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diff --git a/old/66305-0.txt b/old/66305-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 4e8e7b9..0000000 --- a/old/66305-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7751 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of Machine-Gun Tactics, by R. V. K. Applin - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Machine-Gun Tactics - -Author: R. V. K. Applin - -Release Date: September 14, 2021 [eBook #66305] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: deaurider, John Campbell and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The Internet - Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MACHINE-GUN TACTICS *** - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. - - Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been - placed at the end of the book. - - A superscript is denoted by ^, for example 15^x or 12^{th}. - - A subscript is denoted by _{x}, for example a_{2} or CHCl_{3}. - - Basic fractions are displayed as ½ ⅓ ¼ etc; other fractions are shown - in the form a/b, for example 1/25. - - All changes noted in the ERRATA on page vii have been applied to the - etext. - - Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. - - - - - MACHINE-GUN TACTICS - - - BY - - CAPTAIN R. V. K. APPLIN, D.S.O. - - 14th (King’s) Hussars - - - LONDON - HUGH REES, LTD., 119 PALL MALL, S.W. - 1910 - - - - - PRINTED BY - HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD., - LONDON AND AYLESBURY. - - - - - PREFACE - - -This book, which was begun five years ago, is now published because -I feel that, with all its faults, it may bring into greater -prominence the latent possibilities of the machine gun, and the -vital necessity for the most complete organisation and tactical -training of the detachments. - -I desire to express my great indebtedness to Captain C. O. Place, -D.S.O., Royal Engineers, who undertook the work of editing and -preparing the book for the press at a moment’s notice on my sailing -for India. - - R. V. K. APPLIN. - - R.I.M.S. “NORTHBROOK,” - _December 1st, 1909_. - - - - - CONTENTS - - - CHAP. PAGE - - I. DESCRIPTION AND ORGANISATION 1 - - II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 28 - - III. WITH INDEPENDENT CAVALRY 57 - - IV. WITH PROTECTIVE CAVALRY 86 - - V. EMPLOYMENT WITH INFANTRY 105 - - VI. EMPLOYMENT WITH INFANTRY (_cont._) 130 - - VII. IN FORTRESS WARFARE 144 - - VIII. IN MINOR OPERATIONS 161 - - IX. MACHINE GUNS OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 187 - - - - - LIST OF PLATES AND DIAGRAMS - - - FACING PAGE - - MACHINE GUN ON ADJUSTABLE TRIPOD BEHIND COVER. - FRONT VIEW 224-5 - - MACHINE GUN ON ADJUSTABLE TRIPOD BEHIND COVER. - VIEW FROM REAR 224-5 - - MAP OF PORT ARTHUR 266 - - PAGE - - DIAGRAM TO SHOW THE ZONE BEATEN BY 50 PER CENT. - OF BULLETS 5 - - DIAGRAM TO SHOW THE DISPERSION OF BULLETS 6 - - DIAGRAM TO SHOW FORMATION WHEN COMING INTO POSITION 39 - - DIAGRAM TO SHOW METHOD OF LAYING BY AIMING POSTS 51 - - DIAGRAM TO OBTAIN ANGLE OF SIGHT _m_ 53 - - DIAGRAM OF JAPANESE MACHINE-GUN TRIPOD MOUNT 251 - - - - - ERRATA - - - -----------------+-----+-----+-------------------------------------- - Error |Page |Line | Correction - -----------------+-----+-----+-------------------------------------- - “firing” | 4 | 20 | finding - “to” | 6 | 4 | delete - “short” | 27 | 17 | shorter - “25” | 35 | 20 | 125 - “G to O” | 53 | 9 | O to G; - “VIII” | 65 | 26 | I - “training” | 72 | 1 | turning - “distance” | 116 | 5 | distant - “work.” | 160 | 1 | works - “the” | 163 | 2 | delete (_i.e._ “attack in mass”) - “line” (omitted) | 177 | 27 | insert word “line” after “blockhouse” - “portable” | 174 | 28 | potable - (Sentence wrong) | 179 | 27 | “an event which has happened - | | | almost every decade.” - “1 ft.” | 196 | 22 | 1 ft. 6 in. - “natural” | 221 | 5 | mutual - “gear” | 226 | 15 | gun - “ground” | ” | 19 | gun - “screen” | 227 | 13 | screw - “it placed” | 231 | 12 | is - “attacked” | 238 | 8 | attached - ·26 | 251 | 3 | ·256 - “strap” | 252 | 5 | strip - ----------------+----+----+----------------------------------------- - - - - -MACHINE-GUN TACTICS - - - - -CHAPTER I - -DESCRIPTION AND ORGANISATION - - -The modern machine gun is essentially an automatic weapon of -small-arm calibre, capable of firing from 100 to 600 shots a minute -from a light mounting of extreme mobility, and should fulfil the -following qualifications: - -1. It should be able to deliver about 400 shots a minute without -loss of accuracy, even with prolonged “continuous” firing. - -2. It should be capable of accompanying cavalry and infantry -wherever these arms can go; it should occupy the smallest space, -and be able to come into action quickly at rifle range. - -3. It should have a firm mounting, upon which the gun is steady, -and from which it can be aimed rapidly and fired while kneeling, -sitting, or lying. - -4. The gun and its mounting must present a small target, and be -light enough for each, and if possible, both, to be carried by one -man for a considerable distance, and should admit of being dragged -by a man crawling or crouching for short distances. - -5. It should be in constant readiness for action, and able when -limbered up to open fire in less than thirty seconds. - -6. It should be simple, strong, and durable. Mobility and constant -readiness for action are indispensable with cavalry, while -lightness and smallness of target are essential factors. - -There are eight main types of machine guns at present in use in the -armies of the world, viz.: - - Gun. In use in - Maxim Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Italy, Portugal, - Turkey, Switzerland, and U.S.A. - Hotchkiss France, Japan, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, - Spain, and Portugal. - Perino Italy. - Puteaux France. - Schwarzlose Austria. - Skoda Japan and China. - Madsen Russia, Denmark (Rekyl pattern), and China - (for cavalry). - Colt By several countries in addition to adopted gun. - -The principal differences between these guns are: (_a_) The -automatic mechanism. (_b_) Method of loading. - -(_a_) may be divided into two classes: 1. _Recoil action_--the -Maxim, Perino, and the Madsen. 2. _Gas-pressure action_--the -Schwarzlose, Hotchkiss, Skoda, and Colt. - -(_b_) consists of three classes: 1. _Belt loaders_--the Maxim, -Schwarzlose, and Colt. 2. _Metal clip loaders_--Hotchkiss, Madsen, -Perino, and Puteaux. 3. _Hopper loaders_--the Skoda. - -Several of the above countries--notably Russia, Japan, France, and -Austria--have more than one pattern of gun in their service, and -it is difficult to say which they intend finally to adopt; but -Russia, since the war, has ordered several thousand Madsen guns, -and Japan is said to be trying this gun, one of which during the -war fired 25,000 shots in a single day. - -The Rexar gun has been purposely omitted; it only weighs 17½ lb., -but is fired from the shoulder, and is therefore more of the nature -of an automatic rifle than a machine gun. It would take too long -to deal with each of these weapons separately, therefore the Maxim -has been selected as the type with which to discuss the question of -tactics. - -In order thoroughly to understand the methods that should govern -the tactical employment of machine guns, and their place in the -battlefield, it is first necessary clearly to realise their nature -and potentialities, and for this purpose we will examine their -principal characteristics. Guns of this class are capable of firing -service small-arm ammunition at the rate of 800 shots in one -minute, but this very high rate of fire is obviously undesirable -for several reasons--the principal, from a military point of view, -being that, however skilfully the gun is handled, a great waste of -ammunition must ensue, and hundreds of shots be wasted in space, -however accurate the fire. These guns are, therefore, regulated -to fire at a maximum rate of from 400 to 500 rounds a minute, or -seven to eight shots a second, but even this is greater than is -necessary to obtain the maximum fire effect; at ordinary targets -100 to 250 rounds a minute, according to the nature of the target, -has been found to give the best results in practice. The “rate of -fire” of a gun must not be confused with the number of rounds that -can be fired from it effectively in one minute; the necessity for -frequent pauses to observe the effect, to correct the elevation and -direction of the fire, prevent a greater number than from 150 to -250 shots being fired effectively in one minute from a gun whose -rate of fire is 450 shots a minute. Colonel Mayne, in his book _The -Infantry Weapon and its Use in War_, says: “The machine gun now in -use can fire about 600 rounds a minute, or ten a second. This is a -far greater rapidity of fire than is really necessary, for it means -that a man or horse is struck several times before falling. It is -a good thing to be able to fire 600 rounds a minute on occasions -(such as for range finding), but a far slower rate of fire (say 100 -rounds or even less a minute) is ample for all ordinary tactical -purposes against living beings and animals, whilst causing an -enormous saving of ammunition.” - -The extreme range of this type of gun is for all practical purposes -the same as the infantry rifle--about 3,500 yards--though it is -more effective at the longer ranges than an equal volume of rifle -fire, owing to the ease with which the firer can elevate and aim -the gun on its mountings and the stability of this mounting, which -causes it to have a beaten zone of only half the depth and nearly -half the width of that of infantry firing the same number of -rounds. This has been proved again by actual experiment at the -schools of musketry in England, India, and South Africa, while -very elaborate experiments and trials carried out in Germany with -the Maxim gun on the carriage adopted for that service proved that -the beaten zone was only one-sixth of that obtained by infantry, -probably because of the greater stability of their mounting. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM I - -TO SHOW THE ZONE BEATEN BY 50 PER CENT. OF BULLETS] - -In order that “fire” may be “effective,” it is necessary to bring -the enemy within the zone beaten by 75 per cent. of shots, and -it has been found by experiment that 25 per cent. of shots fall -immediately in front and behind the target, then 12½ per cent., 7½ -per cent., and, finally, 5 per cent. scattered far in front and -behind. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM II - -TO SHOW THE DISPERSION OF BULLETS] - -Infantry usually fire at the rate of three rounds a minute “slow,” -and fifteen rounds a minute “rapid”; “slow” fire is the ordinary -rate, and “rapid” fire can only be effectually maintained for about -four minutes; but this is when the firer is fresh, and has not -been subjected to several hours’ marching and fighting as would be -the case in battle, and it is doubtful if “rapid” fire can be kept -up on service for more than one-and-a-half to two minutes without -becoming wild and consequently ineffective. On the other hand, -“rapid” fire is less tiring to the machine gunner than “deliberate” -fire; the gun is held for him by the mounting, it loads and fires -itself, while elevation and direction are maintained without the -least exertion on his part by the elevating and traversing gears. - -In comparing the volume of fire of the machine gun with that of a -body of infantry, it is obvious that “rapid” cannot be taken as -the normal rate of infantry fire, as it can only be used for the -shortest periods, and even then it reduces the users to a state of -inefficiency as regards accuracy in two or three minutes. On the -other hand, “rapid” fire can only be used by the machine gunner on -special occasions, for tactical reasons which will be explained -later, so that it will be necessary to compare “slow” infantry fire -with “deliberate” fire from the machine gun, in order to arrive at -the mean fire volume of each. Seventy shots a minute can easily -be fired “deliberately” from a machine gun, and this could be -increased to 120 by highly trained gunners, but, taking the lower -figure, deliberate fire equals in volume the fire of twenty-four -men using rifles. But it must be always remembered that the object -of the fire fight is to bring a concentrated and overwhelming -fire to bear _at the right moment_ on certain positions of the -enemy, and when the moment arrives machine guns can and will use -the most rapid rate of fire possible, which will be from 250 to -300 rounds a minute or equal to that of 50 or 100 riflemen. Mere -volume of fire, however, is useless without control, accuracy, and -concentration, and it is here that the machine gun is so vastly -superior to the rifle; for amongst 50 men using their rifles there -can only be a small percentage of good shots, while even among the -good shots unforeseen factors, such as fatigue, bad fire positions, -excitement, wrong sighting, failure to see the target, etc., cause -a large percentage of the shots to go astray, and make it very -difficult to concentrate the fire on any particular position of the -enemy. - -An object-lesson to illustrate this superiority of the machine gun -has been carried out during each course at the South African school -of musketry under circumstances most favourable to the rifles. -The record of one such test, carried out on September 21st, 1904, -between a Maxim gun mounted on Mark III. tripod and 42 rifles -(Lee Enfield), was published. The machine gun was worked by two -sergeant-instructors, while the 42 rifles were fired by students -who were all, at least, 1st Class shots before joining the school, -and who for five weeks had been receiving daily instruction in -musketry, and had just completed a course of firing both on the -ranges (Table B) and in field-firing, and had gone through a course -of judging distance. The range was unknown--the number of rounds -unlimited, and the rate of fire “rapid.” The time was limited to -one minute, and the firers were allowed to charge their magazines -before starting. The targets were figures representing infantry in -line extended to two paces. The following was the result: - - Rounds Figures Percentage - fired. Hits. Percentage. hit. of loss. - Rifles 408 62 15·1 27 54 - Maxim 228 69 30·2 32 64 - -The small number of rounds fired by the Maxim was due to the -necessity of picking up the range by firing small groups of five -or ten shots and observing the strike of the bullets. What is -most interesting is that although the rifles fired nearly twice -as many shots as the machine gun, the latter made actually more -hits, while the percentage of loss inflicted was 10 per cent. -greater. The actual range was 1,000 yards. A similar experiment -was carried out during the annual training for 1908 in the U.S.A. -between 42 “sharpshooters” and a Maxim at the regulation “L” -target. The ranges were 600, 800, 1,000 yards; the sharpshooters -fired an average of 750 rounds at the three distances and made an -average of 429 hits, which gave a collective figure of merit of -59·09. The machine gun also fired 750 rounds, made 601 hits, giving -a collective figure of merit of 79·54, being 22·45 in favour of -the machine gun. The troops were armed with new rifles, and fired -the new “S” bullet, while the machine gun used the old pattern -ammunition and a barrel that had fired at least 7,000 shots. The -gun squad had no previous practice at this target, and the gun was -fired by different men at the several ranges. The collective fire -of the troop was “slow aimed,” while the fire of the machine gun -was “rapid continuous” for the number of rounds at each range. The -machine gun took 30 seconds to fire 250 shots at each range, or a -quarter that of the troop.[1] - -The two experiments are particularly interesting, as showing how -closely the results agree, although the conditions are dissimilar -in one respect: viz. that in the first case the number of rounds -was unlimited and the result had to be obtained within one minute; -while in the second case time was unlimited, but the number -of rounds fired by each was the same. The result of the two -experiments show that both in accuracy and rapidity a machine gun -is much superior to 42 picked shots, whether firing the same number -of rounds at known ranges or firing an unlimited number of shots in -a given time at an unknown range. We shall not be wrong, then, if -we say that a machine gun is at least equal to 50 rifles in fire -value,[2] but there are other factors to be considered as well as -fire effect in determining its tactical value, and it is in these -other factors that machine guns are so far superior to riflemen -as to make a reliable estimate of their relative value almost -impossible; these factors are: (1) Mobility; (2) Visibility; (3) -Vulnerability. - -_Mobility._--The mobility of the infantry soldier is limited to -the rate at which he can march, which on the battlefield is -about 100 yards a minute or less than three-and-a-half miles an -hour. Doubling may be left out of the question, as it quickly -reduces fire efficiency to a minimum. An experiment made in the -Austrian Army showed that the percentage of hits which was 76·5 per -cent. after an advance in quick time, fell to 51 per cent. after -doubling.[3] The mobility of the machine gun will depend almost -entirely on the way it is carried, and must not be judged by any -particular carriage which may happen to be in use for the time -being in our own service. A short description of these mountings -and their method of transport will be found in Chapter IX., but -none of them are entirely satisfactory. - -The infantry carriages are heavy, clumsy, and conspicuous, and -are the least mobile of all; they can hardly be moved out of a -walk without risk, and Marks III. and IV. cannot come into action -without first unharnessing the mule or horse, and they then have to -be dragged into position by the whole detachment--thus presenting -a most conspicuous and vulnerable target at the moment when least -desired and when concealment and invisibility are essential to -tactical success.[4] In the German Official Account of the late -Boer War, issued by the General Staff, is the following criticism -of this carriage: - -“Both sides have machine guns, but the rather clumsy mountings -of those used by the British offered too high a target, and so -prevented their being advanced from position to position during the -attack.” - -The tripod mounting, which is light and inconspicuous, is carried -with the gun on a limbered wagon; but the advantages of its -lightness and portability are almost neutralised by being carried -on a wagon, thus reducing its mobility by confining it to ground -suitable for wheeled vehicles. - -If used on a pack-saddle the difficulty of managing a led animal on -foot in the stress of battle may become insuperable, and moving the -gun in and out of action is entirely dependent on the docility of -the pack-animal. The gun weighs anything from 40 to 60 lb., while -the mountings need not weigh more than 34 lb. The combined weight -of a gun and mounting should never exceed 120 lb. and can be as -little as 74 lb. - -In whatever way it is decided to carry the gun, it is a _sine quâ -non_ that it must be at least as mobile as horse artillery. There -is no reason why it should not be as mobile as cavalry, and the -choice remains between a pack-horse with a mounted detachment or -a galloping carriage; and the former is in every way preferable, -principally because it can carry the gun and ammunition across any -country, and can come into action in less than 30 seconds on an -adjustable tripod, which can be carried by hand into any position -and presents a very small, inconspicuous target. - -The majority of foreign countries have adopted pack transport for -their machine guns. It is desirable with infantry and absolutely -essential with cavalry. A suitable saddle is, of course, -indispensable, and strong spiral springs to the hooks which hold -the gun and tripod on either side will entirely prevent horses from -straining their backs when galloping across country or jumping -obstacles with the guns. These hooks must be leather-covered and -made to fit the gun exactly, and, in order to do away with the -present cumbersome straps and buckles, they should have a hinged -attachment to close over the gun and lock automatically in such a -way as to admit of its being opened by a single movement when it -is required to dismount the gun. The Swiss and the Americans have -permanently adopted pack transport for the machine guns with their -cavalry, which are able to accompany them over any country without -detriment to either horses or guns; and in the American army the -average time for a well-trained cavalry machine-gun detachment to -go into action front, from mounted formation, unpack, and set up -the guns, load, aim, and open fire, is 25 seconds; while at the -departmental meeting for 1908 the machine guns of the 10th Cavalry, -from the halt in line, _moved forward in section column at a gallop -for 200 yards and went into action and fired a blank shot in 31 -seconds_.[5] - -This brings us to the second factor--_Visibility_. It is -absolutely necessary for the successful tactical employment of -machine guns that they should be as inconspicuous as possible -when in action; the gun itself is a very small object when close -to the ground, and its visibility will depend almost entirely on -the nature of mounting and its adaptability for use behind cover -of varying heights. All our infantry carriages are so conspicuous -as to be quite unconcealable except in defence, the wheels being -4 ft. 8 in. in diameter and the gun axis 3 ft. 6 in. above the -ground. The Mark IV. tripod is the handiest and least conspicuous -of the mountings at present in use in our service, and although it -weighs 48 lb. it can be carried into almost any position and easily -concealed. It can be adjusted to fire at any desired height between -14½ and 30 in. above the ground level, and consequently can be used -from behind any suitable cover. - -_Vulnerability._--The question of vulnerability would appear at -first to depend entirely on visibility; or, in other words, on -the target presented to the enemy’s fire, but this is only true -to a certain extent. To obtain the minimum vulnerability it is -of course necessary to have the gun as low and inconspicuous as -possible, because the less it can be seen and the better cover it -can obtain, the more difficult it will be to locate and hit. But -the true vulnerability of the gun in comparison with infantry lies -in the amount of front they occupy respectively; or in other words, -the breadth of the target exposed to the enemy and the percentage -of loss they can each sustain _without their fire effect being -reduced_. Infantry will never again fight in two ranks in civilised -warfare, and the closest formation possible for a firing line is -one pace per man; 50 men will therefore occupy a front of, roughly, -50 yards; in other words, the target presented to the enemy is 50 -yards in breadth, and, provided the elevation is correct, shots -striking anywhere within this 50 yards will be effective. The -machine gun, however, only occupies a front of from 4 ft. to 5 -ft. 2 in., or 1/25th _the front offered by infantry having equal -fire effect_. It is on this point that the wonderful tactical -possibilities of the machine gun rests: _the maximum of rifle -fire from the minimum of front_. It is obvious that 10 per cent. -of casualties in the infantry firing line reduce the fire effect -by just that amount, while from 30 to 40 per cent. will probably -silence its fire altogether or render it ineffective. The machine -gun, on the other hand, is unaffected by even 50 per cent. of loss, -while it can suffer 80 per cent. of loss without diminishing its -fire effect, though such a loss would of course cause it to lose -its mobility and seriously affect the morale of the gunners. A -machine-gun detachment consists of from 16 to 24 men, but only two -of them actually work the gun, and one man alone can fire the gun -once it is in action, the second man merely assisting him with the -ammunition, etc., but he is not absolutely necessary to the firing -of the gun. Thus we see that the killing of the gunner only causes -a momentary cessation of fire until another man takes his place, -when the fire is resumed without loss of intensity, accuracy, or -concentration. - -We are now in a position to form an accurate estimate of the -potentialities of the machine gun and its true tactical value as -compared with infantry, and we find: - - 1. Its fire effect 50 rifles at least. - 2. Its mobility Cavalry. - 3. Its visibility A file (2 men). - 4. Its vulnerability Unaffected by 50% of loss. - -Before discussing their place in battle and tactical use it will -be necessary to say a few words on the best methods of grouping -the guns and organising their detachments and the training of the -personnel in peace for the duties they will have to perform in war. -In our service two machine guns are issued to each regiment of -cavalry and battalion of infantry, and the detachment consists of: - - Cavalry. Infantry. - Subaltern 1 1 - Sergeant 1 1 - Corporal 1 1 - Privates 12 12 - Drivers 8 2 - Bâtmen 2 - - -- -- - 25 (1 officer) 17 (1 officer) - -This section of two guns is therefore the smallest tactical -unit, and the officer in command is solely responsible for the -training and efficiency of his section. It is therefore absolutely -essential that the machine-gun section commander should be a -subaltern of not less than three years’ service, specially selected -for his keenness, efficiency, and self-reliance, who has passed -the examination “C” for promotion, and who holds the special -machine-gun certificate from a School of Musketry. A “destroyer” -in the Royal Navy is commanded by a very junior officer, but he is -most carefully selected for similar qualities to those mentioned, -and is in addition required to possess the necessary professional -qualifications--consequently it is a command much sought after, -and competition enables the authorities to appoint the pick of the -service and thus obtain the maximum efficiency where efficiency is -the essence of successful employment in war. The best and nothing -but the best is necessary to the successful employment of machine -guns, and the importance of obtaining the very best officers as -section commanders is so great that there is reason to doubt the -utility of having machine guns at all if they are not commanded and -handled by those who are in every way expert in their use. - -In order to enable machine-gun sections to be trained in tactics -and to co-operate with larger units in war, it is essential that -they should be trained under a senior officer during peace. The -late Colonel Henderson said of the Volunteers in Mexico: “The -ideal of the battle is a combined effort directed by a well-trained -leader: as individuals they fought well; as organised bodies -capable of manœuvring under fire and of combined effort, they -proved to be comparatively worthless.” This is precisely the case -of regimental machine guns. It is easy enough to use a section or -even a single gun apart from its battery should occasion require, -but it is impossible to improvise a battery from a number of -separate sections. It is therefore essential before attempting the -tactical training of machine guns, much less their tactical use, -to organise them in batteries during peace. For this purpose it is -suggested that when a battalion is brigaded with others, either -for administration or training, the six or eight guns should be -formed into one or two batteries, under a selected field officer, -who would be solely responsible for their peace training and -tactical efficiency, and who would command them on manœuvres and -on service. There would be little or no innovation in this, as -our regimental signallers are at present trained and commanded on -similar lines under the divisional signalling officer. A cavalry -brigade under the present organisation (1909) would have one -battery of six guns, and an infantry brigade two batteries of four -guns each. The batteries of a Division would be commanded by the -divisional machine-gun commander. While such organisation would in -no way prevent the regimental machine-gun section being used with -its own unit as at present, it would ensure a very high standard -of tactical training, and enable the Divisional General to have a -splendid reserve in his own hands for use at the critical moment of -the fight as mobile as cavalry, in fire action more powerful than -infantry, occupying the smallest possible front, yet capable of -delivering a storm of some 10,000 bullets a minute with the maximum -of accuracy and concentration. - -The tactics in this book are based on the understanding that the -machine guns are trained on this system, and that they are mounted -on light, adjustable tripods and carried on trained pack-horses -with the entire detachment mounted. - -The failure of machine guns is due to two principal causes: (1) -Insufficient training in working the guns. (2) Improper tactical -employment. - -It will be obvious that unless the gun can be depended upon to open -fire with certainty and accuracy, and maintain it continuously -without jamming or mechanical failure, it is useless to consider -its tactical employment. The mechanism of the Maxim is somewhat -complicated and delicate, and depends for its proper working -upon the exact adjustment of each part; but no more so than any -other piece of modern machinery--it is far less complicated and -certainly far less delicate than the modern motor-car. Indeed, -the comparison is analogous in several respects, as both require -highly trained operators to ensure their smooth and continuous -working, and each individual machine, whether gun or motor, has -its own peculiarities and requires special study to obtain the best -results. Both are capable of hard and constant employment for long -periods, without breakdown or failure, in the hands of an expert. - -No one would think for one moment of engaging a chauffeur for a -high-class motor-car who had less than six months’ training and -experience, and who was not capable of stripping and adjusting -the motors and effecting minor repairs. It would be difficult to -find a machine-gun detachment with a single man who possessed even -these minimum qualifications. Apart from the mechanical knowledge -it must be remembered that the man who fires the gun, known as No. -I. in our service, has in his own hands the fire from 50 rifles, -and on his own judgment and skill as a shot will entirely depend -the effectiveness or otherwise of this fire; it stands to reason -therefore that he should be chosen primarily for his good shooting, -but, in addition to his skill in aiming, he must be a good judge -of distance and possess considerable intelligence, initiative, and -self-reliance; for although he will usually receive orders as to -target, range, rate of fire, and the moment for opening or ceasing -fire, it will often happen that he has to use his own judgment in -these very important matters. - -As the gun is generally required to move and come into action -independently of other troops, it must find its own scouts, who not -only have to safeguard it from surprise when moving, but must be -trained to select good positions whence it can come into action. -For this reason the men of the detachment must be trained scouts. - -To summarise: - -(1) Only marksmen should be chosen. - -(2) Trained scouts should be given the preference. - -(3) The whole detachment must be trained as range-finders and -scouts. - -(4) The whole detachment must be proficient in judging distance. - -(5) Only strong men should be selected. - -The strength of a machine-gun detachment is given in Chapter IX. -With the tripod mountings and pack transport the best _working_ -strength for a machine-gun section will be found to be the -following:-- - -1 officer, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 20 privates--that is, 1 -N.C.O. and 10 men to each gun. It is almost superfluous to say that -the whole detachment must be trained to work and fire the gun, and -should have a very thorough knowledge of its parts and mechanism, -and be experts at remedying failures and effecting minor repairs. -Until the whole detachment are so trained and can detect the cause -of any failure instantly and remedy the same in the minimum time -required, it is useless to attempt tactical training in the field. -The preliminary training will take from three to six months, -according to the ability of the instructor and the time available -daily for work. - -It will be found that certain men of the detachment are far more -skilful in laying and firing the gun than others, and it is -undoubtedly sound to specially train these men as gun-layers and to -permanently allot to the two best layers the duties of Nos. 1 and -2 (_i.e._ the firer and his assistant). This should be the post of -honour and coveted accordingly, and the two best gun-layers should -be awarded a distinguishing badge. As no badge is authorised by our -regulations, a lance stripe might be given to the best No. 1 of -each gun. - -In training the men of the section in the preliminary details -of working the guns, the following points may be found of use. -First frame a course of instruction for each day which will give -systematic and progressive individual instruction in the following -points: mechanism, name and use of every part, the working of the -mechanism, care of gun, stripping and fitting, loading and firing; -spare-part box, the name of each of its contents and recognition of -every part _when out of the box_; failures, their recognition and -remedy; gun-laying and firing, co-operation between layer, loader, -and observer. This course should last at least three months, -provided not less than two hours a day are available. Drills may -be combined with preliminary instruction at the end of the first -month, and must aim at extreme quickness in dismounting the gun -and opening _aimed_ fire and remounting the gun again. The chief -points in the preliminary training are that _all_ the detachment -are _equally_ instructed. Training on the 20-yard range in barracks -should take place during the third month, and special targets -should be used to teach laying the gun, slow use of elevating -gear and combined sights, traversing fire, fire control, rapid -change of target, indirect fire. During this short-range practice -the failures should be practically demonstrated, and firing on -the range should never take place without making a few artificial -failures to test the efficiency of the detachment. These failures -should be introduced by the officer himself without the knowledge -of the detachment, and should be so arranged as to occur naturally -while firing. They should be timed by him in each case, and the -record time for the remedy of each failure posted up in the -barrack-room with the man’s name. Artificial failures can easily -be made by filing round the base of a cartridge so that it is torn -off when fired; by loosening a bullet in a cartridge, by slightly -flattening a cartridge so as to cause it to jam in the chamber, by -wedging a cartridge in the belt, by introducing a blank cartridge, -and by repacking the asbestos with dry packing. It will be found -that by making two or three such jams every time the gun is taken -out to fire the detachment will soon become expert in recognising -and remedying failures. - -The men should be taught that failures may be divided into two -classes, viz. _avoidable_ and _unavoidable_. The occurrence of -an avoidable failure should be looked upon as a disgrace to the -firer. The _unavoidable_ failures so seldom occur that they are -negligible. - -The _avoidable_ failures are those due to (1) Fuzee spring -adjustment. (2) Want of oil. (3) Dirt. (4) Want of water. (5) Bad -packing. (6) Damaged ammunition. (7) Faults in feed due to badly -filled, new, or damaged belts. Each machine gun will be found to -work best with a certain weight of fuzee spring which can only -be found by trial, and this weight will change from time to time -as the gun wears. The machine gunner cannot be considered fit -for further training until he has become so familiar with his -gun that he can instantly tell by the sound if it is working at -its best; just as a chauffeur knows at once if his engines are -running perfectly, and can instantly detect the slightest defect -and make the necessary adjustment of the spark, petrol, or oil -to ensure smooth running. The unavoidable failures are so few -and rare that they will seldom be met with, and can be quickly -remedied, except the breaking of an important part. Failures due -to defective ammunition are extremely rare provided ordinary -precautions are taken to avoid placing damaged cartridges in the -belt. A breakage in any part of the lock can be remedied in a -few seconds by substituting the spare lock which should always -be _on the gun_ in action. The breaking of any other part of the -gun will be an accident of rare occurrence and, provided the gun -is properly inspected before use, may be more properly classified -under accidents than failures. A modern machine gun in the hands -of experts should never jam, while failure of automatic fire will -be rare and momentary. Until this standard has been reached a -machine-gun detachment cannot be considered fit to begin tactical -training. The Japanese in the late war were obliged to improvise -the detachments for their hastily acquired machine guns; and -Captain Matsuda, who commanded the machine guns with Prince Kanin’s -Cavalry Brigade, says: “Whereas at the battle of Peu-si-lau on -October 12th we had some trouble after firing 1,800 rounds, on -March 3rd the guns of one section after firing 11,000 rounds -continued to work perfectly. _The gunners were absolutely familiar -with their weapons._” Lieut.-General Sir C. J. Burnett, K.C.B., -remarked: “Like a good chauffeur, the Japanese machine gunner knows -all the peculiarities of the weapon he fires and can tell almost by -instinct when anything is going wrong.” It is almost superfluous -to say that the men of the machine-gun detachment must never be -changed or taken for any other work. Nothing has been said of the -necessity for training the detachment in the all-important duties -of scouting, range-taking, and horsemastership during this period, -but of course they are vital to ultimate success and must not be -neglected. - -Range practices will follow, and the peculiarities of the gun -and its fire effect must be carefully taught during this period. -The use of traversing and sweeping fire, combined sights, and -observation of fire and the use of deliberate fire in imitation -of rifle fire should be perfected during range practice, so that -they may be carried out under service conditions during the field -practices which follow. - -The tactical training should commence as soon as the field -practices have been completed. The course for this should be -carefully mapped out beforehand and should be based upon the -principles given in Chapter II. and in the chapter dealing with -the arm to which the section belongs, and should culminate in -divisional manœuvres. This course might follow the following -headings: - -(1) Drill over rough country. - -(2) Selecting a position. - -(3) Selecting alternate positions. - -(4) Taking up a position. - -(5) Screening guns. - -(6) Making artificial cover. - -(7) Mutual support (movement and fire). - -(8) Indirect fire. - -(9) A battery working on a wide front in mutual support. - -No drill for a battery has been authorised yet (1909), but the -simple formations of a troop as laid down in _Cavalry Training_ -will be found admirably suited for a battery of machine guns on -pack-horses with mounted detachment. - -The writer is fully aware of the condition under which machine guns -are officered and manned at present, and that a great error has -been made in estimating the time required to train the detachments. -The Germans, who have studied the question of machine guns with a -thoroughness far greater than that of any other nation, have made -them a separate arm of their service, under trained and permanent -gunners, and they evidently consider that only specialists can -attain the necessary efficiency. - -However this may be, it is certain that the officer, whether -commanding a section or the batteries of a Division, must be a -specialist and a highly trained one. - -An officer commanding a company of Russian machine guns in the -Russo-Japanese War, writing his experiences to the _Nouskin -Invalid_, says: - -“I have spent three years in studying machine guns, and consider -myself proficient in their use, but I have always been convinced -that the requisite skill and knowledge cannot be acquired in a -shorter time.” - -The commanding officer who at present looks upon his machine -guns in much the same light as he regards any other portion of -his first-line transport--a necessary encumbrance taking away an -officer and several men from their proper duties, and a source of -anxiety when the regiment goes into action--would regard them with -very different feelings if assured of their efficiency and relieved -of the responsibility for their tactics and safety. That this is -possible without altering the present organisation has been shown; -that it is absolutely essential for their efficient use in war it -is hoped to demonstrate in the chapters that follow. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -GENERAL PRINCIPLES - - -“Each arm has its special characteristics and functions, and is -dependent on the assistance of others; the full power of an army -can be exerted only when all its parts act in close combination, -and this is not possible unless the members of each arm understand -the characteristics of the other arms.” - -The above paragraph from _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., -1909, aptly illustrates a principle which should be impressed -upon every serious machine-gun student, for the principles of -machine-gun tactics are based upon those of the arm with which they -are co-operating. - -The machine gun cannot yet be regarded as a separate “arm” in our -service, nevertheless it possesses a power peculiar to itself; -and until this power is studied and thoroughly understood, the -principles that should govern its employment in the field cannot be -grasped, and consequently its effective use is dependent on chance -or accident, and for every success scored a dozen failures will -occur, any one of which may be fatal. The preceding chapter has -dealt with the peculiarities and power of the machine gun, and it -will be seen that it possesses the fire effect of the infantry arm -while it has several of the characteristics peculiar to artillery; -for instance, it is fired from a mounting by one man, and is moved -from position to position by draught or pack animals. - -We have seen that the chief characteristic of the machine gun is -its power of delivering the “maximum fire from the minimum front”; -this fire is of great volume and is highly concentrated, while it -can also be made to sweep a wide lateral surface of ground. The -gun’s narrow frontage in action renders it easy to conceal, and -when discovered it presents a very small and difficult target to -the enemy’s riflemen; on the other hand, when once discovered if it -cannot be moved unseen to another position it is liable to suffer a -prolonged and concentrated fire from the widely scattered riflemen -of the enemy, to which it cannot effectively reply, and which must -in time cause loss. Again, its range being limited, it is powerless -against artillery except under special circumstances at effective -rifle range. - -The general principles governing its tactical employment depend -upon three factors, viz. (1) the target, (2) the range, (3) the -position. - -The volume and concentration of its fire necessitate a large -and vulnerable target, or ammunition will be expended without -adequate results. The first essential is therefore to obtain this -description of target and to avoid firing on others which may -present themselves. - -A large and deep target might justify fire being opened at long -range, but such targets rarely present themselves on the modern -battlefield, and its vulnerability will partly depend on the -closeness of the range and partly on its formation. To obtain a -suitable target of this description _surprise_ is essential, and to -effect a surprise it will be necessary to conceal the gun and its -detachment in a well-chosen position. - -Thus we see the three cardinal points for tactical success -are--suitable _target_ at close _range_ from a concealed _position_. - - -FIRE EFFECT - -Napoleon’s maxim, that “fire is everything--the rest is of small -account,” is only applicable to the machine gun when the fire is -_effective_. Nothing is so useless and wasteful as ineffective -machine-gun fire, and the careful study of fire effect and how -to obtain the best results is imperative with this weapon. The -principles so ably stated in Colonel Mayne’s excellent book, _The -Infantry Weapon and its Use in War_, apply almost equally to -machine guns, and should be carefully studied by machine gunners, -particularly those chapters dealing with the employment of fire in -the field. - -We have already seen that the range of the machine gun is -practically the same as that of the infantry rifle, but that the -beaten zone is only half the depth and about half the width of the -collective fire of infantry, partly owing to the rigidity of the -mounting, and partly to the fact that the human error is greatly -reduced by being concentrated in the person of a single individual, -instead of being spread over some 50 men of varying temperament, -nerves, and aiming powers. - -In addition to these factors, the fire from machine guns is always -“collective” and “concentrated” unless deliberately dispersed -by the firer, while infantry fire is always “individual” and -“dispersed” unless controlled by fire discipline under a leader. -Fire discipline and fire control are in the hands of one man--there -is no need to point out the target to a scattered firing line, -and there is no delay in passing orders down the line, or in the -setting of 50 different sights for the correct elevation. Thus fire -can be opened far more rapidly and accurately than with rifles, and -can be at once directed on a fresh target without ceasing fire, -while the effect can be seen by the firer, who can instantly change -the rate or cease fire altogether. - -The beaten zone is perhaps the most important factor in obtaining -effective fire, and the following table, compiled from _Musketry -Regulations_, 1909, gives the zone beaten by 75 per cent. at four -ranges. - - - RANGES - - ------------------+-------------------------------------------------- - | Zone containing 75 per cent. of shots - | (effective zone). - +-----------+------------+------------+------------ - | 500 yards.|1,000 yards.|1,500 yards.