vasseau, was in Lvov when this statement which is +mentioned in the Commission Report was made; that is clear from +the report. I believe it is USSR-6, but I am not quite certain. Now, +on 16 May of this year, this woman, Ida Vasseau, was also at Lvov; +and her whereabouts were not unknown, since she was interrogated +on that day. I had discussed the interrogatory which was sent to +Vasseau with the Prosecution; it was at first said that the questions +were suggestive or that something was not in order. But we came +to terms and I altered the questions which I submitted to the High +Tribunal according to the wishes of the Prosecution; so if the Soviet +Delegation were willing, Ida Vasseau could be interrogated at any +time. It is remarkable that in this later statement, this woman +testified on something entirely different from what is set forth in +her previous statement, and something entirely different from what +she was asked in the interrogatory. I think it would be useful if +Ida Vasseau were examined here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, what previous statement do +you mean? What previous statements do you mean?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The statement in the commission report of the +City of Lvov. This commission report was read here once and it +says that the Hitler Youth committed these outrages against the +children; my questionnaire, which the Tribunal approved, deals with +this point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General, was the interrogatory submitted +by Dr. Sauter shown to the witness Vasseau?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, it was not sent to her. May I, to +clarify the matter, come back to the history of this interrogatory? +The Soviet Prosecution submitted a document, the Report of the +Extraordinary State Commission on German Atrocities in the Lvov +Region, and this document contained a statement by the witness +Ida Vasseau; no one interrogated her at that time. In this statement +she said that she witnessed how the Hitler Youth used small +children as targets. That was her statement in the Report of the +Extraordinary State Commission. This document was accepted by +the Tribunal. Then, on our own initiative—Dr. Sauter’s interrogatory +did not come to us and we did not send it out—the whereabouts +of Ida Vasseau was established. She was examined by +interrogating officers and supplemented the testimony which she +had given before the Extraordinary State Commission. I am now +submitting to the Tribunal excerpts from her interrogatory on +16 May in which she dwelt on certain details of the treatment of +children by the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We all understand that, General, but the +question is: Why, if interrogatories had been allowed by the +<span class='pageno' title='532' id='Page_532'></span> +Tribunal and had been seen by the Prosecution and were dated +sometime in April, why was the witness interrogated in May +without having seen these interrogatories? This document is dated +16 May 1946, isn’t it, Dr. Sauter?—Dr. Sauter tells us that interrogatories +allowed by the Tribunal were dated in April.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not know where Dr. Sauter sent his +interrogatory. He did not send it through our office. I repeat that +we did not send this interrogatory and could not have sent it on, +for we did not know where Ida Vasseau lived. On our initiative +steps were taken to establish her whereabouts, and when we found +her she was interrogated, namely on 16 May.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='533' id='Page_533'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: General, the Tribunal will not admit this +document at the present time, but it would wish that you should +present the original document and at the same time the answers +to the interrogatories which the Tribunal has ordered; and the +Tribunal will call upon the Secretary General for a report upon +the whole matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, during the recess I had a +chance to talk this over with Dr. Sauter. He will give me the +interrogatory and measures will be taken to get the necessary +replies from the witness in the shortest possible time. Besides this +the request of the Tribunal to get the original of the document +will be complied with as soon as possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>May I continue now with my interrogation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, please.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I stopped at the testimony of Gert Bruno +Knittel. Here is what he relates about his service in the German +Army:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Not less than twice a week we were sent to comb the forests, +to round up guerrillas and to look for discontent against the +German regime, so that these people could be arrested +and shot immediately. Our 3d Company, Field Depot +Battalion 375, caught and shot five persons in the woods. +Most possibly these persons were not even partisans or guerrillas, +but merely citizens who went into the woods for +personal matters. But we had orders to shoot all who crossed +our path in the woods. I did this together with the other +soldiers of my company.</p> + +<p>“One day in June 1943, in a roundup in the village of +Lishaysk, we surrounded the whole place with three to four +companies so that no one could leave or enter the village. +Outside each house that had to be searched...”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You are cross-examining the Defendant +Von Schirach who was in Vienna. What has this document got to +do with him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: This is the testimony of one of the +members of the Hitler Jugend regarding his participation in atrocities +during his service in the German Army in the occupied territory. +This document is translated into German. I need not read +it. However, I would like the witness Von Schirach to familiarize +himself with this document. Did you read this document? I am +asking you this now, Witness, have you read that document? +<span class='pageno' title='534' id='Page_534'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I have read the document. This man +Knittel who is testifying here was not a member of the Hitler +Youth, but belonged either to the Labor Service or to a unit of +the Army. Earlier in his life, just like all the other young Germans, +he had been a member of the Hitler Youth. He states that; but in +this case he was acting as a member of some unit of the Armed +Forces, not as a member of the Hitler Youth. The entire testimony +seems to be of little credibility. For example, he mentions a Hitler +Youth Party...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you read all the testimony that is +given there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you read all this testimony?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: In connection with this, do you admit +that participation of German youth in similar atrocities was the +effect of the special education and preparation of the Hitler Youth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: No, I do not admit that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have two more questions, and that will +be all. Up to what time did you hold the post of Reichsstatthalter +of Vienna and Reichsleiter of Youth Education?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I was head of Youth Education from 1931 and +Reich Governor of the city of Vienna since 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am interested in knowing to what date, +to what moment?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: I held both of these offices until the collapse.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: You were telling here in detail about +your break with Hitler in 1943. You stated that from that time on +you were politically dead. However, you continued to hold your +posts to the very end. Therefore your break with Hitler was only +theoretical, and in effect entailed no consequences for you. Is that +correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That is wrong. I described the consequences +which it had for me in my statement either on Thursday or Friday, +and I also mentioned at that time that up to the very last moment +I kept my oath which I had given to Hitler as Youth Leader, as an +official, and as an officer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have no more questions, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in order to expedite the proceedings, +I should like to put two brief questions to Defendant +Von Schirach. +<span class='pageno' title='535' id='Page_535'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The first question, Witness: in the course of the cross-examination +you were asked whether you gave the order to hold Vienna +until the very last moment and to defend the city to the last man. +As far as I remember, you answered that question in the negative. +Now, I am interested in knowing in this connection what orders +you gave to your subordinates during the last days in Vienna—I +mean to the Deputy Gauleiter Scharizer and the then Mayor +Blaschke?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The order for the defense of Vienna originated +with Hitler. The defense of Vienna was a matter for the +military authorities, that is, the commandant of the city of Vienna, +the military commander who was in charge of the 6th SS Panzer +Division....</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was his name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Sepp Dietrich, and the officer commanding +the Army Group South, Generaloberst Rendulic.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did they give the orders?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: In carrying out the order which Hitler had +given them regarding the defense of Vienna, they defended Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What orders did you, Witness, give your subordinates +in this connection?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: For the defense of Vienna I gave only such +orders as related to the Volkssturm, or those dealing with the food +supply of the city and similar matters with which I was charged. +I personally had nothing to do with the actual defense of the city. +For even the work of destruction which was necessary in the course +of the military defense of the city is to be traced back to orders +which originated from the Führer’s headquarters and had been +transmitted to the officer commanding the Army group, and to +the city commandant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: My second question, Witness: In your cross-examination +you were questioned about Document 3763-PS. This +is a document which deals with the songs of youth, into which the +Prosecution seems to read a different attitude from the one you +set forth. Do you wish to supplement your testimony on this point?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, I must supplement it briefly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please do.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: The Prosecution accuses me concerning a +certain song, a song which begins, “We are the black swarms of +Geyer, hey, ho”; the chorus of which goes, “Spear them, spike them, +put the red cock on the cloister roof,” and one verse runs, “We will +cry to Him on high that we want to kill the priest.” +<span class='pageno' title='536' id='Page_536'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>This is a Christian song.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How is that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: This can be seen in the fourth and fifth +verses. It is the song of the Protestant peasants under the leadership +of Florian Geyer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The fourth verse goes: “No castle, abbey, and monastery matters. +Nothing but the Holy Scripture is of value to us.” The next verse +goes: “We want the same law from prince down to peasant.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Protestantism, too, was once a revolution. The rebel peasants +sang this song; and it may serve as an example, this song of the +16th century, like some of the songs of the French revolution. This +song may be used as an example to show how, in the beginning, +revolutions are radical rather than tolerant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, with this point I should like to +conclude my direct examination of the Defendant Von Schirach. +Thank you very much. I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Who were your principal assistants in your +office at Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: First of all, the chief of my Central Office, +Hoepken; secondly, the Regierungspräsident Dr. Dellbrügge; thirdly, +the Mayor, Blaschke; and fourthly, the Deputy Gauleiter, Scharizer. +They were my chief collaborators.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That makes four, does it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And did they occupy the whole of their time +working for you in your office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Not all of them. The Deputy Gauleiter had +already been functioning under my predecessor, Bürckel. Mayor +Blaschke, as far as I recall, first became mayor in 1943. His predecessor +as mayor was a Herr Jung. The District President, Dr. Dellbrügge, +assumed his office in 1940, after my arrival in Vienna. He +was sent to me from the Reich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well then, from the time that you took over +the office in Vienna these four men were working for you, is that +right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. I should like to mention also that the +head of the Central Office, Hoepken, was first of all active under +me as adjutant and assumed his position as chief only when the +former chief of this office, Obergebietsführer Müller, lost his life in +an air raid.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Which of the four was it who initialed those +weekly reports which were received in your office? +<span class='pageno' title='537' id='Page_537'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was the District President, Dr. Dellbrügge.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dellbrügge?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And at the time that he received them he +was working in your office as one of your principal assistants?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He was my deputy in the State Administration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That was your office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: That was one of my offices.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, one department in your office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes. May I add, by way of explanation, that +there were various branches: The State Administration, the Municipal +Administration, the Party Management and the Reich Defense +Commissariat. The Reich Defense Commissariat and the State +Administration were combined as far as their representation was +concerned. Everything was co-ordinated in the Central Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, in which department was this principal +assistant who initialed these documents? Which department was he +head of?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: He held a key position in the office of the +Reichsstatthalter as Chief of the State Administration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Civil administration?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes, Civil State Administration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Was he the Deputy Reich Defense Commissioner?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And you were the Reich Defense Commissioner +for the Military District Number XVII, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: And he was your deputy in that military +district?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He received and initialed those reports in +that office, did he not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>VON SCHIRACH: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Von Schirach left the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, with your permission I should like +to call to the witness box the witness Lauterbacher. +<span class='pageno' title='538' id='Page_538'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Lauterbacher took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HARTMANN LAUTERBACHER (Witness): Hartmann Lauterbacher.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is that your full name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Lauterbacher.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear +by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, I have already discussed this +matter with you in the prison; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please pause after each question before you answer +so that the interpreters may keep up.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When were you born?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On 24 May 1909.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: 1909?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, 1909.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Are you married?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You have three children?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What is your profession?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Druggist.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Retail druggist?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You are in an American prison?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In an English prison.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Since when?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Since 29 May 1945.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Have you been interrogated by the Prosecution on +this matter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you become an official, that is to say, +a paid employee of the Hitler Youth? +<span class='pageno' title='539' id='Page_539'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I became a paid employee of the Hitler Youth +when appointed District Leader (Gebietsführer) of the Westphalia-Lower +Rhine area.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And when was that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In April 1932:</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: April 1932. That was at the age of 23?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, at the age of 23.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Before then had you been a member of the HJ?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. I was...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Slowly, please, and always wait until the question +has been completed before you answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I was asking you if you were already a member +of the Hitler Youth when you took up your paid appointment in +the year 1932.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. When I was 13 years old, in the year +1922, I joined what was then known as the National Socialist Youth +Organization. Then, when I was 18 years old, in the year 1927, I +accepted the duties of an Unterführer in my home province of the +Tyrol...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And officially you were...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: ...then I worked in an honorary capacity in +Brunswick from 1929 until 1932; and later on I had a paid appointment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That is to say from 1932?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was your status in the year 1932? What +position did you get then?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In the year 1932 I was entrusted with the +leadership of the area then known as Westphalia-Lower Rhine.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When were you assigned to the Defendant +Von Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On 22 May 1934.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was your position under him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Stabsführer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How long did you remain a Stabsführer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Until August 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I suppose until the time he resigned his office as +Reich Youth Leader? +<span class='pageno' title='540' id='Page_540'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When you took up your paid appointment with +the HJ, had you already served with the Army?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then you had not been an officer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You told us, I believe, that since 1934 you had +been Stabsführer of the Reich Youth Leadership. What tasks did +the Stabsführer of the Reich Youth Leadership have? Please tell +us briefly, so we may have an idea of what your jurisdiction was.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: As the title of Stabsführer indicates, I was +in the first place the chief of the staff of the Reich Youth Leadership. +As such, I had the task of dealing with the general directives +of the Reich Youth Leader, particularly those concerning the Hitler +Youth offices and regions insofar as the Youth Leader did not do +that himself. I had to co-ordinate the various departments of the +Reich Youth Leadership and in particular to deal with matters of +an organizational and personal nature.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Furthermore, in the years 1935 to 1939 I made a number of journeys +abroad at Von Schirach’s request.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who was the deputy of the Reich Youth Leader +when he could not act personally?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was his deputy on occasions when he was +prevented from acting personally.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then apparently you were the first man in the +Reich Youth Leadership after Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were your relations with Von Schirach purely +official, or were you friends as well?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Our association was not limited only to official +matters; we were also personal friends, and so our personal +relationship was not interrupted by Schirach’s appointment in +Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you believe, Herr Lauterbacher—regarding this +friendly relationship that you had with Von Schirach—that he concealed +certain things from you; or are you of the conviction that so +far as official matters were concerned he had no secrets from you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I always have been, and still am today, convinced +of the fact that Von Schirach made all his intentions and +educational measures known to me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So he kept nothing from you? +<span class='pageno' title='541' id='Page_541'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, he kept nothing from me. If Schirach +had discussions with Adolf Hitler during the earlier years he always +informed me immediately afterwards.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, in the year 1939 the second World War +broke out. Did the Defendant Von Schirach, in the last few years +prior to the outbreak of the World War, have any discussions with +you in which he expressed the view that youth should be educated +for war—in other words—that in educating youth the necessities +and requirements of future war must be taken into account? What +transpired on this point between you and Von Schirach before +the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The possibility of war was never discussed. +Occasionally I attended Party rallies in the company of Von Schirach; +and on these occasions, when Adolf Hitler delivered a speech, I +only—on the occasion of these rallies I had the definite and unalterable +impression that Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Reich +were determined to maintain peace and to allow matters to follow +a peaceful course. That is why it never occurred to me that youth +should be trained specifically for war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, in your capacity as Stabsführer of the +Reich Youth Leadership, did you have any knowledge about the +mail as a whole which either came to Schirach or was dispatched +by him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I always saw all the official mail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In the mail which reached Schirach in his office, +did you see anything about directives for the Reich Youth Leadership +received from Hitler, from the Party leadership, from the OKW, +or from any other agency, either State or Party, regarding the preparations +for war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, neither open nor camouflaged.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we have already heard about the main +functions of youth education in the course of the last few days. I +do not believe, Mr. President, that I need go into these subjects in +detail. The witness is the person best qualified to give us information, +but I think I may take the subject of youth education as +clarified.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think so. I think the facts about it have +been sufficiently stated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thank you. Then I can pass on to another subject +immediately.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>Turning to the witness.</span>] You said that you had not been a +soldier. Did not Schirach attach importance to the inclusion among +his collaborators of a certain number of officers, or at least of men +<span class='pageno' title='542' id='Page_542'></span> +who had served their term of military service and who might be +enrolled as instructors? Please be brief.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, at first, that is, during the early years of +the period of development, Von Schirach rejected officers as youth +leaders on ideological and educational grounds. The aim and mission +of the Hitler Youth were those of a socialist community and +of a socialist state; and the old type of officer of the period, the +representative of a reactionary epoch, would have been absolutely +incompatible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Absolutely incompatible? Do you mean with the...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: With the principles of education which +Schirach had laid down for the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, have you any idea whether Schirach +always rejected the proposal, or to put it the other way round, do +you know whether he agreed when any military authorities tried +to influence the character of the Youth Leadership? Perhaps you +could also answer this point briefly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Even in 1933 attempts were made to introduce +officers into the Hitler Youth as leaders. As far as my +information goes, two officers had been given appointments in the +Hitler Youth before my period of office as Stabsführer, under more +or less direct orders from Hitler. They were entirely unable to cope +with youth as such; and I think I am justified in saying that their +appearance was a complete failure.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What happened to them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Schirach went to Adolf Hitler and succeeded +in having these gentlemen dismissed; also through him, a directive +was drawn up by Hitler which said that officers were not to hold +positions in the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were no further attempts of the kind made to +force officers from somewhere or other upon him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Oh, yes. In 1936 and 1937, and then again +in 1938, attempts were made to influence the education of the Hitler +Youth through so-called liaison officers. But these attempts also +failed; and up to the very end there were no officers working with +the Hitler Youth who were responsible to any other authority except +Schirach, apart from former Hitler Youth leaders who had served +in the Army and received officers’ commissions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: If I understand you correctly, Witness, you wish to +say—and please confirm whether I have understood you correctly—that +Schirach rejected these attempts. Is that correct?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='543' id='Page_543'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, why did the Hitler Youth wear uniform—the +girls as well?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Uniform is perhaps not quite the correct term +for the clothing worn by the members of the Hitler Youth. It was +more in the nature of a national costume which was worn by members +of youth organizations before the existence of the Hitler Youth, +not only in Germany but in other countries as well. Moreover, +Schirach was anxious that all boys and girls should, as he expressed +himself, wear the dress of the socialist community.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Of the socialist community. Does that mean a +community of all—of all the boys and girls of every class of German +society without any distinction?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Without any distinction as to descent or creed +or anything else.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Or rich or poor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were the Hitler Youth in possession of weapons +and were they trained in the use of military weapons? You must +know that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, they were not trained in the use of military +weapons during the period in which Schirach and I held office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did the Hitler Youth have, in particular, tanks, +armored cars, and so forth, since reference was made to the training +of the young men in the so-called “motorized Hitler Youth” in connection +with the question of the special unit (Sonderformation)—tanks, +armored cars?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, to my knowledge the Hitler Youth never +received any training in armored cars, tanks, or anything of the +kind, even after Schirach’s term of office. At any rate...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the facts stated by the defendant +as to the weapons of the Hitler Youth and their formations were +not cross-examined. You need not go into that. Mr. Dodd did not +suggest that they had tanks.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thank you, Mr. President. Then I can perhaps be +more brief.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I now come, Herr Lauterbacher, to the Defendant Von Schirach’s +attitude toward the Jewish question. Was the Hitler Youth involved +in any way in the Jewish pogroms of November 1938?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I think I can answer your question with a +definite “no.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, you told me something about +a speech made by the Defendant Von Schirach a few days after +<span class='pageno' title='544' id='Page_544'></span> +9 November 1938, on the subject of these Jewish pogroms. Tell me +when and to whom he delivered this speech and what the contents +of the speech were.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Von Schirach was in Munich on 10 November +1938 and I was in Berlin. Schirach instructed me by telephone to +tell the district leaders of the Hitler Youth that their organizations +were in no circumstances to take part in these anti-Jewish demonstrations, +and to call a meeting of all these leaders to hear a specific +declaration on this point. This meeting took place about 15 November +1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Where?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In Berlin. Schirach asked these district leaders +to report to him and expressed his satisfaction at having in the +meantime received reports to the effect that the Hitler Youth had +not been involved in these excesses. He then described the said +excesses in his speech. I still remember this speech extraordinarily +well, for it was particularly impressive. He described these pogroms +as a disgrace to our culture and as amounting to self-defamation. +He said that such things might be expected of an uncivilized people +but not of the German people. He went on to say that we had +antagonized not only the world in general but also all decent people +in Germany itself by these demonstrations. He was afraid that +serious political difficulties would arise at home, as well as difficulties +within the Party itself. As we know, the Party was not at all +unanimous in its judgment of these happenings. A very large section +of the Party members and of the Party leadership condemned +these excesses.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Please tell us more of what Schirach said at that +time. I should be more interested in that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Von Schirach then gave the Youth Leadership +special instructions to keep out of demonstrations of this or a +similar kind in the future, no matter what the circumstances might +be, and condemned every use of violence on educational grounds +alone. He concluded the proceedings by prohibiting the reading of +the newspaper <span class='it'>Der Stürmer</span> by the Hitler Youth at club evenings +or on any other occasions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: On this occasion, Herr Lauterbacher, did he say +anything about the needless destruction of so many cultural treasures, +art treasures, property belonging to the people, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, and +did he not give certain instances of this?