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diff --git a/old/66251-0.txt b/old/66251-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 49ccb47..0000000 --- a/old/66251-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13994 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of Is Tomorrow Hitler's?, by Hubert Renfro -Knickerbocker - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Is Tomorrow Hitler's? - 200 Questions on the Battle of Mankind - -Author: Hubert Renfro Knickerbocker - -Release Date: September 8, 2021 [eBook #66251] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Tim Lindell, Craig Kirkwood, and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was - produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital - Library.) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK IS TOMORROW HITLER'S? *** - -Transcriber’s Note: - -Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). - -Additional Transcriber’s Notes are at the end. - - * * * * * - -Is Tomorrow Hitler’s? - - * * * * * - -H. R. KNICKERBOCKER - - - - -IS TOMORROW HITLER’S? - - - 200 Questions - On the Battle of Mankind - - Reynal & Hitchcock : New York - - * * * * * - - COPYRIGHT, 1941, BY H. R. KNICKERBOCKER - - _All rights reserved, including the right to - reproduce this book, or portions - thereof, in any form_ - - Second Printing - - PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - BY THE CORNWALL PRESS, CORNWALL, N. Y. - - * * * * * - -TO AGNES - - - - -CONTENTS - - -_NOTE: This descriptive table of contents gives only a sampling of the -many provocative questions discussed._ - - CHAPTER PAGE - - FOREWORD xi - - INTRODUCTION xv - - 1. GERMANY 1 - - Have you ever met Hitler? - What impression does he make when you meet him? - Does Hitler’s personality grow upon closer acquaintance? - Is Hitler personally brave? - Is it true that Hitler is a homosexual? - Are women attracted to Hitler? - What kind of public speaker is Hitler? - What is the secret of Hitler’s power? - Do you think Hitler is personally responsible for the war? - Is Hitler the real boss of Germany? - Are any of the men around Hitler of a calibre to succeed him? - Does Hitler actually direct his battles as did Napoleon? - Why didn’t Hitler attack England after Dunkirk? - What was Hitler’s second mistake? - Isn’t there anything constructive about Hitlerism? - How has Hitler run his show without money, without gold, - without foreign exchange? - Can the Nazi economy continue to run indefinitely? - How can you describe the German people as hysterical? - What would happen if Hitler were killed? - Why doesn’t somebody kill Hitler? - What was the explanation of the bombing attempt on Hitler in - the Munich Beer Hall? - Were the Nazi atrocity stories exaggerated? - Do you consider _Out of the Night_ authentic? - Hasn’t Hitler proved he is an enemy of Bolshevism by attacking - Russia? - What should we do with Hitler after he is defeated? - - 2. RUSSIA 88 - - What is the best way for the United States to help the Russians? - How can the Russian resistance to the German attack be explained? - What do the Russians fight for? - Is it true that the Soviet government has restored freedom of - worship? - Are we running a risk if we support the Russians? - Can Stalin be trusted? - Under what circumstances would Stalin make a separate peace? - What would be the effect of such a compromise peace on Great - Britain and the United States? - What is the NKVD? - Are the peasants better off on collective farms? - How about the Soviet elections of which we hear? - Why do you give so much importance to the Soviet Terror? - How do you explain Russian inefficiency and wastefulness? - How has the Red Army been able to stand up so well? - Could Stalin carry on with the resources of the Urals? - - 3. ENGLAND 139 - - What place will Churchill have in history? - Is Churchill really backed by the English people? - Can Churchill be trusted? - What does Churchill think of the United States? - What are Churchill’s characteristics as a person? - Would the British Navy survive the fall of the British Isles? - How can the flight of Hess be explained? - What is the secret of Churchill’s success? - What are Churchill’s principal interests? - - 4. WAR AIMS 184 - - What are Britain’s war aims? - What was the meaning of the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting? - How can the gains of victory be consolidated? - Will the United States come out of the war in a better economic - condition than others? - What will the peace conference be like? - In what sense will the conquered peoples be slaves? - How could we compete with Hitler after a German victory? - Can’t American labor produce better and cheaper than slave labor? - What are Hitler’s plans for Europe? - What kind of negotiated peace would be acceptable to the Axis? - What is the text of Hitler’s terms? - What chance has Communism in a defeated Germany? - Is there any way to render Germany impotent? - Is the problem of the Germans insoluble? - Will England come out of the war with a socialist system? - What is to be done with all the former nations of Europe? - - 5. FRANCE 234 - - Why did France fall? - Were there traitors on the French General Staff? - How did treason manifest itself in the operations of the army? - Who gave the orders? - What is the opinion of informed Frenchmen? - Is Pétain a patriot or traitor, or misguided? - Is Pétain moved by personal ambition? - What would Hitler do if he finally tired of fooling with Vichy? - What about Darlan? And Laval? - Has Laval a chance to seize power? - In what way are we Americans very much like the French? - Are there any encouraging differences between ourselves and the - unfortunate French? - Is there any hope that the French may come back? - Will Hitler’s treatment of France be different later? - How was the French indemnity fixed? - How does this compare with the reparations paid by Germany - after the World War? - What is Hitler doing with French industry? - Should we continue diplomatic relations with Vichy? - - 6. THE UNITED STATES 293 - - What is the greatest danger we face as a nation today? - Is our morale very bad? - What is the state of our armament? - If we have nothing to fight with, how can we go to war? - Could Hitler succeed in invading the British Isles? - Why doesn’t Ireland allow Britain to take over naval bases? - Is it true that Hitler wants to destroy the United States? - Haven’t we plenty to do at home without getting into a foreign - war? - Why do you think we ought to go to war with Germany today? - Why would a declaration of war be worth so much immediately? - What effect would a declaration of war have on the morale of - the Army? - But weren’t we suckers in the last war? - Would an American declaration of war have any effect on the - morale of the Germans? - Would another A.E.F. be required? - Might a new League of Nations be successful? - - 7. FIFTH COLUMNISTS 339 - - What makes Lindbergh the way he is? - Are we fair in calling Lindbergh a Copperhead? - What is the reason for the divorce between Lindbergh and the - American people? - Why did Lindbergh attack the Jews? - What is to be the fate of the Jews? - What are Lindbergh’s arguments against our entering the war? - What is the answer to America’s Fifth Columnists? - - - - -FOREWORD - - -I met H. R. Knickerbocker way back in 1927 or thereabouts. Those were -the good old days. They were the days of the Long Armistice. No one -had ever heard of the Rome-Berlin Axis, Stuka dive bombers, or the -Haushofer Plan. Mr. Roosevelt was out of politics, Mr. Churchill was -a chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Lindbergh had just flown the -Atlantic. We talked of such neolithic creatures as Pilsudski of Poland -and Alexander of Jugoslavia, and most of us thought that Hitler was a -bad Austrian joke, more or less. Those were the good old days. Even so, -thunderheads were gathering. - -I first met Mr. Knickerbocker in Berlin. This was fitting, since -Berlin was his bailiwick. We all had bailiwicks in those days. Duranty -was in Moscow, Raymond Swing was in London, and Dorothy Thompson had -just left Berlin. I was bouncing all over the place. I didn’t have my -bailiwick yet. We were all very good friends. We formed a kind of fluid -international community. We were buzzards in every foreign office, and -kings on every wagon-lit. - -We didn’t meet often, since we lived in different cities, and it took -something of a catastrophe to bring us all together. When we did meet, -the vault of heaven shook. I remember days--and nights--in Geneva, -Bucharest, Cairo, Helsingfors. I think of Sheean, the Mowrers, Webb -Miller, Shirer, Jay Allen, Fodor, Whitaker, and many more. Don’t let me -sound nostalgic. I am thinking merely that we have all grown up. We are -not cameras any longer. - -This foreword is not about Mr. Knickerbocker’s book. Let that speak -for itself. Knick is the most pertinacious, plausible, and inquisitive -question-asker I ever met. In this book he answers questions instead -of asking them. I like to see the tables turned. I don’t know that I -agree with all his answers. But let him answer them. - -This foreword is about Mr. Knickerbocker himself. His flaming red -hair, his flaming red personality (I mean “red” chromatically, not -politically) are famous on four continents. He needs no introduction. -But certain nuggets of memory stay fixed in mind. I remember the time -he fed me caviar inside a baked potato, at Horcher’s in Berlin, and -I remember the time I fed him a dinner in London that, deliberately, -we planned so that it would cost exactly five pounds. I remember the -time that he took me to hear Putzi Hanfstaengl hammer out a tornado -of Wagner in the Hotel Kaiserhof, and I remember the time I took him -across the freezing Danube, on the way to Sofia, in what was supposed -to be a rowboat. I remember week-ends on the Semmering, bad oysters -in Madrid, evenings in the Café Royal, drinks in Rome, Budapest, and -points beyond. - -Knick’s career has been spectacular in more than one dimension. He -once set out to fly the Atlantic, as a passenger in a German plane, -long before the Lindbergh flight; he was the only correspondent during -the Ethiopian war to glimpse the front from the air; he has had more -interviews with European heads of state, I imagine, than any other -newspaper man alive. - -Mr. Knickerbocker was born in Texas in 1898. He went to Europe in -1923, and, a student of psychiatry at the University of Munich, walked -straight into Hitler’s Beerhall Putsch. He studied briefly in Vienna, -and then got a job in Berlin on the _New York Evening Post-Philadelphia -Public Ledger_ foreign service. Since then his career has been a -calendar of most of the great events of our time. He spent two years in -Moscow as correspondent for the International News Service (this was in -1924-26, when Trotsky was declining and the N.E.P. expanding), and in -1928 took over Dorothy Thompson’s job as chief correspondent in Berlin -for the _Public Ledger_. He won a Pulitzer prize for distinguished -foreign correspondence--a series of articles on Russia’s Five Year -Plan, but for almost ten years Berlin was the blazing focus of his life. - -Meantime there were trips to take. In 1933 he travelled all over Europe -for a series, “Will War Come in Europe?” for I.N.S. He saw the death -of Dollfuss in Vienna, and the burial of Hindenburg in Germany. He met -Mussolini, Masaryk, King Alexander, King Boris, Otto Habsburg, and -hosts of others. He did one series of articles on Russia and the Baltic -states, comparing living standards under communism and capitalism, and -another surveying economic aspects of the Europe that was crumbling. -Came the war in Ethiopia in 1935, which he covered on Haile Selassie’s -side. I will never forget the agitated days in London when Knick was -accumulating the vast equipment he took along. In 1936 came the Spanish -civil war, and the next year the war in China. He saw bombings all -the way from Toledo to Nanking. He returned to Europe to cover the -Anschluss crisis and the Munich disaster; then he dipped briefly into -South America, and reached Peru. Then Europe called again; he saw the -beginning of World War II in London and France, and in 1940 accompanied -the French armies till they collapsed, and then saw the battle of -Britain at its fiercest climax, in September. - -But let me go back to those days in Berlin. The main point I want to -make has to do with Knickerbocker in Berlin. During the turbulent -1930’s he was much more than a journalist covering Germany; he was a -definite public character in German political life. After Hindenburg -and Hitler, he was practically the best known man in the country. His -_réclame_ was fabulous, personally and politically. Everyone knew the -lithe, active, red-haired Herr Knickerbocker (pronounce the K, please). -Once a musical comedy was named for him--supreme tribute! - -Partly this was because he published half a dozen books in German, -compiled from the long newspaper articles he wrote, which appeared -serially in the _Vossische Zeitung_ or the _Berliner Tageblatt_. The -books were extraordinarily successful in Germany; they introduced -German readers to a new type of American journalism. Among them were -_Der Rote Handel Droht!_, _Der Rote Handel Lockt!_, _Kommt Europe -Wieder Hoch?_, _Rote Wirtschaft und Weisse Wohlstand!_, _England’s -Wirtschaft und Schwarzhemden!_, _Deutschland So oder So!_, and _Kommt -Krieg in Europa?_ - -Knick knew practically every human being of consequence in Germany. He -explored the country from top to bottom. He talked to Hitler, Spengler, -Brüning, Goering, Goebbels. Then Hitler came to power. At the time -Knickerbocker was in the middle of a German lecture tour that had begun -in the Lessing Hochschule in Berlin. Knick watched the Nazi revolution -crushingly obliterate all opposition. He wrote a series exposing the -Brown Terror that caused violent comment in New York as well as Berlin. -Presently he was excluded from the country. There are hate affairs as -well as love affairs. The hate affair between Hitler and Knickerbocker -is one of the most torrid in political history. - -But this should not detract from the main point, which is that Knick -knows the real Germany, loves it, and respects it. He is a Nazi-hater, -but not a German-hater. His authority on the subject is authentic and -complete. - - _John Gunther_ - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -There is no such thing as winning a fight without passion. France went -to war apologetically; France fought the war without music, and so -France lost. Britain went to war apologetically, but Britain had the -inestimable advantage of being bombed, and today for the first time -in 100 years Britain is angry and is fighting as she has never fought -before. We, the United States, are today apologetic, so sorry that it -seems we after all are called upon to fight, and some of us still say -we should not fight, and others say we must fight only with aviators -and sailors, and never with infantrymen, and very few indeed are the -strains of martial music throughout the land. From all sides we are -called upon to restrain our emotions, and it is said that the cool head -is the shrewd head, and that is correct, of course, but a cool head -without a hot heart is useless on a battlefield. Without anger there -can be no victory and useful anger is based upon understanding. Unless -the American people can be brought to understand that our national -existence and our individual security are today in peril, and unless -the American people become angry at the enemy, we shall become a part -of Hitler’s Reich. - -History may eventually record that Britain was saved by the bombs -Hitler has rained upon her since the fall of France. Unless they -annihilate the British, these bombs will have fulfilled a function -Hitler never imagined. He thought they would terrorize the British into -surrender; instead the bombs aroused a resistance such as no other -population has ever shown, for the prolonged punishment of Britain’s -cities has been worse than anything we know of elsewhere, including -Belgrade, Warsaw, Rotterdam, Madrid, Barcelona, or Chungking. The -British required this experience to awaken them. They had been at war -eight months when the Germans finally attacked in the West, but they -had not given up the grand old British custom of the Friday to Tuesday -week end. It took the German break-through on the Meuse, and then the -German bombs on London, to shock every inhabitant of the British Isles -into the realization that they faced death for their nation and death -or slavery for themselves unless they fought with a ferocity even -greater than that of their jungle enemies. - -We are today as sound asleep as the British were before May 1940. -We are as sound asleep as the French were before they saw their -fortifications fall and their army of 4,500,000 soldiers with the -tradition of Napoleon dissolve between May 10 and June 17, in five -weeks of the greatest military debacle of all time. We have had no -bombs on America, and presumably shall not have them until it is time -to trek for the Rocky Mountains. A sober American patriot remarked, -“How fortunate Britain has been to have had the bombs to arouse her -martial spirit before it was too late. If Hitler were to have a lapse -in judgment and send just half a dozen bombers over New York, and drop -just half a dozen bombs, it might be the salvation of America.” But -Hitler will do no such thing. He is glad to accommodate those Americans -who refuse to believe they are threatened until they are physically -attacked. When and if the Germans break through upon America we shall -awake to find ourselves alone, cut off, surrounded, outnumbered, -outgunned, and outlawed amid a world of enemies. - -A few of us, chiefly correspondents formerly in Germany, have been -trying to do duty for German bombs on America, and for the German -break-through. We have been called alarmists. For years the world of -international observers was divided into two groups: the one composed -of nearly everybody on earth outside of Germany, who understood nothing -of the true character of Hitler’s Third Reich; and the second tiny -group, small enough to be contained within a lecture hall, composed -of correspondents, diplomats, and a few businessmen who had firsthand -knowledge of what the Nazis mean. Today a good many persons without -this intimate knowledge of Nazi Germany have been able to decide for -themselves about the character of a regime which has overrun fifteen -countries in three years, but the danger to America still looks very -remote and impersonal to millions of patriotic citizens. I have been -talking to about 100,000 of these citizens, during a lecture series. - -My thesis was in brief: That the United States should be in a state of -formal, shooting war with Germany as speedily as possible because only -by this means can we make the world safe for America; and that we must -realize that after going to war we have only begun a task which may -last for many years and one which we can fulfill only by learning to -fight with even more fervor than the demoniac Nazi shock troops, and by -greater national self-sacrifice than we have ever been called upon to -make. - -On this thesis I was asked around 3,000 questions during the question -period following the lectures. For this book I have chosen around -200 as representative of what the American people are thinking. I -have arranged the questions in categories and have added many recent -ones to bring the Forum up to date. Eager, painful, almost agonizing -concern for the future of America was the background of these queries -from audiences in 128 communities, including two-thirds of all cities -of more than 100,000 population and scores of towns and villages. The -people with whom I talked ranged from millionaire winter tourists -in Florida to coal miners in Pennsylvania, applegrowers in Yakima, -oilmen in Oklahoma, college boys in the Great Lakes states, farmers -in the Midwest, workers, bankers, club ladies, teachers, cowhands, -Catholics, Jews, Protestants, atheists, Yankees, Southerners, Texans, -Westerners--Americans. - -I am convinced that these earnest Americans, representing through -their family and friendly connections at least ten times their number, -or more than 1,000,000 persons, are far in advance of the President’s -moves toward active defense, just as the President has always been far -ahead of the Congress. They wanted action even before the President -offered it. Among 3,000 questioners there were not more than six openly -hostile hecklers from the floor. Would it be too hopeful to say that -America is 2,994 to 6 in favor of liberty? - - - - -1. GERMANY - - -Q. _Have you ever met Hitler?_ - -A. Many times. From 1923 until today I have watched and studied him -and a good part of that time I was close enough to have opportunities -for firsthand observation. I first heard him speak in August 1923, not -long before his unsuccessful attempt to seize power, in the famous -Beer Hall Putsch, and then I witnessed the Putsch, and reported his -trial with Ludendorff for treason. He was released from Landsberg -Prison in December 1924 where he had been held in comfortable “fortress -confinement” just long enough for him to have time conveniently to -write _Mein Kampf_. I interviewed him for the first time in the Brown -House in Munich in 1932. Thereafter I had a series of interviews with -him, and was present at many of the great moments of his career. - - -Q. _What impression does he make when you meet him?_ - -A. The first impression he makes upon any non-German is that he looks -silly. Not to a German, mind you, and I suppose he did not look silly -to any of those heads of European states who crawled to Berchtesgaden -to get their orders. But to a foreigner not subject to his commands he -certainly looks silly. I know that is a strong word to use about a man -who has already conquered a continent but it fits. - -I remember well the first time I ever laid eyes on him, in August -1923, when he was speaking at the Zirkus Krone in Munich--I broke out -laughing. Even if you had never heard of him you would be bound to -say, “He looks like a caricature of himself.” The moustache and the -lock of hair over the forehead help this look, but chiefly it is the -expression of his face, and especially the blank stare of his eyes, -and the foolish set of his mouth in repose. Sometimes he looks like a -man who ought to go around with his mouth open, chin hanging in the -style of a surprised farm hand. Other times he clamps his lips together -so tightly and juts out his jaw with such determination that again he -looks silly, as though he were putting on an act. - -Indeed Hitler is, more than anything else, an actor. He will go on -being one the rest of his life, a great actor who in his role as tyrant -conqueror will have affected the destinies of more millions of people -than any other human being in history, but an actor to the last, a -tragedian whom no one would take seriously until he began shooting at -his audience. Even in the midst of his triumphs he manages to look -silly to any outsider capable for the moment of detaching himself from -horrified contemplation of the fate inflicted upon his victims. - -I remember watching him roll down the Ringstrasse in Vienna standing -beside the chauffeur in a cream-colored Mercedes car, with his arm -outstretched in the stiff salute he affects on such occasions, the -hand rigidly held at a slight angle downward. It was the moment of -his conquest of Austria. The streets were crowded with half a million -people, a few cheering sincerely, many cheering out of fear, and -hundreds of thousands grim-faced, weeping inwardly. - -At that moment when I, too, felt like weeping at the abasement of the -city where I had worked and danced and studied and played when I first -came to Europe fifteen years before, even at such a moment I found -myself smiling and saying to friends looking out the window of my room -in the Hotel Bristol, “Doesn’t he look silly?” That oversized cap of -his, the military cap with the too-large crown and the visor which -completely hides his low forehead! - -There is something absurd even about his stance as he rides his -victorious chariot through freshly conquered cities. He is softly fat -about the hips and this gives his figure a curiously female appearance. -A scientist friend of mine watching him once remarked that Hitler -seemed afflicted by _steatopygia_, which he defined as “an excessive -development of fat on the buttocks, especially in _females_.” It is -possible that the strongly feminine element in Hitler’s character -is one of the reasons for his violence. He realizes his femininity, -is ashamed of it, wishes to be a man, and overcompensates by brutal -behavior. This little fatty-hipped, slope-shouldered, lonely figure, -standing so inflexibly, his arm outstretched so tautly, his eyes -staring over the heads of his subjects, is incredible. “No,” you say to -yourself, “this can’t be true.” - -If this odd creature finally conquers the world, his last victims, -we once proud Americans, would still be saying as we filed into -concentration camp, “It’s impossible. He looks too silly.” But he is -not silly. My friend, Captain Philippe Barres of the French Army, one -of those who did not surrender, remarked to another Frenchman: “You -say Hitler is merely a madman, an idiot. I suppose you must be one of -those Frenchmen who prefer to have been conquered by an idiot than by a -clever man.” - -Oh no, he certainly is not an idiot; but is it not incredible that -this mighty conqueror, now master over two hundred and fifty million -Europeans--more civilized white human beings than ever before came -under the tyranny of a single despot--and now reaching out to drive -another thousand million under his yoke, that this man usually looks -completely insignificant? I am sure that was the first impression -Mussolini had of him. I saw the two dictators when they first met and -Hitler never looked sillier in his life than at that time. - - -Q. _How did the two behave toward each other? Did they seem to like -each other?_ - -A. Not much. It was June 14, 1934 when Hitler first visited Italy to -meet the Duce and discuss with him the fate of Austria. Hitler had -not yet created his army and Mussolini could still talk on terms of -equality, or even a little better. Mussolini wanted to impress his -guest as much as possible with the power and glory of Fascist Italy. -Hitler had to try to impress Mussolini with the coming strength of Nazi -Germany. Mussolini, being at home, had all the advantage. For Hitler -the trip itself must have been a great experience because it was the -first time he had ever been out of Germany or Austria in his whole -life, if you except the time he spent as a soldier in the trenches of -Northern France. - -Mussolini proved a great stage manager. He arranged the meeting to take -place in Venice, and had his guest land on the airfield of the Lido. -The fact that it was an island made it easy for the authorities to -exclude the public, and when Hitler arrived he stepped directly into a -perfectly appointed theater. - -There were representatives of all the Italian armed forces, companies -of Bersaglieri, Alpini, Sailors, Airmen, and the Black Shirt Fascist -Militia, and a group of the highest civilian officials in black uniform -with the black-tasseled fez caps of the party, surrounding the Duce -himself who was in the powder-blue uniform of a Corporal of the Fascist -Militia. - -Mussolini used to think of himself as the successor to the Corsican -Corporal. I remember once noticing that the only ornament on his desk -was a framed portrait of Napoleon. I remarked on it, and Mussolini -exclaimed, “A great Italian!” One of the Duce’s most ambitious literary -ventures was a play called _The Hundred Days_. Whether he is still able -after Greece, Libya, and Ethiopia to fancy himself in the role of a -conqueror when he meets Hitler now, he still appears in the uniform of -a corporal as when he met Hitler the first time. - -The only persons on the field not in uniform were the foreign -correspondents and we looked very dim compared with the brilliant -Italians. Mussolini appeared a few minutes early and when he strode -down the line and looked over his warriors he made a most vigorous -impression. He had an electric step; his feet seemed to bounce off the -ground, and the air vibrated with his personality. After he finished -reviewing his troops he came over and stood within a few feet of us and -we waited. - -Presently Hitler’s Junkers plane roared down out of the sky, landed, -taxied up to us, and came to a full stop. The door opened. The Italian -troops, dazzling in full dress, presented arms. The Fascist officials -stood at attention. The sunshine sparkled on Mussolini’s gold braid -and the Duce, stepping close to the open door of the airplane, flung -out his arm in a Roman salute with so much energy that it seemed as -though he might lose his hand. He trembled with passion. Then, out of -the shadow of the door, emerged Hitler. There, before the splendid -Italians, he stood, a faint little man arrayed in his old worn -raincoat, his blue serge suit, and a brand-new Fedora hat. His right -hand faltered up in the Nazi salute. - -He gives the salute two ways. For reviewing his own troops or crowds -he gives it stiff-arm. This is his Prussian style. For greeting -individuals he gives the salute, Viennese style, with a limp hand, the -arm not outstretched but bent at the elbow and the hand flopping back -until it almost touches his shoulder, then flopping forward feebly. He -used the Viennese version on Mussolini. Hitler was embarrassed. Later -we learned he had threatened to dismiss Baron von Neurath, then chief -of protocol, for having advised him to come in civilian clothes. - -The Fuehrer stood for a moment, blinking in the sunlight, then -awkwardly came down the steps, and the two dictators shook hands. -They were not over three yards from me, and I was fascinated to watch -the expressions on their faces. Beneath the obligatory cordiality I -fancied I could see an expression of amusement in Mussolini’s eyes and -of resentment in Hitler’s. At any rate Hitler’s embarrassment did not -diminish, for when Mussolini led him down the line of troops he did not -know how to carry it off. This was the first time he had ever had to -inspect foreign troops, but that was not the chief trouble. The chief -trouble was his hat. - -He had taken it off as a salute to the Italian flag, and he started to -put it back on his head, thought better of it, and held it in his right -hand. Then, as he walked beside the Duce, who was chattering all the -time in his fluent German, Hitler shifted the hat to his left hand, -then back to the right, and so back and forth until one could feel he -would have given anything to be able to throw the hat away. Finally, -when they reached the end of the line, he clapped the hat back on his -head, but he had not yet recovered his poise because when they came to -the launch which was to carry them to Venice, Hitler, flustered, tried -to insist that Mussolini, the host, precede him on board. The Duce -finally got behind the Fuehrer and shooed him down the gangplank first. - -Mussolini arranged that his visitor should constantly be reminded that -although Germany might have her great man, Italy had a greater. With -true totalitarian courtesy Mussolini ordered thousands of young Black -Shirts to cheer him and keep up a continuous howl of “Duce, Duce, -Duce!” whenever Hitler appeared. They jammed St. Mark’s square and that -night when Mussolini gave his guests a banquet in the wonderful old -Palace of the Doges, the Black Shirts yelled so much and so powerfully -that nobody could hear the speeches. Finally Mussolini had to send word -for the boys to quiet down. - -The show had its desired effect as far as the Italian populace was -concerned. The climax of the evening was a procession on the Grand -Canal. They had taken from museums the most treasured old gondolas, -and decorated them with lanterns. You may imagine what a spectacle they -made under a June moon. My wife had a gondolier who spoke a few words -of broken English. She asked him, “What do you think of Hitler?” “Oh,” -said the gondolier, “Eetlaire, Eetlaire is only a _piccolo_ Mussolini.” -I wonder if the gondolier still thinks Hitler is a “little Mussolini”? - - -Q. _What did the two dictators accomplish by their meeting? Did they -lay the basis for the Axis there?_ - -A. No, just the contrary. They laid the basis for nearly going to -war with each other. The Axis was not formed until much later, after -Mussolini had been compelled to recognize Hitler’s supremacy and take -orders from him. At the time they first met, Mussolini still fancied -himself Hitler’s superior. At Venice they were supposed to negotiate an -agreement about Austria. - -At that time Mussolini wanted very much to take Austria himself, or to -keep it independent as a buffer state between Italy and the Germany -which he felt was going some day to become strong enough to menace him -as well as the rest of Europe. Hitler, on the other hand, was bent upon -the Anschluss, upon annexing Austria as the first item on his program -of expansion. - -Mussolini had an army of unknown quality but big enough compared with -Hitler’s to make the Duce feel superior and Hitler feel cautious. So -they talked on this basis and Count Ciano, Mussolini’s son-in-law and -already Propaganda Minister, took me aside the afternoon of the second -day and triumphantly whispered that a “gentleman’s agreement” had been -reached that both parties would respect the integrity and independence -of Austria. It was all I could do to restrain myself from putting in my -cable some obvious crack about the agreement between those two notable -“gentlemen,” but one does not do that under censorship. - -What happened then? I must say that everything that has happened in -Europe since the gangsters took over has the quality of a caricature. -Sure enough, Hitler and Mussolini made their “gentlemen’s agreement” to -keep hands off Austria on June 15, and just forty days later, on July -25, Hitler sent a band of Nazi revolutionaries to seize the Austrian -government. They murdered Chancellor Dollfuss, but were overpowered by -loyal troops, and before Hitler could move, Mussolini had mobilized on -the Brenner mechanized forces strong enough to make Hitler back down -and disavow the whole action. I reached Vienna and the Ballhaus Platz -while the loyal troops were still besieging the Reichskanzlei. Dollfuss -had not died yet. In the midst of it all I had to laugh at the thought -of that “gentlemen’s agreement.” - - -Q. _That must have made Mussolini cocky, to make Hitler back down?_ - -A. Decidedly! I went from Vienna where I had covered the Dollfuss -Putsch, back to Berlin for the death of Hindenburg--and incidentally -for a sidelight on Hitler, let me remark this. You still hear repeated -the wishful thought that the German Army will some day “do something” -about Hitler. Nobody who knows anything about Germany believes that -for a moment now, but I admit I thought it possible until the day -Hindenburg died that the army might stop Hitler. - -That was August 7, 1934, and at the moment Goebbels announced on the -radio the death of the President he also announced that Hitler had -assumed the presidency, which meant he was commander in chief of the -armed forces as well as Reichs Chancellor, and thus had sole executive -power. That morning I came early to the office in Berlin and as I -entered the door Goebbels’ voice began to come over the radio. I worked -on the cables until mid-afternoon and then Dosch-Fleurot and I went out -to witness the swearing in of the Berlin garrison. That was where I -learned that the army would from then on do nothing to stop Hitler. - -The regiment was drawn up in hollow square and in the middle stood -the commanding general on a platform. Every one of the 2,000 men and -officers held his right hand above his head with the two fingers -extended as in taking an oath in court. The general repeated the words -two at a time and the troops repeated in sonorous chorus, “I swear--by -God--eternal allegiance--to my Fuehrer--Adolf Hitler--to obey him,” -and so on, with no word about the flag, the Constitution, or even -the Fatherland. The oath was a personal oath to Hitler himself, as -commander in chief. I believe it is unique; at any rate I have never -heard of such an oath in any other army. - -The officers corps knew what it meant, so much so that thousands -of officers absented themselves that day from duty “on account -of illness,” but when they came back each had to take the oath -individually. The significance of that is that no German army has ever -mutined, and this oath bound every soldier of Germany to the person of -Adolf Hitler. It was a most impressive ceremony and I carried away from -it the conviction that this army would never break its oath and turn on -Hitler until it met defeat. I am still convinced this is true. - - -Q. _Yes, but what about Mussolini? You said he was decidedly cocky -about defeating Hitler over Austria._ - -A. I started to say that after having covered the death of Hindenburg -and the accession to the Presidency of Hitler, I went down and reported -the Nuremberg Party Congress, and directly thereafter went to Rome -and met Mussolini. It was October 1934. I had met him several times -previously and he always used to insist on asking more questions than -he answered; so he began our conversation by saying, “I hear you have -been to Nuremberg--what did you learn there? What did they think of me?” - -I answered that frankly the Italians were not popular in Nuremberg, -and that one of my English colleagues, Chris Holmes of Reuters, who is -tall, dark, and handsome, had once been mistaken for an Italian and had -some trouble with Nazi Storm Troopers until he identified himself. “So -we are unpopular there,” Mussolini ruminated. “And go on, what else did -you observe in that line?” - -“Well,” I continued, “one night I met a group of officers of the SS -[_Schutzstaffel_] and we were talking about affairs, and one of them -asked me what you, Your Excellency, would have done with those troops -you mobilized on the Brenner during the Dollfuss Putsch if you had -marched into Austria.” “Yes,” said the Duce leaning forward. “Yes, yes, -go on, what did they want to know?” “Well,” I hesitated, “they wanted -to know if you had marched into Austria, would you have stopped there, -or would you have gone on and marched into Germany?” Mussolini put his -hands on the desk and leaned halfway over it, and a great smile came on -his face as he ejaculated, “Ahhhh! Were they afraid?” I laughed and he -laughed and it was agreed that the Germans had been afraid, and if ever -there was a delighted man it was Mussolini, reveling in the thought -that he had frightened his gentlemen friends. - - -Q. _You have told us that the first impression one gets of Hitler -is that he looks silly, but you remarked that this was a false -impression.... Do you imply that on closer acquaintance his personality -grows upon you?_ - -A. In a way, perhaps. At any rate you realize after several meetings -that the silly appearance is due to superficialities. His moustache, -the lock of hair over his forehead, and his staring eyes make his face -easy work for a cartoonist, and a world of them have taken advantage -of it. It is almost like a mask. He frequently looks as though he were -gazing into space when he is looking straight at you. He has terrific -power of concentration and sometimes when he talks he appears to forget -his surroundings, and to be conversing with himself, although he may be -shouting loud enough to be heard by a great multitude. - -His manner is various, and he can be quietly affable just as another -time he may rave and bellow until his voice breaks. Once, during his -trial for treason, I heard him bellow and then surrender to a louder -voice. This was an incident worth recording, because as far as I know -it is the only time Hitler has been literally shouted down. All during -his trial the courtroom was dominated by the figure of Ludendorff, -the great Ludendorff who for the last two years of the war had been -master of Germany. Ludendorff of course was as guilty of treason as -Hitler, and if the court had done its duty both Ludendorff and Hitler -would have been sentenced to death and executed. Ludendorff, however, -had such prestige that even this republican court was afraid to find -him guilty, and as you know, they acquitted him. And having acquitted -Ludendorff it was not possible to sentence Hitler to death. They gave -him the lightest possible sentence, fortress confinement for five -years, and later commuted by a general amnesty to less than a year. - -Ludendorff used to bark at the court in _Kommandostimme_, the tone of -the parade ground, every syllable clipped harsh, and when his imperious -voice rose, the little Chief Justice in the middle of the Bench would -quiver until his white goatee flickered so badly he had to seize it -to keep it quiet. Hitler at that time had nothing like the authority -of Ludendorff but he made up for that by his volubility and his rough -treatment of the witnesses against him. As defendant he had the right -to question witnesses and he bullied them unmercifully until the turn -came of General von Lossow, the chief witness for the state. Von Lossow -was in command of the Bavarian Reichswehr. - -A few days before the Putsch, Hitler had given his personal word of -honor to von Lossow that he would not try a revolution. On the night -of the Putsch, Hitler, brandishing a revolver, forced von Lossow to -join the revolution and yield the Bavarian Reichswehr to the new Hitler -government. But the moment von Lossow was free, he mobilized his troops -and crushed the Putsch. So the two men hated each other, and each -considered the other a double-crosser. - -When von Lossow took the stand, Hitler stood up and yelled a question. -Thereupon the General, a tall bony man, with a corrugated shaven -head and a jaw of steel, pulled himself up to his full height and -began yelling at Hitler and throwing his long forefinger as if it -were a weapon at Hitler’s face. Hitler started to shout back, but the -General shouted so much louder, and looked so menacing, that presently -Hitler fell back in his seat as if he had collapsed under a physical -blow. Hitler had his revenge on June 30, 1934 when he had von Lossow -assassinated along with the hundreds of others who perished in the -Blood Purge. In retrospect it is fascinating to reflect that Hitler, -the most successful bully our world has seen, can himself be bullied. - - -Q. _Do you think that Hitler is personally responsible, or largely -responsible, for this war? Is it possible to ascribe that much -importance to one individual?_ - -A. I do ascribe that much importance to the individual Hitler. We would -no more have had this war, in the form it has taken, and at the time it -has taken place, without Hitler, than we would have had the Napoleonic -wars without Napoleon. Without Hitler, Germany would either have forged -slowly ahead as she was doing under the Weimar Republic, or she would -have come under some other leader of Pan-German Imperialism who would -have attempted on a lesser and not so successful scale something like -the thing Hitler has attempted. It is extremely unlikely that anyone -else could have been found with Hitler’s genius. It is more likely that -the Weimar Republic would have persisted. Remember, when Hitler was -sentenced to fortress confinement for his 1923 Putsch, his National -Socialist German Workers Party practically disappeared, but immediately -upon his emergence from prison it began to grow until by 1928 he had 12 -seats, and in 1930, 130 seats in the Reichstag. - -You may say this growth of a radical party would have been inevitable -under the circumstances of economic crisis, unemployment, and so on. I -agree that the growth of radical votes would have been inevitable, but -it was far from inevitable that so many of these radical votes should -be canalized into one great, super-efficient, terroristic, militaristic -party. This was the accomplishment of one man, Adolf Hitler. - -I was a correspondent in Germany from 1923 on, and during that -particular decade, 1923 to 1933, when Hitler took power, two-thirds -of the German electorate voted consistently in favor of some form -of collectivism, either Social Democracy, or National Socialism, or -Communism. I contend that it was solely the genius of Adolf Hitler -which eventually brought the whole country under his particular brand -of collectivism. Without him the votes given the Nazis would have -been split in half a dozen ways, and the probability is that the -conservative parties representing one-third of the votes, with the -Social Democrats who wanted a democratic republican collectivism, would -have won out in the long run, and we should have had a republican -Germany today and no war. This is sheer retrospective speculation, but -it is useful to point out the importance of the personality of Hitler. - -The Marxists have always insisted that individuals do not count; that -history is made by economic and social forces which in the long run -accomplish their destiny no matter who lives or dies. The longer I -live the less I believe in this explanation of history, at any rate as -it applies to our span of life. - -Over centuries it may be that the great forces carry mankind -irresistibly along no matter what leaders it has, but within a single -generation we are bound to feel that the history of our nation -would have been quite different if this or that individual had not -existed. Objectively it may be true that over long periods of time -the individual leader counts for little. But subjectively, for short -periods of time, the individual leader counts for nearly everything. -What a difference it would have made for the Jews of the whole world, -if a Hitler had not obtained control of the collectivist movement in -Germany. - -There was nothing inherently anti-Semitic in the German yearning for a -_Gemeinschaft_, a collective. Anti-Semitism need not have played any -part in National Socialism any more than it did in Communism or Social -Democracy. Yet, because Hitler from his early youth had been infected -with this curious kind of psychic sickness, anti-Semitism became a part -of the German state religion, and from this accident of history has -grown the tragedy of twelve million people. - - -Q. _Is Hitler really the boss of Germany, or is there not someone -behind the throne?_ - -A. There is nobody behind the throne. Hitler is the whole regime, its -author, its parent, its spirit, its brains, and its boss. - - -Q. _What about the men around Hitler; are any of them of the caliber to -succeed him?_ - -A. None of them is of the caliber to succeed Hitler, but Hitler has -publicly announced Goering as his successor, and he would automatically -take the position if der Fuehrer should die now. In the Party there -is nobody to compete with him. The bloodthirsty Himmler, head of -the SS Elite Guards and the Gestapo, is merely a policeman, one of -great ability, ranking perhaps with the notorious Fouché of the -French Revolution, but out of the question as Fuehrer. Goebbels, the -advertising director, is the cleverest man in the Party, but he would -be lucky to remain alive twenty-four hours after Hitler’s protective -hand was removed. He and Himmler are rivals in unpopularity. Who are -the rest? Minor figures, as Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, the upstart -“Bismarck” of the champagne trade, who if anything is more widely -disliked and despised than Goebbels. Hess, of course, has fled. Dr. -Ley, the head of the Labor Front, is the type of drunken, racketeering -labor gangster who in this country would have gone to the penitentiary -under the lash of Westbrook Pegler. Alfred Rosenberg, the Party’s -“brain,” could no more succeed Hitler than he could take Joe Louis’s -place. - -The more one scrutinizes the German scene the more one realizes that -the war has moved all the big party figures far into the background, -leaving only Goering a modest place miles beneath the Fuehrer. The -outside world has believed Goering would be an improvement on Hitler, -in that he would be more amenable to reason, less aggressive. He would -be an improvement only in that he would be weaker. His instincts and -intentions are not more Christian than Hitler’s. He would have neither -Hitler’s magic hold on the German people nor Hitler’s genius in action, -but he is as cruel a man as ever exercised power in a modern state. -At the same time he has all the sentimentality which is an almost -invariable accompaniment of brutality in this type of German. During -the period of the worst Terror, the active Nazi revolution in 1933, -Goering was over Himmler in charge of the concentration camps, and at -the moment when the Nazi sadists and criminals in charge of the camps -were beating to death and torturing and hanging scores of men daily, -Goering decreed the severest law against cruelty to animals ever to be -passed anywhere. - -Goering’s most marked characteristics, aside from his high animal -spirits, his callous cruelty, and his sentimentality, are his energy, -courage, and will power. He looks too fat to be self-disciplined, but -he twice cured himself of the morphine habit, which he had contracted -after his wounding in the World War, and again after his wounding on -the Odeon’s Platz during the Munich Putsch. A glandular derangement -resulting from his wounds made him monstrously obese, but appears to -have endowed him with an excess of energy which he demonstrates by -doing the work of half a dozen men. He works incomparably harder than -Hitler who by any ordinary standards is a fitful worker, given to long -spells of dreamy idleness. - -Everybody else in Germany quails before Goering, but Reichs Marshal -Goering becomes a trembling, whipped child when Hitler yells at him, -despite fanciful newspaper stories about Goering’s disputing with der -Fuehrer. The Army prefers Goering to any other Nazi leader except -Hitler, because Goering is the only soldier and the only gentleman by -birth among the Nazi chiefs. Yet when one has reviewed all the points -in favor of Goering’s position, it becomes more and more obvious that -the war has made a successor to Hitler almost unthinkable. Hitler has -the power now more than ever, but the power now is the Army; it is no -longer, as it was until September 1939, the Party. If Goering were to -take over automatically, after Hitler’s death, how long could he keep -the apparatus running; what would the Army do; how would the German -people and the people of Europe respond to their new and obviously so -immensely inferior master? The more one considers the condition of -Germany today the more it seems that Hitler is indispensable to German -success. His successors would probably succeed one another with Blitz -speed. - - -Q. _What about Karl Haushofer, who is said to be his one-man brain -trust?_ - -A. Haushofer is one of the men Hitler consults. Hitler likes -Haushofer’s theory of what they call _Geopolitik_ because it fits -in with Hitler’s own theory that politics should always go ahead -of economics, which is his particular way of proving the Marxists -wrong. But Haushofer has no more influence than perhaps half a dozen -of Hitler’s advisers. Hitler hates experts, because they advance -objections to his projects. The only experts who have a chance with -him are yes-men, except in the Army. He listens to technical advice -from generals he respects, although even from them he would tolerate no -shadow of opposition to his grand strategy. You may be sure Haushofer -has never said no. - - -Q. _Is Hitler also in the military sphere the real war lord? Does he -actually direct his battles as did Napoleon?_ - -A. Hitler is the nearest thing to Napoleon since Napoleon. I remember -just before the beginning of the war, in August 1939, I asked a Colonel -of the French General Staff if they had heard that Hitler had taken -over active command of the Army, in fact, and that when war began he -would direct the fighting. The French Colonel said yes, that the French -General Staff knew that was true. Then he surprised me by saying that -they did not like it. - -I had expected him to rub his hands and exclaim over French good -luck in having an amateur at the head of the German Army. Not at -all. This French Colonel went on to explain that Hitler had already -demonstrated the most miraculous sense of timing, and this was perhaps -the most important talent a field marshal could have, and that with -the technical advice of his generals, Hitler might prove a formidable -adversary indeed. Less than a year later the French Colonel who had -foreseen so well was one of the vast army of military refugees fleeing -before the New Napoleon. - -I do not mean to say that Hitler blueprints each battle and determines -where each division is to go. He simply determines the grand strategy, -names the objective, and sets the time. For instance, in the case of -Poland, some time before the German attack, Hitler called his General -Staff together and said, “Gentlemen, I want you to work out a plan for -the crushing of Poland as swiftly as possible. The problem is how to -knock out Poland before the French and British can bring any help or -alleviation by attacking in the West. Now, how many divisions can we -have fully mobilized within a month? So, and how many do we need to -hold the French? So. That will leave us so and so many for the Polish -campaign. Now, gentlemen, at how many different points can we attack -Poland, from every available entrance? You say five, including East -Prussia. All right, now within forty-eight hours I want you to bring me -a sketch plan of attack, with the outline of the number of divisions to -attack at each point.” - -With these data in hand Hitler orders the general disposition of the -troops. Then he waits, and takes into account each of a score or -hundred other factors besides military factors that may enter into -the supreme decision to choose the exact time to strike. He considers -the attitude of all the powers involved, the British and French -morale, their military strength, the weather, the attitude of Poland’s -neighbors, the Polish preparations, and finally when he is ready he -gives the fateful order to march at 2 A.M. on September 1, 1939. Before -the order reaches the commanding generals probably not more than half a -dozen men in the world know the time. - -He may meet technical criticism from his generals; he often does. But -unlike Mussolini, whose staff is so subservient and sycophantic that -they say “Yes” when the Duce has outlined some impossible campaign such -as his fiasco in Greece, the German generals voice their objections. -If the objections are valid, Hitler may change his plans. As a rule, -however, Hitler’s grand strategy is seldom affected, because the great -sweeping decisions are based upon Hitler’s appreciation of the problem, -the campaign, the scene as a whole. His generals will be thinking of -the local problem, and their opinion in this respect carries weight. -But Hitler will be thinking in terms first of the whole war, second of -the whole campaign, as against Poland. To these great decisions the -generals invariably bow. - - -Q. _Why? How has this man who was able to become only a corporal in -the last war suddenly obtained such an ascendancy over the German Army -and in particular over the General Staff? I always understood that -the General Staff of the German Army was one of the proudest, most -professionally capable, and vain and exclusive organizations in the -whole world._ - -A. How has Hitler done it? By being always right. Well, nearly always. -He has so far made two mistakes, either or both of which may prove -fatal, or not, as destiny will have it. The first was when, instead of -launching an all-out assault on Britain immediately after Dunkirk, he -pursued the crumbling French Army, which as he later learned, could not -have been a danger to him; thus he postponed too late his attack on -Britain. - - -Q. _Why didn’t he attack England at that time?_ - -A. Because Hitler did not expect France to collapse as speedily as she -did. Neither he nor anyone else in the world expected it. He may say -he did but the best proof that he did not is the fact that he failed -to take advantage of it. When the German armies broke through the -Low Countries, and began to press upon the French line at the famous -“hinge” at Montmedy, they were like a man who is pressing hard on a -locked and bolted door when suddenly the bolt breaks, the door flies -open, and the man pitches forward into the room. - -So the German armies pitched forward into France when they broke across -the Meuse and staggered on, almost losing their balance for lack of -the opposition they had expected to find. They lurched on until at the -end of five weeks the French Army had dissolved; the French government -had surrendered; the nation of France had ceased to exist. Then Hitler -pulled his army together, turned it around, started it for the Channel -ports. But it takes time to turn an army around; it takes time to -establish air bases and collect the thousands of flat-bottomed vessels -to ferry an army across the channel. - -The time required was fifty-five days from June 17, the day the French -asked for an armistice, to August 8, when the Germans made their first -mass air attack on Britain as preliminary to invasion. It was those -fifty-five days which saved Britain. I arrived in London on June 20, -full of the apprehension that Hitler’s army was about to sweep the -world. After all it is impressive to have believed all your life that -the French Army was the best in the world and then to witness it -disappear in thirty-seven days of fighting. - -It is more impressive to become a refugee. I had established in Paris -the first home I had had in twenty years of vagabond newspaper work. -As the German armies came closer to the French capital I congratulated -myself that I could now live at home and motor daily to the front. Then -one night around midnight the American military attaché, my old friend -Colonel Horace M. Fuller, our wisest professional observer of the war -abroad, and Lieutenant-Commander Hillenkoetter, our naval attaché, -veteran submarine expert, called on me and said: “Knick, you must leave -tonight; the Germans will be here by morning.” - -In Edgar Mowrer’s overfull Ford, followed by Lilian Mowrer valiantly -driving her tiny Simca, we left Paris about three o’clock in the -morning, passing through empty streets, the great boulevards stretching -wide and forlorn without so much as a policeman in sight, while fog -eddied above the paving. We passed through the gates of the city where -not even a sentry stood. - -Paris was already broken, already humiliated. We fled on down, stopping -with the demoralized government at Tours, and then on to Bordeaux -where with 1,600 other refugees I found a place on the British India -Line S.S. _Madura_, built to accommodate 160. On the way from Paris -to Bordeaux we had traveled with six to eight million other refugees, -the largest number of fugitives ever to assemble on the roads of the -Western World. Flight, flight, flight! Anything to get away! That was -the panic spirit which had gripped the whole population of France, as -of the Low Countries. - -The German Army could not even come in contact with the main body -of refugees, except in the contact of murder when the Luftwaffe -machine-gunned the roads. From the moment, eleven days after the grand -assault began, when the Germans reached the sea at Abbeville, May 21, -from that moment on French resistance disappeared. But Hitler could -not begin to attack England until the British Expeditionary Force and -the Northern French Army were destroyed. Actually the B.E.F. escaped -from Dunkirk June 4, and from that date on Hitler was free to turn in -either direction, and many observers believed he would drive straight -at England. - -Instead, he chose to pursue the French Army another thirteen days, -until it surrendered. If Hitler, immediately after Dunkirk, had -concentrated every resource on invading England, nobody can say what -would have happened. Dunkirk had shocked the British more deeply than -anything in 100 years, but the French capitulation shocked them worse. - -By the time I arrived at Falmouth, after four days on deck with my -fellow refugees, the British were still dazed, dismayed, not panicky, -but desperately aware that they stood closer to national destruction -than ever in 1,000 years. The truth was they had no army, or rather -their army had no weapons. The B.E.F., which had possessed about 75 per -cent of all the weapons possessed by all the British Land Forces, had -been compelled to leave behind at Dunkirk all their tanks, cannon, and -most of their machine guns and even their rifles. It was terrifying to -stand on the curb in London and watch battalions of the Guards march by -with only half a dozen rifles to a battalion. - -The British Land Forces immediately after Dunkirk were practically -weaponless. The R.A.F. which was soon to give so gallant an account of -itself, needed reorganization; all the units which had been in France -had to be brought back and reintegrated for the defense of the island. -If ever the German invasion could succeed, it could have succeeded -then, but Hitler did not move until the night of August 8, when he sent -over his first mass of 400 bombers and fired the docks of London in a -blaze so high I was able to read a newspaper by its light on the roof -of the Ministry of Information building, eight miles from the fire. Had -that attack been launched June 8 or even June 18, instead of August 8, -who knows what the result would have been? By August 8 the British had -been transformed. - -Three things had happened to them which had not happened for over 100 -years, since the time of Napoleon. First, they had become frightened; -second, they had become angry; third, they had been forced, again I -repeat, for the first time in 100 years, forced to go to work. Until -the fall of France the British had been as easygoing as we are now, -despite the fact they had been formally at war for eight months; but -after the fall of France every able-bodied human being in the United -Kingdom went to work at the rate of ten to twelve hours a day seven -days a week. - -In a miraculously short time they tripled their production of weapons, -planes, ammunition; meanwhile we sent them 1,000 cannon, many machine -guns, and 750,000 rifles. The R.A.F. trained, reorganized, expanded, -laid out new fields. In short, when Hitler attacked he struck a new -Britain, aroused as never since 1066. It was a dazzling example of what -danger can do to a people. The British of August 1940 were not the -British of June 1940. - -Historians will wonder why Hitler did not move earlier against England. -I suppose they will go on wondering why for centuries, even after -Hitler has explained it in his memoirs, for his own benefit, and to -the satisfaction of few. My estimate is that he simply overvalued the -French Army and undervalued the British spirit. Surprised by the French -collapse he was carried along by the momentum of his drive to destroy -the possibility of further French resistance before trying to invade -England. He lost thereby what may prove to have been his greatest -chance when he failed to throw his whole air force, army, and navy at -England in the moment of her greatest weakness. - - -Q. _What was Hitler’s second mistake?