|2,000 yards. - ------------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ - Depth | 150 yds. | 70 yds. | 60 yds. | 50 yds. - Lateral Dispersion| 4 ft. | 8 ft. | 13 ft. | 19 ft. - ------------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ - -It will be seen that the 75 per cent., or effective zone, is -deepest at 500 yards, and gradually decreases as the range -increases up to 2,000 yards; beyond this distance it increases -again in about the same ratio up to 3,000 yards. - -The following formula will give the effective zone (75 per cent. of -shots) approximately for all ranges up to 1,500 yards inclusive: -50,000/Range + 20. Example for 1,000 yards: 50,000/1,000 + 20 = -70 yards, which is the depth of the area swept by 75 per cent. of -shots, or the “effective” beaten zone. For ranges beyond 1,500 -yards this formula is useless, and after 2,000 the beaten zone -increases in depth, while the angle of descent of the bullets -becomes so steep that the “dangerous space” is reduced to a -minimum; and consequently the zone beaten by 75 per cent. of shots -is no longer the “effective zone,” and it will be necessary to -get the target within the zone beaten by the nucleus, or 50 per -cent. of the shots. This zone at 2,500 yards range is about 50 -yards in depth, so an error in estimating the range of more than -25 yards over or under the correct distance will render the fire -“ineffective.” Even at 1,500 yards the “effective zone” (75 per -cent.) is but 60 yards deep, which only allows an error of 30 yards -over or under the correct range--a very small margin, even when -using a range-finding instrument, but without an instrument it is -obviously impossible to “estimate” or “judge” the distance with -sufficient accuracy to ensure bringing the “effective zone” on the -target. - -For ranges over 500 yards it is absolutely necessary to know the -range accurately or to find some other method of bringing the -“effective zone” on to the target. - -The machine gunner may be likened to the fireman with his -hose-pipe, whose object is to bring the base of his jet of water to -play on a certain spot some distance away from the nozzle of his -pipe. He does not trouble about the distance, he does not require -to know the range; but pointing the nozzle in the direction of the -spot he desires to strike, he elevates or depresses it until he -observes the base of the cone of water falling on the right spot, -and then he holds his pipe so that it continues to fall where he -desires; he does not trouble about the smaller streams and drops of -water that fall short or go beyond, but devotes his whole attention -to keeping the nucleus of the stream--the 75 per cent. or 50 per -cent. zone--falling on his “target.” In precisely the same way the -machine gunner must look upon his stream of bullets as a stream of -water from a hose-pipe, and his object must be to cause the centre -of that stream to play on the target, or, in other words, to bring -the effective cone of fire on the target so that it is the centre -of the beaten zone. This can be done by “observing” the strike of -the nucleus of the shots and altering the elevation accordingly. -On favourable ground fire can be observed by No. 1 up to 800 -yards, but No. 2 with the aid of good glasses can observe fire on -favourable ground up to 1,500. This observation of fire is the best -method of obtaining the correct elevation at “effective” ranges -(_i.e._ 1,400 to 600), if the ground is suitable. The procedure -should be as follows: The range should be “estimated” by No. 1, who -should then adjust his sight for 100 or 200 yards less elevation -than the supposed distance, and fire “groups” of 8 or 10 shots; No. -2 observing the strike of the bullets and saying “short” or “over,” -as the case may be, while No. 1 alters the elevation between each -group until No. 2 says “on,” when fire may be continued, still -observed by No. 2, until the desired effect has been attained. No. -1 must be careful to fire his first group of shots short of the -target, as they are much easier to locate than shots which fall -“over.” - -If the target is only visible for a short time, the groups may -be “rapid,” but as a rule “deliberate” fire at the quickest rate -should be used, and “rapid” only used when the range has been -found. If the ground is not favourable for the observation of fire, -or the range is too great, this method cannot be used, and it will -be necessary to obtain the range by instruments; but it will not -always be possible to do so, and it is necessary to find some other -reliable way of ensuring that the target is within the “effective” -zone. - -Supposing the range to be estimated at 1,400 yards, the effective -zone is about 60 yards in depth--therefore an error of only 30 -yards in estimating the range can be permitted. There is but one -way to overcome the difficulty, and that is by _increasing_ the -effective zone; and this can be done by using “combined sights,” -thus making two or more beaten zones which touch each other and -overlap where the effective 75 per cent. of shots of both ends. - -There are two ways of using combined sights: - -(_a_) The “single gun” method. - -(_b_) The “battery” method. - -In (_a_), with an estimated range of 1,400 yards, the sights will -be set for 1,300 and aim taken; then the sights will be again -set for 1,500 yards, but without altering the original aim, and -then “rapid” fire opened and the elevating wheel slowly turned to -elevate the gun until the 1,500 yards sighting is aligned on the -target. The result of this operation is to sweep the whole ground -from 1,270 to 1,530 yards with effective fire; and if an error -of 125 yards over or under the correct range has been made, the -target is nevertheless brought within the effective zone by the -combined elevations used. This is the best method for sections or -single guns, and a section can vary this by one gun using 1,250 -yards elevation and working up to 1,400, while the other gun begins -at 1,350 and works up to 1,550. The choice of the amount over and -under the estimated range must depend upon the ability of the -person estimating the range and circumstances of the case, but less -than 100 yards over or under should never be used. - -The second method (_b_) is only used where at least four guns are -available, and requires six guns to obtain the best results. The -range is estimated as before, and then each gun uses an elevation -differing by 25 yards from the next: thus, taking 1,400 yards again -as an example of the estimated distance, No. 1 gun will use 1,300; -No. 2, 1,325; No. 3, 1,350, and so on, No. 6 using 1,425 yards. - -In this way the effective zone of No. 1 gun, which is 60 yards in -depth, will just overlap the effective zone of No. 2 gun, and so -on right up to No. 6 gun. Thus instead of one small zone of 60 -yards of effective fire, we have six guns joining to make one big -effective zone 185 yards deep. - -Care must be taken not to use more than 25 yards between sights at -ranges over 1,400 yards, otherwise there will be gaps between each -effective zone, and the fire would be ineffective should the target -happen to be at a spot between any two zones. - -The methods of firing the gun are laid down in the official -Handbook, but it may be added that in using “deliberate” fire the -double button should be pressed irregularly so as to imitate rifle -fire, and with a little practice a rate of 120 shots a minute can -easily be attained. - -This kind of fire, although it should seldom be used, will -occasionally be serviceable in ranging for observation when it -is desired to do away with the peculiar sound of the machine gun -and thus not disclose its presence prematurely. In covering a -retirement it may also be found useful to deceive the enemy into -believing they are only opposed by riflemen, while reserving its -full fire power until a good target presents itself at close range. - -“_Continuous_” fire should be used in “gusts” or bursts of from 15 -to 30 shots, a momentary pause being made to observe the effect, -and, if necessary, to correct the aim. The great expenditure -of ammunition caused by “continuous” fire renders its use only -justified when the effect obtained is commensurate, and it should -seldom be adopted until the circumstances justify it. But when a -really good target is found at close range, the ammunition need no -longer be considered until there is nothing left alive to fire at. -Annihilation should always be the final aim of machine-gun fire. - - -TAKING UP A POSITION - -Except under special circumstances, such as for covering fire or -a demonstration, the battery will not move as such into position, -but each section will be given its approximate place and move there -independently, keeping touch, however, by signal or connecting -files with the battery commander and acting in close co-operation -with the other sections. - -Positions are of two kinds, viz. (1) positions of observation, (2) -positions of readiness. - -The position of observation will usually precede the position of -readiness, and the principal points are the concealment of the guns -and detachments, the facilities for observing the enemy and for -movement in any direction. - -The position of readiness will be in the immediate vicinity of the -fire positions, and the guns may be actually in position awaiting -the target. - -When moving alone on the march, scouts working in pairs must be -pushed well out ahead and on the exposed flank or flanks, and -they should be trained to use a system of signals to indicate the -following: (1) “All clear”; (2) “Enemy in sight”; (3) “A good -target in sight”; (4) “Cavalry” (prepare for); (5) “Artillery -within range”; (6) “A good gun position.” - -Six simple and unmistakable signals can easily be arranged and -learned during peace training, which might prove invaluable in -war, for “opportunity” is everything to the machine gunner, and -is usually so fleeting as to demand instant action in order to -obtain success. On moving to occupy a position as a battery, the -guns will usually be in line at from 10 to 100 yards interval, with -the section commanders leading their sections and the scouts well -ahead; the flank guns must arrange for the protection of the flanks -by scouts in the same manner. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM III - -TO SHOW FORMATION WHEN COMING INTO POSITION - - aaa. The Position. B. Ground Scouts. C. Battery Commander. - D. Connecting files. E. Section Commanders. ee. Flankers. - F. Guns & Detachments.] - -The Germans consider that ground scouts should never go into the -proposed position, as they are likely to expose themselves to -the enemy, and thus “give the position away,” and, as already -pointed out, “surprise” is the essence of success. They say that -the commander of the battery or section, whichever the unit may -be, should alone examine the position and select the place for -his battery or section to come into action--and this is the right -method as a general principle; but in broken or hilly country, -where cover is abundant, and where the position is extensive, a -battery commander can do no more than indicate generally the -positions to be occupied by the sections, and it will then be -advisable for the section commanders to personally select the -positions for their guns. If the cover is good, the range-finders -may next occupy the gun positions and proceed to take ranges. They -must be most careful not to show themselves in the least and should -work from cover to cover, some distance from the gun positions -and not on the same alignment. The ranges must be noted on proper -range cards, and when complete sent to the section commanders. -In open country, where there is no good cover in the position, -the scouts will only approach it sufficiently to ensure that it -is not occupied by the enemy, and will then halt and find a good -position for the guns to be dismounted; the commander, passing -through the scouts, will then reconnoitre the position himself, -and select the place for coming into action. There are two methods -of taking up a position, which depend for their choice upon the -proximity of the enemy and the time at which fire is to be opened. -The first is the “deliberate” method, when the guns are brought -up and the range taken before the target appears. In this case -cover is essential to success, and the guns must be most carefully -concealed, the whole object being to surprise the enemy when the -moment arrives, and thus concealment is of the first importance. -The second method is used when the enemy is in the immediate -vicinity, when the country is open and the position without cover, -or when the position is within artillery range of the enemy. The -guns unlimber and prepare for action immediately in rear of the -gun positions, and as close to them as possible and completely out -of sight of the enemy. The commander alone goes into the position, -and having selected approximately where each gun is to go, he -stations them immediately in rear of their intended places out of -sight and then creeps into the position himself and watches for -the opportune moment; when this arrives, a blast on his whistle -brings the guns up with a rush, no concealment is attempted, but, -fully exposed, each gun opens fire on the nearest target. If the -moment has been rightly judged and the range properly estimated, -60 to 90 seconds is sufficient time to obtain the desired effect, -and before the enemy’s artillery can get the range a second signal -from the commander sends the guns out of action again as rapidly -as they appeared. This is one of the most successful methods of -employing machine guns: there is no risk of being seen before the -target appears, there is no “giving away the position” by careless -scouts, and there is no chance that a powerful pair of glasses will -discover the guns in position before they open fire and turn the -tables by surprising them instead. On the other hand, it requires -very highly trained detachments and a vast amount of peace practice -to ensure its success in war. - -Alternative positions are always necessary when the deliberate -method is used, and must be carefully practised in peace--the -principal points to be observed being: (1) That the second -position is suitable for bringing effective fire to bear on the -enemy, and (2) that the gun is able to gain the position without -exposure. - -Scouts so often forget that they can work with ease where it is -impossible to carry a gun; and unless the above conditions are -fulfilled, the alternative position will be useless. - -The place for dismounting the guns must always be as close to the -fire position as possible without exposing the teams to fire or -view; the reserve ammunition must be brought up to this spot, and -precautions must be taken to prevent the teams being surprised -from the flanks or rear if exposed. Machine guns should never be -advanced for a short distance. If it is desired to obtain a closer -range, nothing is gained by moving two or three hundred yards, -while the guns are exposed to considerable risk. The guns are just -as effective at 1,000 yards as at 800, and when a closer range is -necessary they must await the opportunity for moving up to close -range, _i.e._, 300 or 400 yards, where their fire may be decisive. - - -COVER - -Cover may be of two kinds: - -(1) _Cover from fire._ - -(2) _Cover from view._ - -Cover from fire must be proof against the projectiles likely to be -used against it--that is, against rifle fire and shrapnel. “Cover -from fire” should also be “cover from view” if possible; it must -be inconspicuous, and should be of the same colour and material as -the background and locality. It must be as low as is compatible -with command, and must never be on the skyline. The following -points in the order given constitute good “cover from fire”: - -(1) Bullet proof. - -(2) Good field of fire. - -(3) Invisibility. - -(4) Protection from enfilade fire. - -(5) Good line of retreat (under cover). - -“Cover from view” is often not cover from fire, and must be used -with great caution; it is the principal means by which guns are -brought up to the fire position without the enemy’s knowledge, -thus effecting a surprise. Cover may be either (1) natural, (2) -artificial, (3) a combination of both. - -“Cover from fire” will generally be artificial or a combination of -natural and artificial cover, because natural cover will seldom be -found that is suitable for machine guns, although _partial_ cover -from fire may often be found behind a bank, a rock, or in a ditch. - -“_Cover from view_” will generally be natural cover, and will be -used to conceal the guns while approaching a position to occupy -it and, when in position, to effect a surprise. When used in -position to effect a surprise, it must be remembered that the -moment the guns open “rapid” fire the cover is no longer any -protection--indeed, it may be a source of great danger should it -be isolated or conspicuous, such as a patch of scrub in a plain, -or a clump of bushes on a hillside, as it will form a mark to aim -at for every gun and rifle within range. “Cover from view” may be -also “cover from fire,” as when folds in the ground or a ravine -are used to conceal the guns. It may also be artificial cover, -such as screens of boughs and brushwood as used by the Japanese -at Liao-yang to conceal their march, or to hide guns in position. -Hurdles covered with grass, reeds, bush, or branches of trees to -closely imitate the surrounding growth, and placed as screens to -hide the guns until the moment arrives for opening fire, will often -prove a most valuable method of concealing guns in position, and -under favourable circumstances the guns may even open fire from -behind the screens without being discovered. This method requires -constant practice in peace to attain success on service--indeed, -the necessity for the most thorough peace training and constant -practice in all the details of bringing guns into action, making -cover, taking up alternative positions, retiring under mutual -support, etc., cannot be too strongly urged on section commanders. -Little ammunition is available for practice in our own service, -it is true, but there is nothing to prevent constant practice in -this vital duty of the machine gunner; and by getting a few men to -represent the enemy, with an intelligent officer and a pair of good -glasses, most valuable help can be given by criticising the manner -the guns are handled, and the amount of exposure or concealment of -the gun and detachment in taking up a position or making cover. - -Artificial cover may be either excavated or built up, or a -combination of both. Excavated cover will usually take the form -of a pit of sufficient size to hold the tripod, ammunition, and -three men, and deep enough to conceal the gun and men not only -from view, but from fire at “effective” range. This form of cover -is particularly good on a level plain, the muzzle of the gun being -just above the surface of the ground. The rear side of the pit may -require to be enlarged to take the long leg of the tripod where -time is limited and the pit has not been made large enough to take -the tripod in any position, but it is advisable to make the pit of -sufficient area to allow the gun to be worked in any direction. -With an adjustable tripod, the pit should be so deep that the gun -is completely concealed below the surface of the ground, and it is -only raised when it is intended to open fire. - -Other forms of cover consist of epaulements, trenches, sangars, -etc., which will not differ essentially from those given in the -manual of Military Engineering. In all types of “cover from fire” -care must be taken that the cover is high enough to protect No. -1 from bullets fired at ranges up to 1,400 yards, taking into -consideration the angle of descent of the bullets at that range and -the distance of No. 1 from the cover. - -Cover can seldom, if ever, combine all the points enumerated here, -and it will lie with the section commander to discriminate between -them and decide what points he will sacrifice in favour of others -more important: thus it may be necessary, where concealment is the -chief object, to forgo “cover from fire” at the longer ranges in -favour of a low parapet or even none at all. It is only possible -to indicate in outline the principles that should be followed; -practice in training and the experience thus gained alone will make -the reader an expert. - -Shields will be found of great value in the final stages of the -battle, when machine guns are pushed up to close range to assist -in the final assault. They are too heavy to carry on the guns, and -should be with the ammunition in the first-line transport, where -they are easily obtained if required. - - -COVERING FIRE - -Machine guns will often be used to cover the advance of infantry -from “long” to “effective” range when the artillery is still -occupied in the artillery duel and the infantry first come under -effective rifle fire from the enemy. The ease with which they can -instantly open and cease fire, concentrate on a particular spot, or -sweep a line of trenches, renders them particularly suited for this -purpose, and the Japanese constantly used them to keep down the -enemy’s rifle fire in this manner during the late war. - -The narrow beaten zone enables them to fire safely over the heads -of advancing infantry from all ranges beyond 800 yards, provided -the infantry are at least 200 yards from the enemy fired at. A -study of the table of trajectory in the Appendix to _Manual of -Military Training_ will enable the machine gunner to decide the -circumstances under which the fire is safe in each case. - -Positions on the flanks and if possible to the front of the -advancing infantry will render covering fire most effective, but -these positions will rarely be possible. The first consideration -is the concealment of the gun from the enemy’s artillery, which -can easily silence them if exposed. It is also necessary that the -positions selected should be sufficiently commanding to enable the -battery commander to see the attacking infantry during the whole -advance, so as to fire only when they are moving, while at the same -time he must be able to see the position of the enemy’s trenches -and thus direct the fire on any part desired. - - -INDIRECT FIRE - -The best method of using covering fire in the early stages of the -attack is by _indirect fire_ from the reverse slopes of a hill -or from behind a ridge or other feature. This is not difficult -to carry out and in no way lessens the accuracy of the fire or -endangers the troops in front, as the following experiment will -prove. - - -EXPERIMENT IN INDIRECT FIRE - -The following is an extract from an article by First Lieutenant A. -E. Phillips of the 10th Cavalry, from the _Journal_ of the United -States Cavalry Association for July 1909: - -“To determine how many, if any, of the bullets from the machine gun -would strike troops in front of an assumed ‘hill’ over which the -gun was to fire, canvas frames were used to represent such objects, -the targets being concealed from view. - -“The target consisted of a strip of target cloth 6 ft. high and -15 yards wide, along the bottom edge of which is pasted a row of -kneeling figures with an interval of a yard from centre to centre. -Across the target and parallel to its top edge was drawn a narrow -black line tangent to the tops of the heads of the figures. Value -of hits on any figure = 5; value of hits on the cloth below the -line = 3; value of hits on the cloth above the line = 1. Canvas -frame, 8 ft. high, placed 200 yards in front of the gun. Rapid fire: - - - _First Experiment_ - - Range 800 yards - - -------+-------------------------------+----------------------------- - | No. of Hits. | - No. of +------+-------+-------+--------+ Remarks. - shots. | Figs.| 5’s. | 3’s. | Total. | - -------+------+-------+-------+--------+----------------------------- - | | | | | - 30 | 5 | 10 | 12 | 22 | Line of sight was 5 ft. - 30 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 19 | below top of obstruction. - | | | | | All shots over. - -------+------+-------+-------+--------+----------------------------- - - - _Second Experiment_ - - Range 1,000 yards - - -------+----------------------------------+--------------------------- - | No. of Hits. | - No. of +------+-----+-----+---------------+ - shots. | Figs.| 5’s.| 3’s.|Total per cent.| Remarks. - | | | | of figs. hit. | - -------+------|-----|-----|---------------+--------------------------- - | | | | | - 30 | 9 | 11 | 4 | 60 | Line of sight was 3 ft. - 30 | 12 | 17 | 7 | 80 | below top of obstruction. - | | | | | All shots over. - -------+------+-----+-----+---------------+--------------------------- - - - _Third Experiment_ - - Range 1,200 yards - - -------+----------------------------------+--------------------------- - | No. of Hits. | - No. of +------+-----+-----+---------------+ - shots. | Figs.| 5’s.| 3’s.|Total per cent.| Remarks. - | | | | of figs. hit. | - -------+------|-----|-----|---------------+--------------------------- - 30 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 13 | Line of sight was 3 ft. - 30 | 4 | 5 | 13 | 27 | below top of obstruction. - 0 | 8 | 11 | 9 | 53 | All shots over. - -------+------+-----+-----+---------------+--------------------------- - -“It will be noticed no 1’s were made. Assuming the height above -the ground of the average mounted soldier as 8 ft., had a troop -of cavalry mounted been 200 yards in front of the machine guns -in the third experiment, the line of sight would have struck -about the backs of their horses, and all bullets would have gone -over the riders with at least 4 feet to spare, as proved by the -experiment.... The troop mounted could have moved forward to within -100 yards of the target and would not have been struck by the -bullets.” - -The methods of carrying out indirect covering fire will vary -according to the nature of the position selected and the way the -guns are to be laid. This is one of the few occasions when a -battery or two may have all their guns in line close together. If -the slope is a steep one, they may be pushed up close to the crest, -but on a gentle slope they must be placed sufficiently far back to -avoid the forward effect of shrapnel bursting on the crest line. - -The battery commander will select the position for the guns and -will then give each gun or section a section of front to fire on. -The method of marking off this section is as follows: two iron rods -about 3 ft. long for each gun are painted white, and are then “laid -off” from the gun to the target, in an exact line, the first being -on the reverse slope a few yards short of the crest; the next on or -just behind the crest line. By aligning the gun on the rods, fire -is brought on the centre of the target; should traversing fire be -required, the limits may be marked by similar sticks on either side. - -There are two methods of laying the gun. (1) By observation of -fire. (2) By quadrant elevation. The first method has been already -described, and the second must be done by using the following -table in conjunction with an instrument for elevating the gun at -the required angle; but it must be remembered that each gun will -require adjusting to its own angle of elevation to suit its known -error at each range. Thus a gun which is known to require sighting -at 900 yards when firing at 1,000 should receive 1° 10½ and not 1° -25½. When proper instruments are not obtainable, very fair results -may be obtained by using an ordinary clinometer. The necessary -allowance for the height the gun is above the target must be made, -or, in other words, the angle of sight as shown by the clinometer -must be deducted from the quadrant elevation given on the gun. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM IV - -TO SHOW METHOD OF LAYING BY AIMING POSTS - - aa. Aiming Posts (about 15^x apart and some distance in front - of gun.) - - ttt. Targets.] - - -TABLE OF ELEVATION FOR MAXIM ·303 USING AMMUNITION GIVING 2,000 F.S. - - ------------+--------------------------- - Range. | Angles of elevation on the - | Maxim gun. - ------------+--------------------------- - 200 yards | 0 4·0 0 1 - 300 ” | 0 9·5 ” - 400 ” | 0 17·0 ” - 500 ” | 0 25·5 ” - 600 ” | 0 35·5 ” - 700 ” | 0 45·5 ” - 800 ” | 0 57·5 ” - 900 ” | 1 10·5 ” - 1,000 ” | 1 25·5 ” - 1,100 ” | 1 41·5 ” - 1,200 ” | 1 57·5 ” - 1,300 ” | 2 16·5 ” - 1,400 ” | 2 37·5 ” - 1,500 ” | 2 59·5 ” - 1,600 ” | 3 22·5 ” - 1,700 ” | 3 47·5 ” - 1,800 ” | 4 14·5 ” - 1,900 ” | 4 43·5 ” - 2,000 ” | 5 14·5 ” - 2,100 ” | 5 42·0 ” - 2,200 ” | 6 22·0 ” - 2,300 ” | 6 59·0 ” - 2,400 ” | 7 40·0 ” - 2,500 ” | 8 25·0 ” - 2,600 ” | 9 16·0 ” - 2,700 ” | 10 18·0 ” - 2,800 ” | 11 18·0 ” - ------------+--------------------------- - -What is required is the angle of _quadrant elevation_ to be put on -the gun in order that the shots may strike the target at a known -range. From range table obtain _angle of tangent elevation_; now -if the target is _below_ the guns we must _subtract_ the angle of -sight (_m_), if the target is _above_ the guns we must _add_ the -angle of sight (_m_) to obtain correct angle of quadrant elevation. - - _To obtain angle of sight m_ - -(1) When target is visible from the immediate vicinity of guns the -angle may be measured by pocket clinometer or other mechanical -means; or, if heights can be obtained from a contoured map, from -the formula: - - _m_ = (_h_ × 1146)/R - -where _h_ = difference in _feet_ of height between guns and target; -R = range in yards. - -(2) When target is not visible from immediate vicinity of guns, _m_ -may be found from the following formula: - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM V - - (a_{1} × OG + a_{2} × OT)/GT - - Where a_{1} is the angle of sight from O to G; a_{2} is the angle - of sight from O to T.] - -Angles of elevation are read plus, angles of depression minus; T -being the target, G the gun, and O the observer. - -Before firing it is necessary to ascertain that the trajectory will -clear the intervening crest--_i.e._ see that the angle of slope to -the top of crest is less than the angle of Q.E. at which the gun is -likely to be fired. If there is an obstacle some distance in front -of the guns, to ascertain if the trajectory will clear it make a -liberal estimate of the range to the obstacle and ascertain if the -quadrant elevation to be fired at is greater than that which would -be required to hit the obstacle. - -If it is possible to place a mark to aim at near the crest with a -given elevation which will ensure the fire striking the target, -this will much simplify indirect fire, but the combination of -circumstances required to enable this to be done will not often be -found. - -When all is ready to open fire the battery commander will take up a -position from which to direct it, and will give the orders to open -and cease fire and name the guns or sections to fire. The section -commanders will watch the fire effect of their guns and give the -orders necessary for correcting elevation or direction. The battery -captain will assist the commanding officer by noting the fire -effect. - -It will be seen from the foregoing that considerable practice is -required to enable indirect fire to be efficiently carried out; but -the results obtained in covering the advance of infantry and thus -enabling them to push up quickly to close range, without the delay -and exhaustion caused by a prolonged fire fight, will more than -repay the time spent in perfecting machine-gun detachments in this -duty. - - -SUMMARY OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES - -_With Cavalry._--To enable it to retain its mobility and do away -with the necessity of dismounting whole squadrons for fire action. -To give it greater power both in attack and defence, and enable -small detachments to hold important strategical or tactical points. -To act as escort to artillery and to assist in the pursuit. - -_With Infantry._--To cover the first advance with fire. In attack -they should be held back until the last reserve has been thrown in, -when they must be used to bring an overwhelming fire to bear on -the point selected for assault. Owing to their narrow beaten zone -and great accuracy, they can safely fire over the heads of prone -infantry within 100 yards of the position. A Japanese officer who -commanded a machine-gun battery at the battle of Mukden said on one -occasion he “continued this fire until their attacking infantry -were within 30 metres of the enemy’s position.”[6] - -They may also be used to reinforce threatened points, when their -mobility will enable them to arrive at a distant part of the -battlefield with the rapidity of cavalry. They should rarely be -used in the firing line, where their fire, being dispersed, is less -effective than an equal volume of rifle fire, and where they are -at once the target for every rifle. Machine guns can never engage -artillery, and should avoid engaging other machine guns or firing -on a line of skirmishers. - -They are particularly useful at night with the outposts, and can be -trained by day on roads, defiles, or bridges, and thus can be used -in the dark to sweep the approaches with accurate fire. - -The Golden Rule for Machine Gun Tactics may be thus expressed: - -“Conceal your guns, utilise cover, and operate by surprise--for -surprise is the essence of tactical success.” - - - - -CHAPTER III - -EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH THE INDEPENDENT CAVALRY - - The Germans have resolutely adopted the plan of attaching machine - guns to cavalry, and they seem thus to understand the modern - combination of fire and shock tactics. To the machine gun the - fire action, to the horseman the morale action--so much the more - easy and productive of results, as the machine gun is the more - powerful.--CHIEF OF 2ND BUREAU, French General Staff. - - -Since this was written it has been generally recognised by the -leading military authorities of the world that the machine gun -is essentially a cavalry weapon; and Colonel Zaleski in a recent -article on the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War goes so far as to -say, “Even their addition to squadrons cannot be carried out too -rapidly, and this weapon would now appear to be indispensable to -cavalry.” - -The truth of this statement is obvious to the student of modern -tactics who is also acquainted with the machine gun as organised -and equipped on the Continent and in the United States, where it -is as mobile as the cavalryman himself and as quick in coming into -action.[7] When its true rôle is understood and its tremendous -fire power made full use of, it will go far to render cavalry -independent of the rifle, and to restore to them that dash -and independence of action which made them the terror of the -battlefields of the past. - -The following extract from an article in _The Times_ newspaper -of August 23rd, 1905, by their special correspondent with the -Japanese Army in Manchuria, shows the necessity for machine guns by -emphasising the danger of training cavalry to fight as infantry. - -“The prime value of cavalry lies in its mobility. As an actual -fighting unit in battle a body of cavalry is much inferior to an -equal body of infantry. The discrepancy is less marked if the -cavalryman carries a rifle, but there is always the encumbrance of -the horses, which require the attention of one man in every four -when the rifle is employed. It being postulated that tactics evolve -themselves into the effort to obtain a superiority of rifle fire, -it is evident that the necessity of dispensing with one quarter of -a body of mounted riflemen before their weapons can be brought to -bear greatly lessens the value of that body. On the other hand, the -mobility of the mounted rifleman compensates for his comparative -ineffectiveness to such a degree, it is believed in the British -Army, that elaborate arrangements have been made for the provision -and training of what is known as mounted infantry. Granted the -value of mounted and mobile men as an auxiliary to infantry, the -question arises, What is the weapon with which they shall be -armed, and what the nature of the training to which they shall -be subjected? These things depend upon whether the mobility of a -mounted man is regarded as secondary to his function as a rifleman, -or whether his weapon be merely adapted to his mobility. In other -words, are mounted men wanted for their riding or their shooting? -The arming of our cavalry with rifles, and certain modifications -in its training, together with the formation of corps of mounted -infantry, show that those who held the ear of the Secretary of -State for War a few years ago pinned their faith to the superior -value of shooting, and regarded mobility in a mounted man only as -a means to an end. If we turn to the conflict now proceeding in -Manchuria, it is found that in one respect it differs considerably -from other great wars, particularly those which have been fought -on level ground. Cavalry has been conspicuous not by its absence, -but by its utter and astonishing ineffectiveness. From Liao-yang -northwards both armies have occupied part of the level plain -traversed by the Liao River. The right of the Russian Army and -the left of the Japanese have faced each other for nearly twelve -months, in country as flat as a billiard-table and as suitable for -cavalry evolutions as any of the low countries in which the famous -leaders of last century made their reputations. Here have been -conditions ideal for the employment of shock tactics; a veritable -jousting-ground where the vaunted Russian cavalry might have run -a-tilt at the sword-worshipping Japanese. Yet no single instance -has been recorded of combat between mounted men, and to the best -of my belief none has occurred. - -“Is it, then, that those who advocate the substitution of mounted -infantry for cavalry are in the right; that the lancer, hussar, -and dragoon of picturesque memory have become obsolete in these -days of the breechloading rifle? Almost it would seem so. But -for two important considerations, the case for mounted infantry -might well be deemed as proved. These considerations, however, -are of such a nature as to lead the observer to directly opposite -conclusions: to conclude actually that cavalry pure and simple is -as useful to the army of to-day as it was to the army of Napoleon’s -day; and that it is totally erroneous to suppose that mounted -infantry can be an efficient substitute for cavalry. The cause of -the effectiveness of Japanese cavalry is not far to seek. The men -are the most intelligent of Japanese soldiers, and their many fine -patrol performances are evidence of the sound methods in which -they have been trained. Their weakness lies in the poor quality -of the horses, and the fact that the Russian cavalry outnumbers -them by six to one. Marked inferiority of force, in all forms of -rivalry, is a fatal disadvantage, and it is for this reason that -the Japanese have failed to shine in the rôle which experience has -assigned to cavalry. The Russian cavalry, on the other hand, is -estimated to number 30,000 sabres, a force of mounted men which, in -the circumstances, ought to have made the lives of the Japanese -commanders on the flank of the army a burden to them. Instead of -which, life in the rear of the Japanese front has been a sinecure, -a positive _dolce far niente_, undisturbed even by the distant -flash of any of these sabres. Is this a proof that, if the sabres -had been rifles, something could have been accomplished? Very far -from it. It is because the Russian cavalry, armed as it is with -rifle and--shade of Seydlitz!--bayonet, is trained to fight only -on foot, thereby throwing away its most valuable weapon, mobility, -that it has proved no more effective in the field than a flock of -sheep. That the microscopic force of Japanese cavalry has held -the Russian throughout the campaign--an exceedingly remarkable -performance when it is remembered how indifferently the Japanese -are mounted--testifies clearly enough that there must be something -futile about the arming and training of the Russians.... They -failed as cavalry and they failed as riflemen, and the reason of -the failure was that they are neither fish, flesh, fowl, nor good -red herring. They are organised as cavalry, but have been trained -to dismount on service. In peace they are armed with lance and -sword, and in war they are asked to fight with rifle and bayonet. -Truly an absurdity, worthy of one of those nebulous units evolved -by our own Parliamentary reformers. Last month Mishchenko, marching -forty-five miles in four long summer days, again descended on -the Japanese flank, accounted for a couple of companies and a -field hospital, frightened a number of Chinese carters, and -stopped before a thin line of infantry guarding the approaches -to Hsin-minting, where Japanese supplies are stored sky-high. -Had he known it, he was within an ace of picking up a number of -distinguished British officers, besides newspaper correspondents, -and a famous general whom the Emperor William has specially -delighted to honour. But an inferior number of riflemen checked the -advance, and no use was made of the mobility of the column, except -to retire by a circuitous route.... So far as my information goes, -the Russian cavalry west of Mukden never once took the offensive -during the battle. Strapped up with rifle and bayonet, they are -incapable of wielding the sword; their lances, except in the case -of a small proportion of the Cossacks, have been left in Russia. -So it was useless to contemplate old-fashioned cavalry work. But -the Japanese communications were an easy mark, and it is one of the -most singular features of Russian tactics that they did not avail -themselves of so glaring an opportunity. Even as mounted infantry -they should have been able to destroy Nogi’s communications. Yet -they never made a single attempt at interference. - -“The deduction is obvious: either the training or arming must be at -fault. When a mounted man dismounts he sacrifices his mobility to -become a weak infantryman. The Russian cavalry has been trained to -fight dismounted, and the result is that the Russians have divested -themselves of the one arm which, many keen observers believe, -might have availed to turn the tide in their favour. The battle of -Mukden was a great defeat, though not an overwhelming disaster. -At one period the result hung in the balance, and it is no wild -statement to say that if the Russian cavalry had been trained -and armed in orthodox cavalry fashion, and handled in a manner -consistent with cavalry tradition, Mukden would have proved a drawn -battle. It is my firm belief--a belief shared with many others more -competent to judge--that if French, with 10,000 British cavalry, -had been given a free hand early in the war on the Russian side, -there would have been no necessity for Kuropatkin to retire from -his strong position at Liao-yang, and I have no less hesitation in -saying that if the same able commander, with such a cavalry force -as I have mentioned, had been attached to the Japanese side at -Liao-yang or at Mukden, there would be no Russian army in Manchuria -to-day. _En passant_ it may be remarked that if the Japanese -cavalry had been capable of pursuit at Mukden, it would have proved -a terrible thorn in the already bleeding Russian side. As it was, -the Japanese were out-numbered and hence completely ineffective.” - -If the writer of this article is correct in his deduction of the -lesson to be learned by cavalry from this war--and his opinion -has since been confirmed by military opinion generally,--it -would appear that the machine gun is just the one thing needed -to give cavalry the fire power of infantry, while retaining -mobility and their proper rôle in all the circumstances of the -modern battlefield. It will therefore be instructive to study -the possibilities of machine guns with cavalry in the various -situations which may arise in the course of a campaign. - -The use of machine guns in certain stages of an action is similar -whatever the scale of the operations may be; and to avoid -unnecessary repetition, such phases as the Pursuit, the Retreat, -etc., have only been dealt with once. The tactics of the various -bodies of cavalry are based on the principles laid down in the -Training Manuals, the Independent cavalry being treated in this -chapter, the Divisional and Protective in the next. - -While the opposing armies are still at a considerable distance -apart, the Independent Cavalry will gain touch with the enemy -and endeavour to find out such information as may clear up the -strategical situation and afford the main army strategical freedom -of action; they may also carry out special missions such as -cutting the enemy’s communications, carrying out raids, or seizing -important strategical points. This can usually only be accomplished -when the enemy’s cavalry has been defeated. It will therefore be -the first duty of the Independent Cavalry to seek out and defeat -the cavalry of the enemy in order to be free to carry out its -mission.