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. As an especially glaring instance, he +quoted the case of the attempt, which was at least partially carried +through, to loot the Jewish firm of Bernheimer, art dealers in +Munich. +<span class='pageno' title='545' id='Page_545'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Munich?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. He quoted this example to the Youth +Leadership to illustrate the dangerous and irreparable inroads made +on the reservoir of our culture and our cultural treasures by these +demonstrations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Is it true that immediately after this Berlin speech +about which you have just told us, the Defendant Von Schirach +caused definite directives to be issued by telephone from Berlin, +through your agency, to the individual Hitler Youth offices?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: This took place as early as 10 November, the +day after the Munich meeting. It had nothing to do with the district +leaders’ meeting, which only took place about 15 November.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, I assume that, as time went +on, you were present at a good many speeches made by the Defendant +Von Schirach to his subleaders, or to the Hitler Youth, and that +you listened to many of these speeches yourself. Did the Defendant +Von Schirach engage in Jew-baiting on these or other occasions? +Did he suggest that violence be used against the Jews? What was +his attitude?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes; I must have listened to all the important +speeches delivered by Von Schirach before the Leadership Corps +of the Hitler Youth, and on the occasion of these speeches I never +heard him urge the use of violence, which would in any case have +been completely foreign to his nature. At any rate, I cannot recall +that Von Schirach ever called upon the Youth Leadership, either +directly or indirectly, to take part in acts of violence of any kind +against anyone.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What did Schirach usually talk about in delivering +one of his many speeches addressed to youth? Just the main topic, +briefly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: One must certainly differentiate between the +long speeches which he delivered at public demonstrations and the +speeches which he made before the leaders of the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the speeches he addressed to the leaders he always discussed +the main political and ideological tasks and the tasks of social policy, +cultural policy, and professional training which he had assigned to +the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Now, we shall turn to a different topic, Herr +Lauterbacher. Did Schirach cause you to leave the Church?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you leave the Church?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I do not believe that Herr Von Schirach even +knew to what religious denomination I belonged or whether I left +<span class='pageno' title='546' id='Page_546'></span> +the Church or not. I left the Church in 1937 or 1938, without being +influenced or forced to do so by anyone.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Von Schirach urge his other collaborators to +leave the Church, as far as you know?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Schirach abuse Christianity or incite others to +attack it on the occasion of the numerous speeches made by him, to +which you have just told us that you listened?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On those occasions Schirach always told the +youth to respect religious convictions, and characterized atheism as +an evil, not only once but many times. In his speeches, Von Schirach +vigorously criticized, for instance, the athletic clubs existing both +before and after 1933 in connection with the various churches and +demanded the unity of youth; but on these occasions he did not +attack Christianity or the religious convictions of others either in +public or in private.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Lauterbacher, during the time the Defendant +Von Schirach was Reich Youth Leader, negotiations were pending +with the Roman Catholic Church with a view to concluding a concordat, +so that relations between the State and the Church would +be regulated by an agreement. Do you know whether Von Schirach +took part in these concordat negotiations and whether he took +much trouble to effect an understanding with the Church on a basis +satisfactory to both sides?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. In 1933 and 1934 Schirach had numerous +discussions with representatives of the Church, Reich Bishop Müller +of the Protestant Church and the representative of the Fulda Conference +of Bishops, Bishop Berning of Osnabrück. I remember that +Schirach strove to draw a dividing line between their respective +powers and jurisdiction on some such basis as: “Render unto Caesar +the things which are Caesar’s and unto God the things which are +God’s.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I have another question, Witness: Do you know +whether Von Schirach actually tried to bring about an understanding +between the Hitler Youth, of which he was the leader, +and the youth of other countries, and can you tell us, for instance, +what he did and what steps he took to that end?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The establishment of a cordial understanding +between German youth and world youth generally was undoubtedly +one of those tasks the importance of which Schirach constantly +emphasized to his youth leaders, and I always had the impression +that this task was, as I might almost say, his particular passion. I +myself, on his orders—and perhaps I am a cardinal witness on +<span class='pageno' title='547' id='Page_547'></span> +precisely this point—visited the various European countries, from +1935 onwards, at least once a year and sometimes even two or three +times a year, so that I could get in touch with existing youth organizations +and with organizations of combatants of the first World War, +in order to establish contact with them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Which countries?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: It can truthfully be said that the Hitler Youth +sought contacts with all the countries of Europe; and I myself, at +the direct order of Von Schirach, visited England several times. +There I met the leader of the British Boy Scouts and his colleague, +but also...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think those facts are in dispute. It +is merely the inference that is to be drawn from the facts that +the Prosecution will rely upon. Therefore it is not necessary for +you to go into the facts again, as to the connection of the Hitler +Youth with the foreign youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, you have just heard that these facts are not in dispute. +We can therefore turn to another topic. You were the Stabsführer +of the Hitler Youth in the Reich Youth Leadership. Do you know +whether the Leadership of the Hitler Youth maintained spies or +agents abroad, or whether it trained people for the so-called Fifth +Column—and I take it you know what that is—in other countries, +or whether it brought young people over to be trained as parachutists +in Germany and then sent them back to their own countries. +During your whole period of office as Stabsführer, did you ever +learn of anything like that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The Hitler Youth did not have spies, agents, +or parachutists to operate in any country in Europe. I would have +been bound to learn of such a fact or such an arrangement in any +circumstances.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Even if Schirach had made such an arrangement +behind your back, do you believe that you would have been bound +to learn of it in any case through the channels of reports from +district leaders and similar channels?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I would inevitably have learned of this or +have observed it in these districts on some of my many official trips.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then, Witness, I should like to turn to another +topic. The other day you told me about a certain discussion. After +the Polish campaign—that would be, presumably, at the end of September +or beginning of October 1939—and before the actual campaign +in France you had a meeting with the Defendant Von Schirach +<span class='pageno' title='548' id='Page_548'></span> +in your residence in Berlin-Dahlem, on which occasion the Defendant +Von Schirach voiced his attitude to the war. Will you describe +this conversation briefly to the Court?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. Von Schirach came to see me at the end +of September or beginning of October 1939. He visited me in the +house which I occupied at the time in Berlin. The conversation very +quickly turned to war, and Schirach said that, in his opinion, this +war should have been prevented. He held the Foreign Minister of +that time responsible for having given Hitler inadequate or false +information. He regretted the fact that Hitler and the leading men +of the State and the Party knew nothing about Europe and the +world generally and had steered Germany into this war without +having any idea of the consequences.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At that time he was of the opinion that if the war could not be +brought to an end in the shortest possible time, we should lose it. +In this connection he referred to the enormous war potential of the +United States and England. He said—and I remember the expression +very well—that this war was an unholy one and that if the +German people were not to be plunged into disaster as a result of +it, the Führer must be informed of the danger which would arise +for Germany if America were to intervene, either through deliveries +of goods or through actual entry into the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We considered at the time who could inform Hitler, who, in +fact, could even obtain access to him. Schirach suggested trying +in some way to introduce Colin Ross into Adolf Hitler’s presence. +Colin Ross was to call Hitler’s attention to the threatening catastrophe +and to inform Hitler of the facts. This was to be done +outside the competency of the Foreign Minister and without the +Foreign Minister being present. At that time Colin Ross was not +yet in Germany. I remember that when he returned he was +introduced into Hitler’s presence by way of Schirach.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, will you tell us more about the discussion +which you mentioned as having taken place in 1939. I should like +you to answer this question: How did he come to choose Dr. Colin +Ross in particular? How did you happen to think of him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I have already mentioned that the leaders of +the National Socialist State and of the Party were almost totally +lacking in knowledge of the world and foreign countries generally, +and had consequently hit upon this man, who had seen so much of +the world. Colin Ross had occasionally attended meetings of the +Hitler Youth Leaders before 1939 and had addressed them...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What about?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: ...and thus he was known to Schirach and +the Hitler Youth. +<span class='pageno' title='549' id='Page_549'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What were the topics he discussed before the +Hitler Youth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Colin Ross spoke of his experiences in every +continent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How did Colin Ross become known to the Hitler +Youth? On this occasion did you also speak of whether an attempt +should be made to find a solution of the Jewish problem, so that +it would be easier to reach an understanding with other countries, +and if so, on what basis?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. In the course of this conversation +Schirach referred to the excesses of 9 November 1938 and to the +speech he made immediately afterwards, and said that in the +circumstances it would naturally be extremely difficult to start +discussions with America; that we might have to try beforehand—if +circumstances permitted—and he wished to suggest this to +Hitler during an interview...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal does not think it is +really sufficiently important to go into Schirach’s private discussions +with this witness. If he can say anything as to what Schirach did, +it may be different, but now the witness is simply reciting the discussions +which he had with Schirach, nothing more than private +discussion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what steps did Schirach actually take +towards peace, or to shorten the war, as a result of these discussions +with you? Did he take any steps; and what were +these steps?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, as he told me at a later discussion, +Schirach made use of every opportunity at the beginning of the +war to convince Hitler of the need for discussions with America, +and with this purpose in view, he actually brought Colin Ross to +Hitler, as he told me later. Colin Ross was with Hitler for several +hours. When Colin Ross visited me at Hanover he told me about +this discussion and on this occasion he said that Hitler was very +thoughtful. He did say also, however, that a second discussion which +had been planned with Hitler had not materialized, for, according +to his version, the Foreign Office had protested against this kind +of information.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks that this +witness is dealing in great detail with matters which are of very +<span class='pageno' title='550' id='Page_550'></span> +little importance and the Tribunal wishes you to bring his attention +to something which is of real importance.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have in any case only one more +question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>One last question, Witness. You have not been with Schirach +since 1940. I believe you became a Gauleiter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Schirach went to Vienna. But in 1943 you again +had a long talk with him, mainly about why Schirach did not +resign from his post. My reason for putting this question to you +is that one member of the Prosecution has already discussed the +question today. Will you tell us briefly what reasons Schirach gave +at the time for retaining his office or why he did not resign, and +what his views on the war were in 1943—at that time, I mean?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In March 1943, when I made an unofficial +visit to Vienna, a very long conversation took place between +Von Schirach and myself. At that time, Von Schirach talked very +pessimistically about the prospects of the war and told me that +we should soon be fighting outside Vienna, in the Alps and along +the Rhine. On that occasion he said that he had not been able to +see Adolf Hitler for a very long time; that he had had no further +opportunity of reporting to him, as had formerly been the case; +and that the Chief of the Party Chancellery, Bormann, had consistently +prevented him from seeing the Führer and talking to him +alone; and that he therefore no longer had any opportunity whatsoever +of discussing Viennese questions or general questions with +Hitler. In this connection he also stated that Bormann came to him +with objections and complaints every day, cancelling orders and +directives he had issued in his capacity of Gauleiter in Vienna, +and that in view of all this, it was no longer possible for him to +remain in office and to shoulder the responsibility.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>At a later stage of that conversation, in the course of which we +considered all kinds of possibilities, he said that, as he had sworn +an oath of allegiance to Hitler, he felt bound to remain in office +whatever happened and that, above all, he could not take the +responsibility in the present military situation for abandoning the +population over which he had been appointed Gauleiter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>He saw the catastrophe coming but said that even his resignation +or any action that he might take would not have any influence on +the leaders of the State or on Hitler himself and that he would, +therefore, remain true to his oath, as a soldier would, and retain +his appointment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, that concludes my examination of +this witness. +<span class='pageno' title='551' id='Page_551'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defense counsel want to ask +him any questions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, were you Gauleiter in Hanover +from 1940?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, from December 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You were also Plenipotentiary for Labor in +that capacity?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were there many foreign laborers in your +Gau?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, there were a great many foreign +laborers in my district. This was mainly due to the Hermann +Göring Works, which had been established near Brunswick.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have to look after them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, my assignments as Plenipotentiary for +Labor were confined to looking after foreign civilian workers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive instructions from Sauckel on +that point?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I, like all other Gauleiter of the NSDAP, +constantly received instructions from Sauckel with regard to the +recruitment of labor; that is to say, regarding the welfare of these +civilian workers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What type of instructions were they?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The instructions which I received as Gauleiter +consisted almost exclusively of repeated demands to do everything +to satisfy the foreign workers in matters of accommodation, +food, clothing, and cultural welfare.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was that carried out in practice?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: It was naturally carried out within the limits +of existing possibilities.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you inspect camps or factories where these +workers were employed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, I myself inspected such camps and +especially such factories on my official trips. Apart from that I had, +as my Gau supervisor of the German Labor Front, a man who +assisted me in this task on such occasions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you or your Gau supervisor discover the +existence of shocking conditions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes. After the air raids from which Hanover +and Brunswick suffered particularly badly from 1943 onwards, I +<span class='pageno' title='552' id='Page_552'></span> +found conditions in foreign civilian labor camps—just as I did in +the living quarters of German people—to be what I would call, perhaps +not shocking, but certainly very serious; and after that I tried +as far as possible to have these destroyed dwellings repaired, for +instance, or to have new ones built.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you see any abuses for which these industrial +enterprises of the supervisory agencies were directly responsible?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, I do remember two such cases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Several firms in Hanover had formed a kind of industrial association—a +kind of union—and had established a camp for their foreign +civilian workers. The trustees of these firms were responsible +for this camp. One day the Gau supervisor of the German Labor +Front reported to me that living conditions did not comply with +instructions received and asked my permission to intervene, that +is to say, to be allowed to assume responsibility through the German +Labor Front for that collective camp. I gave him this assignment; +and sometime afterwards he reported that these difficulties had +been overcome.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Hermann Göring Works constitute another example of this +kind. Since I am speaking under oath here, I must mention the fact +that that firm disregarded Sauckel’s instructions in many respects. +On one occasion they recruited workers independently, outside the +jurisdiction of the labor administration through their branches in +the Ukraine and other countries. These laborers came to Watenstedt, +in the area supervised by the Executive Board of the Party, +outside the quota fixed by the Plenipotentiary for Labor, and consequently +outside of his jurisdiction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I myself had very considerable difficulty in obtaining entry to +the works and the camp. For although Gauleiter and Plenipotentiary, +I was not by any means in a position simply to...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What has this got to do with +the Defendant Sauckel?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I asked him about any abuses which he had +found, for as plenipotentiary for the recruitment of foreign workers +it was his duty to ascertain where such bad conditions existed and +to report them so that they would finally be brought to Sauckel’s +notice. He has digressed rather widely and has just been describing +the Hermann Göring Works.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You should stop him, Dr. Servatius. You know +the question you were asking.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you discover the existence of +abuses in the camp? +<span class='pageno' title='553' id='Page_553'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was unable to enter the camp, because +entry was forbidden.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel himself address the workers in +your Gau?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, not during my period of office. But he +frequently sent representatives.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have now got some questions to put on behalf +of the political leaders whom I represent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you receive special instructions from the Führer on your +appointment as Gauleiter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. When I was appointed Gauleiter I was +merely introduced by Herr Hess as Gauleiter, during an assembly +of Gauleiter. But I received no special instructions on the occasion +of that meeting, and during my...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Witness, the answer was “no” and you did +not need to add to it at all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you talk to the Führer later on? Did you +receive special or secret instructions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I only saw the Führer now and again at +Gauleiter meetings and I never had any official discussions with him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know anything about the activities of +block leaders? In particular, I want to ask you: Were they used +as spies?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: But there seems to be a widespread belief that +in fact block leaders did act as spies and informers and that has +been brought up by the Prosecution. Perhaps the SD used block +leaders for that purpose?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The SD had its own agents who were not +known to the Party. At any rate, the block leaders had no instructions +to work for the SD.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was no card index kept of Party opponents?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Not in the Party organizations. As far as I +know this card index was kept by the Secret Police, as was made +known in connection with the plot of 20 July 1944.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Party use agents for spying who may +not have been block leaders but who worked for you in your capacity +of Gauleiter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When did you join the SS, Witness? +<span class='pageno' title='554' id='Page_554'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was made an SS Brigadier General on +2 August 1940, on the occasion of my appointment as Deputy Gauleiter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not hear your answer as to when you first +joined the SS. Would you repeat it, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On 2 August 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You had not belonged before that date to the organization +at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was not a member of the SS before that +date; but I served in the Waffen-SS as a soldier, from 26 May 1940 +to September 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And then you later became an SS Obergruppenführer, +did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: On 20 April 1944.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And when did you join the staff of Himmler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was never a member of Himmler’s staff.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you not join it in January of 1944, or what would +you say that you did join in the Reichsführer SS Organization? Perhaps +I have used the wrong term “staff.” There is some other name +for it. Were you not affiliated in some way with Himmler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, I never had any SS assignments.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you have any connection with the Reichsführer +SS from January 1944 on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: In October 1944 the Reichsführer SS had +gone in his special train to Bad Pyrmont, on the occasion of a meeting +of West German Gauleiter and Higher SS and Police Leaders. +I had orders to be present at that function; and in the course of +the meeting I had a talk with him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is not what I asked; but I will pass it. Did you +become an SA Obergruppenführer in 1944, as well as SS Obergruppenführer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I became an SA Obergruppenführer, I think, +in 1944 or 1943.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You were also a member of the Reichstag in 1936, +were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And a member of the Party, I guess you said, since +1927; is that right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Since 1927.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And a member of the Hitler Youth, or NSDAP, +since 1923? +<span class='pageno' title='555' id='Page_555'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I joined the Hitler Youth in 1927. The Hitler +Youth was not established until 1927.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, whenever it was, the youth organization of the +Party, that is what I mean. How many people did you have hanged +publicly while you were the Gauleiter up in Hanover?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I did not understand the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I said: How many people did you have hanged publicly +while you were the Gauleiter up in Hanover?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I never hanged anyone publicly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Are you sure about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How many people did you send to concentration +camps?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I might have handed over 5 or 10 persons +to ordinary courts for violating war economy regulations. And in +one case which I remember particularly well, there were two people +who refused...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I do not care about the details. Just tell me +how many you sent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: There were two. I do not know if they were +sent to concentration camps, because I myself could not intern them. +The internment was decided in Berlin.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know a man by the name of Huck, H-u-c-k, +Heinrich Huck?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Huck—no. At the moment I cannot remember +that name.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: The police commissar under your Gau, or in your +Gau?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, I do not know him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I want to ask: Did you not have a foreign worker +from one of the eastern countries hanged, publicly hanged in the +market square, and to remain there a whole day, at one time, while +you were the Gauleiter up there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. Where is that supposed to have happened?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It is supposed to have happened in Hildesheim.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In March of 1945, just before the war ended.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. That is unknown to me. I never gave +any such instructions. +<span class='pageno' title='556' id='Page_556'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you order 400 or 500 prisoners poisoned or shot +just before the city was taken by an Allied army?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, that was put to me in London, and I +think I cleared up the matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You know what I am talking about, then?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, the penitentiary at Hameln.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You know that your Kreisleiter says that you ordered +them poisoned with either prussic acid or strychnine, or else they +were to be shot?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>You know about that, do you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was told about that in London.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And not only does your Kreisleiter say that but +Richard Rother, who was an inspector at the prison at Hameln, confirms +that the order was passed on, that either they were to be +poisoned or shot; do you know about that as well?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I never gave any such order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am asking you if you know that these people +associated with you have sworn under oath that you did. You have +seen these affidavits, have you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I was told of it in London; but I was also +told that the inmates of that penitentiary were neither poisoned nor +shot, but sent back.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, they were, but not because of you, but because +your people refused to carry out your orders, is not that so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I know nothing about that, because I was +no longer in Hameln and no longer a Gauleiter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You have seen these affidavits, so I do not think +there is any need to hand them to you, but I am going to offer them +in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I received the statement of the commissioned +Kreisleiter, Dr. Krämer, in London, and I replied to it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well. You know what he says, then?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I offer this D-861 as Exhibit USA-874, Mr. President. It is a document +consisting of 7 affidavits from persons associated with this witness +when he was the Gauleiter, and having to do with his conduct +while he was Gauleiter there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: How do you suggest that that evidence is +relevant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I offer them in relation to this man’s credibility, or +rather lack of it. I do not think that they have anything to do +directly with the case, other than they show the kind of individual +<span class='pageno' title='557' id='Page_557'></span> +he is, as we claim, and that the Tribunal should have this information +before it when it considers the weight it will give to his +testimony.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I have also just been reminded by my friend, Mr. Elwyn Jones, +that of course it would have a bearing on the issue of the Leadership +Corps of the Nazi Party, of which he is a member. That had +not occurred to me, however. However, I do wish to claim it as a +ground, also, for this document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Where are the people who made these affidavits?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, I will have to inquire. I do not know. +They are in custody, some of them at least, in the British zone here +in Germany.