_ - -A. His second mistake was when he went into Russia, apparently -expecting the Red Army to fold up at least as fast as the French Army, -probably hoping to be able to turn around and launch a second attack -on Britain in 1941 before American aid became effective. The initial -effect of the invasion of Russia was a disappointment to Hitler, -however it may eventually end. So was the First Battle of Britain, but -the final outcome of both battles must be awaited to determine how they -will affect Hitler’s reputation as a master of war. - -Meanwhile his generals have not had reason to change fundamentally -the judgment they formed on the basis of their experience with him -since 1933. That experience began when he took over the Presidency and -obtained the oath of allegiance which, as we have seen, laid at least a -legal foundation for his ascendancy over the armed forces. Then he set -out to build out of the 100,000-man Reichswehr the mightiest military -machine the world has ever known. - -He denounced the military clauses of the Versailles treaty, and thus -relieved the Army of its crushing sense of being condemned forever to -inferiority. He boldly announced the creation of an Air Force, and -assigned to it the explosive energies of his first Paladin, Goering. -Thereafter, all the resources of the nation were poured into the armed -forces. Nothing was too good for the troops. They were given barracks -such as no European army had ever had, as good as anything the United -States Army has ever known. The food of the army and navy and air force -was improved until it was on the average far better, even in peacetime, -than anything the German soldier had to eat at home. - -Discipline was kept at its highest point, but at the same time a new -spirit of comradeship came into the German armed forces. For the first -time in the history of the German Navy, officers and men would eat at -the same table. All this was bound to have its effect upon the services -and to make them think at any rate gratefully of Hitler, but of course -the test had still to come. What would this commander in chief order -his troops to do? Would he lead them into some impossible adventure -prematurely? Would this amateur after building his beautiful machine -sacrifice it in some vainglorious maneuver? It seemed as though he -would do just that. - -The first test of Hitler’s fitness to command his army came on March 7, -1936, when he ordered it into the Rhineland to reoccupy that portion of -Germany adjoining France which had been demilitarized by the Versailles -treaty. France had insisted that Germany should promise never to -quarter troops on the right bank of the Rhine. This was to make up -for the fact that France had been prevented from occupying the right -bank of the Rhine, and for the fact that the United States in 1919 had -refused to join the proposed tripartite pact of France, England, and -the United States, to guarantee the French from invasion by Germany. - -As long as the Germans kept out of the Rhineland, France was safe. If -the Germans ever reoccupied the Rhineland, it meant that they intended -sooner or later to use it as a jumping-off-place from which to attack -France. France therefore had insisted upon and had obtained this clause -in the Versailles treaty, and had thereafter frequently announced that -its violation would mean war. Nevertheless, Hitler toward the middle -of February 1936 informed his General Staff that in the first week of -March he intended to reoccupy the Rhineland. At that moment Hitler met -his first opposition from the Army. The generals protested that they -could not be responsible for what would happen, because if the French -mobilized and fought, the German Army was not strong enough--it would -have to retreat. Unspoken was the conclusion that if the German Army -retreated, it would mean the end of the Nazi regime, the end of Hitler. - -Hitler replied that it was the duty of the Army to obey orders; it was -his duty as Fuehrer to give orders which could be successfully obeyed. -“I know,” he told them, “that the French will not mobilize. I know the -French will not fight. I know the English don’t want them to fight. -Don’t ask me how I know. I know. It is my business to know.” - -When I was in Spain during the Spanish Civil War, I learned under -unusual circumstances something of what went on inside the German -General Staff during those days of March 1936, which were to decide -the history of the continent. At Burgos, headquarters of Franco’s -government, I met Major von der Osten, who was ostensibly in charge of -certain economic investigations or negotiations, but as a matter of -fact was the chief of the German Gestapo in Spain. He was an agreeable -fellow, father of eight children, highly intelligent, amusing, and -it did not matter to me that some months before, his organization, -the Gestapo, had had me arrested and thrown into a death cell in San -Sebastian for thirty-six hours, whence I escaped by the determined -vocal and political efforts of my friend and fellow correspondent, -Randolph Churchill. - -The Major knew that I knew that he was chief of the Gestapo and he knew -that I would do all I could to get information from him of value to me, -as I knew he would do likewise with me. So we got along famously, and -one day he included me in a picnic with several other correspondents. -There, on the banks of a clear stream while the Major’s soldier -servants served us grilled frankfurters and Rhine wine, I led the -conversation into discussion of what the Army thought of Hitler. The -theme reached the reoccupation of the Rhineland, and at this the Major -became enlightening. - -“I was assigned to the Bendlerstrasse [headquarters of the General -Staff] then,” the Major said. “I can tell you that for five days and -five nights not one of us closed an eye. We knew that if the French -marched, we were done. We had no fortifications, and no army to match -the French. If the French had even mobilized, we should have been -compelled to retire.” He confirmed that the opinion of virtually the -entire General Staff was against Hitler; they considered the move -suicidal, and when they did move, it was only to obey orders, not -because they were convinced it was right. - -“And what did they think after the thing was all over and Hitler had -been proved right? Did they think that Hitler had proved himself a -genius or that he just had extraordinarily good luck?” - -The Major smiled. “We thought there was a good deal of kind fortune -concerned,” he said. - -That was Hitler’s first brush with his army, and his generals may -well have put him down as lucky. He won, and later events proved how -tremendous his victory was. For the occupation of the Rhineland enabled -Hitler to build there his Siegfried line, and the Siegfried line -enabled him eventually to hold France until he was ready to fall upon -and destroy her as he did in 1940. - -This first demonstration that he was “always right,” strengthened -his position with the General Staff enormously. The second test was -accordingly easier. It was Austria. - -Just as in the case of the Rhineland, so in the case of Austria, France -had often declared that any German attempt to annex Austria would be a -cause of war. This made good sense, just as it had made good sense for -the French to have said they would go to war to prevent reoccupation -of the Rhineland. Once the Germans had the Rhineland and began to -fortify it, they made it difficult for the French to defend Austria. -Once the Germans had Austria they made it difficult for the French to -defend Czechoslovakia. Once the Germans had Czechoslovakia they made it -difficult for the French to defend France. - -The German generals understood this series of steps as well as or -better than the French, and therefore they could not believe that the -French would allow each step to be taken without trying to stop it. -Therefore, as Hitler ordered each step taken, his generals protested, -since like all generals they did not want to start a war without the -certainty of winning. - -They protested vigorously over the decision to go into Austria, but -once again Hitler said: “Gentlemen, it is your business to take the -action I direct. It is my business to direct only action which will be -successful. I can assure you now, as I assured you on the reoccupation -of the Rhineland, that now also France will not move, the British will -not move; we can do as we like.” He was right again, and now with two -major victories to his credit, he could face his generals with an even -more momentous and critical order--to occupy Czechoslovakia. - -This third move, against Czechoslovakia, was the most critical, -because here France was pledged by her solemn word of honor to fight -for her ally, and because the possession of Czechoslovakia would make -it possible finally to attack France herself. These two facts were of -course amply known to the German generals and once more they assumed -that the French generals and the French government would now awaken -and fight for the life of their country. - -So, in spite of the two lessons Hitler had given them, the German -generals once more pointed out the dangers. Their Siegfried line was -not nearly complete. If they threw crushing weight at Czechoslovakia, -they would have to weaken their West Front so badly that the French, if -they wished to plunge, might break through. Hitler this time was beside -himself. He not only knew the French and British would not fight if the -Czechs asked them to fight, but he believed, and I think he was right, -that the French and British would not have fought even if the Czechs -had fought. - -So he wanted above all things at this juncture to meet a little -opposition to blood his sword. He wanted the Czechs to fight, and -knowing he would have them alone, he longed for a chance to show what -his vast army and air force could do with overwhelming odds on their -side. In my opinion it is just the opposite of true to say that Hitler -wanted another bloodless victory. He did not. He wanted a bloody one, -the blood of course, to be shed by the hopelessly outnumbered enemy. -It seemed to him absolutely idiotic that any of his generals should -object. They did, but feebly. - -Once more Hitler overrode them, with the same arguments. “France will -not fight. The British will not fight. We can do as we like with the -Czechs. I only hope they do fight.” Hitler this time got everything -he wanted but one thing. The Czechs, brutally betrayed by their ally -France and bullied by England, did not fight. Hitler was cheated of -his desire to do violence. At Munich the bad temper he displayed when -Chamberlain and Daladier gave in to him on every point was caused by -the fact that he realized these good gentlemen were going to make the -Czechs surrender. He was not going to be given the chance to drop one -bomb. He had to wait a whole year for his bloodshed. - -If you doubt this analysis of Hitler’s bloodthirstiness, recollect that -he never gave Poland a chance to imitate Czechoslovakia’s surrender. -Would it not be a matter for wonderment if the German generals -had failed to be impressed by this third example of the Fuehrer’s -infallibility? - -Yet when he proposed to destroy Poland even after the British and -French had “guaranteed” her, some of Hitler’s generals still cautiously -offered objections on the grounds that this would inevitably mean -the Great War and maybe they could not win the Great War. For the -fourth time Hitler overcame constantly lessening opposition of “timid” -generals. He explained that he would knock out Poland before the French -or British could strike, if indeed they intended to strike at all. - -There was some doubt whether the Allies would really fight. Ribbentrop -insisted Britain was through, and although they might declare war and -mobilize, the British would do so only to save face, and would take -the first opportunity to quit with a negotiated peace. But even if the -British and the French did go to war, Hitler explained, he would finish -Poland swiftly, and then turn such heat on France, bring such terrific -forces to bear on the Western Front, that she would probably also be -ready to negotiate peace, and if not he would knock her out also. -_That_ he was sure he could do, and once he had done that, the British -would capitulate. - -If there was any opposition lingering among the generals, it -disappeared upon the signature of the Russo-German Pact, August 23, -1939. This most brilliant of all Hitler’s foreign political coups -convinced his generals first that they would not have to fight a war on -two major fronts, second that they were in the hands of an invincible -military-political genius of the first category. - -How gloriously right Hitler seemed to be. At first everything appeared -to depend upon the speed with which Hitler could knock out the Poles, -whether he could finish them off before the French could mobilize for a -great offensive on the West. Optimistic Poles said they could hold out -for three years; pessimistic Poles said one year. The French thought -the Poles could hold for six months. The German generals thought it -would take three months to break the Poles. Hitler gave them six weeks -to do the job. They conquered Poland in eighteen days! - -Then came Norway and then came France! - -No matter what the German generals had thought before, by May 1940 they -had the feeling Hitler was another Napoleon. Sure enough, on May 10, -they attacked and on June 17 the French Army, the mighty French Army of -4,500,000 men only three generations from Napoleon, surrendered. The -Germans, led by Hitler, had accomplished the greatest victory in the -history of the German Army, and had inflicted upon their age-old enemy -the most colossal defeat in the history of France. Indeed from the -point of view of the numbers of men involved, and the issues at stake, -it may be said to be dimensionally the greatest victory of military -history. - -How can anyone now wonder that after the fall of France the German -General Staff with all its professional vanity would be proud to take -and if necessary blindly obey orders from Corporal Hitler? - -Hitler had brought his General Staff to this position of unquestioning -obedience when he gave the orders to attack Russia. Here was truly the -place for caution. If Hitler was another Napoleon, here was the same -Russia. It meant a two-front war. It would give time for United States -aid to become effective. At the best it meant lengthening the war by -years. - -“No,” Hitler ordered, “we shall conquer Russia before the summer is -out, and conquer England before the year is out and before the United -States can do anything about it. _Vorwaerts!_” Only the prestige built -up by Hitler’s uninterrupted series of victories from the Rhineland to -Crete could have won the acquiescence of the German General Staff to -the Russian adventure. - - -Q. _Is Hitler personally brave?_ - -A. It is hard to say. I could put it this way: Hitler is not the sort -of man about whom one would unhesitatingly say that he is personally -brave, as one would say about Churchill, for example. Perhaps we shall -not count the story he told me about his winning the Iron Cross in the -last war, since many Germans say it is not a true story. Yet it is an -interesting one. He told it to me the night of March 11, 1932 on the -eve of the Presidential election when he ran against Hindenburg and -scored eleven million to Hindenburg’s eighteen million votes. - -I asked him how he had won his Iron Cross. He always wore it but his -political enemies declared there was no record in the army archives of -its having been awarded him and neither in _Mein Kampf_ nor elsewhere -could there be found any account of how he got it. I was afraid when I -asked the question that it might irritate him, but he seemed amused, -and even pleased. - -“You know,” he said, “I was a dispatch bearer in the war. One day, -toward the first of June 1918, I was ordered to take a message to -another part of the front, and had to traverse a section of no man’s -land. Presently I passed a dugout which I thought abandoned, but -suddenly I heard French voices below. - -“Being alone, and armed only with a pistol, I stopped a moment, then -drew my pistol and shouted below in my very bad French, ‘Come up, -surrender!’ Then I shouted in German as though to a squad of soldiers, -orders to ‘Fix bayonets! Draw your hand grenades!’ First one French -soldier, and then another, and then another came up with their hands -in the air until there were seven. I marched them to the rear and -turned them over as prisoners of war. Now,” he paused, and smiled at -Tom Delmer of the London _Daily Express_, who was with me, “if they had -been English soldiers, or,” turning to me and continuing to smile, “if -they had been American soldiers, I am not sure I should have been able -to make them surrender so easily, and perhaps I would not have my Iron -Cross or be here today.” - -This is the only time I have observed a sense of humor in Hitler, -and of course if his story is correct, it proves that he had on that -occasion a considerable amount of personal bravery. - -Then there is the time when, during the 1923 Munich Beer Hall Putsch, -he threw himself down when the Reichswehr armored car began to fire its -machine gun at him and Ludendorff and Goering and the rest of them. -I was about a hundred yards away, jammed in the crowd, when I heard -that machine-gun fire, the first I had ever heard in my life. That -one whiff of fire killed sixteen of Hitler’s men including the body -servant of Ludendorff standing next to the General whom he had served -throughout the war. Hitler was injured because he had thrown himself -down so violently that he broke his collarbone. Would you consider that -a sign of cowardice? I do not know. It was the proper reaction for a -front-line soldier. - -Nevertheless, Ludendorff not only refused to take shelter but -contemptuously stalked across the Odeon’s Platz and, in his uniform -of a Lieutenant General, gave himself up to the Reichswehr Lieutenant -in charge of the armored car, with the words: “Arrest me, Lieutenant. -I shall never wear this uniform again.” Now there was a man about -whom one would unhesitatingly say he is a brave man. You remember how -Ludendorff, then a Colonel, took the fortress of Liege singlehanded, -simply drove in his staff car to the Belgian lines, by amazing luck got -through, drove straight to the entrance of the fortress, knocked, and -walked in. When the Belgian commander saw before him a German Colonel, -he assumed the game was up and surrendered. That won for Ludendorff the -Pour le Merite, Germany’s Victoria Cross. - -There was a time when Hitler displayed indubitable personal courage. -That was when he arrested Captain Ernst Roehm, the head of his -2,500,000 Storm Troops, on the famous June 30, 1934, the day of the -Blood Purge. Roehm had been Hitler’s close, if not closest, personal -associate. I cannot use the word friend, because Hitler has never had -a friend. He was the only man in the party, in the world, as a matter -of fact, with whom Hitler exchanged the intimate “Du” or “Thou.” We -Americans can never understand the significance of this continental -custom. If you are on “Du Fuss” or “Thou Footing” with another man, it -means you are brothers, and it is taken very seriously indeed by all -except the proletariat, who in the informal brotherhood of the working -classes, call each other indiscriminately “Thou.” But this intimacy of -Hitler and Roehm did not prevent Hitler from cold-bloodedly ordering -his friend’s execution when once Hitler had convinced himself Roehm was -plotting treason. Cold blood is one of Hitler’s chief characteristics. -It reminds one of Robespierre. - -Roehm was hiding out with his staff at the hamlet of Wiessee, not far -from Munich. His guards, heavily armed, had strictest orders to stop -everyone, but _everyone_, and by that underlining emphasis in the -orders, _everyone_ was meant to include Hitler himself. Nevertheless, -on the fateful morning, Hitler with two automobiles containing among -others the canny Goebbels, several high SS officers, and a handful of -SS gunmen, drove into Wiessee at daybreak, and when Roehm’s guards saw -the All-Highest, instead of stopping him they saluted “Heil Hitler!” -There was at least some bravery in Hitler’s daring to go personally to -arrest Roehm, surrounded by his bodyguards. Once he had penetrated the -sentry lines, there was not much for Hitler to fear, especially not in -his personal encounter with Roehm. He found Roehm in bed with what they -call in German a _Lust Knabe_. - -Roehm was a barrel-chested, scar-faced desperado whose only two -weaknesses were his homosexuality and drink. He had grown potbellied, -and invariably woke with a hangover. He slept in a nightgown. When -Hitler flung open his bedroom door at daybreak and routed him out -of bed, Roehm must have been distinctly at a disadvantage. There he -stood, bleary-eyed, nightgowned, potbellied, before his Fuehrer roaring -charges of treason, yelling that he was under arrest, ordering him to -dress and be quick about it. - -I passed through Munich on my way from Rome to Berlin to cover the -Blood Purge the next night. From SS officers who boarded my train at -Munich, via the good-looking Italian Wagon-Lit conductor who had been -from time to time propositioned by Roehm, I learned that Major Buch, -Hitler’s chief SS executioner, had that evening gone to Roehm’s cell -where a revolver had been left to let him commit suicide, and had shot -Roehm as he cried, “Tell Adolf to come kill me if he has the nerve!” - - -Q. _Is it true that Hitler is a homosexual?_ - -A. No, it is not true. He came seriously under suspicion because of -his intimacy with Roehm, and because for so many years he tolerated -the blatant homosexuality of Roehm and his cohorts. This was a scandal -so colossal that it surely has no counterpart in history. Roehm as -the head of 2,500,000 Storm Troops had surrounded himself with a -staff of perverts. His chiefs, men of the rank of Gruppenfuehrer or -Obergruppenfuehrer, commanding units of several hundred thousand Storm -Troopers, were almost without exception homosexuals. Indeed, unless a -Storm Troop officer were homosexual, he had no chance of advancement. - -All this was known to every intelligent observer in Germany and of -course was known in every detail to Hitler. His moral indignation when -he made his Blood Purge and cleaned out this “nest of immorality” was -one of his more brazen pieces of hypocrisy. He purged Roehm not on -account of his distasteful habits but because Roehm was plotting to -seize power, make himself head of the Army, and form what would have -been, incidentally, a homosexual government. - -Nobody knows whether he intended to do away with Hitler or merely -force Hitler to go along with him. At any rate Hitler would have -no part of it, and Roehm was killed, though not for his abnormal -love life. Thereafter Hitler passed the most stringent edicts -against homosexuality and this odd feature of German life was driven -underground. It remains, nevertheless, characteristic of the Germans, -that they, outwardly the most brutally masculine of all European -peoples, are the most homosexual nation on earth. - -Naturally because Hitler never showed any sign of interest in women, -he came under suspicion, but prolonged observation has convinced all -the witnesses I know, including Germans and foreigners, that Hitler is -simply asexual, has no sex life at all, or rather has sublimated it in -his “marriage to the German people.” - - -Q. _How do you mean, “marriage to the German people”?_ - -A. That is precisely the relationship Hitler conceives himself to have -with the Germans, and I must say millions of Germans appear to feel as -though they constituted his wife. Incidentally it was Lord D’Abernon, -long-time British Ambassador to Germany, who remarked that the world -did not properly understand the meaning of masculinity and femininity -as applied to nations, and that in his opinion the Germans were the -most feminine people in Europe and the French the most masculine. -Whether D’Abernon would today be of the same opinion, I do not know. -At any rate Hitler certainly obtains from his contact with the German -people a more than adequate surrogate for normal sex life. - -Just imagine what his feelings must be when he stands, as in peacetime -he used to stand, on the platform at the Tempelhofer Field in Berlin, -and before him are a million Germans. This is the largest crowd that -any man has ever had before him in person. You could never assemble -such a crowd in a democracy, because it takes them twelve hours to -march into place and twelve hours to march away. - -On the night before the first of May, which the Nazis stole from -the Communists and Socialists and made their own Labor Day, the -Berlin population is herded into line and marched off in battalions. -Everything is meticulously arranged by a General Staff, so that by the -time Hitler appears one million persons, no less, are standing to hear -him. When Hitler appears, from a million throats roars the cry “Heil -Hitler! Heil! Heil! Heil!” time and time and time again. - -Then he speaks and at every possible opportunity comes again the bellow -from a million German voices “Heil! Heil! Heil!” Sounds silly? Oh no, -not any more than the German goose step is silly. It looks silly only -in the movies. In real life it is tremendously impressive--ten thousand -steel-shod boots striking the ground with all the force ten thousand -muscular legs can put into it. They shake the ground, and when the -million Germans shout “Heil!” they make the firmament quiver. I defy -anyone to hear such a mass yell without trembling at the sheer brute -power of it. - -Suppose you were the recipient of this ovation! Hitler obtains his -life’s satisfaction from this sort of power orgasm. Now, of course, he -has the whole continent of Europe to trample upon. Every man who loves -power for its own sake as Hitler does, has a strong streak of sadism, -of enjoyment in the infliction of pain or humiliation upon others. So -now Hitler has a double stream of enjoyment in which to wallow. I do -not think he will ever marry. - - -Q. _Are women attracted to Hitler?_ - -A. Soon after he came to power he had to pass an edict forbidding -German women to crawl out of the crowd and attempt to kiss the hem of -his raincoat as he passed by. This was forbidden partially for the -same reason as the _Verbot_ against throwing flowers, which was issued -because it would be easy to conceal a bomb in a bouquet. Whenever he -appeared in public, scores of German women tried to get near enough to -him to touch his raincoat or come into some kind of personal contact -with him. - -It is, regrettably, impossible to record that this is a purely German -phenomenon. An American woman distinguished herself at the Olympic -Games, and incidentally brought about a disciplinary shake-up among -Hitler’s bodyguards, by brushing past his gunmen and kissing him on -the cheek. All this is, perhaps, only evidence of the traditional -regard women have for strength, whether exhibited by the champion prize -fighter, wrestler, chess master, millionaire, or by the Fuehrer of -Germany. - - -Q. _I have heard scores of you fellows, foreign correspondents and -others, say they “know the truth about Hitler,” and constantly -recommend that we find out what he means, but that seems to be a pretty -complicated business, and we cannot all live in Germany long enough to -find out about it. Can you tell us in a few words just what he does -mean, for us?_ - -A. Yes, in the fewest words: Hitler means exactly what he says. He -says the German people are a master race, destined to rule the world. -He says the German people have the power to enforce their rule on the -world. He intends that they shall rule the world during his lifetime. -He includes the United States in the world he intends to rule. - -Finally, he does have the power to carry out his world conquest unless -we fight him in time. That is the shortest way to put it. The reason -you think it hard to understand or find out what Hitler means is that -you refuse to believe these things because they upset you, and if -you believed them then you might have to work harder, or sacrifice -something such as your automobile, or blood, or maybe your life. Read -_Mein Kampf_. It is all there. - - -Q. _What kind of public speaker is Hitler? Is he truly a great orator? -How does he compare with others?_ - -A. He is probably the greatest spellbinder of all time. He literally -talked himself into power in Germany and thereafter he talked the great -German nation into becoming his blindly obedient and fanatically loyal -Herculean slave. With his slave he has laid a continent in chains. But -he never delivered an oration in his life, because an oration according -to Webster is “An elaborate discourse, delivered in public, treating an -important subject in a formal and dignified manner,” and that Hitler -never did. In this respect, Goebbels is incomparably his superior. - -An oration by Goebbels has a beginning, a middle, and a crescendo -end; it has form, style, and the language is chosen, the gestures -sparing but effective, the voice clear and only now and then distorted -by passion. Hitler begins any old way, rambles, digresses, becomes -excited, rants, shouts until his voice is hoarse, and frequently breaks -into a falsetto scream. - -The quality of Hitler’s voice is unpleasant. It is thick in the middle -register, guttural in the low, and its high notes are rasping. In -every speech at some time he becomes angry and then the tone is either -terrifying or embarrassing to the listener, depending upon his relation -to Hitler’s power. I speak, of course, of the foreign listener, as -it would affect you if you understood German. His anger frequently -overpowers him, but he never splutters, he roars. I sometimes felt as I -listened to him, and I have heard him fifty times or more, as though he -were a wild beast. - -Then he can shift in a twinkling to the tone of irony, contemptuous, -derisive. Much of his speech is ungrammatical; many of his sentences -do not “read,” do not make German. He pays apparently no attention to -the structure of his speech. He sometimes ends so abruptly that his -audience is shocked, having expected him to finish his thought, or even -complete a sentence. His gestures are extravagant, and resemble those -of an old-fashioned camp-meeting preacher. He mimics well, and delights -in ridiculing his opponents by caricaturing them. - -There is scarcely a rule of oratory he does not ignore. He is -seldom dignified. All of this, of course, is in reference to his -extemporaneous public speaking which brought him to power, not to the -speeches he reads, as he has read nearly everything since he took -power. As Chancellor of the Reich he can read a speech with dignity, -as he read the funeral oration over Hindenburg, which I heard in -Tannenberg. - -Yet with all the criticism one can bring to bear on his public -speaking, he remains the most effective mob master ever to step on a -platform. He sweeps his audience with him. Sometimes they are slow to -come along, as the time when after seven days of slaughter in Germany -he rose in his own uniformed Reichstag to explain the Blood Purge of -June 30, 1934. That time he spoke for twenty minutes before he received -a single handclap. He had just killed more than a thousand people -including leaders of his own party, Ernst Roehm, his closest friend -and head of the 2,500,000 Storm Troops; Gregor Strasser, one-time -rival for leadership of the Nazis; General Kurt von Schleicher, former -Reichs Chancellor, and his wife; Karl Ernst, head of the 250,000 Berlin -and Brandenburg Storm Troopers; General von Lossow and former Reichs -Commissar von Kahr of Bavaria, who had defeated his first effort at -seizing power in Munich, and hundreds of others. - -The nation was stunned; the Nazi Party itself was partially paralyzed -with fear. Hitler had turned his SS (_Schutzstaffel_) Black Guards -against his SA (_Sturmabteilung_) Storm Troops, and hundreds of Brown -Shirt officers had died before the Black Shirt firing squads, many of -them shouting “Heil Hitler!” as they fell. Most of the members of the -Reichstag, that curious gesture of Hitler before democracy, were active -or honorary officers in the Storm Troops. A score of seats were empty. -Their lawful occupants were dead. The survivors were appalled and not -less bewildered than the public. Nobody knew what had happened; what to -expect. When Hitler began to speak, for the first time in his life he -was received in silence. - -As I sat in the press gallery of the Kroll Opera House, I noted this -with amazement, but I felt the silence was that of stupefaction, not of -indifference and certainly not of rejection. The listeners were simply -stricken dumb. Yet the silence continued, for five, ten, fifteen, -twenty minutes. By then I began to think that Hitler might have made -a mistake, that perhaps his dummy Reichstag was actually disapproving -their idol. Many of them had close friends among the dead. Then came -the breaking point. I think it was the most dramatic moment in any -speech I have ever heard of Hitler’s. - -In his intolerably repetitious way he had started with a description -of Germany’s suffering under the Versailles treaty, and under the -“fourteen years of servitude to the traitors of November,” then -sketched the events leading up to the Blood Purge, described his -discovery of the plot against the State, and then with a leap he -shifted into his most passionate style. He had come to the moment of -ordering the executions. Raising his right hand, forefinger pointed on -high, he stood on his toes and roared: “_Meine Herren_, at that moment -_I_ was the Supreme Court of Germany; _I_ was the Supreme Judge of -Germany; _I_ was Germany!” - -The silence in the Reichstag broke, and as though hypnotized, the 500 -Brown-Shirted members roared: “Heil! Heil! Heil!” There, they had -recognized their master. He had spoken as a master. He had consented -again to be their master, and from a mood of bewilderment and fear they -burst into the joyful acknowledgment of their abasement. Forgotten were -the friendships with the dead, blotted out in the keen pleasure of -hearing the crack of the lash. From then on his lengthy accounting was -constantly punctuated by the traditional applause. - -Incidentally it might be pointed out here that there is after all a -very significant difference between the tyrants of long ago and the -tyrants of today. It is a fact that the tyrants of today exercise -greater power over the lives of their subjects than any we can -recollect from former times. Historians have to search to find a -Ptolemy, a Caesar, or a Mongol Khan who had so complete a discipline -over their populations, so profound a control over the individual lives -of their subjects as have the despots of the modern totalitarian states. - -But all the modern despots find it necessary to report to their -subjects, to speak and explain, to take them into their alleged -confidence, however mendacious the report may be. They find it -expedient, no matter how they spurn the principles of democracy, to -pretend to treat their subjects as free to exercise a judgment. Why -else does Hitler constantly come before his people to talk? In the -western tyrannies of antiquity and the Middle Ages, in the European -monarchies of divine right and in the Oriental despotisms, the rulers -considered it unnecessary to deliver an accounting to their people. - -The conclusion is that the short experience the world has had with -democracy, not yet two hundred years in duration, has left with the -most imperious ruler a sense of responsibility to the ruled, or is it -merely fear? Hitler despises the masses, I know. But he fears them -also. If Louis XVI had possessed a fraction of Hitler’s speaking -talent, or King Charles of England, or Czar Nicholas of Russia, perhaps -they might have had a different fate. - -In the preface to _Mein Kampf_ Hitler indicates the paramount -importance he attaches to the art of political speaking. He wrote: “I -know that one is able to win people far more by the spoken than by the -written word, and that every great movement on this globe owes its rise -to the great speakers and not to the great writers.” He then wrote a -book of 1,000 pages which is said by now to have been distributed to -eight million people, but it was still the spoken word. He dictated -every line of it. You ask, what kind of public speaker is Hitler? I -answer, read _Mein Kampf_. - -It reminds me of a man named Korff. Korff was the brains of the -Ullstein Verlag, pre-Hitler Germany’s greatest publishing concern. -Korff originated the _Berliner Illustrierte_, first of the world’s -great picture weeklies, forerunner of _Life_, and _Look_, and the -French _Match_. He raised his _Berliner Illustrierte_ to more than two -million circulation, undreamed of on the continent before. His salary -was record breaking, his prestige likewise. - -One day in 1931, more than a year before Hitler came to power, Korff -came before his board of directors and said, “Gentlemen, I’m through. -I am going to resign. I wish you to release me and to make your -arrangements accordingly.” Astounded, the board asked why. “Because -I’ve read the book, gentlemen,” replied Korff. “What book?” they asked. -“_Mein Kampf_,” Korff said, and began to explain, but couldn’t on -account of the laughter. Dear old Korff had to have his joke. But no, -it was not a joke. Korff resigned, liquidated his property, got out -of Germany and in 1933 when Hitler came to power the Nazis bought out -Ullstein’s at forced sale. - -The laughing members of the board and stockholders--those not yet dead, -shot attempting to escape, or hanged by their belts in concentration -camp--received a fraction of one per cent of the value of their -holding. Of all the house of Ullstein, only the man who read the book -escaped. I advise you to read the book. - -As an orator, Hitler has many superiors. I have mentioned Goebbels in -Germany. Trotzky was certainly better. I heard Trotzky speak in Moscow -the last time he ever appeared on a Russian platform. It was in 1926. -He had been in disgrace for more than a year, but was allowed to speak -on the innocuous theme, “The United Sates of America and Siberia,” a -lecture with paid admissions. The proceeds were to go to the benefit -of needy students of Moscow University. Why Stalin allowed it I do -not know, but he never permitted a return engagement, for Trotzky’s -popularity proved so great that the mounted police had to be called -out to move the crowds which, despite the exorbitant admission price, -jammed the street before the lecture hall. - -I paid thirty roubles for a balcony seat. It was worth the price. -Trotzky appeared, dapper in a light-gray whipcord suit, and for an hour -and a half in Russian which I only faintly understood, moved me and the -three thousand other listeners to intense appreciation of his forensic -talents. I was surprised to hear Trotzky’s voice, a clear high tenor. -I had expected a deeper, more rotund tone. They said, however, that -the clarity of his delivery and its carrying power were such that he -alone among Bolshevik orators could speak in the Red Square and without -a microphone be heard by half a million listeners. Without being able -to understand more than one word in ten, as at that time I had been -in Russia less than a year, I was nevertheless convinced by this one -hearing of Trotzky that he was one of history’s greatest orators. - - -Q. _What sort of eyes has Hitler? Are they magnetic? What color are -they?_ - -A. It seems to depend on who is looking at them. I noticed that Francis -Hackett in his useful book, _What Mein Kampf Means to America_, cites -three descriptions of Hitler’s eyes, all different. Otto Tolischus -calls them “small, greenish brown and almost poetically introspective -eyes.” William D. Bayes calls them “faded blue eyes between colorless -brows and puffy sallow cheeks.” John McCutcheon Raleigh wrote: “The -fanaticism in his eyes was the most commanding thing about him ... they -possess a hypnotic quality that can easily persuade his followers to do -anything the mind behind the eyes desires.” - -These differences evoked from Mr. Hackett the remark: “If you want -to feel discouraged about the art of reporting, consider these three -accounts of Hitler’s eyes.” But what about these additions? Dorothy -Thompson says in her interview, reprinted in _Dictators and Democrats_: -“The eyes alone were notable. Dark gray and hyperthyroid, they have -the peculiar shine which often distinguishes geniuses, alcoholics and -hysterics.” In the same book Lothrop Stoddard writes: “His eyes are -very dark blue.” Likewise, in the same compilation, I have reported -that “He fixed his flat, non-magnetic, China-blue eyes on me....” I -will stick to my version. His eyes were certainly not magnetic as far -as I was concerned, though I am convinced they would be highly magnetic -to any German. As for the color, they are of such an intermediate, -shifting shade that it may well be they could show in different lights -all the way from greenish brown, faded blue, dark gray, dark blue, to -China blue. - - -Q. _Is Hitler really the tough man he claims to be? I remember he was -reported in a recent speech to have remarked: “I am the hardest man -ever to rule Germany.”_ - -A. When a man talks too much about his strength, it may mean he is not -so strong after all. Francis Hackett sorted out in his index of _Mein -Kampf_ all the references to “Qualities, concepts or practises Hitler -approves,” and to the ones he disapproves. The two lists throw a good -deal of light on Hitler’s character, or rather on what he thinks his -character ought to be. - -The things Hitler approves are: First, “Advance by sections,” by which -he means that to achieve, one must concentrate upon one goal at a time, -as he has brilliantly exemplified in his conduct of the war so far. -Then in alphabetic order, Hitler approves: “Brutality; Discipline; -Executions for Treason; Faith; Fanaticism; Force; Hardness; Idealism; -Joy in responsibility; Loyalty; Obedience; Passion; Perseverance; -Ruthlessness; Sacrifice; Self-preservation; Self-sufficiency, national; -Silence and discretion; Social justice; Social responsibility; -Terrorism; Toughness; Will power and determination.” - -Hitler condemns: “Cowardice; Eroticism; Half measures; Humaneness; -Liberty; Pacifism; Passive resistance.” - -My impression is that of the qualities he named, Hitler possesses -brutality, discipline, faith, fanaticism, force, hardness, idealism, -joy in responsibility, passion, perseverance, ruthlessness, sacrifice, -discretion, terrorism, will power and determination; but that he does -not possess loyalty or a true sense of social justice, or social -responsibility, or toughness. He is hard without being tough. That -is, I believe he will one day prove brittle. As for loyalty, he is -notoriously able to discard a lifelong friend, and if necessary kill -him, as he did Roehm, without visible compunction. - - -Q. _What is the secret of Hitler’s power?_ - -A. That is a question that has interested me for eighteen years, -since I first saw Hitler and heard him speak. During all this time I -have heard hundreds of explanations of his power and have thought of -some myself. But the most interesting and plausible discussion of his -personality I have ever heard was given me by Dr. Carl G. Jung, the -great Swiss psychiatrist, when I visited him in his home in Zurich -to ask him to diagnose the dictators. It was in October 1938, and -I had come directly from Prague where I had witnessed the death of -Czechoslovakia. - -Dr. Jung’s analysis of Hitler has been remarkably confirmed by the -events since that time. He had been personally fascinated by the -problem of Hitler’s personality, and had studied it for years. He said: -“There were two types of strong men in primitive society. One was the -chief who was physically powerful, stronger than all his competitors, -and another was the medicine man who was not strong in himself but was -strong by reason of the power which the people projected into him. Thus -we had the Emperor and the Pope. - -“Hitler belongs in the category of the truly mystic medicine man. His -body does not suggest strength. The outstanding characteristic of his -physiognomy is its dreamy look. I was especially struck by that when I -saw pictures taken of him in the Czechoslovakian crisis; there was in -his eyes the look of a seer.” - -I asked, “Why is it that Hitler who makes nearly every German fall down -and worship him, produces next to no impression on any foreigner?” - -“Exactly,” Dr. Jung assented. “Few foreigners respond at all, yet -apparently every German in Germany does. It is because Hitler is the -mirror of every German’s unconscious, but of course he mirrors nothing -from a non-German. - -“He is the loud-speaker which magnifies the inaudible whispers of the -German soul until they can be heard by the German’s conscious ear. He -is the first man to tell every German what he has been thinking and -feeling all along in his unconscious about German fate, especially -since the defeat in the World War, and the one characteristic which -colors every German soul is the typically German inferiority complex, -the complex of the younger brother, of the one who is always a bit late -to the feast. Hitler’s power is not political; it is _magic_. - -“To understand magic you must understand what the unconscious is. It is -that part of our mental constitution over which we have little control -and which is stored with all sorts of impressions and sensations; -which contains thoughts and even conclusions of which we are not -aware. Besides the conscious impressions which we receive, there are -all sorts of impressions constantly impinging upon our sense organs of -which we do not become aware because they are too slight to attract our -conscious attention. They lie beneath the threshold of consciousness. -But all these subliminal impressions are recorded; nothing is lost. -Someone may be speaking in a faintly audible voice in the next room -while we are talking here. You pay no attention to it, but the -conversation next door is being recorded in your unconscious as surely -as though the latter were a dictaphone record. - -“Now the secret of Hitler’s power is not that Hitler has an -unconscious more plentifully stored than yours or mine. Hitler’s secret -is twofold; first, that his unconscious has exceptional access to his -consciousness, and second, that he allows himself to be moved by it. -He is like a man who listens intently to a stream of suggestions in a -whispered voice from a mysterious source, and then _acts upon them_. - -“In our case, even if occasionally our unconscious does reach us -through dreams, we have too much rationality, too much cerebrum to obey -it--but Hitler listens and obeys. The true leader is always _led_. - -“We can see it work in him. He himself has referred to his Voice. -His Voice is nothing other than his own unconscious, into which the -German people have projected their own selves; that is, the unconscious -of seventy-eight million Germans. That is what makes him powerful. -Without the German people he would be nothing. It is literally true -when he says that whatever he is able to do is only because he has the -German people behind him, or, as he sometimes says, because he _is_ -Germany. So with his unconscious being the receptacle of the souls of -seventy-eight million Germans, he is powerful, and with his unconscious -perception of the true balance of political forces at home and in the -world, he has so far been infallible. - -“That is why he makes political judgments which turn out to be right -against the opinions of all his advisors and against the opinions -of all foreign observers. When this happens it means only that the -information gathered by his unconscious, and reaching his consciousness -by means of his exceptional talent, has been more nearly correct than -that of all others, German or foreign, who attempted to judge the -situation and who reached conclusions different from his.” - -I remarked that if Hitler’s Voice continued to be always right, we were -in for a very interesting period. This was five months before Hitler -swallowed the whole of Czechoslovakia, and eleven months before he -launched the Second World War by assaulting Poland. - -Dr. Jung gravely answered: “Yes, it seems that the German people are -now convinced they have found their Messiah. In a way the position of -the Germans is remarkably like that of the Jews of old. - -“Since their defeat in the World War the Germans have awaited a -Messiah, a Savior. That is characteristic of people with an inferiority -complex. The Jews got their inferiority complex from geographical and -political factors. They lived in a part of the world which was a parade -ground for conquerors from both sides, and after their return from -their first exile to Babylon, when they were threatened with extinction -by the Romans, they invented the solacing idea of a Messiah who was -going to bring all the Jews together into a nation once more and save -them. - -“The Germans got their inferiority complex from comparable causes. They -came up out of the Danube Valley too late, and founded the beginnings -of their nation long after the French and English were well on their -way to nationhood. They were too late for the scramble for colonies -and for the foundation of empire. Then when they did get together and -made a unified nation, they looked around them and saw the British, the -French, and others with rich colonies and all the equipment of grown-up -nations and they became jealous, resentful, like a younger brother -whose older brothers have taken the lion’s share of the inheritance. - -“So the Germans slept through the division of the world into colonial -empires and thus they got their inferiority complex which made them -want to fight the World War; and of course when they lost it their -feeling of inferiority grew even worse and developed a desire for -a Messiah, and so they have their Hitler. If he is not their true -Messiah, he is like one of the Old Testament prophets; his mission is -to unite his people and lead them to the Promised Land. This explains -why the Nazis have to combat every other form of religion besides -their own idolatrous brand. I have no doubt but that the campaign -against the Catholic and Protestant churches will be pursued with -relentless and unremitting vigor, for the very sound reason, from the -Nazi point of view, that they wish to substitute the new faith of -Hitlerism.” - -I asked Dr. Jung: “Do you consider it possible that Hitlerism -might become for Germany a permanent religion for the future, like -Mohammedanism for the Moslems?” - -“I think it is highly possible,” Dr. Jung replied. “Hitler’s ‘religion’ -is the nearest to Mohammedanism, realistic, earthy, promising the -maximum of rewards in this life, but with a Moslem-like Valhalla into -which worthy Germans may enter and continue to enjoy themselves. Like -Mohammedanism, it teaches the _virtue_ of the sword. Hitler’s first -idea is to make his people powerful because the spirit of the Aryan -German deserves to be supported by might, by muscle and steel. It -is not a spiritual religion in the sense in which we ordinarily use -the term. But remember that in the early days of Christianity it was -the church which made the claim to total power, both spiritual and -temporal. Today the church no longer makes this claim, but the claim -has been taken over by the totalitarian states which demand not only -temporal but spiritual power. - -“Incidentally it occurs to me that the religious character of Hitlerism -is also emphasized by the fact that the German communities throughout -the world far from the political power of Berlin, have adopted -Hitlerism. Look at South America.” - -Dr. Jung said he had closely observed Hitler at his meeting with -Mussolini in Berlin. “I was only a few yards away from the two men and -could study them well. In comparison with Mussolini, Hitler made upon -me the impression of a sort of scaffolding of wood covered with cloth, -an automaton with a mask, like a robot or a mask of a robot. During the -whole performance he never laughed; it was as though he were in a bad -humor, sulking. He showed no human sign. - -“His expression was that of an inhumanly single-minded purposiveness, -with no sense of humor. He seemed as if he might be a double of a real -person, and that Hitler the man might perhaps be hiding inside like -an appendix, and deliberately so hiding in order not to disturb the -mechanism. - -“With Hitler you do not feel that you are with a man. You are with a -medicine man, a form of spiritual vessel, a demi-deity, or even better, -a myth. With Hitler you are scared. You know you would never be able to -talk to that man; because there is nobody there. He is not a man, but -a collective. He is not an individual, but a whole nation. I take it -to be literally true that he has no personal friend. How can you talk -intimately with a nation?” - -Finally Dr. Jung delivered a prophecy which was to prove woefully -accurate just five months later. “England and France,” he said, “will -not honor their new guarantee to Czechoslovakia any more than France -honored her previous pledge to Czechoslovakia. No nation keeps its -word. A nation is a big, blind worm, following what? Fate perhaps. A -nation has no honor, it has no word to keep. That is the reason why -in the old days, they tried to have kings who did possess personal -honor, and a word. But you know if you choose one hundred of the most -intelligent people and get them all together, they are a stupid mob? -Ten thousand of them together would have the collective intelligence -of an alligator. Haven’t you noticed at a dinner party that the more -people you invite the more stupid the conversation? In a crowd, the -qualities which everybody possesses multiply, pile up, and become the -dominant characteristics of the whole crowd. - -“Not everybody has virtues, but everybody has the low animal instincts, -the basic primitive caveman suggestibility, the suspicious and vicious -traits of the savage. The result is that when you get a nation of -many millions of people, it is not even human. It is a lizard or a -crocodile, or a wolf. Its statesmen cannot have a higher morality than -the animal-like mass morality of the nation, although individual -statesmen of the democratic states may attempt to behave a little -better. For Hitler, however, more than for any other statesman in the -modern world, it would be impossible to expect that he should keep the -word of Germany against her interest, in any international bargain, -agreement, or treaty. Because Hitler is the nation.” - - -Q. _Isn’t there anything constructive about Hitlerism? Is it all -destructive? Won’t they get over their period of madness and settle -down and make good world citizens?_ - -A. In 1934 I talked with President Thomas G. Masaryk of Czechoslovakia -in the old Hradzin Palace in Prague. The venerable statesman was -eighty-four years old, but he was still able to deliver measured -philosophical replies. One of them was to the question: “Aren’t you -as head of the Republic of Czechoslovakia which Hitler and his Nazis -threaten so violently, afraid he may some day attack you?” The old -man slowly replied, “No, because every revolutionary movement such as -the Nazis’ has its period of ecstasy, and the Nazis are going through -theirs now, but in a little while more they will subside and we will be -able to get along peaceably with them.” - -I went away with my first example of the fact that no man over seventy -ever seems to be able to understand Hitler. I beg the pardon of the -grand exception, Senator Glass, whose early and persistent advocacy of -effective action against Hitler has distinguished him among Senators, -some of whom approach treason in their imbecilic refusal to comprehend -the life-and-death issue facing America. - -Just five years after the founder of Czechoslovakia had expressed -his faith in the fundamental normality of the Nazis, his conviction -that they were after all like other people, and that their revolution -would follow the natural course of other radical movements and become -stabilized, Hitler sat at the very desk in the Hradzin where Masaryk -had sat. Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist precisely because Masaryk -and all the other heads of states in Europe blindly refused to see -that in Hitlerism the world was faced with a brute which always had to -move forward, steadily became bigger and hungrier as it was fed, and -would never cease to destroy and devour until stopped by force. To the -German there is something mystically attractive about this Nazi Wave -of Destruction. They feel their fate is being achieved by violence so -fierce that it intoxicates them, as the young Nazi Shock Troops are -intoxicated by battle lust when they fling themselves upon the enemy. - -It is the Nazis’ ability to combine this berserk, mystic rage with cold -scientific mastery of the intricate instruments of mechanized war that -makes them so formidable. They even loot scientifically, as witness the -way they have bled France. I know an amusing and typical example of the -German’s aptitude for plundering profitably. - -In Spain I met a young German Nazi machine gunner serving with Franco. -His name was Franz, and he had been an SS officer in Duesseldorf. He -had come to Spain, he declared, for idealistic motives, to fight the -Bolsheviks, and now after three months’ service his idealism had been -rewarded with a small fortune. I asked him how he had been able to make -any money serving as a noncommissioned officer. - -“Oh,” he explained, “I have the advantage over these Spaniards and -Moors of having an academic education. I did not finish school but I -had enough _Naturwissenschaft_ to know my way about in a physics or -chemistry laboratory. Now what do these poor ignorant Spaniards and -Moors do when they enter a town we have just taken. They go busting -around breaking into homes and offices, looking for cash and jewelry -and such things, but nobody ever leaves cash and jewelry lying around. -What do I do? I go straight to the _Kino_, the motion picture theater, -and straight to the projection room, and there I remove the lenses -which are worth from ten to twenty thousand pesetas, and I put the -lenses in my suitcase when I get back, and now I have two suitcases -full of lenses. They are worth a fortune. You see the beauties of -education?” - - -Q. _How has Hitler run his show without money, without gold, without -foreign exchange? Can the Nazi economy continue to run indefinitely on -its present basis?_ - -A. The Nazi economy can continue to run only as long as the war lasts. -This is the economic compulsion on Hitler to go on fighting. The Nazi -economy is one of scarcity. There are not enough workers, since most -able-bodied men are in the army; not enough food, or clothing, or -fuel, or manufactured articles. Everybody not in the armed forces has -to work very hard, very long hours in order to feed the colossal war -machine and produce the minimum necessary for the civilians to subsist. -Scarcity would normally shove prices upward; but not in the Nazi -economy where the Terror makes price control really work. The Gestapo -is a more potent backing for the currency than gold. The workings of a -totalitarian economy seem queer to us only because we continue to think -of Adam Smith’s “economic man,” and because we still believe that man -will always act freely in accord with the law of supply and demand. -But man under the Nazis is not free, does not act according to the law -of supply and demand but according to the Nazi law. This compulsion by -Terror makes a different kind of economic unit of him; our economic -laws do not apply to him any more. In our bourgeois society when civil -law condemns a man to go hungry, appetite is likely to make him break -the law. In the totalitarian state the punishments of the concentration -camp subdue almost every impulse to rebel. - -For foreign trade the Nazis use an infinitely flexible, complex system -of barter, often three-way. They confidently assert they have outgrown -the use of gold; although one of the reasons Walther Darre advanced -for a Nazi conquest of America was to lay hands on the American gold -reserve at Fort Knox. The Nazis have demonstrated that they can do -without gold, but this is no proof that gold is not more convenient -than barter; it is proof only that anything can be used for money -as long as the people believe in it, by natural inclination or by -compulsion--wampum, cows, brass, paper, or the muzzle of a Gestapo -pistol. It is one of our commonest fallacies to believe that financial -considerations affect very much the beginning or the middle or the end -of a war. Can you recall any war that had to stop because one side ran -out of money? In wartime a nation becomes a collective and money a -mere bookkeeping item. Only after the war when accounts are presented, -does bankruptcy become real. Hitler inherited a bankrupt, bourgeois, -peacetime economy and turned it overnight, from the moment he came to -power in 1933, into a wartime economy. Real peace would mean the total -collapse of Hitler’s totalitarian economic machine. - - -Q. _Why do the Nazis call theirs the Third Reich?