[8] - -This Independent Cavalry will never be less than a Division, -while it may consist of two or three Divisions in the case of -a war between any of the Great Powers. The nation that is weak -in cavalry will therefore do well to make up for this deficiency -by the employment of great numbers of machine guns so organised -and equipped that they will be able not only to accompany their -cavalry anywhere, but, in addition, to operate and manœuvre as -self-contained units. They will thus free the cavalry from the -necessity of dismounted action when met by superior numbers, -and from being compelled to detach squadrons to secure tactical -positions to check the enemy, or strategical points of importance -which it may be vital to possess. In addition to this, detached -machine guns may be used in the place of mounted escorts to the -Horse Artillery, and to enable single troops to be used in the -place of contact squadrons without detracting from their offensive -or defensive strength. - -The Divisional General of Cavalry will have 24 machine guns under -the present organisation, viz. two guns with each regiment; and -it must be assumed that they have been organised and trained to -work together, as suggested in Chapter I., in order to enable them -to be used as fire units in co-operation with their brigades or -the Division. It will depend upon the nature of the country, the -tactical situation and the strength and morale of the opposing -cavalry, whether the G.O.C. retains all four batteries in his -own hands or gives one or more to the brigade commanders. Every -situation requires its own special treatment, and the following is -only given as one of many possible methods of using machine guns in -the preliminary stages of the cavalry combat. We will assume that a -Cavalry Division is acting as Independent Cavalry and is operating -against an unknown but superior force of cavalry as yet unlocated, -in country such as will be met with in a European campaign. - -The formation for the march towards the enemy will of course depend -on the roads available and the general nature of the country, but -an advanced guard of one brigade would be sent out with orders to -push forward tactical reconnoitring patrols supported by contact -troops or squadrons. This brigade might be given two batteries of -machine guns, while the G.O.C. retained two batteries with the -main body, which would probably move as concentrated as possible -in two wings with flank guards, and a battery of machine guns on -each flank. The advanced guard commander would use one battery -of machine guns to give each “contact squadron” a section of two -guns and thus enable it to retain its mobility if held up by rifle -fire. He would keep one battery intact to use in the manner to be -indicated later with his main guard. - -We will follow one of these “contact squadrons” and see how the -machine guns may be employed to assist it. In the first place the -squadron now possesses the fire power of an extra hundred rifles -and can therefore afford to send out stronger patrols and give -them more support. The contact squadron, having sent out its -patrols and any detachments necessary for special services, will -sooner or later be called upon to afford active support to one of -its patrols when the latter come in touch with the enemy. Upon the -information furnished by this patrol, as to the strength of the -enemy and the nature of the country, will depend the action to be -taken. - -The necessity for brushing aside all opposition and pushing forward -will probably cause the commander of the contact squadron to attack -with vigour, and such a course will compel the enemy to accept the -engagement mounted, or if inferior in strength or morale, to take -up a position for dismounted action and hold the squadron by rifle -fire. - -In the first case the squadron with scouts in front will move in -column of troops ready to wheel into line for the attack. The -machine guns should move in line immediately in rear of the rear -troop and as close as possible, so as not to be seen from the -front. The subsequent action of the machine guns must of course -depend on the method of attack of the squadron and the nature of -the country; but the objects in view will be (1) to support the -attack by fire up to the moment of the collision, and then to -bring fire to bear upon the retreating enemy and prevent their -rallying; (2) to take up a position to cover the retirement of the -squadron and enable it to re-form if worsted in the encounter. It -is likely that if the first object is successfully attained and -the fire of the section brought to bear on the enemy’s squadron, -from any range under 800 yards, for only 30 seconds, the effect on -the closed body of horsemen, whether in column or line, would be -such as to throw them into considerable confusion at the moment of -the charge, while any attempt to charge the guns, even by a second -squadron, must be abortive and result in disaster. The squadron -leader should have arranged beforehand with his machine-gun -commander to manœuvre with a view to this co-operation, and will -give the signal a few moments before wheeling into line to attack, -when the machine guns will gallop out to the most suitable flank, -and come into action as rapidly as possible so as to enfilade the -enemy’s advance. The moment the charging squadrons mask the fire -of the guns, they must remount and gallop to a fresh position in -anticipation of the pursuit, in order to bring fire to bear on the -retreating enemy and prevent a rally; or to cover the retirement -of the squadron and enable it to rally and reform. The effect of -his fire and the success or otherwise of the first collision will -enable the section commander to decide instantly which of these -two actions will be necessary. It will be seldom that the country -is so flat that some feature cannot be found giving a good field -of fire or commanding a road, or bridge, or other defile by which -the enemy must retreat, or which they must pass in pursuit, and the -use of such features will greatly assist the action of machine -guns. Although both guns will fire together before the collision, -their subsequent action must be made in mutual support, one gun -firing while the other races to a new position from which it can -overtake and flank the retiring enemy, so that, if possible, one -gun is always firing at effective range while the other is moving. -In the same way, if covering the retreat of their own squadron, one -gun will fire while the other retires to a second position and in -turn covers the retirement of the first. The guns must not hesitate -to separate widely in order to obtain unseen the best possible -positions from which to fire, but must always be able to support -each other. If the country is much broken, opportunities will be -found for concealing the gun in a position from which to enfilade -the pursuing cavalry at short range, or for bringing a cross fire -to bear from both guns on a defile. Such an opportunity skilfully -utilised, when the range has been accurately taken, and fire -reserved until the main body is within close range (600 yards or -less), should be so decisive in its result as to check the pursuit -altogether and possibly turn defeat into victory, if the retiring -squadron has had time to re-form and is in a position to launch a -counter-attack at this moment. - -To make full use of machine guns with a squadron, it is necessary -for the squadron leader thoroughly to understand their power and -capabilities, and to anticipate their action and the result likely -to ensue; otherwise he will be unable to do more than passively -accept their support, and will fail to reap the advantage of their -principal characteristic--their ability to surprise and their power -suddenly to overwhelm with fire a superior body of troops. - -Should the enemy’s squadron be reinforced or be so superior in -numbers that an attack appears inadvisable, it may be possible with -the assistance of machine guns to equalise matters by concealing -the guns in a donga or behind a ridge, a clump of trees, or group -of rocks, and then manœuvring the squadron so as to draw the enemy -across the front of the guns at close range. The best method of -doing this is to lead the squadron, formed in column of troops, -past the cover selected at a sharp pace, the guns being concealed -on the outer flank or behind the rear troop as circumstances may -require. As the squadron passes the selected spot, the machine guns -will be dropped; and the squadron at the same moment wheeling into -line towards the enemy, will hide the guns from view until they are -concealed by the cover. - -The gun horses and the rest of the detachment not actually required -to fire the guns should move on with the squadron, so that no -indication is given the enemy that the guns are not still with the -squadron. If this manœuvre is successfully accomplished, it will -not be difficult to draw the enemy across the guns at close range. -It is a manœuvre well worth practice in peace, but an opposing -squadron should always be used to try to detect the guns and thus -ensure that the concealment is properly carried out. - -We will now suppose a case where the enemy takes up a defensive -position and the contact squadron has to force its way through. -The squadron leader’s method of attack must entirely depend on the -strength of the position, the force holding it, and the natural -features of the country in the immediate vicinity; and on his plan -of attack must depend the details of the action of the machine -guns. The general principles governing their employment will remain -the same, however much they may vary in the method of carrying out: -the first is to supplement the rifle fire of the squadron so as to -enable as many men as possible to remain mounted, while holding -the enemy to his position; and the second is to gain superiority -of fire for the squadron at the time and place selected by the -squadron leader. We will suppose the position to be strong and -the enemy to possess machine guns, and that the squadron leader’s -plan is to hold the enemy to his position by a vigorous frontal -attack, while he turns the weaker flank. To do this he may decide -to use his guns for the containing attack supported by a troop, -or to use his squadron for the containing attack and his guns to -turn the flank. Having machine guns in position against him, it -might be advisable to choose the latter course, because machine -guns are less effective against a skirmishing line of attackers, -while his own machine guns are more effective if they can gain the -flank or rear of the enemy’s position and thus enfilade them, and -any movement of mounted troops to repulse the turning movement, -or take their attackers in flank, will afford the machine guns -an opportunity for decisive fire action. Should the machine guns -or one of them succeed in stalking the led horses of the enemy, -their action will probably be decisive, as nothing affords a -machine gun such an easy and effective target as the horses of a -dismounted squadron, while the effect of fire on them is to render -the squadron immobile and to place them out of action as cavalry -altogether. - -The method of attack will probably be as follows. Scouts -(dismounted) having been sent forward to reconnoitre and draw fire -to disclose the extent of the position, two troops dismounted and -widely extended will advance to the attack and open a heavy fire -and push the attack as hotly as possible; at the same moment one -troop (mounted) will move slowly round the flank which it is not -intended to attack, keeping wide of the position and closed up, -and in signalling communication with the squadron leader. This -will probably draw attention to this flank, and the troop should -report by signal any movement made by the enemy to check them. -Rapid fire should now be ordered all along the line, and the troop -on the flank should wheel and open out towards the enemy, but not -approach within range if it can be avoided. Under cover of this -demonstration, the machine guns with the remaining troop will work -round the flank selected for attack, the guns being concealed on -the outer flank of the troop and using every bit of cover possible -to prevent being seen. Scouts must precede them, and the troop -should screen their movements and engage the enemy with fire if -opposed. Engagement with the enemy should be avoided as far as -possible until the place selected for attack is reached, and the -position turned. Even now the machine guns must avoid opening fire -with the troop, and must endeavour to find a position from which an -enfilading fire can be brought to bear at close range. Under cover -of the surprise caused by the sudden burst of machine-gun fire, the -second gun must push farther round to the rear, and try to fire on -the led horses or catch the enemy’s guns on the move, for they will -certainly be moved to meet this fresh attack. If the horses cannot -be reached, the second gun must seek the best position to bring a -reverse fire in support of the first gun; and unless a really good -target is obtained, fire should be reserved until the first gun is -discovered and attacked, when its intention to retire must be the -signal for a burst of heavy fire which must be kept up until the -first gun is in a fresh position and ready to open fire to cover -the retirement of the second. - -This action will enable the squadron leader to use the troop -feinting on the other flank, which he will have recalled on the -first sign of firing by the flank attack, in order to reinforce the -point where the attack can be pressed home. - -The machine guns must avoid engaging those of the enemy, while -always endeavouring to catch them limbered up, _i.e._ when -changing position or while coming into or going out of action, for -then they are most vulnerable. The situation at the moment of the -flank attack is this: The front of the position is attacked by a -strong but widely extended firing line which overlaps the flanks -and compels a strong defensive firing line to check its advance. -If the defender decides to put his machine guns into position here -and to reserve half the squadron for defence of the flanks, the -great extension of the attack renders their fire of little effect -as long as the attack utilises cover and advances by rushes from -the right or left of sections; on the other hand, if he decides to -put the squadron into the firing line and to use his machine guns -to protect his flanks, he has either to divide his guns or wait -till he can see which flank is threatened, and he cannot ignore the -troop which is moving against one. Consequently, he must either -be weaker than the flank attack--in which case it is likely to -succeed; or he must withdraw troops from his position to strengthen -the threatened flank--in which case there should be no difficulty -in pushing home the front attack with the aid of the extra troop; -while the position of the machine guns on the flank and rear -should render his retirement from the position very costly. In all -probability the threat of turning a flank either by mounted troops -or by machine guns will compel the enemy to abandon the position in -the case of a minor engagement between squadrons--especially where -a counter-attack is rendered impossible by the strength of the -frontal attack. - -When touch has been gained by the contact squadrons and the enemy -found in force, they will either be compelled by superior numbers -to fall back or they must be at once supported; in either case the -advanced guard will now become engaged and will endeavour to break -through the advanced guard of the enemy, or, if in touch with the -main body of the enemy’s cavalry, will endeavour to prevent him -breaking through till their own Cavalry Division comes up. - -If it is decided to attack, the action will follow much the same -lines as that of the contact squadrons, but on a larger scale and -with the addition of artillery; and the machine guns will be used -in much the same way to support the mounted attack up to the moment -of the charge, for which purpose the machine guns working in pairs -on the opposite flank to the artillery must be pushed forward to -occupy positions from which to bring fire to bear on the hostile -squadrons while manœuvring prior to the attack. The whole battery -may be used for this purpose if the ground favours their action; -or a single section only, while the remainder are held back as a -reserve to complete a successful charge or to cover the retirement -of the brigade in the event of failure. - -The officer commanding the machine-gun battery will remain with the -brigadier and must be perfectly acquainted with his plans, and will -receive from him direct orders as to the way the guns are to be -employed to support the attack. The details for carrying out these -orders should be left to the battery commander, who will issue his -own instructions to the section commanders, who should also be -told the brigadier’s plans. The section commanders must be given a -free hand in selecting fire positions and in all details relating -to coming into action and opening and ceasing fire--the battery -commander’s orders only indicating the flank and extent of the -positions of observation for each section, the method of action and -the object to be attained. Under special circumstances he may order -certain specific action such as reservation of fire, simultaneous -fire on a given signal, or concentration of fire of a certain -target; but it must be remembered that definite orders of this -nature tie the hands of section commanders, and tend to paralyse -their action and destroy initiative, and can be justified on rare -occasions only. Should the enemy take up a defensive position, -the machine guns will be used to economise dismounted men and to -bring a sudden and intense fire to bear on the defenders when they -attempt to retire from the position. Cavalry will not “assault” a -position, but rather try to compel the defender to retire from it -by turning a flank and threatening his led horses or his line of -retreat, while he is held to his ground by fire. Some guns should -also be held in reserve to meet a counter-attack or to be launched -in pursuit when the enemy attempts to retire. The machine guns -with the contact squadrons will be available, as these squadrons -become merged in the main guard, and they must now be used to hold -tactical positions of importance and to hinder the march of the -main body of the enemy by seizing all rising ground in front or to -a flank of the approaching cavalry. - -The Division will now have concentrated and joined the advanced -guard, and will be manœuvring in anticipation of the cavalry -combat. All the machine guns, except those holding positions in -front, will now be concentrated under the Divisional General. They -will be used at this stage in conjunction with the artillery--but -not in their vicinity--to support the deployment of the Division -by their fire, and they must necessarily be concentrated and -employed as batteries in order not to hinder the deployment and -free manœuvre of their own cavalry. The flank opposite to that of -the artillery must be used, and “positions of observation” must be -maintained where the guns are concealed from view and if possible -from artillery fire. - -The officer commanding the machine guns of the Division should -remain with the G.O.C., and must be perfectly acquainted with his -plans and intentions. As a rule fire will not be opened in the -first instance except by his order. Officers commanding batteries -must be where they can best direct their fire and at the same time -be in signalling communication with their Chief. Ranges will be -taken from the “position of observation,” but should the guns have -to gallop to a fresh position and fire at once, the opportunity -for using combined sights by the battery if the range be unknown -and the time limited should not be neglected. Rising ground is very -important at this stage, for it enables fire to be maintained until -just before the collision. - -Should the ground permit of the machine-gun batteries approaching -the enemy unseen, and enable them to reserve their fire from a -concealed position until the closed bodies of the enemy’s squadrons -come within effective range, the result should be so decisive as to -render the attack of the Division successful, even against greatly -superior numbers. The machine guns should render the envelopment of -a flank by a superior force impossible, and their great mobility -will enable them to meet easily any movement of this kind. - -They should avoid the enemy’s artillery, which alone can put them -out of action, but they must boldly engage it within effective -ranges should it open fire on the cavalry. - -The defeat of the independent cavalry alone will be of little -value, and it will be necessary to ensure their complete -destruction to enable the exact situation of the enemy’s forces -to be discovered. A close and relentless pursuit is therefore -imperative, and it must be remembered that machine guns with -cavalry are far more effective in the pursuit than cavalry alone, -because they move with the same speed; but whereas cavalry can only -use the sword or lance against others similarly armed and capable -of defending themselves, and both men and horses are equally -subject to exhaustion, the machine guns on overtaking the enemy -are able to shoot down men and horses without any more effort than -is needed to set up the guns and work the elevating and traversing -gear. The exhaustion of men and horses has no effect upon the -accuracy or intensity of the fire, while the result is further to -scatter and disperse bodies that may still retain any cohesion. - - -IN THE PURSUIT - -There are many instances in war when cavalry flushed with victory -and exhausted in the pursuit have been themselves caught and ridden -down by troops that have rallied or by fresh supports; but machine -guns have nothing to fear from cavalry, and can confidently await -their attack while covering the retirement of their own cavalry. -The longer they are in action, the more time there is for their own -horses to recover their “wind,” and be ready to carry their guns -out of action at a speed which renders pursuit useless. It must -be remembered also that the machine guns with cavalry cannot be -distinguished from that arm at a distance even when moving alone, -while it is impossible to do so when they are with their regiment -or brigade. - -The machine guns must anticipate the pursuit and race off to -positions on the flanks and rear from which they can best cut off, -and if possible annihilate, the retreating squadrons; no effort -must be spared to inflict the maximum loss, and guns must be -pushed up to close range even at the risk of being ridden down. - -The troops reserved for the pursuit should have their machine guns -with them, as their co-operation will be of the greatest service, -and regiments will probably act separately, and may be directed to -special points to intercept the enemy or prevent reinforcements -coming up. - -The Independent Cavalry, having defeated and scattered the enemy’s -cavalry, are now in a position to send out strategical patrols; -and having “torn aside the veil” are able to see the dispositions -of his main armies, and are free to undertake raids on his -communications and to harass and delay the march of his columns. - -Raids are only justified when some specific object can be -attained, and are only likely to be effective during the course -of operations, when both armies are in touch and awaiting -reinforcements to renew hostilities. - -The cavalry will in most cases be more profitably employed in -attacking the enemy’s main columns in flank or rear, and thus -hindering their march by causing premature deployment. This action -will bring the independent cavalry in contact with infantry. The -machine guns can now be used to supplement the fire action and -to enable as many squadrons as possible to remain mounted. They -should be employed as separate units or attached to squadrons -according to the nature of the engagement and the force to which -they are opposed. Usually they will be held back in the preliminary -stages of the dismounted fight, until the action has developed -sufficiently to enable the general situation to be seen, when they -will be sent forward under cover to positions from which they can -develop superiority of fire, by concentrating against the enemy’s -strongest points. This will not prevent the use of a few guns with -the advanced guard to seize and hold important points, and nothing -should prevent machine guns from seizing the key of the position, -the moment this can be discovered. - -The four batteries of machine guns of the Division may be allotted -as follows: With the advanced guard, one battery; with the main -body (for use in firing line), two batteries; with the G.O.C. (in -reserve), one battery. - - -TO COVER RETIREMENT - -This reserve battery will enable the G.O.C. not only to reinforce -a particular point or cover the retirement with a rapidity and -effectiveness that no other form of reserve could do, but to use -it to turn a flank or to meet a counter-attack without exposing -his squadrons to fire during the movement. The security they -are able to afford to the horses of the squadrons in the firing -line will justify their occupying “positions of observation” on -the rear flanks, from which they can protect them while waiting -other employment. The deployment of the enemy’s infantry and the -development of his fire will compel the cavalry commanders to -break off the engagement; and to do this without loss under the -heavy rifle fire to which he will now be subjected, this fire must -be temporarily checked or rendered ineffective. Every machine gun -will therefore be brought up to such positions as will enable them -to sweep the enemy’s firing lines, and under a simultaneous fire -from the 24 guns the dismounted men will be able to retire from -the firing line and regain their horses. The retirement of the -machine guns must be effected in the usual way, each section acting -independently and retiring by alternate guns--no gun moving till -the other is ready in a fresh position to open fire. The sections -on the flanks should retire first, as they are better able to -protect the centre by a cross fire. - - -COVER IN FIRING LINE - -When the country is flat or the features devoid of natural -cover, it will be necessary to provide pits for the machine guns -practically in the firing line. If this is carried out with skill, -the guns may be perfectly concealed, and protected even from -artillery fire. These pits should be made along the whole front and -as widely scattered as possible, and when a gun is discovered by -the artillery it should immediately be lowered into the pit, out of -sight, where it will be perfectly safe, until the artillery directs -its fire elsewhere. The following instance from the Russo-Japanese -War is an illustration of the skilful handling of machine guns -under such conditions. - - -EXAMPLE FROM RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR - -On June 8th, 1905, at Wan-ching, General Samsonov had two cavalry -regiments and a machine-gun section of four guns. During the -dismounted action these machine guns were concealed in the firing -line, two in the centre 100 yards apart, and one on each flank -about 400 yards away. When the firing line retired, the machine -guns opened fire and held the position alone; and so well had they -been posted, that although attacked by infantry, which advanced -to within 300 yards of the position, supported by artillery which -brought a heavy fire to bear on the front occupied by the machine -guns, they were able to hold their ground for nearly three hours, -when the Japanese abandoned the attack and fell back. It would be -interesting to know if this astonishing success of machine guns, -enabling the cavalry to defeat infantry supported by artillery in a -fight of several hours’ duration, without risking their personnel -or abandoning their mobility, was due to the use of natural cover -or, as seems more probable, to the use of pits which would have -afforded protection from artillery fire as well as concealment. - - -IN THE BATTLE - -The hostile columns having arrived within striking distance, the -battle will now take place, during which the Independent Cavalry -will usually occupy a position in front and on the flank of the -main line of battle. From here they will be able to co-operate by -attacking on the flank, from which they can bring fire to bear -concentrically with the main attack, while such a position favours -pursuit on parallel lines, and is also a suitable one from which to -prevent pursuit in the event of a retreat.[9] The machine guns will -now assemble in batteries under their G.O.C., who will use them, -as the occasion may demand, to hold “positions of observation,” to -protect his front and flank in the early stages of the battle, and -later, in conjunction with a few dismounted squadrons, to envelop -the enemy’s flank and bring a powerful volume of fire to assist -the main infantry attack, or to draw troops away from the point -selected for assault. - -“The climax of the infantry attack is the assault which is made -possible by superiority of fire,”[10] and the cavalry commander -will be justified in using his 24 machine guns in assisting to -attain this object, provided that in doing so they remain under his -immediate orders and in a position from which they are instantly -available for the pursuit. - -We have already seen how machine guns should co-operate in -the pursuit, and their mobility will render them even more -effective when pursuing infantry. The following example from the -Russo-Japanese War may be of interest in this connection. - - -EXAMPLE OF MACHINE GUNS USED IN PURSUIT - -A Russian infantry battalion which was retreating by a pontoon -bridge across the Taitzu River was almost annihilated by a Japanese -cavalry regiment, accompanied by machine guns, which swept the -bridge; “and for the first time in this war,” adds the _Standard_ -correspondent with Kuroki’s army, “a machine gun was used with -decisive effect.” - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH THE PROTECTIVE CAVALRY - - -Each army will usually be divided into several columns, each -preceded by its advanced guard, the whole covered by the Protective -Cavalry. The bulk of the latter will be scattered or remain -concentrated according to the size of the zone in which it is to -operate, the nature of the ground, and the first dispositions of -the enemy. The veil thus formed will only be torn aside when the -artillery and infantry of the advanced guards open fire.[11] - -It is probable that the side which is weak in cavalry will dispense -with Independent Cavalry altogether, and will meet the Independent -Cavalry of the enemy with their Protective Cavalry supported by -machine guns. The Japanese, who were outnumbered by six to one, -were unable to use Independent Cavalry, and during the early stages -of the war supported their cavalry by infantry. The Russians, who -possessed masses of cavalry, used them principally as Protective -Cavalry, if we except the raids made by the Division under -Lieutenant-General Mishchenko after the fall of Port Arthur. The -Protective Cavalry will therefore, in such a case, not only have to -prevent the enemy’s Independent Cavalry from obtaining information -by penetrating their screen, but will also have the task of -obtaining information as to the enemy’s numbers and direction of -march. That they are able to do this even in the face of greatly -superior numbers has been proved by the Japanese, whose cavalry, -outnumbered and badly horsed as they were, succeeded throughout the -war in a remarkable degree in penetrating the enemy’s screen and -obtaining information. The Russians, on the other hand, in spite of -their masses of cavalry, failed not only to destroy the diminutive -force opposed to them, but even to penetrate their thin veil or -obtain any information of what was taking place behind it. - -Are we not in precisely the same position as the Japanese in our -numerical weakness in cavalry, and should we not be confronted by -the same problem in the event of war with a military nation? - -Let us, then, see how the Japanese Protective Cavalry was able to -fulfil its mission in spite of the vastly superior numbers of its -opponents. In the first place the Japanese cavalry is trained in -the orthodox cavalry spirit, which is highly developed; suppleness -and power to manœuvre for the delivery of the attack is the chief -aim, while the charge is regarded as the culmination of manœuvre. -Swordsmanship, horsemanship, and independent scouting are the -features of individual training, while only thirty rounds per -annum are fired in the musketry course, from the carbine with -which they are armed in addition to the sword. The consequence is -that the whole cavalry is saturated with a spirit of enterprise -and daring, and a firm belief in its superiority to all other arms -in manœuvre and offence. It was this spirit and confidence that -enabled them, when outnumbered and deprived of their swordsmanship, -to retain their dash and mobility, while using their carbines from -behind village walls against the hosts they were unable to ride -down. It must be remembered that the Japanese had practically -no machine guns at the beginning of the war, and those hastily -purchased after hostilities broke out were required at Port -Arthur. Consequently, the Japanese had to solve the problem of -how to oppose the masses of Russian cavalry with their few but -highly trained squadrons, and their solution was to hold up the -Russian cavalry by fire on every possible occasion, and to be -held up by them as seldom as possible. For this purpose they were -closely supported by infantry; and it is of interest to remember -how our own light infantry were used in much the same way in the -Peninsula--the 13th Light Infantry being actually mounted for the -purpose. Can we ignore the lesson? Is it not plain that machine -guns would not only have done the work of the carbine and rifle -far more effectively, but instead of depriving the cavalry of much -of their mobility and preventing them from being made full use -of--as undoubtedly was the case--they would have enabled them to -go anywhere with the certainty of being able to defend themselves -against a greatly superior force of cavalry. - -The action of Protective Cavalry on a large scale is so similar to -that of Independent Cavalry--especially in the matter of patrols -and contact squadrons--that it will be unnecessary to reconsider -these duties. In speaking of the duties of the Protective -Cavalry, _Field Service Regulations_, 1909, Part I., Chapter V., -observes: “These functions of the Protective Cavalry will entail -principally defensive action, and will necessitate extension over -a considerable front; but the commander must dispose his force in -sufficient depth to enable it, with the assistance of the advanced -guards of the columns in rear, to check any attempt to break -through and surprise the main body.” - -It is obvious that fire action is here indicated, and a preceding -paragraph states that mounted infantry will usually accompany the -Protective Cavalry, though it is to be doubted if it will be found -possible to provide horses for this purpose in time of war. - -Machine guns, however, will provide the necessary fire power -without requiring many men or horses, and the use of a few extra -batteries of machine guns with the Protective Cavalry would give -them all the stiffening and defensive power of infantry without -detracting from their mobility as cavalry. If the Japanese have -taught us anything, it is this--that our cavalry, small as it is, -if properly supported by strong and well-trained batteries of -mobile machine guns, will be able to more than hold its own against -greatly superior numbers in a European campaign. To attain such an -end we should at once organise cavalry machine-gun batteries, and -attach two batteries to each brigade in addition to the guns they -already possess. This would give each cavalry brigade the fire -power of a battalion of infantry (900 rifles), while in no way -detracting from their mobility, as they would only occupy the road -space of two extra squadrons, and move just as rapidly over any -country. The alternative is to follow Colonel Zaleski’s advice and -attach two machine guns to each squadron, which would give the same -number of guns, but would be likely to detract from the efficiency -of both guns and squadrons. We are, however, dealing with existing -organisation, and, however much we may desire to increase the -efficiency of our Protective Cavalry, we have only one battery of -six guns with each brigade instead of the visionary three. Let us -see how we may use them to the best advantage. - -Supposing the Protective Cavalry to consist of one brigade, they -will probably be extended to form a screen over a considerable -front. The exact formation and method of advance will entirely -depend upon the proximity of the enemy, his strength, and the -nature of the country. We will suppose the country open and both -flanks exposed and the enemy in the immediate vicinity, the -contact squadrons or patrols having gained touch with him. The -duties of the Protective Cavalry are the tactical reconnaissance, -and the occupation of positions of tactical importance to the -infantry and artillery. - -With so small a number of machine guns as a single battery, it will -be necessary to decide where they may be most usefully employed, -and a great deal must depend on the particular situation. If the -tactical reconnaissance is incomplete, they may be used in the -first instance to hold the enemy in front while the squadrons move -round the flanks to complete the information required. If used in -this manner, they must be handled with dash, and, working in widely -extended pairs--two in the centre and two on each flank--must push -forward and try to surprise the enemy in close formation, moving -from position to position and never remaining stationary after -fire has been opened, provided cover exists to hide movement. Six -guns co-operating in a vigorous offensive, unopposed by artillery, -can push up to close range and do immense damage, while the enemy -should be quite unable to decide what numbers are opposed to him. -A ridge, a gully, a road with good hedges parallel to the front, -is sufficient to conceal the movement of machine guns; and as they -have nothing to fear from cavalry and can always retire if galled -by rifle fire, they can dominate the situation if handled according -to the principles already laid down for them. - -Where the tactical reconnaissance has already been completed and -the principal object is to protect the force covered, machine guns -will be found most valuable to support the flanks should an attempt -be made to turn them, as their mobility enables them to be sent to -a distant point with great rapidity, and their concentrated fire at -once makes itself felt at a threatened point and turns the scale -in a fire fight with astonishing suddenness. This mobility renders -them particularly suitable for seizing and holding positions until -the main body comes up. - -When used for this duty the battery or section commander, as the -case may be, should receive definite orders as to the importance -of the position he is sent to hold and how long he is expected to -remain there. The position should be carefully reconnoitred by -scouts before the guns approach it, and steps should be taken at -once to entrench the guns and teams against artillery fire if the -position is to be held for any time. Alternative positions for -each gun, with concealed approaches, should be constructed, and -the guns carefully hidden by erecting screens in front of them, or -by placing them behind bushes, which are then cut almost through -the stem, so that they can be instantly removed to open fire. -Ranges must be taken and carefully written down, with their compass -bearings to conspicuous marks. The flanks must be protected, and -dead ground made good by posting one gun to sweep it. The gun -horses and detachment not on duty should be posted well to the -flank and rear where they can obtain the best shelter from view and -fire. Signalling communication should be established with the rear -and flanks when possible. - -Very definite instructions must be given as to when and on what -targets fire is to be opened, and the temptation to fire at patrols -or small bodies of the enemy must be resisted. Fire should only be -opened in the first instance by the order of the senior officer -present, and in all cases should be reserved as long as possible. - -The battery of machine guns may also be used during the cavalry -combat as already described in the last chapter, and when used as -a reserve on a flank, should take up “positions of observation” if -the ground permits, from which they can repulse a flank attack, -while remaining ready to move off at a moment’s notice to any point -where they may be required. - -Machine-gun commanders with the Protective Cavalry must bear -in mind that their object must always be to help their cavalry -in attaining the end in view, be it reconnaissance, attack, or -resistance, and that close co-operation with the cavalry commander -is essential. The most brilliant action causing loss or defeat to a -portion of the enemy is useless if it does not directly further the -object of the Protective Cavalry; and if we are unable to give here -many examples from recent campaigns, it is principally due to this -want of co-operation and consequent inability to make effective use -of the machine guns. - -The report made by Captain Golochtchanov, who commanded a -detachment of six machine guns attached to the 11th Orenburg -Cossacks during the last few months of the war, contains a vivid -description of the reconnaissance of the Japanese position made on -August 14th, 1905, at Sitasi, by the regiment forming the advanced -guard of Major-General Grêkow. “At about 4 a.m. the Russian cavalry -attacked the Japanese outposts, consisting of three companies of -infantry and two squadrons. While waiting for the situation to be -cleared up, the machine guns were kept in reserve. Two and then -four were sent against the enemy’s flank; the Japanese retired -from position to position. At one o’clock the fight stopped; the -Russians had carried three villages and determined the line and -direction of the enemy’s trenches. Their task was accomplished. On -the Russian side there were only 100 rifles in the firing line, -with four machine guns.”[12] - -“Instead of marching at a uniform rate and distance in front of -the main army it may be advantageous at times for portions of the -Protective Cavalry to move rapidly forward to some natural feature, -such as a ridge or river, along which it will establish posts of -observation, the intervening country being watched by patrols, the -line being divided into sections with suitable supports for each. -The remainder of the force will continue to maintain a line of -observation in rear, until the new line of observation is taken -up; it will then concentrate and move up to support the latter, or -pass through it to form a more advanced line.”[13] - -When this method of advance is used the machine guns working as -independent sections should be used to hold important features, -such as bridge-heads, defiles, passes, and villages in the line of -observation. If positions are carefully selected whence effective -fire can be brought to bear on points which the enemy must pass in -close order, and the usual procedure as to cover, concealment, and -range-taking is observed, the mounted troops may be spared much -fatigue and given opportunities for resting men and horses. - - -USE OF MACHINE GUNS IN A RETREAT - -During the battle the Protective Cavalry will be used in the way -already described in the previous chapter, in which we also dealt -with the Pursuit; we will therefore now see how they may be used to -assist a Retreat. - -“When retreat appears inevitable the routes to the rallying -position should never be so close to the battlefield as to come at -once under the fire of the enemy. It should be occupied as soon as -possible by some portion of the artillery, and by complete infantry -units. _The cavalry and other mounted troops, aided by a strong -force of artillery, will meanwhile check the enemy’s advance_, -and the remainder of the force, with the exception, if possible, -of a rear guard in support of the mounted troops, will move as -rapidly as possible to the shelter of the rallying position and -there reorganise. Steps should be taken immediately to secure any -bridges, defiles, or other vital points on the line of retreat, -at which the enemy’s mounted troops might intercept the force. -Commanders of retreating troops must recognise that their greatest -danger will arise from attacks in flank delivered by the enemy’s -mounted troops and horse artillery; if possible, therefore, they -should take precautions that _all ground commanding their line -of retreat is occupied by flank guards_.”[14] The action of the -Protective Cavalry is indicated in the first paragraph quoted in -italics, while the second gives the only method by which a retreat -can be rendered successful or secure. In no phase of modern war -are machine guns so valuable as during a retreat, and it is quite -probable that, properly organised and handled, they may make the -pursuit so difficult and costly as to render the retreat a far -less dangerous undertaking than it has been in the past. It is not -difficult to realise that an arm possessing such great mobility, -together with rapidity and concentration of fire, before which no -closed bodies can exist at effective range, will be able not merely -to check and delay pursuing cavalry, but may even prevent any -effective pursuit by mounted men alone. - -The lack of machine guns on the side of the Russians in the late -war renders this point still to be proved by a future campaign; but -it is well known that the machine guns with the 1st Siberian Army -Corps constantly checked the Japanese pursuit, and more than once -rendered a flanking movement abortive. - -The moment that it is evident that a retreat is necessary it -will be the duty of the Protective Cavalry commander immediately -to collect all his cavalry, with a view to checking the enemy’s -advance, and at the same time he should apply to the G.O.C. for -as many machine guns as he can spare, and this is certainly the -occasion when all the mounted machine-gun batteries should be sent -to the commander of the rear guard. - -The first step will be to allot one or more batteries to the troops -forming the two flank guards and to the main guard covering the -centre. The general situation at this moment will of course govern -their use. “The commander will determine, in accordance with the -features of the ground, whether delay is best brought about by -the occupation of positions blocking or flanking the enemy’s line -of advance and the employment of fire action, or by a vigorous -and timely attack by a body of horsemen. Frequently, however, -opportunities may be offered for acting wide on the flanks, where -even the threat of a mounted attack or a sudden dash from ambush -may cause the enemy’s pursuit to be delayed without the force -becoming too deeply committed.”