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, you have just inquired where these +people are who made these affidavits. Perhaps I can assist you in +clarifying these questions. This Josef Krämer, whom the Prosecution +have just quoted as the leading witness against the witness +Lauterbacher, was sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment by an +English court some 8 or 10 days ago, and this for the very reason +which the prosecutor has just mentioned. Herr Lauterbacher knows +nothing about this matter, but quite accidentally I read a report of +this trial in a German newspaper and I have the report here. In +that article, dated 2 May of this year, it is stated that the former +Kreisleiter of Hameln, Dr. Josef Krämer, was sentenced by the court +of the 5th British Division to 7 years’ imprisonment. I quote from +that article:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“Upon the approach of the Allied troops Krämer had given +the order to liquidate the inmates of the penitentiary at +Hameln. ‘No dangerous prisoner and no foreigner is to be +allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy,’ was his order. +‘They must all be poisoned with prussic acid, or, if that is not +possible, they will have to be shot.’ ”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>That was the wording of the order given by ex-Kreisleiter Josef +Krämer; and he is now being used as a witness against my witness +here. The report goes on to say that officials at the penitentiary, +who appeared as witnesses, stated that in spite of this order from +Dr. Krämer they had refused to liquidate the prisoners. The rest is +of no interest but I thought that perhaps it might be important for +the Tribunal, when dealing with this question, to see from a document +how this former Kreisleiter behaved in reality. If you are +interested, Mr. President, the newspaper clipping, although it is in +German, can be admitted to you at once.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May I say, Mr. President, that perfectly substantiates +the document; that is, Krämer says in here that is what he did, that +<span class='pageno' title='558' id='Page_558'></span> +he passed orders on but that he got them from this man. If anything, +it supports us. It does not hurt us one whit insofar as the +value of this document is concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In looking them over, I think it is perhaps best if I only offer +the first one and the last one. There are some others in this group +that are not particularly helpful, I expect, for the Court. I shall +withdraw all but the first and last and offer only the affidavit of +Krämer and the affidavit of Huck.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal does not think that +these documents ought to be admitted. In the first place, so far as +the credit of the particular witness is concerned, they do not think +that his answers on questions of credit ought to be challenged by +other evidence. So far as the Leadership Corps is concerned, they +think that these documents are only evidence of one individual +crime.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, I understood you to say that you never heard the +Defendant Von Schirach say anything really derogatory of the +Jewish people, and, on the contrary, you heard him speak out +quite openly after the events of 9 November 1938. Did I understand +you correctly?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, he criticized the atrocities in no uncertain +terms at the meeting of Gauleiters. He had no doubt that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do not go all through it again. I just wanted to be +sure that I understood you correctly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I suppose you read the Hitler Youth yearbook for the year 1938, +as the Deputy to the Reich Leader.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: At the moment I do not remember this book. +If I could have a look at it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Of course I do not expect you to. I merely wanted +to ascertain that you did read it. I suppose you always read your +yearbook?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What, you did not read it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I cannot remember, no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, would it not be customary for you to read the +yearbook? Let us put it that way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: The yearbook was compiled by the Press +Department and I had no influence on the details of the journalistic +make-up of our newspapers, periodicals or yearbooks. I do not +remember this book, at least as far as it concerns demands for anti-Semitic +atrocities, or a policy of force. +<span class='pageno' title='559' id='Page_559'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I will show it to you in any event and call +your attention to an article in the yearbook concerning the Jewish +people. Do you know what I refer to? Where they were charged +with having spilled the blood of millions of dead in history. That +was put out, I assume, after the brave statements by the defendant +in November of 1938, since it is for the whole year of 1938. You +will find the article that I refer to on Page 192.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Have you seen that article before?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. That yearbook had no official character; +it was a private enterprise on the part of the publishers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. What do you mean, “it had no +official character”? It was the yearbook of the Hitler Youth, was +it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: This yearbook was not officially edited by +the Hitler Youth or by the Party. I never saw it until after it was +published.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It was published by the Central Publishing House +of the NSDAP, was it not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes, that is correct; I see that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: It was called <span class='it'>The Yearbook of the Hitler Youth</span>, and +you put it out for a good many years consecutively, did you not? +I do not mean you personally, but I mean the Party and the Hitler +Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. This yearbook was compiled and published +every year by the gentleman mentioned there, or by others, as +the case might be.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I know that. I am simply trying to establish this, +that this was the yearbook of the Hitler Youth and the only one +that was put out, and it was put out each year. Now is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: This book appeared every year, but I repeat +again that it had no official character, nor do I believe that...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, what would you say would give it an official +character?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: If it said here, “Published by the Reich Youth +Leader’s Office,” it would have an official character.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And the fact that it said, “Published by the Central +Publishing House of the NSDAP” would not give it one, is that it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Certainly not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You did not put out any other publications in the +nature of a yearbook, did you, except this one? +<span class='pageno' title='560' id='Page_560'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: A calendar was published every year.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I am certainly not talking about a calendar; +I am talking about a report or a book.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you are still telling this Tribunal that this was +not the yearbook of the Hitler Youth and the only one that was +published in Germany?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I repeat that this yearbook did not have any +official character.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, after having read that quotation, do you still +think that Schirach, as leader of the Reich Youth, was not actively +speaking about the Jews in a derogatory sort of way, or that talk +of this kind was not going on under his leadership?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Von Schirach never left any doubt regarding +his anti-Semitic attitude as long as he was Reich Youth Leader.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know the speech he made in 1942 when he +took credit for deporting the Jews from Vienna? Are you familiar +with that speech?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, I do not know that speech. During that +time I was in Hanover, and Schirach was in Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes. He was a fellow Gauleiter at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you ever get any SS reports on what was happening to the +Jews in the East?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Never. I never had access to SS reports, SS +circulars, or orders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you deport any Jews from your Gau?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: When I came to the Gau in December 1940, +the Jews had already emigrated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: They were already out by the time you got there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you ever hear of Gauleiters getting reports from +Heydrich or from Himmler about what was happening to the Jews +in the East? Did any of your fellow Gauleiter ever tell you that +they got reports regularly, say by the month or by the week?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. Himmler’s reports were no more accessible +to the Gauleiter than they were to the honorary leaders of the +SS. As Obergruppenführer of the SS I never received a report or +an instruction from Himmler.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Those Himmler reports were handled pretty carefully, +were they not? +<span class='pageno' title='561' id='Page_561'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am now asking you—as an SS Obergruppenführer I suppose +you know something about it—were those reports handled very +carefully, those Himmler and Heydrich reports?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: As an SS Obergruppenführer I never received +any of Himmler’s reports, and I know that Himmler sent all reports +dealing with confidential or internal SS matters only to SS and +Police, that is, SS leaders in the service of the SS, but never to the +honorary leaders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, what I really asked you was whether or not +the reports, when they were sent out, were very carefully handled. +Do you know the answer to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I do not know. I do not know how these +reports were handled.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What was Heydrich’s reputation, so far as you were +concerned, in 1942? Did you think very well of him or did you +think very poorly of him before he was killed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I only knew Heydrich from meeting him a +few times in the Reich Youth Leader’s Office, and I had a good +impression of him personally. I am forced to have a different +opinion of him now; but only because I now know of his measures.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What was he doing in the Reich Youth Leader’s +Office the few times that you met him? What business did he have +there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: He had intervened on his own initiative and +through his own agencies in cases of homosexuality. Schirach forbade +that and told him that these matters too were first of all subject +to his own jurisdiction.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You sat in on all of these conferences with Heydrich, +no matter how many there were, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: I participated in one conference on the question +of homosexuality in the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Tell us this: Did it appear to you, from what you +saw and heard there, that Heydrich and Schirach were very friendly, +or on a very friendly basis?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: That conference did not take place with Von +Schirach, but with one of the officials from the Reich Youth Leader’s +Office who, as Chief of the Hitler Youth Legal Administration, +conducted the discussion with Heydrich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were you ever present when Heydrich talked to +Von Schirach? Were you ever present?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No. +<span class='pageno' title='562' id='Page_562'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did Heydrich ever talk to you, or rather, did +Von Schirach ever talk to you about Heydrich?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>LAUTERBACHER: No, I cannot remember that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: We have no further questions, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thank you, I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: With the permission of the President, I shall now +call my next witness, Gustav Hoepken.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Hoepken took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>GUSTAV DIETRICH HOEPKEN (Witness): Gustav Dietrich +Hoepken.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear +by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Hoepken, I have already examined you on +the case of Schirach when you were in prison?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, you have already examined me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How old are you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I am 36.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What is your father’s occupation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: My father is a dock laborer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And yourself?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I was a newspaper boy, a dock laborer, a spare-time +student, and sports instructor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Sports instructor. You are now in American hands, +are you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I am a prisoner in American hands.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Since when?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Since 19 May 1945.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Has the Prosecution interrogated you on this +matter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Up to now the Prosecution has not interrogated me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you join the Hitler Youth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I joined the Hitler Youth in 1933. +<span class='pageno' title='563' id='Page_563'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You joined the Hitler Youth in 1933? How old +were you at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I was 23.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And in what capacity did you join?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: First as an ordinary member. In September 1933 +I became an Unterbannführer in the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Unterbannführer in 1933?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, in September 1933.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was that a salaried position or an honorary +appointment?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: From 1933 to 1935 I worked as a sports instructor +in the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And in 1935?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: In 1935 I joined the government offices at Potsdam +as an expert on PT in schools.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But that had nothing to do with the Hitler Youth, +had it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: At Potsdam I also commanded the Potsdam unit and +local headquarters of the Hitler Youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So you were a civil servant—or rather, an employee +of the State and apart from that an honorary leader of the +Hitler Youth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: From 1935 until 1939 I was a civil servant in the +government offices at Potsdam and I also commanded the Hitler +Youth unit and local headquarters at Potsdam in an honorary +capacity.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Therefore in the summer of 1939 you joined the +Reich Youth Leadership, did you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: In June 1939 I joined the Reich Youth Leadership +and became adjutant to Baldur von Schirach who was Reich Youth +Leader at the time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And how long did you hold that office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Until August 1939, and then I became a soldier.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Before you joined Schirach’s staff, had you not +served in the Armed Forces?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Up to joining Schirach in 1939 I had done 8 weeks’ +obligatory training in the Air Force.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Apart from that, you had no training?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Apart from that I had no military training. +<span class='pageno' title='564' id='Page_564'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you an officer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I had not been an officer up to that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: So far as his other collaborators were concerned, +did Schirach attach importance to their being officers or trained +soldiers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: So far as I know, Von Schirach did not care whether +his collaborators were soldiers or officers, on the contrary, it was +his view, as he told me repeatedly, that soldiers and officers, as +far as he could see, were less suitable as youth leaders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I do not want to go into the general question of +the training of the Hitler Youth, but I wish to ask you one single +question on this point, especially because you are a sports instructor +by profession. It is a question about the training of the Hitler +Youth in shooting. Were they trained with military weapons, or +how were they trained in firing?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The Hitler Youth were trained in shooting with air +guns or small arms. They did not shoot with military weapons.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In that case I will not put any further questions +to you on the subject of uniform as these questions have already +been clarified. But there is one other thing in which I am interested +and that is the relationship to the Church: Do you know, Witness, +whether the Defendant Von Schirach in 1937, that is in the issue of +the Berlin paper, the <span class='it'>Berliner Tageblatt</span> of 14 January 1937, published +an article written by his press adviser Günther Kaufmann, +headed “Can the Gap be Bridged”? That article, a copy of which I +have before me, deals with a problem in which I am interested, and +that is why I want to ask you: Do you know what Schirach made +his press adviser write in that article on the question of whether +the Hitler Youth leaders should consider the young people’s need +for church services or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know the article.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You know it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I also know the order issued by the Reich Youth +Leader of that time stating that on Sundays there should be no +Hitler Youth duty for all those boys and girls who wanted to attend +church. Every boy and girl in the Hitler Youth at that time was +supposed to be able to attend religious services of his or her own +free will; and it was made part of the duty of the Hitler Youth +leaders at the time to refrain from entering into any arguments +or controversies about the Hitler Youth and the Church. He prohibited +that. +<span class='pageno' title='565' id='Page_565'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, that is the main point of that article of +14 January 1937. But you know that the Defendant Schirach had +certain difficulties with Hitler because of this article. Will you tell +us briefly what you know about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: As soon as the agreement between the Church and +the Hitler Youth was made, the article mentioned appeared in the +<span class='it'>Berliner Tageblatt</span>. On the day that article appeared, Schirach +was at a meeting in Rosenberg’s office. Hitler called Schirach to +the telephone at that time. Hitler took Schirach sternly to task, +firstly, for making an agreement between the Church and the +Hitler Youth and, secondly, for publishing this article. His intention +was to cancel the agreement and to ban any further issue +of the newspapers. Neither of these things happened.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Schirach refuse to withdraw the article?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: So far as I know he did.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In 1940 you went to Vienna with Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I did not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you go?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I went to Vienna for the first time in September 1941.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Where had you been in the meantime?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I have already told you that I joined the Luftwaffe +in August 1939 and served during that time as a service flying +instructor in a Luftwaffe training school.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And you did not rejoin Schirach until 1941, and +then in Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes; I joined Schirach in Vienna in September 1941.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The highest dignitary of the Catholic Church in +Vienna is Cardinal Innitzer, right?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know what Von Schirach’s attitude to +Cardinal Innitzer was? I will tell you at once why I am asking +you this question; I want to know if it is true that Schirach objected +to Cardinal Innitzer’s being molested by the Hitler Youth, and what +steps he took, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Schirach told me repeatedly that he would like to +have a talk with Cardinal Innitzer, but that he was not allowed to +do so, firstly, because of a decree issued by the former head of the +Party Chancellery, Martin Bormann, prohibiting the Gauleiter from +contacting Church dignitaries and, secondly, because Schirach knew +that he himself was under surveillance. +<span class='pageno' title='566' id='Page_566'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Who, Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: That Schirach was under surveillance and thought +that if he forced such a discussion, Bormann would be certain to +know of it on the next day, which would have had most unpleasant +consequences both for Schirach and Cardinal Innitzer. On the other +hand, it was Schirach’s view that Cardinal Innitzer also would +certainly have liked to have a talk with Schirach and Schirach +thought that certainly would not have been the case if Cardinal +Innitzer had not known of his tolerant attitude toward the Church +and the Christian religion. It is furthermore known to me—and I +think this happened in the winter of 1944 to 1945—that Cardinal +Innitzer was molested by youthful civilians while returning from +mass. Cardinal Innitzer had the police find out the names of these +youngsters, and they turned out to be Hitler Youth leaders. +Schirach ordered the competent district leader of the Hitler Youth +to him the same day, took him severely to task, and demanded that +the youth leaders in question be relieved of their duties at once. As +far as I know, this was actually done. I believe I also remember +that Schirach had a letter of apology sent to Cardinal Innitzer, +either personally or through one of his officials.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better break off now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 28 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<div><span class='pageno' title='567' id='Page_567'></span><h1><span style='font-size:larger'>ONE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH DAY</span><br/> Tuesday, 28 May 1946</h1></div> + +<h2 class='nobreak'><span class='it'>Morning Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that +Defendant Göring is absent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We were going to deal with Defendant Bormann’s +documents, were we not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, two witnesses only have arrived +so far for the Defendant Sauckel. Three essential witnesses are still +missing. Perhaps the Court can help to bring these witnesses +quickly so that the case will not be delayed. They are the witnesses +Stothfang, Dr. Jäger, and Hildebrandt. I have repeatedly asked the +Prosecution to get them but they are not here yet. I have not yet +spoken to the witnesses.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Have they been located?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. One is in a camp in Kassel, which is only +a few hours from here, and the other is in Neumünster. That is a +little farther, perhaps 6 or 7 hours from here. Dr. Jäger is free.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: That is not in accordance with the information +which the Tribunal has. The Tribunal has the information that +they cannot be found.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I received the information that their whereabouts +has been ascertained.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: From whom did you receive that information?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Officially, from the General Secretary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will make inquiries into it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, first, with regard to +the witnesses applied for for the Defendant Bormann. They are, +as I understand it, Fräulein Krüger, to whom we have no objection. +The witness Müller is no longer applied for?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, I have dispensed with that witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, Klopfer, and lastly, +Friedrich. These are with regard to Bormann’s law-making activities, +and the Prosecution have no objections. +<span class='pageno' title='568' id='Page_568'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Your Lordship, in place of the witness Müller, +whom I have withdrawn, I have an additional request for the +witness Gerta Christian on the same subject for which I had +requested the witness Müller.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The first witness, Miss Krüger, is going to +speak to exactly the same facts, is she not, to the death of Bormann?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, Your Lordship. The circumstances concerning +Bormann’s death are not very clear. It is very necessary to +hear all the available witnesses on this subject because only in this +way can one be convinced of the fact, which I am trying to establish, +that the Defendant Bormann is already dead.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It does not seem to be a very relevant fact. +It is very remotely relevant whether he is dead or whether he is +alive. The question is whether he is guilty or innocent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Your Lordship, my point of view is that sentence +cannot be passed against a dead man. That is not provided for in +the Charter. According to the Charter, the Court can only sentence +an absent person, but a dead person cannot be included under the +term “absent.” If the defendant is dead, the Charter does not +provide the possibility of continuing proceedings against him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you any objection to that +other witness?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, the Prosecution +does not make any objections.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, My Lord, with regard to +the documents, the first batch of documents is a series of treaties +and diplomatic pronouncements and documents to counteract the +statement of Sir Hartley Shawcross as to the position of international +law before the Charter, the statement that the law of +nations had constituted aggressive war an international crime before +this Tribunal was established and this Charter became part of the +public law of the world. The position of the Prosecution is that +evidence on that point is really irrelevant because after all, the +Tribunal is covered by the Charter, and it seems unnecessary to +translate and publish, by way of document books, all these matters +which the learned counsel has set out in his application. That is, +shortly, the position of the Prosecution with regard to that first +batch of documents. Especially, I do not want to discuss the problem +for the reason that I have given.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What are the numbers of them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are 1 to 11—no, 7, in the +application. +<span class='pageno' title='569' id='Page_569'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Are they long documents?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Your Lordship, I have not seen them yet. I +applied for these documents 3 months ago in order to look them +over, but unfortunately I have not received them yet and therefore +I cannot give the Court any information as to whether they are long +or not and what parts of them I will need for my defense.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Number 2 looks like a long document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: But I will not use all these documents if I +receive them. I shall probably take some of them, Your Lordship; +I shall only...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: When you say you applied for them 3 months +ago, you do not mean you applied to the Tribunal, do you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: I applied to the General Secretary, but perhaps +it was put aside when Your Lordship decided that my case should +be postponed to the end. Perhaps it was forgotten.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Was there any order on your application?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You applied, I think, for an adjournment, +did you not, in order that the matter might be brought up later?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Yes, Your Lordship; I am in an especially +difficult situation. I have questioned many witnesses and have tried +very hard, but I can find nothing exonerating. All the witnesses are +filled with great hatred toward the Defendant Bormann, and they +want to incriminate him in order to exonerate themselves. That +makes my case especially difficult. The man himself is probably +dead and can give me no information. Any day now I might get +new information. For example, a few days ago one of Bormann’s +co-workers, a Dr. Von Hummeln, was arrested in Salzburg. I will +go to see him and perhaps I shall get fresh information—perhaps +none. I must also assume...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We need not bother about that now. We are +only inquiring about your application with reference to the documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Sir David, have you anything further you want to say about the +documents?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is my short point. I do +not want to discuss the merits of my points because that is the +issue, that I am saying is irrelevant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What about Number 11?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not disposed to object to +any of the other documents, My Lord. +<span class='pageno' title='570' id='Page_570'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Are there any others besides...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Number 11—I can see a possible +argument on that, My Lord; therefore I am not going to object to +it. The other documents we certainly have no objection to; the +ordinances of the Führer’s Deputy and...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: All under “B”?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The Prosecution makes no +objection to these.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Now, what do you say to Sir David’s objection to these documents, +1 to 7?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. BERGOLD: Well, Your Lordship, I have already made my +point of view clear in my application. In order to save the time of +the Court, I will merely refer to this written application. I will not +say any more at the moment on the subject, but if Your Lordship +wants me to explain it here now I am ready to do so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the matter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did Your Lordship wish to deal +with the other outstanding applications or would Your Lordship +prefer to deal with that later on at the end of the case of Von +Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we have the papers here. We +were only going to deal with Bormann this morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, we have got a document here, +D-880, said to be extracts from testimony of Admiral Raeder, taken +at Nuremberg on 10 November 1945 by Major John Monigan. Have +you offered that document in evidence or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: May I have just a minute to check it? I am not +certain.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we will give you the document.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I believe not, Mr. President; I do not believe it has +been offered in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It seems to have been handed up yesterday +or the day before...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I think through a mistake.