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diff --git a/old/66566-0.txt b/old/66566-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 0239b41..0000000 --- a/old/66566-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6727 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of The History of Philosophy in Islam, by T.J. -de Boer - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: The History of Philosophy in Islam - -Author: T.J. de Boer - -Translator: Edward R. Jones - -Release Date: October 19, 2021 [eBook #66566] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed Proofreading - Team at https://www.pgdp.net/ for Project Gutenberg (This file - was produced from images generously made available by The - Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN -ISLAM *** - - - - - THE - HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM - - BY - Dr. T. J. DE BOER, - UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN. - - TRANSLATED - (with the sanction of the Author) - BY - EDWARD R. JONES B.D. - - - LONDON - LUZAC & CO., 46, GREAT RUSSELL STREET, - 1903. - - - - - - - - -TRANSLATOR’S PREFATORY NOTE. - - -This edition of Dr. de Boer’s recent work is produced in the hope that -it may prove interesting to not a few English readers, and especially -that it may be of service to younger students commencing to study the -subject which is dealt with in the following pages. The translator has -aimed at nothing more than a faithful reproduction of the original. His -best thanks are due to the accomplished author, for his kindness in -revising the proof-sheets of the version, as it passed through the -Press. - - E. R. J. - - - - - - - - -PREFACE. - - -The following is the first attempt which has been made, since the -appearance of Munk’s excellent sketch [1], to present in connected form -a History of Philosophy in Islam. This work of mine may therefore be -regarded as a fresh initiation,—not a completion of such a task. I -could not know of all that had been done by others, in the way of -preliminary study in this field; and when I did know of the existence -of such material, it was not always accessible to me. As for manuscript -assistance, it was only in exceptional cases that this was at my -disposal. - -Conforming to the conditions which I had to meet, I have in the -following account refrained from stating my authorities. But anything -which I may have taken over, nearly word for word or without testing -it, I have marked in foot-references. For the rest, I deeply regret -that I cannot duly indicate at present how much I owe, as regards -appreciation of the sources, to men like Dieterici, de Goeje, -Goldziher, Houtsma, Aug. Müller, Munk, Nöldeke, Renan, Snouck -Hurgronje, van Vloten, and many, many others. - -Since the completion of this volume an interesting monograph on Ibn -Sina [2] has appeared, which farther extends its survey over the -earlier history of Philosophy in Islam. It gives rise to no occasion, -however, to alter substantially my conception of the subject. - -For all bibliographical details I refer the reader to “die -Orientalische Bibliographie”, Brockelmann’s “Geschichte der Arabischen -Litteratur”, and Ueberweg—Heinze’s “Grundriss der Geschichte der -Philosophie” II3, p. 213 sqq. In the transcription of Arabic names I -have been more heedful of tradition and German pronunciation, than of -consistency. Be it noted only that z is to be pronounced as a soft s, -and th like the corresponding English sound [3]. In the Index of -Personal Names, accents signify length. - -As far as possible I have confined myself to Islam. On that ground Ibn -Gebirol and Maimonides have received only a passing notice, while other -Jewish thinkers have been entirely omitted, although, philosophically -considered, they belong to the Muslim school. This, however, entails no -great loss, for much has been written already about the Jewish -philosophers, whereas Muslim thinkers have hitherto been sadly -neglected. - - - Groningen (Netherlands). - - T. J. de Boer. - - - - - - - - -CONTENTS. - - -CHAPTER I. - -Introduction. - - PAGE - - 1. The Theatre 1–6 - 1. Ancient Arabia 1 - 2. The first Caliphs. Medina. The Shiʻites 2 - 3. The Omayyads. Damascus, Basra and Kufa 3 - 4. The Abbasids. Bagdad 3 - 5. Minor States. Fall of the Caliphate 5 - - 2. Oriental Wisdom 6–11 - 1. Semitic Speculation 6 - 2. Persian Religion. Zrwanism 8 - 3. Indian Wisdom 8 - - 3. Greek Science 11–30 - 1. The Syrians 11 - 2. The Christian Churches 11 - 3. Edessa and Nisibis 12 - 4. Harran 13 - 5. Gondeshapur 14 - 6. Syriac Translations 14 - 7. Philosophy among the Syrians 16 - 8. Arabic Translations 17 - 9. The Philosophy of the Translators 19 - 10. Range of Tradition 21 - 11. Continuation of Neo-Platonism 22 - 12. The “Book of the Apple” 24 - 13. The “Theology of Aristotle” 25 - 14. Conception of Aristotle 27 - 15. Philosophy in Islam 28 - -CHAPTER II. - -Philosophy and Arab Knowledge. - - 1. Grammatical Science 31–35 - 1. The several Sciences 31 - 2. The Arabic Language. The Koran 31 - 3. The Grammarians of Basra and Kufa 32 - 4. Grammar influenced by Logic. Metrical Studies 33 - 5. Grammatical Science and Philosophy 35 - - 2. Ethical Teaching 36–41 - 1. Tradition and Individual Opinion (Sunna, - Hadith, Raʼy) 36 - 2. Analogy (Qiyas). Consensus of the Congregation - (Idjma) 37 - 3. Position and Contents of the Muslim Ethical - System (al-Fiqh) 38 - 4. Ethics and Politics 40 - - 3. Doctrinal Systems 41–64 - 1. Christian Dogmatic 41 - 2. The Kalam 42 - 3. The Mutazilites and their Opponents 43 - 4. Human and Divine Action 44 - 5. The Being of God 46 - 6. Revelation and Reason 48 - 7. Abu-l-Hudhail 49 - 8. Nazzam 51 - 9. Djahiz 53 - 10. Muammar and Abu Hashim 54 - 11. Ashari 55 - 12. The Atomistic Kalam 57 - 13. Mysticism or Sufism 62 - - 4. Literature and History 65–71 - 1. Literature 65 - 2. Abu-l-Atahia. Mutanabbi. Abu-l-Ala. Hariri 65 - 3. Annalistic. Historical Tradition 67 - 4. Masudi and Muqaddasi 69 - - -CHAPTER III. - -The Pythagorean Philosophy. - - 1. Natural Philosophy 72–80 - 1. The Sources 72 - 2. Mathematical Studies 73 - 3. Natural Science 75 - 4. Medicine 76 - 5. Razi 77 - 6. The Dahrites 80 - - 2. The Faithful Brethren of Basra 81–96 - 1. The Karmatites 81 - 2. The Brethren and their Encyclopaedia 82 - 3. Eclecticism 84 - 4. Knowledge 85 - 5. Mathematics 87 - 6. Logic 89 - 7. God and the World 90 - 8. The Human Soul 92 - 9. Philosophy of Religion 93 - 10. Ethics 94 - 11. Influence of the Encyclopaedia 95 - - -CHAPTER IV. - -The Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of The East. - - 1. Kindi 97–106 - 1. His Life 97 - 2. Relation to Theology 99 - 3. Mathematics 100 - 4. God; World; Soul 101 - 5. Doctrine of the Spirit (ʻaql) 102 - 6. Kindi as an Aristotelian 104 - 7. The School of Kindi 105 - - 2. Farabi 106–128 - 1. The Logicians 106 - 2. Farabi’s Life 107 - 3. Relation to Plato and Aristotle 108 - 4. Farabi’s Conception of Philosophy 110 - 5. His Logic 111 - 6. His Metaphysics. Being. God 114 - 7. The Celestial World 115 - 8. The Terrestrial World 117 - 9. The Human Soul 118 - 10. The Spirit in Man 119 - 11. Farabi’s Ethics 121 - 12. His Politics 122 - 13. The Future Life 123 - 14. General Survey of Farabi’s System 124 - 15. Effects of his Philosophy. Sidjistani 126 - - 3. Ibn Maskawaih 128–131 - 1. His Position 128 - 2. The Nature of the Soul 128 - 3. The Principles of his Ethics 129 - - 4. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) 131–148 - 1. His Life 131 - 2. His Work 132 - 3. Branches of Philosophy. Logic 134 - 4. Metaphysics and Physics 135 - 5. Anthropology and Psychology 139 - 6. The Reason 141 - 7. Allegorical Representation of the Doctrine of - the Reason 143 - 8. Esoteric Teaching 144 - 9. Ibn Sina’s Time. Beruni 145 - 10. Behmenyar 146 - 11. Survival of Ibn Sina’s Influence 147 - - 5. Ibn al-Haitham (Alhazen) 148–153 - 1. Scientific Movement turning Westward 148 - 2. Ibn al-Haitham’s Life and Works 149 - 3. Perception and Judgment 150 - 4. Slender effect left by his Teaching 152 - - -CHAPTER V. - -The Outcome of Philosophy in The East. - - 1. Gazali 154–168 - 1. Dialectic and Mysticism 154 - 2. Gazali’s Life 155 - 3. Attitude towards his Time: Hostility to - Aristotelianism 158 - 4. The World as the Production of God’s Free - Creative Might 159 - 5. God and Divine Providence 162 - 6. Doctrine of the Resurrection 163 - 7. Gazali’s Theology 164 - 8. Experience and Revelation 166 - 9. Estimate of Gazali’s Position and Teaching 168 - - 2. The Epitomists 169–171 - 1. Position of Philosophy in the East, after - Gazali’s Time 169 - 2. Philosophical Culture 170 - - -CHAPTER VI. - -Philosophy in The West. - - 1. Beginnings 172–175 - 1. The Age of the Omayyads 172 - 2. The Eleventh Century 174 - - 2. Ibn Baddja (Avempace) 175–181 - 1. The Almoravids 175 - 2. Ibn Baddja’s Life 176 - 3. The Character of his Works 177 - 4. His Logic and Metaphysics 177 - 5. His Opinions regarding Soul and Spirit 178 - 6. The Individual Man 179 - - 3. Ibn Tofail (Abubacer) 181–187 - 1. The Almohads 181 - 2. Ibn Tofail’s Life 182 - 3. “Hai ibn Yaqzan” 182 - 4. “Hai” and the Development of Humanity 184 - 5. “Hai’s” Ethics 185 - - 4. Ibn Roshd (Averroes) 187–199 - 1. His Life 187 - 2. Ibn Roshd and Aristotle 188 - 3. Logic. Attainability of Truth 189 - 4. The World and God 191 - 5. Body and Spirit 193 - 6. Spirit and Spirits 194 - 7. Estimate of Ibn Roshd as a Thinker 196 - 8. Summary of his Views on the Relations of - Theology, Religion and Philosophy to one - another. Practical Philosophy 197 - - -CHAPTER VII. - -Conclusion. - - 1. Ibn Khaldun 200–208 - 1. The Conditions of his Time 200 - 2. Ibn Khaldun’s Life 201 - 3. Philosophy and Worldly Experience 202 - 4. Philosophy of History. Historical Method 204 - 5. The Subject of History 205 - 6. Characterization 206 - - 2. The Arabs and Scholasticism 208–213 - 1. Political Situation. The Jews 208 - 2. Palermo and Toledo 209 - 3. Parisian Averroism in the Thirteenth Century 211 - - - - - - - - -I. INTRODUCTION. - - -1. The Theatre. - -1. In olden time the Arabian desert was, as it is at this day, the -roaming-ground of independent Bedouin tribes. With free and healthy -minds they contemplated their monotonous world, whose highest charm was -the raid, and whose intellectual treasure was the tribal tradition. -Neither the achievements of social labour, nor the accomplishments of -elegant leisure were known to them. Only on the borders of the desert, -in regularly constituted communities, which often had to suffer from -the incursions of those Bedouins, a higher degree of civilization had -been attained. This was the case in the South, where the ancient -kingdom of the Queen of Sheba continued its existence in Christian -times under Abyssinian or Persian overlordship. On the West lay Mecca -and Medina (Yathrib), by an old caravan route; and Mecca in particular, -with its market safe-guarded by a temple, was the centre of a brisk -traffic. Lastly on the North, two semi-sovereign States had been formed -under Arab princes: towards Persia, the kingdom of the Lakhmids in -Hira; and towards Byzantium the dominion of the Gassanids in Syria. In -speech and poetry, however, the unity of the Arab nation was set forth -to some extent even before Mohammed’s time. The poets were the ‘men of -knowledge’ for their people. Their incantations held good as oracles, -first of all for their several tribes, but no doubt extending their -influence often beyond their own particular septs. - -2. Mohammed and his immediate successors, Abu Bekr, Omar, Othman and -Ali (622–661) succeeded in inspiring the free sons of the desert, -together with the more civilized inhabitants of the coast-lands, with -enthusiasm for a joint enterprise. To this circumstance Islam owes its -world-position: for Allah showed himself great, and the world was quite -small for those who surrendered themselves to him (Muslims). In a short -time the whole of Persia was conquered, and the East-Roman empire lost -its fairest provinces,—Syria and Egypt. - -Medina was the seat of the first Caliphs or representatives of the -prophet. Then Mohammed’s brave son-in-law Ali, and Ali’s sons, fell -before Moawiya, the able governor of Syria. From that time dates the -existence of the party of Ali (Shiʻites), which in the course of -diverse vicissitudes,—now reduced to subjection, now in detached places -attaining power,—lives on in history, until it finally incorporates -itself with the Persian kingdom in definite opposition to Sunnite -Islam. - -In their struggle against the secular power the Shiʻites availed -themselves of every possible weapon,—even of science. Very early there -appears among them the sect of the Kaisanites, which ascribes to Ali -and his heirs a superhuman secret lore, by the help of which the inner -meaning of the Divine revelation first becomes clear, but which demands -from its devotees not less faith in, and absolute obedience to, the -possessor of such knowledge, than does the letter of the Koran. (Cf. -III, 2 § 1). - -3. After the victory of Moawiya, who made Damascus the capital of the -Muslim empire, the importance of Medina lay mainly in the spiritual -province. It had to content itself with fostering, partly under Jewish -and Christian influences, a knowledge of the Law and Tradition. In -Damascus, on the other hand, the Omayyads (661–750) conducted the -secular government. Under their rule the empire spread from the -Atlantic to districts beyond the frontiers of India and Turkestan, and -from the Indian Ocean to the Caucasus and the very walls of -Constantinople. With this development, however, it had reached its -farthest extension. - -Arabs now assumed everywhere the leading position. They formed a -military aristocracy; and the most striking proof of their influence is -the fact, that conquered nations with an old and superior civilization -accepted the language of their conquerors. Arabic became the language -of Church and State, of Poetry and Science. But while the higher -offices in the State and the Army were administered by Arabs in -preference, the care of the Arts and Sciences fell, first of all, to -Non-Arabs and men of mixed blood. In Syria school-instruction was -received from Christians. The chief seats of intellectual culture, -however, were Basra and Kufa, in which Arabs and Persians, Muslims, -Christians, Jews and Magians rubbed shoulders together. There, where -trade and industry were thriving, the beginnings of secular science in -Islam must be sought for,—beginnings themselves due to -Hellenistic-Christian and Persian influences. - -4. The Omayyads were succeeded by the Abbasids (750–1258). To obtain -the sovereignty, the latter had granted concessions to the Persians, -and had utilized religio-political movements. During the first century -of their rule (i.e. up to about 860), though only during that period, -the greatness of the empire continued to increase, or at least it held -its own. In the year 762, Mansur, the second ruler of this house, -founded Bagdad as the new capital,—a city which soon outshone Damascus -in worldly splendour, and Basra and Kufa in intellectual illumination. -Constantinople alone could be compared to it. Poets and scholars, -particularly from the North-Eastern provinces, met together in Bagdad -at the court of Mansur (754–775), of Harun (786–809), of Mamun -(813–833), and others. Several of the Abbasids had a liking for secular -culture, whether for its own sake or to adorn their court, and although -they may often have failed to recognize the value of artists and -learned men, these at any rate could appreciate the material benefits -conferred upon them by their patrons. - -From the time of Harun at least, there existed in Bagdad a library and -a learned institute. Even under Mansur, but especially under Mamun and -his successors, translation of the scientific literature of the Greeks -into the Arabic tongue went forward, largely through the agency of -Syrians; and Abstracts and Commentaries bearing upon these works were -also composed. - -Just when this learned activity was at its highest, the glory of the -empire began to decline. The old tribal feuds, which had never been at -rest under the Omayyads, had seemingly given place to a firmly-knit -political unity; but other controversies,—theological and metaphysical -wranglings, such as in like manner accompanied the decay of the -East-Roman empire,—were prosecuted with ever-increasing bitterness. The -service of the State, under an Eastern despotism, did not require men -of brilliant parts. Promising abilities accordingly were often ruined -in luxurious indulgence, or flung away upon sophistry and the show of -learning. On the other hand, for the defence of the empire the Caliphs -enlisted the sound and healthy vigour of nations who had not been so -much softened by over-civilization,—first the Iranian or Iranianized -people of Khorasan, and then the Turks. - -5. The decline of the empire became more and more evident. The power of -the Turkish soldiery, uprisings of city mobs and of peasant labourers, -Shiʻite and Ismaelite intrigues on all sides, and in addition the -desire for independence shown by the distant provinces,—were either the -causes or the symptoms of the downfall. Alongside of the Caliphs, who -were reduced to the position of spiritual dignitaries, the Turks ruled -as Mayors of the Palace; and all round, in the outlying regions of the -empire, independent States were gradually formed, until an utterly -astounding body of minor States appeared. The most influential ruling -houses, more or less independent, were the following: in the West, to -say nothing of the Spanish Omayyads (cf. VI, 1), the Aglabids of -North-Africa, the Tulunids and Fatimids of Egypt, and the Hamdanids of -Syria and Mesopotamia; in the East, the Tahirids and Samanids, who were -by slow degrees supplanted by the Turks. It is at the courts of these -petty dynasties that the poets and scholars of the next period (the -10th and 11th centuries) are to be found. For a short time Haleb -(Aleppo), the seat of the Hamdanids, and for a longer time Cairo, built -by the Fatimids in the year 969,—have a better claim to be regarded as -the home of intellectual endeavour than Bagdad itself. For another -brief space lustre is shed on the East by the court of the Turk, Mahmud -of Ghazna, who had become master of Khorasan in the year 999. - -The founding of the Muslim Universities also falls within this period -of petty States and Turkish administration. The first one was erected -in Bagdad in the year 1065; and from that date the East has been in -possession of Science, but only in the form of stereotyped -republications. The teacher conveys the teaching which has been handed -down to him by his teachers; and in any new book hardly a sentence will -be found which does not appear in older books. Science was rescued from -danger; but the learned men of Transoxiana, who, upon hearing of the -establishment of the first Madrasah, appointed a solemn memorial -service, as tradition tells, to be held in honour of departed science, -have been shewn to be correct in their estimate. [4] - -Then,—in the 13th century,—there came storming over the Eastern regions -of Islam the resounding invasion of the Mongols, who swept away -whatever the Turks had spared. No culture ever flourished there again, -to develope from its own resources a new Art or to stimulate a revival -of Science. - - - - -2. Oriental Wisdom. - -1. Prior to its contact with Hellenism, the Semitic mind had proceeded -no farther in the path of Philosophy than the propounding of enigmas, -and the utterance of aphoristic wisdom. Detached observations of -Nature, but especially of the life and fate of Man, form the basis of -such thinking; and where comprehension ceases, resignation to the -almighty and inscrutable will of God comes in without difficulty. We -have become familiar with this kind of wisdom from the Old Testament; -and that it was developed in like manner among the Arabs, is shewn to -us by the Bible story of the Queen of Sheba, and by the figure of the -wise Loqman in the Arab tradition. - -By the side of this wisdom there was found everywhere the Magic of the -sorcerer,—a knowledge which was authenticated by command over outward -things. But it was only in the priestly circles of ancient -Babylonia,—under what influences and to what extent we do not precisely -know,—that men rose to a more scientific consideration of the world. -Their eyes were turned from the confusion of earthly existence to the -order of the heavens. They were not like the Hebrews, who never got -beyond the wondering stage [5], or who saw merely an emblem of their -own posterity in the countless stars [6]; they resembled rather the -Greeks who came to understand the Many and the Manifold in their -sublunary forms, only after they had discovered the harmony of the All -in the unity and steadiness of the movement of the heavens. The only -drawback was that much mythological by-play and astrological pretence -was interwoven with what was good, as in fact was the case also in -Hellenism. This Chaldaean wisdom, from the time of Alexander the Great, -became pervaded, in Babylonia and Syria, with Hellenistic and later -with Hellenistic-Christian ideas, or else was supplanted by them. In -the Syrian city of Harran only, up to the time of Islam, the old -heathenism held its ground, little affected by Christian influences. -(Cf. I, 3, § 4). - -2. Of more importance than any Semitic tradition, was the contribution -made to Islam by Persian and Indian wisdom. We do not need to enter -here upon the question as to whether Oriental wisdom was originally -influenced by Greek philosophy, or Greek philosophy by Oriental wisdom. -What Islam carried away directly from Persians and Indians may be -learned with tolerable certainty from Arabic sources, and to this we -may confine ourselves. - -Persia is the land of Dualism, and it is not improbable that its -dualistic religious teaching exercised an influence upon theological -controversy in Islam, either directly or through the Manichaeans and -other Gnostic sects. But much greater, in worldly circles, was the -influence wielded by that system which, according to tradition, came to -be even publicly recognized, under the Sasanid Yezdegerd II -(438/9–457), viz. Zrwanism (Cf. III, 1, § 6). In this system the -dualistic view of the world was superseded by setting up endless Time, -(zrwan, Arab. dahr) as the paramount principle, and identifying it with -Fate, the outermost heavenly sphere or the movement of the heavens. -This doctrine, pleasing to philosophic intellects, has secured, with or -without the guise of Islam, a prominent place for itself in Persian -literature and in the views of the people, up to our own day. By -theologians, however, and no less by philosophers of the Idealistic -schools, it was disavowed as Materialism, Atheism and so forth. - -3. India was regarded as the true land of wisdom. In Arab writers we -often come upon the view that there the birthplace of philosophy is to -be found. By peaceful trading, in which the agents between India and -the West were principally Persians, and next as a result of the Muslim -conquest, acquaintance with Indian wisdom spread far and wide. Much of -it was translated under Mansur (754–775) and Harun (786–809), partly by -means of the intervening step of Persian (Pahlawi) versions, and partly -from the Sanskrit direct. Many a deliverance of ethical and political -wisdom, in the dress of proverbs, was taken over from the fables and -tales of India, such as the Tales of the Panchatantra, translated from -the Pahlawi by Ibn al-Moqaffa in Mansur’s time, and others. It was, -however, Indian Mathematics and Astrology,—the latter in combination -with practical Medicine and Magic,—that mainly influenced the -beginnings of secular wisdom in Islam. The Astrology of the Siddhanta -of Brahmagupta, which was translated from the Sanskrit, under Mansur, -by Fazari assisted by Indian scholars, was known even before Ptolemy’s -Almagest. A wide world, past and future, was thereby opened up. The -high figures with which the Indians worked produced a powerful, -perplexing impression upon the sober Muslim annalists, just as, on the -other hand, Arab merchants, who in India and China put the age of our -created world at a few thousand years, exposed themselves to the utmost -ridicule. - -Nor did the logical and metaphysical speculations of the Indians remain -unknown to the Muslims. These produced, however, much less effect on -scientific development than did their Mathematics and Astrology. The -investigations of the Indians, associated with their sacred books and -wholly determined by a religious purpose, have certainly had a lasting -influence upon Persian Sufism and Islamic Mysticism. But,—once for -all,—Philosophy is a Greek conception, and we have no right, in -deference to the taste of the day, to allot an undue amount of space in -our description to the childish thoughts of pious Hindoos. What has -been advanced by these meditative penitents about the deceptive show of -everything sensuous, may often possess a poetic charm, just as it -agrees perhaps with those observations on the evanescence of all that -is earthly, which the East had access to in Neo-Pythagorean and -Neo-Platonic sources; but it has contributed just as little of -importance as these did, towards the explanation of phenomena or the -awakening of the scientific spirit. Not the Indian imagination, but the -Greek mind was needed to direct the reflective process to the knowledge -of the Real. The best example of this is furnished by Arabic -Mathematics. In the opinion of those who know the subject best, almost -the only thing Indian in it is the Arithmetic, while the Algebra and -the Geometry are Greek, preponderatingly, if not exclusively. Hardly a -single Indian penetrated to the notion of pure mathematics. Number, -even in its highest form, remained always something concrete; and in -Indian Philosophy knowledge in the main continued to be only a means. -Deliverance from the evil of existence was the aim, and Philosophy a -pathway to the life of blessedness. Hence the monotony of this -wisdom,—concentrated, as it was, upon the essence of all things in its -One-ness,—as contrasted with the many-branched science of the Hellenes, -which strove to comprehend the operations of Nature and Mind on all -sides. - -Oriental wisdom, Astrology and Cosmology delivered over to Muslim -thinkers material of many kinds, but the Form,—the formative -principle,—came to them from the Greeks. In every case where it is not -mere enumeration or chance concatenation that is taken in hand, but -where an attempt is made to arrange the Manifold according to positive -or logical points of view, we may conclude with all probability that -Greek influences have been at work. - - - - -3. Greek Science. - -1. Just as the commercial intercourse between India and China and -Byzantium was conducted principally by the Persians, so in the remote -West, as far even as France, the Syrians came forward as the agents of -civilization. It was Syrians who brought wine, silk &c. to the West. -But it was Syrians also who took Greek culture from Alexandria and -Antioch, spreading it eastward and propagating it in the schools of -Edessa and Nisibis, Harran and Gondeshapur. Syria was the true neutral -ground, where for centuries the two world-powers, the Roman and the -Persian, came in contact with one another, either as friends or as -foes. In such circumstances, the Christian Syrians played a part -similar to the one which in later days fell to the share of the Jews. - -2. The Muslim conquerors found the Christian church split up into three -main divisions,—to say nothing of many sects. The Monophysite church, -alongside of the Orthodox State-church, preponderated in Syria proper, -and the Nestorian church in Persia. The difference between the -doctrinal systems of these churches was perhaps not without importance -for the development of Muslim Dogmatics. According to the teaching of -the Monophysites, God and Man were united in one nature in Christ, -whereas the Orthodox, and in a still more pronounced manner the -Nestorians, discriminated between a Divine nature and a human nature in -him. Now nature means, above everything, energy or operative principle. -The question, accordingly, which is at issue, is whether the Divine, -and the human Willing and Acting are one and the same in Christ or -different. The Monophysites, from speculative and religious motives, -gave prominence to the Unity in Christ their God, at the expense of the -human element: The Nestorians, on the other hand, emphasized, in -contrast with the Divine element, all that is specially characteristic -of human Being, Willing and Acting. The latter view, however, favoured -by political circumstances and conditions of culture, offers freer play -to philosophical speculations on the world and on life. In point of -fact the Nestorians did most for the cultivation of Greek Science. - -3. Syriac was the language both of the Western and of the Eastern or -Persian Church; but Greek was also taught along with it in the Cloister -schools. Rasain and Kinnesrin must be mentioned as being centres of -culture in the Western or Monophysite Church. Of more importance, at -the outset at least, was the school of Edessa, inasmuch as the dialect -of Edessa had risen to the position of the literary language; but in -the year 489 the school there was closed because of the Nestorian views -held by its teachers. It was then re-opened in Nisibis, and, being -patronized by the Sasanids on political grounds, it disseminated -Nestorian belief and Greek knowledge throughout Persia. - -Instruction in these schools had a pre-eminently Biblical and -ecclesiastical character, and was arranged to meet the needs of the -Church. However, physicians or coming students of medicine also took -part in it. The circumstance that they frequently belonged to the -ecclesiastical order does not do away with the distinction between -theological study and the pursuit of secular knowledge. It is true that -according to the Syro-Roman code, Teachers (learned Priests) and -Physicians were entitled in common to exemption from taxation and to -other privileges; but the very fact that priests were regarded as -healers of the soul, while physicians had merely to patch up the body, -seemed to justify the precedence accorded to the former. Medicine -always remained a secular matter; and, by the regulations of the School -of Nisibis (from the year 590), the Holy Scriptures were not to be read -in the same room with books that dealt with worldly callings. - -In medical circles the works of Hippocrates, Galen and Aristotle were -highly prized; but in the cloisters Philosophy was understood to be -first of all the contemplative life of the ascetic, and “the one thing -needful” was the only thing cared for. - -4. The Mesopotamian city of Harran, in the neighbourhood of Edessa, -takes a place of its own. In this city, especially when it began to -flourish again after the Arab conquest, ancient Semitic paganism comes -into association with mathematical and astronomical studies and -Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic speculation. The Harranaeans or -Sabaeans, as they were called in the 9th and 10th centuries, traced -their mystic lore back to Hermes Trismegistus, Agathodaemon, Uranius -and others. Numerous pseudepigraphs of the later Hellenism were adopted -by them in good faith, and some perhaps were forged in their own -circle. A few of them became active as translators and learned authors, -and many kept up a brisk scientific intercourse with Persian and Arab -scholars from the 8th to the 10th century. - -5. In Persia, at Gondeshapur, we find an Institution for philosophical -and medical studies established by Khosrau Anosharwan (521–579). Its -teachers were principally Nestorian Christians; but Khosrau, who had an -inclination for secular culture, extended his toleration to -Monophysites as well as to Nestorians. At that time, just as was the -case later at the court of the Caliphs, Christian Syrians were held in -special honour as medical men. - -Farther, in the year 529, seven philosophers of the Neo-Platonic -school, who had been driven away from Athens, found a place of refuge -at the court of Khosrau. Their experiences there, however, may have -resembled those of the French free-thinkers of the 18th century at the -Russian court. At all events they longed to get home again; and the -king was sufficiently liberal-minded and magnanimous to allow them to -go, and in his treaty of peace with Byzantium of the year 549 to -stipulate in their case for freedom of religious opinion. Their stay in -the Persian kingdom was doubtless not wholly devoid of influence. - -6. The period of Syriac translations of profane literature from the -Greek extends perhaps from the 4th to the 8th century. In the 4th -century collections of aphorisms were translated. The first translator, -however, who makes his appearance avowing his name, is Probus, “Priest -and physician in Antioch” (1st half of the 5th century?). Possibly he -was merely an expounder of the logical writings of Aristotle, and of -the Isagoge of Porphyry. Better known is Sergius of Rasain,—who died at -the age of 70 or so, probably in Constantinople, about 536,—a -Mesopotamian monk and physician, whose studies, which were probably -pursued in Alexandria itself, took in the whole range of Alexandrian -science, and whose translations not only embraced Theology, Morals and -Mysticism, but even Physics, Medicine and Philosophy. Even after the -Muslim conquest the learned activity of the Syrians continued. Jacob of -Edessa (circa 640–708) translated Greek theological writings; but he -occupied himself besides with Philosophy, and in answer to a question -relative thereto he pronounced that it was lawful for Christian -ecclesiastics to impart the higher instruction to children of Muslim -parents. There was thus a felt need of culture among the latter. - -The translations of the Syrians, particularly of Sergius of Rasain, are -generally faithful; but a more exact correspondence with the original -is shewn in the case of Logic and Natural Science than in Ethical and -Metaphysical works. Much that is obscure in these last has been -misunderstood or simply omitted, and much that is pagan has been -replaced by Christian material. For instance, Peter, Paul and John -would come upon the scene in room of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. -Destiny and the Gods were obliged to give place to the one God; and -ideas like World, Eternity, Sin and the like were recast in a Christian -mould. The Arabs, however, in subsequent times went to a much greater -length with the process of adaptation to their language, culture and -religion than the Syrians. This may perhaps be partly explained by the -Muslim horror of everything heathen, but partly too by their greater -faculty of adaptation. - -7. Apart from a few mathematical, physical and medical writings, the -Syrians interested themselves in two subjects,—the first consisting of -moralizing collections of aphorisms, put together into a kind of -history of Philosophy, and, generally, of mystical Pythagorean-Platonic -wisdom. This is found principally in pseudepigraphs, which bear the -names of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plutarch, Dionysius and others. The -centre of interest is a Platonic doctrine of the Soul, subjected to a -later Pythagorean, Neo-Platonic, or Christian form of treatment. In the -Syrian cloisters Plato is even turned into an oriental monk, who built -a cell for himself in the heart of the wilderness, far away from the -dwellings of men, and after three years’ silent brooding over a verse -of the Bible was led to a recognition of the Tri-Unity of God. - -A second subject of interest was added, in Aristotle’s Logic. Among the -Syrians, and for a longer period among the Arabs also, Aristotle was -commonly known almost solely as a logician. This knowledge, just as in -the early scholasticism of the West, extended to the Categories, the -Hermeneutics, and the first Analytics as far as the Categorical -Figures. They stood in need of the Logic in order to comprehend the -writings of Greek ecclesiastical teachers, since these, at least in -form, were influenced thereby. But as they did not possess it complete, -as little did they possess it pure. They had it before them only in a -Neo-Platonic redaction, as may be seen, for example, from the work of -Paulus Persa, which was written in Syriac for Khosrau Anosharwan. In -that work knowledge is placed above faith, and philosophy is defined as -the process by which the soul becomes conscious of its own inner -essence, in which, like a God as it were, it sees all things. - -8. What the Arabs owe to the Syrians is expressed by this circumstance -amongst others,—that Arab scholars held Syriac to be the oldest, or the -real (natural) language. The Syrians, it is true, produced nothing -original; but their activity as translators was of advantage to -Arab-Persian science. It was Syrians almost without exception, who, -from the 8th century to the 10th, rendered Greek works into Arabic, -either from the older Syriac versions or from those which had been in -part improved by them, and in part re-arranged. Even the Omayyad -prince, Khalid ibn Yezid (died 704), who occupied himself with Alchemy -under the guidance of a Christian monk, is said to have provided for -translations of works on Alchemy from Greek into Arabic. Proverbs, -maxims, letters, wills, and in short whatever bore on the history of -philosophy, were at a very early time collected and translated. But it -was not till the reign of Mansur that a commencement was made with the -translation into Arabic—partly from Pahlawi versions—of those writings -of the Greeks which deal with Natural Science, Medicine and Logic. Ibn -al-Moqaffa, an adherent of Persian Dualism, took a leading part in this -task, from whom later workers must have marked themselves off by their -terminology. None of his philosophical translations have come down to -us. Other material too, belonging to the 8th century has gone amissing. -The earliest specimen of this work of translation which we possess -dates from the 9th century, the time of Mamun and his successors. - -The translators of the 9th century were, for the most part, medical -men; and Hippocrates and Galen were among the first to be translated -after Ptolemy and Euclid. But let us confine ourselves to Philosophy, -in the narrower sense. A translation of the Timäus of Plato is said to -have come from Yuhanna or Yakhya ibn Bitriq (in the beginning of the -9th century), as well as Aristotle’s ‘Meteorology’, the ‘Book of -Animals’, an epitome of the ‘Psychology’, and the tract ‘On the World’. -To Abdalmasikh ibn Abdallah Naima al-Himsi (circa 835) is to be -ascribed a rendering of the ‘Sophistics’ of Aristotle, in addition to -the Commentary of John Philoponus upon the ‘Physics’, as well as the -so-called ‘Theology of Aristotle’,—a paraphrased epitome of the Enneads -of Plotinus. Qosta ibn Luqa al-Balabakki (circa 835) is said to have -translated the Commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias and John -Philoponus upon the ‘Physics’ of Aristotle, and in part, Alexander’s -Commentary on the ‘De generatione et corruptione’, as well as the -‘Placita Philosophorum’ of the Pseudo-Plutarch, and other works. - -The most productive translators were Abu Zaid Honain ibn Ishaq -(809?-873), his son, Ishaq ibn Honain († 910 or 911), and nephew -Hobaish ibn al-Hasan. Seeing that they worked together, there is a good -deal which is ascribed, now to the one and now to the other. Not a -little material must have been prepared, under their oversight, by -disciples and subordinates. Their activity extended over the whole -range of the science of that day. Existing translations were improved, -and new ones added. The father preferred to work at versions of medical -authors, but the son turned more to the rendering of philosophical -material. - -The work of the translators was still proceeding in the 10th century. -Among those who especially distinguished themselves were Abu Bishr -Matta ibn Yunus al-Qannai († 940), Abu Zakarya Yakhya ibn Adi -al-Mantiqi († 974), Abu Ali Isa ibn Ishaq ibn Zura († 1008), and -finally, Abu-l-Khair al-Hasan ibn al-Khammar (born 942), a pupil of -Yakhya ibn Adi’s, of whose writings, besides translations, -commentaries, and so forth, a tract is mentioned, on the Harmony -between Philosophy and Christianity. - -From the time of Honain ibn Ishaq the activity of the translators was -almost wholly confined to Aristotelian and Pseudo-Aristotelian -writings, and to epitomes of them, to paraphrases of their contents and -to commentaries upon them. - -9. These translators are not to be regarded as specially great -philosophers. Their work was seldom entered upon spontaneously, but -almost always at the command of some Caliph or Vizir or other person of -note. Outside of their own department of study, usually Medicine, they -were chiefly interested in Wisdom,—that is, in pretty stories with a -moral, in anecdotes, and in oracular sayings. The expressions which we -merely bear with in intercourse, in narrative or on the stage, as being -characteristic utterances with certain persons, were admired and -collected by these worthy people for the sake of the wisdom contained -in them, or perhaps even for no more than the rhetorical elegance of -their form. As a rule, those men continued true to the Christian faith -of their fathers. The traditional story of Ibn Djebril gives a good -idea both of their way of thinking and of the liberal-mindedness of the -Caliphs. When Mansur wanted to convert him to Islam, he is said to have -replied: “In the faith of my fathers I will die: where they are, I wish -also to be, whether in heaven or in hell”. Whereupon the Caliph -laughed, and dismissed him with a rich present. - -Only a small portion has been saved of the original writings of these -men. A short dissertation by Qosta ibn Luqa on the distinction between -Soul and Spirit (πνεῦμα, ruh), preserved in a Latin translation, has -been frequently mentioned and made use of. According to it, the Spirit -is a subtle material, which from its seat in the left ventricle of the -heart animates the human frame and brings about its movements and -perceptions. The finer and clearer this Spirit is, the more rationally -the man thinks and acts: there is but one opinion upon this point. It -is more difficult, however, to predicate anything sure, and universally -valid, of the Soul. The deliverances of the greatest philosophers -occasionally differ, and occasionally contradict each other. In any -case the Soul is incorporeal, for it adopts qualities, and, in fact, -qualities of the most opposite nature at one and the same time. It is -uncompounded and unchangeable, and it does not, like the Spirit, perish -with the body. The Spirit only acts as an intermediary between the Soul -and the Body, and it is in this way that it becomes a secondary cause -of movement and perception. - -The statement which has just been given regarding the Soul is found in -many of the later writers. But by slow degrees, as the Aristotelian -philosophy thrusts Platonic opinions more and more into the background, -another pair of opposites come into full view. Physicians alone -continue to speak of the importance of the ‘ruh’ or Spirit of Life. -Philosophers institute a comparison between Soul and Spirit or Reason -(νοῦς, ʻaql). The Soul is now reduced to the domain of the perishable, -and sometimes, in Gnostic fashion, even to the lower and evil realm of -the desires. The rational Spirit,—as that which is highest, that which -is imperishable in man—is exalted above the Soul. - -In this notice, however, we are anticipating history: let us return to -our translators. - -10. The most valuable portion of the legacy which the Greek mind -bequeathed to us in art, poetry, and historical composition, was never -accessible to the Orientals. It would even have been difficult for them -to understand it, seeing that they lacked the due acquaintance with -Greek life, and the relish for it. For them the history of Greece began -with Alexander the Great, surrounded with the halo of legend; and the -position which Aristotle held beside the greatest prince of ancient -times must have assuredly conduced to the acceptance of the -Aristotelian philosophy at the Muslim court. Arab historians counted up -the Greek princes, on to Cleopatra, and then the Roman Emperors; but a -Thucydides, for example, was not known to them, even by name. Of Homer -they had not picked up much more than the sentence, that “one only -should be the ruler”. They had not the least idea of the great Greek -dramatists and lyric poets. It was only through its Mathematics, -Natural Science and Philosophy, that Greek antiquity could bring its -influence to bear upon them. They had come to know something of the -development of Greek Philosophy, from Plutarch, Porphyry and others, as -well as from the writings of Aristotle and Galen. A good deal of -legendary matter, however, was mingled with their information; and the -account which passed in the East, of the doctrines of the Pre-Socratic -philosophers can only be referred by us to the pseudepigraphs which -they consulted, or perhaps even to the opinions which had been -developed in the East itself, and which they endeavoured to support -with the authority of old Greek sages. But still, in every case, our -thoughts must turn first of all to some Greek original. - -11. It may be affirmed generally that the Syro-Arabs took up the thread -of philosophy, precisely where the last of the Greeks had let it fall, -that is, with the Neo-Platonic explanation of Aristotle, along with -whose philosophy the works of Plato were also read and expounded. Among -the Harranaeans, and for a long time in several Muslim sects, it was -Platonic or Pythagorean-Platonic studies which were prosecuted with -most ardour,—with which much that was Stoic or Neo-Platonic was -associated. Extraordinary interest was taken in the fate of Socrates, -who had suffered a martyr’s death in heathen Athens for his rational -belief. The Platonic teaching regarding the Soul and Nature exercised -great influence. The Pythian utterance: “Know thyself”,—handed down as -the motto of the Socratic wisdom, and interpreted in a Neo-Platonic -sense,—was ascribed by the Muslims to Ali, Mohammed’s son-in-law, or -even put into the mouth of the Prophet himself. “He who knows himself, -knows God his Lord thereby”: this was the text for Mystic speculations -of all kinds. - -In medical circles and at the worldly court, the works of Aristotle -came more and more into favour, first of all of course the Logic and a -few things from the Physical writings. The Logic—so they thought—was -the only new thing the Stagyrite had discovered: in all the other -sciences he agreed throughout with Pythagoras, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, -Socrates and Plato. Accordingly Christian and Sabaean translators, and -the circle influenced by them, drew their psychologico-ethical, -political and metaphysical instruction without hesitation from the -Pre-Aristotelian sages. - -What bore the names of Empedocles, Pythagoras &c., was, naturally, -spurious. Their wisdom is traced either to Hermes or to other wise men -of the East. Thus Empedocles must have been a disciple of King David’s, -and afterwards of Loqman the Wise: Pythagoras must have sprung from the -school of Solomon,—and so on. Writings which are cited in Arabic works -as Socratic are, in so far as they are genuine, Platonic dialogues in -which Socrates appears. Their quotations from Plato—not to speak of -spurious writings—have a more or less comprehensive range: they are -taken from the Apology, Krito, the Sophistes, Phaedrus, the Republic, -Phaedo, Timäus and the Laws. That does not mean, however, that they -possessed complete translations of all these works. - -This much is certain,—that Aristotle did not reign as sole lord from -the very outset. Plato, as they understood him, taught the Creation of -the world, the Substantiality of the Spiritual, and the Immortality of -the Soul. That teaching did no harm to the Faith. But Aristotle, with -his doctrine of the Eternity of the World, and his less spiritualistic -Psychology and Ethics, was regarded as dangerous. Muslim theologians of -the 9th and 10th centuries, from various camps, wrote therefore against -Aristotle. But circumstances altered. Philosophers arose by-and-by who -rejected the Platonic doctrine of the One World-Soul, of which the -souls of men are only transient parts, and sought grounds for their -hope of immortality from Aristotle who attributed so great a -significance to the Individual Substance. - -12. The conception which was entertained of Aristotle in the period -most remote, is best shown by the writings which were foisted upon him. -Not only did they get his genuine works with Neo-Platonic -interpretations attached to them,—not only was the treatise: “On the -world” unhesitatingly acknowledged as Aristotelian, but he was also -regarded as the author of many late-Greek productions, in which a -Pythagorising Platonism or Neo-Platonism, or even a barren Syncretism -was quite frankly taught. - -Let us take here as our first example “the Book of the Apple” [7], -wherein Aristotle plays the same part as Socrates in the Phaedo of -Plato. As his end draws near, the Philosopher is visited by some of his -disciples who find him in a cheerful frame of mind. This leads them to -request their departing Master to give them some instruction about the -Essence and Immortality of the Soul. Thereupon he discourses somewhat -as follows:—“The Essence of the Soul consists in knowing,—in fact, in -Philosophy, which is the highest form of knowing. A perfect knowledge -of the truth constitutes therefore the blessedness which after death -awaits the soul which is devoted to knowing. And just as knowing is -rewarded with a higher knowledge,—so the punishment for not-knowing -consists in a deeper ignorance. And really, there is nothing in Heaven -or Earth, after all, except knowing and not-knowing, and the recompence -which these two severally bring with them. Farther,—virtue is not -essentially different from knowing; nor does vice differ essentially -from not-knowing. The relation of virtue to knowing, or of vice to -not-knowing, is like that of water to ice: i.e. it is the same thing -in a different form. - -In knowing,—which is the divine essence of the Soul,—the Soul finds -naturally its only true joy, and not in eating and drinking and sensual -pleasure. For, sensual pleasure is a flame which merely warms for a -short time; but the thinking Soul,—which longs for its deliverance from -the murky world of the senses,—is a pure light that sheds a radiance -far and wide. The Philosopher therefore is not afraid of death, but -meets it gladly, when the Deity summons him. The enjoyment, which his -limited knowledge affords him here is a guarantee to him of the rapture -which the unveiling of the great world of the Unknown will procure him. -Even already he knows something of this, for it is only through -knowledge of the invisible, that the proper estimate of the sensible, -on which he prides himself, is at all possible. He who comes to know -his own self in this life, possesses in that very knowledge of himself -the assurance of comprehending all things with an eternal knowledge,—i. -e. of being immortal.” - -13. In the second place the so-called “Theology of Aristotle” may be -referred to. In it Plato is represented as the Ideal-Man, who gains a -knowledge of all things by means of an intuitive thinking, and thus has -no need of the logical resources of Aristotle. Indeed, the highest -reality—Absolute Being—is not apprehended by thinking, but only in an -ecstatic Vision. “Often was I alone with my soul”, says -Aristotle-Plotinus, on this point. “Divested of the body, I entered as -pure substance into my proper self, turning back from all that is -external to what is within. I was pure knowing there, at once the -knowing and the known. How astonished I was to behold beauty and -splendour in my proper self, and to recognize that I was a part of the -sublime Divine world, endowed even with creative life! In this -assurance of self, I was lifted above the world of the senses, ay, even -above the world of spirits, up to the Divine state, where I beheld a -light so fair that no tongue can tell it, nor ear understand”. - -The soul forms the centre of the discussions in the ‘Theology’ also. -All true human science is science of the soul or knowledge of -self,—knowledge of its essence, it is true, coming first, and next in -order, though less complete, knowledge of the operations of that -essence. In such knowledge, to which exceedingly few attain, the -highest wisdom consists, which does not admit of being fully understood -in the form of ideas, and which therefore the philosopher like a -skilful artist and wise lawgiver represents, for us men, in ever -beautiful figures in religious service. In this function precisely, the -wise man comes forward as the potent, self-sufficing magician, whose -knowledge lords it over the multitude, seeing that they remain always -bound in the fetters of outward things, of presentations and desires. - -The soul stands in the centre of the All. Above it are God and -Intelligence, beneath it—Matter and Nature. Its coming from God through -Intelligence into Matter, its presence in the body, its return on -high—these are the three stadia in which its life and that of the world -run their course. Matter and Nature, Sense-perception and Presentation -here lose their significance almost entirely. All things exist by -Intelligence (νοῦς, ʻaql). Intelligence constitutes all things, and in -Intelligence all things are One. The Soul too is Intelligence, but, so -long as it stays in the body, it is Intelligence in hope, Intelligence -in the form of longing. It longs for what is above, for the good and -blessed stars, which spend their contemplative existence as sources of -light, exalted above presentation and effort. - -That then is the oriental Aristotle, as he was acknowledged by the -earliest Peripatetics in Islam [8]. - -14. We need not wonder that the Easterns did not succeed in reaching an -unadulterated conception of the Aristotelian philosophy. Our critical -apparatus for discriminating between the genuine and the spurious was -not in their possession. It must have proved even more difficult for -them, to familiarize themselves with the world of Greek civilization, -than for the Christian scholars of the Middle Ages, which had never -entirely lost living touch with antiquity. In the East men remained -dependent on Neo-Platonic redactions and interpretations. A part of the -scientific system, to wit, the Politics of Aristotle, was a-wanting; -and so, as a matter of course, the Laws or the Republic of Plato took -its place. Only a few were aware of the difference between the two. - -Another determining motive deserves notice. In their Neo-Platonic -sources even, the Muslims came upon a harmonizing exposition of the -Greek philosophers, and they felt constrained to adopt it. The first -adherents of Aristotle were bound to assume a polemical and apologetic -attitude. In opposition to, or in conformity with, the voice of the -Muslim community, they required a coherent philosophy, in which the One -Truth must be found. The same reverence, which Mohammed in his day had -paid to the sacred writings of the Jews and of the Christians, was -shewn afterwards by Muslim scholars towards the works of Greek -philosophers; but these learned men exhibited greater familiarity with -their models, and less originality. In their eyes the old philosophers -were invested with an authority, to which it was their duty to submit. -The earliest Muslim thinkers were so fully convinced of the superiority -of Greek knowledge that they did not doubt that it had attained to the -highest degree of certainty. The thought of making farther and -independent investigations did not readily occur to an Oriental, who -cannot imagine a man without a teacher as being anything else than a -disciple of Satan. In accordance, therefore, with the precedent set by -Hellenistic philosophers, an attempt had to be made to demonstrate the -existence of the harmony between Plato and Aristotle,—and, in -particular, to shelve tacitly those doctrines which gave offence, or to -exhibit them in a sense which was not too decidedly contrary to Muslim -Dogmatics. In order to humour the opponents of Aristotle or of -Philosophy in general, prominence was given to wise and edifying -sayings out of the philosopher’s works,—both the genuine and the -spurious,—that so the way might be prepared for the reception of his -scientific thoughts. To the initiated, however, the teaching of -Aristotle, like that of other schools and sects, was set forth as a -higher truth, to which the positive faith of the multitude and the more -or less firmly established system of the theologians were merely -preliminary steps. - -15. Muslim Philosophy has always continued to be an Eclecticism which -depended on their stock of works translated from the Greek. The course -of its history has been a process of assimilation rather than of -generation. It has not distinguished itself, either by propounding new -problems or by any peculiarity in its endeavours to solve the old ones. -It has therefore no important advances in thought to register. And yet, -from a historical point of view, its significance is far greater than -that of a mere intermediary between classical antiquity and Christian -Scholasticism. To follow up the reception of Greek ideas into the mixed -civilization of the East is a subject of historical interest possessing -a charm entirely its own, especially if one can forget at the same time -that once there were Greeks. But the consideration of this occurrence -becomes important also by its presenting an opportunity for comparison -with other civilizations. Philosophy is a phenomenon so unique—so -thoroughly indigenous and independent a growth of Grecian soil—that one -might regard it as being exempt from the conditions of general -civilized life, and as being explicable only per se. Now the History of -Philosophy in Islam is valuable, just because it sets forth the first -attempt to appropriate the results of Greek thinking, with greater -comprehensiveness and freedom than in the early Christian dogmatics. -Acquaintance with the conditions which made such an attempt possible, -will permit us to reach conclusions, by way of analogical -reasonings—though with precaution, and for the present at least, to a -very limited extent—as to the reception of Graeco-Arab science in the -Christian Middle Ages, and will perhaps teach us a little about the -conditions under which Philosophy arises in general. - -We can hardly speak of a Muslim philosophy in the proper sense of the -term. But there were many men in Islam who could not keep from -philosophizing; and even through the folds of the Greek drapery, the -form of their own limbs is indicated. It is easy to look down on these -men, from the high watch-tower of some School-Philosophy, but it will -be better for us to get to know them and to comprehend them in their -historical environment. We must leave to special research the tracing -of each thought up to its origin. Our aim in what follows can be -nothing more than to point out what the Muslims constructed out of the -materials which were before them. - - - - - - - - -II. PHILOSOPHY AND ARAB KNOWLEDGE. - - -1. Grammatical Science. - -1. By Muslim scholars of the 10th century the sciences were divided -into ‘Arab Sciences’ and ‘Old’- or ‘Non-Arab Sciences’. To the former -belonged Grammar, Ethics and Dogmatics, History and Knowledge of -Literature; to the latter Philosophy, Natural Science and Medicine. In -the main the division is a proper one. The last-named branches are not -only those which were determined the most by foreign influences, but -those too which never became really popular. And yet the so called -‘Arab Sciences’ are not altogether pure native products. They too arose -or were developed in places in the Muslim empire where Arabs and -Non-Arabs met together, and where the need was awakened of reflecting -on those subjects which concern mankind the most,—Speech and Poetry, -Law and Religion,—in so far as differences or inadequacies appeared -therein. In the mode in which this came about, it is easy to trace the -influence of Non-Arabs, particularly of Persians; and the part taken by -Greek Philosophy in the process asserts itself in ever-growing -importance. - -2. The Arabic language,—in which the Arabs themselves took particular -delight, for its copious vocabulary, its wealth of forms and its -inherent capability of cultivation,—was peculiarly fitted to take a -leading position in the world. If it is compared, for example, with the -unwieldy Latin, or even with the turgid Persian, it is found to be -specially distinguished by the possession of short Abstract-forms,—a -property of great service in scientific expression. It is capable of -indicating the finest shades of meaning; but just because of its richly -developed stock of synonyms, it offers temptations to deviate from the -Aristotelian rule,—that the use of synonyms is not permissible in exact -science. A language so elegant, expressive, and difficult withal, as -Arabic was, necessarily invited much examination, when it had become -the polite language of the Syrians and the Persians. Above all, the -study of the Koran, and the recital and interpretation of it demanded -profound attention to be devoted to the language. Unbelievers, also, -may have thought that they could point out grammatical errors in the -sacred Book; and therefore examples were gathered out of ancient poems -and out of the living speech of the Bedouins, to support the -expressions of the Koran. To these examples remarks were, no doubt, -added upon grammatical accuracy in general. On the whole, the living -usage formed the standard, but in order to save the authority of the -Koran, it was certainly not applied without artifice. This proceeding -was regarded, all the same, by simple believers, with a measure of -suspicion. Masudi tells us even of some grammarians from Basra, who, -when on a pleasure trip, took to going through a Koran Imperative, and -for that reason(?) were soundly cudgelled by country folk engaged in -date-gathering. - -3. The Arabs trace their grammatical science, like so many other -things, to Ali, to whom is ascribed even Aristotle’s tripartite -division of speech. In reality the study began to be cultivated in -Basra and Kufa. Its earliest development is involved in obscurity, for -in the Grammar of Sibawaih († 786) we have a finished system,—a -colossal work—, which, like Ibn Sina’s Canon of Medicine in after -times, could only be explained by later generations as the production -of many scholars working in collaboration. We are but ill-informed even -on the points of difference between the schools of Basra and Kufa. The -Basra grammarians, like the school of Bagdad in subsequent times, must -have conceded a great influence to Qiyas (Analogy) in the determination -of grammatical phenomena, while those of Kufa allowed many idiomatic -forms which diverged from Qiyas. On this ground, to mark the contrast -between the Basra grammarians and those of Kufa, the former were called -‘the Logic people’. Their terminology differed in detail from that of -the Kufa school. Many, whose heads had been turned by logic, in the -opinion of the genuine Arabs, must have gone decidedly too far in their -captious criticism of the language; but on the other side caprice was -raised to the position of rule. - -It was from no mere accident that the school of Basra was the first to -avail itself of logical resources. Generally speaking, it was at Basra -that the influence of philosophic doctrines first appeared, and among -its grammarians were to be found many Shiʻites and Mutazilites, who -readily permitted foreign wisdom to influence their doctrinal teaching. - -4. Grammatical science, in so far as it was not confined, to the -collecting of Examples, Synonyms &c., when so determined by the -subjects specially treated, was affected by the Aristotelian Logic. -Even before the Muslim era, Syrians and Persians had studied the -treatise περὶ ἑρμηνείας, with Stoic and Neo-Platonic additions. Ibn -al-Moqaffa, who at first was intimate with the grammarian Khalil (v. -infra), then made accessible to the Arabs all that existed in Pahlawi -of a grammatical or logical nature. In conformity therewith the various -kinds of Sentences were enumerated,—at one time five, at another eight -or nine, as well as the three parts of speech,—Noun, Verb and Particle. -Afterwards some scholars, like Djahiz, included syllogistic figures -among the Rhetorical figures; and in later representations there was -much disputation about Sound and Idea. The question was discussed -whether language is the result of ordinance or a product of nature; but -gradually the philosophic view preponderated, that it came by -ordinance. - -Next to Logic the influence of the preparatory or mathematical sciences -falls to be noticed here. Like the prose of ordinary intercourse and -the rhymes of the Koran, the verses of the poets were not only -collected but also arranged according to special principles of -classification,—for example, according to metre. After Grammar Prosody -arose. Khalil († 791), the teacher of Sibawaih, to whom the first -application of Qiyas to grammatical science was attributed, is said -even to have created metrical science. While language came to be -regarded as the national, conventional element in poetry, the notion -was entertained that what was natural, and common to all populations, -would be found in their metre. Thabit ibn Qorra (836–901) therefore -maintained, in his classification of the sciences, that metre was -something essential, and the study of metre a natural science, and -therefore a branch of philosophy. - -5. Grammatical science, nevertheless, limited as it was to the Arabic -language, retained its peculiarities, upon which this is not the place -to enter. At all events, it is an imposing production of the -keenly-observing and diligently-collecting Arab intelligence,—a -production of which the Arabs might well be proud. An apologist of the -10th century, who was engaged in combating Greek philosophy, said: “He -who is acquainted with the subtleties and profundities of Arab poetry -and versification, knows well that they surpass all such things as -numbers, lines and points, which are wont to be advanced in proof of -their opinions, by people who idly dream that they are capable of -understanding the essence of things. I cannot see the substantial -advantage of things like numbers, lines and points, if, in spite of the -trifling profit which may attend them, they do harm to the Faith and -are followed by consequences, against which we have to invoke the help -of God.” Men would not have their delight in the minutiae of their -language disturbed by general philosophic speculations. Many a -word-form, originating with the translators of foreign works, was held -in detestation by purist Grammarians. The beautiful art of calligraphy, -more decorative in its nature than constructive, like Arabic art in -general, became developed in noble, delicate forms, and met with a -wider expansion than scientific research into the language. In the very -characters of the Arabic speech, we may still see the subtlety of the -intelligence which formed them, although at the same time we may see a -lack of energy, which is observable in the entire development of Arab -culture. - - - - -2. Ethical Teaching. - -1. The believing Muslim, in so far as custom did not maintain its -dominion over him, had at first the Word of God and the example of His -Prophet as his rule of conduct and opinion. After the Prophet’s death, -the Sunna of Mohammed was followed, in cases where the Koran gave no -information,—that is to say, men acted and decided, as Mohammed had -decided or acted, according to the Tradition of his Companions. But -from the time of the conquest of countries in possession of an old -civilization, demands which were altogether new were made of Islam. -Instead of the simple conditions of Arab life, usages and institutions -were met with there, in regard to which the Sacred Law gave no precise -direction, and to meet which no tradition or interpretation of -tradition presented itself. Every day added thus to the number of -individual cases which had not been provided for, and yet about which -one had to come to a decision, whether according to custom, or his own -sense of right. In the old-Roman provinces, Syria and Mesopotamia, -Roman law must have long continued to exercise an important influence. - -Those jurists who attributed to their own opinion (Raʼy, opinio) -alongside of the Koran and Sunna, a subsidiary authority to determine -the law, were called ‘Adherents of the Raʼy’. One of them, Abu Hanifa -of Kufa († 767), the founder of the Hanifite School, became specially -famous. But even in Medina, before the appearance of the school of -Malik (715–795), as well as in that school, a harmless though -restricted deference was at first paid to the Raʼy. By slow degrees, -however, and in the course of opposing a Raʼy which was becoming a -pretext for much arbitrariness, the view gained ground, that in -everything the Tradition (hadith) respecting the Sunna of the Prophet -was to be followed. Thereupon traditions were collected from all -quarters, and explained—and in large numbers even forged—; and a system -of criteria to determine their genuineness was formed, which, however, -laid more stress upon the external evidence and the appropriateness of -the traditionary material than upon consistency and historic truth. As -a consequence of this development, the ‘people of the Raʼy’, who were -chiefly located in Iraq (Babylonia), were now confronted by the -‘Adherents of the Tradition’, or the Medina school. Even Shafii -(767–820), the founder of the third school of Law, who in general held -to the Sunna, was numbered with the partisans of Tradition, in -contradistinction no doubt to Abu Hanifa. - -2. Logic introduced a new element into this controversy,—viz. Qiyas or -Analogy. There had been, of course, stray applications of Qiyas, even -in earlier times; but, to lay down Qiyas as a principle, a foundation -or a source of law,—presupposed the influence of scientific reflection. -Although the terms Raʼy and Qiyas may be used as synonyms, yet there is -in the latter term, less suggestion of the presence and operation of -individual predilection than there is in Raʼy. The more one grew -accustomed to employ Qiyas in grammatical and logical researches, the -more readily could he include this principle in the institutes of -jurisprudence, whether by way of reasoning from one instance to -another, or from the majority of instances to the remainder (i.e. -analogically), or by way of seeking rather for some common ground -governing various cases, from which the conduct proper in a particular -case might be deduced (i.e. syllogistically) [9]. - -The application of Qiyas appears to have come into use, first and most -extensively, in the Hanifite school, but afterwards also in the school -of Shafii,—though with a more limited range. In connection therewith, -the question—whether language was capable of expressing the Universal, -or could merely denote the Particular—became important for ethical -doctrine. - -The logical principle of Qiyas never attained to great repute. Much -more emphasis was laid,—next to the Koran and the Sunna, the historic -foundations of the Law—, upon the Idjma, that is, the Consensus of the -Congregation of the faithful. The Consensus of the Congregation or, -practically, of the most influential learned men in it,—who may be -compared to the fathers and teachers of the Catholic Church,—is the -Dogmatical principle, which, contested only by a few, has proved the -most important instrument in establishing the Muslim Ethical System. -Theory, however, continues to assign a certain subordinate place to -Qiyas, as a fourth source of moral guidance, after Koran, Sunna and -Idjma. - -3. The Muslim Ethical System (al-fiqh = ‘the knowledge’) take into -account the entire life of the believer, for whom the Faith itself is -the first of all duties. Like every innovation the system at first -encountered violent opposition:—commandment was now turned into -doctrinal theory, and believing obedience into abstruse pursuit of -knowledge: that called for protestation alike from plain pious people -and from wise statesmen. But gradually the ‘knowing’ men or men learned -in the Law (ulamā, or in the West, faqihs) were recognized as the true -heirs of the prophets. The Ethical system was developed before the -Doctrinal, and it has been able to hold the leading position up to the -present day. Nearly every Muslim knows something of it, seeing it is -part of a good religious upbringing. According to the great -Church-father Gazali, ‘the Fiqh’ is the daily bread of believing souls, -while the Doctrine is only valuable as a Medicine for the sick. - -We are not called upon here to enter into the minutiae of the fine-spun -casuistic of the Fiqh. The main subject handled in it is an ideal -righteousness, which can never be illustrated in all its purity in our -imperfect world. We are acquainted now with its principles, and with -the position which it holds in Islam. Let us merely add a brief notice -of the division of moral acts which was formulated by ethical teachers. -According to this classification there are: - - - 1. Acts, the practice of which is an absolute duty and is therefore - rewarded, and the omission of which is punished: - 2. Acts which are recommended by the Law, and are the subject of - reward, but the neglect of which does not call for punishment: - 3. Acts which are permitted, but which in the eyes of the Law are a - matter of indifference: - 4. Acts which the Law disapproves of, but does not hold as - punishable: - 5. Acts which are forbidden by the Law and which demand - unconditional punishment [10]. - - -4. Greek philosophic enquiries have had a two-fold influence upon the -Ethics of Islam. With many of the sectaries and mystics, both orthodox -and heretic, an ascetic system of Ethics is found, coloured by -Pythagorean-Platonic views. The same thing appears with philosophers, -whom we shall afterwards meet again. But in orthodox circles the -Aristotelian deliverance,—that virtue consists in the just mean—, found -much acceptance, because something similar stood in the Koran, and -because, generally, the tendency of Islam was a catholic one,—one -conciliatory of opposites. - -More attention indeed was given to Politics than to Ethics, in the -Muslim empire, and the struggles of political parties were the first -thing to occasion difference of opinion. Disputes about the Imâmat, -i.e. the headship in the Muslim Church, pervade the entire history of -Islam; but the questions discussed have commonly more of a personal and -practical than a theoretical importance, and therefore a history of -philosophy does not need to consider them very fully. Hardly anything -of philosophic value emerges in them. Even in the course of the first -centuries there was developed a firm body of constitutional law -canonically expressed; but this, like the ideal system of duty, was not -particularly heeded by strong rulers,—who viewed it as mere theological -brooding,—while, on the other hand, by weak princes it could not be -applied at all. - -Just as little is it worth our while to examine minutely the numerous -‘mirrors of Princes’, which were such favourites, in Persia especially, -and in whose wise moral saws, and maxims of political sagacity, the -courtly circles found edification. - -The weight of philosophic endeavour in Islam lies on the theoretical -and intellectual side. With the actual proceedings of social and -political life they are able to make but a scanty compromise. Even the -Art of the Muslims, although it exhibits more originality than their -Science, does not know how to animate the crude material, but merely -sports with ornamental forms. Their Poetry creates no Drama, and their -Philosophy is unpractical. - - - - -3. Doctrinal Systems. - -1. In the Koran there had been given to Muslims a religion, but no -system,—precepts but no doctrines. What is contrary to logic -therein,—what we account for by the shifting circumstances of the -Prophet’s life, and his varying moods,—was simply accepted by the first -believers, without asking questions about the How and Why. But in the -conquered countries they were faced by a fully-formed Christian -Dogmatic as well as by Zoroastrian and Brahmanic theories. We have laid -frequent stress already upon the great debt which the Muslims owe to -the Christians; and the doctrinal system has certainly been determined -the most by Christian influences. In Damascus the formation of Muslim -Dogmas was affected by Orthodox and Monophysite teaching, and in Basra -and Bagdad rather perhaps by Nestorian and Gnostic theories. Little of -the literature belonging to the earliest period of this movement has -come down to us, but we cannot be wrong in assigning a considerable -influence to personal intercourse and regular school-instruction. Not -much was learned in the East at that time out of books, any more than -it is to-day: more was learned from the lips of the teacher. The -similarity between the oldest doctrinal teachings in Islam and the -dogmas of Christianity is too great to permit any one to deny that they -are directly connected. In particular, the first question about which -there was much dispute, among Muslim Scholars, was that of the Freedom -of the Will. Now the freedom of the will was almost universally -accepted by Oriental Christians. At no time and in no place perhaps was -the Will-problem—first in the Christology, but afterward in the -Anthropology—so much discussed from every point as in the Christian -circles of the East at the time of the Muslim conquest. - -Besides these considerations which are partly of an a priori character, -there are also detached notices which indicate that some of the -earliest Muslims, who taught the Freedom of the Will, had Christian -teachers. - -A number of purely philosophic elements from the Gnostic systems, and -afterwards from the translation-literature, associated themselves with -the Hellenistic-Christian influences. - -2. An assertion, expressed in logical or dialectic fashion, whether -verbal or written, was called by the Arabs,—generally, but more -particularly in religious teaching—a Kalam (λόγος), and those who -advanced such assertions were called Mutakallimun. The name was -transferred from the individual assertion to the entire system, and it -covered also the introductory, elementary observations on Method,—and -so on. Our best designation for the science of the Kalam is -‘Theological Dialectics’ or simply ‘Dialectics’; and in what follows we -may translate Mutakallimun by ‘Dialecticians’. - -The name Mutakallimun, which was at first common to all the -Dialecticians, was in later times applied specially to the -Antimutazilite and Orthodox theologians. In the latter case it might be -well, following the sense, to render the term by Dogmatists or -Schoolmen. In fact while the first dialecticians had the Dogma still to -form, those who came later had only to expound and establish it. - -The introduction of Dialectics into Islam was a violent innovation, and -it was vehemently denounced by the party of the Tradition. Whatever -went beyond the regular ethical teaching was heresy to them, for faith -should be obedience, and not,—as was maintained by the Murdjites and -Mutazilites—, knowledge. By the latter it was laid down without reserve -that speculation was one of the duties of believers. Even to this -demand the times became reconciled, for according to tradition the -Prophet had said already: ‘The first thing which God created was -Knowledge or Reason’. - -3. Very numerous are the various opinions which found utterance in the -days even of the Omayyads, but especially in those of the early -Abbasids. The farther they diverged from one another, the more -difficult it was for the men of the Tradition to come to an -understanding with them; but gradually certain compact doctrinal -collections stood out distinctly, of which the rationalist system of -the Mutazilites, the successors of the Qadarites, was most widely -extended, particularly among Shiʻites. From Caliph Mamun’s time down to -Mutawakkil’s, it even received State recognition; and the Mutazilites, -who had been in earlier days oppressed and persecuted by the temporal -power, now became Inquisitors of the Faith themselves, with whom the -sword supplied the place of argument. About the same time, however, -their opponents the Traditionalists commenced to build up a system of -belief. Upon the whole there was no lack of intermediary forms between -the naive Faith of the multitude and the Gnosis of the dialecticians. -In contrast to the spiritualistic stamp of Mutazilitism these -intermediary forms took an anthropomorphic character with regard to the -doctrine of the Deity, and a materialistic character with regard to the -theory of man and the universe (Anthropology and Cosmology). The soul, -for example, was conceived of by them as corporeal, or as an accident -of the body, and the Divine Essence was imagined as a human body. The -religious teaching and art of the Muslims were greatly averse to the -symbolical God-Father of the Christians, but there was an abundance of -absurd speculations about the form of Allah. Some went so far as to -ascribe to him all the bodily members together, with the exception of -the beard and other privileges of oriental manhood. - -It is impossible to discuss in detail all the Dialectic sects, which -often made their first appearance in the form of political parties. -From the standpoint of the history of Philosophy it is enough to give -here the chief doctrines of the Mutazilites, in so far as they can lay -claim to general interest. - -4. The first question, then, concerned man’s conduct and destiny. The -forerunners of the Mutazilites, who were called Qadarites, taught the -Freedom of the human Will; and the Mutazilites, even in later times, -when their speculations were directed more to theologico-metaphysical -problems, were first and foremost pointed to as the supporters of the -doctrine of Divine Righteousness,—which gives rise to no evil, and -rewards or punishes man according to his deserts—, and, in the second -place, as the confessors, or avowed supporters of the Unity of God, -i.e. the absence of properties from his Essence considered per se [or -the predicateless character of the essential nature of God]. The -systematic statement of their doctrines must have been influenced by -the Logicians (v. IV, 2 § 1); for even in the first half of the 10th -century, the Mutazilite system began with the confession of the Unity -of God, while the doctrine of God’s Righteousness, announced as it is -in all his works, is relegated to the second place. - -The responsibility of man, as well as the holiness of God, who is -incapable of directly causing man’s sinful actions, had to be saved by -asserting the freedom of the Will. Man must therefore be lord of his -actions; but he is lord of these only, for few entertained any doubt -that the energy which confers ability to act at all, and the power of -doing either a good or a bad action come to man from God. Hence the -numerous subtle discussions,—amalgamated with a criticism of the -philosophic conception of Time—on the question whether the power, which -God creates in man, is bestowed previous to the action, or -coincidentally and simultaneously therewith: For, did the power precede -the act, then it would either have to last up to the time of the act, -which would belie its accidental character (cf. II, 3 § 12), or have -ceased to exist before the act,—in which case it might have been -dispensed with altogether. - -From human conduct speculation passed on to consider the operations of -nature. Instead of God and man, the antithesis in this case is God and -nature. The productive and generative powers of nature were recognized -as means or proximate causes; and some endeavoured to investigate them. -In their opinion, however, nature herself, like all the world, was a -work of God, a creature of his wisdom: And just as the omnipotence of -God was limited in the moral kingdom by his holiness or -righteousness,—so in the natural world it was limited by his wisdom. -Even the presence of evil and mischief in the world was accounted for -by the wisdom of God, who sends everything for the best. A production -or object of Divine activity, evil is not. “God may be able, -indeed,”—so an earlier generation had maintained—“to act wickedly and -unreasonably, but he would not do it.” The later Mutazilites taught, on -the other hand, that God has no power at all to do anything which is in -this way repugnant to his nature. Their opponents, who regarded God’s -unlimited might and unfathomable will as directly operative in all -doing and effecting were indignant at this teaching, and compared its -propounders to the dualistic Magians. Consistent Monism was on the side -of these opponents, who did not care to turn man and nature into -creators—next to and under God—of their acts or operations. - -5. The Mutazilites, it is clear from the foregoing, had a different -idea of God from that which was entertained by the multitude and by the -Traditionalists. This became specially evident, as speculation -advanced, in the doctrine of the Divine attributes. From the very -beginning the Unity of God was strongly emphasized in Islam; but that -did not prevent men from bestowing upon him many beautiful names -following human analogy, and ascribing to him several attributes. Of -these the following came gradually into greatest prominence, under the -influence assuredly of Christian dogmatics:—viz.: Wisdom, Power, Life, -Will, Speech or Word, Sight and Hearing. The last two of these—Sight -and Hearing—were the first to be explained in a spiritual sense, or -entirely set aside. But the absolute Unity of the Godhead did not -appear to be compatible with any plurality of co-eternal attributes. -Would not that be the Trinity of the Christians, who before now had -explained the three Persons of the One Divine Being as attributes? In -order to avoid this inconvenience they sought sometimes to derive -several attributes out of others by a process of abstraction, and to -refer them to a single one—for instance to Knowledge or Power—and -sometimes to apprehend them each and all as being states of the Divine -essence, or to identify them with the essence itself, in which case of -course their significance nearly disappeared. Occasionally an attempt -was made through refinements of phraseology to save something of that -significance. While, for example, a philosopher, denying the -attributes, maintained that God is by his essence a Being who knows, a -Mutazilite dialectian expressed it thus: God is a Being who knows, but -by means of a knowledge, which He himself is. - -In the opinion of the Traditionalists the conception of God was in this -way being robbed of all its contents. The Mutazilites hardly got beyond -negative determinations,—that God is not like the things of this -world,—that he is exalted above Space, Time, Movement, and so on; but -they held fast to the doctrine that he is the Creator of the world. -Although little could be asserted regarding the Being of God, it was -thought he could be known from his works. - -For the Mutazilites as well as for their opponents, the Creation was an -absolute act of God, and the existence of the world an existence in -time. They energetically combated the doctrine of the eternity of the -world,—a doctrine supported by the Aristotelian philosophy, and which -had been widely spread throughout the East. - -6. We have already found ‘Speech’ or ‘the Word’, given as one of the -eternal attributes of God; and, probably by way of conformity with the -Christian doctrine of the Logos, there was taught in particular the -eternity of the Koran which had been revealed to the Prophet. This -belief in an eternal Koran by the side of Allah, was downright -idolatry, according to the Mutazilites; and in opposition thereto the -Mutazilite Caliphs proclaimed it as a doctrine accepted by the -State,—that the Koran had been created: Whoever denied this doctrine -was publicly punished. Now although the Mutazilites in maintaining this -dogma were more in harmony with the original Islam than their -opponents, yet history has justified the latter, for pious needs proved -stronger than logical conclusions. Many of the Mutazilites, in the -opinion of their brethren in the faith, were far too ready to make -light of the Koran, the Word of God. If it did not agree with their -theories, it received ever new interpretations. In actual fact reason -had more weight with many than the revealed Book. By comparing not only -the three revealed religions together, but these also with Persian and -Indian religious teaching and with philosophic speculation, they -reached a natural religion, which reconciled opposites. This was built -up on the basis of an inborn knowledge, universally necessary,—that -there is one God, who, as a wise Creator, has produced the world, and -also endowed Man with reason that he may know his Creator and -distinguish between Good and Evil. Contrasted with this Natural or -Rational Religion, acquaintance with the teaching of revelation is then -something adventitious,—an acquired knowledge. - -By this contention the most consistent of the Mutazilites had broken -away from the consensus of the Muslim religious community, and had thus -actually put themselves outside the general faith. At first they still -appealed to that consensus,—which they were able to do as long as the -secular power was favourably disposed to them. That condition, however, -did not last long, and they soon learned by experience what has often -been taught since,—that the communities of men are more ready to accept -a religion sent down to them from on high, than an enlightened -explanation of it. - -7. Following up this survey let us take a closer view of one or two of -the most considerable of the Mutazilites, that the general picture may -not be wanting in individual features. - -Let us first glance at Abu-l-Hudhail al-Allaf, who died about the -middle of the 9th century. He was a famous dialectician, and one of the -first who allowed philosophy to exercise an influence on their -theological doctrines. - -That an attribute should be capable of inhering in a Being in any way -is not conceivable, in the opinion of Abu-l-Hudhail: It must either be -identical with the Being or different from it. But yet he looks about -for some way of adjustment. God is, according to him, knowing, mighty, -living, through knowledge, might and life, which are his very essence; -and just as men had done even before this, on the Christian side, he -terms these three predicates the Modi (wudjuh) of the Divine Being. He -agrees also that hearing, seeing and other attributes are eternal in -God, but only with regard to the world which was afterwards to be -created. Besides, it would be easy enough for him and for others, who -were affected by the philosophy of the day, to interpret these and -similar expressions—such as God’s ‘beholding’ on the last day, [11]—in -a spiritual sense, since generally they regarded seeing and hearing as -spiritual acts. For example, Abu-l-Hudhail maintained that motion was -visible, but not palpable, because it was not a body. - -The Will of God, however, is not to be regarded as eternal. On the -contrary, Abu-l-Hudhail assumes absolute declarations of Will as being -different both from the Being who wills and the object which is willed. -Thus the absolute Word of Creation takes an intermediate position -between the eternal Creator and the transient created world. These -declarations of God’s Will form a kind of intermediate essence, to be -compared with the Platonic Ideas or the Sphere-spirits, but perhaps -regarded rather as immaterial powers than as personal spirits. -Abu-l-Hudhail distinguishes between the absolute Word of Creation and -the accidental Word of Revelation, which is announced to men in the -form of command and prohibition, appearing as matter and in space, and -which is thus significant only for this transient world. The -possibility of living in accordance with the Divine word of revelation, -or of resisting it, exists therefore in this life alone. Binding -injunction and prohibition presuppose Freedom of Will and capability of -acting in accordance therewith. On the other hand in the future life -there are no obligations in the form of laws, and, accordingly, no -longer any freedom: everything there depends on the absolute -determination of God. Nor will there be any motion in the world beyond, -for as motion has once had a beginning, it must, at the end of the -world, come to a close in everlasting rest. Abu-l-Hudhail, therefore, -could not have believed in a resurrection of the body. - -Human actions he divides into Natural and Moral, or Actions of the -members, and Actions of the heart. An action is moral, only when we -perform it without constraint. The moral act is Man’s own property, -acquired by his own exertions, but his knowledge comes to him from God, -partly through Revelation, and partly through the light of Nature. - -Anterior even to any revelation man is instructed in duty by Nature, -and thus is fully enabled to know God, to discern Good from Evil, and -to live a virtuous, honest and upright life. - -8. Noteworthy as a man and a thinker is a younger contemporary of -Abu-l-Hudhail’s, and apparently a disciple of his, commonly called -Al-Nazzam, who died in the year 845. A fanciful, restless, ambitious -man, not a consistent thinker, but yet a bold and honest one,—such is -the representation of him given us by Djahiz, one of his pupils. The -people considered him a madman or a heretic. A good deal in his -teaching is in touch with what passed among the Orientals as the -Philosophy of Empedocles and Anaxagoras (Cf. also Abu-l-Hudhail). - -In the opinion of Nazzam God can do absolutely no evil thing; in fact -he can only do that which he knows to be the best thing for his -servants. His omnipotence reaches no farther than what he actually -does. Who could hinder him from giving effect to the splendid -exuberance of his Being? A Will, in the proper sense of the term,—which -invariably implies a need,—is by no means to be attributed to God. The -Will of God, on the contrary, is only a designation of the Divine -agency itself, or of the commands which have been conveyed to men. -Creation is an act performed once for all, in which all things were -made at one and the same time, so that one thing is contained in -another, and so that in process of time the various specimens of -minerals, plants and animals, as well as the numerous children of Adam, -gradually emerge from their latent condition and come to the light. - -Nazzam, like the philosophers, rejects the theory of atoms (v. II, 3 § -12), but then he can only account for the traversing of a definite -distance, by reason of the infinite divisibility of space, by -postulating leaps. He holds bodily substances to be composed of -‘accidents’ instead of atoms. And just as Abu-l-Hudhail could not -conceive of the inherence of attributes in an essence, so Nazzam can -only imagine the accident as the substance itself or as a part of the -substance. Thus ‘Fire’ or ‘the Warm’, for instance, exists in a latent -condition in wood, but it becomes free when, by means of friction, its -antagonist ‘the Cold’ disappears. In the process there occurs a motion -or transposition, but no qualitative change. Sensible qualities, such -as colours, savours and odours, are, in Nazzam’s view, bodies. - -Even the soul or the intellect of Man he conceives to be a finer kind -of body. The soul, of course, is the most excellent part of man: it -completely pervades the body, which is its organ, and it must be termed -the real and true Man. Thoughts and aspirations are defined as -Movements of the Soul. - -In matters of Faith and in questions of Law Nazzam rejects both the -consensus of the congregation and the analogical interpretation of the -Law, and appeals in Shiʻite fashion to the infallible Imam. He thinks -it possible for the whole body of Muslims to concur in admitting an -erroneous doctrine, as, for instance, the doctrine that Mohammed has a -mission for all mankind in contradistinction to other prophets. Whereas -God sends every prophet to all mankind. - -Nazzam, besides, shares the view of Abu-l-Hudhail as to the knowledge -of God and of moral duties by means of the reason. He is not -particularly convinced of the inimitable excellence of the Koran. The -abiding marvel of the Koran is made to consist only in the fact that -Mohammed’s contemporaries were kept from producing something like to -the Koran. - -He has certainly not retained much of the Muslim Eschatology. At least -the torments of hell are in his view resolved into a process of -consuming by fire. - -9. Many syncretistic doctrines, but all devoid of originality, have -come down to us from the school of Nazzam. The most famous man, whom it -produced was the elegant writer and Natural-Philosopher Djahiz († 869), -who demanded of the genuine scholar that he should combine the study of -Theology with that of Natural Science. He traces in all things the -operations of Nature, but also a reference in these operations to the -Creator of the world. Man’s reason is capable of knowing the Creator, -and in like manner of comprehending the need of a prophetic revelation. -Man’s only merit is in his will, for on the one hand all his actions -are interwoven with the events of Nature, and on the other his entire -knowledge is necessarily determined from above. And yet no great -significance appears to accrue to the Will, which is derived from -‘knowing’. At least Will in the Divine Being is quite negatively -conceived of, that is, God never operates unconsciously, or with -dislike to his work. - -In all this there is little that is original. His ethical ideal is ‘the -mean’, and the style of his genius is also mediocre. It is only in -compiling his numerous writings that Djahiz has shown any excess. - -10. With the earlier Mutazilites reflections on Ethics and Natural -Philosophy predominate; with those who come later Logico-metaphysical -meditations prevail. In particular Neo-Platonic influences are to be -traced here. - -Muammar, whose date cannot be accurately determined, although it may be -set down as about the year 900, has much in common with those who have -just been named. But he is far more emphatic in his denial of the -existence of Divine attributes, which he regards as being contradictory -of the absolute unity of the Divine essence. God is high above every -form of plurality. He knows neither himself nor any other being, for -‘knowing’ would presuppose a plurality in him. He is even to be called -Hyper-eternal. Nevertheless he is to be recognized as Creator of the -world. He has only created bodies, it is true; and these of themselves -create their Accidents, whether through operation of Nature or by Will. -The number of these accidents is infinite, for in their essence they -are nothing more than the intellectual relations of thought. Muammar is -a Conceptualist. Motion and Rest, Likeness and Unlikeness, and so on, -are nothing in themselves, and have merely an intellectual or ideal -existence. The soul, which is held to be the true essence of Man, is -conceived of as an Idea or an immaterial substance, though it is not -clearly stated how it is related to the body or to the Divine essence. -The account handed down is confused. - -Man’s will is free, and,—properly speaking,—Willing is his only act, -for the outward action belongs to the body (Cf. Djahiz). - -The school of Bagdad, to which Muammar seems to belong, was -conceptualist. With the exception of the most general predicates,—those -of Being and Becoming, it made Universals subsist only as notions or -concepts. Abu Hashim of Basra († 933) stood nearer to Realism. The -attributes of God, as well as Accidents and Genus-notions in general, -were regarded by him as something in a middle position between Being -and Not-Being: he called them Conditions or Modes. He designated Doubt -as a requisite in all knowing. A simple Realist he was not. - -Mutazilite thinkers indulged in dialectic quibbling even about -‘Not-Being’. They argued that Not-Being, as well as Being, must come to -possess a kind of reality, seeing that it may become the subject of -thought: at least man tries to think of ‘Nothing’ rather than not think -at all. - -11. In the 9th century several dialectic systems had been formed in the -contest against the Mutazilites, one of which, viz. the Karramite -system, held its ground till long after the 10th century. There arose, -however, from the ranks of the Mutazilites a man whose mission it was -to reconcile antagonistic views, and who set up that doctrinal system -which was acknowledged as orthodox first in the East, and, later, -throughout the whole of Islam. This was Al-Ashari (873–935), who -understood how to render to God the things that are God’s, and to man -the things that are man’s. He rejected the rude anthropomorphism of the -Antimutazilite dialecticians, and set God high above all that is bodily -and human, while he left to the Deity his omnipotence, and his -universal agency. With him Nature lost all her efficaciousness; but for -man a certain distinction was reserved, consisting in his being able to -give assent to the works which were accomplished in him by God, and to -claim these as his own. Nor was Man’s sensuous-spiritual being -interfered with: He was permitted to hope for the resurrection of the -body and the beholding of God. As regards the Koranic revelation, -Ashari distinguished between an eternal Word in God, and the Book as we -possess it, which latter was revealed in Time. - -In the detailed statement of his doctrines Ashari showed no originality -in any way, but merely arranged and condensed the material given him,—a -proceeding which could not be carried out without discrepancies. The -main thing, however, was that his Cosmology, Anthropology and -Eschatology did not depart too far from the text of the Tradition for -the edification of pious souls, and that his theology, in consequence -of a somewhat spiritualized conception of God was not altogether -unsatisfactory even to men of higher culture. - -Ashari relies upon the revelation contained in the Koran. He does not -recognize any rational knowledge with regard to Divine things that is -independent of the Koran. The senses are not in general likely to -deceive us, but on the other hand our judgment may easily do so. We -know God, it is true, by our reason, but only from Revelation, which is -the one source of such knowledge. - -According to Ashari, then, God is first of all the omnipotent Creator. -Farther he is omniscient: he knows what men do and what they wish to -do: he knows also what happens, and how that which does not happen -would have happened, if it had happened. Moreover all predicates which -express any perfection are applicable to God, with the proviso that -they apply to him in another and higher sense than to his creatures. In -creating and sustaining the world God is the sole cause: all worldly -events proceed continually and directly from him. Man, however, is -quite conscious of the difference between his involuntary movements, -such as shivering and shaking, and those which are carried out in the -exercise of his will and choice. - -12. The most characteristic theory which the dialectic of the Muslims -has fashioned, is their doctrine of Atoms. The development of this -doctrine is still wrapped in great obscurity. It was advocated by the -Mutazilites but particularly by their opponents before the time of -Ashari. Our sketch shows how it was held in the Asharite school, where -partly perhaps it was first developed. - -The Atomic doctrine of the Muslim dialecticians had its source, of -course, in Greek Natural Philosophy; but its reception and farther -development were determined by the requirements of theological Polemic -and Apologetic. The like phenomenon may be observed in the case of -individual Jews and among believing Catholics. It is impossible to -suppose that Atomism was taken up in Islam, merely because Aristotle -had fought against it. Here we have to register a desperate struggle -for a religious advantage, and one in which weapons are not chosen at -will: It is the end that decides. Nature has to be explained, not from -herself but from some divine creative act; and this world must be -regarded not as an eternal and divine order of things, but as a -creature of transient existence. God must be thought of and spoken of -as a freely-working and almighty Creator, not as an impersonal cause or -inactive primeval source. Accordingly, from the earliest times the -doctrine of the creation is placed at the apex of Muslim dogmatics, as -a testimony against the pagan-philosophical view of the eternity of the -world and the efficient operations of Nature. What we perceive of the -sensible world,—say these Atomists,—is made up of passing ‘accidents’ -which every moment come and go. The substratum of this ‘change’ is -constituted by the (bodily) substances; and because of changes -occurring in or on these substances, they cannot be thought of as -themselves unchangeable. If then they are changeable, they cannot be -permanent, for that which is eternal does not change. Consequently -everything in the world, since everything changes, has come into being, -or has been created by God. - -That is the starting-point. The changeableness of all that exists -argues an eternal, unchangeable Creator. But later writers, under the -influence of Muslim philosophers, infer from the possible or contingent -character of everything finite, the necessary existence of God. - -But let us come back to the world. It consists of Accidents and their -substrata,—Substances. Substance and Accident or Quality are the two -categories by means of which reality is conceived. The remaining -categories either come under the category of Quality, or else are -resolved into relations, and modifications of thought, to which, -objectively, nothing corresponds. Matter, as possibility, exists only -in thought: Time is nothing other than the coexistence of different -objects, or simultaneity in presentation; and Space and Size may be -attributed to bodies indeed, but not to the individual parts (Atoms), -of which bodies are composed. - -But, generally speaking, it is Accidents which form the proper -predicates of substances. Their number in every individual substance is -very great, or even infinite as some maintain, since of any pair -whatever of opposite determinations,—and these include negatives -also,—the one or the other is attributable to every substance. The -negative ‘accident’ is just as real as the positive. God creates also -Privation and Annihilation, though certainly it is not easy to discover -a substratum for these. And seeing that no Accident can ever have its -place elsewhere than in some substance, and cannot have it in another -Accident, there is really nothing general or common in any number of -substances. Universals in no wise exist in individual things: They are -Concepts. - -Thus there is no connection between substances: they stand apart, in -their capacity of atoms equal to one another. In fact they have a -greater resemblance to the Homoeomeries of Anaxagoras than to the -extremely small particles of matter of the Atomists. In themselves they -are non-spatial (without makan), but they have their position (hayyiz), -and by means of this position of theirs they fill space. It is thus -unities not possessing extension, but conceived of as points,—out of -which the spatial world of body is constructed. Between these unities -there must be a void, for were it otherwise any motion would be -impossible, since the atoms do not press upon one another. All change, -however, is referred to Union and Separation, Movement and Rest. -Farther operative relations between the Atom-substances, there are -none. The Atoms exist then, and enjoy their existence, but have nothing -at all to do with one another. The world is a discontinuous mass, -without any living reciprocal action between its parts. - -The ancients had prepared the way for this conception by their theory, -amongst other things, of the discontinuous character of Number. Was not -Time defined as the tale or numbering of Motion? Why should we not -apply that doctrine to Space, Time and Motion? The Dialecticians did -this; and the ‘skepsis’ of the older philosophy may have contributed -its influence in the process. Like the substantial, corporeal -world,—Space, Time and Motion were decomposed into atoms devoid of -extension, and into moments without duration. Time becomes a succession -of many individual ‘Nows’, and between every two moments of time there -is a void. The same is the case with Motion: between every two -movements there is a Rest. A quick motion and a slow motion possess the -same speed, but the latter has more points of Rest. Then, in order to -get over the difficulty of the empty space, the unoccupied moment of -time, and the pause for rest between two movements, the theory of a -Leap is made use of. Motion is to be regarded as a leaping onward from -one point in space to another, and Time as an advance effected in the -same manner from one moment to another. - -In reality they had no use at all for this fantastic theory of a Leap: -it was a mere reply to unsophisticated questioning. With perfect -consistency they had cut up the entire material world, as it moves in -space and time, into Atoms with their Accidents. Some no doubt -maintained, that although accidents every moment disappear, yet -substances endure, but others made no difference in this respect. They -taught that substances, which are in fact points in space, exist only -for a point of time, just like Accidents. Every moment God creates the -world anew, so that its condition at the present moment has no -essential connection with that which has immediately preceded it or -that which follows next. In this way there is a series of worlds -following one another, which merely present the appearance of one -world. That for us there is anything like connection or Causality in -phenomena proceeds from the fact that Allah in his inscrutable will -does not choose either to-day or to-morrow to interrupt the usual -course of events by a miracle,—which however he is able at any moment -to do. The disappearance of all causal connection according to the -Atomistic Kalam is vividly illustrated by the classical instance of -‘the writing man.’ God creates in him,—and that too by an act of -creation which is every moment renewed—first the will, then the faculty -of writing, next the movement of the hand, and lastly the motion of the -pen. Here one thing is completely independent of the other. - -Now if against this view the objection is urged, that along with -Causality or the regular succession of worldly events, the possibility -of any knowledge is taken away, the believing thinker replies, that -Allah verily foreknows everything, and creates not only the things of -the world and what they appear to effect, but also the knowledge about -them in the human soul, and we do not need to be wiser than He. He -knows best. - -Allah and the World, God and Man,—beyond these antitheses Muslim -dialectic could not reach. Besides God, there is room only for -corporeal substances and their accidents. The existence of human souls -as incorporeal substances, as well as generally the existence of pure -Spirits,—both of which doctrines were maintained by philosophers, and, -though less definitely, by several Mutazilites,—would not harmonize -properly with the Muslim doctrine of the transcendent nature of God, -who has no associate. The soul belongs to the world of body. Life, -Sensation, Rational endowment, are accidents, just as much as Colour, -Taste, Smell, Motion and Rest. Some assume only one soul-atom: -According to others several finer soul-atoms are mingled with the -bodily atoms. At all events thinking is attached to one single Atom. - -13. It was not every good Muslim that could find mental repose in -dialectic. The pious servant of God might yet, in another way, draw -somewhat nearer to his Lord. This need,—existing in Islam at the very -outset, strengthened too by Christian and Indo-Persian influences, and -intensified under more highly developed conditions of -civilization,—evoked in Islam a series of phenomena, which are usually -designated as Mysticism or Sufism. [12] In this development of a Muslim -order of Holy men, or of a Muslim Monkish system, the history of -Christian monks and cloisters in Syria and Egypt, as well as that of -Indian devotees, is repeated. In this matter then we have at bottom to -deal with religious or spiritual practice; but practice always mirrors -itself in thought, and receives its theory. In order to bring about a -more intimate relationship with the Godhead, many symbolical acts and -mediating persons were required. Such persons then endeavoured to -discover the mysteries of the symbols for themselves and to disclose -them to the initiated, and to establish, besides, their own mediatory -position in the scale of universal being. In particular, Neo-Platonic -doctrines,—partly drawn from the turbid source of the Pseudo-Dionysius -the Areopagite and the holy Hierotheos (Stephen bar Sudaili?)—had to -lend their aid in this work. The Indian Yoga too, at least in Persia, -seems to have exercised considerable influence. For the most part -Mysticism kept within the pale of Orthodoxy, which was always sensible -enough to allow a certain latitude to poets and enthusiasts. As regards -the doctrine that God works all in all, Dialecticians and Mystics were -agreed; but extreme Mysticism propounded the farther doctrine that God -is all in all. From this a heterodox Pantheism was developed, which -made the world an empty show, and deified the human Ego. Thus the Unity -of God becomes Universal Unity; his universal activity Universal -Existence. Besides God, there exist at the most only the attributes and -conditions of the Sufi souls that are tending towards him. A psychology -of feeling is developed by the Sufi teachers. In their view, while our -conceptions come to the soul from without, and our exertions amount to -the externalizing of what is within, the true essence of our soul -consists in certain states or feelings of inclination and -disinclination. The most essential of all these is Love. It is neither -fear nor hope, but Love that lifts us up to God. Blessedness is not a -matter of ‘knowing’ or of ‘willing’: it is Union with the loved one. -These Mystics did away with the world (as ultimately they did with the -human soul) in a far more thorough-going fashion than the Dialecticians -had done. By the latter the world was sacrificed to the arbitrary -character of God in Creation; by the former to the illuminating, loving -nature of the Divine Being. The confusing multiplicity of things, as -that appears to sense and conception, is removed in a yearning after -the One and Beloved being. Everything, both in Being and Thinking, is -brought to one central point. Contrast with this the genuine Greek -spirit. In it a wish was cherished for a still greater number of -senses, to enable men to get a somewhat better acquaintance with this -fair world. But these Mystics blame the senses for being too many, -because their number brings disorder into their felicity. - -Human nature, however, always asserts herself. Those men who renounce -the world and the senses, frequently run riot in the most sensual -fantasies, till far advanced in life. We need not wonder after all, -that many troubled themselves very little indeed about religious -doctrine, or that the ascetic morality of the Sufis often went to the -other extreme. - -The task of following out in detail the development of Sufism, however, -belongs to the history of Religion rather than to the history of -Philosophy. Besides, we find the philosophical elements which it took -up, in the Muslim philosophers whom we shall meet with farther on. - - - - -4. Literature and History. - -1. Arabic Poetry and Annalistic were developed independently of the -learning of the schools. But as time went on, Literature and Historical -Composition could not remain untouched by foreign influences. A few -notices, confirmatory of this statement, must suffice us here. - -The introduction of Islam involved no break with the poetical tradition -of the Arab race, such as had been occasioned by Christianity in the -Teutonic world. The secular literature of the times even of the -Omayyads handed down many wise sayings, partly taken from ancient -Arabic poetry, which rivalled the preachings of the Koran. Abbasid -Caliphs, like Mansur, Harun and Mamun, had more literary culture than -Charlemagne. The education of their sons was not confined to the -reading of the Koran: it embraced acquaintance also with the ancient -poets and with the history of the nation. Poets and literary men were -drawn to the courts and rewarded in princely fashion. In these -circumstances, Literature underwent the influence of scholarly culture -and philosophical speculation, although, in most cases, in a very -superficial manner. The result is specially exhibited in sceptical -utterances, frivolous mockery of what is most sacred, and glorification -of sensual pleasure. At the same time, however, wise sayings, serious -reflections and mystic speculations made their way into the originally -sober and realistic poetry of the Arabs. The place of the first natural -freshness of representation was now taken by a wearisome play on -thoughts and sentiments, and even on mere words, metres and rhymes. - -2. The unpleasant Abu-l-Atahia (748–828), in his effeminate poetry, is -nearly always talking about unhappy love and a longing for death. He -gives expression to his wisdom in the following couplet: - - - “The mind guide thou with cautious hesitation: - ’Gainst sin use the best shield, Renunciation”. - - -Whoever possesses any faculty for appreciating life and the poetry of -Nature will find little to enjoy in his world-renouncing songs; and -just as little satisfaction will be afforded him in the verses of -Mutanabbi (905–965), frightfully tedious in their contents, although -epigrammatic in their form. And yet Mutanabbi has been praised as the -greatest Arabic poet. - -In like manner people have unduly extolled Abu-l-Ala al-Maarri -(973–1058) as a philosophic poet. His occasionally quite respectable -sentiments and sensible views are not philosophy, nor does the affected -though often hackneyed expression of these amount to poetry. Under more -favourable conditions,—for he was blind and not surpassingly rich,—this -man might perhaps have rendered some service in the subordinate walks -of criticism as a philologist or a historical writer. But, in place of -an enthusiastic acceptance of life’s duties, he is led to preach the -joyless abandonment of them, and to grumble generally at political -conditions, the opinions of the orthodox multitude, and the scientific -assertions of the learned, without being able himself to advance -anything positive. He is almost entirely wanting in the gift of -combination. He can analyse, but he does not hit upon any synthesis, -and his learning bears no fruit. The tree of his knowledge has its -roots in the air, as he himself confesses in one of his letters, though -in a different sense. He leads a life of strict celibacy and -vegetarianism, as becomes a pessimist. As he puts it in his poems “all -is but an idle toy: Fate is blind; and Time spares neither the king who -partakes of the joys of life, nor the devout man who spends his nights -in watching and prayer. Nor does irrational belief solve for us the -enigma of existence. Whatever is behind those moving heavens remains -hidden from us for ever: Religions, which open up a prospect there, -have been fabricated from motives of self-interest. Sects and factions -of all kinds are utilized by the powerful to make their dominion -secure, though the truth about these matters can only be whispered. The -wisest thing then is to keep aloof from the world, and to do good -disinterestedly, and because it is virtuous and noble to do so, without -any outlook for reward”. - -Other literary men had a more practical philosophy, and could make -their weight more felt in the world. They subscribed to the wise -doctrine of the Theatre-Manager in Goethe’s Faust: “He who brings much, -will something bring to many”. The most perfect type of this species is -Hariri (1054–1122), whose hero, the beggar and stroller, Abu Zaid of -Serug, teaches as the highest wisdom: - - - “Hunt, instead of being hunted; - All the world’s a wood for hunting. - If the falcon should escape you, - Take, content, the humble bunting: - If you finger not the dinars, - Coppers still are worth the counting” [13]. - - -3. The Annalistic of the ancient Arabs, like their Poetry, was -distinguished by a clear perception of particulars, but was incapable -of taking a general grasp of events. With the vast extension of the -empire their view was necessarily widened. First a great mass of -material was gathered together. Their historical and geographical -knowledge was advanced by means of journeys undertaken to collect -traditions, or for purposes of administration and trade, or simply to -satisfy curiosity, more than it could have been by mere religious -pilgrimages. Characteristic methods of research, brought to bear upon -the value of tradition as a source of our knowledge, were elaborated. -With the same subtlety which they displayed in Grammar, they portioned -out, in endless division and subdivision, the extended field of their -observation, in a fashion more truly ‘arabesque’ than lucid; and in -this way they formed a logic of history which must have appeared to an -oriental eye much finer than the Aristotelian Organon with its austere -structure. Their tradition,—in authenticating which they were, as a -rule, less particular in practice than in theory,—was by many made -equal in value to the evidence of the senses, and preferred to the -judgment of the reason, which so easily admitted fallacious inferences. - -There were always people, however, who impartially handed down -contradictory reports, alongside of one another. Others, although -exhibiting consideration for the feelings and requirements of the -present, did not withhold their more or less well-founded judgment on -the past, for it is often easier to be discerning in matters of history -than in the affairs of the living world. - -New subjects of enquiry came up, together with new modes of treatment. -Geography included somewhat of Natural Philosophy, for example in the -geography of climate; while historical composition brought within the -range of its description intellectual life, belief, morals, literature -and science. Acquaintance also with other lands and nations invited -comparison on many points; and thus an international, humanistic or -cosmopolitan element was introduced. - -4. A representative of the humanistic attitude of mind is met with in -Masudi, who died about the year 956. He appreciates, and is interested -in, everything that concerns humanity. Everywhere he is learning -something from the men he meets with: and in consequence the reading of -books, which occupies his privacy, is not without fruit. But it is -neither the narrow, everyday practices of life and religion, nor the -airy speculations of Philosophy, that specially appeal to him. He knows -where his strength lies; and up to the last, when he is spending his -old age in Egypt, far from his native home, he finds his -consolation,—the medicine of his soul,—in the study of History. History -for him is the all-embracing science: it is his philosophy; and its -task is to set forth the truth of that which was and is. Even the -wisdom of the world, together with its development, becomes the subject -of History; and without it all knowledge would long since have -disappeared. For learned men come and go; but History records their -intellectual achievements, and thereby restores the connection between -the past and the present. It gives us unprejudiced information about -events and about the views of men. Of course Masudi leaves it often to -the intelligent reader to find out for himself the due synthesis of the -facts and the individual opinion of the author. - -A successor of his, the geographer Maqdasi, or Muqaddasi, who wrote in -the year 985, deserves to be mentioned with high commendation. He -journeyed through many countries, and exercised the most varied -callings, in order to acquaint himself with the life of his time. He is -a true Abu Zaid of Serug (cf. II, 4 § 2), but one with an object before -him. - -He sets to work in critical fashion, and holds to the knowledge which -is gained by research and enquiry, not by faith in tradition or by mere -deductions of the reason. The geographical statements in the Koran he -explains by the limited intellectual horizon of the ancient Arabs, to -which Allah must have seen fit to adapt himself. - -He describes then, sine ira et studio, the countries and races he has -seen with own eyes. His plan is to set down, in the first place, -results gathered from his own experience and observation; next, what he -has heard from trustworthy people; and last of all what he has met with -in books. The following sentences are extracted from his -characterization of himself. - -“I have given instruction in the common subjects of education and -morals: I have come forward as a preacher, and I have made the minaret -of the mosque resound with the call to prayer. I have been present at -the meetings of the learned and the devotions of the pious. I have -partaken of broth with Sufis, gruel with monks, and ship’s-fare with -sailors. Many a time I have been seclusion itself, and then again I -have eaten forbidden fruit against my better judgment. I associated -with the hermits of Lebanon, and in turn I lived at the court of the -Prince. In wars I have participated: I have been detained as a captive -and thrown into prison as a spy. Powerful princes and ministers have -lent me their ear, and anon I have joined a band of robbers, or sat as -a retail-dealer in the bazaar. I have enjoyed much honour and -consideration, but I have likewise been fated to listen to many curses -and to be reduced to the ordeal of the oath, when I was suspected of -heresy or evil deeds”. - -We are accustomed at the present day to picture to ourselves the -Oriental as a being who, in contemplative repose, is completely bound -to his ancestral faith and usages. This representation is not quite -correct, but still it agrees better with the situation which now exists -than it does with the disposition of Islam in the first four centuries, -for during that period it was inclined to take into its possession not -only the outward advantages of the world, but also the intellectual -acquisitions of Mankind. - - - - - - - - -III. THE PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY. - - -1. Natural Philosophy. - -1. Euclid and Ptolemy, Hippocrates and Galen, some portion of -Aristotle, and, in addition, an abundant Neo-Platonic -Literature,—indicate the elements of Arabic Natural Philosophy. It is a -popular philosophy, which, chiefly through the instrumentality of the -Sabaeans of Harran, found acceptance with the Shiʻites and other sects, -and which in due course impressed not only court circles, but also a -large body of educated and half-educated people. Stray portions of it -were taken from the writings of the “Logician”,—Aristotle,—e.g. from -the “Meteorology”, from the work “On the Universe”, which has been -attributed to him, from the “Book of Animals”, from the “Psychology”, -and so on; but its general character was determined by -Pythagorean-Platonic teaching, by the Stoics, and by subsequent -astrologers and alchemists. Human curiosity and piety were fain to read -the secrets of the Deity in the book of his Creation, and they -proceeded in this search far beyond practical requirements, which -merely called for a little arithmetic to serve in the division of -inheritances and in trade, and a little astronomy besides, to determine -the proper times for celebrating the functions of religion. Men -hastened to gather wisdom from every quarter, and in so doing they -manifested a conviction, which Masudi accurately expressed, when he -said: “Whatever is good should be recognized, whether it is found in -friend or foe”. Indeed Ali, the prince of believers, is reported to -have said: “The wisdom of the world is the believer’s strayed sheep: -take it back, even though it come from the unbelieving”. - -2. Pythagoras is the presiding genius of Mathematical study in Islam. -Greek and Indian elements are mingled in it, it is true, but everything -is regarded from a Neo-Pythagorean point of view. Without studying such -branches of Mathematics, as Arithmetic and Geometry, Astronomy and -Music, no one, they said, becomes a philosopher or an educated -physician. The Theory of Numbers,—prized more highly than Mensuration, -because it appeals less to the outward vision, and should bring the -mind nearer the essence of things,—gave occasion to the most -extravagant puerilities. God is, of course, the great Unity, from whom -everything proceeds, who himself is no number, but who is the First -Cause of Number. But above all, the number Four,—the number of the -elements and so on,—was held in high favour by the philosophers; and -by-and-by nothing in heaven or earth was spoken of or written about, -except in sentences of four clauses and in discourses under four heads. - -The transition from Mathematics to Astronomy and Astrology was rapid -and easy. The old Eastern methods, which came into their hands, -continued to be applied even by the court-astrologers of the Omayyads, -but with still greater thoroughness at the Abbasid court. In this way -they arrived at speculations which ran counter to the revealed Faith, -and which therefore could never be approved of by the guardians of -religion. The only antithesis which existed for the Believer was—God -and the World, or this life and the next; but for the Astrologer there -were two worlds, one of the Heavens and another of the Earth, while God -and the life beyond were in the far distance. According to the -different conceptions entertained of the relation which subsisted -between the heavenly bodies and sublunary things, either a rational -Astronomy was developed, or a fantastic Astrology. Only a few kept -entirely free from Astrological delusions. As long, in fact, as the -science was dominated by the Ptolemaic system, it was easier for the -completely uneducated man to jeer at what was absurd in it than it was -for the learned investigator to disprove the same. For the latter -indeed this earth with its forms of life was a product of the forces of -the heavens, a reflection of celestial light, an echo of the eternal -harmony of the Spheres. Those then who ascribed conception and will to -the Spirits of the stars and spheres, held them as the representatives -of Divine providence, and thus traced to their agency both what is good -and what is evil, seeking also to foretell future events from the -situation of their orbs, by means of which they bring their influence -to bear upon earthly things in accordance with steadfast laws. Others, -it is true, had their doubts about this secondary providence, on -grounds of experience and reason, or from the Peripatetic belief that -the blessed existences of the heavens are Spirits of pure intellect, -exalted above conception and will, and in consequence above all -particularity that appeals to the senses, so that their providential -influence is directed only to the good of the whole, but never can have -reference to any individual occurrence. - -3. In the domain of Natural Science Muslim learned men collected a rich -body of material; but hardly in any case did they succeed in really -treating it scientifically. In the separate Natural sciences, the -development of which we cannot follow up in this place, they clung to -traditional systems. To establish the wisdom of God and the operations -of Nature,—which was regarded as a power or emanation of the -World-Soul,—alchemistic experiments were instituted, the magical -virtues of talismans tested, the effects of Music upon the emotions of -men and animals investigated, and observations made on physiognomy, -while attempts were also set on foot to explain the wonders of the life -of sleep and of dreams, as well as those of soothsaying and prophecy, -&c. As might be expected, the centre of interest was Man, as the -Microcosm which must combine in itself all the elements and powers of -the world together. The essential part of Man’s being was held to be -the Soul; and its relation to the World-Soul, and its future lot were -made subjects of enquiry. There was also a good deal of speculation -about the faculties of the soul and their localization in the heart and -the brain. One or two adhered to Galen, but others went farther than he -did, and made out five inner senses corresponding to the five outer -ones,—a theory which, along with similar natural mysteries, was traced -to Apollonius of Tyana. - -Obviously the most diverse attitudes towards religious doctrine were -possible in the study of Mathematical and Physical Science. But the -propaedeutic sciences, as soon as they came forward on their own -account, were always dangerous to the Faith. The assumption of the -eternity of the world, and of an uncreated matter in motion from all -eternity,—was readily combined with Astronomy. And if the movement of -the Heavens is eternal, so too are, no doubt, the changes which take -place on earth. All the kingdoms of Nature then, according to many -teachers, being eternal, the race of man is eternal also, wheeling -round and round in an orbit of its own. There is therefore nothing new -in the world: the views and ideas of men repeat themselves like -everything else. All that can possibly be done, maintained or known, -has already been and will again be. - -Admirable discourse and lamentation were expended upon this theme, -without much advancing thereby the interests of Science. - -4. The science of Medicine, which on obvious grounds was favoured by -the ruling powers, appears to have proved somewhat more useful. Its -interests furnished one of the reasons, and not the least considerable, -which induced the Caliphs to commission so many men to translate Greek -authors. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the teachings of -Mathematics and Natural Science, together with Logic, also affected -Medicine intimately. The old-fashioned doctor was disposed to be -satisfied with time-honoured magical formulae, and other empirical -expedients; but modern society in the ninth century required -philosophical knowledge in the physician. He had to know the “natures” -of foods, stimulants or luxuries, and medicaments, the humours of the -body, and in every case the influence of the stars. The physician was -brother to the astrologer, whose knowledge commanded his respect, -because it had a more exalted object than medical practice. He had to -attend the lectures of the alchemist, and to practise his art in -accordance with the methods of Mathematics and Logic. It was not enough -for the fanatics of education in the ninth century that a man had to -speak, believe and behave in accordance with Qiyas,—that is to say, -with logical correctness: he must, over and above, submit to be treated -medically in accordance with Qiyas. The principles of Medicine were -discussed in learned assemblies at the court of Wathik (842–847) like -the foundations of Doctrine and Morals. The question, in fact, was -asked, prompted by a work of Galen’s, whether Medicine relies upon -tradition, experience or rational knowledge, or whether on the other -hand it derives its support from the principles of Mathematics and -Natural Science by means of logical deduction (Qiyas). - -5. The Natural Philosophy, which has just been rapidly sketched, -actually stood for Philosophy with the most of the scholars of the -ninth century, as contrasted with theological dialectic, and was styled -Pythagorean. It lasted even into the tenth century, when its most -important representative was the famous physician Razi († 923 or 932). -Born in Rai he received a mathematical education and studied Medicine -and Natural Philosophy with great diligence. He was averse to dialectic -and was only acquainted with Logic as far as the categorical figures of -the First Analytics. After having practised as director of the hospital -in his native city and in Bagdad, he entered upon his travels and -resided at various princely courts, amongst others at the court of the -Samanid Mansur ibn Ishaq, to whom he dedicated a work on Medicine. - -Razi has a high opinion of the medical profession and of the study -which it demands. The wisdom of a thousand years, contained in books, -he prizes more than the experiences of the individual man gained in one -short life, but he prefers even these to deductions of the “Logicians” -which have not been tested by experience. - -He thinks that the relation between the body and the soul is determined -by the soul. And seeing that in this way the circumstances and -sufferings of the soul admit of being discerned by means of the -physiognomy, the medical man has to be at the same time a physician of -the soul. Therefore he drew up a system of spiritual medicine,—a kind -of Dietetic of the Soul. The precepts of Muslim law, like the -prohibition of wine, and so on, gave him no concern, but his -freethinking seems to have led him into pessimism. In fact he found -more evil than good in the world, and described inclination as the -absence of disinclination. - -High though the value was which Razi put upon Aristotle and Galen, he -did not give himself any special trouble to gain a more profound -comprehension of their works. He was a devoted student of Alchemy, -which in his view was a true art, based on the existence of a primeval -matter,—an art indispensable to philosophers, and which, he believed, -had been practised by Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato, Aristotle and -Galen. In opposition to Peripatetic teaching he assumed that the body -contained in itself the principle of movement, a thought which might -certainly have proved a fruitful one in Natural Science, if it had been -recognized and farther developed. - -Razi’s Metaphysic starts from old doctrines, which his contemporaries -ascribed to Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Mani and others. At the apex of his -system stand five co-eternal principles,—the Creator, the Universal -Soul, the First or Primeval matter, Absolute Space, and Absolute Time -or Eternal Duration. In these the necessary conditions of the actually -existing world are given. The individual sense-perceptions, generally, -presuppose an existing Matter, just as the grouping of different -perceived objects postulates Space. Perceptions of change farther -constrain us to assume the condition of Time. The existence of living -beings leads us to recognize a Soul; and the fact that some of these -living beings are endowed with Reason, i.e.—have the faculty of -bringing the Arts to the highest perfection,—necessitates our belief in -a wise Creator, whose Reason has ordered everything for the best. - -Notwithstanding the eternity of his five principles, Razi thus speaks -of a Creator and even gives a story of Creation. First then a simple, -pure, spiritual Light was created, the material of Souls, which are -simple, spiritual substances, of the nature of Light. That -Light-material or Upper-world, from which souls descended, is also -called Reason, or Light of the Light of God. The Light is followed by -the Shadow, from which the Animal Soul is created, for the service of -the Rational Soul. But simultaneously with the simple, spiritual light, -there existed from the first a composite form, which is Body, from the -shadow of which now issue the four “natures”, Warmth and Cold, Dryness -and Moistness. From these four natures at last are formed all heavenly -and earthly bodies. The whole process, however, is in operation from -all eternity, without beginning in time, for God was never inactive. - -That Razi was an astrologer is plain from his own utterances. The -heavenly bodies consist indeed, according to him, of the same elements -as earthly things, and the latter are continually exposed to the -influences of the former. - -6. Razi had to maintain a polemical attitude in two directions. On the -one side he impugned the Muslim Unity of God, which could not bear to -be associated with any eternal soul, matter, space or time; and on the -other side he attacked the Dahrite system, which does not acknowledge -any Creator of the world. This system, which is frequently mentioned by -Muslim authors, with due aversion of course, appears to have found -numerous representatives, though none of any importance. The adherents -of the ‘Dahr’ (v. I, 2, § 2) are represented to us as Materialists, -Sensualists, Atheists, Believers in the transmigration of souls, and so -on; but we learn nothing more definite about their doctrines. In any -case the Dahrites had no need to trace all that exists to a principle -which was of spiritual essence and creative efficiency. Muslim -Philosophy, on the other hand, did stand in need of such a principle, -if it should only conform in some degree to the teaching of the faith. -Natural Philosophy was not suited for the furtherance of this object, -as it showed more interest in the manifold and often contrary -operations of Nature than in the One Cause of all. Such aim was better -attained by Neo-Platonic Aristotelianism, whose logico-metaphysical -speculations endeavoured to trace all existence to one highest -existence, or to derive all things from one supreme operative -principle. But before we attend to this direction of thought, which -commenced to appear even in the ninth century, we have still to give -some account of an attempt to blend Natural Philosophy and the -teachings of the Faith into a Philosophy of Religion. - - - - -2. The Faithful Brethren of Basra. - -1. In the East, where every religion formed a State within the State, a -political party invariably made its appearance in the additional -character of a religious sect, just to gain adherents in some way or -other. As a matter of principle indeed, Islam knew no distinction -between men,—no caste or social standing. But property and education -have the same influence everywhere; and in their train degrees of piety -and stages of knowledge began to be set up, according as a community or -party permitted of adjustment. Thus there arose secret societies having -different grades, of which the highest and perhaps the next highest -possessed an esoteric doctrine, which borrowed a good deal from the -Natural Philosophy of the Neo-Pythagoreans. In furtherance of their -object, which was to conquer political power, every expedient was -regarded as lawful. For the initiated the Koran was explained -allegorically. They traced their mystic lore, it is true, back to -prophets with Biblical and Koranic names, but heathen philosophers were -at the bottom of it all. Philosophy was completely transformed into a -mythology of politics. The high intelligences and souls, which -theoretic thinkers had recognized in the stars and planets, embodied -themselves in human beings for the work of actual Politics; and it was -declared to be a religious duty to assist these embodied intelligences -in the establishment of an earthly kingdom of righteousness. The -associations which acted in this way may best be compared to societies, -which up to the days of Saint-Simonism and kindred phenomena in last -century were wont to appear in countries where freedom of thought was -restricted. - -In the second half of the ninth century Abdallah ibn Maimun, head of -the Karmatite party, was the originator of a movement of this kind. He -was a Persian oculist, trained in the school of the Natural -Philosophers. He proved able to associate both believers and -freethinkers in a confederacy to endeavour to compass the overthrow of -the Abbasid government. To the one set he was a conjurer, to the other -a pious ascetic or learned philosopher. His colours were white, because -his religion was that of the pure light, to which the soul was to -ascend after its earthly wanderings. The duties inculcated were -contempt for the body, disregard of the Material, community of goods -for all the confederate brethren, as well as self-surrender to the -confederacy, and fidelity and obedience to their chiefs, even to -death,—for the society had its grades. In accordance with the sequence -of existence, viz., God, Reason, Soul, Space and Time, they conceived -the revelation of God to be made in history and in the constitution of -their own brotherhood. - -2. The chief homes of Karmatite activity were Basra and Kufa. Now we -find in Basra in the second half of the tenth century a small -association of men, whose confederacy aims at having four grades. We do -not know, to be sure, how far the brethren succeeded in realizing the -ideal organization of their confederacy. To the first grade belong -young men of from 15 to 30 years of age, whose souls are being formed -in the natural way: these must be completely submissive to their -teachers. The second grade,—from 30 to 40 years of age—are introduced -to secular wisdom, and receive an analogical knowledge of things. In -the third grade,—from 40 to 50 years of age—the Divine law of the world -becomes known in more adequate form: that constitutes the stage of the -prophets. Finally, in the highest grade, when one is over 50 years old, -he comes to see the true reality of things, just like the blessed -angels: he is exalted then above Nature, Doctrine and Law. - -From this brotherhood there has come down to us a -progressively-advancing Encyclopaedia of the Sciences of that day. It -consists of 51 (originally perhaps 50) treatises, the contents of which -are of such varied nature and origin that the redactors or compilers -have not succeeded in establishing a complete harmony among them. In -general, however, there is found in this Encyclopaedia an eclectic -Gnosticism built on a foundation of Natural Science, and provided with -a political background. The scheme sets out with mathematical -considerations, continually playing with numbers and letters, and -proceeds through Logic and Physics,—referring everything, however, to -the Soul and its powers,—in order to approach at last, in a mystical -and magical fashion, the knowledge of the Godhead. The whole -representation is that of the doctrine of a persecuted sect, with the -political features peeping out here and there. We see also something of -suffering and struggle,—something of the oppressions to which the men -of this Encyclopaedia or their predecessors were exposed, and something -of the hope they cherished and the patience they preached. They seek in -this spiritualistic philosophy, consolation or redemption: It is their -religion. ‘Faithful to death,’—so runs the expression—shall the -brethren be, for to meet death for a friend’s welfare, is the true Holy -war. In life’s pilgrimage through this world,—thus the obligatory -journey to Mecca is allegorized—, one must aid the other by all the -means in his power. The rich must communicate to others a share of -their material goods, and the wise a share of their intellectual -possessions. But yet knowledge, as we have it in the Encyclopaedia, was -probably reserved for initiated members of the highest grade. - -It must be allowed, however, that this confraternity of the Faithful -Brethren of Basra seems to have led a quiet existence, as perhaps was -the case also with a branch-settlement of theirs in Bagdad. The -relation of the Brethren to the Karmatites may have resembled that of -the more peaceful Baptists to the revolutionary Anabaptists of the -‘King of Sion’. [14] - -The names of the following have been given to us by later writers, as -having been members of the Brotherhood and collaborators of the -Encyclopaedia, viz.: Abu Sulaiman Mohammed ibn Mushir al-Busti, called -al-Muqaddasi; Abu-l-Hasan Ali ibn Harun al-Zandjani; Mohammed ibn -Akhmed al-Nahradjuri; Al-Aufi and Zaid ibn Rifaa. In the time of their -activity the Caliphate had already been forced to make an entire -surrender of its secular power into the hands of the Shiʻite dynasty of -the Buyids. Probably this circumstance was favourable to the appearance -of an Encyclopaedia, in which Shiʻite and Mutazilite doctrines together -with the results of Philosophy were comprehended in one popular system. - -3. The Brethren themselves avow their eclecticism. They wish to collect -the wisdom of all nations and religions. Noah and Abraham, Socrates and -Plato, Zoroaster and Jesus, Mohammed and Ali are all prophets of -theirs. Socrates, and Jesus and his apostles, no less than the children -of Ali, are honoured as holy martyrs of their rational faith. The -religious law in its literal sense is pronounced good for the ordinary -man,—a medicine for weak and ailing souls: the deeper philosophic -insight is for strong intelligences. Though the body is devoted to -death, dying means rising again to the pure life of the Spirit, for -those who during their earthly existence have been awakened by means of -philosophic considerations out of careless slumber and foolish sleep. -This is impressed with endless repetition, by means of legends and -myths of later-Greek, Judaeo-Christian, Persian or Indian origin. Every -transitory thing is here turned into an emblem. On the ruins of -positive religion and unsophisticated opinion a spiritualistic -philosophy is built up, embracing all the knowledge and endeavour of -human kind, so far as these came within the Brethren’s field of view. -The aim of their philosophizing is given as ‘the assimilation of the -soul to God, in the degree possible for man’. - -In this scheme, the negative tendencies of the Brethren, are kept -somewhat in the background, for reasons which are quite intelligible. -But their criticism of human society and of positive religions is -exhibited with least reserve in the ‘Book of the Animal and the Man’, -in which the figurative dress makes it possible for them to represent -animals as saying what might he questionable if heard from a human -mouth. - -4. The eclectic character of the scheme, and the far from systematic -method adopted in its subdivisions render it difficult to give a -coherent exposition of the philosophy of the Brethren. But still the -most important tenets, though sometimes loosely connected, must here be -set forth with a measure of order. - -The mental activity of Man falls to be divided, according to the -Encyclopaedia, into Art and Science. Now Science or Knowledge is the -form assumed within the knowing soul by that which is known, or a -higher, finer, more intellectual mode of existence of whatever is -realized in outward substance. Art on the other hand consists in -projecting the form from the artist-soul into matter. Knowledge is -potentially present in the soul of the disciple, but it becomes actual -only through the teaching activity of a master, who carries knowledge -as a reality within his own mind. But whence did it come to the first -master? The Brethren answer, that according to the philosophers he -gained it by his own reflection, while, according to the theologians, -he received it through prophetic illumination; “but in our view there -are various ways or instrumentalities by which knowledge may be -attained. From the intermediate position of the soul, between the -worlds of body and of mind it results that there are open to it three -ways or sources of knowledge. Thus by means of the senses the soul is -made acquainted with what is beneath it, and through logical inference -with what is above it, and finally with itself by rational -consideration or direct intuition. Of these kinds of knowledge the -surest and the most deserving of preference is knowledge of one’s self. -When human knowledge attempts to go farther than this, it proves itself -to be limited in many ways. Therefore one must not philosophize -straight away about questions like the origin or the eternity of the -world, but make his first essays with what is simpler. And only through -renunciation of the world, and righteous conduct, does the soul lift -itself gradually up to the pure knowledge of the Highest.” - -5. After secular instruction in Grammar, Poetry and History, and after -religious education and doctrine, philosophic study should begin with -the mathematical branches. Here everything is set forth in -Neo-Pythagorean and Indian fashion. Not only numbers but even the -letters of the alphabet are employed in childish trifling. It was -particularly convenient for the Brethren that the number of letters in -the Arabic alphabet is 28, or 4 multiplied by 7. Instead of proceeding -according to practical and real points of view, they give the rein to -fancy in all the sciences, in accordance with grammatical analogies and -relations of numbers. Their Arithmetic does not investigate Number as -such, but rather its significance. No search is made for any more -suitable mode of expressing number in the case of phenomena; but things -are themselves explained in accordance with the system of numbers. The -Theory of number is Divine wisdom, and is above Things, for things are -only formed after the pattern of numbers. The absolute principle of all -existence and thought is the number One. The science of number, -therefore, is found at the beginning, middle, and end of all -philosophy. Geometry, with its figures addressing the eye, serves -merely to make it more easily understood by beginners, but Arithmetic -alone is true and pure science. And yet Geometry too is divided into a -sensible form of it which deals with lines, surfaces and solids, and a -pure or spiritual form which treats of the dimensions or properties of -things, such as length, breadth and depth. The object both of -Arithmetic and Geometry is to conduct the soul from the sensible to the -spiritual. - -First of all then they lead us to consider the stars. Now the -Encyclopaedia offers us, in its Astrology,—and nothing else could be -expected—teaching which is exceedingly fantastic and sometimes -self-contradictory. The whole of it is pervaded by the conviction that -the stars not merely foretell the future, but directly influence or -bring about every thing that happens beneath the moon. Fortune and -misfortune come equally from them. Jupiter, Venus and the Sun bring -fortune; misfortune is brought, on the other hand, by Saturn, Mars and -the Moon; while the effects produced by the planet Mercury have in them -both bad and good. Mercury is the lord of education and science: we owe -to him our knowledge, which comprises bad and good. In the same way too -the other planets have all their several spheres of influence; and man -in the course of life, if he is not prematurely snatched away, -experiences successively the influences of the whole of the heavenly -bodies. The Moon causes his body to grow and Mercury forms his mind. -Then he comes under the sway of Venus. The Sun gives him family, riches -or dominion; Mars, bravery and noble-mindedness. Thereupon, under the -guidance of Jupiter, he prepares, by means of religious exercises, for -the journey to the world beyond, and he attains rest under the -influence of Saturn. Many men, however, do not live long enough, or are -not enabled by circumstances, to develope their natural capacities in -unbroken sequence. God therefore graciously sends them his prophets, by -whose teaching they may, even in a short time and under unfavourable -circumstances, form their natures completely. - -6. According to the Encyclopaedia, Logic is related to Mathematics. In -fact just as Mathematics conducts from the sensible to the -intellectual, so Logic takes an intermediate position between Physics -and Metaphysics. In Physics we have to do with bodies; in Metaphysics, -with pure Spirits; but Logic treats of the ideas of the latter as well -as of the representations of the former in our soul. Yet in range and -importance Logic is inferior to Mathematics. For the subject of -Mathematics is regarded not merely as an intermediary, but also as the -essence of the All, while on the other hand Logic remains completely -restricted to psychic forms as an intermediary between body and mind. -Things are regulated by numbers, but our presentations and ideas by -things. - -The logical observations of the Brethren start from Porphyry’s -Introduction, and the Categories, the Hermeneutics and the Analytics of -Aristotle. They present nothing original, or very little. - -To the five terms of Porphyry, a sixth,—the ‘Individual’—is added, no -doubt for the sake of symmetry. Three of these,—Genus, Species, -Individual,—are then called Objective Qualifications and -three,—Difference, Property, Accident—Abstract or Conceptional -Qualifications. The Categories are Genus-conceptions, of which the -first is Substance, the other nine denoting its Accidents. The whole -system of Concepts is farther developed by a division into species. But -besides Division, there are three additional logical methods in use: -Analysis, Definition and Deduction. Analysis is the method for -beginners, because it permits a knowledge of what is individual. More -subtle, however, as disclosing to us what is spiritual,—are Definition -and Deduction, the former investigating the essential nature of -Species, and the latter that of Genera. The Senses apprise us of the -existence of things; but acquaintance with the essence of things is -gained by reflection. The information which is conveyed to us by the -senses is small, as it were the letters of the alphabet. Of greater -importance considerably are the principles of rational knowledge, just -as words have more significance than letters; but the most important -knowledge of all, lies in the propositions which have been derived from -those principles, and which the human mind gains for itself or -appropriates, in contradistinction to that knowledge which Nature or -the Divine revelation has imparted to it. - -7. From God, the highest Being, who is exalted above all distinctions -and oppositions both of the Material and the Spiritual, the whole world -is derived by the path of Emanation. If now and again a Creation is -spoken of, that is only to be understood as a form of adaptation to -theological language. The gradation then of the Emanations is exhibited -as follows: 1. The Creative Spirit (νοῦς, ʻaql); 2. The Passive Spirit, -or the All-Soul or World-Soul; 3. The First Material; 4. The Operative -Nature, a power of the World-Soul; 5. The Absolute Body, called also, -the Second Material; 6. The World of the Spheres; 7. The Elements of -the Sublunary World; 8. The Minerals, Plants and Animals composed of -these elements. These then are the eight Essences which,—together with -God, the Absolute One, who is in everything and with -everything—complete the series of Original Essences corresponding to -the nine Cardinal Numbers. - -Spirit, Soul, Original Matter, and Nature are simple; but with Body we -enter the realm of the Composite. Here all is composed of Matter and -Form, or,—to adopt another principle of division,—of Substance and -Accident. The first Substances are Matter and Form; the first Accidents -or Properties, Space, Motion and Time, to which in the opinion of the -Brethren may perhaps be added Tone and Light. Matter is one; all -plurality and diversity come from the Forms. Substance is designated -also as the constitutive, material Form, while Accident is the -completing, spiritual Form. The Encyclopaedia does not express itself -clearly on these points. But in any case Substantiality is looked for -rather in the Universal than in the Particular, and Form is put before -Matter. The Substantial Form, like a spectre, frightens off every -attempt of the philosopher to investigate thoroughly the domain of the -Material. The Forms wander at their own sweet will like lords through -the lower world of Matter. No trace is discoverable of any inner -relation between Matter and Form. Not only in thought, but also in -reality they keep themselves separate. - -From the account which has been given an idea may now be formed of the -story of Nature as the Brethren viewed it. They have been represented -as the Darwinists of the tenth century, but nothing could more -inappropriate. The various realms of Nature, it is true, yield -according to the Encyclopaedia an ascending and connected series; but -the relation is determined not by bodily structure, but by the inner -Form or Soul-Substance. The Form wanders in mystic fashion from the -lower to the higher and vice versa, not in accordance with inner laws -of formation, or modified to suit external conditions, but in -accordance with the influences of the stars, and, in the case of Man at -least, in accordance with practical and theoretical behaviour. To give -a history of Evolution in the modern sense of the term was very far -from the thought of the Brethren. For example they expressly insist -that the horse and the elephant resemble Man more than the ape does, -although the bodily likeness is greater in the last-named. In fact in -their system the body is a matter of quite secondary consideration: the -death of the body is called the birth of the soul. The soul alone is an -efficient existence, which procures the body for itself. - -8. The teaching of the Brethren concerning Nature is therefore merged -almost completely in Psychology. Let us confine ourselves here to the -human soul. It stands in the centre of the All; and just as the World -is a huge man, Man is a little world. - -The human soul has emanated from the World-soul; and the souls of all -individuals taken together constitute a substance which might be -denominated the Absolute Man or the Spirit of Humanity. Every -individual soul, however, is involved in Matter, and must gradually be -formed into spirit. To that end it possesses many faculties or powers, -and of these the speculative faculties are the choicest, for knowledge -is the very life of the soul. - -The soul of the child is at first like a white sheet of paper. What the -five senses convey to it is first presented, then judged, and lastly -stored up, in the front, middle, and hinder parts of the brain -respectively. Through the faculty of speech and the art of writing, -which make up the number of the internal senses to five, corresponding -to the number of the External, the contents of Presentation are then -realized. - -Among the external senses, Hearing takes precedence of Sight; for -Sight, a mere slave of the moment, is occupied with what is actually -present to the sense, whereas Hearing apprehends also what is past, and -is conscious of the harmony of the tuneful spheres. Hearing and Sight -constitute the group of the intellectual senses, whose effect must -continue time without end. - -While Man then possesses the external senses in common with the lower -animals, the specific nature of human reason is notified in Judgment, -Speech and Action. Reason judges of good and bad, and in conformity -with that judgment the will is determined. But in particular the -significance which Language has for the soul’s life of cognition is to -be emphasised. A concept which cannot be denoted by some expression in -some language is not thinkable at all. The word is the body of the -thought, which cannot exist absolutely per se. - -But it is difficult to see how this understanding of the relation -between concept and expression is to square with other opinions of the -Brethren. - -9. At its highest stage the teaching of the Brethren becomes a -Philosophy of Religion. Its purpose is a reconciliation between Science -and Life, Philosophy and Faith. Now in these matters men differ -greatly. The ordinary man requires a sensuous worship of God; but just -as the souls of animals and plants are beneath the soul of the ordinary -man, so above it are the souls of the philosopher and the prophet with -whom the pure angel is associated. In the higher stages the soul is -raised also above the lower popular religion with its sensuous -conceptions and usages. - -No doubt Christianity and the Zoroastrian faith appeared to the -Brethren to be more perfect religious revelations. ‘Our Prophet, -Mohammed’, they said, ‘was sent to an uncivilized people, composed of -dwellers in the desert, who neither possessed a proper conception of -the beauty of this world, nor of the spiritual character of the world -beyond. The crude expressions of the Koran, which are adapted to the -understanding of that people, must be understood in a spiritual sense -by those who are more cultured’. - -But the truth is not presented in its purity even in the other national -religions. There is a rational faith above them all for which the -Brethren moreover tried to find a metaphysical derivation. Between God -and his first creature, the Creative Spirit, there is interposed by way -of hypostasis the Divine World-Law (nâmûs). That World-Law extends over -everything, and is the wise arrangement of a merciful Creator, who -intends evil to no one. Belief in a God of Anger, in the punishment of -Hell and the like, the Brethren declare to be irrational. Such a faith -does harm to the soul. The ignorant sinful soul finds its hell even in -this life and in its own body. On the other hand, Resurrection is the -separation of the soul from its body, and the great Resurrection at the -last day is the separation of the Universal soul from the world, and -its return to God. This turning to God indeed is the aim in all -religions. - -10. The ethical system of the Brethren has an ascetic, spiritualistic -character, although here too their eclecticism is shewn. According to -it man is acting rightly, when he follows his proper nature; -‘praiseworthy is the free act of the soul; admirable are the actions -which have proceeded from rational consideration; and lastly, obedience -to the Divine World-Law is worthy of the reward of being raised to the -celestial world of spheres. But this requires longing for what is -above; and therefore the highest virtue is Love, which strives after -union with God, the first loved one, and which is evinced even in this -life in the form of religious patience and forbearance with all created -beings. Such love gains in this life serenity of soul, freedom of heart -and peace with the whole world, and in the life to come ascension to -Eternal Light.’ - -After all this we need not wonder that the body was depreciated a good -deal. ‘Our true essence is the soul, and the highest aim of our -existence should be to live, with Socrates, devoted to the Intellect, -and with Christ, to the Law of Love. Nevertheless the body must be -properly treated and looked after in order that the soul may have time -to attain its full development.’ In this view the Brethren set up an -ideal type of human culture, whereof the features were borrowed from -the characteristics of various nations. ‘The ideal, and morally perfect -man, should be of East-Persian derivation, Arabic in faith, of Irak, -i.e. Babylonian, education, a Hebrew in astuteness, a disciple of -Christ in conduct, as pious as a Syrian Monk, a Greek in the individual -sciences, an Indian in the interpretation of all mysteries, but lastly -and especially, a Sufi in his whole spiritual life.’ - -11. The attempt to establish in this way a reconciliation between -knowledge and faith satisfied neither side. Theological dialecticians -looked down upon the interpretation of the Koran given by the Brethren, -just as the divines of our day look down upon the N. T. exegesis of -Count Tolstoi. And the more rigid Aristotelians regarded the -Pythagorean-Platonic tendency of the Encyclopaedia much as a modern -professor of philosophy is wont to look upon Spiritism, Occultism, and -phenomena of that nature. But the writings, or at any rate the -opinions, of the Faithful Brethren of Basra have exercised an important -influence on the great body of the educated or half-educated world,—an -influence to which eloquent attestation is borne by the very fact that -so many manuscripts, mostly of recent date, are to be met with, of this -extensive Encyclopaedia. Among many sects within the world of Islam, -such as the Batinites, the Ismaelites, the Assassins, the Druses, or -whatever may be their names, we find again the same doctrines in the -main. In this form Greek wisdom has best succeeded in making itself at -home in the East, while the Aristotelian School-Philosophy would only -thrive, with few exceptions, in the hothouse-cultivation bestowed upon -it at the courts of princely patrons. The great religious father, -Gazali, is ready enough to toss aside the wisdom of the Brethren as -mere popular philosophy, but he does not hesitate to take over what was -good in them. He owes more to their body of ideas than he would perhaps -have cared to avow. And their treatises have been turned to profit by -others besides, particularly in Encyclopaediac works. The influence of -the Encyclopaedia continues even yet in the Muslim East. In vain was it -burned in Bagdad in the year 1150, along with the writings of Ibn Sina. - - - - - - - - -IV. THE NEO-PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF THE EAST. - - -1. Kindi. [15] - -1. Kindi is related in various ways to the Mutazilite Dialecticians and -the Neo-Pythagorean Natural-Philosophers of his time, and we might -therefore have dealt with him among the latter, even before Razi (v. -III, 1, § 5). But yet tradition with one accord represents him as the -first Peripatetic in Islam. What justification exists for this -traditionary view will be seen in what follows, so far as an inference -can be drawn from the few and imperfectly-preserved writings of this -philosopher which have come down to us. - -Abu Yaqub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi (i.e. of the tribe of Kinda) was of -Arabian origin, and therefore was called the “Arabian” philosopher, to -distinguish him from the numerous non-Arab associates of his, who had -taken to the study of secular wisdom. He traced his genealogy to the -old Kinda princes, although whether he was entitled to do so we need -not seek to decide. The South-Arabian tribe of Kinda was in any case -farther advanced in outward civilization than other tribes. Many -Kindite families too had for long been settlers in Iraq (Babylonia); -and there, in the town of Kufa, of which his father was governor, our -philosopher was born, probably in the beginning of the ninth century. -He received his education, it would appear, partly in Basra, and -thereafter in Bagdad, and therefore in the headquarters of the culture -of his time. Here he came to put a higher value upon Persian -civilization and Greek wisdom than upon old Arab virtue and the Muslim -faith. He maintained even,—no doubt, following others—, that Kakhtan, -the ancestor of the South-Arabians was a brother of Yaunan’s, from whom -the Greeks were descended. It was possible to make an observation of -that kind in Bagdad at the Abbasid court, for there they knew of no -nationality, and regarded the ancient Greeks with admiration. - -It is not known how long Kindi remained at court, or what position he -held there. He is mentioned as a translator of Greek works into Arabic, -and is said to have revised and improved translations made by others, -for example, in the case of the so-called “Theology of Aristotle”. -Numerous servants and disciples, whose names have been handed down to -us, were probably set to this work under his supervision. Farther, he -may have rendered services to the court in the capacity of astrologer -or physician, and perhaps even in the administration of the revenues. -But in later years he was dismissed, when he with others was made to -suffer from the restoration of orthodoxy under Mutawakkil (847–861); -and his library was for a long time confiscated. As regards personal -character, tradition reproaches him with having been niggardly,—a -stigma, however, which appears to have rested upon many other literary -men and lovers of books. - -The year of Kindi’s death is as little known as that of his birth. He -appears thus to have been out of court-favour when he died, or at least -to have been in a subordinate position. It is strange that Masudi (v. -II, 4 § 4), who had a great regard for him, is utterly silent on this -point; but it seems in the highest degree probable from one of his -astrological treatises that he was still alive subsequent to the year -870. The expiry of some petty astronomical cycle was imminent at that -date, and this was being utilized by the Karmatites for the overthrow -of the reigning family. In this matter, however, Kindi was loyal enough -to make out the prolongation, for about 450 years, of the State’s -existence, menaced though it was by a planetary conjunction. His -princely patron might well be satisfied; and history conformed to the -time predicted, to within half-a-century. [16] - -2. Kindi was a man of extraordinary erudition, a Polyhistor: he had -absorbed the whole learning and culture of his time. But although he -may have set down and communicated observations of his own as a -geographer, a historian of civilization and a physician, he was in no -respect a creative genius. His theological views bear a Mutazilite -stamp. He wrote specially on Man’s power of action, and the time of its -appearance, i.e. whether it was before the act or whether it was -synchronous with the act. The righteousness and the unity of God he -expressly emphasized. In opposition to the theory,—known at that time -as Indian or Brahmanic,—that Reason is the sole and sufficient source -of knowledge, he defended prophecy, while yet he sought to bring it -into harmony with reason. His acquaintance with various systems of -religion impelled him to compare them together, and he found as a -common element in them all the belief that the world was the work of a -First Cause, One and Eternal, for whom our knowledge furnishes us with -no more precise designation. It is however the duty of the discerning -to recognize this First Cause as divine; and God himself has shewn them -the way thereto, and has sent them ambassadors to bear witness for him, -who are instructed to promise everlasting bliss to the obedient, and to -threaten corresponding punishment to those who do not obey. - -3. Kindi’s actual philosophy, like that of his contemporaries, -consists, first and especially, of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy, -in which Neo-Platonism and Neo-Pythagoreanism merge into one another. -According to him no one can be a philosopher without studying -Mathematics. Fanciful play upon letters and numbers is frequently met -with in his writings. Mathematics he also applied to Medicine in his -theory of the compound remedies. In fact he based the efficacy of these -remedies, like the effect of music, upon geometrical proportion. It is -here a matter of the proportionality of the sensible qualities, warm, -cold, dry and moist. If a remedy has to be warm in the first degree, it -must possess double the warmth of the equable mixture,—in the second -degree, four times as much, and so on. Kindi seems to have entrusted -the decision of this point to Sense, particularly to the sense of -Taste, so that in him we might have a hint of the proportional relation -existing between stimulus and sensation. Yet that view, though quite -original, was with him a mere piece of mathematical play. However, -Cardan, a philosopher of the Renaissance, on the ground of this -doctrine, reckoned him among the twelve most subtle-minded thinkers. - -4. In Kindi’s opinion, as has already been said, the world is a work of -God, but His influence in its descent is transmitted through many -intermediate agencies. All higher existence affects the lower, but that -which is caused has no influence upon its cause, standing as this does -above it in the scale of Being. In all the events of the world there is -a pervading causality, which makes it possible for us, from our -knowledge of the cause, to foretell the future,—for example, of the -positions of the heavenly bodies. Farther, in any single existing -thing, if it is thoroughly known, we possess a mirror, in which we may -behold the entire scheme of things. - -It is to the Spirit or Mind that the higher reality and all activity -belong, and matter has to dispose itself in conformity with the desire -of the Spirit. Midway between the Spirit of God and the material and -bodily world stands the Soul, and it is the Soul which first called -into being the world of the Spheres. From this Soul of the world the -Human Soul is an emanation. In its nature, that is, in its operations, -it is bound to the body with which it is united, but in its spiritual -essence it is independent of the body; and thus the influences of the -stars, which are limited to physical occurrences, do not affect it. -Kindi goes on to say that our Soul is an uncompounded, imperishable -substance, descended from the world of reason into that of the senses, -but endowed with a recollection of its earlier condition. It does not -feel at home here, for it has many needs, the satisfaction of which is -denied to it, and which consequently are attended with painful -emotions. Verily there is nothing constant in this world of coming and -going, in which we may be deprived at any moment of what we love. Only -in the world of reason is stability to be found. If then we desire to -see our wishes fulfilled, and would not be deprived of what is dear to -us, we must turn to the eternal blessings of reason, to the fear of -God, to science, and to good works. But if we follow merely after -material possessions in the belief that we can retain them, we are -pursuing an object which does not really exist. - -5. Kindi’s theory of knowing corresponds to the ethical and -metaphysical duality of the sensible and the spiritual. According to it -our knowledge is either knowledge conveyed by the senses, or knowledge -acquired by the reason: that which lies between,—the Fancy or -Imagination,—is called a mediating faculty. The senses, then, apprehend -the Particular, or the material Form, but the reason conceives the -Universal,—species and genera, or the spiritual Form. And just as that -which is perceived is one with Sense-Perception, so too that which is -conceived by the reason is one with Reason itself. - -Here then emerges for the first time the doctrine of the Reason or of -the Spirit or Mind, (νοῦς, ʻaql) in a form in which, merely modified -somewhat, it occupies a large space with the later Muslim philosophers. -It continued to be a characteristic feature of philosophy in Islam -throughout its whole course. And just as in the controversy regarding -Universals in the Christian Middle Ages an objective and scientific -interest is made evident also, so in the philosophical discussions of -the Muslims concerning the thinking Spirit, the subjective requirement -of intellectual culture is brought conspicuously to the front. - -Kindi has a fourfold division of the Spirit [17]: first the Spirit -which is ever real,—the Cause and the Essence of all that is spiritual -in the world,—thus without doubt God or the First Spirit produced; -second, Spirit as the Reasoning capacity or Potentiality of the human -soul; third, as the Habit or actual possession of the soul, which it -can make use of at any moment, just as, for example, the writer can -make use of his art; fourth and last, as Activity, by which a reality -within the soul may be carried over to the reality that is without. The -Activity last named appears, according to Kindi, to be the act of man -himself, while to the First Cause,—to the ever-existing Spirit,—he -ascribes the carrying of Potentiality into Habit, or the realisation of -the Possible. The real Spirit or Mind we have thus received from above, -and the third ʻaql is therefore called ʻaql mustafad, (Lat. intellectus -adeptus sive adquisitus). The fundamental view of antiquity—that all -our knowledge about things must come from a source outside of us—, -runs, in the form of this doctrine of the ʻaql mustafad or Spirit which -we receive from above, through the whole of Arabian Philosophy, and -thence passes into Christian Philosophy. Unfortunately the theory is -nearly correct, as far as this philosophy is itself concerned, for the -‘Active Spirit’, which has created it, is in reality the Neo-Platonic -Aristotle. - -Man has always attributed to his God or Gods the highest of his own -possessions. Muslim theologians directly attribute to the divine agency -the moral actions of men. But in the opinion of the philosophers, -Knowing is of more importance than Doing. The latter, having more to do -with the lower world of the senses, may possibly be Man’s own; but his -highest knowledge, the pure Reason, comes from above,—from the Divine -Essence. - -It is clear that the doctrine of the Spirit, as it stands in Kindi, -goes back to the ‘Nous’-doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisias in his -second book “On the Soul”. But Alexander expressly maintained that -according to Aristotle there is a threefold ‘Nous’. Kindi says on the -contrary that he is representing the opinion of Plato and Aristotle. In -this the Neo-Pythagorean and the Neo-Platonic views unite: for in -everything the number ‘Four’ must be pointed out, and Plato and -Aristotle brought into agreement. - -6. Let us now sum up: Kindi is a Mutazilite theologian and Neo-Platonic -philosopher with Neo-Pythagorean additions. Socrates, the martyr of -Athenian heathenism, is his ideal: on him, his fate and his teaching he -has composed several works; and he seeks to combine Plato and Aristotle -in Neo-Platonic fashion. - -Tradition nevertheless calls him the first who followed Aristotle in -his writings; and assuredly this representation is not altogether -unfounded. In the long list of his works Aristotle takes a prominent -place. He was not satisfied with merely translating him, but he studied -his translated works and endeavoured to improve and explain them. At -all events the Aristotelian Physics, with the commentary of Alexander -of Aphrodisias, had an important influence upon him. Such assertions as -that the world is only potentially unending and not actually so, and -that motion is continuous, and the like, point rather in that -direction. The Natural-Philosophers of that day, as well as the -Faithful Brethren, said for instance, that motion had as little -continuity as number. But farther, Kindi resolutely turned away from -the marvel-mongering philosophy of the time, by declaring Alchemy an -imposture. That which nature alone could produce, he held to be beyond -the power of man. Whoever then gives himself up to alchemistic -experiments, is in his opinion deceiving either himself or others. The -famous physician, Razi, attempted to controvert this view of Kindi’s. - -7. The influence of Kindi as a teacher and an author has operated -mainly through his Mathematics, Astrology, Geography and Medicine. His -most faithful and certainly his most notable disciple was Akhmed ibn -Mohammed al-Tayyib al-Sarakhsi († 899), a government-official and -friend of the Caliph Mutadid, to whose negligence or caprice he fell a -victim. He worked at Alchemy and Astrology, strove to gain a knowledge -of the wisdom and might of the Creator from the wonders of creation, -and prosecuted the study of Geography and History. Another disciple of -Kindi’s has become better known,—Abu Mashar († 885), who, however, owes -all his reputation to Astrology. He is said to have become, when 47 -years of age, an admirer of Kindi’s,—though up till then he had been a -fanatical opponent of philosophy,—having been attracted to the pursuit -of Astrology, by a superficial study of Mathematics. Whether this be -truth or fiction, such a course of education is at all events -characteristic of that inquisitive grasping at half-understood -knowledge, which peculiarly belongs to the first centuries of Arab -Science. - -The school of Kindi went in no way beyond the master. Of its literary -activity hardly any sample has been preserved to us beyond a stray -quotation or two. It is of course possible that in the treatises of the -Faithful Brethren, something of it may have been saved, but this cannot -be determined, in the present state of our knowledge. - - - - -2. Farabi. - -1. In the tenth century the Logicians or Metaphysicians are -distinguished from the Natural-Philosophers. The former follow a more -rigorous method than the Dialecticians, and treat of other subjects -than those which are dealt with by the Physical school. They have -repudiated Pythagoras, to entrust themselves to the guidance of -Aristotle, of course in Neo-Platonic guise. - -We have here to do with two directions of scientific interest. The -Natural-Philosophers are more or less concerned with the plenitude of -the concrete phenomena of Nature, as in Geography and Ethnology. They -investigate in all directions the effects of things, and think the -essential nature of these is only to be discerned in such effect or -working. When they do ascend beyond Nature, Soul and Spirit, to the -Divine Essence, then the definition of it to which they confine -themselves, or which they adopt by preference, is—‘the First Cause’, -or,—‘the wise Creator’, whose goodness and wisdom appear from his -works. - -The Logicians proceed in a very different way. The occurrence of the -Particular has only a subordinate value in their eyes,—the value, -merely, of an illustration of its deducibility from the Universal. -While the Physicists start from effects or operations, the Logicians -seek to comprehend things from principles. Everywhere they enquire -after the Idea or Essence of things, up to the highest. For them,—to -make the contrast more intelligible by an example—, God is not, first -of all, ‘the wise Creator’, but first of all ‘the necessarily existing -Being’. - -In the order of time the Logicians come after the Physical school, just -as the Mutazilite Dialectic on its part (v. II, 3 §§ 4 and 5) brought -within the scope of its consideration first God’s Working, and then his -Being. - -We have already come to recognize Razi as the most important -representative of the philosophical direction taken by the Physicists; -and as for the Logical and Metaphysical efforts,—for which Kindi and -others had prepared the way,—they culminate with Razi’s younger -contemporary Abu Nasr ibn Mohammed ibn Tarkhan ibn Uzlag al-Farabi. - -2. We cannot say much with certainty about the course of Farabi’s -outward life and training. He was a quiet man, devoted to a life of -philosophy and contemplation, sheltered by the powerful, and assuming -at last the dress of a Sufi. His father is said to have been a Persian -general, and he himself was born at Wasidj, a small fortified place in -the district of Farab in Turkish Transoxiana. It was in Bagdad, and -partly at the hands of a Christian preceptor Yohanna ibn Hailan, that -he received his education. This embraced both literary and mathematical -subjects, forming the equivalent of the ‘Trivium’ and ‘Quadrivium’ of -mediæval Christendom. One or two of his writings, particularly on -Music, give evidence still of his mathematical training. Legend credits -him with ability to speak in all the languages of the world, seventy in -number. That he understood Turkish and Persian,—an a priori -probability,—is manifest from his works. Arabic he writes clearly, and -with a certain grace, although now and then his fondness for synonyms -and parallel clauses interferes with the precision of philosophical -expression. - -The philosophy in which Farabi was initiated sprung from the school of -Merv; and perhaps its members had given greater attention to -metaphysical questions than the men of Harran and Basra with their -marked leaning to Natural Philosophy. - -From Bagdad, where he had long lived and worked, he went to Haleb -(Aleppo), in consequence doubtless of political disturbances, and there -he settled at the brilliant court of Saif-addaula; but he must have -spent his closing years not at court but in retirement. He died at -Damascus, while on a journey, in December, 950; and it is reported that -his prince, attired as a Sufi, pronounced over him his funeral oration. -We are told that he was eighty years of age, and it is otherwise -probable that he was a very old man. His contemporary, and partner in -study, Abu Bishr Matta died ten years before him, and his pupil Abu -Zakariya Yakhya ibn Adi in the year 971, at the age of eighty-one. - -3. The chronological order of the works of Farabi has not been -determined. Shorter treatises in which he comes into touch with the -Dialecticians and Natural-Philosophers, if these are at all genuine in -the form handed down to us, may have been popular or juvenile -productions of his; but his mature powers were applied to the study of -Aristotle’s writings, for which reason the name given him by the East -was ‘the Second Teacher’, that is, ‘the Second Aristotle’. - -Since his day the number and order of the works composed by Aristotle -or at least attributed to him, which have been paraphrased and -commented on after Farabi’s example, remain upon the whole fixed. First -come the eight Logical treatises, viz., the Categories; the -Hermeneutics; the First Analytics; the Second Analytics; the Topics; -the Sophistics; Rhetoric; and the Poetics: It is to these that the -Isagoge of Porphyry is the introduction. Then follow the eight -treatises which deal with Physical subjects, viz., Auscultatio Physica; -De Coelo et Mundo; De Generatione et Corruptione; the Meteorology; the -Psychology; De Sensu et Sensato; the Book of Plants; and the Book of -Animals. Lastly come the Metaphysics, the Ethics, the Politics and so -on. - -The so-called “Theology of Aristotle” was still considered by Farabi to -be a genuine work. In Neo-Platonic fashion, and with some attempt at -adaptation to the Muslim faith, he seeks to demonstrate that Plato and -Aristotle harmonize with one another. The need which he experiences is -not for a discriminating criticism, but for a conclusive and -comprehensive view of the world; and the satisfaction of this -need,—which is rather a religious than a scientific one,—induces him to -overlook philosophic differences. Plato and Aristotle must differ from -each other only in method, in phraseology, and in relation to practical -life: their doctrine of wisdom is the same. They are the ‘Imāms’ or -‘highest authorities’ in philosophy; and seeing that they were two, -independent, original minds, the authority which is constituted by -their agreement has more validity in the eyes of Farabi than the faith -of the whole Muslim community, who with blind confidence follow the -guidance of one. - -4. Farabi is counted among the physicians, but he seems not to have -been in actual practice. He was entirely devoted to the spiritual -healing art. Purity of Soul he denominated the condition and fruit of -all philosophizing, and he demanded love of truth even though it should -oppose Aristotle. Then the judgment has to be trained by means of -Geometry and Logic for the study of physical and mental science. -Farabi, however, pays but little heed to the separate branches of -study: his powers are concentrated on Logic, Metaphysics, and the -principles of Physics. Philosophy for him is the science of all Being -as such, in the acquisition of which science we come to resemble the -Godhead. It is the one, all-embracing science, which pictures the world -to us as a Universe. Farabi’s charge against the Dialecticians is, that -they employ as a basis for their demonstrations the deliverances of -ordinary consciousness without testing them; and the -Natural-Philosophers he blames for continually occupying themselves -merely with the effect of things, and thus never getting beyond the -contrasts of worldly phenomena by attaining to a unified conception of -the All. He would confront the former by setting Thought on a proper -foundation; and in opposition to the latter he would thoroughly -investigate the subject of the One First Cause of all that exists. -Consequently we shall be taking the best way to do justice to his -historical and dogmatic position, if we endeavour to give some account, -first of his Logic, next of his Metaphysics, and finally of his Physics -and Practical Philosophy. - -5. The Logic of Farabi is not a mere analysis of scientific thinking: -it contains in addition many remarks on grammar, and discussions on the -theory of knowledge. While grammar is limited to the language of one -people, Logic, on the other hand, has to regulate the expression in -language of the aggregate intelligence of mankind. From the simplest -elements of speech it must advance to the most complex forms,—from the -word to the sentence, and on to discourse. - -Logic falls into two divisions, according as its subjects stand related -to actuality; the first of these comprising the doctrine of Ideas and -Definitions (tasawwur), and the second, the doctrine of Judgments, -Inferences, and Proofs (tasdiq). Ideas,—with which are classed -Definitions, though in a mere loose, outward juxtaposition,—have in -themselves no relation to actuality, that is to say, they are neither -true nor false. Among ‘Ideas’ Farabi recognizes here the simplest -psychological forms, that is, both the representations of individual -objects arising from Sense-Perception, and those ideas which have been -stamped upon the mind from the first, such as the Necessary, the -Actual, the Possible. Such representations and ideas are immediately -certain. A man’s mind may be directed to these, and his soul made -observant of them, but they cannot be demonstrated to him, nor can they -be explained by deriving them from what is known, seeing that they are -already clear in themselves, and that too with the highest degree of -certitude. - -By combining representations or ideas, judgments result, and these may -be either true or false. To obtain a foundation for these judgments we -have to go back through the processes of Inference and of Proof to -certain propositions originally conveyed to the understanding, -immediately obvious, and admitting of no farther confirmation. Such -propositions,—the fundamental propositions or Axioms of all -Science,—there must be for Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Ethics. - -The doctrine of Proof, by which, starting from what is known and -well-established, we arrive at a knowledge of something formerly -unknown, is, according to Farabi, Logic properly so called. -Acquaintance with the leading Concepts (the Categories), and with their -synthesis in Judgment (Hermeneutics) and in Inference (First Analytics) -furnishes only the introduction thereto. And in the Proof-doctrine the -chief point is to ascertain the Norms or principles of a universally -valid and necessary Science, which Philosophy has to be. Here the Law -of Contradiction is looked upon as the highest of these principles, by -which law the truth or necessity of a proposition, and at the same time -the untruth or impossibility of the contrary, become known in one -single cognitive act. From this point of view the Platonic Dichotomy is -to be preferred, as a scientific method, to the Aristotelian Polytomy. -And Farabi is not content with the formal side of the doctrine of -proof. That doctrine has to be more than a methodology which points out -the right way to the truth: it must itself point out the truth; it must -generate science. It not only deals with judgments as material for the -syllogism, but it enquires also into the truth which they contain, with -reference to the particular sciences concerned. It is not a mere -implement; it is rather a constituent part of philosophy. - -As we have seen, the theory of proof terminates in necessary knowledge, -corresponding to necessary existence. But besides this there is the -great province of the Possible, from which we can gain only a probable -knowledge. The different degrees then of probability, or the modes in -which we attain to a knowledge of the Possible, are discussed in the -Topics, and with them are associated Sophistic, Rhetoric and Poetics. -In other connections these last three subjects are mainly concerned -with practical aims, but in Farabi’s hands they are combined with the -Topics into a Dialectic of the Seeming. He proceeds to say that true -science can be built up only on the necessary propositions of the -Second Analytics, but that Probability shades off into the mere phantom -of truth, from the topical or dialectic judgments down to the poetical. -Thus Poetry stands at the very bottom of the scale, being in Farabi’s -opinion a lying and immoral absurdity. - -In the addendum to the Isagoge of Porphyry, our philosopher has also -given expression to his views on the question of ‘Universals’. He finds -the Particular not only in things and in sense-perception but also in -thought. In like manner the Universal exists not merely as an -‘accident’ in individual things, but also as a ‘substance’ in mind. The -mind of man abstracts the Universal from things, but it had an -existence of its own before these. Virtually therefore the triple -distinction of the ‘ante rem’, ‘in re’ and ‘post rem’ already occurs in -Farabi. - -Does mere ‘being’ also belong to the Universals? Is existence, in -effect, a predicate? This question which caused so much mischief in -philosophy was fully and correctly answered by Farabi. According to -him, existence is a grammatical or logical relation, but not a category -of actuality which makes any assertion about things. The existence of a -thing is nothing but the thing itself. - -6. The trend of thought found in the Logic asserts itself also in the -Metaphysics. Instead of the Changeable and the Everlasting, there -emerge the ideas of the Possible and the Necessary. - -Everything in fact that exists, is, in Farabi’s view, either a -necessary or a possible thing; there is no third kind of Being. Now -since all which is possible presupposes for its realisation a Cause, -while yet the chain of causes cannot be traced back without end, we see -ourselves compelled to assume that there is a Being, existing of -necessity, uncaused, possessing the highest degree of perfection and an -eternal plenitude of reality, self-sufficing, without any change, who -as absolute Mind and pure goodness and thinking,—being the thinking and -the thought in one nature,—loves the all-transcending goodness and -beauty of that nature, which is his own. This Being cannot be proved to -exist, because he himself is the proof and first cause of all things, -in whom truth and reality coincide. And it is involved in the very idea -of such a Being, that he should be one, and one only, for if there were -two first and absolute Beings, they would have to be partly alike and -partly different,—in which case, however, the simplicity of each would -be destroyed. A Being who is the most perfect of all, must be one -alone. - -This first Existence, one alone, and of a verity real, we call God; and -since in him all things are one, without even difference in kind, no -definition of his Being can be supplied. Yet man bestows upon him the -noblest names, expressive of all that is most honoured and esteemed in -life, because in the mystic impulse thereto, words lose their usual -significance, transcending all discrepancy. Some names refer to his -essential nature, others to his relation to the world, without -prejudicing, however, the unity of his essence; but they are all to be -understood metaphorically, and we can interpret them only according to -feeble analogy. Of God, as the most perfect Being, we ought properly to -have also the most complete idea. At least our mathematical notions are -more perfect than our notions of physics, because the former refer to -the more perfect objects. But with the most perfect object of all we -fare as with the most brilliant light: by reason of the weakness of our -eyes we cannot bear it. Thus the imperfections inherent in Matter cling -to our understanding. - -7. We are able to see God better in the regular gradation of Beings -which proceed from him than in himself. From him, the One alone, comes -the All, for his knowledge is the highest power: In his cognizance of -himself the world comes into being: The cause of all things is not the -will of an almighty Creator, but the knowledge of the Necessary. From -eternity the Forms or Types of things are in God, and from him -eternally proceeds also his own image, termed ‘the Second All’ or ‘the -first created Spirit’, which moves the outermost celestial Sphere. In -succession to this Spirit, come, one out of the other, the eight -Spirits of the Spheres, all of which are unique in their several kinds -and perfect, and these are the creators of the celestial bodies. These -nine Spirits, called ‘Celestial Angels’, together form the second grade -of Being. In the third grade stands the Reason, active in Humanity, -which is also termed the Holy Spirit and which unites heaven and earth. -The Soul is in the fourth grade. These two, the Reason and the Soul, do -not remain by themselves in their strict original One-ness, but -multiply in accordance with the great number of human beings. Lastly -appear Form and Matter, as Beings of the fifth and sixth orders; and -with them the series of Spiritual existences is closed. The first three -grades, God, the Spirits of the Spheres, and the Active Reason, remain -Spirit per se; but the three which follow,—Soul, Form and Matter, -although incorporeal, yet enter into relation with Body. - -The Corporeal, which is held to originate in the imagination of the -Spirit, has also its six grades: Celestial Bodies, Human Bodies, Bodies -of Lower Animals, Bodies of Plants, Minerals, and Elementary Bodies. - -The influence of Farabi’s Christian preceptor is probably still to be -seen in these speculations, following as they do the number Three. That -number had the same significance in them that the number Four had with -the Natural-Philosophers. The terminology also bears out this idea. - -That, however, is merely external: It is Neo-Platonism that contributes -the contents. Here the Creation, or Emanation of the world, appears as -an eternal, intellectual process. By the first created Spirit thinking -of its Author, the second Sphere-spirit comes into being; while, by the -same Spirit thinking of itself and thus realizing itself, there -proceeds from it the first Body, or the uppermost celestial Sphere. And -so the process goes on in necessary succession, down to the lowest -Sphere, that of the Moon, in entire accordance with the Ptolemaic -Sphere-system,—as it is known to every well-educated person at least -from Dante’s “Commedia”,—and in the Neo-Platonic manner of derivation. -The Spheres together form an unbroken order, for all that exists is a -Unity. The creation and preservation of the world are one and the same. -And not only is the unity of the Divine Being portrayed in the world, -but the Divine righteousness is also expressed in the beautiful order -which there prevails. The logical order of the world is at the same -time a moral order. - -8. The sublunary world of this earth is, of course, wholly dependent on -the world of the celestial spheres. Yet the influence from above bears -in the first place, as we know a priori, upon the necessary order of -the whole, although in the second place the individual thing also is -made to happen, but only according to natural reciprocal action, and -therefore by rules which experience teaches us. Astrology, which -attributes everything that is contingent or extraordinary to the stars -and their conjunctions, is combated by Farabi. There is no certain -knowledge of the Contingent; and,—as Aristotle also has taught,—much of -what happens on this earth possesses in a high degree the character of -the Contingent or the Possible. The celestial world, on the other hand, -has another and a more perfect nature, which operates according to -necessary laws. It can bestow upon this earthly world only that which -is good; and therefore it is a complete mistake to maintain that some -stars bring good luck, and others ill luck. The nature of the heavens -is one, and it is uniformly good. The conclusion then at which Farabi -arrives, by these reflections is this: Knowledge, capable of -demonstration, and perfectly certain, is afforded by Mathematical -Astronomy alone; the physical study of the heavens yields a probable -knowledge; but the tenets and vaticinations of Astrology merit an -exceedingly hesitating belief. - -Overagainst the simplicity of the celestial world we have the sublunary -kingdom of the four natures,—the kingdom of contrasts and of change. -Even in this realm, in the midst of its plurality, we meet with the -unity of an ascending series, from the Elements up to Man. Farabi is -unable to advance much that is original on this subject. True to his -logical standpoint, he gives himself very little concern about the -Natural Sciences, among which, in reliance upon the original unity of -matter, he seems without any hesitation to have counted Alchemy. We -turn at once to his Doctrine of Man or of the Human Soul, which -presents a measure of interest. - -9. The powers or divisions of the Human Soul are, in Farabi’s opinion, -not of co-ordinate rank, but constitute an ascending series. The lower -faculty is Material for the higher; and this again is the Form for the -first, while the highest power of all, viz. Thinking, is non-material, -and is Form for all the Forms which precede. The life of the Soul is -raised from things of sense to thought, by means of the power of -Representation; but in all the faculties there is involved Effort or -Will. Every theory has its obverse side in practice; and Inclination -and Disinclination are inseparable from the perceptions furnished by -the senses. To the representations of these the soul takes up an -attitude of assent or dissent, by affirming or denying. Finally, -Thought passes judgment on Good and Bad, gives to the Will its motives, -and constructs Art and Science. All Perception, Representation or -Thought is attended with a certain effort to reach the necessary -consequence, just as warmth radiates from the substance of fire. - -The Soul is that which gives completeness (Entelechia) to the existence -of the body; but that which gives completeness to the existence of the -Soul is the Mind, or the Spirit (ʻaql). The Spirit only is the real -Man. - -10. Accordingly the discussion turns mainly on the Mind or Spirit. In -the human Spirit everything earthly is raised to a higher mode of -existence, which is lifted out of the categories of the Corporeal. Now -as a capability or potentiality, Mind or Spirit is present in the Soul -of the Child; and it becomes actual Spirit in the course of its -apprehension of bodily forms in experience by means of the Senses and -the representative faculty. But this transition from possibility to -actuality,—the realisation thus of experience,—is not Man’s own act, -but is brought about by the Superhuman Spirit, which has sprung from -the last Sphere-Spirit, that of the Moon. In this way Man’s knowledge -is represented as being a contribution from above, and not a knowledge -which has been acquired in mental struggle. In the light of the Spirit -which stands above us, our understanding descries the Forms of the -Corporeal; and thereby experience is amplified into rational knowledge. -Experience, in fact, takes in only the Forms which have been abstracted -from the world of Matter. But there are in existence also,—before and -above material things,—Forms and general entities, in the pure Spirits -of the Spheres. Man now receives information from these ‘detached -Forms’: it is only by means of their influence that his actual -experience becomes explicable to him. From God down to the Spirit of -Mankind, the higher Form affects only that which immediately succeeds -it. Every intermediate Form stands in a relation of ‘receptive’ -activity to what is above it, and of ‘conferring’ activity to what is -below it. In its relation to the Human Spirit, which is influenced from -above (ʻaql mustafad), the Superhuman Spirit, produced from the last -Sphere-Spirit, is to be called ‘active’ or ‘creative’ (ʻaql faʻʻâl). -Yet it is not continually active, because its effectiveness is -restrained by its material. But God is the completely-real, -eternally-active Spirit. - -The Spirit in Man is threefold: according as it is (1) Possible, (2) -Actual, and (3) Influenced from above. Now in the sense of Farabi, this -means—that (1) the spiritual potentiality in Man is, by means of (2) -realizing the knowledge which is gained by experience, (3) led to the -knowledge of the Supersensible, which precedes all experience, and -itself induces the experience. - -The grades of Spirit and its knowledge correspond to the grades of -existence. The lower strives wistfully to reach the higher, and the -higher lifts the lower up to its