[15] In either case the important -thing for machine guns to do at this stage is quickly to seize -ground from which to bring effective fire to bear across a wide -extent of front. Dealing first with the commander of the batteries -allotted to the centre, he will consult the O.C. cavalry and -arrange with him his plan of action. It is of the first importance -to stop the forward movement of the enemy on the direct line of -retreat, as this is the easiest line of pursuit and the one upon -which the most shaken portion of the troops will be found. The -probable course of action for the machine guns here will be to -break up into sections and form a line along the nearest feature of -ground immediately in rear, from which fire can be brought to sweep -the front and check direct pursuit. The more broken the country and -the more commanding the ridge or other features, the more effectual -will be the check, for at this stage guns will certainly be -prominent in the pursuit and shelter from their fire will be very -necessary. - -The fact that the machine guns are working in pairs on a very wide -front should make it exceedingly difficult for artillery to locate -them, except singly, and thus it will take them a considerable time -to silence more than one or two of the scattered line of guns. -Alternative positions and the constant change to a fresh one after -opening fire will render the majority of the machine guns capable -of remaining in action until closely engaged by the infantry. This -will cause considerable delay, and by the time a serious infantry -attack develops the machine guns will be able to retire to a fresh -position. In anticipation of this, the battery commanders will have -sent scouts to the rear directly the guns are in position, and they -should personally examine the new line to be taken up, and select -the gun positions for each section. One scout should remain in the -new position of each section and the other return to the gun horses -of his section, to guide them when the moment for retiring takes -place. - -The gun horses should be as near the guns in action as possible; -but should the position be such that this is impossible without -exposing the horses to fire, then all the spare rifles of the -gun-team must be used to open rapid fire to conceal the fact that -the gun is being moved. The guns of each section must arrange with -each other to cover their own retirement, but the battery commander -must issue the order in the first instance and will arrange which -sections move first. - -Where the pressure is great and co-operation difficult, it may -be advisable to retire by half sections along the whole front at -the same moment; thus the right guns of sections may be ordered -to retire on a given signal, while the left guns cover them by a -heavy continuous fire. If this method of retirement is adopted, it -will be necessary for the second position to be within long range -of the first, which is not always advisable in covering a retreat. -It will seldom be possible to select a concealed position in the -early stages of the retreat, but it must be borne in mind that if -a concealed position can be occupied, and fire reserved until the -pursuing cavalry are at close range, the effect of such a surprise -will do much to check the pursuit, and impose such caution on the -enemy that they will hesitate to press on without those precautions -which necessitate deployments and thus cause much delay. - -The machine guns allotted to the flanks should form the supports -to the cavalry there; and if two batteries are available on each -flank, one should accompany the cavalry to enable it to remain -mounted, while they provide the fire action necessary to support it -in the attack and to cover its retirement in the face of superior -numbers. The detail of such action has already been given with -the Independent Cavalry. The other batteries will break up into -sections and move parallel to the line of retreat in single file -at wide intervals, keeping touch with the cavalry by scouts on the -outer flank. The object of this battery is to seize and hold good -positions on the flank of the line of retreat until the main body -has passed. The scouts of the rear section of this battery should -get into touch with the scouts of the flank gun of the centre -battery from time to time, to ensure proper co-operation between -the various batteries. - -The importance of concealed positions from which to ambush the -pursuers must not blind machine-gun commanders to the necessity -for seizing and holding to the last possible moment, even at -the risk of capture, every position from which the retreat can -be effectually covered and the pursuit delayed. Should a river -or other natural obstacle be encountered on the line of retreat, -machine guns must freely sacrifice themselves in covering the -retirement of the cavalry across the bridge or beyond the obstacle. - -Cavalry is the most costly of all arms, and cannot be replaced -during a campaign; machine guns are the least expensive in -proportion to their fire value, and the easiest to renew; they must -consequently save the cavalry when they can, even if they sacrifice -themselves in doing so. - - -ESCORT TO ARTILLERY - -There is one important duty which machine guns are able to perform -better than any other arm, and that is escorting artillery, but -more especially horse artillery. When cavalry are detailed for -this purpose they not only deprive squadrons of much-needed men, -but can only provide three rifles in action to every four men of -the escort, owing to the necessity of providing horse-holders. In -addition to this drawback, the horses provide a costly fire-trap -for the shells of the enemy’s guns which may go wide of the -battery. For these reasons, where it is possible to spare them, -a section of machine guns should be allotted to each battery of -artillery when an escort is necessary. - -They should march in the rear of the battery when on a road, and -on the outer flank when in open country and away from cavalry. -The sole object of the machine guns is to afford protection to -the battery from cavalry, and to prevent rifle fire from being -brought to bear on them from effective range; therefore the section -commander must devote his whole attention to this object, and he is -not justified in opening fire on any target that does not directly -threaten the battery--this especially applies to that stage of the -mounted combat immediately before the collision, when the guns are -firing on the opposing squadrons. - -The section commander will be under the immediate orders of the -battery commander, and should be acquainted with his plans and -intentions. He should remain with him until the position for -action has been selected, when he will immediately seek the best -position from which to cover the guns, taking particular care -not to mask or limit their radius of fire nor hinder their line -of advance or retreat. This will necessitate a careful but rapid -survey of the ground in the vicinity of the position, in which -good ground scouts, who have been previously trained in this work, -will materially assist. The most suitable positions will usually -be found well to the front and on the inner flank of the battery -from 200 to 600 yards’ distance. It may be occasionally possible to -place a machine gun on each flank from which a cross fire can be -brought to bear on ground in front of the guns; but such a position -on either side of the battery, unless the ground is particularly -favourable, has the disadvantage of rendering fire control -difficult, and may hamper the fire or movement of the battery. -The principal considerations which should govern the choice of a -position are as follows: - -(1) Good field of fire to protect the battery from attack. - -(2) Position clear of the fire and movement of the battery. - -(3) Immunity from artillery firing on the battery. - -(4) Concealment. - -(5) Cover from fire. - -There should be no dead ground in front or on the flanks of the -battery, and with two machine guns this condition can generally be -satisfied. In cases where one flank remains exposed and cannot be -protected by the fire of the machine guns, or where a portion of -the front or one flank cannot be seen, scouts must be placed well -out in this direction, where they can see anything approaching -and signal timely warning of it, and a position must be selected -beforehand to which to move a machine gun should the warning be -given. It has already been pointed out in a previous chapter, and -may be repeated here, that machine guns have nothing to fear from -cavalry under any circumstances, and when in a selected position -with ranges accurately known, as they would be in this case, a -single gun properly handled could easily stop a squadron. When -selecting the place for the led horses, it must be remembered that -fire from the enemy’s guns is likely to search the reverse slopes -of the position immediately in rear of the battery. - -The machine guns must not be re-horsed until after the battery -has limbered up and moved off, as they are then most vulnerable. -They should endeavour to come into action before the battery -unlimbers--though this will seldom be possible with horse -artillery. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH INFANTRY - - -The employment of machine guns with infantry seems at first sight -to be obvious, for they fire the same ammunition and have the -same range and kinetic effect. Nevertheless the first machine -gun was used by the French in 1870 as artillery, and its name -“mitrailleuse” indicates “grape shot” rather than rifle bullets. -This initial error in its tactical employment, together with its -crude mechanism, artillery carriage, and short range (about 500 -yards), enabled the artillery to silence it early in the battle, so -that it rarely proved of any use. - -On the few occasions when it was concealed from the artillery -and used at short range against the infantry, its effect was as -astonishing as it was decisive. At Gravelotte several batteries of -mitrailleuses concealed near St. Hubert’s Farm reserved their fire -until the attacking infantry was on the glacis within close range. -The result was decisive, and the German attack was repulsed with -terrific loss. Again at Mars la Tour, the German official account -describes the repulse of the 38th Prussian Brigade by mitrailleuse -batteries placed on the crest of the hill, as causing them such -losses as to amount almost to annihilation. The brigade lost more -than half its numbers and two-thirds of its officers. - -When it is remembered that this mitrailleuse was not automatic, but -had to be operated by hand, that it had 25 barrels and a maximum -effective range of only 500 yards, and that it cheerfully engaged -in the artillery duel at ranges between 2,000 and 4,000 yards, -the only wonder is that, having accomplished so much, the reasons -for its failure were not immediately apparent, and that it has -taken nearly forty years to convince the world that tactics are -as necessary for the effective employment of machine guns as for -infantry. The general principles for their tactical employment have -already been dealt with in Chapter II., but they are so excellently -condensed in Sect. 187 of the German Regulations, that at the risk -of repetition they may be quoted here. - -“Machine guns enable commanders to develop at fixed points the -maximum volume of infantry fire on the smallest possible front. -Machine guns can be employed over any country that is practical -for infantry, and when they are unlimbered they must be able to -surmount considerable obstacles. In action they offer no greater -target than riflemen fighting under like conditions, and they can, -in proportion to their fire value, support far greater losses than -infantry. They can utilise all cover that infantry are able to use. -Cover which is barely sufficient for a section of infantry (60 -men) can protect an entire machine-gun detachment (six guns).” - -In order to see in more detail how machine guns should be employed -with infantry and the limitations of their tactics, it will be -necessary to follow the sequence of the infantry combat in attack -and defence, and to assume such situations as seem likely to arise. - - -ADVANCED GUARDS - -The action of the infantry of an advanced guard will follow the -same lines whatever the dimensions of the force, and the battalion -is a convenient unit with which to deal. There are four battalions -in a brigade, and three brigades in a Division; consequently the -Divisional General will have six batteries of four guns each, or 24 -machine guns, under his command. We will assume that the battalion -we are dealing with forms the advanced guard of its brigade, and -that the Brigadier has given it a battery of four machine guns, two -of which will probably belong to the battalion. - -_Field Service Regulations_, 1909, page 79, says: “An advanced -guard is divided into a vanguard and a main guard.... The special -duty of the vanguard is reconnaissance. It will therefore generally -be composed of the advanced guard mounted troops, with or without a -body of infantry as a support. By day, when the country is open and -the advanced guard is strong in mounted troops, infantry will not -as a rule form part of the vanguard.... The main guard comprises -the troops of the advanced guard not allotted to the vanguard.” - -We will first take the case of infantry with the vanguard as a -support to the mounted troops, and suppose that two companies are -allotted for this duty and have been given a section of machine -guns. The formation of the infantry of the vanguard will largely -depend on the nature of the country and the proximity of the enemy. -Where the country is open plain they will probably be extended in -a long line of skirmishers, in which case the machine guns should -march close in rear of the centre on the road. Should the country -be close or broken, the vanguard infantry may be confined to the -road--with small parties pushed out to the front and flanks--in -which case the machine guns should march in rear of the advanced -party, and not in rear of the vanguard. It must be remembered -that machine guns are able to come into action and open a heavy -and accurate fire in less time than it would take infantry of -equal fire power to deploy and to open fire from a position; it is -therefore the machine guns of the vanguard that should be the first -to open fire and give the infantry time to deploy and find fire -positions. When the enemy is encountered the object of the vanguard -infantry must be to support the cavalry as quickly as possible, and -enable them to mount and push forward round the flanks. - -The section commander must go forward at once with scouts from -each gun, and quickly grasp the situation, consulting the officer -commanding the troops engaged as to the action to be taken; he must -then select the positions for his guns to come into action. The -scouts should take ranges and have everything ready for the guns to -open fire on arrival. The moment the guns open fire, the section -commander should send scouts off to find alternative positions to -the front and flank from which it may appear possible to enfilade -the enemy. Should the target be unsuitable, _e.g._ a line of -well-concealed skirmishers, etc., fire must be _reserved_, and the -guns should take up positions of observation while the section -commander and scouts seek for a position on the flanks from which -to bring an effective fire. - -As soon as the vanguard infantry are deployed the section commander -must co-operate with them entirely, and must take his instructions -from the vanguard commander, who should leave him a free hand, -merely telling him his intentions and how the guns may best assist -him. - -When the main guard comes up, in the case where the vanguard is -checked, the section commander should take the earliest opportunity -of placing himself under the battery commander, and at this stage -the guns should be used to seize and hold positions of importance, -especially artillery positions. If the advanced-guard action -discloses the fact that the main body of the enemy has been -encountered, and the G.O.C decides to engage, the advanced guard -will be required to seize all positions of tactical value and to -hold off the enemy until the main body has had time to arrive and -deploy. Their action will vary according to whether the G.O.C. -decides to act on the offensive or defensive. The latest German -Regulations say: “On becoming engaged, that side will have the -advantage which gains the start over its opponents in readiness -for action, and thus reaps the benefit of the initiative.” No arm -is better able to assist in this than the machine gun, and every -available battery should be brought up at this stage to take part -in the advanced-guard engagement. - -The Germans say: “The advanced guard will fight on a wider front -than that ordinarily allotted to a force of its size, so as to -seriously engage the enemy. It will be disposed in groups more or -less detached, which will occupy those positions the possession of -which will most protect the deployment of the main body. _It will -be assisted by detachments of machine guns, which will be placed -for preference on those positions which it is most necessary to -prevent the enemy from capturing._”[16] - -The commander of the machine guns of the advanced guard is -under the immediate orders of the O.C. advanced guard, and must -co-operate with him throughout the engagement. All officers with -machine guns must remember that isolated action is useless, and -that however effective their fire may be locally, unless it -directly furthers the object of the action, it is an unjustifiable -waste of fire power. - -The seizure of ground likely to be of use to the main -body--particularly artillery positions--must be the first -consideration of machine guns with the advanced-guard infantry, -once the infantry are in action. That they can hold these -unsupported is certain. “There never has been and cannot be such -a thing as a successful attack on a line of machine guns in a -favourable position in action, until the machine guns have been -well battered by artillery fire,” says Lieutenant Parker in his -book _Tactical Organisation and Uses of Machine Guns in the Field_. - -In the cases where the infantry of the advanced guard forms the -main guard, the battery of machine guns should march with the -foremost body of troops and should never march in rear, where they -are useless, and where, if on a road, they can only be moved up -with difficulty. The battery commander should remain with the O.C. -advanced guard until he is fully acquainted with the situation -and his intentions. Should the situation be such as to enable the -advanced guard to brush aside the opposition, the machine guns must -be used vigorously to support the infantry attack, and should be -pushed forward to seize positions before the infantry deploy, and -cover their deployment by fire. In the preliminary stages these -positions will probably be on the immediate front, and the four -guns should be able to occupy a front roughly coinciding with the -first deployment of the infantry. As soon as the infantry come -into action the machine guns may be withdrawn and used on the -flanks to bring a cross fire to bear, and to fire on any closed -bodies, led horses, etc., that may offer a target. At this stage -the guns should work in pairs in mutual support, and may be used on -one or both flanks as the situation requires. - -Machine guns should rarely be used in the firing line after the -infantry deploy, as they offer a rather marked target and can be -far more profitably employed in pressing the attack on the flanks. - -There are several instances of the successful use of machine guns -with the advanced guard in South Africa in 1900 to support the -mounted vanguard, and on many occasions they were able to brush the -enemy aside without deploying the main guard or delaying the march -of the column. - - -THE ATTACK - -Under cover of the advanced-guard action and the subsequent -artillery duel the infantry will deploy for the attack. The first -advance of the infantry will probably be covered and supported by -the artillery, and they will generally be able to push forward to -within long range of the enemy’s infantry, without the necessity -of covering their advance by rifle fire. From here, however, the -firing line will begin to suffer from rifle fire, and it will be -necessary to reply to this fire in order to cover the further -advance. - -“To enable the attack to be prosecuted it is clear that from -this moment the hostile fire must be met by fire of greater -power, _its intensity and duration being dependent on the effect -produced_. Moreover, from this point forward movement will as a -rule be contingent on the mutual fire support afforded to one -another by neighbouring bodies, and on the effects produced by -the _covering fire brought to bear on the enemy’s line_ wherever -the ground admits of such action, by supports, reserves, and the -troops specially told off for this purpose. Covering fire should -be delivered so as to strike the enemy, disturb his aim, and -compel him to seek shelter when the assailant is exposed or in -difficulties. _In such circumstances intensity of fire is of the -first importance; but fire should be reserved when the assailants’ -progress is satisfactory, or when he is under cover._”[17] - -No one who has controlled the covering fire of infantry, even -on manœuvres, will dispute the immense difficulty of timing -the opening and ceasing of such a fire, with even a company, -to coincide with the advance of the troops covered; while the -necessity for observation of fire and its concentration on certain -parts of the enemy’s position make it still more difficult -effectively to cover the advance of troops with rifle fire at long -range. - -That machine guns will be able to perform this duty far more -effectively and easily than infantry is manifest from the nature -of the fire required, the features being _intensity_, _control_, -and _concentration_, all of which are characteristic of machine -guns. When required to cover the advance of infantry, machine guns -should be used in batteries and must be so placed that they are -able to see the infantry they are covering, and to sweep those -portions of the enemy’s position from which fire can be brought -to bear on the advancing troops. If the enemy’s artillery is not -silenced or at least dominated by that of the attackers, it will -be necessary to conceal the machine guns from view and provide -cover from fire. That machine guns well concealed and provided with -cover (pits) are able to remain in action under artillery fire for -considerable periods, is proved by instances in the Russo-Japanese -War (see Chapter III. p. 28). Major Kuhn, who was with the Japanese -Army in Manchuria, in his report states: “Importance is laid on -concealing the guns, and it was claimed that none had been knocked -out by the Russian artillery.” Covering fire from the flanks is -more likely to be effective than frontal fire, because it will -enfilade entrenchments, reach men behind natural cover and have a -more disconcerting morale effect than frontal fire. It will not -always be possible to find suitable fire positions on the flanks -for machine guns at this stage of the attack, and it will then be -necessary to place them in rear of the attacking infantry and fire -over their heads. This can be done with perfect safety--indeed, -there is far less danger of accidentally hitting the attacking -infantry with machine guns than with artillery fire. Direct fire -should only be used when it is impossible to use indirect fire on -account of the nature of the ground in the vicinity. - -Indirect fire from the reverse slope of a hill has the advantage -of concealing the guns and rendering them immune from artillery -fire. The position must be carefully selected with due regard to -the slope in its relation to fire from the enemy as laid down in -chap. ii. p. 67, of _Training Manuals Appendix_, 1905. The best -position is just below the crest of a steep slope, as observation -of fire is rendered easier and the effect of shrapnel minimised. -The safety of the infantry in front will depend entirely on the -range, height of the guns above the infantry, and the position of -the target (enemy). On level ground the range must not be less -than 800 yards,[18] and the infantry will be perfectly safe at all -distances between 200 yards from the guns and 200 yards from the -enemy. (See table, Appendix A.) The methods of employing indirect -fire have been given at the end of Chapter II., and its success -will depend largely upon the careful observation of fire by the -section commanders, who must concentrate their attention on this -alone--the battery commander giving the signal for opening and -ceasing fire, and the target or direction of fire for each section. -Machine guns used as covering fire have ample time for preparation; -and as ranges can be accurately taken, and great deliberation used -in selecting positions, observing fire, and correcting errors, the -maximum of accuracy should be attained. If the enemy is entrenched -against frontal fire, good results may be expected from accurate -distant fire, owing to the angle of descent of the bullet causing -the low parapet or shallow trench to be no protection. - -They were successfully used by the Japanese as covering fire for -infantry in the attack, as the following examples will show: “At -Mukden on March 1st all the machine guns of a whole Japanese -division (12 to 18 guns) were brought into action upon a Russian -_point d’appui_. The Russian fire was silenced, but burst out again -whenever the machine-gun fire slackened. The Japanese infantry used -these pauses in the enemy’s fire to press forward to close range -_under cover of their machine-gun fire_.”[19] On March 2nd the -three machine guns of the 10th Japanese Infantry Regiment acted in -the same way against a Russian fieldwork. This method of employing -machine guns requires the closest co-operation with the infantry -from the commencement of the attack. - -Again, during the Japanese attack on Namako Yama the infantry -were greatly assisted by covering fire from their machine guns -directed on the Russian trenches. These guns were used from behind -_screens_, and their success was largely due to their being well -concealed. - -It will rarely be advisable for machine guns to follow infantry -into the firing line, where they present a conspicuous target -which attracts fire and renders their withdrawal difficult. - -We made this mistake in the South African War more than once. At -Rietfontein the machine-gun detachment of the Gloucester Regiment, -which had followed the battalion into the firing line, was almost -annihilated. At Modder River the Scots Guards Maxim gun accompanied -the firing line, and the detachment was annihilated by pom-pom -fire, and the gun was left on the field alone all day.[20] In the -attack on Cronje’s laager at Paardeberg, machine guns were used in -the firing line on the left bank of the river, and when the attack -failed the machine guns, having suffered severe losses, could not -be withdrawn and had to be abandoned till nightfall. - -When the covering fire of machine guns is no longer considered -necessary, they should be withdrawn and concentrated in batteries -in rear of the reserve or in such other convenient position as the -G.O.C. may direct. They should take this opportunity of refilling -belts, replenishing ammunition, water, etc., and if the guns have -fired many thousand rounds, of exchanging barrels.[21] They are -now at the immediate disposal of the G.O.C. and will be used by -him as a mobile reserve. Circumstances vary so in war that it is -impossible to particularize in their use at this stage, but their -great mobility will render them extremely valuable in the following -cases: - -1. To assist a turning movement. - -2. To reinforce a distant flank. - -3. To repel a counter-attack. - -4. To hold a captured position. - -When the infantry reach close range, the point for the assault will -have been selected and the reserves massed behind this point. When -the reserves have been thrown in, and the fire fight has reached -its height, the moment will have arrived when one side or the other -will obtain superiority of fire. “_The climax of the infantry -attack is the assault which is made possible by superiority of -fire._”[22] To assist in the attainment of this superiority of -fire is the true rôle of machine guns with infantry, and, as their -beaten zone at short ranges is so small, they can safely fire -over the heads of prone infantry, even when the latter are within -a hundred yards of the target. The guns should now be pushed up -to the closest ranges, and fire of the most rapid description -concentrated on the point of assault. When it is remembered that -the machine guns of a single Infantry Division, as at present -organised, can bring a fire of more than ten thousand shots a -minute from close range where its accuracy is assured, at this -crisis, there will be no need to say any more on the tactical -importance of the probable result. - -In bringing machine guns into action for this purpose, they will -generally be used in batteries, but may come into action in -sections or even single guns once the objective has been pointed -out. The object being to obtain superiority of fire regardless of -cost, rapidity and concentration of fire must be the principal -points. The guns must therefore press forward to the closest -range, and where it is possible to bring a cross or enfilading -fire to bear, the opportunity must not be neglected. It may be -necessary to fire over the heads of the infantry or even to push -guns into the firing line itself, though this is seldom desirable -if good positions can be found in rear. When any portion of the -line advances to the assault, fire must be concentrated over their -heads on the position assaulted; and when they are so close to -the position as to render such fire impossible, fire must not -cease, but be directed over the position so as to strike the enemy -as they retreat. Fire from machine guns may be kept up from 500 -yards’ range over the heads of prone infantry within 100 yards of -the target with perfect safety, and from 800 yards over infantry -advancing to within the same distance. General Nogi, speaking of -the use of machine guns in the attack, says: “Our troops trained -machine guns on the most advanced lines of infantry _to overwhelm -with fire the points at which resistance was greatest_. Sacks of -earth were used to mask them. _They have often enabled the infantry -to advance with success._” M. Ullrich, war correspondent of the -_Gazette de Cologne_, was present in many engagements in which -machine guns were pushed up to support the firing line in the final -stage. He says: “In the offensive the Japanese frequently made -successful use of machine guns. _When the infantry were carrying -out a decisive attack, they were supported by their machine guns, -which concentrated their fire on points arranged beforehand_.... -When machine guns have been skilfully employed, their action has -been infinitely more effective than that of field artillery, more -especially when they fire at infantry ranges.” The following is -an example of their actual use in this way. “The Japanese,” says -a Russian eye-witness of the fighting round Mukden, “brought up -during the night dozens of machine guns with hundreds of thousands -of cartridges to their front line of skirmishers, from 400 to 500 -yards from our positions, and entrenched them there. _When the -assault commenced, at dawn, the machine guns opened fire with fatal -accuracy on the parapets of our trenches and on our reserves_, -preventing them from coming up. We could do nothing with the enemy, -because when the machine guns showed the least vulnerability, they -were at once protected by shields of bullet-proof steel.”[23] - -The machine guns of the enemy will all be in action during the -final stages, but they should not be engaged by the machine guns -of the attack except when exposed. They are very difficult to put -out of action by small-arm fire at any time, and when employed by -the defence are sure to be well concealed and provided with cover. -It is the duty of the artillery to silence machine guns, and this -was so far recognised in the war between Russia and Japan that -the latter brought up mountain guns on more than one occasion to -silence the Russian machine guns. - -At Kinsan on June 26th, 1905, when the Japanese were attacking the -position, the Russians brought up two machine guns against the -43rd Regiment and a mountain battery at 3 p.m. The battery at once -silenced the machine guns, and by 5.30 p.m. the hill was in the -hands of the Japanese.[24] Captain Niessel, of the Russian Army, -gives another instance. “It was on August 31st at 7 p.m. that the -Japanese decided to drive the machine guns out of the village of -Goutsiati by _artillery fire_. Knowing that their infantry had been -checked, they posted at the village of Datchaotsiati a battery -which showered on us shrapnel and high explosive shell. Although -the men had taken cover behind a wall of earth, we had many wounded -and could not breathe freely until nightfall, when the enemy -ceased their fire, to which _we could not reply on account of the -distance_. At 9 p.m. I was ordered to evacuate the position.”[25] - -The moment the infantry assault is successful, the machine guns -must be pushed forward into the captured position to secure the -ground gained and to repel counter-attacks. As the confusion at -this moment will be considerable, it will seldom be possible for -the machine-gun commander to receive orders from the G.O.C., but -this must not prevent him from immediately directing guns to occupy -and quickly entrench themselves in positions which it may appear -vital to secure, and to order the remainder of the guns not so -required to follow and fire on the enemy wherever he may show signs -of rallying. In order that these two distinct duties may be carried -out instantly and without confusion, it will be advisable to tell -off beforehand those batteries that are to pursue the enemy. - -Theoretically every available gun should be launched in the -pursuit, but the recent war between Russia and Japan has shown -how often a position that has been stormed and captured has been -retaken by a rapid counter-attack before the attackers have had -time to rally and prepare to hold what they have taken. Machine -guns can render a position safe from counter-attack so quickly and -effectually that this duty should be the _first_ consideration of a -machine-gun commander with infantry in the assault. - -Fresh ammunition must be brought up, and every endeavour made to -conceal the guns and construct good cover from any material found -in the position. - -“During the battle of Mukden, on the evening of March 1st, a -position at Sha-shan was captured by the Japanese. The Russians -had taken up another position some 500 yards in rear, from which -they opened an effective fire upon the Japanese infantry in the -captured position. Another Russian force about 1,000 yards -further to the west threatened their flank. The Japanese, however, -succeeded in bringing up _the machine guns which had taken part in -the attack, and brought them into action under cover of a number of -sandbags abandoned by the Russians_. The effect was decisive: all -counter-attacks failed before the annihilating fire of the machine -guns.”[26] - - -IN THE DEFENCE - -When infantry are acting on the defensive, it is advisable that the -majority of the machine guns should be held in reserve, and used to -check turning movements, to reinforce distant portions of the line -of defence, and to deliver counter-attacks, but their principal -rôle will be the repelling of the assault. Guns allotted for this -purpose must be placed in very carefully selected positions in the -line of defence, from which they can command narrow approaches, -and sweep ground in front of trenches or important works by cross -fire, especially any dead ground likely to afford temporary cover -to the attackers. Concealment is of the first importance, and cover -from fire absolutely necessary, but the combination of the two -requires great skill both in choosing positions and in constructing -an inconspicuous shelter. In certain positions where the country -is flat or undulating and has no abrupt features, pits will be -found the best form of cover; but where the ground presents -marked features, emplacements providing overhead cover will not -only conceal the guns, but render them immune from shrapnel. The -Japanese used these emplacements with great success, the guns often -remaining concealed even when the enemy were within 300 yards. - -The positions for machine guns should not be in one and the same -line, and they should be placed at wide intervals. At least two -positions should be provided for each gun, and a second series -of positions in rear, commanding those in front, should also be -provided. The machine guns should be allotted to their positions by -sections, each gun being so placed that its fire crosses that of -the other when possible. Section commanders should be responsible -for having all ranges from their respective positions taken and -written up in each emplacement. They must arrange with the O.C. of -that portion of the position to which they are allotted the time -and signal (if any) for opening fire; the exact moment should be -left to the discretion of the section commander as a rule, the O.C. -merely indicating the stage of the attack up to which fire is to be -reserved, and great care should be taken not to open fire before -this stage has been reached. Every endeavour should be made to -ensure co-operation between the machine-gun units in reserving fire -till the shortest range has been reached by the attack and a really -good target presented. Nothing can justify a machine gun opening -fire from a concealed position until its fire will give the best -results that can be expected from that place, and to ensure this -it is necessary that the target is big and vulnerable, the range -close, and the fire unexpected by the enemy. Captain von Beckmann, -speaking of the Russo-Japanese War, says: “Premature fire upon -unsuitable targets at long range is to be deprecated. The greater -the surprise, and the shorter the time within which heavy loss is -inflicted, the greater the morale effect produced. At the battle -of Hai-kou-tai on January 27th, 1905, a Japanese company attacked -Sha-shan. Four Russian machine guns _opened fire at about 1,100 -yards upon the extended firing line, without causing any serious -loss or affecting its advance_. On the other hand, the Japanese -on March 1st had _approached to within 200 or 300 yards_ of the -Russian position at Wang-chia-wo-pang and were beginning the final -assault. Two Russian machine guns _suddenly came into action_, and -the Japanese assault _was repulsed with heavy loss_ owing to the -annihilating fire.” - -These two instances well illustrate the right and wrong way of -using machine guns in the defence. Where a battery is allotted to -one section of the defence the guns should be distributed two or -four along the front and one or more on each flank. Single guns -may be used in the defence where a section cannot be spared, as -the assistance of a supporting gun is not essential to its safety -when behind entrenchments. In the first instance guns may be kept -in rear of the position until the direction of the attack has -been ascertained, provided they are able to occupy their positions -unseen. - -Machine guns at salients and on the flanks are of great value in -defending a position. - -If sufficient machine guns are available, one or two batteries -should be reserved for the counter-attack. They should in this -instance be pushed right into the firing line when necessary and -used with the greatest boldness. It will be their duty to cover the -retirement of the Infantry in the event of a repulse, and for this -purpose positions in rear should have been selected beforehand. - -Although the principle of reserving machine guns in the defence -must be strictly adhered to, there may be occasions when the use -of a battery or two well in front of the defensive position will -compel the enemy to deploy prematurely, cause him loss, and delay -his advance. Machine guns so used may also find opportunities for -surprising artillery while unlimbering, and thus render great -service to the defence. They should be withdrawn when their mission -is accomplished, and be reserved for further use as already -indicated. The following are examples from the Russo-Japanese War -of the use of machine guns in the defence of a position. - -General Nogi has written: “Our most formidable foes were wire -entanglements placed 100 yards in front of the Russian trenches, -well lit up by search-lights and covered by the murderous fire of -machine guns. The defenders made use of them to flank dead ground -in their front and also had them at other points, kept carefully -in reserve and under good cover, to make use of continuous fire -against the attackers at the moment of the assault.” - -“On January 28th, 1905, near Lin-chin-pu at about 7 p.m. the -Japanese attacked the forts of Vosnesenski and the trenches near -by, in which were posted two machine guns. _These latter opened -fire at 200 or 300 yards on a Japanese company in line. In one or -two minutes they fired about 1,000 rounds, and the Japanese company -was annihilated._”[27] - -“At Mukden on March 1st, the left of a Japanese Division _being -within 300 yards of the enemy’s position_ and about to assault, -the Russians suddenly opened a very heavy machine-gun fire from -cleverly concealed positions, _causing such loss that the Japanese -attack was temporarily suspended_. On August 20th, 1904, the -Japanese captured a lunette near the village of Shin-shi after -severe fighting. _The Russians made a counter-attack with three -machine guns, and drove the Japanese out again with a loss of over -300._ The three machine guns retired from the lunette before the -attackers got home, and, taking up a position behind the open gorge -of the work, showered such a hail of bullets on the victorious -Japanese that they were compelled to retire.”[28] - -“On February 27th, 1905, the Russians tried to surprise the -railway bridge over the Sha-ho on a very clear night, when one -could see as far as 500 yards. Four Japanese machine guns opened -fire on a company of the 10th Light Infantry, which was almost -wiped out.”[29] - -At the battle of Hei-kow-tai, the Russians at Shen-tan-pu made -no less than five determined attacks against the Japanese -entrenchments, in which was a machine gun, but were repulsed each -time. The machine gun is said to have done great execution, and -_one thousand dead Russians were reported to have been found before -it_.[30] - -The 8th Division of the Japanese Army are reported to have made -several fine attacks upon Hei-kow-tai, _but were each time repulsed -mainly by the fire of the Russian machine guns_.[31] The same -report says, “Throughout the campaign in Manchuria the Japanese -have suffered severely in attacking those points of the Russian -front which have been armed with machine guns,” and proceeds to -quote an episode in the operations of the 5th Division at the -battle of Mukden, to show to what lengths the Japanese went in -order to silence these weapons. It appears that the Japanese were -so galled by the fire of four machine guns that the attack was -materially affected. They decided to bring up two mountain guns to -within 500 yards of these machine guns, to try to destroy them. -The mountain guns were brought up behind a wall and fired through -two holes bored for the muzzles. Two machine guns were at once -destroyed, but so well had the others been concealed that they were -able to be withdrawn in safety. - -Sufficient has been quoted to show that both the Japanese and -Russians made the greatest use of machine guns in the defence, -and that when employed on sound tactical principles they not only -afforded material assistance, but were often the predominant -factor. On the other hand, when these principles were neglected -or ignored, the machine guns merely wasted ammunition and were -impotent to affect the situation. The lesson to be learned is this: -_that machine guns are only useful when their tactical handling is -thoroughly understood, and then their effect is more decisive than -that of any other arm_. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH INFANTRY (_contd._) - - -THE RETREAT - -The reply of the British drummer-boy when asked by the great -Napoleon to beat the “Retreat,” is historical, and, following the -traditions of the British infantry, the word will not be found in -the index of _Infantry Training_. Nevertheless, although British -infantry never retreat, they may be called upon to perform that -most difficult operation of war--“a retirement in the face of the -enemy.” - -_Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, speaking of the retreat -says: “The cavalry and other mounted troops, aided by a strong -force of artillery, will meanwhile check the enemy’s advance, -and the remainder of the force, with the exception, if possible, -of _a rear guard in support of the mounted troops_, will move as -rapidly as possible to the shelter of the rallying position and -there reorganise. Steps should be taken immediately _to secure any -bridges, defiles, or other vital points on the line of retreat_ -at which the enemy’s mounted troops might intercept the force. -Commanders of retreating troops must recognise that their greatest -danger will arise from attacks in flank delivered by the enemy’s -mounted troops and horse artillery; if possible, therefore, they -should take precautions _that all ground commanding their line of -retreat is occupied by flank guards_.” - -There are three distinct ways of employing machine guns with -infantry to assist in covering the retreat, as will be seen from -the portions of the above quoted in italics, viz. (1) With the rear -guard. (2) To secure vital points on the line of retreat. (3) To -occupy commanding positions on the flanks. The use of machine guns -with the rear guard will be dealt with separately, so we will see -how they should be employed to fulfil the two latter duties. - -Let us suppose that the moment has arrived when the commander of -the force decides to break off the engagement and to effect a -retreat. We have already seen how the cavalry and their machine -guns will co-operate, and we may assume that their intervention -will enable the infantry to break off the fight under cover of the -fire of the rear guard and their machine guns. In anticipation -of this, the commander of the machine-gun batteries--other than -those allotted to the rear guard--will assemble them in a central -position and receive from the commander of the force his plan of -action and instructions for the co-operation of the machine guns. -These instructions should definitely state the positions to be -occupied on the line of retreat, and for how long such positions -are to be held (_e.g._ until the infantry are past such-and-such a -place, or to the last possible moment, etc.); but they should leave -all details as to unit of guns, fire positions, opening fire, -etc., to the machine-gun commander, who should be given a free hand -in carrying out his instructions. The machine-gun commander will -then issue his orders to battery commanders, allotting the battery -for the flank and the battery which is to occupy positions on the -line of retreat. In like manner the battery commander will tell off -sections to occupy certain positions, if these have already been -selected, and if not he will direct his battery to a position of -readiness and will gallop off with his section commanders to select -the positions for each section and explain the course of action to -be taken. The position of readiness must be in the vicinity of the -position to be occupied, and section commanders must take steps to -ensure that their sections keep in signalling connection with them -and can be brought up by signal to the position selected. - -The choice of the position will depend upon the nature of the -country and the features favourable to delaying the enemy, but it -may be laid down that the machine guns should not be placed in -one line, but should be broken up as much as possible, so that no -two guns are at the same range. In the same way, guns placed in -well-concealed positions on the lower slopes of hills should have -the other guns of their sections higher up, where they can command -a wide extent of country and at the same time cover the retirement -of the guns below. All guns must be so placed that they can be -_retired under cover of the ground immediately they move_. The -guns on the higher ground will open fire at long range, and the -opportunity may be afforded at this stage for using “deliberate” -fire at the most rapid rate possible, in imitation of rifle fire, -for the double purpose of concealing the guns and deceiving -the enemy by causing them to believe that the position is held -by infantry. The guns at the lower position should watch their -opportunity for opening fire on a large and vulnerable target; but -should none be presented, it is possible by reserving fire to catch -the enemy in close formation should they press on when the guns -have ceased fire, thinking the position has been vacated. - -It may be possible to surprise the enemy from close range at -bridge-heads or on roads through defiles leading to the line of -retreat, if guns are carefully concealed in positions commanding -such approaches. Indeed, the opportunities for ambushing pursuing -cavalry or infantry will be frequent during the early stages of a -retreat, and no chance must be lost in making the enemy pay dearly -for his temerity during the pursuit. One successful ambush by -machine guns is worth more than the most stubborn stand, for it -imposes caution as nothing else can; and caution in the pursuit -means delay, and delay spells failure. When machine guns get a -really good target at close range, the result is little short of -annihilation, and the morale effect of such a heavy loss, totally -unexpected and inflicted in a few moments, takes the life out of -the pursuit more completely than even a long stand. - -The machine guns allotted to the flanks will find positions in -the way already described. These positions must be chosen along -the line of retreat so as to hold all ground from which fire can -be brought to bear on the retreating columns, and from which the -enemy can be successfully repulsed when he attempts to break -through. If there has been time to form infantry flank guards, the -machine guns will assist in strengthening their resistance, and -in covering their withdrawal. When acting alone they should open -fire on suitable targets at the longest ranges, but when supporting -infantry they may be able to reserve fire and surprise the enemy -from close range. Guns working together on a flank must keep in -touch with each other by signal, and guns should work in sections -in mutual support. A battery acting as a flank guard to a force -retreating must be prepared to occupy a front of some two or three -miles, and sections will often be in positions a mile apart in -open ground. Directly the guns have taken up positions the battery -commander should go off with scouts from each gun and select fresh -positions along the line of retreat. He will give the signal for -retirement, and if in action at the time one gun of each section -should move off first under cover of the fire of the others; or -where the situation permits, a flank section may be ordered to move -first. It must sometimes occur that the cavalry on the flanks will -be compelled to retire by a superior force, and when this is the -case machine guns in position may be able to inflict considerable -loss, should the pursuing cavalry follow them too closely while -retiring. - -As soon as it is known that the main body has reached the rallying -position and is ready to hold it, the machine guns can be -withdrawn. This will not usually be possible in daylight, and as a -rule it will take place after dark. The dispositions of the machine -guns in the rallying positions will be the same as in the case with -infantry in the defence. - - -REAR GUARDS - -The prime necessity for the machine guns with a rear guard of a -retreating force is mobility, and without this they will be of -little service and become a hindrance rather than a help. - -“A rear guard carries out its mission best by compelling the -enemy’s troops to halt and deploy for attack as frequently and at -as great a distance as possible. It can usually effect this by -taking up a succession of defensive positions which the enemy must -attack in turn. When the enemy’s dispositions are nearly complete, -the rear guard moves off by successive retirements, each party as -it falls back covering the retirement of the next by its fire. -This action is repeated on the next favourable ground.... A rear -guard may also effectually check an enemy by attacking his advanced -troops as they emerge from a defile or difficult country.”