_ - -A. Historically the First Reich was the Holy Roman Empire, the second -was the one founded by Bismarck, and the third is Hitler’s. When I -discussed this once with Dr. Jung, he pointed out deeper meanings. -He said, “Nobody called Charlemagne’s kingdom the First Reich, nor -William’s the Second Reich. Only the Nazis call theirs the Third Reich, -because it has a profound _mystical_ meaning.” - -Dr. Jung said the Nazis feel a parallel between the Biblical triad, -Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the _Third_ Reich, and that in fact -many Nazis refer to Hitler as the Holy Ghost. “Again,” Dr. Jung -continued, “consider the widespread revival in the Third Reich of -the cult of Wotan, God of Wind. Take the name _Sturmabteilung_, -Storm Troops. The swastika is a revolving form making a vortex moving -ever toward the left--which means in Buddhistic symbolism sinister, -unfavorable, directed toward the unconscious. All these symbols of a -Third Reich led by its prophet under the banners of wind and storm -and whirling vortices point to a mass movement which is to sweep the -German people in a hurricane of unreasoning emotion on to a destiny -which perhaps none but the seer, the prophet, the Fuehrer himself can -foretell--and perhaps not even he.” - -This psychiatric explanation of the Nazi names and symbols may sound -to a layman fantastic, but can anything be as fantastic as the bare -facts about the Nazi Party and its Fuehrer? Be sure there is much -more to be explained in them than can be explained by merely calling -them gangsters. They are products of that most hysterical, illogical, -emotional mentality in Europe, the German. - - -Q. _But I thought the Germans were stolid, phlegmatic, sensible people. -How can you describe them as hysterical?_ - -A. The commonest mistake the outside world makes about the Germans -is to describe them the way you have done. We Americans seem to -have judged most European nations exactly opposite from what they -really are. We consider the Italian to be emotional, easily swayed, -the Frenchman to be volatile, the Spaniard passionate, and so on. -Well, all the Latin races are models of calm, common sense and -middle-of-the-road, essentially stable people compared with the -Germans. As Dr. Jung put it, “The Italians are stable. Their minds do -not roll and wallow and leap and plunge through all the extravagant -ecstasies which are the daily exercise of the German mind.” The Germans -carry everything to excess. - -What other nation in Europe would have been inundated in one decade by -a wave of hysteria which was to sweep them into idolatrous worship -of a former building-trades laborer and corporal and lift them into -conquest of the entire continent of Europe and promise the conquest of -the world? Surely this is the most extraordinary yielding by a great -people to a mass emotion ever observed in our so-called civilized world. - -It is not, however, the first time that similar things have happened -in Germany. Hitler has had some notable predecessors in the turbulent -period of the Reformation. - -The Anabaptists of Munster were forerunners of the Nazis, and their -Fuehrer, John of Leyden, was a figure comparable to Hitler in ambition -and in his mystic hold over his followers. Leyden and his associates -seized the city of Munster in Westphalia in 1532 and, establishing a -totalitarian theocracy, set out to conquer the world and make Munster -its capital. Is that any more or less fantastic than Adolf Hitler, -setting out to proceed from Munich to the conquest of the world? - -John of Leyden differed in one respect, however, from Hitler. He -not only encouraged polygamy as Hitler’s Black Guards encourage -promiscuity, but he had four wives of his own, one of whom he, in a -typically Hitlerian fit of rage, beheaded with his own hand in the -market place. Munster for three years was the scene of excesses, -profligacy, and inhuman tortures committed upon the foes of the -medieval Nazis, until they were finally overcome by a coalition of -outraged neighbors, comparable in a smaller way, one might say, to the -present coalition against the Third Reich. - - -Q. _Doesn’t the life of Hitler, as far as we know it, show that he -suffered very much from poverty in his youth and then when Germany was -defeated, he suffered along with his fellow Germans so deeply that we -ought to be able to understand and forgive instead of hating and making -war upon him?_ - -A. That seems the equivalent of appealing for sympathy and -understanding for a mad dog, because the poor dog had been bitten and -given rabies without wanting it. It was not his fault, and he had -suffered from it, so why shoot him? Hitler, we know, did suffer as a -youth from many disabilities, including extreme poverty, and we ought -to be sorry that he did, not merely as Christians from love of our -neighbor, but because Hitler is causing us such infinite trouble and -misery, partially perhaps, on account of these early discomforts. - -But we can do nothing to correct Hitler’s personal history. By the time -he came into our lives his character was fixed in rigid, implacable -hatred for every human being on earth not willing or suitable to help -him place Deutschland in command of the world with himself the globe’s -supreme ruler. He is as little susceptible to reformation today as a -rattlesnake. As for the German people and their sufferings after the -defeat in the last war, there are several things to say. - -First, they did not suffer nearly so much as a nation usually suffers -after losing a four-years’ war. I can testify to that from personal -observation of the Germans from 1923 on, a period including the most -desperate months of the inflation. It is simply not correct to say -as Hackett says about the Germans after the war, “They were just as -unhappy, as despairing and as demoralized, in the midst of their -Reconstruction Period, as the old South in the years after the Civil -War.” - -The old South was physically devastated by the war. Germany surrendered -before the enemy reached her territory; she came off materially -scot-free. The people of the old South felt permanently beaten and for -a long time hopeless because they had failed in their attempt to defend -their right to be independent. The people of Germany felt temporarily -frustrated of their ambition to dominate the world; just twenty years -later they set forth to try it again. Do you think the old South, if it -had wanted to do so, would have been able physically or economically -to have resumed the struggle with the North in 1885, twenty years after -the end of the Civil War, as the Germans did with the Allies in 1939, -twenty years after Versailles? - -My second point about the German suffering is that before Versailles -they demonstrated their intention in the treaties of Bucharest and -Brest-Litovsk, to inflict upon their enemies terms incomparably more -severe than Versailles. - -Third, in the course of the present war the Germans have proved that -the sort of peace they intend to grant the countries they vanquish now -will make the Versailles treaty appear to be a dispensation from Heaven. - -Fourth, although these facts do not of course excuse the flaws in -the Versailles treaty, none of its defects could possibly excuse the -bestial behavior of the Germans toward the especial objects of their -pathological antipathy, the Jews, Czechs, and Poles, nor provide a -reasonable basis for their desire to inflict vengeance upon the entire -world. - -Finally, it makes no difference what the reasons for present German -behavior are, that behavior threatens to destroy us and unless we check -it by force, we shall perish. - - -Q. _What should we do with Hitler after we beat him? Will he be allowed -to escape to a lifetime of comfort the way Kaiser Wilhelm did?_ - -A. When this question is asked I am reminded of an old Texas recipe for -cooking rabbit. It begins, “First catch your rabbit.” I do not know -what will be done with Hitler. There are many people who say he will -never be taken alive; that he will commit suicide. I do not believe -that. My guess is that Hitler would either “do a Hess” and escape to -England or seek death in battle as the Kaiser once claimed he would do. - -If he remains alive, our people being incurably sentimental, we should -probably treat him the way the Allies treated Napoleon after Leipzig. -They sent him, as you may remember, to Elbe, and gave him an annual -income of 2,000,000 francs, which was about $400,000 and equivalent to -$1,000,000 in purchasing power today. Perhaps we would not, though, -especially if the American people have to live through a great deal of -hardship and bloodletting on account of this man. Maybe we will become -like the British, who, after all, are going to have something to say -about the fate of Hitler if and when he is ever caught. - -The _Daily Mail_ of London ran a questionnaire asking its readers what -they thought should be done with Hitler after the war. The largest -number, twenty-five per cent, wanted him shown about the country in a -cage. This is an idea which had been suggested for the former Kaiser, -and it shows a surprising insight into the source of the deepest -emotions for extremely vain men of the type of Hitler and the Kaiser; -they certainly would suffer more from such public humiliation than from -any other punishment. - -Another twenty per cent wanted him executed by hanging, shooting, or -beheading, in that order. Fifteen per cent wanted him exiled to remote, -unpleasant places, as Devil’s Island, the Andaman Islands, Ascension -Island, Arctic wastes, and the African desert. Another fifteen per cent -wanted him condemned to lifelong solitary confinement. Ten per cent -wanted to make him live the rest of his life under the same conditions -the English are living under now, with bombs, rationing, and so on. -Five per cent wanted to hand him over to the Poles or Jews. Five per -cent would have him treated as a certified lunatic. - -Five per cent suggested all sorts of miscellaneous treatment, including -confinement under precisely the same conditions as normally obtain -in a Nazi torture chamber. There were no suggestions at all that he -should be treated well, as Napoleon was treated. The question is not -trivial and the answers of the British are really important, because -they throw light on the temper of the British people after the brutal -manhandling they have received from Nazi bombers. The most constructive -suggestion I ever heard on the subject of what to do with Hitler came -from my brilliant friend, Edgar Mowrer, who had a decade of experience -in Germany. He suggests that after we have defeated Hitler we put him -in a cage and send him about Germany to explain to the Germans how -wrong he had been. - - -Q. _What would happen if Hitler were to be killed?_ - -A. It would reduce the German war effort by one-half, and would -guarantee that Germany would lose. Hitler is irreplaceable, unique, and -if he were to be killed, or died, or anyhow left the scene, Germany -would not collapse but she would be as an automobile going at top -speed, suddenly run out of gasoline. The momentum of the car would -carry it forward a certain distance, but it would eventually stop. - -That, in my opinion, is what would happen to Germany if deprived of -Hitler. It is not his technical ability that would be missed so much, -nor his administrative brains, nor even his incredibly accurate, -intuitive knowledge of his enemies, nor even his uncanny sense of -timing. What would be missed would be his inspiration to the German -people. If they lost their medicine man the faith in his name would -flicker on, but the confidence in his infallibility which now upholds -the civil population in the hardships of war and promotes the courage -of the troops in battle would disappear. The effect would be disastrous. - - -Q. _Why doesn’t somebody kill Hitler?_ - -A. For the last two years that has been the question most frequently -asked me on the lecture platform all over America. Sometimes a fourth -of all the written questions sent up would be this one. An average -of twenty-five persons out of every thousand in the audience would -put this question and they have been doing that ever since Hitler’s -victory over the Allies in Munich in September 1938. This itself is -an interesting light on the American attitude. Most of the time the -question was framed, “Why doesn’t some Jew, or some Britisher, or some -Frenchman kill Hitler?” - -It is bewildering to reflect that up until September 1939, any young -man, Jew or Gentile, British, French, or of any of the thirteen nations -Hitler has conquered, any brave, intelligent man could have killed -Hitler within two months of making the resolution to do so. Only one -requirement was essential--that the assassin be willing to give up his -life. Now, however, it may cost the lives of millions of young men on -the battlefield before this author of evil is destroyed. - - -Q. _But wasn’t he always too closely guarded to be killed?_ - -A. Not at all. Now it is another matter. Since the war began he is so -well guarded that it might be impossible to get at him. Before the war -began it would have been easy to kill him. It might even have been -possible for a bold and shrewd assassin to have killed him without -being captured. I give you one instance. - -At every Nazi Party Congress in Nuremberg there are hundreds of -thousands of strangers in the city. The Gestapo with all its resources -cannot possibly check on them all. A resourceful foreigner, speaking -German and posing as a German, could obtain a room in a hotel facing -the main street down which the parades pass. During the course of the -Congress Hitler appears in at least one parade a day down this street. -He always uses a long black Mercedes car and he stands in the front, -next to his chauffeur. Hitler stands there holding on now and then with -his left hand, and giving the Nazi salute with his right. - -In the rear of his car are four SS men, and on the running boards are -two others, and behind Hitler’s car is another identical Mercedes with -six to eight more SS men. The SS men, who are the best pistol shots -in Germany, lean out of their cars, peering at the crowds, and they -keep their right hands always on their pistols. You say that sounds as -though he were well guarded? Not at all. The crowd in Nuremberg is so -great that it encroaches on the path of the automobiles until they are -slowed to a walk. That means Hitler passes underneath your window at a -walking speed. - -An assassin could lean out of his window and toss a bomb into Hitler’s -car with absolute accuracy. He could not miss. I have often leaned out -and looked down at Hitler and remarked in a whisper to my comrades, -“How easy it would be, wouldn’t it, to drop a grapefruit?” And if you -think a bomb is too uncertain, why not try a sub-machine gun? That -would be 100 per cent sure. You would have him at a distance of about -thirty yards. With one burst you could riddle him, put perhaps twenty -bullets into him before the guards could turn around. - -You ask how the assassin could get the sub-machine gun or the bombs -into the hotel? The Gestapo is good, but it is a long way from being -perfect. They overlook a great many things. We were in Vienna when -Hitler marched in. The Gestapo had been in control of the city for -days. But on the very day Hitler came to Vienna my wife borrowed a -radio set from Tess Shirer and had the porter carry it into the hotel -and up to our room. It was the size of a large thick suitcase. Nobody -stopped her, or asked to investigate it. It might have contained two -or three sub-machine guns with sufficient ammunition and a few hand -grenades. - -You object that the assassin would certainly be caught and executed. I -agree. Political assassins almost never escape. But political assassins -must always and nearly always are willing to take this chance. You -can take it as a rule of political assassination, however, that if -the assassin is bold enough, he can always get his man. Remember the -Macedonian gunman, Vlada Georgiev, who killed King Alexander and Louis -Barthou in Marseilles, October 9, 1934? He was a husky fellow who -waited behind the police line until the royal automobile came opposite -him and then burst through the line like a football player and with one -leap was on the running board of the automobile pumping bullets from -his automatic into his two victims. It was all over in thirty seconds. -The police had no chance to intervene before Alexander was dead. -General Georges, later the unhappy second in command of the French -Army, cut down the assassin with his saber. - -This is the classic street assassination, resembling in every detail -the killing by Gavril Princip of the Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand in -Sarajevo, June 28, 1914, which touched off the first World War. But the -Nuremberg situation would give an assassin a chance for his life. You -see, the SS guards are constantly watching the crowds in the street. -None of them pays attention to the windows of the houses and hotels -along the street. The crowds are so thick that between our hotel and -the path of Hitler’s automobile would be standing twenty to thirty -thousand people. - -Now suppose the assassin drops his bomb or fires his machine gun, or to -make assurance doubly sure, drops bombs _and_ fires his machine gun. -Hitler falls. The crowd panics. How long would it take the SS men or -other police to get through the crowd to the hotel entrance, climb the -stairs, and search for the assassin? It would take several minutes at -least. And in the midst of that howling mob of panic-stricken people -it would take minutes more before the police could surround the block. -Meanwhile the assassin would have plenty of time to run upstairs to the -roof, across to another building, and down a rear fire escape to mingle -with the crowd. Whatever the later details of escape, there would be -a chance of his getting away from the scene of the shooting if he had -laid his plans carefully in advance. - - -Q. _You haven’t told us yet why nobody ever tried it?_ - -A. Yes, it has been clumsily tried, but without the proper preparation. -Four or five attempts were made on Hitler’s life during his first -two years in office, 1933 and 1934, while I was in Berlin. They were -all hushed up so closely that we never had more than the skeleton of -the story. They were hushed up because the Nazis and especially the -Gestapo, and especially its chief, Heinrich Himmler, know that there is -nothing so infectious as the idea of political assassination. - -The news of an attempt at assassination will set off a series of -imitative attempts. Therefore Himmler gave up his original idea which -was expressed in his announcement through the German press a few weeks -after Hitler took office. Himmler declared in a formal proclamation -that if anyone were to assassinate or attempt to assassinate the -Fuehrer, there would be, and these are his exact words, “a massacre -such as the world has never seen.” He specified that the Gestapo would -massacre all of the Nazis’ opponents, and implied they would kill every -Jew in Germany. - -Himmler’s announcement was calculated to deter assassins, but he never -meant to put it into effect unless Hitler were actually killed. We -correspondents, however, heard of several attempts on Hitler. One was -said to have taken place the day before the great Blood Purge of June -30, 1934, and was believed to have contributed to Hitler’s decision -to exterminate his enemies. In this case the assassin fired with a -rifle at Hitler’s automobile. Another time his car was narrowly saved -from crashing into an obstacle supposed to have been placed in the -road with the purpose of killing him. Other attempts were even more -vaguely rumored. Himmler took care that the public should learn nothing -about these attempts, not only because of the infectious nature of -the news of the assassinations, but because the Gestapo considered it -undesirable to reveal that anybody in Germany could want to kill the -Fuehrer. - - -Q. _That’s all right about Germans, but why not a Britisher, or a -Frenchman, or a Jew?_ - -A. The question why doesn’t a Jew, or why didn’t a Jew, kill Hitler is -one that I have often heard asked of my Jewish friends, and the answer -usually is that if a Jew killed Hitler the Nazis would slaughter every -Jew in their dominions. The Nazis now have under their despotism in the -Reich and the fifteen conquered countries perhaps five or six million -Jews still. I agree that it is perfectly possible that the Nazis -might try to slaughter them all if a Jew were to kill Hitler, but if -Hitler is not defeated these unfortunate victims of Nazi hatred will -ultimately perish anyway. - -Nevertheless, even the very courageous young Jews who used to operate -an organization to counter Arab terror argued the same way with me when -I was in Palestine, that if they killed Hitler they would doom hundreds -of thousands if not millions of Jews to death. It seems that they can -believe rationally that Hitler does intend eventually to exterminate -all the Jews in Europe, and so it would not make much difference -if they were all or many of them killed as a result of Hitler’s -assassination, but emotionally they cling to the subconscious hope that -something will happen to save them. Of course, the only thing that can -save the Jews of Europe is for Hitler to be defeated before they all -die. - -As for a young Britisher or Frenchman killing Hitler, before the war -began, as I have said, it would have been easy, but consider if a man -had killed Hitler before the war, what would the world have said? -What sort of judgment would the world have delivered on the assassin? -Would he have been considered a hero, a savior of mankind? Not at all, -because Hitler up to that time was only a potential menace to Britain, -France, and the other peaceful states. If he had been killed, his -assassin would have been declared a madman, and his act would have been -condemned by all save the small group of persons who perceived the -inevitability and the catastrophic course of the war Hitler planned -against the world. No assassin kills out of pure idealism. A man who -killed Hitler would want a little credit for it, and until the war -began he would have received none. - - -Q. _He would receive plenty of credit now. Why doesn’t the British -government organize the killing of Hitler? Haven’t they plenty of -agents in Germany?_ - -A. I have no doubt the killer of Hitler would be decorated by -fifteen governments or more, but there are still millions of muddled -sentimentalists in this country who would shudder at the thought of -assassination. There were few, I suppose, who objected to the G-men -shooting the rabid Dillinger, but millions denounced the little doctor, -Weiss, who shot the far more dangerous criminal, Huey Long. So it would -have fared with anyone who would have assassinated Hitler. Imagine how -different the history of Germany and of the world might have been if -Hitler had been among the victims of the machine gun which fired on him -on the morning of November 10, 1923, on the Odeon’s Platz in Munich. - -Before this war there were just as many sentimentalists in England, but -you would have to look a long time to find one now. During an air raid -in London I asked an old English lady, one of the gentlest creatures I -have ever known, what she would do if she were driving an automobile -and suddenly Hitler were to appear in front of the car. Would she turn -and save him, or would she drive ahead and hit him? “I would press the -accelerator and drive straight over him,” she said firmly. - - -Q. _What was the explanation of the bombing attempt on Hitler in the -Munich Beer Hall?_ - -A. It bore every earmark of being an admirably well thought-out and -executed plan by the British which just failed by a few minutes. I -should think the British government has done all it could to have -Hitler killed. Certainly the British know how supremely important it -would be to do away with the heart and brains of Nazidom. The bomb -attempt on Hitler in the _Buergerbraeu Keller_ in Munich, November -8, 1939, the anniversary of the Hitler-Ludendorff Putsch, nearly -succeeded. To refresh your memory: Hitler and his “Old Fighters” left -the beer hall twelve minutes before a time bomb exploded, killing seven -persons and wounding sixty-three. The Germans blamed it on the British -secret agents, and announced they had captured two such agents, a Mr. -Best and a Captain Stevens, on the day after the bomb explosion. - -The Gestapo had gone over into Holland to kidnap the two Britishers who -incautiously made a rendezvous close to the frontier. - -Some persons analyzed this affair thus: The Gestapo itself arranged the -bomb to go off after Hitler left. The Gestapo did it for one of two -reasons. Either Himmler wanted to kill Hitler, or Hitler wanted the -bomb attempt in order to arouse sympathy for himself among his people, -and hatred of the English. Neither of these explanations makes sense to -me. No Nazi leader in his right mind wants Hitler to be killed, because -every Nazi is aware that his party, his job, and his very life are -dependent upon the continued existence and leadership of Hitler. I will -not say anything further about the plain fact that most of Hitler’s -subordinates literally worship him. Just on the basis of individual -self-interest, it would be unlikely that any Nazi leader should wish to -weaken the Nazi position so disastrously. - -I do not believe Himmler or any other Nazi was behind the attempt. Nor -is it credible that Hitler planted the bomb to arouse sympathy for -himself among the German people. He has all the sympathy he needs, and -German hatred for the English is quite adequate. Neither of these two -reasons could balance the danger involved in the infectious quality -of a public attempt at assassination such as this was. This attempt, -which took place before a large public, could not be concealed. - -Finally, it seems that the German capture of the two British secret -agents crippled the British Intelligence Service in Germany for many -months. They were men high in the service and could be presumed to -have known a good deal about the whole Intelligence Service setup -in Germany. With the Gestapo at work on them in the approved style -recently made so vivid and bloodcurdling by Jan Valtin in _Out of the -Night_, it is not likely that many British Intelligence agents in -Germany remained unidentified. At any rate there have not been any -further attempts on Hitler, at least none that we know about. - -The time-bomb attempt was compared by some correspondents to the -Reichstag fire, but I fail to see the basis for comparison. The -Reichstag was set afire by the Nazis for the specific, rational purpose -of blaming it on the Communists, suppressing their party, jailing -their deputies, and thus obtaining for the Nazis a majority vote in -the Reichstag. These purposes were achieved to the great profit of -the Nazis. What profit could the Nazis have had in staging a near -assassination of Hitler? When the Reichstag was burned, my cabled -report was censored, the first censorship I had experienced in eight -years of work as a correspondent in Germany. - -The freshly appointed censor cut out a paragraph in which I had pointed -out that police when seeking the perpetrator of a crime, always try to -find out first who would have profited by the crime. So in the case of -the Reichstag fire it was only necessary to look for the persons who -would profit by the fire. The answer was as plain as daylight. Only the -Nazis would profit by the fire. The censor deleted this commonplace -but accurate observation. Who would profit by the death of Hitler? The -Nazis? Of course not. The British? Of course! If they had succeeded -they would have earned the thanks of a thousand million beneficiaries -throughout the world. - -The fact that Hitler and his staff saved their lives by leaving the -_Buergerbraeu Keller_ earlier than had been their custom in former -years is the basis of the peculiar claim that the whole thing was a -Nazi plot. Why, it is argued, should Hitler have not stayed as usual to -chat with the comrades of the early days? Why indeed? Because this was -wartime, the first anniversary of the Putsch to be celebrated since the -war began. Hitler has not been known to waste much time since the war -began. He could be assumed to have had a number of things to do more -important than chatting with his Beer Cellar veterans. This time his -industry saved his life. - - -Q. _Why is it there are so few assassinations or attempted -assassinations in any of the totalitarian states? You would think their -cruelties would lead many desperate men to seek revenge._ - -A. Yes, you would, and this is a matter that many of us in Russia used -to discuss. How odd it was that in the history of the Soviet Union -there were only three known assassinations or attempts at assassination -of Soviet leaders. - -Lenin was shot and seriously wounded in 1918 by Dora Kaplan, a Social -Revolutionary; Uritzky, police chief of Leningrad, was killed at the -same time; and sixteen years later, December 4, 1934, Sergei Kirov, -political boss of Leningrad, was shot by a half-demented former -Communist, Nikolaev. I shall not forget the Kirov killing because I was -in Moscow at the time and saw Stalin, in the bitter cold of a Moscow -December, help carry barehanded the coffin of Kirov to its grave on the -Red Square, and then hurry back to his office to plan his revenge, the -most colossal ever enjoyed by a human being since the prophet wrote -that vengeance was reserved to the Almighty. - -It was the Kirov killing, of course, which touched off Stalin’s great -purge. It illustrates perfectly the first of several reasons why -assassinations are rare in the totalitarian states. Let me say here -that one of those reasons is not the one most popularly believed. It -is not due to the impenetrable guard kept around the tyrants. There at -the funeral of Kirov, we in the press box were not more than twenty -yards from Stalin as he stood on top of Lenin’s tomb, and when he -walked to the grave he came within almost touching distance of me. - -Granted that the correspondents have unusual facilities, and that the -G.P.U. checks all of them to be confident none of them is dangerous. -But there in the Red Square hundreds of thousands of men and women -marched past Stalin, the nearest only a few feet away. Any one of them -could have shot at him or hurled a hand grenade at him before any of -the police surrounding the tomb could have intervened. - -Likewise, Stalin could have been killed any time during the two decades -by any person with the initiative to attend the Bolshoi Theater when -Stalin was there, sitting in the rear of his first floor forward box. -He could have been shot from a score of seats in the first two rows of -the orchestra. It would have been even easier to wait for one of the -big Communist meetings in the Bolshoi Theater when Stalin was there -with all the leaders of the party. I have seen him with the entire -Politburo and forty or fifty others, sitting bunched together on the -stage of the Bolshoi Theater, while we in the Press box in the Gallery, -almost overhanging the stage, leaned over the rail and quietly observed -how easy it would be to drop something in Stalin’s lap. - -A single bomb small enough to be concealed beneath an overcoat would -have killed Stalin and perhaps the entire top rank of the Communist -Party. Why hasn’t anyone tried it? Stalin surely has more enemies who -would like to see him dead than any man in the world except Hitler. -Stalin probably has more personal enemies than Hitler, because Stalin -has executed more people. When you think of the millions who died as -victims of the Revolution, and of the millions who died in the famine -of 1932-33, when Stalin ordered the peasants of the Ukraine to be -stripped of all their food to teach them a lesson, it seems singular -that no bereaved survivor should have lifted his hand against the -tyrant. - -The first reason, however, why a modern despot enjoys relative security -is the character of totalitarian terror. In a normal democratic country -an assassin has to fear only the loss of his own life, and the lives -of his immediate conspirators, if any. In Russia, after Kirov’s death, -Stalin executed in this wise: - -First, 103 persons who were not even accused of having had anything -to do with the assassination but had been held in jail for various -political offenses. This was simply the first gesture of the Terror, -intended to shock the country. Then as the police rounded up Nikolaev’s -family, friends, and acquaintances, and read his diary, they came to -know virtually every human being Nikolaev had known during his whole -life. Every one of these persons was arrested and after being squeezed -dry of information was executed; at any rate they all disappeared. - -But that was only the beginning. The purges which were occasioned, not -caused, by the Kirov killing lasted about four years, from 1935 to -1938 inclusive. The Purge became so huge that Nikolaev was forgotten, -but before the G.P.U. finished with the Nikolaev complex, they had -liquidated in this wise: Every relative of Nikolaev to the third -cousins; every acquaintance of Nikolaev and every acquaintance of an -acquaintance of Nikolaev, and every acquaintance of every acquaintance -of every acquaintance of Nikolaev. You think this is an exaggeration? -Not at all. The number of executions ran into thousands. - -Now what would be the effect upon a would-be assassin, if, as he -contemplated his deed, he reflected that as a consequence of his -killing Stalin, not merely would he himself be executed, but every -human being in the world with whom he had ever come in contact? Man -experiences the world largely as a series of contacts with other men. -Suppose the assassin knew by just such an experience as the Russian -people had in the case of the killing of Kirov, that his entire world -would be blotted out if he went on with his plans. Would not this deter -almost any man? - -He might be motivated by the highest idealism, and would plan to give -his own life in order to rid his country of a cruel despot, but if he -were thinking of helping the people in his own world he would be bound -to admit that far from helping them, he was about to condemn to death -everybody on earth he had ever known. This surely is the most important -deterrent to assassination in despotic states and it is corroborated by -the experience of Italy. - -Mussolini’s Fascist state is the least terroristic of the three -totalitarian states. The terror is so mild in comparison with -the Soviet or Nazi varieties, that it almost fails to qualify as -terroristic at all. The best proof I know of this is the experience of -an Italian friend of mine who before Fascism came to Italy was chief -correspondent of one of Italy’s greatest newspapers. - -He occupied a position which might be compared with that of chief -Washington correspondent of the _New York Times_. When Mussolini took -power this friend, whom I may call Luigi, was dismissed from his -newspaper because he refused to become a Fascist. If he had wished to -serve Mussolini, he would have been made a Senator, and would have -become a rich man. But no, he was a courageous, passionately sincere -liberal. He used to declare, “I would approve of nearly all Mussolini’s -program (he doubtless would not say that now), but as long as he wants -to compel me to approve, I disapprove. I shall only approve when I am -at liberty to disapprove.” - -Now what would have happened to this sort of man in Soviet Russia? A -leading journalist under the Czar defies Bolshevik power! You know -as well as I what would happen to him. He would be shot at once. -They would not even waste on him food for a day’s extra meals. He -would have been shot the moment the Cheka noticed him. And what would -have happened to Luigi in Germany? He would have been sent to a -concentration camp and there he would have been tortured and either -gradually killed or turned out a broken emasculated creature, not a man -any more. - -But what happened to him in Italy? First, his newspaper, with which -he had a contract, bought off the contract for a sum sufficient for -him to live on in a modest way the rest of his life. At the same time -the police established a twenty-four hour surveillance of him. Three -detectives working in eight-hour shifts were assigned to watch him. -Mind you, he wasn’t arrested, and was even allowed to become the -correspondent of a foreign newspaper. - -The detectives were there all the time. Luigi came to know them well. -If they behaved decently and he liked them, he never gave them any -trouble. But if one of them was rude, this is the way Luigi would -do. He would get all his newspapers, a dozen or more to read in the -morning, and though ordinarily he would take a taxi or walk to his -office, now to discipline the detective, Luigi would get on one of -the streetcars which circle Rome and he would sit there, going around -and around the city for a couple of hours, reading his papers. The -detective had to follow him. The detective rode a bicycle. Two hours -of hard road work usually corrected the manners of the worst of them. -Think of that kind of police “Terror,” and you have a fair idea of the -comparative mildness of the Italian kind of totalitarianism. We used to -take delight in counting up how many hundreds of thousands of lire it -had cost the Italian government to keep three detectives employed for -fifteen years. - -What has this to do with our theme of assassination? Just this, that -during the first twelve years of Mussolini’s dictatorship he was -attacked twelve times, and several of the attempts only failed by the -narrowest margin. - -One of the earliest and most serious attempts was by a former general -who hired a room a couple of hundred yards away from the Palazzo -Chigi, equipped himself with a sporting rifle fitted with telescopic -sights, and waited for Mussolini to come out on the balcony to speak. -This event may have inspired Geoffrey Household’s _Rogue Male_. The -general was betrayed at the last moment, arrested, and sentenced to -life imprisonment on the Lipari Islands. That is another index of the -comparatively mild character of the Italian despotism. At that time the -Fascist legal code still had no provision for the death penalty for a -plot against the life of the head of the State. - - -Q. _In spite of everything you say it still seems difficult to see why -some person half-demented by persecution or the cruelties inflicted -upon his family and friends should not have tried to take vengeance -against the tyrant. There must certainly be among the victims of Nazi -or Bolshevik brutality many persons too tortured in mind to be able to -remember all those considerations you have advanced?_ - -A. Undoubtedly there are, but these persons are generally too -demoralized to act. If they are sufficiently distorted by their -suffering to forget the consequences to their family and friends of an -attack on the tyrant, they are too enfeebled to move. Fear paralyzes -them. The modern totalitarian tyranny, as the German and Russian, by -reason of the ideology of the ruling party and superior organization -of its police force, ferrets out, identifies, and disciplines a larger -percentage of its opponents than any tyranny was ever able to do in the -past. The ideology of the party makes an ex-officio police agent out of -every Communist in Russia and every Nazi in Germany. - -The G.P.U. and Gestapo are superior to the police systems of former -modern tyrannies because this is the first time that tyrannies have -not been ashamed of their political police, but acknowledge, boast of -them, and coerce the population to cooperate with them. The amorality -of Bolshevism and Nazism, or rather their rejection of the Christian -standard of behavior, is best illustrated by the exceptional position -of the political police systems. Under a regime such as the Czar’s, -the political police, the Okhrana, was likewise an instrument of -repression, and as such the regime showed constant evidence of being -ashamed of it. - -The efficiency of the Okhrana suffered correspondingly. Today, in view -of our experience with the G.P.U. and the Gestapo, the Okhrana seems -like a benevolent association for the benefit of wayward Russians. -It is instructive now to go back and read the memoirs of that great -opponent of the Czar, the noble revolutionary, Prince Kropotkin. -To note the comparative triviality of the offenses charged by the -revolutionaries against the regime, and then to note the comparative -leniency of the punishments inflicted by the Czar upon his enemies is -to measure the chasm which the Bolshevik Revolution and the Red Terror -dug between our New Dark Age and the imperfect, liberal, easygoing -Past, the like of which no one in our generation shall ever see again. - -Under the Okhrana the number of political assassinations in Russia -culminating with the killing of Alexander the Second, reached an -all-time high. This fact, like the attempts on Mussolini’s life, -corroborate the thesis that mild Terror is ineffective, while extreme -Terror may be completely effective. It seems to me to be useful to -stress this fact about the Nazi or Bolshevik Terror, because one of our -American democratic illusions to which we cling most fondly is that -good will always triumph, liberty will eventually win over tyranny, and -despots will ultimately be overthrown by their oppressed victims. - -This doctrine is not only false, but one of the most harmful of our -wishful thoughts, since it leads us to believe that all may come right -with this very wrong world without our having to do anything about it. -Another instructive pursuit is to get a copy of the old _Who’s Who of -the Russian Communist Party_ and observe that there was not a single -leading member of the Party who had not been at one time or another, -and frequently many times, under arrest by the Okhrana. Stalin, -supreme butcher of the lot, was five times in the hands of the men whom -he later was to help exterminate. One can conservatively say that if -the Okhrana had been operated on the principles of the Soviet Police, -not a single leader of the Bolsheviks would have been left alive, and -there would have been no Bolshevik Revolution as we know it, and no -Soviet Union with its melancholy record of life-taking failure, and -perhaps no Nazi party in Germany, and who knows, perhaps no World War -now. - -Absolute Terror not only physically removes the more dangerous -opponents of the tyranny but it reduces the survivors to morbid -obeisance, to a sort of unwilling, servile, unconscious idolatry of -the tyrant. The tyrant, when he attains the stature of Hitler or -Stalin, becomes the Omnipotent Father in the subconsciousness of all -his subjects, including those hostile to him. This makes it all the -more difficult for the rebel to raise his hand in patricide. Those who -insist that the modern tyrants are mere gangsters overlook the aura -of mystic power which is created around the figure of a ruler daily -greeted by choruses of adulation and abasement from tens of millions of -his people. It is no more to be resisted than the rhythm of tom-toms. - -When the Lion of Judah, Emperor Haile Selassie, declared formal -mobilization of his ragged soldiers, he had two batteries of war drums, -one in major, one in minor key, beating their defiant message all day -and all night from his palace in Addis Ababa. The pulsations of the -drums at the Ghibi more than two miles away came to me in my room in -the stables of the Imperial hotel with a mesmeric force that made me -long to follow their rhythmic directions. The same effect is obtained -in the great tyrannies by the mass salutations of the tyrant worshipers. - -Never in history have there been such vast numbers of people to add -the influence of the multitude to the herd instinct to conform. The -greatest tyrannies of long ago, when the human tribe was a fraction -of its size today, the Roman Empire, the Mongol Khanates, or even -the Indian Mogul Kingdoms, disposed of power over small populations -compared with the more than 250,000,000 now ruled by Hitler or the -200,000,000 by Stalin. In this day of electric communications the -huge bulk of such aggregates does not become unmanageable. The more -territory Hitler conquers, the more loot he has, the more permanent -resources to exploit, and the more people to enslave at work useful for -the Nazis. Our only hope against him is for his military defeat at the -hands of ourselves and our friends. - - -Q. _You have made discouragingly plain why there are so few political -assassinations in Germany, but couldn’t somebody like the fellow who -killed King Alexander and Barthou in Marseilles be found?_ - -A. I do not think so. That fellow, Vlada Georgiev, was a member of -the famous Imro, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, -which had the only system I ever heard of to guarantee that their -members carry out assigned assassinations, no matter what the police -terror might be. The Imro’s object was to unify and obtain the greatest -possible degree of independence for Macedonia, divided among Bulgaria, -Greece, and Jugoslavia. Their chief weapon was assassination, and -when the Imro decreed a person’s death it was about as certain to be -carried out as any human decision can be. The procedure was to appoint -a killer and provide that he be killed unless he fulfilled his task. To -make this principle work it was necessary that the appointed assassin -realize he would more surely die if he failed than if he succeeded and -risked legal execution. A long tradition of killings within the Imro -made this fearful compulsion effective. - -The mechanics of the system were simple. Like the Russian Nihilists -under Boris Savinkov, the Imro used to try and formally condemn their -victims to death. Thereupon the committee would draw beans from a bag. -The man drawing a black bean was the appointed assassin. He was _A_. -He had to leave the room. The others drew again. The man drawing the -second black bean, _B_, was appointed to kill _A_ if _A_ didn’t kill -the chosen victim. _B_ then left the room and a third black bean, _C_, -was appointed to kill _B_ if _B_ failed to carry out his assignment, -and so on until the whole committee had lined up, each with a gun -in the back of another. No one knew who among his comrades was his -potential executioner, but each knew that death was certain if the -decisions of the committee were not obeyed. Now this sort of system -would work, I believe, even in Nazi Germany, but the democracies are -far too squeamish to indulge in such practical methods.[1] - -FOOTNOTE: - -[1] A German statistician objected to this description of the Imro -system on the ground that the second to the last man would know that it -was the last man who was delegated to kill him if necessary; and the -last man would not have a gun in his back. True enough mathematically, -but the Imro system was run by practical assassins, not mathematicians. -They never let it get to the last man; the existence of the chain, -incomplete though it had to be, guaranteed that the originally -appointed assassin performed his duty. - - -Q. _Did the Nazis or the Bolsheviks practice assassination?_ - -A. They both rather looked down on individual killings as dilettante. -They preferred to do away with their victims en masse; especially the -Bolsheviks. I remember at the time of the Blood Purge of June 30, 1934, -when Hitler had murdered one thousand or more of his opponents, a -Polish correspondent in Moscow was expelled by the Soviet authorities -because he commented in a dispatch from the Russian capital that the -Bolsheviks regarded Hitler’s purge with the same disdain a wholesaler -would have toward the operations of a retailer. One thousand dead would -be retail business for the Bolsheviks. The Communists, however, stood -programmatically on the platform of no “individual terror” as they put -it, because they considered that assassinations of single persons were -ineffective, time and energy wasting. - -The Nazis spurned no weapon, and so they murdered right and left from -the beginning. It was their type of young men, whether yet organized -in the Nazi Party or not, who committed most of the political -assassinations of postwar Germany from Rathenau and Erzberger until -Hitler came to power. Meanwhile, they deliberately provoked battles -with the young men of every other faction, Democrats as well as -Communists, in assemblies and on the streets, and the deaths from these -clashes numbered hundreds yearly. - -After Hitler came to power you might have expected individual -assassinations to cease. But no, the murders by individual Nazis of -individual enemies, business rivals, or of anyone they happened to -dislike, continued through the year 1933 and it was not until 1934 that -the Gestapo took over the monopoly of murder. No claim of Hitler’s is -more ridiculous than his boast that the Nazi revolution was bloodless. -There is no record of how many Germans perished at the hands of the -uniformed bullies of the Nazi Party for strictly personal reasons, but -the numbers surely ran into thousands. I was a correspondent in Berlin -during that bloody year and I can testify as an eyewitness. - - -Q. _But weren’t those stories about atrocities exaggerated? You know -we were fed so much propaganda in the last war that later turned out -untrue, like the Belgian baby’s hands being cut off--how much can we -believe of the atrocity stories we hear now?_ - -A. No, the atrocity stories of today and of yesterday and of the last -war were not exaggerated. The truth is that we shall never learn of -more than the tiniest fraction of the atrocities committed by the -Germans, and I am sure we never learned about more than a fraction of -their atrocities in the last war. - -Now by all means let some earnest young man arise and declare that the -British and the French and the Americans also commit atrocities. Do -they? Perhaps, because among our troops as among the troops of every -nation are some exceptionally brutal men, who when they are possessed -of the fury and license of battle become criminals. But only among the -Germans was and is atrocious behavior, torture, and murder, an official -policy, calculatedly carried out upon the authority of the government -to terrorize or exterminate the vanquished. When I came to Germany -I was intensely sympathetic with the Germans and refused to believe -any of the atrocity stories of the last war. It took many years of -residence in Germany and the experience of living through the bloodiest -period of the Nazi revolution to realize that there was almost no -atrocity charged against the Germans which could not have happened. - -What a beautiful example of German propaganda the Belgian baby atrocity -story was. Dr. Goebbels must often have jealously admired the person, -whoever he was, who thought up the Belgian baby. Do we wish to cast -in doubt reports about the atrocities our people are committing? -Very well, let us plant a monstrous charge against ourselves, which -we can prove untrue, then we can claim (and many of our softheaded -opponents will believe us) that all other charges are untrue. This was -the effect of the charge that German troops had cut off the hands of -Belgian babies. Strangely enough, it was Northcliffe’s _Daily Mail_ -which obliged the Germans by first picking up the story of the Belgian -baby, and then offering a reward for proof, and finally printing as -a journalistic scoop the fact that no proof could be found that the -Germans had ever cut off a Belgian baby’s hands. Thus in the minds of -millions of simple British and Americans the Germans were exculpated of -_any atrocities_. The bombarded British are not likely to make such a -mistake again. - -Was there anything in the first World War to equal the deliberate -machine-gunning by German warplanes of the fleeing populations on the -roads of Poland, France, and the Lowlands? I do not believe it has a -counterpart in modern history, and only Genghis Khan and Tamerlane -could have matched it in earlier days. There were thousands of children -including babes in arms among the dead along the roads scarified by -the Luftwaffe. An American diplomat in Paris estimated that in France -and the Lowlands 100,000 civilians, two-thirds of them women and -children, were killed thus by the Germans, or approximately the same -as the number of French soldiers who died in battle. The slaughter of -civilians in Poland surpassed this figure many times. - -I do not know why I should boggle at the lopped-off Belgian baby’s -hands, except that nobody could ever find an authentic example, and -I cannot imagine what good it would do the Germans, nor believe that -even Nazi Germans like to torture babies. The machine-gunning of the -roads in Europe had a military object, to cause panic and to clog the -movements of the Allied troops. But I have seen enough purposeless acts -of brutality committed by the Nazis to know what they are capable of -doing. - -I wish Anne Morrow Lindbergh, whose sensitivity as a poet I sincerely -admire, could have been with me one day in the women’s ward of a Berlin -hospital as I listened to a woman explain to me why she lay there -bandaged from head to foot, with the blood still oozing through. It -was in the spring of 1933, and the Brown Terror was getting into its -stride, but the Nazis had not yet learned to bar correspondents from -hospitals. After this story they were all barred. - -The woman was Frau Marie Jankowsky, forty-eight years old, mother of -five sons. She was a Social Democratic welfare worker. “Night before -last,” she related to me, pausing only when pain made her gasp, “a -group of Storm Troopers came to our flat. One of them backed my husband -and sons into the kitchen and held them at the point of his revolver. -The others took me away to a Storm Troop barracks on the second floor -of a building not far from my house. There they stripped me naked. In -the middle of the room was a table, and covering the table a flag. They -asked me what the flag was. - -“I answered it was the Black Red Gold flag of the Republic. They said -‘No,’ and commanded me to repeat that it was Black Red Ordure. I -refused and four Storm Troopers pulled me face down over the table, the -fifth pushed my face into a bundle of rags to stop me screaming, and a -sixth began beating me across the back with a light steel rod. - -“It cut the skin and made blood come with every blow. The Storm Troop -Captain said, ‘Give her twenty blows, the Jewish sow.’ I am not Jewish -but that did not make any difference. Then they jerked me off the table -and said, ‘You stole shoes from your welfare section, didn’t you?’ I -said, ‘No,’ and the Captain said, ‘Give her another twenty.’ I was -bleeding badly when they pulled me off the table again and yelled at -me, ‘What’s this?’ and showed me our flag of the Iron Front with three -arrows. I told them, but they demanded that I say it was a manure fork. -I refused and the Captain ordered another twenty blows. - -“That made sixty, and I was very weak, but finally when they pulled me -off the table again and yelled at me, ‘You served Communists in your -soup kitchen,’ I still had enough strength left to say, ‘You ought to -be ashamed to say that because I served you and you and you, but no -Communists.’ This made them angrier than ever and the last twenty blows -were the worst, and when I rolled off the table they picked me up, and -the Captain struck me across the face with his riding crop, and then a -Storm Trooper hit me on the jaw with his fist and knocked me across the -room so that I fell and wrenched my knee.” - -The livid scar of the riding crop flamed across her face, and the -dressing on her knee confirmed that injury. I asked the medical -attendant to describe her injuries as they were when she arrived and he -confirmed that her back had been cut deep into the musculature. Yes, I -wish Anne Morrow Lindbergh had been with me to see and hear this story, -although it is only one of hundreds of thousands which could have been -related first by German victims of the Nazis and now by the vanquished -of the entire continent. - -Mrs. Lindbergh says the “Wave of the Future,” by which she means the -wave of collectivism, the wave of Nazism, is irresistible, and hence we -would be wrong to try to resist it, because by resisting we would only -increase the casualty list. She dismisses the brutalities, atrocities, -inhumanities of the conquering Nazis as merely the “scum” on the wave, -something which will pass away and leave the clear blue water of the -New Order. But she has not viewed this Wave of the Future at firsthand -and so she has not been able to perceive that the scum reaches all the -way from the top to the bottom of the Nazi wave; that there is no clear -water beneath the surface brutality of the New Order, that from its -beginning until today and until it is destroyed it has been, is, and -will be unqualifiedly evil. - -Atrocities? I assure you there are more atrocities being committed -this very moment by the hosts of the Gestapo, the Black Guards, the -Storm Troops, and all the other ruffians of Hitler throughout prostrate -Europe than you have ever dreamed about. If only we could arrange to -have all our isolationists, our weasel-worded noninterventionists, -and our complaisant converts to the Wave of the Future take a trip to -Europe and let them observe the fate of the 150,000,000 under Hitler’s -heel. The Wave of the Future is a wave of blood and tears. What -American in his right mind can wish to live if this wave engulfs our -world? - - -Q. _You mentioned Jan Valtin’s book_, Out of the Night. _Do you -consider the book authentic?_ - -A. It is the most accurate description of Nazi and Bolshevik Terror I -have ever seen in print. Valtin tells from the inside of the G.P.U. and -the Gestapo what an American newspaperman working in Russia and Germany -could observe in fragments from the outside. There is not an incident -in the book, however gruesome, which could not have happened, no matter -how improbable it may appear to a reader far away from the horrors of -totalitarian police methods. I recommend the book to every American, -because these two evil weapons of the tyrant states are operating today -in our country and Valtin has given us the most authoritative picture -of their activities we have ever had. Whatever he was in the past, this -strange young German has done more for democracy by writing these grim -memoirs than most democrats who have been democrats all their lives. - - -Q. _Since Hitler attacked Russia, don’t you think it is no longer -correct to say Nazism and Communism are the same? Hasn’t Hitler proved -now that he is really an enemy of Bolshevism and is protecting the -world against it?