own level. The Spirit which stands -above us, and which has lent to all earthly things their Forms, seeks -to bring these scattered Forms together that they may become one in -love. First of all he collects them in Man. And indeed the possibility -and truth of human knowledge depend on the fact that the same Spirit -who bestowed upon the Corporeal its figure, also gives Idea to Man. The -scattered Forms of the earthly are found again in the Human Spirit, and -thereby it comes to resemble the last of the Celestial Spirits. Unity -with that Celestial Spirit,—and in this an approach to God,—is the aim -and the blessedness of the Spirit of Man. - -Now the question whether such a union is possible before Man’s death -is, in Farabi’s opinion, either a doubtful one, or one which should be -answered in the direct negative. The highest thing that can be attained -in this life, is rational knowledge. But separation from the body gives -to the rational soul the complete freedom which belongs to spirit. But -does it then continue to exist as an individual soul? Or is it merely a -Moment of the higher World-Intelligence? On this point Farabi expresses -himself ambiguously, and with a lack of consistency, in his various -writings. Men,—so the expression runs,—disappear in death; one -generation follows another; and like is joined to like, each in its own -class. And forasmuch as rational souls are not bound to space, they -multiply without end, just as thought is added to thought, and power to -power. Every soul reflects on itself and all others that are like to -it; and the more it so reflects, the more intense is its joy (Cf. -infra, § 13). - -11. We come now to Farabi’s practical philosophy. In his Ethics and -Politics we are brought into a somewhat closer relation to the life and -belief of the Muslims. One or two general points of view may be brought -forward. - -Just as Logic has to give an account of the principles of knowledge, so -Ethics have to deal with the fundamental rules of conduct, although, in -the latter, somewhat more value is attached to practice and experience -than in the theory of knowledge. In the treatment of this subject -Farabi agrees sometimes with Plato, and sometimes with Aristotle; but -occasionally, in a mystic and ascetic fashion, he goes farther than -either of them. In opposition to the Theologians, who recognize, no -doubt, a knowledge gained by Reason, but not rules of conduct taught by -Reason, Farabi frequently affirms with emphasis that Reason decides -whether a thing is good or evil. Why should not that Reason, which has -been imparted to us from above, decide upon conduct, seeing that the -highest virtue certainly consists in knowing? In vigorously accentuated -terms Farabi declares that if one man knew everything that stands in -the writings of Aristotle, but did not act in accordance with his -knowledge, while another man shaped his conduct in accordance with -Aristotle’s teaching, without being acquainted with it, the preference -would have to be assigned to the former. Knowledge takes a higher -position than the moral act; otherwise it could not decide upon the -act. - -By its very nature the Soul desires. In so far as it perceives and -represents, it has a will, just like the lower animals. But man alone -possesses freedom of choice, seeing that this rests upon rational -consideration. Pure thought is the sphere of freedom. Thus it is a -freedom which depends upon motives furnished by thinking,—a freedom -which is at the same time necessity, inasmuch as in the last resort it -is determined by the rational nature of God. In this sense Farabi is a -Determinist. - -On account of the opposition offered by matter, the freedom of man, as -thus conceived, can only imperfectly vindicate its lordship over the -Sensible. It does not become perfect till the rational soul has been -enfranchised from the bonds of matter and the wrappings of error,—in -the life of the Spirit. But that is the highest blessedness which is -striven after for its own sake, and consequently it is plainly the -Good. Such good the Human Soul is seeking, when it turns to the Spirit -above it, just as the Spirits of the heavens do, when they draw near to -the Highest. - -12. Even in the Ethics little regard is had to actual moral conditions; -but in his Politics Farabi withdraws still farther from real life. In -his oriental way of looking at things, the ideal Republic of Plato -merges into ‘the Philosopher as Ruler’. Men, having been brought -together by a natural want, submit themselves to the will of a single -person, in whom the State, be it good or bad, is, so to speak, -embodied. A State therefore is bad, if the head of it is, as regards -the principles of the Good, either ignorant or in error, or quite -depraved. On the other hand the good or excellent State has only one -type, that namely in which the philosopher is ruler. And Farabi endows -his ‘Prince’ with all the virtues of humanity and philosophy: he is -Plato in the mantle of the Prophet Mohammed. - -In the description of rulers representative of the ideal Prince,—for -there may be more than one existing together, and Prince and minister -may divide governing-virtue and wisdom between them,—we come nearer the -Muslim political theory of that day. But the expressions are wrapped in -obscurity: the lineage, for example, which is proper for a Prince, and -his duty of taking the lead in the holy war,—are not clearly signified. -All indeed is left floating in philosophic mist. - -13. Morality reaches perfection only in a State which at the same time -forms a religious community. Not only does the condition of the State -determine the temporal lot of its citizens, but also their future -destiny. The souls of citizens in an “ignorant” State are devoid of -reason, and return to the elements as sensible Forms, in order to be -united anew with other beings,—men or lower animals. In States which -are “in error”, and in those which are “depraved”, the leader alone is -responsible, and punishment awaits him in the world beyond; but the -souls which have been led into error share the fate of the ignorant. On -the other hand, if the good and ‘knowing’ souls only maintain their -ground, they enter the world of pure Spirit; and the higher the stage -of knowledge to which they have attained in this life, the higher will -their position be after death, in the order of the All, and the more -intense their blessed delight. - -In all likelihood expressions of this kind are only the outer wrapping -of a mystico-philosophical belief in the absorption of the Human Spirit -into the World-Spirit and finally into God. For,—as Farabi -teaches,—although the world, deductively considered (i.e. logically -and metaphysically), is something different from God, yet inductively -the present world is regarded by the soul as being identical with the -next, because in everything, even in his Unity, God is himself the All. - -14. If we now take a general survey of Farabi’s system, it exhibits -itself as a fairly consistent Spiritualism,—or,—to be more -precise,—Intellectualism. The Corporeal,—that which appeals to the -Senses,—as it originates in the imagination of the Spirit, might be -designated “a confused presentation”. The only true existence is -Spirit, although it assumes various degrees. God alone is entirely -unmixed and pure Spirit, while those Spirits, which eternally proceed -from him, already have in them the element of plurality. The number of -primary Spirits has been determined by the Ptolemaic cosmology, and -corresponds to the celestial hierarchy. The farther any one of them is -removed from the first, so much the less part has it in the Being of -the pure Spirit. From the last World-Spirit Man receives his essential -nature, that is—Reason. There is no gap in all the system; the Universe -is a beautiful and well-ordered whole. The Evil and the Bad are the -necessary consequence of finiteness in individual things; but the Good -which characterizes the Universe is set thereby in bolder relief. - -Can this fair order of the Universe, from all eternity emanating from -God, ever be destroyed, or can it even flow back to God? A sustained -streaming-back to the Godhead, there doubtless is. The longing of the -Soul is directed to what is above and advancing knowledge purifies it -and leads it upwards. But how far? Neither philosophers nor prophets -have been able to return a clear answer to this question. And the -wisdom of both of these,—both philosophy and prophecy,—Farabi derives -from the creative World-Spirit above us. Now and again he speaks of -prophecy as if it represented the highest stage of human knowledge and -action. But that cannot be his real view;—at least it is not the -logical consequence of his theoretical philosophy. According to it -everything prophetic,—in dream, vision, revelation and so on,—belongs -to the sphere of the Imagination or Representation, and thus takes an -intermediate position between Sense-Perception and pure Rational -Knowledge. Although, in his Ethics and Politics, he attaches a high -educational importance to religion, it is always regarded as inferior -in absolute worth to knowledge acquired through pure reason. - -Farabi lived perpetually in the world of the Intellect. A king in the -mental realm, a beggar in worldly possessions, he felt happy with his -books, and with the birds and flowers of his garden. To his people,—the -Muslim community,—he could be only very little. In his political and -ethical teaching there was no proper place for worldly matters or for -the ‘holy war’. His philosophy did not satisfy any need appertaining to -the senses, while it spoke against the life of imagination belonging -both to the senses and the intellect, as that life gives special -expression to itself in the creations of Art and in religious fancies. -He was lost in the abstractions of pure Spirit. As a pious, holy man, -he was an object of wonder to his contemporaries, and by a few -disciples he was honoured as the personification of wisdom; but by the -genuine scholars of Islam he was always decried as a heretic. There -was, of course, ground enough for this: just as Natural Philosophy -easily led to Naturalism and Atheism, the Monotheism of the Logicians -imperceptibly conducted to Pantheism. - -15. Farabi had no great following of disciples: Abu Zakariya Yakhya ibn -Adi, a Jacobite Christian, became known as a translator of Aristotelian -works; but a pupil of Zakariya’s came to be more spoken of, called Abu -Sulaiman Mohammed ibn Tahir ibn Bahram al-Sidjistani, who gathered -about him in Bagdad, in the second half of the tenth century, the -learned men of his time. The conversational discussions which they -conducted, and the philosophical instructions which were imparted by -the master, have been to some extent preserved, and we can clearly see -the outcome of the school. Just as Natural Philosophy drifted into a -secret lore, and the school of Kindi abandoned Philosophy for the -separate branches of Mathematical and Physical Science, so the logical -tendency of Farabi passed into a philosophy of words. Distinctions and -definitions form the subject of these conferences. Individual points in -the history of philosophy and in the several sciences are discussed -also, without any systematic connection; but almost never does any -positive interest in these subjects appear. The Human Soul occupies the -foreground entirely, just as in the case of the Faithful Brethren, -except that these last dealt rather with the marvellous operations of -the Soul, while the Logicians pondered over its rational essence and -its elevation to the Supra-rational. The Sidjistani Society trifled -with words and concepts, instead of with numbers and letters after the -fashion of the Brethren; but the end in both cases was—a mystical -Sufism. - -It is therefore no matter of astonishment that in the learned meetings -of Abu Sulaiman, as reported by his pupil Tauhidi († 1009), -Empedocles, Socrates, Plato and others are oftener mentioned than -Aristotle. A very miscellaneous society came together in those -meetings. No question was asked as to the country from which any one -came, or the religion to which he adhered. They lived in the -conviction,—derived from Plato, that every opinion contained a measure -of truth, just as all things shared in a common existence, and all -sciences in an actual knowledge which was one and the same. On that -assumption alone could they have conceived that every one might start -with maintaining that his own opinion was the true one, and that the -science which he cultivated was the science most to be preferred. And -for that very reason there is no conflict between Religion and -Philosophy, however vehement the assertions may be on these two sides. -On the contrary Philosophy confirms the doctrines of Religion, just as -the latter brings the results of Philosophy to perfection. If -Philosophical Knowledge is the essence and end of the Soul of man, -Religious Belief is its life, or the way to that end; and as Reason is -God’s vicegerent on earth, it is impossible for Reason and Revelation -to contradict each other. - -It is not worth while to accentuate particular points in these -conversational discussions, the tenor of which we have given. The -appearance of Sidjistani and his circle is important in the history of -culture; but it has no significance as regards the development of -Philosophy in Islam. What was to Farabi the very life of his Spirit, -becomes in this Society a subject merely of clever conversation. - - - - -3. Ibn Maskawaih. - -1. We have arrived at the point of time when the tenth century is -passing into the eleventh. Farabi’s school has apparently died out; and -Ibn Sina,—destined to awaken into fresh life the philosophy of his -predecessor,—is still a youth. Here however we have to make mention of -a man, more allied, it is true, to Kindi than to Farabi, but who yet -agrees with the latter in essential points, by reason of employing the -same sources with him. He affords an instance also of the fact that the -most sagacious minds of his time were not disposed to follow Farabi -into the region of Logico-Metaphysical speculation. - -This man is Abu Ali ibn Maskawaih, physician, philologist and -historian, who was the treasurer and friend of the Sultan Adudaddaula, -and who died full of years in 1030. Amongst other things he has left us -a philosophical system of Ethics which up to this day is valued in the -East. It is a combination of material taken from Plato, Aristotle, -Galen and the Muslim Religious Law, although Aristotle predominates in -it. It commences with a treatise on the Essential Nature of the Soul. - -2. The Soul of Man, as Ibn Maskawaih explains, is a simple, incorporeal -substance, conscious of its own existence, knowledge and working. That -it must be of a spiritual nature—follows from the very fact that it -appropriates at one and the same time Forms the most opposed to each -other, for example, the notions of white and black, while a body can -only take up one of the two forms at a time. Farther, it apprehends -both the forms of the Sensible and those of the Spiritual in the same -spiritual manner, for Length is not ‘long’ in the soul, nor does it -become ‘longer’ in the memory. Accordingly the knowledge and endeavour -of the soul extend far beyond its own body: even the entire world of -sense cannot satisfy it. Moreover it possesses an inborn rational -knowledge, which cannot have been bestowed by the Senses, for it is by -means of this knowledge that it determines the True and the False, in -the course of comparing and distinguishing between the objects -presented to it in Sense-Perception,—thus supervising and regulating -the Senses. Finally, it is in Self-Consciousness, or knowing of its own -knowing, that the spiritual unity of the soul is most clearly shewn,—a -unity, in which thinking, that which thinks, and that which is -thought—all coincide. - -The human soul is distinguished from the souls of the lower animals -particularly by rational reflection as the principle of its conduct, -directed towards the Good. - -3. That by which a Being, possessed of will, attains the end or the -perfection of his nature is, in general terms, ‘good’. A certain -capability, therefore, or disposition, directed to an end is requisite, -in order to be good. But as regards their capability men differ very -essentially. Only a few,—Maskawaih thinks,—are by nature good, and -never become bad, since what is by nature, does not change; while on -the other hand, many are by nature bad, and never become good. Others, -however, who at first are neither good nor bad, are definitely turned -either in the one direction or the other, through upbringing and social -intercourse. - -Now the Good is either a general good or a particular good. There is an -absolute Good, which is identical with the highest Being and the -highest knowledge; and all the good together strive to attain to it. -But for every individual person a particular Good presents itself -subjectively under the aspect of Happiness or Pleasure; and this -consists in the full and active manifestation of his own essential -nature,—in the complete realisation of his inmost being. - -Speaking generally,—Man is good and happy, if he acts as Man: Virtue is -human excellence. But since humanity is presented as occupying -different levels in different individuals, Happiness or the Good is not -the same for all. And because an individual man, if he were left to his -own resources could not realize all the good things that might -otherwise be obtained, it is necessary that many should live together. -As a consequence of this condition, the first of duties, or the -foundation of all the virtues, is a general love for humankind, without -which no society is possible. It is only along with, and among other -human beings that the individual man attains perfection;—so that Ethics -must be Social Ethics. Friendship therefore is not, as Aristotle would -have it, an expansion of Self-love, but a limitation of it, or a kind -of love of one’s neighbour. And this, like virtue in general, can find -a field of exercise only in society, or in citizenship, and not in the -pious monk’s renunciation of the world. The hermit, who thinks he is -living temperately and righteously, is deceived as to the character of -his actions: they may be religious, but moral they certainly are not; -and therefore the consideration of them does not belong to Ethics. - -Besides, in Ibn Maskawaih’s opinion, the Religious Law when rightly -apprehended, pre-eminently accords with an Ethics of Benevolence. -Religion is a moral training for the people. Its prescriptions, with -regard to the worship of God in common and the pilgrimage to Mecca for -instance, have plainly in view the cultivation of the love of one’s -neighbour in the widest acceptation. - -In certain special points Ibn Maskawaih has not been successful in -combining harmoniously the ethical doctrines of the Greeks,—which he -incorporates in his Scheme,—either with one another or with the Law of -Islam. That however we pass over; and in any case we ought not only to -praise in general terms his attempt to give a system of Ethics which -should be free from the casuistry of the Moralists and the asceticism -of the Sufis, but also to recognize in the execution of his design the -good sense of a man of wide culture. - - - - -4. Ibn Sina. - -1. Abu Ali al-Hosain ibn Abdallah ibn Sina (Avicenna) was born at -Efshene in the neighbourhood of Bokhara, in the year 980, of a family -connected with the public service. He received his secular and -religious education at home, where Persian and anti-Muslim traditions -were still full of life and vigour. Then the youth, precocious alike in -body and in mind, studied philosophy and medicine in Bokhara. He was -seventeen years old when he had the good fortune to cure the prince, -Nukh ibn Mansur, and to obtain the privilege of access to his library. -From that time forward he was his own teacher, in scientific research -and in practice, and proved able to turn to account the life and -culture of his time. He kept continually venturing his fortunes in the -political working of the smaller States: Probably he could never have -submitted to a great prince, any more than to a teacher in Science. He -wandered on from court to court, at one time employed in -State-Administration, at another as a teacher and author, until he -became vizir of Shems Addaula in Hamadan. After the death of this -prince he was consigned to prison by his son, for some months. He then -proceeded farther afield, to the court of Ala Addaula in Ispahan. And -at last, having returned to Hamadan, which Ala Addaula had conquered, -he died there in 1037, at the age of 57; and there his grave is pointed -out to this day. - -2. The notion that Ibn Sina pushed on beyond Farabi and reached a purer -Aristotelianism, is perhaps the greatest error which has found a -footing in the history of Muslim Philosophy. What did this our man of -the world in reality care for Aristotle? It was not his concern to -commit himself wholly to the spirit of any system. He took what was to -his liking, wherever he found it, but he had a preference for the -shallow paraphrases of Themistius. Thus he became the great philosopher -of accommodation in the East, and the true forerunner of -compendium-writers for the whole world. He knew how to group with skill -his material, collected as it was from every quarter, and to present it -in an intelligible form, although not without sophistry. Every moment -of his life was fully employed. In the daytime he attended to State -affairs or gave instruction to his pupils: the evening was devoted to -the social enjoyments of friendship and love; and many a night found -him engaged in composition, pen in hand, and goblet within reach lest -he should fall asleep. Time and circumstances determined the direction -of this activity. If at the prince’s court he had the requisite -leisure, and a library at hand, he wrote his Canon of Medicine or the -great Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. While travelling, he composed -epitomes and smaller works. In prison he wrote poems and pious -meditations, but always in a pleasing form; in fact his smaller -mystical writings have a poetic charm about them. When commissioned to -do so, he put even Science, Logic and Medicine into verse,—a practice -which came more and more into vogue from the tenth century onwards. Add -to this that he wrote Persian and Arabic at will, and you get the -picture of a most accomplished man. His life was superabundantly rich -both in work and in enjoyment. In geniality, of course he was inferior -to his older compatriot, the poet Firdausi (940–1020), and in -scientific talent to his contemporary Beruni (v. infra § 9), men still -of importance in our eyes. Ibn Sina, however, was the true expression -of his time; and upon this fact have been founded his great influence -and historic position. He did not, like Farabi, withdraw from common -life to become immersed in the commentators of Aristotle, but he -blended in himself Greek science and Oriental wisdom. Enough -commentaries, he thought, had already been written on the ancient -authors: it was now time for men to construct a philosophy of their -own,—in other words, to give a modern form to the ancient doctrines. - -3. In Medicine Ibn Sina gives diligent endeavour to produce a -systematic account of that science, but here he proves by no means an -exact logician. He assigns a large place, at least theoretically, to -Experience, and describes in detail the conditions under which alone, -for example, the efficacy of remedies can be ascertained. But the -philosophical principles which are involved in Medicine, must be taken -over in the form of lemmas from Philosophy itself. - -Philosophy proper is divided into Logic, Physics and Metaphysics. In -its entirety it embraces the science of all Existence as such, and of -the principles of all the separate sciences, whereby, as far as is -humanly possible, the Soul which is devoted to philosophy, attains the -highest perfection. Now Existence is either spiritual, when it is the -subject of Metaphysics, or corporeal, when it is discussed in Physics, -or intellectual, when it forms the theme of Logic. The subjects of -Physics can neither exist, nor be thought of as existing, without -Matter. The Metaphysical, however is quite devoid of Matter; while the -Logical is an abstraction from the Material. The Logical has a certain -likeness to the Mathematical, in so far as the subjects of Mathematics -may also be abstractions from matter. But yet the Mathematical always -remains capable of being represented and constructed, while on the -other hand the Logical, as such, has its existence only in the -intellect, as, for instance, Identity, Unity and Plurality, -Universality and Particularity, Essentiality and Contingency, and so -on. Consequently Logic is the Science of the Determinate Forms of -Thought. - -In the more detailed treatment of his subject Ibn Sina conforms -entirely to Farabi’s Logic. This agreement would perhaps be more -apparent to us, if the logical works of his predecessor were extant in -a more complete form. He frequently lays stress on the defectiveness of -the intellectual constitution in man, which is urgently in need of a -logical rule. Just as the physiognomist infers from the external -features the character of the nature within, so the logician is called -upon to derive from known premises that which is unknown. How easy it -is for the errors of appearance and desire to insinuate themselves into -a process of that kind! A struggle with Sense is required in order that -the life of representation may be elevated to the pure truth of the -Reason, through which any knowledge of a necessary kind is gained. The -divinely-inspired man, but he alone, can dispense with Logic, precisely -as the Bedouin is independent of an Arabic Grammar. - -The question of Universals is also treated in a manner similar to that -which is adopted by Farabi. Prior to any plurality, every thing has an -existence in the Mind of God and of the Angels (the Sphere-Spirits); -then as material form it enters upon plurality, to be raised finally in -the intellect of man to the universality of the Idea. Now just as -Aristotle has distinguished between First Substance (Individual) and -Second Substance (cogitable as a Universal), so Ibn Sina similarly -makes a distinction between First and Second Notion or Intention -(Maʻnâ, intentio). The First is referred to the things themselves, the -Second to the disposition of our own thought. - -4. In Metaphysics and Physics Ibn Sina is differentiated from Farabi -chiefly through the fact that, by not deriving Matter from God, he -places the Spiritual at a higher elevation above all that is Material, -and in consequence heightens the importance of the Soul as an -intermediary between the Spiritual and the Corporeal. - -From the conception of the Possible and the Necessary, the existence of -a Necessary Being plainly follows. According to Ibn Sina we should not -seek to demonstrate the existence of a Creator from his works, but -rather should deduce, from the possible character of all that is, and -all that is thinkable in the world, the existence of a First and -Necessary Being, whose essence and existence are one. - -Not only is every sublunary thing of a ‘possible’ nature, but even the -heavens are, in themselves, merely ‘possible’. Their existence becomes -‘necessary’ through another existence which transcends all -‘possibility’ and therefore all plurality and mutability. The -‘absolutely Necessary’ is an unbending Unity, from which nothing -multiplex can proceed. This first One is the God of Ibn Sina, of whom -many attributes may of course be predicated, such as thought &c., but -only in the sense of negation or relation, and in such a way that they -do not affect the Unity of his essence. - -Out of the first One accordingly,—One only can proceed, viz.,—the first -World-Spirit. It is in this latter Spirit that Plurality has its -origin. In fact by thinking of its own Cause, it generates a third -Spirit, the governor of the outermost Sphere; when again, it thinks of -itself, a Soul is produced, by means of which the Sphere-Spirit -exercises its influence; and, in the third place, inasmuch as it is in -itself a ‘possible’ existence, there emerges from it a Body, viz., the -outermost Sphere. And so the process goes on: Every Spirit, thus -generated, except of course the last of the series, liberates from -itself a trinity,—Spirit, Soul and Body; for, since the Spirit cannot -move the Body directly, it needs the Soul to bring its effectiveness -into operation. Finally comes the Active Spirit (ʻaql faʻʻâl), closing -the series, and generating no farther pure (separate) Spirit, but -producing and directing the material of what is earthly, as well as -corporeal forms and human souls. - -The whole of this process,—which is not to be represented as occurring -in time, takes place in a substratum,—that of Matter. Matter is the -eternal and pure possibility of all that exists, and at the same time -the limitation of the operation of the Spirit. It is the principle of -all individuality. - -Now this teaching must certainly have presented a dreadful appearance -to believing Muslims. Mutazilite dialecticians had doubtless asserted -that God can do nothing evil, and nothing irrational; but now -Philosophy was maintaining that, God instead of being able to do all -that is possible is only in a position to effect that which is in its -own nature possible, and that only the first World-Spirit proceeds from -him directly. - -As for the rest Ibn Sina makes every endeavour to conform to the -popular belief. Everything exists, he says, through God’s appointment, -both the Good and the Evil, but it is only the former that meets with -his glad approval. Evil is either a non-existent thing, or,—in so far -as it proceeds from God,—an accidental thing. Suppose that He, to avoid -the evils which of necessity cling to the world, had kept it from -coming into being,—that would have been the greatest evil of all. The -world could not be better or more beautiful than it actually is. The -Divine Providence, administered as it is by the Souls of the Heavens, -is found in the world’s fair order. God and the pure Spirits know the -Universal only, and therefore are unable to attend to the Particular; -but the Souls of the celestial Spheres, to whose charge falls the -representation of what is individual, and through whom Spirit acts upon -Body, render it possible to admit a providential care for the -individual thing and the individual person, and to account for -revelation, and so on. Farther, the sudden rise and disappearance of -substances (Creation and Annihilation), in contrast to the constant -movement,—that is, the gradual passing of the Possible into the -Actual,—seem to Ibn Sina to indicate nothing impossible. In general, -there is a predominant want of clearness in his views regarding the -relation of the forms of Existence,—Spirit and Body, Form and Matter, -Substance and Accident. A place at all events is left for Miracle. In -passionate forms of excitement in the Soul, which often generate in -ourselves great heat or cold, we have, according to Ibn Sina, phenomena -analogous to miraculous effects produced by the World-Soul, although it -usually follows the course of Nature. Our philosopher himself, however, -makes a very moderate use of any of these possibilities. Astrology and -Alchemy he combated on quite rational grounds; and yet soon after his -death astrological poems were attributed to him; and in Turkish -Romance-Literature he appears as a magician, of course to represent an -ancient Mystic. - -Ibn Sina’s theory of Physics rests entirely on the assumption that a -body can cause nothing. That which causes,—is in every case a Power, a -Form, or a Soul, the Spirit operating through such instrumentality. In -the realm of the Physical there are accordingly countless Powers, the -chief grades of which, from the lower to the higher, are—the Forces of -Nature, the Energies of Plants and Animals, Human Souls and -World-Souls. - -5. Farabi was above all things interested in pure Reason: he loved -Thinking for its own sake, Ibn Sina, on the other hand, is concerned -throughout with the Soul. In his Medicine it is man’s Body which he -looks to; and similarly, in his Philosophy his eyes are fixed on man’s -Soul. The very name of his great Philosophical Encyclopaedia is—‘The -Healing’ (that is—of the Soul). His system centres in Psychology. - -His theory of human nature is dualistic. Body and Soul have no -essential connection with one another. All bodies are produced, under -the influence of the stars, from the mingling of the Elements; and in -this way the human body also is produced, but from a combination in -which the finest proportion is observed. A spontaneous generation of -the body, just like the extinction and restoration of the human race, -is therefore possible. The Soul, however, is not to be explained from -such mixture of the Elements. It is not the inseparable Form of the -body, but is accidental to it. From the Giver of Forms, that is—from -the Active Spirit over us, every Body receives its own Soul, which is -adapted to it and to it alone. From its very beginning each Soul is an -individual substance, and it developes increasing individuality -throughout its life in the body. It must be admitted that this does not -agree with the contention that Matter is the principle of -individuality. But the Soul is the “infant prodigy” of our philosopher. -He is not a credulous man, and he often cautions us against too ready -an acceptance of mysteries in the life of the Soul; but still he has -the art himself of relating many things about the numerous wonderful -powers and possible influences of the Soul, as it wanders along the -highly intricate pathways of life, and crosses the abysses of Being and -Not-Being. - -The speculative faculties are the choicest of all the powers of the -Soul. Acquaintance with the world is conveyed to the rational soul by -the External and Internal Senses. In particular a full account is given -by Ibn Sina of his theory of the Internal Senses, or the -sensuous-spiritual faculties of representation, which have their seat -in the brain. - -Medical Philosophers commonly assumed three Internal Senses or stages -of the representative process: 1. Gathering the several -sense-perceptions into one collective image in the fore part of the -brain; 2. Transforming or remodelling this representation of the -general Sense, with the help of representations already existing, thus -constituting apperception proper, in the middle region; 3. Storing up -the ‘apperceived’ representation in the Memory, which was held to -reside in the hinder part of the brain. Ibn Sina, however, carries the -analysis somewhat farther. He distinguishes in the anterior portion of -the brain the Memory of the Sensible,—or the treasure-house of the -collective images,—from the General or Co-ordinating Sense. Farther, he -makes out Apperception,—the function of the middle region of the -brain,—to be in part brought about unconsciously, under the influence -of the sensible and appetent life, as is the case also with the lower -animals, and, on the other hand, to take place in part consciously, -with the co-operation of the Reason. In the first case the -representation preserves its reference to the individual thing,—thus -the sheep knows the hostility of the wolf,—but in the second case, the -representation is extended to the Universal. Then, in the hinder part -of the brain, the Representative Memory, or store-house of the -representations formed by combined Sensuous Impression and Rational -Reflection, follows as a fifth power. In this way five Internal Senses -[18] correspond to the five External Senses, although with quite -another reference than the five Internal Senses of the Faithful -Brethren. The question which is raised—as to whether one should farther -separate Recollection, as a special faculty, from Memory,—remains -unanswered. - -6. At the apex of the intellectual powers of the Soul stands the -Reason. There is indeed a Practical Reason also, but in its action we -have been only multiplying ourselves mediately: On the other hand, in -Self-Consciousness, or the pure recognition of our essential nature, -the unity of our Reason is directly exhibited. But instead of keeping -down the lower powers of the Soul, the Reason lifts them up, refining -Sense-Perception, and generalizing Presentation. Reason, which at first -is a mere capacity for Thought, becomes elaborated gradually,—in that -Material which is conveyed to it by the external and internal -senses,—into a finished readiness in Thought. Through exercise the -capability becomes reality. This comes about through the -instrumentality of experience, but under guidance and enlightenment -from above,—from the ‘Giver of the Forms’, who as Active Spirit imparts -the Ideas to the Reason. The Soul of man, however, does not possess any -memory for the pure ideas of Reason, for memory always presupposes a -corporeal substratum. As often then as the Rational Soul comes to know -anything, that knowledge flows to it on each occasion from above; and -thinking Souls do not differ in the range and contents of their -knowledge, but in the readiness with which they put themselves in -communication with the Spirit over us, in order to receive their -knowledge. - -The Rational Soul, which rules over that which is under it, and comes -to know the higher by means of the enlightenment given by the -World-Spirit, is then the real Man,—brought into existence, but as -unmixed essence, as individual substance, indestructible, immortal. On -this point the clearness of Ibn Sina’s teaching marks it off from that -of Farabi; and, since his time, the assumption of the individual -immortality of the human Souls, which have come into being, is regarded -in the East as Aristotelian, and the opposite doctrine as Platonic. -Thus a better understanding prevails between his philosophy and the -accepted religion. The human body and the whole world of sense furnish -the Soul with a school for its training. But after the death of the -body, which puts an end to this body for ever, the Soul continues to -exist in a more or less close connection with the World-Spirit. In this -union with the Spirit over us,—which is not to be conceived as a -complete unification,—the blessedness of the good, ‘knowing’ souls -consists. The lot of the others is eternal misery; for just as bodily -defects lead to disease, so punishment is the necessary consequence of -an evil condition of Soul. In the same way too, the rewards of Heaven -are apportioned according to the degree of soundness or rationality -which the Soul has attained in its life on earth. The pure Soul is -comforted amidst the sufferings of Time by its prospect of Eternity. - -The highest is of course, reached only by a few; for on the pinnacle of -Truth there is no room for the many; but one presses forward after -another, to reach the source of the knowledge of God, welling forth on -its lonely height. - -7. To express his view of the Human Reason, Ibn Sina employs and -explains poetical traditions,—a favourite proceeding in the Persian -literature. First and foremost our interest is awakened by the -allegorical figure of Hai ibn Yaqzan. It represents the ascent of the -Spirit out of the Elements, and through the realms of Nature, of the -Souls, and of the Spirits, up to the throne of the Eternal One. Hai -presents himself to the philosopher in the form of an old man with an -air of youth about him, and offers his services as guide. The wanderer -has been striving to reach a knowledge of Earth and Heaven, by means of -his outer and inner senses. Two ways open out before him, one to the -West, the way of the Material and the Evil, the other to the Rising -Sun, the way of Spiritual and ever-pure Forms; and along that way Hai -now conducts him. Together they reach the well of Divine wisdom, the -fountain of everlasting youth, where beauty is the curtain of beauty, -and light the veil of light,—the Eternal Mystery. - -Hai ibn Yaqzan is thus the guide of individual, thinking Souls: he is -the Eternal Spirit who is over mankind, and operates in them. - -A similar meaning is found by our philosopher in the frequently -remodelled late-Greek legend of the brothers Salaman and Absal. Salaman -is the World-Man, whose wife (i.e., the World of the Senses) falls in -love with Absal, and contrives by a stratagem to wile him into her -arms. But before the decisive moment, a flash of lightning comes down -from heaven, and reveals to Absal the wantonness of the action which he -had nearly committed, and raises him from the world of sensual -enjoyment to that of pure spiritual contemplation. - -In another passage the soul of the philosopher is compared to a bird, -which with great trouble escapes from the snares of the earth, -traversing space in its flight, until the Angel of Death delivers it -from the last of its fetters. - -That is Ibn Sina’s Mysticism. His soul has needs, for which his -medicine-chest provides no resource, and which the life of a court -cannot satisfy. - -8. The theoretical development of Ethics and Politics may be left to -the teachers of the ‘fiqh’. Our philosopher feels himself on the level -of a inspired person, exalted like a God above all human laws. -Religious or Civil Law is binding only on the Many. Mohammed’s object -was, to civilize the Bedouins; and, in order to aid in accomplishing -that object, he preached, among other doctrines, that of the -Resurrection of the Body. They would never have understood the meaning -of purely spiritual blessedness; and so he had to educate them by -setting before them the prospect of bodily pleasure or pain. As for the -Ascetics,—notwithstanding their willingness to renounce entirely the -world and the senses,—they chime in with this sensuous multitude (whose -worship of God consists in the observance of outward forms), in respect -that they practise their works of piety with an eye to a reward also, -even though it be a heavenly one. Higher than the many or the pious -stand those who truly worship God in spiritual love, entertaining -neither hope nor fear. Their peculiar possession is Freedom of the -Spirit. - -But this secret should not be revealed to the multitude; and the -philosopher confides it only to his favourite pupils. - -9. In the course of his travels Ibn Sina met with many of the learned -men of his time; but it would appear that these interviews did not give -rise to any enduring intimacies. Just as he feels indebted to Farabi -alone, of all those who preceded him, so the only persons of his own -day, whom he sees fit to thank, are the princes who patronized him. He -criticized unfavourably Ibn Maskawaih (v. IV, 3), whom he met with -still more frequently. With Beruni, his superior in research, he -conducted a correspondence, but it was soon broken off. - -Beruni (973–1048) deserves a short notice here, to illustrate the -character of the time, although Kindi and Masudi have a better claim to -be called his masters, than Farabi and the younger Ibn Sina. He was -particularly occupied in the study of Mathematics, Astronomy, Geography -and Ethnology; and he was a keen observer and a good critic. For many a -solution of his difficulties, however, he was indebted to Philosophy; -and he continually bestowed attention upon it, as one of the phenomena -of civilization. - -Beruni brings into striking prominence the harmony which exists between -the Pythagorean-Platonic philosophy, Indian wisdom, and many of the -Sufi views. No less striking is his recognition of the superiority of -Greek Science, when compared with the attempts and performances of the -Arabs and the Indians. ‘India’, he says, ‘not to mention Arabia, has -produced no Socrates: there no logical method has expelled phantasy -from science’. But yet he is ready to do justice to individual Indians, -and he quotes with approval the following, as the teaching of the -adherents of Aryabhata: “It is enough for us to know that which is -lighted up by the sun’s rays. Whatever lies beyond, though it should be -of immeasurable extent, we cannot make use of; for what the sunbeam -does not reach, the senses do not perceive, and what the senses do not -perceive, we cannot know”. - -From this we may gather what Beruni’s philosophy was: Only -sense-perceptions, knit together by a logical intelligence, yield sure -knowledge; and for the uses of life we need a practical philosophy, -which enables us to distinguish friend from foe. He doubtless did not -himself imagine that he had said all that could be said on the subject. - -10. From the school of Ibn Sina, we have had more names handed down, -than we have had writings preserved. Djuzdjani annexes to his -Autobiography an account of the life of the master. And, farther, we -have one or two short metaphysical treatises by Abu-l-Hasan Behmenyar -ibn al-Marzuban, which are nearly in complete agreement with the system -of his teacher. But Matter appears to lose somewhat of its -substantiality: as Possibility of Existence it becomes a relation of -thought. - -According to Behmenyar, God is the pure, uncaused Unity of Necessary -Existence,—not the living, all-producing Creator. True enough, He is -the cause of the world, but the effect is given necessarily and -synchronously with the cause; otherwise the cause would not be perfect, -being capable of change. Essentially, though not in point of time, the -existence of God precedes that of the world. Three predicates thus -pertain to the highest existence, viz., that it is (1) essentially -first, (2) self-sufficing, and (3) necessary. In other words God’s -essential nature is the Necessity of his Existence. All that can -possibly be,—owes its existence to this Absolutely Necessary Being. - -Now that is quite in harmony with the doctrines of Ibn Sina; and the -same is the case with the disciple’s scheme of the world and his -doctrine of Souls. Whatever has once attained to full reality,—the -various Sphere-Spirits according to their kind, Primeval Matter, and -the individually different Souls of Men,—all lasts for ever. Nothing -that is completely real can pass away, inasmuch as the completely real -has nothing to do with mere possibility. - -The characteristic of all that is spiritual is its knowledge of its own -essential nature. Will is nothing else, in Behmenyar’s opinion, than -the knowledge of that which is the necessary outcome of that nature. -Farther, the life and the joy of rational souls consist in -self-knowledge. - -11. Ibn Sina achieved a far-reaching influence. His Canon of Medicine -was highly esteemed even in the West, from the 13th century to the -16th, and it is still the authority for medical treatment among the -Persians of the present day. On Christian Scholasticism his influence -was important. Dante placed him between Hippocrates and Galen; and -Scaliger maintained that he was Galen’s equal in Medicine, and much his -superior in Philosophy. - -For the East he stood and yet stands as the Prince of Philosophy. In -that region Neo-Platonic Aristotelianism continues to be known under -the form which was given it by Ibn Sina. Manuscripts of his works -abound,—an evidence of his popularity,—while commentaries on his -writings, and epitomes of them, are countless. He was studied by -physicians and statesmen, and even by theologians: It was only a few -who went farther back and consulted his sources. - -From the very first, of course, he had many enemies, and they were more -noisy in their demonstrations than his friends. Poets cursed him: -theologians either chimed in with him, or tried to refute him. And in -Bagdad in the year 1150, the Caliph Mustandjid consigned to the flames -Ibn Sina’s writings, as part of a certain judge’s philosophical -library. - - - - -5. Ibn al-Haitham. - -1. After the days of Ibn Sina and his school, little more attention was -paid to the cultivation of Speculative Philosophy in the Eastern -regions of the Muslim empire. In these lands Arabic was forced more and -more to yield to Persian, both in life and in literature. That the -Persian tongue is not so well adapted for abstract logical and -metaphysical discussion—might be only of quite secondary importance, in -connection with this decline in speculation; but the conditions of -civilization, and with them the subjects which interested men, were -sadly changed. Ethics and Politics came more to the front, although -without assuming an actually new form. But in the later Persian -literature the predominant place was unmistakeably held by Poetry, -partly of a free-thinking tendency, partly, and indeed -preponderatingly, of a mystic kind, which satisfied the need for -wisdom, experienced by people of culture. - -From about the middle of the 10th century, the scientific movement -which originated at Bagdad had in part turned westward. We have already -found Farabi in Syria, and Masudi in Egypt: In the latter country Cairo -was becoming a second Bagdad. - -2. In Cairo, at the beginning of the 11th century, we come upon one of -the most considerable mathematicians and physicists in all the Middle -Ages, Abu Ali Mohammed ibn al-Hasan ibn al-Haitham (Alhazen). He had -formerly been a government-official in Basra, his native town. -Confiding too much in the practical value of his mathematical -knowledge, he imagined that he could regulate the inundations of the -Nile; but having been summoned on that account by the Caliph al-Hakim, -he became aware, soon after his arrival, of the futility of his -efforts. Thereupon he fell into disgrace as a public official, and went -into hiding till the Caliph’s death, in 1021. From that time he devoted -himself to literary and scientific work, up to his own death, in 1038. - -His chief strength is shown in mathematics and its practical -application; but he also devoted great attention to the writings of -Galen and Aristotle, nor did he confine that attention to the physical -treatises. By his own confession he had, in a spirit of doubt about -everything, been engaged, from his youth up, in considering the various -views and doctrines of men, until he came to recognize in all of them -more or less successful attempts to approximate to the truth. Moreover -truth for him was only that which was presented as material for the -faculties of sense-perception, and which received its form from the -understanding, being thus the logically-elaborated perception. To seek -such truth was his aim in the study of philosophy. In his view -philosophy should be the basis of all the sciences. He found it in the -writings of Aristotle, inasmuch as that sage had best understood how to -knit sense-perception into a coherent whole with rational knowledge. -With eagerness therefore he studied and illustrated Aristotle’s works, -for the use and profit of mankind, as well as to exercise his own -intellect and provide a treasure and consolation for his old age. Of -these labours, however, nothing seems to have been preserved for us. - -The most important of Ibn al-Haitham’s writings is the “Optics”, which -has come down to us in a Latin translation and redaction. In it he -shows himself to be an acute mathematical thinker, always taking pains -with the analysis of hypotheses and of the actual examples. A Western, -belonging to the 13th century (Vitello), was able to give a more -methodical account of the whole subject; but yet in keenness of -observation on specific points, Ibn al-Haitham may be reckoned his -superior. - -3. Ibn al-Haitham’s thinking is expressed in quite a mathematical -style. The Substance of a body consists, according to him, of the sum -of its essential attributes, just as a whole is equal to the sum of its -parts, and a concept to the sum of its marks. - -In the “Optics” the psychological remarks on Seeing and on -Sense-Perception in general—are of special interest for us. Here he -exerts himself to separate the individual Moments of the Perception, -and to give prominence to the condition of Time as characterizing the -whole process. - -Perception then is a compound process, arising out of (1) sensation, -(2) comparison of several sensations or of the present sensation with -the memory-image which has been gradually formed in the soul as a -result of earlier sensations, and (3) recognition, in such fashion that -we recognize the present percept as equivalent to the memory-image. -Comparison and recognition are not activities of the Senses, which -merely receive impressions passively, but they devolve upon the -Understanding as the faculty of judgment. Ordinarily the whole process -goes forward unconsciously or semi-consciously, and it is only through -reflection that it is brought within our consciousness, and that the -apparently simplex is separated into its component parts. - -The process of Perception is gone through very quickly. The more -practice a man has in this respect, and the oftener a perception is -repeated, the more firmly is the memory-image stamped upon the soul, -and the more rapidly is recognition or perception effected. The cause -of this is that the new sensation is supplemented by the image which is -already present in the soul. One might thus be disposed to think that -Perception was an instantaneous act, at least after long practice. -That, however, would be erroneous, for not only is every sensation -attended by a corresponding change localized in the sense-organ, which -demands a certain time, but also, between the stimulation of the organ -and the consciousness of the perception an interval of time must -elapse, corresponding to the transmission of the stimulus for some -distance along the nerves. That it needs time, for example, to perceive -a colour, is proved by the rotating circle of colours, which shows us -merely a mixed colour, because on account of the rapid movement we have -no time to perceive the individual colours. - -Comparison and Recognition are, according to Ibn al-Haitham, the -significant Mental Moments of Perception. On the other hand Sensation -tallies with the Material; and the Sense experiencing the sensation -exhibits a passive attitude. Properly all sensation is in itself a kind -of discomfort, which ordinarily does not make itself felt, but which -emerges into consciousness under very strong stimuli, for example, -through too bright a light. A pleasurable character accrues only to the -completed perception, that is to the recognition which lifts the -material given in sensation, up to the mental form. - -The comparison and recognition, which are put in operation in -Perception, constitute an unconscious judgment and conclusion. The -child is already drawing a conclusion, when of two apples he chooses -the finer one. As often as we comprehend a connection, we are -concluding. But, since judging and concluding are quickly settled, men -are easily misled in this matter, and frequently they regard as an -original concept that which is merely a judgment derived by a process -of ratiocination. In the case of everything which is announced to us as -an axiom, we should be on our guard and trace it up, to see whether it -cannot be derived from something more simple. - -4. This appeal of our philosopher had little effect in the East. It is -true that in Mathematics and Astronomy he created somewhat of a school; -but his Aristotelian philosophy had comparatively few admirers. We know -only one of his scholars who is counted among the Philosophers, -Abu-l-Wafa Mubasshir ibn Fatik al-Qaid, an Egyptian emir, who in the -year 1053 produced a work made up of proverbial wisdom, anecdotes in -illustration of the history of philosophy, and so on. Hardly anything -can be traced in it which is the result of his own thinking. It should -have been pleasant reading. And the inhabitants of Cairo in after times -found edification,—more even than in such a work,—in the tales of the -Thousand and One Nights. - -The East set the stigma of heresy upon Ibn al-Haitham and his works, -and now it has almost completely forgotten him. A disciple of -Maimonides, the Jewish philosopher, relates that he was in Bagdad on -business, when the library of a certain philosopher, (who died in 1214) -was burned there. The preacher, who conducted the execution of the -sentence, threw into the flames, with his own hands, an astronomical -work of Ibn al-Haitham, after he had pointed to a delineation therein -given of the sphere of the earth, as an unhappy symbol of impious -Atheism. - - - - - - - - -V. THE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE EAST. - - -1. Gazali. - -1. We have already seen that the theological movement in Islam was -strongly influenced by Philosophy. Not only the Mutazilite, but also -the Antimutazilite Dialectic drew its opinions and the arguments with -which it supported its own teaching or disputed that of its opponents, -for the most part out of the writings of the philosophers. Out of these -one took just what he was able to make use of: the rest he left in -peace, or else he endeavoured to refute it. Thus numerous writings came -into existence, directed against some particular philosophical -doctrine, or some individual philosopher. No attempt, however, had been -made before the time of Gazali, to direct an attack from general points -of view and after thorough-going study, against the entire system of -Philosophy which had been built up in the East on a Greek foundation. - -Gazali’s undertaking had also a positive side. Along with the Dialectic -which sought to make the doctrines of the Faith intelligible, or even -to provide them with a rational basis, there were movements in Islam of -a mysticism which tended to a conception of dogma, profound and full of -feeling. Its wish was, not to comprehend or demonstrate the contents of -the Faith, but to learn them by experience and live in them through the -Spirit. The highest certitude ought to belong to the Faith. Ought it -then to be in the power of any to transform it into a derived -knowledge? Or must its tenets be principles of the Reason, neither -capable of farther proof, nor requiring it? But the fundamental -principles of the Reason, when once they are known, must be universally -recognized; and universal recognition is lacking in the case of the -tenets of the Faith. From what other source does unbelief arise? Thus -the questioning proceeded; and it seemed to many that the only way out -of these doubts was to base religious doctrine upon an inner, -supra-rational illumination. At first this came about unconsciously, -under a mystic impulse, whereby the contents of moral and religious -teaching were often brought into neglect. Gazali took part in this -movement also. That which had perhaps been typified by the Salimites -and Karramites, Antimutazilite sects, he set forth completely and in a -dignified style; and ever since his time Mysticism both sustains and -crowns the Temple of Learning in Orthodox Islam. - -2. The story of this man’s life is a remarkable one; and, in order to -understand the effectiveness of his work, it is absolutely essential to -examine it with a measure of detail. He was born at Tos in Khorasan in -the year 1059, being thus a countryman of the great poet Firdausi. And -just as the latter furnishes a proof of the old glory of the Persian -nation, so Gazali was destined to be a “testimony and ornament” for all -future Islam. Even his early education,—obtained after his father’s -death, in the house of a Sufi friend,—was rather cosmopolitan than -national in its direction. Farther, any limitation was displeasing to -the youth’s restless and fanciful spirit. He did not feel at home in -the hair-splitting casuistry of the teachers of Morals with their -precise formulas: he regarded it as a worldly knowledge, from which he -turned away, to immerse his spirit in the knowledge of Allah. Then he -studied theology in Nishabur with the Imām al-Haramain, who died in -1085; and at the same time he may himself have begun to write and to -teach, and, perhaps even thus early, to entertain doubts of his own -science. Thereafter he was in attendance at the court of Nizam al-Mulk, -the Vizir of the Seldjuk prince, until in 1091 he was appointed a -Professor in Bagdad. It was during this time at all events that he -busied himself most with philosophy. But it was not pure love for the -science, which impelled him to that study, but the longing of his heart -to find a solution of the doubts which assailed his understanding. Not -any explanation of the events of the world, nor any clearing up of his -own thinking, but peace of mind and the experience of a higher reality -constituted the object which he strove to reach. He subjected to a -thorough study the writings of the philosophers, in particular those of -Farabi and Ibn Sina; and, following chiefly the system of the latter, -he composed a Compendium of Philosophy, regarding it objectively, but -still with some appearance of sympathy with its contents. He said,—at -first in a kind of whisper to pacify his own mind, but afterwards -publicly in self-defence,—that he composed that work in order that he -might follow up the statement of the doctrines of philosophy with the -refutation of the same. And that refutation did appear, probably not -long after. It was the famous “Destruction of the Philosophers”,—which -was composed in all likelihood while he was still in Bagdad, or shortly -after he had left it. - -But by the end of four years, viz. in 1095, Gazali had discontinued his -work of teaching in Bagdad, attended though it had been with outward -success. His mind, continually in a state of doubt, probably found no -satisfaction in dogmatic prelections. He was alternately attracted and -repelled by his own brilliant position, and he came to think that he -could, and that he should, fight against the world and its wisdom in -some other way, to more purpose. Ambition with him embraced far more -than this world. Profounder still his musings became; and during an -illness of his, the inner call presented itself to his soul. He had -secretly to prepare for the work, by means of Sufi exercises,—perhaps -even to assume the character of a religious and political reformer. At -the very time that the Crusaders were equipping themselves in the West -against Islam, Gazali was preparing himself to be the spiritual -champion of the Muslim faith. His conversion was not of a violent -character, like that of St. Augustine, but was rather to be compared to -the experience of St. Jerome, who was summoned in a dream from his -Ciceronian predilections to practical Christianity. - -For ten years Gazali travelled here and there, dividing his time -between pious exercises and literary work. In the first part of that -period it may be conjectured that he wrote his principal -theologico-ethical work, “The Revival of Religious Sciences”: towards -the end he endeavoured to exercise influence as a reformer. His -journeyings led him by way of Damascus and Jerusalem—before it was -taken by the Crusaders,—Alexandria, Mecca and Medina, back to his home. - -After his return Gazali once more engaged in teaching for a short time -in Nishabur; and he died in Tos, his native town, on the 19th of -December, 1111. His closing years were chiefly devoted to pious -contemplation and the study of the Traditions, which as a youth he -could never remember. A beautifully complete and rounded life, in which -the end comes back to the beginning! - -3. Gazali passes in review the spiritual tendencies of his time. These -are: the Dialectic of the Theologians; Sufi Mysticism; Pythagorean -Popular Philosophy; and Neo-Platonic Aristotelianism. That which -Dialectic desires to establish is also the object of his own faith; but -its arguments appear to him rather weak, and many of its assertions on -that account open to question. He feels most in sympathy with the Sufi -Mysticism: to it he owes his dearest possession, viz., the -establishment of his own faith in Personality,—so that he can postulate -as an inner experience that which the Dialecticians attempt to derive -by a process of reasoning. He thanks also the Popular Philosophy for -the instruction it gives, particularly in Mathematics, which he fully -recognizes as a science, together with its Astronomical deductions. He -concedes the validity of its Physics, where that is not in conflict -with the Faith. But Aristotelianism,—as it has been taught by Farabi -and Ibn Sina, with as much subservience to authority as has been -exhibited by the Theologians,—seems to him to be the enemy of Islam; -and in the name of all the Muslim schools and tendencies of thought -together, he feels bound to do battle with it, as from a catholic -standpoint. And in truth he does this with Aristotle’s own -weapons,—those of Logic; for the axioms of thought which Logic lays -down are, in his eyes, just as firmly established as the propositions -of Mathematics. Fully alive to this, he starts from the Principle of -Contradiction, to which, according to his contention, God himself -submits. Of the Physico-Metaphysical doctrines of Philosophy then, he -attacks three in particular: 1. That the world is eternal; 2. That God -takes cognizance only of the Universal, and that consequently there is -no special providence; 3. That the Soul alone is immortal, and -therefore a Resurrection of the Body is not to be looked for. In the -refutation of these doctrines Gazali is in many respects dependent on -the Christian commentator on Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus, who also -has written against the doctrine of the eternity of the world -maintained by Proclus. - -4. (1) The world, according to the philosophers, is a sphere of finite -extent but of infinite duration. From all eternity, it proceeds from -God, even as the effect is in existence at the same time with the -cause. Gazali, on the contrary, is of opinion that it is not admissible -to put such different constructions on the notions of Space and Time -respectively; and he holds that the Divine Causality should be defined -as free Creative Might. - -First then as to Space and Time: we are as little able to imagine an -outermost boundary of Space as a beginning or end of Time. He who -believes in an endless Time, must, in consistency with that notion of -his, assume also the existence of an infinite Space. To say that Space -answers to the external sense, and Time on the other hand to the -internal,—does not alter the case, for we do not after all get rid of -the Sensible. Just as Space bears a relation to Body, so does Time to -the movement of Body. Both are merely relations of things, created in -and with the things of the world, or rather relations between our -conceptions, which God creates in us. - -Still more important is that which Gazali advances about Causality. The -Philosophers distinguish between an operation of God, of Spiritual -Beings endowed with will, of the Soul, of Nature, of Chance and the -like; but for Gazali, just as for the orthodox Kalam, there is really -only one causality, that of the ‘Willing’ Being. He completely puts -aside the causality of Nature, which is reducible without remainder -into a relation of Time. We see one definite phenomenon (Cause) -regularly succeeded by another definite phenomenon (Effect); but how -the latter results from the former is left an enigma for us. Of -operation in the objects of Nature we know nothing. Farther, any -alteration is in itself inconceivable. That any one thing should become -a different thing is incomprehensible to thought, which may just as -well ask about facts as about causes. A thing either exists, or it does -not exist; but not even Divine Omnipotence can transform one existing -thing into another thing. It creates or else annihilates. - -And yet it is a fact of our consciousness that we do effect something. -If we ‘will’ anything, and possess the power to carry it out, we claim -the result as our act. Action, proceeding from a free will, and -conscious of the exertion of power, is the only causality of which we -know; and we argue from this to the Divine Being. But by what right? -The warrant for such a conclusion Gazali thinks that he finds in his -own personal experience of the image of God in his soul; while on the -other hand he declines to credit Nature with the likeness to God which -belongs to his own soul. - -For him accordingly, God, in so far as he can be known from the world, -is the Almighty Being, free in will and efficient in operation. No -spatial limit may be set to his causative activity, which yet the -philosophers do, when they grant only his influence in his first -created work. But on the other hand He can limit his own work both in -Space and Time, so that this finite world has only a finite duration. -That God should call the world into existence out of nothing by an -absolute act of creation—seems to the Philosophers to be absurd. They -recognize only an exchange of Accidents or Forms in the one material, a -passing of the actual from possibility to possibility. But does nothing -new ever come then into being? Is not every apprehension of the -senses,—asks Gazali,—and every spiritual perception, something entirely -new, which either exists or else does not exist, but at whose coming -into existence the contrary does not cease, and at whose vanishing from -existence, the opposite does not make its appearance? Consider farther -the numerous individual souls which, according to Ibn Sina’s system, -must be in existence: have not these come into being, absolutely new? - -There is no end to the putting of questions. The representative process -wanders about in all directions and far; and thought leads us on ad -infinitum. The chain of causation can nowhere be brought to an end, any -more than Space or Time. In order then that there should be a definite, -final Existence,—and in postulating this, Gazali is at one with the -Philosophers—, we need an Eternal Will as First Cause, different from -everything else. - -We may at all events make this acknowledgement to Gazali, that Ibn -Sina’s fantastic doctrine of Forms and Souls makes no stand against his -criticism. - -5. (2) We have now come to the idea of God. In the view of the -Philosophers, God is the highest Being, and his essence is Thought. -That which He knows, comes into existence, emanating from his -abundance; but he has not positively ‘willed’ it, for all Willing -presupposes a deficiency,—a need—, and is conditioned by some change in -the Being that wills. Willing is movement in the material: completely -real Spirit wills nothing. Therefore God beholds his creation in a -contemplation which is undisturbed by any wish. He recognizes himself, -or even his first Creature, or, according to Ibn Sina, the Universal, -the eternal Genera and Species of all things. - -But according to Gazali there must eternally belong to God a Will, as -one of his eternal attributes. In a conventional way he grants, it is -true, that in metaphysical and ethical considerations knowing precedes -willing, but he is convinced that unity of Being does not more reside -in knowing than in willing. Not only the multiplicity of the objects of -knowledge, and their different relations to the knowing Subject, but -even Self-Consciousness, or knowing about the knowing, considered per -se, is an endless process. An act of will is absolutely necessary to -bring it to a conclusion. In directing the attention and in -self-communing an original “Willing” is in operation; and thus even -Divine knowledge comes to a conclusion as a coherent unity, in its -Personality, by means of an original eternal Will. In place of the -assertion of the Philosophers that God wills the world, because he -thinks of it as the best, Gazali substitutes the statement: “God has -cognizance of the world because he wills it and in his willing it”. - -Must not then He, who wills and creates all, have cognizance of his -work down to the smallest part of its material? Just as his eternal -will is the cause of all individual things, so his eternal knowledge -embraces at one and the same time every particular thing, without the -unity of his nature being thereby taken away. There is consequently a -Providence. - -To the objection that Divine Providence makes every particular event a -necessary event, Gazali, like St. Augustine, replies that this -fore-knowledge is not distinguishable from knowledge in memory,—that is -to say, that God’s knowledge is exalted above every distinction of -time. - -It may be questioned whether, in order to save the eternal, almighty, -creative Will, Gazali has not sacrificed to that absolute might both -the temporary character of the world, which he would like to prove, and -the freedom of human action, from which he sets out, and which he would -not altogether surrender. This world of shadows and images, as he calls -it, vanishes for the sake of God. - -6. (3) The third question, with regard to which Gazali separates -himself from the Philosophers, has less philosophic interest. It refers -to the Resurrection of the Body. According to the Philosophers it is -only the Soul that is immortal, either in its individuality or as a -part of the World-Soul: The Body on the other hand is perishable. -Against this Dualism, which in theory led to an ascetic Ethics, but -which in practice was easily converted into Libertinism, the religious -and moral feeling of Gazali rose in rebellion. If the flesh is to have -its obligations, it must in turn be invested with its rights. The -possibility of the Resurrection cannot be denied, for the reunion of -the Soul with its (new) bodily frame is not more wonderful than its -first union with the earthly body, which has been assumed even by the -Philosophers. Surely then every soul at the resurrection-time may -obtain a new body suited to it. But in any case Man’s real essence is -the Soul; and it is of little consequence what the material is, out of -which its heavenly body is formed. - -7. Even from these last propositions it is clear that Gazali’s theology -did not remain unaffected by philosophical speculation. Like the -Fathers of the Western Church, he had, whether consciously or -unconsciously, appropriated a good deal from philosophy; and for that -reason his theology was long proscribed as a heretical innovation by -the Muslims of the West. In reality his teaching regarding God, the -World, and the human Soul exhibits many elements which are foreign to -the oldest type of Islam, and which may be traced back,—partly through -the intervening agency of Christian and Jewish writers and partly -through that of more recent Muslim authors,—to heathen wisdom. - -Allah, Lord of the Worlds, God of Mohammed, is for Gazali a living -personality it is true, but yet far less anthropomorphic than he -appeared to simple Faith or in the Antimutazilite dogma. The surest way -of coming to know him must be to refuse to attribute to him any of the -properties of his creatures. But that does not mean that he possesses -no attributes: the very reverse is the case. The plurality of his -qualities does not prejudice the Unity of his Being. Analogies are -presented in the bodily world: A thing certainly cannot be both black -and white at the same time, but it may well be cold and also dry. Only, -if the qualities of men are attributed to God, they must be understood -in another and higher sense, for he is pure Spirit. Besides omniscience -and omnipotence, pure goodness and omnipresence belong to Him. By means -of this omnipresence this world and the next are brought in a manner -nearer to one another than by the usual representation. - -The conception of God is thus spiritualized. But resurrection and the -future life are also regarded as being much more spiritual in character -than the present life. Such a conception is facilitated by the doctrine -of the Gnostic Philosophy, that there are three or four worlds. One -above the other in regular order rise the Earthly and Sensible World of -Men, the World of Celestial Spirits, to which our Soul belongs, the -World of Supra-celestial Angels, and lastly God himself, as the World -of purest Light and most perfect Spirit. The pious and enlightened Soul -ascends from the lower world through the heavens till it is face to -face with God, for it is of spiritual nature and its resurrection-body -is of celestial essence. - -In a manner corresponding to the different worlds and grades of Souls, -men themselves differ from one another. The man of sensuous nature must -be content with the Koran and Tradition: he should not venture beyond -the letter of the Law. The study of duty is his bread of life; -philosophy would be a deadly poison to him. He who cannot swim should -not venture into the sea. - -However there are always people who go into the water for the purpose -of learning to swim. They want to elevate their faith into knowledge, -but in the process they may easily fall into doubt and unbelief. For -them, in Gazali’s opinion, a useful remedy may be found in the study of -Doctrine and Polemics directed against Philosophy. - -Those, however, have reached the highest degree of human perfection, -who, without any laborious cogitation, experience in themselves by -means of an inward and Divine illumination the truth and the reality of -the Spiritual World. Such are the prophets and pious mystics, among -whom Gazali himself may be reckoned. They see God in everything,—Him, -and Him alone—, and in Nature just as in the life of their own Soul; -but they see Him best in the Soul, for although it is not Divine it has -at least a likeness to the Divine. How altered now is every outward -thing! That which seems to be in existence outside of us, becomes a -condition or a property of the Soul, which in the consciousness of its -union with God, advances to the highest bliss. All things then become -one in Love. The true service of God transcends fear of punishment and -hope of reward, attaining to Love of God in the Spirit. The perfect -servant of God is raised above endurance and thanksgiving,—which -constitute the obligation of the pious wanderer upon the earth, so long -as he remains imperfect—, so that even in this world he loves and -praises God with joy of heart. - -8. From what has been said it follows that there are three stages of -Belief or Certainty. First, the belief of the multitude, who believe -what some man worthy of belief declares to them, for instance, that -So-and-so is in the house; secondly, the knowledge of the learned, -gained by deduction: they have heard So-and-so speaking, and conclude -that he is in the house; but thirdly we have the immediate certainty of -the ‘knowing’ ones, for they have entered the house and seen the person -with their own eyes. - -In contradistinction to the Dialecticians and Philosophers, Gazali -everywhere lays stress upon experience. The former, with their -Universal Ideas, in the first place fail to do justice to the -multiplicity which attaches to this world of sense. The sensible -qualities of things,—even the number of the stars for example,—we come -to know only through experience, and not from pure Ideas. Much less, -however, do such Ideas exhaust the heights and depths of our inner -being. That which the friend of God knows intuitively, remains hidden -for ever from the discursive intellect of the learned. A very small -number attain to this height of knowledge, where they meet with the -Apostles of God and Prophets of all times. It is the duty then of the -Spirits who stand at a lower level to strive to follow them. - -But now how are we to recognize the superior Spirit whom we need as our -guide? That is a question, on which every religiously-determined -system, which cannot do without human intermediaries, must founder, if -considered purely in the light of the understanding. Even Gazali’s -answer is indecisive. This much is certain to him, that grounds -furnished by the reason alone cannot decide this question. The Prophet -and Teacher who has been actually inspired by God is recognized by -merging ourselves in his peculiar personality, through the experience -of an inward relationship. The truth of Prophecy is authenticated by -the moral influence which it exercises upon the Soul. Of the -truthfulness of God’s word in the Koran we acquire a moral, not a -theoretical certainty. The detached miracle is not capable of -convincing; but the revelation as a whole, together with the -personality of the Prophet, through whom the revelation has been -conveyed, produce an irresistible impression upon the kindred soul. -Then, wholly carried away by such impression, the soul renounces the -world, to walk in the way of God. - -9. Gazali is without doubt the most remarkable figure in all Islam. His -doctrine is the expression of his own personality. He abandoned the -attempt to understand this world. But the religious problem he -comprehended much more profoundly than did the philosophers of his -time. These were intellectual in their methods, like their Greek -predecessors, and consequently regarded the doctrines of Religion as -merely the products of the conception or fancy or even caprice of the -lawgiver. According to them Religion was either blind obedience, or a -kind of knowledge which contained truth of an inferior order. - -On the other hand Gazali represents Religion as the experience of his -inner Being. It is for him more than Law and more than Doctrine: it is -the Soul’s experience. - -It is not every one who has this experience of Gazali’s. But even those -who cannot follow him in his mystic flight, when he transcends the -conditions of any possible experience, will at least be constrained to -acknowledge that his aberrations in searching for the highest are not -less important for the history of the Human Mind than the apparently -surer paths taken by the philosophers of his time, through a land which -others had discovered before them. - - - - -2. The Epitomists. - -1. In a history of scholarly Education as conducted in the Muslim -nations, this subject would necessarily have a larger space assigned -it: but here we shall dismiss it in a few words. - -That Gazali has annihilated philosophy in the East, for all time to -come, is an assertion frequently repeated but wholly erroneous, and one -which evidences neither historical knowledge nor understanding. -Philosophy in the East has since his day numbered its teachers and -students by hundreds and by thousands. The teachers of the Faith have -no more discontinued their dialectical arguments in support of Doctrine -than the teachers of Morals have abandoned their hair-splitting -casuistry. General culture too has adopted an element of philosophical -learning. - -But it is true that Philosophy did not succeed in conquering for itself -a commanding position, or in retaining the consideration which it once -enjoyed. According to an Arab anecdote a Philosopher, who had been -thrown into prison, on being asked what he was fit for, by a man who -wanted to purchase him as a slave, is said to have replied: “For -freedom”. Philosophy needs freedom. And where was this Freedom to be -met with in the East? Freedom from material cares, freedom to exemplify -unprejudiced thinking, tended continually to dwindle away from regions -where no enlightened despots were to be found, able to warrant and -protect it. But that is just a symptom of the general decay of -civilization. And although travellers from the West in the twelfth -century praised highly the culture of the East, it had, in comparison -with earlier times, at least begun to decline. In no department did -they pass the mark which had been reached of old: Minds were now too -weak to accomplish such a feat. Literary production became stagnant, -and the only merit which belongs to the voluminous compilers of the -following centuries is that of elegant selection. Ethical and religious -doctrine had ended in Mysticism; and the same was the case with -Philosophy. After the time of Ibn Sina, the Prince of Philosophy, no -one felt called upon to come forward with independent views. The day -had come for Abridgements, Commentaries, Glosses, and Glosses upon -Glosses. The learned world occupied their time in school with work of -that nature, while the believing multitude placed themselves more and -more under the guidance of the Dervish orders. - -2. That which general education borrowed most from philosophical -Propaedeutics was a little Mathematics &c., naturally exceedingly -elementary as a rule. By sectaries and mystics a good deal was taken -over from Pythagorean-Platonic wisdom. In particular these doctrines -had to be drawn upon in order to support the belief in saints and -miracles; and a barren syncretistic Theosophy was tricked out -therewith. The system even enrolled Aristotle among its teachers, of -course the spurious Aristotle, but it turned him into a disciple of -Agathodaemon and Hermes. - -The more sober-minded thinkers, on the other hand, kept to -Aristotelianism, so far as it agreed with their own views or with the -orthodox Faith. The system of Ibn Sina was almost universally followed -by them; and it was only a few that went back to Farabi, or that -endeavoured to combine the two. Very little notice was taken of -Physical and Metaphysical doctrines: Ethics and Politics were rather -more attended to. Logic was the only subject universally studied; for -it could be admirably conveyed in scholastic form; and, as pure Formal -Logic, it was an instrument which every one was able to make use of. In -fact with the resources of Logic everything might be proved; and even -if the demonstration should be recognized as faulty, there was this -consolation that the averment might still be true, although its -demonstration had not been properly conducted. - -Even in the Encyclopaedia of Abu Abdallah al-Khwarizmi, a production of -the last quarter of the tenth century, a larger space was assigned to -Logic than to Physics and Metaphysics. The very same thing was done in -many later encyclopaedias and compilations. The Dogmatists also -commenced their system with logical and epistemological considerations, -in which a traditional eulogy was pronounced over “knowing”. And from -the twelfth century onwards there arose a whole multitude of separate -arrangements of the Aristotelian Organon. Here may be mentioned -only,—as being much used, commented on, and so forth,—the works of -Abhari († 1264), who gave a short summary of the whole ‘Logic’ under -the title of “Isagudji” (εἰσαγωγή); and the works of Qazwini († 1276). - -At the greatest University in the Muslim world, that of Cairo, the -Epitomes of the 13th and 14th centuries are used, up to this day. There -the word still is, as for a long time it was with ourselves: “First of -all a College of Logic”, and, we need scarcely add, with no better -result. They indulge themselves, within the limits of the Law, in the -luxury of studying the rules of thinking discovered by the ancient -philosophers, but all the while they smile at these men and at the -Mutazilite Dialecticians, who “believed in Reason!” - - - - - - - - -VI. PHILOSOPHY IN THE WEST. - - -1. Beginnings. - -1. Western North-Africa, Spain and Sicily are reckoned as forming the -Muslim West. North-Africa, to begin with, is of subordinate importance: -Sicily is regulated by Spain, and is soon overthrown by the Normans of -Lower Italy. For our purpose Muslim Spain or Andalusia first falls to -be considered. - -The drama of culture in the East passes here through a second -representation. Just as Arabs there intermarried with Persians, so in -the West they intermarry with Spaniards. And instead of Turks and -Mongols we have here the Berbers of North-Africa, whose rude force is -flung into the play of more refined civilization with a blighting -influence ever on the increase. - -After the fall of the Omayyads in Syria (750), a member of that House, -Abderrakhman ibn Moawiya, betook himself to Spain, where he contrived -to work his way up to the dignity of Emir of Cordova and all Andalusia. -This Omayyad overlordship lasted for more than 250 years, and after a -passing system of petty States, it attained its greatest brilliancy -under Abderrakhman III (912–961), the first who assumed the title of -Caliph, and his son al-Hakam II (961–976). The tenth century was for -Spain, what the ninth was for the East,—the time of highest material -and intellectual civilization. If possible, it was more fresh and -native here than in the East, and, if it be true that all theorizing -betokens either a lack or a stagnation of the power of production, it -was more productive also: The sciences, and Philosophy in particular, -had far fewer representatives in Spain. Speaking generally, we may say -that the relations of intellectual life took a simpler form. There was -a smaller number of strata in the new culture than in the old. No doubt -there were, besides Muslims, Jews and Christians in Spain, who in the -time of Abderrakhman III played their part in this cultivated life, of -the Arabic stamp, in common with the rest. But of adherents of -Zoroaster, atheists and such like, there were none. Even the sects of -Eastern Islam were almost unknown. Only one school of Law, that of -Malik, was admitted. No Mutazilite dialectic troubled the peace of the -Faith. True enough the Andalusian poets glorified the trinity of Wine, -Woman and Song; but flippant free-thinking on the one hand, and gloomy -theosophy and renunciation of the world on the other, rarely found -expression. - -On the whole, intellectual culture was dependent upon the East. From -the tenth century onwards many journeys in search of knowledge were -undertaken thither from Spain, by way of Egypt and as far as Eastern -Persia, for the purpose of attending the prelections of scholars of -renown. And farther, educational requirements in Andalusia attracted to -it many a learned Eastern who found no occupation in his own home. -Besides, al-Hakam II caused books to be copied, all over the East, for -his library, which is said to have contained 400,000 volumes. - -The West was mainly interested in Mathematics, Natural Science, -Astrology and Medicine, precisely as was the case at first in the East. -Poetry, History and Geography were cultivated with ardour. But the mind -was not yet “sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought”, for when -Abdallah ibn Masarra of Cordova, under Abderrakhman III, brought home -with him from the East a system of Natural Philosophy, he had to submit -to see his writings consigned to the flames. - -2. In the year 1013 Cordova, “the Gem of the World”, was laid waste by -the Berbers, and the kingdom of the Omayyads was split up into a number -of minor States. Its second bloom fills up the eleventh century,—the -Medicean age of Spain, in which Art and Poetry still flourish in -luxuriant growth at the courts of the various cities, upon the ruins of -ancient splendour. Art grows refined; poetry becomes sage, and -scientific thought subtle. Intellectual nutriment continues to be -fetched from the East; and Natural Philosophy, the writings of the -Faithful Brethren, and Logic from the school of Abu Sulaiman -al-Sidjistani find admission one after the other. Towards the close of -the century it is possible to trace the influence even of the writings -of Farabi, and the “Medicine” of Ibn Sina becomes known. - -The beginnings of philosophical reflection are found chiefly with the -numerous men of culture among the Jews. Eastern Natural Philosophy -produces a powerful and quite singular impression upon the mind of Ibn -Gebirol, the Avencebrol of Christian authors; and Bakhya ibn Pakuda is -influenced by the Faithful Brethren. Even the religious poetry of the -Jews is affected by the philosophical movement; and what speaks therein -is not the Jewish Congregation seeking after God, but the Soul rising -towards the Supreme Spirit. - -Among the Muslims, however, the number of those who addressed -themselves to a thorough study of Philosophy was very limited. No -master gathered about him a numerous band of disciples; and meetings of -the learned, for the discussion of philosophical subjects, were -scarcely ever held. The individual thinker must have felt very lonely -in these circumstances. In the West, just as in the East, Philosophy -was developed subjectively; but here it was more the concern of a few -isolated individuals; and, besides, it stood more apart from the faith -of the mass of the people. In the East there were countless -intermediary agencies between faith and knowledge,—between the -philosophers and the believing community. The problem of the individual -thinker, confronted by political society and the faith of narrow-minded -fanatical multitudes, was accordingly realized more acutely in the -West. - - - - -2. Ibn Baddja. - -1. Towards the end of the eleventh century, when Abu Bekr Mohammed ibn -Yakhya ibn al-Saig ibn Baddja (Avempace) was born in Saragossa, the -fair kingdom of Andalusia was approaching the time of its disappearance -in a system of petty States. It was threatened from the North by the -less civilized but yet powerful and brave Christian knights. But the -Berber dynasty of the Almoravids came to the rescue, who were not only -firmer in the faith but also wiser in their policy than the voluptuous -ruling race of Spain. Then the time of refined culture and free enquiry -seemed gone for ever. Only traditionalists, of the strictest rite, -ventured to make a public appearance, while philosophers, unless they -kept concealed, were persecuted or put to death. - -2. But barbarous lords have their caprices, being fond of -appropriating, at least superficially, the culture of those who have -been subjugated by them. Thus Abu Bekr ibn Ibrahim, brother-in-law of -the Almoravid prince Ali,—who was for some time Governor of Saragossa, -made Ibn Baddja his intimate friend and first minister, thereby giving -great offence to his Faqihs and soldiers. Now this was a man, skilled -both in the theory and practice of the Mathematical Sciences, -particularly Astronomy and Music, as well as an adept in Medicine, and -one who was devoted to speculative studies in Logic, Natural Philosophy -and Metaphysics; and in the opinion of the fanatics he was an utterly -abandoned atheist and immoral person. - -We know nothing more of the outward life of Ibn Baddja except that he -was in Seville in the year 1118, after the fall of Saragossa, and that -he composed several of his works there, afterwards betaking himself to -the Almoravid court in Fez, where he died in 1138. According to -tradition he met his death by poison, administered at the instigation -of a jealous physician. His short life, as he himself confesses, had -not been a happy one; and he had often longed for death, as a final -refuge. Material want, and, above all, intellectual isolation, may have -weighed down his spirits. His extant writings abundantly evince that he -was unable to feel at home in that day and that environment. - -3. He conforms almost entirely to Farabi, the quiet, solitary Eastern. -Like him he was little given to systematizing. His original treatises -are but few in number; and they consist chiefly of brief expositions of -Aristotelian and other philosophical works. His observations are of a -desultory character: Now he makes a beginning in one place; again, he -starts afresh in another. In continually renewed approaches he -endeavours to get nearer Greek thought, and to penetrate from every -possible side to ancient science. He does not discard philosophy, and -he does not deal conclusively with it. On a first glance, that produces -a puzzling impression; but, in the sombre impulse which is upon him, -the philosopher has become aware of the path he is pursuing. In -searching for truth and righteousness, he is coming upon another -thing,—unity and joy in his own life. In his opinion, Gazali took the -matter much too easily, when he thought he could be happy only in the -full possession of the truth comprehended by means of Divine -illumination. In his love for the truth, which is concealed rather than -revealed by the sensuous images of religious mysticism, the philosopher -must be strong enough to renounce that happiness. Only pure thinking, -undisturbed by any sensuous desire, is privileged to behold the supreme -Godhead. - -4. In his logical writings Ibn Baddja hardly departs from Farabi. Even -his physical and metaphysical theories agree generally with the views -of the master. But perhaps the mode, in which he represents the history -of the development of the human spirit and the position of man in -knowledge and in life, may claim a measure of interest. There are two -kinds of existence, according to his view,—one which is moved, and one -which is not moved. That which is moved is corporeal and limited, but -its everlasting movement cannot be explained by finite Body. On the -contrary, in order to explain this endless movement, an unending power -is needed, or an eternal essence, namely Spirit. Now while the -corporeal or the natural is moved from without, and the Spirit, itself -unmoved, confers movement upon the corporeal, the Soul-substance -occupies a middle position, being that which moves itself. The relation -between the natural and the psychical presents as little difficulty to -Ibn Baddja as to his predecessors; but the great problem is this:—‘How -are the Soul and the Spirit related to each other, that is to say in -Man?’ - -5. Ibn Baddja starts with the assumption that Matter cannot exist -without some Form, while Form may exist by itself, without Matter. -Otherwise, in fact, absolutely no change is thinkable, because that is -rendered possible only by the coming and going of substantial Forms. - -These Forms then, from the hylic up to the purely spiritual, constitute -a series, to which the development of the human spirit corresponds, in -so far as it realizes the rational ideal. Man’s task is to comprehend -all the spiritual Forms together; first the intelligible Forms of all -that is corporeal, then the sensible-spiritual presentations of the -Soul, next the human Spirit itself and the Active Spirit over it, and -lastly the pure Spirits of the celestial spheres. By rising through -successive stages from the individual and sensible, the presentation of -which constitutes the material on which the Spirit operates, Man -attains to the superhuman and the Divine. Now his guide in this process -is Philosophy, or the knowledge of the universal, which issues from -knowledge of the particular through study and reflection, aided however -by the enlightening Spirit from above. Contrasted with this knowledge -of the universal or the infinite,—in which Being, and becoming the -object of cognition coincide,—all perception and presentation prove -deceptive. Thus it is by rational knowledge, and not by religious and -mystical dreaming, with the sensuous invariably clinging thereto, that -the human Spirit arrives at perfection. Thinking is the highest bliss, -for its very purpose is to reach all that is intelligible. But since -that is the universal, the continued existence of individual human -Spirits beyond this life cannot be assumed. It may be that the -Soul,—which apprehends the particular in the life of sensuous-spiritual -presentation, and notifies its existence in separate desires and -actions,—has the faculty of continuing that existence after death, and -of receiving reward or punishment; but the Spirit or the rational part -of the Soul is one in all. It is only the Spirit of the entirety of -Mankind, or, in other words, the one Intellect, Mind or Spirit in -Humanity,—and that too in its union with the active Spirit over -it,—which is eternal. This theory, which made its way into the -Christendom of the Middle Ages, under the name of Averroes’ Theory, is -thus found even with Ibn Baddja, if not quite distinctly conceived, at -all events more clearly given than with Farabi. - -6. Every man does not rise to such a height of contemplation. The -greater number grope about continually in the dark; they merely see the -adumbrations of things, and like shadows they will pass away. Some see -the Light, it is true, and the coloured world of things, but very few -indeed recognize the essence of what they have seen. It is only the -latter, the blessed ones, who attain to life eternal,—in which state -they themselves become Light. - -But now, how does the individual man get to this stage of knowledge and -blessed existence? Through action directed by reason, and the free -cultivation of his intellectual powers. Action directed by reason is -free action, that is, action in which there is a consciousness of -purpose. If one, for instance, breaks a stone to pieces, because he has -stumbled against it, he is behaving without purpose, like a child or a -lower animal; but if he does this in order that others may not stumble -against the stone, his action must be called manlike, and directed by -reason. - -In order to be able to live as a man should, and to act in a rational -way, the individual man, must as far as circumstances permit, withdraw -from society. The name borne by the Ethics of Ibn Baddja is “Guidance -to the Solitary”. It demands self-culture. Generally, however, one may -avail himself of the advantages attending social life in man, without -including in the bargain its disadvantages. The wise may associate -themselves in larger or smaller unions; such indeed is their duty, if -they light upon one another; and then they form a State within the -State. Naturally they endeavour to live in such a manner that neither -physician nor judge is necessary among them. They grow up like plants -in the open air, and do not stand in need of the gardener’s skill. They -keep at a distance from the lower enjoyments and sentiments of the -multitude. They are strangers to the movements of worldly society. And -as they are friends among themselves, this life of theirs is wholly -determined by Love. Then too as friends of God, who is the Truth, they -find repose in union with the superhuman Spirit of Knowledge. - - - - -3. Ibn Tofail. - -1. The sovereignty over Western Islam remained with the Berbers, but -the Almohads speedily took the place of the Almoravids. Mohammed ibn -Tumart, the founder of the new dynasty, had, from the year 1121, come -forward as Mahdi. Under his successors Abu Yaaqub Yusuf (1163–1184) and -Abu Yusuf Yaaqub (1184–1198), their sovereignty, which was centred in -Marocco, reached its culminating point. - -The Almohads brought with them a startling novelty in theology: The -system of Ashari and Gazali, which till then had been branded as -heretical, was adopted in the West. That meant an infusion of -intellectualism into the teaching of the Faith,—a proceeding which -could not be altogether satisfactory either to the adherents of the old -Faith or to freethinkers, but which may have incited many to farther -philosophizing. Hitherto an attitude of repudiation had been maintained -towards all reasoning in matters of faith; and, even later, many -politicians and philosophers were of opinion that the faith of the -multitude should not be violently disturbed, nor elevated to knowledge, -but that the provinces of Religion and of Philosophy should be kept -scrupulously separate. - -The Almohads were interested in questions of theology, but yet Abu -Yaaqub and his successors manifested, as far as political conditions -permitted, such an appreciation of secular knowledge, that philosophy -was enabled to enjoy a brief period of prosperity at their court. - -2. We find Abu Bekr Mohammed ibn Abdalmalik ibn Tofail al-Qaisi -(Abubacer) in the position of Vizir and Body-Physician to Abu Yaaqub, -after holding an appointment as Secretary in Granada. His place of -birth was the small Andalusian town of Guadix, and he died in Marocco, -the seat of Government, in the year 1185. The life that lies between -appears to have been by no means eventful. He was fonder of books than -of men, and in his sovereign’s great library he gathered, by reading, -much information which he required for his art, or which met his ardent -thirst for knowledge. He was the dilettante of the philosophers of the -West, and was more given to contemplative enjoyment than scientific -work. Rarely did he set himself to write. We need not perhaps put -absolute faith in his assertion that he could have fundamentally -improved the Ptolemaic system. Many Arabs made a like assertion, -without carrying it into effect. - -Of Ibn Tofail’s poetic ventures, one or two poems have been preserved -to us. But his principal endeavour, like that of Ibn Sina, was to -combine Greek Science and Oriental Wisdom into a modern view of the -world. That was to him a personal concern, just as it was to Ibn -Baddja. He too occupied his mind with the relation of the individual -man to Society and its prejudices. But he went farther: Ibn Baddja, as -a rule made out the individual thinker or a small association of -independent thinkers, as constituting a State within the State,—a copy, -as it were, of the great total, or a model for happier times: Ibn -Tofail on the other hand, turned to consider the original. - -3. He states the case clearly, in his work “Hai ibn Yaqzan”. The -scenery is contributed by two islands, on one of which he sets human -society with its conventions, and on the other an individual man, who -is being developed naturally. This society as a whole is governed by -lower impulses, subjected only to some measure of outward restraint by -a grossly sensuous religion. But out of this society two men, called -Salaman and Asal (Absal, cf. IV, 4 § 7), rise to rational knowledge and -control of their desires. Accommodating himself to the popular -religion, the first, who is of a practical turn of mind, contrives to -rule the people; but the second, being of speculative disposition and -mystic leanings, wanders off to the island which lay opposite, and -which he imagines to be uninhabited,—there to devote himself to study -and ascetic discipline. - -On that island, however, our Hai ibn Yaqzan,—i.e. ‘the Active one, the -son of the Vigilant’,—had been trained into a perfect philosopher. Cast -upon the island when a child, or else brought into existence there by -spontaneous generation, he had been suckled by a gazelle, and then had -been in the course of time left, like a Robinson Crusoe, and that -entirely, to his own resources. Yet he had secured a material -existence, and farther, by observation and reflection, had acquired a -knowledge of Nature, the heavens, God, and his own inner being, until -after seven times seven years he had attained to that which is highest, -viz., the Sufi vision of God, the state of ecstasy. In this situation -he was found by Asal. After they had come to understand each other,—for -at first Hai was still without speech,—it was found that the philosophy -of the one and the religion of the other were two forms of the same -truth, except that in the first form it was somewhat less veiled. But -when Hai came to know that on the opposite island an entire people -continued in darkness and error, he resolved to proceed thither and -reveal the truth to them. Here, however, he was brought to learn by -experience that the multitude were incapable of a pure apprehension of -the truth, and that Mohammed had acted wisely in giving the people -sensuous forms instead of full light. After this result therefore he -repaired again with his friend Asal to the uninhabited island, to serve -God in spirit and in truth till the hour of death. - -4. Ibn Tofail has devoted by far the largest portion of his romance to -the course of Hai’s development; but he cannot certainly have thought -that the individual man, left to himself, is able, with the resources -of Nature alone and without the help of society, to advance so far as -Hai did. And yet his conception is perhaps rather more historical, than -certain views which have been entertained since his day, e.g. by some -of the Rationalists of the 18th century. Many little touches in his -work shew that Hai was intended to represent humanity as it stands -outside of revelation. That which is accomplished in him, is the -development of Indian, Persian and Greek wisdom. One or two hints -pointing in that direction, but which cannot be farther followed out -here, may help to lend probability to this view. Thus it is -significant, to begin with, that Hai lives on the island of Ceylon, the -climate of which was held to be such as to render spontaneous -generation possible, where also, according to the legend, Adam, the -first man, had been created, and where the Indian king came to the Wise -Man. Then Hai’s first religious sentiment of wonder, after he had -struggled up out of the primary, animal stage, through shame and -curiosity, is elicited by fire, which has been discovered by him,—a -circumstance which recalls to us the Persian religion. And his farther -speculations are borrowed from Greco-Arabic Philosophy. - -The affinity to Ibn Sina’s Hai, which Ibn Tofail himself indicates, is -clear: Only, the figure of Hai in this case presents a more human -appearance. With Ibn Sina the character of Hai represents the -Superhuman Spirit, but the hero of Ibn Tofail’s romance seems to be the -personification of the natural Spirit of Mankind illuminated from -above; and that Spirit must be in accordance with the Prophet-Soul of -Mohammed when rightly understood, whose utterances are to be -interpreted allegorically. - -Ibn Tofail has thus arrived at the same result as his Eastern -predecessors. Religion must still be kept up for the ordinary man, -because he cannot go beyond it. It is only a few who rise to an -understanding of religious symbols; and very rarely indeed does any one -attain to the unrestrained contemplation of the highest reality. This -last truth he accentuates with the greatest emphasis. Even if we do -find in Hai the representative of human nature, we cannot gainsay this -truth; for the representation given sets forth the supreme perfection -of Man as consisting in submerging his own self in the World-Spirit, in -the most lonely quietude, and withdrawn from all that is sensuous. - -It is true that this condition is attained only in mature age, in -which, besides, a human friend has been met with; and attention to what -is material, and to the arts and sciences, forms the natural -preliminary stage of spiritual perfection. Thus Ibn Tofail is permitted -to look back without regret or shame upon his life spent at court. - -5. We have already met frequently with the philosophical views, which -Hai developed in his seven life-periods. But even his practical -behaviour is specially considered by Ibn Tofail. Sufi exercises, as -they are still observed among the religious orders of the East, and as -they had been recommended even by Plato and the Neo-Platonists, have -taken the place of the observances of religious worship enjoined by the -Muslim Law. And Hai forms for himself in the seventh period of his life -a system of Ethics which has a Pythagorean appearance. - -Hai has set before him as the aim of his action,—to seek for the One in -all things and to unite himself to the absolute and the self-existing. -He sees in fact all Nature striving to reach this Highest Being. He is -far above the view that everything on the earth exists for the sake of -Man. Animals and plants likewise live for themselves and for God; and -thus he is not permitted to deal capriciously with them. He now -restricts his bodily wants to what is absolutely necessary. Ripe fruits -are preferred by him, the seeds of which he piously consigns to the -soil, taking anxious precaution that no kind may die out through his -avidity. And only in extreme need does he touch animal food, in which -case he seeks in like manner to spare the species. ‘Enough for life, -not enough for sleep’ is his motto. - -That has reference to his bodily attitude towards the earthly; but the -living principle binds him to the heavens, and, like the heavens, he -strives to be useful to his surroundings, and to keep his own life -pure. He therefore tends the plants and protects the animals about him, -in order that his island may become a paradise. He pays scrupulous -attention to the cleanliness of his person and his clothing, and -endeavours to give a harmonious turn to all his movements, in -conformity with those of the heavenly bodies. - -In this way he is gradually rendered capable of elevating his own self -above earth and heaven to the pure Spirit. That is the condition of -ecstasy, which no thought, no word, no image has ever been able to -comprehend or express. - - - - -4. Ibn Roshd. - -1. Abu-l-Walid Mohammed ibn Akhmed ibn Mohammed ibn Roshd (Averroes) -was born at Cordova, of a family of lawyers, in the year 1126. There -too he made himself master of the learned culture of his time. In 1153 -he is said to have been presented to the prince Abu Yaaqub by Ibn -Tofail; and we possess a report of that occurrence, full of character. -After the introductory phrases of politeness the prince asked him: -“What is the opinion of philosophers about the heavens? Are they -eternal, or have they been brought into existence?” Ibn Roshd -cautiously replied that he had not given attention to philosophy. -Thereupon the prince commenced to discuss the subject with Ibn Tofail, -and, to the astonishment of the listener, shewed that he was acquainted -with Aristotle, Plato, and the philosophers and theologians of Islam. -Then Ibn Roshd also spoke out freely, and won the favour of his -high-placed master. His lot was fixed: He was destined to interpret -Aristotle, as no one before him had done, that mankind might be put in -complete and genuine possession of science. - -He was, besides, a jurist and a physician. We find him in 1169 in the -position of judge in Seville, and shortly afterwards in Cordova. Abu -Yaakub, now Caliph, nominates him his Body-Physician in the year 1182; -but, a short time after, he is again judge in his native city, as his -father and grandfather had been. Circumstances, however, change for the -worse. Philosophers are pronounced accursed, and their writings are -committed to the flames. In his old age Ibn Roshd is banished by Abu -Yusuf to Elisana (Lucena, near Cordova), but yet he dies in Marocco the -capital, on the 10th December, 1198. - -2. It was upon Aristotle that his activity was concentrated. All that -he could procure of that philosopher’s works, or about them, he -subjected to diligent study and careful comparison. Writings of the -Greeks, which are now lost either entirely or in part, were still known -to Ibn Roshd in translated form. He goes critically and systematically -to work: He paraphrases Aristotle and he interprets him, now with -comparative brevity, and anon in greater detail, both in moderate-sized -and in bulky commentaries. He thus merits the name of “the -Commentator”, which also is assigned to him in Dante’s “Commedia” [19]. -It looks as if the Philosophy of the Muslims had been fated in him to -come to an understanding of Aristotle, just that it might then expire, -after that end had been attained. Aristotle for him is the supremely -perfect man, the greatest thinker, the philosopher who was in -possession of an infallible truth. New discoveries in Astronomy, Art or -Physics could make no alteration in that respect. Of course it is -possible to misunderstand Aristotle: Ibn Roshd himself came to have a -different and better understanding of many a point which he took from -the works of Farabi and Ibn Sina; but yet he lived continually in the -belief that Aristotle, when rightly understood, corresponds to the -highest knowledge which is attainable by man. In the eternal revolution -of worldly events Aristotle has reached a height which it is impossible -to transcend. Men who have come after him are frequently put to the -cost of much trouble and reflection to deduce the views which readily -disclosed themselves to the first master. Gradually, however, all doubt -and contradiction are reduced to silence, for Aristotle is one who is -more than man, destined as it were by Providence to illustrate how far -the human race is capable of advancing in its approximation to the -World-Spirit. As being the sublimest incarnation of the Spirit of -Mankind, Ibn Roshd would like to call his master the ‘Divine’ Teacher. - -It will be shewn by what follows, that even in the instance of Ibn -Roshd, unmeasured admiration for Aristotle did not suffice to bring -about a perfect comprehension of his thoughts. He allows no opportunity -to pass of doing battle with Ibn Sina, and, upon occasion, he parts -company with Farabi and Ibn Baddja,—men to whom he owes a great deal. -He carps at all his predecessors, in a far more disagreeable fashion -than Aristotle did in the case of his teacher Plato. And yet he himself -is far from having got beyond the interpretation of Neo-Platonic -expositors and the misconceptions of Syrian and Arab translators. -Frequently he follows even the superficial Themistius in opposition to -the judicious Alexander of Aphrodisias, or else he tries to combine -their views. - -3. Ibn Roshd is above all a fanatical admirer of the Aristotelian -Logic. Without it one cannot be happy, and it is a pity that Plato and -Socrates were ignorant of it! The happiness of men is measured by the -degree of their logical attainments. With the discernment of a critic -he recognizes Porphyry’s “Isagoge” as superfluous, but he still counts -the “Rhetoric” and the “Poetics” as forming part of the Organon. And -then the oddest misapprehensions are met with. For example, Tragedy and -Comedy are turned into Panegyrics and Lampoons; poetical probability -has to be content with signifying either truth capable of -demonstration, or deceptive appearance; recognition on the stage -(ἀναγνώρισις) becomes Apodictic judgment, and so on. Of course he has -absolutely no conception of the Greek world; and that is venial, for he -could not have had any notion of it. And yet we do not readily excuse -one who has been so severe a critic of others. - -Like his predecessors, Ibn Roshd lays especial emphasis upon Grammar, -as far as it is common to all languages. This common principle, and -therefore the universal one, Aristotle, he thinks, keeps always before -him in his Hermeneutics, and even in the Rhetoric. Accordingly the Arab -philosopher is also bound to adhere to it, although in illustrating -universal rules he may take his examples from the Arabic language and -literature. But it is universal rules which form his object, for -science is the knowledge of the universal. - -Logic smooths the path for the ascent of our cognition from sensuous -particularity to pure rational truth. The multitude will always live in -the sensuous element, groping about in error. Defective mental parts -and poor education, and depraved habits to boot, prevent them from -making any advance. But still it must be within the power of some to -arrive at a knowledge of truth. The eagle looks the sun in the face, -for if no being could look at him, Nature would have made something in -vain. Whatever shines there is meant to be seen; and so whatever exists -is meant to be known, were it only by one single man. Now truth exists; -and the love for it which fills our hearts would have been all in vain, -if we could not approach it. Ibn Roshd thinks that he has come to know -the truth in the case of many things, and even that he has been able to -discover absolute Truth. He would not, with Lessing, have cared to -resign himself to a mere search for it. - -Truth, in fact, has been given him in Aristotle; and from that -standpoint he looks down upon Muslim theology. Certainly he recognizes -that religion has a truth of its own, but theology is repugnant to him. -It wants to prove what cannot be proved in this way. Revelation, as -contained in the Koran,—according to the teaching of Ibn Roshd and -others, and similarly of Spinoza in later times,—does not aim at making -men learned, but at making them better. Not knowledge, but obedience or -moral practice is the aim of the lawgiver, who knows that human welfare -can only be realized in society. - -4. That which especially distinguishes Ibn Roshd from those who -preceded him, and in particular from Ibn Sina, is the unequivocal mode -in which he conceives of the world as an eternal process of ‘becoming’. -The world as a whole is an eternally necessary unity, without any -possibility of non-existence or of different existence. Matter and Form -can only be separated in thought. Forms do not wander like ghosts -through dull Matter, but are contained in it after the manner of germs. -The Material Forms, in the guise of natural forces, operate in an -eternal process of generation, never separated from matter, but yet -deserving to be called divine. Absolute origination or extinction there -is none, for all happening is a transition from potentiality to -actuality, and from actuality back to potentiality, in which process -like is ever generated by like and by that alone. - -But there is a graded order in the world of Being. The material or -substantial Form stands midway between mere Accident and pure (or -separate) Form. Substantial Forms also exhibit varieties of -degree,—intermediate conditions between potentiality and actuality. -And, finally, the whole system of Forms, from the nethermost hylic Form -up to the Divine Essence, the original Form of the whole, constitutes -one compact structure rising tier upon tier. - -Now the eternal process of Becoming, within the given System, -presupposes an eternal movement, and that again an eternal Mover. If -the world had had an origin, we might have reasoned from it to another -and a similarly originated corporeal world, which had produced it, and -so on without end. If again it had been a ‘possible’ entity, we might -have inferred a ‘possible’ entity out of which it had proceeded, and so -on ad infinitum. And according to Ibn Roshd, it is only the hypothesis -of a world moved as a unity and of eternal necessity, that yields us -the possibility of inferring a Being, separate from the world, yet -eternally moving it, who in his continually producing that movement and -maintaining the fair order of the All, may legitimately be called the -Author of the world, and who in the Spirits that move the Spheres,—for -every separate kind of movement demands its separate -principle,—possesses agents to give effect to his activity. - -The essence of the First Mover, or of God, as well as of the -Sphere-Spirits, is found by Ibn Roshd in Thought, in which unity of -Being is given him. Thought which is identical with its object is the -sole positive definition of the Divine Essence; but Being and Unity -absolutely synchronize with such Thought. In other words, Being and -Unity are not annexed to the Essence, but are given only in Thought, -just like all universals. Thought produces everywhere the general in -the particular. It is true that the universal as a disposition is -operative in things, but the universal qua universal exists in the -understanding alone. Or, in possibility (or potentiality) it exists in -things, but it exists actually in the understanding,—that is, it has -more Being,—a higher kind of existence,—in the understanding than in -things. - -If now the question is asked,—‘Does Divine Thought take in merely the -general, or does it take in the particular too?’, Ibn Roshd replies, -‘It does not directly take in either the one or the other, for the -Divine Essence transcends both of them. Divine Thought produces the All -and embraces the All. God is the principle, the original Form, and the -final aim of all things. He is the order of the world, the -reconciliation of all opposites, the All itself in its highest mode of -existence.’ It follows of course from this theory, that there can be no -talk of a Divine Providence in the ordinary sense of the term. - -5. Two kinds of Being we know: one which is moved, and one which causes -motion, though itself unmoved,—or a corporeal and a spiritual. But it -is in the spiritual that the higher unity or perfection of all Being -lies, and that too in graded order. It is thus no abstract unity. The -farther the Sphere-Spirits are from the First, so much the less simple -are they. All know themselves, but in their knowledge there is at the -same time a reference to the First Cause. The result is a kind of -parallelism between the corporeal and the spiritual. There is something -in the lower Spirits which corresponds to the composition of the -corporeal out of Matter and Form. What is mingled with the purely -spiritual is of course no mere Matter, that could suffer anything, but -yet it is something resembling Matter,—something which has the faculty -of taking to itself something else. Otherwise the multiplicity of -intelligibilia could not be brought into harmony with the unity of the -Spirit which apprehends them. - -Matter suffers, but Spirit receives. This parallelism, with its subtle -distinction, has been introduced by Ibn Roshd with special reference to -the human Spirit. - -6. Ibn Roshd is firmly of opinion that the human soul is related to its -body, as Form is to Matter. He is completely in earnest on this point. -The theory of numerous immortal souls he most decidedly rejects, -combating Ibn Sina. The soul has an existence only as a completion of -the body with which it is associated. - -As regards empirical psychology he has anxiously endeavoured to keep by -Aristotle, in opposition to Galen and others; but in the doctrine of -the “nous” he diverges from his master not inconsiderably, without -being aware of it. His conception,—springing from Neo-Platonic -views,—of the Material Reason, is peculiar. It is not a mere aptitude -or capacity of the human soul, neither is it equivalent to the -sensuous-spiritual life of presentation, but it is something above the -soul, and above the individual. The Material Reason is eternal, -imperishable Spirit, as eternal and imperishable as the pure Reason or -the Active Spirit over us. The ascription of a separate existence to -Matter in the domain of the corporeal, is here transferred by Ibn -Roshd,—following of course Themistius and others,—to the region of the -spiritual. - -The Material Reason is thus eternal substance. The natural aptitudes, -or the capacity of the human individual for intellectual knowledge Ibn -Roshd denominates the Passive Reason. That comes into being and -disappears, with men as individuals, but the Material Reason is -eternal, like Man as a race. - -But a measure of obscurity remains, and it could hardly have been -otherwise, about the relation between the Active Spirit and the -Receptive Spirit, (if we may for the time use this last term for the -Material Reason). The Active Spirit renders intelligible the -presentations of the human soul, while the Receptive Spirit absorbs -these intelligibilia. The life of the soul in individual men thus forms -the meeting-place of this mystic pair of lovers. And such places differ -very greatly. It depends on the entire capacity of a man’s soul, and on -the disposition of his perceptions, in what degree the Active Spirit -can elevate these to intelligibility, and how far the Receptive Spirit -is in a position to make them a portion of its own contents. This -explains why men are not all at the same stage of spiritual knowledge. -But the sum of spiritual knowledge in the world continues unaltered, -although the partition of it undergoes individual variations. By a -necessity of nature, the Philosopher re-appears, without fail, whether -an Aristotle or an Ibn Roshd, in whose brain Being becomes Idea. It is -true that the thoughts of individual men occur in the element of time, -and that the Receptive Spirit is changeable, so far as the individual -has a part in it; but considered as the Reason of the Human Race, that -Spirit is eternally incapable of change, like the Active Spirit from -the last Sphere above us. - -7. On the whole, three great heresies set the system of Ibn Roshd in -opposition to the theology of the three world-religions of his time: -first, the eternity of the material world and of the Spirits that move -it; next, the necessary causal nexus in all that happens in the world, -so that no place is left for providence, miracle, and the like; and, -thirdly, the perishable nature of all that is individual, by which -theory individual immortality is also taken away. - -Considered logically the assumption of a number of independent -Sphere-Spirits under God does not appear to have any sufficient basis. -But Ibn Roshd, like his predecessors, gets over this difficulty by -asserting that these Sphere-Spirits do not differ individually but only -in kind. Their sole purpose was to explain the different movements in -the system of the world, so long as its unity was still unknown. After -the Ptolemaic system of the world had been put aside, and these -intermediary Spirits had become superfluous, men identified the Active -Spirit with God, as, for the matter of that, they had even in earlier -times attempted to do, on speculative and religious grounds. It was -merely one step farther, to identify even the eternal Spirit of Man -with God. Ibn Roshd did neither of these things, at least according to -the strict letter of his writings; but his system, when consistently -carried out, made it possible to take these steps, and in this way to -arrive generally at a Pantheistic conception of the world. On the other -hand Materialism might easily find support in the system, however -decidedly our philosopher contended against such a view; for where the -eternity, form and efficacy of all that is material are so strongly -emphasized, as was done by him, Spirit may indeed still receive the -name of king, but seemingly by the favour merely of the material. - -Ibn Roshd deserves at all events to be called a bold and consistent -thinker, although not an original one. Theoretical philosophy was -sufficient for him; but yet he owed it to his time and his position to -come to an understanding with religion and practice. We may devote a -few words to this point. - -8. Ibn Roshd often takes the opportunity of expressing himself against -the uneducated rulers and obscurantist theologians of his own day; but -he continues to prefer life as a citizen to a solitary life. He even -thanks his opponents for many a piece of instruction,—and that is a -pleasing touch of character. He thinks that the solitary life produces -no arts or sciences, and that one can at the most enjoy in it what has -been gained already, or perhaps improve it a little. But every one -should contribute to the weal of the whole community: even women as -well as men should be of service to society and the State. In this -opinion Ibn Roshd agrees with Plato (for he was not acquainted with the -Politics of Aristotle), and he remarks with entire good sense that a -great deal of the poverty and distress of his time arises from the -circumstance that women are kept like domestic animals or house plants -for purposes of gratification, of a very questionable character -besides, instead of being allowed to take part in the production of -material and intellectual wealth, and in the preservation of the same. - -In his Ethical system our philosopher animadverts with great severity -upon the doctrine of the professors of Law, that a thing is good or bad -only because God so willed it. On the contrary, says he, everything has -its moral character from nature or in conformity with reason. The -action which is determined by rational discernment is moral. It is not, -of course, the individual Reason, but the Reason which looks to the -welfare of the community or State, to which appeal must be made in the -last instance. - -Ibn Roshd regards religion also from a statesman’s point of view. He -values it on account of its moral purpose. It is Law, not Learning. He -is therefore constantly engaged in fighting the Theologians, who wish -to understand intellectually, instead of obeying with docile faith. He -makes it a reproach to Gazali, that he has allowed philosophy to -exercise an influence upon his religious doctrine, and thereby has led -many into doubt and unbelief. The people should believe, exactly in -accordance with what stands in the Book. That is Truth,—Truth meant no -doubt for a bigger sort of children, to whom we convey it in the form -of stories. Whatever goes beyond this, comes of evil. For example, the -Koran has two proofs of the existence of God, which are evident to -every one, viz: the Divine care of everything, especially of human -beings,—and the production of life in plants, animals, &c. These -deliverances should not be disturbed, nor should the literal -acceptation of revelation be quibbled about, in the theological -fashion. For, the proofs which theologians adduce of the existence of -God can make no stand against a scientific criticism, any more than the -proof which is furnished from the notion of the possible and the -necessary, in Farabi and Ibn Sina. All this leads to Atheism and -Libertinism. In the interests of morality, and therefore of the State, -this semi-theology should be fought against. - -On the other hand, philosophers who have attained to knowledge are -permitted to interpret the Word of God in the Koran. In the light of -the highest truth they understand what is aimed at therein; and they -tell merely just so much of it to the ordinary man as he is capable of -apprehending. In this way the most admirable harmony results. Religious -precept and philosophy are in agreement with one another, precisely -because they are not seeking the same thing. They are related as -practice and theory. In the philosopher’s conception of religion, he -allows its validity in its own domain, so that philosophy by no means -rejects religion. Philosophy, however, is the highest form of truth, -and at the same time the most sublime religion. The religion of the -philosopher, in fact, is the knowledge of all that exists. - -But yet this view has the appearance of being irreligious; and a -positive religion can never be content to recognize the leading -position of philosophy in the realm of truth. It was only natural that -the theologians of the West, like their brethren of the East should -seek to profit by the favour of circumstances, and take no rest until -they had reduced the mistress to the position of the handmaid of -Theology. - - - - - - - - -VII. CONCLUSION. - - -1. Ibn Khaldun. - -1. The Philosophy of Ibn Roshd, and his interpretation of Aristotle, -have had extremely little effect upon the Muslim world. Many of his -works, in the original, are lost, and we have them only in Hebrew and -Latin translations. He had no disciples or followers. In retired -corners no doubt many a free-thinker or Mystic might be met with, to -whose mind it looked sufficiently fantastic to toil earnestly with -philosophic questions of a theoretical kind; but Philosophy was not -permitted to influence general culture or the condition of affairs. -Before the victorious arms of the Christians the material civilization -as well as the intellectual culture of the Muslims retreated farther -and farther. Spain became like Africa, where the Berber was ruler. The -times were serious: the very existence of Islam in these regions was at -stake. Men made ready for fighting against the enemy, or even against -one another; and pious brethren everywhere formed unions for mystic -observances. In the Sufi orders of these people, a few philosophical -formulae at least were still preserved in safety. When, towards the -middle of the thirteenth century, the emperor Frederick II submitted a -number of philosophical questions to the Muslim scholars of Ceuta, the -Almohad Abdalwahid charged Ibn Sabin, founder of a Mystic order, to -reply to them. He did so, drawling forth in a pedantic tone the views -both of ancient and recent philosophers, and affording a glimpse of the -Sufi secret,—that God is the reality of all things. The only thing, -however, which we can learn from his answers, may be said to be, that -Ibn Sabin had read books, of which he thought the Emperor Frederick had -not the faintest notion. - -2. In small State-systems, the Muslim civilization of the West drifted -away, now rising, now falling. But before it vanished completely, a man -appeared, who endeavoured to discover the law of its formation, and who -thought to found therewith a new philosophical discipline,—the -Philosophy of Society or of History. That remarkable man was Ibn -Khaldûn, born at Tunis is the year 1332, of a family belonging to -Seville. There he also received his upbringing, and there he was next -instructed in philosophy, partly by a teacher who had been trained in -the East. After studying all known sciences, he occupied himself -sometimes in the service of the Government, and sometimes in travel, -proving everywhere an excellent observer. He served various princes in -the capacity of secretary, and he was ambassador at several courts in -Spain and Africa: as such he visited the Christian court of Peter the -Cruel in Seville. He was also at the court of Tamerlane in Damascus. He -had thus acquired a wide and full experience of the world, when he died -at Cairo in the year 1406. - -In character perhaps he does not take a high rank; but a measure of -vanity, dilettantism and the like, may readily be forgiven to the man -who, above all others in his time, lived for Science. - -3. Ibn Khaldûn was not satisfied with the School-Philosophy, as he had -come to know it. His picture of the world would not fit its -conventional framing. If he had been somewhat more given to theorizing, -he might no doubt have constructed a system of Nominalism. Philosophers -pretend to know everything; but the universe seems to him too great to -be capable of being comprehended by our understanding. There are more -beings and things, infinitely more, than Man can ever know. “God -creates what you know nothing of”. Logical deductions frequently do not -agree with the empirical world of individual things, which becomes -known by observation alone. That we can reach truth by merely applying -the rules of Logic, is a vain imagination: therefore reflection on what -is given in experience is the task of the scientific man. And he must -not rest satisfied with his own individual experience; but, with -critical care he must draw upon the sum of the collected experience of -mankind, which has been handed down. - -By nature the soul is devoid of knowledge; but yet by nature it has the -power of reflecting on the experience which is given, and elaborating -it. In the course of such reflection, there frequently springs forth, -as if by inspiration, the proper middle term, by means of which the -insight which has been gained may be arranged and explained according -to the rules of Formal Logic. Logic does not produce knowledge: it -merely traces the path which our reflection ought to take: it points -out how we arrive at knowledge; and it has the farther value of being -able to preserve us from error, and to sharpen the intellect and keep -it to accuracy in thinking. It is therefore an auxiliary science, and -ought to be cultivated even for its own sake by one or two qualified -men, called specially to that task; but it does not possess the -fundamental importance which is attributed to it by the Philosophers. -The path which it indicates for our reflection to take, is at need -followed by scientific talent in any individual science, quite -independently of logical guidance. - -Ibn Khaldûn is a sober thinker. He combats Alchemy and Astrology on -rational grounds. To the Mystic rationalism of the Philosophers he -opposes frequently the simple doctrines of his religion, whether from -personal conviction, or from political considerations. But religion -exercises no greater influence upon his scientific opinions than -Neo-Platonic Aristotelianism. Plato’s Republic, the -Pythagorean-Platonic Philosophy, but without its marvel-mongering -outgrowths, and the historical works of his oriental forerunners, -particularly of Masudi, have had most influence on the development of -his thoughts. - -4. Ibn Khaldûn comes forward with a claim to establish a new -philosophical discipline, of which Aristotle had no conception. -Philosophy is the science of what exists, developed from its own -principles or reasons. But what the Philosophers advance, about the -high Spirit-world and the Divine Essence, does not correspond thereto: -that which they say on these subjects is incapable of proof. We know -our world of men much better; and a more certain deliverance may be -given regarding it, by means of observation and inner mental -experience. Here facts permit of being authenticated, and their causes -discovered. Now, so far as the latter process is feasible in History, -i.e. so far as historical events are capable of being traced back to -their causes, and historical laws capable of being discovered, History -deserves actually to be called Science and a part of Philosophy. Thus -the idea of History as Science clearly emerges. It has nothing to do -with curiosity, frivolousness, general benefit, edifying effect &c. It -should, although in the service of the higher purposes of life, -determine nothing except facts, endeavouring to find out their causal -nexus. The work must be done in a critical, unprejudiced spirit. The -governing principle which rules here is this,—that the cause -corresponds to the effect,—that is to say, that like events presuppose -the same conditions, or, that under the same circumstances of -civilization the like events will occur. Now, as it is a probable -assumption that the nature of men and of society undergoes no change by -the advance of time, or no considerable change, a living comprehension -of the present is the best means of investigating the past. That which -is fully known and is under our very eyes permits us to form -retrospective conclusions in regard to the less fully known events of -an earlier time: it promises even a glance into the future. In every -instance, therefore, tradition must be tested by the present; and if it -tells us of things which are impossible now, we must for that very -reason doubt its truth. Past and Present are as like one another as two -drops of water. If understood absolutely, that might have been said -even by Ibn Roshd. But according to Ibn Khaldûn it is only quite -generally valid as a principle of research. In detail it suffers many a -limitation; and in any case it has itself to be established by facts. - -5. What then is the subject of History as a philosophical discipline? -Ibn Khaldûn answers that it is the Social life,—the collective, -material and intellectual culture of Society. History has to show how -men work and provide themselves with food, why they contend with each -other and associate in larger communities under single leaders, how at -last they find in a settled life leisure for the cultivation of the -higher arts and sciences, how a finer culture comes into bloom in this -way out of rude beginnings, and how again this in time dies away. - -The forms of Society which replace one another are, in the opinion of -Ibn Khaldûn; 1) Society in the Nomad condition; 2) Society under a -Military Dynasty; and 3) Society after the City type. The first -question is that of food. Men and nations are differentiated by their -economical position, as nomads, settled herdsmen, agriculturists. Want -leads to rapine and war, and to subjection to a monarch who will lead -them. Thus dynastic authority is developed. This again founds for -itself a city, where division of labour or mutual assistance produces -prosperity. But this prosperity leads to degenerate idleness and -luxury. Labour has in the first place brought about prosperity; but -now, at the highest stage of civilization, men get others to labour for -them, and often without any direct equivalent, because regard or even -servility to the upper classes, and extortionate treatment of the -lower, secure success. But, all the same, men are coming to depend upon -others. Needs are always growing more clamant, and taxes more -oppressive. Rich spendthrifts and tax-payers grow poor, and their -unnatural life makes them ill and miserable. [20] The old warlike -customs have been refined away, so that people are no longer capable of -defending themselves. The bond,—formed by a sense of belonging to one -community, or the bond of Religion,—by the help of which the necessity -and the will of the chief knit the individual members together in older -days, is relaxed, for the citizens are not pious. Everything, -therefore, is ready to break up from within. And then appears a new and -powerful nomad race from the desert, or a people not so greatly -over-civilized, but possessed of a firmer public spirit; and it falls -upon the effeminate city. Thereafter a new State is formed, which -appropriates the material and intellectual wealth of the old culture, -and the same history is repeated. It fares with States and the larger -associations of men, just as with single families: their history is -brought to a close, in from three to six generations. The first -generation founds; the second maintains, as perhaps the third or even -farther generations also do; the last demolishes. That is the cycle of -all civilization. - -6. According to August Müller the theory of Ibn Khaldûn is in -conformity with the history of Spain, West Africa and Sicily, from the -eleventh to the fifteenth century,—from the study of which, in fact, it -was taken. His own historical work is a compilation, it is true. In -detail he is often at fault, when he criticizes tradition with the help -of his theory; but there is an abundance of fine psychological and -political observation in his philosophical Introduction, and as a whole -it is a masterly performance. The ancients never dealt thoroughly with -the problem of History. They have bequeathed to us great works of art -in their historical compositions, but no philosophical establishment of -History as a Science. That mankind, though existing from all eternity, -long failed to attain to much of the higher civilization, was explained -by elementary occurrences, such as earthquakes, floods, and the like. -On the other hand Christian philosophy regarded History with its -vicissitudes as the realization of, or the preparation for, the kingdom -of God upon the earth. Now Ibn Khaldûn was the first to endeavour,—with -full consciousness and in a statement amply substantiated,—to derive -the development of human society from proximate causes. The conditions -of race, climate, production of commodities, and so on, are discussed, -and are set forth in their effect upon the sensuous and intellectual -constitution of man and of society. In the course which is run by -civilization he finds an intimate conformity to Law. He searches -everywhere for natural causes, with the utmost completeness which was -possible for him. He also asserts his belief that the chain of causes -and effects reaches its conclusion in an Ultimate Cause. The series -cannot go on without end, and therefore we argue that there is a God. -But this deduction, as he calls it, properly means this,—that we are -not in a position to become acquainted with all things and the manner -of their operation: it is virtually a confession of our ignorance. -Conscious ignorance is even a kind of knowledge; but knowledge should -be pursued, as far as possible. In clearing the way for his new -science, Ibn Khaldûn considers that he has merely indicated the main -problems, and merely suggested generally the method and the subject of -the science. But he hopes that others will come after him to carry on -his investigations and propound fresh problems, with sound -understanding and sure knowledge. - -Ibn Khaldûn’s hope has been realized, but not in Islam. As he was -without forerunners, he remained without successors. But yet his work -has been of lasting influence in the East. Many Muslim statesmen who, -from the fifteenth century onwards, drove so many a European sovereign -or diplomatist to despair, had studied in our philosopher’s school. - - - - -2. The Arabs and Scholasticism. - -1. To the victor belongs the bride. In the wars which were waged in -Spain between Christians and Muslims, the former had often come under -the influence of the attractions of Moorish fair ones. Many a Christian -knight had celebrated “the nine-days’ religious rite” with a Moorish -woman. But besides material wealth and sensual enjoyment, the charm of -intellectual culture had also its effect upon the conqueror. And Arab -Science thus presented the appearance of a lovely bride to the eyes of -many men who felt their want of knowledge. - -It was the Jews especially who played the part of matchmakers in the -transaction. The Jews had participated in all the transformations of -Muslim intellectual culture: many of them wrote in Arabic, and others -translated Arabic writings into Hebrew; not a few philosophical works -by Muslim authors owe their preservation to the latter circumstance. - -The development of this Jewish study of philosophy culminated in -Maimonides (1135–1204), who sought, chiefly under the influence of -Farabi and Ibn Sina, to reconcile Aristotle with the Old Testament. In -part he expounded the doctrines of philosophy from the text of -revelation, and in part he restricted the Aristotelian philosophy to -what belongs to this earth, while a knowledge of that which is above -it, had to be gained from the Word of God. - -In the various Muslim States, at the time when they were most -flourishing, the Jews had shewn an interest in scientific work, and -they had not only been tolerated, but even regarded with favour. Their -position, however, was altered, when those States were together -overthrown, and when the decline of their civilization ensued. Expelled -by fanatical mobs they fled for refuge to Christian lands, and -particularly to Southern France, there to fulfil their mission as the -disseminators of culture. - -2. The Muslim world and the Christian world of the West came into -contact at two points,—in Lower Italy and in Spain. At the court of the -Emperor Frederick II in Palermo, Arab science was eagerly cultivated -and made accessible to Latinists. The Emperor and his son Manfred -presented the Universities of Bologna and Paris with translations of -philosophical works, partly rendered from the Arabic, and partly direct -from the Greek. - -Of much greater importance and influence, however, was the activity of -translators in Spain. In Toledo, which had been re-captured by the -Christians, there existed a rich Arabic Mosque-library, the renown of -which, as a centre of culture, had penetrated far into the Christian -countries of the North. Arabs of mixed lineage and Jews, some of them -converts to Christianity, worked together there, along with Spanish -Christians. Fellow-workers were present from all countries. Thus -co-operated as translators, for example, Johannes Hispanus and -Gundisalinus (first half of the twelfth century), Gerard of Cremona -(1114–1187), Michael the Scot and Hermann the German (between 1240 and -1246). We are not yet in possession of sufficiently detailed -information regarding the labours of these men. Their translations may -be called faithful, to the extent that every word in the Arabic -original, or the Hebrew (or Spanish?) version has some Latin word -corresponding to it; but they are not generally distinguished by an -intelligent appreciation of the subject matter. To understand these -translations thoroughly is a difficult thing, for one who is not -conversant with Arabic. Many Arabic words which were taken over as they -stood, and many proper names, disfigured beyond recognition, flit about -with the air of ghosts. All this may well have produced sad confusion -in the brains of Latinist students of Philosophy; and the thoughts, -which were being disclosed afresh, had themselves at least an equally -perplexing tendency. - -The activity of translators kept pace generally with the interest shewn -by Christian circles, and this interest followed a development similar -to that which we had occasion to observe in Eastern and Western Islam -(cf. VI, 1 § 2). The earliest translations were those of works on -Mathematical Astrology, Medicine, Natural Philosophy, and Psychology, -including Logical and Metaphysical material. As time went on, people -restricted themselves more to Aristotle and commentaries upon him; but, -at first, a preference was shewn for everything that met the craving -for the marvellous. - -Kindi became known chiefly as a physician and an astrologer. Ibn Sina -produced a notable effect by his ‘Medicine’, and his empirical -psychology, and also by his Natural Philosophy and his Metaphysics. -Compared with him, Farabi and Ibn Baddja exercised a less considerable -influence. Lastly came the Commentaries of Ibn Roshd (Averroes); and -the reputation which they gained, along with that which was secured by -Ibn Sina’s Canon of Medicine, has been longest maintained. - -3. What then does the Christian Philosophy of the Middle Ages owe to -the Muslims? The answer to this question lies properly outside the -scope of the present monograph. It is a special task, which -necessitates the ransacking of many folios, none of which I have read. -In general terms it may be affirmed that in the translations from the -Arabic a twofold novelty was disclosed to the Christian West. In the -first place men came to possess Aristotle, both in his Logic and in his -Physics and Metaphysics, more completely than they had hitherto known -him. But still this circumstance was only of passing importance, though -stimulating for the moment, for erelong all his writings were -translated much more accurately, direct from the Greek into Latin. The -most important result, however, was—that from the writings of the -Arabs, particularly of Ibn Roshd, a peculiar conception of the -Aristotelian doctrines, as constituting the highest truth, came to the -knowledge of men. This was bound to give occasion for contradiction, or -for compromise, between theology and philosophy, or even for denial of -the Church’s creed. Thus the influence of Muslim Philosophy upon the -scholastic development of Church dogma was partly of a stimulating, -partly of a disintegrating character; for, in the Christian world, -philosophy and theology were not yet able to proceed side by side in an -attitude of mutual indifference, as doubtless happened in the case of -Muslim thinkers. Christian Dogmatic had adopted too much Greek -Philosophy already in the first centuries of its development, to admit -of such an attitude: it could even assimilate a little more. It was -therefore relatively easier to get the better of the simple teachings -of Islam than the complicated dogmas of Christianity. - -In the twelfth century, when the influence of the Arabs commenced to -operate in that field, Christian Theology exhibited a Neo-Platonic, -Augustinian character. That character continued to be kept up with the -Franciscans, even in the thirteenth century. Now the -Pythagorean-Platonic tendency, in Muslim thought, harmonized well with -this. Ibn Gebirol (Avencebrol, v. VI, 1 § 2) was, for Duns Scotus, an -authority of the first rank. On the other hand, the great Dominicans, -Albert and Thomas, who decided the future of the doctrine of the -Church, adopted a modified Aristotelianism, with which a good deal out -of Farabi, but especially out of Ibn Sina and Maimonides, agreed quite -well. - -A more profound influence emanates from Ibn Roshd, but not till about -the middle of the thirteenth century, and, in fact, in Paris, the -centre of the Christian scientific education of that time. In the year -1256 Albertus Magnus writes against Averroes; and fifteen years later -Thomas Aquinas controverts the Averroists. Their leader is Siger of -Brabant (known from 1266), member of the Parisian Faculty of Arts. He -does not shrink from the rigorous, logical results of the Averroist -system. And just as Ibn Roshd censures Ibn Sina, so Siger criticizes -the great Albert and the saintly Thomas, although in terms of the -utmost respect. It is true that he asseverates his submission to -Revelation; but still, his reason confirms what Aristotle,—as he is -expounded, in doubtful cases, by Ibn Roshd,—has taught in his works. -This subtle intellectualism of his, however, does not please the -theologians. At the instance of the Franciscans, it would seem, who -perhaps wished also to strike at the Aristotelianism of the Dominicans, -he was persecuted by the Inquisition, till he died in prison at Orvieto -(circa 1281–1284). Dante, who possibly knew nothing of his heresies has -placed Siger in Paradise as the representative of secular wisdom. The -two champions of Muslim Philosophy, on the other hand, he met with in -the vestibule of the Inferno, in the company of the great and wise men -of Greece and Rome. Ibn Sina and Ibn Roshd there end the series of the -great men of heathendom, towards whom succeeding ages, like Dante, have -so often lifted up their eyes in admiration. - - - - - - - - -NOTES - - -[1] S. Munk, “Mélanges de Philosophie juive et arabe”, Paris 1859. - -[2] Carra de Vaux, “Avicenne”, Paris 1900. - -[3] [Translator’s Note: In this version the transliteration has been -adapted as far as possible to English sounds.] - -[4] Cf. Snouck Hurgronje, “Mekka”, II, p. 228 sq. - -[5] Job XXXVIII. - -[6] Gen. XV:5. - -[7] The dialogue has received this name from the circumstance that -during the conversation Aristotle holds in his hand an apple, the smell -of which keeps awake what remains of his vital powers. At the close, -his hand drops powerless, and the apple falls to the ground. - -[8] Farther, an epitome of the στοιχείωσις θεολογική of Proclus, was -held even in later times to be a genuine work of Aristotle’s. - -[9] Examples of both methods occur, but usually Qiyas is equivalent to -Analogy. However, in the philosophical terminology which owes its -origin to the Translators, Qiyas always stands for συλλογισμός, while -ἀναλογία is rendered by the Arabic mithl. - -[10] Cf. Snouck Hurgronje in ZDMG, LIII p. 155. - -[11] For this the Mystics introduced a sixth sense. - -[12] Ascetics were called Sufis, from their coarse woollen garment, or -Sûf. - -[13] V. Rückerts Uebers. d. Makamen II, p. 219. - -[14] [Translator’s note.—‘John of Leyden’.] - -[15] Cf. my Article “On Kindi and his School” in Stein’s ‘Archiv für -Geschichte der Philosophie XIII’, p. 153 sqq., from which I have taken -over, without much alteration, not a little that appears in this -chapter. - -[16] [Translator’s note.—The Bagdad Caliphate lasted up to the death of -Mustassim (A.H. 656 or A.D. 1258), i.e. for 400 Mohammedan years -after A.H. 256 or A.D. 870]. - -[17] The Arabic ʻaql (νοῦς) is usually translated by Reason and -Intelligence (Lat. intellectus and intelligentia). I prefer however the -rendering, Geist, Spirit or Mind, because the expression includes God -and the pure (separate) spirits of the spheres. Moreover it is hard to -decide how far the personification of Reason was carried by individual -thinkers. - -[18] [Translator’s note.—Accordingly Ibn Sina’s Five Internal Senses -are: A. The General or Co-ordinating Sense; 2. Memory of the Collective -sense-images; 3. Unconscious Apperception, referring to individuals; 4. -Conscious Apperception, with generalization; 5. Memory of the higher -apperceptions]. - -[19] “Averrois, che’l gran comento feo” Canto IV. - -[20] Ibn Khaldûn speaks only of rich people who have grown poor, and -says nothing of the misery of the proletariate, and that which prevails -in large cities, as we know it. He lived too in smaller cities, for the -most part, and till late in life admired Cairo from a distance. - - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN -ISLAM *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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} -.hebr { font-family: Shlomo, 'Ezra SIL', serif; } -.syrc { font-family: 'Serto Jerusalem', serif; } -/* CSS rules generated from @rend attributes in TEI file */ -.xd31e2142 { -text-align:right; -} -.cover-imagewidth { -width:480px; -} -.xd31e113 { -text-align:center; font-size:large; -} -.titlepage-imagewidth { -width:473px; -} -.xd31e160 { -text-align:center; font-size:small; -} -@media handheld { -} -/* ]]> */ </style> -</head> -<body> - -<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The History of Philosophy in Islam, by T.J. de Boer</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: The History of Philosophy in Islam</p> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: T.J. de Boer</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Translator: Edward R. Jones</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: October 19, 2021 [eBook #66566]</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net/ for Project Gutenberg (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)</div> - -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM ***</div> -<div class="front"> -<div class="div1 cover"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#toc">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divBody"> -<p class="first"></p> -<div class="figure cover-imagewidth"><img src="images/new-cover.jpg" alt="Newly Designed Front Cover." width="480" height="720"></div><p> -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div class="div1 frenchtitle"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#toc">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divBody"> -<p class="first xd31e113">THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div class="div1 titlepage"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#toc">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divBody"> -<p class="first"></p> -<div class="figure titlepage-imagewidth"><img src="images/titlepage.png" alt="Original Title Page." width="473" height="720"></div><p> -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div class="titlePage"> -<div class="docTitle"> -<div class="mainTitle">THE <br>HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM</div> -</div> -<div class="byline">BY -<span class="docAuthor"><span class="sc">D<sup>r</sup>.</span> T. J. DE BOER</span>, <br>UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN. -<br><i>TRANSLATED</i> <br>(with the sanction of the Author) -<br>BY -<br><span class="docAuthor">EDWARD R. JONES B.D.</span> </div> -<div class="docImprint">LONDON <br>LUZAC & CO., 46, GREAT RUSSELL STREET, <br><span class="docDate">1903.</span> </div> -</div> -<p></p> -<div class="div1 imprint"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#toc">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divBody"> -<p class="first xd31e160">PRINTED BY E. J. BRILL—LEYDEN (HOLLAND). -<span class="pageNum" id="pb.v">[<a href="#pb.v">V</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -<div class="div1 preface"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#toc">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h2 class="main">TRANSLATOR’S PREFATORY NOTE.</h2> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p class="first">This edition of Dr. <span class="sc">de Boer</span>’s recent work is produced in the hope that it may prove interesting to not a few -English readers, and especially that it may be of service to younger students commencing -to study the subject which is dealt with in the following pages. The translator has -aimed at nothing more than a faithful reproduction of the original. His best thanks -are due to the accomplished author, for his kindness in revising the proof-sheets -of the version, as it passed through the Press. -</p> -<p class="signed">E. R. J. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb.vii">[<a href="#pb.vii">VII</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -<div class="div1 preface"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#toc">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h2 class="main">PREFACE.</h2> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p class="first">The following is the first attempt which has been made, since the appearance of Munk’s -excellent sketch<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e179src" href="#xd31e179">1</a>, to present in connected form a History of Philosophy in Islam. This work of mine -may therefore be regarded as a fresh initiation,—not a completion of such a task. -I could not know of all that had been done by others, in the way of preliminary study -in this field; and when I did know of the existence of such material, it was not always -accessible to me. As for manuscript assistance, it was only in exceptional cases that -this was at my disposal. -</p> -<p>Conforming to the conditions which I had to meet, I have in the following account -refrained from stating my authorities. But anything which I may have taken over, nearly -word for word or without testing it, I have marked in foot-references. For the rest, -I deeply regret that I cannot duly indicate at present how much I owe, as regards -appreciation of the sources, to men like Dieterici, de Goeje, Goldziher, Houtsma, -Aug. Müller, Munk, Nöldeke, Renan, Snouck Hurgronje, van Vloten, and many, many others. -</p> -<p>Since the completion of this volume an interesting monograph on Ibn Sina<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e190src" href="#xd31e190">2</a> has appeared, which farther extends <span class="pageNum" id="pb.viii">[<a href="#pb.viii">VIII</a>]</span>its survey over the earlier history of Philosophy in Islam. It gives rise to no occasion, -however, to alter substantially my conception of the subject. -</p> -<p>For all bibliographical details I refer the reader to “<span lang="de">die Orientalische Bibliographie</span>”, Brockelmann’s “<span lang="de">Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur</span>”, and Ueberweg—Heinze’s “<span lang="de">Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie</span>” II<sup>3</sup>, p. 213 <i>sqq.</i> In the transcription of Arabic names I have been more heedful of tradition and German -pronunciation, than of consistency. Be it noted only that <i>z</i> is to be pronounced as a soft <i>s</i>, and <i>th</i> like the corresponding English sound<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e223src" href="#xd31e223">3</a>. In the Index of Personal Names, accents signify length. -</p> -<p>As far as possible I have confined myself to Islam. On that ground Ibn Gebirol and -Maimonides have received only a passing notice, while other Jewish thinkers have been -entirely omitted, although, philosophically considered, they belong to the Muslim -school. This, however, entails no great loss, for much has been written already about -the Jewish philosophers, whereas Muslim thinkers have hitherto been sadly neglected. -</p> -<p class="dateline"><span class="ex">Groningen</span> (Netherlands). -</p> -<p class="signed"><span class="sc">T. J. de Boer.</span> -<span class="pageNum" id="pb.ix">[<a href="#pb.ix">IX</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -<div class="footnotes"> -<hr class="fnsep"> -<div class="footnote-body"> -<div id="xd31e179"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e179src">1</a></span> <span class="sc">S. Munk</span>, “<i lang="fr">Mélanges de Philosophie juive et arabe</i>”, Paris 1859. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e179src" title="Return to note 1 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e190"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e190src">2</a></span> <span class="sc" lang="fr">Carra de Vaux</span>, “<i lang="fr">Avicenne</i>”, Paris 1900. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e190src" title="Return to note 2 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e223"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e223src">3</a></span> [<i>Translator’s Note</i>: In this version the transliteration has been adapted as far as possible to English -sounds<span class="corr" id="xd31e227" title="Source: ].">.]</span> <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e223src" title="Return to note 3 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div id="toc" class="div1 contents"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#toc">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h2 class="main">CONTENTS.</h2> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p class="first tocHead">CHAPTER I. -</p> -<p class="tocHead"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch1" id="xd31e247">Introduction</a>.</span> -</p> -<table class="tocList"> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">Page</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>1.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s1.1" id="xd31e262"><b>The Theatre</b></a> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">1–6</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.1.1">Ancient Arabia</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.1.2">The first Caliphs. Medina. The Shiʻites</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">2</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.1.3">The Omayyads. Damascus, Basra and Kufa</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">3</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.1.4">The Abbasids. Bagdad</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">3</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.1.5">Minor States. Fall of the Caliphate</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">5</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>2.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s1.2" id="xd31e326"><b>Oriental Wisdom</b></a> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">6–11</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.2.1">Semitic Speculation</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">6</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.2.2">Persian Religion. Zrwanism</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">8</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.2.3">Indian Wisdom</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">8</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>3.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s1.3" id="xd31e370"><b>Greek Science</b></a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">11–30</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.1">The Syrians</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">11</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.2">The Christian Churches</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">11</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.3">Edessa and Nisibis</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">12</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.4">Harran</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">13</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.5">Gondeshapur</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">14</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">6.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.6">Syriac Translations</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">14</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">7.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.7">Philosophy among the Syrians</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">16</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">8.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.8">Arabic Translations</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">17</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">9.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.9">The Philosophy of the Translators</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">19</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">10.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.10">Range of Tradition</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">21</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">11.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.11">Continuation of Neo-Platonism</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">22</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">12.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.12">The “Book of the Apple”</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">24</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">13.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.13">The “Theology of Aristotle”</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">25</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">14.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.14">Conception of Aristotle</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">27</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">15.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p1.3.15">Philosophy in Islam</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">28</td> -</tr> -</table><p> -<span class="pageNum" id="pb.x">[<a href="#pb.x">X</a>]</span></p> -<p class="tocHead">CHAPTER II. -</p> -<p class="tocHead"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch2" id="xd31e536">Philosophy and Arab Knowledge</a>.</span> -</p> -<table class="tocList"> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>1.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s2.1" id="xd31e546"><b>Grammatical Science</b></a> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">31–35</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.1.1">The several Sciences</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">31</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.1.2">The Arabic Language. The Koran</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">31</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.1.3">The Grammarians of Basra and Kufa</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">32</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.1.4">Grammar influenced by Logic. Metrical Studies</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">33</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.1.5">Grammatical Science and Philosophy</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">35</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>2.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s2.2" id="xd31e610"><b>Ethical Teaching</b></a> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">36–41</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.2.1">Tradition and Individual Opinion (<i>Sunna</i>, <i>Hadith</i>, <i>Raʼy</i>)</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">36</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.2.2">Analogy (<i>Qiyas</i>). Consensus of the Congregation (<i>Idjma</i>)</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">37</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.2.3">Position and Contents of the Muslim Ethical System (<i>al-Fiqh</i>)</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">38</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.2.4">Ethics and Politics</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">40</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>3.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s2.3" id="xd31e676"><b>Doctrinal Systems</b></a> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">41–64</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.1">Christian Dogmatic</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">41</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.2">The Kalam</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">42</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.3">The Mutazilites and their Opponents</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">43</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.4">Human and Divine Action</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">44</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.5">The Being of God</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">46</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">6.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.6">Revelation and Reason</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">48</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">7.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.7">Abu-l-Hudhail</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">49</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">8.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.8">Nazzam</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">51</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">9.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.9">Djahiz</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">53</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">10.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.10">Muammar and Abu Hashim</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">54</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">11.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.11">Ashari</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">55</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">12.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.12">The Atomistic Kalam</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">57</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">13.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.3.13">Mysticism or Sufism</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">62</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>4.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s2.4" id="xd31e821"><b>Literature and History</b></a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">65–<span class="corr" id="xd31e827" title="Source: 61">71</span></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.4.1">Literature</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">65</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.4.2">Abu-l-Atahia. Mutanabbi. Abu-l-Ala. Hariri</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">65</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.4.3">Annalistic. Historical Tradition</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">67</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p2.4.4">Masudi and Muqaddasi</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">69</td> -</tr> -</table><p> -</p> -<p class="tocHead">CHAPTER III. -</p> -<p class="tocHead"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch3" id="xd31e877">The Pythagorean Philosophy</a>.</span> -</p> -<table class="tocList"> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>1.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s3.1" id="xd31e887"><b>Natural Philosophy</b></a> -<span class="pageNum" id="pb.xi">[<a href="#pb.xi">XI</a>]</span></td> -<td class="tocPageNum">72–80</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.1.1">The Sources</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">72</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.1.2">Mathematical Studies</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">73</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.1.3">Natural Science</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">75</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.1.4">Medicine</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">76</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.1.5">Razi</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">77</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">6.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.1.6">The Dahrites</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">80</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>2.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s3.2" id="xd31e962"><b>The Faithful Brethren of Basra</b></a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">81–96</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.2.1">The Karmatites</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">81</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.2.2">The Brethren and their Encyclopaedia</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">82</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.2.3">Eclecticism</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">84</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.2.4">Knowledge</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">85</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.2.5">Mathematics</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">87</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">6.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.2.6">Logic</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">89</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">7.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.2.7">God and the World</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">90</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">8.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.2.8">The Human Soul</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">92</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">9.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.2.9">Philosophy of Religion</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">93</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">10.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.2.10">Ethics</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">94</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">11.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p3.2.11">Influence of the Encyclopaedia</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">95</td> -</tr> -</table><p> -</p> -<p class="tocHead">CHAPTER IV. -</p> -<p class="tocHead"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch4" id="xd31e1086">The Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of The East</a>.</span> -</p> -<table class="tocList"> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>1.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s4.1" id="xd31e1096"><b>Kindi</b></a> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">97–106</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.1.1">His Life</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">97</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.1.2">Relation to Theology</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">99</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.1.3">Mathematics</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">100</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.1.4">God; World; Soul</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">101</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.1.5">Doctrine of the Spirit (<i>ʻaql</i>)</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">102</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">6.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.1.6">Kindi as an Aristotelian</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">104</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">7.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.1.7">The School of Kindi</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">105</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>2.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s4.2" id="xd31e1182"><b>Farabi</b></a> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">106–128</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.1">The Logicians</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">106</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.2">Farabi’s Life</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">107</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.3">Relation to Plato and Aristotle</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">108</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.4">Farabi’s Conception of Philosophy</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">110</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.5">His Logic</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">111</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">6.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.6">His Metaphysics. Being. God</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">114</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">7.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.7">The Celestial World</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">115</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">8.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.8">The Terrestrial World</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">117</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">9.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.9">The Human Soul</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">118</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">10.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.10">The Spirit in Man</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">119</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">11.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.11">Farabi’s Ethics</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">121</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">12.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.12">His Politics</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">122</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">13.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.13">The Future Life</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">123</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">14.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.14">General Survey of Farabi’s System</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">124</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">15.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.2.15">Effects of his Philosophy. Sidjistani</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">126</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>3.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s4.3" id="xd31e1347"><b>Ibn Maskawaih</b></a> -<span class="pageNum" id="pb.xii">[<a href="#pb.xii">XII</a>]</span></td> -<td class="tocPageNum">128–131</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.3.1">His Position</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">128</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.3.2">The Nature of the Soul</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">128</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.3.3">The Principles of his Ethics</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">129</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>4.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s4.4" id="xd31e1392"><b>Ibn Sina</b> (<i>Avicenna</i>)</a> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">131–148</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.4.1">His Life</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">131</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.4.2">His Work</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">132</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.4.3">Branches of Philosophy. Logic</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">134</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.4.4">Metaphysics and Physics</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">135</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.4.5">Anthropology and Psychology</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">139</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">6.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.4.6">The Reason</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">141</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">7.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.4.7">Allegorical Representation of the Doctrine of the Reason</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">143</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">8.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.4.8">Esoteric Teaching</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">144</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">9.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.4.9">Ibn Sina’s Time. Beruni</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">145</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">10.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.4.10">Behmenyar</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">146</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">11.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.4.11">Survival of Ibn Sina’s Influence</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">147</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>5.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s4.5" id="xd31e1519"><b>Ibn al-Haitham</b> (<i>Alhazen</i>)</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">148–153</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.5.1">Scientific Movement turning Westward</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">148</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.5.2">Ibn al-Haitham’s Life and Works</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">149</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.5.3">Perception and Judgment</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">150</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p4.5.4">Slender effect left by his Teaching</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">152</td> -</tr> -</table><p> -</p> -<p class="tocHead">CHAPTER V. -</p> -<p class="tocHead"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch5" id="xd31e1576">The Outcome of Philosophy in The East</a>.</span> -</p> -<table class="tocList"> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>1.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s5.1" id="xd31e1586"><b>Gazali</b></a> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">154–168</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p5.1.1">Dialectic and Mysticism</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">154</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p5.1.2">Gazali’s Life</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">155</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p5.1.3">Attitude towards his Time: Hostility to Aristotelianism</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">158</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p5.1.4">The World as the Production of God’s Free Creative Might</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">159</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p5.1.5">God and Divine Providence</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">162</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">6.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p5.1.6">Doctrine of the Resurrection</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">163</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">7.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p5.1.7">Gazali’s Theology</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">164</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">8.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p5.1.8">Experience and Revelation</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">166</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">9.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p5.1.9">Estimate of Gazali’s Position and Teaching</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">168</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>2.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s5.2" id="xd31e1690"><b>The Epitomists</b></a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">169–171</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p5.2.1">Position of Philosophy in the East, after Gazali’s Time</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">169</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p5.2.2">Philosophical Culture</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">170</td> -</tr> -</table><p> -</p> -<p class="tocHead">CHAPTER VI. -</p> -<p class="tocHead"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch6" id="xd31e1725">Philosophy in The West</a>.</span> -</p> -<table class="tocList"> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>1.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s6.1" id="xd31e1735"><b>Beginnings</b></a> -<span class="pageNum" id="pb.xiii">[<a href="#pb.xiii">XIII</a>]</span></td> -<td class="tocPageNum">172–175</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.1.1">The Age of the Omayyads</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">172</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.1.2">The Eleventh Century</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">174</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>2.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s6.2" id="xd31e1770"><b>Ibn Baddja</b> (<i>Avempace</i>)</a> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">175–181</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.2.1">The Almoravids</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">175</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.2.2">Ibn Baddja’s Life</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">176</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.2.3">The Character of his Works</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">177</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.2.4">His Logic and Metaphysics</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">177</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.2.5">His Opinions regarding Soul and Spirit</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">178</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">6.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.2.6">The Individual Man</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">179</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>3.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s6.3" id="xd31e1847"><b>Ibn Tofail</b> (<i>Abubacer</i>)</a> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">181–187</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.3.1">The Almohads</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">181</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.3.2">Ibn Tofail’s Life</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">182</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.3.3">“Hai ibn Yaqzan”</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">182</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.3.4">“Hai” and the Development of Humanity</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">184</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.3.5">“Hai’s” Ethics</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">185</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>4.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s6.4" id="xd31e1914"><b>Ibn Roshd</b> (<i>Averroes</i>)</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">187–199</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.4.1">His Life</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">187</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.4.2">Ibn Roshd and Aristotle</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">188</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.4.3">Logic. Attainability of Truth</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">189</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.4.4">The World and God</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">191</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.4.5">Body and Spirit</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">193</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">6.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.4.6">Spirit and Spirits</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">194</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">7.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.4.7">Estimate of Ibn Roshd as a Thinker</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">196</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">8.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p6.4.8">Summary of his Views on the Relations of Theology, Religion and Philosophy to one -another. Practical Philosophy</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">197</td> -</tr> -</table><p> -</p> -<p class="tocHead">CHAPTER VII. -</p> -<p class="tocHead"><span class="sc"><a href="#ch7" id="xd31e2011">Conclusion</a>.</span> -</p> -<table class="tocList"> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>1.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s7.1" id="xd31e2021"><b>Ibn Khaldun</b></a> -</td> -<td class="tocPageNum">200–208</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p7.1.1">The Conditions of his Time</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">200</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p7.1.2">Ibn Khaldun’s Life</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">201</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p7.1.3">Philosophy and Worldly Experience</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">202</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">4.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p7.1.4">Philosophy of History. Historical Method</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">204</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">5.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p7.1.5">The Subject of History</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">205</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">6.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p7.1.6">Characterization</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">206</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tocDivNum"><b>2.</b></td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="7"> <a href="#s7.2" id="xd31e2095"><b>The Arabs and Scholasticism</b></a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">208–213</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">1.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p7.2.1">Political Situation. The Jews</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">208</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">2.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p7.2.2">Palermo and Toledo</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">209</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td></td> -<td class="tocDivNum">3.</td> -<td class="tocDivTitle" colspan="6"> <a href="#p7.2.3">Parisian Averroism in the Thirteenth Century</a> </td> -<td class="tocPageNum">211</td> -</tr> -</table><p> -<span class="pageNum" id="pb.xiv">[<a href="#pb.xiv">XIV</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -<div class="div1 errata"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#toc">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h2 class="main">CORRIGENDA.</h2> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p class="first"></p> -<div class="table"> -<table> -<tr> -<td class="cellLeft cellTop"><span class="seg">Page</span> 5; </td> -<td class="xd31e2142 cellTop">3<sup>rd</sup> </td> -<td class="cellTop"><span class="seg">last line</span>: </td> -<td colspan="2" class="colspan cellRight cellTop">As last word, read <i>and</i>. </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="cellLeft"><span class="seg"><span class="ditto"><span class="s">Page</span><span class="d"><span class="i">»</span></span></span> </span> 144; </td> -<td class="xd31e2142">8<sup>th</sup> </td> -<td><span class="seg"><span class="ditto"><span class="s">last</span><span class="d"><span class="i">»</span></span></span> <span class="ditto"><span class="s">line</span><span class="d"><span class="i">»</span></span></span> </span>: </td> -<td><span class="seg">For</span> <i>abone</i>, </td> -<td class="cellRight"><span class="seg">read</span> <i>above</i>. </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="cellLeft cellBottom"><span class="seg"><span class="ditto"><span class="s">Page</span><span class="d"><span class="i">»</span></span></span> </span> 186; </td> -<td class="xd31e2142 cellBottom">2<sup>nd</sup> </td> -<td class="cellBottom"><span class="seg"><span class="ditto"><span class="s">last</span><span class="d"><span class="i">»</span></span></span> <span class="ditto"><span class="s">line</span><span class="d"><span class="i">»</span></span></span> </span>: </td> -<td class="cellBottom"><span class="seg"><span class="ditto"><span class="s">For</span><span class="d"><span class="i">»</span></span></span> </span> <i>bestows</i> </td> -<td class="cellRight cellBottom"><span class="seg"><span class="ditto"><span class="s">read</span><span class="d"><span class="i">»</span></span></span> </span> <i>pays</i>. </td> -</tr> -</table> -</div><p> -<span class="pageNum" id="pb1">[<a href="#pb1">1</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div class="body"> -<div id="ch1" class="div1 chapter"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e247">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h2 class="main"><span class="divNum">I.</span> INTRODUCTION.</h2> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<div id="s1.1" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e262">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">1.</span> <span class="sc">The Theatre.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p1.1.1" class="first">1. In olden time the Arabian desert was, as it is at this day, the roaming-ground -of independent Bedouin tribes. With free and healthy minds they contemplated their -monotonous world, whose highest charm was the raid, and whose intellectual treasure -was the tribal tradition. Neither the achievements of social labour, nor the accomplishments -of elegant leisure were known to them. Only on the borders of the desert, in regularly -constituted communities, which often had to suffer from the incursions of those Bedouins, -a higher degree of civilization had been attained. This was the case in the South, -where the ancient kingdom of the Queen of Sheba continued its existence in Christian -times under Abyssinian or Persian overlordship. On the West lay Mecca and Medina (Yathrib), -by an old caravan route; and Mecca in particular, with its market safe-guarded by -a temple, was the centre of a brisk traffic. Lastly on the North, two semi-sovereign -States had been formed under Arab princes: towards Persia, the kingdom of the Lakhmids -in Hira; and towards Byzantium the dominion of the Gassanids in Syria. In speech and -poetry, however, the unity of the Arab nation was set forth to some extent <span class="pageNum" id="pb2">[<a href="#pb2">2</a>]</span>even before Mohammed’s time. The poets were the ‘men of knowledge’ for their people. -Their incantations held good as oracles, first of all for their several tribes, but -no doubt extending their influence often beyond their own particular septs. -</p> -<p id="p1.1.2">2. Mohammed and his immediate successors, Abu Bekr, Omar, Othman and Ali (622–661) -succeeded in inspiring the free sons of the desert, together with the more civilized -inhabitants of the coast-lands, with enthusiasm for a joint enterprise. To this circumstance -Islam owes its world-position: for Allah showed himself great, and the world was quite -small for those who surrendered themselves to him (Muslims). In a short time the whole -of Persia was conquered, and the East-Roman empire lost its fairest provinces,—Syria -and Egypt. -</p> -<p>Medina was the seat of the first Caliphs or representatives of the prophet. Then Mohammed’s -brave son-in-law Ali, and Ali’s sons, fell before Moawiya, the able governor of Syria. -From that time dates the existence of the party of Ali (Shiʻites), which in the course -of diverse vicissitudes,—now reduced to subjection, now in detached places attaining -power,—lives on in history, until it finally incorporates itself with the Persian -kingdom in definite opposition to Sunnite Islam. -</p> -<p>In their struggle against the secular power the Shiʻites availed themselves of every -possible weapon,—even of science. Very early there appears among them the sect of -the Kaisanites, which ascribes to Ali and his heirs a superhuman secret lore, by the -help of which the inner meaning of the Divine revelation first becomes clear, but -which demands from its devotees not less faith in, and <span class="pageNum" id="pb3">[<a href="#pb3">3</a>]</span>absolute obedience to, the possessor of such knowledge, than does the letter of the -Koran. (Cf. <a href="#p3.2.1">III, 2 § 1</a>). -</p> -<p id="p1.1.3">3. After the victory of Moawiya, who made Damascus the capital of the Muslim empire, -the importance of Medina lay mainly in the spiritual province. It had to content itself -with fostering, partly under Jewish and Christian influences, a knowledge of the Law -and Tradition. In Damascus, on the other hand, the Omayyads (661–750) conducted the -secular government. Under their rule the empire spread from the Atlantic to districts -beyond the frontiers of India and Turkestan, and from the Indian Ocean to the Caucasus -and the very walls of Constantinople. With this development, however, it had reached -its farthest extension. -</p> -<p>Arabs now assumed everywhere the leading position. They formed a military aristocracy; -and the most striking proof of their influence is the fact, that conquered nations -with an old and superior civilization accepted the language of their conquerors. Arabic -became the language of Church and State, of Poetry and Science. But while the higher -offices in the State and the Army were administered by Arabs in preference, the care -of the Arts and Sciences fell, first of all, to Non-Arabs and men of mixed blood. -In Syria school-instruction was received from Christians. The chief seats of intellectual -culture, however, were Basra and Kufa, in which Arabs and Persians, Muslims, Christians, -Jews and Magians rubbed shoulders together. There, where trade and industry were thriving, -the beginnings of secular science in Islam must be sought for,—beginnings themselves -due to Hellenistic-Christian and Persian influences. -</p> -<p id="p1.1.4">4. The Omayyads were succeeded by the Abbasids <span class="pageNum" id="pb4">[<a href="#pb4">4</a>]</span>(750–1258). To obtain the sovereignty, the latter had granted concessions to the Persians, -and had utilized religio-political movements. During the first century of their rule -(i.e. up to about 860), though only during that period, the greatness of the empire -continued to increase, or at least it held its own. In the year 762, Mansur, the second -ruler of this house, founded Bagdad as the new capital,—a city which soon outshone -Damascus in worldly splendour, and Basra and Kufa in intellectual illumination. Constantinople -alone could be compared to it. Poets and scholars, particularly from the North-Eastern -provinces, met together in Bagdad at the court of Mansur (754–775), of Harun (786–809), -of Mamun (813–833), and others. Several of the Abbasids had a liking for secular culture, -whether for its own sake or to adorn their court, and although they may often have -failed to recognize the value of artists and learned men, these at any rate could -appreciate the material benefits conferred upon them by their patrons. -</p> -<p>From the time of Harun at least, there existed in Bagdad a library and a learned institute. -Even under Mansur, but especially under Mamun and his successors, translation of the -scientific literature of the Greeks into the Arabic tongue went forward, largely through -the agency of Syrians; and Abstracts and Commentaries bearing upon these works were -also composed. -</p> -<p>Just when this learned activity was at its highest, the glory of the empire began -to decline. The old tribal feuds, which had never been at rest under the Omayyads, -had seemingly given place to a firmly-knit political unity; but other controversies,—theological -and metaphysical wranglings, such as in like manner accompanied the decay of <span class="pageNum" id="pb5">[<a href="#pb5">5</a>]</span>the East-Roman empire,—were prosecuted with ever-increasing bitterness. The service -of the State, under an Eastern despotism, did not require men of brilliant parts. -Promising abilities accordingly were often ruined in luxurious indulgence, or flung -away upon sophistry and the show of learning. On the other hand, for the defence of -the empire the Caliphs enlisted the sound and healthy vigour of nations who had not -been so much softened by over-civilization,—first the Iranian or Iranianized people -of Khorasan, and then the Turks. -</p> -<p id="p1.1.5">5. The decline of the empire became more and more evident. The power of the Turkish -soldiery, uprisings of city mobs and of peasant labourers, Shiʻite and Ismaelite intrigues -on all sides, and in addition the desire for independence shown by the distant provinces,—were -either the causes or the symptoms of the downfall. Alongside of the Caliphs, who were -reduced to the position of spiritual dignitaries, the Turks ruled as Mayors of the -Palace; and all round, in the outlying regions of the empire, independent States were -gradually formed, until an utterly astounding body of minor States appeared. The most -influential ruling houses, more or less independent, were the following: in the West, -to say nothing of the Spanish Omayyads (cf. <a href="#s6.1">VI, 1</a>), the Aglabids of <span class="corr" id="xd31e2263" title="Source: North Africa">North-Africa</span>, the Tulunids and Fatimids of Egypt, and the Hamdanids of Syria and Mesopotamia; -in the East, <span class="corr" id="xd31e2266" title="Source: The">the</span> Tahirids and Samanids, who were by slow degrees supplanted by the Turks. It is at -the courts of these petty dynasties that the poets and scholars of the next period -(the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> centuries) are to be found. For a short time Haleb (Aleppo), the seat of the Hamdanids, -and for a longer <span class="pageNum" id="pb6">[<a href="#pb6">6</a>]</span>time Cairo, built by the Fatimids in the year 969,—have a better claim to be regarded -as the home of intellectual endeavour than Bagdad itself. For another brief space -lustre is shed on the East by the court of the Turk, Mahmud of Ghazna, who had become -master of Khorasan in the year 999. -</p> -<p>The founding of the Muslim Universities also falls within this period of petty States -and Turkish administration. The first one was erected in Bagdad in the year 1065; -and from that date the East has been in possession of Science, but only in the form -of stereotyped republications. The teacher conveys the teaching which has been handed -down to him by his teachers; and in any new book hardly a sentence will be found which -does not appear in older books. Science was rescued from danger; but the learned men -of Transoxiana, who, upon hearing of the establishment of the first Madrasah, appointed -a solemn memorial service, as tradition tells, to be held in honour of departed science, -have been shewn to be correct in their estimate.