[32] - -Machine guns, by reason of their concentrated fire and shallow -beaten zone, are peculiarly suited for compelling troops to deploy -at long range. They are also suited for quickly taking up a -defensive position, and, when mobile, can instantly cease fire and -move off in a few moments with considerable rapidity. - -Their power for suddenly developing an intense fire will enable -them quickly to overwhelm an enemy caught “emerging from a defile -or difficult country.” It would appear therefore that the machine -guns are far more fitted than infantry to perform the duties of a -rear guard as quoted above. - -“The first consideration in selecting a position for the artillery -is that it shall be able to open fire on an enemy at long range, -and thus compel his infantry to assume an extended formation at -the greatest possible distance. The second is that it should be -possible to withdraw without difficulty.”[33] - -When the infantry arrive within effective rifle range of the -artillery, the latter will be compelled to retire, especially if -the former are supported by cavalry. This will also be the moment -when the infantry will require to retire to a fresh position in -rear. Machine guns that have been well concealed, or which have -taken up fresh positions in good cover in rear of the infantry -line, should be able to unmask and by their fire hold off the enemy -until both guns and infantry have effected their retreat. The -facility with which they can traverse and sweep widely extended -lines, and instantly concentrate fire on any portion of it, make -them of great service in covering a retirement at effective range, -as they can render the hottest fire ineffective and aimed fire -impossible for a short time. - -Machine guns with a rear guard must be prepared to work from place -to place with great rapidity, and for this purpose they must -arrange to bring the gun horses close up to their fire position. -Alternative positions are essential, but must be reached under -cover and unobserved by the enemy. Sections will act independently, -using their guns in mutual support; but the retirement of -one section may often afford another the opportunity, from a -well-chosen position on a flank, to surprise the enemy from close -range as they press forward to occupy the abandoned position. - -A ruse that may sometimes be successful where guns are really well -concealed is to bring up the gun horses and retire at a gallop -by a pre-arranged signal all along the position, but leaving one -gun of each section still in position but flat on the ground, -where it will be completely concealed even from glasses. This is -almost certain to draw a hot pursuit, especially if the artillery -and infantry have retired previously, and if fire is reserved -till close range a severe check may be administered to the enemy. -“Skilfully laid ambushes will cause the enemy to move with caution -in pursuit.”[34] - -Machine guns should never retire for a few hundred yards, except -where absolutely necessary for covering the retirement of those in -front. Once in position, they should only be moved to alternative -positions when discovered, and these will usually be more or less -on the same general alignment. When they retire they should move -to such a distance in rear as to give them time to select, or -if necessary improvise, good cover in the new positions and to -replenish ammunition, etc. “The positions should be sufficiently -far apart to induce the enemy, after seizing one, to re-form column -of route before advancing against the next.”[35] - -General Alderson, speaking at the Aldershot Military Society in -1904 and referring to the South African War, said: “I had two -Maxims with tripod mountings on pack-saddles, which belonged to the -1st Battalion Mounted Infantry. These guns had well-trained mounted -detachments, and a pushing officer, with a good eye for ground, in -command. _They were most useful, and more than once saved the flank -of their unit from being turned by galloping up and coming into -action on the flank of the out-flanking Boers_.... I am of opinion -that if the most is to be got out of the guns, the detachments, -_even with infantry_, should be mounted.... With the detachment -mounted ... there is no question about the guns not keeping up, and -they can be sent quickly to any desired position. They can hold on -to any such position as long as required to _cover the advance or -retirement of their infantry_, and then easily catch them up or get -into another position. In fact, if the detachment is mounted the -value of the guns is more than doubled.” - -Machine guns with the rear guard will certainly be exposed to -artillery fire, and they will seldom have the time or opportunity -for making sufficient cover to protect themselves. It will be -necessary therefore either to withdraw the gun on coming under -artillery fire or to find shelter from it. If good natural cover -has been obtained, it will only be necessary to lower the gun flat -on the ground behind it, and for the detachment to lie flat close -against it, when they will be practically safe. The artillery will -cease fire as soon as they find there is nothing to fire at, but -the detachment should not move for some time after this, as the -guns, having got the range, will be able to inflict considerable -damage if the detachment exposes itself. - -It is always advisable to keep one or two sections in reserve with -a rear guard to be used to protect the flanks or any point where -the pursuit threatens to break through in the manner mentioned by -General Alderson. These sections should remain with the rear-guard -commander and be under his immediate command; they should be in -readiness for instant action. - - -OUTPOSTS - -The duties of the outposts are: - -(1) To provide protection against surprise. - -(2) In case of attack, to gain time for the commander of the force -to put his plan of action into execution.[36] - -The first duty of outposts, which is _reconnaissance_, cannot -be assisted by machine guns; but their second duty, which is -_resistance_, may be materially strengthened and aided by them, -as we have already seen in dealing with the defence. Little can -be said about tactics, and it will be necessary to use the guns -in positions on the line of resistance where their fire power is -most likely to be of value. In order clearly to understand where -and how machine guns should be used with outposts, it will be -necessary first to examine the composition and distribution of -outposts of a force of all arms. _Field Service Regulations_, -Part I., 1909, says: “When there is any possibility of a force -coming in conflict with an enemy, its commander, when halting for -the night, should first decide on his dispositions in case of -attack, and then arrange the quartering of his command and the -position of the outposts accordingly.... Command, co-operation, and -inter-communication will be facilitated by placing the advanced -troops along well-defined natural features, such as ridges, -streams, the outer edges of woods, etc., or in the vicinity of -roads, but this must not be allowed to outweigh the necessity -for making the best tactical dispositions possible. In enclosed -country, and at night, the movements of troops are generally -confined to the roads and tracks, which should be carefully -watched. If the outpost position is extensive, it may be divided -into sections, each section being numbered from the right. The -extent of a section depends upon the amount of ground which can be -supervised conveniently by one commander. The extent of frontage -to be allotted to each company will depend on the defensive -capabilities of the outpost position, and, where they exist, on -the number of approaches to be guarded. The outpost position will -invariably be strengthened and communications improved where -necessary. Piquets and supports will do this without waiting for -definite orders.... The outposts of a force of all arms consist of -outpost mounted troops, outpost companies, and, where necessary, -the reserve. Machine guns will generally be included and sometimes -artillery.... When stationary, the duty of local protection will -fall almost entirely on the infantry, most of the outposts mounted -troops being withdrawn, their place in this case being with the -reserve, if there be one. In certain cases, however, standing -mounted patrols may be left out at night with advantage.... - -“Machine guns with outposts may be employed to sweep approaches, -and to cover ground which an enemy in advancing may be compelled to -pass or occupy.”[37] - -Machine guns must be used on the principles given above, which -naturally fall under two distinct headings, viz. use by day and -use by night. Machine guns with outposts by day will not occupy -their fire positions unless an attack is imminent, but should be -posted with the reserves in their own section of the defence. This -must not prevent emplacements or pits for the guns being made, -ranges carefully taken and written up, and everything being ready -in case of action. These positions and the subsequent action will -correspond so closely with those already suggested for infantry in -the defence in the last chapter, that they need not be repeated. By -night, however, the case is very different, and it is necessary to -select very carefully the position of each gun, so that it commands -a road, a bridge, or other ground which the enemy in advancing may -be compelled to pass or occupy. These places must be selected in -order of importance, and an endeavour made to leave no approach by -which a body of troops might move uncovered by fire. The machine -guns must occupy their positions before dark and be carefully laid -to sweep the area of ground necessary for protecting the position, -the angle of elevation of the gun being taken by clinometer -afterwards in order that it may be relaid if necessary in the dark. -Great care must be taken to conceal these guns from observation -when bringing them into position or withdrawing them, and it is -worth while going to some considerable trouble to do this. One -method of many is suggested to show what is meant. Field guns might -be placed in the positions by day and withdrawn before night, the -machine guns being brought up on the limbers and dropped in the -position behind a screen of brushwood, and withdrawn again in the -morning when the field gun is brought up. - -The detachment of each machine gun must find two double sentries -and their reliefs, who will remain at their posts with the gun, -which should have the belt ready in the feed block, but not -actually loaded. These men may either take it in turn to stand to -the gun or both be directed to watch. When there are no infantry -sentries on piquet duty in front of the gun, it will be necessary -to detail two who will be posted in the usual way some little -distance in front of the gun to prevent it being rushed in the -dark. The method of preparing the sights and laying the gun for -night work is given in Chapter VII. - -The value of machine guns with the outposts at night is shown -by an incident at the Battle of Mukden, March 6th, 1905. Two -Russian battalions made a night attack against the hill north of -Tung-chia-wen, which was occupied by the 2nd Japanese Regiment. -There was no moon and the night was very dark. Two Japanese machine -guns did great execution at ranges between 50 and 100 yards, and -the Russians were repulsed with a loss of 450 men, the Japanese -casualties being only 48. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -EMPLOYMENT IN FORTRESS WARFARE - - -The siege of Port Arthur by the Japanese and its defence by the -Russians have thrown an entirely new light on Fortress Warfare. -Although the main principles of the attack and defence remain -unchanged and the primary armament of both is still the heavy -artillery, the improvement of small-arms, their great range, and -rapid fire have materially altered the nature of the fighting in -the later stages and during the assault. The result of this has -been to prolong the defence after the fortress has been dismantled -by the bombardment, and to render the storming of a single breach -an operation no longer possible in war. The machine gun is largely -responsible for this; and when high-explosive shells have destroyed -the fortifications and disabled the artillery, the stormers will -be met by rifle fire and that of machine guns concealed among -the ruins of the works. The intensity and accuracy of this fire -will be such as to result frequently in the complete repulse of -the assault, and even when the glacis of a work has been occupied -it may be several weeks before the capture of the work itself is -effected. - -Machine guns are particularly suited to the defence of -fortresses during this period, and Sir G. S. Clarke, in his book -_Fortification_, says: “The fire of the Maxim gun, delivering about -700 bullets a minute,[38] can be directed by one man, who need not -show more than his head (easily shielded) above the parapet, the -feed being tended by another man completely under cover. In the -special qualities of the machine gun there is a distinct advantage -to the defence, arising from the fact that _an intense fire over a -particular area can be suddenly developed by a few men occupying -a small space_. This, in the case of night attacks especially, -is a valuable quality. At Port Arthur the Russians in some cases -employed machine guns with good effect, concealing them so that -their fire came as a surprise to the assaulting parties. Their -portability renders them well suited for the defence of positions, -and they will doubtless form an important element in the armament -of fortresses.” - -Speaking of the difficulty of “storming” the modern fortress, the -same author says: “The _vive force_ school proposed therefore--on -paper--to shell them heavily and then storm, trusting to incomplete -organisation and general unpreparedness. There is little or nothing -in military history to bear out the views of this school, and -modern experience is entirely against them. Only one such attempt -was made in 1870-1, against the indifferent provisional works of -Belfort, garrisoned mainly by _Gardes Mobiles_--and this failed -completely. The tremendous assaults on the defences of Port Arthur -may have been partially inspired by the German teaching; but the -results were discouraging, although the devoted and sustained -gallantry of the Japanese could not be surpassed and probably would -not be equalled by any European army.” - -The machine guns of a fortress should be divided into two -classes--the stationary and the mobile guns. To the former will be -allotted the defence of distinct portions of the permanent works, -and they will be provided with cone and parapet mountings,[39] the -former being fixed and the latter capable of being moved within the -work to which it is allotted. - -The mobile guns should be mounted on a light tripod and carried -in a low-wheeled handcart, or they may be mounted on a very light -two-wheeled carriage capable of being drawn by one man and having -wheels of small track, which can move over the narrowest roads -in the fortress. These mobile guns should not be allotted to any -particular work, but to the garrison other than those within the -forts, for use in repelling assaults and making counter-attacks. - -We will deal first with the stationary machine guns. It will not be -necessary to provide a machine gun for each cone mounting, as the -guns can be easily carried from one cone to another as required. -Shields should be used with all stationary mountings, but must be -detachable, and should not be placed in position until required, as -they indicate the situation of the gun and are easily destroyed by -artillery. - -The positions for machine-gun mountings in a fort must depend on -the size and construction of the work, the nature of the outer -defences, and particularly on the supporting works in the immediate -vicinity. Positions commanding the glacis and the entanglements, -on salients of works and enfilading ditches, and any dead ground -where the enemy may effect a lodgment, are suitable. Counterscarp -galleries at the angles of works flanking the ditch should -invariably have machine-gun positions, with a special loophole, -long and shallow, to enable them to sweep a wide area with fire. - -The selection of the positions for machine guns in permanent works -belongs to the art of the engineer, and there is little that can be -said of their tactical employment. Fire should be reserved until -the attack has reached close range, and then only opened when the -target is large and vulnerable. Guns must be concealed by every -possible device and all the loopholes must be blinded. By night -all guns should be mounted and trained to sweep ground by which -the enemy must approach; when search-lights are not in use, the -elevation should be checked by the use of a clinometer and the -amount of traverse may be shown by chalk lines on the parapet, or -white stones placed in two rows. In this way accurate fire may be -brought to bear on the assault on the darkest night, and many night -attacks were repulsed with machine-gun fire by the Russians at Port -Arthur. Sir G. S. Clarke says: “The front faces of the forts were -retrenched in some cases by obstacles and a line of field parapet -across the terre-plein. _These, with the assistance of machine guns -brought up at the last moment_, enabled assaults of the breaches -formed by the mines to be repulsed.” Again, “The Russians used -machine guns with effect, frequently concealing them in light -blindages, so that their positions could not be detected until they -were brought to bear upon an attacking force.” - -The war correspondent Mr. F. Villiers, in his book _Three Months -with the Besiegers_, speaking of the storming of West Panlung -Redoubt,[40] says: “The death-dealing machine guns of the Russians -_in the casemates of the fort_ are playing ghastly havoc--such -havoc that only a score or more of Ouchi’s battalions reached the -first ditch of the fence, where they threw themselves panting into -the grateful cover of the pits their own artillery have torn.” - -The number of machine guns allotted to the permanent works of Port -Arthur is given as 38 by the United States Official Report, while -Nojine, in _The Truth about Port Arthur_, gives them in detail as -28, the distribution of which is shown in red figures on the map at -the end of Chapter IX. The ten guns unaccounted for were probably -mobile, and used for the defence of the harbour and the various -landing-places in the neighbourhood of the fortress. - -The mobile machine guns of the fortress will be used on the -advanced line of defence with the mobile troops, and should be -divided into two--those allotted to the outposts and those allotted -to the local reserve.[41] Those allotted to the outposts must be -placed in carefully selected positions commanding the approaches -to the section of the defence to which they have been posted. -These positions will usually be in minor works such as redoubts, -emplacements, and lunettes, and they will be selected for their -good field of fire, particular attention being paid to their -command of dead ground in front of other works. Great care and -trouble must be taken in concealing the guns and providing them -with good cover, not only from rifle fire, but also from artillery. -An endeavour should be made to command all wire entanglements along -the front with machine guns, and the angles of traverse of each gun -should be carefully laid off and marked in white paint or tape, so -that they may be used in the dark accurately to sweep their area -of ground. Too much stress cannot be laid on the importance of the -accurate laying and sighting of machine guns by day for use at -night, and it must be remembered that they are the only weapons -which are capable of bringing a rapid and concentrated rifle fire -on a particular spot in the dark, and are therefore invaluable to -the defence during a night attack. - -The detachments of guns on outpost duty at night should be told -off into three watches of two men each, whose duty it will be to -remain with the gun in readiness for instant action. The gun should -be loaded and laid, and the men on duty should watch the front. -Where the gun is in an emplacement or other loop-holed work, one -man should watch through the loophole in turns of half an hour -at a time. The strain of peering into the dark and listening for -the sound of an approach at night is so great that no man should -be required to do this duty for more than half an hour at a time, -while the chance of a man dozing during a short spell is much -reduced and the acuteness of the senses has not time to get dulled. -Very strict orders must be given to insure that fire is not opened -prematurely; and where infantry sentries are on duty near the gun, -it may be advisable not to load the gun, but merely to insert the -belt in the feed-block in readiness. - -It is always advisable to have the gun ready for any emergency -at night, and the following will be found an effective method of -preparing the sights for aiming in the dark. Cut a piece of white -paper, previously prepared with luminous paint, into the shape -of a triangle, and paste it on the slide of the tangent sight so -that the apex of the triangle touches the bottom of the V of the -sight. Cut also a circular piece of a size that will fit on the -foresight just below the tip, and paste this on the foresight. On -looking over the sights in the dark, when the luminous ball on the -foresight is seen resting on the apex of the luminous triangle on -the tangent sight, the gun will be truly laid for the range for -which the sight is set. - -Machine guns with the local reserves must be light and mobile; they -will be used in a similar way to those with infantry, and to assist -in counter-attacks, particularly against the advanced infantry -positions and sap-heads of the besiegers. They may also have -opportunities of enfilading a trench or firing into a work that has -been captured by the enemy. When used for this purpose they must be -brought up by hand under cover and open fire at close range from -a position that commands the interior of the trench or work, and -if possible enfilades it. Great risks are justified in bringing up -machine guns for this purpose, as the results of a successful fire -action will usually be decisive and far-reaching. - -The following is an example of their use in this manner during the -siege of Port Arthur: - -“On the attack on 203-Metre Hill, machine guns on Akasakayama -flanked the position and enfiladed the attackers. Four hundred -Japanese were sheltered together in a parallel, where they -were completely screened from fire from any part of 203-Metre -Hill. Suddenly two machine guns, _which had been concealed on -Akasakayama, where they could fire directly into the parallel_, -opened fire. Within a few seconds it was turned into a veritable -pandemonium, a seething mass of humanity, where men were wildly -fighting to get away, trampling on the wounded, climbing over -piles of corpses which blocked the entrance, and trying to escape -down the coverless hillside. But the Maxims did their work as -only Maxims can, and within a few moments practically the whole -force was wiped out; a few men were shot dead as they ran down -the hillside, but nearly all the others were killed in the narrow -trench. It took the Japanese days to extricate and carry away the -fearfully intermingled corpses.”[42] - -There are so many instances of the successful use of machine guns -in the defence of Port Arthur that it will be impossible to quote -more than a few of the most striking to illustrate the principle on -which they should be employed. - -At the third general attack on November 26th, at 2 p.m., a large -force of Japanese assaulted Sung-shu fort, and having crossed the -moat through a bomb-proof passage, they gained the parapet of the -rampart and swarmed over it. “Into this seething mass of humanity -the machine guns of the forts and batteries on An-tzu Shan poured -such a tremendous fire that the attackers were mowed down, crushed, -dispersed, and sent head over heels to the moat again in less than -half a minute, before a single man had reached the interior of the -fort. _The same fate befell a fresh attempt undertaken at five -o’clock._”[43] - -Here we see the importance of machine guns being able to command -the parapet of neighbouring works, and the necessity of reserving -fire until the best possible target is presented, even though the -enemy is permitted actually to scale the parapet. The same thing -occurred at the storming of Erh-lung Fort. At midnight on November -26th the Japanese “made a desperate attempt to storm the upper -battery, but the assailants were mown down by machine guns, _as -soon as they appeared on the parapet_.”[44] - -This is a good illustration of the use of machine guns at night, -and no doubt these guns had been trained by day to sweep the -parapet in anticipation of an attack after dark. “On January 28th, -1905, near Linchinpan at about 7 p.m. the Japanese attacked the -forts of Vosnesenski and the trenches near by in which were posted -two machine guns. These latter opened fire at 200 or 300 yards on a -Japanese company in line. _In one or two minutes they fired about -1,000 rounds and the Japanese company was annihilated._”[45] During -the attack on North Chi-kuan Fort on December 19th, by the 38th -Regiment under General Samayeda, which took place at 5 p.m., the -men were sent over the parapet man by man from different points, to -make it more difficult for the Russian machine gunners. “As soon as -there was a little interval in the rattling of the machine guns, a -man would jump up and run for his life, and seek shelter behind the -débris piled up in the terre-plein after the explosion, or in the -holes which the big howitzer shells had made in the ground. Though -many of the men were shot down in the short race, little by little -a force of about 150 men were assembled in the front part of the -fort, and the commander, Captain Iwamoto, then led them against -the sandbag trenches at the rear.... The fighting was mostly -hand-to-hand, _but the Russian machine guns took an important part -in the defence_, their galling fire making fearful ravages amongst -the attacking party. The Japanese, therefore, got a couple of -mountain guns hauled up on the parapet, and with them succeeded in -silencing the Maxims.”[46] - -Speaking of the use of machine guns in the defence of Port Arthur, -Norregaard says: “As an active means of defence the search-light -and _machine guns_ undoubtedly come in the first rank. The Japanese -acknowledge the immense value of machine guns to the defence. The -search-lights are stationary, they say, and the ground round Port -Arthur is broken, so that they can avoid them; but the machine guns -can be moved about anywhere and can easily be shifted from place to -place by a couple of men. It is nearly impossible to detect them -and put them out of action; their effect on the Japanese was most -disastrous and time after time enabled the Russians to beat off -their attacks, inflicting severe losses. Nothing can stand against -them, and it is no wonder that the Japanese fear them and even the -bravest have a chilly feeling creeping down their backs when the -enemy’s machine guns beat their devil’s tattoo. They shoot with -amazing precision even at very long range, and they were splendidly -served.” - -The U.S.A. Official Report on the siege of Port Arthur states: -“Machine guns played an important part in the siege, being freely -used by both sides.... The guns were used with telling effect -against the Japanese in the numerous bloody assaults, _being -trained to cover all the approaches with murderous fire_.” These -last words condense into a single sentence their tactics in the -defence of a fortress. - -The Russians used the Maxim of ·312 calibre manufactured by -Vickers, Sons & Maxim, of London, while the Japanese used the -Hotchkiss of ·253 calibre made at the Arsenal at Tokyo. The -Japanese had 72 of these weapons at Port Arthur, immediately under -the command of the Divisional General, viz. 24 guns with each -Division. - -The use of machine guns in the siege of a fortress will cover a -far wider field than in the defence, and much that has already -been written of their employment both in the attack and defence, -of positions will apply to the attack on a fortress. It cannot be -claimed for machine guns that they are as vital to the success of -the besiegers as they are to the garrison, but that they often -afford material assistance during assaults, in holding sap-heads -and repelling sorties, cannot be denied. - -The details of their tactical employment with the besiegers will -differ greatly in accordance with the nature of the operations, and -particularly with the situation of the fortress and the surrounding -country. In the case of Port Arthur the broken and mountainous -nature of the terrain, the deep ravines, and rocky watercourses all -lent themselves to the employment of machine guns, and consequently -the Japanese were able to make greater use of them than would have -been the case under less favourable conditions. - -It will be impossible here to do more than briefly indicate how -machine guns may be used to assist in siege operations generally, -and then show how the Japanese used them before Port Arthur. - -“When the enemy’s advanced troops have been driven in and the -preliminary reconnaissance has enabled the line of investment to be -fixed, this line will be divided into sections, to which commanders -will be appointed and troops allotted.... Outposts will be -established as closely as possible round the fortress in order to -cut it off from outside communication and to protect the operations -in rear.[47] Machine guns should be allotted to these sections -in proportion to their importance in the line of investment. -The commander of the section should use them according to the -circumstances of the situation, but as a rule a large proportion of -the guns should be distributed to the outposts.... The duties of -outposts in siege operations are even more important and exacting -than they are in the field operations; in the case both of an -investment and of a regular siege the brunt of the work throughout -will fall upon the outposts.... They must therefore have greater -power of resistance than outposts in field warfare in order to -prevent the troops in rear from being disturbed by every skirmish. -The outposts of a section which is maintaining a close investment -should be about one quarter of the total infantry allotted to the -section, together with a proportion of artillery, _machine guns, -and engineers_.”[48] - -The positions for the machine guns should be along the _line of -resistance_, which will usually be the piquet line. It will be -necessary to provide bomb-proof emplacements for the machine guns, -and alternative emplacements should be made for each gun. The -temptation to engage in the fire fight must be resisted, and the -machine guns should be solely employed for resisting attacks and -their fire reserved till close range. Once they have been unmasked, -it will be advisable to move them to a fresh position, leaving a -dummy gun in the old position. - -In the second phase of the siege the machine guns not required -for the outpost line should be allotted to the local reserves -and the general reserve, and will be used as circumstances -require in assisting attacks on outlying works and in repelling -counter-attacks. In the third phase machine guns must be pushed -up to secure sap-heads and to assist the infantry in the -assault; they will be found specially useful in covering the -advance of assaulting infantry by sweeping parapets with fire -and in securing captured works against counter-attacks. Sandbags -should always be carried with machine guns supporting infantry -in the assault, and the first consideration should be to secure -the guns from fire on reaching a position. It must be remembered -that machine guns in siege operations are always exposed to their -worst enemy--artillery--and that their only hope of success is -by concealment and cover. An example of their use in repulsing a -counter-attack at Port Arthur is given by Nojine in his book _The -Truth about Port Arthur_. Speaking of the attempt by the Russians -to retake Chien-shan, he says: “The 13th Regiment took two-thirds -of it, but could not advance further, as the Japanese threw in -heavy reinforcements _and brought up a number of machine guns_. -On the night of the 5th we had to withdraw and abandon further -attempts to retake the position, as one attack alone had cost us -500 men.” - -The following account from the U.S.A. Official Report of the -storming of Fort Erh-lung, one of the principal forts of Port -Arthur, shows how machine guns can be used to assist in the final -assault. “On December 28th the parapet of Fort Erh-lung was blown -up at 10 a.m. by five mines being simultaneously sprung.... When -the smoke cleared sufficiently, the exterior slope at the salient -of the fort was seen to be filled with a dense crowd of Japanese -infantry, who closely hugged the ground.... It appears that the -Russians had occupied the heavy gun line which lies in the interior -of the fort _and with machine guns_ raked the front parapet and -thus made it impossible for the Japanese infantry to leave their -cover on the exterior slope. Meanwhile the Japanese brought up -_three machine guns, and with these replied to the Russian fire -from the heavy line_.... The bombardment kept up without diminution -until about 1 p.m., when it slackened perceptibly on both sides.... -About 4 p.m. the Japanese infantry could be seen working along the -flanks of the work on the outside of the parapet. The Russians -retired to the gorge parapet which had been arranged to fire to -the front, and maintained themselves for several hours longer. By -7.30 p.m. the Japanese had fully mastered the position, and the -largest and strongest of the permanent works on the front of attack -fell into their possession.... A large number of field and machine -guns[49] were included in the spoils of Fort Erh-lung. The assault -entailed a loss of about 1,000 men to the Japanese.” - -During the attack on Wangtai Fort the Japanese used machine guns -from the high ridge N.E. of the fort, and thus brought a heavy fire -against the Russian interior line. - -The Japanese invariably brought up their machine guns with the -assault and lost no time in placing them in position to hold -captured works. This is indeed their true rôle in the assault, as -they will seldom be able to support the actual stormers with fire, -but once a foothold is gained in a work, they may be invaluable for -the purpose of holding it and thus set free the storming party for -another advance. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD IN MINOR OPERATIONS - - -SMALL WARS - -Callwell, in his well-known work on this subject, defines the -small war in the following terms: “It comprises the expeditions -against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined soldiers, -it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and -guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organised armies -are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open -field, and it thus obviously covers operations very varying in -their scope and in their conditions.”[50] - -The British Empire, “upon which the sun never sets,” is seldom -without its small war in some remote part of the globe, and it is -safe to affirm that there is never a small war in which the machine -gun does not play a prominent part. - -Wars against savages or semi-civilised peoples differ fundamentally -in principles and tactics from war against a civilised enemy, -and the tactics adopted will be governed by the object of the -expedition and the tactics and arms of the enemy to be dealt with. -Callwell says: “The tactics of such opponents differ so greatly in -various cases that it is essential that these be taken fully into -consideration. The armament of the enemy is also a point of extreme -importance.” - -In dealing with machine-gun tactics in small wars, it is obviously -impossible to treat with all the situations that may be met with or -to attempt to lay down definite rules for their use under all the -varying conditions of country, race, and arms before mentioned. It -will therefore be sufficient for our purpose to show how machine -guns may be used generally in warfare in uncivilised countries, -and then to take a single typical campaign to illustrate their -employment. - -“Against an enemy who fights outside stockades, machine guns are -very efficacious; and in any case against all uncivilised people a -sudden burst of fire from these is often most paralysing.”[51] - -After speaking of the jamming of non-automatic machine guns at -Ulundi, Abu Klea, Dogali, and Tofreck, Callwell says: “On the -other hand, Maxims, which can be easily handled and moved, have -done excellent service in East Africa, in Matabililand, and in -the campaigns on the North-West Frontier of India. There can be -no doubt that machine guns of an easily portable and thoroughly -trustworthy class may be most valuable in small wars, and they -will probably be freely used in such operations in the future, -especially when the enemy is inclined to attack in mass. In hill -warfare these weapons scarcely get a proper chance, as they are not -very well suited for picking off individuals and as it is dangerous -to thrust them too far to the front with the small parties which -are so much used in operations of this class. In bush warfare -also the want of a fair target is unfavourable to them, and when -the shooting is at short range the detachment is likely to be put -_hors de combat_, as it offers such a good target; this happened -at Owikokaro. An open field of fire and a well-defined object to -aim at are almost more necessary to machine guns than to artillery. -On the defensive, machine guns can hardly fail to be valuable. In -laager, zarebas, and detached posts of all kinds they are always -likely to be of service, and to a certain extent they may take the -place of guns for such work. During the operations in Rhodesia -in 1896 they were found very useful as a protection to the small -laagers left behind by the columns when they moved out for a fight. -Two of them did tremendous execution in Chakdara Fort during the -siege of that post in 1897. It is interesting to note that at the -fight on the Shangani River in Matabililand after the attempt to -capture the king had failed, the troops, although they were in a -bad position, could not move to a better one for a while, simply -because the machine guns would have been thrown out of action -during the change of position. Against rushes of Zulus, Ghazis, -or other fanatics the effect of such weapons is tremendous, as -long as the fire is well maintained. In the excitement of the -moment the best infantry may fire unsteadily; but machine guns can -be absolutely trusted to commit destructive havoc in the hostile -throng, provided that their mechanism does not go out of order.”[52] - -The above is interesting as showing the wide field for their use in -small arms and yet how narrow the method of tactical employment. -It may be summed up in a few words: a good target, a good field of -fire, constant readiness for action, and sufficient protection to -enable the gun to be handled with confidence. - -Machine guns should form an integral part of the arm to which they -are attached, and must be used with them to supplement their fire -power. In attack they must seek positions from which to bring to -bear a concentrated and overwhelming fire on the main body of the -enemy, and against savages this must be from the flanks or rear -to be successful, as the object is to prevent flight and insure -decisive results. Their real value in small wars lies in their -enormous defensive powers, which may be employed in clearing -the way for columns in enclosed country, in stopping a charge -of fanatics whether mounted or on foot, and in preventing small -columns on the march from being overwhelmed by superior numbers. - -It will be found that, although it is the invariable rule for the -disciplined force in a small war to assume the initiative and -attack with vigour on every possible occasion, the uncivilised -enemy, by reason of his primitive arms and tactics, generally -avoids the encounter until he is able to make an attack at a time -and on ground of his own choosing. Thus we find the disciplined -force thrown on the defensive in the early stages of the expedition -and the very heavy losses inflicted then often directly lead to a -speedy termination of the campaign. Callwell says: “The tactics -adopted by the Zulus and Mahdists when flushed with confidence -were best met at a halt in close formation, even on ground where -arms of precision could not tell with full effect. In the jungles -of Dahomey the sudden hostile attacks on flanks and rear could be -confronted most satisfactorily by the troops on the spot acting -on the defence until the edge was taken off the hostile appetite -for combat.... Where a small force of regular troops is opposed to -great hostile masses, no matter how ill-armed or how deficient in -morale the masses may be, circumstances render it almost imperative -to act on the defensive.” - -For this reason alone machine guns form the most valuable arm in -encounters of this nature, and their tremendous effect cannot be -better illustrated than at Omdurman, where they literally mowed -down the attacking masses in great swathes. - -The first consideration when employing machine guns in a small war -is the method of carrying the gun and its ammunition, which must -be suited to the country in which the operations are to take place. - -In the majority of cases it will be found that the usual transport -of the country is the most suitable, and a tripod-mounted gun can -be adapted to almost any form of carriage. In mountainous open -country such as the North-West Frontier of India mules or ponies -are suitable; in the desert the camel has been used; while in the -forests of East Africa machine guns have been carried by porters on -their heads, strapped on their backs, or slung beneath a pole by -two men. Whatever method is adopted, it is essential that the gun -can be brought into action easily and quickly, and that it is at -least as mobile as the troops it accompanies. - -The operations in Somaliland in 1901-4 are an excellent example of -one of our typical small wars, and will serve to illustrate the use -of machine guns against a savage enemy in a bush country. - -The camel is the transport animal of the country and riding camels -were used to carry the machine guns with the infantry of the force. -In the first expedition, under Lieut.-Colonel Swayne, there were -three Maxim guns--two of which were ·450 bore and one a ·303. On -June 2nd, 1901, Captain McNeil, who was left in zareba at Smala -to guard the live stock, was attacked by about 3,000 Somalis, who -increased to about 5,000 on the 3rd. His force consisted of three -British officers and 500 native troops, many of whom were native -levies and only 370 of whom were armed with rifles. There were -about 3,500 camels, 100 horses, and some cattle and goats in a -separate zareba from the men who were above and able to command it. -The Maxim, under Lieutenant Younghusband and served by Somalis, -was placed on a cairn of stones at the top of the men’s zareba and -commanded a good field of fire all round. The ground was fairly -open all round, and clear of bushes for about 150 yards from the -zareba. Before the camels could be driven in, the enemy’s horsemen -appeared and threatened to capture a large head of camels, to -prevent which a section under a Jemada was sent out to try to -keep off the enemy until these camels could be driven in. Captain -McNeil says: “I supported him by turning the Maxim on the nearest -horseman.... Some of the horsemen had got round by now a good way -out, but by keeping the Maxim on them, supported by long-range -volleys from the Punjabis, we did much to check them.”