_ - -A. That would be the equivalent of saying that one monarchy would not -attack another or that you could not have war between two republics. -The war between Hitler and Stalin is a war between two terroristic -collectives. The collectivist form of their economy is almost -identical, both of them being a form of state capitalism; both are -supported by police terror and both found their principle motive power, -the fuel to run their society, in hatred. - -Both avowed that the end justifies the means and both thereupon -employed every conceivable form of fraud, deceit, and violence to -attain their ends. Pagan, atheistic rejection of Christianity, -deliberate denial of even the desirability of the principle of -universal brotherly love was common to the two totalitarian creeds. -The fact that the two monsters of malevolence finally turned their -hatred upon one another actively only emphasizes the identical -character of the fratricidal twins. What of their essential features -has changed since they warred upon each other? Nothing whatever. Does -the Russo-German war prove Hitler’s thesis that he was an implacable -enemy of Bolshevism? Nonsense! Hitler’s brand of Bolshevism is -infinitely more menacing to us all than any produced in Russia. The -bibles of the twin regimes, _Mein Kampf_ and _Das Kapital_, preach -identical doctrine: Here, hate everybody of a different race; there, -hate everybody of a different class. Since Jesus Christ was on earth -the Communist Party and the Nazi Party and the states they founded are -the first institutions of such dimensions to be built avowedly and -officially on hatred. - -In Russia they began by saying they had to hate and kill in order to -clear the land of all classes hostile to a socialist world, in order -to make room for a happier life. But hatred becomes a habit, grows, -expands monstrously until it cannot find enough victims. Before the -Bolsheviks even gained a far-off glimpse of a happier life their hatred -had become an end in itself. They began, by hating, as they thought, -rationally; they finished by hating and killing themselves. - -The proletariat and peasantry, instructed by the Communists, began by -hating the Czar, the aristocrats, bankers, factory managers, engineers, -technicians, schoolteachers, dentists, undertakers, physicians, -lawyers, priests and policemen, everyone who occupied any position -noticeably superior to that of the masses. It took them about ten -years to slaughter this lot, and then they began hating and killing -the better-off farmers. I was there during the final mopping up of the -first victims and again for the extermination of the second group, and -as the last of the identifiable enemies of the Bolsheviks disappeared -in the cellars of the G.P.U., or in the wastes of Siberia, we in Moscow -used to discuss quite seriously what these furious haters were going to -do when they ran out of “classes” to hate. - -It was no joke. It had become indispensable to Bolshevik life to have -an object of hatred and when the object was exterminated another had -to be found. We guessed they would have to begin hating and killing -themselves, and we were right. To us it was not surprising. When you -lived among them, you realized that Communist “class hatred” is hatred -of anyone who gets along better than oneself and there is just as much -hatred of Communists by Communists as of capitalists. - -In no organization has there ever been more back-stabbing, poisoning, -strangling, murderous mutual hatred of one another than in the -Communist Party, from the malignant Russian Central Committee through -all its verminous offspring in the Comintern. They used to boast of the -“monolithic” character of the Russian Communist Party. It was like a -block of granite without a crevice. The Russian Jacobins declared they -would never commit the error of their French forebears who found they -could not stop killing when once they had started to kill one another. -For years the outside world observed this Bolshevik self-restraint and -there was much fear of it. - -Then suddenly the prodigious store of hatred within the Bolshevik -breast burst the bounds of self-preserving sanity and the apostles of -Marx fell to killing each other with bewildering ferocity. Howling -“Wrecker,” “Saboteur,” “Trotzkyist,” “Bukharinist,” “Rightist,” -“Leftist,” “Nazi,” “Fascist,” they shot their own Soviet-reared -professional men, generals, admirals, government officials, in a -whirl of self-destroying madness which left even persistent Soviet -sympathizers unable to explain what was going on because nobody, -possibly including Stalin, understood it. It was like a mad dog biting -himself, tearing out his own viscera. What could be the fate of the -eviscerated animal? - -Even before the war, in both Germany and Russia, the omnipotent, -omnivorous State had devoured all but a vestige of happiness. As the -two regimes of hatred went forward along their respective paths each -lost gradually even the desire to promote the happiness of anybody, -even of its own people. - -In the land of the Bolsheviks, the bigoted struggle against men of -another class became a struggle against men of another view. The -internal political conflict impaired production, hampered the campaign -against poverty, and protracted the wretchedness of the population. -Nobody ate, drank, slept, lived even decently, much less comfortably, -and there was no security. They had given up liberty for security. Now -security was gone, for to their dismay the Bolsheviks saw that the one -thing for which everything had been sacrificed, the defense apparatus, -was inadequate. - -In the land of the Nazis, the attempts of the Supermen to rule the -world led the Germans to forget individual happiness as completely -as the Bolsheviks. The Nazis believed that if they gave up butter -for guns today, they could tomorrow win with their guns more butter; -but the Nazi chief never had any intention of stopping for butter. -In comfort-loving, once-bourgeois Germany, food, clothing, fuel, -transportation deteriorated until it was impossible to find even a -physically happy person outside the young armed forces for whom the -nation sacrificed all. These favored youths found their chief pleasure -in the exercise of a technical skill and lust in combat which enabled -them to crush a continent with playful ease. - -Now from the Atlantic to the Pacific, across the greatest continuous -land surface on the globe, from the English Channel to the Sea of Japan -there exists not one comfortable, secure, happy family. Not among the -more than five hundred million persons now in Europe with its neighbor -states could be discovered a trace of the happiness, imperfect though -it was, which used to exist. The Nazi Bolsheviks had achieved triumph -as far as Europe was concerned. The Wave of the Future had swept -happiness from its path. - - - - -2. RUSSIA - - -Q. _What is the best way for the United States to help the Russians -fight the German Army?_ - -A. The best way for the United States to help the Russians fight the -German Army is for us to go to war against Germany. Our declaration -of war against Germany would be of more value to Russian resistance -than all the war supplies we shall ever be able to send to the Soviet -Union. We ought to try to send the Red Army as much as we can spare -of airplanes and arms and anything else it needs to help it hold the -Germans, but all such aid would be trivial compared with the effect of -our declaration of war. - - -Q. _Why? What practical effect on the Russian war effort would we have -by going to war with Germany?_ - -A. It would have the moral effect of convincing the Russians that they -would win in the long run; hence it should obviate any chance, however -faint, of Stalin’s capitulating. As we have said before, it would -convince the Germans they would lose the war and hence would halve -their determination to go on. It would triple our war effort overnight, -and result speedily in a vast increase of production here of the -materials the Russians as well as the British need to carry on the war. -It would enable us to base our Pacific Fleet on Singapore and other -British bases in the Far East, and our Air Force, if it were found -expedient, on Russian bases in Kamchatka and near Vladivostok within -bombing distance of Tokyo. This would not only check the Japanese from -advancing farther south but from indulging in any military adventure, -such as attacking Siberia, while the danger existed of our immediate -intervention against them. This would relieve pressure on the Far -Eastern Red Army and permit it to send urgently needed reinforcements -to the troops fighting the Germans in European Russia. - -The use of our Atlantic antisubmarine vessels in complete cooperation -with the British Navy in all the war zones would help break the -German counter-blockade and permit a greater quantity of supplies to -reach the British armed forces. It would enable us to seize those -positions we need off the west coast of Africa and on the coast, and -thus provide the first step toward establishing another take-off -place for an expeditionary force against the Reich. The example of -America’s entering the war could lead Weygand, or other authorities in -Morocco, to consider collaboration with us instead of with the Germans; -the north African coast has long been kept in mind as a possible -springboard for invading Europe. America’s entry into the war would for -the first time enable the British to attempt invasion of the continent. -Until now the British have had to keep at home more reserves than they -would need if they knew the American Army would soon be at their side. - -Even with our Army in its present state of semi-preparedness, we have -enough completely trained Regular Army and Marine units to be able to -send abroad for active service an important contingent which would -either take its place immediately in an invasion force or replace -British units assigned to that task. The first effect upon the Germans -of the intelligence that the British were seriously preparing to -attempt an invasion would be to compel them to send back troops from -Russia to threatened points in Europe. - -Finally, from the broadest strategical standpoint, the entry of the -United States would turn the tables on the Germans who until now have -had the advantage of initiative and surprise. Throughout the world -until now Hitler has kept the world wondering “where is he going to -strike next?” With the United States in the war, it would be the turn -of the Axis powers to wonder where the Anglo-American-Russian forces -were going to strike next, and Hitler would be forced to keep large -numbers of troops stationed at every point where our forces could -possibly attack. - - -Q. _The Russian resistance to the German attack seems to have surprised -nearly everybody. How do you explain it?_ - -A. There are many reasons for it. It is true that almost every expert -expected the Russians to collapse within a few weeks after Hitler began -his drive. Walter Duranty is the only one I know who said from the -outset that the Red Army would hold much longer than the outside world -seemed to expect. - -The first reason for Russian resistance is that this was the first -time Hitler ever tackled a country with _lives to waste_ and _miles -to waste_. Its 200,000,000 population lived almost like animals, but -most of them flourished like healthy animals on their black bread -and cabbage and made sturdy fighting material. They claimed around -12,000,000 soldiers in their standing army and reserve. Thus they could -lose as many men as the entire German Army and still have left an army -as big as the former French Army. In fighting against the Germans -they could afford to lose two to one and still have superiority in -numbers. Their high command knew this and wasted lives with abandon but -sometimes to advantage. The same advantage in size held with respect to -terrain. They could afford to retreat over distances equivalent to the -width of many European countries and still have room to live in, just -as the Chinese did. - -The second reason for Russian resistance is that this was the first -time Hitler had ever struck an army and a generation untouched by the -humanizing influence of Christianity, immune to any form of pacifism, -unsoftened by Western civilization. It was the first time Hitler had -ever struck an army that had been taught that all life is struggle, -that to fight for the Soviet Union was the noblest thing a man or woman -could do, the first time the Nazis had met a fanaticism sharper than -theirs. The Bolsheviks invented totalitarian fanaticism; the Nazis only -copied it. - -It was the first time the Germans had come up against a people more -savage than themselves. The Bolsheviks were ahead of the Nazis in -pronouncing that the end justifies the means, and the oriental Russians -surpassed the occidental Germans in cruelty. The Germans have known -Hitlerism only since 1933 and until that time they had normal contacts -with the outside world. The Russians have known nothing but Bolshevism -since 1918 and from that moment on have been hermetically sealed from -the outside world. - -For war-making this savage insularity has its uses. The Red Army is -even more fanatically homogeneous in its political faiths and hatreds -than is the Nazi Army. Everybody under the age of forty in Russia today -has experienced either throughout life or in adult life nothing but -the Soviet regime. The Russians have the advantage that they have been -practicing totalitarians all their lives and are used to it. For the -civilian population not immediately in the path of the battles there -was less change in the move from peace to war in the Soviet Union than -in any other belligerent state, because the Russians have been living -on a war footing since 1918. - -During this generation of hardships their Asiatic characteristics have -been deepened, their fatalistic contempt for death increased. They are -content to let the Party guide their emotions. There are no Hamlets -among them. The Russians Dostoevsky wrote about, who dreamed and -sorrowed and could not act--all these have long been eliminated. Also -no living inhabitant of the Soviet Union has been corrupted by ease or -luxury! Yet because they are completely cut off from the outside world -the Russians think the Soviet Union superior to any other country. This -is an advantage in war. - -Isolated and youthful, the Russians after twenty-three years of -suffering and historically unparalleled loss of life through -revolution, famine, and terror, still were not disillusioned by a -political, social, and economic system which had given them a standard -of living and culture beneath that of any large white community in the -world. There were no ideological divisions to rend the nation, since -all who differed with the ruling clique were liquidated the moment -the difference became apparent. Hence there was no Fifth Column in -Russia. Since Soviet justice or Stalin policy goes on the principle -that it is better to execute a hundred innocents than to let one guilty -escape, the purge of 1934-1938 probably did eliminate important Fifth -Columnists, together with many valuable military and industrial leaders. - -A third reason for the strength of the Russian resistance is that the -Red Army for the past twenty-three years has received a larger share -of the national income in peacetime than any other defense force of -any nation has ever enjoyed, including Germany. Though Russia starved, -the Red Army ate well. On the four occasions--1925-1927, 1930, 1934, -and 1937--when I visited the Soviet Union and worked there as a -correspondent, I noticed that no matter how poorly the rest of the -population was dressed, Red Army soldiers always wore good uniforms -and strong leather boots. This was because ever since the Soviet Union -was born, every leader from Lenin and Trotzky to Stalin was profoundly -convinced that “the capitalist world will never permit the Socialist -State to exist and some day will seek to destroy us.” - -Of course this attack of Hitler’s is not the attack of the capitalist -world upon the Socialist State, and the Socialist State now finds -the capitalist world its only ally. Nevertheless the unshakable and -correct Bolshevik belief in inevitable war led the regime to impose the -greatest sacrifices upon the people for the sake of the armed forces, -and even though the Soviet economy was most backward, the enormous -amounts expended were bound to have effect. - -Even in American terms the Soviet defense budget was large. In 1940 it -was the equivalent of $11,000,000,000, and represented one-third of the -national expenditure. Measure this against the fact that the infinitely -richer United States will approximate the expenditure of that much -yearly only in 1942 after two years of our greatest defense effort. - -Most of the money spent on the Red Army and Air Force went for machines -of war. Twenty-three years ago when the Bolshevik revolution took place -there were few machines in Russia. Marx said Communism must come in a -highly industrialized society. The Bolsheviks identified their dreams -of socialist happiness with machines which would multiply production -and reduce hours of labor until everyone would have everything he -needed and would work only as much as he wished. Somehow this has not -come about, but the Russians still worship machines, and this helped -make the Red Army the most highly mechanized in the world, except -perhaps the German Army now. - -Like Americans, the Russians admire size, bigness, large numbers. They -took pride in building a vast army of tanks, some of them the largest -in the world, armored cars, airplanes, motorized guns, and every -variety of mechanical weapon. Their quality was seldom the best. Few -things produced in the Soviet Union have attained high quality, but the -attempt is made to compensate by quantity. - -Bolshevik love of novelty, eagerness to experiment and try new things -(they invented parachute troops), their willingness to discard -traditional methods, and their liking for youthful leadership all were -advantages. The Red Army apparently was the only one to learn from -the lessons of the German campaign in Poland--which were open for the -instruction of the French, British, Dutch, Belgians, and every other -country in Europe, but were ignored by all of them. Stalin’s purge of -the Red Army wherein he executed or otherwise eliminated one-fourth of -the senior officers was believed at the time to have done unmitigated -harm, but besides the probability that it disposed of some real Fifth -Columnists, it destroyed nearly all the older generals, and left the -field for men under fifty. Voroshiloff and Budenny were vestigial -exceptions. In this day of brand-new warfare youth has an advantage. - -We have to include here also the fact that the Russian is an excellent -pilot. He has reckless courage, keen eyesight, abounding health, -contempt for the enemy, and fanatical belief in his cause. The Russians -have a word they like to apply to themselves, _Shirokaya Natura_, -meaning broad-natured, lavish-tempered. That is a characteristic of all -the good pilots I have ever known. It means they are ready to spend -themselves, their lives, as readily as they spend their money. The -R.A.F. has it, Udet has it, Goering has it, the American and Canadian -pilots have it, and the Russians have it. I dare say Lindbergh must -have had it once. There are millions of boys in Russia of pilot age. - -The fourth set of reasons for Russian resistance is based upon the -immense benefit the Red Army won through the occupation of the Finnish -Mannerheim line, the Baltic states, Eastern Poland, and Bessarabia -during the time Hitler was busy conquering the rest of Europe. This -action of Stalin’s was typical of the principle that the end justifies -the means. If you believed in this principle and in the righteousness -of the Soviet cause, you would now have to admit that the end did -justify the means in this case, since the creation of this screen of -territory enabled the Red Army to defeat the Blitz. - -The term Blitzkrieg, frequently misused, technically means the -destruction of your enemy by action so swift that he is not able to -mobilize, or bring up his forces to meet yours at the decisive point. -The screen of occupied territory slowed up the Germans long enough for -the Red Army to mobilize fully. Thereafter the great distances, the -bad roads, the unfavorable weather, and the scorched-earth policy -impeded the German advance, while Russian guerilla warfare proved more -effective than anything of the kind the Germans had ever met. - -Russian guerilla fighting is not the old-fashioned kind, where a farmer -hides with a shotgun to catch an enemy sentry with his back turned. -During the Russian Civil War, the most ferocious conflict of modern -times until its Spanish equivalent, the Reds especially developed -Partisan warfare. This consisted in deliberately hiding companies of -several score or hundred heavily armed men until the enemy passed -forward. These guerillas would then attack from the rear, usually by -night, and often annihilate whole detachments of the enemy. Their -ambushes, ruses, and surprises were endlessly ingenious. The guerillas -seldom wore uniforms. They were invariably shot if captured. They -also never took prisoners except to obtain information by torture. -They were extremely successful. Heretofore the Germans have been able -to terrorize their conquered populations by the exercise of utterly -ruthless Terror. They will have less success with the Russians than -with any people they have yet tried to break, except perhaps the Serbs. - - -Q. _But that is a very long list of reasons for Russian resistance. -Can’t you sum them up for us in a word?_ - -A. Yes, the answer is morale, or better, faith. That word with its -deep Christian connotations may sound blasphemous when applied to the -atheist Bolsheviks, but it is a true faith, in reverse, founded upon -hatred. It may be objected that faith is a positive force and it may -be asked in what do the Russians have faith? In their dogma, their -doctrine, their nation, or faith in themselves, or the faith that lies -in their deep attachment to their soil? Or is it not their faith in the -unspeakably evil character of their enemies? I think it is the last. -The Bolsheviks have taught all Russians to hate the Fascists, as they -generically call the Nazis, with a ferocity which surpasses anything -in our experience. This sort of faithful hatred is a terrific force. -It inspires to limitless valor. It is a priceless asset in war. The -Russians see the Nazi legions as the incarnation of wickedness, led by -the devil himself. They are right. Furthermore they are inspired to -fight by the belief, also correct, that if they lose they will suffer -intolerable punishment. Unlike the French they have no illusions about -the fate that awaits them at the hands of the man who has called them -the “scum of the earth.” - -This hatred of their enemies and fear of the consequences of defeat -are probably the strongest feelings animating the Russians in battle, -but they have also an incredible faith in themselves. It makes no -difference that this faith is founded for the most part on lack of -knowledge of the outside world, and the absence of any chance to -compare themselves with other nations and other systems: they are -unshakably convinced that they are what would have been called in -another time and another place, “God’s anointed.” An American general -defined morale as “when a soldier thinks his army is the best in the -world, his regiment the best in the army, his company the best in the -regiment, his squad the best in the company, and that he himself is -the best blankety-blank soldier man in the outfit.” This is what the -Red Army soldier thinks. The Red Army was not impressed by the German -victory in France. After all, the defeated were “just Frenchmen, just -_bourgeoisie_.” - -The average Russian has a strong conviction, unspecified and -unsupported by evidence, but forming a subconscious background for all -his thinking about the war, that the citizens of the outside world, in -“capitalist-imperialist” and “capitalist-fascist” states alike, are -composed of two classes, depraved slave drivers and spiritless slaves. -He even looks down on the proletariat abroad which has gone these -twenty years without making the revolution the Russians made. It was -a bitter revelation to many an American and other foreign Communist -leader on visiting Moscow the first time, to be assigned a cubbyhole -in the old Lux Hotel, and to be forced to wait hours for an audience -with a Russian official who scarcely troubled to conceal his contempt -for the inferior foreign communist. - -We are surprised that the Russians, after all these years of starving -and pain and suffering, should still possess the morale to fight, but -we overlooked the fact that faith thrives on tribulation. The British -had no faith and no morale until they were threatened with death and -punished with fire. Today they have a faith in their cause such as -they have not had since they became a nation, and now they announce -they will scorch the earth, and if necessary burn London before the -advance of an invader. Today the British are poor in food and clothes -and lodgings, but rich in spirit. The Russians are likewise, and though -it is painful to say it, so are the Germans. We alone among the nations -are still rich in material goods and poor in spirit, for we lack faith. -Where are those among us furious to fight for liberty and democracy? - - -Q. _Do you mean to say the Russians have more faith in their cause than -we do in ours?_ - -A. I do. - - -Q. _How can you say such a thing, how do you mean it?_ - -A. I think you are surprised because you confuse faith and morality. -They have nothing to do with each other. - -The morality of the Nazis and the Bolsheviks is abhorrent. That has -nothing to do with the fact that their faith was strong enough to -make them great warriors. The best fighters in the Spanish Civil War, -Ernest Hemingway testifies, were the Moors. Those skinny brown men, -who looked so insignificant and whose behavior was so abominable, were -always chosen, if available, to be the shock troops, as when they -relieved the Alcazar. They fought with the bravery traditional of the -Mohammedan warrior from the Ottoman Turks to the Afghans. Their morals -were criminal. They butchered, looted, raped with neither compunction -nor discrimination. - -I have seen them walking down a village street laden with sewing -machines, women’s clothing, surgical instruments, and chicken feed to -set up shop in a Cathedral underneath the image of the Saviour whose -head they had hacked off. Decent folk on Franco’s side were appalled, -but Franco could not do without them. They had a faith that only the -Catholic Requetés on the one hand and the Communists on the other could -equal, and when they went into battle the Moors sang. I have heard them -and reflected that good and evil have nothing to do with faith which -moves mountains and wins wars. Are we today in the United States going -into battle singing? We are not even going into battle, although we -admit it is ours. - - -Q. _Do you mean to say the Moors fought for the Mohammedan faith in -Spain?_ - -A. I do not. I mean to say that they fought because they believe the -profession of a man is to fight, and in fighting they are upheld in -spirit by their belief in Allah, and their faith in his promises. - - -Q. _What do the Russians fight for? They have no Allah and believe in -no hereafter._ - -A. I am not sure that either of those statements is correct. The images -of Lenin, Stalin, and Marx blend in the primitive Soviet Russian mind -together with dim memories of Orthodox ritual to make up a kind of ikon -of Communism. In some minds it may be only the figure of Father Lenin, -now mummified, deified, or at least sanctified, in his glass coffin -on the Red Square, but in all save the minds of the intellectualized -leaders there is some personification of the faith. As for belief in a -hereafter, I have sometimes wondered if even the highest leaders of the -Party are always as sure as their Bezbozhnik Society, the Society of -the Godless, professes to be. - -The Bezbozhniks’ battle against God would be meaningless unless they -thought, however subconsciously, that there must be something there to -fight. Twice I have seen Stalin stand at the graveside of a lifetime -comrade, once at the burial of Frunze and once at Kirov’s, and each -time as the final words were spoken and the earth fell and the bells of -the Kremlin tolled, I scrutinized his face for a sign of his thoughts -and under the spell of the moment I always thought I could see the -flicker of a question across his gloomy face. As a matter of fact I -suppose he was absorbed in thinking how to finish the ceremony as -quickly as possible in order to get back to his office and ensure that -a good Stalin man succeeded the dead. - - -Q. _Is it true that in order to curry favor with the outside world the -Soviet government has restored freedom of worship?_ - -A. Freedom of worship in the Soviet Union was never frankly and -publicly prohibited; it was merely quietly strangled. Today its public -restoration is a gesture toward the outside world and an effort to -canalize even the religious energies sleeping in the hearts of the -older people, into national defense. All the old shibboleths of -religion and patriotism and nationalism and local pride and mystic -faith in Holy Russia which for two decades had been banned have now -been revived. In the supreme trial of war the Russian people have -returned instinctively to the deep primitive traditions common to man -everywhere. Their Bolshevik masters have apparently recognized the -desirability of kindling fighting energy from any fuel, and have -permitted a veritable carnival of emotions which a short while ago -would have been condemned as “bourgeois” and “counterrevolutionary.” -Who knows what further changes the war may bring? - - -Q. _American friends of the Soviet Union claim that her present -resistance to the Germans entitles her now to our moral approval, and -that we are obligated to give it to our “Ally.” Is this true?_ - -A. I am sure Stalin does not care for our moral approval. He would -much rather have our material support. Those Americans who changed -their views of the Soviet Union either when Stalin signed his pact with -Hitler in August 1939, or when the Red Army attacked Finland, or when -it marched into Poland, the Baltic states, and Bessarabia, or again -when the Germans attacked Russia and the Red Army fought back--such -observers only proved that their judgment of Stalin’s system was -founded on mere day-to-day, surface events. When they approved of the -Soviet Union it was for wrong reasons; when they disapproved it was for -wrong reasons. - -None of the events just named meant any change in the nature of the -Soviet regime. If one approved of it today for resisting Germany, one -ought to have approved of it in August 1939 for having signed up with -Germany. Both acts had the same motive: the self-interest of the Stalin -regime. - -Whether we wish to extend our moral approval to the Stalin regime or -not, we all owe profound gratitude and respect to the Russian people. -It is said that every people gets the kind of government it deserves, -but I do not think this has ever been true of the Russian people; they -have never had as good a government as they deserved. Today they are -demonstrating a spirit on the battlefield which places us forever in -debt to them. Whatever his regime, the Russian soldier is giving his -life to defeat the Germans and every sacrifice of a Russian life means -the possible saving of an American life. - -To the Russian people we owe our friendship as well as all our support. -Our support can reach the Russian people only through their regime. Let -us keep the distinction sharp and the supplies moving. - - -Q. _Aren’t we running a risk if we support the Russians?_ - -A. Yes, we are compelled to run a risk no matter what we do. The time -when we could have made ourselves secure without risk is long past; our -isolationists saw to that. Today we risk much if we support the Soviet -Union, but we risk more if we do not. If we do not support her, we risk -Hitler’s winning the resources of Russia. If we do support her, we risk -two things, first, that after we have poured supplies and munitions, -airplanes, gasoline, and guns into Russia, Stalin might capitulate and -these war materials would fall into the hands of the Germans. - -The other risk is that with our help the Red Army should not only hold -the Germans but actually defeat them and invade and occupy Germany. I -purposely draw this picture crudely. This is a small immediate risk, -for the Red Army has not the offensive power to do it. But suppose the -Red Army were able to hold the Germans for another year, the while -Britain with the United States’ help grows strong enough in the air -to obtain supremacy over the Luftwaffe on the Western Front. Suppose -during this time, with the aid of shipments from the United States the -Red Air Force recovers and also grows strong enough to dominate the -Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front. It is then possible to imagine a time -when the Germans, disintegrating from within, would begin to withdraw -from the East and the Red Army begin to attack. - -When once Germany begins to crumble, it is the conviction of all who -know that brittle country that she will fall apart at once. It will be -a miracle, indeed, if she finds a Hindenburg to lead her armies home -and demobilize them in orderly fashion. It will be more of a miracle if -a Prince Max of Baden can be found in Germany to apply for an armistice -or negotiated peace. - -The German Army will have been defeated, disrupted, demoralized. For -a time there will be anarchy. Then all will depend upon which forces -reach German territory and the German capital first, the Red Army or -the armies of the West. If we have stayed out of the war, or have -participated only as a naval and air power; if the Western Allies have -conquered Germany on the sea and in the air, but have left the land -to be conquered by the Red Army; then if the Red Army pushes into -Germany before our forces can arrive, it will mean Communist revolution -throughout Europe. - -Why has the world not gone Communist long ago? It is because Communism, -or its Soviet version, in the only country it was ever tried, had been -a peacetime failure. Let us not argue the definition of Communism and -whether we ought to call it State Capitalism. The world had made up its -mind that the collectivist system as practiced by the Russians could -not produce enough to make its population as well off as the people -were even under old-fashioned, broken-down, rickety capitalism. Now, -victory by the Red Army would be evidence that Russian Communism could -do what Western capitalism could not do--defeat Hitler. The populations -of Europe would count that power victorious whose land armies were on -the spot to occupy the territory of the defeated. If the Red Army were -to get there first, it would prove to millions of uncritical observers -that the Soviet system had won, that it was a success to be emulated, -and in the circumstances of disorder and unemployment which would -prevail at the conclusion of the war, such a judgment could lead to -continental upheaval. - - -Q. _How can we prevent this and at the same time see that Nazi Germany -is defeated?_ - -A. Only by going to war against Germany now. Never since the war began -have we had any stronger reasons for entering the war than now. We -cannot afford to stay out and allow Hitler the possibility of winning -the war by getting Russia. We cannot afford to stay out and allow the -Bolshevik regime the possibility of winning the continent of Europe to -Communism. - - -Q. _But can Stalin be trusted?_ - -A. Certainly not. His agreement with Churchill not to conclude a -separate peace is worth even less than the solemn promise the French -government made on March 28, 1940 to make no separate peace, just three -months before it made a separate peace over the protest of its Ally, -Britain. - - -Q. _Why do you say Stalin’s promise is worth even less than that?_ - -A. Because Bolsheviks, from whom the Nazis have copied their ethics, -do not believe in keeping their word. I do not mean this frivolously -or cynically. On page 323 of volume XVII of the collected works of -Lenin, the father of Bolshevism wrote: “Morality is that which serves -the destruction of the old exploiter’s society ... which creates a -new society of communists. Communist morality is that which serves -this struggle.... We do not believe in eternal morality and we expose -the deceit of all legends about morality.” As the end justifies the -means and the end is the State, so treaty breaking is justified when -it serves the State. For a Bolshevik or a Nazi, one of the most absurd -phrases in the Bible is the reference to the obviously bourgeois -simpleton who sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not. For both -Bolshevik and Nazi the theory is that individual honor must always -be sacrificed if necessary to the State, and the State itself has no -obligation of honor to any other State, or individual. - -You may say that the only difference between a Bolshevik’s or Nazi’s -breaking his word and a bourgeois’ doing the same is that the Bolshevik -or Nazi would be proud of it and the bourgeois would not. True enough, -and that makes all the difference between a moral world and an amoral -world. It is the difference between the recognition of morality and the -defiance of it--the difference between civilization and the jungle. -This jungle attitude we hope to eliminate by defeating Hitler. - - -Q. _How do you expect to eliminate this jungle by fighting on the side -of the Bolsheviks?_ - -A. We would not be “fighting on the side of the Bolsheviks.” We would -be fighting disease with disease. As a youth I studied medicine for a -while in Vienna, and one of my professors was the great Wagner-Jauregg, -the discoverer of the malaria treatment for the tertiary stage of -syphilis. Wagner-Jauregg observed that some of his paretic patients -who contracted another disease accompanied by high fever would -after the recession of the fever often be almost cured of their -syphilitic disabilities. He began to inoculate his syphilitic patients -with malaria and thus by using one disease against another won a -considerable number of victories over the more dangerous of the two -afflictions. After curing the syphilis it was relatively easy to cure -the malaria. Nazi Germany is at this moment as much more dangerous -than Bolshevik Russia to our world as syphilis is more malignant than -malaria. - - -Q. _So you think Bolshevism, after it has helped eliminate Nazism, will -be as easy to cure as malaria?_ - -A. Probably not, but we may entertain reasonable hopes that in case the -Red Army as distinct from the Bolshevik Party is victorious, or even -semi-victorious over the invading Germans, it will have more to say in -the affairs of Russia than ever in the past. - - -Q. _Do you consider that would be an improvement?_ - -A. Decidedly. Armies are usually conservative and pacifist. If we want -to get rid of the Communist International and have Russia re-enter -the family of nations, let the Red Army take hold of affairs in the -Kremlin. Stalin is afraid of it. - -In the purge of 1934-1938 Stalin arrested no less than 30,000 officers -according to an estimate quoted by Louis Fischer. He started by -executing the head of the army, Tukhachevsky, and seven other of the -highest generals, then three more, and so on until there were left of -the original staff only Voroshiloff and Budenny. Some may have been -guilty of wishing to cooperate with the Nazis, but most were killed -because Stalin feared they were plotting against him. - -Stalin’s principal instrument of espionage against his own army is the -system of political commissars, whereby a Stalin party man is allocated -to each Red commander, with the prime duty of watching his every move, -listening to his every word, and if possible trapping him into an -indiscretion. This obviously hinders military efficiency, and in times -when Stalin feels safe or when he wants military efficiency more than -an immediate sense of personal security, he gives it up. - -When he attacked Finland, for example, he felt strong enough personally -to give it up, and the Red Army improved sufficiently to win. There was -much boasting among Communists that the Red Army now no longer would -need political commissars again, but to their disappointment, shortly -after the German attack on Russia, Stalin reinstalled his commissars. -This at the moment when the Soviet Union was more gravely threatened -than ever in its history meant that Stalin felt himself less menaced -by the defeat of the Red Army than by the Red Army itself. - -Is it farfetched to imagine that since Stalin has played the part of a -super-Robespierre, the time may come when he will suffer Robespierre’s -end? - - -Q. _If you say, as you did, that Stalin would make a separate peace if -it suited him, despite his agreement not to do so, what was the use of -Britain’s offering and entering into such an agreement?_ - -A. It was useful to make the agreement in order to convince Stalin -that Britain, for her part, intends to keep on fighting no matter -what happens. This might encourage Stalin to fight a little longer -than he might have done if he thought that at any moment he might be -deserted by his Ally. You remember the _New Yorker_ anecdote about the -suburbanite who met the town Communist soon after Germany attacked -Russia, and twitted him about the German-Soviet pact, but without -results. - -The Communist said blandly that it was only to be expected, that it -proved Russia was the dominant figure on the international scene, and -so on. Then he added: “The only time I was worried was when I was -listening to Churchill’s speech on the radio. For a minute, at the -beginning, I thought he was going to rat on us.” So the Anglo-Soviet -agreement is strictly one-way, but it has its uses. It may persuade -Stalin that Churchill is not going to rat on him! - - -Q. _Under what circumstances do you think Stalin would make a separate -peace?_ - -A. At any time Hitler would let him have peace and remain in power and -retain sufficient of the framework of the Soviet system to promise its -continuance after the Western powers had defeated Hitler. It is plain -now that, once the Germans had attacked, Stalin must have realized -he had to fight or die, for Hitler was evidently sure of quick, -complete victory. If Stalin had tried to capitulate, as some thought -he would, without fighting, he could have obtained nothing better than -obliteration of himself and his regime. Therefore Stalin fought, but -this does not necessarily mean he intends to fight to the bitter end, -with the Red Army backing up to the Urals, to Siberia, and the Soviet -government moving to Sverdlovsk or Novosibirsk, as romantic enthusiasts -would have it. - -Stalin probably defines his task to fight Hitler so well, make it -cost the Germans so much, that Hitler will finally offer a peace -Stalin could afford to accept on the basis of his expectation that -Germany would in the long run lose the war. The Bolshevik surrender -at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 was based on similar reasoning, that the -Bolsheviks’ enemy, Germany, would eventually be removed by world -revolution and that good Bolshevik strategy would seek first to -preserve the structure, if only a skeleton structure, of the Soviet -Socialist State, at any cost of immediate humiliation and suffering. - -The Russians have proved now by their destruction of the great dam at -Dniepropetrovsk that they mean truly to scorch the earth before Hitler -even if it means the destruction of their most precious possessions. -The destruction of the Dnieper dam was to my mind the most important -single event of the Russian-German war. - - -Q. _Why was the blowing up of the Dnieper dam so important?_ - -A. Because Dnieprostroy was an object almost of worship to the Soviet -people. Its destruction demonstrates a will to resist which surpasses -anything we had imagined. I know what that dam meant to the Bolsheviks. -I visited it in 1930 when it was being built under the supervision -of the American engineer, Hugh Cooper. It was the largest, most -spectacular, and most popular of all the immense projects of the First -Five-Year Plan. It was the principal source of hydroelectric power for -the Ukraine. - -During all the years under the Soviet government the Russian people -had to do without romance, until the Five-Year Plan was begun. Then -they began to find glamour in statistics. They glorified in figures -showing that this or that project in the Soviet Union was the largest -of its kind in the world. The Dnieper dam when it was built was the -biggest on earth and so it occupied a place in the imagination and -affection of the Soviet people difficult for us to realize. I remember -standing in the middle of the mile-long dam and listening to a young -Soviet engineer rhapsodically exclaim: “You see there, that forest -of cranes, that army of excavating machines! There is more machinery -concentrated on this construction site than was ever concentrated -anywhere in the world! Look at those gravel mixers. We are pouring here -five thousand cubic meters of gravel, more per day than any body of men -ever poured in the history of the world! See those immense snail-shaped -turbo dynamos! They are the biggest ever made. We will supply more -electricity from a single point than ever....” And so he went on -endlessly, and back in Moscow people would eagerly scan the newspapers -for the latest bulletins on Dnieprostroy. - -Stalin’s order to destroy it meant more to the Russians emotionally -than it would mean to us for Roosevelt to order the destruction of the -Panama Canal. Suppose our troops defending the canal were to have been -driven back by the invading Japanese until it became evident they would -capture the canal if we did not destroy it. If our troops then blew up -the locks, it would be an act of determination which could be compared -to that of the Russians in blowing up the Dnieper dam. - - -Q. _Well then, doesn’t this prove that the Russians will fight to the -bitter end and never make a separate peace?_ - -A. Perhaps, but not necessarily. They may fight to the bitter end but -even the Dnieper dam does not prove it. The task of Stalin, it appears -now, is by just such a demonstration of stubborn courage, to whittle -down Hitler’s demands until they reach Stalin’s ability to accede to -them. If he can get Hitler to offer to keep the Soviet government and -bureaucracy in power and to withdraw the bulk of the German troops, and -not to demand too much in the way of demobilization of the Red Army, -the two tyrants might once more get together. - - -Q. _But why should Stalin quit? Why should he ever be willing to make -such a compromise peace if in the long run he believes Germany will be -beaten?_ - -A. Because the Soviet Union is not strong enough economically to go on -fighting indefinitely, particularly if the industries and mines and -agriculture of Southern Russia are cut off by the Germans. It would be -a miracle if the Russians could endure a long war. Most peoples have a -surplus they can do without in wartime. The Soviet Union has no surplus. - - -Q. _What about the Chinese? They didn’t seem to have a surplus either, -but they have gone on fighting the Japanese now for over four years._ - -A. That is true and important, but the Chinese economy was -decentralized. The Chinese lives locally. Chinese communities could -be cut off from the outside world and live almost normally. The -Soviet economy is centralized, a closely knit system of collective -farms-mines-factories, which if ruptured at one point would tend to go -to pieces. Nevertheless there is a significant similarity between the -primitive character of the Russian and the Chinese peasants, and their -ability to improvise a living and keep on fighting when more highly -civilized folk, as the French, would give in. - - -Q. _Under what circumstances do you think Hitler would offer Stalin a -compromise peace?_ - -A. The moment he believes he has defeated the Red Army sufficiently -to force Stalin to accept a peace which would include substantial -demobilization of the Red Army--enough to ensure that it could not -be used for a sudden attack on the German Army after it had returned -its attention to the West. It is probable that Hitler had much more -totalitarian goals in view when he first attacked Russia; but the Red -Army has probably made him content for the moment with less. - - -Q. _Isn’t there some evidence that Hitler is after an all-out victory -over Russia and intends no compromise, but complete conquest?_ - -A. Yes, the most direct evidence we have of such an intention is -contained in his speech of September 12, 1936 at Nuremberg, when he -said: “If the Ural mountains with their immeasurable wealth of raw -materials, Siberia with its rich forests, and the Ukraine with its -immense grain fields, were lying within Germany, this country under -National Socialist leadership would be swimming in wealth. We would -produce so much that every single German would have more than enough to -live on.” - -This does not sound as though he intended to stop short of anything, -but the fact still remains that unless he believes he can make -peace with the West (and he cannot have much hope for that after -the Roosevelt-Churchill proclamations of peace terms), his most -advantageous solution of the war would be compromise, with Stalin or -some other Russian leader as his Gauleiter. - - -Q. _Wouldn’t Hitler obtain more supplies if he took them than if he -trusted to the Soviets to deliver them, even if they promised to do so -after having been conquered?_ - -A. Not for a very long time, probably several years. If Hitler, -completely defeating the Red Army, were to try to replace the Soviet -system with something of his own devising, imagine the chaos! There are -several million employees of the Soviet bureaucracy. Suppose they all -sabotaged as the Czarist bureaucracy sabotaged the Bolsheviks when they -seized power. It took the Bolsheviks five years to work back up from -starvation in 1918 to the level of subsistence in 1923. - -Suppose the scorched-earth policy is extended to the oil fields of -the Caucasus. Really determined skilled effort can make an oil field -unproductive for a year or more. To pursue the Red forces into the -Urals and beyond and then to hold down the whole country would be a -task which would absorb the energies of even the German war machine. -There would thus be bargaining points on both sides. - -Hitler could say to Stalin: “I can utterly destroy you and your system -if I choose.” Stalin could say to Hitler: “Yes, but I can make your -conquest futile as far as supplies are concerned, and if you try to -destroy me and my system I will starve you and tire you until you are -too weak to win in the West.” Stalin’s argument might well run that by -making a compromise peace he could save something, including his own -job, from the wreck; then by waiting patiently for the victory of the -Allies which he probably foresees in the long run, he would win back -everything, just as the Bolsheviks did after they had deserted the -Allies in the first World War. - -Hitler, on the other hand, knows that without Stalin’s help he cannot -begin to obtain the materials he needs from Russia in time to serve his -necessity. Douglas Miller points out that in the two summers of 1917 -and 1918 when the Germans occupied the Ukraine, they got only 43,000 -small carloads of grain, which scarcely paid the costs of occupation. -Only with Stalin as his Gauleiter can Hitler make his Russian -investment pay economically during the critical next two years. - - -Q. _What would be the effect of such a compromise peace between Germany -and Russia on the United States and Great Britain?_ - -A. It would be a disaster even worse than the signing of the original -Soviet-German pact in August 1939. - - -Q. _Why worse? It would be just about the same, wouldn’t it?_ - -A. No, because this time Hitler would have obtained what he thought he -had obtained but had not obtained from Russia through his 1939 pact. He -would have nearly complete security on the Eastern frontier and would -not have to pin down there more than a fraction of the divisions he had -there from 1939 on. - -He would have obtained guaranteed deliveries of the oil and grain and -other products he needs. His guarantee would be the disarmament of the -Red Army to the point where the Germans could march in at any moment -and enforce their demands. He would also have obtained the right to -march his troops across the Ukraine, or sail across the Black Sea and -from the Caucasus drive at Suez, or eventually India. Furthermore -the re-neutralization, or the military emasculation, of the Soviet -Union would free Japan’s rear from the danger of attack, and would -proportionately increase the chances of Japan’s attacking southward in -the area of our vital interests. Such a compromise peace would enable -Hitler to endure many years longer than if he had to fight on to the -complete conquest of Russia, against a nationwide, scorched-earth, -guerilla warfare. - - -Q. _You make it seem as though a compromise peace were quite possible. -Why then did Stalin fight at all?_ - -A. You mean, when the Germans attacked? Because he was given no choice. -There was rumor of Hitler’s having submitted an ultimatum or terms to -Stalin, but as it turned out Hitler submitted no demands at all; he -simply attacked. - - -Q. _Why didn’t Hitler at least make the attempt and demand of Stalin -the things he wanted, including the demobilization of the Red Army?_ - -A. I suppose he knew that even Stalin could not successfully order -the demobilization of the Red Army without suffering the danger of -revolution. Hitler had successfully brought the armies of several -powers under his control without fighting: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, -Rumania, Bulgaria, but they were small states which would never have -stood a chance for more than a few hours or days of resistance against -the Germans. It seemed to many people that Hitler could have done the -same with Russia. The acquiescence of Stalin in every other German -demand encouraged this belief. But Hitler never made the trial. - - -Q. _I still do not see why he did not try._ - -A. Perhaps because of Napoleon. This is only a theory of mine, but in -analyzing Hitler’s motives for attacking Russia, it struck me that -his vanity may have led him to wish to impose his will by force upon -Stalin, his only remaining rival on the continent, and to do the -thing Napoleon failed to do, conquer Russia. Hitler is an admirer of -Napoleon. When he first visited Paris he spent half an hour alone -by the tomb of Napoleon, then ordered the remains of Napoleon’s son -brought from Vienna to be re-interred beside his father. Hitler does -not collect ordinary Napoleonana as Mussolini does. Hitler collects the -same countries which Napoleon once collected or tried to collect. He is -not merely going over the same territory, he is consciously emulating -Napoleon. - -The French Emperor’s excuse for attacking Russia was that Alexander -refused to join Napoleon’s blockade of England, the “Continental -System.” Historians now agree, however, that Napoleon went into Russia -in 1812 chiefly to satisfy his vanity and his lust for war and to -appease his jealousy of Alexander, his only remaining rival on the -continent. Alexander was willing to do almost everything Napoleon -wanted, but Napoleon wanted to impose his will by force. So with -Hitler. He had even less excuse than Napoleon for attacking Russia. - -I share the opinion of many observers that Hitler could have had -anything he liked from Stalin, beginning with the delivery of -all available materials even if it meant stripping the Russians, -and including the permission to pass troops through Russia, and -even including perhaps consent to as much of a demobilization of -the Red Army as Stalin believed he could order without danger of -revolt--possibly enough to have satisfied Hitler that the Red Army -could not attack him. Nor does it seem likely that the Red Army ever -would have attacked the Germans except after they had definitely lost -the war in the West, and then it would have made little difference who -delivered the final blow. - -The Russians would probably have behaved toward Germany exactly as the -Italians behaved toward France. In their anxiety to run no risks, the -Italians waited until their intervention made no difference; the French -were already defeated. So Stalin would probably have waited until the -German Army was knocked out before he moved. - - -Q. _But wasn’t it likely that Stalin would have attacked if Hitler -attempted to invade the British Isles?_ - -A. Not unless it had become apparent that the invasion had not only -failed but that the German Army had lost practically all its Air Force -and was about to collapse. If this contention is correct, there was no -danger to Hitler from the Russians, and the material supplies he seeks -could certainly have been obtained in greater quantity by peaceful -coercion than by war. - - -Q. _You have given us quite a number of strong points of the Soviet -Union. Can you outline its weak points?_ - -A. Without pleasure. It is no pleasure to expose the demerits of a -force which for the time being, at any rate, is fighting against our -major enemy, and has fought gallantly and has lost more blood than -all the other opponents of our enemy put together. Yet it seems to -me useful always to keep our eyes open and to know as much as we can -about the characteristics of friend and foe and especially of the sort -of ally which has the ambiguous role of the Soviet Union toward both -Britain and America, neither friend nor foe, but possessed merely of -the same enemy. - -The fundamental weakness of the Soviet Union and the root of all its -evil is the fact that the Bolsheviks believe and practice as their -first rule of political conduct that the end justifies the means. This -rule led to adoption of the Terror as the chief weapon in the struggle -to establish Socialism, and the Terror in turn made it impossible to -establish Socialism. The Terror destroyed democracy. Without political -democracy, the vaunted economic democracy of the Soviet Union became -a farce. Constant coercion of the masses through the Terror benumbed -them. Production was concentrated on war materials and the output of -consumption goods never rose above subsistence level. The Soviet Union -became a permanent pauper state. The level from the standpoint of -culture and comfort remained barbarian, but the Russians showed they -had the virtues of barbarians. When the time came to fight they proved -they could stand up better to their Nazi brother barbarians than any of -the civilized folk of Europe. - -The principle that the end justifies the means works in wartime as -it is a barbarous principle and war is a barbarous business, and that -is one reason why the Russians have done as well as they have against -the Germans. In peacetime the principle that the end justifies the -means defeats itself because peaceful processes are not promoted by -violence. The Bolsheviks used the Terror to force every member of the -vast community of Russia into a pattern of National Planned Economy, -but after thirteen years of watching the Five-Year plans, now in the -midst of the Third, we can scan the whole Russian scene and soberly -observe that National Planned Terror plus Bolshevik zeal have not -been able to produce anything like as much for the whole population -as free capitalist economy running on the profit motive with a -competitive labor market. I am not for Hoover capitalism, but even it -is incomparably better than Stalin’s economy. - - -Q. _What authority have you to speak about Russia?_ - -A. Possibly no authority, but a good deal of experience. I was for two -years a correspondent in Moscow, from 1925 to 1927--that was during the -NEP--and thereafter made three long trips and visited every part of the -country from Vladivostok to Odessa and Leningrad to Tiflis. I was the -first correspondent to visit the huge industrial plants of the First -Five-Year Plan from the Urals to the Caucasus, and after a 17,000-mile -trip which lasted three months I wrote a series of twenty-four -articles, which were given a Pulitzer prize. That was in 1930, and I -made another study trip in 1934 and another in 1937. I keep up as well -as one can by diligent reading and contact with friends fresh from the -Soviet Union and it appears that the conditions there today, aside from -the war, are about as they were when I was last there. Most capitalist -critics of the Soviet Union oppose it because it has done away with -the institution of private property and of profit, and substituted -a collectivist system. It would not make much difference to these -capitalist critics whether the Soviet collectivist system worked or -not. What irks them is that it has eliminated the form of economic -organization which has enabled them to become well to do. - -This is not of any interest to me. The only thing that interests me -about the Soviet collectivist system is whether it works or not. If it -works better than ours, to bring more happiness to everybody in the -community than our system, then let us have it. But the trouble with -the Soviet collectivist system is that it simply does not work to make -men happier. It’s only success has been to make men fight. That is what -we need now, but it is not enough. - - -Q. _Can you prove that the Soviet system does not work?_ - -A. I am not going to try to do it with statistics. I have played and -worked and sweated with Soviet statistics as much as the next man, but -if there ever was a country on earth where the old saying, “Figures -don’t lie but liars figure,” is true, it is the Soviet Union, where -avowedly and openly it is announced that the Statistical Office must -consider itself in the service of propaganda for the national good. I -can give you only a reproduction of the impressions I had, and which -you would have had if you had been with me. - -The two chief impressions you get from the Soviet Union are its extreme -poverty and the all-pervading Terror. True, the Terror diminishes as -one gets away from Moscow and the large cities, but it is present -in greater or less degree everywhere. The population as a whole is -desperately poor and always afraid. I thought when I read of the German -attack on the Soviet Union, and then of the valiant initial Soviet -resistance, that the war must have come to the Soviet population as a -sort of release. - -Although “the NKVD instituted severe police measures to round up Fifth -Columnists,” nevertheless the net effect of the impact of the war -upon the Soviet population must have been very much like the opening -of jail doors. The national emergency and the necessity for all to -get together and fight for their lives, I am sure had an inspiriting -effect even greater than it would have in a less primitive Western -community. That wartime spirit of exaltation is not true of the Soviet -Union in peacetime. In ordinary times, the Soviet population is -surely the unhappiest 200,000,000 ever to live under one flag in one -vast succession of barracks and slums covering one-sixth of the land -surface of the globe and stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Black -Sea and from the Sea of Okhotsk to the Baltic. Think of that immense -area with its huge population and reflect that from one end of the -country to the other there cannot be found a single household (aside -from those of high Soviet officials, and a few artists, journalists, -and other privileged classes--not more than a few thousand out of -200,000,000) possessing the food, clothing, furniture, the necessities -and conveniences of an ordinary workman’s family in the United States. - -After two years of warfare and bombing and blockade it would be -difficult to find in all England a workman compelled to live as -uncomfortably, unhygienically, and with as poor food and clothing -as the ordinary Moscow workman. The average family on relief in -America lives better than the privileged Moscow workman’s family. I -particularly emphasize “Moscow workman” because he is the best-off -person in the Soviet Union with the exception of the tiny privileged -group I have mentioned. The revolution was made for the proletariat and -what there is to enjoy goes to the workman. - -The peasants on their collective farms live on the whole on a level -beneath that of any large group of white people in the world. The -Soviet peasant’s condition is substantially that of a serf. He is bound -to his collective and may not leave without permission. He is paid -chiefly in kind and his pittance of cash is almost useless, since there -are such small supplies of anything in the stores to buy. He eats day -in and day out, year in and year out, for breakfast, dinner, and supper -black bread and cabbage soup and little else. - -The average Russian peasant does not taste meat more than a few times -a year. He is able to live on this diet because his black rye bread -contains everything necessary for complete nutrition save fat, which -he gets from a meager ration of salt pork. His relationship to the -collective is the relationship of serf to master. The serf under -the Czar could be punished by his master; so can the Soviet serf be -punished by the NKVD, without trial, and whereas under the Czar the -landowner had no power of life and death over his serfs, the NKVD has -that power not only over the peasants but over every human being in the -Soviet Union except Stalin himself and his immediate cohorts. - - -Q. _If the peasant is such a serf, why has he not revolted now that the -advance of Hitler’s armies has given him a chance to do so?