<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e2281src" href="#xd31e2281">1</a> -</p> -<p>Then,—in the 13<sup>th</sup> century,—there came storming over the Eastern regions of Islam the resounding invasion -of the Mongols, who swept away whatever the Turks had spared. No culture ever flourished -there again, to develope from its own resources a new Art or to stimulate a revival -of Science. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s1.2" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e326">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">2.</span> <span class="sc">Oriental Wisdom.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p1.2.1" class="first">1. Prior to its contact with Hellenism, the Semitic mind had proceeded no farther -in the path of Philosophy than the propounding of enigmas, and the utterance of aphoristic -<span class="pageNum" id="pb7">[<a href="#pb7">7</a>]</span>wisdom. Detached observations of Nature, but especially of the life and fate of Man, -form the basis of such thinking; and where comprehension ceases, resignation to the -almighty and inscrutable will of God comes in without difficulty. We have become familiar -with this kind of wisdom from the Old Testament; and that it was developed in like -manner among the Arabs, is shewn to us by the Bible story of the Queen of Sheba, and -by the figure of the wise Loqman in the Arab tradition. -</p> -<p>By the side of this wisdom there was found everywhere the Magic of the sorcerer,—a -knowledge which was authenticated by command over outward things. But it was only -in the priestly circles of ancient Babylonia,—under what influences and to what extent -we do not precisely know,—that men rose to a more scientific consideration of the -world. Their eyes were turned from the confusion of earthly existence to the order -of the heavens. They were not like the Hebrews, who never got beyond the wondering -stage<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e2304src" href="#xd31e2304">2</a>, or who saw merely an emblem of their own posterity in the countless stars<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e2309src" href="#xd31e2309">3</a>; they resembled rather the Greeks who came to understand the Many and the Manifold -in their sublunary forms, only after they had discovered the harmony of the All in -the unity and steadiness of the movement of the heavens. The only drawback was that -much mythological by-play and astrological pretence was interwoven with what was good, -as in fact was the case also in Hellenism. This Chaldaean wisdom, from the time of -Alexander the Great, became pervaded, in Babylonia and Syria, with Hellenistic and -later with Hellenistic-Christian ideas, or else was supplanted by them. <span class="pageNum" id="pb8">[<a href="#pb8">8</a>]</span>In the Syrian city of Harran only, up to the time of Islam, the old heathenism held -its ground, little affected by Christian influences. (Cf. <a href="#p1.3.4">I, 3, § 4</a>). -</p> -<p id="p1.2.2">2. Of more importance than any Semitic tradition, was the contribution made to Islam -by Persian and Indian wisdom. We do not need to enter here upon the question as to -whether Oriental wisdom was originally influenced by Greek philosophy, or Greek philosophy -by Oriental wisdom. What Islam carried away directly from Persians and Indians may -be learned with tolerable certainty from Arabic sources, and to this we may confine -ourselves. -</p> -<p>Persia is the land of Dualism, and it is not improbable that its dualistic religious -teaching exercised an influence upon theological controversy in Islam, either directly -or through the Manichaeans and other Gnostic sects. But much greater, in worldly circles, -was the influence wielded by that system which, according to tradition, came to be -even publicly recognized, under the Sasanid Yezdegerd II (438/9–457), viz. Zrwanism -(Cf. <a href="#p3.1.6">III, 1, § 6</a>). In this system the dualistic view of the world was superseded by setting up endless -Time, (<i>zrwan</i>, Arab. <i>dahr</i>) as the paramount principle, and <span class="corr" id="xd31e2330" title="Source: identifiying">identifying</span> it with Fate, the outermost heavenly sphere or the movement of the heavens. This -doctrine, pleasing to philosophic intellects, has secured, with or without the guise -of Islam, a prominent place for itself in Persian literature and in the views of the -people, up to our own day. By theologians, however, and no less by philosophers of -the Idealistic schools, it was disavowed as Materialism, Atheism and so forth. -</p> -<p id="p1.2.3">3. India was regarded as the true land of wisdom. In Arab writers we often come upon -the view that there the <span class="pageNum" id="pb9">[<a href="#pb9">9</a>]</span>birthplace of philosophy is to be found. By peaceful trading, in which the agents -between India and the West were principally Persians, and next as a result of the -Muslim conquest, acquaintance with Indian wisdom spread far and wide. Much of it was -translated under Mansur (754–775) and Harun (786–809), partly by means of the intervening -step of Persian (Pahlawi) versions, and partly from the Sanskrit direct. Many a deliverance -of ethical and political wisdom, in the dress of proverbs, was taken over from the -fables and tales of India, such as the Tales of the <span class="corr" id="xd31e2337" title="Source: Pantshatantra">Panchatantra</span>, translated from the Pahlawi by Ibn al-Moqaffa in Mansur’s time, and others. It was, -however, Indian Mathematics and Astrology,—the latter in combination with practical -Medicine and Magic,—that mainly influenced the beginnings of secular wisdom in Islam. -The Astrology of the Siddhanta of Brahmagupta, which was translated from the Sanskrit, -under Mansur, by Fazari assisted by Indian scholars, was known even before Ptolemy’s -Almagest. A wide world, past and future, was thereby opened up. The high figures with -which the Indians worked produced a powerful, perplexing impression upon the sober -Muslim annalists, just as, on the other hand, Arab merchants, who in India and China -put the age of our created world at a few thousand years, exposed themselves to the -utmost ridicule. -</p> -<p>Nor did the logical and metaphysical speculations of the Indians remain unknown to -the Muslims. These produced, however, much less effect on scientific development than -did their Mathematics and Astrology. The investigations of the Indians, associated -with their sacred books and wholly determined by a religious purpose, have certainly -had a <span class="pageNum" id="pb10">[<a href="#pb10">10</a>]</span>lasting influence upon Persian Sufism and Islamic Mysticism. But,—once for all,—Philosophy -is a Greek conception, and we have no right, in deference to the taste of the day, -to allot an undue amount of space in our description to the childish thoughts of pious -Hindoos. What has been advanced by these meditative penitents about the deceptive -show of everything sensuous, may often possess a poetic charm, just as it agrees perhaps -with those observations on the evanescence of all that is earthly, which the East -had access to in Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic sources; but it has contributed -just as little of importance as these did, towards the explanation of phenomena or -the awakening of the scientific spirit. Not the Indian imagination, but the Greek -mind was needed to direct the reflective process to the knowledge of the Real. The -best example of this is furnished by Arabic Mathematics. In the opinion of those who -know the subject best, almost the only thing Indian in it is the Arithmetic, while -the Algebra and the Geometry are Greek, preponderatingly, if not exclusively. Hardly -a single Indian penetrated to the notion of pure mathematics. Number, even in its -highest form, remained always something concrete; and in Indian Philosophy knowledge -in the main continued to be only a means. Deliverance from the evil of existence was -the aim, and Philosophy a pathway to the life of blessedness. Hence the monotony of -this wisdom,—concentrated, as it was, upon the essence of all things in its One-ness,—as -contrasted with the many-branched science of the Hellenes, which strove to comprehend -the operations of Nature and Mind on all sides. -</p> -<p>Oriental wisdom, Astrology and Cosmology delivered over <span class="pageNum" id="pb11">[<a href="#pb11">11</a>]</span>to Muslim thinkers material of many kinds, but the Form,—the formative principle,—came -to them from the Greeks. In every case where it is not mere enumeration or chance -concatenation that is taken in hand, but where an attempt is made to arrange the Manifold -according to positive or logical points of view, we may conclude with all probability -that Greek influences have been at work. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s1.3" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e370">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">3.</span> <span class="sc">Greek Science.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p1.3.1" class="first">1. Just as the commercial intercourse between India and China and Byzantium was conducted -principally by the Persians, so in the remote West, as far even as France, the Syrians -came forward as the agents of civilization. It was Syrians who brought wine, silk -&c. to the West. But it was Syrians also who took Greek culture from Alexandria and -Antioch, spreading it eastward and propagating it in the schools of Edessa and Nisibis, -Harran and Gondeshapur. Syria was the true neutral ground, where for centuries the -two world-powers, the Roman and the Persian, came in contact with one another, either -as friends or as foes. In such circumstances, the Christian Syrians played a part -similar to the one which in later days fell to the share of the Jews. -</p> -<p id="p1.3.2">2. The Muslim conquerors found the Christian church split up into three main divisions,—to -say nothing of many sects. The Monophysite church, alongside of the Orthodox State-church, -preponderated in Syria proper, and the Nestorian church in Persia. The difference -between the doctrinal systems of these churches was perhaps not without importance -for the development of Muslim Dogmatics. According <span class="pageNum" id="pb12">[<a href="#pb12">12</a>]</span>to the teaching of the Monophysites, God and Man were united in <i>one</i> nature in Christ, whereas the Orthodox, and in a still more pronounced manner the -Nestorians, discriminated between a Divine nature and a human nature in him. Now nature -means, above everything, energy or operative principle. The question, accordingly, -which is at issue, is whether the Divine, and the human Willing and Acting are one -and the same in Christ or different. The Monophysites, from speculative and religious -motives, gave prominence to the Unity in Christ their God, at the expense of the human -element: The Nestorians, on the other hand, emphasized, in contrast with the Divine -element, all that is specially characteristic of human Being, Willing and Acting. -The latter view, however, favoured by political circumstances and conditions of culture, -offers freer play to philosophical speculations on the world and on life. In point -of fact the Nestorians did most for the cultivation of Greek Science. -</p> -<p id="p1.3.3"><span class="corr" id="xd31e2364" title="Not in source">3. </span>Syriac was the language both of the Western and of the Eastern or Persian Church; -but Greek was also taught along with it in the Cloister schools. Rasain and Kinnesrin -must be mentioned as being centres of culture in the Western or Monophysite Church. -Of more importance, at the outset at least, was the school of Edessa, inasmuch as -the dialect of Edessa had risen to the position of the literary language; but in the -year 489 the school there was closed because of the Nestorian views held by its teachers. -It was then re-opened in Nisibis, and, being patronized by the Sasanids on political -grounds, it disseminated Nestorian belief and Greek knowledge throughout Persia. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb13">[<a href="#pb13">13</a>]</span></p> -<p>Instruction in these schools had a pre-eminently Biblical and ecclesiastical character, -and was arranged to meet the needs of the Church. However, physicians or coming students -of medicine also took part in it. The circumstance that they frequently belonged to -the ecclesiastical order does not do away with the distinction between theological -study and the pursuit of secular knowledge. It is true that according to the Syro-Roman -code, Teachers (learned Priests) and Physicians were entitled in common to exemption -from taxation and to other privileges; but the very fact that priests were regarded -as healers of the soul, while physicians had merely to patch up the body, seemed to -justify the precedence accorded to the former. Medicine always remained a secular -matter; and, by the regulations of the School of Nisibis (from the year 590), the -Holy Scriptures were not to be read in the same room with books that dealt with worldly -callings. -</p> -<p>In medical circles the works of Hippocrates, Galen and Aristotle were highly prized; -but in the cloisters Philosophy was understood to be first of all the contemplative -life of the ascetic, and “the one thing needful” was the only thing cared for. -</p> -<p id="p1.3.4">4. The Mesopotamian city of Harran, in the neighbourhood of Edessa, takes a place -of its own. In this city, especially when it began to flourish again after the Arab -conquest, ancient Semitic paganism comes into association with <span class="corr" id="xd31e2371" title="Source: mathemathical">mathematical</span> and astronomical studies and Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic speculation. The Harranaeans -or Sabaeans, as they were called in the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> centuries, traced their mystic lore back to Hermes Trismegistus, Agathodaemon, Uranius -and others. Numerous pseudepigraphs <span class="pageNum" id="pb14">[<a href="#pb14">14</a>]</span>of the later Hellenism were adopted by them in good faith, and some perhaps were forged -in their own circle. A few of them became active as translators and learned authors, -and many kept up a brisk scientific intercourse with Persian and Arab scholars from -the 8<sup>th</sup> to the 10<sup>th</sup> century. -</p> -<p id="p1.3.5">5. In Persia, at Gondeshapur, we find an Institution for philosophical and medical -studies established by Khosrau Anosharwan (521–579). Its teachers were principally -Nestorian Christians; but Khosrau, who had an inclination for secular culture, extended -his toleration to Monophysites as well as to Nestorians. At that time, just as was -the case later at the court of the Caliphs, Christian Syrians were held in special -honour as medical men. -</p> -<p>Farther, in the year 529, seven philosophers of the Neo-Platonic school, who had been -driven away from Athens, found a place of refuge at the court of Khosrau. Their experiences -there, however, may have resembled those of the French free-thinkers of the 18<sup>th</sup> century at the Russian court. At all events they longed to get home again; and the -king was sufficiently liberal-minded and magnanimous to allow them to go, and in his -treaty of peace with Byzantium of the year 549 to stipulate in their case for freedom -of religious opinion. Their stay in the Persian kingdom was doubtless not wholly devoid -of influence. -</p> -<p id="p1.3.6">6. The period of Syriac translations of profane literature from the Greek extends -perhaps from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 8<sup>th</sup> century. In the 4<sup>th</sup> century collections of aphorisms were translated. The first translator, however, -who makes his appearance avowing his name, is Probus, “Priest and physician in Antioch” -(1<sup>st</sup> half of the 5<sup>th</sup> century?). Possibly <span class="pageNum" id="pb15">[<a href="#pb15">15</a>]</span>he was merely an expounder of the logical writings of Aristotle, and of the Isagoge -of Porphyry. Better known is Sergius of Rasain,—who died at the age of 70 or so, probably -in Constantinople, about 536,—a Mesopotamian monk and physician, whose studies, which -were probably pursued in Alexandria itself, took in the whole range of Alexandrian -science, and whose translations not only embraced Theology, Morals and Mysticism, -but even Physics, Medicine and Philosophy. Even after the Muslim conquest the learned -activity of the Syrians continued. Jacob of Edessa (<i>circa</i> 640–708) translated Greek theological writings; but he occupied himself besides with -Philosophy, and in answer to a question relative thereto he pronounced that it was -lawful for Christian ecclesiastics to impart the higher instruction to children of -Muslim parents. There was thus a felt need of culture among the latter. -</p> -<p>The translations of the Syrians, particularly of Sergius of Rasain, are generally -faithful; but a more exact correspondence with the original is shewn in the case of -Logic and Natural Science than in Ethical and Metaphysical works. Much that is obscure -in these last has been misunderstood or simply omitted, and much that is pagan has -been replaced by Christian material. For instance, Peter, Paul and John would come -upon the scene in room of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Destiny and the Gods were -obliged to give place to the one God; and ideas like World, Eternity, Sin and the -like were recast in a Christian mould. The Arabs, however, in subsequent times went -to a much greater length with the process of adaptation to their language, culture -and religion than the Syrians. This may perhaps be partly explained by the Muslim -horror of everything <span class="pageNum" id="pb16">[<a href="#pb16">16</a>]</span>heathen, but partly too by their greater faculty of adaptation. -</p> -<p id="p1.3.7">7. Apart from a few mathematical, physical and medical writings, the Syrians interested -themselves in two subjects,—the <i>first</i> consisting of moralizing collections of aphorisms, put together into a kind of history -of Philosophy, and, generally, of mystical Pythagorean-Platonic wisdom. This is found -principally in pseudepigraphs, which bear the names of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plutarch, -Dionysius and others. The centre of interest is a Platonic doctrine of the Soul, subjected -to a later Pythagorean, Neo-Platonic, or Christian form of treatment. In the Syrian -cloisters Plato is even turned into an oriental monk, who built a cell for himself -in the heart of the wilderness, far away from the dwellings of men, and after three -years’ silent brooding over a verse of the Bible was led to a recognition of the Tri-Unity -of God. -</p> -<p>A <i>second</i> subject of interest was added, in Aristotle’s Logic. Among the Syrians, and for a -longer period among the Arabs also, Aristotle was commonly known almost solely as -a logician. This knowledge, just as in the early scholasticism of the West, extended -to the Categories, the Hermeneutics, and the first Analytics as far as the Categorical -Figures. They stood in need of the Logic in order to comprehend the writings of Greek -ecclesiastical teachers, since these, at least in form, were influenced thereby. But -as they did not <span class="corr" id="xd31e2431" title="Source: possses">possess</span> it complete, as little did they possess it pure. They had it before them only in -a Neo-Platonic redaction, as may be seen, for example, from the work of Paulus Persa, -which was written in Syriac for Khosrau Anosharwan. In that work knowledge is placed -above faith, <span class="pageNum" id="pb17">[<a href="#pb17">17</a>]</span>and philosophy is defined as the process by which the soul becomes conscious of its -own inner essence, in which, like a God as it were, it sees all things. -</p> -<p id="p1.3.8">8. What the Arabs owe to the Syrians is expressed by this circumstance amongst others,—that -Arab scholars held Syriac to be the oldest, or the real (natural) language. The Syrians, -it is true, produced nothing original; but their activity as translators was of advantage -to Arab-Persian science. It was Syrians almost without exception, who, from the 8<sup>th</sup> century to the 10<sup>th</sup>, rendered Greek works into Arabic, either from the older Syriac versions or from -those which had been in part improved by them, and in part re-arranged. Even the Omayyad -prince, Khalid ibn Yezid (died 704), who occupied himself with Alchemy under the guidance -of a Christian monk, is said to have provided for translations of works on Alchemy -from Greek into Arabic. Proverbs, maxims, letters, wills, and in short whatever bore -on the history of philosophy, were at a very early time collected and translated. -But it was not till the reign of Mansur that a commencement was made with the translation -into Arabic—partly from Pahlawi versions—of those writings of the Greeks which deal -with Natural Science, Medicine and Logic. Ibn al-Moqaffa, an adherent of Persian Dualism, -took a leading part in this task, from whom later workers must have marked themselves -off by their terminology. None of his philosophical translations have come down to -us. Other material too, belonging to the 8<sup>th</sup> century has gone amissing. The earliest specimen of this work of translation which -we possess dates from the 9<sup>th</sup> century, the time of Mamun and his successors. -</p> -<p>The translators of the 9<sup>th</sup> century were, for the most <span class="pageNum" id="pb18">[<a href="#pb18">18</a>]</span>part, medical men; and Hippocrates and Galen were among the first to be translated -after Ptolemy and Euclid. But let us confine ourselves to Philosophy, in the narrower -sense. A translation of the Timäus of Plato is said to have come from Yuhanna or Yakhya -ibn Bitriq (in the beginning of the 9<sup>th</sup> century), as well as Aristotle’s ‘Meteorology’, the ‘Book of Animals’, an epitome -of the ‘Psychology’, and the tract ‘On the World’. To Abdalmasikh ibn Abdallah Naima -al-Himsi (<i>circa</i> 835) is to be ascribed a rendering of the ‘Sophistics’ of Aristotle, in addition -to the Commentary of John Philoponus upon the ‘Physics’, as well as the so-called -‘Theology of Aristotle’,—a paraphrased epitome of the Enneads of Plotinus. Qosta ibn -Luqa al-Balabakki (<i>circa</i> 835) is said to have translated the Commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias and -John Philoponus upon the ‘Physics’ of Aristotle, and in part, Alexander’s Commentary -on the ‘<span lang="la">De generatione et corruptione</span>’, as well as the ‘<span lang="la">Placita Philosophorum</span>’ of the Pseudo-Plutarch, and other works. -</p> -<p>The most productive translators were Abu Zaid Honain ibn Ishaq (809?–873), his son, -Ishaq ibn Honain († 910 or 911), and nephew Hobaish ibn al-Hasan. Seeing that they -worked together, there is a good deal which is ascribed, now to the one and now to -the other. Not a little material must have been prepared, under their oversight, by -disciples and subordinates. Their activity extended over the whole range of the science -of that day. Existing translations were improved, and new ones added. The father preferred -to work at versions of medical authors, but the son turned more to the rendering of -philosophical material. -</p> -<p>The work of the translators was still proceeding in the 10<sup>th</sup> century. Among those who especially distinguished <span class="pageNum" id="pb19">[<a href="#pb19">19</a>]</span>themselves were Abu Bishr Matta ibn Yunus al-Qannai († 940), Abu Zakarya Yakhya ibn -Adi al-Mantiqi († 974), Abu Ali Isa ibn Ishaq ibn Zura († 1008), and finally, Abu-l-Khair -al-Hasan ibn al-Khammar (born 942), a pupil of Yakhya ibn Adi’s, of whose writings, -besides translations, commentaries, and so forth, a tract is mentioned, on the Harmony -between Philosophy and Christianity. -</p> -<p>From the time of Honain ibn Ishaq the activity of the translators was almost wholly -confined to Aristotelian and Pseudo-Aristotelian writings, and to epitomes of them, -to paraphrases of their contents and to commentaries upon them. -</p> -<p id="p1.3.9">9. These translators are not to be regarded as specially great philosophers. Their -work was seldom entered upon spontaneously, but almost always at the command of some -Caliph or Vizir or other person of note. Outside of their own department of study, -usually Medicine, they were chiefly interested in Wisdom,—that is, in pretty stories -with a moral, in anecdotes, and in oracular sayings. The expressions which we merely -bear with in intercourse, in narrative or on the stage, as being characteristic utterances -with certain persons, were admired and collected by these worthy people for the sake -of the wisdom contained in them, or perhaps even for no more than the rhetorical elegance -of their form. As a rule, those men continued true to the Christian faith of their -fathers. The traditional story of Ibn Djebril gives a good idea both of their way -of thinking and of the liberal-mindedness of the Caliphs. When Mansur wanted to convert -him to Islam, he is said to have replied: “In the faith of my fathers I will die: -where they are, I wish also to be, whether in heaven or <span class="pageNum" id="pb20">[<a href="#pb20">20</a>]</span>in hell”. Whereupon the Caliph laughed, and dismissed him with a rich present. -</p> -<p>Only a small portion has been saved of the original writings of these men. A short -dissertation by Qosta ibn Luqa on the distinction between Soul and Spirit (<span class="trans" title="pneuma"><span lang="grc" class="grek">πνεῦμα</span></span>, <i>ruh</i>), preserved in a Latin translation, has been frequently mentioned and made use of. -According to it, the Spirit is a subtle material, which from its seat in the left -ventricle of the heart animates the human frame and brings about its movements and -perceptions. The finer and clearer this Spirit is, the more rationally the man thinks -and acts: there is but one opinion upon this point. It is more difficult, however, -to predicate anything sure, and universally valid, of the Soul. The deliverances of -the greatest philosophers occasionally differ, and occasionally contradict each other. -In any case the Soul is incorporeal, for it adopts qualities, and, in fact, qualities -of the most opposite nature at one and the same time. It is uncompounded and unchangeable, -and it does not, like the Spirit, perish with the body. The Spirit only acts as an -intermediary between the Soul and the Body, and it is in this way that it becomes -a secondary cause of movement and perception. -</p> -<p>The statement which has just been given regarding the Soul is found in many of the -later writers. But by slow degrees, as the Aristotelian philosophy thrusts Platonic -opinions more and more into the background, another pair of opposites come into full -view. Physicians alone continue to speak of the importance of the ‘<i>ruh</i>’ or Spirit of Life. Philosophers institute a comparison between Soul and Spirit or -Reason (<span class="trans" title="nous"><span lang="grc" class="grek">νοῦς</span></span>, <i>ʻaql</i>). The Soul is now reduced to the domain of the perishable, and sometimes, in Gnostic -fashion, even <span class="pageNum" id="pb21">[<a href="#pb21">21</a>]</span>to the lower and evil realm of the desires. The rational Spirit,—as that which is -highest, that which is imperishable in man—is exalted above the Soul. -</p> -<p>In this notice, however, we are anticipating history: let us return to our translators. -</p> -<p id="p1.3.10">10. The most valuable portion of the legacy which the Greek mind bequeathed to us -in art, poetry, and historical composition, was never accessible to the Orientals. -It would even have been difficult for them to understand it, seeing that they lacked -the due acquaintance with Greek life, and the relish for it. For them the history -of Greece began with Alexander the Great, surrounded with the halo of legend; and -the position which Aristotle held beside the greatest prince of ancient times must -have assuredly conduced to the acceptance of the Aristotelian philosophy at the Muslim -court. Arab historians counted up the Greek princes, on to Cleopatra, and then the -Roman Emperors; but a Thucydides, for example, was not known to them, even by name. -Of Homer they had not picked up much more than the sentence, that “one only should -be the ruler”. They had not the least idea of the great Greek dramatists and lyric -poets. It was only through its Mathematics, Natural Science and Philosophy, that Greek -antiquity could bring its influence to bear upon them. They had come to know something -of the development of Greek Philosophy, from Plutarch, Porphyry and others, as well -as from the writings of Aristotle and Galen. A good deal of legendary matter, however, -was mingled with their information; and the account which passed in the East, of the -doctrines of the Pre-Socratic philosophers can only be referred by us to the pseudepigraphs -which <span class="pageNum" id="pb22">[<a href="#pb22">22</a>]</span>they consulted, or perhaps even to the opinions which had been developed in the East -itself, and which they endeavoured to support with the authority of old Greek sages. -But still, in every case, our thoughts must turn first of all to some Greek original. -</p> -<p id="p1.3.11">11. It may be affirmed generally that the Syro-Arabs took up the thread of philosophy, -precisely where the last of the Greeks had let it fall, that is, with the Neo-Platonic -explanation of Aristotle, along with whose philosophy the works of Plato were also -read and expounded. Among the Harranaeans, and for a long time in several Muslim sects, -it was Platonic or Pythagorean-Platonic studies which were prosecuted with most ardour,—with -which much that was Stoic or Neo-Platonic was associated. Extraordinary interest was -taken in the fate of Socrates, who had suffered a martyr’s death in heathen Athens -for his rational belief. The Platonic teaching regarding the Soul and Nature exercised -great influence. The Pythian utterance: “Know thyself”,—handed down as the motto of -the Socratic wisdom, and interpreted in a Neo-Platonic sense,—was ascribed by the -Muslims to Ali, Mohammed’s son-in-law, or even put into the mouth of the Prophet himself. -“He who knows himself, knows God his Lord thereby”: this was the text for Mystic speculations -of all kinds. -</p> -<p>In medical circles and at the worldly court, the works of Aristotle came more and -more into favour, first of all of course the Logic and a few things from the Physical -writings. The Logic—so they thought—was the only new thing the Stagyrite had discovered: -in all the other sciences he agreed throughout with Pythagoras, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, -Socrates and Plato. Accordingly Christian <span class="pageNum" id="pb23">[<a href="#pb23">23</a>]</span>and Sabaean translators, and the circle influenced by them, drew their psychologico-ethical, -political and metaphysical instruction without hesitation from the Pre-Aristotelian -sages. -</p> -<p>What bore the names of Empedocles, Pythagoras &c., was, naturally, spurious. Their -wisdom is traced either to Hermes or to other wise men of the East. Thus Empedocles -must have been a disciple of King David’s, and afterwards of Loqman the Wise: Pythagoras -must have sprung from the school of Solomon,—and so on. Writings which are cited in -Arabic works as Socratic are, in so far as they are genuine, Platonic dialogues in -which Socrates appears. Their quotations from Plato—not to speak of spurious writings—have -a more or less comprehensive range: they are taken from the Apology, Krito, the Sophistes, -Phaedrus, the Republic, Phaedo, Timäus and the Laws. That does not mean, however, -that they possessed complete translations of all these works. -</p> -<p>This much is certain,—that Aristotle did not reign as sole lord from the very outset. -Plato, as they understood him, taught the Creation of the world, the Substantiality -of the Spiritual, and the Immortality of the Soul. That teaching did no harm to the -Faith. But Aristotle, with his doctrine of the Eternity of the World, and his less -spiritualistic Psychology and Ethics, was regarded as dangerous. Muslim theologians -of the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> centuries, from various camps, wrote therefore against Aristotle. But circumstances -altered. Philosophers arose by-and-by who rejected the Platonic doctrine of the One -World-Soul, of which the souls of men are only transient parts, and sought grounds -for their hope of immortality from Aristotle who attributed so great a significance -to the Individual Substance. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb24">[<a href="#pb24">24</a>]</span></p> -<p id="p1.3.12">12. The conception which was entertained of Aristotle in the period most remote, is -best shown by the writings which were foisted upon him. Not only did they get his -genuine works with Neo-Platonic interpretations attached to them,—not only was the -treatise: “On the world” unhesitatingly acknowledged as Aristotelian, but he was also -regarded as the author of many late-Greek productions, in which a Pythagorising Platonism -or Neo-Platonism, or even a barren Syncretism was quite frankly taught. -</p> -<p>Let us take here as our first example “the Book of the Apple”<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e2538src" href="#xd31e2538">4</a>, wherein Aristotle plays the same part as Socrates in the Phaedo of Plato. As his -end draws near, the Philosopher is visited by some of his disciples who find him in -a cheerful frame of mind. This leads them to request their departing Master to give -them some instruction about the Essence and Immortality of the Soul. Thereupon he -discourses somewhat as follows:—“The Essence of the Soul consists in knowing,—in fact, -in Philosophy, which is the highest form of knowing. A perfect knowledge of the truth -constitutes therefore the blessedness which after death awaits the soul which is devoted -to knowing. And just as knowing is rewarded with a higher knowledge,—so the punishment -for not-knowing consists in a deeper ignorance. And really, there is nothing in Heaven -or Earth, after all, except knowing and not-knowing, and the recompence which these -two severally bring with them. Farther,—virtue is not essentially different from knowing; -nor does vice differ <span class="pageNum" id="pb25">[<a href="#pb25">25</a>]</span>essentially from not-knowing. The relation of virtue to knowing, or of vice to not-knowing, -is like that of water to ice: i.e. it is the same thing in a different form. -</p> -<p>In knowing,—which is the divine essence of the Soul,—the Soul finds naturally its -only true joy, and not in eating and drinking and sensual pleasure. For, sensual pleasure -is a flame which merely warms for a short time; but the thinking Soul,—which longs -for its deliverance from the murky world of the senses,—is a pure light that sheds -a radiance far and wide. The Philosopher therefore is not afraid of death, but meets -it gladly, when the Deity summons him. The enjoyment, which his limited knowledge -affords him here is a guarantee to him of the rapture which the unveiling of the great -world of the Unknown will procure him. Even already he knows something of this, for -it is only through knowledge of the invisible, that the proper estimate of the sensible, -on which he prides himself, is at all possible. He who comes to know his own self -in this life, possesses in that very knowledge of himself the assurance of comprehending -all things with an eternal knowledge,—i.e. of being immortal.” -</p> -<p id="p1.3.13">13. In the second place the so-called “Theology of Aristotle” may be referred to. -In it Plato is represented as the Ideal-Man, who gains a knowledge of all things by -means of an intuitive thinking, and thus has no need of the logical resources of Aristotle. -Indeed, the highest reality—Absolute Being—is not apprehended by thinking, but only -in an ecstatic Vision. “Often was I alone with my soul”, says Aristotle-Plotinus, -on this point. “Divested of the body, I entered as pure substance into my proper self, -turning back from all that is external to what is <span class="pageNum" id="pb26">[<a href="#pb26">26</a>]</span>within. I was pure knowing there, at once the knowing and the known. How astonished -I was to behold beauty and splendour in my proper self, and to recognize that I was -a part of the sublime Divine world, endowed even with creative life! In this assurance -of self, I was lifted above the world of the senses, ay, even above the world of spirits, -up to the Divine state, where I beheld a light so fair that no tongue can tell it, -nor ear understand”. -</p> -<p>The soul forms the centre of the discussions in the ‘Theology’ also. All true human -science is science of the soul or knowledge of self,—knowledge of its essence, it -is true, coming first, and next in order, though less complete, knowledge of the operations -of that essence. In such knowledge, to which exceedingly few attain, the highest wisdom -consists, which does not admit of being fully understood in the form of ideas, and -which therefore the philosopher like a skilful artist and wise lawgiver represents, -for us men, in ever beautiful figures in religious service. In this function precisely, -the wise man comes forward as the potent, self-sufficing magician, whose knowledge -lords it over the multitude, seeing that they remain always bound in the fetters of -outward things, of presentations and desires. -</p> -<p>The soul stands in the centre of the All. Above it are God and Intelligence, beneath -it—Matter and Nature. Its coming from God through Intelligence into Matter, its presence -in the body, its return on high—these are the three <i>stadia</i> in which its life and that of the world run their course. Matter and Nature, Sense-perception -and Presentation here lose their significance almost entirely. All things exist by -Intelligence (<span class="trans" title="nous"><span lang="grc" class="grek">νοῦς</span></span>, <i>ʻaql</i>). Intelligence constitutes <span class="pageNum" id="pb27">[<a href="#pb27">27</a>]</span>all things, and in Intelligence all things are One. The Soul too is Intelligence, -but, so long as it stays in the body, it is Intelligence in hope, Intelligence in -the form of longing. It longs for what is above, for the good and blessed stars, which -spend their contemplative existence as sources of light, exalted above presentation -and effort. -</p> -<p>That then is the oriental Aristotle, as he was acknowledged by the earliest Peripatetics -in Islam<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e2568src" href="#xd31e2568">5</a>. -</p> -<p id="p1.3.14">14. We need not wonder that the Easterns did not succeed in reaching an unadulterated -conception of the Aristotelian philosophy. Our critical apparatus for discriminating -between the genuine and the spurious was not in their possession. It must have proved -even more difficult for them, to familiarize themselves with the world of Greek civilization, -than for the Christian scholars of the Middle Ages, which had never entirely lost -living touch with antiquity. In the East men remained dependent on Neo-Platonic redactions -and interpretations. A part of the scientific system, to wit, the Politics of Aristotle, -was a-wanting; and so, as a matter of course, the Laws or the Republic of Plato took -its place. Only a few were aware of the difference between the two. -</p> -<p>Another determining motive deserves notice. In their Neo-Platonic sources even, the -Muslims came upon a harmonizing exposition of the Greek philosophers, and they felt -constrained to adopt it. The first adherents of Aristotle were bound to assume a polemical -and apologetic attitude. In opposition to, or in conformity with, the voice of the -Muslim community, they required a coherent philosophy, <span class="pageNum" id="pb28">[<a href="#pb28">28</a>]</span>in which the One Truth must be found. The same reverence, which Mohammed in his day -had paid to the sacred writings of the Jews and of the Christians, was shewn afterwards -by Muslim scholars towards the works of Greek philosophers; but these learned men -exhibited greater familiarity with their models, and less originality. In their eyes -the old philosophers were invested with an authority, to which it was their duty to -submit. The earliest Muslim thinkers were so fully convinced of the superiority of -Greek knowledge that they did not doubt that it had attained to the highest degree -of certainty. The thought of making farther and independent investigations did not -readily occur to an Oriental, who cannot imagine a man without a teacher as being -anything else than a disciple of Satan. In accordance, therefore, with the precedent -set by Hellenistic philosophers, an attempt had to be made to demonstrate the existence -of the harmony between Plato and Aristotle,—and, in particular, to shelve tacitly -those doctrines which gave offence, or to exhibit them in a sense which was not too -decidedly contrary to Muslim Dogmatics. In order to humour the opponents of Aristotle -or of Philosophy in general, prominence was given to wise and edifying sayings out -of the philosopher’s works,—both the genuine and the spurious,—that so the way might -be prepared for the reception of his scientific thoughts. To the initiated, however, -the teaching of Aristotle, like that of other schools and sects, was set forth as -a higher truth, to which the positive faith of the multitude and the more or less -firmly established system of the theologians were merely preliminary steps. -</p> -<p id="p1.3.15">15. Muslim Philosophy has always continued to be an <span class="pageNum" id="pb29">[<a href="#pb29">29</a>]</span>Eclecticism which depended on their stock of works translated from the Greek. The -course of its history has been a process of assimilation rather than of generation. -It has not distinguished itself, either by propounding new problems or by any peculiarity -in its endeavours to solve the old ones. It has therefore no important advances in -thought to register. And yet, from a historical point of view, its significance is -far greater than that of a mere intermediary between classical antiquity and Christian -Scholasticism. To follow up the reception of Greek ideas into the mixed civilization -of the East is a subject of historical interest possessing a charm entirely its own, -especially if one can forget at the same time that once there were Greeks. But the -consideration of this occurrence becomes important also by its presenting an opportunity -for comparison with other civilizations. Philosophy is a phenomenon so unique—so thoroughly -indigenous and independent a growth of Grecian soil—that one might regard it as being -exempt from the conditions of general civilized life, and as being explicable only -<i>per se</i>. Now the History of Philosophy in Islam is valuable, just because it sets forth the -first attempt to appropriate the results of Greek thinking, with greater comprehensiveness -and freedom than in the early Christian dogmatics. Acquaintance with the conditions -which made such an attempt possible, will permit us to reach conclusions, by way of -analogical reasonings—though with precaution, and for the present at least, to a very -limited extent—as to the reception of Graeco-Arab science in the Christian Middle -Ages, and will perhaps teach us a little about the conditions under which Philosophy -arises in general. -</p> -<p>We can hardly speak of a Muslim philosophy in the <span class="pageNum" id="pb30">[<a href="#pb30">30</a>]</span>proper sense of the term. But there were many men in Islam who could not keep from -philosophizing; and even through the folds of the Greek drapery, the form of their -own limbs is indicated. It is easy to look down on these men, from the high watch-tower -of some School-Philosophy, but it will be better for us to get to know them and to -comprehend them in their historical environment. We must leave to special research -the tracing of each thought up to its origin. Our aim in what follows can be nothing -more than to point out what the Muslims constructed out of the materials which were -before them. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb31">[<a href="#pb31">31</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div class="footnotes"> -<hr class="fnsep"> -<div class="footnote-body"> -<div id="xd31e2281"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e2281src">1</a></span> <i>Cf.</i> Snouck Hurgronje, “Mekka”, II, p. 228 <i>sq.</i> <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e2281src" title="Return to note 1 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e2304"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e2304src">2</a></span> <a class="biblink xd31e44" title="Reference to the Bible: Job, chapter 38" href="https://classic.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=jb%2038&version=NRSV">Job XXXVIII</a>. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e2304src" title="Return to note 2 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e2309"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e2309src">3</a></span> <a class="biblink xd31e44" title="Reference to the Bible: Genesis 15:5" href="https://classic.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=gn%2015:5&version=NRSV">Gen. XV:5</a>. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e2309src" title="Return to note 3 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e2538"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e2538src">4</a></span> The dialogue has received this name from the circumstance that during the conversation -Aristotle holds in his hand an apple, the smell of which keeps awake what remains -of his vital powers. At the close, his hand drops powerless, and the apple falls to -the ground. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e2538src" title="Return to note 4 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e2568"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e2568src">5</a></span> Farther, an epitome of the <span class="trans" title="stoicheiōsis theologikē"><span lang="grc" class="grek">στοιχείωσις θεολογική</span></span> of Proclus, was held even in later times to be a genuine work of Aristotle’s. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e2568src" title="Return to note 5 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div id="ch2" class="div1 chapter"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e536">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h2 class="main"><span class="divNum">II.</span> PHILOSOPHY AND ARAB KNOWLEDGE.</h2> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<div id="s2.1" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e546">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">1.</span> <span class="sc">Grammatical Science.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p2.1.1" class="first"><span class="corr" id="xd31e2610" title="Not in source">1. </span>By Muslim scholars of the 10<sup>th</sup> century the sciences were divided into ‘Arab Sciences’ and ‘Old’- or ‘Non-Arab Sciences’. -To the former belonged Grammar, Ethics and Dogmatics, History and Knowledge of Literature; -to the latter Philosophy, Natural Science and Medicine. In the main the division is -a proper one. The last-named branches are not only those which were determined the -most by foreign influences, but those too which never became really popular. And yet -the so called ‘Arab Sciences’ are not altogether pure native products. They too arose -or were developed in places in the Muslim empire where Arabs and Non-Arabs met together, -and where the need was awakened of reflecting on those subjects which concern mankind -the most,—Speech and Poetry, Law and Religion,—in so far as differences or inadequacies -appeared therein. In the mode in which this came about, it is easy to trace the influence -of Non-Arabs, particularly of Persians; and the part taken by Greek Philosophy in -the process asserts itself in ever-growing importance. -</p> -<p id="p2.1.2">2. The Arabic language,—in which the Arabs themselves took particular delight, for -its copious vocabulary, <span class="pageNum" id="pb32">[<a href="#pb32">32</a>]</span>its wealth of forms and its inherent capability of cultivation,—was peculiarly fitted -to take a leading position in the world. If it is compared, for example, with the -unwieldy Latin, or even with the turgid Persian, it is found to be specially distinguished -by the possession of short Abstract-forms,—a property of great service in scientific -expression. It is capable of indicating the finest shades of meaning; but just because -of its richly developed stock of synonyms, it offers temptations to deviate from the -Aristotelian rule,—that the use of synonyms is not permissible in exact science. A -language so elegant, expressive, and difficult withal, as Arabic was, necessarily -invited much examination, when it had become the polite language of the Syrians and -the Persians. Above all, the study of the Koran, and the recital and interpretation -of it demanded profound attention to be devoted to the language. Unbelievers, also, -may have thought that they could point out grammatical errors in the sacred Book; -and therefore examples were gathered out of ancient poems and out of the living speech -of the Bedouins, to support the expressions of the Koran. To these examples remarks -were, no doubt, added upon grammatical accuracy in general. On the whole, the living -usage formed the standard, but in order to save the authority of the Koran, it was -certainly not applied without artifice. This proceeding was regarded, all the same, -by simple believers, with a measure of suspicion. Masudi tells us even of some grammarians -from Basra, who, when on a pleasure trip, took to going through a Koran Imperative, -and for that reason(?) were soundly cudgelled by country folk engaged in date-gathering. -</p> -<p id="p2.1.3">3. The Arabs trace their grammatical science, like so <span class="pageNum" id="pb33">[<a href="#pb33">33</a>]</span>many other things, to Ali, to whom is ascribed even Aristotle’s tripartite division -of speech. In reality the study began to be cultivated in Basra and Kufa. Its earliest -development is involved in obscurity, for in the Grammar of Sibawaih († 786) we have -a finished system,—a colossal work—, which, like Ibn Sina’s Canon of Medicine in after -times, could only be explained by later generations as the production of many scholars -working in collaboration. We are but ill-informed even on the points of difference -between the schools of Basra and Kufa. The Basra grammarians, like the school of Bagdad -in subsequent times, must have conceded a great influence to <i>Qiyas</i> (Analogy) in the determination of grammatical phenomena, while those of Kufa allowed -many idiomatic forms which diverged from Qiyas. On this ground, to mark the contrast -between the Basra grammarians and those of Kufa, the former were called ‘the Logic -people’. Their terminology differed in detail from that of the Kufa school. Many, -whose heads had been turned by logic, in the opinion of the genuine Arabs, must have -gone decidedly too far in their captious criticism of the language; but on the other -side caprice was raised to the position of rule. -</p> -<p>It was from no mere accident that the school of Basra was the first to avail itself -of logical resources. Generally speaking, it was at Basra that the influence of philosophic -doctrines first appeared, and among its grammarians were to be found many Shiʻites -and Mutazilites, who readily permitted foreign wisdom to influence their doctrinal -teaching. -</p> -<p id="p2.1.4">4. Grammatical science, in so far as it was not confined, to the collecting of Examples, -Synonyms &c., when so determined by the subjects specially treated, was affected <span class="pageNum" id="pb34">[<a href="#pb34">34</a>]</span>by the Aristotelian Logic. Even before the Muslim era, Syrians and Persians had studied -the treatise <span class="trans" title="peri hermēneias"><span lang="grc" class="grek">περὶ ἑρμηνείας</span></span>, with Stoic and Neo-Platonic additions. Ibn al-Moqaffa, who at first was intimate -with the grammarian Khalil (v. <i>infra</i>), then made accessible to the Arabs all that existed in Pahlawi of a grammatical -or logical nature. In conformity therewith the various kinds of Sentences were enumerated,—at -one time five, at another eight or nine, as well as the three parts of speech,—Noun, -Verb and Particle. Afterwards some scholars, like Djahiz, included syllogistic figures -among the Rhetorical figures; and in later representations there was much disputation -about Sound and Idea. The question was discussed whether language is the result of -ordinance or a product of nature; but gradually the philosophic view preponderated, -that it came by ordinance. -</p> -<p>Next to Logic the influence of the preparatory or mathematical sciences falls to be -noticed here. Like the prose of ordinary intercourse and the rhymes of the Koran, -the verses of the poets were not only collected but also arranged according to special -principles of classification,—for example, according to metre. After Grammar Prosody -arose. Khalil († 791), the teacher of Sibawaih, to whom the first application of Qiyas -to grammatical science was attributed, is said even to have created metrical science. -While language came to be regarded as the national, conventional element in poetry, -the notion was entertained that what was natural, and common to all populations, would -be found in their metre. Thabit ibn Qorra (836–901) therefore maintained, in his classification -of the sciences, that metre was something essential, and the study of metre <span class="pageNum" id="pb35">[<a href="#pb35">35</a>]</span>a natural science, and therefore a branch of philosophy. -</p> -<p id="p2.1.5">5. Grammatical science, nevertheless, limited as it was to the Arabic language, retained -its peculiarities, upon which this is not the place to enter. At all events, it is -an imposing production of the keenly-observing and diligently-collecting Arab intelligence,—a -production of which the Arabs might well be proud. An apologist of the 10<sup>th</sup> century, who was engaged in combating Greek philosophy, said: “He who is acquainted -with the subtleties and profundities of Arab poetry and versification, knows well -that they surpass all such things as numbers, lines and points, which are wont to -be advanced in proof of their opinions, by people who idly dream that they are capable -of understanding the essence of things. I cannot see the substantial advantage of -things like numbers, lines and points, if, in spite of the trifling profit which may -attend them, they do harm to the Faith and are followed by consequences, against which -we have to invoke the help of God.” Men would not have their delight in the minutiae -of their language disturbed by general philosophic speculations. Many a word-form, -originating with the translators of foreign works, was held in detestation by purist -Grammarians. The beautiful art of <span class="corr" id="xd31e2649" title="Source: caligraphy">calligraphy</span>, more decorative in its nature than constructive, like Arabic art in general, became -developed in noble, delicate forms, and met with a wider expansion than scientific -research into the language. In the very characters of the Arabic speech, we may still -see the subtlety of the intelligence which formed them, although at the same time -we may see a lack of energy, which is observable in the entire development of Arab -culture. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb36">[<a href="#pb36">36</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s2.2" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e610">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">2.</span> <span class="sc">Ethical Teaching.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p2.2.1" class="first">1. The believing Muslim, in so far as custom did not maintain its dominion over him, -had at first the Word of God and the example of His Prophet as his rule of conduct -and opinion. After the Prophet’s death, the Sunna of Mohammed was followed, in cases -where the Koran gave no information,—that is to say, men acted and decided, as Mohammed -had decided or acted, according to the Tradition of his Companions. But from the time -of the conquest of countries in possession of an old civilization, demands which were -altogether new were made of Islam. Instead of the simple conditions of Arab life, -usages and institutions were met with there, in regard to which the Sacred Law gave -no precise direction, and to meet which no tradition or interpretation of tradition -presented itself. Every day added thus to the number of individual cases which had -not been provided for, and yet about which one had to come to a decision, whether -according to custom, or his own sense of right. In the old-Roman provinces, Syria -and Mesopotamia, Roman law must have long continued to exercise an important influence. -</p> -<p>Those jurists who attributed to their own opinion (<i>Raʼy</i>, <i lang="la">opinio</i>) alongside of the Koran and Sunna, a subsidiary authority to determine the law, were -called ‘Adherents of the Raʼy’. One of them, Abu Hanifa of Kufa († 767), the founder -of the Hanifite School, became specially famous. But even in Medina, before the appearance -of the school of Malik (715–795), as well as in that school, a harmless though restricted -deference was at first paid to the Raʼy. By slow degrees, however, and in the course -of opposing <span class="pageNum" id="pb37">[<a href="#pb37">37</a>]</span>a Raʼy which was becoming a pretext for much arbitrariness, the view gained ground, -that in everything the Tradition (<i>hadith</i>) respecting the Sunna of the Prophet was to be followed. Thereupon traditions were -collected from all quarters, and explained—and in large numbers even forged—; and -a system of criteria to determine their genuineness was formed, which, however, laid -more stress upon the external evidence and the appropriateness of the traditionary -material than upon consistency and historic truth. As a consequence of this development, -the ‘people of the Raʼy’, who were chiefly located in Iraq (Babylonia), were now confronted -by the ‘Adherents of the Tradition’, or the Medina school. Even Shafii (767–820), -the founder of the third school of Law, who in general held to the Sunna, was numbered -with the partisans of Tradition, in contradistinction no doubt to Abu Hanifa. -</p> -<p id="p2.2.2">2. Logic introduced a new element into this controversy,—viz<span class="corr" id="xd31e2676" title="Not in source">.</span> <i>Qiyas</i> or Analogy. There had been, of course, stray applications of Qiyas, even in earlier -times; but, to lay down Qiyas as a principle, a foundation or a source of law,—presupposed -the influence of scientific reflection. Although the terms <i>Raʼy</i> and <i>Qiyas</i> may be used as synonyms, yet there is in the latter term, less suggestion of the -presence and operation of individual predilection than there is in <i>Raʼy</i>. The more one grew accustomed to employ Qiyas in grammatical and logical researches, -the more readily could he include this principle in the institutes of jurisprudence, -whether by way of reasoning from one instance to another, or from the majority of -instances to the remainder (i.e. analogically), or by way of seeking rather for some -common ground governing various cases, <span class="pageNum" id="pb38">[<a href="#pb38">38</a>]</span>from which the conduct proper in a particular case might be deduced (i.e. syllogistically)<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e2689src" href="#xd31e2689">1</a>. -</p> -<p>The application of Qiyas appears to have come into use, first and most extensively, -in the Hanifite school, but afterwards also in the school of Shafii,—though with a -more limited range. In connection therewith, the question—whether language was capable -of expressing the Universal, or could merely denote the Particular—became important -for ethical doctrine. -</p> -<p>The logical principle of Qiyas never attained to great repute. Much more emphasis -was laid,—next to the Koran and the Sunna, the historic foundations of the Law—, upon -the <i>Idjma</i>, that is, the Consensus of the Congregation of the faithful. The Consensus of the -Congregation or, practically, of the most influential learned men in it,—who may be -compared to the fathers and teachers of the Catholic Church,—is the Dogmatical principle, -which, contested only by a few, has proved the most important instrument in establishing -the Muslim Ethical System. Theory, however, continues to assign a certain subordinate -place to Qiyas, as a fourth source of moral guidance, after Koran, Sunna and Idjma. -</p> -<p id="p2.2.3">3. The Muslim Ethical System (<i>al-fiqh</i><span id="xd31e2725"></span> = ‘the knowledge’) take into account the entire life of the believer, for whom the -Faith itself is the first of all duties. Like every innovation the system at first -encountered violent opposition:—commandment was now turned into doctrinal theory, -and <span class="pageNum" id="pb39">[<a href="#pb39">39</a>]</span>believing obedience into abstruse pursuit of knowledge: that called for protestation -alike from plain pious people and from wise statesmen. But gradually the ‘knowing’ -men or men learned in the Law (<i>ulamā</i>, or in the West, <i>faqihs</i>) were recognized as the true heirs of the prophets. The Ethical system was developed -before the Doctrinal, and it has been able to hold the leading position up to the -present day. Nearly every Muslim knows something of it, seeing it is part of a good -religious upbringing. According to the great Church-father Gazali, ‘the Fiqh’ is the -daily bread of believing souls, while the Doctrine is only valuable as a Medicine -for the sick. -</p> -<p>We are not called upon here to enter into the minutiae of the fine-spun casuistic -of the Fiqh. The main subject handled in it is an ideal righteousness, which can never -be illustrated in all its purity in our imperfect world. We are acquainted now with -its principles, and with the position which it holds in Islam. Let us merely add a -brief notice of the division of moral acts which was formulated by ethical teachers. -According to this classification there are: -</p> -<ul> -<li class="numberedItem"><span class="itemNumber">1.</span> Acts, the practice of which is an absolute duty and is therefore rewarded, and the -omission of which is punished: </li> -<li class="numberedItem"><span class="itemNumber">2.</span> Acts which are recommended by the Law, and are the subject of reward, but the neglect -of which does not call for punishment: </li> -<li class="numberedItem"><span class="itemNumber">3.</span> Acts which are permitted, but which in the eyes of the Law are a matter of indifference: -</li> -<li class="numberedItem"><span class="itemNumber">4.</span> Acts which the Law disapproves of, but does not hold as punishable: <span class="pageNum" id="pb40">[<a href="#pb40">40</a>]</span></li> -<li class="numberedItem"><span class="itemNumber">5.</span> Acts which are forbidden by the Law and which demand unconditional punishment<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e2757src" href="#xd31e2757">2</a>. </li> -</ul><p> -</p> -<p id="p2.2.4">4. Greek philosophic enquiries have had a two-fold influence upon the Ethics of Islam. -With many of the sectaries and mystics, both orthodox and heretic, an ascetic system -of Ethics is found, coloured by Pythagorean-Platonic views. The same thing appears -with philosophers, whom we shall afterwards meet again. But in orthodox circles the -Aristotelian deliverance,—that virtue consists in the just mean—, found much acceptance, -because something similar stood in the Koran, and because, generally, the tendency -of Islam was a catholic one,—one conciliatory of opposites. -</p> -<p>More attention indeed was given to Politics than to Ethics, in the Muslim empire, -and the struggles of political parties were the first thing to occasion difference -of opinion. Disputes about the <i>Imâmat</i>, i.e. the headship in the Muslim Church, pervade the entire history of Islam; but -the questions discussed have commonly more of a personal and practical than a theoretical -importance, and therefore a history of philosophy does not need to consider them very -fully. Hardly anything of philosophic value emerges in them. Even in the course of -the first centuries there was developed a firm body of constitutional law canonically -expressed; but this, like the ideal system of duty, was not particularly heeded by -strong rulers,—who viewed it as mere theological brooding,—while, on the other hand, -by weak princes it could not be applied at all. -</p> -<p>Just as little is it worth our while to examine minutely the numerous ‘mirrors of -Princes’, which were such favourites, <span class="pageNum" id="pb41">[<a href="#pb41">41</a>]</span>in Persia especially, and in whose wise moral saws, and maxims of political sagacity, -the courtly circles found edification. -</p> -<p>The weight of philosophic endeavour in Islam lies on the theoretical and intellectual -side. With the actual proceedings of social and political life they are able to make -but a scanty compromise. Even the Art of the Muslims, although it exhibits more originality -than their Science, does not know how to animate the crude material, but merely sports -with ornamental forms. Their Poetry creates no Drama, and their Philosophy is unpractical. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s2.3" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e676">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">3.</span> <span class="sc">Doctrinal Systems.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p2.3.1" class="first">1. In the Koran there had been given to Muslims a religion, but no system,—precepts -but no doctrines. What is contrary to logic therein,—what we account for by the shifting -circumstances of the Prophet’s life, and his varying moods,—was simply accepted by -the first believers, without asking questions about the How and Why. But in the conquered -countries they were faced by a fully-formed Christian Dogmatic as well as by Zoroastrian -and Brahmanic theories. We have laid frequent stress already upon the great debt which -the Muslims owe to the Christians; and the doctrinal system has certainly been determined -the most by Christian influences. In Damascus the formation of Muslim Dogmas was affected -by Orthodox and Monophysite teaching, and in Basra and Bagdad rather perhaps by Nestorian -and Gnostic theories. Little of the literature belonging to the earliest period of -this movement has come down to us, but we cannot be <span class="pageNum" id="pb42">[<a href="#pb42">42</a>]</span>wrong in assigning a considerable influence to personal intercourse and regular school-instruction. -Not much was learned in the East at that time out of books, any more than it is to-day: -more was learned from the lips of the teacher. The similarity between the oldest doctrinal -teachings in Islam and the dogmas of Christianity is too great to permit any one to -deny that they are directly connected. In particular, the first question about which -there was much dispute, among Muslim Scholars, was that of the Freedom of the Will. -Now the freedom of the will was almost universally accepted by Oriental Christians. -At no time and in no place perhaps was the Will-problem—first in the Christology, -but afterward in the Anthropology—so much discussed from every point as in the Christian -circles of the East at the time of the Muslim conquest. -</p> -<p>Besides these considerations which are partly of an <i>a priori</i> character, there are also detached notices which indicate that some of the earliest -Muslims, who taught the Freedom of the Will, had Christian teachers. -</p> -<p>A number of purely philosophic elements from the Gnostic systems, and afterwards from -the translation-literature, associated themselves with the Hellenistic-Christian influences. -</p> -<p id="p2.3.2">2. An assertion, expressed in logical or dialectic fashion, whether verbal or written, -was called by the Arabs,—generally, but more particularly in religious teaching—a -<i>Kalam</i> (<span class="trans" title="logos"><span lang="grc" class="grek">λόγος</span></span>), and those who advanced such assertions were called <i>Mutakallimun</i>. The name was transferred from the individual assertion to the entire system, and -it covered also the introductory, elementary observations on Method,<span class="pageNum" id="pb43">[<a href="#pb43">43</a>]</span>—and so on. Our best designation for the science of the Kalam is ‘Theological Dialectics’ -or simply ‘Dialectics’; and in what follows we may translate <i>Mutakallimun</i> by ‘Dialecticians’. -</p> -<p>The name <i>Mutakallimun</i>, which was at first common to all the Dialecticians, was in later times applied specially -to the Antimutazilite and Orthodox theologians. In the latter case it might be well, -following the sense, to render the term by Dogmatists or Schoolmen. In fact while -the first dialecticians had the Dogma still to form, those who came later had only -to expound and establish it. -</p> -<p>The introduction of Dialectics into Islam was a violent innovation, and it was vehemently -denounced by the party of the Tradition. Whatever went beyond the regular ethical -teaching was heresy to them, for faith should be obedience, and not,—as was maintained -by the Murdjites and Mutazilites—, knowledge. By the latter it was laid down without -reserve that speculation was one of the duties of believers. Even to this demand the -times became reconciled, for according to tradition the Prophet had said already: -‘The first thing which God created was Knowledge or Reason’. -</p> -<p id="p2.3.3">3. Very numerous are the various opinions which found utterance in the days even of -the Omayyads, but especially in those of the early Abbasids. The farther they diverged -from one another, the more difficult it was for the men of the Tradition to come to -an understanding with them; but gradually certain compact doctrinal collections stood -out distinctly, of which the rationalist system of the Mutazilites, the successors -of the Qadarites, was most widely extended, particularly among Shiʻites. From Caliph -Mamun’s <span class="pageNum" id="pb44">[<a href="#pb44">44</a>]</span>time down to Mutawakkil’s, it even received State recognition; and the Mutazilites, -who had been in earlier days oppressed and persecuted by the temporal power, now became -Inquisitors of the Faith themselves, with whom the sword supplied the place of argument. -About the same time, however, their opponents the Traditionalists commenced to build -up a system of belief. Upon the whole there was no lack of intermediary forms between -the naive Faith of the multitude and the Gnosis of the dialecticians. In contrast -to the spiritualistic stamp of Mutazilitism these intermediary forms took an anthropomorphic -character with regard to the doctrine of the Deity, and a materialistic character -with regard to the theory of man and the universe (Anthropology and Cosmology). The -soul, for example, was conceived of by them as corporeal, or as an accident of the -body, and the Divine Essence was imagined as a human body. The religious teaching -and art of the Muslims were greatly averse to the symbolical God-Father of the Christians, -but there was an abundance of absurd speculations about the form of Allah. Some went -so far as to ascribe to him all the bodily members together, with the exception of -the beard and other privileges of oriental manhood. -</p> -<p>It is impossible to discuss in detail all the Dialectic sects, which often made their -first appearance in the form of political parties. From the standpoint of the history -of Philosophy it is enough to give here the chief doctrines of the Mutazilites, in -so far as they can lay claim to general interest. -</p> -<p id="p2.3.4">4. The first question, then, concerned man’s conduct and destiny. The forerunners -of the Mutazilites, who were <span class="pageNum" id="pb45">[<a href="#pb45">45</a>]</span>called Qadarites, taught the Freedom of the human Will; and the Mutazilites, even -in later times, when their speculations were directed more to theologico-metaphysical -problems, were first and foremost pointed to as the supporters of the doctrine of -Divine Righteousness,—which gives rise to no evil, and rewards or punishes man according -to his deserts—, and, in the second place, as the confessors, or avowed supporters -of the Unity of God, i.e. the absence of properties from his Essence considered <i>per se</i> [or the predicateless character of the essential nature of God]. The systematic statement -of their doctrines must have been influenced by the Logicians (v. <a href="#p4.2.1">IV, 2 § 1</a>); for even in the first half of the 10<sup>th</sup> century, the Mutazilite system began with the confession of the Unity of God, while -the doctrine of God’s Righteousness, announced as it is in all his works, is relegated -to the second place. -</p> -<p>The responsibility of man, as well as the holiness of God, who is incapable of directly -causing man’s sinful actions, had to be saved by asserting the freedom of the Will. -Man must therefore be lord of his actions; but he is lord of these only, for few entertained -any doubt that the energy which confers ability to act at all, and the power of doing -either a good or a bad action come to man from God. Hence the numerous subtle discussions,—amalgamated -with a criticism of the philosophic conception of Time—on the question whether the -power, which God creates in man, is bestowed previous to the action, or <span class="corr" id="xd31e2831" title="Source: coincidently">coincidentally</span> and simultaneously therewith: For, did the power precede the act, then it would either -have to last up to the time of the act, which would belie its accidental character -(cf. <a href="#p2.3.12">II, 3 § 12</a>), or have ceased to <span class="pageNum" id="pb46">[<a href="#pb46">46</a>]</span>exist before the act,—in which case it might have been dispensed with altogether. -</p> -<p>From human conduct speculation passed on to consider the operations of nature. Instead -of God and man, the antithesis in this case is God and nature. The productive and -generative powers of nature were recognized as means or proximate causes; and some -endeavoured to investigate them. In their opinion, however, nature herself, like all -the world, was a work of God, a creature of his wisdom: And just as the omnipotence -of God was limited in the moral kingdom by his holiness or righteousness,—so in the -natural world it was limited by his wisdom. Even the presence of evil and mischief -in the world was accounted for by the wisdom of God, who sends everything for the -best. A production or object of Divine activity, evil is not. “God may be able, indeed,”—so -an earlier generation had maintained—“to act wickedly and unreasonably, but he would -not do it.” The later Mutazilites taught, on the other hand, that God has no power -at all to do anything which is in this way repugnant to his nature. Their opponents, -who regarded God’s unlimited might and unfathomable will as directly operative in -all doing and effecting were indignant at this teaching, and compared its propounders -to the dualistic Magians. Consistent Monism was on the side of these opponents, who -did not care to turn man and nature into creators—next to and under God—of their acts -or operations. -</p> -<p id="p2.3.5">5. The Mutazilites, it is clear from the foregoing, had a different idea of God from -that which was entertained by the multitude and by the Traditionalists. This became -specially evident, as speculation advanced, in the doctrine <span class="pageNum" id="pb47">[<a href="#pb47">47</a>]</span>of the Divine attributes. From the very beginning the Unity of God was strongly emphasized -in Islam; but that did not prevent men from bestowing upon him many beautiful names -following human analogy, and ascribing to him several attributes. Of these the following -came gradually into greatest prominence, under the influence assuredly of Christian -dogmatics:—viz.: Wisdom, Power, Life, Will, Speech or Word, Sight and Hearing. The -last two of these—Sight and Hearing—were the first to be explained in a spiritual -sense, or entirely set aside. But the absolute Unity of the Godhead did not appear -to be compatible with any plurality of co-eternal attributes. Would not that be the -Trinity of the Christians, who before now had explained the three Persons of the One -Divine Being as attributes? In order to avoid this inconvenience they sought sometimes -to derive several attributes out of others by a process of abstraction, and to refer -them to a single one—for instance to Knowledge or Power—and sometimes to apprehend -them each and all as being states of the Divine essence, or to identify them with -the essence itself, in which case of course their significance nearly disappeared. -Occasionally an attempt was made through refinements of phraseology to save something -of that significance. While, for example, a philosopher, denying the attributes, maintained -that God is by his essence a Being who knows, a Mutazilite dialectian expressed it -thus: God is a Being who knows, but by means of a knowledge, which He himself is. -</p> -<p>In the opinion of the Traditionalists the conception of God was in this way being -robbed of all its contents. The Mutazilites hardly got beyond negative determinations,<span class="pageNum" id="pb48">[<a href="#pb48">48</a>]</span>—that God is not like the things of this world,—that he is exalted above Space, Time, -Movement, and so on; but they held fast to the doctrine that he is the Creator of -the world. Although little could be asserted regarding the Being of God, it was thought -he could be known from his works. -</p> -<p>For the Mutazilites as well as for their opponents, the Creation was an absolute act -of God, and the existence of the world an existence in time. They energetically combated -the doctrine of the eternity of the world,—a doctrine supported by the Aristotelian -philosophy, and which had been widely spread throughout the East. -</p> -<p id="p2.3.6">6. We have already found ‘Speech’ or ‘the Word’, given as one of the eternal attributes -of God; and, probably by way of conformity with the Christian doctrine of the Logos, -there was taught in particular the eternity of the Koran which had been revealed to -the Prophet. This belief in an eternal Koran by the side of Allah, was downright idolatry, -according to the Mutazilites; and in opposition thereto the Mutazilite Caliphs proclaimed -it as a doctrine accepted by the State,—that the Koran had been created: Whoever denied -this doctrine was publicly punished. Now although the Mutazilites in maintaining this -dogma were more in harmony with the original Islam than their opponents, yet history -has justified the latter, for pious needs proved stronger than logical conclusions. -Many of the Mutazilites, in the opinion of their brethren in the faith, were far too -ready to make light of the Koran, the Word of God. If it did not agree with their -theories, it received ever new interpretations. In actual fact reason had more weight -with many than the revealed Book. By comparing not only the <span class="pageNum" id="pb49">[<a href="#pb49">49</a>]</span>three revealed religions together, but these also with Persian and Indian religious -teaching and with philosophic speculation, they reached a natural religion, which -reconciled opposites. This was built up on the basis of an inborn knowledge, universally -necessary,—that there is one God, who, as a wise Creator, has produced the world, -and also endowed Man with reason that he may know his Creator and distinguish between -Good and Evil. Contrasted with this Natural or Rational Religion, acquaintance with -the teaching of revelation is then something adventitious,—an acquired knowledge. -</p> -<p>By this contention the most consistent of the Mutazilites had broken away from the -consensus of the Muslim religious community, and had thus actually put themselves -outside the general faith. At first they still appealed to that consensus,—which they -were able to do as long as the secular power was favourably disposed to them. That -condition, however, did not last long, and they soon learned by experience what has -often been taught since,—that the communities of men are more ready to accept a religion -sent down to them from on high, than an enlightened explanation of it. -</p> -<p id="p2.3.7">7. Following up this survey let us take a closer view of one or two of the most considerable -of the Mutazilites, that the general picture may not be wanting in individual features. -</p> -<p>Let us first glance at Abu-l-Hudhail al-Allaf, who died about the middle of the 9<sup>th</sup> century. He was a famous dialectician, and one of the first who allowed philosophy -to exercise an influence on their theological doctrines. -</p> -<p>That an attribute should be capable of inhering in a <span class="pageNum" id="pb50">[<a href="#pb50">50</a>]</span>Being in any way is not conceivable, in the opinion of Abu-l-Hudhail: It must either -be identical with the Being or different from it. But yet he looks about for some -way of adjustment. God is, according to him, knowing, mighty, living, through knowledge, -might and life, which are his very essence; and just as men had done even before this, -on the Christian side, he terms these three predicates the Modi (<i>wudjuh</i>) of the Divine Being. He agrees also that hearing, seeing and other attributes are -eternal in God, but only with regard to the world which was afterwards to be created. -Besides, it would be easy enough for him and for others, who were affected by the -philosophy of the day, to interpret these and similar expressions—such as God’s ‘beholding’ -on the last day,<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e2868src" href="#xd31e2868">3</a>—in a spiritual sense, since generally they regarded seeing and hearing as spiritual -acts. For example, Abu-l-Hudhail maintained that motion was visible, but not palpable, -because it was not a body. -</p> -<p>The Will of God, however, is not to be regarded as eternal. On the contrary, Abu-l-Hudhail -assumes absolute declarations of Will as being different both from the Being who wills -and the object which is willed. Thus the absolute Word of Creation takes an intermediate -position between the eternal Creator and the transient created world. These declarations -of God’s Will form a kind of intermediate essence, to be compared with the Platonic -Ideas or the Sphere-spirits, but perhaps regarded rather as immaterial powers than -as personal spirits. Abu-l-Hudhail distinguishes between the absolute Word of Creation -and the accidental Word of Revelation, which is announced to men in the form of command -and prohibition, appearing as matter and in space, and which <span class="pageNum" id="pb51">[<a href="#pb51">51</a>]</span>is thus significant only for this transient world. The possibility of living in accordance -with the Divine word of revelation, or of resisting it, exists therefore in this life -alone. Binding injunction and prohibition presuppose Freedom of Will and capability -of acting in accordance therewith. On the other hand in the future life there are -no obligations in the form of laws, and, accordingly, no longer any freedom: everything -there depends on the absolute determination of God. Nor will there be any motion in -the world beyond, for as motion has once had a beginning, it must, at the end of the -world, come to a close in everlasting rest. Abu-l-Hudhail, therefore, could not have -believed in a resurrection of the body. -</p> -<p>Human actions he divides into Natural and Moral, or Actions of the members, and Actions -of the heart. An action is moral, only when we perform it without constraint. The -moral act is Man’s own property, acquired by his own exertions, but his knowledge -comes to him from God, partly through Revelation, and partly through the light of -Nature. -</p> -<p>Anterior even to any revelation man is instructed in duty by Nature, and thus is fully -enabled to know God, to discern Good from Evil, and to live a virtuous, honest and -upright life. -</p> -<p id="p2.3.8">8. Noteworthy as a man and a thinker is a younger contemporary of Abu-l-Hudhail’s, -and apparently a disciple of his, commonly called Al-Nazzam, who died in the year -845. A fanciful, restless, ambitious man, not a consistent thinker, but yet a bold -and honest one,—such is the representation of him given us by Djahiz, one of his pupils. -The people considered him a madman or a heretic. A good deal in his teaching is in -touch with what passed among <span class="pageNum" id="pb52">[<a href="#pb52">52</a>]</span>the Orientals as the Philosophy of Empedocles and Anaxagoras (Cf. also Abu-l-Hudhail). -</p> -<p>In the opinion of Nazzam God can do absolutely no evil thing; in fact he can only -do that which he knows to be the best thing for his servants. His omnipotence reaches -no farther than what he actually does. Who could hinder him from giving effect to -the splendid exuberance of his Being? A Will, in the proper sense of the term,—which -invariably implies a need,—is by no means to be attributed to God. The Will of God, -on the contrary, is only a designation of the Divine agency itself, or of the commands -which have been conveyed to men. Creation is an act performed once for all, in which -all things were made at one and the same time, so that one thing is contained in another, -and so that in process of time the various specimens of minerals, plants and animals, -as well as the numerous children of Adam, gradually emerge from their latent condition -and come to the light. -</p> -<p>Nazzam, like the philosophers, rejects the theory of atoms (v. <a href="#p2.3.12">II, 3 § 12</a>), but then he can only account for the traversing of a definite distance, by reason -of the infinite divisibility of space, by postulating leaps. He holds bodily substances -to be composed of ‘accidents’ instead of atoms. And just as Abu-l-Hudhail could not -conceive of the inherence of attributes in an essence, so Nazzam can only imagine -the accident as the substance itself or as a part of the substance. Thus ‘Fire’ or -‘the Warm’, for instance, exists in a latent condition in wood, but it becomes free -when, by means of friction, its antagonist ‘the Cold’ disappears. In the process there -occurs a motion or transposition, but no qualitative change. Sensible qualities, such -as <span class="pageNum" id="pb53">[<a href="#pb53">53</a>]</span>colours, savours and odours, are, in Nazzam’s view, bodies. -</p> -<p>Even the soul or the intellect of Man he conceives to be a finer kind of body. The -soul, of course, is the most excellent part of man: it completely pervades the body, -which is its organ, and it must be termed the real and true Man. Thoughts and aspirations -are defined as Movements of the Soul. -</p> -<p>In matters of Faith and in questions of Law Nazzam rejects both the consensus of the -congregation and the analogical interpretation of the Law, and appeals in Shiʻite -fashion to the infallible Imam. He thinks it possible for the whole body of Muslims -to concur in admitting an erroneous doctrine, as, for instance, the doctrine that -Mohammed has a mission for all mankind in contradistinction to other prophets. Whereas -God sends every prophet to all mankind. -</p> -<p>Nazzam, besides, shares the view of Abu-l-Hudhail as to the knowledge of God and of -moral duties by means of the reason. He is not particularly convinced of the inimitable -excellence of the Koran. The abiding marvel of the Koran is made to consist only in -the fact that Mohammed’s contemporaries were kept from producing something like to -the Koran. -</p> -<p>He has certainly not retained much of the Muslim Eschatology. At least the torments -of hell are in his view resolved into a process of consuming by fire. -</p> -<p id="p2.3.9">9. Many syncretistic doctrines, but all devoid of originality, have come down to us -from the school of Nazzam. The most famous man, whom it produced was the elegant writer -and Natural-Philosopher Djahiz († 869), who demanded of the genuine scholar that he -should combine the study <span class="pageNum" id="pb54">[<a href="#pb54">54</a>]</span>of Theology with that of Natural Science. He traces in all things the operations of -Nature, but also a reference in these operations to the Creator of the world. Man’s -reason is capable of knowing the Creator, and in like manner of comprehending the -need of a prophetic revelation. Man’s only merit is in his will, for on the one hand -all his actions are interwoven with the events of Nature, and on the other his entire -knowledge is necessarily determined from above. And yet no great significance appears -to accrue to the Will, which is derived from ‘knowing’. At least Will in the Divine -Being is quite negatively conceived of, that is, God never operates unconsciously, -or with dislike to his work. -</p> -<p>In all this there is little that is original. His ethical ideal is ‘the mean’, and -the style of his genius is also mediocre. It is only in compiling his numerous writings -that Djahiz has shown any excess. -</p> -<p id="p2.3.10">10. With the earlier Mutazilites reflections on Ethics and Natural Philosophy predominate; -with those who come later Logico-metaphysical meditations prevail. In particular Neo-Platonic -influences are to be traced here. -</p> -<p>Muammar, whose date cannot be accurately determined, although it may be set down as -about the year 900, has much in common with those who have just been named. But he -is far more emphatic in his denial of the existence of Divine attributes, which he -regards as being contradictory of the absolute unity of the Divine essence. God is -high above every form of plurality. He knows neither himself nor any other being, -for ‘knowing’ would presuppose a plurality in him. He is even to be called Hyper-eternal. -Nevertheless he is to be recognized as Creator of the world. He has only created bodies, -it is true; and these of themselves <span class="pageNum" id="pb55">[<a href="#pb55">55</a>]</span>create their Accidents, whether through operation of Nature or by Will. The number -of these accidents is infinite, for in their essence they are nothing more than the -intellectual relations of thought. Muammar is a Conceptualist. Motion and Rest, Likeness -and Unlikeness, and so on, are nothing in themselves, and have merely an intellectual -or ideal existence. The soul, which is held to be the true essence of Man, is conceived -of as an Idea or an immaterial substance, though it is not clearly stated how it is -related to the body or to the Divine essence. The account handed down is confused. -</p> -<p>Man’s will is free, and,—properly speaking,—Willing is his only act, for the outward -action belongs to the body (Cf. Djahiz). -</p> -<p>The school of Bagdad, to which Muammar seems to belong, was conceptualist. With the -exception of the most general predicates,—those of Being and Becoming, it made Universals -subsist only as notions or concepts. Abu Hashim of Basra († 933) stood nearer to Realism. -The attributes of God, as well as Accidents and Genus-notions in general, were regarded -by him as something in a middle position between Being and Not-Being: he called them -Conditions or Modes. He designated Doubt as a requisite in all knowing. A simple Realist -he was not. -</p> -<p>Mutazilite thinkers indulged in dialectic quibbling even about ‘Not-Being’. They argued -that Not-Being, as well as Being, must come to possess a kind of reality, seeing that -it may become the subject of thought: at least man tries to think of ‘Nothing’ rather -than not think at all. -</p> -<p id="p2.3.11">11. In the 9<sup>th</sup> century several dialectic systems had been formed in the contest against the Mutazilites, -one of which, <span class="pageNum" id="pb56">[<a href="#pb56">56</a>]</span>viz. the Karramite system, held its ground till long after the 10<sup>th</sup> century. There arose, however, from the ranks of the Mutazilites a man whose mission -it was to reconcile antagonistic views, and who set up that doctrinal system which -was acknowledged as orthodox first in the East, and, later, throughout the whole of -Islam. This was Al-Ashari (873–935), who understood how to render to God the things -that are God’s, and to man the things that are man’s. He rejected the rude anthropomorphism -of the Antimutazilite dialecticians, and set God high above all that is bodily and -human, while he left to the Deity his omnipotence, and his universal agency. With -him Nature lost all her efficaciousness; but for man a certain distinction was reserved, -consisting in his being able to give assent to the works which were accomplished in -him by God, and to claim these as his own. Nor was Man’s sensuous-spiritual being -interfered with: He was permitted to hope for the resurrection of the body and the -beholding of God. As regards the Koranic revelation, Ashari distinguished between -an eternal Word in God, and the Book as we possess it, which latter was revealed in -Time. -</p> -<p>In the detailed statement of his doctrines Ashari showed no originality in any way, -but merely arranged and condensed the material given him,—a proceeding which could -not be carried out without discrepancies. The main thing, however, was that his Cosmology, -Anthropology and Eschatology did not depart too far from the text of the Tradition -for the edification of pious souls, and that his theology, in consequence of a somewhat -spiritualized conception of God was not altogether unsatisfactory even to men of higher -culture. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb57">[<a href="#pb57">57</a>]</span></p> -<p>Ashari relies upon the revelation contained in the Koran. He does not recognize any -rational knowledge with regard to Divine things that is independent of the Koran. -The senses are not in general likely to deceive us, but on the other hand our judgment -may easily do so. We know God, it is true, by our reason, but only from Revelation, -which is the one source of such knowledge. -</p> -<p>According to Ashari, then, God is first of all the omnipotent Creator. Farther he -is omniscient: he knows what men do and what they wish to do: he knows also what happens, -and how that which does not happen would have happened, if it had happened. Moreover -all predicates which express any perfection are applicable to God, with the proviso -that they apply to him in another and higher sense than to his creatures. In creating -and sustaining the world God is the sole cause: all worldly events proceed continually -and directly from him. Man, however, is quite conscious of the difference between -his involuntary movements, such as shivering and shaking, and those which are carried -out in the exercise of his will and choice. -</p> -<p id="p2.3.12">12. The most characteristic theory which the dialectic of the Muslims has fashioned, -is their doctrine of Atoms. The development of this doctrine is still wrapped in great -obscurity. It was advocated by the Mutazilites but particularly by their opponents -before the time of Ashari. Our sketch shows how it was held in the Asharite school, -where partly perhaps it was first developed. -</p> -<p>The Atomic doctrine of the Muslim dialecticians had its source, of course, in Greek -Natural Philosophy; but its reception and farther development were determined by the -requirements of theological Polemic and Apologetic. The <span class="pageNum" id="pb58">[<a href="#pb58">58</a>]</span>like phenomenon may be observed in the case of individual Jews and among believing -Catholics. It is impossible to suppose that Atomism was taken up in Islam, merely -because Aristotle had fought against it. Here we have to register a desperate struggle -for a religious advantage, and one in which weapons are not chosen at will: It is -the end that decides. Nature has to be explained, not from herself but from some divine -creative act; and this world must be regarded not as an eternal and divine order of -things, but as a creature of transient existence. God must be thought of and spoken -of as a freely-working and almighty Creator, not as an impersonal cause or inactive -primeval source. Accordingly, from the earliest times the doctrine of the creation -is placed at the apex of Muslim dogmatics, as a testimony against the pagan-philosophical -view of the eternity of the world and the efficient operations of Nature. What we -perceive of the sensible world,—say these Atomists,—is made up of passing ‘accidents’ -which every moment come and go. The substratum of this ‘change’ is constituted by -the (bodily) substances; and because of changes occurring in or on these substances, -they cannot be thought of as themselves unchangeable. If then they are changeable, -they cannot be permanent, for that which is eternal does not change. Consequently -everything in the world, since everything changes, has come into being, or has been -created by God. -</p> -<p>That is the starting-point. The changeableness of all that exists argues an eternal, -unchangeable Creator. But later writers, under the influence of Muslim philosophers, -infer from the possible or contingent character of everything finite, the necessary -existence of God. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb59">[<a href="#pb59">59</a>]</span></p> -<p>But let us come back to the world. It consists of Accidents and their substrata,—Substances. -Substance and Accident or Quality are the two categories by means of which reality -is conceived. The remaining categories either come under the category of Quality, -or else are resolved into relations, and modifications of thought, to which, objectively, -nothing corresponds. Matter, as possibility, exists only in thought: Time is nothing -other than the coexistence of different objects, or simultaneity in presentation; -and Space and Size may be attributed to bodies indeed, but not to the individual parts -(Atoms), of which bodies are composed. -</p> -<p>But, generally speaking, it is Accidents which form the proper predicates of substances. -Their number in every individual substance is very great, or even infinite as some -maintain, since of any pair whatever of opposite determinations,—and these include -negatives also,—the one or the other is attributable to every substance. The negative -‘accident’ is just as real as the positive. God creates also Privation and Annihilation, -though certainly it is not easy to discover a substratum for these. And seeing that -no Accident can ever have its place elsewhere than in some substance, and cannot have -it in another Accident, there is really nothing general or common in any number of -substances. Universals in no wise exist in individual things: They are Concepts. -</p> -<p>Thus there is no connection between substances: they stand apart, in their capacity -of atoms equal to one another. In fact they have a greater resemblance to the Homoeomeries -of Anaxagoras than to the extremely small particles of matter of the Atomists. In -themselves they are <span class="pageNum" id="pb60">[<a href="#pb60">60</a>]</span>non-spatial (without <i>makan</i>), but they have their position (<i>hayyiz</i>), and by means of this position of theirs they fill space. It is thus unities not -possessing extension, but conceived of as points,—out of which the spatial world of -body is constructed. Between these unities there must be a void, for were it otherwise -any motion would be impossible, since the atoms do not press upon one another. All -change, however, is referred to Union and Separation, Movement and Rest. Farther operative -relations between the Atom-substances, there are none. The Atoms exist then, and enjoy -their existence, but have nothing at all to do with one another. The world is a discontinuous -mass, without any living reciprocal action between its parts. -</p> -<p>The ancients had prepared the way for this conception by their theory, amongst other -things, of the discontinuous character of Number. Was not Time defined as the tale -or numbering of Motion? Why should we not apply that doctrine to Space, Time and Motion? -The Dialecticians did this; and the ‘skepsis’ of the older philosophy may have contributed -its influence in the process. Like the substantial, corporeal world,—Space, Time and -Motion were decomposed into atoms devoid of extension, and into moments without duration. -Time becomes a succession of many individual ‘Nows’, and between every two moments -of time there is a void. The same is the case with Motion: between every two movements -there is a Rest. A quick motion and a slow motion possess the same speed, but the -latter has more points of Rest. Then, in order to get over the difficulty of the empty -space, the unoccupied moment of time, and the pause for rest between two movements, -the theory of a Leap is made use of. Motion is to be regarded <span class="pageNum" id="pb61">[<a href="#pb61">61</a>]</span>as a leaping onward from one point in space to another, and Time as an advance effected -in the same manner from one moment to another. -</p> -<p>In reality they had no use at all for this fantastic theory of a Leap: it was a mere -reply to unsophisticated questioning. With perfect consistency they had cut up the -entire material world, as it moves in space and time, into Atoms with their Accidents. -Some no doubt maintained, that although accidents every moment disappear, yet substances -endure, but others made no difference in this respect. They taught that substances, -which are in fact points in space, exist only for a point of time, just like Accidents. -Every moment God creates the world anew, so that its condition at the present moment -has no essential connection with that which has immediately preceded it or that which -follows next. In this way there is a series of worlds following one another, which -merely present the appearance of one world. That for us there is anything like connection -or Causality in phenomena proceeds from the fact that Allah in his inscrutable will -does not choose either to-day or to-morrow to interrupt the usual course of events -by a miracle,—which however he is able at any moment to do. The disappearance of all -causal connection according to the Atomistic Kalam is vividly illustrated by the classical -instance of ‘the writing man.’ God creates in him,—and that too by an act of creation -which is every moment renewed—first the will, then the faculty of writing, next the -movement of the hand, and lastly the motion of the pen. Here one thing is completely -independent of the other. -</p> -<p>Now if against this view the objection is urged, that along with Causality or the -regular succession of worldly <span class="pageNum" id="pb62">[<a href="#pb62">62</a>]</span>events, the possibility of any knowledge is taken away, the believing thinker replies, -that Allah verily foreknows everything, and creates not only the things of the world -and what they appear to effect, but also the knowledge about them in the human soul, -and we do not need to be wiser than He. He knows best. -</p> -<p>Allah and the World, God and Man,—beyond these antitheses Muslim dialectic could not -reach. Besides God, there is room only for corporeal substances and their accidents. -The existence of human souls as incorporeal substances, as well as generally the existence -of pure Spirits,—both of which doctrines were maintained by philosophers, and, though -less definitely, by several Mutazilites,—would not harmonize properly with the Muslim -doctrine of the transcendent nature of God, who has no associate. The soul belongs -to the world of body. Life, Sensation, Rational endowment, are accidents, just as -much as Colour, Taste, Smell, Motion and Rest. Some assume only one soul-atom: According -to others several finer soul-atoms are mingled with the bodily atoms. At all events -thinking is attached to one single Atom. -</p> -<p id="p2.3.13">13. It was not every good Muslim that could find mental repose in dialectic. The pious -servant of God might yet, in another way, draw somewhat nearer to his Lord. This need,—existing -in Islam at the very outset, strengthened too by Christian and Indo-Persian influences, -and intensified under more highly developed conditions of civilization,—evoked in -Islam a series of phenomena, which are usually designated as Mysticism or Sufism.<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e2956src" href="#xd31e2956">4</a> In this development of a Muslim order of Holy men, or of a Muslim Monkish <span class="pageNum" id="pb63">[<a href="#pb63">63</a>]</span>system, the history of Christian monks and cloisters in Syria and Egypt, as well as -that of Indian devotees, is repeated. In this matter then we have at bottom to deal -with religious or spiritual practice; but practice always mirrors itself in thought, -and receives its theory. In order to bring about a more intimate relationship with -the Godhead, many symbolical acts and mediating persons were required. Such persons -then endeavoured to discover the mysteries of the symbols for themselves and to disclose -them to the initiated, and to establish, besides, their own mediatory position in -the scale of universal being. In particular, Neo-Platonic doctrines,—partly drawn -from the turbid source of the Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and the holy Hierotheos -(Stephen bar Sudaili?)—had to lend their aid in this work. The Indian Yoga too, at -least in Persia, seems to have exercised considerable influence. For the most part -Mysticism kept within the pale of Orthodoxy, which was always sensible enough to allow -a certain latitude to poets and enthusiasts. As regards the doctrine that God <i>works</i> all in all, Dialecticians and Mystics were agreed; but extreme Mysticism propounded -the farther doctrine that God <i>is</i> all in all. From this a heterodox Pantheism was developed, which made the world an -empty show, and deified the human Ego. Thus the Unity of God becomes Universal Unity; -his universal activity Universal Existence. Besides God, there exist at the most only -the attributes and conditions of the Sufi souls that are tending towards him. A psychology -of feeling is developed by the Sufi teachers. In their view, while our conceptions -come to the soul from without, and our exertions amount to the externalizing of what -is within, the true essence of our soul consists in certain states or feelings of -<span class="pageNum" id="pb64">[<a href="#pb64">64</a>]</span>inclination and disinclination. The most essential of all these is Love. It is neither -fear nor hope, but Love that lifts us up to God. Blessedness is not a matter of ‘knowing’ -or of ‘willing’: it is Union with the loved one. These Mystics did away with the world -(as ultimately they did with the human soul) in a far more thorough-going fashion -than the Dialecticians had done. By the latter the world was sacrificed to the arbitrary -character of God in Creation; by the former to the illuminating, loving nature of -the Divine Being. The confusing multiplicity of things, as that appears to sense and -conception, is removed in a yearning after the One and Beloved being. Everything, -both in Being and Thinking, is brought to one central point. Contrast with this the -genuine Greek spirit. In it a wish was cherished for a still greater number of senses, -to enable men to get a somewhat better acquaintance with this fair world. But these -Mystics blame the senses for being too many, because their number brings disorder -into their felicity. -</p> -<p>Human nature, however, always asserts herself. Those men who renounce the world and -the senses, frequently run riot in the most sensual fantasies, till far advanced in -life. We need not wonder after all, that many troubled themselves very little indeed -about religious doctrine, or that the ascetic morality of the Sufis often went to -the other extreme. -</p> -<p>The task of following out in detail the development of Sufism, however, belongs to -the history of Religion rather than to the history of Philosophy. Besides, we find -the philosophical elements which it took up, in the Muslim philosophers whom we shall -meet with farther on. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb65">[<a href="#pb65">65</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s2.4" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e821">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">4.</span> <span class="sc">Literature and History.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p2.4.1" class="first">1. Arabic Poetry and Annalistic were developed independently of the learning of the -schools. But as time went on, Literature and Historical Composition could not remain -untouched by foreign influences. A few notices, confirmatory of this statement, must -suffice us here. -</p> -<p>The introduction of Islam involved no break with the poetical tradition of the Arab -race, such as had been occasioned by Christianity in the Teutonic world. The secular -literature of the times even of the Omayyads handed down many wise sayings, partly -taken from ancient Arabic poetry, which rivalled the preachings of the Koran. Abbasid -Caliphs, like Mansur, Harun and Mamun, had more literary culture than Charlemagne. -The education of their sons was not confined to the reading of the Koran: it embraced -acquaintance also with the ancient poets and with the history of the nation. Poets -and literary men were drawn to the courts and rewarded in princely fashion. In these -circumstances, Literature underwent the influence of scholarly culture and philosophical -speculation, although, in most cases, in a very superficial manner. The result is -specially exhibited in sceptical utterances, frivolous mockery of what is most sacred, -and glorification of sensual pleasure. At the same time, however, wise sayings, serious -reflections and mystic speculations made their way into the originally sober and realistic -poetry of the Arabs. The place of the first natural freshness of representation was -now taken by a wearisome play on thoughts and sentiments, and even on mere words, -metres and rhymes. -</p> -<p id="p2.4.2">2. The unpleasant Abu-l-Atahia (748–828), in his effeminate poetry, is nearly always -talking about unhappy <span class="pageNum" id="pb66">[<a href="#pb66">66</a>]</span>love and a longing for death. He gives expression to his wisdom in the following couplet: -</p> -<div class="lgouter"> -<p class="line">“The mind guide thou with cautious hesitation: </p> -<p class="line">’Gainst sin use the best shield, Renunciation”. </p> -</div> -<p class="first">Whoever possesses any faculty for appreciating life and the poetry of Nature will -find little to enjoy in his world-renouncing songs; and just as little satisfaction -will be afforded him in the verses of Mutanabbi (905–965), frightfully tedious in -their contents, although epigrammatic in their form. And yet Mutanabbi has been praised -as the greatest Arabic poet. -</p> -<p>In like manner people have unduly extolled Abu-l-Ala al-Maarri (973–1058) as a philosophic -poet. His occasionally quite respectable sentiments and sensible views are not philosophy, -nor does the affected though often hackneyed expression of these amount to poetry. -Under more favourable conditions,—for he was blind and not surpassingly rich,—this -man might perhaps have rendered some service in the subordinate walks of criticism -as a philologist or a historical writer. But, in place of an enthusiastic acceptance -of life’s duties, he is led to preach the joyless abandonment of them, and to grumble -generally at political conditions, the opinions of the orthodox multitude, and the -scientific assertions of the learned, without being able himself to advance anything -positive. He is almost entirely wanting in the gift of combination. He can analyse, -but he does not hit upon any synthesis, and his learning bears no fruit. The tree -of his knowledge has its roots in the air, as he himself confesses in one of his letters, -though in a different sense. He leads a life of strict celibacy and vegetarianism, -<span class="pageNum" id="pb67">[<a href="#pb67">67</a>]</span>as becomes a pessimist. As he puts it in his poems “all is but an idle toy: Fate is -blind; and Time spares neither the king who partakes of the joys of life, nor the -devout man who spends his nights in watching and prayer. Nor does irrational belief -solve for us the enigma of existence. Whatever is behind those moving heavens remains -hidden from us for ever: Religions, which open up a prospect there, have been fabricated -from motives of self-interest. Sects and factions of all kinds are utilized by the -powerful to make their dominion secure, though the truth about these matters can only -be whispered. The wisest thing then is to keep aloof from the world, and to do good -disinterestedly, and because it is virtuous and noble to do so, without any outlook -for reward”. -</p> -<p>Other literary men had a more practical philosophy, and could make their weight more -felt in the world. They subscribed to the wise doctrine of the Theatre-Manager in -Goethe’s Faust: “He who brings much, will something bring to many”. The most perfect -type of this species is Hariri (1054–1122), whose hero, the beggar and stroller, Abu -Zaid of Serug, teaches as the highest wisdom: -</p> -<div class="lgouter"> -<p class="line">“Hunt, instead of being hunted; </p> -<p class="line">All the world’s a wood for hunting. </p> -<p class="line">If the falcon should escape you, </p> -<p class="line">Take, content, the humble bunting: </p> -<p class="line">If you finger not the dinars, </p> -<p class="line">Coppers still are worth the counting”<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e3007src" href="#xd31e3007">5</a>. </p> -</div> -<p id="p2.4.3" class="first">3. The Annalistic of the ancient Arabs, like their Poetry, was distinguished by a -clear perception of particulars, but <span class="pageNum" id="pb68">[<a href="#pb68">68</a>]</span>was incapable of taking a general grasp of events. With the vast extension of the -empire their view was necessarily widened. First a great mass of material was gathered -together. Their historical and geographical knowledge was advanced by means of journeys -undertaken to collect traditions, or for purposes of administration and trade, or -simply to satisfy curiosity, more than it could have been by mere religious pilgrimages. -Characteristic methods of research, brought to bear upon the value of tradition as -a source of our knowledge, were elaborated. With the same subtlety which they displayed -in Grammar, they portioned out, in endless division and subdivision, the extended -field of their observation, in a fashion more truly ‘arabesque’ than lucid; and in -this way they formed a logic of history which must have appeared to an oriental eye -much finer than the Aristotelian Organon with its austere structure. Their tradition,—in -authenticating which they were, as a rule, less particular in practice than in theory,—was -by many made equal in value to the evidence of the senses, and preferred to the judgment -of the reason, which so easily admitted fallacious inferences. -</p> -<p>There were always people, however, who impartially handed down contradictory reports, -alongside of one another. Others, although exhibiting consideration for the feelings -and requirements of the present, did not withhold their more or less well-founded -judgment on the past, for it is often easier to be discerning in matters of history -than in the affairs of the living world. -</p> -<p>New subjects of enquiry came up, together with new modes of treatment. Geography included -somewhat of Natural Philosophy, for example in the geography of climate; while <span class="pageNum" id="pb69">[<a href="#pb69">69</a>]</span>historical composition brought within the range of its description intellectual life, -belief, morals, literature and science. Acquaintance also with other lands and nations -invited comparison on many points; and thus an international, humanistic or cosmopolitan -element was introduced. -</p> -<p id="p2.4.4">4. A representative of the humanistic attitude of mind is met with in Masudi, who -died about the year 956. He appreciates, and is interested in, everything that concerns -humanity. Everywhere he is learning something from the men he meets with: and in consequence -the reading of books, which occupies his privacy, is not without fruit. But it is -neither the narrow, everyday practices of life and religion, nor the airy speculations -of Philosophy, that specially appeal to him. He knows where his strength lies; and -up to the last, when he is spending his old age in Egypt, far from his native home, -he finds his consolation,—the medicine of his soul,—in the study of History. History -for him is the all-embracing science: it is his philosophy; and its task is to set -forth the truth of that which was and is. Even the wisdom of the world, together with -its development, becomes the subject of History; and without it all knowledge would -long since have disappeared. For learned men come and go; but History records their -intellectual achievements, and thereby restores the connection between the past and -the present. It gives us unprejudiced information about events and about the views -of men. Of course Masudi leaves it often to the intelligent reader to find out for -himself the due synthesis of the facts and the individual opinion of the author. -</p> -<p>A successor of his, the geographer Maqdasi, or Muqaddasi, who wrote in the year 985, -deserves to be mentioned <span class="pageNum" id="pb70">[<a href="#pb70">70</a>]</span>with high commendation. He journeyed through many countries, and exercised the most -varied callings, in order to acquaint himself with the life of his time. He is a true -Abu Zaid of Serug (cf. <a href="#p2.4.2">II, 4 § 2</a>), but one with an object before him. -</p> -<p>He sets to work in critical fashion, and holds to the knowledge which is gained by -research and enquiry, not by faith in tradition or by mere deductions of the reason. -The geographical statements in the Koran he explains by the limited intellectual horizon -of the ancient Arabs, to which Allah must have seen fit to adapt himself. -</p> -<p>He describes then, <i lang="la">sine ira et studio</i>, the countries and races he has seen with own eyes. His plan is to set down, in the -first place, results gathered from his own experience and observation; next, what -he has heard from trustworthy people; and last of all what he has met with in books. -The following sentences are extracted from his characterization of himself. -</p> -<p>“I have given instruction in the common subjects of education and morals: I have come -forward as a preacher, and I have made the minaret of the mosque resound with the -call to prayer. I have been present at the meetings of the learned and the devotions -of the pious. I have partaken of broth with Sufis, gruel with monks, and ship’s-fare -with sailors. Many a time I have been seclusion itself, and then again I have eaten -forbidden fruit against my better judgment. I associated with the hermits of Lebanon, -and in turn I lived at the court of the Prince. In wars I have participated: I have -been detained as a captive and thrown into prison as a spy. Powerful princes and ministers -have lent me their ear, and anon I have <span class="pageNum" id="pb71">[<a href="#pb71">71</a>]</span>joined a band of robbers, or sat as a retail-dealer in the bazaar. I have enjoyed -much honour and consideration, but I have likewise been fated to listen to many curses -and to be reduced to the ordeal of the oath, when I was suspected of heresy or evil -deeds”. -</p> -<p>We are accustomed at the present day to picture to ourselves the Oriental as a being -who, in contemplative repose, is completely bound to his ancestral faith and usages. -This representation is not quite correct, but still it agrees better with the situation -which now exists than it does with the disposition of Islam in the first four centuries, -for during that period it was inclined to take into its possession not only the outward -advantages of the world, but also the intellectual acquisitions of Mankind. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb72">[<a href="#pb72">72</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div class="footnotes"> -<hr class="fnsep"> -<div class="footnote-body"> -<div id="xd31e2689"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e2689src">1</a></span> Examples of both methods occur, but usually <i>Qiyas</i> is equivalent to <i>Analogy</i>. However, in the philosophical terminology which owes its origin to the Translators, -<i>Qiyas</i> always stands for <span class="trans" title="syllogismos"><span lang="grc" class="grek">συλλογισμός</span></span>, while <span class="trans" title="analogia"><span lang="grc" class="grek">ἀναλογία</span></span> is rendered by the Arabic <i>mithl</i>. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e2689src" title="Return to note 1 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e2757"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e2757src">2</a></span> Cf. Snouck Hurgronje in ZDMG, LIII p. 155. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e2757src" title="Return to note 2 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e2868"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e2868src">3</a></span> For this the Mystics introduced a sixth sense. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e2868src" title="Return to note 3 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e2956"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e2956src">4</a></span> Ascetics were called <i>Sufis</i>, from their coarse woollen garment, or <i>Sûf</i><span class="corr" id="xd31e2961" title="Not in source">.</span> <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e2956src" title="Return to note 4 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e3007"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e3007src">5</a></span> V. Rückerts Uebers. d. Makamen II, p. 219. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e3007src" title="Return to note 5 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div id="ch3" class="div1 chapter"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e877">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h2 class="main"><span class="divNum">III.</span> THE PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY.</h2> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<div id="s3.1" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e887">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">1.</span> <span class="sc">Natural Philosophy</span>.</h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p3.1.1" class="first">1. Euclid and Ptolemy, Hippocrates and Galen, some portion of Aristotle, and, in addition, -an abundant Neo-Platonic Literature,—indicate the elements of Arabic Natural Philosophy. -It is a popular philosophy, which, chiefly through the instrumentality of the Sabaeans -of Harran, found acceptance with the Shiʻites and other sects, and which in due course -impressed not only court circles, but also a large body of educated and half-educated -people. Stray portions of it were taken from the writings of the “Logician”,—Aristotle,—<i>e.g</i>. from the “Meteorology”, from the work “On the Universe”, which has been attributed -to him, from the “Book of Animals”, from the “Psychology”, and so on; but its general -character was determined by Pythagorean-Platonic teaching, by the Stoics, and by subsequent -astrologers and alchemists. Human curiosity and piety were fain to read the secrets -of the Deity in the book of his Creation, and they proceeded in this search far beyond -practical requirements, which merely called for a little arithmetic to serve in the -division of inheritances and in trade, and a little astronomy besides, to determine -the proper times for celebrating the functions of religion. <span class="pageNum" id="pb73">[<a href="#pb73">73</a>]</span>Men hastened to gather wisdom from every quarter, and in so doing they manifested -a conviction, which Masudi accurately expressed, when he said: “Whatever is good should -be recognized, whether it is found in friend or foe”. Indeed Ali, the prince of believers, -is reported to have said: “The wisdom of the world is the believer’s strayed sheep: -take it back, even though it come from the unbelieving”. -</p> -<p id="p3.1.2"><span class="corr" id="xd31e3063" title="Not in source">2. </span>Pythagoras is the presiding genius of Mathematical study in Islam. Greek and Indian -elements are mingled in it, it is true, but everything is regarded from a Neo-Pythagorean -point of view. Without studying such branches of Mathematics, as Arithmetic and Geometry, -Astronomy and Music, no one, they said, becomes a philosopher or an educated physician. -The Theory of Numbers,—prized more highly than Mensuration, because it appeals less -to the outward vision, and should bring the mind nearer the essence of things,—gave -occasion to the most extravagant puerilities. God is, of course, the great Unity, -from whom everything proceeds, who himself is no number, but who is the First Cause -of Number. But above all, the number Four,—the number of the elements and so on,—was -held in high favour by the philosophers; and by-and-by nothing in heaven or earth -was spoken of or written about, except in sentences of four clauses and in discourses -under four heads. -</p> -<p>The transition from Mathematics to Astronomy and Astrology was rapid and easy. The -old Eastern methods, which came into their hands, continued to be applied even by -the court-astrologers of the Omayyads, but with still greater thoroughness at the -Abbasid court. In this way <span class="pageNum" id="pb74">[<a href="#pb74">74</a>]</span>they arrived at speculations which ran counter to the revealed Faith, and which therefore -could never be approved of by the guardians of religion. The only antithesis which -existed for the Believer was—God and the World, or this life and the next; but for -the Astrologer there were two worlds, one of the Heavens and another of the Earth, -while God and the life beyond were in the far distance. According to the different -conceptions entertained of the relation which subsisted between the heavenly bodies -and sublunary things, either a rational Astronomy was developed, or a fantastic Astrology. -Only a few kept entirely free from Astrological delusions. As long, in fact, as the -science was dominated by the Ptolemaic system, it was easier for the completely uneducated -man to jeer at what was absurd in it than it was for the learned investigator to disprove -the same. For the latter indeed this earth with its forms of life was a product of -the forces of the heavens, a reflection of celestial light, an echo of the eternal -harmony of the Spheres. Those then who ascribed conception and will to the Spirits -of the stars and spheres, held them as the representatives of Divine providence, and -thus traced to their agency both what is good and what is evil, seeking also to foretell -future events from the situation of their orbs, by means of which they bring their -influence to bear upon earthly things in accordance with steadfast laws. Others, it -is true, had their doubts about this secondary providence, on grounds of experience -and reason, or from the Peripatetic belief that the blessed existences of the heavens -are Spirits of pure intellect, exalted above conception and will, and in consequence -above all particularity that appeals to the senses, so that their providential influence -is directed only <span class="pageNum" id="pb75">[<a href="#pb75">75</a>]</span>to the good of the whole, but never can have reference to any individual occurrence. -</p> -<p id="p3.1.3">3. In the domain of Natural Science Muslim learned men collected a rich body of material; -but hardly in any case did they succeed in really treating it scientifically. In the -separate Natural sciences, the development of which we cannot follow up in this place, -they clung to traditional systems. To establish the wisdom of God and the operations -of Nature,—which was regarded as a power or emanation of the World-Soul,—alchemistic -experiments were instituted, the magical virtues of talismans tested, the effects -of Music upon the emotions of men and animals investigated, and observations made -on physiognomy, while attempts were also set on foot to explain the wonders of the -life of sleep and of dreams, as well as those of soothsaying and prophecy, &c. As -might be expected, the centre of interest was Man, as the Microcosm which must combine -in itself all the elements and powers of the world together. The essential part of -Man’s being was held to be the Soul; and its relation to the World-Soul, and its future -lot were made subjects of enquiry. There was also a good deal of speculation about -the faculties of the soul and their localization in the heart and the brain. One or -two adhered to Galen, but others went farther than he did, and made out five inner -senses corresponding to the five outer ones,—a theory which, along with similar natural -mysteries, was traced to Apollonius of Tyana. -</p> -<p>Obviously the most diverse attitudes towards religious doctrine were possible in the -study of Mathematical and Physical Science. But the propaedeutic sciences, as soon -as they came forward on their own account, were always <span class="pageNum" id="pb76">[<a href="#pb76">76</a>]</span>dangerous to the Faith. The assumption of the eternity of the world, and of an uncreated -matter in motion from all eternity,—was readily combined with Astronomy. And if the -movement of the Heavens is eternal, so too are, no doubt, the changes which take place -on earth. All the kingdoms of Nature then, according to many teachers, being eternal, -the race of man is eternal also, wheeling round and round in an orbit of its own. -There is therefore nothing new in the world: the views and ideas of men repeat themselves -like everything else. All that can possibly be done, maintained or known, has already -been and will again be. -</p> -<p>Admirable discourse and lamentation were expended upon this theme, without much advancing -thereby the interests of Science. -</p> -<p id="p3.1.4">4. The science of Medicine, which on obvious grounds was favoured by the ruling powers, -appears to have proved somewhat more useful. Its interests furnished one of the reasons, -and not the least considerable, which induced the Caliphs to commission so many men -to translate Greek authors. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the teachings -of Mathematics and Natural Science, together with Logic, also affected Medicine intimately. -The old-fashioned doctor was disposed to be satisfied with time-honoured magical formulae, -and other empirical expedients; but modern society in the ninth century required philosophical -knowledge in the physician. He had to know the “natures” of foods, stimulants or luxuries, -and medicaments, the humours of the body, and in every case the influence of the stars. -The physician was brother to the astrologer, whose knowledge commanded his respect, -because it had a more exalted object than medical practice. He had to <span class="pageNum" id="pb77">[<a href="#pb77">77</a>]</span>attend the lectures of the alchemist, and to practise his art in accordance with the -methods of Mathematics and Logic. It was not enough for the fanatics of education -in the ninth century that a man had to speak, believe and behave in accordance with -<i>Qiyas</i>,—that is to say, with logical correctness: he must, over and above, submit to be -treated medically in accordance with <i>Qiyas</i>. The principles of Medicine were discussed in learned assemblies at the court of -Wathik (842–847) like the foundations of Doctrine and Morals. The question, in fact, -was asked, prompted by a work of Galen’s, whether Medicine relies upon tradition, -experience or rational knowledge, or whether on the other hand it derives its support -from the principles of Mathematics and Natural Science by means of logical deduction -(<i>Qiyas</i>). -</p> -<p id="p3.1.5">5. The Natural Philosophy, which has just been rapidly sketched, actually stood for -Philosophy with the most of the scholars of the ninth century, as contrasted with -theological dialectic, and was styled Pythagorean. It lasted even into the tenth century, -when its most important representative was the famous physician Razi († 923 or 932). -Born in Rai he received a mathematical education and studied Medicine and Natural -Philosophy with great diligence. He was averse to dialectic and was only acquainted -with Logic as far as the categorical figures of the First Analytics. After having -practised as director of the hospital in his native city and in Bagdad, he entered -upon his travels and resided at various princely courts, amongst others at the court -of the Samanid Mansur ibn Ishaq, to whom he dedicated a work on Medicine. -</p> -<p>Razi has a high opinion of the medical profession and of the study which it demands. -The wisdom of a thousand <span class="pageNum" id="pb78">[<a href="#pb78">78</a>]</span>years, contained in books, he prizes more than the experiences of the individual man -gained in one short life, but he prefers even these to deductions of the “Logicians” -which have not been tested by experience. -</p> -<p>He thinks that the relation between the body and the soul is determined by the soul. -And seeing that in this way the circumstances and sufferings of the soul admit of -being discerned by means of the physiognomy, the medical man has to be at the same -time a physician of the soul. Therefore he drew up a system of spiritual medicine,—a -kind of Dietetic of the Soul. The precepts of Muslim law, like the prohibition of -wine, and so on, gave him no concern, but his freethinking seems to have led him into -pessimism. In fact he found more evil than good in the world, and described inclination -as the absence of disinclination. -</p> -<p>High though the value was which Razi put upon Aristotle and Galen, he did not give -himself any special trouble to gain a more profound comprehension of their works. -He was a devoted student of Alchemy, which in his view was a true art, based on the -existence of a primeval matter,—an art indispensable to philosophers, and which, he -believed, had been practised by Pythagoras, Democritus, Plato, Aristotle and Galen. -In opposition to Peripatetic teaching he assumed that the body contained in itself -the principle of movement, a thought which might certainly have proved a fruitful -one in Natural Science, if it had been recognized and farther developed. -</p> -<p>Razi’s Metaphysic starts from old doctrines, which his contemporaries ascribed to -Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Mani and others. At the apex of his system stand five co-eternal -<span class="pageNum" id="pb79">[<a href="#pb79">79</a>]</span>principles,—the Creator, the Universal Soul, the First or Primeval matter, Absolute -Space, and Absolute Time or Eternal Duration. In these the necessary conditions of -the actually existing world are given. The individual sense-perceptions, generally, -presuppose an existing Matter, just as the grouping of different perceived objects -postulates Space. Perceptions of change farther constrain us to assume the condition -of Time. The existence of living beings leads us to recognize a Soul; and the fact -that some of these living beings are endowed with Reason, <i>i.e.</i>—have the faculty of bringing the Arts to the highest perfection,—necessitates our -belief in a wise Creator, whose Reason has ordered everything for the best. -</p> -<p>Notwithstanding the eternity of his five principles, Razi thus speaks of a Creator -and even gives a story of Creation. First then a simple, pure, spiritual Light was -created, the material of Souls, which are simple, spiritual substances, of the nature -of Light. That Light-material or Upper-world, from which souls descended, is also -called Reason, or Light of the Light of God. The Light is followed by the Shadow, -from which the Animal Soul is created, for the service of the Rational Soul. But simultaneously -with the simple, spiritual light, there existed from the first a composite form, which -is Body, from the shadow of which now issue the four “natures”, Warmth and Cold, Dryness -and Moistness. From these four natures at last are formed all heavenly and earthly -bodies. The whole process, however, is in operation from all eternity, without beginning -in time, for God was never inactive. -</p> -<p>That Razi was an astrologer is plain from his own utterances. The heavenly bodies -consist indeed, according <span class="pageNum" id="pb80">[<a href="#pb80">80</a>]</span>to him, of the same elements as earthly things, and the latter are continually exposed -to the influences of the former. -</p> -<p id="p3.1.6">6. Razi had to maintain a polemical attitude in two directions. On the one side he -impugned the Muslim Unity of God, which could not bear to be associated with any eternal -soul, matter, space or time; and on the other side he attacked the Dahrite system, -which does not acknowledge any Creator of the world. This system, which is frequently -mentioned by Muslim authors, with due aversion of course, appears to have found numerous -representatives, though none of any importance. The adherents of the ‘Dahr’ (v. <a href="#p1.2.2">I, 2, § 2</a>) are represented to us as Materialists, Sensualists, Atheists, Believers in the transmigration -of souls, and so on; but we learn nothing more definite about their doctrines. In -any case the Dahrites had no need to trace all that exists to a principle which was -of spiritual essence and creative efficiency. Muslim Philosophy, on the other hand, -did stand in need of such a principle, if it should only conform in some degree to -the teaching of the faith. Natural Philosophy was not suited for the furtherance of -this object, as it showed more interest in the manifold and often contrary operations -of Nature than in the One Cause of all. Such aim was better attained by Neo-Platonic -Aristotelianism, whose logico-metaphysical speculations endeavoured to trace all existence -to one highest existence, or to derive all things from one supreme operative principle. -But before we attend to this direction of thought, which commenced to appear even -in the ninth century, we have still to give some account of an attempt to blend Natural -Philosophy and the teachings of the Faith into a Philosophy of Religion. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb81">[<a href="#pb81">81</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s3.2" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e962">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">2.</span> <span class="sc">The Faithful Brethren of Basra.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p3.2.1" class="first">1. In the East, where every religion formed a State within the State, a political -party invariably made its appearance in the additional character of a religious sect, -just to gain adherents in some way or other. As a matter of principle indeed, Islam -knew no distinction between men,—no caste or social standing. But property and education -have the same influence everywhere; and in their train degrees of piety and stages -of knowledge began to be set up, according as a community or party permitted of adjustment. -Thus there arose secret societies having different grades, of which the highest and -perhaps the next highest possessed an esoteric doctrine, which borrowed a good deal -from the Natural Philosophy of the Neo-Pythagoreans. In furtherance of their object, -which was to conquer political power, every expedient was regarded as lawful. For -the initiated the Koran was explained allegorically. They traced their mystic lore, -it is true, back to prophets with Biblical and Koranic names, but heathen philosophers -were at the bottom of it all. Philosophy was completely transformed into a mythology -of politics. The high intelligences and souls, which theoretic thinkers had recognized -in the stars and planets, embodied themselves in human beings for the work of actual -Politics; and it was declared to be a religious duty to assist these embodied intelligences -in the establishment of an earthly kingdom of righteousness. The associations which -acted in this way may best be compared to societies, which up to the days of Saint-Simonism -and kindred phenomena in last century were wont to appear in countries where freedom -of thought was restricted. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb82">[<a href="#pb82">82</a>]</span></p> -<p>In the second half of the ninth century Abdallah ibn Maimun, head of the Karmatite -party, was the originator of a movement of this kind. He was a Persian oculist, trained -in the school of the Natural Philosophers. He proved able to associate both believers -and freethinkers in a confederacy to endeavour to compass the overthrow of the Abbasid -government. To the one set he was a conjurer, to the other a pious ascetic or learned -philosopher. His colours were white, because his religion was that of the pure light, -to which the soul was to ascend after its earthly wanderings. The duties inculcated -were contempt for the body, disregard of the Material, community of goods for all -the confederate brethren, as well as self-surrender to the confederacy, and fidelity -and obedience to their chiefs, even to death,—for the society had its grades. In accordance -with the sequence of existence, viz., God, Reason, Soul, Space and Time, they conceived -the revelation of God to be made in history and in the constitution of their own brotherhood. -</p> -<p id="p3.2.2">2. The chief homes of Karmatite activity were Basra and Kufa. Now we find in Basra -in the second half of the tenth century a small association of men, whose confederacy -aims at having four grades. We do not know, to be sure, how far the brethren succeeded -in realizing the ideal organization of their confederacy. To the first grade belong -young men of from 15 to 30 years of age, whose souls are being formed in the natural -way: these must be completely submissive to their teachers. The second grade,—from -30 to 40 years of age—are introduced to secular wisdom, and receive an analogical -knowledge of things. In the third grade,—from 40 to 50 years of <span class="pageNum" id="pb83">[<a href="#pb83">83</a>]</span>age—the Divine law of the world becomes known in more adequate form: that constitutes -the stage of the prophets. Finally, in the highest grade, when one is over 50 years -old, he comes to see the true reality of things, just like the blessed angels: he -is exalted then above Nature, Doctrine and Law. -</p> -<p>From this brotherhood there has come down to us a progressively-advancing Encyclopaedia -of the Sciences of that day. It consists of 51 (originally perhaps 50) treatises, -the contents of which are of such varied nature and origin that the redactors or compilers -have not succeeded in establishing a complete harmony among them. In general, however, -there is found in this Encyclopaedia an eclectic Gnosticism built on a foundation -of Natural Science, and provided with a political background. The scheme sets out -with mathematical considerations, continually playing with numbers and letters, and -proceeds through Logic and Physics,—referring everything, however, to the Soul and -its powers,—in order to approach at last, in a mystical and magical fashion, the knowledge -of the Godhead. The whole representation is that of the doctrine of a persecuted sect, -with the political features peeping out here and there. We see also something of suffering -and struggle,—something of the oppressions to which the men of this Encyclopaedia -or their predecessors were exposed, and something of the hope they cherished and the -patience they preached. They seek in this spiritualistic philosophy, consolation or -redemption: It is their religion. ‘Faithful to death,’—so runs the expression—shall -the brethren be, for to meet death for a friend’s welfare, is the true Holy war. In -life’s pilgrimage through this world,—<span class="pageNum" id="pb84">[<a href="#pb84">84</a>]</span>thus the obligatory journey to Mecca is allegorized—, one must aid the other by all -the means in his power. The rich must communicate to others a share of their material -goods, and the wise a share of their intellectual possessions. But yet knowledge, -as we have it in the Encyclopaedia, was probably reserved for initiated members of -the highest grade. -</p> -<p>It must be allowed, however, that this confraternity of the Faithful Brethren of Basra -seems to have led a quiet existence, as perhaps was the case also with a branch-settlement -of theirs in Bagdad. The relation of the Brethren to the Karmatites may have resembled -that of the more peaceful Baptists to the revolutionary Anabaptists of the ‘King of -Sion’.<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e3136src" href="#xd31e3136">1</a> -</p> -<p>The names of the following have been given to us by later writers, as having been -members of the Brotherhood and collaborators of the Encyclopaedia, viz.: Abu Sulaiman -Mohammed ibn Mushir al-Busti, called al-Muqaddasi; Abu-l-Hasan Ali ibn Harun al-Zandjani; -Mohammed ibn Akhmed al-Nahradjuri; Al-Aufi and Zaid ibn Rifaa. In the time of their -activity the Caliphate had already been forced to make an entire surrender of its -secular power into the hands of the Shiʻite dynasty of the Buyids. Probably this circumstance -was favourable to the appearance of an Encyclopaedia, in which Shiʻite and Mutazilite -doctrines together with the results of Philosophy were comprehended in one popular -system. -</p> -<p id="p3.2.3">3. The Brethren themselves avow their eclecticism. They wish to collect the wisdom -of all nations and religions. Noah and Abraham, Socrates and Plato, Zoroaster and -<span class="pageNum" id="pb85">[<a href="#pb85">85</a>]</span>Jesus, Mohammed and Ali are all prophets of theirs. Socrates, and Jesus and his apostles, -no less than the children of Ali, are honoured as holy martyrs of their rational faith. -The religious law in its literal sense is pronounced good for the ordinary man,—a -medicine for weak and ailing souls: the deeper philosophic insight is for strong intelligences. -Though the body is devoted to death, dying means rising again to the pure life of -the Spirit, for those who during their earthly existence have been awakened by means -of philosophic considerations out of careless slumber and foolish sleep. This is impressed -with endless repetition, by means of legends and myths of later-Greek, Judaeo-Christian, -Persian or Indian origin. Every transitory thing is here turned into an emblem. On -the ruins of positive religion and unsophisticated opinion a spiritualistic philosophy -is built up, embracing all the knowledge and endeavour of human kind, so far as these -came within the Brethren’s field of view. The aim of their philosophizing is given -as ‘the assimilation of the soul to God, in the degree possible for man’. -</p> -<p>In this scheme, the negative tendencies of the Brethren, are kept somewhat in the -background, for reasons which are quite intelligible. But their criticism of human -society and of positive religions is exhibited with least reserve in the ‘Book of -the Animal and the Man’, in which the figurative dress makes it possible for them -to represent animals as saying what might he questionable if heard from a human mouth. -</p> -<p id="p3.2.4">4. The eclectic character of the scheme, and the far from systematic method adopted -in its subdivisions render it difficult to give a coherent exposition of the philosophy -<span class="pageNum" id="pb86">[<a href="#pb86">86</a>]</span>of the Brethren. But still the most important tenets, though sometimes loosely connected, -must here be set forth with a measure of order. -</p> -<p>The mental activity of Man falls to be divided, according to the Encyclopaedia, into -Art and Science. Now Science or Knowledge is the form assumed within the knowing soul -by that which is known, or a higher, finer, more intellectual mode of existence of -whatever is realized in outward substance. Art on the other hand consists in projecting -the form from the artist-soul into matter. Knowledge is potentially present in the -soul of the disciple, but it becomes actual only through the teaching activity of -a master, who carries knowledge as a reality within his own mind. But whence did it -come to the first master? The Brethren answer, that according to the philosophers -he gained it by his own reflection, while, according to the theologians, he received -it through prophetic illumination; “but in our view there are various ways or instrumentalities -by which knowledge may be attained. From the intermediate position of the soul, between -the worlds of body and of mind it results that there are open to it three ways or -sources of knowledge. Thus by means of the senses the soul is made acquainted with -what is beneath it, and through logical inference with what is above it, and finally -with itself by rational consideration or direct intuition. Of these kinds of knowledge -the surest and the most deserving of preference is knowledge of one’s self. When human -knowledge attempts to go farther than this, it proves itself to be limited in many -ways. Therefore one must not philosophize straight away about questions like the origin -or the eternity of the world, but make his first essays with what is simpler. And -only <span class="pageNum" id="pb87">[<a href="#pb87">87</a>]</span>through renunciation of the world, and righteous conduct, does the soul lift itself -gradually up to the pure knowledge of the Highest.” -</p> -<p id="p3.2.5">5. After secular instruction in Grammar, Poetry and History, and after religious education -and doctrine, philosophic study should begin with the mathematical branches. Here -everything is set forth in Neo-Pythagorean and Indian fashion. Not only numbers but -even the letters of the alphabet are employed in childish trifling. It was particularly -convenient for the Brethren that the number of letters in the Arabic alphabet is 28, -or 4 multiplied by 7. Instead of proceeding according to practical and real points -of view, they give the rein to fancy in all the sciences, in accordance with grammatical -analogies and relations of numbers. Their Arithmetic does not investigate Number as -such, but rather its significance. No search is made for any more suitable mode of -expressing number in the case of phenomena; but things are themselves explained in -accordance with the system of numbers. The Theory of number is Divine wisdom, and -is above Things, for things are only formed after the pattern of numbers. The absolute -principle of all existence and thought is the number One. The science of number, therefore, -is found at the beginning, middle, and end of all philosophy. Geometry, with its figures -addressing the eye, serves merely to make it more easily understood by beginners, -but Arithmetic alone is true and pure science. And yet Geometry too is divided into -a sensible form of it which deals with lines, surfaces and solids, and a pure or spiritual -form which treats of the dimensions or properties of things, such as length, breadth -and depth. The object both of Arithmetic and <span class="pageNum" id="pb88">[<a href="#pb88">88</a>]</span>Geometry is to conduct the soul from the sensible to the spiritual. -</p> -<p>First of all then they lead us to consider the stars. Now the <span class="corr" id="xd31e3164" title="Source: Encylopaedia">Encyclopaedia</span> offers us, in its Astrology,—and nothing else could be expected—teaching which is -exceedingly fantastic and sometimes self-contradictory. The whole of it is pervaded -by the conviction that the stars not merely foretell the future, but directly influence -or bring about every thing that happens beneath the moon. Fortune and misfortune come -equally from them. Jupiter, Venus and the Sun bring fortune; misfortune is brought, -on the other hand, by Saturn, Mars and the Moon; while the effects produced by the -planet Mercury have in them both bad and good. Mercury is the lord of education and -science: we owe to him our knowledge, which comprises bad and good. In the same way -too the other planets have all their several spheres of influence; and man in the -course of life, if he is not prematurely snatched away, experiences successively the -influences of the whole of the heavenly bodies. The Moon causes his body to grow and -Mercury forms his mind. Then he comes under the sway of Venus. The Sun gives him family, -riches or dominion; Mars, bravery and noble-mindedness. Thereupon, under the guidance -of Jupiter, he prepares, by means of religious exercises, for the journey to the world -beyond, and he attains rest under the influence of Saturn. Many men, however, do not -live long enough, or are not enabled by circumstances, to develope their natural capacities -in unbroken sequence. God therefore graciously sends them his prophets, by whose teaching -they may, even in a short time and under unfavourable circumstances, form their natures -completely. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb89">[<a href="#pb89">89</a>]</span></p> -<p id="p3.2.6">6. According to the Encyclopaedia, Logic is related to Mathematics. In fact just as -Mathematics conducts from the sensible to the intellectual, so Logic takes an intermediate -position between Physics and <span class="corr" id="xd31e3170" title="Source: Metaphics">Metaphysics</span>. In Physics we have to do with bodies; in Metaphysics, with pure Spirits; but Logic -treats of the ideas of the latter as well as of the representations of the former -in our soul. Yet in range and importance Logic is inferior to Mathematics. For the -subject of Mathematics is regarded not merely as an intermediary, but also as the -essence of the All, while on the other hand Logic remains completely restricted to -psychic forms as an intermediary between body and mind. Things are regulated by numbers, -but our presentations and ideas by things. -</p> -<p>The logical observations of the Brethren start from Porphyry’s Introduction, and the -Categories, the Hermeneutics and the Analytics of Aristotle. They present nothing -original, or very little. -</p> -<p>To the five terms of Porphyry, a sixth,—the ‘Individual’—is added, no doubt for the -sake of symmetry. Three of these,—Genus, Species, Individual,—are then called Objective -Qualifications and three,—Difference, Property, Accident—Abstract or Conceptional -Qualifications. The Categories are Genus-conceptions, of which the first is Substance, -the other nine denoting its Accidents. The whole system of Concepts is farther developed -by a division into species. But besides Division, there are three additional logical -methods in use: Analysis, Definition and Deduction. Analysis is the method for beginners, -because it permits a knowledge of what is individual. More subtle, however, as disclosing -to us what is spiritual,—are <span class="pageNum" id="pb90">[<a href="#pb90">90</a>]</span>Definition and Deduction, the former investigating the essential nature of Species, -and the latter that of Genera. The Senses apprise us of the existence of things; but -acquaintance with the essence of things is gained by reflection. The information which -is conveyed to us by the senses is small, as it were the letters of the alphabet. -Of greater importance considerably are the principles of rational knowledge, just -as words have more significance than letters; but the most important knowledge of -all, lies in the propositions which have been derived from those principles, and which -the human mind gains for itself or appropriates, in contradistinction to that knowledge -which Nature or the Divine revelation has imparted to it. -</p> -<p id="p3.2.7">7. From God, the highest Being, who is exalted above all distinctions and oppositions -both of the Material and the Spiritual, the whole world is derived by the path of -Emanation. If now and again a Creation is spoken of, that is only to be understood -as a form of adaptation to theological language. The gradation then of the Emanations -is exhibited as follows: 1. The Creative Spirit (<span class="trans" title="nous"><span lang="grc" class="grek">νοῦς</span></span>, <i>ʻaql</i>); 2. The Passive Spirit, or the All-Soul or World-Soul; 3. The First Material; 4. -The Operative Nature, a power of the World-Soul; 5. The Absolute Body, called also, -the Second Material; 6. The World of the Spheres; 7. The Elements of the Sublunary -World; 8. The Minerals, Plants and Animals composed of these elements. These then -are the eight Essences which,—together with God, the Absolute One, who is in everything -and with everything—complete the series of Original Essences corresponding to the -nine Cardinal Numbers. -</p> -<p>Spirit, Soul, Original Matter, and Nature are simple; <span class="pageNum" id="pb91">[<a href="#pb91">91</a>]</span>but with Body we enter the realm of the Composite. Here all is composed of Matter -and Form, or,—to adopt another principle of division,—of Substance and Accident. The -first Substances are Matter and Form; the first Accidents or Properties, Space, Motion -and Time, to which in the opinion of the Brethren may perhaps be added Tone and Light. -Matter is one; all plurality and diversity come from the Forms. Substance is designated -also as the constitutive, material Form, while Accident is the completing, spiritual -Form. The Encyclopaedia does not express itself clearly on these points. But in any -case Substantiality is looked for rather in the Universal than in the Particular, -and Form is put before Matter. The Substantial Form, like a spectre, frightens off -every attempt of the philosopher to investigate thoroughly the domain of the Material. -The Forms wander at their own sweet will like lords through the lower world of Matter. -No trace is discoverable of any inner relation between Matter and Form. Not only in -thought, but also in reality they keep themselves separate. -</p> -<p>From the account which has been given an idea may now be formed of the story of Nature -as the Brethren viewed it. They have been represented as the Darwinists of the tenth -century, but nothing could more inappropriate. The various realms of Nature, it is -true, yield according to the Encyclopaedia an ascending and connected series; but -the relation is determined not by bodily structure, but by the inner Form or Soul-Substance. -The Form wanders in mystic fashion from the lower to the higher and <i>vice versa</i>, not in accordance with inner laws of formation, or modified to suit external conditions, -but in accordance with the influences of the stars, and, in the <span class="pageNum" id="pb92">[<a href="#pb92">92</a>]</span>case of Man at least, in accordance with practical and theoretical behaviour. To give -a history of Evolution in the modern sense of the term was very far from the thought -of the Brethren. For example they expressly insist that the horse and the elephant -resemble Man more than the ape does, although the bodily likeness is greater in the -last-named. In fact in their system the body is a matter of quite secondary consideration: -the death of the body is called the birth of the soul. The soul alone is an efficient -existence, which procures the body for itself. -</p> -<p id="p3.2.8">8. The teaching of the Brethren concerning Nature is therefore merged almost completely -in Psychology. Let us confine ourselves here to the human soul. It stands in the centre -of the All; and just as the World is a huge man, Man is a little world. -</p> -<p>The human soul has emanated from the World-soul; and the souls of all individuals -taken together constitute a substance which might be denominated the Absolute Man -or the Spirit of Humanity. Every individual soul, however, is involved in Matter, -and must gradually be formed into spirit. To that end it possesses many faculties -or powers, and of these the speculative faculties are the choicest, for knowledge -is the very life of the soul. -</p> -<p>The soul of the child is at first like a white sheet of paper. What the five senses -convey to it is first presented, then judged, and lastly stored up, in the front, -middle, and hinder parts of the brain respectively. Through the faculty of speech -and the art of writing, which make up the number of the internal senses to five, corresponding -to the number of the External, the contents of Presentation are then realized. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb93">[<a href="#pb93">93</a>]</span></p> -<p>Among the external senses, Hearing takes precedence of Sight; for Sight, a mere slave -of the moment, is occupied with what is actually present to the sense, whereas Hearing -apprehends also what is past, and is conscious of the harmony of the tuneful spheres. -Hearing and Sight constitute the group of the intellectual senses, whose effect must -continue time without end. -</p> -<p>While Man then possesses the external senses in common with the lower animals, the -specific nature of human reason is notified in Judgment, Speech and Action. Reason -judges of good and bad, and in conformity with that judgment the will is determined. -But in particular the significance which Language has for the soul’s life of cognition -is to be emphasised. A concept which cannot be denoted by some expression in some -language is not thinkable at all. The word is the body of the thought, which cannot -exist absolutely <i>per se</i>. -</p> -<p>But it is difficult to see how this understanding of the relation between concept -and expression is to square with other opinions of the Brethren. -</p> -<p id="p3.2.9">9. At its highest stage the teaching of the Brethren becomes a Philosophy of Religion. -Its purpose is a reconciliation between Science and Life, Philosophy and Faith. Now -in these matters men differ greatly. The ordinary man requires a sensuous worship -of God; but just as the souls of animals and plants are beneath the soul of the ordinary -man, so above it are the souls of the philosopher and the prophet with whom the pure -angel is associated. In the higher stages the soul is raised also above the lower -popular religion with its sensuous conceptions and usages. -</p> -<p>No doubt Christianity and the Zoroastrian faith appeared <span class="pageNum" id="pb94">[<a href="#pb94">94</a>]</span>to the Brethren to be more perfect religious revelations. ‘Our Prophet, Mohammed’, -they said, ‘was sent to an uncivilized people, composed of dwellers in the desert, -who neither possessed a proper conception of the beauty of this world, nor of the -spiritual character of the world beyond. The crude expressions of the Koran, which -are adapted to the understanding of that people, must be understood in a spiritual -sense by those who are more cultured’. -</p> -<p>But the truth is not presented in its purity even in the other national religions. -There is a rational faith above them all for which the Brethren moreover tried to -find a metaphysical derivation. Between God and his first creature, the Creative Spirit, -there is interposed by way of hypostasis the Divine World-Law (<i>nâmûs</i>). That World-Law extends over everything, and is the wise arrangement of a merciful -Creator, who intends evil to no one. Belief in a God of Anger, in the punishment of -Hell and the like, the Brethren declare to be irrational. Such a faith does harm to -the soul. The ignorant sinful soul finds its hell even in this life and in its own -body. On the other hand, Resurrection is the separation of the soul from its body, -and the great Resurrection at the last day is the separation of the Universal soul -from the world, and its return to God. This turning to God indeed is the aim in all -religions. -</p> -<p id="p3.2.10">10. The ethical system of the Brethren has an ascetic, spiritualistic character, although -here too their eclecticism is shewn. According to it man is acting rightly, when he -follows his proper nature; ‘praiseworthy is the free act of the soul; admirable are -the actions which have proceeded from rational consideration; and lastly, obedience -to the Divine World-Law is worthy of the reward of being raised <span class="pageNum" id="pb95">[<a href="#pb95">95</a>]</span>to the celestial world of spheres. But this requires longing for what is above; and -therefore the highest virtue is Love, which strives after union with God, the first -loved one, and which is evinced even in this life in the form of religious patience -and forbearance with all created beings. Such love gains in this life serenity of -soul, freedom of heart and peace with the whole world, and in the life to come ascension -to Eternal Light.’ -</p> -<p>After all this we need not wonder that the body was depreciated a good deal. ‘Our -true essence is the soul, and the highest aim of our existence should be to live, -with Socrates, devoted to the Intellect, and with Christ, to the Law of Love. Nevertheless -the body must be properly treated and looked after in order that the soul may have -time to attain its full development.’ In this view the Brethren set up an ideal type -of human culture, whereof the features were borrowed from the characteristics of various -nations. ‘The ideal, and morally perfect man, should be of East-Persian derivation, -Arabic in faith, of Irak, i.e. Babylonian, education, a Hebrew in astuteness, a disciple -of Christ in conduct, as pious as a Syrian Monk, a Greek in the individual sciences, -an Indian in the interpretation of all mysteries, but lastly and especially, a Sufi -in his whole spiritual life.’ -</p> -<p id="p3.2.11">11. The attempt to establish in this way a reconciliation between knowledge and faith -satisfied neither side. Theological dialecticians looked down upon the interpretation -of the Koran given by the Brethren, just as the divines of our day look down upon -the N. T. exegesis of Count Tolstoi. And the more rigid Aristotelians regarded the -Pythagorean-Platonic tendency of the Encyclopaedia <span class="pageNum" id="pb96">[<a href="#pb96">96</a>]</span>much as a modern professor of philosophy is wont to look upon Spiritism, Occultism, -and phenomena of that nature. But the writings, or at any rate the opinions, of the -Faithful Brethren of Basra have exercised an important influence on the great body -of the educated or half-educated world,—an influence to which eloquent attestation -is borne by the very fact that so many manuscripts, mostly of recent date, are to -be met with, of this extensive Encyclopaedia. Among many sects within the world of -Islam, such as the Batinites, the Ismaelites, the <span class="corr" id="xd31e3232" title="Source: Assasins">Assassins</span>, the Druses, or whatever may be their names, we find again the same doctrines in -the main. In this form Greek wisdom has best succeeded in making itself at home in -the East, while the Aristotelian School-Philosophy would only thrive, with few exceptions, -in the hothouse-cultivation bestowed upon it at the courts of princely patrons. The -great religious father, Gazali, is ready enough to toss aside the wisdom of the Brethren -as mere popular philosophy, but he does not hesitate to take over what was good in -them. He owes more to their body of ideas than he would perhaps have cared to avow. -And their treatises have been turned to profit by others besides, particularly in -Encyclopaediac works. The influence of the Encyclopaedia continues even yet in the -Muslim East. In vain was it burned in Bagdad in the year 1150, along with the writings -of Ibn Sina. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb97">[<a href="#pb97">97</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div class="footnotes"> -<hr class="fnsep"> -<div class="footnote-body"> -<div id="xd31e3136"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e3136src">1</a></span> [<i>Translator’s note.</i>—‘John of Leyden’<span class="corr" id="xd31e3140" title="Not in source">.</span>] <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e3136src" title="Return to note 1 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div id="ch4" class="div1 chapter"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1086">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h2 class="main"><span class="divNum">IV.</span> THE NEO-PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF THE EAST.</h2> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<div id="s4.1" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1096">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">1.</span> <span class="sc">Kindi.</span><a class="noteRef" id="xd31e3249src" href="#xd31e3249">1</a></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p4.1.1" class="first">1. Kindi is related in various ways to the Mutazilite Dialecticians and the Neo-Pythagorean -Natural-Philosophers of his time, and we might therefore have dealt with him among -the latter, even before Razi (v. <a href="#p3.1.5">III, 1, § 5</a>). But yet tradition with one accord represents him as the first Peripatetic in Islam. -What justification exists for this traditionary view will be seen in what follows, -so far as an inference can be drawn from the few and imperfectly-preserved writings -of this philosopher which have come down to us. -</p> -<p>Abu Yaqub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi (<i>i.e.</i> of the tribe of Kinda) was of Arabian origin, and therefore was called the “Arabian” -philosopher, to distinguish him from the numerous non-Arab associates of his, who -had taken to the study of secular wisdom. He traced his genealogy to the old Kinda -princes, although whether he was entitled to do so we need not seek to decide. The -South-Arabian tribe of Kinda was <span class="pageNum" id="pb98">[<a href="#pb98">98</a>]</span>in any case farther advanced in outward civilization than other tribes. Many Kindite -families too had for long been settlers in Iraq (Babylonia); and there, in the town -of Kufa, of which his father was governor, our philosopher was born, probably in the -beginning of the ninth century. He received his education, it would appear, partly -in Basra, and thereafter in Bagdad, and therefore in the headquarters of the culture -of his time. Here he came to put a higher value upon Persian civilization and Greek -wisdom than upon old Arab virtue and the Muslim faith. He maintained even,—no doubt, -following others—, that Kakhtan, the ancestor of the South-Arabians was a brother -of Yaunan’s, from whom the Greeks were descended. It was possible to make an observation -of that kind in Bagdad at the Abbasid court, for there they knew of no nationality, -and regarded the ancient Greeks with admiration. -</p> -<p>It is not known how long Kindi remained at court, or what position he held there. -He is mentioned as a translator of Greek works into Arabic, and is said to have revised -and improved translations made by others, for example, in the case of the so-called -“Theology of Aristotle”. Numerous servants and disciples, whose names have been handed -down to us, were probably set to this work under his supervision. Farther, he may -have rendered services to the court in the capacity of astrologer or physician, and -perhaps even in the administration of the revenues. But in later years he was dismissed, -when he with others was made to suffer from the restoration of orthodoxy under Mutawakkil -(847–861); and his library was for a long time confiscated. As regards personal character, -tradition reproaches him with having been niggardly,—a stigma, <span class="pageNum" id="pb99">[<a href="#pb99">99</a>]</span>however, which appears to have rested upon many other literary men and lovers of books. -</p> -<p>The year of Kindi’s death is as little known as that of his birth. He appears thus -to have been out of court-favour when he died, or at least to have been in a subordinate -position. It is strange that Masudi (v. <a href="#p2.4.4">II, 4 § 4</a>), who had a great regard for him, is utterly silent on this point; but it seems in -the highest degree probable from one of his astrological treatises that he was still -alive subsequent to the year 870. The expiry of some petty astronomical cycle was -imminent at that date, and this was being utilized by the Karmatites for the overthrow -of the reigning family. In this matter, however, Kindi was loyal enough to make out -the prolongation, for about <span class="tocPageNum">450</span> years, of the State’s existence, menaced though it was by a planetary conjunction. -His princely patron might well be satisfied; and history conformed to the time predicted, -to within half-a-century.<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e3279src" href="#xd31e3279">2</a> -</p> -<p id="p4.1.2">2. Kindi was a man of extraordinary erudition, a Polyhistor: he had absorbed the whole -learning and culture of his time. But although he may have set down and communicated -observations of his own as a geographer, a historian of civilization and a physician, -he was in no respect a creative genius. His theological views bear a Mutazilite stamp. -He wrote specially on Man’s power of action, and the time of its appearance, <i>i.e.</i> whether it was before the act or whether it was synchronous with the act. The righteousness -and the unity of God he expressly emphasized. In opposition <span class="pageNum" id="pb100">[<a href="#pb100">100</a>]</span>to the theory,—known at that time as Indian or Brahmanic,—that Reason is the sole -and sufficient source of knowledge, he defended prophecy, while yet he sought to bring -it into harmony with reason. His acquaintance with various systems of religion impelled -him to compare them together, and he found as a common element in them all the belief -that the world was the work of a First Cause, One and Eternal, for whom our knowledge -furnishes us with no more precise designation. It is however the duty of the discerning -to recognize this First Cause as divine; and God himself has shewn them the way thereto, -and has sent them ambassadors to bear witness for him, who are instructed to promise -everlasting bliss to the obedient, and to threaten corresponding punishment to those -who do not obey. -</p> -<p id="p4.1.3">3. Kindi’s actual philosophy, like that of his contemporaries, consists, first and -especially, of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy, in which Neo-Platonism and Neo-Pythagoreanism -merge into one another. According to him no one can be a philosopher without studying -Mathematics. Fanciful play upon letters and numbers is frequently met with in his -writings. Mathematics he also applied to Medicine in his theory of the compound remedies. -In fact he based the efficacy of these remedies, like the effect of music, upon geometrical -proportion. It is here a matter of the proportionality of the sensible qualities, -warm, cold, dry and moist. If a remedy has to be warm in the first degree, it must -possess double the warmth of the equable mixture,—in the second degree, four times -as much, and so on. Kindi seems to have entrusted the decision of this point to Sense, -particularly to the sense of Taste, so that in him <span class="pageNum" id="pb101">[<a href="#pb101">101</a>]</span>we might have a hint of the proportional relation existing between stimulus and sensation. -Yet that view, though quite original, was with him a mere piece of mathematical play. -However, Cardan, a philosopher of the Renaissance, on the ground of this doctrine, -reckoned him among the twelve most subtle-minded thinkers. -</p> -<p id="p4.1.4">4. In Kindi’s opinion, as has already been said, the world is a work of God, but His -influence in its descent is transmitted through many intermediate agencies. All higher -existence affects the lower, but that which is caused has no influence upon its cause, -standing as this does above it in the scale of Being. In all the events of the world -there is a pervading causality, which makes it possible for us, from our knowledge -of the cause, to foretell the future,—for example, of the positions of the heavenly -bodies. Farther, in any single existing thing, if it is thoroughly known, we possess -a mirror, in which we may behold the entire scheme of things. -</p> -<p>It is to the Spirit or Mind that the higher reality and all activity belong, and matter -has to dispose itself in conformity with the desire of the Spirit. Midway between -the Spirit of God and the material and bodily world stands the Soul, and it is the -Soul which first called into being the world of the Spheres. From this Soul of the -world the Human Soul is an emanation. In its nature, that is, in its operations, it -is bound to the body with which it is united, but in its spiritual essence it is independent -of the body; and thus the influences of the stars, which are limited to physical occurrences, -do not affect it. Kindi goes on to say that our Soul is an uncompounded, imperishable -substance, descended from the world of reason into that of the senses, <span class="pageNum" id="pb102">[<a href="#pb102">102</a>]</span>but endowed with a recollection of its earlier condition. It does not feel at home -here, for it has many needs, the satisfaction of which is denied to it, and which -consequently are attended with painful emotions. Verily there is nothing constant -in this world of coming and going, in which we may be deprived at any moment of what -we love. Only in the world of reason is stability to be found. If then we desire to -see our wishes fulfilled, and would not be deprived of what is dear to us, we must -turn to the eternal blessings of reason, to the fear of God, to science, and to good -works. But if we follow merely after material possessions in the belief that we can -retain them, we are pursuing an object which does not really exist. -</p> -<p id="p4.1.5">5. Kindi’s theory of knowing corresponds to the ethical and metaphysical duality of -the sensible and the spiritual. According to it our knowledge is either knowledge -conveyed by the senses, or knowledge acquired by the reason: that which lies between,—the -Fancy or Imagination,—is called a mediating faculty. The senses, then, apprehend the -Particular, or the material Form, but the reason conceives the Universal,—species -and genera, or the spiritual Form. And just as that which is perceived is one with -Sense-Perception, so too that which is conceived by the reason is one with Reason -itself. -</p> -<p>Here then emerges for the first time the doctrine of the Reason or of the Spirit or -Mind, (<span class="trans" title="nous"><span lang="grc" class="grek">νοῦς</span></span>, <i>ʻaql</i>) in a form in which, merely modified somewhat, it occupies a large space with the -later Muslim philosophers. It continued to be a characteristic feature of philosophy -in Islam throughout its whole course. And just as in the controversy regarding Universals -in the Christian Middle Ages an objective <span class="pageNum" id="pb103">[<a href="#pb103">103</a>]</span>and scientific interest is made evident also, so in the philosophical discussions -of the Muslims concerning the thinking Spirit, the subjective requirement of intellectual -culture is brought conspicuously to the front. -</p> -<p>Kindi has a fourfold division of the Spirit<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e3321src" href="#xd31e3321">3</a>: first the Spirit which is ever real,—the Cause and the Essence of all that is spiritual -in the world,—thus without doubt God or the First Spirit produced; second, Spirit -as the Reasoning capacity or Potentiality of the human soul; third, as the Habit or -actual possession of the soul, which it can make use of at any moment, just as, for -example, the writer can make use of his art; fourth and last, as Activity, by which -a reality within the soul may be carried over to the reality that is without. The -Activity last named appears, according to Kindi, to be the act of man himself, while -to the First Cause,—to the ever-existing Spirit,—he ascribes the carrying of Potentiality -into Habit, or the realisation of the Possible. The real Spirit or Mind we have thus -received from above, and the third <i>ʻaql</i> is therefore called <i>ʻaql mustafad</i>, (Lat. <i lang="la">intellectus adeptus sive adquisitus</i>). The fundamental view of antiquity—that all our knowledge about things must come -from a source outside of us—, runs, in the form of this doctrine of the <i>ʻaql mustafad</i> or Spirit which we receive from above, through the whole of Arabian Philosophy, and -thence passes into Christian Philosophy. Unfortunately the theory is nearly correct, -as far as this philosophy is itself concerned, for the <span class="pageNum" id="pb104">[<a href="#pb104">104</a>]</span>‘Active Spirit’, which has created it, is in reality the Neo-Platonic Aristotle. -</p> -<p>Man has always attributed to his God or Gods the highest of his own possessions. Muslim -theologians directly attribute to the divine agency the moral actions of men. But -in the opinion of the philosophers, Knowing is of more importance than Doing. The -latter, having more to do with the lower world of the senses, may possibly be Man’s -own; but his highest knowledge, the pure Reason, comes from above,—from the Divine -Essence. -</p> -<p>It is clear that the doctrine of the Spirit, as it stands in Kindi, goes back to the -‘Nous’-doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisias in his second book “On the Soul”. But -Alexander expressly maintained that according to Aristotle there is a threefold ‘Nous’. -Kindi says on the contrary that he is representing the opinion of Plato and Aristotle. -In this the Neo-Pythagorean and the Neo-Platonic views unite: for in everything the -number ‘Four’ must be pointed out, and Plato and Aristotle brought into agreement. -</p> -<p id="p4.1.6">6. Let us now sum up: Kindi is a Mutazilite theologian and Neo-Platonic philosopher -with Neo-Pythagorean additions. Socrates, the martyr of Athenian heathenism, is his -ideal: on him, his fate and his teaching he has composed several works; and he seeks -to combine Plato and Aristotle in Neo-Platonic fashion. -</p> -<p>Tradition nevertheless calls him the first who followed Aristotle in his writings; -and assuredly this representation is not altogether unfounded. In the long list of -his works Aristotle takes a prominent place. He was not satisfied with merely translating -him, but he studied his translated works and endeavoured to improve and explain them. -At <span class="pageNum" id="pb105">[<a href="#pb105">105</a>]</span>all events the Aristotelian Physics, with the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias, -had an important influence upon him. Such assertions as that the world is only potentially -unending and not actually so, and that motion is continuous, and the like, point rather -in that direction. The Natural-Philosophers of that day, as well as the Faithful Brethren, -said for instance, that motion had as little continuity as number. But farther, Kindi -resolutely turned away from the marvel-mongering philosophy of the time, by declaring -Alchemy an imposture. That which nature alone could produce, he held to be beyond -the power of man. Whoever then gives himself up to alchemistic experiments, is in -his opinion deceiving either himself or others. The famous physician, Razi, attempted -to controvert this view of Kindi’s. -</p> -<p id="p4.1.7">7. The influence of Kindi as a teacher and an author has operated mainly through his -Mathematics, Astrology, Geography and Medicine. His most faithful and certainly his -most notable disciple was Akhmed ibn Mohammed al-Tayyib al-Sarakhsi († 899), a <span class="corr" id="xd31e3365" title="Source: government official">government-official</span> and friend of the Caliph Mutadid, to whose negligence or caprice he fell a victim. -He worked at Alchemy and Astrology, strove to gain a knowledge of the wisdom and might -of the Creator from the wonders of creation, and prosecuted the study of Geography -and History. Another disciple of Kindi’s has become better known,—Abu Mashar († 885), -who, however, owes all his reputation to Astrology. He is said to have become, when -47 years of age, an admirer of Kindi’s,—though up till then he had been a fanatical -opponent of philosophy,—having been attracted to the pursuit of Astrology, by a superficial -study of Mathematics. <span class="pageNum" id="pb106">[<a href="#pb106">106</a>]</span>Whether this be truth or fiction, such a course of education is at all events characteristic -of that inquisitive grasping at half-understood knowledge, which peculiarly belongs -to the first centuries of Arab Science. -</p> -<p>The school of Kindi went in no way beyond the master. Of its literary activity hardly -any sample has been preserved to us beyond a stray quotation or two. It is of course -possible that in the treatises of the Faithful Brethren, something of it may have -been saved, but this cannot be determined, in the present state of our knowledge. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s4.2" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1182">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">2.</span> <span class="sc">Farabi.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p4.2.1" class="first">1. In the tenth century the Logicians or Metaphysicians are distinguished from the -Natural-Philosophers. The former follow a more rigorous method than the Dialecticians, -and treat of other subjects than those which are dealt with by the Physical school. -They have repudiated Pythagoras, to entrust themselves to the guidance of Aristotle, -of course in Neo-Platonic guise. -</p> -<p>We have here to do with two directions of scientific interest. The Natural-Philosophers -are more or less concerned with the plenitude of the concrete phenomena of Nature, -as in Geography and Ethnology. They investigate in all directions the effects of things, -and think the essential nature of these is only to be discerned in such effect or -working. When they do ascend beyond Nature, Soul and Spirit, to the Divine Essence, -then the definition of it to which they confine themselves, or which they adopt by -preference, is—‘the First Cause’, or,—‘the wise Creator’, whose goodness and wisdom -appear from his works. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb107">[<a href="#pb107">107</a>]</span></p> -<p>The Logicians proceed in a very different way. The occurrence of the Particular has -only a subordinate value in their eyes,—the value, merely, of an illustration of its -deducibility from the Universal. While the Physicists start from effects or operations, -the Logicians seek to comprehend things from principles. Everywhere they enquire after -the Idea or Essence of things, up to the highest. For them,—to make the contrast more -intelligible by an example—, God is not, first of all, ‘the wise Creator’, but first -of all ‘the necessarily existing Being’. -</p> -<p>In the order of time the Logicians come after the Physical school, just as the Mutazilite -Dialectic on its part (v. <a href="#p2.3.4">II, 3 §§ 4</a> and <a href="#p2.3.5">5</a>) brought within the scope of its consideration first God’s Working, and then his -Being. -</p> -<p>We have already come to recognize Razi as the most important representative of the -philosophical direction taken by the Physicists; and as for the Logical and Metaphysical -efforts,—for which Kindi and others had prepared the way,—they culminate with Razi’s -younger contemporary Abu Nasr ibn Mohammed ibn Tarkhan ibn Uzlag al-Farabi. -</p> -<p id="p4.2.2">2. We cannot say much with certainty about the course of Farabi’s outward life and -training. He was a quiet man, devoted to a life of philosophy and contemplation, sheltered -by the powerful, and assuming at last the dress of a Sufi. His father is said to have -been a Persian general, and he himself was born at Wasidj, a small fortified place -in the district of Farab in Turkish Transoxiana. It was in Bagdad, and partly at the -hands of a Christian preceptor Yohanna ibn Hailan, that he received his education. -This embraced both literary and mathematical subjects, forming the equivalent of the -‘Trivium’ and ‘Quadrivium’ of mediæval <span class="pageNum" id="pb108">[<a href="#pb108">108</a>]</span>Christendom. One or two of his writings, particularly on Music, give evidence still -of his mathematical training. Legend credits him with ability to speak in all the -languages of the world, seventy in number. That he understood Turkish and Persian,—an -<i>a priori</i> probability,—is manifest from his works. Arabic he writes clearly, and with a certain -grace, although now and then his fondness for synonyms and parallel clauses interferes -with the precision of philosophical expression. -</p> -<p>The philosophy in which Farabi was initiated sprung from the school of Merv; and perhaps -its members had given greater attention to metaphysical questions than the men of -Harran and Basra with their marked leaning to Natural Philosophy. -</p> -<p>From Bagdad, where he had long lived and worked, he went to Haleb (Aleppo), in consequence -doubtless of political disturbances, and there he settled at the brilliant court of -Saif-addaula; but he must have spent his closing years not at court but in retirement. -He died at Damascus, while on a journey, in December, 950; and it is reported that -his prince, attired as a Sufi, pronounced over him his funeral oration. We are told -that he was eighty years of age, and it is otherwise probable that he was a very old -man. His contemporary, and partner in study, Abu Bishr Matta died ten years before -him, and his pupil Abu Zakariya Yakhya ibn Adi in the year 971, at the age of eighty-one. -</p> -<p id="p4.2.3">3. The chronological order of the works of Farabi has not been determined. Shorter -treatises in which he comes into touch with the Dialecticians and Natural-Philosophers, -if these are at all genuine in the form handed down to us, may have been popular or -juvenile productions of his; <span class="pageNum" id="pb109">[<a href="#pb109">109</a>]</span>but his mature powers were applied to the study of Aristotle’s writings, for which -reason the name given him by the East was ‘the Second Teacher’, that is, ‘the Second -Aristotle’. -</p> -<p>Since his day the number and order of the works composed by Aristotle or at least -attributed to him, which have been paraphrased and commented on after Farabi’s example, -remain upon the whole fixed. First come the eight Logical treatises, viz., the Categories; -the Hermeneutics; the First Analytics; the Second Analytics; the Topics; the Sophistics; -Rhetoric; and the Poetics: It is to these that the Isagoge of Porphyry is the introduction. -Then follow the eight treatises which deal with Physical subjects, <i>viz.</i>, <span lang="la">Auscultatio Physica; De Coelo et Mundo; De Generatione et Corruptione</span>; the Meteorology; the Psychology; <span lang="la">De Sensu et Sensato</span>; the Book of Plants; and the Book of Animals. Lastly come the Metaphysics, the Ethics, -the Politics and so on. -</p> -<p>The so-called “Theology of Aristotle” was still considered by Farabi to be a genuine -work. In Neo-Platonic fashion, and with some attempt at adaptation to the Muslim faith, -he seeks to demonstrate that Plato and Aristotle harmonize with one another. The need -which he experiences is not for a discriminating criticism, but for a conclusive and -comprehensive view of the world; and the satisfaction of this need,—which is rather -a religious than a scientific one,—induces him to overlook philosophic differences. -Plato and Aristotle must differ from each other only in method, in phraseology, and -in relation to practical life: their doctrine of wisdom is the same. They are the -‘Imāms’ or ‘highest authorities’ in philosophy; and seeing that they were two, independent, -original minds, the authority which is constituted <span class="pageNum" id="pb110">[<a href="#pb110">110</a>]</span>by their agreement has more validity in the eyes of Farabi than the faith of the whole -Muslim community, who with blind confidence follow the guidance of one. -</p> -<p id="p4.2.4">4. Farabi is counted among the physicians, but he seems not to have been in actual -practice. He was entirely devoted to the spiritual healing art. Purity of Soul he -denominated the condition and fruit of all philosophizing, and he demanded love of -truth even though it should oppose Aristotle. Then the judgment has to be trained -by means of Geometry and Logic for the study of physical and mental science. Farabi, -however, pays but little heed to the separate branches of study: his powers are concentrated -on Logic, Metaphysics, and the principles of Physics. Philosophy for him is the science -of all Being as such, in the acquisition of which science we come to resemble the -Godhead. It is the one, all-embracing science, which pictures the world to us as a -Universe. Farabi’s charge against the Dialecticians is, that they employ as a basis -for their demonstrations the deliverances of ordinary consciousness without testing -them; and the Natural-Philosophers he blames for continually occupying themselves -merely with the effect of things, and thus never getting beyond the contrasts of worldly -phenomena by attaining to a unified conception of the All. He would confront the former -by setting Thought on a proper foundation; and in opposition to the latter he would -thoroughly investigate the subject of the One First Cause of all that exists. Consequently -we shall be taking the best way to do justice to his historical and dogmatic position, -if we endeavour to give some account, first of his Logic, next of his Metaphysics, -and finally of his Physics and Practical Philosophy. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb111">[<a href="#pb111">111</a>]</span></p> -<p id="p4.2.5">5. The Logic of Farabi is not a mere analysis of scientific thinking: it contains -in addition many remarks on grammar, and discussions on the theory of knowledge. While -grammar is limited to the language of one people, Logic, on the other hand, has to -regulate the expression in language of the aggregate intelligence of mankind. From -the simplest elements of speech it must advance to the most complex forms,—from the -word to the sentence, and on to discourse. -</p> -<p>Logic falls into two divisions, according as its subjects stand related to actuality; -the first of these comprising the doctrine of Ideas and Definitions (<i>tasawwur</i>), and the second, the doctrine of Judgments, Inferences, and Proofs (<i>tasdiq</i>). Ideas,—with which are classed Definitions, though in a mere loose, outward juxtaposition,—have -in themselves no relation to actuality, that is to say, they are neither true nor -false. Among ‘Ideas’ Farabi recognizes here the simplest psychological forms, that -is, both the representations of individual objects arising from Sense-Perception, -and those ideas which have been stamped upon the mind from the first, such as the -Necessary, the Actual, the Possible. Such representations and ideas are immediately -certain. A man’s mind may be directed to these, and his soul made observant of them, -but they cannot be demonstrated to him, nor can they be explained by deriving them -from what is known, seeing that they are already clear in themselves, and that too -with the highest degree of certitude. -</p> -<p>By combining representations or ideas, judgments result, and these may be either true -or false. To obtain a foundation for these judgments we have to go back through the -processes of Inference and of Proof to certain propositions <span class="pageNum" id="pb112">[<a href="#pb112">112</a>]</span>originally conveyed to the understanding, immediately obvious, and admitting of no -farther confirmation. Such propositions,—the fundamental propositions or Axioms of -all Science,—there must be for Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Ethics. -</p> -<p>The doctrine of Proof, by which, starting from what is known and well-established, -we arrive at a knowledge of something formerly unknown, is, according to Farabi, Logic -properly so called. Acquaintance with the leading Concepts (the Categories), and with -their synthesis in Judgment (Hermeneutics) and in Inference (First Analytics) furnishes -only the introduction thereto. And in the Proof-doctrine the chief point is to ascertain -the Norms or principles of a universally valid and necessary Science, which Philosophy -has to be. Here the Law of Contradiction is looked upon as the highest of these principles, -by which law the truth or necessity of a proposition, and at the same time the untruth -or impossibility of the contrary, become known in one single cognitive act. From this -point of view the Platonic Dichotomy is to be preferred, as a scientific method, to -the Aristotelian Polytomy. And Farabi is not content with the formal side of the doctrine -of proof. That doctrine has to be more than a methodology which points out the right -way to the truth: it must itself point out the truth; it must generate science. It -not only deals with judgments as material for the syllogism, but it enquires also -into the truth which they contain, with reference to the particular sciences concerned. -It is not a mere implement; it is rather a constituent part of philosophy. -</p> -<p>As we have seen, the theory of proof terminates in necessary knowledge, corresponding -to necessary existence. But <span class="pageNum" id="pb113">[<a href="#pb113">113</a>]</span>besides this there is the great province of the Possible, from which we can gain only -a probable knowledge. The different degrees then of probability, or the modes in which -we attain to a knowledge of the Possible, are discussed in the Topics, and with them -are associated Sophistic, Rhetoric and Poetics. In other connections these last three -subjects are mainly concerned with practical aims, but in Farabi’s hands they are -combined with the Topics into a Dialectic of the Seeming. He proceeds to say that -true science can be built up only on the necessary propositions of the Second Analytics, -but that Probability shades off into the mere phantom of truth, from the topical or -dialectic judgments down to the poetical. Thus Poetry stands at the very bottom of -the scale, being in Farabi’s opinion a lying and immoral absurdity. -</p> -<p>In the addendum to the Isagoge of Porphyry, our philosopher has also given expression -to his views on the question of ‘Universals’. He finds the Particular not only in -things and in sense-perception but also in thought. In like manner the Universal exists -not merely as an ‘accident’ in individual things, but also as a ‘substance’ in mind. -The mind of man abstracts the Universal from things, but it had an existence of its -own before these. Virtually therefore the triple distinction of the ‘<i>ante rem</i>’, ‘<i>in re</i>’ and ‘<i>post rem</i>’ already occurs in Farabi. -</p> -<p>Does mere ‘being’ also belong to the Universals? Is existence, in effect, a predicate? -This question which caused so much mischief in philosophy was fully and correctly -answered by Farabi. According to him, existence is a grammatical or logical relation, -but not a category of actuality which makes any assertion about things. The existence -of a thing is nothing but the thing itself. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb114">[<a href="#pb114">114</a>]</span></p> -<p id="p4.2.6">6. The trend of thought found in the Logic asserts itself also in the Metaphysics. -Instead of the Changeable and the Everlasting, there emerge the ideas of the Possible -and the Necessary. -</p> -<p>Everything in fact that exists, is, in Farabi’s view, either a necessary or a possible -thing; there is no third kind of Being. Now since all which is possible presupposes -for its realisation a Cause, while yet the chain of causes cannot be traced back without -end, we see ourselves compelled to assume that there is a Being, existing of necessity, -uncaused, possessing the highest degree of perfection and an eternal plenitude of -reality, self-sufficing, without any change, who as absolute Mind and pure goodness -and thinking,—being the thinking and the thought in one nature,—loves the all-transcending -goodness and beauty of that nature, which is his own. This Being cannot be proved -to exist, because he himself is the proof and first cause of all things, in whom truth -and reality coincide. And it is involved in the very idea of such a Being, that he -should be one, and one only, for if there were two first and absolute Beings, they -would have to be partly alike and partly different,—in which case, however, the simplicity -of each would be destroyed. A Being who is the most perfect of all, must be one alone. -</p> -<p>This first Existence, one alone, and of a verity real, we call God; and since in him -all things are one, without even difference in kind, no definition of his Being can -be supplied. Yet man bestows upon him the noblest names, expressive of all that is -most honoured and esteemed in life, because in the mystic impulse thereto, words lose -their usual significance, transcending all discrepancy. Some <span class="pageNum" id="pb115">[<a href="#pb115">115</a>]</span>names refer to his essential nature, others to his relation to the world, without -prejudicing, however, the unity of his essence; but they are all to be understood -metaphorically, and we can interpret them only according to feeble analogy. Of God, -as the most perfect Being, we ought properly to have also the most complete idea. -At least our mathematical notions are more perfect than our notions of physics, because -the former refer to the more perfect objects. But with the most perfect object of -all we fare as with the most brilliant light: by reason of the weakness of our eyes -we cannot bear it. Thus the imperfections inherent in Matter cling to our understanding. -</p> -<p id="p4.2.7">7. We are able to see God better in the regular gradation of Beings which proceed -from him than in himself. From him, the One alone, comes the All, for his knowledge -is the highest power: In his cognizance of himself the world comes into being: The -cause of all things is not the will of an almighty Creator, but the knowledge of the -Necessary. From eternity the Forms or Types of things are in God, and from him eternally -proceeds also his own image, termed ‘the Second All’ or ‘the first created Spirit’, -which moves the outermost celestial Sphere. In succession to this Spirit, come, one -out of the other, the eight Spirits of the Spheres, all of which are unique in their -several kinds and perfect, and these are the creators of the celestial bodies. These -nine Spirits, called ‘Celestial Angels’, together form the second grade of Being. -In the third grade stands the Reason, active in Humanity, which is also termed the -Holy Spirit and which unites heaven and earth. The Soul is in the fourth grade. These -two, the Reason and the Soul, do not remain by themselves in their strict original -<span class="pageNum" id="pb116">[<a href="#pb116">116</a>]</span>One-ness, but multiply in accordance with the great number of human beings. Lastly -appear Form and Matter, as Beings of the fifth and sixth orders; and with them the -series of Spiritual existences is closed. The first three grades, God, the Spirits -of the Spheres, and the Active Reason, remain Spirit <i>per se</i>; but the three which follow,—Soul, Form and Matter, although incorporeal, yet enter -into relation with Body. -</p> -<p>The Corporeal, which is held to originate in the imagination of the Spirit, has also -its six grades: Celestial Bodies, Human Bodies, Bodies of Lower Animals, Bodies of -Plants, Minerals, and Elementary Bodies. -</p> -<p>The influence of Farabi’s Christian preceptor is probably still to be seen in these -speculations, following as they do the number Three. That number had the same significance -in them that the number Four had with the Natural-Philosophers. The terminology also -bears out this idea. -</p> -<p>That, however, is merely external: It is Neo-Platonism that contributes the contents. -Here the Creation, or Emanation of the world, appears as an eternal, intellectual -process. By the first created Spirit thinking of its Author, the second Sphere-spirit -comes into being; while, by the same Spirit thinking of itself and thus realizing -itself, there proceeds from it the first Body, or the uppermost celestial Sphere. -And so the process goes on in necessary succession, down to the lowest Sphere, that -of the Moon, in entire accordance with the Ptolemaic Sphere-system,—as it is known -to every well-educated person at least from Dante’s “Commedia”,—and in the Neo-Platonic -manner of derivation. The Spheres together form an unbroken order, for all that exists -is a Unity. The creation and preservation of the <span class="pageNum" id="pb117">[<a href="#pb117">117</a>]</span>world are one and the same. And not only is the unity of the Divine Being portrayed -in the world, but the Divine righteousness is also expressed in the beautiful order -which there prevails. The logical order of the world is at the same time a moral order. -</p> -<p id="p4.2.8">8. The sublunary world of this earth is, of course, wholly dependent on the world -of the celestial spheres. Yet the influence from above bears in the first place, as -we know <i>a priori</i>, upon the necessary order of the whole, although in the second place the individual -thing also is made to happen, but only according to natural reciprocal action, and -therefore by rules which experience teaches us. Astrology, which attributes everything -that is contingent or extraordinary to the stars and their conjunctions, is combated -by Farabi. There is no certain knowledge of the Contingent; and,—as Aristotle also -has taught,—much of what happens on this earth possesses in a high degree the character -of the Contingent or the Possible. The celestial world, on the other hand, has another -and a more perfect nature, which operates according to necessary laws. It can bestow -upon this earthly world only that which is good; and therefore it is a complete mistake -to maintain that some stars bring good luck, and others ill luck. The nature of the -heavens is one, and it is uniformly good. The conclusion then at which Farabi arrives, -by these reflections is this: Knowledge, capable of demonstration, and perfectly certain, -is afforded by Mathematical Astronomy alone; the physical study of the heavens yields -a probable knowledge; but the tenets and vaticinations of Astrology merit an exceedingly -hesitating belief. -</p> -<p>Overagainst the simplicity of the celestial world we have <span class="pageNum" id="pb118">[<a href="#pb118">118</a>]</span>the sublunary kingdom of the four natures,—the kingdom of contrasts and of change. -Even in this realm, in the midst of its plurality, we meet with the unity of an ascending -series, from the Elements up to Man. Farabi is unable to advance much that is original -on this subject. True to his logical standpoint, he gives himself very little concern -about the Natural Sciences, among which, in reliance upon the original unity of matter, -he seems without any hesitation to have counted Alchemy. We turn at once to his Doctrine -of Man or of the Human Soul, which presents a measure of interest. -</p> -<p id="p4.2.9">9. The powers or divisions of the Human Soul are, in Farabi’s opinion, not of co-ordinate -rank, but constitute an ascending series. The lower faculty is Material for the higher; -and this again is the Form for the first, while the highest power of all, viz. Thinking, -is non-material, and is Form for all the Forms which precede. The life of the Soul -is raised from things of sense to thought, by means of the power of Representation; -but in all the faculties there is involved Effort or Will. Every theory has its obverse -side in practice; and Inclination and Disinclination are inseparable from the perceptions -furnished by the senses. To the representations of these the soul takes up an attitude -of assent or dissent, by affirming or denying. Finally, Thought passes judgment on -Good and Bad, gives to the Will its motives, and constructs Art and Science. All Perception, -Representation or Thought is attended with a certain effort to reach the necessary -consequence, just as warmth radiates from the substance of fire. -</p> -<p>The Soul is that which gives completeness (Entelechia) to the existence of the body; -but that which gives completeness <span class="pageNum" id="pb119">[<a href="#pb119">119</a>]</span>to the existence of the Soul is the Mind, or the Spirit (<i>ʻaql</i>). The Spirit only is the real Man. -</p> -<p id="p4.2.10">10. Accordingly the <span class="corr" id="xd31e3489" title="Source: discusion">discussion</span> turns mainly on the Mind or Spirit. In the human Spirit everything earthly is raised -to a higher mode of existence, which is lifted out of the categories of the Corporeal. -Now as a capability or potentiality, Mind or Spirit is present in the Soul of the -Child; and it becomes actual Spirit in the course of its apprehension of bodily forms -in experience by means of the Senses and the representative faculty. But this transition -from possibility to actuality,—the realisation thus of experience,—is not Man’s own -act, but is brought about by the Superhuman Spirit, which has sprung from the last -Sphere-Spirit, that of the Moon. In this way Man’s knowledge is represented as being -a contribution from above, and not a knowledge which has been acquired in mental struggle. -In the light of the Spirit which stands above us, our understanding descries the Forms -of the Corporeal; and thereby experience is amplified into rational knowledge. Experience, -in fact, takes in only the Forms which have been abstracted from the world of Matter. -But there are in existence also,—before and above material things,—Forms and general -entities, in the pure Spirits of the Spheres. Man now receives information from these -‘detached Forms’: it is only by means of their influence that his actual experience -becomes explicable to him. From God down to the Spirit of Mankind, the higher Form -affects only that which immediately succeeds it. Every intermediate Form stands in -a relation of ‘receptive’ activity to what is above it, and of ‘conferring’ activity -to what is below it. In its relation to the Human Spirit, which is influenced from -above (<i>ʻaql mustafad</i>), <span class="pageNum" id="pb120">[<a href="#pb120">120</a>]</span>the Superhuman Spirit, produced from the last Sphere-Spirit, is to be called ‘active’ -or ‘creative’ (<i>ʻaql faʻʻâl</i>). Yet it is not continually active, because its effectiveness is restrained by its -material. But God is the completely-real, eternally-active Spirit. -</p> -<p>The Spirit in Man is threefold: according as it is (1) Possible, (2) Actual, and (3) -Influenced from above. Now in the sense of Farabi, this means—that (1) the spiritual -potentiality in Man is, by means of (2) realizing the knowledge which is gained by -experience, (3) led to the knowledge of the Supersensible, which precedes all experience, -and itself induces the experience. -</p> -<p>The grades of Spirit and its knowledge correspond to the grades of existence. The -lower strives wistfully to reach the higher, and the higher lifts the lower up to -its own level. The Spirit which stands above us, and which has lent to all earthly -things their Forms, seeks to bring these scattered Forms together that they may become -one in love. First of all he collects them in Man. And indeed the possibility and -truth of human knowledge depend on the fact that the same Spirit who bestowed upon -the Corporeal its figure, also gives Idea to Man. The scattered Forms of the earthly -are found again in the Human Spirit, and thereby it comes to resemble the last of -the Celestial Spirits. Unity with that Celestial Spirit,—and in this an approach to -God,—is the aim and the blessedness of the Spirit of Man. -</p> -<p>Now the question whether such a union is possible before Man’s death is, in Farabi’s -opinion, either a doubtful one, or one which should be answered in the direct negative. -The highest thing that can be attained in this life, is <span class="pageNum" id="pb121">[<a href="#pb121">121</a>]</span>rational knowledge. But separation from the body gives to the rational soul the complete -freedom which belongs to spirit. But does it then continue to exist as an individual -soul? Or is it merely a Moment of the higher World-Intelligence? On this point Farabi -expresses himself ambiguously, and with a lack of consistency, in his various writings. -Men,—so the expression runs,—disappear in death; one generation follows another; and -like is joined to like, each in its own class. And forasmuch as rational souls are -not bound to space, they multiply without end, just as thought is added to thought, -and power to power. Every soul reflects on itself and all others that are like to -it; and the more it so reflects, the more intense is its joy (Cf. <a href="#p4.2.13"><i>infra</i>, § 13</a>). -</p> -<p id="p4.2.11">11. We come now to Farabi’s practical philosophy. In his Ethics and Politics we are -brought into a somewhat closer relation to the life and belief of the Muslims. One -or two general points of view may be brought forward. -</p> -<p>Just as Logic has to give an account of the principles of knowledge, so Ethics have -to deal with the fundamental rules of conduct, although, in the latter, somewhat more -value is attached to practice and experience than in the theory of knowledge. In the -treatment of this subject Farabi agrees sometimes with Plato, and sometimes with Aristotle; -but occasionally, in a mystic and ascetic fashion, he goes farther than either of -them. In opposition to the Theologians, who recognize, no doubt, a knowledge gained -by Reason, but not rules of conduct taught by Reason, Farabi frequently affirms with -emphasis that Reason decides whether a thing is good or evil. Why should not that -Reason, which has been imparted to us from above, decide upon conduct, <span class="pageNum" id="pb122">[<a href="#pb122">122</a>]</span>seeing that the highest virtue certainly consists in knowing? In vigorously accentuated -terms Farabi declares that if one man knew everything that stands in the writings -of Aristotle, but did not act in accordance with his knowledge, while another man -shaped his conduct in accordance with Aristotle’s teaching, without being acquainted -with it, the preference would have to be assigned to the former. Knowledge takes a -higher position than the moral act; otherwise it could not decide upon the act. -</p> -<p>By its very nature the Soul desires. In so far as it perceives and represents, it -has a will, just like the lower animals. But man alone possesses freedom of choice, -seeing that this rests upon rational consideration. Pure thought is the sphere of -freedom. Thus it is a freedom which depends upon motives furnished by thinking,—a -freedom which is at the same time necessity, inasmuch as in the last resort it is -determined by the rational nature of God. In this sense Farabi is a Determinist. -</p> -<p>On account of the opposition offered by matter, the freedom of man, as thus conceived, -can only imperfectly vindicate its lordship over the Sensible. It does not become -perfect till the rational soul has been enfranchised from the bonds of matter and -the wrappings of error,—in the life of the Spirit. But that is the highest blessedness -which is striven after for its own sake, and consequently it is plainly the Good. -Such good the Human Soul is seeking, when it turns to the Spirit above it, just as -the Spirits of the heavens do, when they draw near to the Highest. -</p> -<p id="p4.2.12">12. Even in the Ethics little regard is had to actual moral conditions; but in his -Politics Farabi withdraws still farther from real life. In his oriental way of looking -<span class="pageNum" id="pb123">[<a href="#pb123">123</a>]</span>at things, the ideal Republic of Plato merges into ‘the Philosopher as Ruler’. Men, -having been brought together by a natural want, submit themselves to the will of a -single person, in whom the State, be it good or bad, is, so to speak, embodied. A -State therefore is bad, if the head of it is, as regards the principles of the Good, -either ignorant or in error, or quite depraved. On the other hand the good or excellent -State has only one type, that namely in which the philosopher is ruler. And Farabi -endows his ‘Prince’ with all the virtues of humanity and philosophy: he is Plato in -the mantle of the Prophet Mohammed. -</p> -<p>In the description of rulers representative of the ideal Prince,—for there may be -more than one existing together, and Prince and minister may divide governing-virtue -and wisdom between them,—we come nearer the Muslim political theory of that day. But -the expressions are wrapped in obscurity: the lineage, for example, which is proper -for a Prince, and his duty of taking the lead in the holy war,—are not clearly signified. -All indeed is left floating in philosophic mist. -</p> -<p id="p4.2.13">13. Morality reaches perfection only in a State which at the same time forms a religious -community. Not only does the condition of the State determine the temporal lot of -its citizens, but also their future destiny. The souls of citizens in an “ignorant” -State are devoid of reason, and return to the elements as sensible Forms, in order -to be united anew with other beings,—men or lower animals. In States which are “in -error”, and in those which are “depraved”, the leader alone is responsible, and punishment -awaits him in the world beyond; but the souls which have been led into error share -the fate of the ignorant. On the <span class="pageNum" id="pb124">[<a href="#pb124">124</a>]</span>other hand, if the good and ‘knowing’ souls only maintain their ground, they enter -the world of pure Spirit; and the higher the stage of knowledge to which they have -attained in this life, the higher will their position be after death, in the order -of the All, and the more intense their blessed delight. -</p> -<p>In all likelihood expressions of this kind are only the outer wrapping of a mystico-philosophical -belief in the absorption of the Human Spirit into the World-Spirit and finally into -God. For,—as Farabi teaches,—although the world, deductively considered (<i>i.e.</i> logically and metaphysically), is something different from God, yet inductively the -present world is regarded by the soul as being identical with the next, because in -everything, even in his Unity, God is himself the All. -</p> -<p id="p4.2.14">14. If we now take a general survey of Farabi’s system, it exhibits itself as a fairly -consistent Spiritualism,—or,—to be more precise,—Intellectualism. The Corporeal,—that -which appeals to the Senses,—as it <span class="corr" id="xd31e3532" title="Source: orginates">originates</span> in the imagination of the Spirit, might be designated “a confused presentation”. -The only true existence is Spirit, although it assumes various degrees. God alone -is entirely unmixed and pure Spirit, while those Spirits, which eternally proceed -from him, already have in them the element of plurality. The number of primary Spirits -has been determined by the Ptolemaic cosmology, and corresponds to the celestial hierarchy. -The farther any one of them is removed from the first, so much the less part has it -in the Being of the pure Spirit. From the last World-Spirit Man receives his essential -nature, that is—Reason. There is no gap in all the system; the Universe is a beautiful -and well-ordered <span class="pageNum" id="pb125">[<a href="#pb125">125</a>]</span>whole. The Evil and the Bad are the necessary consequence of finiteness in individual -things; but the Good which characterizes the Universe is set thereby in bolder relief. -</p> -<p>Can this fair order of the Universe, from all eternity emanating from God, ever be -destroyed, or can it even flow back to God? A sustained streaming-back to the Godhead, -there doubtless is. The longing of the Soul is directed to what is above and advancing -knowledge purifies it and leads it upwards. But how far? Neither philosophers nor -prophets have been able to return a clear answer to this question. And the wisdom -of both of these,—both philosophy and prophecy,—Farabi derives from the creative World-Spirit -above us. Now and again he speaks of prophecy as if it represented the highest stage -of human knowledge and action. But that cannot be his real view;—at least it is not -the logical consequence of his theoretical philosophy. According to it everything -prophetic,—in dream, vision, revelation and so on,—belongs to the sphere of the Imagination -or Representation, and thus takes an intermediate position between Sense-Perception -and pure Rational Knowledge. Although, in his Ethics and Politics, he attaches a high -educational importance to religion, it is always regarded as inferior in absolute -worth to knowledge acquired through pure reason. -</p> -<p>Farabi lived perpetually in the world of the Intellect. A king in the mental realm, -a beggar in worldly possessions, he felt happy with his books, and with the birds -and flowers of his garden. To his people,—the Muslim community,—he could be only very -little. In his political and ethical teaching there was no proper place for worldly -matters or for the ‘holy war’. His philosophy did not <span class="pageNum" id="pb126">[<a href="#pb126">126</a>]</span>satisfy any need appertaining to the senses, while it spoke against the life of imagination -belonging both to the senses and the intellect, as that life gives special expression -to itself in the creations of Art and in religious fancies. He was lost in the abstractions -of pure Spirit. As a pious, holy man, he was an object of wonder to his contemporaries, -and by a few disciples he was honoured as the personification of wisdom; but by the -genuine scholars of Islam he was always decried as a heretic. There was, of course, -ground enough for this: just as Natural Philosophy easily led to Naturalism and Atheism, -the Monotheism of the Logicians imperceptibly conducted to Pantheism. -</p> -<p id="p4.2.15">15. Farabi had no great following of disciples: Abu Zakariya Yakhya ibn Adi, a Jacobite -Christian, became known as a translator of Aristotelian works; but a pupil of Zakariya’s -came to be more spoken of, called Abu Sulaiman Mohammed ibn Tahir ibn Bahram al-Sidjistani, -who gathered about him in Bagdad, in the second half of the tenth century, the learned -men of his time. The conversational discussions which they conducted, and the philosophical -instructions which were imparted by the master, have been to some extent preserved, -and we can clearly see the outcome of the school. Just as Natural Philosophy drifted -into a secret lore, and the school of Kindi abandoned Philosophy for the separate -branches of Mathematical and Physical Science, so the logical tendency of Farabi passed -into a philosophy of words. Distinctions and definitions form the subject of these -conferences. Individual points in the history of philosophy and in the several sciences -are discussed also, without any systematic connection; but almost never does any positive -interest in these subjects <span class="pageNum" id="pb127">[<a href="#pb127">127</a>]</span>appear. The Human Soul occupies the foreground entirely, just as in the case of the -Faithful Brethren, except that these last dealt rather with the marvellous operations -of the Soul, while the Logicians pondered over its rational essence and its elevation -to the Supra-rational. The Sidjistani Society trifled with words and concepts, instead -of with numbers and letters after the fashion of the Brethren; but the end in both -cases was—a mystical Sufism. -</p> -<p>It is therefore no matter of astonishment that in the learned meetings of Abu Sulaiman, -as reported by his pupil Tauhidi († 1009), Empedocles, Socrates, Plato and others -are oftener mentioned than Aristotle. A very miscellaneous society came together in -those meetings. No question was asked as to the country from which any one came, or -the religion to which he adhered. They lived in the conviction,—derived from Plato, -that every opinion contained a measure of truth, just as all things shared in a common -existence, and all sciences in an actual knowledge which was one and the same. On -that assumption alone could they have conceived that every one might start with maintaining -that his own opinion was the true one, and that the science which he cultivated was -the science most to be preferred. And for that very reason there is no conflict between -Religion and Philosophy, however vehement the assertions may be on these two sides. -On the contrary Philosophy confirms the doctrines of Religion, just as the latter -brings the results of Philosophy to perfection. If Philosophical Knowledge is the -essence and end of the Soul of man, Religious Belief is its life, or the way to that -end; and as Reason is God’s vicegerent on earth, it is impossible for Reason and Revelation -to contradict each other. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb128">[<a href="#pb128">128</a>]</span></p> -<p>It is not worth while to accentuate particular points in these conversational discussions, -the tenor of which we have given. The appearance of Sidjistani and his circle is important -in the history of culture; but it has no significance as regards the development of -Philosophy in Islam. What was to Farabi the very life of his Spirit, becomes in this -Society a subject merely of clever conversation. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s4.3" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1347">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">3.</span> <span class="sc">Ibn Maskawaih.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p4.3.1" class="first">1. We have arrived at the point of time when the tenth century is passing into the -eleventh. Farabi’s school has apparently died out; and Ibn Sina,—destined to awaken -into fresh life the philosophy of his predecessor,—is still a youth. Here however -we have to make mention of a man, more allied, it is true, to Kindi than to Farabi, -but who yet agrees with the latter in essential points, by reason of employing the -same sources with him. He affords an instance also of the fact that the most sagacious -minds of his time were not disposed to follow Farabi into the region of Logico-Metaphysical -speculation. -</p> -<p>This man is Abu Ali ibn Maskawaih, physician, philologist and historian, who was the -treasurer and friend of the Sultan Adudaddaula, and who died full of years in 1030. -Amongst other things he has left us a philosophical system of Ethics which up to this -day is valued in the East. It is a combination of material taken from Plato, Aristotle, -Galen and the Muslim Religious Law, although Aristotle predominates in it. It commences -with a treatise on the Essential Nature of the Soul. -</p> -<p id="p4.3.2">2. The Soul of Man, as Ibn Maskawaih explains, is a <span class="pageNum" id="pb129">[<a href="#pb129">129</a>]</span>simple, incorporeal substance, conscious of its own existence, knowledge and working. -That it must be of a spiritual nature—follows from the very fact that it appropriates -at one and the same time Forms the most opposed to each other, for example, the notions -of white and black, while a body can only take up one of the two forms at a time. -Farther, it apprehends both the forms of the Sensible and those of the Spiritual in -the same spiritual manner, for Length is not ‘long’ in the soul, nor does it become -‘longer’ in the memory. Accordingly the knowledge and endeavour of the soul extend -far beyond its own body: even the entire world of sense cannot satisfy it. Moreover -it possesses an inborn rational knowledge, which cannot have been bestowed by the -Senses, for it is by means of this knowledge that it determines the True and the False, -in the course of comparing and distinguishing between the objects presented to it -in Sense-Perception,—thus supervising and regulating the Senses. Finally, it is in -Self-Consciousness, or knowing of its own knowing, that the spiritual unity of the -soul is most clearly shewn,—a unity, in which thinking, that which thinks, and that -which is thought—all coincide. -</p> -<p>The human soul is distinguished from the souls of the lower animals particularly by -rational reflection as the principle of its conduct, directed towards the Good. -</p> -<p id="p4.3.3">3. That by which a Being, possessed of will, attains the end or the perfection of -his nature is, in general terms, ‘good’. A certain capability, therefore, or disposition, -directed to an end is requisite, in order to be good. But as regards their capability -men differ very essentially. Only a few,—Maskawaih thinks,—are by nature good, and -<span class="pageNum" id="pb130">[<a href="#pb130">130</a>]</span>never become bad, since what is by nature, does not change; while on the other hand, -many are by nature bad, and never become good. Others, however, who at first are neither -good nor bad, are definitely turned either in the one direction or the other, through -upbringing and social intercourse. -</p> -<p>Now the Good is either a general good or a particular good. There is an absolute Good, -which is identical with the highest Being and the highest knowledge; and all the good -together strive to attain to it. But for every individual person a particular Good -presents itself subjectively under the aspect of Happiness or Pleasure; and this consists -in the full and active manifestation of his own essential nature,—in the complete -realisation of his inmost being. -</p> -<p>Speaking generally,—Man is good and happy, if he acts as Man: Virtue is human excellence. -But since humanity is presented as occupying different levels in different individuals, -Happiness or the Good is not the same for all. And because an individual man, if he -were left to his own resources could not realize all the good things that might otherwise -be obtained, it is necessary that many should live together. As a consequence of this -condition, the first of duties, or the foundation of all the virtues, is a general -love for humankind, without which no society is possible. It is only along with, and -among other human beings that the individual man attains perfection;—so that Ethics -must be Social Ethics. Friendship therefore is not, as Aristotle would have it, an -expansion of Self-love, but a limitation of it, or a kind of love of one’s neighbour. -And this, like virtue in general, can find a field of exercise only in society, or -in citizenship, and not in the <span class="pageNum" id="pb131">[<a href="#pb131">131</a>]</span>pious monk’s renunciation of the world. The hermit, who thinks he is living temperately -and righteously, is deceived as to the character of his actions: they may be religious, -but moral they certainly are not; and therefore the consideration of them does not -belong to Ethics. -</p> -<p>Besides, in Ibn Maskawaih’s opinion, the Religious Law when rightly apprehended, pre-eminently -accords with an Ethics of Benevolence. Religion is a moral training for the people. -Its prescriptions, with regard to the worship of God in common and the pilgrimage -to Mecca for instance, have plainly in view the cultivation of the love of one’s neighbour -in the widest acceptation. -</p> -<p>In certain special points Ibn Maskawaih has not been successful in combining harmoniously -the ethical doctrines of the Greeks,—which he incorporates in his Scheme,—either with -one another or with the Law of Islam. That however we pass over; and in any case we -ought not only to praise in general terms his attempt to give a system of Ethics which -should be free from the casuistry of the Moralists and the asceticism of the Sufis, -but also to recognize in the execution of his design the good sense of a man of wide -culture. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s4.4" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1392">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">4.</span> <span class="sc">Ibn Sina.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p4.4.1" class="first">1. Abu Ali al-Hosain ibn Abdallah ibn Sina (<i>Avicenna</i>) was born at Efshene in the neighbourhood of Bokhara, in the year 980, of a family -connected with the public service. He received his secular and religious education -at home, where Persian and anti-Muslim traditions were still full of life and vigour. -Then the youth, precocious alike <span class="pageNum" id="pb132">[<a href="#pb132">132</a>]</span>in body and in mind, studied philosophy and medicine in Bokhara. He was seventeen -years old when he had the good fortune to cure the prince, Nukh ibn Mansur, and to -obtain the privilege of access to his library. From that time forward he was his own -teacher, in scientific research and in practice, and proved able to turn to account -the life and culture of his time. He kept continually venturing his fortunes in the -political working of the smaller States: Probably he could never have submitted to -a great prince, any more than to a teacher in Science. He wandered on from court to -court, at one time employed in State-Administration, at another as a teacher and author, -until he became vizir of Shems Addaula in Hamadan. After the death of this prince -he was consigned to prison by his son, for some months. He then proceeded farther -afield, to the court of Ala Addaula in Ispahan. And at last, having returned to Hamadan, -which Ala Addaula had conquered, he died there in 1037, at the age of 57; and there -his grave is pointed out to this day. -</p> -<p id="p4.4.2">2. The notion that Ibn Sina pushed on beyond Farabi and reached a purer Aristotelianism, -is perhaps the greatest error which has found a footing in the history of Muslim Philosophy. -What did this our man of the world in reality care for Aristotle? It was not his concern -to commit himself wholly to the spirit of any system. He took what was to his liking, -wherever he found it, but he had a preference for the shallow paraphrases of Themistius. -Thus he became the great philosopher of <span class="corr" id="xd31e3592" title="Source: accomodation">accommodation</span> in the East, and the true forerunner of compendium-writers for the whole world. He -knew how to group with skill his material, collected as it was from every quarter, -<span class="pageNum" id="pb133">[<a href="#pb133">133</a>]</span>and to present it in an intelligible form, although not without sophistry. Every moment -of his life was fully employed. In the daytime he attended to State affairs or gave -instruction to his pupils: the evening was devoted to the social enjoyments of friendship -and love; and many a night found him engaged in composition, pen in hand, and goblet -within reach lest he should fall asleep. Time and circumstances determined the direction -of this activity. If at the prince’s court he had the requisite leisure, and a library -at hand, he wrote his Canon of Medicine or the great Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. -While travelling, he composed epitomes and smaller works. In prison he wrote poems -and pious meditations, but always in a pleasing form; in fact his smaller mystical -writings have a poetic charm about them. When commissioned to do so, he put even Science, -Logic and Medicine into verse,—a practice which came more and more into vogue from -the tenth century onwards. Add to this that he wrote Persian and Arabic at will, and -you get the picture of a most accomplished man. His life was superabundantly rich -both in work and in enjoyment. In geniality, of course he was inferior to his older -compatriot, the poet Firdausi (940–1020), and in scientific talent to his contemporary -Beruni (v. <a href="#p4.4.9"><i>infra</i> § 9</a>), men still of importance in our eyes. Ibn Sina, however, was the true expression -of his time; and upon this fact have been founded his great influence and historic -position. He did not, like Farabi, withdraw from common life to become immersed in -the commentators of Aristotle, but he blended in himself Greek science and Oriental -wisdom. Enough commentaries, he thought, had already been written on the ancient authors: -it was now <span class="pageNum" id="pb134">[<a href="#pb134">134</a>]</span>time for men to construct a philosophy of their own,—in other words, to give a modern -form to the ancient doctrines. -</p> -<p id="p4.4.3">3. In Medicine Ibn Sina gives diligent endeavour to produce a systematic account of -that science, but here he proves by no means an exact logician. He assigns a large -place, at least theoretically, to Experience, and describes in detail the conditions -under which alone, for example, the efficacy of remedies can be ascertained. But the -philosophical principles which are involved in Medicine, must be taken over in the -form of lemmas from Philosophy itself. -</p> -<p>Philosophy proper is divided into Logic, Physics and Metaphysics. In its entirety -it embraces the science of all Existence as such, and of the principles of all the -separate sciences, whereby, as far as is humanly possible, the Soul which is devoted -to philosophy, attains the highest perfection. Now Existence is either spiritual, -when it is the subject of Metaphysics, or corporeal, when it is discussed in Physics, -or intellectual, when it forms the theme of Logic. The subjects of Physics can neither -exist, nor be thought of as existing, without Matter. The Metaphysical, however is -quite devoid of Matter; while the Logical is an abstraction from the Material. The -Logical has a certain likeness to the Mathematical, in so far as the subjects of Mathematics -may also be abstractions from matter. But yet the Mathematical always remains capable -of being represented and constructed, while on the other hand the Logical, as such, -has its existence only in the intellect, as, for instance, Identity, Unity and Plurality, -Universality and Particularity, Essentiality and Contingency, and so on. Consequently -Logic <span class="pageNum" id="pb135">[<a href="#pb135">135</a>]</span>is the Science of the Determinate Forms of Thought. -</p> -<p>In the more detailed treatment of his subject Ibn Sina conforms entirely to Farabi’s -Logic. This agreement would perhaps be more apparent to us, if the logical works of -his predecessor were extant in a more complete form. He frequently lays stress on -the defectiveness of the intellectual constitution in man, which is urgently in need -of a logical rule. Just as the physiognomist infers from the external features the -character of the nature within, so the logician is called upon to derive from known -premises that which is unknown. How easy it is for the errors of appearance and desire -to insinuate themselves into a process of that kind! A struggle with Sense is required -in order that the life of representation may be elevated to the pure truth of the -Reason, through which any knowledge of a necessary kind is gained. The divinely-inspired -man, but he alone, can dispense with Logic, precisely as the Bedouin is independent -of an Arabic Grammar. -</p> -<p>The question of Universals is also treated in a manner similar to that which is adopted -by Farabi. Prior to any plurality, every thing has an existence in the Mind of God -and of the Angels (the Sphere-Spirits); then as material form it enters upon plurality, -to be raised finally in the intellect of man to the universality of the Idea. Now -just as Aristotle has distinguished between First Substance (Individual) and Second -Substance (cogitable as a Universal), so Ibn Sina similarly makes a distinction between -First and Second Notion or Intention (<i>Maʻnâ</i>, <i lang="la">intentio</i>). The First is referred to the things themselves, the Second to the disposition of -our own thought. -</p> -<p id="p4.4.4">4. In Metaphysics and Physics Ibn Sina is differentiated <span class="pageNum" id="pb136">[<a href="#pb136">136</a>]</span>from Farabi chiefly through the fact that, by not deriving Matter from God, he places -the Spiritual at a higher elevation above all that is Material, and in consequence -heightens the importance of the Soul as an intermediary between the Spiritual and -the Corporeal. -</p> -<p>From the conception of the Possible and the Necessary, the existence of a Necessary -Being plainly follows. According to Ibn Sina we should not seek to demonstrate the -existence of a Creator from his works, but rather should deduce, from the possible -character of all that is, and all that is thinkable in the world, the existence of -a First and Necessary Being, whose essence and existence are one. -</p> -<p>Not only is every sublunary thing of a ‘possible’ nature, but even the heavens are, -in themselves, merely ‘possible’. Their existence becomes ‘necessary’ through another -existence which transcends all ‘possibility’ and therefore all plurality and mutability. -The ‘absolutely Necessary’ is an unbending Unity, from which nothing multiplex can -proceed. This first One is the God of Ibn Sina, of whom many attributes may of course -be predicated, such as thought &c., but only in the sense of negation or relation, -and in such a way that they do not affect the Unity of his essence. -</p> -<p>Out of the first One accordingly,—One only can proceed, <i>viz.</i>,—the first World-Spirit. It is in this latter Spirit that Plurality has its origin. -In fact by thinking of its own Cause, it generates a third Spirit, the governor of -the outermost Sphere; when again, it thinks of itself, a Soul is produced, by means -of which the Sphere-Spirit exercises its influence; and, in the third place, inasmuch -as it is in itself a ‘possible’ existence, there emerges from it <span class="pageNum" id="pb137">[<a href="#pb137">137</a>]</span>a Body, viz., the outermost Sphere. And so the process goes on: Every Spirit, thus -generated, except of course the last of the series, liberates from itself a trinity,—Spirit, -Soul and Body; for, since the Spirit cannot move the Body directly, it needs the Soul -to bring its effectiveness into operation. Finally comes the Active Spirit (<i>ʻaql faʻʻâl</i>), closing the series, and generating no farther pure (separate) Spirit, but producing -and directing the material of what is earthly, as well as corporeal forms and human -souls. -</p> -<p>The whole of this process,—which is not to be represented as occurring in time, takes -place in a substratum,—that of Matter. Matter is the eternal and pure possibility -of all that exists, and at the same time the limitation of the operation of the Spirit. -It is the principle of all individuality. -</p> -<p>Now this teaching must certainly have presented a dreadful appearance to believing -Muslims. Mutazilite dialecticians had doubtless asserted that God can do nothing evil, -and nothing irrational; but now Philosophy was maintaining that, God instead of being -able to do all that is possible is only in a position to effect that which is in its -own nature possible, and that only the first World-Spirit proceeds from him directly. -</p> -<p>As for the rest Ibn Sina makes every endeavour to conform to the popular belief. Everything -exists, he says, through God’s appointment, both the Good and the Evil, but it is -only the former that meets with his glad approval. Evil is either a non-existent thing, -or,—in so far as it proceeds from God,—an accidental thing. Suppose that He, to avoid -the evils which of necessity cling to the <span class="pageNum" id="pb138">[<a href="#pb138">138</a>]</span>world, had kept it from coming into being,—that would have been the greatest evil -of all. The world could not be better or more beautiful than it actually is. The Divine -Providence, administered as it is by the Souls of the Heavens, is found in the world’s -fair order. God and the pure Spirits know the Universal only, and therefore are unable -to attend to the Particular; but the Souls of the celestial Spheres, to whose charge -falls the representation of what is individual, and through whom Spirit acts upon -Body, render it possible to admit a providential care for the individual thing and -the individual person, and to account for revelation, and so on. Farther, the sudden -rise and disappearance of substances (Creation and Annihilation), in contrast to the -constant movement,—that is, the gradual passing of the Possible into the Actual,—seem -to Ibn Sina to indicate nothing impossible. In general, there is a predominant want -of clearness in his views regarding the relation of the forms of Existence,—Spirit -and Body, Form and Matter, Substance and Accident. A place at all events is left for -Miracle. In passionate forms of excitement in the Soul, which often generate in ourselves -great heat or cold, we have, according to Ibn Sina, phenomena analogous to miraculous -effects produced by the World-Soul, although it usually follows the course of Nature. -Our philosopher himself, however, makes a very moderate use of any of these possibilities. -Astrology and Alchemy he combated on quite rational grounds; and yet soon after his -death astrological poems were attributed to him; and in Turkish Romance-Literature -he appears as a magician, of course to represent an ancient Mystic. -</p> -<p>Ibn Sina’s theory of Physics rests entirely on the assumption <span class="pageNum" id="pb139">[<a href="#pb139">139</a>]</span>that a body can cause nothing. That which <i>causes</i>,—is in every case a Power, a Form, or a Soul, the Spirit operating through such instrumentality. -In the realm of the Physical there are accordingly countless Powers, the chief grades -of which, from the lower to the higher, are—the Forces of Nature, the Energies of -Plants and Animals, Human Souls and World-Souls. -</p> -<p id="p4.4.5">5. Farabi was above all things interested in pure Reason: he loved Thinking for its -own sake, Ibn Sina, on the other hand, is concerned throughout with the Soul. In his -Medicine it is man’s Body which he looks to; and similarly, in his Philosophy his -eyes are fixed on man’s Soul. The very name of his great Philosophical Encyclopaedia -is—‘The Healing’ (that is—of the Soul). His system centres in Psychology. -</p> -<p>His theory of human nature is dualistic. Body and Soul have no essential connection -with one another. All bodies are produced, under the influence of the stars, from -the mingling of the Elements; and in this way the human body also is produced, but -from a combination in which the finest proportion is observed. A spontaneous generation -of the body, just like the extinction and restoration of the human race, is therefore -possible. The Soul, however, is not to be explained from such mixture of the Elements. -It is not the inseparable Form of the body, but is accidental to it. From the Giver -of Forms, that is—from the Active Spirit over us, every Body receives its own Soul, -which is adapted to it and to it alone. From its very beginning each Soul is an individual -substance, and it developes increasing individuality throughout its life in the body. -It must be admitted that this does not agree <span class="pageNum" id="pb140">[<a href="#pb140">140</a>]</span>with the contention that Matter is the principle of individuality. But the Soul is -the “infant prodigy” of our philosopher. He is not a credulous man, and he often cautions -us against too ready an acceptance of mysteries in the life of the Soul; but still -he has the art himself of relating many things about the numerous wonderful powers -and possible influences of the Soul, as it wanders along the highly intricate pathways -of life, and crosses the abysses of Being and Not-Being. -</p> -<p>The speculative faculties are the choicest of all the powers of the Soul. Acquaintance -with the world is conveyed to the rational soul by the External and Internal Senses. -In particular a full account is given by Ibn Sina of his theory of the Internal Senses, -or the sensuous-spiritual faculties of representation, which have their seat in the -brain. -</p> -<p>Medical Philosophers commonly assumed three Internal Senses or stages of the representative -process: 1. Gathering the several sense-perceptions into one collective image in the -fore part of the brain; 2. Transforming or remodelling this representation of the -general Sense, with the help of representations already existing, thus constituting -apperception proper, in the middle region; 3. Storing up the ‘apperceived’ representation -in the Memory, which was held to reside in the hinder part of the brain. Ibn Sina, -however, carries the analysis somewhat farther. He distinguishes in the anterior portion -of the brain the Memory of the Sensible,—or the treasure-house of the collective images,—from -the General or Co-ordinating Sense. Farther, he makes out Apperception,—the function -of the middle region of the brain,—to be in part brought about unconsciously, <span class="pageNum" id="pb141">[<a href="#pb141">141</a>]</span>under the influence of the sensible and appetent life, as is the case also with the -lower animals, and, on the other hand, to take place in part consciously, with the -co-operation of the Reason. In the first case the representation preserves its reference -to the individual thing,—thus the sheep knows the hostility of the wolf,—but in the -second case, the representation is extended to the Universal. Then, in the hinder -part of the brain, the Representative Memory, or store-house of the representations -formed by combined Sensuous Impression and Rational Reflection, follows as a fifth -power. In this way five Internal Senses<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e3655src" href="#xd31e3655">4</a> correspond to the five External Senses, although with quite another reference than -the five Internal Senses of the Faithful Brethren. The question which is raised—as -to whether one should farther separate Recollection, as a special faculty, from Memory,—remains -unanswered. -</p> -<p id="p4.4.6">6. At the apex of the intellectual powers of the Soul stands the Reason. There is -indeed a Practical Reason also, but in its action we have been only multiplying ourselves -mediately: On the other hand, in Self-Consciousness, or the pure recognition of our -essential nature, the unity of our Reason is directly exhibited. But instead of keeping -down the lower powers of the Soul, the Reason lifts them up, refining Sense-Perception, -and generalizing Presentation. Reason, which at first is a mere capacity for Thought, -becomes elaborated gradually,—in that Material which <span class="pageNum" id="pb142">[<a href="#pb142">142</a>]</span>is conveyed to it by the external and internal senses,—into a finished readiness in -Thought. Through exercise the capability becomes reality. This comes about through -the instrumentality of experience, but under guidance and enlightenment from above,—from -the ‘Giver of the Forms’, who as Active Spirit imparts the Ideas to the Reason. The -Soul of man, however, does not possess any memory for the pure ideas of Reason, for -memory always presupposes a corporeal substratum. As often then as the Rational Soul -comes to know anything, that knowledge flows to it on each occasion from above; and -thinking Souls do not differ in the range and contents of their knowledge, but in -the readiness with which they put themselves in communication with the Spirit over -us, in order to receive their knowledge. -</p> -<p>The Rational Soul, which rules over that which is under it, and comes to know the -higher by means of the enlightenment given by the World-Spirit, is then the real Man,—brought -into existence, but as unmixed essence, as individual substance, indestructible, immortal. -On this point the clearness of Ibn Sina’s teaching marks it off from that of Farabi; -and, since his time, the assumption of the individual immortality of the human Souls, -which have come into being, is regarded in the East as Aristotelian, and the opposite -doctrine as Platonic. Thus a better understanding prevails between his philosophy -and the accepted religion. The human body and the whole world of sense furnish the -Soul with a school for its training. But after the death of the body, which puts an -end to this body for ever, the Soul continues to exist in a more or less close connection -with the World-Spirit. In this union with the <span class="pageNum" id="pb143">[<a href="#pb143">143</a>]</span>Spirit over us,—which is not to be conceived as a complete unification,—the blessedness -of the good, ‘knowing’ souls consists. The lot of the others is eternal misery; for -just as bodily defects lead to disease, so punishment is the necessary consequence -of an evil condition of Soul. In the same way too, the rewards of Heaven are apportioned -according to the degree of soundness or rationality which the Soul has attained in -its life on earth. The pure Soul is comforted amidst the sufferings of Time by its -prospect of Eternity. -</p> -<p>The highest is of course, reached only by a few; for on the pinnacle of Truth there -is no room for the many; but one presses forward after another, to reach the source -of the knowledge of God, welling forth on its lonely height. -</p> -<p id="p4.4.7">7. To express his view of the Human Reason, Ibn Sina employs and explains poetical -traditions,—a favourite proceeding in the Persian literature. First and foremost our -interest is awakened by the allegorical figure of Hai ibn Yaqzan. It represents the -ascent of the Spirit out of the Elements, and through the realms of Nature, of the -Souls, and of the Spirits, up to the throne of the Eternal One. Hai presents himself -to the philosopher in the form of an old man with an air of youth about him, and offers -his services as guide. The wanderer has been striving to reach a knowledge of Earth -and Heaven, by means of his outer and inner senses. Two ways open out before him, -one to the West, the way of the Material and the Evil, the other to the Rising Sun, -the way of Spiritual and ever-pure Forms; and along that way Hai now conducts him. -Together they reach the well of Divine wisdom, the fountain of everlasting youth, -where beauty is the curtain of beauty, and light the veil of light,—the Eternal Mystery. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb144">[<a href="#pb144">144</a>]</span></p> -<p>Hai ibn Yaqzan is thus the guide of individual, thinking Souls: he is the Eternal -Spirit who is over mankind, and operates in them. -</p> -<p>A similar meaning is found by our philosopher in the frequently remodelled late-Greek -legend of the brothers Salaman and Absal. Salaman is the World-Man, whose wife (<i>i.e.</i>, the World of the Senses) falls in love with Absal, and contrives by a stratagem -to wile him into her arms. But before the decisive moment, a flash of lightning comes -down from heaven, and reveals to Absal the wantonness of the action which he had nearly -committed, and raises him from the world of sensual enjoyment to that of pure spiritual -contemplation. -</p> -<p>In another passage the soul of the philosopher is compared to a bird, which with great -trouble escapes from the snares of the earth, traversing space in its flight, until -the Angel of Death delivers it from the last of its fetters. -</p> -<p>That is Ibn Sina’s Mysticism. His soul has needs, for which his medicine-chest provides -no resource, and which the life of a court cannot satisfy. -</p> -<p id="p4.4.8">8. The theoretical development of Ethics and Politics may be left to the teachers -of the ‘<i>fiqh</i>’. Our philosopher feels himself on the level of a inspired person, exalted like a -God <span class="corr" id="xd31e3684" title="Source: abone">above</span> all human laws. Religious or Civil Law is binding only on the Many. Mohammed’s object -was, to civilize the Bedouins; and, in order to aid in accomplishing that object, -he preached, among other doctrines, that of the Resurrection of the Body. They would -never have understood the meaning of purely spiritual blessedness; and so he had to -educate them by setting before them the prospect of bodily pleasure or pain. As for -the Ascetics,—notwithstanding <span class="pageNum" id="pb145">[<a href="#pb145">145</a>]</span>their willingness to renounce entirely the world and the senses,—they chime in with -this sensuous multitude (whose worship of God consists in the observance of outward -forms), in respect that they practise their works of piety with an eye to a reward -also, even though it be a heavenly one. Higher than the many or the pious stand those -who truly worship God in spiritual love, entertaining neither hope nor fear. Their -peculiar possession is Freedom of the Spirit. -</p> -<p>But this secret should not be revealed to the multitude; and the philosopher confides -it only to his favourite pupils. -</p> -<p id="p4.4.9">9. In the course of his travels Ibn Sina met with many of the learned men of his time; -but it would appear that these interviews did not give rise to any enduring intimacies. -Just as he feels indebted to Farabi alone, of all those who preceded him, so the only -persons of his own day, whom he sees fit to thank, are the princes who patronized -him. He criticized unfavourably Ibn Maskawaih (v. <a href="#s4.3">IV, 3</a>), whom he met with still more frequently. With Beruni, his superior in research, -he conducted a correspondence, but it was soon broken off. -</p> -<p>Beruni (973–1048) deserves a short notice here, to illustrate the character of the -time, although Kindi and Masudi have a better claim to be called his masters, than -Farabi and the younger Ibn Sina. He was particularly occupied in the study of Mathematics, -Astronomy, Geography and Ethnology; and he was a keen observer and a good critic. -For many a solution of his difficulties, however, he was indebted to Philosophy; and -he continually bestowed attention upon it, as one of the phenomena of civilization. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb146">[<a href="#pb146">146</a>]</span></p> -<p>Beruni brings into striking prominence the harmony which exists between the Pythagorean-Platonic -philosophy, Indian wisdom, and many of the Sufi views. No less striking is his recognition -of the superiority of Greek Science, when compared with the attempts and performances -of the Arabs and the Indians. ‘India’, he says, ‘not to mention Arabia, has produced -no Socrates: there no logical method has expelled phantasy from science’. But yet -he is ready to do justice to individual Indians, and he quotes with approval the following, -as the teaching of the adherents of Aryabhata: “It is enough for us to know that which -is lighted up by the sun’s rays. Whatever lies beyond, though it should be of immeasurable -extent, we cannot make use of; for what the sunbeam does not reach, the senses do -not perceive, and what the senses do not perceive, we cannot know”. -</p> -<p>From this we may gather what Beruni’s philosophy was: Only sense-perceptions, knit -together by a logical intelligence, yield sure knowledge; <span class="corr" id="xd31e3701" title="Source: And">and</span> for the uses of life we need a practical philosophy, which enables us to distinguish -friend from foe. He doubtless did not himself imagine that he had said all that could -be said on the subject. -</p> -<p id="p4.4.10">10. From the school of Ibn Sina, we have had more names handed down, than we have -had writings preserved. Djuzdjani annexes to his Autobiography an account of the life -of the master. And, farther, we have one or two short metaphysical treatises by Abu-l-Hasan -Behmenyar ibn al-Marzuban, which are nearly in complete agreement with the system -of his teacher. But Matter appears to lose somewhat of its substantiality: as Possibility -of Existence it becomes a relation of thought. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb147">[<a href="#pb147">147</a>]</span></p> -<p>According to Behmenyar, God is the pure, uncaused Unity of Necessary Existence,—not -the living, all-producing Creator. True enough, He is the cause of the world, but -the effect is given necessarily and synchronously with the cause; otherwise the cause -would not be perfect, being capable of change. Essentially, though not in point of -time, the existence of God precedes that of the world. Three predicates thus pertain -to the highest existence, viz<span class="corr" id="xd31e3710" title="Not in source">.</span>, that it is (1) essentially first, (2) self-sufficing, and (3) necessary. In other -words God’s essential nature is the Necessity of his Existence. All that can possibly -be,—owes its existence to this Absolutely Necessary Being. -</p> -<p>Now that is quite in harmony with the doctrines of Ibn Sina; and the same is the case -with the disciple’s scheme of the world and his doctrine of Souls. Whatever has once -attained to full reality,—the various Sphere-Spirits according to their kind, Primeval -Matter, and the individually different Souls of Men,—all lasts for ever. Nothing that -is completely real can pass away, inasmuch as the completely real has nothing to do -with mere possibility. -</p> -<p>The characteristic of all that is spiritual is its knowledge of its own essential -nature. Will is nothing else, in Behmenyar’s opinion, than the knowledge of that which -is the necessary outcome of that nature. Farther, the life and the joy of rational -souls consist in self-knowledge. -</p> -<p id="p4.4.11">11. Ibn Sina achieved a far-reaching influence. His Canon of Medicine was highly esteemed -even in the West, from the 13<sup>th</sup> century to the 16<sup>th</sup>, and it is still the authority for medical treatment among the Persians of the present -day. On Christian Scholasticism his influence was important. <span class="pageNum" id="pb148">[<a href="#pb148">148</a>]</span>Dante placed him between Hippocrates and Galen; and Scaliger maintained that he was -Galen’s equal in Medicine, and much his superior in Philosophy. -</p> -<p>For the East he stood and yet stands as the Prince of Philosophy. In that region Neo-Platonic -Aristotelianism continues to be known under the form which was given it by Ibn Sina. -Manuscripts of his works abound,—an evidence of his popularity,—while commentaries -on his writings, and epitomes of them, are countless. He was studied by physicians -and statesmen, and even by theologians: It was only a few who went farther back and -consulted his sources. -</p> -<p>From the very first, of course, he had many enemies, and they were more noisy in their -demonstrations than his friends. Poets cursed him: theologians either chimed in with -him, or tried to refute him. And in Bagdad in the year 1150, the Caliph Mustandjid -consigned to the flames Ibn Sina’s writings, as part of a certain judge’s philosophical -library. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s4.5" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1519">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">5.</span> <span class="sc">Ibn al-Haitham.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p4.5.1" class="first">1. After the days of Ibn Sina and his school, little more attention was paid to the -cultivation of Speculative Philosophy in the Eastern regions of the Muslim empire. -In these lands Arabic was forced more and more to yield to Persian, both in life and -in literature. That the Persian tongue is not so well adapted for abstract logical -and metaphysical discussion—might be only of quite secondary importance, in connection -with this decline in speculation; but the conditions of civilization, and with them -the subjects which interested men, were sadly changed. <span class="pageNum" id="pb149">[<a href="#pb149">149</a>]</span>Ethics and Politics came more to the front, although without assuming an actually -new form. But in the later Persian literature the predominant place was unmistakeably -held by Poetry, partly of a free-thinking tendency, partly, and indeed preponderatingly, -of a mystic kind, which satisfied the need for wisdom, experienced by people of culture. -</p> -<p>From about the middle of the 10<sup>th</sup> century, the scientific movement which originated at Bagdad had in part turned westward. -We have already found Farabi in Syria, and Masudi in Egypt: In the latter country -Cairo was becoming a second Bagdad. -</p> -<p id="p4.5.2">2. In Cairo, at the beginning of the 11<sup>th</sup> century, we come upon one of the most considerable mathematicians and physicists -in all the Middle Ages, Abu Ali Mohammed ibn al-Hasan ibn al-Haitham (<i>Alhazen</i>). He had formerly been a government-official in Basra, his native town. Confiding -too much in the practical value of his mathematical knowledge, he imagined that he -could regulate the inundations of the Nile; but having been summoned on that account -by the Caliph al-Hakim, he became aware, soon after his arrival, of the futility of -his efforts. Thereupon he fell into disgrace as a public official, and went into hiding -till the Caliph’s death, in 1021. From that time he devoted himself to literary and -scientific work, up to his own death, in 1038. -</p> -<p>His chief strength is shown in mathematics and its practical application; but he also -devoted great attention to the writings of Galen and Aristotle, nor did he confine -that attention to the physical treatises. By his own confession he had, in a spirit -of doubt about everything, been <span class="pageNum" id="pb150">[<a href="#pb150">150</a>]</span>engaged, from his youth up, in considering the various views and doctrines of men, -until he came to recognize in all of them more or less successful attempts to approximate -to the truth. Moreover truth for him was only that which was presented as material -for the faculties of sense-perception, and which received its form from the understanding, -being thus the logically-elaborated perception. To seek such truth was his aim in -the study of philosophy. In his view philosophy should be the basis of all the sciences. -He found it in the writings of Aristotle, inasmuch as that sage had best understood -how to knit sense-perception into a coherent whole with rational knowledge. With eagerness -therefore he studied and illustrated Aristotle’s works, for the use and profit of -mankind, as well as to exercise his own intellect and provide a treasure and consolation -for his old age. Of these labours, however, nothing seems to have been preserved for -us. -</p> -<p>The most important of Ibn al-Haitham’s writings is the “Optics”, which has come down -to us in a Latin translation and redaction. In it he shows himself to be an acute -mathematical thinker, always taking pains with the analysis of hypotheses and of the -actual examples. A Western, belonging to the 13<sup>th</sup> century (Vitello), was able to give a more methodical account of the whole subject; -but yet in keenness of observation on specific points, Ibn al-Haitham may be reckoned -his superior. -</p> -<p id="p4.5.3">3. Ibn al-Haitham’s thinking is expressed in quite a mathematical style. The Substance -of a body consists, according to him, of the sum of its essential attributes, just -as a whole is equal to the sum of its parts, and a concept to the sum of its marks. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb151">[<a href="#pb151">151</a>]</span></p> -<p>In the “Optics” the psychological remarks on Seeing and on Sense-Perception in general—are -of special interest for us. Here he exerts himself to separate the individual Moments -of the Perception, and to give prominence to the condition of Time as characterizing -the whole process. -</p> -<p>Perception then is a compound process, arising out of (1) sensation, (2) comparison -of several sensations or of the present sensation with the memory-image which has -been gradually formed in the soul as a result of earlier sensations, and (3) recognition, -in such fashion that we recognize the present percept as equivalent to the memory-image. -Comparison and recognition are not activities of the Senses, which merely receive -impressions passively, but they devolve upon the Understanding as the faculty of judgment. -Ordinarily the whole process goes forward unconsciously or semi-consciously, and it -is only through reflection that it is brought within our consciousness, and that the -apparently simplex is separated into its component parts. -</p> -<p>The process of Perception is gone through very quickly. The more practice a man has -in this respect, and the oftener a perception is repeated, the more firmly is the -memory-image stamped upon the soul, and the more rapidly is recognition or perception -effected. The cause of this is that the new sensation is supplemented by the image -which is already present in the soul. One might thus be disposed to think that Perception -was an instantaneous act, at least after long practice. That, however, would be erroneous, -for not only is every sensation attended by a corresponding change localized in the -sense-organ, which demands a certain time, but also, between the stimulation of the -organ and the consciousness of the perception <span class="pageNum" id="pb152">[<a href="#pb152">152</a>]</span>an interval of time must elapse, corresponding to the transmission of the stimulus -for some distance along the nerves. That it needs time, for example, to perceive a -colour, is proved by the rotating circle of colours, which shows us merely a mixed -colour, because on account of the rapid movement we have no time to perceive the individual -colours. -</p> -<p>Comparison and Recognition are, according to Ibn al-Haitham, the significant Mental -Moments of Perception. On the other hand Sensation tallies with the Material; and -the Sense experiencing the sensation exhibits a passive attitude. Properly all sensation -is in itself a kind of discomfort, which ordinarily does not make itself felt, but -which emerges into consciousness under very strong stimuli, for example, through too -bright a light. A pleasurable character accrues only to the completed perception, -that is to the recognition which lifts the material given in sensation, up to the -mental form. -</p> -<p>The comparison and recognition, which are put in operation in Perception, constitute -an unconscious judgment and conclusion. The child is already drawing a conclusion, -when of two apples he chooses the finer one. As often as we comprehend a connection, -we are concluding. But, since judging and concluding are quickly settled, men are -easily misled in this matter, and frequently they regard as an original concept that -which is merely a judgment derived by a process of ratiocination. In the case of everything -which is announced to us as an axiom, we should be on our guard and trace it up, to -see whether it cannot be derived from something more simple. -</p> -<p id="p4.5.4">4<span class="corr" id="xd31e3772" title="Source: ,">.</span> This appeal of our philosopher had little effect in the <span class="pageNum" id="pb153">[<a href="#pb153">153</a>]</span>East. It is true that in Mathematics and Astronomy he created somewhat of a school; -but his Aristotelian philosophy had comparatively few admirers. We know only one of -his scholars who is counted among the Philosophers, Abu-l-Wafa Mubasshir ibn Fatik -al-Qaid, an Egyptian emir, who in the year 1053 produced a work made up of proverbial -wisdom, anecdotes in illustration of the history of philosophy, and so on. Hardly -anything can be traced in it which is the result of his own thinking. It should have -been pleasant reading. And the inhabitants of Cairo in after times found edification,—more -even than in such a work,—in the tales of the Thousand and One Nights. -</p> -<p>The East set the stigma of heresy upon Ibn al-Haitham and his works, and now it has -almost completely forgotten him. A disciple of Maimonides, the Jewish philosopher, -relates that he was in Bagdad on business, when the library of a certain philosopher, -(who died in 1214) was burned there. The preacher, who conducted the execution of -the sentence, threw into the flames, with his own hands, an astronomical work of Ibn -al-Haitham, after he had pointed to a delineation therein given of the sphere of the -earth, as an unhappy symbol of impious Atheism. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb154">[<a href="#pb154">154</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div class="footnotes"> -<hr class="fnsep"> -<div class="footnote-body"> -<div id="xd31e3249"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e3249src">1</a></span> Cf. my Article “On Kindi and his School” in Stein’s ‘<span lang="de">Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie XIII</span>’, p. 153 <i>sqq.</i>, from which I have taken over, without much alteration, not a little that appears -in this chapter. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e3249src" title="Return to note 1 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e3279"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e3279src">2</a></span> [<i>Translator’s note.</i>—The Bagdad Caliphate lasted up to the death of Mustassim (A.H. 656 or A.D. 1258), -<i>i.e.</i> for 400 Mohammedan years after A.H. 256 or A.D. 870]. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e3279src" title="Return to note 2 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e3321"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e3321src">3</a></span> The Arabic <i>ʻaql</i> (<span class="trans" title="nous"><span lang="grc" class="grek">νοῦς</span></span>) is usually translated by Reason and Intelligence (Lat. <i lang="la">intellectus</i> and <i lang="la">intelligentia</i>). I prefer however the rendering, <span lang="de">Geist</span>, Spirit or Mind, because the expression includes God and the pure (separate) spirits -of the spheres. Moreover it is hard to decide how far the personification of Reason -was carried by individual thinkers. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e3321src" title="Return to note 3 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -<div id="xd31e3655"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e3655src">4</a></span> [<i>Translator’s note.</i>—Accordingly Ibn Sina’s Five Internal Senses are: A. The General or Co-ordinating -Sense; 2. Memory of the Collective sense-images; 3. Unconscious Apperception, referring -to individuals; 4. Conscious Apperception, with generalization; 5. Memory of the higher -apperceptions]. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e3655src" title="Return to note 4 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div id="ch5" class="div1 chapter"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1576">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h2 class="main"><span class="divNum">V.</span> THE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE EAST.</h2> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<div id="s5.1" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1586">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">1.</span> <span class="sc">Gazali.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p5.1.1" class="first">1. We have already seen that the theological movement in Islam was strongly influenced -by Philosophy. Not only the Mutazilite, but also the Antimutazilite Dialectic drew -its opinions and the arguments with which it supported its own teaching or disputed -that of its opponents, for the most part out of the writings of the philosophers. -Out of these one took just what he was able to make use of: the rest he left in peace, -or else he endeavoured to refute it. Thus numerous writings came into existence, directed -against some particular philosophical doctrine, or some individual philosopher. No -attempt, however, had been made before the time of Gazali, to direct an attack from -general points of view and after thorough-going study, against the entire system of -Philosophy which had been built up in the East on a Greek foundation. -</p> -<p>Gazali’s undertaking had also a positive side. Along with the Dialectic which sought -to make the doctrines of the Faith intelligible, or even to provide them with a rational -basis, there were movements in Islam of a mysticism which tended to a conception of -dogma, profound and full of feeling. Its wish was, not to comprehend or <span class="pageNum" id="pb155">[<a href="#pb155">155</a>]</span>demonstrate the contents of the Faith, but to learn them by experience and live in -them through the Spirit. The highest certitude ought to belong to the Faith. Ought -it then to be in the power of any to transform it into a derived knowledge? Or must -its tenets be principles of the Reason, neither capable of farther proof, nor requiring -it? But the fundamental principles of the Reason, when once they are known, must be -universally recognized; and universal recognition is lacking in the case of the tenets -of the Faith. From what other source does unbelief arise? Thus the questioning proceeded; -and it seemed to many that the only way out of these doubts was to base religious -doctrine upon an inner, supra-rational illumination. At first this came about unconsciously, -under a mystic impulse, whereby the contents of moral and religious teaching were -often brought into neglect. Gazali took part in this movement also. That which had -perhaps been typified by the Salimites and Karramites, Antimutazilite sects, he set -forth completely and in a dignified style; and ever since his time Mysticism both -sustains and crowns the Temple of Learning in Orthodox Islam. -</p> -<p id="p5.1.2">2. The story of this man’s life is a remarkable one; and, in order to understand the -effectiveness of his work, it is absolutely essential to examine it with a measure -of detail. He was born at Tos in Khorasan in the year 1059, being thus a countryman -of the great poet Firdausi. And just as the latter furnishes a proof of the old glory -of the Persian nation, so Gazali was destined to be a “testimony and ornament” for -all future Islam. Even his early education,—obtained after his father’s death, in -the house of a Sufi friend,—was rather cosmopolitan than national <span class="pageNum" id="pb156">[<a href="#pb156">156</a>]</span>in its direction. Farther, any limitation was displeasing to the youth’s restless -and fanciful spirit. He did not feel at home in the hair-splitting casuistry of the -teachers of Morals with their precise formulas: he regarded it as a worldly knowledge, -from which he turned away, to immerse his spirit in the knowledge of Allah. Then he -studied theology in Nishabur with the Imām al-Haramain, who died in 1085; and at the -same time he may himself have begun to write and to teach, and, perhaps even thus -early, to entertain doubts of his own science. Thereafter he was in attendance at -the court of Nizam al-Mulk, the Vizir of the Seldjuk prince, until in 1091 he was -appointed a Professor in Bagdad. It was during this time at all events that he busied -himself most with philosophy. But it was not pure love for the science, which impelled -him to that study, but the longing of his heart to find a solution of the doubts which -assailed his understanding. Not any explanation of the events of the world, nor any -clearing up of his own thinking, but peace of mind and the experience of a higher -reality constituted the object which he strove to reach. He subjected to a thorough -study the writings of the philosophers, in particular those of Farabi and Ibn Sina; -and, following chiefly the system of the latter, he composed a Compendium of Philosophy, -regarding it objectively, but still with some appearance of sympathy with its contents. -He said,—at first in a kind of whisper to pacify his own mind, but afterwards publicly -in self-defence,—that he composed that work in order that he might follow up the statement -of the doctrines of philosophy with the refutation of the same. And that refutation -did appear, probably not long after. It was the famous <span class="pageNum" id="pb157">[<a href="#pb157">157</a>]</span>“Destruction of the Philosophers”,—which was composed in all likelihood while he was -still in Bagdad, or shortly after he had left it. -</p> -<p>But by the end of four years, viz<span class="corr" id="xd31e3807" title="Not in source">.</span> in 1095, Gazali had discontinued his work of teaching in Bagdad, attended though -it had been with outward success. His mind, continually in a state of doubt, probably -found no satisfaction in dogmatic prelections. He was alternately attracted and repelled -by his own brilliant position, and he came to think that he could, and that he should, -fight against the world and its wisdom in some other way, to more purpose. Ambition -with him embraced far more than this world. Profounder still his musings became; and -during an illness of his, the inner call presented itself to his soul. He had secretly -to prepare for the work, by means of Sufi exercises,—perhaps even to assume the character -of a religious and political reformer. At the very time that the Crusaders were equipping -themselves in the West against Islam, Gazali was preparing himself to be the spiritual -champion of the Muslim faith. His conversion was not of a violent character, like -that of St. Augustine, but was rather to be compared to the experience of St. Jerome, -who was summoned in a dream from his Ciceronian predilections to practical Christianity. -</p> -<p>For ten years Gazali travelled here and there, dividing his time between pious exercises -and literary work. In the first part of that period it may be conjectured that he -wrote his principal theologico-ethical work, “The Revival of Religious Sciences”: -towards the end he endeavoured to exercise influence as a reformer. His journeyings -led him by way of Damascus and Jerusalem—before it was taken <span class="pageNum" id="pb158">[<a href="#pb158">158</a>]</span>by the Crusaders,—Alexandria, Mecca and Medina, back to his home. -</p> -<p>After his return Gazali once more engaged in teaching for a short time in Nishabur; -and he died in Tos, his native town, on the 19<sup>th</sup> of December, 1111. His closing years were chiefly devoted to pious contemplation -and the study of the Traditions, which as a youth he could never remember. A beautifully -complete and rounded life, in which the end comes back to the beginning! -</p> -<p id="p5.1.3">3. Gazali passes in review the spiritual tendencies of his time. These are: the Dialectic -of the Theologians; Sufi Mysticism; Pythagorean Popular Philosophy; and Neo-Platonic -Aristotelianism. That which Dialectic desires to establish is also the object of his -own faith; but its arguments appear to him rather weak, and many of its assertions -on that account open to question. He feels most in sympathy with the Sufi Mysticism: -to it he owes his dearest possession, viz<span class="corr" id="xd31e3820" title="Not in source">.</span>, the establishment of his own faith in Personality,—so that he can postulate as an -inner experience that which the Dialecticians attempt to derive by a process of reasoning. -He thanks also the Popular Philosophy for the instruction it gives, particularly in -Mathematics, which he fully recognizes as a science, together with its Astronomical -deductions. He concedes the validity of its Physics, where that is not in conflict -with the Faith. But Aristotelianism,—as it has been taught by Farabi and Ibn Sina, -with as much subservience to authority as has been exhibited by the Theologians,—seems -to him to be the enemy of Islam; and in the name of all the Muslim schools and tendencies -of thought together, he feels bound to do battle with it, as from a <span class="pageNum" id="pb159">[<a href="#pb159">159</a>]</span>catholic standpoint. And in truth he does this with Aristotle’s own weapons,—those -of Logic; for the axioms of thought which Logic lays down are, in his eyes, just as -firmly established as the propositions of Mathematics. Fully alive to this, he starts -from the Principle of Contradiction, to which, according to his contention, God himself -submits. Of the Physico-Metaphysical doctrines of Philosophy then, he attacks three -in particular: 1. That the world is eternal; 2. That God takes cognizance only of -the Universal, and that consequently there is no special providence; 3. That the Soul -alone is immortal, and therefore a Resurrection of the Body is not to be looked for. -In the refutation of these doctrines Gazali is in many respects dependent on the Christian -commentator on Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus, who also has written against the doctrine -of the eternity of the world maintained by Proclus. -</p> -<p id="p5.1.4">4. (1) The world, according to the philosophers, is a sphere of finite extent but -of infinite duration. From all eternity, it proceeds from God, even as the effect -is in existence at the same time with the cause. Gazali, on the contrary, is of opinion -that it is not admissible to put such different constructions on the notions of Space -and Time respectively; and he holds that the Divine Causality should be defined as -free Creative Might. -</p> -<p>First then as to Space and Time: we are as little able to imagine an outermost boundary -of Space as a beginning or end of Time. He who believes in an endless Time, must, -in consistency with that notion of his, assume also the existence of an infinite Space. -To say that Space answers to the external sense, and Time on the other hand to the -internal,—does not alter the case, for we <span class="pageNum" id="pb160">[<a href="#pb160">160</a>]</span>do not after all get rid of the Sensible. Just as Space bears a relation to Body, -so does Time to the movement of Body. Both are merely relations of things, created -in and with the things of the world, or rather relations between our conceptions, -which God creates in us. -</p> -<p>Still more important is that which Gazali advances about Causality. The Philosophers -distinguish between an operation of God, of Spiritual Beings endowed with will, of -the Soul, of Nature, of Chance and the like; but for Gazali, just as for the orthodox -Kalam, there is really only one causality, that of the ‘Willing’ Being. He completely -puts aside the causality of Nature, which is reducible without remainder into a relation -of Time. We see one definite phenomenon (Cause) regularly succeeded by another definite -phenomenon (Effect); but how the latter results from the former is left an enigma -for us. Of operation in the objects of Nature we know nothing. Farther, any alteration -is in itself inconceivable. That any one thing should become a different thing is -incomprehensible to thought, which may just as well ask about facts as about causes. -A thing either exists, or it does not exist; but not even Divine Omnipotence can transform -one existing thing into another thing. It creates or else annihilates. -</p> -<p>And yet it is a fact of our consciousness that we do effect something. If we ‘will’ -anything, and possess the power to carry it out, we claim the result as our act. Action, -proceeding from a free will, and conscious of the exertion of power, is the only causality -of which we know; <span class="corr" id="xd31e3834" title="Source: aud">and</span> we argue from this to the Divine Being. But by what right? The warrant for such a -conclusion Gazali thinks that he finds in his own personal experience of the image -<span class="pageNum" id="pb161">[<a href="#pb161">161</a>]</span>of God in his soul; while on the other hand he declines to credit Nature with the -likeness to God which belongs to his own soul. -</p> -<p>For him accordingly, God, in so far as he can be known from the world, is the Almighty -Being, free in will and efficient in operation. No spatial limit may be set to his -causative activity, which yet the philosophers do, when they grant only his influence -in his first created work. But on the other hand He can limit his own work both in -Space and Time, so that this finite world has only a finite duration. That God should -call the world into existence out of nothing by an absolute act of creation—seems -to the Philosophers to be absurd. They recognize only an exchange of Accidents or -Forms in the one material, a passing of the actual from possibility to possibility. -But does nothing new ever come then into being? Is not every apprehension of the senses,—asks -Gazali,—and every spiritual perception, something entirely new, which either exists -or else does not exist, but at whose coming into existence the contrary does not cease, -and at whose vanishing from existence, the opposite does not make its appearance? -Consider farther the numerous individual souls which, according to Ibn Sina’s system, -must be in existence: have not these come into being, absolutely new? -</p> -<p>There is no end to the putting of questions. The representative process wanders about -in all directions and far; and thought leads us on <i>ad infinitum</i>. The chain of causation can nowhere be brought to an end, any more than Space or -Time. In order then that there should be a definite, final Existence,—and in postulating -this, Gazali <span class="pageNum" id="pb162">[<a href="#pb162">162</a>]</span>is at one with the Philosophers—, we need an Eternal Will as First Cause, different -from everything else. -</p> -<p>We may at all events make this acknowledgement to Gazali, that Ibn Sina’s fantastic -doctrine of Forms and Souls makes no stand against his criticism. -</p> -<p id="p5.1.5">5. (2) We have now come to the idea of God. In the view of the Philosophers, God is -the highest Being, and his essence is Thought. That which He knows, comes into existence, -emanating from his abundance; but he has not positively ‘willed’ it, for all Willing -presupposes a deficiency,—a need—, and is conditioned by some change in the Being -that wills. Willing is movement in the material: completely real Spirit wills nothing. -Therefore God beholds his creation in a contemplation which is undisturbed by any -wish. He recognizes himself, or even his first Creature, or, according to Ibn Sina, -the Universal, the eternal Genera and Species of all things. -</p> -<p>But according to Gazali there must eternally belong to God a Will, as one of his eternal -attributes. In a conventional way he grants, it is true, that in metaphysical and -ethical considerations knowing precedes willing, but he is convinced that unity of -Being does not more reside in knowing than in willing. Not only the multiplicity of -the objects of knowledge, and their different relations to the knowing Subject, but -even Self-Consciousness, or knowing about the knowing, considered <i>per se</i>, is an endless process. An act of will is absolutely necessary to bring it to a conclusion. -In directing the attention and in self-communing an original “Willing” is in operation; -and thus even Divine knowledge comes to a conclusion as a coherent unity, in its Personality, -by means of an original eternal Will. In <span class="pageNum" id="pb163">[<a href="#pb163">163</a>]</span>place of the assertion of the Philosophers that God wills the world, because he thinks -of it as the best, Gazali substitutes the statement: “God has cognizance of the world -because he wills it and in his willing it”. -</p> -<p>Must not then He, who wills and creates all, have cognizance of his work down to the -smallest part of its material? Just as his eternal will is the cause of all individual -things, so his eternal knowledge embraces at one and the same time every particular -thing, without the unity of his nature being thereby taken away. There is consequently -a Providence. -</p> -<p>To the objection that Divine Providence makes every particular event a necessary event, -Gazali, like St. Augustine, replies that this fore-knowledge is not distinguishable -from knowledge in memory,—that is to say, that God’s knowledge is exalted above every -distinction of time. -</p> -<p>It may be questioned whether, in order to save the eternal, almighty, creative Will, -Gazali has not sacrificed to that absolute might both the temporary character of the -world, which he would like to prove, and the freedom of human action, from which he -sets out, and which he would not altogether surrender. This world of shadows and images, -as he calls it, vanishes for the sake of God. -</p> -<p id="p5.1.6">6. (3) The third question, with regard to which Gazali separates himself from the -Philosophers, has less philosophic interest. It refers to the Resurrection of the -Body. According to the Philosophers it is only the Soul that is immortal, either in -its individuality or as a part of the World-Soul: The Body on the other hand is perishable. -Against this Dualism, which in theory led to an ascetic Ethics, but which in practice -was easily converted into <span class="pageNum" id="pb164">[<a href="#pb164">164</a>]</span>Libertinism, the religious and moral feeling of Gazali rose in rebellion. If the flesh -is to have its obligations, it must in turn be invested with its rights. The possibility -of the Resurrection cannot be denied, for the reunion of the Soul with its (new) bodily -frame is not more wonderful than its first union with the earthly body, which has -been assumed even by the Philosophers. Surely then every soul at the resurrection-time -may obtain a new body suited to it. But in any case Man’s real essence is the Soul; -and it is of little consequence what the material is, out of which its heavenly body -is formed. -</p> -<p id="p5.1.7">7. Even from these last propositions it is clear that Gazali’s theology did not remain -unaffected by philosophical speculation. Like the Fathers of the Western Church, he -had, whether consciously or unconsciously, appropriated a good deal from philosophy; -and for that reason his theology was long proscribed as a heretical innovation by -the Muslims of the West. In reality his teaching regarding God, the World, and the -human Soul exhibits many elements which are foreign to the oldest type of Islam, and -which may be traced back,—partly through the intervening agency of Christian and Jewish -writers and partly through that of more recent Muslim authors,—to heathen wisdom. -</p> -<p>Allah, Lord of the Worlds, God of Mohammed, is for Gazali a living personality it -is true, but yet far less anthropomorphic than he appeared to simple Faith or in the -Antimutazilite dogma. The surest way of coming to know him must be to refuse to attribute -to him any of the properties of his creatures. But that does not mean that he <span class="corr" id="xd31e3867" title="Source: posssesses">possesses</span> no attributes: the very reverse is the case. The plurality of his qualities does -not prejudice the Unity <span class="pageNum" id="pb165">[<a href="#pb165">165</a>]</span>of his Being. Analogies are presented in the bodily world: A thing certainly cannot -be both black and white at the same time, but it may well be cold and also dry. Only, -if the qualities of men are attributed to God, they must be understood in another -and higher sense, for he is pure Spirit. Besides omniscience and omnipotence, pure -goodness and omnipresence belong to Him. By means of this omnipresence this world -and the next are brought in a manner nearer to one another than by the usual representation. -</p> -<p>The conception of God is thus spiritualized. But resurrection and the future life -are also regarded as being much more spiritual in character than the present life. -Such a conception is facilitated by the doctrine of the Gnostic Philosophy, that there -are three or four worlds. One above the other in regular order rise the Earthly and -Sensible World of Men, the World of Celestial Spirits, to which our Soul belongs, -the World of Supra-celestial Angels, and lastly God himself, as the World of purest -Light and most perfect Spirit. The pious and enlightened Soul ascends from the lower -world through the heavens till it is face to face with God, for it is of spiritual -nature and its resurrection-body is of celestial essence. -</p> -<p>In a manner corresponding to the different worlds and grades of Souls, men themselves -differ from one another. The man of sensuous nature must be content with the Koran -and Tradition: he should not venture beyond the letter of the Law. The study of duty -is his bread of life; philosophy would be a deadly poison to him. He who cannot swim -should not venture into the sea. -</p> -<p>However there are always people who go into the water for the purpose of learning -to swim. They want to elevate <span class="pageNum" id="pb166">[<a href="#pb166">166</a>]</span>their faith into knowledge, but in the process they may easily fall into doubt and -unbelief. For them, in Gazali’s opinion, a <span class="corr" id="xd31e3878" title="Source: usefal">useful</span> remedy may be found in the study of Doctrine and Polemics directed against Philosophy. -</p> -<p>Those, however, have reached the highest degree of human perfection, who, without -any laborious cogitation, experience in themselves by means of an inward and Divine -illumination the truth and the reality of the Spiritual World. Such are the prophets -and pious mystics, among whom Gazali himself may be reckoned. They see God in everything,—Him, -and Him alone—, and in Nature just as in the life of their own Soul; but they see -Him best in the Soul, for although it is not Divine it has at least a likeness to -the Divine. How altered now is every outward thing! That which seems to be in existence -outside of us, becomes a condition or a property of the Soul, which in the consciousness -of its union with God, advances to the highest bliss. All things then become one in -Love. The true service of God transcends fear of punishment and hope of reward, attaining -to Love of God in the Spirit. The perfect servant of God is raised above endurance -and thanksgiving,—which constitute the obligation of the pious wanderer upon the earth, -so long as he remains imperfect—, so that even in this world he loves and praises -God with joy of heart. -</p> -<p id="p5.1.8">8. From what has been said it follows that there are three stages of Belief or Certainty. -<i>First</i>, the belief of the multitude, who believe what some man worthy of belief declares -to them, for instance, that So-and-so is in the house; <i>secondly</i>, the knowledge of the learned, gained by deduction: they have heard So-and-so speaking, -<span class="pageNum" id="pb167">[<a href="#pb167">167</a>]</span>and conclude that he is in the house; but <i>thirdly</i> we have the immediate certainty of the ‘knowing’ ones, for they have entered the -house and seen the person with their own eyes. -</p> -<p>In contradistinction to the Dialecticians and Philosophers, Gazali everywhere lays -stress upon experience. The former, with their Universal Ideas, in the first place -fail to do justice to the multiplicity which attaches to this world of sense. The -sensible qualities of things,—even the number of the stars for example,—we come to -know only through experience, and not from pure Ideas. Much less, however, do such -Ideas exhaust the heights and depths of our inner being. That which the friend of -God knows intuitively, remains hidden for ever from the discursive intellect of the -learned. A very small number attain to this height of knowledge, where they meet with -the Apostles of God and Prophets of all times. It is the duty then of the Spirits -who stand at a lower level to strive to follow them. -</p> -<p>But now how are we to recognize the superior Spirit whom we need as our guide? That -is a question, on which every religiously-determined system, which cannot do without -human intermediaries, must founder, if considered purely in the light of the understanding. -Even Gazali’s answer is indecisive. This much is certain to him, that grounds furnished -by the reason alone cannot decide this question. The Prophet and Teacher who has been -actually inspired by God is recognized by merging ourselves in his peculiar personality, -through the experience of an inward relationship. The truth of Prophecy is authenticated -by the moral influence which it exercises upon the Soul. Of the truthfulness of God’s -word in the Koran we acquire a <span class="pageNum" id="pb168">[<a href="#pb168">168</a>]</span>moral, not a theoretical certainty. The detached miracle is not capable of convincing; -but the revelation as a whole, together with the personality of the Prophet, through -whom the revelation has been conveyed, produce an irresistible impression upon the -kindred soul. Then, wholly carried away by such impression, the soul renounces the -world, to walk in the way of God. -</p> -<p id="p5.1.9">9. Gazali is without doubt the most remarkable figure in all Islam. His doctrine is -the expression of his own personality. He abandoned the attempt to understand this -world. But the religious problem he comprehended much more profoundly than did the -philosophers of his time. These were intellectual in their methods, like their Greek -predecessors, and consequently regarded the doctrines of Religion as merely the products -of the conception or fancy or even caprice of the lawgiver. According to them Religion -was either blind obedience, or a kind of knowledge which contained truth of an inferior -order. -</p> -<p>On the other hand Gazali represents Religion as the experience of his inner Being. -It is for him more than Law and more than Doctrine: it is the Soul’s experience. -</p> -<p>It is not every one who has this experience of Gazali’s. But even those who cannot -follow him in his mystic flight, when he transcends the conditions of any possible -experience, will at least be constrained to acknowledge that his aberrations in searching -for the highest are not less important for the history of the Human Mind than the -apparently surer paths taken by the philosophers of his time, through a land which -others had discovered before them. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb169">[<a href="#pb169">169</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s5.2" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1690">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">2.</span> <span class="sc">The Epitomists.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p5.2.1" class="first">1. In a history of scholarly Education as conducted in the Muslim nations, this subject -would necessarily have a larger space assigned it: but here we shall dismiss it in -a few words. -</p> -<p>That Gazali has annihilated philosophy in the East, for all time to come, is an assertion -frequently repeated but wholly erroneous, and one which evidences neither historical -knowledge nor understanding. Philosophy in the East has since his day numbered its -teachers and students by hundreds and by thousands. The teachers of the Faith have -no more discontinued their dialectical arguments in support of Doctrine than the teachers -of Morals have abandoned their hair-splitting casuistry. General culture too has adopted -an element of philosophical learning. -</p> -<p>But it is true that Philosophy did not succeed in conquering for itself a commanding -position, or in retaining the consideration which it once enjoyed. According to an -Arab anecdote a Philosopher, who had been thrown into prison, on being asked what -he was fit for, by a man who wanted to purchase him as a slave, is said to have replied: -“For freedom”. Philosophy needs freedom. And where was this Freedom to be met with -in the East? Freedom from material cares, freedom to exemplify unprejudiced thinking, -tended continually to dwindle away from regions where no enlightened despots were -to be found, able to warrant and protect it. But that is just a symptom of the general -decay of civilization. And although travellers from the West in the twelfth century -praised highly the culture of the East, it had, in comparison with earlier times, -at least begun to decline. In no department <span class="pageNum" id="pb170">[<a href="#pb170">170</a>]</span>did they pass the mark which had been reached of old: Minds were now too weak to accomplish -such a feat. Literary production became stagnant, and the only merit which belongs -to the voluminous compilers of the following centuries is that of elegant selection. -Ethical and religious doctrine had ended in Mysticism; and the same was the case with -Philosophy. After the time of Ibn Sina, the Prince of Philosophy, no one felt called -upon to come forward with independent views. The day had come for Abridgements, Commentaries, -Glosses, and Glosses upon Glosses. The learned world occupied their time in school -with work of that nature, while the believing multitude placed themselves more and -more under the guidance of the Dervish orders. -</p> -<p id="p5.2.2">2. That which general education borrowed most from philosophical Propaedeutics was -a little Mathematics &c., naturally exceedingly elementary as a rule. By sectaries -and mystics a good deal was taken over from Pythagorean-Platonic wisdom. In particular -these doctrines had to be drawn upon in order to support the belief in saints and -miracles; and a barren syncretistic Theosophy was tricked out therewith. The system -even enrolled Aristotle among its teachers, of course the spurious Aristotle, but -it turned him into a disciple of Agathodaemon and Hermes. -</p> -<p>The more sober-minded thinkers, on the other hand, kept to Aristotelianism, so far -as it agreed with their own views or with the orthodox Faith. The system of Ibn Sina -was almost universally followed by them; and it was only a few that went back to Farabi, -or that endeavoured to combine the two. Very little notice was taken of Physical and -Metaphysical doctrines: Ethics and Politics were rather more attended to. Logic was -the only subject universally <span class="pageNum" id="pb171">[<a href="#pb171">171</a>]</span>studied; for it could be admirably conveyed in scholastic form; and, as pure Formal -Logic, it was an instrument which every one was able to make use of. In fact with -the resources of Logic everything might be proved; and even if the demonstration should -be recognized as faulty, there was this consolation that the averment might still -be true, although its demonstration had not been properly conducted. -</p> -<p>Even in the Encyclopaedia of Abu Abdallah al-Khwarizmi, a production of the last quarter -of the tenth century, a larger space was assigned to Logic than to Physics and Metaphysics. -The very same thing was done in many later encyclopaedias and compilations. The Dogmatists -also commenced their system with logical and epistemological considerations, in which -a traditional eulogy was pronounced over “knowing”. And from the twelfth century onwards -there arose a whole multitude of separate arrangements of the Aristotelian Organon. -Here may be mentioned only,—as being much used, commented on, and so forth,—the works -of Abhari († 1264), who gave a short summary of the whole ‘Logic’ under the title -of “Isagudji” (<span class="trans" title="eisagōgē"><span lang="grc" class="grek">εἰσαγωγή</span></span>); and the works of Qazwini († 1276). -</p> -<p>At the greatest University in the Muslim world, that of Cairo, the Epitomes of the -13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries are used, up to this day. There the word still is, as for a long time it -was with ourselves: “First of all a College of Logic”, and, we need scarcely add, -with no better result. They indulge themselves, within the limits of the Law, in the -luxury of studying the rules of thinking discovered by the ancient philosophers, but -all the while they smile at these men and at the Mutazilite Dialecticians, who “believed -in Reason!” -<span class="pageNum" id="pb172">[<a href="#pb172">172</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div id="ch6" class="div1 chapter"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1725">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h2 class="main"><span class="divNum">VI.</span> PHILOSOPHY IN THE WEST.</h2> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<div id="s6.1" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1735">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">1.</span> <span class="sc">Beginnings.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p6.1.1" class="first">1. Western North-Africa, Spain and Sicily are reckoned as forming the Muslim West. -North-Africa, to begin with, is of subordinate importance: Sicily is regulated by -Spain, and is soon overthrown by the Normans of Lower Italy. For our purpose Muslim -Spain or Andalusia first falls to be considered. -</p> -<p>The drama of culture in the East passes here through a second representation. Just -as Arabs there intermarried with Persians, so in the West they intermarry with Spaniards. -And instead of Turks and Mongols we have here the Berbers of North-Africa, whose rude -force is flung into the play of more refined civilization with a blighting influence -ever on the increase. -</p> -<p>After the fall of the Omayyads in Syria (750), a member of that House, Abderrakhman -ibn Moawiya, betook himself to Spain, where he contrived to work his way up to the -dignity of Emir of Cordova and all Andalusia. This Omayyad overlordship lasted for -more than 250 years, and after a passing system of petty States, it attained its greatest -brilliancy under Abderrakhman III (912–961), the first who assumed the title of Caliph, -and his son <span class="pageNum" id="pb173">[<a href="#pb173">173</a>]</span>al-Hakam II (961–976). The tenth century was for Spain, what the ninth was for the -East,—the time of highest material and intellectual civilization. If possible, it -was more fresh and native here than in the East, and, if it be true that all theorizing -betokens either a lack or a stagnation of the power of production, it was more productive -also: The sciences, and Philosophy in particular, had far fewer representatives in -Spain. Speaking generally, we may say that the relations of intellectual life took -a simpler form. There was a smaller number of strata in the new culture than in the -old. No doubt there were, besides Muslims, Jews and Christians in Spain, who in the -time of Abderrakhman III played their part in this cultivated life, of the Arabic -stamp, in common with the rest. But of adherents of Zoroaster, atheists and such like, -there were none. Even the sects of Eastern Islam were almost unknown. Only one school -of Law, that of Malik, was admitted. No Mutazilite dialectic troubled the peace of -the Faith. True enough the Andalusian poets glorified the trinity of Wine, Woman and -Song; but flippant free-thinking on the one hand, and gloomy theosophy and renunciation -of the world on the other, rarely found expression. -</p> -<p>On the whole, intellectual culture was dependent upon the East. From the tenth century -onwards many journeys in search of knowledge were undertaken thither from Spain, by -way of Egypt and as far as Eastern Persia, for the purpose of attending the prelections -of scholars of renown. And farther, educational requirements in Andalusia attracted -to it many a learned Eastern who found no occupation in his own home. Besides, al-Hakam -II caused books to be <span class="pageNum" id="pb174">[<a href="#pb174">174</a>]</span>copied, all over the East, for his library, which is said to have contained 400,000 -volumes. -</p> -<p>The West was mainly interested in Mathematics, Natural Science, Astrology and Medicine, -precisely as was the case at first in the East. Poetry, History and Geography were -cultivated with ardour. But the mind was not yet “sicklied o’er with the pale cast -of thought”, for when Abdallah ibn Masarra of Cordova, under Abderrakhman III, brought -home with him from the East a system of Natural Philosophy, he had to submit to see -his writings consigned to the flames. -</p> -<p id="p6.1.2">2. In the year 1013 Cordova, “the Gem of the World”, was laid waste by the Berbers, -and the kingdom of the Omayyads was split up into a number of minor States. Its second -bloom fills up the eleventh century,—the Medicean age of Spain, in which Art and Poetry -still flourish in luxuriant growth at the courts of the various cities, upon the ruins -of ancient splendour. Art grows refined; poetry becomes sage, and scientific thought -subtle. Intellectual nutriment continues to be fetched from the East; and Natural -Philosophy, the writings of the Faithful Brethren, and Logic from the school of Abu -Sulaiman al-Sidjistani find admission one after the other. Towards the close of the -century it is possible to trace the influence even of the writings of Farabi, and -the “Medicine” of Ibn Sina becomes known. -</p> -<p>The beginnings of philosophical reflection are found chiefly with the numerous men -of culture among the Jews. Eastern Natural Philosophy produces a powerful and quite -singular impression upon the mind of Ibn Gebirol, the Avencebrol of Christian authors; -and Bakhya ibn Pakuda <span class="pageNum" id="pb175">[<a href="#pb175">175</a>]</span>is influenced by the Faithful Brethren. Even the religious poetry of the Jews is affected -by the philosophical movement; and what speaks therein is not the Jewish Congregation -seeking after God, but the Soul rising towards the Supreme Spirit. -</p> -<p>Among the Muslims, however, the number of those who addressed themselves to a thorough -study of Philosophy was very limited. No master gathered about him a numerous band -of disciples; and meetings of the learned, for the discussion of philosophical subjects, -were scarcely ever held. The individual thinker must have felt very lonely in these -circumstances. In the West, just as in the East, Philosophy was developed subjectively; -but here it was more the concern of a few isolated individuals; and, besides, it stood -more apart from the faith of the mass of the people. In the East there were countless -intermediary agencies between faith and knowledge,—between the philosophers and the -believing community. The problem of the individual thinker, confronted by political -society and the faith of narrow-minded fanatical multitudes, was accordingly realized -more acutely in the West. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s6.2" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1770">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">2.</span> <span class="sc">Ibn Baddja.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p6.2.1" class="first">1. Towards the end of the eleventh century, when Abu Bekr Mohammed ibn Yakhya ibn -al-Saig ibn Baddja (<i>Avempace</i>) was born in Saragossa, the fair kingdom of Andalusia was approaching the time of -its disappearance in a system of petty States. It was threatened from the North by -the less civilized but yet powerful and brave Christian knights. But the Berber dynasty -of the Almoravids came to the <span class="pageNum" id="pb176">[<a href="#pb176">176</a>]</span>rescue, who were not only firmer in the faith but also wiser in their policy than -the voluptuous ruling race of Spain. Then the time of refined culture and free enquiry -seemed gone for ever. Only traditionalists, of the strictest rite, ventured to make -a public appearance, while philosophers, unless they kept concealed, were persecuted -or put to death. -</p> -<p id="p6.2.2">2. But barbarous lords have their caprices, being fond of appropriating, at least -superficially, the culture of those who have been subjugated by them. Thus Abu Bekr -ibn Ibrahim, brother-in-law of the Almoravid prince Ali,—who was for some time Governor -of Saragossa, made Ibn Baddja his intimate friend and first minister, thereby giving -great offence to his <i>Faqihs</i> and soldiers. Now this was a man, skilled both in the theory and practice of the -Mathematical Sciences, particularly Astronomy and Music, as well as an adept in Medicine, -and one who was devoted to speculative studies in Logic, Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics; -and in the opinion of the fanatics he was an utterly abandoned atheist and immoral -person. -</p> -<p>We know nothing more of the outward life of Ibn Baddja except that he was in Seville -in the year 1118, after the fall of Saragossa, and that he composed several of his -works there, afterwards betaking himself to the Almoravid court in Fez, where he died -in 1138. According to tradition he met his death by poison, administered at the instigation -of a jealous physician. His short life, as he himself confesses, had not been a happy -one; and he had often longed for death, as a final refuge. Material want, and, above -all, intellectual isolation, may have weighed down his spirits. His extant writings -abundantly evince <span class="pageNum" id="pb177">[<a href="#pb177">177</a>]</span>that he was unable to feel at home in that day and that environment. -</p> -<p id="p6.2.3">3. He conforms almost entirely to Farabi, the quiet, solitary Eastern. Like him he -was little given to systematizing. His original treatises are but few in number; and -they consist chiefly of brief expositions of Aristotelian and other philosophical -works. His observations are of a desultory character: Now he makes a beginning in -one place; again, he starts afresh in another. In continually renewed approaches he -endeavours to get nearer Greek thought, and to penetrate from every possible side -to ancient science. He does not discard philosophy, and he does not deal conclusively -with it. On a first glance, that produces a puzzling impression; but, in the sombre -impulse which is upon him, the philosopher has become aware of the path he is pursuing. -In searching for truth and righteousness, he is coming upon another thing,—unity and -joy in his own life. In his opinion, Gazali took the matter much too easily, when -he thought he could be happy only in the full possession of the truth comprehended -by means of Divine illumination. In his love for the truth, which is concealed rather -than revealed by the sensuous images of religious mysticism, the philosopher must -be strong enough to renounce that happiness. Only pure thinking, undisturbed by any -sensuous desire, is privileged to behold the supreme Godhead. -</p> -<p id="p6.2.4">4. In his logical writings Ibn Baddja hardly departs from Farabi. Even his physical -and metaphysical theories agree generally with the views of the master. But perhaps -the mode, in which he represents the history of the development of the human spirit -and the position of man in knowledge <span class="pageNum" id="pb178">[<a href="#pb178">178</a>]</span>and in life, may claim a measure of interest. There are two kinds of existence, according -to his view,—one which is moved, and one which is not moved. That which is moved is -corporeal and limited, but its everlasting movement cannot be explained by finite -Body. On the contrary, in order to explain this endless movement, an unending power -is needed, or an eternal essence, namely Spirit. Now while the corporeal or the natural -is moved from without, and the Spirit, itself unmoved, confers movement upon the corporeal, -the Soul-substance occupies a middle position, being that which moves itself. The -relation between the natural and the psychical presents as little difficulty to Ibn -Baddja as to his predecessors; but the great problem is this:—‘How are the Soul and -the Spirit related to each other, that is to say in Man?’ -</p> -<p id="p6.2.5">5. Ibn Baddja starts with the assumption that Matter cannot exist without some Form, -while Form may exist by itself, without Matter. Otherwise, in fact, absolutely no -change is thinkable, because that is rendered possible only by the coming and going -of substantial Forms. -</p> -<p>These Forms then, from the hylic up to the purely spiritual, constitute a series, -to which the development of the human spirit corresponds, in so far as it realizes -the rational ideal. Man’s task is to comprehend all the spiritual Forms together; -first the intelligible Forms of all that is corporeal, then the sensible-spiritual -presentations of the Soul, next the human Spirit itself and the Active Spirit over -it, and lastly the pure Spirits of the celestial spheres. By rising through successive -stages from the individual and sensible, the presentation of which constitutes the -material on which the Spirit operates, Man attains to the <span class="pageNum" id="pb179">[<a href="#pb179">179</a>]</span>superhuman and the Divine. Now his guide in this process is Philosophy, or the knowledge -of the universal, which issues from knowledge of the particular through study and -reflection, aided however by the enlightening Spirit from above. Contrasted with this -knowledge of the universal or the infinite,—in which Being, and becoming the object -of cognition coincide,—all perception and presentation prove deceptive. Thus it is -by rational knowledge, and not by religious and mystical dreaming, with the sensuous -invariably clinging thereto, that the human Spirit arrives at perfection. Thinking -is the highest bliss, for its very purpose is to reach all that is intelligible. But -since that is the universal, the continued existence of individual human Spirits beyond -this life cannot be assumed. It may be that the Soul,—which apprehends the particular -in the life of sensuous-spiritual presentation, and notifies its existence in separate -desires and actions,—has the faculty of continuing that existence after death, and -of receiving reward or punishment; but the Spirit or the rational part of the Soul -is one in all. It is only the Spirit of the entirety of Mankind, or, in other words, -the one Intellect, Mind or Spirit in Humanity,—and that too in its union with the -active Spirit over it,—which is eternal. This theory, which made its way into the -Christendom of the Middle Ages, under the name of Averroes’ Theory, is thus found -even with Ibn Baddja, if not quite distinctly conceived, at all events more clearly -given than with Farabi. -</p> -<p id="p6.2.6">6. Every man does not rise to such a height of contemplation. The greater number grope -about continually in the dark; they merely see the adumbrations of things, and like -shadows they will pass away. Some see the Light, <span class="pageNum" id="pb180">[<a href="#pb180">180</a>]</span>it is true, and the coloured world of things, but very few indeed recognize the essence -of what they have seen. It is only the latter, the blessed ones, who attain to life -eternal,—in which state they themselves become Light. -</p> -<p>But now, how does the individual man get to this stage of knowledge and blessed existence? -Through action directed by reason, and the free cultivation of his intellectual powers. -Action directed by reason is free action, that is, action in which there is a consciousness -of purpose. If one, for instance, breaks a stone to pieces, because he has stumbled -against it, he is behaving without purpose, like a child or a lower animal; but if -he does this in order that others may not stumble against the stone, his action must -be called manlike, and directed by reason. -</p> -<p>In order to be able to live as a man should, and to act in a rational way, the individual -man, must as far as circumstances permit, withdraw from society. The name borne by -the Ethics of Ibn Baddja is “Guidance to the Solitary”. It demands self-culture. Generally, -however, one may avail himself of the advantages attending social life in man, without -including in the bargain its disadvantages. The wise may associate themselves in larger -or smaller unions; such indeed is their duty, if they light upon one another; and -then they form a State within the State. Naturally they endeavour to live in such -a manner that neither physician nor judge is necessary among them. They grow up like -plants in the open air, and do not stand in need of the gardener’s skill. They keep -at a distance from the lower enjoyments and sentiments of the multitude. They are -strangers to the movements of worldly society. And as they are friends among themselves, -this life of theirs is <span class="pageNum" id="pb181">[<a href="#pb181">181</a>]</span>wholly determined by Love. Then too as friends of God, who is the Truth, they find -repose in union with the superhuman Spirit of Knowledge. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s6.3" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1847">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">3.</span> <span class="sc">Ibn Tofail.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p6.3.1" class="first">1. The sovereignty over Western Islam remained with the Berbers, but the Almohads -speedily took the place of the Almoravids. Mohammed ibn Tumart, the founder of the -new dynasty, had, from the year 1121, come forward as Mahdi. Under his successors -Abu Yaaqub Yusuf (1163–1184) and Abu Yusuf Yaaqub (1184–1198), their sovereignty, -which was centred in Marocco, reached its culminating point. -</p> -<p>The Almohads brought with them a startling novelty in theology: The system of Ashari -and Gazali, which till then had been branded as heretical, was adopted in the West. -That meant an infusion of intellectualism into the teaching of the Faith,—a proceeding -which could not be altogether satisfactory either to the adherents of the old Faith -or to freethinkers, but which may have incited many to farther philosophizing. Hitherto -an attitude of repudiation had been maintained towards all reasoning in matters of -faith; and, even later, many politicians and philosophers were of opinion that the -faith of the multitude should not be violently disturbed, nor elevated to knowledge, -but that the provinces of Religion and of Philosophy should be kept scrupulously separate. -</p> -<p>The Almohads were interested in questions of theology, but yet Abu Yaaqub and his -successors manifested, as far as political conditions permitted, such an appreciation -of secular knowledge, that philosophy was enabled to enjoy a brief period of prosperity -at their court. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb182">[<a href="#pb182">182</a>]</span></p> -<p id="p6.3.2">2. We find Abu Bekr Mohammed ibn Abdalmalik ibn Tofail al-Qaisi (<i>Abubacer</i>) in the position of Vizir and Body-Physician to Abu Yaaqub, after holding an appointment -as Secretary in Granada. His place of birth was the small Andalusian town of Guadix, -and he died in Marocco, the seat of Government, in the year 1185. The life that lies -between appears to have been by no means eventful. He was fonder of books than of -men, and in his sovereign’s great library he gathered, by reading, much information -which he required for his art, or which met his ardent thirst for knowledge. He was -the <i>dilettante</i> of the philosophers of the West, and was more given to contemplative enjoyment than -scientific work. Rarely did he set himself to write. We need not perhaps put absolute -faith in his assertion that he could have fundamentally improved the <span class="corr" id="xd31e4036" title="Source: Ptolemaie">Ptolemaic</span> system. Many Arabs made a like assertion, without carrying it into effect. -</p> -<p>Of Ibn Tofail’s poetic ventures, one or two poems have been preserved to us. But his -principal endeavour, like that of Ibn Sina, was to combine Greek Science and Oriental -Wisdom into a modern view of the world. That was to him a personal concern, just as -it was to Ibn Baddja. He too occupied his mind with the relation of the individual -man to Society and its prejudices. But he went farther: Ibn Baddja, as a rule made -out the individual thinker or a small association of independent thinkers, as constituting -a State within the State,—a copy, as it were, of the great total, or a model for happier -times: Ibn Tofail on the other hand, turned to consider the original. -</p> -<p id="p6.3.3">3. He states the case clearly, in his work “Hai ibn Yaqzan”. The scenery is contributed -by two islands, on <span class="pageNum" id="pb183">[<a href="#pb183">183</a>]</span>one of which he sets human society with its conventions, and on the other an individual -man, who is being developed naturally. This society as a whole is governed by lower -impulses, subjected only to some measure of outward restraint by a grossly sensuous -religion. But out of this society two men, called Salaman and Asal (<i>Absal</i>, cf. <a href="#p4.4.7">IV, 4 § 7</a>), rise to rational knowledge and control of their desires. <span class="corr" id="xd31e4049" title="Source: Accomodating">Accommodating</span> himself to the popular religion, the first, who is of a practical turn of mind, contrives -to rule the people; but the second, being of speculative disposition and mystic leanings, -wanders off to the island which lay opposite, and which he imagines to be uninhabited,—there -to devote himself to study and ascetic discipline. -</p> -<p>On that island, however, our Hai ibn Yaqzan,—<i>i.e.</i> ‘the Active one, the son of the Vigilant’,—had been trained into a perfect philosopher. -Cast upon the island when a child, or else brought into existence there by spontaneous -generation, he had been suckled by a gazelle, and then had been in the course of time -left, like a Robinson Crusoe, and that entirely, to his own resources. Yet he had -secured a material existence, and farther, by observation and reflection, had acquired -a knowledge of Nature, the heavens, God, and his own inner being, until after seven -times seven years he had attained to that which is highest, viz., the Sufi vision -of God, the state of ecstasy. In this situation he was found by Asal. After they had -come to understand each other,—for at first Hai was still without speech,—it was found -that the philosophy of the one and the religion of the other were two forms of the -same truth, except that in the first form it was somewhat less veiled. But when Hai -came to know that on the opposite island an <span class="pageNum" id="pb184">[<a href="#pb184">184</a>]</span>entire people continued in darkness and error, he resolved to proceed thither and -reveal the truth to them. Here, however, he was brought to learn by experience that -the multitude were incapable of a pure apprehension of the truth, and that Mohammed -had acted wisely in giving the people sensuous forms instead of full light. After -this result therefore he repaired again with his friend Asal to the uninhabited island, -to serve God in spirit and in truth till the hour of death. -</p> -<p id="p6.3.4">4. Ibn Tofail has devoted by far the largest portion of his romance to the course -of Hai’s development; but he cannot certainly have thought that the individual man, -left to himself, is able, with the resources of Nature alone and without the help -of society, to advance so far as Hai did. And yet his conception is perhaps rather -more historical, than certain views which have been entertained since his day, <i>e.g.</i> by some of the Rationalists of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Many little touches in his work shew that Hai was intended to represent -humanity as it stands outside of revelation. That which is accomplished in him, is -the development of Indian, Persian and Greek wisdom. One or two hints pointing in -that direction, but which cannot be farther followed out here, may help to lend probability -to this view. Thus it is significant, to begin with, that Hai lives on the island -of Ceylon, the climate of which was held to be such as to render spontaneous generation -possible, where also, according to the legend, Adam, the first man, had been created, -and where the Indian king came to the Wise Man. Then Hai’s first religious sentiment -of wonder, after he had struggled up out of the primary, animal stage, through shame -and curiosity, is <span class="pageNum" id="pb185">[<a href="#pb185">185</a>]</span>elicited by fire, which has been discovered by him,—a circumstance which recalls to -us the Persian religion. And his farther speculations are borrowed from Greco-Arabic -Philosophy. -</p> -<p>The affinity to Ibn Sina’s Hai, which Ibn Tofail himself indicates, is clear: Only, -the figure of Hai in this case presents a more human appearance. With Ibn Sina the -character of Hai represents the Superhuman Spirit, but the hero of Ibn Tofail’s romance -seems to be the personification of the natural Spirit of Mankind illuminated from -above; and that Spirit must be in accordance with the Prophet-Soul of Mohammed when -rightly understood, whose utterances are to be interpreted allegorically. -</p> -<p>Ibn Tofail has thus arrived at the same result as his Eastern predecessors. Religion -must still be kept up for the ordinary man, because he cannot go beyond it. It is -only a few who rise to an understanding of religious symbols; and very rarely indeed -does any one attain to the unrestrained <span class="corr" id="xd31e4070" title="Source: comtemplation">contemplation</span> of the highest reality. This last truth he accentuates with the greatest emphasis. -Even if we do find in Hai the representative of human nature, we cannot gainsay this -truth; for the representation given sets forth the supreme perfection of Man as consisting -in submerging his own self in the World-Spirit, in the most lonely quietude, and withdrawn -from all that is sensuous. -</p> -<p>It is true that this condition is attained only in mature age, in which, besides, -a human friend has been met with; and attention to what is material, and to the arts -and sciences, forms the natural preliminary stage of spiritual perfection. Thus Ibn -Tofail is permitted to look back without regret or shame upon his life spent at court. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb186">[<a href="#pb186">186</a>]</span></p> -<p id="p6.3.5">5. We have already met frequently with the philosophical views, which Hai developed -in his seven life-periods. But even his practical behaviour is specially considered -by Ibn Tofail. Sufi exercises, as they are still observed among the religious orders -of the East, and as they had been recommended even by Plato and the Neo-Platonists, -have taken the place of the observances of religious worship enjoined by the Muslim -Law. And Hai forms for himself in the seventh period of his life a system of Ethics -which has a Pythagorean appearance. -</p> -<p>Hai has set before him as the aim of his action,—to seek for the One in all things -and to unite himself to the absolute and the self-existing. He sees in fact all Nature -striving to reach this Highest Being. He is far above the view that everything on -the earth exists for the sake of Man. Animals and plants likewise live for themselves -and for God; and thus he is not permitted to deal capriciously with them. He now restricts -his bodily wants to what is absolutely necessary. Ripe fruits are preferred by him, -the seeds of which he piously consigns to the soil, taking anxious precaution that -no kind may die out through his avidity. And only in extreme need does he touch animal -food, in which case he seeks in like manner to spare the species. ‘Enough for life, -not enough for sleep’ is his motto. -</p> -<p>That has reference to his bodily attitude towards the earthly; but the living principle -binds him to the heavens, and, like the heavens, he strives to be useful to his surroundings, -and to keep his own life pure. He therefore tends the plants and protects the animals -about him, in order that his island may become a paradise. He <span class="corr" id="xd31e4082" title="Corrected by author from: bestows">pays</span> scrupulous attention to the cleanliness of his person and <span class="pageNum" id="pb187">[<a href="#pb187">187</a>]</span>his clothing, and endeavours to give a harmonious turn to all his movements, in conformity -with those of the heavenly bodies. -</p> -<p>In this way he is gradually rendered capable of elevating his own self above earth -and heaven to the pure Spirit. That is the condition of ecstasy, which no thought, -no word, no image has ever been able to comprehend or express. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s6.4" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e1914">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">4.</span> <span class="sc">Ibn Roshd.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p6.4.1" class="first">1. Abu-l-Walid Mohammed ibn Akhmed ibn Mohammed ibn Roshd (<i>Averroes</i>) was born at Cordova, of a family of lawyers, in the year 1126. There too he made -himself master of the learned culture of his time. In 1153 he is said to have been -presented to the prince Abu Yaaqub by Ibn Tofail; and we possess a report of that -occurrence, full of character. After the introductory phrases of politeness the prince -asked him: “What is the opinion of philosophers about the heavens? Are they eternal, -or have they been brought into existence?” Ibn Roshd cautiously replied that he had -not given attention to philosophy. Thereupon the prince commenced to discuss the subject -with Ibn Tofail, and, to the astonishment of the listener, shewed that he was acquainted -with Aristotle, Plato, and the philosophers and theologians of Islam. Then Ibn Roshd -also spoke out freely, and won the favour of his high-placed master. His lot was fixed: -He was destined to interpret Aristotle, as no one before him had done, that mankind -might be put in complete and genuine possession of science. -</p> -<p>He was, besides, a jurist and a physician. We find him in 1169 in the position of -judge in Seville, and shortly <span class="pageNum" id="pb188">[<a href="#pb188">188</a>]</span>afterwards in Cordova. Abu Yaakub, now Caliph, nominates him his Body-Physician in -the year 1182; but, a short time after, he is again judge in his native city, as his -father and grandfather had been. Circumstances, however, change for the worse. Philosophers -are pronounced accursed, and their writings are committed to the flames. In his old -age Ibn Roshd is banished by Abu Yusuf to Elisana (Lucena, near Cordova), but yet -he dies in Marocco the capital, on the 10<sup>th</sup> December, 1198. -</p> -<p id="p6.4.2">2. It was upon Aristotle that his activity was concentrated. All that he could procure -of that philosopher’s works, or about them, he subjected to diligent study and careful -comparison. Writings of the Greeks, which are now lost either entirely or in part, -were still known to Ibn Roshd in translated form. He goes critically and systematically -to work: He paraphrases Aristotle and he interprets him, now with comparative brevity, -and anon in greater detail, both in moderate-sized and in bulky commentaries. He thus -merits the name of “the Commentator”, which also is assigned to him in Dante’s “Commedia”<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e4108src" href="#xd31e4108">1</a>. It looks as if the Philosophy of the Muslims had been fated in him to come to an -understanding of Aristotle, just that it might then expire, after that end had been -attained. Aristotle for him is the supremely perfect man, the greatest thinker, the -philosopher who was in possession of an infallible truth. New discoveries in Astronomy, -Art or Physics could make no alteration in that respect. Of course it is possible -to misunderstand Aristotle: Ibn Roshd himself came to have a different and better -understanding of many a point which he took from the works of Farabi and Ibn Sina; -but yet he lived continually <span class="pageNum" id="pb189">[<a href="#pb189">189</a>]</span>in the belief that Aristotle, when rightly understood, corresponds to the highest -knowledge which is attainable by man. In the eternal revolution of worldly events -Aristotle has reached a height which it is impossible to transcend. Men who have come -after him are frequently put to the cost of much trouble and reflection to deduce -the views which readily disclosed themselves to the first master. Gradually, however, -all doubt and contradiction are reduced to silence, for Aristotle is one who is more -than man, destined as it were by Providence to illustrate how far the human race is -capable of advancing in its approximation to the World-Spirit. As being the sublimest -incarnation of the Spirit of Mankind, Ibn Roshd would like to call his master the -‘Divine’ Teacher. -</p> -<p>It will be shewn by what follows, that even in the instance of Ibn Roshd, unmeasured -admiration for Aristotle did not suffice to bring about a perfect comprehension of -his thoughts. He allows no opportunity to pass of doing battle with Ibn Sina, and, -upon occasion, he parts company with Farabi and Ibn Baddja,—men to whom he owes a -great deal. He carps at all his predecessors, in a far more disagreeable fashion than -Aristotle did in the case of his teacher Plato. And yet he himself is far from having -got beyond the interpretation of Neo-Platonic expositors and the misconceptions of -Syrian and Arab translators. Frequently he follows even the superficial Themistius -in opposition to the judicious Alexander of Aphrodisias, or else he tries to combine -their views. -</p> -<p id="p6.4.3">3. Ibn Roshd is above all a fanatical admirer of the Aristotelian Logic. Without it -one cannot be happy, and it is a pity that Plato and Socrates were ignorant of it! -<span class="pageNum" id="pb190">[<a href="#pb190">190</a>]</span>The happiness of men is measured by the degree of their logical attainments. With -the discernment of a critic he recognizes Porphyry’s “Isagoge” as superfluous, but -he still counts the “Rhetoric” and the “Poetics” as forming part of the Organon. And -then the oddest misapprehensions are met with. For example, Tragedy and Comedy are -turned into Panegyrics and Lampoons; poetical probability has to be content with signifying -either truth capable of demonstration, or deceptive appearance; recognition on the -stage (<span class="trans" title="anagnōrisis"><span lang="grc" class="grek">ἀναγνώρισις</span></span>) becomes Apodictic judgment, and so on. Of course he has absolutely no conception -of the Greek world; and that is venial, for he could not have had any notion of it. -And yet we do not readily excuse one who has been so severe a critic of others. -</p> -<p>Like his predecessors, Ibn Roshd lays especial emphasis upon Grammar, as far as it -is common to all languages. This common principle, and therefore the universal one, -Aristotle, he thinks, keeps always before him in his Hermeneutics, and even in the -Rhetoric. Accordingly the Arab philosopher is also bound to adhere to it, although -in illustrating universal rules he may take his examples from the Arabic language -and literature. But it is universal rules which form his object, for science is the -knowledge of the universal. -</p> -<p>Logic smooths the path for the ascent of our cognition from sensuous particularity -to pure rational truth. The multitude will always live in the sensuous element, groping -about in error. Defective mental parts and poor education, and depraved habits to -boot, prevent them from making any advance. But still it must be within the power -of some to arrive at a knowledge of truth. The eagle looks <span class="pageNum" id="pb191">[<a href="#pb191">191</a>]</span>the sun in the face, for if no being could look at him, Nature would have made something -in vain. Whatever shines there is meant to be seen; and so whatever exists is meant -to be known, were it only by one single man. Now truth exists; and the love for it -which fills our hearts would have been all in vain, if we could not approach it. Ibn -Roshd thinks that he has come to know the truth in the case of many things, and even -that he has been able to discover absolute Truth. He would not, with Lessing, have -cared to resign himself to a mere search for it. -</p> -<p>Truth, in fact, has been given him in Aristotle; and from that standpoint he looks -down upon Muslim theology. Certainly he recognizes that religion has a truth of its -own, but theology is repugnant to him. It wants to prove what cannot be proved in -this way. Revelation, as contained in the Koran,—according to the teaching of Ibn -Roshd and others, and similarly of Spinoza in later times,—does not aim at making -men learned, but at making them better. Not knowledge, but obedience or moral practice -is the aim of the lawgiver, who knows that human welfare can only be realized in society. -</p> -<p id="p6.4.4">4. That which especially distinguishes Ibn Roshd from those who preceded him, and -in particular from Ibn Sina, is the unequivocal mode in which he conceives of the -world as an eternal process of ‘becoming’. The world as a whole is an eternally necessary -unity, without any possibility of non-existence or of different existence. Matter -and Form can only be separated in thought. Forms do not wander like ghosts through -dull Matter, but are contained in it after the manner of germs. The Material Forms, -in the guise of natural forces, operate in an eternal process <span class="pageNum" id="pb192">[<a href="#pb192">192</a>]</span>of generation, never separated from matter, but yet deserving to be called divine. -Absolute origination or extinction there is none, for all happening is a transition -from potentiality to actuality, and from actuality back to potentiality, in which -process like is ever generated by like and by that alone. -</p> -<p>But there is a graded order in the world of Being. The material or substantial Form -stands midway between mere Accident and pure (or separate) Form. Substantial Forms -also exhibit varieties of degree,—intermediate conditions between potentiality and -actuality. And, finally, the whole system of Forms, from the nethermost hylic Form -up to the Divine Essence, the original Form of the whole, constitutes one compact -structure rising tier upon tier. -</p> -<p>Now the eternal process of Becoming, within the given System, presupposes an eternal -movement, and that again an eternal Mover. If the world had had an origin, we might -have reasoned from it to another and a similarly originated corporeal world, which -had produced it, and so on without end. If again it had been a ‘possible’ entity, -we might have inferred a ‘possible’ entity out of which it had proceeded, and so on -<i>ad infinitum</i>. And according to Ibn Roshd, it is only the hypothesis of a world moved as a unity -and of eternal necessity, that yields us the possibility of inferring a Being, separate -from the world, yet eternally moving it, who in his continually producing that movement -and maintaining the fair order of the All, may legitimately be called the Author of -the world, and who in the Spirits that move the Spheres,—for every separate kind of -movement demands its separate principle,—possesses agents to give effect to his activity. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb193">[<a href="#pb193">193</a>]</span></p> -<p>The essence of the First Mover, or of God, as well as of the Sphere-Spirits, is found -by Ibn Roshd in Thought, in which unity of Being is given him. Thought which is identical -with its object is the sole positive definition of the Divine Essence; but Being and -Unity absolutely synchronize with such Thought. In other words, Being and Unity are -not annexed to the Essence, but are given only in Thought, just like all universals. -Thought produces everywhere the general in the particular. It is true that the universal -as a disposition is operative in things, but the universal qua universal exists in -the understanding alone. Or, in possibility (or potentiality) it exists in things, -but it exists actually in the understanding,—that is, it has more Being,—a higher -kind of existence,—in the understanding than in things. -</p> -<p>If now the question is asked,—‘Does Divine Thought take in merely the general, or -does it take in the particular too?’, Ibn Roshd replies, ‘It does not directly take -in either the one or the other, for the Divine Essence transcends both of them. Divine -Thought produces the All and embraces the All. God is the principle, the original -Form, and the final aim of all things. He is the order of the world, the reconciliation -of all opposites, the All itself in its highest mode of existence.<span class="corr" id="xd31e4146" title="Not in source">’</span> It follows of course from this theory, that there can be no talk of a Divine Providence -in the ordinary sense of the term. -</p> -<p id="p6.4.5">5. Two kinds of Being we know: one which is moved, and one which causes motion, though -itself unmoved,—or a corporeal and a spiritual. But it is in the spiritual that the -higher unity or perfection of all Being lies, and that too in graded order. It is -thus no abstract unity. The farther the <span class="pageNum" id="pb194">[<a href="#pb194">194</a>]</span>Sphere-Spirits are from the First, so much the less simple are they. All know themselves, -but in their knowledge there is at the same time a reference to the First Cause. The -result is a kind of parallelism between the corporeal and the spiritual. There is -something in the lower Spirits which corresponds to the composition of the corporeal -out of Matter and Form. What is mingled with the purely spiritual is of course no -mere Matter, that could suffer anything, but yet it is something resembling Matter,—something -which has the faculty of taking to itself something else. Otherwise the multiplicity -of <i>intelligibilia</i> could not be brought into harmony with the unity of the Spirit which apprehends them. -</p> -<p>Matter suffers, but Spirit receives. This parallelism, with its subtle distinction, -has been introduced by Ibn Roshd with special reference to the human Spirit. -</p> -<p id="p6.4.6">6. Ibn Roshd is firmly of opinion that the human soul is related to its body, as Form -is to Matter. He is completely in earnest on this point. The theory of numerous immortal -souls he most decidedly rejects, combating Ibn Sina. The soul has an existence only -as a completion of the body with which it is associated. -</p> -<p>As regards empirical psychology he has anxiously endeavoured to keep by Aristotle, -in opposition to Galen and others; but in the doctrine of the “<i>nous</i>” he diverges from his master not inconsiderably, without being aware of it. His conception,—springing -from Neo-Platonic views,—of the Material Reason, is peculiar. It is not a mere aptitude -or capacity of the human soul, neither is it equivalent to the sensuous-spiritual -life of presentation, but it is something above the soul, and above the individual. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb195">[<a href="#pb195">195</a>]</span>The Material Reason is eternal, imperishable Spirit, as eternal and imperishable as -the pure Reason or the Active Spirit over us. The ascription of a separate existence -to Matter in the domain of the corporeal, is here transferred by Ibn Roshd,—following -of course Themistius and others,—to the region of the spiritual. -</p> -<p>The Material Reason is thus eternal substance. The natural aptitudes, or the capacity -of the human individual for intellectual knowledge Ibn Roshd denominates the Passive -Reason. That comes into being and disappears, with men as individuals, but the Material -Reason is eternal, like Man as a race. -</p> -<p>But a measure of obscurity remains, and it could hardly have been otherwise, about -the relation between the Active Spirit and the Receptive Spirit, (if we may for the -time use this last term for the Material Reason). The Active Spirit renders intelligible -the presentations of the human soul, while the Receptive Spirit absorbs these <i>intelligibilia</i>. The life of the soul in individual men thus forms the meeting-place of this mystic -pair of lovers. And such places differ very greatly. It depends on the entire capacity -of a man’s soul, and on the disposition of his perceptions, in what degree the Active -Spirit can elevate these to intelligibility, and how far the Receptive Spirit is in -a position to make them a portion of its own contents. This explains why men are not -all at the same stage of spiritual knowledge. But the sum of spiritual knowledge in -the world continues unaltered, although the partition of it undergoes individual variations. -By a necessity of nature, the Philosopher re-appears, without fail, whether an Aristotle -or an Ibn Roshd, in whose brain Being becomes <span class="pageNum" id="pb196">[<a href="#pb196">196</a>]</span>Idea. It is true that the thoughts of individual men occur in the element of time, -and that the Receptive Spirit is changeable, so far as the individual has a part in -it; but considered as the Reason of the Human Race, that Spirit is eternally incapable -of change, like the Active Spirit from the last Sphere above us. -</p> -<p id="p6.4.7">7. On the whole, three great heresies set the system of Ibn Roshd in opposition to -the theology of the three world-religions of his time: first, the eternity of the -material world and of the Spirits that move it; next, the necessary causal nexus in -all that happens in the world, so that no place is left for providence, miracle, and -the like; and, thirdly, the perishable nature of all that is individual, by which -theory individual immortality is also taken away. -</p> -<p>Considered logically the assumption of a number of independent Sphere-Spirits under -God does not appear to have any sufficient basis. But Ibn Roshd, like his predecessors, -gets over this difficulty by asserting that these Sphere-Spirits do not differ individually -but only in kind. Their sole purpose was to explain the different movements in the -system of the world, so long as its unity was still unknown. After the Ptolemaic system -of the world had been put aside, and these intermediary Spirits had become superfluous, -men identified the Active Spirit with God, as, for the matter of that, they had even -in earlier times attempted to do, on speculative and religious grounds. It was merely -one step farther, to identify even the eternal Spirit of Man with God. Ibn Roshd did -neither of these things, at least according to the strict letter of his writings; -but his system, when consistently carried out, made <span class="pageNum" id="pb197">[<a href="#pb197">197</a>]</span>it possible to take these steps, and in this way to arrive generally at a Pantheistic -conception of the world. On the other hand Materialism might easily find support in -the system, however decidedly our philosopher contended against such a view; for where -the eternity, form and efficacy of all that is material are so strongly emphasized, -as was done by him, Spirit may indeed still receive the name of king, but seemingly -by the favour merely of the material. -</p> -<p>Ibn Roshd deserves at all events to be called a bold and consistent thinker, although -not an original one. Theoretical philosophy was sufficient for him; but yet he owed -it to his time and his position to come to an understanding with religion and practice. -We may devote a few words to this point. -</p> -<p id="p6.4.8">8. Ibn Roshd often takes the opportunity of expressing himself against the uneducated -rulers and obscurantist theologians of his own day; but he continues to prefer life -as a citizen to a solitary life. He even thanks his opponents for many a piece of -instruction,—and that is a pleasing touch of character. He thinks that the solitary -life produces no arts or sciences, and that one can at the most enjoy in it what has -been gained already, or perhaps improve it a little. But every one should contribute -to the weal of the whole community: even women as well as men should be of service -to society and the State. In this opinion Ibn Roshd agrees with Plato (for he was -not acquainted with the Politics of Aristotle), and he remarks with entire good sense -that a great deal of the poverty and distress of his time arises from the circumstance -that women are kept like domestic animals or house plants for purposes of gratification, -of a very questionable <span class="pageNum" id="pb198">[<a href="#pb198">198</a>]</span>character besides, instead of being allowed to take part in the production of material -and intellectual wealth, and in the preservation of the same. -</p> -<p>In his Ethical system our philosopher animadverts with great severity upon the doctrine -of the professors of Law, that a thing is good or bad only because God so willed it. -On the contrary, says he, everything has its moral character from nature or in conformity -with reason. The action which is determined by rational discernment is moral. It is -not, of course, the individual Reason, but the Reason which looks to the welfare of -the community or State, to which appeal must be made in the last instance. -</p> -<p>Ibn Roshd regards religion also from a statesman’s point of view. He values it on -account of its moral purpose. It is Law, not Learning. He is therefore constantly -engaged in fighting the Theologians, who wish to understand intellectually, instead -of obeying with docile faith. He makes it a reproach to Gazali, that he has allowed -philosophy to exercise an influence upon his religious doctrine, and thereby has led -many into doubt and unbelief. The people should believe, exactly in accordance with -what stands in the Book. That is Truth,—Truth meant no doubt for a bigger sort of -children, to whom we convey it in the form of stories. Whatever goes beyond this, -comes of evil. For example, the Koran has two proofs of the existence of God, which -are evident to every one, viz: the Divine care of everything, especially of human -beings,—and the production of life in plants, animals, &c. These deliverances should -not be disturbed, nor should the literal acceptation of revelation be quibbled about, -in the theological fashion. For, the proofs which theologians adduce <span class="pageNum" id="pb199">[<a href="#pb199">199</a>]</span>of the existence of God can make no stand against a scientific criticism, any more -than the proof which is furnished from the notion of the possible and the necessary, -in Farabi and Ibn Sina. All this leads to Atheism and Libertinism. In the interests -of morality, and therefore of the State, this semi-theology should be fought against. -</p> -<p>On the other hand, philosophers who have attained to knowledge are permitted to interpret -the Word of God in the Koran. In the light of the highest truth they understand what -is aimed at therein; and they tell merely just so much of it to the ordinary man as -he is capable of apprehending. In this way the most admirable harmony results. Religious -precept and philosophy are in agreement with one another, precisely because they are -not seeking the same thing. They are related as practice and theory. In the philosopher’s -conception of religion, he allows its validity in its own domain, so that philosophy -by no means rejects religion. Philosophy, however, is the highest form of truth, and -at the same time the most sublime religion. The religion of the philosopher, in fact, -is the knowledge of all that exists. -</p> -<p>But yet this view has the appearance of being irreligious; and a positive religion -can never be content to recognize the leading position of philosophy in the realm -of truth. It was only natural that the theologians of the West, like their brethren -of the East should seek to profit by the favour of circumstances, and take no rest -until they had reduced the mistress to the position of the handmaid of Theology. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb200">[<a href="#pb200">200</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div class="footnotes"> -<hr class="fnsep"> -<div class="footnote-body"> -<div id="xd31e4108" lang="it"> -<p class="footnote" lang="it"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e4108src">1</a></span> “Averrois, che’l gran comento feo” Canto IV. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e4108src" title="Return to note 1 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div id="ch7" class="div1 chapter"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e2011">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h2 class="main"><span class="divNum">VII.</span> CONCLUSION.</h2> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<div id="s7.1" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e2021">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">1.</span> <span class="sc">Ibn Khaldun.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p7.1.1" class="first">1. The Philosophy of Ibn Roshd, and his interpretation of Aristotle, have had extremely -little effect upon the Muslim world. Many of his works, in the original, are lost, -and we have them only in Hebrew and Latin translations. He had no disciples or followers. -In retired corners no doubt many a free-thinker or Mystic might be met with, to whose -mind it looked sufficiently fantastic to toil earnestly with philosophic questions -of a theoretical kind; but Philosophy was not permitted to influence general culture -or the condition of affairs. Before the victorious arms of the Christians the material -civilization as well as the intellectual culture of the Muslims retreated farther -and farther. Spain became like Africa, where the Berber was ruler. The times were -serious: the very existence of Islam in these regions was at stake. Men made ready -for fighting against the enemy, or even against one another; and pious brethren everywhere -formed unions for mystic observances. In the Sufi orders of these people, a few philosophical -formulae at least were still preserved in safety. When, towards the middle of the -thirteenth <span class="pageNum" id="pb201">[<a href="#pb201">201</a>]</span>century, the emperor Frederick II submitted a number of philosophical questions to -the Muslim scholars of Ceuta, the Almohad Abdalwahid charged Ibn Sabin, founder of -a Mystic order, to reply to them. He did so, drawling forth in a pedantic tone the -views both of ancient and recent philosophers, and affording a glimpse of the Sufi -secret,—that God is the reality of all things. The only thing, however, which we can -learn from his answers, may be said to be, that Ibn Sabin had read books, of which -he thought the Emperor Frederick had not the faintest notion. -</p> -<p id="p7.1.2">2. In small State-systems, the Muslim civilization of the West drifted away, now rising, -now falling. But before it vanished completely, a man appeared, who endeavoured to -discover the law of its formation, and who thought to found therewith a new philosophical -discipline,—the Philosophy of Society or of History. That remarkable man was Ibn Khaldûn, -born at Tunis is the year 1332, of a family belonging to Seville. There he also received -his upbringing, and there he was next instructed in philosophy, partly by a teacher -who had been trained in the East. After studying all known sciences, he occupied himself -sometimes in the service of the Government, and sometimes in travel, proving everywhere -an excellent observer. He served various princes in the capacity of secretary, and -he was ambassador at several courts in Spain and Africa: as such he visited the Christian -court of Peter the Cruel in Seville. He was also at the court of Tamerlane in Damascus. -He had thus acquired a wide and full experience of the world, when he died at Cairo -in the year 1406. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb202">[<a href="#pb202">202</a>]</span></p> -<p>In character perhaps he does not take a high rank; but a measure of vanity, dilettantism -and the like, may readily be forgiven to the man who, above all others in his time, -lived for Science. -</p> -<p id="p7.1.3">3. Ibn Khaldûn was not satisfied with the School-Philosophy, as he had come to know -it. His picture of the world would not fit its conventional framing. If he had been -somewhat more given to theorizing, he might no doubt have constructed a system of -Nominalism. Philosophers pretend to know everything; but the universe seems to him -too great to be capable of being comprehended by our understanding. There are more -beings and things, infinitely more, than Man can ever know. “God creates what you -know nothing of”. Logical deductions frequently do not agree with the empirical world -of individual things, which becomes known by observation alone. That we can reach -truth by merely applying the rules of Logic, is a vain imagination: therefore reflection -on what is given in experience is the task of the scientific man. And he must not -rest satisfied with his own individual experience; but, with critical care he must -draw upon the sum of the collected experience of mankind, which has been handed down. -</p> -<p>By nature the soul is devoid of knowledge; but yet by nature it has the power of reflecting -on the experience which is given, and elaborating it. In the course of such reflection, -there frequently springs forth, as if by inspiration, the proper middle term, by means -of which the insight which has been gained may be arranged and explained according -to the rules of Formal Logic. Logic does not produce knowledge: it merely traces the -path which our <span class="pageNum" id="pb203">[<a href="#pb203">203</a>]</span>reflection ought to take: it points out how we arrive at knowledge; and it has the -farther value of being able to preserve us from error, and to sharpen the intellect -and keep it to accuracy in thinking. It is therefore an auxiliary science, and ought -to be cultivated even for its own sake by one or two qualified men, called specially -to that task; but it does not possess the fundamental importance which is attributed -to it by the Philosophers. The path which it indicates for our reflection to take, -is at need followed by scientific talent in any individual science, quite independently -of logical guidance. -</p> -<p>Ibn Khaldûn is a sober thinker. He combats Alchemy and Astrology on rational grounds. -To the Mystic rationalism of the Philosophers he opposes frequently the simple doctrines -of his religion, whether from personal conviction, or from political considerations. -But religion exercises no greater influence upon his scientific opinions than Neo-Platonic -Aristotelianism. Plato’s Republic, the Pythagorean-Platonic Philosophy, but without -its marvel-mongering outgrowths, and the historical works of his oriental forerunners, -particularly of Masudi, have had most influence on the development of his thoughts. -</p> -<p id="p7.1.4">4. Ibn Khaldûn comes forward with a claim to establish a new philosophical discipline, -of which Aristotle had no conception. Philosophy is the science of what exists, developed -from its own principles or reasons. But what the Philosophers advance, about the high -Spirit-world and the Divine Essence, does not correspond thereto: that which they -say on these subjects is incapable of proof. We know our world of men much better; -and a more certain deliverance may be given regarding it, by means of observation -<span class="pageNum" id="pb204">[<a href="#pb204">204</a>]</span>and inner mental experience. Here facts permit of being authenticated, and their causes -discovered. Now, so far as the latter process is feasible in History, <i>i.e.</i> so far as historical events are capable of being traced back to their causes, and -historical laws capable of being discovered, History deserves actually to be called -Science and a part of Philosophy. Thus the idea of History as Science clearly emerges. -It has nothing to do with curiosity, frivolousness, general benefit, edifying effect -&c. It should, although in the service of the higher purposes of life, determine nothing -except facts, endeavouring to find out their causal nexus. The work must be done in -a critical, unprejudiced spirit. The governing principle which rules here is this,—that -the cause corresponds to the effect,—that is to say, that like events presuppose the -same conditions, or, that under the same circumstances of civilization the like events -will occur. Now, as it is a probable assumption that the nature of men and of society -undergoes no change by the advance of time, or no considerable change, a living comprehension -of the present is the best means of investigating the past. That which is fully known -and is under our very eyes permits us to form retrospective conclusions in regard -to the less fully known events of an earlier time: it promises even a glance into -the future. In every instance, therefore, tradition must be tested by the present; -and if it tells us of things which are impossible now, we must for that very reason -doubt its truth. Past and Present are as like one another as two drops of water. If -understood absolutely, that might have been said even by Ibn Roshd. But according -to Ibn Khaldûn it is only quite generally valid as a principle of research. In detail -it <span class="pageNum" id="pb205">[<a href="#pb205">205</a>]</span>suffers many a limitation; and in any case it has itself to be established by facts. -</p> -<p id="p7.1.5">5. What then is the subject of History as a philosophical discipline? Ibn Khaldûn -answers that it is the Social life,—the collective, material and intellectual culture -of Society. History has to show how men work and provide themselves with food, why -they contend with each other and associate in larger communities under single leaders, -how at last they find in a settled life leisure for the cultivation of the higher -arts and sciences, how a finer culture comes into bloom in this way out of rude beginnings, -and how again this in time dies away. -</p> -<p>The forms of Society which replace one another are, in the opinion of Ibn Khaldûn; -1) Society in the Nomad condition; 2) Society under a Military Dynasty; and 3) Society -after the City type. The first question is that of food. Men and nations are differentiated -by their economical position, as nomads, settled herdsmen, agriculturists. Want leads -to rapine and war, and to subjection to a monarch who will lead them. Thus dynastic -authority is developed. This again founds for itself a city, where division of labour -or mutual assistance produces prosperity. But this prosperity leads to degenerate -idleness and luxury. Labour has in the first place brought about prosperity; but now, -at the highest stage of civilization, men get others to labour for them, and often -without any direct equivalent, because regard or even servility to the upper classes, -and extortionate treatment of the lower, secure success. But, all the same, men are -coming to depend upon others. Needs are always growing more clamant, and taxes more -oppressive. Rich spendthrifts and tax-payers grow poor, and <span class="pageNum" id="pb206">[<a href="#pb206">206</a>]</span>their unnatural life makes them ill and miserable.<a class="noteRef" id="xd31e4233src" href="#xd31e4233">1</a> The old warlike customs have been refined away, so that people are no longer capable -of defending themselves. The bond,—formed by a sense of belonging to one community, -or the bond of Religion,—by the help of which the necessity and the will of the chief -knit the individual members together in older days, is relaxed, for the citizens are -not pious. Everything, therefore, is ready to break up from within. And then appears -a new and powerful nomad race from the desert, or a people not so greatly over-civilized, -but possessed of a firmer public spirit; and it falls upon the effeminate city. Thereafter -a new State is formed, which appropriates the material and intellectual wealth of -the old culture, and the same history is repeated. It fares with States and the larger -associations of men, just as with single families: their history is brought to a close, -in from three to six generations. The first generation founds; the second maintains, -as perhaps the third or even farther generations also do; the last demolishes. That -is the cycle of all civilization. -</p> -<p id="p7.1.6">6. According to August Müller the theory of Ibn Khaldûn is in conformity with the -history of Spain, West Africa and Sicily, from the eleventh to the fifteenth century,—from -the study of which, in fact, it was taken. His own historical work is a compilation, -it is true. In detail he is often at fault, when he criticizes tradition with the -help of his theory; but there is an abundance of fine psychological <span class="pageNum" id="pb207">[<a href="#pb207">207</a>]</span>and political observation in his philosophical Introduction, and as a whole it is -a masterly performance. The ancients never dealt thoroughly with the problem of History. -They have bequeathed to us great works of art in their historical compositions, but -no philosophical establishment of History as a Science. That mankind, though existing -from all eternity, long failed to attain to much of the higher civilization, was explained -by elementary occurrences, such as earthquakes, floods, and the like. On the other -hand Christian philosophy regarded History with its vicissitudes as the realization -of, or the preparation for, the kingdom of God upon the earth. Now Ibn Khaldûn was -the first to endeavour,—with full consciousness and in a statement amply substantiated,—to -derive the development of human society from proximate causes. The conditions of race, -climate, production of commodities, and so on, are discussed, and are set forth in -their effect upon the sensuous and intellectual constitution of man and of society. -In the course which is run by civilization he finds an intimate conformity to Law. -He searches everywhere for natural causes, with the utmost completeness which was -possible for him. He also asserts his belief that the chain of causes and effects -reaches its conclusion in an Ultimate Cause. The series cannot go on without end, -and therefore we argue that there is a God. But this deduction, as he calls it, properly -means this,—that we are not in a position to become acquainted with all things and -the manner of their operation: it is virtually a confession of our ignorance. Conscious -ignorance is even a kind of knowledge; but knowledge should be pursued, as far as -possible. In clearing the way for his new science, <span class="pageNum" id="pb208">[<a href="#pb208">208</a>]</span>Ibn Khaldûn considers that he has merely indicated the main problems, and merely suggested -generally the method and the subject of the science. But he hopes that others will -come after him to carry on his investigations and propound fresh problems, with sound -understanding and sure knowledge. -</p> -<p>Ibn Khaldûn’s hope has been realized, but not in Islam. As he was without forerunners, -he remained without successors. But yet his work has been of lasting influence in -the East. Many Muslim statesmen who, from the fifteenth century onwards, drove so -many a European sovereign or diplomatist to despair, had studied in our philosopher’s -school. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div id="s7.2" class="div2 section"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#xd31e2095">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h3 class="main"><span class="divNum">2.</span> <span class="sc">The Arabs and Scholasticism.</span></h3> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p id="p7.2.1" class="first">1. To the victor belongs the bride. In the wars which were waged in Spain between -Christians and Muslims, the former had often come under the influence of the attractions -of Moorish fair ones. Many a Christian knight had celebrated “the nine-days’ religious -rite” with a Moorish woman. But besides material wealth and sensual enjoyment, the -charm of intellectual culture had also its effect upon the conqueror. And Arab Science -thus presented the appearance of a lovely bride to the eyes of many men who felt their -want of knowledge. -</p> -<p>It was the Jews especially who played the part of matchmakers in the transaction. -The Jews had participated in all the transformations of Muslim intellectual culture: -many of them wrote in Arabic, and others translated Arabic writings into Hebrew; not -a few philosophical works by Muslim authors owe their preservation to the latter circumstance. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb209">[<a href="#pb209">209</a>]</span></p> -<p>The development of this Jewish study of philosophy culminated in Maimonides (1135–1204), -who sought, chiefly under the influence of Farabi and Ibn Sina, to reconcile Aristotle -with the Old Testament. In part he expounded the doctrines of philosophy from the -text of revelation, and in part he restricted the Aristotelian philosophy to what -belongs to this earth, while a knowledge of that which is above it, had to be gained -from the Word of God. -</p> -<p>In the various Muslim States, at the time when they were most flourishing, the Jews -had shewn an interest in scientific work, and they had not only been tolerated, but -even regarded with favour. Their position, however, was altered, when those States -were together overthrown, and when the decline of their civilization ensued. Expelled -by fanatical mobs they fled for refuge to Christian lands, and particularly to Southern -France, there to fulfil their mission as the disseminators of culture. -</p> -<p id="p7.2.2">2. The Muslim world and the Christian world of the West came into contact at two points,—in -Lower Italy and in Spain. At the court of the Emperor Frederick II in Palermo, Arab -science was eagerly cultivated and made accessible to Latinists. The Emperor and his -son Manfred presented the Universities of Bologna and Paris with translations of philosophical -works, partly rendered from the Arabic, and partly direct from the Greek. -</p> -<p>Of much greater importance and influence, however, was the activity of translators -in Spain. In Toledo, which had been re-captured by the Christians, there existed a -rich Arabic Mosque-library, the renown of which, as a centre of culture, had penetrated -far into the Christian <span class="pageNum" id="pb210">[<a href="#pb210">210</a>]</span>countries of the North. Arabs of mixed lineage and Jews, some of them converts to -Christianity, worked together there, along with Spanish Christians. Fellow-workers -were present from all countries. Thus co-operated as translators, for example, Johannes -Hispanus and Gundisalinus (first half of the twelfth century), Gerard of Cremona (1114–1187), -Michael the Scot and Hermann the German (between 1240 and 1246). We are not yet in -possession of sufficiently detailed information regarding the labours of these men. -Their translations may be called faithful, to the extent that every word in the Arabic -original, or the Hebrew (or Spanish?) version has some Latin word corresponding to -it; but they are not generally distinguished by an intelligent appreciation of the -subject matter. To understand these translations thoroughly is a difficult thing, -for one who is not conversant with Arabic. Many Arabic words which were taken over -as they stood, and many proper names, disfigured beyond recognition, flit about with -the air of ghosts. All this may well have produced sad confusion in the brains of -Latinist students of Philosophy; and the thoughts, which were being disclosed afresh, -had themselves at least an equally perplexing tendency. -</p> -<p>The activity of translators kept pace generally with the interest shewn by Christian -circles, and this interest followed a development similar to that which we had occasion -to observe in Eastern and Western Islam (cf. <a href="#p6.1.2">VI, 1 § 2</a>). The earliest translations were those of works on Mathematical Astrology, Medicine, -Natural Philosophy, and Psychology, including Logical and Metaphysical material. As -time went on, people restricted themselves more to Aristotle and commentaries upon -him; but, at first, a <span class="pageNum" id="pb211">[<a href="#pb211">211</a>]</span>preference was shewn for everything that met the craving for the marvellous. -</p> -<p>Kindi became known chiefly as a physician and an astrologer. Ibn Sina produced a notable -effect by his ‘Medicine’, and his empirical psychology, and also by his Natural Philosophy -and his Metaphysics. Compared with him, Farabi and Ibn Baddja exercised a less considerable -influence. Lastly came the Commentaries of Ibn Roshd (<i>Averroes</i>); and the reputation which they gained, along with that which was secured by Ibn -Sina’s Canon of Medicine, has been longest maintained. -</p> -<p id="p7.2.3">3. What then does the Christian Philosophy of the Middle Ages owe to the Muslims? -The answer to this question lies properly outside the scope of the present monograph. -It is a special task, which necessitates the ransacking of many folios, none of which -I have read. In general terms it may be affirmed that in the translations from the -Arabic a twofold novelty was disclosed to the Christian West. In the first place men -came to possess Aristotle, both in his Logic and in his Physics and Metaphysics, more -completely than they had hitherto known him. But still this circumstance was only -of passing importance, though stimulating for the moment, for erelong all his writings -were translated much more accurately, direct from the Greek into Latin. The most important -result, however, was—that from the writings of the Arabs, particularly of Ibn Roshd, -a peculiar conception of the Aristotelian doctrines, as constituting the highest truth, -came to the knowledge of men. This was bound to give occasion for contradiction, or -for compromise, between theology and philosophy, or even for denial of the <span class="pageNum" id="pb212">[<a href="#pb212">212</a>]</span>Church’s creed. Thus the influence of Muslim Philosophy upon the scholastic development -of Church dogma was partly of a stimulating, partly of a disintegrating character; -for, in the Christian world, philosophy and theology were not yet able to proceed -side by side in an attitude of mutual indifference, as doubtless happened in the case -of Muslim thinkers. Christian Dogmatic had adopted too much Greek Philosophy already -in the first centuries of its development, to admit of such an attitude: it could -even assimilate a little more. It was therefore relatively easier to get the better -of the simple teachings of Islam than the complicated dogmas of Christianity. -</p> -<p>In the twelfth century, when the influence of the Arabs commenced to operate in that -field, Christian Theology exhibited a Neo-Platonic, Augustinian character. That character -continued to be kept up with the Franciscans, even in the thirteenth century. Now -the Pythagorean-Platonic tendency, in Muslim thought, harmonized well with this. Ibn -Gebirol (<i>Avencebrol</i>, v. <a href="#p6.1.2">VI, 1 § 2</a>) was, for Duns Scotus, an authority of the first rank. On the other hand, the great -Dominicans, Albert and Thomas, who decided the future of the doctrine of the Church, -adopted a modified Aristotelianism, with which a good deal out of Farabi, but especially -out of Ibn Sina and Maimonides, agreed quite well. -</p> -<p>A more profound influence emanates from Ibn Roshd, but not till about the middle of -the thirteenth century, and, in fact, in Paris, the centre of the Christian scientific -education of that time. In the year 1256 Albertus Magnus writes against Averroes; -and fifteen years later Thomas Aquinas controverts the Averroists. Their leader is -Siger <span class="pageNum" id="pb213">[<a href="#pb213">213</a>]</span>of Brabant (known from 1266), member of the Parisian Faculty of Arts. He does not -shrink from the rigorous, logical results of the Averroist system. And just as Ibn -Roshd censures Ibn Sina, so Siger criticizes the great Albert and the saintly Thomas, -although in terms of the utmost respect. It is true that he asseverates his submission -to Revelation; but still, his reason confirms what Aristotle,—as he is expounded, -in doubtful cases, by Ibn Roshd,—has taught in his works. This subtle intellectualism -of his, however, does not please the theologians. At the instance of the Franciscans, -it would seem, who perhaps wished also to strike at the Aristotelianism of the Dominicans, -he was persecuted by the Inquisition, till he died in prison at Orvieto (<i>circa</i> 1281–1284). Dante, who possibly knew nothing of his heresies has placed Siger in -Paradise as the representative of secular wisdom. The two champions of Muslim Philosophy, -on the other hand, he met with in the vestibule of the Inferno, in the company of -the great and wise men of Greece and Rome. Ibn Sina and Ibn Roshd there end the series -of the great men of heathendom, towards whom succeeding ages, like Dante, have so -often lifted up their eyes in admiration. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb214">[<a href="#pb214">214</a>]</span> </p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div class="footnotes"> -<hr class="fnsep"> -<div class="footnote-body"> -<div id="xd31e4233"> -<p class="footnote"><span class="fnlabel"><a class="noteRef" href="#xd31e4233src">1</a></span> Ibn Khaldûn speaks only of rich people who have grown poor, and says nothing of the -misery of the proletariate, and that which prevails in large cities, as we know it. -He lived too in smaller cities, for the most part, and till late in life admired Cairo -from a distance. <a class="fnarrow" href="#xd31e4233src" title="Return to note 1 in text.">↑</a></p> -</div> -</div> -</div> -</div> -</div> -<div class="back"> -<div class="div1 index"><span class="pageNum">[<a href="#toc">Contents</a>]</span><div class="divHead"> -<h2 class="main">INDEX OF PERSONAL NAMES.</h2> -</div> -<div class="divBody"> -<p class="first">Abdallâh ibn Maimûn, <a href="#pb82" class="pageref">82</a>. -</p> -<p>Abdallâh ibn Masarra, <a href="#pb174" class="pageref">174</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Abdallâh al-Khwarizmî, <a href="#pb171" class="pageref">171</a>. -</p> -<p>Abdalmasîkh ibn Abdallâh Naima al-Himsî, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>. -</p> -<p>Abdalwâhid, <a href="#pb201" class="pageref">201</a>. -</p> -<p>Abderrakhmân ibn Moawiya, <a href="#pb172" class="pageref">172</a>. -</p> -<p>Abderrakhmân III, <a href="#pb173" class="pageref">173</a> <i>sq.</i> -</p> -<p>Abharî, <a href="#pb171" class="pageref">171</a>. -</p> -<p>Abraham, <a href="#pb84" class="pageref">84</a>. -</p> -<p>Abubacer, <i>v.</i> <a href="#ibntofail">ibn Tofail</a>. -</p> -<p id="akhmed">Akhmed ibn Mohammed al-Tayyib al-Sarakhsî, <a href="#pb105" class="pageref">105</a>. -</p> -<p>Adudaddaula, <a href="#pb128" class="pageref">128</a>. -</p> -<p>Agathodaemon, <a href="#pb13" class="pageref">13</a>, <a href="#pb170" class="pageref">170</a>. -</p> -<p>Alâ addaula, <a href="#pb132" class="pageref">132</a>. -</p> -<p>abu-l-Alâ al-Maarî, <a href="#pb66" class="pageref">66</a>. -</p> -<p>Albertus Magnus, <a href="#pb212" class="pageref">212</a> <i>sq.</i> -</p> -<p>Alexander of Aphrodisias, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>, <a href="#pb104" class="pageref">104</a>, <a href="#pb189" class="pageref">189</a>. -</p> -<p>Alexander the Great, <a href="#pb7" class="pageref">7</a>, <a href="#pb21" class="pageref">21</a>. -</p> -<p>Alhazen, <i>v.</i> <a href="#ibnalhaitham">ibn al-Haitham</a>. -</p> -<p>Alî, <a href="#pb2" class="pageref">2</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb22" class="pageref">22</a>, <a href="#pb33" class="pageref">33</a>, <a href="#pb73" class="pageref">73</a>, <a href="#pb85" class="pageref">85</a>. -</p> -<p>Alî, the Almoravid, <a href="#pb176" class="pageref">176</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Alî, <i>v.</i> <a href="#ibnsina">ibn Sinâ</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Alî Isâ ibn Ishâq ibn Zura, <a href="#pb19" class="pageref">19</a>. -</p> -<p>Anaxagoras, <a href="#pb22" class="pageref">22</a>, <a href="#pb52" class="pageref">52</a>, <a href="#pb59" class="pageref">59</a>, <a href="#pb78" class="pageref">78</a>. -</p> -<p>Apollonius of Tyana, <a href="#pb175" class="pageref">175</a>. -</p> -<p>Aristotle, <a href="#pb13" class="pageref">13</a>, <a href="#pb15" class="pageref">15</a>–18, <a href="#pb21" class="pageref">21</a>–28, <a href="#pb58" class="pageref">58</a>, <a href="#pb72" class="pageref">72</a>, <a href="#pb78" class="pageref">78</a>, <a href="#pb89" class="pageref">89</a>, <a href="#pb98" class="pageref">98</a>, <a href="#pb104" class="pageref">104</a>, <a href="#pb106" class="pageref">106</a>, <a href="#pb109" class="pageref">109</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb117" class="pageref">117</a>, <a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb127" class="pageref">127</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb130" class="pageref">130</a>, <a href="#pb132" class="pageref">132</a>–135, <a href="#pb149" class="pageref">149</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb159" class="pageref">159</a>, <a href="#pb170" class="pageref">170</a>, <a href="#pb187" class="pageref">187</a>–190, <a href="#pb194" class="pageref">194</a>–197, <a href="#pb200" class="pageref">200</a>, <a href="#pb203" class="pageref">203</a>, <a href="#pb209" class="pageref">209</a>, <a href="#pb211" class="pageref">211</a>, <a href="#pb213" class="pageref">213</a>. -</p> -<p>Aryabhata, <a href="#pb146" class="pageref">146</a>. -</p> -<p>Asharî, <a href="#pb56" class="pageref">56</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb181" class="pageref">181</a>. -</p> -<p>abu-l-Atâhia, <a href="#pb65" class="pageref">65</a>. -</p> -<p>al-Aufi, <a href="#pb84" class="pageref">84</a>. -</p> -<p>Augustine, <a href="#pb157" class="pageref">157</a>, <a href="#pb163" class="pageref">163</a>. -</p> -<p>Avempace, <i>v.</i> <a href="#ibnbaddja">ibn Baddja</a>. -</p> -<p>Avencebrol, <i>v.</i> <a href="#ibngebirol">ibn Gebirol</a>. -</p> -<p>Averroes, <i>v.</i> <a href="#ibnroshd">ibn Roshd</a>. -</p> -<p>Avicenna, <i>v.</i> <a href="#ibnsina">ibn Sinâ</a>. -</p> -<p id="ibnbaddja">ibn Bâddja, <a href="#pb175" class="pageref">175</a> <i>sqq.</i>, <a href="#pb182" class="pageref">182</a>, <a href="#pb189" class="pageref">189</a>, <a href="#pb211" class="pageref">211</a>. -</p> -<p>Bakhya ibn Pakuda, <a href="#pb174" class="pageref">174</a>. -</p> -<p id="behmenyar">Behmenyar, <a href="#pb146" class="pageref">146</a> <i>sq.</i> -</p> -<p>abu Bekr, <a href="#pb2" class="pageref">2</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Bekr ibn Ibrâhîm, <a href="#pb176" class="pageref">176</a>. -</p> -<p>Bêrûnî, <a href="#pb133" class="pageref">133</a>, <a href="#pb145" class="pageref">145</a> <i>sq.</i> -</p> -<p>abu Bishr Mattâ ibn Yûnus al-Qannâî, <a href="#pb19" class="pageref">19</a>, <a href="#pb108" class="pageref">108</a>. -</p> -<p>Brahmagupta, <a href="#pb9" class="pageref">9</a>. -</p> -<p>Cardan, <a href="#pb101" class="pageref">101</a>. -</p> -<p>Cleopatra, <a href="#pb21" class="pageref">21</a>. -</p> -<p>Dante, <a href="#pb116" class="pageref">116</a>, <a href="#pb148" class="pageref">148</a>, <a href="#pb188" class="pageref">188</a>, <a href="#pb213" class="pageref">213</a>. -</p> -<p>David, <a href="#pb23" class="pageref">23</a>. -</p> -<p>Democritus, <a href="#pb78" class="pageref">78</a>. -</p> -<p>Dionysius Areopag., <a href="#pb16" class="pageref">16</a>, <a href="#pb63" class="pageref">63</a>. -</p> -<p>Djâhîz, <a href="#pb34" class="pageref">34</a>, <a href="#pb51" class="pageref">51</a>, <a href="#pb53" class="pageref">53</a> <i>sqq.</i> -</p> -<p>ibn Djebril, <a href="#pb19" class="pageref">19</a>. -</p> -<p>Djuzdjânî, <a href="#pb146" class="pageref">146</a>. -</p> -<p>Duns Scotus, <a href="#pb212" class="pageref">212</a>. -</p> -<p>Empedocles, <a href="#pb22" class="pageref">22</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb52" class="pageref">52</a>, <a href="#pb78" class="pageref">78</a>, <a href="#pb127" class="pageref">127</a>. -</p> -<p>Euclid, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>, <a href="#pb72" class="pageref">72</a>. -</p> -<p id="farabi">Fârâbî, <a href="#pb106" class="pageref">106</a> <i>sqq.</i>, <a href="#pb133" class="pageref">133</a>–136, <a href="#pb139" class="pageref">139</a><span class="corr" id="xd31e4795" title="Source: .">,</span> <a href="#pb142" class="pageref">142</a>, <a href="#pb145" class="pageref">145</a>, <a href="#pb149" class="pageref">149</a>, <a href="#pb156" class="pageref">156</a> <i>sqq.</i>, <a href="#pb170" class="pageref">170</a>, <a href="#pb174" class="pageref">174</a>, <a href="#pb177" class="pageref">177</a>, <a href="#pb179" class="pageref">179</a>, <a href="#pb189" class="pageref">189</a>, <a href="#pb199" class="pageref">199</a>, <a href="#pb209" class="pageref">209</a>, <a href="#pb211" class="pageref">211</a> <i>sq.</i> -<span class="pageNum" id="pb215">[<a href="#pb215">215</a>]</span></p> -<p>Fazârî, <a href="#pb9" class="pageref">9</a>. -</p> -<p>Firdausî, <a href="#pb133" class="pageref">133</a>, <a href="#pb155" class="pageref">155</a>. -</p> -<p>Frederick II, <a href="#pb201" class="pageref">201</a>, <a href="#pb209" class="pageref">209</a>. -</p> -<p>Galen, <a href="#pb13" class="pageref">13</a>, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>, <a href="#pb21" class="pageref">21</a>, <a href="#pb72" class="pageref">72</a>, <a href="#pb75" class="pageref">75</a>, <a href="#pb78" class="pageref">78</a>, <a href="#pb128" class="pageref">128</a>, <a href="#pb148" class="pageref">148</a>, <a href="#pb194" class="pageref">194</a>. -</p> -<p id="gazali">Gazâlî, <a href="#pb39" class="pageref">39</a>, <a href="#pb96" class="pageref">96</a>, <a href="#pb154" class="pageref">154</a> <i>sqq.</i>, <a href="#pb177" class="pageref">177</a>, <a href="#pb181" class="pageref">181</a>, <a href="#pb198" class="pageref">198</a>. -</p> -<p id="ibngebirol">ibn Gebirol, <a href="#pb174" class="pageref">174</a>, <a href="#pb212" class="pageref">212</a>. -</p> -<p>Gerard of Cremona, <a href="#pb210" class="pageref">210</a>. -</p> -<p>Gundisalinus, <a href="#pb210" class="pageref">210</a>. -</p> -<p id="ibnalhaitham">ibn al-Haitham, <a href="#pb148" class="pageref">148</a> <i>sqq.</i> -</p> -<p>al-Hakam II, <a href="#pb173" class="pageref">173</a>. -</p> -<p>al-Hâkim, <a href="#pb149" class="pageref">149</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Hâmid, <i>v.</i> <a href="#gazali">Gazâlî</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Hanîfa, <a href="#pb36" class="pageref">36</a> <i>sq.</i> -</p> -<p>al-Haramain, Imâm, <a href="#pb156" class="pageref">156</a>. -</p> -<p>Harîrî, <a href="#pb67" class="pageref">67</a>. -</p> -<p>Hârûn, <a href="#pb4" class="pageref">4</a>, <a href="#pb9" class="pageref">9</a>, <a href="#pb65" class="pageref">65</a>. -</p> -<p>abu-l-Hasan Ali ibn Hârûn al-Zandjânî, <a href="#pb84" class="pageref">84</a>. -</p> -<p>abu-l-Hasan Behmenyar ibn <span class="corr" id="xd31e4994" title="Source: al-Mazzubân">al-Marzubân</span>, <i>v.</i> <a href="#behmenyar">Behmenyar</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Hâshim, <a href="#pb55" class="pageref">55</a>. -</p> -<p>Hermann the German, <a href="#pb210" class="pageref">210</a>. -</p> -<p>Hermes Trismegistus, <a href="#pb13" class="pageref">13</a>, <a href="#pb23" class="pageref">23</a>, <a href="#pb170" class="pageref">170</a>. -</p> -<p>Hippocrates, <a href="#pb13" class="pageref">13</a>, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>, <a href="#pb72" class="pageref">72</a>, <a href="#pb148" class="pageref">148</a>. -</p> -<p>Hobaish ibn al-Hasan, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>. -</p> -<p>Homer, <a href="#pb21" class="pageref">21</a>. -</p> -<p>Honain ibn Ishâq, <i>v.</i> <a href="#abuzaid">abu Zaid</a>. -</p> -<p>abu-l-Hudhail al-Allâf, <a href="#pb49" class="pageref">49</a>–53. -</p> -<p>Ishâq ibn Honain, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>. -</p> -<p>Jacob of Edessa, <a href="#pb15" class="pageref">15</a>. -</p> -<p>Jerome, <a href="#pb157" class="pageref">157</a>. -</p> -<p>Joannes Hispanus, <a href="#pb210" class="pageref">210</a>. -</p> -<p>John Philoponus, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>, <a href="#pb159" class="pageref">159</a>. -</p> -<p>John, St., <a href="#pb15" class="pageref">15</a>. -</p> -<p>Kakhtân, <a href="#pb98" class="pageref">98</a>. -</p> -<p>abu-l-Khair al-Hasan ibn al-Khammâr, <a href="#pb19" class="pageref">19</a>. -</p> -<p>ibn Khaldûn, <a href="#pb200" class="pageref">200</a> <i>sqq.</i> -</p> -<p>Khâlid ibn Yezîd, <a href="#pb17" class="pageref">17</a>. -</p> -<p>Khalîl, <a href="#pb34" class="pageref">34</a>. -</p> -<p>Khosrau Anosharwân, <a href="#pb14" class="pageref">14</a>, <a href="#pb16" class="pageref">16</a>. -</p> -<p>Lessing, <a href="#pb191" class="pageref">191</a>. -</p> -<p>Loqman, <a href="#pb7" class="pageref">7</a>, <a href="#pb23" class="pageref">23</a>. -</p> -<p>Mahmud of Ghazna, <a href="#pb6" class="pageref">6</a>. -</p> -<p>Maimonides, <a href="#pb153" class="pageref">153</a>, <a href="#pb209" class="pageref">209</a>, <a href="#pb212" class="pageref">212</a>. -</p> -<p>Mâlik, <a href="#pb36" class="pageref">36</a>, <a href="#pb173" class="pageref">173</a>. -</p> -<p>Mamûn, <a href="#pb4" class="pageref">4</a>, <a href="#pb17" class="pageref">17</a>, <a href="#pb43" class="pageref">43</a>, <a href="#pb65" class="pageref">65</a>. -</p> -<p>Manfred, <a href="#pb209" class="pageref">209</a>. -</p> -<p>Mâni, <a href="#pb78" class="pageref">78</a>. -</p> -<p>Mansûr, <a href="#pb4" class="pageref">4</a>, <a href="#pb9" class="pageref">9</a>, <a href="#pb17" class="pageref">17</a>, <a href="#pb19" class="pageref">19</a>, <a href="#pb65" class="pageref">65</a>. -</p> -<p>Mansûr ibn Ishâq, <a href="#pb77" class="pageref">77</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Mashar, <a href="#pb105" class="pageref">105</a>. -</p> -<p>ibn Maskawaih, <a href="#pb128" class="pageref">128</a> <i>sqq.</i>, <a href="#pb145" class="pageref">145</a>. -</p> -<p>Masûdî, <a href="#pb32" class="pageref">32</a>, <a href="#pb69" class="pageref">69</a>, <a href="#pb73" class="pageref">73</a>, <a href="#pb99" class="pageref">99</a>, <a href="#pb145" class="pageref">145</a>, <a href="#pb149" class="pageref">149</a>, <a href="#pb203" class="pageref">203</a>. -</p> -<p>Michael the Scot, <a href="#pb210" class="pageref">210</a>. -</p> -<p>Moawiya, <a href="#pb2" class="pageref">2</a> <i>sq.</i> -</p> -<p>Mohammed, <a href="#pb2" class="pageref">2</a>, <a href="#pb22" class="pageref">22</a>, <a href="#pb28" class="pageref">28</a>, <a href="#pb36" class="pageref">36</a>, <a href="#pb53" class="pageref">53</a>, <a href="#pb85" class="pageref">85</a>, <a href="#pb94" class="pageref">94</a>, <a href="#pb123" class="pageref">123</a>, <a href="#pb144" class="pageref">144</a>, <a href="#pb164" class="pageref">164</a>, <a href="#pb185" class="pageref">185</a>. -</p> -<p>Mohammed ibn Akhmed al-Nahradjûrî, <a href="#pb84" class="pageref">84</a>. -</p> -<p>Mohammed ibn Tumart, <a href="#pb181" class="pageref">181</a>. -</p> -<p>ibn al-Moqaffa, <a href="#pb9" class="pageref">9</a>, <a href="#pb17" class="pageref">17</a>, <a href="#pb34" class="pageref">34</a>. -</p> -<p>Muammar, <a href="#pb54" class="pageref">54</a> <i>sq.</i> -</p> -<p>Muqaddasî, <a href="#pb69" class="pageref">69</a>. -</p> -<p>Mustandjid, <a href="#pb148" class="pageref">148</a>. -</p> -<p>Mutadid, <a href="#pb105" class="pageref">105</a>. -</p> -<p>Mutanabbî, <a href="#pb66" class="pageref">66</a>. -</p> -<p>Mutawakkil, <a href="#pb44" class="pageref">44</a>, <a href="#pb98" class="pageref">98</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Nasr, <i>v.</i> <a href="#farabi">Fârâbî</a>. -</p> -<p>al-Nazzâm, <a href="#pb51" class="pageref">51</a>–53. -</p> -<p>Nizâm al-Mulk, <a href="#pb156" class="pageref">156</a>. -</p> -<p>Noah, <a href="#pb84" class="pageref">84</a>. -</p> -<p>Nûkh ibn Mansûr, <a href="#pb132" class="pageref">132</a>. -</p> -<p>Omar, <a href="#pb2" class="pageref">2</a>. -</p> -<p>Othmân, <a href="#pb2" class="pageref">2</a>. -</p> -<p>Paul, St., <a href="#pb15" class="pageref">15</a>. -</p> -<p>Paulus Persa, <a href="#pb16" class="pageref">16</a>. -</p> -<p>Peter the Cruel, <a href="#pb201" class="pageref">201</a>. -</p> -<p>Peter, St., <a href="#pb15" class="pageref">15</a>. -<span class="pageNum" id="pb216">[<a href="#pb216">216</a>]</span></p> -<p>Plato, <a href="#pb15" class="pageref">15</a>–18, <a href="#pb22" class="pageref">22</a>–25, <a href="#pb27" class="pageref">27</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb78" class="pageref">78</a>, <a href="#pb84" class="pageref">84</a>, <a href="#pb104" class="pageref">104</a>, <a href="#pb109" class="pageref">109</a>, <a href="#pb121" class="pageref">121</a>, <a href="#pb123" class="pageref">123</a>, <a href="#pb127" class="pageref">127</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb186" class="pageref">186</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb189" class="pageref">189</a>, <a href="#pb197" class="pageref">197</a>, <a href="#pb203" class="pageref">203</a>. -</p> -<p>Plotinus, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>, <a href="#pb25" class="pageref">25</a>. -</p> -<p>Plutarch, <a href="#pb16" class="pageref">16</a>, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>, <a href="#pb21" class="pageref">21</a>. -</p> -<p>Porphyry, <a href="#pb15" class="pageref">15</a>, <a href="#pb21" class="pageref">21</a>, <a href="#pb89" class="pageref">89</a>, <a href="#pb113" class="pageref">113</a>, <a href="#pb190" class="pageref">190</a>. -</p> -<p>Probus, <a href="#pb16" class="pageref">16</a>. -</p> -<p>Proclus, <a href="#pb27" class="pageref">27</a>, <a href="#pb159" class="pageref">159</a>. -</p> -<p>Ptolemy, <a href="#pb9" class="pageref">9</a>, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>, <a href="#pb72" class="pageref">72</a>. -</p> -<p>Pythagoras, <a href="#pb7" class="pageref">7</a>, <a href="#pb22" class="pageref">22</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb73" class="pageref">73</a>, <a href="#pb78" class="pageref">78</a>, <a href="#pb106" class="pageref">106</a>. -</p> -<p>Qazwînî, <a href="#pb171" class="pageref">171</a>. -</p> -<p>Qostâ ibn Lûqâ al-Balabakkî, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>, <a href="#pb20" class="pageref">20</a>. -</p> -<p>Râzî, <a href="#pb77" class="pageref">77</a> <i>sqq.</i>, <a href="#pb97" class="pageref">97</a>, <a href="#pb105" class="pageref">105</a>. -</p> -<p id="ibnroshd">ibn Roshd, <a href="#pb179" class="pageref">179</a>, <a href="#pb187" class="pageref">187</a> <i>sqq.</i>, <a href="#pb200" class="pageref">200</a>, <a href="#pb211" class="pageref">211</a>–213. -</p> -<p>ibn Sabîn, <a href="#pb201" class="pageref">201</a>. -</p> -<p>Saif addaula, <a href="#pb108" class="pageref">108</a>. -</p> -<p>al-Sarakhsî, <i>v.</i> <a href="#akhmed">Akhmed</a>. -</p> -<p>Scaliger, <a href="#pb148" class="pageref">148</a>. -</p> -<p>Sergius of Rasain, <a href="#pb15" class="pageref">15</a>. -</p> -<p>Shafiî, <a href="#pb37" class="pageref">37</a>. -</p> -<p>Shems addaula, <a href="#pb132" class="pageref">132</a>. -</p> -<p>Sibawaih, <a href="#pb33" class="pageref">33</a> <i>sq.</i> -</p> -<p>Siger of Brabant, <a href="#pb212" class="pageref">212</a> <i>sq.</i> -</p> -<p id="ibnsina">ibn Sinâ, <a href="#pb33" class="pageref">33</a>, <a href="#pb89" class="pageref">89</a>, <a href="#pb128" class="pageref">128</a>, <a href="#pb131" class="pageref">131</a> <i>sqq.</i>, <a href="#pb156" class="pageref">156</a>, <a href="#pb158" class="pageref">158</a>, <a href="#pb161" class="pageref">161</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb170" class="pageref">170</a>, <a href="#pb174" class="pageref">174</a>, <a href="#pb182" class="pageref">182</a>, <a href="#pb185" class="pageref">185</a>, <a href="#pb188" class="pageref">188</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb191" class="pageref">191</a>, <a href="#pb194" class="pageref">194</a>, <a href="#pb199" class="pageref">199</a>, <a href="#pb209" class="pageref">209</a>, <a href="#pb211" class="pageref">211</a> <i>sqq.</i> -</p> -<p>Socrates, <a href="#pb15" class="pageref">15</a> <i>sq.</i>, <a href="#pb22" class="pageref">22</a> <i>sqq.</i>, <a href="#pb84" class="pageref">84</a>, <a href="#pb95" class="pageref">95</a>, <a href="#pb104" class="pageref">104</a>, <a href="#pb127" class="pageref">127</a>, <a href="#pb146" class="pageref">146</a>, <a href="#pb189" class="pageref">189</a>. -</p> -<p>Solomon, <a href="#pb23" class="pageref">23</a>. -</p> -<p>Spinoza, <a href="#pb191" class="pageref">191</a>. -</p> -<p><span class="corr" id="xd31e5750" title="Source: Stephhen">Stephen</span> bar Sudaili, <a href="#pb63" class="pageref">63</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Sulaimân Mohammed ibn Mushîr al-Bustî, <a href="#pb84" class="pageref">84</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Sulaimân Mohammed ibn Tâhir ibn Bahrâm al-Sidjistânî, <a href="#pb126" class="pageref">126</a> <i>sqq.</i>, <a href="#pb174" class="pageref">174</a>. -</p> -<p>Tamerlane, <a href="#pb201" class="pageref">201</a>. -</p> -<p>Tauhîdî, <a href="#pb127" class="pageref">127</a>. -</p> -<p>Thâbit ibn Qorra, <a href="#pb34" class="pageref">34</a>. -</p> -<p>Themistius, <a href="#pb132" class="pageref">132</a>, <a href="#pb189" class="pageref">189</a>, <a href="#pb195" class="pageref">195</a>. -</p> -<p>Thomas Aquinas, <a href="#pb212" class="pageref">212</a> <i>sq.</i> -</p> -<p>Thucydides, <a href="#pb21" class="pageref">21</a>. -</p> -<p id="ibntofail">ibn Tofail, <a href="#pb181" class="pageref">181</a> <i>sqq.</i>, <a href="#pb187" class="pageref">187</a>. -</p> -<p>Uranius, <a href="#pb13" class="pageref">13</a>. -</p> -<p>Vitello, <a href="#pb150" class="pageref">150</a>. -</p> -<p>abu-l-Wafâ Mubasshir ibn Fâtik al-Qâid, <a href="#pb153" class="pageref">153</a>. -</p> -<p>abu-l-Walîd, <i>v.</i> <a href="#ibnroshd">ibn Roshd</a>. -</p> -<p>Wâthik, <a href="#pb77" class="pageref">77</a>. -</p> -<p>Yakhyâ ibn Bitrîq, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Yaaqûb Yûsuf, <a href="#pb181" class="pageref">181</a>, <a href="#pb187" class="pageref">187</a>. -</p> -<p>Yaunân, <a href="#pb98" class="pageref">98</a>. -</p> -<p>Yesdegerd II, <a href="#pb8" class="pageref">8</a>. -</p> -<p>Yohannâ ibn Hailân, <a href="#pb107" class="pageref">107</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Yûsuf Yaaqûb, <a href="#pb181" class="pageref">181</a>, <a href="#pb188" class="pageref">188</a>. -</p> -<p>Zaid ibn Rifâa, <a href="#pb84" class="pageref">84</a>. -</p> -<p id="abuzaid">abu Zaid Honain ibn Ishâq, <a href="#pb18" class="pageref">18</a>. -</p> -<p>abu Zakariyâ Yakhyâ ibn Adî al-Mantiq, <a href="#pb19" class="pageref">19</a>, <a href="#pb108" class="pageref">108</a>, <a href="#pb126" class="pageref">126</a>. -</p> -<p>Zoroaster, <a href="#pb84" class="pageref">84</a>, <a href="#pb173" class="pageref">173</a>. -</p> -</div> -</div> -<div class="transcriberNote"> -<h2 class="main">Colophon</h2> -<h3 class="main">Availability</h3> -<p class="first">This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project -Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at <a class="seclink xd31e44" title="External link" href="https://www.gutenberg.org/" rel="home">www.gutenberg.org</a>. -</p> -<p>This eBook is produced by the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at <a class="seclink xd31e44" title="External link" href="https://www.pgdp.net/">www.pgdp.net</a>. -</p> -<p>The German original, <i lang="de"><a class="pglink xd31e44" title="Link to Project Gutenberg ebook" href="https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/54679">Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam</a></i>, is also available from Project Gutenberg. -</p> -<p>Scans of this work are available from the Internet Archive (copy <a class="seclink xd31e44" title="External link" href="https://archive.org/details/historyofphiloso00boer">1</a>, <a class="seclink xd31e44" title="External link" href="https://archive.org/details/thehistoryofphil00boeruoft">2</a>). -</p> -<h3 class="main">Metadata</h3> -<table class="colophonMetadata" summary="Metadata"> -<tr> -<td><b>Title:</b></td> -<td>The history of philosophy in Islam</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><b>Author:</b></td> -<td>Tjitze Jacobs de Boer (1866–1942)</td> -<td><a href="https://viaf.org/viaf/12674288/" class="seclink">Info</a></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><b>Translator:</b></td> -<td>Edward R. Jones</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><b>Publication date:</b></td> -<td>2021-10-17</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><b>Language:</b></td> -<td>English</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><b>Original publication date:</b></td> -<td>1903</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><b>Keywords:</b></td> -<td>Islamic philosophy -- History</td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><b>Project Gutenberg:</b></td> -<td><a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/66566" class="seclink">66566</a></td> -<td></td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td><b>QR-code:</b></td> -<td colspan="2"><img src="images/qr66566.png" alt="QR-code of Project Gutenberg URL" width="148" height="148"></td> -</tr> -</table> -<h3 class="main">Revision History</h3> -<ul> -<li>2021-10-16 Started. </li> -</ul> -<h3 class="main">External References</h3> -<p>This Project Gutenberg eBook contains external references. These links may not work -for you.</p> -<h3 class="main">Corrections</h3> -<p>The following corrections have been applied to the text:</p> -<table class="correctionTable" summary="Overview of corrections applied to the text."> -<tr> -<th>Page</th> -<th>Source</th> -<th>Correction</th> -<th>Edit distance</th> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e227">VIII</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">].</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">.]</td> -<td class="bottom">2</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e827">X</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">61</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">71</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2263">5</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">North Africa</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">North-Africa</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2266">5</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">The</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">the</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2330">8</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">identifiying</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">identifying</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2337">9</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Pantshatantra</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Panchatantra</td> -<td class="bottom">2</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2364">12</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom"> -[<i>Not in source</i>] -</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">3. </td> -<td class="bottom">3</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2371">13</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">mathemathical</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">mathematical</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2431">16</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">possses</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">possess</td> -<td class="bottom">2</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2610">31</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom"> -[<i>Not in source</i>] -</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">1. </td> -<td class="bottom">3</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2649">35</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">caligraphy</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">calligraphy</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2676">37</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2961">62</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3140">84</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3710">147</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3807">157</a>, <a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3820">158</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom"> -[<i>Not in source</i>] -</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">.</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2725">38</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">)</td> -<td class="width40 bottom"> -[<i>Deleted</i>] -</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e2831">45</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">coincidently</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">coincidentally</td> -<td class="bottom">2</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3063">73</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom"> -[<i>Not in source</i>] -</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">2. </td> -<td class="bottom">3</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3164">88</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Encylopaedia</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Encyclopaedia</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3170">89</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Metaphics</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Metaphysics</td> -<td class="bottom">2</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3232">96</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Assasins</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Assassins</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3365">105</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">government official</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">government-official</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3489">119</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">discusion</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">discussion</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3532">124</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">orginates</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">originates</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3592">132</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">accomodation</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">accommodation</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3684">144</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">abone</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">above</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3701">146</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">And</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">and</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3772">152</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">,</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">.</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3834">160</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">aud</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">and</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3867">164</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">posssesses</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">possesses</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e3878">166</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">usefal</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">useful</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e4036">182</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Ptolemaie</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Ptolemaic</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e4049">183</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Accomodating</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Accommodating</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e4070">185</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">comtemplation</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">contemplation</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e4082">186</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">bestows</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">pays</td> -<td class="bottom">6</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e4146">193</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom"> -[<i>Not in source</i>] -</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">’</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e4795">214</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">.</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">,</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e4994">215</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">al-Mazzubân</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">al-Marzubân</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="width20"><a class="pageref" href="#xd31e5750">216</a></td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Stephhen</td> -<td class="width40 bottom">Stephen</td> -<td class="bottom">1</td> -</tr> -</table> -</div> -</div> -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will 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