[53] - -On June 3rd at about 9 a.m. a very large force of footmen attacked -in one long line several ranks deep and enveloped the south and -west sides of both zarebas. They came on at a steady pace and -opened fire at about 400 yards. Fire was reserved until the enemy -were at about 500 yards range, when heavy fire was opened by both -rifles and Maxim, with the result that no one got within 150 yards -of the zareba, though they advanced most pluckily. 180 dead were -found around the zareba, and the enemy’s loss was estimated at 500. - -The danger of rushing machine guns up to the front while still -mounted is shown in an incident that occurred on June 17th during -a successful attack on the Mullah’s villages near Feriddin. During -the reconnaissance the mounted corps became somewhat heavily -engaged, and Colonel Swayne sent forward the reserve company and -the Maxims to bring fire to bear from a commanding spur about two -miles to the front. On reaching the spur they came under a heavy -fire, and the Maxim camels and some ponies were shot down. The -Somalis, however, were able to disentangle the Maxims from the dead -camels and bring them into action on commanding ground.[54] Colonel -Swayne, in his official report, said: “Mekometers were badly wanted -for the Maxims.... The Maxims had a trick of jamming at critical -moments, but were quickly set right again. The fault may have been -due to the belts.” - -When the Maxim gun jams without a breakage of the mechanism, the -fault is usually want of experience on the part of the gunner. - -During the third expedition the machine guns were increased to -eleven and were carried by porters with the infantry. - -The disaster to Colonel Plunkett’s force at Gumburu on April 17th -was due to ammunition running short. The force, consisting of about -200 men with two machine guns, was attacked by a large force of -horse and foot. They at once formed square, and took up a position -in an open spot surrounded by dense bush at from 300 to 600 yards’ -distance. For some two hours they were able to hold off the enemy, -but on the ammunition being exhausted they were overwhelmed. - -On April 22nd, 1903, Major Gough’s force of about 200 men with one -machine gun was attacked in thick bush by a large force under very -similar conditions to Colonel Plunkett. The attack began at 10.30 -a.m. from all sides, and was continued with great determination -until 2 p.m. Square was formed, and fire opened at very close -range (20 to 50 yards), owing to the dense bush. “The Maxim, under -Sergeant Gibb, was moved from place to place as occasion arose, the -enemy always giving way when it opened fire.”[55] - -In the fourth expedition, under General Egerton, the ammunition per -machine gun was 30,200 rounds in garrison, 10,400 rounds with the -brigade, and 2,200 rounds in second-line transport; 6,000 rounds -with each gun was carried ready in belts. - -During the action at Jidbali on January 10th, 1904, the force -engaged, which consisted of about 2,500, including native levies, -the infantry, about 1,299 strong, formed the usual hollow square -round the transport. The enemy consisted of the pick of the -Mullah’s fighting Dervishes, and were about 6,000 to 8,000 strong. -The Dervishes advanced in regular skirmishing order, rushing from -cover to cover, and lying down. A few got within 400 yards of the -square, _but were unable to face the heavy rifle and Maxim fire -that met them_, and this attack failed. Then two determined rushes -were made on the front and right flank of the square, _but they -were met with such a terrific fire from rifles and Maxims that the -charging enemy could not face it_. At 10 a.m. the whole mass of -the enemy broke and fled, followed by fire till it was masked by -the pursuing mounted troops. Six hundred and sixty-eight dead were -counted round the position two days later.[56] - -“_Much execution was done by the Maxim worked in the right corner -of the square by Sergeant Gibbs, 1st Bn. King’s African Rifles, on -the groups of Dervishes taking cover behind the scattered clumps -of bushes surrounding the square. One entire group of nine men was -wiped out in a moment by this Maxim._”[57] - -It will be seen that machine guns are a very useful auxiliary in -bush warfare, especially in holding posts and defending squares -from the rush of fanatics. They must always march with the main -body of the arm to which they are attached, and be used as -circumstances require. A high state of efficiency in working the -gun, a thorough knowledge of its mechanism, and ability to bring -it into action with great rapidity are of more importance in bush -warfare than tactical handling, which is usually of the simplest -description. - - -MOUNTAIN WARFARE - -“The principle of always having bodies of men in rear or on the -flanks, covering by their fire the advance or retirement of the -troops nearest the enemy, is specially important in hill fighting. -On nearly every ridge and spur positions will be found where this -can be done, and advantage can also often be taken of parallel -features, from which covering and cross fire may be used with -effect.”[58] - -It will seldom be possible to make much use of machine guns with -the advanced guards, as mountaineers usually oppose the advance -by bands of skirmishers who fire from the cover of rocks and -scattered sangars, and while affording a bad target to the machine -gun, can quickly put it out of action by concentrating their fire -upon it. They are also unsuitable for piqueting the heights, on -account of the difficulty of getting them into position and of -rapidly withdrawing them again. They are, however, very useful to -strengthen small fortified posts on the lines of communications, -and for the defence of camps by night, being trained by day and the -sights prepared as suggested in Chapter VII., page 150. Callwell -says: “It is a good plan, if night attacks are at all probable, -to train guns and machine guns by daylight upon points where the -enemy may be expected to mass, or from which assault is to be -anticipated. _This was done at the defence of Chakdara in 1897 with -excellent results._” - -Machine guns are invaluable to the rear guard of a force retiring, -which is an exceedingly difficult undertaking in mountain warfare, -because hillmen invariably await this opportunity to swoop down -and make a vigorous attack. The very nature of the operations -necessitates frequent retirements. Callwell says: “Columns have -to visit outlying valleys for punitive purposes, and must then -rejoin the main body; and even when penetrating into the heart of -a hostile mountain district, the rear of the army, as it passes -successively the homes of different tribes and clans, draws these -down upon it, and, as a result of the general direction of its -march, retires before them.” - -_Field Service Regulations_, 1909, speaking of rear guards in -mountain warfare, says: “Mountain artillery should usually form -part of a rear guard, _and machine guns may be usefully employed_. -The withdrawal of the artillery is usually an encouragement to the -enemy to press on, and on such occasions machine guns will often -find scope for action....” “If the rear-guard commander considers -it impossible to reach camp before nightfall, it will generally be -advisable for him to halt and bivouac for the night in the most -favourable position for defence.” Here, again, machine guns will -be most useful in defending the bivouac after dark if trained by -daylight to sweep approaches, while the morale effect of its -accurate fire in the dark will be considerable. There are many -instances from our wars on the North-West Frontier where machine -guns might have been used profitably in covering the retreat; but -to be successfully employed in such cases, they must be far more -mobile and better trained for rapid-fire practice than they have -been in the past. Lieut.-Colonel Haughton’s retreat from the Iseri -Kandeo Pass is typical of such operations. “A brigade had been sent -on detached duty into the Warais Valley, and after completing its -work there was rejoining the rest of the army in Maidan. In doing -so the brigade had to cross the Iseri Kandeo Pass over the hills -which separate the two valleys. As the force quitted its bivouacs -the Ghurkas were left as rear guard, while the 15th Sikhs were told -off to hold the Kotal, which was about half-way. The main body and -baggage moved off early, and the latter reached the maidan almost -unnoticed. The Ghurkas, however, were pressed from the commencement -of the retirement right up to the top of the Kotal; then they -marched on, leaving the 15th Sikhs to cover the retirement. As the -Sikhs began to draw in their piquets from the heights above the -pass, the Afridis, as was their wont, grew bolder and bolder, and, -taking advantage of the cover of a wood hard by, they crept down -close to the rear guard. One company as it withdrew was suddenly -charged by a crowd of swordsmen.... But those who participated in -this rush paid dearly for their temerity, the Sikh company meeting -them with steady musketry and being most opportunely reinforced -by another company. The carrying off of the wounded was, however, -becoming a matter of serious difficulty, so reinforcements were -asked for. These arrived in the shape of two companies of Dorsets -and of several companies of the 36th Sikhs under Lieut.-Colonel -Haughton, who assumed command, and who withdrew his force down the -hill without much loss.”[59] It is easy to imagine how machine -guns might have been used here, and how their presence might even -have rendered the reinforcements unnecessary; but unless they are -capable of coming into action and opening fire in thirty seconds, -and of packing up and moving off again after ceasing fire in the -same time, the rear guard in mountain warfare is no place for them -and they had best march with the baggage. - -During the expedition to Tibet some trouble arose with the machine -guns owing to the extreme cold, which not only froze the water in -the barrel-casing of the Maxims, but froze the lubricating oil in -the lock and recoiling parts and thus rendered the gun useless. -When very low temperatures are encountered in high latitudes, -alcohol or spirit should be added to the water to prevent it -freezing; and as potable spirit is liable to “evaporate,” a little -paraffin oil should be added. Glycerine may be substituted for -lubricating oil in temperatures where even Russian petroleum will -freeze. - - -CONVOYS - -Callwell defines a convoy as “a column of non-combatants guarded by -a comparatively speaking small escort.” The object of this escort -is to hold off all hostile parties and to get the convoy to its -destination in safety. Escorts will generally have to be reduced -to the smallest possible size in order not to deprive the fighting -force of men. They will therefore always act on the defensive, -while endeavouring to keep moving with the convoy, which will only -be halted when compelled to do so for its own safety. When the -escort consists of the three arms, machine guns may be used to -reduce the number of infantry required very considerably, while -adding to the defensive power of those necessary. - -In minor operations where every available rifle is required with -the fighting force, machine guns will be found invaluable to -replace infantry. Their exact position with the convoy must depend -upon its composition and length and the number of guns available. -The principle of having a machine gun, or where possible a section, -at the head and another at the rear end of the line of wagons or -pack animals is sound, as these are the vital points, and an attack -on the centre can be met by a cross fire from these positions. If -the convoy is unduly long, another gun or section may be placed in -the centre. Should it be necessary to form laager, the machine guns -in the front and rear enable this to be done under their converging -fire. Where wagons or carts are used and the enemy is unprovided -with arms of precision, machine guns may be mounted on the tops -of wagons, so that they can open fire instantly and fire while -moving forward with the convoy; this position not only provides -them with a good field of fire, but also affords protection to the -detachments from a sudden charge home of savages from an ambush. - -“The success of an attack upon a convoy usually depends upon the -defeat of the protecting troops. This will involve a combat, which -will be governed by the principles already laid down in this -manual.... If fighting is inevitable, the enemy should be engaged -as far from the convoy as possible.”[60] - -For this reason machine guns should open fire on any body of the -enemy presenting a good target, even at long range, if they are -moving to attack the convoy. The presence of machine guns with a -convoy will free the infantry to move out wide on the flanks in -open country, and to push ahead to piquet hills, clear bush, and -occupy heights on the line of march, without exposing the convoy to -danger during their absence. - - -BLOCKHOUSES - -Blockhouses have been much used in warfare in uncivilised -countries ever since the introduction of firearms, to enable small -detachments on a frontier or on the lines of communication to -maintain themselves in the midst of the enemy when unsupported by -other troops, and also to form a chain of posts across an enemy’s -country for the capture or suppression of guerilla bands. - -Looking back to the South African War, it appears inexplicable -that little or no use was made of machine guns to hold the long -blockhouse lines which stretched for so many hundreds of miles in -every direction during the latter stages of the war. Time after -time the Boers succeeded in breaking through this line, even in -places where the blockhouses were within effective range of each -other and the intervening space guarded by elaborate barbed-wire -entanglements. The reason for this is not difficult to discover. -Screened by the darkness, the fire of the small garrisons of these -blockhouses was neither sufficiently powerful nor accurate to -stop the majority of the enemy from breaking through, even though -stopped by the entanglements and compelled to use a single gap. The -annihilating and concentrated fire of machine guns which had been -laid by day to sweep the entanglements should render the forcing of -a similar blockhouse line impossible in the future. Machine guns in -detached blockhouses should be sited as low as is compatible with a -good field of fire, and should have long narrow loopholes prepared -for them for at least two positions on every face. Constant change -of position within the blockhouse after firing will prevent the -enemy from being able to “snipe” the gunners through the loopholes. - -The great variety of conditions and circumstances under which minor -operations take place renders it impossible to do more than show -how they may be used in certain selected instances. The machine -gunner must be prepared to modify and adapt his tactics to suit the -special circumstances of the expedition with which he is employed, -and he cannot do better than study Callwell’s _Small Wars, their -Principles and Practice_, which has been so freely quoted in this -chapter. - - -ENCLOSED COUNTRY - -This chapter would not be complete without some reference to the -use of machine guns in enclosed country such as is found in the -United Kingdom. Clery, in his _Minor Tactics_, p. 118, says that -cultivated country is the most favourable to the attack, while in -defence the country to the front cannot be too open. “In the first, -infantry gains a succession of covered positions by means of which -it comes on more equal terms with the defence. In the second, the -infantry of the defence has a clear field to destroy the assailants -as they approach.” - -Apart from civil war, the only possible occasion for the use of -machine guns in the British Isles is against an invader, and it -is well known to students of modern war that the prospects of a -successful invasion do not depend upon the strength or weakness of -our fleet, but on that of our army for home defence. The duty of a -fleet in time of war is to go to sea and destroy the enemy’s ships, -and while it is absent on this mission an opportunity for invasion -may occur, the success of which will wholly depend upon the force -the invader will meet on landing. - -The Japanese recently landed in Manchuria in spite of Russia’s -superior naval strength; but because it was the case of an island -invading a continent, we do not apply the lesson to ourselves, and -are content to believe that a continent cannot invade an island. - -It is obvious to the military student that no invasion will be -attempted unless its success is reasonably certain, and the -presence of four divisions of regular troops at home renders such -an enterprise extremely difficult, if not impossible, without -permanent command of the sea. But these four divisions are not -the Home Defence Force, and form that part of our Expeditionary -Army for service outside the United Kingdom. We may, therefore, -rest assured that as long as we retain command of the sea, no -invasion can take place until we are involved in an over-seas war -which requires a more or less large portion of our Expeditionary -Force--an event which has happened almost every decade. - -It will be safe, therefore, to assume that in the event of an -invasion we shall have to rely on our Territorial Army to meet the -enemy, and it will be doing this force no injustice to assume that -they will be compelled to act on the defensive in the face of a -highly trained and disciplined Continental Army. Indeed, it is -difficult for a soldier to realise how a Volunteer force, trained -for fourteen days in the year and unacquainted with military -discipline, can hope to meet on equal terms, even if superior by -three to one in numbers, the pick of Continental manhood trained -under an iron discipline for the minimum of two years. - -Be that as it may, it is necessary to realise the difficulties to -be faced, not the least of which is the question of _training_, -for, as already pointed out, it is absolutely essential to the -successful use of machine guns that the personnel should be very -highly trained, and this applies to their use in enclosed country -even more than elsewhere. - -Although as a general principle enclosed country benefits the -attacker and is disadvantageous to the defender, this is not -always the case with machine guns, and provided the golden rule -of “concealment, cover, and surprise” is intelligently applied, -enclosed country is particularly suited for the use of machine guns -in the defence. - -For this purpose machine guns should be trained to work in pairs in -mutual support. They must be so mounted that they can be carried by -hand for considerable distances into position, and must be capable -of firing from a low siting when they must be inconspicuous. If -mounted, as at present, on a wheeled carriage, a light tripod may -be carried on the carriage, which will render the gun far more -inconspicuous and useful. - -While all the principles for the tactical handling of machine guns -with infantry hold good, there are several points of importance -to be noted in using them in the defence in enclosed country. The -advance of any formed bodies of the enemy will be confined to the -roads; consequently machine guns must endeavour to command all -roads leading from the enemy, especially where they become defiles. - -The hedgerows, standing crops, woods, and lanes must be used to -afford concealment in advancing or retiring from position to -position, and scouts must be specially trained in finding the -easiest _concealed_ way from field to field by gates, gaps, or -through stiles. The way from the road or lane to the selected -position must be always marked by sticks or broken branches which -are placed to indicate the direction of gates or gaps, or where -a turning has to be made. The usual procedure will be for the -scouts to work across country on one or both sides of the road. The -section commander, who should be mounted, will select the position -for the guns, and scouts from each gun will be sent out to guide -them to the positions. The carriages and ammunition cart must -move up the road to the nearest point to the position, and scouts -should select and mark the easiest way to the carriages. Careful -co-operation between the guns and carriages will often enable the -latter to greatly facilitate movement, by pushing up by-lanes or -across fields to a position near the guns. Ammunition will usually -have to be carried to the guns by hand, so that great pains must -be taken to get the cart as near the position as possible. The -selection of the position will be governed by the facilities it -presents for surprising the enemy in close formation at effective -range. The range must be accurately found, and fire must only be -opened by order of the section commander. In selecting a position -care must be taken that it offers perfect concealment from view, -and that the guns can retire under cover to their carriages. The -neighbourhood of conspicuous objects, such as single trees, a gap -in a fence, etc., must be carefully avoided, and care must be taken -to secure a good field of fire for as great a distance as possible -to the front, while the flanks and any cover within effective range -which the enemy might occupy must be watched by scouts. It is in -this matter of careful reconnaissance, of selecting ground and -occupying or watching all neighbouring cover, that the successful -use of machine guns in enclosed country mainly depends. The enemy -is obliged by the nature of the country to move in close formation -to pass defiles, roads, gaps, or to avoid crops, woods, and -villages, and it is the intelligent anticipation of where this will -occur that gives the machine gun its chance for decisive action. -The hedges, orchards, lanes and woods, and other features will -afford endless opportunities for bringing _flanking_ fire to bear -on the enemy. Nothing is so effective, and the morale effect on an -enemy who is enfiladed at close range renders it usually decisive. - -Cover will generally be provided by the spade, and ditches require -little work to turn them into excellent pits, the only thing -necessary as a rule being to excavate a hole in rear for the back -leg of the tripod. Where there is a ditch with a hedge in front of -it, the ditch should be improved so as to provide a pit for the gun -to fire through the hedge about six inches above ground level. If -the hedge is too thick to fire through, it should not be cut down, -but a hole should be cut in the growth for the muzzle of the gun -sufficiently large to aim through. If it is necessary to cut a gap -in the hedge, the growth should be cut through close to the ground, -but _without removing it_ until the moment for opening fire. - -Alternative positions in the same hedgerow should be avoided, as it -is certain to be discovered immediately, and the range is probably -already known. - -The edge of the wood, if it commands suitable ground, is an -excellent position for machine guns; but if the carriages remain in -the wood they must be provided with cover. When time and material -are available, a good field of fire may be obtained by erecting -a platform ten to twelve feet above the ground in the trees, and -placing a machine gun on this; not only is the field of fire much -increased, but the gun will be almost impossible to discover. This -was done on one occasion in the Spanish-American War, when it met -with considerable success. - -When machine guns are used for the defence of villages or farms, -they should be placed outside the village or farm buildings well -clear of the walls. The salient angle will usually be the most -suitable place, a good field of fire being the chief object. The -guns should be placed so as to flank one side of the village, and -must be most carefully concealed, a pit being usually the best -form of cover. Walls should as a rule be avoided, as they are very -easily destroyed by artillery fire and always afford a conspicuous -target. - -When time permits the pits should be deepened and hollowed out -in front to afford the firers protection from artillery fire. -Similar protection may be provided for the rest of the detachment -by making a narrow and deep trench connected with each side of the -gun pit. Should it be necessary to defend the village to the last, -a second position should be provided in the centre of the village, -commanding the main avenues, and the church tower, or roof, may -afford a suitable site, provided artillery is not present. - -Although machine guns have never been used in England, they -were employed by the French in 1871 during General Chanzy’s -retreat from the Loire to Le Mans with great success, and this -campaign is particularly interesting to us because the country -greatly resembles England. Dr. Miller Maguire, in his lecture -given at the Royal Artillery Institute on this campaign, quotes -the German official account as follows: “The entire country is -covered with the densest cultivation of long-standing growth, -with vineyards, orchards, and vegetable gardens.... Owing to the -extensive subdivision of land customary in this country, every -property is surrounded by hedges, ditches, and walls. There are, -consequently, numerous positions and isolated points at which -even moderate troops could defend themselves behind good cover. -Although the superior effect of the chassepot here ceased to -avail, _the mitrailleuses were in their true element_, and became -a dangerous weapon in the narrow passes.” Dr. Maguire remarks: “I -do not know how far you will be inclined to apply those remarks to -the circumstances of your own country in the event of invasion. -It might be a good lesson to try; for the several arms could -be handled between Dover and London step by step.” Later on he -quotes from a British officer, who says: “In fact, Kent and Surrey -combined, with vineyards instead of hop gardens, would be an exact -picture of the country through which the Germans were pushing on.” - -There are numerous instances in this campaign where the -mitrailleuse caused great loss to the Germans, and enabled the -French to delay their advance and hold on to villages and positions -with greatly inferior forces. - -Remembering that the mitrailleuse of 1870 was a clumsy and -primitive weapon, worked by hand and mounted on a field carriage, -there is every reason to suppose that the modern automatic machine -gun, on its light and mobile tripod, will be still more valuable in -fighting in enclosed country. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -MACHINE GUNS IN THE ARMIES OF THE WORLD - - -AMERICA (UNITED STATES) - -GUN.--At present there are three machine guns in use in the United -States, viz.: - - (_a_) The Gatling. - - (_b_) The Maxim Automatic. - - (_c_) The Colt Automatic. - -(_a_) _The Gatling._--Calibre ·3 in., and takes the service rifle -bullet. It has 10 barrels, and is fed by a rotating cylinder. The -gun is mounted on a shielded carriage with limber. The rate of fire -is about 600 rounds per minute. - -(_b_) _The Maxim Automatic._--This is similar to the one in use in -our own service, and takes the ·3 in. U.S. service ammunition. - -_Mounting._--For infantry and cavalry, a tripod mounting. For use -in fortified works, a two-wheeled shielded carriage. - -The transport is by means of pack-animals. A complete outfit -consists of five packs, _e.g._ the gun and tripod form one pack, -and the remaining four packs carry 1,500 rounds of ammunition -and accessories for the gun, including water for filling the -water-jacket. - -For firing blank it is fitted with an attachment called the “drill -and blank-fire attachment.” - -(_c_) _The Colt Automatic._--Calibre ·3 in., and takes the service -rifle bullet. The gun is fed by means of a cartridge belt, and -fires 400 rounds a minute. - -The weight is 40 lb., and the gun is mounted either on a tripod -mounting or a wheeled carriage. - -A “silencer” for the Maxim was tested in March, 1909, and the -results compared with those obtained from the gun without the -silencer. As regards accuracy of fire there was nothing to choose -between the two. The silencer, however, reduced the noise to that -of a ·22 in. long cartridge, and when used at night the flash was -entirely obliterated. - -ORGANISATION.--_Infantry._--One battalion in each regiment has a -machine-gun platoon consisting of 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 18 -privates, and 2 guns. - -_Cavalry._--In a regiment of 3 squadrons, 1 squadron has a -machine-gun platoon of 3 corporals and 18 privates. - - -AUSTRIA - -GUN.--In 1907 after prolonged trial the Austrians definitely -adopted the Schwarzlose. It is a very simple weapon and very -reliable, firing 375 rounds per minute from a tripod mounting. - -ORGANISATION.--A section of machine guns is attached to each -regiment of cavalry and infantry; there are also mountain companies -of machine guns. - -With infantry the section consists of 2 guns; 10,000 rounds are -carried per machine gun. The detachment consists of 14 men per gun, -7 for actually working the gun and 7 to lead the horses. There are -7 horses to each gun, of which 1 carries the gun and 500 rounds, 5 -carry from 1,500 to 2,000 rounds each, and 1 carries the shields. -There is also a spare horse. For hand transport one man carries 2 -belts of 250 cartridges, another the gun and 1 belt, a third the -mounting and 1 belt, a fourth 2 belts, a fifth the water-jacket, -etc. The shields are left on the horse. It will be seen that when -the machine gun is taken forward in this way it has ready for -immediate use 1,500 rounds. - -With cavalry the section consists of 4 guns without shields. On -account of the great independence of cavalry, the machine guns have -with them 15,000 rounds each, of which 5,000 are on pack-animals -and 10,000 in wagons. These wagons usually march in rear of the -column. The detachment, which is all mounted, consists of 9 men per -gun with 4 pack-horses (1 for the gun and 3 for ammunition). Hand -transport is provided for as with the infantry machine guns. - -The mountain machine-gun company consists of 3 officers and 64 -other ranks. There are 4 guns carried on pack-horses, with 2 -pack-horses per gun for ammunition (4,000 rounds per gun). - -TACTICAL (taken from a précis of the Austrian Regulations, 1908; -published in _Streffleurs militärische Zeitschrift_, April, -1908).--(_a_) _With Infantry._--During the advance it is well to -give some machine guns to the principal units of the covering -force, for they add to their resisting power, and in the many -phases of the preparatory fight they are sure to have opportunities -of effecting surprise. The place for the section leader is then -near the O.C. detachment. When the machine guns leave the column it -is always advisable to detail a few cavalry to cover them. - -To take up a position it is necessary to observe the following: - -(1) To manœuvre out of sight of the enemy. This will often -necessitate unloading and carrying forward the _matériel_ by hand. - -(2) Not to keep the guns too close together, which may cause -additional losses. The “position of observation” will play an -important part in the machine-gun fight. - -The narrow effective zone of the machine guns allows them to fire -over the heads of other troops. Such fire will be advantageously -employed when machine guns occupy high positions. But it is only -allowed at ranges greater than 1,000 yards, and when the troops -over whom they are firing are at least 400 yards from the guns. -Under these circumstances the use of searching fire is forbidden. - -Both in attack and defence it is necessary to remember that -machine guns are not suitable for a continuous fight of long -duration. If during the preparatory fight the machine guns have -found opportunities of opening fire, they ought, when the general -engagement has begun, to be withdrawn from the firing line and held -ready to act again under certain circumstances of importance. - -These circumstances are: - -In attack: to act on the enemy’s flank to facilitate the infantry -advance; to open fire on the decisive point, whether flank or -front, from a dominating position, either over the heads of the -infantry or by carrying the machine guns up into the firing line. - -In defence: to reinforce threatened points; to stop enveloping -movements; to repulse an assault; to take part in a counter-attack. - -In most cases these tasks will necessitate the machine guns being -at once carried into the firing line to fight side by side with the -infantry. - -(_b_) _With Cavalry._--The rôle of machine guns with cavalry is -thus determined: - -(1) To take part in dismounted action: if pushed forward, they -allow the number of men dismounted to be limited; if kept in -reserve or pushed against a flank, they facilitate the success of -the frontal attack. - -(2) To add considerably to the offensive and defensive power of -patrols by replacing the battalions of chasseurs which used to be -attached to the cavalry. - -(3) Finally, to take part in the cavalry fight; for this they -should be judiciously divided among the troops of the advanced -guard, and should make use of their mobility. This will allow -them to open fire from well-chosen positions before the moment of -contact, and help to obtain the desired result. - -The place for the machine-gun commander is near the General. If the -machine guns have been well placed in the column, they will--thanks -to their mobility, which is equal to that of any cavalry -detachment--be able to make use of the considerable time required -by a large force of cavalry to get into battle formation. - -Whereas with infantry the surprise of the enemy is always effected -by making use of the features of the ground, the best method for -cavalry guns is to utilise their rapidity of motion and their -resemblance to other cavalry units, for which at a distance they -are easily mistaken. - -The widest power of initiative is left to the commander for the -grouping of his units in the fight. Very often he will only bring -up near the firing line the horse carrying the gun and one carrying -ammunition, in order to be able to escape rapidly. At other times -all the horses will be brought up close under cover. At others the -whole section will dash up to their position at full speed; the -guns will be unloaded at once, and the horses will disappear to the -rear. The one important thing is to open fire as a surprise. - -To sum up: the Austrian Regulations only confirm the rules already -laid down by very competent writers who have published works -on the subject. They enunciate in a clear and concise form the -principles which should govern the employment of machine guns in -various circumstances, laying particular stress on the necessity -for constant readiness for action in a position of observation. - -In _Les Mitrailleuses à l’Etranger_ Lieutenant M. quotes certain -Austrian officers who, writing before the publication of the -Regulations of 1908, considered that the value of machine guns -lay chiefly in their use as a reserve of fire. Lieut.-Colonel -Berndt says: “In offence, as in defence, machine guns must be held -back as a reserve of fire to be used at the moment when the rapid -development of heavy fire is required.” Lieutenant Binder is of the -same opinion, and also recommends their being used in the closest -co-operation with the infantry. Lieutenant Hayeck-Liprandi, a -cavalry officer, fully realises the importance of machine-guns, as -relieving cavalry to a large degree of the necessity for dismounted -action. He also advocates the attachment of machine-gun sections to -regiments at the disposal of the regimental commanding officer.[61] - - -CHINA - -GUN.--The Chinese have bought numbers of Maxims for attachment to -their infantry. With cavalry they have adopted the Madsen. - -Their organisation is at present in process of evolution, and no -official views on their tactical employment have been published -hitherto. - - -DENMARK - -GUN.--In 1904 Major-General Madsen, the Danish War Minister, -invented the Rekyl (recoil) machine gun. The gun weighs only 13½ -lb., is not much longer than the service rifle, and in case of need -can be served by one man. It has a rate of fire of 750 rounds per -minute with a muzzle velocity of 2,350 ft. per second. - -ORGANISATION.--Every Hussar Squadron in the Danish Army is to have -a section of three guns attached. The gun is carried on a horse -together with 300 rounds of ammunition, and with each gun there is -a led horse with reserve ammunition. - -TACTICS.--The gun detachment can easily and rapidly follow all -the movements of the body of horse to which they are attached, -even through woods. It is therefore argued that the possession of -this weapon will do away with the necessity for dismounted cavalry -action. - - -FRANCE - -GUN.--France has adopted both the Puteaux and Hotchkiss patterns -of machine gun without shields. With cavalry the question of -mounting has not yet been definitely settled, but experiments have -been carried out with wheeled carriages drawn by four horses. The -infantry sections have been provided with a tripod mounting (70 -lb.), which can be adjusted to two heights, either 1 ft. 6 in. or 2 -ft. 6 in. above the ground. - -ORGANISATION.--At present (1909) every brigade, both of cavalry -and of infantry, has a two-gun section attached. It is intended to -provide every regiment with a section as soon as possible. - -With cavalry the detachment for each gun consists of 24 men, who -are all mounted. The carriage carries 16,500 rounds of ammunition -in addition to the gun. - -The infantry section is commanded by a lieutenant, who has under -him one N.C.O. and 23 men, armed with rifles. There are two gun -horses, which each carry a gun, tripod, and one box of ammunition; -and eight ammunition horses, which each carry seven boxes, three on -each side and one on top. A box contains 150 rounds, so that each -section has 8,700 rounds. The “Souchier” telemeter is carried. - -TACTICAL.--The French Regulations are at present under -consideration, and the tendency seems to be to follow the -principles laid down by the Germans. - -M. le Commandant Niessel, in his preface to _Les Mitrailleuses à -l’Etranger_, by Lieutenant M., says: “There is one principle which -should dominate the whole subject and never be lost to view. It -is that machine guns are condensed infantry, and that therefore -it is as infantry that they should be used in battle. Together -with accuracy and power of fire, the characteristic which should -especially distinguish infantry in battle is their utilisation -of every feature of the ground. Machine guns, then, to exert to -the full their powers of effecting surprise and developing great -intensity of fire, should reach effective and, if possible, close -range without being observed. - -“Machine guns ought, then, in battle to be carried forward by -hand by the detachment, in order to take up positions as much -under cover as possible; this does not in any degree lessen their -opportunities of offensive action, for there can be no hope of -decisive success for the infantry whom they are supporting except -in a vigorous offensive.” - - -GERMANY - -GUN.--Germany has adopted the Maxim gun. The guns are mounted on -sleighs which are themselves mounted on limbered gun-carriages, -being clamped into grooves. They can either be fired from the -carriage or be dismounted and fired from the sleigh. The gun on -the sleigh can be adjusted to fire from a height of 1 ft. 6 in., 2 -ft. 6 in. or 3 ft. 6 in. above the ground by a simple lattice-work -arrangement. The gun can easily be dragged to almost any position -where men can go, and can be fired by men lying down under cover. - -ORGANISATION.--Machine guns have been organised into 16 batteries -(called Sections), which are independent, and 216 companies, which -are attached to infantry regiments. - -The battery consists of six machine guns, drawn by four horses and -divided into three sections (called Divisions). There are three -ammunition wagons and one battery wagon (1st line). There are three -2nd-line wagons. The detachment consists of: - -1 captain (in command); 3 lieutenants; 1 sergeant-major; 12 -N.C.O.’s; 36 gunners; 28 drivers; 1 armourer; 1 trumpeter; 1 -apothecary (dresser); 70 horses (20 saddle and 50 draught). - -The men wear a special greyish-green uniform, and are armed with -carbine and bayonet; the carbines are carried in the limbers. -87,300 rounds are carried with each battery. - -Each company consists of six guns drawn by two horses, three -wagons, and one cart. The detachment consists of: - -1 lieutenant (in command); 3 second lieutenants; 9 N.C.O.’s; 74 -men; 28 horses (7 saddle, 18 draught, and 3 spare). - -All the officers and 3 warrant officers are mounted. The men are -armed with automatic pistols. 72,000 rounds are carried with each -company, as follows: - - With the guns 18,000 - With the wagons 42,000 - With the reserve cart 12,000 - ------ - Total 72,000 - ====== - -On going into action each gun is made up to 5,000 rounds. The -infantry pattern range-finder is used. - -TACTICAL.