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: ...or last week. Yes. But you will find out +about that and let us know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Sir. +<span class='pageno' title='571' id='Page_571'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, you were still examining Gustav +Hoepken, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I shall continue my examination of +the witness Hoepken.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Hoepken resumed the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Hoepken, we stopped yesterday when discussing +the question whether the Defendant Von Schirach during +his time in Vienna was opposed to the Church or was tolerant in +this connection. The last answer you gave me yesterday referred to +the relations of the Defendant Von Schirach to the Viennese Cardinal, +Innitzer. Is it correct, Witness, that at the suggestion and +with the knowledge of the Defendant Von Schirach during his time +in Vienna you periodically had talks with a Catholic priest there, +a Dean, Professor Ens, for the purpose of discussing Church +questions with him and removing any differences which might arise?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, that is true. Professor Ens was not, as you +assume, Catholic, but Protestant. He was Dean of the faculty of +theology of the University of Vienna. When he visited me he submitted +many Church and religious questions to me. I discussed +them with him. He then asked me to report on them to Herr Von +Schirach so that, if it were in his power, he could make redress. +This was done as far as possible.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know, Witness, that the Defendant Von +Schirach, for example, ordered that at the Party Christmas celebrations +new National Socialist Christmas songs were not to be +sung, but the old Christian Christmas hymns?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I know that at the Christmas celebrations of +the Party and of the Hitler Youth, and the Christmas celebration +for wounded soldiers, the old Christian Christmas carols, such as +“Es ist ein Ros’ entsprungen,” and “Silent Night, Holy Night...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: This is surely not a matter which is worthy +to be given in evidence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know that the Defendant Von +Schirach, in the official magazine of the Hitler Youth, had a special +number published which was in favor of humane treatment of the +people of the Eastern Territories, and when was that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know that it was the quarterly number for April +to June 1943.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that in the same official magazine +of the Hitler Youth, at the request of the Defendant Bormann, a +special anti-Semitic number was to appear, but that Von Schirach +refused it? +<span class='pageno' title='572' id='Page_572'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know that it was requested at that time by the +Propaganda Ministry and also by the Party Chancellery. Von +Schirach refused each time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know that Von Schirach once inspected +a concentration camp?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I know that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Which one?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The concentration camp Mauthausen.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In regard to this point, which has already been +more or less cleared up by the testimony of other witnesses, I am +interested only in one question. When was this visit to Mauthausen?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I cannot say exactly. I can say with certainty, however, +that it was not after April 1943.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why can you say that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: In April 1943 I was discharged from hospital and +began my service in Vienna. From that day on until April 1945 I +knew every day where Von Schirach was. Moreover, immediately +after my arrival in Vienna in April 1943, when I asked him, as I +was rather run-down physically because of my wound and was also +a sports teacher, whether I might do some sports between 7 and +8 in the morning...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we do not want to know about +the witness’ health, do we?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you heard what the President just said. +I have already told you I am interested in when this visit to Mauthausen +was. You said, if I understood you correctly...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He said he could not say when it was and it +was after April 1943. He said he could not say when it was.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I believe you misunderstood the +witness. Witness, please pay attention as to whether this is correct. +I understood the witness to say that it was before April 1943. The +visit must have been before April 1943. It could not have been later.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, he also said, according to the +conversation I heard and took down, that he could not say when +the particular time was.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, but through the testimony of the witness I +should like to settle the fact that it was not later than April 1943.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: He said that already. He said it. He said, +“I cannot say when it was, but it was not after April 1943.” He +said: “In April 1943 I was discharged from the hospital and began +my service in Vienna. I knew every day where Schirach was.” I +have got that all written down. +<span class='pageno' title='573' id='Page_573'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Very well. Witness, in this conversation about his +visit to Mauthausen did the Defendant Von Schirach tell you anything +to the effect that on this visit he got to hear of any atrocities, +ill-treatment, and such things?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, he said nothing about that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I now turn to the question of the deportation +of Jews from Vienna. As far as I know you were an ear-witness +of a conversation between the Reichsführer SS Himmler +and the Defendant Schirach. Will you tell us what was said in this +conversation on the question of the deportation of Jews?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I believe it was in November 1941; Himmler and +Schirach were motoring through East Prussia from Himmler’s +quarters to his special train. In the car Himmler asked Von +Schirach: “Tell me, Von Schirach, how many Jews are still in +Vienna?” Von Schirach answered, “I cannot say exactly. I estimate +40,000 to 50,000.” And Himmler said: “I must evacuate these Jews +as quickly as possible from Vienna.” And Schirach said: “The Jews +do not give me any trouble, especially as they are now wearing +the yellow star.” Then Himmler said: “The Führer is already +angry that Vienna, in this matter as in many others, is made an +exception, and I will have to instruct my SS agencies to carry this +out as speedily as possible.” That is what I remember of this conversation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know anything about the anti-Semitic +speech made by the Defendant Von Schirach in September 1942 at +a Congress in Vienna, which the Prosecution submitted to the Court?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, the contents of the speech are known to us.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I want to know whether you know anything +about it, especially whether Schirach said anything to you about +why he made this anti-Semitic speech?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know from the press officer Günther Kaufmann, +who was mentioned yesterday, that directly after this speech Von +Schirach instructed Kaufmann that every point in the speech should +be telephoned to the DNB (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro) in Berlin, +with the remark that he had every reason to make a concession to +Bormann on this point.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why a concession?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I assume that Schirach knew that his position in +Vienna was precarious, and that he constantly heard, especially +from the Party Chancellery, that he must take a stricter course in +Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You were Chief of the Central Bureau with +Schirach in Vienna. In this capacity, did all Schirach’s incoming +mail go through you? +<span class='pageno' title='574' id='Page_574'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Not all of his mail, but the great majority of it. +Mail stamped “only direct” and “personal” did not go through my +hands.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But the other mail?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: That went through my office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, we have here a number of documents +which have been submitted to the Court. They are the activity and +situation reports which the Chief of the Security Police made, I +believe, monthly or weekly and which have been submitted to the +Court under Number 3943-PS. These reports came from Vienna, +and since you know the situation in the Central Bureau in Vienna +and are well-informed about its activity, I will now hand you +several of these documents. Please look at the documents and then +tell us whether from these documents, which are photostat copies, +you can determine whether these reports of the SS came to you or +to the Defendant Von Schirach, or whether they went to a different +office. I call your special attention to the manner in which these +documents are annotated. Please note on the individual documents +who initialed the document and what was done with the document +after that. And then please tell us who these officials are who figure +in the documents as officials of the Reich Defense Commission; for +instance, a Dr. Fischer, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Those are the documents, Mr. President, about which the Court +asked questions the other day.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know they are, but I do not know +what the question is exactly. It seems to me there are a great +number of questions. Well, let us get on, Dr. Sauter. We shall have +to consider these documents, you know, and the witness ought to +be able to give his answer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President. Of course, the witness has to +look at the documents first. He must especially note which officials +initialed the documents and what the officials did with them. That +is what I must ask the witness, in order to ascertain what the +documents...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought that he had seen these +documents before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: No; they were just handed over in cross-examination. +I could not discuss them previously with the witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: They were certainly handed over before this +morning.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Not to the witness—to me, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, get on, Dr. Sauter, get on. +<span class='pageno' title='575' id='Page_575'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what do these documents tell you? Did +they come to the knowledge of the Defendant Von Schirach, or how +were they dealt with?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: These documents did not go through the Central +Bureau. I see here that they are initialed by a Dr. Felber. I know +him. He was the expert assigned to the Regierungspräsident in +Vienna for all matters concerning the Reich Defense Commissioner.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>From the treatment given these documents, I must assume that +the Berlin SD agency sent them directly to the office of the Regierungspräsident, +and from there they were entered into the files, +as I see here. I do not see Von Schirach’s initials here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The Regierungspräsident was a certain Dellbrügge?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Dr. Dellbrügge.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And this Dr. Felber whom you mentioned was an +official of the Regierungspräsident?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, an official of the Regierungspräsident.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And when such a document as you have there +arrived, where did the post office or any other agency deliver it? +Was it delivered to you or did the Regierungspräsident have his +own office for incoming mail, or how was it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I already said that they must have been sent directly +to the office of the Regierungspräsident, who had his own office for +incoming mail.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How can you tell that the Defendant Von Schirach +had no knowledge of these documents?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Because he did not initial these documents. If documents +were submitted to him, they were initialed “z.K.g.”—noted—“B.v.S.,” +and that does not appear on these documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, I do not think the Prosecution +suggested that they were initialed by Von Schirach. It was quite +clearly brought out in Von Schirach’s evidence that he had not +initialed them, and that fact was not challenged by Mr. Dodd.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I believe it is a decisive point +whether Defendant Von Schirach had any knowledge of these +documents.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Why do you keep asking whether they were +initialed by him or not? That fact, as I have pointed out, has already +been proved and not challenged.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have here an additional collection of +documents under Number 3876-PS. They are additional reports +from the Chief of the Security Police. There is another address +<span class='pageno' title='576' id='Page_576'></span> +on these. It says here, among other things: “To the Reich Defense +Commissioner for the Defense District XVII”—that was Vienna—“for +the attention of Oberregierungsrat Dr. Fischer in Vienna.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am interested in knowing who Dr. Fischer was. Was he in the +Central Bureau, or who was he?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I do not know a Dr. Fischer either in the Central +Bureau or in the Reichsstatthalterei.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Then how do you explain the fact that in these +reports it always says, “To the Reich Defense Commissioner for the +Defense District XVII, for the attention of Oberregierungsrat +Dr. Fischer?”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I assume he was a colleague of Oberregierungsrat +Dr. Felber, who specialized in these matters. Also I see they were +secret letters, and were therefore addressed to him personally.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As far as you know, did not the Regierungspräsident +Dellbrügge report to the Defendant Von Schirach on +these reports which reached him, or have one of his officials report +about them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The Regierungspräsident reported directly to Herr +Von Schirach about matters concerning the Reich Governor and the +Reich Defense Commissioner. I was not present at these conversations; +consequently I cannot say to what extent he reported to +Von Schirach on these matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: If the Regierungspräsident or one of his officials +reported to the Defendant Von Schirach on these reports, would +that be shown in the documents?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Probably yes. In that case the Regierungspräsident +or the officials would have had to write on them “To be filed after +being reported to the Reich Governor,” or “for further action.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: On the documents which I submitted to you there +is no such indication?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: On these documents, no.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And on the documents which I have here, there is +no such note either. Do you conclude from this that the Defendant +Von Schirach received no report on them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I must conclude that Von Schirach was not informed +on these matters.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Defendant Von Schirach was chief of +the state administration in Vienna in his capacity as Reich Governor, +as well as chief of the local administration to a certain extent +as mayor, and finally chief of the Party as Gauleiter. Now, we hear +that in each of these capacities he had a permanent representative. +<span class='pageno' title='577' id='Page_577'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should like to know who normally administered the affairs of +the Reich Defense Commissioner and the Reich Governor; that is, +the affairs of the state administration?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I have already said that it was the Regierungspräsident, +Dr. Dellbrügge.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And then what did the Defendant Von Schirach do +in the field of state administration?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: He was given regular reports by the Regierungspräsident. +Von Schirach then made his decision, and these decisions +were then carried out by the officials or departments.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: If I understand you correctly, the Defendant +Von Schirach concerned himself only with such matters as were +reported to him by the Regierungspräsident or which were brought +to his special attention in writing; is that true?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, that is true.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, were you yourself a member of the SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I was never a member of the SS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Of the SA?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that these three permanent representatives, +whom the Defendant Von Schirach had in Vienna, +namely the Regierungspräsident, the Deputy Gauleiter, and the +Mayor, were all three SS Führer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I know that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: How was that? Did the Defendant Von Schirach +select these men himself, or how do you explain the fact that all +three of his representatives were SS Führer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The Deputy Gauleiter, Scharizer, was an honorary +SS Führer and, as far as I recall, he was Oberbefehlsleiter of the +Party. When Von Schirach came to Vienna, Scharizer had already +been active for several years in Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As what?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: As Deputy Gauleiter. I do not know when the Regierungspräsident, +Dr. Dellbrügge, came to Vienna; but I assume +either before or at about the same time as Von Schirach. Moreover, +the Regierungspräsidenten were appointed by the Ministry of the +Interior, so that I think he could hardly have had sufficient influence +to refuse or select a particular Regierungspräsident.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>As for the mayor, the situation was similar.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: He was a certain Blaschke? +<span class='pageno' title='578' id='Page_578'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes. He was SS Brigadeführer Blaschke, he was also +appointed by the Ministry of the Interior as acting mayor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: By the Ministry of the Interior?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When was that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I believe that was in 1944, in January or February +of 1944.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that this SS Brigadeführer, or +whatever he was, this Blaschke, before the time of the Defendant +Von Schirach, was active in Vienna as a town councillor, and I +believe also as vice mayor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: He was a town councillor before; and I believe he +was vice mayor before I came to Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know that the Defendant Von Schirach +for a long time opposed this SS Oberführer or Brigadeführer +Blaschke being appointed mayor of Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I should say he opposed this for about 6 or 9 months, +and I believe later he refused to allow the Minister of the Interior +finally to confirm his appointment as mayor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, what were the relations between the +Defendant Von Schirach and the SS and the SS officers? Were they +especially friendly and cordial or what were they like?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: As far as I know, Schirach associated with the SS +Führer as far as was officially necessary and no more.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Was he friendly with SS men?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No; I do not know. In any case I knew of no such +friendship.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did he not express to you his attitude toward +the SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I have already said that he always had the feeling +that he was under a certain supervision from them and for that +reason he was rather distrustful.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Distrustful of...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Of the SS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know how the Defendant +Von Schirach received his information about the foreign press and +foreign press reports?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: He received them from the Reich Propaganda Office +in Vienna. They were excerpts which the Propaganda Ministry +<span class='pageno' title='579' id='Page_579'></span> +issued in collaboration with the Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich. As +far as I know, however, they were selected and screened.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you live for a long time with Von Schirach in +Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: From 1944 on I lived in Schirach’s house.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You also took your meals with him?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes, I also took meals with him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did not the Defendant Von Schirach obtain information +from the foreign radio?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I am almost certain he did not, because after every +meal he listened to the official German news services with me and a +few other co-workers. Besides, if he had done so it would in my +opinion have become known very soon for, as I said already, he had +the feeling that he was being watched.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the witness can only tell us what +he knows. How could he know whether Von Schirach ever listened +to any foreign news? If he does not know, why do you not take him +on to something else?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: The witness said, Mr. President, that during the +latter part of his time in Vienna, from the spring of 1944 I believe +he said, he lived in the house of the Defendant Von Schirach.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know he said that, and he said that he +did not think he heard foreign news. What more can he give? What +more evidence can he give on that subject?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I wanted to hear that, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: But he said it already. I have taken it down. +Why do you not go on to something else?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know that in the last weeks of +the resistance an order came to Vienna from Berlin according to +which all defeatists, whether men or women, were to be hanged? +What attitude did Schirach take toward this order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I know that so-called courts martial were to be set +up with the purpose of speedily sentencing people who objected to +the conduct of the war or who showed themselves to be defeatists. +This court martial was set up in Vienna, or rather appointed, but +it did not meet once, and thus did not pronounce any sentences.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did the court martial of the Defendant Von +Schirach carry on any proceedings at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, not to my knowledge.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you know anything about it? +<span class='pageno' title='580' id='Page_580'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, that fact, again, was given in +evidence by Von Schirach and was not cross-examined to—that that +court martial did not meet.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know anything about the fact that +in the last weeks an order came to form <span class='it'>franc-tireur</span> units? What +was Von Schirach’s attitude to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I do not know that <span class='it'>franc-tireur</span> units were to be +formed, but I do know that a “Freikorps Hitler” was to be formed. +They were to be in civilian clothes. Schirach ordered that no people +from the Reichsgau Vienna were to be assigned to this “Freikorps.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Why not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Because at that time he considered resistance +senseless. Secondly, because he considered it contrary to international +law.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: My last question to you, Witness. You were with +Schirach to the last, until he left Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did Schirach give an order to destroy bridges or +churches, residential quarters, and so forth, in Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not know of that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was the position he took?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: That orders to blow up bridges or to take any +defense measures were given only by the military authorities, as far +as I know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But not by Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no more questions to put to +this witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to +ask questions? The Prosecution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Witness, would you see all of the files that were in +Von Schirach’s office during the time that you were his adjutant?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I have already told you, or I told the defense +counsel, that most of the mail went through the Central Bureau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I want to show you a document that is in evidence +here and ask you if you can tell us whether or not you have seen +this before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>A document was handed to the witness.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Have you ever seen that document before? +<span class='pageno' title='581' id='Page_581'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I do not know this document officially, as I see it is +dated 28 May 1942, at which time I was an officer in the Luftwaffe.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I see, you did not mean the Tribunal to understand +that you were familiar with everything that was in Von Schirach’s +files, because certainly this document was there during the years +that you were his adjutant. You never saw it. It is marked “Central +Bureau,” and you had charge of these very files, yet you never saw +this teletype to Bormann? So you certainly did not know everything +that was in his files, did you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I said that the majority of the mail went through +my offices but, of course, since I was not in Vienna at this time but +only came to Vienna in April 1943, I was not able to look through +all the back documents and letters in the files of the Reich Governor. +That would have taken years.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Let me ask you something else. You were there in +the last days, I assume, when the city was taken by the Allied +Forces, were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I was in Vienna until April 1945.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What was done with Von Schirach’s files when the +end was very obviously coming? What did you do with all those +files over which you had control?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I was not in charge of any files. I was chief of the +bureau, and I...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, you know what I mean—chief of the bureau +or of the office where these files were kept. What I want to know is +what did you do with the files?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I gave no orders in this connection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know what became of the files?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: They were taken out of the office sometime before +the city was captured; do you not know that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I did not know that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were the files there the last day that you were +there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Probably, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not want a “probably.” I want to know if you +know and if you do, to tell us. Were they there or not the last day +that you were in the office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I gave no orders to destroy them or to remove them. +<span class='pageno' title='582' id='Page_582'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I did not ask you if you gave orders. I asked you +if you know what became of them and whether or not they were in +the office the last day that you were there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I do not know what happened to them. Nor can I +say whether they were still there on the last day.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you not know that they were all moved to a salt +mine in Austria?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not know that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You have never heard that, or that they were taken +out of the office and were later found by the Allied Forces in a +salt mine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not know that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not mean that you heard they were found +there, but you certainly knew that they were taken out of the office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I do not know. I also gave no orders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, now, let me put this proposition to you, and +then perhaps you can give an explanation of it to the Tribunal. +This document that I have just shown to you and these reports that +you examined for Dr. Sauter were all found in Schirach’s files in a +salt mine. Would you have any explanation for that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I cannot explain that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: They were found together. Would that mean +anything to you, or would you have any explanation for it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I have not. I can only explain that by saying +that probably the Chief of the Reich Governor’s office or one of his +officials who was in charge of these things gave the order to that +effect, of course without my knowledge and without any order +from me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Tell the Tribunal exactly what day you closed up +your office in Vienna, or the last day that you were in this office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: It might have been the 3d or 4th of April.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When was the city taken?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I read in the newspaper afterwards that the city +finally fell into the hands of the Allies on 13 April.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you all leave your office on the 3d or 4th of +April? Did Von Schirach leave as well, and all the clerical staff, +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Schirach and I and his adjutant left the office on this +day, or rather, Schirach had previously set up his office at his home +and was working there. +<span class='pageno' title='583' id='Page_583'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Had he taken any files from his office to his home?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Only what he needed immediately to carry on his +business; that is, the matters which were being dealt with at the +moment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you leave someone in charge of the files when +you left there, you and Von Schirach on the 3d of April; and if +you did, who was it that you left in charge?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I did not leave anyone to supervise. The file clerks +did that of their own accord.