_ - -A. It may sound flippant but it is the sober truth that the Russian -peasant serf does not know that he is a serf; he is convinced that -he lives better than any farm hand in the world. He has utterly no -standard of comparison. He is as incapable of judging his position -in the world as the Eskimos in _Kabloona_ who had never seen a white -man until Gontran de Poncins visited them. The Russian peasant is as -shut off from the outside world as an inhabitant of old Japan before -Perry. Within his world he has no neighbors better off than himself. -This makes him a happier man than if he were able to observe and become -envious of more pleasant ways of life. - - -Q. _What is the NKVD?_ - -A. That is the name given the Soviet Political Police in 1934. It has -had three names, first the Cheka, then the G.P.U., pronounced Gay Pay -Oo, and now NKVD, pronounced En Kah Vay Day, which is an abbreviation -for the _Narkomvnudel_, itself an abbreviation of four Russian words -meaning Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Whenever the -Political Police has accumulated too much blood on its name, it is -changed, but its functions remain the same: to administer the Terror. - - -Q. _Are the people in the collective farms better off than when they -were individual farmers?_ - -A. I did not know the Russia of the Czars, but the peasant himself gave -a very good answer to that when he refused to go into the collectives, -and rather than enter with his livestock, killed it by the thousands -of head, until within a year more than half the cattle, horses, pigs, -and sheep of the country had been slaughtered. The Soviet Union has -not yet entirely recovered from this animal massacre. The peasants -slaughtered their livestock because once collectivized, the livestock -passed completely out of control of the peasants. Stalin later conceded -each collective farm peasant the right to own one cow and one pig as -his private possession. Otherwise the members of the collective may not -dispose of the product of their own toil. - - -Q. _But isn’t that precisely the nature of a collective, for all -members to pool their resources and labor and then draw the dividends?_ - -A. That is the theory, but the dividends for the Soviet peasant consist -of the barest subsistence. They must turn over to the State trusts -a stipulated amount or share of whatever their collective produces, -wheat, or dairy products, beef or pork, and this share is usually so -high that there is nothing left for the peasants to eat but black bread -and cabbage. It is the settled policy of the Five-Year Plans to take -from the soil all its produce except the minimum subsistence for the -peasants and devote it to industrialization, by distribution at high -prices to the workmen, and by export, in exchange for machines from -abroad. - - -Q. _Then, surely the Russian workman is much better off, since the -whole system is supposed to be for the benefit of the proletariat._ - -A. He is better off than the peasant, but he is worse off than any -other white workman in the world. In the winter of 1934-1935 I made -a survey of the Russian standard of living and compared it with -the standard of living in capitalist states. In order to make the -comparison as fair as possible I chose the little capitalist states -which used to be a part of Imperial Russia--Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, -Lithuania, and Poland. - -First I spent two months in Moscow, studying the standard of living -of the workmen in the best Moscow factories. These workmen were more -favorably situated than any others in the Soviet Union. Then I spent -three months studying the standard of living of typical working-class -families in the little capitalist states. To my surprise I found -that the poorest workmen’s families in the capitalist states lived -considerably better than the Moscow workers, who were the most -prosperous in all Russia. - -This was after seventeen years of Communism, and the capitalist states -used for comparison were among the poorest in the world. They had all -suffered more from the World War than Russia as a whole had suffered, -and they began their new national lives from scratch, without capital -or credit. Yet the average workman in Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, -Lithuania, and Poland was living at least twice as well as the best-off -workmen in the Soviet Union. - - -Q. _How did you get your facts?_ - -A. By visiting scores of homes and talking with the housewives. I asked -each one fifty to a hundred questions, and found out the total family -income, how it was earned, and how it was spent. Then I made up a -theoretical basket, to contain a week’s supply of food for a workman, -and found out by direct inquiry the number of hours a man would have -to work to earn the basket. I found that in order to buy the basket the -Soviet workman had to spend an average of twice as many working hours -as his fellow worker in the small capitalistic states, while he would -have to spend over three times as many working hours as a workman in -the United States. - -The Moscow workers, as the workers in most parts of the Soviet Union, -live in barracks, one or more families to a room, brutally overcrowded. -The Soviet Union has never succeeded in solving its housing problem and -seems, indeed, to be slipping steadily backward, each year jamming more -and more people into tenements fantastically full. It is not unusual -to find four families sharing a single room. Imagine how much privacy -they have, with each family’s quarter of the room partitioned off by a -hanging sheet. In the little capitalist states, many workmen had their -own cottage homes, a thing utterly unknown in the Soviet Union. - -The food eaten by the capitalist workmen was incomparably better in -quality and greater in quantity than the Soviet workman’s food. The -clothing worn by the Soviet workmen and their families was pathetically -threadbare, sleazy and cheap, while the capitalist workmen were -well-dressed in comparison. Now these Russian workmen, it must be -remembered, were in the midst of their Second Five-Year Plan, and -were the recipients of the cream of its production. They were the -beneficiaries of that vast scheme of National Planned Economy which was -to produce so much more efficiently than the capitalist system that -before long everybody in the Soviet Union would be living like rich -men in the United States. It was their idea that the time would soon -come when production of every conceivable kind of commodity would be -so prolific in the Soviet Union that everybody could have his every -material want satisfied. “From each according to his ability--to each -according to his need,” the classic Communist ideal would be finally -attained. - -Now after twenty-three years of trial it seems certain that in -place of Soviet State Capitalism, any form of private capitalism -under a democracy would have given Russia not only the blessings of -individual liberty, but far greater industrial production, which of -course is the prime measure of any economic system’s success. This is -not a mere speculation. If you take the graph of Imperialist Russian -industrial production before the last war, and prolong it over the -next twenty-three years at the same rate of increase as the years -1900 to 1914, you will find that Czarist Russia would have produced -more in 1940 than the Soviet Union with all its Five-Year Plans. What -Russia could have accomplished under a liberal democratic, or a free -democratic-socialist regime, we can only guess. - -Both Lenin and Trotzky once remarked that no matter what else the -Soviet Union did, if it did not succeed in producing more than the -capitalist system produced, the Soviet system must be called a failure. -If it is objected that the Soviet Union had to spend its surplus -on defense, one can reply that a system which is so poor that the -population has to live on a bare subsistence level in order to maintain -its armed services, is a failure also. Twenty-three years is a long -enough trial for any system to show at least some hope. - - -Q. _What is State Capitalism and what has this to do with the war?_ - -A. It has a great deal to do with the war, because Soviet weakness -tempted Hitler to attack and Soviet weakness is a direct outcome -of Soviet State Capitalism. This term means that the State is the -monopolizer of all industry, trade, and agriculture. It is the sole -employer. It is the owner and manager of all factories, mines, shops, -farms, fisheries, transport systems, in short of every means of -production and distribution in the country. - -No one can work for any other employer except the State and the State -has absolute power to order every minute detail of the daily lives of -its employees, the whole population. The Soviet workman is no less a -serf than the Soviet peasant, for the workman also cannot leave his job -without permission, and he also has no control of any kind over his -employer, no means of bringing pressure on him, because his employer -is the State and the State is not elected, but its representatives are -appointed from the top down, beginning with Stalin. - - -Q. _You say the State is not elected, but how about the Soviet -elections we hear about?_ - -A. The voters are presented with a ticket chosen by the Party and they -are allowed to accept the Party candidates. Citizens of the Soviet -Union have exactly as much voice in their government as citizens of -Nazi Germany have in theirs, that is, none at all. It is nevertheless -interesting to note that the tyrant in the Soviet Union still thinks -it worth while to preserve the farce of elections while the tyrant in -Germany has apparently dispensed with them altogether. - - -Q. _But cannot the Soviet workmen bring pressure to bear on the -authorities by striking?_ - -A. Strikes have been outlawed _de facto_ in the Soviet Union since its -earliest years. Soviet trades unions are merely the instruments for -helping the State enforce discipline. They are the classic type of -company unions. We can sum up this aspect of Soviet State Capitalism by -saying that whereas this form of collectivism was intended originally -to free the workman from all the disabilities, injustices, and -inequalities suffered by the workman under the individual capitalist -employer, all that has happened is that the workman has exchanged a -comparatively weak, sometimes well-meaning, individual or corporate -capitalist employer for a monster, all-powerful, completely egocentric, -impersonal, soulless monopoly, the State, which has all the faults of -the worst individual employer multiplied a millionfold. It is just as -greedy as the worst individual, but has no check upon its greed, and -it is never as efficient as the least efficient individual. It is Jack -London’s Iron Heel in reverse. - - -Q. _It was the original Bolshevik theory, was it not, that their -Planned National Economy would be superior to Unplanned Capitalist -Economy because it would prevent the cyclic recurrence of economic -crises, such as 1929-1930? It was to end all booms and depressions by -ending overproduction. Hasn’t the Soviet Union done at least that much?_ - -A. We cannot tell, because the Soviet Union has never, in the -twenty-three years of its existence, had anything like sufficient -production, much less overproduction. - - -Q. _Why couldn’t the Soviet Planned Economy succeed?_ - -A. We can split the total failure into five parts: First, failure -adequately to replace the profit system; second, failure of planned -production; third, failure of planned distribution; fourth, failure -of the monetary system; fifth, failure of Soviet construction to keep -up with deterioration. Behind all these four failures looms the black -father of them all, the Terror. - - -Q. _Why do you devote so much importance to the Soviet Terror?_ - -A. From having witnessed its importance in the Soviet Union. Aside -from that, we ought to be able to recognize purely theoretically its -paramount role in any attempt swiftly to transform an individualistic -society into a collectivist society. For thousands of years men have -been living more or less free individual lives. Suddenly it is decided -to create a collective, as the Bolsheviks decided in Russia. At the -time of the Revolution there were said to have been no more than ten -thousand Bolsheviks. Eventually they were to impose their will upon -200,000,000 people and reorganize them into a vast, badly functioning, -but nevertheless authentic anthill. To do this as swiftly as the -Bolsheviks wanted it done required compulsion, applied without stint, -to every unit in the ant heap. Having no say in the matter these -multitudes of human beings were required to change every habit of their -lives; were ordered even to change their instincts. It took unlimited -compulsion to achieve a semblance of the goal. The instrument of -compulsion was the Terror. - -It produced an ant heap, but the ant heap never was able to do more -than provide minimum food, lodging, and clothing for its ants. For a -long time outside observers leniently agreed that this must be due -to the strain of reorganizing an individualistic into a collectivist -society, but now that a generation has passed, the tendency is to -consider that more fundamental faults are to blame. - -First, it appeared that the motive for work was not so effective in -the ant heap as it was in the outside world, since from the day of -its foundation until this moment the Soviet workman has produced less -per capita per hour than capitalist workmen anywhere in the world. -Furthermore, higher ranks, as engineers, technicians, superintendents, -managers, and directors in the Soviet Union were so notably inefficient -compared with their capitalist colleagues that for a time the anthill -authorities imported and paid highly trained specialists from the -outside world to set an example and teach. - -This effort too was a failure, as Soviet production usually declined to -its original level after departure of the foreign specialist. Also the -men of enterprise who in a free society risk their capital and brains -to found factories, dig mines, and sometimes swindle their fellow men, -were assigned in the anthill to the Gosplan, the Government Planning -Commission. There, in the effort to plan production for 200,000,000 -people, the anthill failed most dismally. The conclusion was that the -collective with its rigid wage scales, limited incomes, prohibited -labor market, and ban on profits had not provided a motive for work -as stimulating and productive as the profit motive and the competitive -wage system in the free capitalist world. - - -Q. _How can you call it a free capitalist world? There isn’t any -freedom left in the capitalist world. Look at all the checks on -business here in the United States. Do you consider our farmers free? -They can’t even plant what they want._ - -A. Yes, I call it free, as free as bird life compared with the Soviet -Union or with Nazi Germany. The trouble with you and with all of us -who complain about the checks on business, on agriculture, and so -on, is that we lack the experience of being really without freedom. -Unless you have lived in a slave state, under a real tyranny, you -simply do not know what freedom means. All these checks about which you -complain are legal checks imposed by law made by representatives of -your choosing and passed upon by courts which are eventually also of -your choosing, and drawn within a constitution which was also chosen -and is now maintained by the people’s free will. If you dislike any of -these checks, you have only to get a majority to agree with you and you -can change it. To compare the lack of absolute freedom in our world -with the absolute lack of freedom in the totalitarian world, whether -Bolshevik or Nazi, is the same as to compare a traffic policeman with -the warden of a penitentiary. - -It was precisely this effort at penitentiary production on a -continental scale that broke down the Russian effort at planned -national economy. It proved impossible to plan effectively for so -enormous an aggregate of human beings every detail of their production. -A few of the population, perhaps two per cent, were zealous Communists -who were willing to work harder to make the collective successful than -they would have worked for any amount of profit. - -Terror was used to make the other ninety-eight per cent fit in and -work. But the Terror took away from the managers, supervisors, and -technicians the willingness to take responsibility. A mistake, honest -though it might be, could cost a factory manager his life. In the -Soviet Union the man who makes a mistake is automatically suspected and -accused of sabotage. The only way to be safe is to make no decisions, -pass every responsibility to a higher authority. This is the rule today -throughout the Soviet economic apparatus. - -Parallel with this effect of the Terror is the benumbing influence of -the unforgiving rigidity of the Plan. Each factory manager is given a -quota to fulfill. Quotas are calculated at a trifle more than normal -maximum capacity. No excuses are accepted for nonfulfillment. In the -chaos of Soviet economic life it is seldom that raw materials, fuel, -tools, and labor can easily be brought together to fulfill a quota, -yet failure may cost the factory manager “liquidation,” which means -anything from dismissal or exile at hard labor to death. - -Consequently, nearly all quotas are fulfilled in quantity, but quality -is in practice ignored. The number of units of production is easily -checked; quality is more difficult to check. Hence, Soviet industrial -production is lower in quality than in the capitalist world, and this -is a partial explanation for the divergence between Soviet industrial -statistics which show a high level of production, and the facts of -Soviet economic life which demonstrate to the naked eye how low the -level of production is. Some observers have estimated that at least -thirty per cent should be taken off all Soviet industrial production -statistics to allow for the quantities of entirely unusable goods -produced. - - -Q. _But we used to prize highly many objects of Russian manufacture, -and you can still see in jewelry and antique stores all kinds of finely -made things, enamel work, and leather goods, wonderfully printed books. -What has become of them?_ - -A. Nearly all that fine handicraft is gone now. The Russian artisan -used to be one of the best in the world. Home handicrafts formerly -supplied a sizable fraction of Russian consumption goods, not only -the things you mention, but furniture, pottery, textiles--wonderful -hand-woven linen and wool--and lacquer work. Most of these artisans, -or such of them as outlived the hardships of the Revolution, have -been forced into factories today to turn out mass production articles -inferior to any in the world, including the Japanese. - -I often wonder what a Moscow citizen would say if he could walk through -an American five-and-ten-cent store. I am sure he would think he was -being deceived. He could not imagine such a wealth of high-grade, -luxurious articles. Once one of the younger members of the Rosenwald -clan visited Moscow and as we looked in the pitiful shopwindows I -remarked that if he wanted to start a revolution in Russia all he -would have to do would be to distribute a few million Sears Roebuck -catalogues among the workers and peasants of the greatest poorhouse in -history. Such a system of nationwide mail-order distribution would be -utterly beyond the comprehension of a Soviet citizen, for one of the -weakest links in the weak chain of Soviet economy is the distribution -of goods. - -Poor as the goods are, they are not so poor as the method of putting -them in the hands of the consumers. Since there is always a goods -shortage, the consumer is placed in the permanent position of a -supplicant, glad to get anything even if it is a substitute for a -substitute for the article he wants. Allocation of the scanty supplies -is made from the top down. The local community is not asked what it -needs. The Planners arbitrarily ship certain quantities of shoes, hoe -handles, and seed, and the recipients have learned to be grateful, no -matter if what they needed was kerosene, matches, and cloth. - - -Q. _But you said something about the monetary system, that it had -failed too. How can a monetary system fail in a completely planned -national economy?_ - -A. The monetary system under the Soviets seems just as difficult to -handle as it is in the capitalist system. The authorities incessantly -juggle wages against prices, raising the one, lowering the other, -inflating the currency, selling bonds and even lottery bonds, as -blatantly gambling as the old Louisiana lottery. Yet the answer never -seems to be achieved satisfactorily. Always the citizen’s purchasing -power is behind his needs. Fundamentally, of course, the answer is that -there is never enough of anything to go around. - - -Q. _But isn’t the answer to that the fact that the Soviet State is -taking away from the citizens today in order to invest in productive -industry from which the citizens will draw a dividend tomorrow? At -least I should have thought that was the theory._ - -A. That is the theory, but one of the tragic aspects of the epic -struggle of the Russian Bolsheviks to make their collectivist system -work is that their investments in factories and machinery wear out -almost as fast and sometimes faster than they can replace them and -build new ones. The bad workmanship of the buildings and the poor -quality and rough handling of the machines results in a speed of -deterioration far beyond the normal in the capitalist world. If they -had given their population slightly better food and living conditions -and had therefore been compelled to limit their investment in new -buildings and machines to something like a capitalist standard of new -investment, deterioration would probably have taken away more plant -than they could replace. - - -Q. _How do you explain such inefficiency and wastefulness?_ - -A. For all the reasons given before, and for another which I left for -a different category since it is, so to speak, historical, while these -reasons we have discussed are current. The historical fact of import at -least during the life of this generation is that the Bolsheviks twice -in twenty years exterminated their ablest people in the country, or -rather I should say, the Bolsheviks first killed off the ablest people -of old Russia and then Stalin killed off the ablest Bolsheviks. It has -been so long ago, and the popular interest and sympathy in the Soviet -experiment was at the time so great, that we have almost forgotten what -the Bolsheviks did to their own countrymen. - -Their conviction was that they could not establish Communism, or -Socialism, without physically exterminating the persons who had -become, under capitalism, better off than the mass of the people. -They reasoned that no capitalist, and by that they meant any person -who lived a little better than the poorest member of the community, -would ever tolerate willingly the establishment of a Socialist State. -They believed all such people would attempt to wreck the new Socialist -economy. The professional revolutionaries had spent half their lives -attempting to wreck the capitalist system, and they attributed to the -capitalists a similar resolution. - -In Germany, the Nazis succeeded in coercing the capitalists into -becoming useful members of the National Socialist Collective. In -Russia, the Bolsheviks set out to destroy the capitalists as a -class, or rather every human being who by his birth, or position, or -accomplishment, had become identified as an active member of the old -system. First, they killed off the aristocracy and landed proprietors, -numbering several hundred thousand, and including of course the -Czar and his family. Then they exterminated the industrialists, not -very numerous, because Russia was the least industrialized of the -great nations. Nevertheless they were important. With them a little -later were exterminated the managers, supervisors and technicians, -the scientists, the professional men, dentists, surgeons, lawyers, -teachers, and judges. These numbered a million or more. - -By the time I got to Russia in 1925 all these were fully exterminated. -By extermination I mean just that. They were either shot, or sent -into exile in the Arctic or the deserts of Central Asia, or condemned -to penal labor under such conditions that they died within a few -years. They were nearly all killed. Only the most meager remnant -remained, a few accidents of survival. I shall never forget the man -who peddled cigarettes. I shared a house in Moscow with Theo Seibert, -correspondent of the _Hamburger Fremdenblatt_, today, alas, editor of -the _Voelkischer Beobachter_. Theo and I used to try to get the old man -to talk, but he was too frightened to make much sense. The baldheaded -trembling man who begged us to buy his cigarettes had been a Justice of -the Moscow Supreme Court! His survival was just an accident. - -After this initial massacre the Bolsheviks let a pause ensue and -for several years no great killings took place, just the routine -score or so of executions per month. But when the Five-Year Plan was -inaugurated, the decision was made to exterminate the kulaks. A kulak -was the term applied originally to a peasant who had risen sufficiently -above his neighbors to employ labor. That made him an exploiter, a -person who lived from the surplus value produced by his hired hands. -The Bolsheviks, however, chose to amplify this category to include all -peasants who, even if they did not employ labor, had become in the -least degree more prosperous than their neighbors. This prosperity, -based for the most part upon the individual industry and sagacity -of the kulak, might consist in the possession of two cows to the -neighbor’s one. In any case the reasoning of the Bolsheviks was that -they could not afford to tolerate the existence of any peasant who, -forced to join a collective farm, would at the beginning have to live -worse than he had lived as an individual farmer. - -Such peasants, the Bolsheviks reasoned, would be just as incorrigible -enemies to collectivism as the aristocrats and industrialists. They -had to die. They did die. This was the greatest Soviet mass slaughter, -because there were a great many more such peasants than there were -aristocrats, or industrialists, or intelligentsia. It took about two -years to do away with the kulaks. Tens of thousands of G.P.U. troops -and agents sought out every family of better-than-average peasants -throughout the entire Soviet Union, and forced them into boxcars -and herded them off to places of exile, down to Kazakstan or up to -Narimsky Krai, to places where it was too hot or too cold to live. It -is a conservative estimate to say that some 5,000,000 of these more -enterprising farm workers and their families died at once, or within a -few years. - -This process destroyed what there was left of the originally -non-Communist party talent in Russia. You would have thought that this -ought to satisfy the Bolsheviks. It did, but it did not satisfy Stalin. -There was no more opposition to the Bolshevik program. There was not a -human being left in Russia who had any connection with the old regime. -Not in modern history has there been such a clean wiping of the slate. -The Bolsheviks were left not only as absolute masters, but containing -a country in which every living person was their hopeful or cowed -collaborator. Then came the fatal quarrel between Stalin and Trotzky. -Out of this quarrel came the great purges by Stalin which destroyed for -the second time within a generation the principal talent of Russia. - -This may be regarded as the most fateful slaughter of all. Bolsheviks -could argue that the extermination of every vestige of Czarist Russia -could be justified on account of the inefficiency, inhumanity, -unproductivity of the old regime, and the fact that, according to -Bolshevik reasoning, members of the old regime would never cooperate -with the new. But now Stalin was destroying not the old, but the new -regime, all its talents, its best intellects, its best characters if -you like. - -Beginning with the politicians, he killed off in the course of four -years of uninterrupted purges, the top fourth or fifth, to estimate it -conservatively, of the Party itself, of the Army, Navy, and Air Force -leaders and then of the new Bolshevik intelligentsia, the foremost -technicians, managers, supervisors, scientists. There is, of course, -enough youth among 200,000,000 for the nation to recover even after -such a purge. The youth whom Stalin spared have proved in battle how -boundless are the forces of Russia, the first country Hitler ever -tackled with lives to waste! - - -Q. _You have not made it clear, if the Soviet system is so brutal a -tyranny, how it is that the Red Army has been able to stand up so well -to the Germans._ - -A. The answer is that the Red Army has fought as Russians have always -fought under any regime, bravely, enduringly, stubbornly, gallantly. -Russians have always had to fight despite their government; as they did -in the last war, as they are doing in this war. The general distaste -of the outside world for the Bolshevik system led many to forget that -the Russian soldier retains in the Red Army all the martial virtues he -possessed in the past. And have we forgotten that the Imperial Army in -the last war held the Germans for three years? If the Red Army does as -well we will be eternally thankful. True, the Germans in the last war -had to divide their forces into two fronts, while today the Red Army -has to bear the shock of nearly the full force of the whole German land -forces. The task of the Red Army is accordingly heavier. - -But our appraisal of the Red Army’s resistance has been strongly -influenced by an element which has colored and distorted our judgment -of the quality of any army which faces the Germans. That element is -our recollection of the collapse of the French Army, which was due to -a score of causes besides the excellence of the German Army. It was -so overwhelming, bewildering, and impressive that it gave rise to the -involuntary, subconscious feeling that the Germans were invincible. -Now when any troops stand up to the Germans we are inclined to judge it -a miracle of valor and military effectiveness. This is not to take away -one whit of the immense credit due the Russians for holding up Hitler’s -juggernaut but it is fair to point out that if we had not seen France -fall, if for example Germany had attacked Russia before attacking -France, everybody would have expected the Russians to put up just -about the resistance they have put up. After all, Russia is a nation -of double the population of Germany, with incomparably greater natural -resources, and with twenty-three years of unflagging preparation for -precisely this war. If there had been the exceptional virtue in the -Soviet collectivist system which is ascribed to it by its disciples in -America, it should not merely have stopped but should have defeated, -routed, and conquered the Germans. - - -Q. _Aside from the fact that everybody was influenced by the French -example, most military experts seem to have been deceived about the -fighting ability of the Red Army. Why was that?_ - -A. It seemed almost as though Stalin wanted the outside world to -think his army less strong than it was. None but the most acute of -professional observers, among them Colonel Faymonville, for years -American military attaché to Moscow, and now a member of the Allied -military mission there, had a correct view of the Red Army. Hitler for -the first time in his life admitted he had “had no idea” how strong the -Red Army was. No outsider was ever allowed to see more than fragments -of it. No newspaper correspondent, for example, ever put foot over the -threshold of a Red Army barracks. Maneuvers were nearly always carried -out in secret without the presence of military attachés. One almost had -the feeling that Stalin had deliberately arranged the initial debacle -of his attack on Finland in the first Soviet-Finnish war in order to -deceive the world into thinking his army inferior to its real strength. -Of course that makes no sense, and the fact was that Stalin had been -led to think he could walk over Finland with ease and hence had not -properly prepared his attack. Nevertheless the net effect of the first -Finnish war combined with the secrecy thrown about the Red Army was to -make even military attachés in observation posts around Russia believe -the Red Army extremely weak. There was always the greatest difficulty -in obtaining the most elementary facts about the Red Army. The Soviet -government published less about its military establishment than any -other great power. It kept concealed the very existence of important -armaments factories; it never published production figures in the arms -industry; it furnished the League of Nations less information about its -vast army than any other members of the League. The G.P.U. Terror made -it possible to envelop the Red Army in an impenetrable blanket which -even the Germans were not able to pierce. - -This secrecy emphasized the surprise that many felt at the outbreak of -the war, when the Soviet economy was now indisputably revealed to have -been a totally one-purpose economy, for the single end of making war. -Every student of the Soviet Union had realized the great emphasis laid -upon national defense, but everyone had supposed that at the same time -the Soviet Planners were working primarily, if ineffectively, to create -a thousand-purpose economy for the satisfaction of the myriad needs of -the population. No one had divined what turned out to be the fact, that -this huge economy was being organized for nothing but fighting. - -It proved effective, as was to be expected. A brutal, simplified -economy which ignores most of the people’s wants and devotes all its -energy and materials to preparing for war, is better able to prepare -and to make war than a more complete economy devoted to satisfying -its people’s peacetime needs. Sparta was stronger in battle than -Athens, but should we measure the value of a society by the efficiency -with which it makes war? If so, we ought to value the Nazis above -all others, since they are still leading in this activity. Hitler’s -society took Sparta as its model; Stalin’s took Spartacus. The Nazis -met their identical twin when they struck the Red Army in battle. -Hitler wishes us to believe he is crusading against a fundamentally -different regime in a “crusade for civilization.” We shall not be -deceived. - - -Q. _What would be the result if Stalin were really to try to hold out -indefinitely? Could he do so? Has he the resources in the Urals to -carry on there?_ - -A. He has almost everything he needs in the Urals except sufficient -oil. If he were cut off from oil in the Caucasus, he would have to -import supplies over the trans-Siberian, already overburdened. If he -really were determined to carry on in spite of all odds, and could make -Sverdlovsk or Cheliabinsk another Chungking, it would compel Hitler to -keep an important fraction of his total forces in action in Russia; -it would probably prevent Hitler from being able to attempt to invade -England; it would lead to a deadlock which could be turned into victory -by our intervention. - - -Q. _Would it be possible for us to supply the Russians with sufficient -to make up for their losses? Could we enable them to carry on?_ - -A. Our shipments to Russia are as important morally as materially; -indeed their token strength is greater than their real strength. We -shall never be able to make up for the territory Russia has lost to -the Germans--60 per cent of their steel supply, 45 per cent of their -manganese, 49 per cent of their tire production, and so on. Our -shipments will always be limited by the transportation facilities of -the trans-Siberian railway and the route through Iran, both of which -are long and time-consuming. Actually we can scarcely hope to get -enough American supplies in the hands of the Red Army to make much -real difference before next spring, no matter how hard we try, and -we ought to do our best. It is the publicly announced policy of both -Washington and London that Russia shall have priority on the vital -war materials. But everything is up to Stalin. If he wishes to quit -and announce that he had not received sufficient aid from Britain and -the United States, he will be able to do so any time during the next -several months, and make a case at least among his friends. - -If Stalin decides to hold on, we have a two to one chance to beat -Hitler in the long run; if he decides to quit it means we face much -worse odds. There is only one way we can persuade him that we are going -to put our full powers into the struggle. It is our crystal-clear duty -to ourselves, our children, and our national future to keep Stalin in -the war by ourselves going formally to war against Germany. It is a -crime against America to wait. - - - - -3. ENGLAND - - -Q. _What place do you think Churchill will have in history?_ - -A. If Churchill brings his country victorious out of this war, he -will without a doubt go down as the greatest man in English history. -No Prime Minister of the sixty ministries since Walpole, and none of -the Monarchs when they exercised unlimited power, nor any Admiral or -General has upon his tombstone: “He saved England from death.” Many -have saved England from defeat. Many have added to England’s power and -glory. But only Churchill will be entitled to the supreme rank, for -never before has England been threatened with the supreme penalty of -national extinction. Among the Prime Ministers Lloyd George would have -a place near Churchill, but the alternative to victory in the first -World War was not the alternative in this war. Among the defenders of -England, Nelson, Wellington, and the Great Duke of Marlborough would -rank near Churchill. But the alternative to victory against Napoleon or -Louis XIV was not the alternative England faces now. And no England of -the past ever faced such odds as Churchill and his people faced at the -fall of France. Whatever the decision, Churchill has already achieved -greatness. This man who used to be accused of playing at politics and -acting only for himself has been lifted by his responsibility to forget -himself in the Battle of Mankind. - - -Q. _Is Mr. Churchill really backed by all the British people?_ - -A. Mr. Churchill is the most popular and trusted leader the British -people have had within the memory of living man. The man who caused -the defeat of the General Strike in 1926 is if anything more popular -among the working classes than among the upper classes. In the House -of Commons he usually receives heartier applause from Labor members -than from Conservatives even though he is the head of the Conservative -party. This is partly because the Conservatives cannot rid themselves -of a tinge of resentment at the man who was always, consistently, -unfailingly right about the coming of the war, and what it would be -like, while they were always, consistently, unfailingly wrong. The -Conservatives out of a rooted misconception of the character and -intentions of Hitler, felt an instinctive sympathy for him almost up to -the time he actually began to drop bombs upon them. The Labor party on -the other hand shared Churchill’s antipathy for Hitler from the very -beginning, and there was thus early established a bond between the -great British aristocrat and the British working classes which has been -greatly strengthened by his leadership of the war. I doubt if there -is a single Labor party leader with as devoted a following among the -British workers as Churchill has. - - -Q. _What part in the war has the British workingman played under -Churchill’s leadership?_ - -A. The British workingman, inspired and informed by Churchill, has been -superbly and intelligently patriotic. It is this union of Churchill -with Labor which has warded off defeat in the most desperate hour, -and which with our help will eventually win the war. British Labor’s -attitude toward the struggle which will decide the fate of all the -world for generations to come is a reproach to that minority of -American labor which has failed to understand the fact that the liberty -and the life of every individual American workingman depends on the -outcome of this war. During those awful months following the evacuation -of Dunkirk, the British trades unions voluntarily gave up all the -trades unions rules which, designed to protect the interests of labor -in peacetime, hampered production and became a danger in war. They -lengthened hours, took less pay for more work, stayed on the job to the -point of complete exhaustion. In the course of about three months the -British workingman doubled the production of weapons and munitions, and -almost tripled airplane production by the end of the year. It could not -have been done without Churchill. From 1932 to 1939, for seven years, -Churchill had been tirelessly teaching, preaching, exhorting, and -pleading with the British public and the British government to meet the -German menace. By the time the war came the British working classes had -learned from Churchill what it was about. They learned much faster than -the Chamberlains and many a muddleheaded rich appeaser. - -Another impressive sign of the wisdom of the British Labor Party from -the leaders to the rank and file is that you do not hear from them the -demands for a “definition of war aims” which are so loudly voiced by -groups of American liberals. These Americans who are so concerned about -establishing the chemical purity of British intentions, and who insist -on a blueprint of the peace settlement, and a guarantee that the world -will be made over in a style that meets with their approval--these -Americans show precisely the incomprehension of Hitler that Chamberlain -showed with his appeasement. Your ordinary British dock worker knows -more about the meaning of the war than scores of American intellectuals -who are still bleating about war aims. As the British Labor publicist, -G. D. H. Cole, put it, “The Labor leaders and the great majority -of their followers alike believed firmly that the defeat of Hitler -mattered immeasurably more than anything else. For this reason they -were ready to put aside even their socialism and the greater part of -their reforming policy and even to abstain from criticizing openly -the government’s mistakes rather than run any risk of dividing the -national elements which stood for a vigorous prosecution of the war.” - - -Q. _Is Churchill what you would call a realist or an idealist?_ - -A. Churchill is both. He is a hardheaded, tough-minded idealist and -an imaginative, generous realist. He is convinced that the policy -which works for the good of all will also work best for the good of -the individual. This is the foundation stone of civilization. Hitler -believes that the smart man is the man who exploits others. Hitler’s -are the ethics of the “heel,” the gangster, the racketeer, the cheat -who is always on the lookout for a chance to swindle, or rob, betray, -or murder for profit. The Churchill attitude is that of the moral man, -the member of society. The Hitler attitude is that of the amoral man, -the bandit preying upon society. - -I do not think Churchill is formally a religious man, although he -attends divine services and thus sets an example for the nation under -his leadership. But Churchill’s beliefs add up to something closely -approaching practical Christianity. It seems to me that very few -Americans really understand what Churchill stands for. He is so much in -the public eye as a war leader, that we are bound to think of him as -a warrior first. We forget or never were told that he is first of all -a builder. Before the war, in the field of international relations he -believed passionately in the life-and-death necessity of sustaining the -League, of collective security through the League. - -Then as now, and in England as here in America, there were great -numbers of persons who thought they were being hardheaded realists -by rejecting the League as romantic. Their successors today are our -isolationists or noninterventionists, as they shamefacedly call -themselves now. Churchill remorselessly revealed how suicidal was this -refusal to cooperate among nations for the maintenance of security for -all. Long before Litvinoff coined the phrase Churchill was preaching -that “peace is indivisible,” that only through collective security -could the security of any single state be secured. His scorn for the -British counterpart of our isolationists was withering: “It is of the -utmost consequence to the unity of British national action that the -policy of adhering to the Covenant of the League of Nations shall not -be weakened or whittled away. I read in the _Times_ a few days ago a -letter in which a gentleman showed that these ideas of preventing war -by international courts and by reasonable discussion had been tried -over and over again. He said they had been tried after Marlborough had -defeated Louis XIV and after Europe had defeated Napoleon, but, he -said, they had always failed. If that is true it is a melancholy fact -but what was astonishing was _the crazy glee_ with which the writer -hailed such lapses from grace. I was told the other day of a sentence -of Carlyle’s in which he describes ‘the laugh of the hyena on being -assured that, after all, the world is only carrion.’” - -It is of course plain to everybody now that the world is being torn -apart because _crazy_ people prevented the League of Nations from -functioning, _crazy_ people who believed they were as shrewd as the -Americans who today would like us to wait for the Germans to land on -United States soil before we fight. It has always been considered by -cheap and vulgar men that it is clever to be entirely selfish, and so -our Lindberghs, Wheelers, and Nyes even whisper temptingly the base -suggestion that we may profit by this war if Britain falls and her -Empire crumbles. What retribution would be ours were we to listen to -such voices! Churchill, whom no detractor has ever called a stupid -man, is not afraid to come out boldly and declare: “I think we ought -to place our trust in those moral forces which are enshrined in the -Covenant of the League of Nations. Do not let us mock at them, for they -are surely on our side. Do not mock at them for this may well be a time -when the highest idealism is not divorced from strategic prudence. -Do not mock at them, for these may be years, strange as it may seem, -when Right may walk hand in hand with Might.” This he spoke in 1937. -How the words are crammed with meaning now for America whose vital -self-interest to bring about the defeat of our enemy is identical with -the highest idealism. - - -Q. _Can Churchill be trusted?_ - -A. I will answer by citing Mr. Churchill’s attitude toward Ireland. In -1938 when the bill to turn the Irish naval bases back from British to -Irish control was being discussed, Churchill protested that when war -came, if Ireland refused to lend the ports to England, there would be -no way to get them back. Because, he said, “It will be no use saying, -‘Then we will retake the ports.’ You will have no right to do so. To -violate Irish neutrality should it be declared at the moment of a -great war may put you out of court in the opinion of the world and may -vitiate the cause by which you may be involved in war. If ever we have -to fight again we shall be fighting in the name of law, or respect for -the rights of small countries.” Can you imagine Hitler nourishing such -scruples? Churchill has proved, moreover, the hardest way, that he -meant what he said. The British still abstain from occupying and using -the Irish ports. They have lost scores of ships to German submarines -which might have been stopped if the Royal Navy had the use of the -Irish bases. Many people think it wrong for the British to imperil -their cause by respecting the neutrality of Ireland, which like every -other country outside the Axis owes its hopes for national independence -to a British victory. - - -Q. _What does Churchill think of the United States? I know that his -mother was American and that now during the war he wants as much help -from us as he can get, but what does he really think of America?_ - -A. We can go as far back as 1932 and find that he had this to say: “Of -course if the United States were willing to come into the European -scene as a prime factor, if they were willing to guarantee to those -countries who take their advice that they would not suffer for it, then -an incomparably wider and happier prospect would open to the whole -world. If they were willing not only to sign but to ratify treaties of -that kind, it would be an enormous advantage. It is quite safe for the -British Empire to go as far in any guarantee in Europe as the United -States is willing to go, and _hardly any difficulty in the world could -not be solved by the faithful cooperation of the English speaking -peoples_.” This was his view of the possibilities of Anglo-American -cooperation before the war; his faith in it now is stronger than ever. -As for his opinion of the American people, one can deduce a good deal -from some of the adjectives he has used about us in the past. He has -called us “active, educated, excitable and harassed”; and “the most -numerous and ebullient of civilized communities.” - - -Q. _What does Churchill think of Roosevelt and the New Deal?_ - -A. I am sure he has a profound admiration for Mr. Roosevelt quite -aside from the help he wants from him. Churchill and Roosevelt are -both aristocrats, both expert politicians, both highly cultured men, -both believers in humanity, and in the destiny of the English-speaking -peoples. There are only two factors to make them differ. The first is -that they are rivals, friendly rivals, of course, and allied rivals for -the duration of the war, but rivals just the same, and when the time -comes to translate victory into peace terms it is going to be exciting -to see which of these powerful, determined men will do the leading. It -will be a struggle of titans. As one reviews the chief characteristics -of each man it seems as though each possesses to the ultimate possible -degree the qualities of courage, intelligence, imagination, and -stubbornness. - -Churchill has called Roosevelt “this great man, this thrice chosen -head of a nation of 130,000,000.” Another time in 1934 he described -Roosevelt’s administration as a dictatorship, writing: “Although the -Dictatorship is veiled by constitutional forms it is none the less -effective.” Hastily he added: “To compare Roosevelt’s effort with that -of Hitler is not to insult Roosevelt but civilization.” Now both men -have become dictators in the classical sense of the word as it has -been so sapiently defined by Frederick L. Schuman. “‘Dictatorship’ is -a form of power which is resorted to voluntarily and temporarily by -democracies to meet dangers of invasion or revolution. It is a device -to save democracy, not to destroy it.... The disposition of democrats -to regard dictatorship in times of crisis as fatal to democracy rather -than as fundamental to its preservation reflects a tragic confusion -resting upon ignorance of history and misuse of labels.” Schuman points -out that Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini are tyrants or despots, but not, -if one uses the word properly, “dictators.” - -The reassuring fact is that both Roosevelt and Churchill believe that -a Pax Anglo-Americana is the key to the future. Churchill believes -that the British ought to take the leading role in such an arrangement -because they have borne the heat of battle to a greater degree than -we shall have done even with our troops in Europe. Roosevelt believes -America ought to be the leader since we are coming out of the war -considerably stronger than Great Britain and the younger nation is now -ready to take over guidance of world affairs from the parent country. -Out of this fundamental difference could come a massive dispute, but -since it will have been based on victory we can hope fervently that the -opportunity for the discussion be provided as quickly as possible. - -Churchill has a second difference with Roosevelt in the field of -economic theory and practice. He is distinctly against the New Deal. -There was a time during the period of the Blue Eagle when Churchill -seemed almost to fear that communism was coming to the United States. -He warned: “It is irrational to tear down or cripple the capitalist -system without having the fortitude of spirit and ruthlessness of -action to create a new communist system.” With Churchillian directness -he proclaims his belief in profits. “There can never be good wages or -good employment for any length of time without good profits.” - -With equal candor and with much wit he defends rich men. “A second -danger to President Roosevelt’s valiant and heroic experiments seems -to arise from the disposition to hunt down rich men as if they were -noxious beasts.... It is a very attractive sport, and once it gets -started quite a lot of people everywhere are found ready to join in the -chase.... The question arises whether the general well-being of the -masses of the community will be advanced by an excessive indulgence -in this amusement. The millionaire or multi-millionaire is a highly -economic animal. He sucks up with sponge-like efficiency money from all -quarters. In this process, far from depriving ordinary people of their -earnings, he launches enterprise and carries it through, raises values, -and he expands that credit without which on a vast scale no fuller -economic life can be opened to the millions. To hunt wealth is not to -capture commonwealth.” All this, his own economic philosophy, he sums -up in the formula: “Whether it is better to have equality at the price -of poverty or well-being at the price of inequality.” - -Does this indicate a narrowly selfish interest by Churchill in his -own class? Not at all. He believes profoundly in the possibility of -extending leisure and well-being to all mankind through the benefits -of science. He takes the evidence of Soviet Russia that the means to -general affluence is not communism, nor does he think it can come -through any form of nationalization of production. He believes the -essence of the problem is monetary. He believes the rights of man are -more important than the success of any economic system. He believes in -the British Empire as a mighty instrument of civilization. He believes -profoundly in cooperation with us. There is no reason why the two -mightiest democratic dictators, Roosevelt and Churchill, should not -emerge from the Peace Conference with a harmonious plan. - - -Q. _Is it true that Churchill is gifted with a peculiar power to -foresee the event?_ - -A. I know of no statement which summed up in so few words a complete -forecast of history as was contained in one sentence of Churchill’s -delivered April 6, 1936 in a speech on the fortification of the -Rhineland. You will remember that Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland March -6, 1936. Mr. Churchill had this to say: “The creation of a line of -forts opposite to the French frontier will enable the German troops to -be economized on that line and will enable the main forces to swing -round through Belgium and Holland.” There in thirty-six words you have -the entire story of the Battle of France, told four years before it -took place. - - -Q. _Tell us what you know of Mr. Churchill as a person. What are his -principal characteristics?_ - -A. Courage is his principal characteristic. I hesitated a moment but -decided to put his courage ahead of his intelligence, because courage -is a more important quality than intelligence. I remember I once had -a spirited argument on this point with Henri Bernstein, the French -playwright. We were at the country home of Louis Bromfield in Senlis, -the point outside Paris where the Germans during the last war came -nearest to the capital. Bernstein insisted intelligence was the most -valuable quality a man could have, and with enough of it he would not -need more than a minimum of courage. I argued that without courage -the keenest intelligence is useless in a world of action. A couple -of years later Bernstein and I were on the same refugee ship, the -_Madura_ of the British India Line, fleeing from Bordeaux to England -after the fall of France. I reminded Bernstein of our argument and -insisted that the disaster of France proved my contention was right. -Surely the French were still what they have often been called, the most -intelligent people on the continent, but for some reason which nobody -has yet completely fathomed, they had at this moment of their national -history lost the desire or the willingness to fight. I suppose it would -be fair to define that as lack of courage, although I would be the last -to assert that this is a permanent state of mind or of heart on the -part of the French. - -The collapse of the French was the signal for Churchill to display the -finest quality of his character. Senator Gerald P. Nye once, with the -good taste characteristic of our isolationists, said: “Britain is a -dead horse. America should not team up with a lost cause.” To France in -her death agony Churchill made the offer that she merge with Britain -and establish a single Franco-British government and cabinet, unite -the resources of the French and British Empires, and fight on to the -last drop of British blood, even if all France were occupied. It took -a Churchill’s imagination, generosity, and audacity to make such an -offer. The French did not have enough strength left to reach out and -accept the hand of rescue. We have heard a great deal about fighting to -the last drop of blood, but Churchill is the only man I have ever seen -among the belligerents who makes it absolutely convincing. - -I was in London during those peak months of the Battle of Britain, -August and September 1940 when the Germans were bombing by day as -well as by night, trying to conquer the R.A.F. to make invasion -possible. One day I was driving through London with Mr. Churchill, and -as we passed a particularly large and well-camouflaged machine-gun -emplacement at a street intersection, the Prime Minister called my -attention to it. “Do you see that?” “Yes,” I said, “it seems you really -meant it when you said the British would fight in the streets.” “Meant -it!” exclaimed Mr. Churchill. “Why the Germans could if they liked -drop a hundred thousand parachutists on London, and if they did we -would chew them up and spit them out.” There was in his voice a note -of delight at the prospect. This note is present in all of Churchill’s -references to getting at the enemy. Although no man would act more -quickly to relieve his people of the necessity of shedding their blood, -while the fight is on Churchill revels in it. The responsibilities -which are his now must be greater than those carried by any other human -being on earth. One would think such a weight would have a crushing -effect upon him. Not at all. The last time I saw him, while the Battle -of Britain was still raging, he looked twenty years younger than before -the war began. As we walked across the garden in the rear of Number Ten -Downing Street I had to quicken my pace and almost trot to keep up with -him, so swiftly did he stride along the gravel path. - -His uplifted spirit is transmitted to the people and it is my -impression that the British are, just as Churchill said, “proud to -be under the fire of the enemy.” You may think it overdrawn but if -you had shared with them the experience of heavy air bombardment, you -would agree that Churchill was only expressing the exact truth when he -said: “The sublime but also terrible experience and emotions of the -battlefield which for centuries have been reserved for soldiers and -sailors now are shared for good or ill by the entire population.” Even -in the midst of the most fearful danger Churchill taunts the enemy--“We -are waiting for that long promised invasion. So are the fishes.” I -would not be surprised if Churchill really wanted the Germans to try, -for if they were to try and fail it would be a defeat so disastrous -that it might well lead to a German collapse. - -Without courage nothing can be accomplished. With it plus intelligence -everything can be done. Churchill’s courage is of every variety. He has -the simple battle courage of the Hussar. Remember the cavalry charge at -Omdurman in the Sudan when the young Lieutenant Churchill fought his -way through a tangle of howling dervishes? He has the enduring physical -courage to play a championship game of polo with a dislocated shoulder. -He has the moral courage to lead a lost cause. It was he who defended -the Duke of Windsor at the abdication, when the once most popular man -in the British Empire had lost every other friend. He has the courage -to take responsibility, and since he has been Prime Minister he has -personally taken the criticism for every ill turn of fortune, every -plan gone wrong. He can meet a hostile mob and talk it down. He can -lead in battle. He can lead in war. Above all he can infuse his courage -into others. - -One’s pulse quickens at that immortal peroration of his delivered on -June 18, 1940, when France had surrendered, the British Expeditionary -Force had escaped with the loss of all its tools, and England stood -weaponless before the foe, in greater mortal peril than ever in ten -centuries. The words Churchill spoke then were the equivalent of a -strong army to defend the British Isles. Translated into the deeds of -the R.A.F., they defeated the enemy. Churchill said: “What General -Weygand called the Battle of France is over. The Battle of Britain is -about to begin. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long -continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might -of the enemy must very soon be turned upon us. Hitler knows that he -will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand -up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move -forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole -world, including the United States and all that we have known and cared -for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister and -perhaps more prolonged by the lights of a perverted science. Let us -therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that if -the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men -will still say ‘This was their finest hour.’” - - -Q. _What was it Churchill said about carrying on even if the British -Isles were conquered?_ - -A. On August 20, 1940 in the midst of the Battle of Britain, Churchill -said: “If we had been put in the terrible position of France, a -contingency now happily impossible, although, of course, it would have -been the duty of all war leaders to fight on here to the end, it would -also have been their duty, as I indicated in my speech of June 4, to -provide as far as possible for the Naval security of Canada and our -Dominions and to make sure they had the means to carry on the struggle -from beyond the oceans.” - - -Q. _That would be fine for us if we could depend upon it, but do you -think Churchill really meant it? What good would it do for the British -Navy to carry on if the British Isles were conquered?_ - -A. I am sure that Churchill himself would do exactly as he said he -would. He would perish with his troops or with his Navy--who can tell -how or where--but he would never surrender. Can you doubt it when you -hear those words of his which are as much an inspiration for us today -as they were for the British when he uttered them on the last day of -the evacuation of Dunkirk? They deserve to be memorized by us all. -“Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous states have -fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious -apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to -the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas, and -oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength -in the air, we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we -shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we -shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the -hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a -moment believe, this island or a large part of it were subjugated and -starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the -British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God’s good time, -the new world, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue -and the liberation of the old.” - -With Churchill’s picture these words are placarded in homes and -offices throughout the British Empire. Their spirit is the spirit of -Britain. But having said this I am compelled to add that it would be -feeble-minded for us to expect that the British Navy would continue -resistance to the Germans after the British Isles had been conquered. - -Let us examine what the position would be if the British Isles fell. -First let us ask a British Naval Officer what would happen to the Royal -Navy if the British Isles were conquered. He will tell you: “There -wouldn’t be any Navy left.” I can see readily how this would be true. -If the Germans try invasion, the Royal Navy is going to throw itself -between the home island and the invaders with a desperation such as -has never been equaled in British Naval history, and that is saying a -very great deal. The Germans cannot capture the British Isles by air -power alone. They can land men and machine guns by air as they did at -Crete, but the heavy weapons they need to beat off and batter down -the formidable British artillery and heavy tanks now massed at home, -they will have to land by sea. Without these weapons they cannot win. -The Royal Navy will prevent their landing or perish in the attempt. -The Germans will try to clear the way for their invading craft by -torpedoes, mines, speedboats, Stukas, burning oil on the water, and -every conceivable means, and by some perhaps not now conceivable to us. -The British defenders will discard caution and risk everything. They -will hurl themselves at the invader. If they lose there will surely be -little left of the Navy. - -But suppose there were left a British naval force large enough when -taken in combination with what we could spare from the Pacific to -continue to maintain practical control of the Atlantic, enough anyway -to prevent any German attempt at sending an invading army to America. -Could we then expect this remnant of the British Navy to retire to -Canada or the United States, and continue resistance to the Germans? I -do not think so. - -In the first place, what would be the purpose of the British Navy in -continuing resistance to the Germans after the British Isles had been -captured? Would it be for the purpose of eventually reconquering the -British Isles? No, because that would be impossible. This is one of -those grim facts which are too ugly for most people to look at, but -there is no use turning our eyes away and refusing to see that if the -Germans do invade and conquer the British Isles, the British people -will have finished their life. It would be the end for them, not for -the duration of this war, which would in fact be ended then, but for as -far into the future as the imagination can travel. The Germans might -remain in possession of the British Isles or in effective control for -the thousand years Hitler so often boasts about, or until they became -weak through centuries of good living. Hitler would disarm the people -of Britain and allow hunger to decimate them. He could count on forty -per cent of the population dying of starvation in a year or so. Does -this seem an exaggeration? It is only one more of those facts about -Hitler which nobody would believe. The trusting Dutch would not believe -what Hitler was like until he taught the people of Rotterdam. But the -British people have now learned their lesson. They have totally lost -the wide-eyed faith of our Lindberghs, that Hitler is “human after -all.” The British know Hitler would do just what I have said, he would -deliberately destroy a great part of the population, allowing to remain -alive only those sufficiently broken to become good slaves. But why, -you ask, could not the British Navy reconquer the British Isles, if -they had our wholehearted help? The answer is that there would be no -base from which to operate. - -We can now contemplate reconquering Europe from the Nazis because we -have a base or several possible bases from which to operate against -the Reich. We have the British Isles and Russia and the Middle East, -and parts of North Africa, and may have other bases before the war is -over. But if the British Isles were captured, where could the British -Navy land to invade and repossess them? And with what troops would this -engagement be fought? With the Canadians and Australians? Nobody would -dare disparage the fighting qualities of these magnificent men, but if -the 46,000,000 Britishers in the British Isles had failed to throw back -the German Army is it likely that 16,000,000 Canadians and Australians -could defeat it? What about the United States? If we had not entered -the war before the conquest of the British Isles, is it likely we would -go to war after the British had been beaten? Moreover, if we did, it -is inconceivable that we should beat the Germans after they had seized -the resources of the United Kingdom. They would then have added to the -shipbuilding capacity of the continent all the British shipyards, at -this moment the most productive in the world. It might be worth our -while to glance an instant at the shipbuilding situation which would -exist if Germany takes the British Isles. - -The shipbuilding capacity of each of the following countries is listed -as of the most productive year since 1917. This was usually 1919. - - _Tons_ - Germany 600,000 - Denmark 140,000 - France 210,000 - Holland 240,000 - Norway 60,000 - Sweden 165,000 - Italy 220,000 - Japan 700,000 - --------- - 2,335,000 - United Kingdom 2,000,000 - --------- - Total 4,335,000 - -After the defeat of Britain, Germany and her allies would possess the -capacity to build 4,335,000 tons of ships a year, which is more than -four times our 1941 production of around 1,000,000 tons and is even -larger than our record performance in 1919 when we turned out 4,075,000 -tons of ships. Admiral Land’s prediction that we would eventually -build 6,000,000 tons a year remains to be fulfilled. As matters now -stand if the Germans were to capture Britain, time would be on their -side for the building of ships. Furthermore, of course, the Germans -would inherit the vast British industrial machine, and save for the -production of steel, would have the power to turn out more airplanes -and munitions than we could for many years. All of this is merely to -emphasize what the fall of Britain and the end of the British Navy as a -fighting force against Hitler would mean to the United States. - - -Q. _But isn’t Churchill often wrong in his military judgment? Hasn’t he -made mistakes due to overconfidence?_ - -A. It is true that Mr. Churchill has the vices of his virtues, and -since his most prominent virtue is courage, he also possesses what has -seemed at times to be recklessness. His sanguine temperament makes him -ideally equipped to lead a nation in desperate circumstances, but his -critics of whom a few still exist will never cease insisting on the -obvious, that he makes mistakes, as though it were not the hoariest of -adages that only the man who never does anything commits no errors. -They list a roll of his alleged military failures, beginning with his -unsuccessful defense of Antwerp and the costly attempt to take the -Dardanelles in the last war; and in this war Norway, Greece, and Crete. -But if these events are analyzed it will be seen that each of them had -its justification. - -Many military critics looking back at the last war now agree that Mr. -Churchill was right to advocate holding Antwerp as an Allied strong -point behind the German lines, and if the Allied High Command had -supported him sufficiently Churchill’s defense might have succeeded. -The Dardanelles attempt--which used to be the failure his enemies -most enjoyed--was in the view of most military men today a brilliant -conception which would have ended the war victoriously for the Allies -two years earlier, if Churchill’s plan had been carried out as it could -have been. We know now not only that the campaign could have succeeded -from the outset and at comparatively little cost, if the Churchill -timetable had been scrupulously kept, but also that the straits could -have been captured even at the very end if one last push had been -made. One of Raymond Swing’s best stories is of his experience as a -war correspondent with the Turks, whom he saw hoarding their last few -rounds of ammunition as, to their astonishment, the British steamed -away, losing with a completely un-British lack of persistence. It was -jealousy more than anything else that spoiled the Dardanelles campaign, -Kitchener’s jealousy of Churchill. - -In his old age, Kitchener, the Army chief, obstinately refused to do -what the Navy chief advised, and the end was failure. It was perhaps -the most keenly felt failure in the life of Churchill when he resigned -after the Dardanelles. Anyone who reads the painstaking account he -has written of the campaign in his history of the war, _The World -Crisis_, may perceive how heavy the blow was. Even clearer evidence are -the pictures of him in his country place at Chartwell. One for which -he sat immediately after the Dardanelles campaign shows him looking -years older than a picture of him before the campaign began. No, the -Dardanelles ought to be remembered to Churchill’s credit, and it will -be eventually. - -In this war its place has been given by his critics to Norway, -Crete, and Greece. Ed Angly, my companion in flight from France, -used humorously to wonder if the British were ever going to cease -retreating and my reply was that they probably never would until they -had retreated to victory. The Norwegian campaign discouraged many, and -critics on both sides of the Atlantic demanded to know why the British -secret service had not known in advance of the German intention to -invade Norway; why the Royal Navy had not prevented invasion; why the -British Army landed in the north could not hold on. - -The reproach of faulty information can be leveled only by persons not -acquainted with the nature of the Gestapo. It must not have escaped -general attention that when the German Army marches into a captured -territory, for a few days news of a sort continues to trickle out, and -we may hope that British or other enemy agents continue to function -during this time. But as soon as the Gestapo appears, with Himmler -directing its hordes of agents in civilian clothes, and its tens of -thousands of black-uniformed SS, it is as though an asbestos curtain -had fallen on the frontiers of the country, and from then on the -silence of the grave envelops the land. I was not surprised that -Hitler could strike with such devastating secrecy; what victim of his -has been warned except by the general reputation of the invader? Even -the Bolsheviks were plaintively surprised when the “assassin of the -working classes” so violently dissolved his friendship with the “scum -of the earth.” We may be sure that if Hitler were ever put, by the fall -of Britain, in a position to attack the Western Hemisphere, we would -also be surprised, not by the action but by the time and method. The -Norwegian surprise was no fault of Churchill. - -The question why the British could not hold on is one that is put not -only about Norway but about Crete and Greece and it may be put again -before the last battle is fought. The answer is one which may have to -be borne in mind for a long time. It is contained in the simplest facts -about the war, which tend to be forgotten in the riot of daily news. -The principal fact is that Britain after two years of war has not yet -caught up with the numbers and equipment of the German war machine -built by a population double that of the British over seven years of -peacetime preparation and two of war. The British have fought on nearly -every one of their battlefields so far with inferior numbers against -superior material and better-trained men. Let those of us in America -who imagine we have only to call a few million boys to the colors -and train them a year in order to have an army, consider the British -experience. The British soldiers are only now after more than two years -of war training, becoming a capable modern army, about one-third the -size of Britain’s “medium-sized” army. - -Finally we heard the criticism that Churchill’s decision to send troops -to Greece was a mistake, since he knew they could not hold out against -the Germans. “Political” reasons, it was said, ought not to govern -military decisions. But what is the war being fought about if not to -re-establish honor among nations? Britain was sworn to come to the -aid of Greece. Had she failed to do so, forlorn though the hope was -of immediate success, she would have lost a good part of that moral -reputation which is worth more than many army corps to her today. This -“political” decision was made in the sense of the classical definition -of politics, “that branch of ethics dealing with the ethical relations -and duties of states.” - -Churchill did make one public mistake, and it was shared by hopeful -millions, when he said at the beginning of the Norwegian campaign, -“Herr Hitler has committed a grave strategic error in spreading the war -so far to the north.” The man who had almost never underestimated the -Germans did so that time. - - -Q. _Wasn’t that apparent error in judgment perhaps really a piece of -good-cheer propaganda for the people?_ - -A. I do not think so; it was a real mistake based on his own audacity, -yet who would not prefer a leadership which tries and fails to one -which does not try at all? In Churchill the British have one leader -who understands that wars are never won on the defensive, and we may -be sure that he can be depended upon to seize the first conceivable -opportunity to carry the war into Hitler’s territory. The offensive -spirit never had a more consistent exponent than Churchill, as in his -proclamation: - -“We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of his Nazi -regime; from this nothing will turn us--nothing. We will never parley, -we will never negotiate with Hitler or any of his men. We shall fight -him by land, we shall fight him by sea, we shall fight him in the -air, until, with God’s help, we have rid the earth of his shadow and -liberated his peoples from the yoke.” - -This eloquence of Churchill is a gift from Heaven for our side during -these terrible years, when confusion of mind is the greatest foe of -the democracies. One of the most famous sayings of Hitler, quoted -by Rauschning is: “Mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, -indecisiveness, panic; these are our weapons.” - -We in America can see how effective these weapons are. Consider the -mental confusion, indecisiveness, and conflicting feelings aroused in -the United States by the speeches of Hitler’s American Quislings, the -Lindberghs and Wheelers. The counterpart of these circles existed in -England but they were long ago rendered powerless and even speechless -by the analytical eloquence of Churchill. Take the case of Hitler’s -invasion of Russia. Hitler undoubtedly expected to divide the outside -world by proclaiming his “Holy Crusade” against Bolshevism. But -Churchill choked this deceit in its inception. The Germans began their -attack on Russia at four o’clock in the morning, and before the day was -out Churchill had given the world his answer. Other statesmen might -have waited a day or even a week. Churchill gave Hitler no time to -spread mental confusion. “Any man or state,” Churchill declared, “who -fights against Nazidom will have our aid. Any man or state who marches -with Hitler is our foe.... Hitler’s invasion of Russia is no more than -a prelude to an attempted invasion of the British Isles.... The Russian -danger is therefore our danger and the danger of the United States.... -Let us redouble our exertions and strike with united strength while -life and power remain.” This declaration, swift and uncompromising as -a bullet, was equivalent to the loss of a great battle for Hitler. I -am sure he entertained hopes that he could induce Britain even to stop -fighting in order that he could more easily destroy Bolshevik Russia. -Churchill’s speed prevented the question from even being debated. This -is the finest example of leadership. The Prime Minister did not wait to -find out by Gallup poll or otherwise what the British people thought. -He boldly led them. - - -Q. _Do you think the flight of Hess to England had any connection with -the German attack on Russia which followed six weeks later?_ - -A. Hess fled to England May 10, and Hitler attacked Russia June 21. I -think there must have been a connection, and I have my theory of it, -but it is only a theory. I think Hess may have carried Churchill a -message from Hitler saying he was going to attack Russia, offering a -negotiated peace, and soliciting the benevolent neutrality if not the -active aid of Britain to destroy the Bolshevik menace. We may be sure -that whatever was the purpose of Hess’s visit, Churchill knows all -about it by now. - -There are two passages in Churchill’s speech after the invasion of -Russia which might bear on Hess. In one place he says, “All this was -no surprise to me. I gave clear and precise warnings to Stalin of -what was coming.” And then, as though he realized that this statement -might indicate that he had specific foreknowledge of the German plans -against Russia, Churchill adds, “I gave him warnings as I have given -warnings to others before. I can only hope that these warnings did not -fall unheeded.” Then at another point Churchill emphasized: “We will -never parley, we will never negotiate with Hitler or any of his men.” -That might refer to Hess’s effort to negotiate. We know that if Hess -had carried such a proposal to Churchill it would have been rejected, -and if Churchill warned Stalin it is very likely Stalin profited by -the warning. It has been argued, however, that the British could have -allowed Hess to believe, and to transmit to Hitler his belief, that the -proposal would be accepted. This would have served to encourage Hitler -to go ahead with his plans and attack Russia. We can be certain that in -the meeting between Hess and Churchill, the Prime Minister did not come -off second best. - -I knew Hess personally--not very well, but well enough to have formed -an estimate of his character. On the basis of his character I would -say we could exclude a great many alleged explanations of his flight. -He was brave and led a life of hazardous adventure. He was not likely -to flee for cowardly reasons. He was first in the personal esteem -of Hitler and Hitler was the only person who could have threatened -his life. Himmler could not do so, nor Goering. He was a quiet, -unambitious fellow and had few enemies. I do not believe fear had -anything to do with the flight. He was devoted to Hitler and it is -almost inconceivable that he should have done anything contrary to the -Fuehrer’s wishes. He was never a policy maker, meddled not at all in -the high politics of the party or state, but merely delivered speeches -on order, and acted as a sort of super-private secretary and valet -to his master. It is not likely that he went to England to advance a -policy of his own, as was widely believed before the German attack -on Russia. Many signs point to the probability that Hess was acting -as Hitler’s emissary to try to dupe Churchill into withdrawing from -the war and sanctioning the attack on Russia. The objections are, of -course, that it is hard to believe that Hitler could have been such a -fool as to think such an attempt feasible, or that he would risk losing -his valued confederate on a mission with such little likelihood of -success, or that he would have risked the revelation of his plans to -the Russians. Yet if Hess had fled because he was afraid, or because he -thought Germany was losing, or because he had split with Hitler, or for -any other reason discreditable to the Nazi cause, surely the British by -now would have given the facts to the public. It would have made the -best propaganda in the world. I heard Jan Valtin, author of _Out of the -Night_, advance the suggestion that Hess, who was always a sensitive -fellow, with a touch of sissy in his carriage, and who was attached to -the Fuehrer with an almost morbid devotion, might have succumbed to a -fit of pique; he might have been slighted by Hitler before one of his -rivals, as Goering or Himmler or Goebbels or Rosenberg, and might have -leaped into his plane and left the country to “make Hitler sorry.” This -is an engaging theory. I will stick to mine. - - -Q. _What is the secret of Churchill’s success?_ - -A. His appetite for creation. He is as eager to create as Hitler is -to destroy life. He cannot live without creating. Hitler cannot live -without destroying. Churchill’s courage, wit, and eloquence are matched -by his industry. He does an incredible amount of work. Before he came -back into the government he never let a day go by without writing at -least 2,000 or 3,000 words. His powers of concentration are phenomenal. -His memory is prodigious. He dictates everything he writes. I have -visited him in his workroom on the top floor of his country home at -Chartwell in Kent. A shelf about breast-high runs the length of the -room, and on it he has arranged his books of reference, notes, and -documents. I was there when he was finishing his monumental life of his -ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough. There were twenty or thirty volumes -lying open on the shelf, with paper slips marking other passages to -be consulted. His practice is to walk up and down the room, glancing -here and there at his various works of reference, dictating all the -time to a secretary. As in the composition of his speeches, he has a -first draft typed with plenty of space for corrections and interlining. -This is returned for recopying and sometimes half a dozen drafts are -necessary before the final form is completed. The result of this -striving after perfection is something as near approaching perfection -as one can find in the works of any writer of, what I might call, -inspired history. I remember once a conversation about Churchill’s -writing ability with Alexander Woollcott. I thought I had been as -appreciative as one could be, but Aleck broke in: “No, Knick, you -haven’t said enough. Churchill is the greatest master of the English -language since the men who wrote the King James version of the Bible.” -There is a nobility and grandeur about Churchill’s oratory which no -literature I know outside the Bible can approach. On July 14, 1940 when -Hitler’s army had swept all before it save the British Isles, Churchill -said: “And now it has come to us to stand alone in the breach, and -face the worst that the tyrant’s might and enmity can do. Bearing -ourselves humbly before God, but conscious that we serve an unfolding -purpose, we are ready to defend our native land against the invasion -by which it is threatened. We are fighting _by_ ourselves alone; but -we are not fighting _for_ ourselves alone. Here in this strong City of -Refuge which enshrines the title deeds of human progress and is of deep -consequence to Christian civilization; here, girt about by the seas -and oceans where the Navy reigns; shielded from above by the prowess -and devotion of our airmen--we await undismayed the impending assault. -Perhaps it will come tonight. Perhaps it will come next week. Perhaps -it will never come. We must show ourselves equally capable of meeting -sudden violent shock, or what is perhaps a harder test, a prolonged -vigil. But be the ordeal sharp or long, or both, we shall seek no -terms, we shall tolerate no parley; we may show mercy--we shall ask for -none.” - -Can this language be matched except by the adjurations of the prophets -of old? And what could surpass the fiery blast of his invective turned -upon Hitler? “This wicked man,” he said, “the repository and embodiment -of many forms of soul-destroying hatred, this monstrous product of -former wrongs and shame, has now resolved to try to break our famous -island race by a process of indiscriminate slaughter and destruction. -What he has done is to kindle a fire in British hearts, here and -all over the world, which will glow long after all traces of the -conflagration he has caused in London have been removed. He has lighted -a fire which will burn with a steady and consuming flame until the last -vestiges of Nazi tyranny have been burnt out of Europe and until the -Old World--and the New--can join hands to rebuild the temples of man’s -freedom and man’s honor, upon foundations which will not soon or easily -be overthrown.” - -It is interesting to catalogue the various words Churchill has used to -describe Hitler, and to note that he prefers the simplest descriptives, -“wicked,” “evil,” and “bad.” What other speaker could use the childish -adjective “bad” and make it so effective as did Churchill on April 27, -1941 when he said: “In February, as you may remember, _that bad man_ in -one of his raving outbursts threatened us with a terrifying increase -in numbers and activities of his U-boats....” And again on February -9: “We must all of us have been asking ourselves what is _that wicked -man_ whose crime-stained regime and system are at bay and in the toils, -what has he been preparing during these winter months?” And earlier on -October 1, 1939: “How soon victory will be gained depends upon how long -Herr Hitler and his group of _wicked men_, whose hands are stained with -blood and soiled with corruption, can keep their grip upon the docile, -unhappy German people.” Once he calls him a “cornered maniac,” and in -the same speech of November 12, 1939 says: “I have the sensation and -also the conviction that _that evil man_ over there and his cluster of -confederates are not sure of themselves as we are sure of ourselves; -that they are harassed in their guilty souls by the thought and by -the fear of an ever approaching retribution for their crimes, and for -the orgy of destruction into which they have plunged us all....” On -March 30, 1940 he refers to “Hitler’s murderous rage,” and says, “In -his frenzy, this _wicked man_ and the criminal regime which he has -conceived and erected, increasingly turn their malice upon the weak.” - -Constantly recurs the simile of bloodstained, foul hands, perhaps best -in Churchill’s speech of June 12, 1941 when he said: “We can not yet -see how deliverance will come or when it will come, but nothing is more -certain than that every trace of Hitler’s footsteps, every stain of his -infected and corroding fingers will be sponged and purged and if need -be, blasted from the surface of the earth.” - -The most famous of Churchill’s epigrams is the one now known by the -entire English-speaking world, about the Royal Air Force, delivered -in his speech of August 20, 1940 on “The War Situation” in the House -of Commons. I heard that speech and particularly noted the epigram, -but I cannot now certify which of the two current versions he actually -delivered. As I remember, he said, “Never in the field of human -conflict have so many owed so much to so few.” But in the collected -volume of his speeches edited by his son, Randolph, the sentence runs, -“Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to -so few.” I have seen both of these versions on placards in British -stores and offices. Hansard must have the original version and it is -possible Churchill or his son may have made an amendment in the volume -of speeches. - - -Q. _What are Churchill’s principal interests?_ - -A. I am going to make an omnibus answer to this and include replies to -a score of questions usually asked about Mr. Churchill. Roughly, in -order of importance Mr. Churchill’s principal interests are England; -the war, the Royal Navy; his family, past, present, and future; power; -politics; the English language; public speaking; writing history and -making it; writing journalism; reading history, biography, literature; -the English-speaking people; Scotch whisky; good food, good wines, -cigars; the French people; all other people; conversation; favorable -publicity; unfavorable publicity; ceremony; painting; bricklaying; -swimming (in younger days polo); six-pack bezique; his hats; his shoes; -his clothes; and of course “that bloodthirsty guttersnipe.” - -Compare this with Hitler’s interests: power; Hitler-Germany; the war; -the German Army; barbarism; haranguing crowds in public; haranguing -friends in private; propaganda; rewriting history; reading military -history (and making it); suppressing journalism; the Jews; colossal -architecture; the movies; vegetarian food; and of course “the warmonger -Churchill.” - -By this comparison I do not put the two men on the same level, for -morally they cannot be considered as belonging to the same species, but -it is interesting to note the contrasts that come out in such a list. -It is not merely the contrast between the aristocrat who is striving -to preserve free life for common men and the “guttersnipe” who is bent -upon enslaving them all; it is a contrast of two worlds. - -Churchill has a profound historical sense and the thought of himself -as a part of the broad stream of the British people, flowing from -the distant past into the limitless future, is never absent from his -speaking and writing. He is never just Churchill, he is Churchill of -British history, of the Marlboroughs, but now more than ever Churchill -of the British people, with whom he has established a community of -feeling seldom equaled in the relationship of leader to people. It has -always been Hitler’s boast that “I _am_ Germany!” An Italian journalist -thinking to jibe at England during the tormented months of the Blitz -said mockingly that the British Isles seemed to be inhabited by “forty -million Churchills.” He was right, for under Churchill’s leadership -the entire population has become animated with his courage and he _is_ -England to the same degree and by the same psychological process as -Hitler _is_ Germany. Hitler obtained his ascendancy over the German -people by expressing their hitherto largely unconscious aspirations, -for revenge, aggression, expansion, and conquest. At the height of the -British people’s peril they turned spontaneously and unanimously to -Churchill whom Providence seemed to have reserved for this critical -hour, and they entrusted to him the fulfillment of their aspirations -to beat off the enemy, save their families, and win victory. I was -there and for four months watched the British people and in particular -the eight million Londoners endure the anxiety of expected invasion -and the full blast of the greatest attack ever made on a civilian -population in history and I know that their faith in Churchill was a -most important factor in their endurance. Every Londoner thought as -the bombs fell, “Churchill is there; he can’t be beaten; we can’t be -beaten.” Churchill “became” England. This is the experience that has -elevated him above himself, fulfilled his character, made him great. -Today Churchill’s every faculty of soul, mind, and body is devoted to -the service of the British Commonwealth. Today every soul and resource -in the German Commonwealth is devoted to the service of Hitler. - -Churchill actively directs the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force but -his love is the Navy. One can tell from his speeches how frequently his -mind dwells upon it. It remains his favorite branch of the services, -despite the noble tribute he has paid the R.A.F. He reserves for it -words such as he would use otherwise only to describe Old England -herself. “Amphibious” is the term he likes best to define the power -of Britain in arms. His conviction of the paramount importance of the -Fleet was thus dramatically expressed: “On them, as we conceived, -floated the might, majesty, dominion and power of the British Empire. -All our long history built up century after century, all our great -affairs in every part of the globe, all the means of livelihood and -safety of our faithful, industrious, active population depended upon -them. Open the seacocks and let them sink beneath the surface and in a -few minutes, half an hour at the most--the whole outlook of the world -would be changed. The British Empire would dissolve like a dream; each -isolated community struggling forward by itself; the central power of -union broken; mighty provinces, whole Empires in themselves, drifting -helplessly out of control, and falling a prey to strangers; and Europe -after one sudden convulsion passing into the iron grip and rule of -the Teuton and of all that the Teutonic system meant. There would -only be left far off across the Atlantic, unarmed, unready and as yet -uninstructed America, to maintain single-handed law and freedom among -men.” That was written about the Royal Navy mobilized for war in August -1914 but with what melancholy accuracy it reflects the situation of -today, except that this time the Teutonic might is such that Europe -has already had its one sudden convulsion and has passed under the -rule of a Teutonic system far grimmer than anything the Hohenzollerns -would have imposed. And once again, after a score of years of warning, -America still finds herself “unarmed, unready and as yet uninstructed,” -dependent now for her very life upon the continued existence of that -Navy which Churchill apostrophizes. - -Now of course the war takes all of Churchill’s time, but in normal -circumstances he has an enormous number of interests and activities. -He concentrates fiercely upon each in turn, and everything he does he -does at least well, some things he does excellently, and some he does -superlatively. Fighting, speaking, writing, eating, drinking, sleeping, -smoking, all are the source of intense satisfaction. He relishes every -moment in his life. This war was made for him, because fighting is -life itself to Churchill. In the last war he was a subordinate and -could not thoroughly enjoy the fight when others checked his combat -plans. Now he is unchecked by anybody except the British people, and -they have shown they are only too glad to let him savor to the full -what are to him the joys of responsibility in the greatest fight with -the greatest consequences in the memory of mankind. Before the war the -most exciting form of conflict was politics, about which Churchill once -said, “Politics are almost as exciting as war and quite as dangerous.” -He takes the keenest pleasure in writing, but he would always give up -his work on a book to go back into politics, as he did when this war -began. - -He was just finishing his monumental _History of the English Speaking -Peoples_ when he was called to the Admiralty. I understand the -_History_ is to be in several volumes, but despite its size Churchill -wrote the whole thing in a year, dictating thousands of words a day. He -had worked on it, gathering material for many years, and such is the -organization of his mind and so precise and comprehensive is his memory -than when he once began he was able to dictate it almost as fast as he -could talk. I have heard that the publisher has already set the book up -but is waiting presumably for the end of the war to release it. - -Today his prewar books, as _My Early Days_, are reprinted and have -become best sellers. Even his prewar newspaper articles are eagerly -dragged out, and reprinted both here and in England to sell at high -prices. His books have been phenomenally successful and his income -from them, from journalism, and from lectures has been for most of his -life considerably higher than the $50,000 a year he receives as Prime -Minister. It was always a financial sacrifice for him to go into office -despite the comparatively liberal salaries of British ministers. He has -no interest in money. His earnings have been large ever since he was -a war correspondent in South Africa, but he has spent money as fast -as it came, on his estate, his family, and on good living. One of his -best American friends, Bernard Baruch, once tried to instruct him in -the art of stock exchange speculation but nothing came of it. Churchill -had for it the interest he has for everything in life, and wanted to -learn it, but he lacked the indispensable requirement for amassing a -fortune, namely an overwhelming desire to make money. The power given -by the possession of money is so paltry compared with political power -that none of the great statesmen, or even the wicked dictators, have -exhibited any interest in it. What use has Hitler for money? I doubt -that he has touched any for years. - -Until this war began it was power that appealed to Churchill more than -anything else in the world. It is ironical that now he possesses it -to a greater degree than he could ever have dreamed of, power for its -own sake he no longer wants. But that has not lessened his aesthetic -capacity to enjoy it. No stress of war, nor the imminence of awful -danger, can prevent him from enjoying the power of his spoken or -written word. You can feel his artistic satisfaction as you hear him in -the House of Commons, delivering on a desperate day passages calculated -not only to encourage, guide, and inspire, but to excite admiration for -their felicity. - -We American correspondents in London used regularly to attend the -House every time Churchill spoke, although none of us need have -done so, since the speeches were delivered into our offices almost -instantaneously by ticker. We wanted to hear him in person not only for -the stirring drama of it but because as journalists we wished to listen -to the greatest living master of our craft. The trouble of attending -Parliament was considerable, for the old House, now in ruins, was too -small to accommodate even the Members if they all attended, and the -foreign press was allotted so few seats it was necessary to apply days -in advance to get a place. The narrow seats with too little space for -knees and feet were uncomfortable, the acoustics poor, but the view -from our gallery was perfect. - -There sits the government, the bald head of Mr. Churchill shining -among the Members with unmistakable authority. The benches are nearly -empty until the time draws near for the Prime Minister to speak; a -few minutes before he rises the House is jammed with Members sitting -even on the foot of the Speaker’s dais. The Prime Minister rises. -There is dead silence as Mr. Churchill lays before him a sheaf of -what are technically called notes, as it is prohibited in the House -for any member, even the Prime Minister, to read a speech. This rule -is presumably to prevent a member from using a speech written by -someone else. The familiar Washington ghost writers would have little -employment in Westminster. Mr. Churchill would have about as much -use for one as Shakespeare would have had. Mr. Churchill’s “notes” -are in fact his completely written speech which he has memorized by -rereading the final copy quickly on the way to the House. He has -worked on this speech for several hours a day for eight days, writing, -rewriting, until he finally has it typed on sheets half the size of -standard typewriter paper. Thereafter he never looks at it. He has it -before him, and he automatically turns the pages, but his delivery -is perfectly extemporaneous, and you would imagine as you sat there -watching and listening that those incomparable phrases were conceived -at the moment, and to the satisfaction of hearing them is added the -illusion of being present at their creation. Mr. Churchill himself -insists he cannot speak well impromptu and I have heard that his son -Randolph, recently seated in Parliament, is considered a better offhand -speaker than his father. - -It is an extraordinary coincidence that this greatest orator of modern -times should have an impediment of speech similar, we may imagine, to -that of the greatest orator of ancient times, Demosthenes. Churchill -has almost overcome the impediment. His delivery is not what we would -consider the best. He depends not at all on gesture. Now and then -he pauses to glance over the top of his spectacles with defiance or -curiosity. His stance is determined, not graceful. For the most part -he stands quietly in the same spot, and only moves a step backward or -forward when he wishes to emphasize a passage. His voice is sonorous, -strong, not the golden voice of a William Jennings Bryan, but also not -the vulgar guttural of Hitler. Yet when Churchill speaks of Hitler -there comes into his tone a note that promises to meet all the Nazi’s -brutality and pay interest. Churchill’s voice is ideally adapted to the -radio and the millions of Americans who listen to him on the air have -heard him at his best. Many have exclaimed at his accent that he does -not talk like an Englishman. His is the accent of Sandhurst, Britain’s -West Point, which is nearer the American way of speaking than the -curious upper-class cockney affected by some graduates of Oxford and -Cambridge. - -I do not know why Mr. Churchill avoids as much as possible making -extemporaneous speeches, unless it is his passion for perfection, -because as a conversationalist he is without superior and he has few -peers. One of them was his intimate friend, Lord Birkenhead, whose -power of expression was almost on a par with Churchill’s, as I had the -opportunity to observe once in Berlin when the then most brilliant -lawyer in England attended a luncheon of the Anglo-American Press -Association and dazzled us with his talk. I remember the answer he -gave when someone asked what he thought of Mussolini. “Mussolini,” he -remarked, “bestrides Italy like a Colossus, but to judge a rider one -must consider the kind of horse he rides.” - -I have listened to Mr. Churchill talk at the dinner table and -he is as brilliant there as he is in the House of Commons. His -conversational style has the same classical quality of his writing -and public speaking. Every sentence is rounded and balanced; none -is left incomplete, and I should think that ninety-five per cent of -everything he says in talking with his friends could be taken down -by a stenographer and reproduced without changing a syllable. At the -same time there is no studied effect and the listeners have not the -feeling they are attending a recitation or declamation. They are -transported back to the time when, either in Ancient Greece or in -eighteenth century Europe, men cultivated the art of speaking and -especially of conversation. Who knows what effect it will have upon -English education and English habits of conversation to have had as -a Prime Minister during the war a master of the word such as appears -only seldom in centuries. The oratory of Churchill must already have -influenced the language standards of the English-speaking world, even -though imperceptibly, for it is impossible that so many millions should -have listened to him and read his speeches without having their taste -improved. As a contrast it is interesting to observe what the effect -has already been upon the German language to have had the apostle -of illiteracy as the head of the German Reich for eight years; the -language of Goethe and Heine has been supplanted deliberately by a -coarse vulgarization of German chosen for its appeal to the lowest -instincts of the population. - -Churchill attracted much attention when in a memorandum to all -government offices he asked for a more effective and economic use -of the English language in official communications and demanded the -abandonment of the jargon currently in use by bureaucrats. He can be -colloquial. The first time I met Mr. Churchill was at a luncheon given -by Lady Colefax, who has done more to help American correspondents in -London than almost anyone there. Present were Mr. Churchill, J. L. -Garvin, the crusty, brilliant editor of the _Observer_ and one-time -editor of the _Encyclopaedia Brittanica_, Somerset Maugham, Mrs. -Simpson, not yet the wife of Edward, Harold Nicolson, Peter Fleming, -Jan Masaryk, and a number of others. The conversation was almost -exclusively between Churchill and Garvin, and well it might be, for -Garvin is one of the few who can talk on anything like equal terms -with the master, and indeed on this occasion Garvin practically talked -Churchill silent. It was just two years before the war, but the topic -was even then the position of Russia, and Garvin exclaimed, “Do you -mean to say you would throw in your lot with the Bolsheviks?” The -Churchillian reply was, “I mean just that, old cock!” with a remark to -the effect that when one had to face an enemy like Germany it would -be only common sense to try for the help of any ally no matter how -distasteful otherwise. - -We can see from Churchill’s policy of helping Russia since the German -attack how consistent he has remained. On the day after the Russians -marched into Poland--and horrified the world of fellow travelers and -caused all except party-liners and a few foresighted realists to draw -back in aversion from this manifestation of Red Imperialism--I had -a talk with Mr. Churchill, who had been appointed First Lord of the -Admiralty a fortnight before. I asked him whether, since Great Britain -had guaranteed the territory of Poland against aggression and had -gone to war with Germany because of the German attack on Poland, one -could now consider that Great Britain was at war with Russia since the -Russians also had attacked Poland? I am not at liberty to quote him, -but he gave the answer in public a fortnight later when after the fall -of Warsaw he declared: “We could have wished that the Russian Armies -should be standing on their present line as the friends and allies of -Poland instead of as invaders. _But that the Russian armies should -stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia -against the Nazi menace...._ I can not forecast to you the action of -Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma: but -perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” - -Thus early and late Churchill maintained that it was desirable to -attempt to bring Russia into arms as an ally against the Germans, and -he was one of the few men in Britain who could advocate such a policy -without being suspected of sympathizing with the Bolsheviks. Only -Finland shook his resolution to do nothing to alienate the Russians and -it is interesting now to recall his words uttered in the midst of the -Russian assault on Finland: “Only Finland, superb, nay, sublime in the -jaws of peril--Finland shows what free men can do. The service rendered -by Finland to mankind is magnificent. They have exposed for all the -world to see, the military incapacity of the Red Army and of the Red -Air Force. Many illusions about Soviet Russia have been dispelled in -these few fierce weeks of fighting in the Arctic Circle. Everyone can -see how Communism rots the soul of a nation; how it makes it abject and -hungry in peace and proves it base and abominable in war.” - -His reaction of sympathy with the people of Finland fighting against -“servitude worse than death” is only one of countless examples that -could be named of the little-appreciated fact that he is an extremely -sensitive man. His gruff way sometimes conceals it, but there is not -a man in public life anywhere who feels the miseries of this stricken -world with more compassion than Churchill. When eighteen months after -these caustic remarks about the Communist regime, Russia was attacked -and Mr. Churchill expressed his sympathy with the Russian people, it is -certain he meant it, although it was good politics too. Incidentally -I am convinced that one of the reasons why he is loath to discuss -detailed plans for what a victorious Britain would like the postwar -world to be, is the problem of Russia. Certainly the vast majority of -British people would like to see the Bolshevik government replaced by -some democratic regime. - -I am sure one reason for Churchill’s aversion to Bolshevism is his -strong family feeling, and his repugnance for the Communist attempt -to subordinate the family, if not to abolish it, as was originally -attempted in the Soviet Union. For his family in the past, his noble -and famous ancestors, he has profound respect and a feeling of proud -affectionate gratitude which has led him to devote a good part of -his literary labors to the biography of his father, Lord Randolph -Churchill, and to the massive life of the Duke of Marlborough. To his -present family, his wife Clementine, his daughters Sarah, Diana, and -Mary, and his son Randolph, he devotes more time and attention than -most men with a fraction of his responsibilities. Randolph’s marriage -to the beautiful Pamela Digby was a delight to Mr. Churchill. It -represented the only chance of the perpetuation of the Churchill name, -and when Winston Spencer, the first grandchild to bear his name was -born, he became the favorite member of the dynasty. - -Churchill’s aversions are just as strong and notable as his -predilections. They might be listed, without order: Hitler, Mussolini, -Trotzky, Nazism, Communism, the New Deal, Prohibition, hypocrisy, -cruelty, thick soup, bores, mediocrity, cowardice, stupidity, -sentimentality, bigotry, muddling, proletarianism, poor English, poor -food, poor anything except poor people. He is intolerant of anything -but the best. He is the perfect exemplar of a gentleman who never -offends anyone except intentionally. His manners to his friends are -of an old-fashioned courtliness. When he bids a guest farewell Mr. -Churchill comes to the driveway to see him off with a handshake and a -Godspeed. His manners to his enemies are savage and the lash of his -tongue is feared from Berlin to Whitehall. He can be wounding to a -colleague who has failed to meet requirements. One Cabinet Minister -complained that when Churchill dismissed him he “kicked me out as -though I had been a servant.” As the war wears on and the duties of -office become heavier, his patience has frayed and the single criticism -one can frequently hear is that he has become short-tempered. He -is particularly intolerant of Parliamentary inquiries which would -require the Government to reveal facts of military value to the enemy. -Constantly, naive Members ask such questions, and if Mr. Churchill -chooses personally to reply he frequently makes his answer blister. Yet -there has never been a Prime Minister with a more meticulous regard for -the rights, functions, and ceremonies of Parliament than Mr. Churchill. -This regard is such that he has sometimes been criticized for delaying -action until all forms are duly complied with by Parliament. - -Churchill’s restless energy is such that his associates are both -inspired and compelled to work harder than they ever did with anyone -else. Shortly after he went to the Admiralty I visited his office and -chatted with his secretaries. They were obviously sincere in their -hero worship of him, but equally sincere in their sighs of weariness -over the strenuous schedule they have to follow. Rauschning describes -Hitler as an essentially lazy man who “does not know how to work -steadily. Indeed is incapable of working. He hates to have to read with -concentration. He rarely reads a book through; usually he only begins -it.” Could there be found a greater contrast than this with the habits -of Churchill whose perpetual industry and powers of concentration are -as important elements in his genius as intellect? As an illustration -of his ability to concentrate I know no better anecdote than the one -told me by Randolph. It was during the months before the war when Mr. -Churchill was writing the _History of the English Speaking Peoples_, -and every day world without end, he turned out, generally in the -evening, his stint of words from 2,000 upward. It made no difference -what was happening in international affairs, or what other demands -were made upon his time. No excitements or exigencies were allowed -to disturb his writing. But events grew bigger and bigger and to the -prescient eye of Mr. Churchill it became every day more clear that -war was certain to come, and that a violent gesture by Hitler might -precipitate it any moment. Suddenly Hitler marched into Prague, -breaking the fresh vows he had made at Munich, deliberately insulting -Britain and France, cynically strangling the rump state he had sworn -to respect. Throughout Europe ran a shudder and the mind of every man -was absorbed with anxious exploration of the possibilities. On that -evening Mr. Churchill rose from dinner, and as he started upstairs to -his workroom to write his stint, he exclaimed to his family, “It will -be difficult for me tonight to concentrate my undivided attention upon -the reign of King James II, but I shall do so.” - -Another time I visited Chartwell with Randolph and as we walked through -the garden I saw a new brick building and remarked that it had not -been there before. “No,” Randolph explained. “Father just built it.” -“You mean, had it built?” I asked. “Oh no, built it with his own -hands.” I had heard about Mr. Churchill’s bricklaying but had no idea -it extended to building whole houses. This one I found was his studio. -He had laid every brick in the building, and evidently was expert as -a professional. He particularly likes difficult jobs such as arches -and corners and curves. The Brick-layers Union at one time admitted -him to membership, but later called in his card on instructions from -the central office which objected to the Union’s accepting a Tory -politician as a member! This brick house, however, was not built by -any honorary bricklayer. If Mr. Churchill ever falls upon evil times -it may serve to recommend him for employment. While Churchill, without -having to do so and merely as a hobby, became a qualified artisan in -the building trades, Hitler could not even out of dire necessity keep -a job in the building trades. Churchill might earn a living also as a -painter. The studio walls were hung from top to bottom with the product -of his brush, signed Charles Morin. There were landscapes, seascapes, -and every variety of scene, many of them recording vacations on the -French Riviera, his favorite resort. Presently we joined Mr. Churchill -swimming in the outdoor pool he had also personally constructed. Later -he played cards with his wife. Six-pack bezique was the game. Guests -had tea on the lawn in the shade of the trees. - -These were the last peaceful days before the hurricane which it -is fashionable to say will sweep away all that comfortable, easy, -country-home England. I do not believe it will do anything of the -kind. The war will certainly leave little of parasitic England. The -vast accumulations of inherited wealth are being swept now into the -hopper of war. It will no longer be possible for Francis Williams -to declare that eighty per cent of the wealth of England belongs to -six per cent of the population, and that nearly half of the national -income goes to ten percent of the people. But Churchill’s type of good -living, country house and all, will not disappear, for it is based upon -his own labors, as we could see demonstrated before our eyes. After -the card game Mr. Churchill went upstairs to his workroom and about -an hour later came down with the manuscript of a 1,500-word article -for the _Daily Telegraph_ which he had just dictated. I read it with -professional envy, for in only a few minutes he had produced one of -his characteristic gems, informative, learned, witty, for which he -would receive a remuneration about equivalent to the annual income of -an average American newspaperman. He frequently surpasses this feat in -economizing time. He used to write many of his newspaper articles on -the way up to London in his automobile, dictating to his secretary. - -Churchill has now by act of Parliament completely dictatorial powers -and can order any British citizen to perform any service or can -confiscate any property, but he has yet to be criticized for ruling -arbitrarily. He hates silly questions and will walk away from a bore, -or cut a hypocrite down with an epigram. Whisky, he believes, is a boon -to mankind, and he has never been the worse, but often the better for -it. The two men he most abhors in our time are Hitler and Trotzky, both -teetotalers. He is a gourmand, that is to say a man with a sensitive -taste in food who likes a lot of it. Once he was in ill health and -went to a noted specialist who, contrary to the fashion of the day and -despite the patient’s well-upholstered body, advised him to eat more -food. He follows the prescription enthusiastically. - -One night, about eighteen months before the war, traveling from -London to Paris, I had the good luck to be on the same train with Mr. -Churchill. After he had finished his work he invited me to join him. -All the way from London to Dover he had dictated to a secretary who -was to return to London. This is the way he works, incessantly, never -wasting a moment. Our train was run onto a massive ferryboat, a new -system of crossing the Channel and this was Mr. Churchill’s first -experience of it. It was bitterly cold. Mr. Churchill wore a heavy -fur-lined coat. We started to explore the ferryboat. Word got about -among the crew that Winston Churchill was aboard, and speedily men -gathered to salute him and mention their service in the Royal Naval -Volunteer Reserve, which he organized. The Captain invited us to the -bridge. Steaming out of Dover harbor with an icy wind cutting our -faces, we listened as the Captain pointed out the lights of two wrecks -near the harbor and ventured the opinion that “You, Sir, I believe -ordered those ships sunk to block the harbor entrance to submarines?” -Mr. Churchill believed the skipper was right. - -With unflagging energy Mr. Churchill led the way about the ship from -the bridge to the hold, stopping now and then to exchange a few -sentences with his admirers. Churchill had been out of the government -then for many years, but he remained the best-known figure in the -realm and one could measure his popularity by the reception he received -on the ferryboat. Toward midnight we climbed to the smoking room where -Mr. Churchill as a nightcap consumed a large platter of thick slices -of rare roast beef with the appetite of John Bull. As I watched him I -thought to myself that this is the way he deals with life, he devours -it. When during the quiet period of the war he made an intensive -inspection of the French and British positions and the Maginot line, -French officers were astonished at his ability to sit up with his hosts -studying and discussing the problems of war and probably a hundred -other things, including certainly the dry vintage champagne he likes -so well, and then appear again a few hours later at dawn for a hearty -breakfast with cigar! No Frenchmen and few of any other nationality -smoke cigars for breakfast, but Mr. Churchill finds them invigorating. -He is seldom without one in his waking hours. - -The last time I visited him he received me at about 9:30 A.M. in the -upper bedroom at Number Ten Downing Street. The Prime Minister was -sitting up in bed, cigar in mouth, hard at work with a kind of bed desk -in front of him to hold his papers, and pinned within easy reaching -distance on the wall a rack for various colored folders to hold -documents of different urgencies. This man who might justly be called -the most industrious human being on earth, is a believer in the maxim -of Mark Twain who did most of his voluminous writing in bed: “A man’s a -fool who runs when he can stand still, or stands when he can sit down, -or sits when he can lie down.” - -For serious writing Mr. Churchill requires the stimulus of striding up -and down, but he finds that for reading and working over state papers -and for dictating letters and memoranda, there is no more efficient -position than sitting up in bed. To sleep Mr. Churchill does not -necessarily require a bed, for such are his powers of endurance that -now in his sixty-seventh year he frequently when on tours of inspection -takes his night’s rest in his automobile. I remember saying good-by to -him one afternoon before the Admiralty and as he was climbing into his -car to drive to one of the great naval ports, his aide-de-camp asked -him where he would spend the night. Mr. Churchill replied, “In the car -driving back.” No Prime Minister has ever moved about his constituency -so much, so tirelessly, and so dangerously as Mr. Churchill who travels -day and night by blackout and under bombardment. He manages the total -war effort of the Empire, but as he has repeatedly emphasized, the -war will be won or lost in the British Isles, and inside this mighty -fortress the Prime Minister gives the major part of his attention to -his duties as Commander in Chief. He is incessantly on inspection. - -Like the Captain of an old-time castle under siege, he roams from -battlement to battlement, from the South of England to the North of -Scotland, viewing the coast defenses, visiting naval stations, driving -the newest tanks, witnessing test flights of the latest warplanes, -cheering the R.A.F., the troops, the civilian population, sharing their -dangers, striding through the dust of bombs, and always everywhere -comprehending instantly, offering suggestions, giving the orders of the -expert he is in every branch of defense. It is sometimes forgotten that -if Hitler is indeed the Marshal in Chief of the German war machine, -so is Churchill of the British war machine, and if Hitler has proved -a military leader of intuitive genius, Churchill has incomparably -more experience and scientific education in war, and certainly no -less imagination than Hitler even in the narrow field of strictly -military affairs. Hitler had four years of the last war as a private -and corporal; has read military history; since he became Chancellor -has had the counsel of the Prussian General Staff; and now has had two -years’ experience of war. Churchill’s military education began with -the exacting instruction of Sandhurst and for practical experience in -old-fashioned combat he witnessed or took part in the Boer War, the -River War in India, civil war in Cuba, and the Sudan campaign. In the -first World War he helped direct the struggle from one of its most -important posts, the Admiralty, conceived the tank and numerous other -new devices of war, fought in France as a colonel, and all the while -before and since, studied and wrote about war until he became one of -its foremost historians. These experiences and studies are those of a -Doctor of Philosophy compared to Hitler’s grammar school course. In the -long run, granting all of Hitler’s genius, I am convinced Churchill, -given the tools, will win--but not without America. - -You may object that it seems absurd to compare favorably the military -abilities of a commander of forces which have constantly been on the -defensive with those of the chief of troops so far ever victorious. But -the war is a long way from its end, and before that goal is reached, -the military qualifications of Churchill may prove their superiority -over Hitler’s. Churchill has not yet had the opportunity to show -what he can do as a war leader pitted with equal weapons against the -enemy, because the war machine he inherited from the feeble hands -of Chamberlain was for a long time capable of nothing but defense. -Meanwhile as the British plus American war machine is growing, it -is encouraging to remember that Churchill with his background of -forty years of war, study of war and leadership in war, his youthful -inventive mind and eager imagination, is capable of taking everything -the Germans have devised or used successfully, and improving it until -with the eventually superior resources he will command, victory will be -certain, provided always that the United States enters the war in time. - - - - -4. WAR AIMS - - -Q. _What are Britain’s war aims?