--_Regulations for Machine-Gun Detachments in the German -Army._ - -_Para. 187._--Machine guns enable commanders to develop at fixed -points the maximum volume of infantry fire on the smallest -possible front. Machine guns can be employed in any country which -is practicable for infantry, and when once they are unlimbered -they must be able to surmount considerable obstacles. In action -they offer no greater target than riflemen, fighting under like -conditions, and they can in proportion to their fire value support -far greater losses than infantry. - -When movements over the battlefield are contemplated, and the -machine guns (unlimbered as soon as hostile fire is expected) -are pulled or carried forward, they can utilise all cover which -infantry is able to use. Cover that is barely sufficient for a -section of infantry can protect an entire machine-gun detachment. -The construction of the carriage on which guns, ammunition, and men -can be conveyed, and the capabilities of the team, enable machine -guns to keep up with mounted troops on the march. - -_Para. 188._--The range and striking effect of the machine gun is -identical with that of the infantry rifle. The rapid succession -of shots and the narrow concentration of the cone of dispersion, -together with the possibilities of uniting several guns on a -limited front, render it feasible for machine guns to obtain -rapidly a decisive success in certain positions, and even at long -ranges to inflict heavy losses in a short time on large and deep -targets. Machine guns, however, are of small use to a commander -fighting a protracted rifle-fire engagement. - -_Para. 189._--An engagement with a thin line of skirmishers under -good cover should be avoided. It demands a heavy expenditure of -ammunition which is not commensurate with the result obtained. -During a lengthy rifle-fire action the detachments with their guns -should be withdrawn temporarily from their position, so as to save -their effect for a decisive moment. - -_Para. 190._--The engagement of hostile machine guns that offer -a difficult target is by no means the chief duty of machine-gun -detachments; in most cases it will be more profitable to leave this -to other arms. When engaging hostile machine guns the most accurate -information should be sought regarding the enemy’s position. - -_Para. 191._--Machine-gun detachments can at all times and under -all conditions confidently await the attacks of hostile cavalry. -To meet these any formation can be adopted which allows of a -well-directed and calmly delivered fire being poured into the -advancing cavalry. Both when firing from the carriage and from the -gun dismounted the fire must be distributed all along the advancing -line of cavalry; special attention must be paid to the supporting -lines, to one’s own flanks, and to the defence of the carriages -when the guns are separated from them. Machine-gun detachments -are able to advance in the open fields without any fear of the -enemy’s cavalry, provided the latter is not supported by artillery -or infantry, or is not in such force as to be able to attack -simultaneously from different sides in several lines. - -_Para. 192._--In action against artillery it should be remembered -that at long ranges the superiority of fire will always remain with -this branch. If machine guns are to engage artillery, the sleighs -must be brought as near as possible to it. The rapidity of movement -of machine guns due to their being horsed will enable them to start -the action from a flank, and thus produce a sensible increase of -effect. Scattering the fire from all the machine guns along the -entire line of a battery is as useless as it is purposeless. - -_Para. 193._--Machine-gun detachments should generally be employed -undivided; on special occasions separate sections may be made to -act independently. The detachment commander will decide as to the -distribution of the ammunition train to the individual sections. -The employment of single machine-gun detachments will be seldom -advisable. In such cases the senior detachment leader will command -the entire force of machine guns. - -_Para. 194._--In view of the uses to which machine-gun -detachments may be applied, and with the object of increasing -their independence of action, it is desirable that a few mounted -men should be attached to them for reconnaissance. Otherwise -the readiness of machine guns is such that it is only in very -obstructed and overgrown country that they require special -protection. Here it may be necessary, in order to secure the -threatened flanks and rear, and to protect the carriages left -behind, to detail small parties of cavalry or infantry. An -application for such from a machine-gun commander should be -complied with by any infantry or cavalry commander in the vicinity. - -_Para. 196._--Machine guns can never replace artillery. - -_Para. 197._--Machine guns will always find their chief work to -be at the place where their powerful fire effect, together with -their mobility (on the march) and the advantage of being able to -get across country when separated from their carriage, can best be -utilised. - -_Para. 198._--For the correct manœuvring of machine guns it is -necessary to possess a clear knowledge of the general situation, -of the aims of the commander, and of the state of the action. The -disposal of the machine-gun detachments rests with the superior -command. By attaching machine-gun detachments to stated bodies of -troops, the full value of the former in action can only be realised -in exceptional cases. - -_Para. 199._--All commanders must quickly make their dispositions -to suit the situation, and must always realise that neglect and -delay are a more serious hindrance to success than an error in the -choice of means. - -_Para. 200._--At the commencement of an action the commander will -proceed to the O.C. troops, or to the commander of the force to -which his detachment is detailed, and receive the necessary orders -for the impending action. It is his duty, in case of emergency, to -act on his own initiative. During the progress of the action he -will remain in constant communication with that commanding officer, -in order to keep him constantly informed of what he is doing, and -in turn to be posted in the progress of the fight. - -_Para. 201._--In choosing a position the first condition to fulfil -is to obtain the best possible fire effect for the task in hand; -then secondly one may think of cover. - -_Para. 202._--The choice of every position must be preceded by -special reconnoitring, the opportune and skilful performance of -which is essential to success. This includes ascertaining what -the targets are, where there are suitable fire positions, and the -facilities for approach, the nature of the ground to be crossed, -and lastly what security is offered against surprises. - -_Para. 203._--In the advance and in defensive positions the -commander reconnoitres himself. During retirements the commander -remains with the detachment so long as it is within effective range -of the enemy, but sends back for reconnoitring purposes a senior -officer. Before occupying a position the commander, if possible, -must have examined it himself. - -_Para. 205._--The attention of the enemy must not be previously -directed to the position selected. A personal inspection is often -to be carried out only on foot, leaving all escort behind. - -_Para. 206._--The following points guide the choice of position: -an open field of fire; a front lying as far as possible at right -angles to the line of fire; plenty of space; possibility of -sweeping all the ground right up to the closest range; concealment, -and facilities for communication along and behind the line of fire. - -_Para. 207._--Positions close to or on a level with a point to -which the enemy has ranged are to be avoided as much as possible. -Similarly it is not advisable to take up a position in close -proximity to prominent objects, still less straight in front of -them, as they facilitate the enemy’s ranging. On the other hand, a -position in front of a dark background or in a place covered with -vegetation hinders the enemy from picking up the target. - -Every kind of concealment, even of an artificial nature, offers -advantages, because the observation of the enemy is thereby impeded. - -_Para. 208._--During the advance and in moving into position -security should not be overlooked. On threatened flanks special -scouts must be sent out by the officer who is bringing up the -troops, especially in close country. These should not ride far -ahead, but should bear in mind to keep in touch with the troops. -During the advance roads should be used as long as possible. - -_Para. 210._--The pace of the advance and the moment of unlimbering -depend on the object of the commander, the state of the action, -the nature of the country and the state of the ground. - -_Para. 211._--The dispositions for taking up a position must be -made in time to avoid any delay in opening fire. Every effort -must be made to take up a position unobserved, and to open fire -by surprise. Both of these are, however, only possible if special -attention is paid to the utilisation of cover during the advance to -the position, thus keeping the enemy in ignorance of the locality -which it is intended to occupy. In the absence of cover, or when -immediate entry into action is required, the surprise of the enemy -must be effected by rapidity in occupying a position. - -_Para. 213._--The most favourable position must be sought for each -individual weapon with regard to fire effect and cover. As a rule -there is an interval of 20 paces between guns, but the direction -and regularity of the intervals in the detachment are not to be -insisted upon. It must be considered, however, that the losses -caused by the enemy’s fire will be heavier in proportion as the -machine guns are posted closer together. Care must be taken that -the individual guns do not interfere with one another’s fire. -Placing single guns in echelon may offer advantages where the -flanks are threatened. - -When the nature of the ground or of the target renders a more -careful choice necessary for each gun, it is recommended that this -be carried out by the No. 1 of the gun. - -_Para. 214._--The decision to open fire must not be made too -hastily. It is to be borne in mind that the fire can only have a -decisive effect when it is directed against troops situated within -effective range. The arm to which they belong has little to do -with the question; the decisive point in choice of target is first -and foremost the momentary tactical importance of that target. -Afterwards fire must be turned on to those targets which, owing to -their height, depth, breadth, and density, render a high percentage -of hits probable. - -_Para. 215._--Good results from indirect fire can only be achieved -if the range and position of the target are known, or if the fall -or the effect of the shots can be observed from a point close to -the detachment. - -_Para. 216._--Firing over one’s own troops is only permissible when -the nature of the ground renders possible the deployment of several -firing lines one above the other. - -_Para. 217._--Firing by night can only promise success if the -guns can be trained by daylight on to points where the enemy is -expected, or if well-lit objects are taken as targets, such as -bivouacs or camps. - -_Para. 218._--From the very beginning of an action it must be -remembered that the number of cartridges carried is limited, and -that the consumption of ammunition implies an expenditure of power -which should only be made when it will meet with success. Should -the decision be taken, however, to fire on a given target, the -ammunition necessary to attain the object of the action must be -expended. Fire with an insufficient effect weakens the morale of -the troops, whilst it encourages the enemy. - -_Para. 219._--The losses inflicted on the enemy will affect him -more if he incurs them in a short space of time, than if they are -distributed over a long period; it is advisable therefore in most -cases, even in the face of a weaker enemy, to open fire with the -whole detachment rather than with one or two sections only. - -The expenditure of ammunition necessary for the silencing of the -enemy will in both cases be about the same, but in the former case -one’s own loss will be appreciably smaller. - -_Para. 220._--A change of objective should not be made until the -result aimed at against the first target has been fully realised. A -frequent change of objective weakens the fire, and should therefore -be avoided. - -_Para. 221._--A distribution of fire over several objectives cannot -be avoided under all circumstances, but it must not resolve itself -into an aimless scattering of fire. - -_Para. 222._--In every case coolness, marksmanship, and strict fire -discipline are necessary to get full value in fire effect. In an -engagement, should the majority of those in command be put out of -action, fire discipline must still be preserved. With well-trained -and well-disciplined troops, the presence of mind of the individual -soldier, and the example of stout-hearted and cool-headed men will -ensure a successful conclusion to an engagement fought against an -enemy in a similar plight. - -_Para. 223._--The officer commanding the troops announces the -object of the action, and also the objective in a general way. - -_Para. 224._--The machine-gun detachment commander selects the -positions, determines the range, names the targets in detail -together with the nature of attack on them, and orders the opening -of fire. - -_Para. 225._--The section commander passes on the orders. He -decides the place for each gun, also the portion of the objective -to be fired at, and the range for each individual weapon. He -observes the service of the guns, and is especially responsible -that the correct target is fired at and for the fire action of his -section. - -_Para. 226._--The No. 1 of the gun selects the spot to place his -gun, and the most suitable height for it to stand above ground, -follows in detail all orders, and ensures (using in case of -necessity independent measures) that the centre of the cone of -dispersion falls on the target. He is responsible for the service -of the gun in detail, and attentively watches the weapon so as to -remedy any defects which might interfere with its fire effect. - -_Para. 227._--By a correct utilisation of the degree of -independence allotted to each individual commander, by a rapid -and accurate ascertaining of ranges, by a correct judgment of the -influence of the weather on the cone of dispersion, it is possible -to avoid an interruption of the fire of the whole detachment for an -alteration of the sights. Any such interruption must be especially -avoided when it is obvious from the nature of the objective that -it will only be in view a short time. Again, when firing at such -objectives, no time must be lost by giving a long and detailed -description of the target. - -A well-trained detachment should be able to get quickly on to the -target, and to distribute its fire advantageously on receiving -brief words of command. If one part of the enemy is silenced or has -vanished, the fire must at once be independently directed on the -still visible and active part of the objective. - -_Para. 228._--The position of the commander is of importance for -issuing commands and controlling the fire. In peace exercises -all commanders must issue their orders from the same positions -and in the same attitude they would adopt in actual warfare. The -commander may allow himself to depart from this rule, and order the -subordinate commanders to do the same, in so far as such a step is -necessary for instructional purposes. Moreover, it must be strongly -insisted upon that no man should expose himself more than is -absolutely necessary for the observation of the general situation, -the service of the guns, the conveyance of ammunition, and the -taking of ranges. - - * * * * * - -_Para. 242._--In an action of two forces meeting, the advanced -guard must secure time and space for the main body to deploy. As -the accomplishment of this duty depends essentially on the rapid -occupation of favourable points on the ground, the allotment of -machine guns to the advanced guard will be highly advantageous. On -the arrival of the infantry the machine guns must be withdrawn from -the firing line, and kept in readiness for further employment. - -_Para. 243._--In an attack on a fully developed and defended front, -the machine guns will as a rule be kept back. They constitute a -highly mobile reserve at the disposal of the G.O.C., which may -be used for the speedy reinforcement of threatened points, for -acting against the flanks of an enemy, and for the preparation of -an attempt to break his line. The attack in view has a chance of -success only when superiority of fire is established. For this -purpose machine guns possess ample mobility to enable them to -follow infantry advancing to the attack. That they should join in -the rushes of the firing line is no more required of them than that -they should join in the charge. - -Under skilful and judicious leadership they will nevertheless be -able to come so close to the enemy as to take part in the decisive -fire engagement; the temporary increase of distance from the -carriages need not be considered. - -It is of exceptional advantage to direct the fire against the point -of the enemy’s line selected for the attack from a commanding -position, or from a flank, since under these circumstances it -is not necessary to cease fire when the infantry continue their -advance, and prepare for the final rush. Should such a position be -reached at a range which admits of the maximum fire effect (800 -yards or under) any further forward movement of the machine guns is -wrong; it interrupts the fire effect and entails fresh laying and -ranging. - -_Para. 244._--In the event of a successful issue of the action, the -machine guns must co-operate with the first pursuit by a lavish use -of their fire power. As soon as the victory is assured they will be -hurried forward into the captured position to support the infantry -in their occupation of the same, and to crush the last powers of -resistance of the enemy. - -_Para. 245._--Should the attack fail, the machine guns must support -the retiring troops. - -_Para. 246._--In using machine guns in defence, one must consider -that the guns are not suitable for conducting a protracted action -for any space of time, and that the advantage of the machine -guns’ mobility cannot be utilised if a fixed part of the position -is handed over to them for defence at the outset. It is to be -recommended generally, and particularly in the defence, to keep the -guns at first with the reserve, and to utilise them as the need -arises--to strengthen the defending line at threatened points, -to hinder outflanking, and to repel an attempt at storming the -position, or for offensive movements. This does not always exclude -machine guns from entering into action at the commencement of an -engagement, _e.g._ if it is necessary to command certain important -approaches. Also, if a covered retreat for the machine guns is -assured, it will be possible to place them to the front or to the -side of the main line of defence, so that they can sweep with their -fire the country which the enemy will presumably occupy with his -artillery. - -At times a flanking machine-gun fire can be used to sweep dead -ground in front of the line of battle. - -_Para. 247._--In all cases where machine guns are placed in -positions selected beforehand, cover must be constructed. If the -time is not sufficient for this, an attempt must at least be made -to arrange some artificial concealment, to improve the field of -fire, and to determine ranges. - -_Para. 248._--After a successful action machine-gun detachments -must be utilised in the boldest fashion, to turn the victory -to account during the pursuit. They are highly suitable for -this purpose, as they unite great power of fire with rapidity -of movement. The pursuit must be continued as long as strength -permits. The machine guns will approach to within effective range -of the enemy, and hinder every attempt of the adversary to re-form -and take up a position. Flanking fire is especially effective. A -liberal supply of ammunition must be pushed forward, this being -necessary for the energetic maintenance of fire in pursuit. - -_Para. 249._--When breaking off an action in the event of -an unsuccessful issue, the machine-gun detachment can render -considerable service by opposing the enemy, regardless of the -possible loss of the guns, and by pouring a vigorous fire into -him. For keeping the enemy in check, positions behind defiles with -covered lines of retreat are especially suitable. - -Special importance must be attached to the provision of sufficient -ammunition, to the thorough reconnaissance of the lines of retreat, -and to the correct estimation of the moment for beginning to -retire, especially when the movement is to be carried out in -echelon. To avoid obstruction the ammunition wagons must be moved -away at the right moment. Increased attention must be paid to the -flanks, since it is from these that danger most threatens during -a retreat. If suitable positions can be occupied on the flanks, -increased facilities for conducting the retreat will be obtained by -utilising them. - -_Para. 250._--Machine guns attached to independent cavalry might -be used to increase the power of cavalry, mounted and dismounted, -and on the offensive and defensive. The duties that will fall -on machine guns in this service demand great mobility and the -strictest fire discipline. - -_Para. 251._--The commander of the independent cavalry will -make all decisions regarding the employment of machine guns. He -communicates all his plans of action to the machine gun commander, -and provides him further with special orders concerning the first -entry into action of the machine guns. If the machine guns are -not to be used, it is advisable to leave them behind in a suitable -covering position. - -_Para. 252._--On reconnaissance duty with the cavalry, machine guns -will be most frequently employed in breaking down the resistance of -the enemy at small posts or defiles which they have occupied, or -vice versa--to stiffen the opposition made by the cavalry at such -points. On such an occasion even the assistance of a single section -with its ammunition will be of use to the cavalry detachment. - -_Para. 253._--In the advance of cavalry against cavalry the -machine-gun detachments must take up their positions as soon as -possible, so as to support first the deployment, and then the -attack of the cavalry. The most advantageous position will be well -to the front and to a flank of the advancing cavalry, since from -there a continuation of the fire is rendered possible up to the -moment almost of the charge, and at the same time an outflanking -movement of the enemy is prevented on that side. A position secure -against direct attack is to be desired, yet a consideration of -the effect gained by the position described above precedes all -thought of cover. A change of position is almost always out of the -question, owing to the rapid development of a mounted action. - -_Para. 254._--A wide separation of the sections is not advisable, -since several lines of fire hamper the movements of cavalry. - -_Para. 255._--In a forward movement of the machine guns when -limbered up, decreasing the intervals to less than 10 paces must be -avoided, since smaller spaces render difficult the passage of the -limbers to the rear. - -_Para. 256._--During the fight the detachment commander will have -to act on his own responsibility, according to the state of the -action. He must not wait for orders, and must always watch the -cavalry engagement; he must use every opportunity to join in the -issue at stake and make preparation for decisive action in case of -either a successful or an unsuccessful termination of the struggle. -Under certain conditions it may be advantageous to await events -with his guns ready to march. - -_Para. 257._--In the event of a favourable issue of the action, it -will be his duty to follow the beaten enemy with his fire and to -prevent him from offering further resistance. - -_Para. 258._--The nature of a cavalry engagement will often render -it necessary to keep the carriages close to the guns or to shoot -from the wheeled carriages. Since the massing of several carriages -in rear of the detachment offers the enemy a favourable opportunity -for attack and impedes firing towards the rear, the question will -arise whether the ammunition wagons should be kept back in a secure -place. - -_Para. 260._--The machine-gun detachments attached to the cavalry -divisions remain with them in action. They will find occasion -to prove of service in the varied duties of cavalry during and -especially after action. - -_Para. 261._--Also for protecting batteries in position, machine -guns can be profitably employed, if infantry are not forthcoming -for this duty. - - -_Extract from “Field Service Regulations, 1908”_ - -“The fire effect of machine guns is influenced primarily by correct -sighting, possibility of observation, size and density of target, -and methods of fire.” - -“It is further affected by the suddenness with which fire is -opened, by the number of machine guns firing at the same target, -and by the enemy’s fire. The high rate of fire concentration of the -bullet-sheaf, and the possibility of bringing several machine guns -into action on a narrow front, enable great effect to be produced -in a short time even at long ranges. When the front of the target -is broken and irregular, the effect is reduced. A wrong sighting -elevation or an imperfect observation of fire may render the fire -completely ineffective.” - -“Dense lines of skirmishers standing suffer heavy losses at ranges -of 1,650 yards and under. At lines of skirmishers lying, good -effect is to be expected at 1,100 yards and under, provided that -the observation of fire is good. Against artillery in action the -fire is similar to that of infantry. Owing to the mobility of -machine-gun batteries they are especially adapted for securing the -increased fire effect due to _oblique_ fire.” - -“At short ranges under hostile fire machine guns can only be -brought up and withdrawn under cover.” - - * * * * * - -The German _Cavalry Drill Book_ of 1909 has some interesting -paragraphs on the employment of machine guns, which are here given: - -_Para. 497._--Horse artillery and machine guns, by reason of their -fire, enhance the offensive and defensive powers of cavalry. In -defence and against unexpected opening of fire they form the most -effective portion of the force. - -_Para. 498._--Horse-artillery fire will often be the first thing to -make the enemy disclose his dispositions, and thus is useful for -reconnaissance. In conjunction with machine guns it can break down -the enemy’s resistance in defiles, and thus save the cavalry the -necessity of dismounted action. - -_Para. 498._--Artillery and machine guns enable the cavalry, ... -especially by fire effect upon their flanks, to distract hostile -columns from their line of march. - -_Para. 500._--Detached forces of the Division may be allotted -artillery and machine guns to increase their powers of offensive -action.... The employment of single machine guns is forbidden. - -_Para. 501._--The commanders of artillery and machine guns must -be kept informed of the situation and of the cavalry commander’s -intentions. They remain with him until the employment of their -commands has been arranged for; and, if necessary, it is their -duty to bring this question of employment to his notice. At later -stages they must keep in constant communication with him. Guns and -machine guns come into action for the first time by order of the -leader. - -_Para. 502._--As a general principle, fire is to be opened on those -portions of the enemy the defeat of which is likely to influence -the decision of the fight. Under anything like equal conditions, a -duel with the hostile artillery cannot lead to rapid results. But -should the hostile artillery expose itself, the opportunity must be -seized with rapidity and energy. It may be also necessary to engage -hostile artillery in order to draw their fire from the cavalry. - -_Para. 503._--Fire control is facilitated by keeping the batteries -together, nor is any great dispersion of the machine-gun sections, -as a rule, to be recommended. Many lines of fire cramp the -movements of cavalry during the mounted combat. The conditions -of the fight, however, or the configuration of the ground, may -necessitate dispersions and separate positions.... Machine guns -only require an escort when the field of view is very restricted. - -_Para. 507._--In the _mounted cavalry combat_ guns and machine -guns must be brought into action so as to support, firstly, the -deployment; secondly, the attack. Positions for the machine guns, -to a flank and in front of the advancing cavalry, all on rising -ground, will allow fire to be maintained until immediately before -the collision, and will make it difficult for the enemy to -envelop a flank. On the other hand, the disadvantage is that any -large flank movement takes time, and sometimes so much time that -the decisive moment may pass while it is being carried out, and -the guns may arrive too late.... It is desirable that artillery -positions should be secured from direct attack by the nature of -the ground. But if circumstances demand it, artillery and machine -guns must come into action on the spot, without regard for cover or -other advantages. - -_Para. 509._--Unless fresh bodies of cavalry offer a tempting -target, fire will be turned on to the hostile batteries and machine -guns immediately after the collision of the cavalry masses. - -_Para. 510._--During the fight the leaders of artillery and machine -guns will for the most part have to act on their own initiative. -They must seek every opportunity for intervention, and, according -to the course of the fight, must make preparations for action under -favourable or unfavourable conditions. On occasions it may be -necessary to remain limbered up and ready to move. - -_Para. 511._--After a successful attack artillery and machine -guns advance rapidly to follow up the beaten enemy with fire, and -to prevent his rallying for renewed opposition. If the result be -unfavourable, artillery and machine-gun leaders must come to a -timely decision whether the circumstances call for a retirement to -a covering position, or whether they should not hold on to their -fire position even at the risk of losing the guns. - -_Para. 512._--Owing to the character of the cavalry encounter, it -is often advisable to keep the limbers with the guns. And it may -sometimes be well to leave a portion of the second-line wagons -and the carts of the machine-gun detachments behind in a place of -security, and to order the light-ammunition column to march at -the head of the second-line transport. Yet another question may -arise for the machine-gun detachments; whether to take the wheeled -carriage or only the sleigh mountings into the firing line. - -_Para. 513._--If the assault succeeds, guns and machine guns hurry -to the captured position to take part in the pursuit. - -Should their own attack fail, or should that of the enemy succeed, -artillery and machine guns must endeavour to cover the retirement, -and, disregarding the hostile artillery, must turn their fire into -pursuing riflemen. - - * * * * * - -In a recent article in the _Jahrbücher für die Deutschen Armeen und -Marine_ Captain von Beckmann gives the following summary of the -tactical use of machine guns:-- - -1. Machine guns must take up the smallest possible space, and be -capable of quickly coming into action (at rifle ranges). They must -be capable of accompanying infantry and cavalry wherever these arms -can go. - -2. They can never take the place of artillery, though capable, -especially at short ranges, of affording effective support to the -latter. - -3. The fire of one machine gun is approximately equivalent to that -of 80 infantrymen. The dispersion of fire is considerably less; -therefore while the effect is greater with an accurate sight, it is -less if the range is not accurately known. - -4. The most suitable targets are those of some size and -depth--_e.g._ infantry columns, cavalry in all formations, and -artillery when limbered up. At medium ranges, extended firing lines -may be fired upon, but little effect can be produced upon men lying -down, even at the shortest ranges--though the morale effect may be -considerable. - -5. Short bursts of heavy fire are especially effective. On the -other hand, long-continued fire is unsuitable, owing to the -expenditure of ammunition and the heating of the barrel. - -6. Artillery in position provided with shields can only be -effectively damaged by enfilade or oblique fire. - -7. Machine guns may either be employed directly under the orders -of the G.O.C. or be attached to certain units. In the first case -they will usually act in complete machine-gun units. In the second -case they will generally do so only at suitable targets at long -and medium ranges. In the later stages they will mostly be used in -sections. The use of single machine guns is to be avoided. - -8. The intervals between machine guns in action must depend on -circumstances. They should not be too small if the guns are to -hold their ground for any length of time. When a section (2 guns) -is acting alone, the guns must be able to afford effective mutual -support in all directions. - -9. Ammunition must be carefully husbanded, especially at the longer -ranges, while a good supply of ammunition is essential. Even -at long ranges, this ammunition will have to be carried by men -specially equipped for the purpose. - -10. When the enemy is unexpectedly met with while on the march, -machine guns will be of special value to the advance guard in -rapidly seizing points in order to hold the enemy at a distance. -The occupation of such points at wide intervals will often -effectively deceive the enemy as to the strength of the force. -Machine guns thus employed will be withdrawn as soon as the -infantry come up and deploy, so as to be available for other work. - -11. The wide extensions of modern armies will often make it -impossible for any but mounted troops to be concentrated -at decisive points--either to make the most of favourable -opportunities, or to ward off an unexpected danger. Mounted -machine-gun detachments will be very valuable for such purposes. - -12. In the attack of a defensive position deliberately occupied, -part of the machine guns will at first be held in reserve, but, -according to the latest opinions formed from the lessons of the -Russo-Japanese War, the majority of the machine guns will support -the advance of the infantry. They are especially effective in -keeping down the defenders’ fire during the last stage of the -attack when the artillery is no longer able to fire over the heads -of the infantry. - -13. On the defensive it is advisable that a considerable number of -machine guns should be held in reserve, especially with a view to -preventing any unexpected turning movements, repelling assaults, -delivering counter-attacks, and in case of such reinforcing any -threatened points in the line of defence. In fortified positions -machine guns may be usefully employed in front of the position to -force the enemy to deploy prematurely. His artillery as it comes -into action will frequently offer very suitable targets. The -majority of machine guns, however, will be placed in the line of -defence (or at least immediately in rear of the sections to which -they are allotted) as soon as the direction of the enemy’s attack -has been ascertained. This presence in the front line will make it -possible to reduce the number of men actually in that line and will -thus economise troops. - -14. In the pursuit machine guns will be especially effective -against the flanks and rear of the retiring enemy. Again, in -covering a retirement and checking the enemy’s pursuit, machine -guns with cavalry and artillery will delay the enemy’s advance and -enable their own infantry to break away. In this case the first -duty will be to protect their own artillery. - -15. With the Independent Cavalry machine guns form a very valuable -addition to the effective strength both for defence and offence. -Even in reconnaissance work they will be able to break down the -enemy’s resistance at certain points (villages) and to increase -the tenacity of their own forces in the defence of similar points. -Light machine guns carried on the saddle would be of the greatest -assistance to smaller bodies of cavalry in such circumstances. -Machine guns are also valuable in purely cavalry engagements, -especially when it is possible for them to take the enemy in flank. -If this be impossible, they can effectively follow up a success, or -cover the retirement of their own cavalry. If some of the machine -guns act as escort to the artillery, the cavalry escort can be -dispensed with. This will increase the effective strength of the -cavalry and also give the artillery a wide choice of position and -great security, thus increasing its efficiency. Even if at the -beginning the cavalry commander himself directs the working of the -machine guns, the officer commanding the latter will have to act -on his own initiative later on, in accordance with the tactical -situation of the moment. - - -GREAT BRITAIN - -ORGANISATION.--Great Britain was one of the earliest countries to -adopt machine guns, and the Maxim has been in use for the last -twenty years. Machine guns are organised in sections of two guns, -and a section forms part of each regiment of cavalry and battalion -of infantry, who provide and train the personnel. - -The organisation is as follows:-- - - -A SECTION WITH A CAVALRY REGIMENT - - ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- - Personnel. |Riding horses.|Draught horses. - ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- - Lieutenant 1 | 3 | -- - Sergeant 1 | 1 | -- - Corporal 1 | 1 | -- - Privates 12 | 12 | -- - Drivers 8 | -- | 16 - Bâtman 2 | -- | -- - ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- - 25 (1 officer) | 17 | 16 - ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- - -_Equipment._--6 pack-saddles (the two lead horses of each wagon are -provided with pack saddlery); 4 G.S. limbered wagons (2 for guns -and 2 for ammunition); 2 machine guns with tripods and pack-saddles -on limbered G.S. wagons, each drawn by 4 horses. - -_Ammunition._--3,500 rounds with each gun; 16,000 with regimental -reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column; 10,000 with -divisional ammunition column for each gun respectively. - - -SECTION WITH AN INFANTRY BATTALION - - ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- - Personnel. |Riding horses.|Draught horses. - ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- - Subaltern 1 | 1 | -- - Sergeant 1 | -- | -- - Corporal 1 | -- | -- - Privates 12 | -- | -- - Drivers | | - (1st-line | | - transport) 2 | -- | 4 - ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- - Total 17 (1 officer) | 1 | 4 - ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- - - -[Illustration: MACHINE GUN ON ADJUSTABLE TRIPOD BEHIND COVER. -FRONT VIEW. - -_By Permission of Messrs. Vickers, Sons & Maxim, Ltd._] - -[Illustration: MACHINE GUN ON ADJUSTABLE TRIPOD BEHIND COVER. -VIEW FROM REAR. - -_By Permission of Messrs. Vickers, Sons & Maxim, Ltd._] - -_Equipment._--2 machine guns with tripods on 1 limbered G.S. wagon -drawn by 2 horses. - -_Ammunition._--3,500 rounds with each gun; 8,000 with regimental -reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column; 10,000 with -divisional ammunition column for each gun respectively. - - -TERRITORIAL FORCE: SECTION WITH AN INFANTRY BATTALION - - ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- - Personnel. |Riding horses.|Draught horses. - ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- - Subaltern 1 | 1 | -- - Sergeant 1 | -- | -- - Rank and | | - File 15 | -- | 2 - ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- - | | - Total 17 (1 officer) | 1 | 2 - ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- - -_Equipment._--2 machine guns on field carriages each drawn by 1 -horse. - -_Ammunition._--4,000 with the guns; 6,000 with regimental reserve; -10,000 with brigade ammunition column. - - -SECTION WITH A YEOMANRY REGIMENT - - ----------------------+------------------+---------------- - Personnel. | Riding horses. | Draught horses. - ----------------------+------------------+---------------- - Subaltern 1 | 2 | -- - Sergeant 1 | 1 | -- - Corporal 1 | 1 | -- - Privates 12 | 12 | -- - Drivers 4 | -- | 8 - Bâtman 2 | -- | -- - ----------------------+------------------+---------------- - Total 21 | 16 | 8 - ----------------------+------------------+---------------- - -_Equipment._--2 carts for guns, tripods, and 2 sets of -pack-saddlery; and 2 carts for machine-gun ammunition. - -_Ammunition._--3,500 rounds with each gun; 6,000 with regimental -reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column. - -MOUNTING.--There are five English patterns of tripods in use and -one Indian. Marks I. and II. English pattern and the Indian pattern -are exceedingly clumsy, and have been largely replaced by Marks -III., III.A, and IV. Mark III. weighs 49 lb., and consists of a -crosshead and pivot mounted on three legs with a saddle for firer, -and has elevating and traversing gears. A traverse of 25 degrees -can be obtained. The two front legs of the tripod are pivoted in -sockets and secured by wing nuts, and can be splayed to lower the -gun, and fold up for transport. The legs are fitted with shoes -to steady the mounting by gripping the ground. When firing, the -ammunition box is placed on the ground on the right side of the gun. - -On the pack-saddle the gun and tripod are carried on either side -of the saddle on hooks and secured by straps. The tool box is -carried on the top of the saddle. With this mounting 4,000 rounds -of ammunition are carried in eight boxes, four on each side of the -ammunition pack-saddle on a second animal. - -Mark III.A tripod weighs 56 lb., and differs from Mark III. as -follows: - -1. The pivot has a bearing surface to support the rear end of -crosshead arm. - -2. The hand nut of elevating gear is formed with four small radial -holes. - -3. The rear leg is telescopic, and consists of an inner and outer -tube. The inner tube has a shoe, and the rear end of the outer tube -has a bracket for the saddle and a handle to clamp the inner to the -outer tube. - -The Mark IV. tripod weighs 48 lb., and the mounting consists of -a crosshead, elevating gear, and socket mounted on three legs. -It has 13 degrees elevation and 25 degrees depression, but by -arranging the position of legs 43 degrees and 55 degrees can be -had. It has an all-round traverse. The elevating gear is actuated -by a hand-wheel, which consists of an inner and an outer screw. -The legs are of tubular steel, the lower ends being fitted with -shoes to steady the mountings, and the upper ends have a joint -with serrations; the rear leg has a joint pin with nut and jamming -handle. Joint studs with disc springs and jamming handles are fixed -to the front legs, by which the legs are securely clamped in the -required position. Numbers are stamped on the legs to show the -relative position of the legs to their normal position. The legs -are secured by a leather strap for transport. When firing, the -ammunition box is placed on the ground on the right side of the -gun. The gun can be fired at heights varying from 14½ inches to 30 -inches above the ground. - -TACTICAL.--Directions for the use of machine guns are found in the -various textbooks issued for each arm. Training is dealt with in -the _Handbook for ·303 Machine Guns_, 1907, and in the _Training -Manuals Appendix_, 1905. The following directions for their -employment in the field are from the latter, ch. vi. pp. 157-63: - -_Para. 2._--Surprise is a powerful factor in the effective -employment of the machine gun; every effort must therefore be -made to avoid the enemy’s observations both when advancing to a -position and when in action. The machine gun possesses the power of -delivering, from a very narrow front, a practically uninterrupted -volume of closely concentrated rifle fire, which can be directed -against any desired object with the least possible delay. The -delivery of such fire cannot, however, be long sustained, because -of the heavy expenditure of ammunition involved and the difficulty -of replacing it. - -It is necessary, therefore, for its effective use, that its -movements and fire action should be so regulated as to enable it -to open fire rapidly whenever a favourable target presents itself, -for the losses inflicted on an enemy will affect him in proportion -to the suddenness and rapidity with which they are experienced. -As the rôle of machine guns is to assist the particular body of -troops to which they belong, the machine-gun commander should be -fully acquainted with the orders issued to such troops. He should -also carefully watch and conform to their movements, and assist -them by every means in his power. As a rule the guns belonging to a -unit will be employed singly in order to obviate the concentration -of hostile fire against them, the most favourable position being -sought for each weapon with regard to fire effect and cover; this, -however, should not prevent the guns being used together when the -circumstances of the moment demand the adoption of such a course. -The massing of guns should be rarely resorted to. When it is -desired to bring an overwhelming fire to bear on any locality, it -should be accomplished by the concentration of fire from dispersed -guns. The selection of a fire position should be preceded by -careful reconnaissance on the part of the machine-gun commander. -The following points should be looked for: - -(_a_) A good field of fire. - -(_b_) Concealment. - -(_c_) Cover from the hostile fire. - -(_d_) Possibilities for advancing to the position unobserved, and -facilities for ammunition supply. - -(_e_) Security against a covered hostile approach. - -If a position affording concealment is not available, one should -be selected which from the nature of its background will be -difficult for the enemy to locate. As the opportunities for the -effective action of machine guns will often be very brief, and as -the guns will usually be employed singly, the non-commissioned -officer in charge of each gun will, as a rule, have to act on -his own initiative in choosing the objective, judging the range, -and in deciding when to open fire. As a general rule, machine -guns are best adapted for action at effective ranges; at these it -is usually possible to distinguish the target, to ascertain its -range, and to observe the effects of the fire. When, however, -concealment and protection from fire exist, it may sometimes be -advisable to bring machine guns into action at decisive range. If -a sufficiently large target be offered and the range be known, the -concentration and rapidity of their fire will enable guns to be -employed, with considerable effect, at long ranges. Machine guns -should seldom engage artillery at long rifle range, for in such -circumstances superiority of fire will always rest with the latter -if the machines are located. Within effective range, however, -machine guns, if concealed, should inflict considerable loss on -hostile artillery. Engagements with their lines of skirmishers -should be avoided, for the risk of disclosing the position of the -guns and the heavy expenditure of ammunition involved will rarely -be justified by results. Since the gun is not well adapted for -keeping up protracted fire, it may be often expedient to withdraw -it from action, move it elsewhere, or hold it in reserve for a more -favourable opportunity. - -The selection of a target upon which to fire should be governed -by (_a_) its tactical importance; (_b_) its dimensions and -vulnerability. It is essential that due regard to economy of -ammunition should be observed. When, however, it is decided to -open fire, the ammunition necessary to secure the results sought -must be expended without hesitation. “Deliberate fire” will rarely -be resorted to. In cases where a favourable target is offered, -prolonged “rapid fire” may be employed, but the most suitable -description of fire will usually be “rapid” in series of from 25 to -30 rounds. - -The range should be taken by a range-finder or ascertained from -neighbouring infantry or artillery. Ranging by observation of -fire should be employed only when the nature of the soil is very -favourable and when no other method is practicable. When a reserve -ammunition cart is provided for the machine guns it will be under -the orders of the machine-gun commander, who will arrange that -it is placed where it can most conveniently supply the guns with -ammunition; it should be screened from view, and if possible -sheltered from fire. All belts shall be refilled as soon as -possible after they are emptied. Should the machine-gun commander -consider an escort necessary, he will at once bring the fact to the -notice of his commanding officer. - - -_With Infantry in the Attack_ - -_Para. 3._--The machine guns will cover the advance of the firing -line by engaging the enemy from positions in close support of it. -In ordinary open ground it would rarely be advisable to push them -into the firing line, where they would offer a conspicuous target -to the enemy; but in a broken or enclosed country, where the guns -can be brought up under cover, occasions may arise when they can -be usefully employed in a forward position. When the ground is -favourable the gun may with advantage accompany that portion -of reserves told off to cover the advance of the remainder by -long-range fire. Machine guns will co-operate with the attacking -infantry in the decisive fire action in endeavouring to obtain -a superiority of fire. Positions on the flank of the attacking -battalions or on commanding ground, if available, should be -selected, as they admit of the guns remaining in action whilst -the firing line is pushing forward. A position on the flank of -the attacking infantry has the further advantages that oblique or -flanking fire, which from machine guns is particularly effective, -can be brought to bear against the enemy, whilst guns so placed are -less likely to draw fire upon the attacking infantry. A change of -position during the decisive fire action interrupts the fire and -entails fresh laying and ranging, and therefore should be seldom -resorted to unless an increased fire effect is to be obtained. At -the decisive stage of the attack, fire of the greatest intensity -should be continued as long as is compatible with the safety of -the advancing firing line. In the event of the attack succeeding, -the guns should be pushed forward at once in order to pursue the -retreating enemy with their fire. In the event of failure, every -effort should be made to cover the retirement of the firing line. -They will assist in repelling counter-attacks to which the firing -line may suddenly become exposed, and in the protection of the -flanks against cavalry or counterstroke. They may be employed to -give effect to holding attacks or feints, by rapid fire directed -against successive portions of the enemy’s line; also to make good -positions secured in the course of an action. - - -_In the Defence_ - -_Para. 4._--It is more important to shield machine guns from -artillery fire than to obtain a long range for them. Their -position, therefore, should be always concealed, and cover from -fire should be provided. They are best utilised to sweep with -their fire spaces which are particularly exposed, but which the -enemy is compelled to cross; to flank salients, cover obstacles, -deny the passage of roads and defiles, or to guard the flanks of -the position. It will be at times expedient to retain the guns in -reserve until the enemy reaches effective ranges. In such cases, -emplacements should be prepared previously and covered approaches -provided. Machine guns may also be held as a reserve of fire to -check the advance of hostile reinforcements, to meet turning -movements, or to prepare and cover the counter-attack. When their -retirement is not likely to be compromised, machine guns may be -utilised in positions in front of the main line to delay the -enemy’s advance. - - -_In Pursuit and Retreat_ - -_Para. 5._--In pursuit machine-gun commanders should act with great -boldness, and it should be their endeavour to come into action -against the enemy’s flanks at decisive range. In retirements they -should avoid close engagements, and should take up successive fire -positions, from which to delay the enemy’s advance and protect the -flanks of the rear guard. - - -_With Advanced and Rear Guards and with Outposts_ - -_Para. 6._--With an advanced guard machine guns may often be -pushed forward to assist in dispersing small bodies of the enemy -who might delay the advance; they may also be employed in opposing -the enemy’s advance and in preventing the occupation of important -positions until the arrival of the main body. With the outposts -they may be used to sweep the approaches, and to dominate certain -points which an enemy, in advancing, is likely to pass or to occupy. - - -_With Cavalry_ - -_Para. 7._--As a general principle machine guns should be employed -to supplement the fire action of cavalry. During the cavalry -combat they may be suitably employed in protecting the flanks or -in directing an oblique fire against the hostile cavalry. When -the charge is successful they should press forward and engage the -hostile cavalry at close range. In event of defeat they should form -rallying points and endeavour to check the enemy’s pursuit. In -reconnaissance, or other detached duties, the machine guns should -be retained by the commander of the unit as a reserve, ready to -move to any point where their presence may be required. They may -be utilised for such purposes as to induce the enemy to expose his -position; to drive in hostile patrols; to check the pursuit of -victorious cavalry; to delay the enemy’s infantry, etc. When their -fire has achieved its object they should be withdrawn temporarily. -In other circumstances their action should be guided by the -principles set forth in the case of infantry. - - -_From_ “FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS,” _Part I., Operations_, 1909 - -The machine gun possesses the power of delivering a volume of -concentrated rifle fire which can be rapidly directed against -any desired object. Rapid fire cannot be long sustained, owing -to the expenditure of ammunition involved, and it is therefore -necessary that the movements and fire action of the weapons should -be regulated so as to enable them to open fire immediately a -favourable opportunity arises. Surprise is an important factor in -the employment of machine guns, which should be concealed, and -whenever possible provided with cover from fire. The massing of -machine guns is likely to attract hostile artillery fire. For this -reason it is usually better to employ them in pairs in support -of the particular body of troops to which they belong. When an -overwhelming fire on a particular point is required it can be -provided by concentrating the fire of dispersed pairs of guns. The -guns of two or more units may, if required, be placed under the -command of a specially selected officer and employed as a special -reserve of fire in the hands of a brigade commander. Machine guns -are best adapted for use at effective infantry ranges, but when -good cover from view and fire exists they may be usefully employed -at close infantry ranges.