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I am trying to understand—and I think it would be +helpful to the Tribunal—whether or not you just walked out of this +office and left everything there, or whether just you and Von Schirach +left and left other people there, or whether the place was in such +chaos that nobody remained. I have not any accurate picture of it, +and I think it is of some importance. You ought to be able to tell us. +You left there with him. What was the situation on the 3d or 4th +of April? The city was practically to be taken in another 10 days. +It was under siege. There was much confusion. What were you +doing about your files and all of your other papers in your office +when you walked out of there that day? You certainly just did not +walk out and not give some directions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I believe that we are not clear about the character +of the Central Bureau. The Central Bureau, of which I was in +charge for the last few months, had no powers, no executive powers, +but all of these things were done by the competent Reich Governor, +that is, the Regierungspräsident, and he probably...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do not need any explanation of how your office +was set up. I want to know if the papers were left there or not, +or if anybody was left with them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: The papers, as far as I know, were left there, and +the archivists were instructed to take care of them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you order any papers to be destroyed before you +walked out that day, the 3d or 4th of April, anything at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: I gave no orders to destroy anything in the Reich +Governor’s Office; I had no authority to do that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did anybody to your knowledge order anything +destroyed, whether you did or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Whether such an order was given and who gave it, +I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What is the document you put to him? +<span class='pageno' title='584' id='Page_584'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Number USA-865. It is Document 3877-PS, a teletype +to Bormann from Von Schirach on 28 May 1942.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine the witness, +Dr. Sauter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I should like to go back to what the +Prosecution just asked you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The documents of the Reich Governor’s office apparently are +supposed to have been found in a salt mine. Did you have any +supervision over the documents of the Reich Governor’s office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: No, I had no supervision over these documents. I +just explained that. For that reason, I could not give any order to +remove them. I know that valuable objects, pictures, and so on, +were removed, but much earlier.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And the other employees of the Central Bureau, +were they Viennese? Did they stay in the office, or what do you +know about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>HOEPKEN: Most of them were Viennese, of course, and probably +remained behind. I shook hands and said goodbye to them, and +then we separated. I also asked whether I could do anything for +them, and then I left Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions, Mr. President.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Perhaps we had better adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the application on behalf +of the Defendant Bormann the Tribunal allows witness Number 1, +Miss Else Krüger.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal allows witnesses Numbers 3 and 4, Dr. Klopfer and +Helmuth Friedrich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Tribunal also allows the witness whose name I have got +inserted instead of Number 2, Christians, I think it was.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>With reference to the documents applied for, Numbers 1 to 7, +the application is refused. But the Tribunal will consider any +application for documents which the defendants’ counsel, who may +be appointed to argue the general questions of law on behalf of all +the defendants, may wish to have translated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Document Number 11 may be translated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Counsel for the Defendant Bormann may see the documents +which are mentioned under Roman Number III in the application +<span class='pageno' title='585' id='Page_585'></span> +and counsel for the Defendant Bormann may also use the documents +contained under heading “B.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The final decision upon the admissibility of all these documents +is, of course, a matter which will be decided at the time the documents +are presented.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There is one other thing that I want to announce, and it is in +answer to the application of Dr. Servatius on behalf of the Defendant +Sauckel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I am told that the witness Timm is in Nuremberg prison. The +witness Biedemann is also in Nuremberg prison. The witness +Hildebrandt will probably arrive in Nuremberg today. His whereabouts +had been lost and he has only just been rediscovered. The +witness Jäger is in the British zone, and the British secretary is +trying through the military authorities to obtain his attendance; +The witness Stothfang has not been located. There appears to be +a mistake in the identity of the person who was reported to the +General Secretary previously. The witness Mitschke has never been +located, although every effort is now being made to locate him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I ask permission to call a further witness, Fritz +Wieshofer. I shall examine this witness only very briefly, because +most points have already been clarified through the other witnesses.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Wieshofer took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRITZ WIESHOFER (Witness): Fritz Wieshofer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear +by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness repeated the oath.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Herr Wieshofer, how old are you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: 31 years old.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Married?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Children?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: One son.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you a member of the Party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I applied for membership in 1938.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: You only applied for membership?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes. +<span class='pageno' title='586' id='Page_586'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Were you a member of the SS or the SA?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was in the Waffen-SS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Since when?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Since June 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Are you Austrian by birth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I am Austrian.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you join the Reich Youth Leader’s +Office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I joined Herr Von Schirach on 3 October 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what did you do before that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Before that I had a temporary post in the Foreign +Office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: For how long?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Only from May until October 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And before that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Before that I was employed in the Gauleiter’s +office in Carinthia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you have anything to do with the Hitler Youth?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In October of 1940, then, you came to Vienna to +join Von Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes, to Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: In what capacity did you go there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I went there as Von Schirach’s adjutant.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what did your duties mostly consist of?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: As adjutant I was responsible for the handling of +the mail, engagements for conferences, seeing to it that files were +presented on time at conferences, travel arrangements, and so on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you only work for Schirach in his capacity as +Reich Governor, as Gauleiter, or did you act for him only as mayor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was adjutant for Herr Von Schirach in all his +capacities.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you also have access to the secret files?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, I shall only have a very few brief +questions to put to you. First of all, I am interested in this: Who +was responsible for the forced evacuation of Jews from Vienna? +<span class='pageno' title='587' id='Page_587'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The forced evacuation of Jews from Vienna, as +far as I know, was handled by the RSHA. The representative in +Vienna was a certain Dr. Brunner, an Obersturmführer in the SS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you often visit Dr. Brunner officially in connection +with the forced evacuation of Jews, and for what reason?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: In some cases, Jews who were affected by this +forced evacuation made written applications to Von Schirach to be +left out of the transport. In such cases, Von Schirach, through the +Chief of his Central Bureau, took the matter up with Dr. Brunner’s +office and asked that the request of the applicant be granted. I +would say that generally this was done by the Chief of the Central +Bureau. I remember two cases where I myself received instructions +to intervene with Dr. Brunner, not by writing or telephoning, but +by going to see him personally.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: And what did this SS Sturmführer Dr. Brunner +tell you about what was actually going to happen to the Jews when +they were taken away from Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Dr. Brunner only told me, on the occasion of one +of these interventions, that the action of resettling the Jews would +be a resettlement from the district of Vienna into the zone of the +former Government General. He also told me in what way this was +being carried out. For instance he said that women and small +children would travel in second-class carriages; that sufficient +rations for the journey and milk for small children would be +provided. He also told me that these resettled persons, upon arrival +at their destination, insofar as they were capable of working, would +immediately be put to work. First of all, they would be put into +assembly camps, but that as soon as accommodation was available, +they would be given homes, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>. He also told me that because +of the numerous interventions by Herr Von Schirach his work had +been made very difficult.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you, or have you—I will put my next question +this way: Did you ever see an order in which Gauleiter were +forbidden to intervene in any way on behalf of Jews, and did you +discuss that order with Von Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I recollect a written order which we received +either at the end of 1940 or at the beginning of 1941. It stated that +“There are reasons which make it necessary once more to point out,” +<span class='it'>et cetera</span>. It obviously was a repetition of an order which had +already been given. The purport of the order was that because of +certain reasons, Gauleiter were prohibited from intervening on +behalf of Jews in the future.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did you talk about that with Schirach? +<span class='pageno' title='588' id='Page_588'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I talked to Herr Von Schirach about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What did he say?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: As far as I can recollect, Von Schirach wrote on +the order “To be filed.” He did not say anything more about it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I have another question, Witness. The Defendant +Von Schirach was once in the concentration camp at Mauthausen. +Can you tell us when that was?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I cannot tell you that exactly. All I can say on +that subject is that when I came back from the front—and this was +either in the autumn of 1942 or in June 1943—the adjutant who +was on duty at the time told me that he had accompanied Herr +Von Schirach to a concentration camp, Mauthausen Camp. Some +time afterwards—it must have been when I came back from the +front the second time, at the end of 1943—Herr Von Schirach also +told me that he had been to Mauthausen. I only recollect that he +said that he had heard a symphony concert there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Well, we are not interested in that; we have heard +that. I am only interested in one thing: Did he visit Mauthausen +or another concentration camp again later on? Can you give us +reliable information on that or not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I can give you reliable information on that. That +is quite out of the question, because from November 1943 until the +collapse I was continuously on duty and I knew where Von Schirach +was, day and night.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Did he go to Mauthausen again in 1944?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No, certainly not, that is out of the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Witness, you remember that toward the end of the +war there were orders coming from some source or other stating +that enemy airmen who had been forced to land were no longer to +be protected. Do you know of that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: That somewhere such orders were issued?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: What was the attitude of Defendant Von Schirach +regarding such orders, and how do you know about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I talked about these orders with Herr Von Schirach. +Von Schirach was always against the idea contained in the order, +and he always said that these airmen, too, should be treated as +prisoners of war. Once he said: “If we do not do that, then there +is the danger that our enemies, too, will treat their prisoners, that +is Germans, in the same manner.” +<span class='pageno' title='589' id='Page_589'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Do you yourself know of cases where Defendant +Von Schirach actually intervened on behalf of enemy airmen in +that way?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Will you please tell us about it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: During one of the last air attacks on Vienna, in +March 1945, an American plane was shot down and crashed near +the headquarters of the Gau command post. That command post +was on a wooded hill in Vienna to which part of the population +used to go during air attacks. Von Schirach was watching from a +32-meter high iron structure on which he would always stand +during air attacks, and he observed that a member of the American +crew bailed out of the aircraft. He immediately ordered the commander +in charge of this command post to drive to the place of the +landing so as to protect the American soldier against the crowd and +bring him to safety. The American soldier was brought to the +command post and after the air attack he was handed over to the +Air Force Command XVII as a prisoner of war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: When did you leave Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I left Vienna with Herr Von Schirach on 13 April +1945.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: On 13 April together with the Defendant Von +Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Together with Herr Von Schirach.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Now, this is the last question I have to put to +you: Witness, have you ever heard from Schirach’s lips anything to +the effect that Vienna was to be held “to the last man” at all costs, +or that destruction should be carried out in Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have never heard him say either the one or +the other.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put +this witness.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, do you know the Prater in Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes, of course, I am Viennese.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of an institution is that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The Prater is, or at least was, a pleasure park.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was it closed during the war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The Prater was not closed during the war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of people used to go there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: During the war you mean? +<span class='pageno' title='590' id='Page_590'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Workers, employees, civil servants, that is the +Viennese, the whole of Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you also see foreign workers there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: A great many or just a few?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The situation in Vienna was such that we used to +say that if you wanted to go to the Prater then you would have to +be able to speak French and Russian, because with Viennese alone +you could not get along. The Prater was overcrowded with foreign +workers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How were these foreigners dressed, badly +or well?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: These foreigners were well dressed, so that you +could not distinguish them from the population. Only when they +talked could you recognize that they were foreigners.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How did they look otherwise? As regards +food, did they look starved?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: As far as I myself could see, the workers looked +perfectly well fed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did the people have money?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: They had lots of money. It was known that the +“black market” in Vienna was almost entirely dominated by foreign +workers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could foreigners be seen only in the Prater or +were they to be seen everywhere in the town?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Not only in the Prater, but also in the rest of the +town, in cafés, of which there are so many in Vienna, in restaurants, +and in hotels.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Whom, besides the Defendant Von Schirach, do you +know of these defendants? And by “know” I mean know personally, +or have some acquaintanceship with the person, or had something +to do with the person?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Personally, I only know Herr Funk.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know Sauckel?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, who else?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I know Herr Seyss-Inquart, but I did not have +any personal dealings with him. I was the adjutant of Von Schirach. +<span class='pageno' title='591' id='Page_591'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How do you know Funk?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was invited by Herr Funk a few times. Officially, +as adjutant of Herr Von Schirach, I had some dealings with +him, and apart from that, he invited me several times privately.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were you in the SS at that time, when you were +invited by Funk?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: At that time I was in the Waffen-SS as an officer.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: By the way, when did you first join the SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I joined the Waffen-SS on 26 June 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were you in any other branch of the SS besides the +Waffen-SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was also in the General SS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When did you join the General SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: In June or July 1939.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: So you were actually in the SS from as far back +as 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: In the General SS; yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Now, you also became an SS Obersturmführer at +one time, did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When was that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I became Obersturmführer about 21 June 1944.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: When did you join the SA?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I joined the SA on 9 May 1932.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you know the Strasshof Camp, S-t-r-a-s-s-h-o-f?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: This is the first time I have heard that name.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, it may have been mispronounced. It was a +camp located outside Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I do not know which camp you mean. I understood +Strasshof. I do not know of any such camp.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, something like that. You never heard of that +camp?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Never.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you were in Vienna from what year?—19...?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I was born in Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I know you were, but I am talking about +your service with the Defendant Schirach. You were there with him +for how long? +<span class='pageno' title='592' id='Page_592'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: From the beginning of October 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And you never heard of Strasshof?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you have much to do with the files of this +Defendant Von Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What would you say you had to do with them? +What was your responsibility?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I merely had to see to it that files were presented +in good time for the conference, and that after they had been used +they were returned to the Central Bureau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Where would you go to get a file for Von Schirach +that had to do with the Reich Defense Commission for that district +or that defense district? Where would you go to get a file that had +to do with matters concerning the Reich Defense Commission? Now, +let us assume a situation—let me make it clear to you. Say that +Von Schirach tells you he wants a file about a certain matter that +has to do with the Reich Defense Commission. You had to have it +on his desk by a certain hour and see that it was there, as you say. +Tell the Tribunal just what you would do, where you would go, +who you would talk to, and how you would get that for him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: That would be simple for me. I would apply to +the Chief of the Central Bureau, knowing that he would probably +have to go to the Regierungspräsident to obtain that file. That is +what I assume. I myself would only have gone to the Central +Bureau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You had a central filing place, did you not, for all +of your files, whether they were under the Reich Defense Commission +or the Gauleiter or the civil government of Vienna; is that not +so? They were all kept in one place?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: They were not all together in one place; only a +part of the files were in the Central Bureau. I cannot tell you +which part because I have never had anything to do with that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You left Vienna on 13 April, you say, with Von +Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I suppose, as his adjutant, you had to make considerable +preparations for leaving for some days previously, did +you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: What did you pack up? What did you take with you? +<span class='pageno' title='593' id='Page_593'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: We did not take anything with us from Vienna. +Von Schirach went by car, and the gentlemen on his staff went in +two or three other cars. Nothing else was taken along from Vienna.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, what did you do in the office; how did you +leave it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: We had not used the office since, I think, the +spring or early summer of 1944, because the “Ballhausplatz,” that +is, the office of the Reich Governor, had a direct hit and Von Schirach +could no longer work there. He was working in his apartment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: In his apartment? And did he have all his files in +his apartment or somewhere near at hand?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: He had no files whatever in his apartment. They +remained in the office, in that part of the Reich Governor’s building +which was still being used and in which one could still work.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Were any files taken out of the filing department of +the Reich Governor’s Office when you left Vienna, or before you +left Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I do not know anything about that. I know that +an order existed, both for the State Administration as well as for +the Party, that files must be destroyed when the enemy approached. +Whether that was done or what actually happened to the files, I do +not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Who got that order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The order, as far as the Party channels were concerned, +went to the deputy Gauleiter, and as far as the State Administration +was concerned, to the Regierungspräsident.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you also receive an order to start moving your +files to places of safety some time in the spring of 1945 or even the +late winter of 1944?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have no recollection of such an order.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know that some 250 folders of your files +were moved to a salt mine outside Vienna? Do you know anything +about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No, I hear that for the first time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Do you know that there is such a mine near Vienna? +You have lived there quite a while, I gather.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. It is not near Vienna—if I may be permitted +to put this matter right—but near Salzburg; we never lived there. +I only know that this mine exists.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: How far is it from Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Approximately 350 kilometers. +<span class='pageno' title='594' id='Page_594'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You do not know anything about any files being +taken there. You are sure about that, are you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I am absolutely certain; I do not know anything +about that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I have just one other question to ask. I suppose you +knew the defendant pretty well. He is a little older than you, but +you had worked for him for some time. Is that not so?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Why did you not join the Army instead of the SS +when you wanted to do something for your country?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: When I was called up, the Waffen-SS was considered +the elite unit and I preferred to serve in such a guards unit, +if I may say so, than in the general Armed Forces.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Was it partly due to the fact that you had been in +the General SS since 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. That had nothing to do with it. Many members +of the General SS went to the Forces.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Did you talk this matter over with your superior, +the Youth Leader Von Schirach, before you joined the SS in 1939, +and the Waffen-SS later on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. Might I remind you that I did not join Von +Schirach until October 1940, whereas I joined the Waffen-SS on +26 June 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, but you were, I suppose, a young man and you +were in touch with the Reich Youth organization in 1939 when you +joined the General SS. Is that not a fact? Were you not a part of +the Youth organization in 1939?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. I was not taken into the Youth Officers Corps +until April 1944 when I became Bannführer. Before that I had +nothing to do with it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, I do not think you understand me. It is not +too important, but how old were you in 1939? You were 24, approximately, +were you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: And were you not then in some way affiliated with +the Hitler Youth or the Youth organization in Germany, either as +a member, or having something to do with it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. Neither as a member nor in any other way. +Of course I knew Youth Leaders in Carinthia, yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: You were quite a speech maker for the Party, were +you not, during your lifetime? +<span class='pageno' title='595' id='Page_595'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I spoke at several meetings in Carinthia between +April 1938 and May 1940.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: At about how many meetings would you say you +spoke in that period of 2 years?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: During that time I spoke at about 80 meetings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Before an average of about, say, 3,000 persons per +meeting?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I also spoke in very small villages. I would say +that the average attendance would be about 200.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is all I have.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: What were the subjects you talked about at these +meetings?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Our subject was given to us by the Reich Propaganda +Ministry. The meetings were conducted in such a way that +every speaker was able to talk on general matters. For instance +the subject might have been “With the Führer to Final Victory,” +or “Why Welfare for the Nation?” or “Why Winter Relief?” Such +subjects were always given.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did you spread Rosenberg’s <span class='it'>Myth of the 20th +Century</span>?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did you speak about such subjects?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Never; in view of my education I would not have +been in a position to do so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Have you ever read this <span class='it'>Myth</span>?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have not read the <span class='it'>Myth</span>.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Did you speak to youth at these meetings?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I did not speak to youth—that is, not particularly +to youth.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. THOMA: Thank you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I do not wish to put any questions +to the witness; thank you very much.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Witness, did Schirach have any +authority to intervene in case of Jews who were being deported +from Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: He had no authority to do so, but he did it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many times did he intervene?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I cannot recollect a single case where Von Schirach +did not intervene when he received a petition. +<span class='pageno' title='596' id='Page_596'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask that; I asked how +many times he intervened.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I cannot give you any figure without being inaccurate. +It is difficult to say.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did he intervene many times, or +a few?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No. He intervened often.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you see the order to the +Police not to protect aviators? You said it was in writing, did +you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Who signed it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: The order was signed by Bormann.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And was it distributed to the +Police in Vienna?