_ - -A. We Americans may still find it interesting to inquire “What are -they fighting for?” but if we stood in the midst of the ruins of -Westminster Abbey or the House of Commons, it would not occur to us -to ask the question. Mr. Churchill has joined President Roosevelt -in a formal statement, the so-called Atlantic Charter, but it seems -to me that he has twice expressed himself far more eloquently and -accurately than he did in the Eight Points. In those dread days when -despair touched nearly every soul but his, and he had just accepted the -responsibility of leading his country at the moment of its greatest -peril, Mr. Churchill said: “You ask what is our policy? I say: It is -to wage war by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the -strength that God can give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny -never surpassed in the dark and lamentable catalogue of human crime. -That is our policy. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: -Victory! Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory -however long and hard the way may be; for without victory there is no -survival.” - -Simple survival does not seem enough for some comfortably situated -critics in this country sheltered by British resistance, but that is -only because it is so difficult for those who have not experienced -the near threat of death to understand what life means. Mr. Churchill -expressed the irritation at such questions that must seize anyone -who has witnessed the effect of Hitler’s terrible force when in a -discussion of Poland he exclaimed: “What a frightful fate has overtaken -Poland! Here was a community of nearly thirty-five millions of people -with all the organization of a modern government and all the traditions -of an ancient state, which in a few weeks was dashed out of civilized -existence to become an incoherent multitude of tortured and starving -men, women and children, ground beneath the heel of two rival forms of -withering and blasting tyranny. Although the fate of Poland stares them -in the face, there are thoughtless dilettanti or purblind worldlings -who sometimes ask us: ‘What is it that Britain is fighting for?’ To -this I answer, ‘If we left off fighting you would soon find out.’” - - -Q. _I understand that, but after victory, what? That won’t be the -end of the world; after we win we shall have a lot to do. What was -the meaning of the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting and their eight-point -declaration?_ - -A. The meeting and its published result, which Churchill calls the -Atlantic Charter, made an interesting commentary and answer to the -demand for a statement of war aims. Its first importance lay in the -fact of the meeting of the two men; its second importance lay in the -confidential discussion of ways and means of beating Hitler; its -third importance was a statement of war aims. I have not been able -to understand why the statement was labeled in this country as an -American statement, as though the President had imposed it upon the -Prime Minister, or as though the principal ideas contained in it -were characterized more by American unselfishness than by British -hardheadedness. It may very well be that Churchill was reluctant to -make any statement of war aims at all, but now that it has been made it -seems to me to be hardheaded, and frankly Churchillian and not at all -the sort of statement that American liberals had been discussing. - - -Q. _Why not; is there anything not liberal in the statement?_ - -A. Not to my way of thinking, but the average liberal argued there -should be a statement of war aims in order first of all to impress -the good German people that we are kindly disposed toward them and if -they knew how well we intended to treat them after they were defeated -they would give up now. What is the sense of the Atlantic Charter? Its -chief meaning is that the main war aim and peace aim is to make the -world safe against Germany. It names two ways of accomplishing this -aim: A. By destruction of the Nazi power and disarmament of Germany -and her allies. B. By restoration of the nations now enslaved. Does -this constitute an encouragement for the Germans to give up? Hardly. -Churchill and Roosevelt were too clear-sighted and too candid to -fall in with the argument that the German people could be fooled by -a dishonest statement of war aims. They knew that the Germans are -bound to realize if they lose this war they will be worse off than -if they win. War is Hell, but much more hellish for the defeated -side. It is untrue that war never settles anything. It always settles -something, whether for a short time, as for the twenty years following -the uncompleted war of 1914-1918, or forever as the Third Punic War. -The Germans know this better than almost any other people. But now -they have had a crushingly frank statement of basic British-American -war aims: abolition of German military power. This time they cannot -complain they have been deceived. - - -Q. _Wasn’t that true of Wilson’s Fourteen Points? Weren’t they a -frank statement to the Germans of the terms they could expect if they -surrendered?_ - -A. No. In the first place, one great difference between Wilson’s -Fourteen Points and the Eight Points of the Atlantic Charter is that -Wilson acted alone, and issued his Fourteen Points to the world in -January 1918, without consulting Britain or France, so that when the -Germans in October finally in the extremity of defeat accepted them, -Britain and France were not bound by them at all. In the second place, -the Fourteen Points declared there should be general disarmament, and -not just a one-sided German disarmament, so that when as a matter of -common prudence, the British and French insisted upon and obtained -German disarmament ahead of their own, the Germans protested they had -been betrayed by Wilson particularly and by the Allies in general. -Hitler based his campaign for power in Germany largely upon his -complaint that Germany had never been fairly beaten on the battlefield, -but had been betrayed by the Fourteen Points. Now it is hard to see how -any future Hitler can raise again such a complaint since the Germans -are now given fair warning that when they are beaten their present -government will be abolished, and their arms will be taken from them -while the British and Americans keep their arms intact. This is a -refreshing example of common-sense honesty. It seems almost as though -Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s clear-sighted candor might finally brush -away the mists of false feeling and thinking which have obscured our -view of the war and of our own interests. - - -Q. _You have named what might be called a negative side of the Atlantic -Charter as being its most important side._ - -A. It is, if you call it negative to aim to destroy the power which has -torn the whole world apart. - - -Q. _Yes, but after that power is destroyed, or rendered impotent, what -are we or the British going to do to consolidate the gains of victory? -How are we going to be better off?_ - -A. If you think we are going to be better off, or could be better off -than we were before 1939, the answer is that we cannot be because -no matter which side wins the world as a whole is going to be very -much worse off for a long time than it was before the war began. We -are not offered the choice now of fighting in order to improve our -present position. Our choice is, either to fight and save something -of our most precious spiritual as well as material possessions; or -not to fight and lose everything. The world as a whole is bound to be -materially much poorer after this war no matter who is victor, although -the United States ought to come out of it in better condition than any -other country. Think of the immense demolition which has been wrought -and is now being wrought in Europe. Just to name a few of the cities -which have been bombarded and have suffered varying degrees of damage -is to compile a roll of casualties never equaled: London, Manchester, -Liverpool, Portsmouth, Southampton, Plymouth, Coventry; Berlin, -Hamburg, Bremen, Cologne, Duisburg, Essen, Dortmund; Warsaw; Belgrade; -Leningrad, Moscow, Minsk, Smolensk, Odessa, Kiev; Alexandria; Nanking, -Hankow, Chungking. From China to Egypt and from England to Central -Russia, fire and high explosives have blasted scars it will take a -century to heal. - -The diversion of billions of man-hours from productive work to the -making of war supplies, the loss of lives, and the dislocation of -millions of human existences, and of the whole world economy, will -impoverish us all for a certain length of time. Happily there are -reasons for believing the United States will suffer less than almost -any other part of the human family, provided only that we enter the -war soon enough to ensure the defeat of the Nazi power and do not -wait to face that power alone. We must keep one thing firmly in mind, -that though our condition may be poor if we are victorious, it will -be definitely better than if we are defeated, and though we may lack -in goods and comforts as a result of our participation in the war, we -shall be far richer and easier in body, mind, and soul after hard-won -victory than if we attempted to purchase from the conquering Nazis a -humiliating security. - - -Q. _Why should the United States, as you suggested, come out of the war -in a better economic condition than the others?_ - -A. First, because if we enter the war in time to have any Allies, we -shall probably be physically undamaged. That is, as long as the British -Isles, our foremost fortress, persists in its resistance it is not -likely that we shall suffer any important injuries by air bombardment -or otherwise. You can see how important this factor is if you consider -the condition of the cities of England now, and how much money, labor, -and time it will take to restore them. Second, the economic structure -of the United States can more easily be transferred back from war to -peace production than most countries. After this war there will be an -increase in the private use of airplanes comparable to the increase -in automobile ownership after the first successful Ford. Our warplane -production can be easily switched to the production of private planes, -and many observers would not be surprised to see American private plane -production go into six figures and then into seven. - -The United States, as the most self-contained of the belligerent -powers, at the end of the war will have everything necessary to resume -its own economic progress and to help the world recover. - -Europe will be starving and desperately in need of our agricultural -products, our cotton, and of almost everything else we produce. If -we wish decisively to influence the organization of the world, one -powerful lever will be our economic power after the war, our ability -if we like, to finance the reconstruction of Europe. With wisdom and -far-sight in control of our administration we ought to be able to put -back into circulation some of our monstrous hoard of gold, for our -own good as well as that of the world. Sometimes when one succumbs -to optimism, it seems possible that there may come after this war a -marvelous opportunity to reshape the affairs of mankind into a happier -pattern. We shall have an opportunity such as we have never had before, -not even after the last war, to make our hopes and aspirations -practically effective, but only of course if we enter the war in time. -There is a fourth reason why we should be economically or financially -better off at the end of this war than at the end of the last one: -we now have no war-debt problem. Who will deny now that everyone -would have been better off after the last war if international debts, -including reparations, had been canceled all around. This aspect of -the Lend-Lease program may go down in history as Roosevelt’s cleverest -device. - -This sounds almost as though I thought the war would be a blessing to -America, emerging undamaged, easily reverting to peacetime production, -stored with goods for our own consumption and for export to clamoring -millions abroad, and with no delinquent war debtors to confuse our -financial affairs. Actually I do not think the war will be a blessing, -except as it unifies us and does something to cleanse us of the scum -of materialism. This view of America’s chances of coming relatively -unscathed out of the war depends entirely upon comparison of our fate -with that of other countries, maimed by bombardment, mutilated by the -loss of millions of breadwinners, fiscally bankrupt, economically -paralyzed, politically divided, and in the case of some, the prey of -anarchy. Think what the problem of leadership will be in most of the -countries of Europe. In Germany and Italy the tyrants have long ago -executed, imprisoned, exiled or otherwise effectively removed from the -political scene every possible candidate for office not in agreement -with them. In France the demoralization caused by defeat and Vichy’s -collaboration with the enemy has left few men with the initiative and -courage to become leaders of a renascent republic. If, as so frequently -happens, we become inclined to take an over-cheerful view of ourselves -and our prospects, we ought to be sobered by the thought of our -responsibilities in the postwar world. Whether we like it or not, and -our isolationists to the contrary notwithstanding, the United States -after this war is going to be compelled to assume the leadership of -the Western World, not only economically but politically. But we shall -be able effectively to influence the peace only if we have effectively -taken part in the war. - - -Q. _What will the peace conference be like?_ - -A. It might be more instructive in the first place to discuss what -the peace will be like if Hitler wins. Of course there will not be -any peace _conference_ if Hitler wins. The Quislings and Darlans will -be called to function for the states of Europe in the same way as -Hitler’s rubber-stamp Reichstag functions for Germany. We know now -what Hitler plans to impose upon the world. Let us begin with Europe. -Europe is to belong exclusively to the Germans. They as a master race -will occupy the top of a pyramid at the bottom of which are the Poles, -Czechs, Serbs, and other “subhuman Slavs” who constitute the lowest -class of slaves. Between these “untouchables” and the Germans will -come all the other peoples of Europe, arranged in order depending -partially upon their degree of racial kinship with the noble Teutons, -but more on the degree of their subservience and “collaboration.” -The Dutch and Scandinavians, for example, are considered by the -Nazis to be semi-Teutonic cousins, but they will not be ranked as -high as the French if the Vichy appeasers succeed in their policy of -“collaboration.” - -Now that Italy has proved an even feebler war partner than her worst -detractors had imagined, Hitler obviously is considering the grant to -France of the position of First Vassal instead of Italy. Spain, if she -eventually enters the war, will be given a role perhaps second to that -of Italy, chiefly because Spanish influence will be helpful in the -conquest of South America. Sweden and Switzerland will of course be -_gleichgeschaltet_, or “coordinated” into the Nazi system and given a -rank corresponding to their servility. But all are slaves, including -the Axis “allies” Italy, Hungary, Spain, and they differ one from -another only in the degree of their degradation. None of them will -be permitted to bear arms capable of threatening their Nazi masters, -and none will have a word in the formulation of the major laws which -determine their lives. - - -Q. _In what sense will the conquered people be slaves?_ - -A. Politically, they will be disfranchised, without a vote, unable to -influence their own fate except by humble petition to Berlin. For the -most part they will be ruled by Nazi governors. States like Poland -will also have Nazis ruling the smallest organs of government, as -municipalities. States like France may be permitted to operate their -own provincial and municipal governments under a Nazi _Gauleiter fuer -Frankreich_. - - -Q. _But Germans also have no vote under the Nazi system. How does the -position of these other nationalities under the Nazis differ from that -of the Germans themselves?_ - -A. It differs as the night from day. Every ruling made and every -action taken by the Nazi governors of the vassal states is intended -to procure tribute for the Great German Reich, tribute which, -scientifically extracted, will prove greater over the years than any -amount of old-fashioned looting could have produced. This tribute, -which is to be paid not merely for generations to come, but as Hitler -modestly estimates, for 1,000 years, will go to elevate the standard -of living of all Germans, and to depress the standard of living of all -non-Germans. It makes no difference that most Germans have no voice -in their government; every German will be under Hitler’s New Order, a -slaveholder, and every non-German inhabitant of occupied territory is -automatically a slave of the whole German tribe. - - -Q. _How is this to be accomplished? Isn’t it difficult to extract -tribute? Didn’t the Allies have trouble getting reparations from -Germany?_ - -A. The Allies were innocent children compared with the Nazis in the -art of obtaining advantage from one’s beaten adversary. No one knows -whether Hitler’s system will work for 1,000 years, or for ten or two -years, but it certainly is a grandiose design without any parallel in -the history of human conquest. First is the movement of populations. -Hitler has moved upward of two million Poles from Western Poland, -dumped them indiscriminately in Central Poland, and replaced them -with Germans, some from the Baltic states, some from the Tyrol, some -from the Reich. The Poles as a rule were visited by the Gestapo after -midnight, given half an hour’s notice to leave their homes forever, -allowed to take but a single suitcase with food for three days and -the clothes on their backs. They were forbidden to take any of their -own articles of value, not even a silver spoon from the kitchen or a -rake from the barn. The German families moving in were fewer than the -evacuated Poles, so that the Germans became wealthier per capita than -the Poles had been. The Poles died for the most part, or else are still -in process of dying from starvation and exposure; it was part of the -German calculation that they should die. Similar methods were used to -evacuate the French from Lorraine. - -Other desirable parts of Europe contiguous to the Great German Reich -will be evacuated of their native populations and settled by the -Germans. This constitutes looting on a grand scale. Sir Norman Angell, -profound thinker on war, once held in his Nobel prize-winning thesis -“The Great Illusion,” that modern conquest cannot pay in this Christian -day and age, because the acquisition of mere political control over an -enemy’s territory, the advancing of the flag over foreign lands, does -not pay even for the cost of the war. The usual incidental looting by -the soldiery amounts of course to nothing from the point of view of -the nation’s economics. Sir Norman could not be blamed for failing -to foresee the grand-scale looting practiced by the Nazis. There is -an evident economic advantage to the nation if a million of its farm -families are moved into rich, fully equipped farms robbed from the -conquered and expelled enemy. But this sort of looting is only the -beginning of Nazi total plunder. In France the major part of the -productive apparatus in industry, trade, and the professions is being -systematically taken over by the Nazis. This is only a step toward -the huge permanent system of eternal tribute, which is based upon the -exploitation of the labor power of Europe. - -No conqueror since the Romans has ever been able profitably to exploit -the labor power of his conquests, but the Nazis propose to do so and -are doing so and boast they will continue to do so for centuries. The -Nazis intend to concentrate all industry in Germany, and to convert -the rest of Europe into an agricultural colony growing food and raw -materials for the master state, the Great German Reich. The entire -population of non-German Europe is to be turned and is already being -turned as fast as possible into a vast army of coolies of the soil, -toiling to supply the Third Reich. The coolies will likewise be -required to buy all their industrial products from Germany. The price -the Germans pay for the coolies’ agricultural products and the price -the coolies pay for the German goods will be fixed by the Germans. Nice -calculation will arrive at the precise prices which will bring the -Herrenvolk the maximum advantage. The Germans with their traditional -scientific acumen will certainly find it to their advantage to pay -their coolies such prices for agricultural products as will enable the -coolies to buy liberally of German manufactured goods. - -Thus with a little reasonableness and spirit of accommodation on -the side of the coolies, who ought to be happy to give up the -responsibility of liberty, and glad to dispense with the obligations -connected with free speech, press, assembly, and thought, Hitler -Europe might settle down into one great unhappy family, orderly as a -penitentiary, quiet as a grave. It is important also to note that by -turning their conquered populations into farm hands the Nazis make -it much easier to keep their victims permanently disarmed, since -only industry on a large scale can turn out tanks, machine guns, and -warplanes necessary for insurrection against a totalitarian tyranny. - - -Q. _But Hitler has not destroyed or removed the factories from France -and not even from Poland, since we constantly read that he is obtaining -considerable war supplies from the industrial plants in the occupied -regions._ - -A. That is because the war is not over yet and Hitler has not had -time to move these factories into Germany. He needs their products -immediately for the war against England and Russia. After his -conquest of Poland he kept many Polish factories, notably locomotive -and freight-car plants, running in Poland with German supervisors, -but after the fall of France, during that period when he was sure -England would capitulate also, he ordered these factories transferred -to Germany. Then after the British failed to surrender and as soon -as it became plain that the war would last some time longer, Hitler -countermanded the transfer of the Polish factories, and many of them -are running today on Polish soil. - - -Q. _Where is Hitler going to get the man power to run such a huge -industrial machine, comprising the manufactories formerly owned in all -the rest of Europe?_ - -A. That is a question which closely concerns us all in America. Hitler -will get the man power in part from his own partially demobilized -armies, but in part also from the conquered coolies, millions of -whom are not agricultural workers at all, but skilled mechanics and -technicians. German authorities admit, or boast, that today 2,000,000 -prisoners of war and “others” are working in German factories, mines, -and on farms. It is against the products of this essentially slave -labor that American industrial products would have to compete if Hitler -after conquering Britain offered merely to compete with the United -States in foreign trade. - - -Q. _Would we not then be at a great disadvantage? How could we compete -at all?_ - -A. We could not compete successfully. Under the Nazi system, precisely -as under its twin brother, the Soviet system, all foreign trade is -carried on by a foreign trade monopoly. It has a hundred different -names in Germany but in reality every foreign trade transaction is a -government transaction. Competition among Germans is thus eliminated -and any foreigner attempting to compete with the Nazi Colossus has -as much chance to succeed as a one-well oil producer trying to trade -against the Standard Oil Company. No American manufacturer, no matter -how big, including our automobile manufacturers, could buck the Nazi -machine, because in addition to its slave labor prices, and its -government foreign trade monopoly, it would have the advantage of -terrific political-military pressure on all the states in the world -not yet an integral part of the Nazi Empire. What South American state -do you think would have the nerve to stand up to a Germany which had -just finished off the whole of Europe and the British Empire? Which one -of them would refuse to give Nazi goods favored tariff treatment over -American goods notwithstanding any existing treaties? - - -Q. _If these are Hitler’s plans for Europe, what does he intend to do -with Africa, Asia, and America if he wins?_ - -A. He intends to swallow piece by piece the entire world, but since he -cannot do so by immediate, world-wide conquest, he would like to be -allowed periods of negotiated peace during which he could allow his -forces to recuperate while by soothing reassurances he lulls that part -of the world not yet under his dominion, into a state of helplessness. -If he could, after the conquest of Russia, make a negotiated peace with -Britain and tacitly, with the United States, he would expect, after a -breathing spell, to be stronger relative to the combined strength of -Britain and America than he is now. When his superiority in strength -had reached a certain point, he would attack again. - - -Q. _How could Hitler expect to be stronger since we are now building -our two-ocean Navy and our great Air Force and Army? Even if Hitler -were now or soon to obtain negotiated peace, wouldn’t we continue -to forge ahead and grow stronger? Wouldn’t we in the face of a -Hitler-dominated world which would result from a negotiated peace be -compelled to turn the United States into an armed camp, and wouldn’t we -increase our armaments until we were invulnerable?_ - -A. That is not at all certain. If we continue in our present state of -complacency, we might take a negotiated peace to be a sign that we -could disarm. The House of Representatives passed the bill extending -the service of selectees beyond one year by a vote of 203 to 202. -One vote preserved the existence of our embryo army. It was not a -mere technical question of how long an army man ought to serve. The -question was whether we were to have an army at all. In the midst of -the war, when every qualified expert declared the United States faced -mortal perils, the House of Representatives could find a majority of -but one-tenth of one per cent in favor of maintaining or attempting to -construct an effective army. I know the majority would have been larger -if the administration leaders had known the vote could come so close, -but the fact remains that in this crisis of our national life, with the -enemy rampant and untamed, the House took this complacent view of our -defense necessities. - -Now what would be the attitude of Congress if a peace should be -negotiated? Would not our isolationists say this was a God-given -opportunity to reduce our tremendous expenditures, whittle the -Army down to police size, confine our Air Force to a few thousand -planes, and stop building our two-ocean Navy? Certainly they would, -and all the immense propaganda resources of the Nazis would be -employed to encourage throughout the United States such a move toward -“common-sense pacifism.” Now, the argument would run, the war is over, -Hitler is satisfied, let us go back to normalcy. Whether we actually -succumbed entirely to this temptation or not, there would be a strong -isolationist campaign in favor of our disarmament, and this would -surely slow up our defense effort. Meanwhile Hitler would be bringing -his New Order slave states with their industries and agriculture into -the service of the Reich, increasing his Navy, rebuilding his Air -Force, re-equipping his Army and in general growing stronger relative -to us. He would never want a negotiated peace unless he believed this -would be its result. - - -Q. _Have you any idea what kind of negotiated peace Hitler would -consider acceptable? Would such a peace be as desirable for us as -Wheeler and Lindbergh say? I notice Lindbergh recently urged that the -only alternative to a negotiated peace was “either a Hitler victory -or a prostrate Europe or a prostrate Europe and possibly a prostrate -America as well.”_ - -A. Fortunately Axis sources have given us a rather complete blueprint -of what they would consider acceptable terms of a negotiated peace. -Reduced to a few words, their terms are: Surrender by Britain and -America of control of the seas by reduction of the British and American -navies to parity with the Axis and demilitarization of British and -American naval bases outside home waters; German dominion over all -Europe, most of Africa, and parts of Asia; Japanese control of the rest -of Asia; and the United States to open the doors of Latin America to -Axis enterprise. - - -Q. _Do you mean that those are serious terms suggested for a so-called -negotiated peace? What is the source of these terms?_ - -A. It is the version put out by the Japanese Foreign Office through its -organ the _Japan Times Advertiser_, April 29, 1941, as a trial balloon. -It remains the most comprehensive statement of Axis terms yet issued. -Since the British government ignored it, and the British and American -press derided it, Germany dropped the idea for the moment, but you -may be sure it has not been dropped for good. Seven weeks after its -publication Hitler sent his armies into Russia. When he has attained -his goal there, it seems highly probable he will again offer peace and -when he does, the general outline of his terms will probably follow -this statement. One has only to remember that since the issuance of -this provisional peace text Russia has been stricken from the list of -“the nations called upon to settle world peace” and has been added as a -victim. - - -Q. _But didn’t the meeting of Churchill and Roosevelt exclude the -possibility of a negotiated peace, since they declared in their -eight-point program that “final destruction of the Nazi tyranny” was -the precondition to peace?_ - -A. They did, but Hitler, though he may have little hope of actually -achieving a negotiated peace, may offer it in order to appeal over the -heads of Churchill and Roosevelt to those elements of the British and -American populations he considers vulnerable to his propaganda. There -are few such elements left in England, but many here. Hitler knows -by now that he has only to furnish the ammunition and Lindbergh and -Wheeler will do the firing for him. - - -Q. _Have you the text of these Hitler terms?_ - -A. Yes, and it would be most instructive to compare it with the -eight-point Atlantic Charter. - - JOINT DECLARATION - - The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, - Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty’s Government in the United - Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain - common principles in the national policies of their respective - countries on which they base their hopes for a better future of the - world. - - First: Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; - - Second: They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord - with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned; - - Third: They desire to respect the right of all peoples to choose the - form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see - sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been - forcibly deprived of them; - - Fourth: They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing - obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, - victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to - the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic - prosperity; - - Fifth: They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between - all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing - for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social - security; - - Sixth: After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to - see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of - dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford - assurance that all the men in the lands may live out their lives in - freedom from fear and want; - - Seventh: Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas - and oceans without hindrance; - - Eighth: They believe that all of the nations of the world, for - realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment - of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if - land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which - threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they - believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of - general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. - They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures - which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of - armaments. - - _Franklin D. Roosevelt._ - _Winston S. Churchill._ - -To this the President added in his message to Congress: “It is also -unnecessary for me to point out that the declaration of principles -includes of necessity the world need for freedom of religion and -freedom of information. No society of the world organized under the -announced principles could survive without these freedoms which are -a part of the whole freedom for which we strive.” And Mr. Churchill -made this significant comment in his broadcast: “There are, however, -two distinct and marked differences in this joint declaration from -the attitude adopted by the Allies during the latter part of the last -war, and no one should overlook them. The United States and Great -Britain do not now assume that there will never be any more war again. -On the contrary, we intend to take ample precautions to prevent its -renewal in any period we can foresee by effectively disarming the -guilty nations while remaining suitably protected ourselves. The second -difference is this: That instead of trying to ruin German trade by -all kinds of additional trade barriers and hindrances as was the mood -of 1917, we have definitely adopted the view that it is not in the -interests of the world and of our two countries that any large nation -should be unprosperous, or shut off from means of making a decent -living for itself and its people by industry and enterprise. These -are far-reaching changes of principle upon which all countries should -ponder.” - - * * * * * - -The Axis statement begins with the declaration that the day of small or -weak nations is over, and no nation which cannot stand on its own feet -may be permitted to exist. - -“1. The strongest powers must have the greatest opportunities of -developing the world and disposing of such questions as spheres of -influence, resources, and type of government. This is the law of nature -and attempts to maintain the status quo of dominant powers who cannot -continue to function through their strength but only through alliances -must break down.” - -The reference here of course is to such colonial powers as France, -Holland, Belgium, etc. - -“2. The nations called upon to settle world peace would be Germany, -with Italy as a junior partner, Japan, the British Empire, and the -United States. Such a peace should include: a. Parity of naval strength -of Britain and the United States on one hand, and the Axis powers on -the other hand, with a naval holiday after this is established.” - -This is the key to the intention of the whole peace. Since the British -and American navies are about double the strength of the Axis powers, -so long as the British hold out we together could continue effectively -to control the seas. If we were to consent to a naval agreement -reducing our and the British strength to the strength of the Axis, and -at the same time demilitarize our naval bases as demanded in other -paragraphs, effective sea power would pass to the Axis. - -“b. Demilitarization of such strongholds as Gibraltar, the Eastern -Mediterranean, Malta, Aden, Red Sea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, as well -as all United States bases in the Pacific and any projects in the -Aleutian Islands reaching out toward Japan.” - -This paragraph would complete the conquest of sea power by the Axis -and would render defenseless all the British Empire’s Far Eastern -possessions and our Philippines and Alaska. - -“c. Complete withdrawal of the British Navy from the Mediterranean and -joint Anglo-Axis administration of the Suez Canal.” - -Withdrawal of the British Navy would give mastery of the Mediterranean -to the Axis, which would automatically control the Suez Canal. To offer -“joint Anglo-Axis administration of the Suez Canal” is a sop which only -underlines the grotesque nature of a Hitler-negotiated peace. - -“d. All North Africa from the Straits of Gibraltar to Somaliland to be -placed at the disposition of the Axis, though France may be permitted -to retain colonies under certain conditions of co-administration. -Certain British and African colonies to be placed under German and -Italian control. South Africa would be required to have complete -independence and abolish trade preference tariffs.” - -The last sentence means that South Africa should leave the British -Empire. The fleeting, condescending mention of the French who _may_ -be permitted to share colonies is the only reference made to them. It -ought to be noted carefully by the men of Vichy who pretend at any rate -to believe that Hitler would not rob them if they abased themselves -sufficiently. For the United States, the significant thing here is that -Germany would control the naval, air, and military bases of Africa -including Dakar opposite Brazil. - -“e. Continental Europe to be organized into a corporate state under -the Reich with domestic autonomy for unit members whose economic and -political cooperation would be based on Berlin.” - -There for all to read is the future map of Europe. The name of Europe -itself will scarcely be needed any more, save as a geographical term -once used to identify the continent now known as Great Germany. No more -France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland. All -will come under the Nazi yoke, even Spain and Portugal and the states -which yielded without a struggle, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria. You -ask, but isn’t this the unification of Europe we have all been hoping -for? The answer is no, because what the world needed was a Europe -voluntarily united in a United States of Europe, or whatever else you -wanted to call it, for the purpose of promoting the mutual prosperity, -health, and happiness of all its members. Hitler Europe’s avowed object -is to confiscate and exploit the resources of the conquered states -and to employ their man power as slaves for the exclusive, perpetual -benefit of the “master race.” This is not a new Commonwealth of -Nations; it is the first step in the Nazis’ program for the systematic -degradation of the human race. The only parallel for it is in Aldous -Huxley’s _Brave New World_. His robot human race was divided into Alpha -masters and various classes of slaves, down to the Epsilon automatons -who would correspond to Hitler’s Slavic serfs. - -“f. The United Kingdom to remain the heart of the British Empire with a -gradual transfer of authority to Canada.” - -This seems to be a covert bid for isolationist approval in the United -States, a hint that as the British Empire will not exist at all much -longer, the United States may profit by absorbing Canada and whatever -other vestigial remnants of the Empire may be granted Canada as the -residuary legatee. This profit-taking by the United States has already -been proposed by Lindbergh in his suggestion that we take over Canada. - -“g. The German sphere of influence may go as far as the Sea of Marmora -unless that were handed over to the joint administration of Turkey and -Soviet Russia. But Germany may demand participation in the oil wells of -Iraq and Iran.” - -This paragraph has been rendered obsolete by the German invasion of -Russia. Germany certainly hopes eventually to get all the oil of Iraq -and Iran. - -“h. The United States’ sphere of influence would be Canada, Central and -South America, Newfoundland, and Greenland with islands and regional -waters, but the United States would undertake not to form any hegemony -over South America inimical to the Axis and would accord the fullest -freedom and equality of opportunity to Germany and her Allies in that -continental brotherhood. No American naval bases would be west of -Hawaii, and that stronghold would be reduced in importance.” - -How does it feel to an American to hear this sort of dictation? It is -dignified treatment compared with what we would receive if we acceded. -Never was a proverb more true than the old Russian one, based on the -bitter experience of their vassalage to the Tartars. “A nation is never -too poor to pay the first installment of tribute and never rich enough -to pay the last.” We are asked to give up all our naval bases in the -Pacific west of Hawaii, but there is no hint of Japanese reciprocity. -The Japanese when the time came would move in and fortify the bases we -had dismantled. - -“i. In the Pacific the Netherlands Indies might be detached from the -Netherlands and placed under an independent government with native -participation, and British possessions would obtain increasing -independence. Throughout all these Pacific islands, Japanese advisors -would be admitted and entrusted with the duty of rationalizing forms -of cooperation in the ‘co-prosperity sphere.’ French Indo-China would -receive independence on the same terms.” - -We see now what this “independence” is. Just twelve weeks after the -publication of these “peace terms” the Japanese took over Indo-China. - -These peace terms are not even hypocritically polite. They simply -assume the opposite “negotiators” are beaten, and that of course -includes the United States, as we may see from our prominent position -among its stipulations. Lindbergh declares we would be beaten from the -start if we entered the war, and that a negotiated peace would be more -acceptable than outright military defeat. But these terms, vouched for -by the Imperial Japanese Foreign Office organ, show us that we would be -treated as a conquered nation if we negotiated a peace. - -“j. Australia would remain within the British Empire, but would -eliminate immigration bars and allow Japanese settlement on terms of -equality.” - -The exclusively Japanese interests would be safeguarded by Germany in -a negotiated peace only if Japan had earned it by following German -orders. Japan, however, may disappoint her senior partner. - -The next to last paragraph reads ironically: - -“k. India would obtain self-government.” - -We may be sure that if the Axis wins, India will not receive -self-government. Both Germany and Japan want India. Somewhere in the -path of this war appears the possibility of a clash between the Germans -and the Japanese. Already Japan shows signs of being afraid that if -Germany wins, Japan will suffer the same fate as Italy and Russia. -Japan likewise shows signs of wanting to wait for better evidence that -the Allies are going to win. Stranger things have happened in this war -than that Japan should finally quit the Axis and go to war on the side -of Britain and the United States. - -But the most ironic paragraph of this peace offer is the last: - -“l. Religious and political liberty would be enjoined throughout the -world.” - -That’s all. That completes the offer of negotiated peace. - - -Q. _Why do they call it a negotiated peace?_ - -A. It is not “negotiated.” It is a dictated peace; it represents a -complete Hitler victory but that is the only kind of negotiated peace -he would consider until he is himself defeated. - - -Q. _But is it possible that these are authentic, genuine terms of the -Axis? It seems to me that the publication of such arrogant demands upon -America was an undiplomatic step, contrary to the interests of the -Axis, since it would be bound to arouse our indignation._ - -A. It was a “semi-official” publication of the Japanese Foreign Office -at the very time when the then Foreign Minister Matsuoka advised -Anthony Eden that Japan was ready to mediate a negotiated peace if -she were requested to do so. Its authentic character can hardly be -questioned. If it is arrogant it is because the Axis is arrogant, and -considers that Britain is already beaten and that the United States -was beaten before she began to fight. As the _Japan Times Advertiser_ -put it: “These may be called victors’ terms but the Axis powers have -achieved a dominant position permitting liberty of dictation.” These -terms could not be worse if we had entered the war and lost it. They -would mean that from now on until perhaps centuries later when the -Nazis shall have become soft and self-indulgent and until some new, -rougher race arose to oust them, the Germans would rule the earth. For -of course if Britain or America were to be willing to accept such terms -it would prove they really were beaten. - -During the period immediately after the signing of the negotiated -peace which would be used by the Germans to consolidate and strengthen -their military position, we should probably be allowed to retain our -nominal sovereignty, although we should not be able to do anything -in the realm of foreign politics or economics that was not permitted -by Germany. During this period our Lindberghs would declaim that they -had been right after all since we had not been invaded and we still -elected our own president and still sang “God Bless America,” and still -called ourselves the land of the free and home of the brave; and the -Lindberghs would insist that the sacrifices we had made were far better -than to have fought a war. But soon we should find that Hitler’s idea -of “equality” in South America meant complete Nazi monopoly. Soon we -should find we had lost all our world trade save that permitted us by -the Axis with the Axis on Axis terms. - - -Q. _Would the Nazi use of slave labor be an advantage? Can’t free -American labor always produce better and cheaper than slave labor?_ - -A. That is one of our popular fallacies. We proclaim this doctrine at -the same time that we use tariffs to protect American industry from -the products of foreign workers who receive lower wages than American -workers. Japanese manufactured articles, the cheapest in the world -because they are made by virtually slave labor, were able to flood our -market in spite of our high tariffs. For ordinary mass production, for -nearly every type of manufactured article save quality goods, slave -labor is more profitable than free labor. If it is not so efficient, -it makes up for that by being so much cheaper. If Hitler were to get -his slave Europe organized, he could turn out products which would -undersell anything we could make. - - -Q. _Wouldn’t he try to make us take his goods also?_ - -A. He would. We are talking now of the alternative to our going to war -and defeating Hitler. We are visualizing the situation as it would be -after Hitler had won, and had made all of those arrangements with the -rest of the world which we have described, and was now in process of -adjusting his Empire to the United States, or rather of adjusting the -United States to his Empire. We are discussing now how we would have to -behave if we wished to continue to be at peace with Hitler. We would of -course have to make some kind of trade agreement with him. What kind -of trade agreement do you think Hitler would propose? We can suppose -he would offer us the same kind of agreement he has concluded with -other states before they fell, or before they volunteered to become -his vassals--the sort of agreements he had with Jugoslavia, or Greece, -and with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. These agreements provide -that German goods may enter at lower tariffs than the goods of other -countries or that tariffs on German goods are abolished altogether, and -usually the country concerned must promise to take a minimum quantity -of whatever articles Germany wishes to export. If we hoped to have -any kind of trade agreement with the victorious Germans at all, it -would have to be one like this. We should probably have to consent to -receive German goods in such quantities and at such prices that our -own industry would step by step be ruined. This would be the German -aim. They intend to make German industry not only the only industry in -Europe, but the master of the manufacturing world. They intend to wreck -any industry they cannot control. - - -Q. _But you don’t think we would put up with such treatment as that, do -you? It would be better to go to war, wouldn’t it?_ - -A. By that time it might be too late to go to war. Now is the time -to go to war. Now is the time to avoid those calamities we have just -discussed. If we had done nothing to protect ourselves while we still -had the power to protect ourselves and still had strong allies -fighting in the field, what use would there be to try to resist Hitler -after he had become master of the world outside America? We should then -face the alternative of submission to Hitler or fighting an almost -hopeless war. - -Our isolationists like the Quislings and the Darlans and Lavals -abroad, are working themselves into the position of the French -collaborationists. That is, they are going so far out on the limb -of isolation-appeasement that eventually they will not be able to -withdraw. Even today they refuse to admit their error. If the worst -came to the worst and we remained out of the war, and Hitler won, and -all these things we are discussing came to pass, our isolationists -would be bound to continue to contend that they were right, and they -would have to advocate collaboration with Hitler, as indeed many of -them do now. We can see what collaboration means in France. Ninety-five -per cent of the French people are against it, and five per cent who -advocate and practice it are now considered traitors. This would be -the history of our isolationists also. When the alternative, war or -surrender, was offered, their answer would be that war was hopeless, -and the only sensible thing to do would be to collaborate with Hitler. - - -Q. _But isn’t there another way out for us? Couldn’t we simply give -up our foreign trade? In 1939 it amounted to only about six billion -dollars. What is that compared with the monstrous expense of war? It -is only one-seventh of the amount we have already agreed to spend for -defense. It is only one-tenth of our national income._ - -A. Even if our total foreign trade represented only one-tenth of our -total business activity, that would make it vitally important, for -as you know, in an economy such as ours, ten per cent means all the -difference between failure and success. Hitler said of Germany, “we -must export or die.” Our case is not that desperate, but it would be -fair to say we must export or suffer a lower standard of living and -increased unemployment. Witness the effect on this country of our -war export business which has revitalized the entire economic system -and practically wiped out unemployment. Before long the last of our -unemployed ought to be at work, as they have all found jobs in England. -Of course if we wished to crawl into a completely abject isolation, -we could give up our foreign trade, recall our ships from the seven -seas, seal our ports, and retire into a kind of hillbilly life, eating -our corn bread and sowbelly, drinking our home-brew, and supporting a -permanent mass of millions of unemployed. - -Even if we attempted such a thing we would not be permitted to -continue to live peacefully behind our imagined walls. The world wants -what we can produce. Nazi Germany wants it. If we were to carry the -isolationist argument to its final absurdity and really try to set up -a complete autarchy and live within the continental borders of the -United States, the Nazis would never let us do so. From within and -from without the Nazis would attack us. Our own Nazis would labor to -bring us into Hitler’s New Order, while the German Nazis would assume -the role of our own Commodore Perry and as he broke open the Japanese -closed door in 1854 the Nazis would smash the locks of American -isolation. - -We are discussing what would be a comparatively short period of time, -the period between the end of the war with a Hitler-negotiated peace -and the moment when he felt himself strong enough to resume the war, -this time to conquer all that was left unconquered at the first truce. -As soon as he had his machine in order and perceived that his strength -had risen relative to ours to such a point that he considered victory -certain, he, with Japan, would attack Britain, then America. If we -had agreed to any such negotiated peace such as the one we have been -discussing, we would be lost. Britain and America have held out so -far because despite the importance of air power, sea power is still -paramount and we have had sea power. We would not have it after a -negotiated peace. - - -Q. _But aren’t these terms of a negotiated peace somewhat dated now -since the German attack on Russia? Hasn’t the unexpectedly strong -Russian resistance diminished Hitler’s feeling that he can already -dictate as a victor?_ - -A. No doubt Hitler’s arrogance has been reduced at least a little -since the “scum of the earth” checked his warriors, but the Russian -setback to Hitler has been only that, and it has not yet changed his -long-range plans. He still aspires to conquer the world and he still -believes he can do it, and any negotiated peace he may offer, whether -it is the one whose terms we have just discussed, or some other terms -more fitted to the moment, will be calculated to give the Germans a -respite in preparation for resumption of the war. That, after all, is -the important point to remember. Specific terms are at this juncture -unimportant. It is only essential to remember that _any_ negotiated -peace with Hitler would not be a peace at all, but only a truce to -which Hitler would never agree unless he believed he would thereby be -strengthened for renewal of the war. We can never emphasize too much -that there is no such thing as a peace with Hitler; there is no such -thing as a peaceful Hitler; Hitler will either conquer or be conquered. - - -Q. _But if Britain and the United States had agreed to the sort of -negotiated peace offered through Tokyo, they would have surrendered -practically everything, so why should Hitler go to the trouble of -attacking us?