[62] - - -_With Outposts_ - -Machine guns with outposts may be employed to sweep approaches, and -to cover ground which an enemy in advancing may be compelled to -pass or occupy.[63] - - -_During the Battle_ - -Machine guns will be especially valuable in bringing a sudden fire -to bear from such positions, both in order to cover a further -advance and to assist in defeating counter-attacks. Machine guns -can normally support an attack most efficiently from well-concealed -positions provided with good cover, and within effective infantry -range of the enemy. Occasionally, when good opportunities for a -concealed advance present themselves, they may be established -within close infantry range of the objective.[64] - - -_From_ “CAVALRY TRAINING,” 1907 - -Machine guns afford a means of developing fire without dismounting -men from the squadrons. During the cavalry fight they will usually -be massed under one commander, but may be employed in pairs when -necessary. They will co-operate with the horse artillery, the -great volume of fire which they are able to bring to bear from a -narrow front being particularly effective. Their presence with the -artillery will often admit of the latter dispensing with any other -escort.[65] - - -_Position of Machine Guns_ - -During the approach march the machine guns will usually accompany -the artillery, to whom they may act as escort when necessary.[66] - - -_From_ “INFANTRY TRAINING, 1908” (AMENDMENT, AUGUST, 1909) - - -_General Characteristics_ - -1. The machine gun possesses the power of delivering rapidly from -a narrow front a volume of closely concentrated fire which can be -controlled easily, be turned readily in any desired direction, or -be distributed by traversing. - -2. The effective range of machine guns is the same as that of the -rifle; they are therefore not suited for employment in place of -artillery. On the other hand, the effect of machine-gun fire at -effective infantry and close infantry ranges is very great, and -at close infantry ranges it may, with favourable conditions, be -annihilating. Machine guns are very suitable for the development of -covering fire within the limits of effective rifle range. They can -accompany the troops to which they may be attached over any country. - -3. The action of the mechanism is liable to temporary interruption -by jams. Machine guns should not therefore be used singly under -normal conditions. They are organised in sections of two guns, -which should rarely be broken up. - -4. Machine guns are essentially weapons of opportunity. The -expenditure of ammunition involved and the nature of the mechanism -make long periods of rapid fire unsuitable. The power of the gun is -best used to develop unexpected bursts of fire. - - -_The Organisation and Training of Infantry Machine-Gun Sections_ - -1. The strength and composition of a machine-gun section are shown -in War Establishments. An infantry machine-gun section is an -integral portion of an infantry battalion, but two or more sections -may be brought together by the brigade commander and used under the -command of a brigade machine-gun officer. - -The two non-commissioned officers and twelve privates shown in the -establishment will be trained as first-class machine gunners. -Two non-commissioned officers and twelve men will be trained, as -opportunity offers, as second-class machine gunners to replace -casualties among first-class machine gunners. - -2. A subaltern officer, other than the assistant adjutant, will be -selected in each battalion to command and train the machine-gun -section, under the orders of the commanding officer. Should a -brigade commander desire to train the machine guns of his brigade -to act together when massed, an officer, who is not the machine-gun -officer of one of the battalions of the brigade, may be selected to -supervise the firing practice and to conduct the brigade training -of machine-gun sections. - -3. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men detailed for -machine-gun training should be changed as little as possible; the -two non-commissioned officers and twelve men trained as first-class -machine gunners will fire the practices prescribed in the Musketry -Regulations with one of the companies of the battalion,[67] but -will at other times be at the disposal of the machine-gun officer -for instruction. - -4. Details as to the mechanism of the gun, and the drill of -machine-gun sections are contained in the handbook of the gun. -Instructions as to the course of firing are contained in the -Musketry Regulations. - -5. The preliminary training, which may be carried out in the -neighbourhood of barracks, will consist in instruction in the -mechanism of the gun; in the drill and methods of laying, ranging, -and firing; in packing and unpacking with limbered wagons. - -6. As soon as the men of a section are thoroughly conversant with -the mechanism, are able to recognise without delay the cause of -any failure and to remedy it at once, and can drill and handle the -gun with precision, their further training will be carried out in -open country away from barracks. During this training the sections -should be practised in bringing the gun into action; in fire -discipline; in fire control; in laying and ranging in every variety -of country; in utilising natural cover when advancing into action; -and in constructing cover from both view and fire. The men should -also be trained in range-finding, judging distance, and in the use -of field-glasses. - -7. When the section is proficient in these branches of training, -the commanding officer will arrange for it to be trained with one -or more companies which have reached the more advanced stages of -company training, in order that it may be practised in co-operating -with other troops and in dealing with such situations as would -confront it in war. The periods of preliminary training should -be arranged so that the section may be ready for this training, -without hurrying through the more elementary work. To enable this -to be done it will usually be necessary to begin the preliminary -training during the winter training season. - - -_General Principles of the Employment of Infantry Machine Guns_ - -1. The normal duty of the infantry machine gun in war is to -assist infantry in every way by its fire, but it may be given an -independent rôle at any time, if the tactical situation makes it -advisable to do so. - -2. The effective use of a machine gun depends largely upon the -skill with which it has been brought into action. Surprise and -concealment are very important factors in its employment; for the -effect of the gun is much increased by sudden bursts of fire from -concealed positions. The tripod mounting makes it possible to take -advantage of small features of the ground to obtain cover and to -escape an enemy’s observation. In order to develop the power of the -gun to the utmost the fullest use should be made of natural and -artificial cover. - -3. The depth of the beaten zone of the machine gun is small as -compared with that of collective rifle fire. This makes the effect -of small errors in sighting for elevation proportionately greater. -A section of machine guns cannot therefore be relied upon to make -its fire effective when first opening fire, at distances beyond -about 1,000 yards. If observation of fire is possible, elevation -may be rapidly corrected, and the fire of the two guns may in -that case be very effective up to 2,000 yards, or up to the limit -of observation. If there is no observation it will be necessary to -employ several guns and expend a large quantity of ammunition in -order to obtain adequate assurance of effect beyond about 1,000 -yards. - -4. By massing the machine guns of a brigade the assurance of fire -effect at ranges beyond 1,000 yards is increased, and it is easier -to control and direct fire. At shorter ranges massed machine guns -may form a conspicuous target, and the control of more than two -guns then becomes difficult. Occasions will, however, often arise -when the massed guns of a brigade can be brought into action in a -well-concealed position within the limits of effective rifle range. -Under such circumstances massed guns may produce great effect both -in attack and defence. - -5. The general considerations which govern the selection of a -target for machine guns are--its tactical importance, its range, -and its vulnerability. - -Machine guns should seldom engage artillery with direct fire beyond -effective rifle range, for in such circumstances superiority of -fire will always rest with the artillery if the machine guns are -located. Within effective range machine guns, if concealed, should -inflict considerable loss on artillery, while oblique fire may be -usefully employed up to the limits of long rifle range. - -Engagements with thin lines of skirmishers should be avoided -unless the range is accurately known, as the risk of disclosing the -position of the gun and the expenditure of ammunition involved will -rarely be justified by results. - -6. It is very important that fire should not be opened until -there is a reasonable probability of obtaining the desired -result. A section commander must have a thorough knowledge of -the capabilities of his guns to enable him to decide when he is -justified in opening fire. - -7. Machine guns should as a rule only open fire upon targets which -are sufficiently large and dense to promise an adequate return -for the ammunition expended. Special circumstances may, however, -warrant the opening of fire upon less favourable targets. When a -machine-gun commander has decided to open fire, the ammunition -necessary to secure the results sought should be expended without -hesitation. - -8. If there is no satisfactory indication of effect, and no special -justification for firing at long range exists, it will usually -be better to withdraw from action and to await opportunities for -effective intervention. - -9. A machine-gun commander should be given definite orders as -to his action, but should be allowed full liberty, within the -limits assigned to the commander of the body of troops with whom -he is co-operating, in carrying out his orders. He should be kept -informed of all changes and developments of the situation which may -affect his action. Initiative and enterprise are essential to the -effective handling of machine guns. - -10. Machine guns will usually be sufficiently protected by the -dispositions of the troops with whom they are acting. Should a -machine-gun commander find himself in an exposed position, he -should consult the nearest infantry commander, who is responsible -for providing a suitable escort, if in his opinion one is necessary. - -11. When a machine gun is in action only those numbers required to -work the gun should be with it. Spare numbers, when not employed as -range-finders, ground scouts, ammunition-carriers, or on similar -duties, should be in covered positions in the vicinity. Groups of -men close to machine guns do not facilitate the working of the gun, -and make a vulnerable target. - -The limbered wagons will be unloaded in positions where they are -screened from the enemy’s fire and observation. - -The commander of the machine-gun section will select a covered -position for his small-arm ammunition cart, as close to his guns as -possible. (see Section 174). - - -_Choice of Fire Positions_ - -1. Reconnaissance is of special importance in the handling of -machine guns. Before bringing his guns into action the brigade -machine-gun officer if the machine guns are brigaded, or the -battalion machine-gun officer if the sections are working -independently, accompanied by range-takers and orderlies, should -usually be well in advance of his guns, where he can observe the -action of the body of infantry with which he is co-operating. He -should carefully reconnoitre suitable fire positions and make all -preparations for bringing his guns rapidly into action. During -this reconnaissance the machine guns should normally be placed -in concealed positions. In any case they should not follow the -machine-gun commander so closely as to expose their movements. -Alternative positions to which the guns may be moved to meet -changes in the situation or to avoid artillery fire should always -be prepared. - -2. The choice of a fire position must depend upon the tactical -requirements of the situation, and upon the object in view; for -example, it must depend upon whether it is desired to use covering -enfilade or flanking fire, or to act by surprise. - -A commanding position is favourable for the development of covering -fire, while for other purposes the gun should be sited as low as is -compatible with obtaining the necessary field of fire. - -3. A clear field of fire, facilities for observation, a covered -approach, concealment and cover for the guns and their detachments, -and facilities for ammunition supply are advantages to be looked -for in a good fire position, but one position will rarely unite -them all. In arranging for the concealment of the guns it is -important to consider the background. The neighbourhood of -landmarks and the tops of prominent features should be avoided. - -4. Their power of all-round traversing and their great effect -against deep targets make machine guns specially suitable for -position on a flank, whence they can bring enfilade fire to bear. A -position in the firing line is rarely suitable, as the fire of the -guns may be masked and the enemy’s fire drawn on the firing line. - -5. The interval between guns in action should be as large as is -compatible with effective control, but the front occupied by the -massed guns of a brigade should rarely exceed 150 yards. - - -_Machine Guns in Attack_ - -1. Since machine guns are unsuited for maintaining a continuous -fire, they will usually best assist the infantry by withholding -their fire during the earlier stages of the battle, so as to be -able to intervene at more critical periods. Machine guns allotted -to a protective detachment will, however, always be employed so as -best to assist the detachment in its special duties (_Field Service -Regulations_, Part I., Chap. V.). - -2. It will depend upon the general situation whether the machine -guns should be placed under the control of the brigade machine-gun -officer or left with the battalions to which they belong. When -the facilities for concealment and control at effective range are -good, and the brigade is engaged in a decisive attack, the best -results will usually be obtained by unity of command. By a timely -concentration of fire machine guns may thus be the deciding factor -in the struggle for superiority of fire. - -When control is difficult, or when the brigade is extended over -a wide front, it will usually be better to leave guns with their -units. - -3. It will often be advisable to employ both methods and to leave -their machine guns with the battalions which are first extended, -while those of reserve battalions are placed under the command of -the brigade machine-gun officer. - -4. Although machine guns can move with deployed infantry under -fire, they should rarely attempt to keep pace with attacking -infantry. When they have gained a position from which they can -effectively support their infantry in the struggle for fire -superiority and in the assault, they should only be moved for -good and sufficient reasons. The difficulties of ranging and -of concealment on the move usually outweigh the advantages of -decreasing the range. - -5. Machine guns will usually find opportunities for employment -in the attack in assisting the advance of their infantry by -means of covering fire; in protecting attacking infantry against -counter-attack or against cavalry; in assisting the infantry in the -fire fight, and in preparing for the assault by sudden bursts of -converging fire against the objective of the attack. They will also -be of value in securing localities which have been seized during -the advance, and can assist local reserves in acting as points of -support to the attack. - - -_Machine Guns in Defence_ - -1. In defence, as in attack, the fire of machine guns should -usually be withheld until the more critical stages of the battle. -Premature opening of fire is liable to expose the position of the -machine guns to the enemy’s artillery. - -2. Machine guns may either be dispersed to command approaches, -defiles, exits from woods, etc., by which the enemy may advance, -to occupy advanced posts, and to bring enfilade fire to bear -upon salients and upon the ground in front of weak parts of the -position, or they may be massed and employed under the orders of -commanders of sections. - -3. When the guns are massed the alternative positions, Sec. -167 (D) 1, should be such that the firing line can be assisted -during the crisis of the fight, and the advance of local and -decisive counter-attacks can be covered and prepared. When covered -approaches can be provided, massed machine guns should usually be -withdrawn, after they have achieved their immediate object, and -should await another favourable opportunity for action. - - -ITALY - -GUN.--The Perino machine gun has been adopted. The barrel is -surrounded by a cooling tube containing water, and the gun fires -the same cartridge as the infantry rifle. It is regulated to fire -425 rounds a minute, and has a maximum rate of 500 rounds. It can -be fired continuously with the automatic action, or intermittently. -It is loaded by a ridged metal clip containing 25 cartridges, 10 -of which clips are formed into a magazine. It is claimed that this -clip is superior to the belt on account of the ease with which -it can be recharged. The gun weighs 27 kilograms, which will be -reduced to 23 in future manufacture. It is mounted on a provisional -tripod, which is of a good pattern, but is said to be too heavy, -and the weight is to be reduced to 20 kilograms. - -The gun can be fired from any height above the ground by moving the -legs of the tripod. - -The mechanism is strong and simple, the range is the same as the -rifle, and it is very accurate at all ranges. - -The Perino machine gun was adopted on the recommendation of a -Commission, who tested it against the Maxim and reported it to be -more efficient. - -They recommended the following organisation: - -ORGANISATION.--Four machine guns are attached to each regiment of -cavalry and infantry, and two guns to each Alpine battalion. The -detachments recommended are: - -For cavalry: 1 N.C.O., 5 men, 7 horses, per gun. - -For infantry: 1 N.C.O., 4 men, 2 mules, per gun. - -_Ammunition._--No details have been settled as to the amount or -method of carrying. - -TACTICAL.--No official instructions for the tactical handling of -machine guns have yet been issued. - - -JAPAN - -GUN.--The Japanese have adopted the Hotchkiss,[68] the barrel of -which is air-cooled, having seven radiating gills on the breech to -absorb the heat. The bore is ·256, being the same as the rifle; -the weight is 70 lb. It is regulated to fire at a maximum rate of -600 rounds a minute. It is loaded by brass clips containing 30 -cartridges inserted into the left side of the gun. The empties are -ejected on the right side. The gun is sighted up to 2,187 yards, -with a tangent sight, and is mounted on a tripod weighing 40 lb., -which has an all-round traverse, and can be adjusted to fire from -two heights. Shields were used in the late war, but were discarded -on account of the weight. It is probable that detachable shields, -large enough to cover the detachment, will in future be issued with -machine guns for use as the situation requires. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM VI - -_Diagram of Japanese Machine Gun--Tripod Mount._ - - _a-b Front and Rear Sights._ - _A Piston rod._ - _m Gas Vent._ - _e Gas chamber._ - _d Regulating nut._ - _e Strong spiral spring._ - _s Feed Slot._ - _R Radiator._] - -The Japanese machine gun is of home design and manufacture, and -belongs to that class in which the mechanism is actuated by the -action of gas pressure operating upon a plunger or piston and not -by the direct force of recoil as in the Maxim. It uses the same -ammunition as the infantry rifle (murata calibre ·256), and is -rated as firing 600 rounds a minute. Two forms of mountings are -employed, the tripod and the wheeled; the former for fortress use, -and the latter for mobile troops. Referring to the plate, a gas -vent _m_ communicates with a gas chamber _c_ attached laterally to -the barrel. The pressure in the gas chamber is regulated, within -limits, by the nut _d_, which varies the capacity of the chamber. -The piston-rod _A_ is acted upon by the gas pressure at its forward -end, and is driven to the rear against a strong spiral spring _o_, -which moves the piston end forward after the gas pressure has -ceased to act. The reciprocating motion of the piston-rod actuates -the mechanism, which is entirely enclosed in the housing, and -performs the various operations of feeding, firing, and ejecting -through a suitable train of gearing. Cooling is effected by the -radiator _R_, a circumferentially grooved mass of metal attached to -the barrel. The cartridges are mounted on a strip of sheet brass -from which clips are punched and bent round the cartridges to hold -them in position. A series of holes along the edges of the brass -strip engage the teeth of pinions which feed the strip forward as -the piston _A_ moves backward and forward. The cartridges are fired -from their clips by fingers, and drop into position when the bolt -is withdrawn. Thirty cartridges are mounted on one strip, which -is fed into the slot _s_, from the left side. The trigger must -be kept down by pressure all the time, otherwise the spring _o_ -cannot operate to return the block forward. The gun is provided -with a shoulder piece and gunner’s seat, as shown. The gun alone -weighs about 73 lb., and with tripod 115 lb. It is sighted to 2,000 -metres. The gun is stated to work very satisfactorily, and, owing -to the positive motions, jamming does not occur easily. - -ORGANISATION.--At the close of the war each of the two cavalry -brigades was equipped with 6 machine guns and each infantry -regiment with 3 guns, and it was contemplated to increase the -allowance to 6 guns for each regiment, infantry or cavalry. The -guns are served by infantrymen who are extra-regimental and -selected from men having mechanical knowledge. - -Guns are organised as follows: - -_Infantry._--Batteries of 6 guns, each subdivided into 3 sections; -each infantry regiment has one battery attached to it. - -The personnel of the battery consists of 1 captain (or lieutenant), -1 W.O., 1 bugler. - -Each gun has 1 commander (sergeant or corporal), 1 firer, 1 loader, -3 ammunition carriers. - -TACTICAL.--Tactically, the guns are used primarily for defence, -and reserve their fire for short ranges up to 600 or 800 metres. -On the defensive line of the Third Army after the battle of Mukden -many machine-gun emplacements were noted. These consisted mainly of -blinded casemates, 8 ft. wide, 10 ft. deep, and 3 ft. 6 in. high, -and from 18 to 24 in. of overhead cover. Importance is attached to -concealing the guns, and it was claimed that none had been knocked -out by Russian artillery. In the cavalry brigades the machine guns -were organised into sections of 2 guns under an officer, so that -sections could be detached with squadrons. - -In the First Cavalry Brigade, General Akiyama, 4,000 rounds per -gun per day was the greatest rate of fire attained. Machine guns -were popular in the Japanese army, and were highly spoken of by the -officers.[69] - -_Cavalry._--Each cavalry brigade has an 8-gun battery, which -is divided into half batteries of 4 guns each. The personnel -of the battery consists of 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 1 W.O. -(sergeant-major), 2 N.C.O.’s, 2 trumpeters. The gun detachments are -the same as for infantry, with 3 mounted men per gun in addition. - -TRANSPORT. _Infantry._--30 horses, 6 of which carry guns and -tripods, and 24 carry the ammunition. One ammunition horse follows -each gun, and the remaining 18 under the W.O. form the battery -ammunition column. Each ammunition horse with the guns carries -15,000 rounds in two boxes, and each horse with the ammunition -column 2,160 rounds in four boxes. - -_Cavalry._--Guns and tripods are carried on horses with 32 -ammunition horses, each carrying 2,400 rounds. - -Total establishment: 3 officers; 87 rank and file. - -NOTE.--The organisation during the war was as follows: - -Each cavalry brigade had a battery of 6 guns (Hotchkiss pattern -made in Japan). These were mounted on a heavy limbered carriage -with pole draught and 4 horses; these carriages were clumsy, heavy, -and conspicuous, and weighed 15 hundredweight. There was a fixed -shield on each carriage and a rough tripod was also carried. - - -_Tactical_ - -The Japanese have issued a well-illustrated drill book for the -use of machine-gun batteries, with cavalry and with infantry -respectively, with a view to enable them to manœuvre accurately and -easily in all situations. Their tactics are at present (1909) under -revision, and it is understood that there are likely to be many -changes introduced owing to the lessons of the late war. - -The following is the most recent summary of the principles of their -tactics: - -Machine guns are used as batteries, but may be broken up into -sections or even single guns. It is thought wrong to employ -“slow” fire, and 800 yards is considered the most useful range. -Well-hidden lines of skirmishers and other machine guns are -unsuitable targets, and they are never to be used to replace -artillery or to fire at artillery at long range, though they may do -so at close range or from the flanks or rear. Concealed positions -are recommended, and the use of alternative positions advocated, -and change of position should be made on the initiative of the -commander. Wide intervals between the guns should be used, but the -battery front should not exceed 110 yards. The guns should be used -on the flanks or rear of the enemy when possible. All ranges should -be measured. - -Machine guns should be used in the attack just before the final -assault, and in the defence when repelling the assault or to -reinforce a threatened flank. In both attack and defence they are -to be held back, and fire reserved for the crisis of the action. - -Use with the advance guard is not desirable as a rule. It is -strongly advocated with a rear guard, owing to their intense fire, -rapidity in ceasing fire (breaking off action), and mobility. -The officer commanding machine guns must be accurately acquainted -with the plans of the G.O.C., but must act on his own initiative -in forwarding the general scheme according to the situation. -Communication with the G.O.C. is considered vital. The guns are -considered especially valuable in covering the retreat of infantry. -Concealment from the enemy while manœuvring and surprise by sudden -fire are considered essential to their success. - - -_Regulations with the Infantry, 1907_ - -_Art. 67._--In the offensive the battery is at first kept in -reserve; but when its intervention becomes necessary during the -general engagement, to prepare the assault on a point in the -enemy’s position, they will be given orders to come into action. - -The employment of machine guns is especially advantageous to -prepare an infantry attack. They can co-operate with this attack -even under heavy fire, without, however, being obliged to follow -the infantry. The battery ought often to change its position, -at the discretion of its commander, to lend its support to the -infantry. The battery will, if possible, take up a dominating -position or will establish itself on a flank in order to open fire -on the selected point of attack, in such a way as not to be marked -by its own infantry. - -_Art. 69._--In the offensive in case of success: The machine guns -will rapidly and boldly move to a favourable position to pursue -the enemy with their fire and to make their infantry powerless to -attempt a counter-attack. The energetic action of the machine guns -after the position has been carried will force the enemy to scatter. - -_Art. 70._--In the offensive in case of failures: The machine guns -will sacrifice themselves, if necessary, to cover their infantry. -They will break down the morale of hostile troops by riddling -them with fire without care for their own losses, and will thus -facilitate the retreat of their own infantry.[70] - - -_Machine Guns in the late War_ - -All officers are enthusiastic about machine guns. All agree that -their chief rôle is defence, even at night, and they are extremely -useful in attack. During the battle of Mukden machine guns were -used very much in the attack by the Japanese, but it seems that the -casualties of the machine-gun detachments were very heavy indeed; -one commander thought them especially useful in pursuit.[71] - - -_Remarks by Lt.-Gen. Sir C. J. Burnett, K.C.B._ - -The value of machine guns is fully recognised. I had a long -conversation with the brigade machine-gun officer. He has six -machine guns formed as a separate detachment, extra-regimental, -and attached to the brigade. Two guns under an officer form the -subdivision of his command, and can be detached at will, but no -machine gun is ever employed singly. The guns are usually kept -at the disposal of the brigadier, and have been used more in -defence than attack; they seldom open at long ranges unless on an -exceptionally good target. It is rather the rule to reserve the -machine-gun fire for decisive ranges. In many actions which cavalry -officers described to me, the practice has been to allow the enemy -to come within 600 yards before opening fire, and then suddenly -to overwhelm him. The principle with such well-trained troops is -sound, for the morale “knock-out” of a 10-per-cent. loss suffered -in a few minutes is far greater than a similar loss spread over the -advance from 1,000 to 600 yards, and the expenditure of ammunition -is less. Concealment is an essential feature of the Japanese -machine-gun tactics, and the officer told me he had not a single -gun put out of action by opposing artillery. The guns have shields; -the manipulators of the machine guns are very expert, and there is -now seldom a jam. Like a good _chauffeur_, the Japanese machine -gunner knows all the peculiarities of the weapon he fires, and can -almost tell by instinct when anything is going wrong. Four thousand -rounds is the most that has been fired in a day by three machine -guns of the 1st Cavalry Brigade; the number is now increased to -six. Throughout the Japanese Army the machine guns introduced -during the war are very popular, and instead of three per regiment, -six per regiment are being provided. - - -_Report by U.S.A. Officers on Russo-Japanese War_ - -These guns were highly thought of in the Japanese Army, and the -propriety of attaching them to the infantry was never questioned. -Four or six guns per battery and one battery per regiment were -usually suggested, although good arguments have been heard for -eight guns in a battery, and the wish for twelve was sometimes -expressed.... On the outbreak of war the Japanese expected -largely to limit the use of the machine gun to the defensive, -but experience soon taught them to widen its field, and later it -was used to great advantage on the offensive. Their rapid fire -frequently silenced the fire of the Russian infantry, and caused -the latter to crouch down in their trenches. When the guns stopped -firing the Russians could be seen again popping their heads above -the parapet. If the flanks of a line be weak, these weapons can be -used advantageously to strengthen them. Six guns were generally -recommended for a battery, thus permitting an assignment of two -per battalion. One officer of high rank, however, who was heard -to discuss this question ably, said he preferred eight guns, and -that he would divide these into two equal sections and assign -each section to a battalion, thus leaving the third battalion -without any. His idea was to use these guns both on the offensive -and defensive. On the offensive he would send them forward among -the first lines of the battalion to which they were attached, -or reinforce these lines by the guns at an early stage of the -action. In this way he would use them as a substitute for infantry -reinforcements. This system will enable the regimental commander to -hold the third battalion much longer intact for a decisive effort -when an opportunity offers. Officers who have had experience with -machine guns were opposed to using them singly, saying that never -less than two should be at any position not only to obtain volume -of fire, but also because a gun can so easily be put out of action. -In order to reduce the losses among the men from shrapnel fire to -a minimum, they recommend that the guns in a platoon be separated -by 20 metres and the platoons by 100 to 200 metres. Artillery -fire is looked upon as the most dangerous foe of the machine gun, -and in fact the most effective use of the latter on the offensive -presupposes the enemy’s artillery has been silenced, or at least -that its attention is well occupied by friendly batteries. The -machine gun is believed to be especially useful in mountainous -districts, where the elevated ground often discloses the close -formation of the enemy. The Japanese frequently fired it from an -elevated position over the heads of their infantry, and in this -way, as their battalions advanced, they at times kept down the fire -from the Russian trenches. - -An officer who commanded one of these batteries at the battle of -Mukden, and who later was detailed to lecture to the attachés with -the First Army, said that on one occasion there he continued this -fire until the advancing infantry had arrived within 30 metres -of the enemy’s position. It is claimed the fire should almost -invariably be directed against the opposing infantry. The gun is -comparatively heavy, and when in action the battery is advancing -with the infantry it is sometimes difficult to keep up with the -latter, and moreover the men carrying the gun offer a good target; -and for these reasons the guns should frequently remain in position -as the echelons make their rushes, provided cover is provided -and a free field of fire secured. It is not essential that they -should be at all times immediately on the line occupied by the -infantry, although when the latter, after a considerable advance, -meets with determined opposition, some guns should be brought up. -This will give a feeling of confidence, and if need be help to -check a counter-attack. When advancing under fire, it is often a -good plan to move one gun at a time. Battery commanders report -good results when firing at long ranges--that is, between 1,200 -and 1,800 metres. One thousand five hundred shots per gun is the -greatest number I heard of being fired in one hour. These guns were -sometimes attached to outposts. The loss among men serving machine -guns is usually great, and this requires that a large number be -trained in each regiment to use them. One officer of experience -with these weapons thought all officers and men selected to work -with them should be trained at division headquarters, or at some -other central point, in order to secure uniformity of instruction -and service. - -On a previous occasion I reported that the shield was not generally -desired. I wish to modify this statement, as further investigation -showed that while different views were entertained on this subject, -the consensus of opinion was favourable to the retention of the -shield. The objections to it are that it offers a good target -and is more or less difficult to handle on the offensive. Some -officers were in favour of using it on the defensive, but not on -the offensive. In general, however, it was thought that both on the -offensive and defensive it gives material cover and adds confidence -and composure. The guns were almost invariably transported on -pack-ponies, except, of course, when effecting changes of position -under heavy fire, when they were carried by hand. It is understood -wheels were occasionally used in some parts of the army, but I -never saw the guns transported that way.... - -Machine guns were also added to the cavalry after the outbreak of -the war, there being six to each brigade, divided into sections of -two guns under one officer. Sections may be attached to squadrons -as required. The guns are used primarily for defence, and their -fire reserved for short and mid ranges.... - -Machine guns played an important part in the siege of Port -Arthur, being freely used by both sides. The Japanese gun was a -single-barrelled gun of home manufacture, while the Russians used -mainly the Maxim automatic. The Russian guns were used with telling -effect against the Japanese in the numerous bloody assaults, being -trained to cover all the approaches with a murderous fire. - - -PORTUGAL - -On mobilisation machine-gun foot batteries are formed, the -personnel being provided from the division to which the batteries -are subsequently attached. Each battery consists of 6 guns, and is -commanded by a captain. It is subdivided into 3 sections of 2 guns -each, commanded by a subaltern. - -The gun is provided with a shield and has a tripod mounting, the -whole being carried on a wheeled carriage on the march. When coming -into action the gun and tripod are taken out of the carriage and -carried into position by 4 men. - -The weight of the gun, tripod, and shield, amounting to about 175 -lb., is unevenly distributed and renders rapid marching impossible, -as it must be carried as one piece owing to the complicated -attachment of gun and tripod. - -The tripod is heavy and rather high, making the gun conspicuous in -action, and on steep slopes the mounting is unstable. - -The elevating and traversing gear do not give sufficient scope. - -The cartridge belt contains 250 rounds. Each section (2 guns) has -an ammunition wagon carrying 14,000 rounds for each gun. - - -RUSSIA - -GUNS.--Rexar and Maxim, but the former are being discarded and -Maxims alone will be used in future. They are sighted up to 2,000 -yards. - -ORGANISATION.--Each regiment (4 battalions) has 4 machine guns, and -it is intended to increase this to 8 in the future. - -The detail of the personnel to each battery of 4 guns is as -follows: 2 officers, 50 N.C.O.’s and men, and 35 horses if the guns -are on wheeled carriages (36 horses if the guns are carried on -pack-horses). - -The detachment is armed with the carbine. - -For each gun 13 belts of ammunition are carried, each belt -containing 450 rounds. - -The weight of the gun is 68 lb., and of the tripod 45 lb.; the -total weight carried by the pack-horse being 198 lb. - - -SPAIN - -has 6 groups of Maxim and Hotchkiss guns, which have been recently -subdivided into 2 sections. Two new sections were raised in -September 1908. - -The 14 sections are attached to the infantry brigades. - -Pack transport has been adopted. - - -SWITZERLAND - -There are 4 companies, each having 8 guns, which are subdivided -into sections of 2 guns each. - -The detachments are mounted and the guns are allotted to the -cavalry. - -The Maxim is the gun adopted by the Swiss Army, and in the -Regulations three kinds of machine-gun fire are recognised, viz.: - -(1) _Salvoes, for range-finding._--The 2 guns of a section fire -short salvoes of 20 to 25 rounds alternately to get the right range. - -(2) _Quick fire._--This is the normal method, and consists in -firing about 100 rounds at a time. - -(3) _Rapid fire by individual guns._--Each gun fires as rapidly -as possible; used only as a last resort, or against a specially -favourable target. - -The section (2 guns) is regarded as the unit, and the spirit of the -Regulations is that the machine guns are particularly for use with -cavalry, and must possess to the full the mobility and dash of that -arm. - -Dismounted action for the cavalry is not favourably regarded, and -the machine guns are expected to relieve the cavalry of this duty. - - - - - PRINTED BY - HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD. - LONDON AND AYLESBURY. - - -[Illustration: A MAP SHEWING - -the approximate allotment of Machine Guns for the - -DEFENCE OF PORT ARTHUR] - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Lieutenant A. E. Phillips, in the _Journal U.S.A. Cavalry -Association_, July 1909. - -[2] The Germans consider its fire value equal to 120 rifles. - -[3] Balck’s _Modern European Tactics_. - -[4] These are still in use in the Territorial Army. - -[5] _Journal of U.S.A. Cavalry Association_, July 1909. - -[6] United States Official Report of Russo-Japanese War. - -[7] See pages 12 and 13. - -[8] See Chap. VII., “Cavalry Training.” - -[9] _Cavalry Training_, 1907, p. 226. - -[10] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I. - -[11] _Cavalry Training_, 1907. - -[12] _France Militaire_, April 15th, 1905. - -[13] _Cavalry Training_, 1907, p. 218. - -[14] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I. chap. vii. p. 133. - -[15] _Cavalry Training_, 1907, chap. vii. p. 229. - -[16] Captain F. Culmann in _R.U.S.I. Journal_, August, 1909. - -[17] _Infantry Training_, 1905, p. 116. - -[18] The Austrian regulations say 1,000 yards. - -[19] Captain von Beckmann. - -[20] _Times History of the War in South Africa._ - -[21] A Japanese machine gun fired 25,000 rounds in one day in -Manchuria.--AUTHOR. - -[22] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I. p. 119. - -[23] _Mitrailleuses à l’Etranger_, par Lieut. M. - -[24] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard. - -[25] Captain Niessel in _Enseignements techniques de la guerre -Russo-Japonaise_. - -[26] Captain von Beckmann. - -[27] Von Ullrich. - -[28] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard. - -[29] Von Ullrich, War Correspondent of _Gazette de Cologne_. - -[30] British Officer’s Report, Russo-Japanese War. - -[31] _Ibid._ - -[32] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 83. - -[33] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 83. - -[34] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 85. - -[35] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 84. - -[36] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 86. - -[37] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, pp. 87-9. - -[38] Between 400 and 500 is the usual rate of fire.--AUTHOR. - -[39] See _Handbook for ·303 Machine Guns_, pp. 88-9. - -[40] See map; the Japanese name for this work is Ban-ru-san Nishi -Hodai. - -[41] See _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 153. - -[42] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard. - -[43] _Ibid._ - -[44] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard. - -[45] Von Ullrich. - -[46] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard. - -[47] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 140. - -[48] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., p. 141. - -[49] A great many machine guns were added to the forts from the -fleet early in June.--AUTHOR. - -[50] _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice._ - -[51] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909. - -[52] _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice_, p. 441. - -[53] Official Report. - -[54] Official History of operations in Somaliland. - -[55] Major Gough’s Official Report. - -[56] Official History of the operations in Somaliland. - -[57] From Staff Diary of 1st Brigade. - -[58] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 173. - -[59] Callwell’s _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice_. - -[60] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, Sect. 157. - -[61] This system was adopted; see paragraph _re_ Organisation, p. -189. - -[62] Section 7. - -[63] Section 77, Para. 4. - -[64] Section 150, Para. 5. - -[65] Section 150, Para. (iv). - -[66] Section 149, Para. (v). - -[67] They should fire with their own companies if it can be -arranged that they complete the various parts of the range practice -on approximately the same date. - -[68] The Hotchkiss loses accuracy after 600 rounds, and becomes -red-hot after 14,000 rounds. - -[69] U.S.A. Official Reports on Russo-Japanese War. - -[70] _Revue d’Infanterie_, March, 1908. - -[71] Officer’s report, U.S.A., Russo-Japanese War. - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been - corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within - the text and consultation of external sources. - - Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, - and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. - - Pg 57: ‘moral action’ replaced by ‘morale action’. - Pg 70: ‘should aways’ replaced by ‘should always’. - Pg 114: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’. - Pg 119: ‘M. Ulrich’ replaced by ‘M. Ullrich’. - Pg 125: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’. - Pg 133: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’. - Pg 152: ‘same fate befel’ replaced by ‘same fate befell’. - Pg 173: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’. - Pg 183: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’. - Pg 220: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’. - Pg 222: ‘he held in’ replaced by ‘be held in’. - Pg 258: ‘the moral “knock-out”’ replaced by ‘the morale “knock-out”’. - - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MACHINE-GUN TACTICS *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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