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: By the Police? If I have understood you rightly, +you were talking about the order that Gauleiter must not intervene +on behalf of Jews.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No. This was the order about not +protecting aviators who had crashed. You said you saw that order, +did you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I did see the order, yes. I can no longer remember +whom it came from and to whom it was addressed. It was merely +sent to our office for our information. We were not called upon +to take any action.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you not know whether or not +the Police had a copy of it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Please, will you be good enough to repeat the +question?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know whether or not the +Police in Vienna had copies of the order?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: That I do not know.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you ever know Himmler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have seen him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did he give you any instructions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you get any instructions +from the SS?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: In which way do you mean? +<span class='pageno' title='597' id='Page_597'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Any instructions from the SS +directly when you were in Von Schirach’s office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): None at all?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: None at all. I cannot recollect any.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think you said once that +Schirach sent a command to save American aviators from the crowd, +did you not? Do you not understand?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes, I understand, and I did say that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And what other efforts did Von +Schirach make to protect aviators from the crowd? Did he make +any other efforts?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did he issue any orders to the +Police or take it up with the Police?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Von Schirach’s opinion was known. In the +circles...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you the opinion. +Did he issue any orders to the Police or talk to the Police?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I have no recollection of that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you would know if he had, +would you not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: If I had been present when he gave the orders +then I would know it, but it is possible that he talked when I was +not there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you say you had access to +the secret files?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What was kept in the secret files?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: I did not understand the question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I asked you what was kept, what +was put in the secret files, what sort of papers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: There were secret files which came from the +Supreme Party Headquarters, secret files which came from the +Minister of the Interior; there were things which made one wonder +why they were called “secret.” But as far as details of these files +are concerned, I cannot, of course, today remember them.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I suppose any documents, +any reports, that were marked “secret” would be put in those secret +files, would they not? +<span class='pageno' title='598' id='Page_598'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: Reports from us to higher departments, or do you +mean from the top downwards?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Reports coming in to you.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: They would then have been filed in the secret +archives.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And SS secret reports would go +in the secret files, would they not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>WIESHOFER: SS reports did not come to us, because we were +not a service department of the SS.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: If you have no questions yourself, Dr. Sauter, +then the witness may retire.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The witness Wieshofer left the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in Schirach’s document book there +are still a few documents which, up to now, have not been expressly +presented; but I believe it is not necessary to read these documents +to you. To save time, I should like, if I may, to refer to the documents +and ask you to take judicial notice of them; for instance, of +the affidavit of Frau Hoepken, which is incorporated in the document +book under Number 3 and which has already been submitted +somewhere else.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There is only one document, Mr. President, about which I want +to give a very brief explanation. In the Schirach document book, +under Number 118(a), there is the farewell letter of the explorer +Dr. Colin Ross. With reference to this Dr. Colin Ross, when the documents +were dealt with, the Prosecutor said that the body of Dr. Ross +had not been discovered. My first reaction was of course surprise, +and I made inquiries as to what actually had been done with these +bodies and I discovered that in fact on 30 April 1945, the day before +the arrival of American troops, the bodies of Dr. Colin Ross and his +wife were found in the house of Defendant Von Schirach at Urfeld, +on Lake Walchen. They had both first taken poison and then, to be +quite sure, Dr. Ross shot his wife and then himself. German +soldiers who were still at Urfeld on Lake Walchen as patients at the +time then buried the bodies quite close to the house of the Defendant +Von Schirach.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the autumn the American Governor ordered that the bodies +were to be transferred to the cemetery, but eventually he rescinded +that order and permitted the bodies to remain where they had +originally been buried.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, can you indicate in what way +you will submit this document has any relevance at all? We have +<span class='pageno' title='599' id='Page_599'></span> +read the document. It does not appear to have any striking +relevance.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, we have submitted this document +because it is to prove, or at least indicate, that the Defendant Von +Schirach, together with this Dr. Colin Ross, continuously worked +to maintain peace, and later on to limit the war. Therefore it is +submitted only to show that the Defendant Von Schirach worked +for peace.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The document does not mention Von Schirach +or in any way indicate that he had worked for peace.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: But it says in the document, “We have done everything +in our power to prevent this war, or...”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the word “We” must mean the +people who “leave this world by our own will,” namely Dr. Colin +Ross and his wife. It does not refer to Von Schirach.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: We do not know that. Why should it not also +refer to Von Schirach?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, because there is such a thing as grammar. +The document begins “We leave this world by our own will.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: As to that, Mr. President, may I remind you that +this name, Dr. Colin Ross, has been mentioned very often during +this trial in connection with the peace efforts of the Defendant Von +Schirach, and that Dr. Colin Ross, together with his wife, was +living in Schirach’s apartment when they committed suicide.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, very well, Dr. Sauter, if you wish to +draw our attention to it, you may do so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Thank you. Mr. President, this letter was not +really meant for the public; the original of the letter was left +behind by Dr. Ross, and a number of carbon copies were sent to +personal friends. In this way we found this letter of Dr. Colin Ross. +I do not think there is anything else I have to say.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I have not said anything critical of the letter. +If you want to read some sentences of it, read them; if you do not +we will take judicial notice of it. As I tell you, we have already +read this letter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I am not stopping your reading a sentence of +it, if you want to read a sentence of it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: It is of course not necessary, Mr. President, if you +have taken cognizance of it. I have nothing else to say, and at this +point I can end my case for the Defendant Von Schirach. +<span class='pageno' title='600' id='Page_600'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, have you offered in evidence all +the documents which are in these books?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then they will be numbered with the numbers +which are in the books.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then we will take judicial notice +of them all.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Well, Mr. President, there is one here which the Tribunal +expressly ruled on—the affidavit of Uiberreither. The Defendant +Von Schirach was told he would have to present Uiberreither +if he were to use this affidavit. He has not been presented +here and now the affidavit is being offered. We expressly asked +that he be called here if this affidavit was to be submitted to the +Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SAUTER: I am not making any reference to Uiberreither’s +affidavit, and I will forego calling the witness Uiberreither.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Sauter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Then the affidavit is not offered?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: No, it is not being offered.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: That is Page 135.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Then it will not be admitted, and we will +adjourn now.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<h2><span class='pageno' title='601' id='Page_601'></span><span class='it'>Afternoon Session</span></h2> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Mr. President, during the presentation of the case +involving the Defendant Funk, there was a number of documents +that we did not submit in evidence at the time; and I asked the +Tribunal’s permission to do so at a later time. I am prepared to +do so now if the Tribunal would care to have me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think it would be quite convenient now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Very well, Sir.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The first one is a matter of clarifying the record with respect +to it. It is Document 2828-PS. It has already been offered in evidence +as Exhibit USA-654. But the excerpt, or the extract, which was +read will be found on Page 105 of the document. We cited another +page, which was in error. Reference to this Document USA-654 +will be found on Page 9071 (Volume XIII, Page 141) of the record.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We also offered our Document EC-440, which consisted of a statement +made by the Defendant Funk, and we quoted a sentence from +Page 4 of that document. I wish to offer that as Exhibit USA-874.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then Document 3952-PS was an interrogation of the Defendant +Funk dated 19 October 1945. We wish to offer that as USA-875.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I might remind the Tribunal that the excerpt quoted from that +interrogation had to do with the statement made by Funk that the +Defendant Hess had notified him of the impending attack on the +Soviet Union. That excerpt has been translated into the four +languages, and therefore will be readily available to the Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then there is also another interrogation dated 22 October 1945. +We read from Pages 15 and 16 of that interrogation, as it appears +in the record at Page 9169 for 7 May (Volume XIII, Page 214). The +document is Number 3953-PS; we offer it as Exhibit USA-876.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>We next referred to Document Number 3894-PS, the interrogation +of one Hans Posse. We offered it as Exhibit USA-843 at the +time, as appears on Page 9093 of the record for 6 May (Volume XIII, +Page 158). At that time I stated to the Tribunal that we would +submit the whole interrogation in French, Russian, German, and +English. We are now prepared to do that, and do so.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then we have Document 3954-PS. This is an affidavit by one +Franz B. Wolf, one of the editors of the <span class='it'>Frankfurter Zeitung</span>. +Reference to it will be found at Page 9082 of the transcript, where +we stated that we would have more to say about the reason for +the retention of the editorial staff of the <span class='it'>Frankfurter Zeitung</span> (Volume +XIII, Page 150). That Document, 3954-PS, is also now available +to the Tribunal in French, Russian, German, and English; and +we offer it as Exhibit USA-877. +<span class='pageno' title='602' id='Page_602'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then, Mr. President, a motion picture film was shown during +this cross-examination of the Defendant Funk; and the Tribunal +inquired as to whether or not we would be prepared to submit +affidavits giving its source, and so on. We are now prepared to +do so; and we offer first an affidavit by Captain Sam Harris who +arranged to have the pictures taken, which becomes Exhibit +USA-878. The second affidavit is by the photographer who actually +took the picture. We offer that as Exhibit USA-879.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Finally, I should also like to clear up one other matter. On +March 25, during the cross-examination of the witness Bohle, +witness for the Defendant Hess, Colonel Amen quoted from the +interrogation of Von Strempel, as appears in the record beginning +at Page 6482 (Volume X, Page 40). We have had the pertinent +portions translated into the operating languages of the Tribunal, +and we ask that this interrogation, which bears our Document +Number 3800-PS, be admitted in evidence as Exhibit USA-880.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I believe, Mr. President, that clears up all of the documents that +we have not offered formally, up to this date.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Now, counsel for the Defendant Sauckel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I will +now call Defendant Sauckel to the witness stand.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The Defendant Sauckel took the stand.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>FRITZ SAUCKEL (Defendant): Ernst Friedrich Christoph Sauckel.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear +by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>[<span class='it'>The defendant repeated the oath.</span>]</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, please describe your career to the +Tribunal.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was the only child of the postman Friedrich +Sauckel, and was born at Hassfurt on the Main near Bamberg. I +attended the elementary school at Schweinfurt and the secondary +school.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How long were you at the secondary school?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: For 5 years. As my father held only a very humble +position, it was my mother, a seamstress, who made it possible for +me to go to that school. When she became very ill with heart +trouble, I saw that it would be impossible for my parents to +<span class='pageno' title='603' id='Page_603'></span> +provide for my studies, and I obtained their permission to go to +sea to make a career for myself there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you join the merchant marine, or where +did you go?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: First of all I joined the Norwegian and Swedish +merchant marine so that I could be thoroughly trained in seamanship +on the big sailing vessels and clippers.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How old were you at the time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: At that time I was 15½.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What were you earning?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As a cabin boy on a Norwegian sailing ship I earned +5 kronen in addition to my keep.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And then, in the course of your career at +sea, where did you go next?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the course of my career as a sailor, and during +my training which I continued afterwards on German sailing +vessels, I sailed on every sea and went to every part of the world.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you come into contact with foreign +families?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Through the Young Men’s Christian Association, +principally in Australia and North America, as well as in South +America, I came into contact with families of these countries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Where were you when the first World War +started?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: It so happened that I was on a German sailing +vessel on the way to Australia when the ship was captured, and on +the high seas I was made prisoner by the French.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How long did you remain prisoner?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Five years, until November 1919.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And did you return home then?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes, I returned home then.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And then what did you do?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Although I had finished my training and studies +in seamanship required of me, I could not go to sea again and take +my examination, since my savings made during those years at sea +had become worthless because of the German inflation. There +were also few German ships and very many unemployed German +seamen, so I decided to take up work in a factory in my home +town of Schweinfurt. +<span class='pageno' title='604' id='Page_604'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you remain in your home town?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: At first I remained in my home town. I learned to +be a turner and engineer in the Fischer ball-bearing factory in +order to save money so that I later could attend a technical school, +an engineering college.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you already interested in politics at +that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Although as a sailor I despised politics—for I loved +my sailor’s life and still love it today—conditions forced me to +take up a definite attitude towards political problems. No one in +Germany at that time could do otherwise. Many years before I +had left a beautiful country and a rich nation and I returned to +that country 6 years later to find it fundamentally changed and +in a state of upheaval, and in great spiritual and material need.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you join any party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. I worked in a factory which people in my home +town described as “ultra-Red.” I worked in the tool shop, and +right and left of me Social Democrats, Communists, Socialists, and +Anarchists were working—among others my present father-in-law—and +during all the rest periods discussions went on, so that whether +one wanted to or not one became involved in the social problems +of the time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You mention your father-in-law. Did you +marry then?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In 1923 I married the daughter of a German workman +I had met at that time. I am still happily married to her +today and we have 10 children.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: When did you join the Party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I joined the Party definitely in 1923 after having +already been in sympathy with it before.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What made you do it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: One of those days I heard a speech of Hitler’s. In +this speech he said that the German factory worker and the German +laborer must make common cause with the German brain worker. +The controversies between the proletariat and the middle class must +be smoothed out and bridged over by each getting to know and +understand the other. Through this a new community of people +would grow up, and only such a community, not bound to middle +class or proletariat, could overcome the dire needs of those days +and the splitting up of the German nation into parties and creeds. +This statement took such hold of me and struck me so forcibly, that +<span class='pageno' title='605' id='Page_605'></span> +I dedicated my life to the idea of adjusting what seemed to be +almost irreconcilable contrasts. I did that all the more, if I may +say so, because I was aware of the fact that there is an inclination +to go to extremes in German people, and in the German +character generally. I had to examine myself very thoroughly to +find the right path for me personally. As I have already said, I had +hardly taken any interest in political questions. My good parents, +who are no longer alive, brought me up in a strictly Christian but +also in a very patriotic way. However, when I went to sea, I +lived a sailor’s life. I loaded saltpeter in Chile. I did heavy lumber +work in Canada, in Quebec. I trimmed coal on the equator, and I +sailed around Cape Horn several times. All of this was hard work; +I ask...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Please, come back to the question of the Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: This has to do with the question of the Party, for +we must all give some reasons as to how we got there. I myself...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I stated at the beginning of +the defendant’s case that we had heard this account from the +Defendant Göring and that we did not propose to hear it again +from 20 defendants. It seems to me that we are having it inflicted +upon us by nearly every one of the defendants.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I believe, Mr. President, that we are interested +in getting some sort of an impression of the defendant himself. +Seen from various points of view, the facts look different. I will +now briefly...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: It is quite true, Dr. Servatius, but we have +had half an hour, almost, of it now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I shall limit it now.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>The Party was dissolved in 1923, and refounded in 1925. Did +you join it again?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you take an active part in the Party or +were you just a member?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: From 1925 on I took an active part in it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what position did you hold?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was then Gauleiter in Thuringia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you do that to get work, to earn your +living, or for what reason?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As Gauleiter in Thuringia I earned 150 marks. In +any other profession I would have had accommodations and earned +more money. +<span class='pageno' title='606' id='Page_606'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: When did you make Hitler’s acquaintance?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I met him briefly in 1925.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: When did you become Gauleiter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I became Gauleiter in 1927.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And how were you appointed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was appointed by letter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any special instructions which +pointed to secret intentions of the Party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: At that time we were very definitely told that under +no circumstances should there be any secret chapters or any other +secrecy in the life of the Party, but that everything should be +done publicly.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Who was your predecessor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Dr. Dinter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Why was he relieved of his post?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Dr. Dinter was dismissed because he wanted to +found a new religious movement within the Party.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: In 1929 you became a member of the +Thuringian Diet?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you elected to that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was elected to the Diet in the same way as at +every parliamentary election.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was dictatorship in power there already at +the time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: That was not possible; the province was governed +in accordance with the Thuringian constitution.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How long were you a member of the Diet?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was a member of the Diet as long as it existed, +until May 1933.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How was it dissolved?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Diet was dissolved by a Reich Government +decree.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Then in 1932, you were a member of the +Provincial Government of Thuringia. How did you get into that +position?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In 1932, in the month of June, new elections took +place for the Thuringian Diet, and the NSDAP obtained 26 out +of 60 seats. +<span class='pageno' title='607' id='Page_607'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was any mention made of a dictatorship which +was to be aimed at?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, a government was elected according to parliamentary +principles.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Well, you had a majority in the Thuringian +Government, had you not, and you could use your influence?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Together with the bourgeois parties, by an absolute +majority, a National Socialist government was elected.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What happened to the old officials? Were +they dismissed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I myself became the President and Minister of the +Interior in that government; the old officials, without exception, +remained in their offices.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And with what did that first National Socialist +government concern itself in the field of domestic politics?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the field of domestic politics there was only one +question at that time, and that was the alleviation of an indescribable +distress which is only exceeded by that of today.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: In this connection, Mr. President, may I submit +two government reports from which I only wish to draw your +attention briefly to two passages. One is the report contained in +Document Number 96, which shows the activity of the government +and its fight against social distress. What is particularly important +when you run through it, is what is not mentioned, that is, there +is no mention of the question of war or other such matters, but +again and again the alleviation of distress is mentioned. And +important, too, is the work that was carried out. That is in Document +Number 97. In this book, on Page 45, there is a statement +of the work undertaken by the government—bridge-building, road-making, +and so on—and in no way had this work anything to do +with war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Then I am submitting Document Number 95 from the same +period. It is a book called <span class='it'>Sauckel’s Fighting Speeches</span>. Here, too, +the book is remarkable for what does not appear in it, namely +preparations for war. Instead it emphasizes the distress which must +be alleviated. It becomes clear from the individual articles that +these are speeches made during a number of years, which show +in a similar way what the preoccupations were of the Defendant +Sauckel. It begins in 1932 with a speech dealing with the misery +of the time, and ends with the final questions where reference is +made once again to the alleviation of social need and the preservation +of peace. The Tribunal will be able to read these articles in +the document book. +<span class='pageno' title='608' id='Page_608'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>In 1933 you also became Reich Regent of Thuringia. How did +you manage to get to that position?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was appointed Reich Regent of Thuringia by Field +Marshal Von Hindenburg, who was Reich President at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What were the instructions you received when +you took up your offices?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When I took over my office as Reich Regent I +received instructions to form a new Thuringian Government, as +the Reich Regent was to keep out of the administrative affairs of +a German state...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You need not tell us these technical details. +I mean what political task were you given?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was given the political task of administering +Thuringia as Reich Regent within the existing Reich law and +prevailing Constitution, and of guaranteeing the unity of the Reich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And did the words “guarantee the unity of +the Reich” mean the overpowering of others, in particular the +authorities in Thuringia?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, the authorities remained.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Now, you held both the position of Gauleiter +and that of Reich Regent. What was the aim of that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Both positions were entirely separate in their organizations. +Under the Regent were officials in office, and under the +Gauleiter were employees of the Party. Both positions were administered +absolutely separately, as is the case in any other state +where members of a party are at the same time party officials or +leaders and exercise both these functions simultaneously.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: So you received no order that one position +should absorb the other?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, I had no such orders. The tasks were entirely +different.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you a member of the SA?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I myself was never an SA man. I was an honorary +Obergruppenführer in the SA.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How did you receive that appointment?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you. It was honorary.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you appointed SS Obergruppenführer by +Himmler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, the Führer made me honorary SS Obergruppenführer +for no special reason and without functions. +<span class='pageno' title='609' id='Page_609'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were you a member of the Reichstag?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes, from 1933 on.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: As a member of the Reichstag, did you know +anything in advance about the beginning of the war? Were you +informed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was never informed in advance about the start +of the war or about foreign political developments. I merely +remember that quite suddenly—it may have been during the days +between 24 August and the end of August—we were called to a +session of the Reichstag in Berlin. This session was canceled at +the time, and we were later ordered to go to the Führer, that is, the +Gauleiter and Reichsleiter. But a number had already left so that +the circle was not complete. The conference, or Hitler’s speech, +only lasted a short time. He said, roughly, that the meeting of the +Reichstag could not take place as things were still in the course +of development. He was convinced that there would not be a war. +He said he hoped there would be some settlement in a small way +and meant by that, as I had to conclude, a solution without the +parts of Upper Silesia lost in 1921. He said—and that I remember +exactly—that Danzig would become German, and apart from that +Germany would be given a railway line with several tracks, like a +Reichsautobahn, with a strip of ground to the right and left of it. +He told us to go home and prepare for the Reich Party Rally, where +we would meet again.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any close connections with the +Führer?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I personally, as far as I know the Führer, had a +great deal of admiration for him. But I had no close connection +with him that one could describe as personal. I had a number of +discussions with him about the administration of my Gau and in +particular about the care he wished to be given to cultural buildings +in Thuringia—in Weimar, Eisenach, and Meiningen; and later on +there were more frequent meetings because of my position as Plenipotentiary +General for the Allocation of Labor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: We shall come to that later. What connections +did you have with the Reichsleiter?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My connections with the Reichsleiter were no different +from my connections with the Führer. They were of an official +and Party nature. As regards personal relationships I cannot say +that I had any particularly personal intercourse with anyone.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What about your connection with the Reich +Ministers? +<span class='pageno' title='610' id='Page_610'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My connection with the Reich Ministers was of a +purely official nature and was very infrequent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What about the Wehrmacht?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I could not have the honor of being a German +soldier because of my imprisonment in the first World War. And +in this World War the Führer refused to allow me to serve as a +soldier.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have held a number of high +positions and offices. You knew the Reich Ministers and Reichsleiter. +Will you please explain why you went aboard the submarine +at that time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had repeatedly made written requests to the +Führer that I might be allowed to join the Wehrmacht as an +ordinary soldier. He refused to give me this permission. So I +arranged in secret for someone to take my place and went aboard +Captain Salmann’s submarine with his agreement. As a former +sailor and now a politician in a high position I wanted to give +these brave submarine men a proof of my comradeship and understanding +and of my sense of duty. Apart from that I had 10 children +for whom, as their father, I had to do something too.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I should like now, in a number of questions, +to refer to your activities. Were you a member of a trade union?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know what the aims of German trade +unions were?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes, I do.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were they economic or political?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As I, as a worker, came to know them, the aims of +German trade unions were political, and there were a number of +different trade unions with varied political views. I considered +that a great misfortune. As workman in the workshop I had had +experience of the arguments among the trade unionists—between +the Christian Socialist trade unions and the Red trade unions, between +the syndicalist, the anarchist and the communist trade unions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The trade unions in your Gau were then +dissolved. Were the leaders arrested at the time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you approve of the dissolution of the +trade unions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The dissolution of the trade unions was in the air +then. The question was discussed in the Party for a long time and +<span class='pageno' title='611' id='Page_611'></span> +there was no agreement at all as to the position trade unions +should hold, nor as to their necessity, their usefulness and their +nature. But a solution had to be found because the trade unions +which we, or the Führer, or Dr. Ley, dissolved all held different +political views. From that time on, however, there was only one +party in Germany and it was necessary, I fully realize, to come to +a definite decision as to the actual duties of the trade unions, the +necessary duties indispensable to every calling and to workers +everywhere.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was not the purpose of removing the trade +unions to remove any opposition which might stand in the way of +an aggressive war?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I can say in all good conscience that during those +years not one of us ever thought about a war at all. We had to +overcome such terrible need that we should have been only too +glad if German economic life could have been started again in +peace and if the German worker, who had suffered the most during +that frightful depression, could have had work and food once more.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did members of trade unions suffer economically +through the dissolution?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In no way. My own father-in-law, who was a +member of a trade union and still is today, and whom I repeatedly +asked for information, whom I never persuaded to join the Party—he +was a Social Democrat and never joined the Party—confirmed +the fact that even when he was getting old and could no longer +work, the German Labor Front never denied him the rights due +to him as an old trade unionist and by virtue of his long trade-union +membership, but allowed him full benefits. On the other +hand, the German State—since in Germany old age and disability +insurance and the accident insurance, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, were paid and +organized by the State—the National Socialist State guaranteed him +all these rights and made full payment.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were all Communist leaders arrested in your +Gau after the Party came to power?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. In my Gau, as far as I know, only Communists +who had actually worked against the State were arrested.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what happened to them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The State Police arrested and interrogated them +and detained them according to the findings.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR.. SERVATIUS: Did you have Kreisleiter in your Gau who had +been members of a former opposition party?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Party’s activity was recruiting. Our most intensive +work was the winning over of political opponents. I am very +<span class='pageno' title='612' id='Page_612'></span> +proud of the fact that many workers in my Gau, numerous former +Communists and Social Democrats, were won over by us and +became local group leaders and Party functionaries.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: But were there not two Kreisleiter from the +extreme left appointed by you?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: One Kreisleiter from the extreme left was appointed. +Also, besides a number of other leaders, the Gau sectional manager +of the German Labor Front had belonged to the extreme left for +a long time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How did you personally deal with your +political opponents?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Political opponents who did not work against the +State were neither bothered nor harmed in my Gau.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the Socialist Deputy Fröhlich?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Socialist Deputy August Fröhlich was my +strongest and most important opponent. He was the leader of the +Thuringian Social Democrats and was for many years the Social +Democrat Prime Minister of Thuringia. I had great respect for him +as an opponent. He was an honorable and upright man. On 20 July +1944, through my own personal initiative, I had him released from +detention. He had been on the list of the conspirators of 20 July, +but I had so much respect for him personally that, in spite of that, +I asked for his release and obtained it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you treat other opponents similarly?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I also had a politician of the Center Party I knew +in my home town of Schweinfurt released from detention.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The Concentration Camp of Buchenwald was +in your Gau. Did you establish it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Buchenwald Camp originated in the following +manner: The Führer, who came to Weimar quite often because of +the theater there, suggested that a battalion of his SS Leibstandarte +should be stationed at Weimar. As the Leibstandarte was considered +a picked regiment I not only agreed to this but was very +pleased, because in a city like Weimar people are glad to have a +garrison. So the State of Thuringia, the Thuringian Government, +at the request of the Führer, prepared a site in the Ettersburg +Forest, north of the incline outside the town.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>After some time Himmler informed me, however, that he could +not bring a battalion of the SS Leibstandarte to Weimar, as he +could not divide up the regiment, but that it would be a newly +established Death’s-Head unit, and Himmler said it would amount +to the same thing. It was only some time later, when the site had +<span class='pageno' title='613' id='Page_613'></span> +already been placed at the disposal of the Reich, that Himmler +declared that he now had to accommodate a kind of concentration +camp with the Death’s-Head units on this very suitable site. I +opposed this to begin with, because I did not consider a concentration +camp at all the right kind of thing for the town of Weimar +and its traditions. However, he—I mean Himmler—making use of +his position, refused to have any discussion about it. And so the +camp was set up neither to my satisfaction nor to that of the +population of Weimar.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the administration +of the camp later on?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I never had anything to do with the administration +of the camp. The Thuringian Government made an attempt at the +time to influence the planning of the building by saying that the +building police in Thuringia wished to give the orders for the +sanitary arrangements in the camp. Himmler rejected this on the +grounds of his position, saying that he had a construction office +of his own and the site now belonged to the Reich.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you visit the camp at any time?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As far as I can remember, on one single occasion at +the end of 1937 or at the beginning of 1938, I visited and inspected +the camp with an Italian commission.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you find anything wrong there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I did not find anything wrong. I inspected the accommodations—I +myself had been a prisoner for 5 years, and so it interested +me. I must admit that at that time there was no cause for +any complaint as such. The accommodations had been divided into day +and night rooms. The beds were covered with blue and white sheets; +the kitchens, washrooms, and latrines were beyond reproach, so that +the Italian officer or officers who were inspecting the camp with me +said that in Italy they would not accommodate their own soldiers +any better.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Later on did you hear about the events in that +camp which have been alleged here?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I heard nothing about such events as have been +alleged here.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the evacuation +of the camp at the end of the war, before the American Army +approached?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When the mayor of Weimar informed me that they +intended to evacuate the camp at Buchenwald and to use the camp +guards to fight the American troops, I raised the strongest objections. +<span class='pageno' title='614' id='Page_614'></span> +As I had no authority over the camp, and since for various reasons +connected with my other office I had had considerable differences +with Himmler and did not care to speak to him, I telephoned the +Führer’s headquarters in Berlin and said that in any case an evacuation +or a transfer of prisoners into the territory east of the Saale +was impossible and madness, and could not be carried through from +the point of view of supplies. I demanded that the camp should be +handed over to the American occupation troops in an orderly manner. +I received the answer that the Führer would give instructions +to Himmler to comply with my request. I briefly reported this to +some of my colleagues and the mayor, and then I left Weimar.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The witness Dr. Blaha has stated that you had +also been to the concentration camp at Dachau on the occasion of +an inspection.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, I did not go to the Dachau Concentration Camp +and, as far as I recollect, I did not take part in the visit of the Gauleiter +to Dachau in 1935 either. In no circumstances did I take part +in an inspection in Dachau such as Dr. Blaha has described here; and +consequently, above all, I did not inspect workshops or anything of +the sort.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not, as Gauleiter, receive official +reports regarding the events in the concentration camp, that is to +say, orders which passed through the Gau administrative offices +both from and to the camp?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. I neither received instructions for the Buchenwald +Camp, nor reports. It was not only my personal opinion but +it was the opinion of old experienced Gauleiter that it was the +greatest misfortune, from the administrative point of view, when +Himmler as early as 1934-35 proceeded to separate the executive +from the general internal administration. There were continual +complaints from many Gauleiter and German provincial administrations. +They were unsuccessful, however, because in the end +Himmler incorporated even the communal fire brigades into the +Reich organization of his Police.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any personal relations with the +Police and the SS at Weimar?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had no personal relations with the SS and the +Police at all. I had official relations inasmuch as the trade police +and the local police of small boroughs still remained under the +internal administration of the State of Thuringia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did not the Police have their headquarters +near you, at Weimar? +<span class='pageno' title='615' id='Page_615'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, it was the ridiculous part of the development at +that time that, as I once explained to the Führer, we had been +changed from a Party state, and a state made up of provinces, into +a departmental state. The Reich ministries had greatly developed, +their departments being fairly well defined, and the individual +district departments of the various administrations did not agree +among one another. Until 1934 Thuringia had its own independent +police administration in its Ministry for Home Affairs. But from +that time the headquarters of the Higher SS and the Police Leader +were transferred to Kassel, so that Himmler, in contrast to the rest +of the State and Party organizations, obtained new spheres for his +Police. He demonstrated this in Central Germany where for example +the Higher SS and Police Leader for Weimar and the State of Thuringia +was stationed in Kassel, whereas for the Prussian part of the +Gau of Thuringia—that is to say the town of Erfurt which is 20 kilometers +away from Weimar—the Higher SS and Police Leader and +the provincial administration had their seat in Magdeburg. It is +obvious that we, as Gau authorities, did not in any way agree with +such a development and that there was great indignation among the +experienced administrators.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The question is: Did you co-operate with these +offices and did you have a friendly association with the officials in +the regime and therefore know what was going on in Buchenwald?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: On the contrary, it was a continual battle. Each +separate organization shut itself off from the others. At such a +period of world development this was most unfortunate. For the +people it was disadvantageous and it made things impossible for +any administration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was there persecution of the Jews in your Gau?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What about the laws concerning the Jews and +the execution of those laws?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: These Jewish laws were proclaimed in Nuremberg. +There were actually very few Jews in Thuringia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were there no violations in connection with the +well-known events, following the murder of the Envoy Vom Rath in +Paris, which have repeatedly become the subject of discussion in +this Trial?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I cannot recollect in detail the events in Thuringia. +As I told you, there were only a few Jews in Thuringia. The Gauleiter +were in Munich at the time, and had no influence at all on +that development, for it happened during the night, when all the +Gauleiter were in Munich. +<span class='pageno' title='616' id='Page_616'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: My question is this: What happened in your +Gau of Thuringia, and what instructions did you give as a result?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There may have been a few towns in Thuringia +where a window was smashed or something of that sort. I cannot +tell you in detail. I cannot even tell you where or whether there +were synagogues in Thuringia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Now one question regarding your financial +position.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>On the occasion of your fiftieth birthday the Führer made you a +donation. How much was it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: On my fiftieth birthday in October 1944 I was surprised +to get a letter from the Führer through one of his adjutants. +In that letter there was a check for 250,000 marks. I told the adjutant +that I could not possibly accept it—I was very surprised. The +Führer’s adjutant—it was little Bormann, the old Bormann, not +Reichsleiter Bormann—told me that the Führer knew quite well +that I had neither money nor any landed property and that this +would be a security for my children. He told me not to hurt the +Führer’s feelings. The adjutant left quickly and I sent for Demme +who was both a colleague and a friend of mine and the president +of the State Bank of Thuringia. He was unfortunately refused as +a witness as being irrelevant ...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think it is enough if we know whether he +ultimately accepted it or not.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Let us drop that question. What happened to +the money?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Through the president of the State Bank in question +the money was placed into an account in the State Bank of Thuringia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What other income did you receive from your +official positions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The only income I had from my official positions was +the salary of a Reich Regent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How much was that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The salary of a Reich Minister; I cannot tell you +exactly what it was. I never bothered about it. It was something +like 30,000 marks.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what means have you today apart from +the donation in that bank account?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I have not saved any money and I never had any +property. +<span class='pageno' title='617' id='Page_617'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: That, Mr. President, brings me to the end of +those general questions and I am now coming to the questions +relating to the Allocation of Labor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>A recess was taken.</span>]</h3> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: To aid the Court I have prepared a plan showing +how the direction of labor was managed, which should help to +explain how the individual authorities co-operated and how the +operation was put into motion.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I will concern myself mainly with the problem of meeting the +demand, that is with the question of how the labor was obtained. +I shall not concern myself much with the question of the use made +of the labor and the needs of industry. That is more a matter for +Speer’s defense, which does not quite fit in with my presentation of +things. But those are details which occurred in error because I did +not go into such matters thoroughly when the plan was being prepared. +Fundamentally there are no differences.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>If I may explain the plan briefly: At the top there is the Führer, +in red; under him is the Four Year Plan; and under that, as part +of the Four Year Plan, there is the office of Sauckel, who was Plenipotentiary +General for the Allocation of Labor and came directly +under the Four Year Plan. He received his instructions and orders +from the Führer through the Four Year Plan, or, as was the Führer’s +way, from him direct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Sauckel’s headquarters were at the Reich Ministry of Labor. It +is the big space outlined in yellow to the left, below Sauckel’s office +which is in brown. Sauckel only became included in the Reich Labor +Ministry by having a few offices put at his disposal. The Reich Minister +of Labor and the whole of the Labor Ministry remained.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In the course of time Sauckel’s position became somewhat +stronger, individual departments being necessarily incorporated +into his, over which, to a certain extent, he obtained personal +power; but the Reich Ministry of Labor remained until the end.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I should now like to explain how the “Arbeitseinsatz” was put +into operation. Owing to operations in Russia and the great losses +in the winter, there arose a need for 2 million soldiers. The +Wehrmacht, OKW, marked in green at the top next to the Führer, +demands soldiers from the industries. It is marked here in the green +spaces which run downwards below the OKW. The line then turns +left downwards to the industries which are marked as having +30 million workers. The Wehrmacht withdraws 2 million workers +but can only do so when new labor is there. It was at that +moment that Sauckel was put into office in order to obtain this labor. +<span class='pageno' title='618' id='Page_618'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>The number of men needed was determined by the higher +authorities through the so-called “Requirements Board,” marked at +the top in yellow, which represented the highest offices: the Armaments +and Production Ministries, the Ministry of Air, Agriculture, +Shipping, Traffic, and so on. They reported their requests to the +Führer and he decided what was needed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Sauckel’s task was carried out as follows: Let us go back to the +brown square. On the strength of the right of the Four Year Plan +to issue orders, he applied to the space on the right where the +squares are outlined in blue. They are the highest district offices +in the occupied territories, the Reich Ministry for the Eastern Territories, +that is, Rosenberg; then come the military authorities; and as +things were handled a little differently in each country, here are the +various countries, Belgium, Northern France, Holland, <span class='it'>et cetera</span>, +marked in yellow. These agencies received the order to make labor +available. Each through its own machinery referred the order to the +next agency below and so on down to the very last, the local labor +offices which are under the district authorities, and here the workers +were assigned to the factories. That is the reserve of foreigners. +Beside that there are two other sources of labor available, the main +reserve of German workers, which is marked in blue to the left at +the bottom, and the reserve of prisoners of war.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Sauckel had to deal with all these three agencies. I will now +put relevant questions to the witness. This is only to refresh our +memories and to check the explanation.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I will submit other charts later. There is a list of the witnesses +drawn up according to their offices so that we know where they +belong; and later there will be another chart showing the inspection +and controls which were set up.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you will no doubt be asking the +witness whether he is familiar with the chart and whether it is +correct.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have seen this chart. Is it correct? +Do you acknowledge it?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: To the best of my memory and belief it is correct, +and I acknowledge it.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: On 21 March 1942 you were made Plenipotentiary +General for the Allocation of Labor. Why were you chosen for +this office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The reason why I was chosen for this office was +never known to me and I do not know it now. Because of my +engineering studies and my occupation I took an interest in questions +concerning labor systems, but I do not know whether that was +the reason. +<span class='pageno' title='619' id='Page_619'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was your appointment not made at Speer’s +suggestion?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Reichsleiter Bormann stated that in the preamble to +his official decree. I do not know the actual circumstances.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I beg to refer to Sauckel Document Number 7. +It is in Document Book 1, Page 5.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I should like to add that this appointment came as +a complete surprise to me, I did not apply for it in any way. I never +applied for any of my offices.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: What number are you giving to this document?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number 7.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I mean the chart. What number are you +giving to the chart?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Document 1.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see, and Document Number 7, Page 5.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. This document is a preamble added by +Reichsleiter Bormann to the decree and which shows that it was +Speer who suggested Sauckel for this position.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Was it an entirely new office which you then entered?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. The Arbeitseinsatz had been directed by the +Four Year Plan before my appointment. A ministerial director, +Dr. Mansfeld, held the office then. I only learned here, during these +proceedings, that the office was already known before my time as +the office of the Plenipotentiary General.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: On taking up your office did you talk to +Dr. Mansfeld, your so-called predecessor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I neither saw Dr. Mansfeld nor spoke to him, nor did +I take over any records from him.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: To what extent was your office different from +that of the previous Plenipotentiary General?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My office was different to this extent: The department +in the Four Year Plan was given up and was no longer used +by me. I drew departments of the Reich Labor Ministry more and +more closely into this work as they had some of the outstanding +experts.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the reason for this reconstruction of +the office?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The reason was to be found in the many conflicting +interests which had been very prominent up to the third year of the +war in the political and state offices, internal administration offices, +<span class='pageno' title='620' id='Page_620'></span> +Party agencies and economic agencies, and which now for territorial +considerations opposed the interdistrict equalization of the labor +potential, which had become urgent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of task did you have then? What +was your sphere of work?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My chief sphere of work was in directing and regulating +German labor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What task were you given then?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had to replace with suitably skilled workers those +men who had to be freed from industry for drafting into the German +Wehrmacht, that is, into the different branches of the Wehrmacht. +Moreover, I also had to obtain new labor for the new war +industries which had been set up for food production as well as for +the production of armaments, of course.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was your task definitely defined?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: It was at first in no way definitely defined. There +were at that time about 23 or 24 million workers to be directed, +who were available in the Reich but who had not yet been fully +employed for war economy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you look on your appointment as a permanent +one?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. I could not consider it as permanent.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Why not?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Because in addition to me the Reich Labor Minister +and his state secretaries were in office and at the head of things; +and then there was the whole of the Labor Ministry.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What sources were at your disposal to obtain +this labor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: First, there were the workers who were already +present in the Reich from all sorts of callings who, as I have said, +had not yet been directed to war economy, not yet completely incorporated +in the way that was necessary for the conduct of the war. +Then further there were the prisoners of war as far as their labor +was made available by the army authorities.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: At first then, if I have understood you correctly, +proper distribution, and a thrifty management of German +labor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When my appointment ...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I do not understand the German +language, but it appears to me that if you would not make pauses +between each word it would make your sentences shorter; and pause +<span class='pageno' title='621' id='Page_621'></span> +at the end of the sentence. It would be much more convenient for +the interpreter. I do not know whether I am right in that. That is +what it looks like. You are pausing between each word, and therefore +it is difficult, I imagine, to get the sense of the sentence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I beg your pardon, Your Lordship.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Servatius.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What did you do to carry out your task?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I will repeat. First, as I had received no specific +instructions I understood my task to mean that I was to fill up the +gaps and deficiencies by employing labor in the most rational and +economic way.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the order you received? How many +people were you to obtain?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: That question is very difficult to answer, for I +received the necessary orders only in the course of the development +of the war. Labor and economy are fluid, intangible things. However +I then received the order that if the war were to continue for +some time I was to find replacements in the German labor sector +for the Wehrmacht, whose soldiers were the potential of peacetime +economy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You drew up a program. What was provided +for in your program?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I drew up two programs, Doctor. At first, when I +took up my office, I drew up one program which included a <span class='it'>levée +en masse</span>, so to speak, of German women and young people, and, +another, as I already said, for the proper utilization of labor from +the economic and technical point of view.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was the program accepted?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The program was rejected by the Führer when I +submitted it to him and, as was my duty, to the Reich economic +authorities and ministries which were interested in the employment +of labor.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Why?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Führer sent for me and in a lengthy statement +explained the position of the German war production and also the +economic situation. He said that he had nothing against my program +as such if he had the time; but that in view of the situation, +he could not wait for such German women to become trained and +experienced. At that time 10 million German women were already +employed who had never done industrial or mechanical work. +Further, he said that the results of such a rationalization of working +methods as I had suggested, something like a mixture of Ford +and Taylor methods ... +<span class='pageno' title='622' id='Page_622'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: One moment. The interpreters cannot translate +your long sentences properly. You must make short sentences +and divide your phrases, otherwise no one can understand you and +your defense will suffer a great deal. Will you please be careful +about that.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In answer to my proposal the Führer said that he +could not wait for a rationalization of the working methods on the +lines of the Taylor and Ford systems.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what did he suggest?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: May I explain the motives which prompted the Führer’s +decision. He described the situation at that time, at the end +of the winter of 1941-42. Many hundreds of German locomotives, +almost all the mechanized armed units, tanks, planes, and mechanical +weapons had become useless as a result of the catastrophe of that +abnormally hard winter.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Hundreds of thousands of German soldiers had suffered terribly +from the cold; many divisions had lost their arms and supplies. The +Führer explained to me that if the race with the enemy for new +arms, new munitions, and new dispositions of forces was not won +now, the Soviets would be as far as the Channel by the next winter. +Appealing to my sense of duty and asking me to put into it all I +could, he gave me the task of obtaining new foreign labor for +employment in the German war economy.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have no scruples that this was against +international law?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Führer spoke to me in such detail about this +question and he explained the necessity so much as a matter of +course that, after he had withdrawn a suggestion which he had +made himself, there could be no misgivings on my part that the +employment of foreign workers was against international law.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You also negotiated with other agencies and +there were already workers within the Reich. What were you told +about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: None of the higher authorities, either military or +civilian, expressed any misgivings. Perhaps I may add some things +which the Führer mentioned as binding upon me. On the whole, the +Führer always treated me very kindly. On this question, he became +very severe and categorical and said that in the West he had left +half the French Army free and at home, and he had released the +greater part of the Belgian Army and the whole of the Dutch Army +from captivity. He told me that under certain circumstances he +would have to recall these prisoners of war for military reasons, +but that in the interests of the whole of Europe and the Occident, +<span class='pageno' title='623' id='Page_623'></span> +so he expressed himself, only a united Europe, where labor was +properly allocated, could hold out in the fight against Bolshevism.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you know the terms of the Hague land +warfare regulations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: During the first World War I myself was taken prisoner +as a sailor. I knew what was required and what was laid down +with regard to the treatment and protection of prisoners of war and +prisoners generally.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did foreign authorities—I am thinking of the +French—ever raise the objection that what you planned with your +Arbeitseinsatz was an infringement of the Hague land warfare +regulations?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No. In France, on questions of the Arbeitseinsatz, +I only negotiated with the French Government through the military +commander and under the presidency of the German Ambassador +in Paris. I was convinced that as far as the employment of labor in +France was concerned, agreements should be made with a proper +French Government. I negotiated in a similar manner with the General +Secretary in Belgium.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Now a large part—about a third—of the foreign +workers were so-called Eastern Workers. What were you told +about them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: With regard to the employment of workers from the +East I was told that Russia had not joined the Geneva Convention, +and so Germany for her part was not bound by it. And I was further +told that in the Baltic countries and in other regions, Soviet +Russia had also claimed workers or people, and that in addition +about 3 million Chinese were working in Soviet Russia.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what about Poland?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: As regards Poland I had been told, just as in the +case of other countries, that it was a case of total capitulation, and +that on the grounds of this capitulation Germany was justified in +introducing German regulations.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you consider the employment of foreign +labor justifiable from the general point of view?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: On account of the necessities which I have mentioned, +I considered the employment of foreign workers justifiable +according to the principles which I enforced and advocated and to +which I also adhered in my field of work. I was, after all, a German +and I could feel only as a German.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Herr Sauckel, you must formulate your sentences +differently, the interpreters cannot translate them. You must +not insert one sentence into another. +<span class='pageno' title='624' id='Page_624'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>So you considered it justifiable, in view of the principles you +wished to apply and, which as you said, you enforced in your field +of work?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you also think of the hardships imposed +on the workers and their families through this employment?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I knew from my own life even if one goes to foreign +countries voluntarily, a separation is very sad and heartbreaking +and it is very hard for members of a family to be separated from +each other. But I also thought of the German families, of the German +soldiers, and of the hundreds of thousands of German workers +who also had to go away from home.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: The suggestion has been made that the work +could have been carried out in the occupied territories themselves, +and it would not then have been necessary to fetch the workers +away. Why was that not done?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: That is, at first sight, an attractive suggestion. If it +had been possible, I would willingly have carried out the suggestion +which was made by Funk and other authorities, and later even by +Speer. It would have made my life and work much simpler. On the +other hand, there were large departments in this system which had +to provide for and maintain the different branches of German economy +and supply them with orders. As the Plenipotentiary General +for the Allocation of Labor I could not have German fields, German +farming, German mass-production with the most modern machinery +transferred to foreign territories—I had no authority for that—and +those offices insisted that I should find replacements for the agricultural +and industrial workers and the artisans whose places had +become vacant in German agriculture or industry because the men +had been called to the colors.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You said before that the manner in which you +had planned the employment of workers was such that it could have +been approved. What then were your leading principles in carrying +out your scheme for the employment of labor?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When the Führer described the situation so drastically, +and ordered me to bring foreign workers to Germany, I +clearly recognized the difficulties of the task and I asked him to +agree to the only way by which I considered it possible to do this, +for I had been a worker too.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was not your principal consideration the economic +exploitation of these foreign workers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The Arbeitseinsatz has nothing to do with exploitation. +It is an economic process for supplying labor. +<span class='pageno' title='625' id='Page_625'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: You said repeatedly in your speeches and on +other occasions that the important thing was to make the best possible +economic use of these workers. You speak of a machine which +must be properly handled. Did you want to express thereby the +thought of economic exploitation?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: At all times a regime of no matter what nature, +can only be successful in the production of goods if it uses labor +economically—not too much and not too little. That alone I consider +economically justifiable.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: It was stated here in a document which was +submitted, the French Document RF-22, a government report, that +the intention existed to bring about a demographic deterioration, +and in other government reports mention is made that one of the +aims was the biological destruction of other peoples. What do you +say about that?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I can say most definitely that biological destruction +was never mentioned to me. I was only too happy when I had +workers. I suspected that the war would last longer than was +expected, and the demands upon my office were so urgent and so +great that I was glad for people to be alive, not for them to be +destroyed.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the general attitude toward the +question of foreign workers before you took office? What did you +find when you came?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There was a controversy when I took up my office. +There were about two million foreign workers in Germany from +neutral and allied states and occupied territories of the East and +the West. They had been brought to the Reich without order or +system. Many industrial concerns avoided contacting the labor +authorities or found them troublesome and bureaucratic. The conflict +of interests, as I said before, was very great. The Police point +of view was most predominating, I think.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And propaganda? What was the propaganda +with regard to Eastern Workers, for example?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Propaganda was adapted to the war in the East. I +may point out now—you interrupted me before when I was speaking +of the order given me by the Führer—that I expressly asked +the Führer not to let workers working in Germany be treated +as enemies any longer, and I tried to influence propaganda to that +effect.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What else did you do with regard to the +situation which confronted you? +<span class='pageno' title='626' id='Page_626'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I finally received approval from the Führer for +my second program. That program has been submitted here as +a document. I must and will bear responsibility for that program.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: It has already been submitted as Document +016-PS. It is the Program for the Allocation of Labor of +20 April 1942, Exhibit USA-168.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this program you made fundamental statements. I will hand +it to you and I ask you to comment on the general questions only, +not on the individual points.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>There is a paragraph added to the last part, “Prisoners of War +and Foreign Workers.” Have you found the paragraph?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: If you will look at the third paragraph you +will find what you want to explain.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I should like to say that I drew up and worked out +this program independently in 1942 after I had been given that +difficult task by the Führer. It was absolutely clear to me what +the conditions would have to be if foreign workers were to be +employed in Germany at all. I wrote those sentences at that time +and the program went to all the German authorities which had to +deal with the matter. I quote:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“All these people must be fed, housed, and treated in such +a way that with the least possible effort”—here I refer to +economics as conceived by Taylor and Ford, whom I have +studied closely—“the greatest possible results will be achieved. +It has always been a matter of course for us Germans to +treat a conquered enemy correctly and humanely, even if +he were our most cruel and irreconcilable foe, and to abstain +from all cruelty and petty chicanery when expecting useful +service from him.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Will you put the document aside now, please. +What authority did you have to carry out your task?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had authority from the Four Year Plan to issue +instructions. I had at my disposal—not under me, but at my disposal—Sections +3 and 5 of the Reich Labor Ministry.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What departments did they represent?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The departments, “Employment of Labor” and +“Wages.”</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could you issue directives and orders?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I could issue directives and orders of a departmental +nature to those offices.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could you carry on negotiations with foreign +countries independently? +<span class='pageno' title='627' id='Page_627'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I could carry on negotiations with foreign countries +only through the Foreign Office or, when I had received permission, +with the ambassadors or ministers in question.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could you give your orders independently +or was agreement and consultation necessary?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: My field of work, as in every large branch of an +administration, made it absolutely necessary for me to discuss the +questions and have consultations about them with neighboring +departments. I was obliged to do so according to instructions.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: With whom did you have to consult, apart +from the Four Year Plan under which you were placed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had first of all to consult the departments themselves +from which I received the orders, and in addition the Party +Chancellery, the office of Reich Minister Lammers—the Reich +Chancellery, the Reich Railways, the Reich Food Ministry, the +Reich Defense Ministry.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did things go smoothly, or were there difficulties?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There were always great difficulties.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any dealings with Himmler?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I had dealings with Himmler only insofar as he +gave instructions. He was Reich Minister and was responsible for +security, as he said.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was not that a question which was very +important for you in regard to the treatment of workers?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: During the first months or in the first weeks, I +believe, of my appointment I was called to see Heydrich. In a very +precise way, Heydrich told me that he considered my program +fantastic, such as it had been approved by the Führer, and that +I must realize that I was making his work very difficult in demanding +that barbed wire and similar fences should not and must not +be put around the labor camps, but rather taken down. He then said +curtly that I must realize that if it was I who was responsible for +the allocation of labor, it was he who was responsible for security. +That is what he told me.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you accept the fact that these strict police +measures now existed?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: Through constant efforts I had these police measures +gradually reduced as far as they concerned the workers who were +employed in Germany through my agency and my office.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What did your authority to issue instructions +consist of? Could you issue orders or had you to negotiate, and how +was this carried out in practice? +<span class='pageno' title='628' id='Page_628'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The authority I had to issue instructions was doubtful +from the beginning because, owing to the necessities of war, +the lack of manpower, and so on, I was forbidden to establish +any office of my own or any other new office or organization. I +could only pass on instructions after negotiation with the supreme +authorities of the Reich and after detailed consultation. These +instructions were, of course, of a purely departmental nature. I +could not interfere in matters of administration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How was this right to issue instructions exercised +with regard to the high authorities in the occupied territories?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: It was exactly the same, merely of a departmental +nature. In practice it was the passing on of the Führer’s +orders which were to be carried out there through the individual +machinery of each separate administration.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Could you give binding instructions to military +authorities, to the Economic Inspectorate East, for example?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: No, there was a strict order from the Führer that +in the Army areas, the operational areas of the Commanders-in-Chief, +the latter only were competent, and when they had examined +military conditions and the situation, everything had to be +regulated according to the needs of these high military commands.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did that apply to the military commander +in France, or could you act directly there?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In France I could, of course, proceed only in the +same way, by informing the military commander of the instructions +which I myself had received. He then prepared for discussions +with the German Embassy and the French Government, so that +with the Ambassador presiding, and the military commander taking +an authoritative part, the discussion with the French Government +took place.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: And what happened as far as the Ministry +for the Occupied Eastern Territories was concerned?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the case of that Ministry I had to transmit my +orders to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories +and had to consult with him. With Reich Minister Rosenberg we +always succeeded in arranging matters between ourselves in a way +that we considered right. But in the Ukraine there was the Reich +Commissioner who was on very intimate terms himself with headquarters, +and, as is generally known, he was very independent and +acted accordingly by asserting this independence.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How did these authorities in the occupied +territories take your activities at first? +<span class='pageno' title='629' id='Page_629'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the occupied territories there was naturally +much opposition at the start of my work, because I brought new +orders and new requirements and it was not always easy to reconcile +conflicting interests.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was there any apprehension that you would +intervene in the administration of the territories?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: From my own conviction I refrained entirely from +any such intervention and I always emphasized that in order to +dispel any such apprehensions, since I myself was not the administrator +there; but there were many selfish interests at work.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: We will discuss this on another occasion. Now +I should like to ask you: You had deputies for the Arbeitseinsatz—when +did you obtain them?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I was given these deputies for the occupied territories +through a personal decree of the Führer on 30 September +1942, as far as I remember.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the reason?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The reason for appointing these deputies was to do +away more easily with the difficulties and the lack of direction +which prevailed to some extent in these areas.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I refer in this connection to Document 12, +“The Führer’s Decree Concerning the Execution of the Decree of +the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.” No, it is +Document 13. “Decree Concerning the Appointment of Deputies”—on +Page 13 of the English document book, and I also refer to +Document 12 which has already been submitted as 1903-PS, Exhibit +USA-206.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Did you not have two different kinds of deputies, I mean, were +there already some deputies previously?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There were previously deputies of the Reich Labor +Ministry who in allied or neutral countries were assigned to the +German diplomatic missions. They must be distinguished from +those deputies who were assigned to the chiefs of the German +military or civilian administration in the occupied territories.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What position did the deputies hold in the +occupied territories?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the occupied territories the deputies had a dual +position. They were the leaders of the labor sections in the local +government there—a considerable burden for me—and at the same +time my deputies who were responsible for the uniform direction +and execution of the principles of the allocation of labor as laid +down by me. +<span class='pageno' title='630' id='Page_630'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have your own organization with +the deputy at the head, or was that an organization of the local +government?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I did not have any organization of my own. The +local governments were independent separate administrations with +an administrative chief as head to whom the various departments +were subordinated.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: How many such deputies were there in one +area?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: In the various countries I had one deputy in each +of the highest offices.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What was the task of the deputy?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The task of the deputy, as I have already said, was +to guarantee that German orders were carried out in a legal way +and, as member of the local administration, to regulate labor +questions which arose there.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What tasks did they have as regards the +interest of the Reich and the distribution of labor for local employment +and in the Reich?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: It was expressly pointed out that they were to +produce labor in reasonable proportions with consideration for local +conditions; they also had to see to it that my principles were +observed with respect to the treatment, feeding, and so forth of +workers from the occupied zones. That is laid down in the form +of a directive.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not have your own recruiting commissions?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: There were no recruiting commissions in the sense +in which the expression is often used here and in our own documents. +It was a question of reinforcements of experts which were +requested by the local government, in order to carry out the tasks +in the countries concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions did these recruiting commissions +have?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: They received the instructions which are frequently +and clearly expressed in my orders and which, as they have been +laid down, I need not mention.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I refer here to Document 15 which has already +been submitted as 3044-PS; Exhibit Number USA-206, and also +USSR-384.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>That is the Order Number 4 of 7 May 1942, which settles in +principle all the problems relating to this question, and gives the +necessary directives to the deputies regarding recruitment. +<span class='pageno' title='631' id='Page_631'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>Were those directives which you issued always adhered to?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: The directives I issued were not always adhered +to as strictly as I had demanded. I made every effort to impose +them through constant orders, instructions, and punishment which, +however, I myself could not inflict.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Were these orders meant seriously? The French +Prosecution has submitted in the government report one of your +speeches, which you made at that time in Posen. It was termed a +speech of apology. I ask you whether these principles were meant +seriously or whether they were only for the sake of appearances, +since you yourself believed, as the document stated, that they could +not be carried out?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I can only emphasize that in my life I had worked +so much myself under such difficult conditions that these instructions +expressed my full conviction as to their necessity. I ask to +have witnesses heard as to what I thought about it and what I +did in order to have these instructions carried out.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Was there any noticeable opposition to your +principles?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: I have already said that to a certain extent my +principles were considered troublesome by some authorities and +injudicious as far as German security was concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>When I was attacked on that account, I took occasion, in addition +to a number of instructions to the German Gauleiter, to issue +a manifesto to all the highest German government offices concerned.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: May I remark that this is Document S-84, in +Document Book 3, Page 215.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I submit the document once more in German because of the +form in which it is printed. It is in the form of an urgent warning +and was sent to all the authorities.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Is it Document Number 84?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Witness, did you, in a meeting of the Central Planning Board ...</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: May I be allowed to say a word with regard to +this manifesto?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>SAUCKEL: When I issued the manifesto, I was met with the +objection, mainly from Dr. Goebbels, that a manifesto should really +be issued only by the Führer and not by a subordinate authority +such as myself. Then I found that I was having difficulties in +getting the manifesto printed. After I had had 150,000 copies +printed for all the German economic offices, for all the works +<span class='pageno' title='632' id='Page_632'></span> +managers and all the other offices which were interested, I had it +printed again myself in this emphatic form and personally sent +it once more, with a covering letter, to all those offices.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>In this manifesto, in spite of the difficulties which I encountered, +I especially advocated that in the occupied territories themselves +the workers should be treated in accordance with my principles +and according to my directives and orders.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>I respectfully ask the Court to be allowed to read a few sentences +from it:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“I therefore order that for all the occupied territories, for +the treatment, feeding, billeting, and payment of foreign +workers, appropriate regulations and directives be issued +similar to those valid for foreigners in the Reich. They are +to be adjusted to the respective local conditions and applied +in accordance with prevailing conditions.</p> + +<p>“In a number of the Eastern Territories indigenous male and +female civilian labor working for the German war industry +or the German Wehrmacht is undernourished. In the urgent +interests of the German war industry in this territory this +condition should be remedied. It is checking production and +is dangerous. And endeavor must therefore be made by all +means available to provide additional food for these workers +and their families. This additional food must be given only +in accordance with the output of work.</p> + +<p>“It is only through the good care and treatment of the whole +of the available European labor on the one hand, and through +its most rigid concentration”—here I mean organizational—“leadership +and direction on the other hand, that the fluctuation +of labor in the Reich and in the occupied territories can +be limited to a minimum, and a generally stable, lasting and +reliable output be achieved.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>May I read one more sentence:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“The foreign workers in the Reich and the population in the +occupied territories who are being employed for the German +war effort must be given the feeling that it is to their own +interests to work loyally for Germany and that therein alone +will they see and actually find their one real guarantee of +life.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='noindent'>May I read still one sentence in the next paragraph:</p> + +<div class='blockquote'> + +<p>“They must be given absolute trust in the justness of the +German authorities and of their German employers.”</p> + +</div> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better not go further in this +document. Can you indicate to us at all how long you are likely +to be with this defendant? +<span class='pageno' title='633' id='Page_633'></span></p> + +<p class='pindent'>DR. SERVATIUS: I shall probably need the whole day tomorrow.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, would it be convenient for you +some time to deal with the documents of the remaining defendants?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, Mr. President, any time that you might set +aside.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know how far the negotiations +and agreements with reference to documents have gone.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: I do with some, but not with all. I can ascertain +the facts tonight, or before the morning session, and advise you +at that time.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and you will let us know tomorrow what +time will be convenient?</p> + +<p class='pindent'>MR. DODD: Yes, Sir.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.</p> + +<h3>[<span class='it'>The Tribunal adjourned until 29 May 1946 at 1000 hours.</span>]</h3> + +<hr class='pbk'/> + +<p class='line' style='text-align:center;margin-top:4em;margin-bottom:2em;font-size:1.2em;'>TRANSCRIBER NOTES</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious +printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for +periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; +however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus +“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes +French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: +hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb +tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the +tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations +between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in the trial.</p> + +<p class='pindent'>An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as +possible to the original document presentation and layout.</p> + +<p class='line'> </p> + +<p class='noindent'>[The end of <span class='it'>Trial of the Major War Criminals +Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 14</span>, +by Various.]</p> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOLUME 14 ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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