_ - -A. Because Hitler does not want “practically” everything; he wants -absolutely everything. Also Hitler cannot stop making war; it will -take a greater Nazi than he to convert the German war machine to -garrison duties and the Nazi hordes to peaceful production. - -No conqueror ever stops conquering until he is stopped by some outside -force. Alexander was just getting into his stride and longing for -more worlds to conquer when he died of a fever after drinking too -much. Hitler will never be stopped that way. Caesar was stopped by -the assassin’s dagger. That could stop Hitler but it would be foolish -to depend upon it. Napoleon was stopped at Waterloo by superior -force. That we hope will be Hitler’s end. But never did a conqueror -stop as our Lindberghs believe Hitler would stop, of his own accord, -satisfied with what he had won. Far more true is the analysis by my old -friend Douglas Miller, who during his fifteen years as United States -Commercial Attaché in Berlin was the constant source of knowledge about -the Nazis for all of us American newspapermen, and who now has written -the wisest book about the Nazis to appear from the pen of an American, -_You Can’t Do Business with Hitler_. - -Miller puts the matter with hair-fine accuracy thus: “The essential -sterility of the Fascist system is one explanation of its -aggressiveness. The totalitarians are a group of bandits who have -learned no useful trade or occupation but are well armed and have no -scruples about attacking their neighbors. Germany has, under Hitler, -thrown away her possibilities of peaceful trade and understanding with -all the world and has no option but to go forward in the campaign of -aggression. She must not, in Hitler’s words, ‘export or die’; she must -fight or die. Under these circumstances it is completely useless to -await any peaceful settlement of Europe’s troubles. The Nazis are not -organized for peace. They are not prepared for it. They would not know -what to do with it.” - -But beyond these reasons for attacking Britain and America even after -they had accepted such humiliating, emasculating terms as those -we have sketched, Hitler would have the same reason to attack the -Anglo-American combination that he had to attack Russia. He attacked -Russia partly to remove the remote possibility of a Russian attack -while he was attempting to invade England, but he attacked Russia also -to get complete control over the Russian resources which Stalin was -doling out to him too slowly and meagerly. So it would be with the -resources of the rump British Empire and of the United States. Hitler -would not be satisfied with the necessity for negotiating or trading -with Anglo-America. He would demand the power to dictate. So in the -long run Hitler by achieving such a negotiated peace as is advocated by -Wheeler, Nye, Lindbergh, and others, would have conquered America. - - -Q. _What kind of a peace would we make if we win the war?_ - -A. That is more difficult to forecast than to sketch the outlines of -a Hitler world. His peace is engraved in his past and blueprinted in -his program. We know what it is like, a simple pattern of masters and -slaves. All we can say positively about our postwar world is that -the British and Americans and the populations of Hitler’s conquered -territory, wish it to be a world in which there shall be no masters or -slaves; we want justice for everybody, and all the liberty possible, -and we want to get rid of fear and want. We know we will not be able to -get all this but the difference between us and Hitler is that Hitler -does not even want such a world. If he could have such a world by -merely asking for it, he would prefer to battle for his sort of world, -because violent struggle and the infliction of pain upon others is an -essential part of the satisfactions of the Nazis. - - -Q. _What chance has Communism in a defeated Germany?_ - -A. If Hitler is defeated it is possible that the Communists will be -the strongest party or political group of any kind in Germany. When he -came to power Hitler dissolved all parties, and only the Communists -continued a militant, underground organization. The bourgeois, -democratic parties completely disappeared, and it is hard to imagine -their revival. It is easy to imagine the revival of the Communist -Party. It won six million votes at the last honest election before -Hitler seized the government. A great many Germans who voted Communist -entered the Nazi Party or Nazi organizations such as the SA Brownshirts -and the SS Elite Guards. This confirmed the observation that between -Nazism and Communism as systems there existed more similarity than -difference. It would be easy for those who had been Communists before -Hitler came to power to return to the Communist cause after Hitler -fell. A Communist program promising immediate peace for the German -people and vengeance on the Nazi leaders would appeal more and more to -the masses of German workingmen as the war lengthens and shows no signs -of ending. We should not forget that the Soviet government, or rather -Joseph Stalin, unless he capitulates, will have something to say when -the time comes to think about the kind of government Germany is to have. - - -_Q. Well then, it seems to me that the first problem of our Peace -Conference will be what to do with the Germans._ - -A. It is likely that an even more urgent problem, demanding the first -attention of the Peace Conference, will be how to keep millions of -people in Europe from starving to death; how to restore the railroad -lines and other means of transportation; and how to prevent sheer -anarchy, or gutter-communism from seizing the continent. In the period -immediately after the Nazis collapse--and be sure of one thing, and -that is that when Hitler cracks he and his regime will crack all at -once in one frightful cataclysmic smash beside which the German -surrender in the last war will look like a fight to the finish--the -likelihood is that throughout Europe law and order will disappear for -a time at least until Allied troops arrive. For years the only law and -order will have been the German troops and Gestapo. The former leading -citizens of the occupied territories, Norwegian, Dutch, Czech, French, -etc., will all have been either killed, exiled, or demoralized. There -will be no firm group of strong men left to restore order anywhere in -Europe. In Germany itself the disorder will reach its height as the -Nazi masters flee and the German people take vengeance upon them. There -will be throughout the continent a universal struggle, as of beasts, -for the scanty food left. It is possible that more lives will be lost -in the immediate postwar period than in the war itself. Therefore I say -the most urgent problem before the Peace Conference will be how to give -Europe the physical means and the police force to keep it alive. - - -Q. _That is such a horrible picture that in spite of myself I must ask -if it would not be better to let Hitler have his way?_ - -A. It is natural for us to recoil from such horrors. But let us -remember that whereas the agony of Europe and of the world, brought -about by the struggle to expel Hitler from power, will be severe but -brief, the degradation of all mankind which would result from the -failure to expel Hitler, would last perhaps for generations, certainly -far beyond the length of time it would take to restore order in a -Europe purged of the Nazis. What did it cost to achieve liberty in the -first place? Think of all the wars it has taken to enable each of us -to stand up and say, “I am the equal of any man on earth.” If we are -not able to face the prospect of fighting and suffering and starving -and dying for liberty and if we are not confident enough in the -righteousness of our cause to demand, not request but demand, that our -fellow citizens do likewise, then we do not deserve liberty, we deserve -our place with the rest of Hitler’s slaves. Better that half the -generation of men alive today go down to early death than that Hitler -should enslave all mankind. - - -Q. _Very well, I agree, but isn’t it understandable that we, away over -here in America, should shrink from such a future?_ - -A. Yes, but unless we learn not to shrink we shall surely die as -a nation. How many Americans today understand and fully realize, -emotionally as well as intellectually, that in order to retain our -liberty and our national independence and make secure the lives of our -children, we have to face now the prospect of years of war, hardship, -and the loss of many American lives, and the wounding and maiming of -many more? Certainly it is brutal, not my words, but the reality. It -is unworthy of a nation of 130,000,000 for its leaders to suggest that -all will be well if only we pass this piece of legislation or take that -stand or appropriate another trillion dollars. Nothing will save this -country except our own blood and our own tears. And please do not go -away and say that I “blithely” recommended blood and tears. I bitterly -declare there is no alternative. - - -Q. _After we have been able, as we hope, to install temporary law and -order and emergency rations throughout the continent, isn’t the problem -of Germany next on the agenda of the Peace Conference?_ - -A. It must be. There is a still larger, the largest problem, that of -trying to reorganize the world into a scheme for living without war, -for some kind of Federated Humanity, but for us in the Western World -nothing can be done until we discover what to do with Germany. Here is -a nation of 80,000,000 whose leaders, clamoring for “living space,” -shamelessly declare they intend to multiply into 250,000,000 within -a century and use their superior force to exterminate or enslave -everybody else. Here is a nation which thrice in the memory of living -man, in 1870, 1914, and 1939 has launched its war machine against its -neighbors, taken the lives of millions, and now has disrupted the -civilization of the entire world. Here is a nation, distinguished in -its past history by precious contributions to the arts and sciences, -which today, led by the lust for conquest, has discarded Christ, truth, -justice, and has debased a whole generation of its youth to the moral -and ethical level of savages. - -Here is a nation which is one of the most talented on earth in -the theory and practice of the natural sciences, capable of world -leadership in bending nature to the peaceful services of mankind, to -the amelioration of suffering and the increase of prosperity, and what -does this nation do? It devotes all its talents to the cultivation of -the science of warfare, and becomes adept beyond all other nations -in the arts of destruction. Why? What is behind all this evil? Never -in modern history has any nation in the Western World displayed such -incorrigible tendencies to raid, rob, seize, invade, plunder, conquer, -and torture. Torture! For the deepest blot upon Nazi Germany is its -dark love of torture, its base delight in pain endured by others, its -cruel concentration camps. Never in any quarter of the globe at any -time in mankind’s history has any nation revealed so determined a will -and clever a method to exploit permanently as slaves the unfortunate -victims of its martial skill. The problem then is, how to restrain -Germany, or how to reform Germany, how, if possible, to bring her into -our world family. - - -Q. _Why not say the problem is how to destroy her or at least paralyze -her?_ - -A. For several reasons. First, because it is impracticable to destroy -80,000,000 persons even if we were Nazi enough to wish to do so. You -can be sure that if Hitler as head of a non-German Alliance were faced -with the German problem he would solve it precisely that way, by -extermination of the Germans. But we are not Nazis, and even suppose -some on our side were to advocate destruction of the Germans by mass -emasculation, you can be sure that millions of Americans and Britons -would arise and cry out in defense of the poor German people, misguided -victims, innocent souls. Politically and morally this solution is out -of the question. - - -Q. _Is there no way we could render Germany impotent to do harm, no way -we could deprive her of the possibility of attacking the world again?_ - -A. There are two ways: military occupation or deindustrialization -of the Reich. It is plain that if Germany is allowed the least -opportunity, she would rearm and attack with the same swift ferocity -she has just displayed. There must be physical restraint to keep her -from doing so. Military occupation is the obvious, traditional method, -but it has serious drawbacks. It is expensive and tiring. Nevertheless -if the Nazis are defeated in this war, it will be imperative to -occupy Germany far more thoroughly than after the last war, if only -to preserve order. There are some advocates of deliberately allowing -Germany a period of disorder during which it could be hoped that the -Germans would themselves exterminate a great number of Nazis. This -would only render more formidable the task which already appears -staggeringly difficult, to re-establish a state of law in the Reich, -where since 1933, law as we know it, has been abolished. Whatever -permanent system of controlling Germany is eventually adopted, the -first step will have to be military occupation. Theoretically, military -occupation could be continued indefinitely. Actually it never is -continued long, because the occupying troops and their people at -home grow tired of it. Even the French, who directly after the war -were fanatically determined to secure their frontier by taking the -Rhineland, and who did get in the Treaty of Versailles permission to -occupy the Rhineland for fifteen years, even these prudent and wary -French grew so tired of it that they evacuated the Rhineland three -years ahead of time, in June 1930. - -Six years later the Nazis moved in and constructed the Siegfried -line along the very positions which had been occupied by the French -troops. I know there were other reasons for the French to give up the -Rhineland. The British had pressed them to appease the Germans. The -Germans had agreed in the Young Plan to a new system of reparations and -as reward received the Rhineland ahead of schedule. But the moment the -last French troops left Germany the period of fulfillment of the war -treaties came to an end, and Germany began the period of repudiation -and revision which ended in this war and for France in her present -national humiliation. Looking backward one can see that nothing should -have moved the French to leave the Rhineland. That they did so is a -classic example of how people grow so careless, lazy, forgetful and -peace-minded that they become insensible to a threat to their very -lives. That is the state of mind of America today. - - -Q. _You mentioned a second possibility for physically retraining -Germany and you used the word deindustrialization. What does that mean?_ - -A. It is an ugly word but I know no other to describe the process of -taking away a country’s factories and leaving it without industry. -That of course would also leave it without the means of making war. -This is what Germany plans to do to the rest of Europe, as we have -seen. The civilized world would have every right to impose the same -treatment on the inventor of the scheme. Briefly the plan would be to -occupy Germany militarily; to disarm her rigorously; to dismantle all -her factories capable of making instruments of war; to prohibit the -import into Germany of raw materials which could be used for making -such instruments; to confiscate and turn over to Allied ownership and -operation all German mines producing iron or other metals; and to -appoint a permanent Inter-allied Control Commission to supervise these -restrictions. It would be necessary to forbid all manufacture or use of -airplanes by Germans in Germany. - - -Q. _How does this proposal fit in with the fourth paragraph of the -eight-point Atlantic Charter which reads, “They will endeavor, with due -respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by -all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal -terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are -needed for their economic prosperity.”_ - -A. There is the difficulty. Adherence to this paragraph would prevent -any such solution as deindustrialization, because there could be no -economic prosperity for a deindustrialized Germany. The first effect -of it would be a widespread return to the land, as Germans would have -no manufactured articles for export, and hence nothing with which to -buy abroad, and hence would be forced to grow all their own food. The -population would decline, young folks would emigrate if any country -would take them, and in general it would be a very unhappy period for -the Herrenvolk. Apparently Roosevelt and Churchill have rejected this -solution in favor of simple old-fashioned military occupation. - - -Q. _They said nothing in their statement about militarily occupying -Germany._ - -A. No, but they said plainly they intended to disarm the aggressor -nations. You do not suppose you could disarm Germany without occupying -her, do you? It ought to be possible to devise something more effective -and novel than the thousand-year-old method of sending in troops. One -suggestion is that all German officers (there may be around 500,000 -of them) should be exiled to an island under perpetual guard where -they could make their own living and end their lives in contemplation -of their sins. The German Army would be abolished entirely; not as in -1919 reduced to 100,000 men who were to become the cadre of the present -seven-million-man machine. For a decade or more the Allies would -have to accept the responsibility of policing Germany. All military -manuals and textbooks would be destroyed. Aviation of all kinds and the -building of airplanes would likewise be forbidden. These measures would -be for the purpose of demilitarizing the population, and it is possible -that, deprived of military instructors or any means of military -instruction, the plan might work, as least for a time. - -In any plan dealing with postwar Germany it is important to avoid -vindictiveness. Nothing should be done as a punishment of Germany’s -crimes in the past; everything should be done to restrain her from -crime in the future. How much better it would have been if there had -been no reparations imposed upon Germany after the last war, but the -Allies had kept their Military Control Commission permanently in -Germany while Allied troops permanently occupied the Rhineland. There -is no use, however, in hoping for any such _permanent_ resolution on -our part. We have only one hope of being able to restrain Germany for -any considerable period, by the humane means which are the only ones -open to us. - - -Q. _What hope have we of being able to restrain Germany?_ - -A. It is the hope that while we occupy Germany with our troops, say -for the next thirty or forty years, a new generation of Germans would -grow up which would forego its desire to conquer the world, forget -that it was a Herrenvolk, and would gradually learn the habits of -civilization. Meanwhile we would try to develop a World Federation or -League of Nations under Anglo-American leadership to such a point of -effectiveness that we could afford to allow Germany to become a member -of it. - - -Q. _But do you suppose our people or the British would put up with the -trouble and expense of occupying Germany militarily for thirty or forty -years? Wouldn’t there be an outcry on behalf of the Germans?_ - -A. Many of our people would probably try to sabotage any realistic -handling of the Germans. After the last war and at the beginning of -this one you could hear many Americans remarking: “How could you expect -the Germans or any upstanding, self-respecting people to tolerate being -treated unequally, to put up with being disarmed while their neighbors -were armed?” These remarks disclosed misapprehension of the German -mind which will surely be duplicated at the end of this war by similar -persons. That will not matter so much since the British will have a -great deal to say about how the Germans are to be restrained, and this -time the British will not be as shortsighted as they were after the -last war. - -You may remember that the French in 1919 wanted to occupy permanently -various strategic points in Germany, including the Rhineland, but the -British said no. They had two principal reasons for not consenting to -proper restraint of the Germans and both reasons were, as we can see -from our perspective of today, completely invalid. First, they did not -want France to become too strong; they believed they had to maintain a -balance of power with Germany, apparently leaving out of account the -enormous, patent facts that there were 80,000,000 Germans to 40,000,000 -Frenchmen, that the French birth rate was nearing the point of racial -suicide, that Frenchmen were concerned not at all with expansion but -only to keep what they had in their beloved “security.” Second, the -British people had failed during the war to suffer any of the pain and -tribulation the Germans had visited upon the French, who had seen their -towns and villages destroyed, their families blown to bits by German -artillery. - -Today when the British sit down to a Peace Table they will be a -different people. In Britain today are upward of 44,000,000 persons who -have been under bombardment for two years and have suffered a strain -upon their courage such as has no parallel. They have witnessed the -mutilation of their dear ones, the destruction of their monuments. They -have heard the menace from their enemy that he intended to destroy -England as Carthage was destroyed. Is it likely that when the British -sit down victorious in a Peace Conference they will shrink from the -application of methods, no matter how severe, to prevent the recurrence -of this horror? We shall not earn the right to speak at all at the -Peace Conference until we have borne our share of the heat of the day. -I hope we shall not try to exercise our influence to obstruct whatever -solutions may seem appropriate at the end of years of war, to solve -this essentially insoluble problem of the Germans. - - -Q. _Why do you call the German problem insoluble?_ - -A. Because no matter what we do, short of destroying the Germans, which -we have agreed is impossible, the Germans are likely to break out again -on the warpath some time. Let us assume that we take the view that -the Versailles treaty was too harsh, and this time we will avoid all -the mistakes of harshness. We grant Germany a peace treaty which not -only takes nothing from her, but allows her to retain a considerable -quantity of the territorial spoils she has accumulated by violence. We -agree to let her retain all the territory inhabited for the most part -by German-speaking people. Thus she is allowed to keep Western Poland -whence she has so brutally expelled the native Polish population. She -is allowed to keep the German Sudetenland, formerly Czechoslovakian, -and until the men of Munich gave it to Hitler, never before a part of -Germany. She is allowed to keep Belgian Eupen Malmedy; and even any -part of Lorraine which may desire to opt for Germany. She is allowed to -keep Austria. In short, Germany is allowed to keep all her 80,000,000 -Germans together. More than that, in order to “right every wrong,” -Germany is given back her old colonies, all of them. Thus there is no -thought of dividing the country. There are of course no reparations. -There are no punitive measures of any kind. Germany is invited to join -the new World Federation as soon as it has been formed. Certainly -this sort of treatment ought to mollify any people. This ought to be -a perfect peace. But wait, there is a crucial point. Shall Germany be -allowed now, at once, to bear arms again? Or ever again? And how many -arms? What kind? - - -Q. _Haven’t Churchill and Roosevelt already declared the aggressors -would be disarmed?_ - -A. Very well, the victors will insist that Germany is to have no -arms at least for a period of years. Do you think that then the -Germans, even with a treaty such as we have sketched, granting every -conceivable amelioration, would be satisfied? No. If we restricted -their armed forces in any degree, for example, by depriving them of -offensive weapons, of tanks and bombing planes, you can be sure that -the complaint of the Germans would be as great as though they had been -stripped of half their population, the Reich divided into a score of -puppet states, and their cities occupied by divisions of Senegalese. - - -Q. _Aren’t the Germans merely demanding absolute, uncompromising -equality?_ - -A. They always demand absolute, uncompromising superiority. Look back -on Hitler’s reign. He had several chances to stop this side of war, -after having gained for his people not mere equality with his greatest -rival, France, and not mere equality with the political and military -forces of all his neighbors put together, but with real superiority in -arms and in political power over all Europe. Look at the chances he -had to stop short of war and build in peace, and perhaps go down as -a greater man than he will appear after this bloody debacle is over. -He could have stopped after he got the Sudetenland, and had finally -united nearly all of his 80,000,000 Germans. He could have stopped -after he took Austria; after he occupied the Rhineland; after he got -the Saar back into Germany. The taking of the Sudetenland would have -been a place to stop at the pinnacle. Suppose he had done that, and -had used his power and talent to transfer his war machine into a -peace machine, and had used his mighty prestige to bring Europe into -a new economic order. Germany had attained practical “equality” with -France by 1936 when Hitler’s troops entered the Rhineland, and they -had “equality” with all the rest of Europe put together--as Hitler has -now so disastrously proved--by 1938 when they got the Sudetenland. So -the point is that the Germans never wanted equality, will never be -satisfied with equality, but will always demand to be what they believe -themselves to be, namely, the _master_ race. - - -Q. _Aren’t you confusing the Germans with Hitler and the Nazis?_ - -A. No, the Germans have done that themselves. By their so-called -plebiscites which document their uniformly spineless behavior since -Hitler came to power, they have identified themselves with him and -permitted him uncontradicted to define himself as Deutschland. - -There is just a chance that a combination of generosity and firmness -may impress a minority of Germans which may grow and eventually bring -the whole nation into our hoped-for World Federation. If, on the -contrary, the Germans secretly arm, and prepare another ambush for -civilization, our only hope is to find it out in time. We should have -no hope at all if our sobbing societies succeeded in inducing the -Peace Conference to give the Germans equality in arms. Let us remember -that if we were all to disarm, including Germany, it would be just as -disadvantageous for us as if we remained armed and allowed Germany -to keep equal arms. For at any stage of armament or disarmament the -Germans are superior to almost any combination of their opponents. -Germany is not just another nation. It is a nation, not exceptionally -numerous, but so highly talented in the mechanics, chemistry, and -physics of warfare and so professionally skilled in the staff work -of war, and so obediently brave in the practice of battle, that its -military power is greater than that of any other single nation on -earth, with no exceptions. - - -Q. _What are we going to do with all the former nations of Europe, -especially the fifteen or so which were conquered? Are we going to -reconstitute them all as they were?_ - -A. We shall try to reconstitute all those which are capable of -maintaining a national life, but how can one foresee the fate of -such unfortunate little states as Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? -The Soviet government, through its ambassador to London, Mr. Maisky, -now declares that it approves the Atlantic Charter’s Eight Points, -including the right of self-determination of all nations. This has been -hailed as a great step forward; but I should prefer to wait to see the -Red Army evacuate voluntarily any territory it may hold at the end of -this war. - -The attitude of the Soviet government toward the rights of small -nations is brilliantly illustrated by Stalin’s treatment of the Baltic -States. First, he asked Britain and France for them to be handed him -on a platter, as roast chicken. Having been refused, he waited until -the war began, then forcibly occupied the three little states, which -were among the more attractive and in many ways more admirable little -countries in Europe. We have almost completely overlooked the grisly -fate of the middle-class population of the Baltic states--virtually -exterminated by Stalin’s gunmen in one of those side shows of horror -which only the great war could obscure. The Baltic population is -suffering an epic of agony. After Stalin’s G.P.U. had killed or exiled -all the professional and business people and all those suspected -of being Nazi sympathizers, and then after war had swept the three -countries, the Germans and the Gestapo moved in and killed all the -Communist and other labor leaders and anti-Nazis. Now that Stalin has -been driven out of the Baltic states, and they are occupied by the -Nazis, the Soviet policy is ceremoniously announced to be in favor of -restoration of full national independence to all states. - -That must ring bitterly in the ears of the pitiful remnant of the -population of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Is there enough of them -left to make it possible to resuscitate their nations? The experience -of these countries shows how difficult it will be in our postwar -settlement to give national independence to small states and at the -same time allow them the possibility of national security. Many a -small state will have to choose between the one or the other. If it -stands alone, it may be devoured by a larger neighbor. If it enters a -larger unit, it will have to sacrifice some of its sovereignty. All -this points to the necessity of making the larger unit big enough to -comprise all nations. - -Whatever we do, the Soviet Union will present us with almost as many -problems as Germany. How can Britain and the United States confidently -outline specific war aims as long as we do not know what the position -of the Soviet Union will be at the end of this war? And if the Soviet -Union survives in her present form and temper, and has not defected -from the war, how is she to fit into our world peace organization? -There are in it only two durable points of reference: the United States -and Great Britain, and one great hope of success for the organization -of peace, the firm friendship of the two countries, braced by their -control of the seas. Our only chance of realizing such a peace is -by cherishing between ourselves a mutual trust which will override -our selfish ambitions, for there are many points and places on the -globe where our material interests conflict. We cannot maintain this -relationship until we Americans begin to carry our full share of the -burden of the war and the British in turn make us feel we are welcome -to the comradeship as well as the responsibilities of the war and the -peace. - - -Q. _Do the British want such a Pax Anglo-Americana which would divide -their victory with us?_ - -A. Let us not be sentimental about the British in spite of our -partnership and friendship with them. The British would like nothing on -earth so much as to be able to win this war without the United States’ -help. They would dearly love to win alone and enjoy the fruits of -victory alone. But they know now they cannot win alone. They know they -cannot beat the Germans without our full, shooting participation in the -war. And so they are resigned to accepting our companionship in battle. - - -Q. _“Resigned to accepting our companionship in battle”? Is that the -way the British feel? Well, then, I for my part...._ - -A. Yes, I know what you are going to say: that you for your part would -just as soon not help the British if that’s the way they feel about it. -How many Americans there are left who still think in terms of “helping -the British”! Cannot we finally understand that we are helping first -of all ourselves, and that it would make no difference to us if the -British were not human beings at all, but a race of perspicacious, -pugnacious penguins? - -So long as these penguins are fighting off our common enemy who would -attack us if the penguins fell, is it not just good sense to throw our -whole combat aid to the penguins, no matter what the penguins may think -of us? If the British were to have a mental breakdown and declare they -disliked us so thoroughly that they would accept no more help from -us of any kind and would rather be beaten by the Nazis than win with -American help, we should be compelled from our own vital self-interest -to beg to be allowed to help them and then we should have to urge and -even threaten until reluctantly the British made room for us in the -battle line. It is good luck that the British are people who would be -worth saving even if thereby we were not going to save ourselves. - - -Q. _Will you recapitulate how you visualize the organization of peace?_ - -A. First, a Pax Anglo-Americana, based on our naval control of the -world. This may take one of several forms, including Union Now, -Clarence Streit’s thoughtful plan for amalgamating the democracies. Its -immediate purpose would be to unite the coercive power of the nations -of good will to restrain those of ill will until time and repentance -had made it possible to bring them into our second organization. -This World Federation of some kind might be a resuscitated League of -Nations, or it might have another name or form. All we know positively -is that unless we organize for peace, we shall have war again; and we -know now that the nations of good will on earth are not strong enough -without the United States to impose peace on the world. We know that if -we stay out of the peace we shall surely be drawn into the succeeding -war. Perhaps by the end of this present struggle we shall have learned -our lesson and will never again attempt to withdraw into an illusory -isolation which must always bring us into the very war it tried to -avoid. Perhaps for the first time in our history we will with open -eyes and clear plan enter the strength of the United States into the -organization of peace with the same zeal we use to make war. If we do, -who knows but that the peace established after this war could endure -for longer than we even dare to guess at this melancholy moment. - - -Q. _Is it a fact that because of the war England is becoming Socialist -and will come out of the war with a government and social system just -as repugnant to us as the Nazis’?_ - -A. It is true that the government and social system of England have -become Socialist but in the Christian and democratic sense of the -word. British society has become a Christian collective. If they could -maintain after the war as ideal a spirit of cooperation and love of -their neighbors as they have today under fire, we might call it the -first step toward the millennium. Far from being a government and -social system we disapproved, they would be worthy of our emulation. To -compare such a system of voluntary, democratic, unselfish devotion to -the common good as exists today in wartime England with the Nazi regime -is to compare good with evil. Beaten by the blows of war the British -people have attained in a period of months a degree of social progress -they would not have reached in decades otherwise. - -Britain was forced to adopt a system of wartime socialism, if you want -to call it that, because that form of socialism under the inspiration -of life-and-death battle can produce so much more than uncontrolled -capitalism. Production is the materialist index of the value of any -economic system. Under British wartime socialism, capitalists and -workers genuinely pool their interests and restrict their demands to -the minimum, while men and women of all classes risk and give their -lives in battle for the community. Until we adopt such a system and -are inspired by the same dire necessity which animates the British, -our system of production, man for man, and unit for unit, will not -equal British production. As for the Nazis, their system of Socialism, -based on Terror and megalomania, aims to enslave the world; the -British system of Socialism, based on free choice and democracy, aims -to liberate the world. No, there is no possibility that any form of -government should emerge in England after the war which would be “as -repugnant to us as the Nazis’,” unless Britain is conquered and becomes -a satrapy of Hitler. - - -Q. _Is this British wartime Socialism not really equivalent to -Communism? How does it differ from capitalism?_ - -A. It is the sort of communism anyone would approve if it could work -in peacetime, though it seems that it really works only in war. In -wartime the motive that makes men work is defense of their lives, their -families, their nation, against an enemy from without. This leads to a -degree of self-sacrifice that is never even approximated in peacetime. -Witness the invariable collapse of national morale after every war. -One of the chief reasons, if not the chief reason, why communism -in peacetime does not work, either in Russia or anywhere else, is -because except under the duress of war, individuals primarily work for -themselves. The Russian Bolshevik party tried for twenty-three years -to make the Russians work for the community, but they never succeeded -until now, when they have gone to war. No matter how the Battle of -Russia turns out, when the war is over, if the Soviet Union is still -Communist, it will revert to its accustomed slackness and poverty. -If the British were to try to continue their wartime socialism into -peacetime, they would find it impossible. Strikes would break out; -employers would begin to reach out for profits and soon the old-time, -though modified capitalism would return, with many of its faults, but -still far more productive than peacetime communism anywhere in the -world. Capitalism in peace; collectivism in war appears to be the law -for democracies in our time. - - - - -5. FRANCE - - -Q. _Why did France fall?_ - -A. Because the French people were hypnotized by their low birth rate; -because their Maginot line had imprisoned their army; because, ignorant -of the character and intentions of their enemy, they did not know -why they had to fight the Germans and so preferred to fight among -themselves; because they had no Churchill; because they were betrayed -by a powerful group of their leaders including senior officers of the -Army; and because the French were stultified by their debased and venal -press. - - -Q. _But I thought they lost chiefly because they lacked the proper -weapons: airplanes and tanks._ - -A. They did not possess anything like the number of tanks and airplanes -used by the Germans; but I would rank this deficiency at the bottom -of any list of causes of the French defeat. If they had ignored their -birth rate, been willing to spend lives, had retained the old offensive -spirit traditional in the French Army, had known that they had to win -or perish, had possessed a Churchill to inspire and lead them, and had -had no traitors in their ranks, their comparative lack of weapons would -not have mattered; they would still be fighting the Germans in France. -The inferiority of their equipment consisted, as you indicate, in the -lack of a sufficient number of planes and tanks, but if they had had -the spirit to win they could have held the Germans until the deficiency -could be made up. - -Tanks cannot cross properly defended rivers, and there were several -sets of rivers which the French could have held if they chose: the -Meuse, the Somme and the Oise, the Aisne, the Marne, the Seine, and -finally the Loire, but they held not at all at any of these natural -barriers. At most of these rivers I was present during the retreat, and -it astonished all of us, including United States officers, to visit a -French position along a river one day and observe how strong it was, -and how difficult it would be to take, and then the next day learn the -Germans had taken it within a few hours of our departure. - - -Q. _But surely the reason was the German dive bombers who could fly -across the rivers and drive the defenders away. I have heard that they -were the principal weapon used to break the French who didn’t have -enough pursuit planes to down them. It seems to me that if the dive -bomber is anything like as lethal as it is said to be, you must put -more of the blame for the French collapse on it than on the failure of -French morale._ - -A. No, the dive bombers are not effective against brave determined -troops. They are not as effective as artillery. I have an authority -for that, General Charles Huntziger, now Minister of War of the -Vichy government. I met him when he was Commander of the Second Army -occupying the left wing of the Maginot line. It was about May 31, 1940 -in the second week after the German break-through. - -General Huntziger received me in his headquarters, an old fortress -of Verdun. He explained that he had now taught his men how to meet -the terrible German tank-plus-dive-bomber attack. He said that he had -explained to his men that the dive bomber was not nearly so deadly as -artillery, and that its effect was chiefly psychological, and that if -the soldiers could master their first fright they could hold their -ground and win. The great thing was to hold long enough to learn that -your chance of being killed by dive bombers was much less than your -chance of being killed by artillery fire, since artillery shells may -fall uninterruptedly for an indefinite time, while a dive bomber has -only one or at the most a few bombs to discharge, and once it has -dropped them, has to return to its base for more, and the number of -dive bombers is limited. - -He emphasized that French soldiers had never been afraid to stand -artillery fire, so why should they run from the less dangerous dive -bombers? He said he instructed all soldiers not serving antiaircraft -guns to go under cover for the few seconds while the dive bombers -dived, but to emerge immediately upon hearing the detonation of the -bombs, and meet the advancing tanks. If they were small thinly armored -tanks, and the French possessed adequate antitank guns, they should -attempt to destroy the tanks. If the tanks were too large and heavily -armored, the French should permit the tanks to go through and emerge in -time to stop the German infantry following the tanks. - -General Huntziger admitted that it had been extremely difficult at -first to persuade his troops of the comparative harmlessness of the -dive bombers and mentioned the fact that in the first thirteen days -of the German attack his troops had been overwhelmed and he had lost -fifty per cent of his effectives, more than ninety per cent of whom -were captured, but he believed that now the troops were experienced -and could not be frightened as they were at first. As we were soon to -observe, the French troops never did get used to the dive bomber which -is truly the most terrifying weapon ever invented. General Huntziger -compared it to a locomotive with its whistle wide open falling upon you -from the sky. - -“You are certain it is coming just for you,” the General said, “and you -believe it is not merely going to drop bombs upon you, but you are sure -the plane itself is going to crash upon you and leave you smashed like -a beetle.” - -The noise of the dive bomber is its most terrifying quality. An -ordinary airplane diving makes a loud rushing noise familiar to -everyone nowadays, but many of the German dive bombers were equipped -with sirens attached to loud-speakers, so that when they dived each -plane screamed with the noise of a score of ordinary diving planes. -In addition to that they were often equipped with screaming bombs. -General Touchon, commander of the Sixth Army, showed me one at his -headquarters. It had four whistles, each about the size of a cannon -cracker, in the vanes of its tail. They made each falling bomb sound -as loud as four American locomotives with the whistles open. “But,” -General Huntziger said, “all you have to do is to realize that noise -doesn’t hurt anyone, and I have explained that to my soldiers and from -now on they will stand firm.” - -Huntziger gave me a copy of his orders of the day. I cannot read it -even now without feeling the terrible weight of despair that settled -upon all of us as we realized that the end of France was near. It is -dated May 18, 1940 and begins: “The war has commenced,”--it was to -be all over in exactly thirty days--“and, in order to win, the enemy -always attacks your morale. In this first shock, his tactic, his ruses -of warfare and his weapons have but one object, _to demoralize you_. -The enemy is reckoning only upon fighting you with fright. It is -necessary therefore that you know this. - -“Know also that the massive bombardments of the enemy aviation, no -matter how impressive they are, make few victims, as you may have -already noted. You know the total lost; they are a minimum. Take refuge -when the enemy aircraft passes and immediately afterward take up again -your combat post. Never forget our aviation protects you. _Even when -you cannot see it._ Know that our airplanes have knocked down more than -a thousand enemy machines in less than eight days and that among the -enemy our bombers are giving blow for blow. - -“Know that against infantry the tank is not able to accomplish big -things if you hide yourself and the tanks cannot see you. Let them pass -without showing yourself, then fire on the guides who accompany them. -Without them the tank is almost blind; sooner or later it will have -to abandon the field to refuel if our antitank guns have not already -knocked it out. - -“These guns are very efficient; they have given many proofs of it in -the last few days. - -“Do not allow yourself to be influenced by tales of parachutists but -if you actually find some, remember that an armed man can always beat -them. Guard yourself against imaginary dangers. As though you were in -active combat, you have to defend yourself against false rumors which -may be spread by a traitor or an imbecile seized with panic. - -“If you listen to such tales they may be able to provoke serious -defection. Listen to no one but your superior officers and those you -know. - -“A man can overcome his fear. It is his duty to surmount it and to -combat the fears of others. If a man spreads fear he not only commits -an act of cowardice. He commits treason. - -“Know finally that the enemy is not so strong as some people think. -Oppose to him your will. It is your will which will sweep the enemy -away. Never forget what you are defending. If you let the enemy pass -you will lose more than your life. You will be pitilessly separated -from your families to suffer far from them a slavery worse than death.” - -The intelligence and courage of Huntziger as displayed in these orders -were of no avail, because he could not, as Churchill can, transmit his -spirit to others. His soldiers listened to his talk and read his orders -of the day but still they yielded to their fear. It must be seldom in -military history that a commanding general has to devote his principal -orders to adjuring his troops not to be afraid. The French Army was -already panic-stricken. - - -Q. _You say there was treachery among senior officers of the French -Army and among the government. Why do you say that and what proof of it -have you?_ - -A. There were both treachery and treason. High French officers and -officials conspired to overthrow the Republic. Pétain himself was their -leader. They were so fanatical in their desire to destroy the Republic -that they fell into the German trap and acquiesced in what the Germans -told them would be a fake defeat, after which they would set up the -Fascist government which they did set up at Vichy. After that Hitler -would withdraw his troops and restore France to all her old power -and glory, an equal partner and friend of Nazi Germany. They were of -course deceived and now most of them must realize they were deceived, -and that Hitler has no intention of ever allowing France to be a great -power again. But this awakening is too late and the guilty men, many -of them now in Pétain’s government, have a life-and-death interest in -preserving their secret, since in the present temper of the French -people if the truth were known many another assassination would follow -the attempts on Laval and Deat. - -This is a rough outline of what I believe to have happened in France. -I will be glad to give you all the evidence I have, admitting that -it probably is not sufficient to win a verdict of guilty in a court -of law, but maintaining that it is convincing to one who witnessed -the debacle and was bewildered by the lack of adequate explanation. -You see, after we had added up all the other reasons for the fall -of France, there was still something lacking; something to explain -the fact that the French Army of nearly five million men, with its -centuries of glorious tradition, and its reputation among experts as -the best in the world, never once held firm after the Germans broke -through the Low Countries, never once stopped the enemy for as much as -a day, but steadily, day by day retreated, crumbled, broke up, and at -the end of five weeks ceased to exist. - -Review our list of causes now and see if all of them put together -explain this phenomenon. Complacency and trust in the Maginot line -and the softening effect of eight months of inactivity, comparative -lack of leadership, man power and planes and tanks; lack of faith, -anger, and the spirit to fight to kill; conflict between communists -and conservatives. No, all these reasons together do not explain the -conduct of the French Army between May 11 and June 17, 1940. - - -Q. _But the thesis you present is too astounding. That French Army -officers should have conspired with the enemy is almost beyond belief. -Do you mean the French General Staff?_ - -A. Yes, the French General Staff. Not all of it; only a few members -were necessary. If you find it difficult to believe, remember that -the French officers and officials concerned did not believe they were -betraying France; they believed that Hitler would keep his word and -restore France as soon as the Republic was overthrown. To make this -aspect of the matter clear: suppose you were a young Frenchman today, -would you think of it as treason if you worked to overthrow the Vichy -government? Would you think of yourself as a traitor if you conspired -with the British to throw out Pétain and reorganize a democratic -government? No. - -Well, in so far as one can credit such Fascists with sincerity, we -have to admit that these men also thought they were serving the best -interests of France when they conspired to overthrow the Republic. -Remember that French officers as a class have generally been -anti-Republican. Napoleon’s officers soon forgot Republican principles -in their devotion to the Emperor. The hierarchy of the Army did not -favor the equalitarianism of the French Republic. Aristocratic officers -generally set the tone for the majority of the higher ranks. Time and -again I was astonished to note that upper-class Frenchmen seemed to -remember as though it had been yesterday the bloody events of the -French Revolution, and were more afraid of their own working class than -of any foreign enemy. - -I visited once the famous deep cellar vaults of the Bank of France -where they kept the gold, and while walking through the doorway, -piercing its twenty-foot thick steel and concrete walls, I asked why -they needed such formidable and expensive protection. Was it against -the Germans? It could not be, because if ever the Germans occupied -Paris, as they do today, no underground fortification such as these -vaults could prevent them from getting the gold, especially since the -Germans would be holding as hostages the men with the keys. No, it was -not against a foreign enemy; the vaults were built against the Paris -mob, against revolutionaries, against another 1789. - -This spirit was shared by many French senior officers, and it is -ironic that their conspiracy to bring about a feigned defeat in order -to overthrow the Republic was greatly helped by the defection of the -Parisian Communist troops in Corap’s Ninth Army at the Meuse. The -very workingmen who had most to lose by the fall of the Republic and -the establishment of a Fascist France, helped bring about their own -downfall under the mistaken guidance of Moscow. The treachery to France -came from the two opposite poles of French society. - - -Q. _How did this treason manifest itself in the operations of the army?_ - -A. I will give you one example, from personal experience and the -testimony of French friends. You remember the Germans, when they broke -through the Low Countries and across the Meuse, dashed with their -Panzer divisions for the coast, pell-mell, at top speed, not bothering -or wasting time at first to widen their column of penetration, which -was still only a few miles wide for much of its length when the first -German detachments reached the sea at Abbeville. North of this thin -German column was the strong French Army under General Prioux, while -south of it were the main French forces. It was the constant fervid -hope of the French that their armies would cut across the German -column, roll it up in two directions, and win not merely the battle of -France but perhaps the war. - -Military experts, foremost our own, thought it possible; some held it -probable. This hope reached its climax after Weygand made an inspection -flight to the Low Countries and returned to Paris. That day at the -Ministry of Information as I was waiting in the office for Colonel -Schieffer, in charge of American correspondents, the gaunt, one-eyed, -black-monocled, fiercely patriotic Colonel came in with a bang, dropped -his customary stillness and exclaimed: “Weygand says he won’t leave a -German alive, not one. He’s going to cut the column and bottle them up -and he says there won’t be left one living.” Like wildfire the word of -Weygand spread through the building, through Paris, through France. It -was the only bright moment in the whole Battle of France. - -But it did not happen. Why didn’t it? A captain from General Prioux’s -staff may have the answer. This is the story he told. “After the -Germans reached Abbeville and cut us off from the South, General Prioux -called us all together one day and said, ‘I have orders from General -Headquarters that you must blow up your tanks and guns and retreat as -speedily as possible to the seashore. I must tell you that personally -I do not approve these orders. I am convinced we are strong enough to -make an offensive southward and cut the Germans and reunite with our -troops in France. However, orders are orders and one does not discuss -orders. You will do as I have told you and I shall stay here where I -am.’ - -“We did as we were told and Prioux became a prisoner of war. That was -our last chance. The failure to cut the German column was the end of -the Battle of France. We could have done it; we were ordered not to.” - -Counterattack, always we waited for the famous French counterattack, -the fulfillment of the French Army tradition of aggression, _à la -baionette!_ but it never came. Orders stopped it. - - -Q. _Who gave the orders? Pétain was not an active officer then._ - -A. No, but General George was. I want to give you my evidence in the -form of a firsthand quotation from a French friend, but before I do so -it is important to point out that between General Gamelin, commander in -chief of all the Allied land forces, and General George, commander of -the French armies fighting against Germany, there existed a jealousy so -strong that it amounted to hatred, and their headquarters staffs became -so permeated with it that they actually withheld information from each -other. - -Here then, were the principal elements and forces involved in the -great conspiracy: First, Pétain, towering above all other figures and -forces; then the Deuxième Bureau, the famous Second Bureau in charge of -Intelligence of the French Army; General George and General Dusseigneur -and Colonel Eugene Deloncle; the Cagoulards, that secret society of -so-called Hooded Men, which most people considered merely absurd but -whose importance turned out to be greater than that of any French -secret society since the Revolution; the group operating the Fascist -weekly, _Je Suis Partout_; and on the German side Otto Abetz, now -Hitler’s ambassador to France, and the unlimited money and propaganda -of Himmler’s Gestapo, Goebbels’ Ministry, Ribbentrop’s Foreign Office, -and the Ausland’s Buro. - - * * * * * - -_Now I shall let my French friend talk. This is his report: from here -to page 262 he is speaking in the first person._ - -On June 17, 1940, I found myself standing outside a wayside tavern in -France. I was one of the millions retreating southward from occupied -Paris ahead of the German Army. I had stopped by the roadside because, -through the open window of the inn, I heard a radio broadcasting the -pathetic voice of an old man. Marshal Pétain was telling the French -nation that he had decided to ask Hitler to grant France an armistice. - -Standing beside me was a young artillery lieutenant. As the last words -of the old Marshal died away, he turned toward me, pale as ivory, and -exclaimed: “Now I begin to understand! They forced us to retreat so -that we would have to accept this armistice, so that the Germans could -come in to do their dirty work for them!” - -I didn’t dare understand. “How do you mean?” I asked him. - -“Don’t be so naive!” he exploded. “Can’t you see what’s happened? -Don’t you remember that handful of enthusiastic young fools who were -always shouting ‘Pétain in power!’ Well, now he is in power. He can -govern with the aid of German troops. He has opened the way for them to -occupy the country. The Germans will make the arrests and carry out the -executions, and when their opponents have all been put out of the way, -Pétain and his friends will be in possession of the kind of Nazified -country they like. Mark my words--this is not the end, but only the -beginning. This is not war; it’s a domestic political maneuver!” - -At that moment it seemed that only a man completely out of his mind -could have believed what the young officer had just said. A higher -officer who had been listening broke in to correct him. Pétain, he -said, was very old and possibly not very intelligent. But he certainly -could not be a traitor. - -“His first consideration,” this officer went on, “will be to obtain -reasonable terms from the enemy. I doubt very much whether he will give -any time at all to internal political questions. All Frenchmen, all the -legislators, all the people, will be behind him in his struggle against -the Germans. What greater power could he gain by bringing about an -internal political transformation?” - -I said nothing but I was deeply anxious. _Why had Pétain announced -publicly that he had asked for an armistice before he was sure -that honorable conditions would be granted?_ The mere fact of an -announcement’s having been made would complete the shattering of army -morale and all hope of further resistance, and make it impossible, in -case satisfactory terms could not be achieved, to reshape a fighting -army and resume the struggle. Pétain’s radio speech seemed at the very -least unwise--_unless its object were to eliminate the slightest chance -that the armistice might not go through_. And in that case, the young -officer was probably right. - -Two dominant theories to explain the fall of France emerge: (1) -France’s rapid debacle was due to complete unpreparedness, both -physical and spiritual; (2) France was sold out, and what happened -is to be explained primarily by the operations of treason. Both -explanations are a part of the truth; neither of them is the whole -truth. - -There was a lack of matériel of all sorts--infantry weapons and -artillery, ammunition, tanks, planes, etc. It was true also that -production in the munitions factories was increasing slowly, and that -the pace would have been insufficient if the intense warfare of the -last five weeks had had to be continued over a long period. But the -fact was that the period of intense warfare was very short; and it is -hardly logical to say that France was beaten because she would have -lacked ammunition if the war had lasted longer. - -Some observers have imagined that France lacked munitions even for so -short a war, for it has been established that there were shortages at -many vital points. I talked with literally hundreds of soldiers and -officers during the retreat of June. Infantrymen complained that they -were given only three or four bullets per rifle; artillerymen said that -whole batteries were left without shells; tanks ran out of gasoline at -the very beginning of action and had no chance to refuel, and worst -of all (everyone stressed this as having been the most discouraging -factor), German planes had complete and undisputed freedom in the air. -Again and again soldiers told me that during engagements, with hundreds -of German planes above, on not one occasion did French aviation -come to the aid of the infantry. It was not surprising, under such -conditions, that morale gave way, and that the army was psychologically -prepared for the final collapse. - -But was this lack of matériel at points essential to the defense the -result of a general shortage or simply of failure to get existing -munitions to the necessary centers? It seems indisputable that it was -the distributing system which was at fault. And was this breakdown -of the supply lines simply due to lack of organization, or to a much -more serious cause--treason? Whatever the case, it is a fact that the -retreating soldiers and officers, drawing their conclusions from such -facts as they had been able to witness, were unanimous in exclaiming: -“We have been sold out!” - -Now listen to the story of a reserve officer, a captain of a -machine-gun detachment, one of the many with whom I talked. - -“Don’t tell me,” he said, “that our General Headquarters lacked -experience in supply problems, or that they forgot to send us -cartridges for our machine guns. In 1914-1918 they had no trouble of -this kind. There were situations quite as complicated as this one -again and again during that war, but the ammunition always arrived. -This short action hasn’t exhausted our reserve of matériel. The depots -are still full. Yet we at the front lines had to destroy our machine -guns to save them from the enemy when we ran out of ammunition for -them and had to fall back. The same thing happened all along the -front, for machine guns, artillery of all calibers, and antitank guns. -You can call it disorganization, if you want. I call it intentional -disorganization--sabotage, directed, probably, from the same central -point. But I don’t dare yet to try to form any conclusions, to -understand why such sabotage took place. Perhaps one day we shall all -understand.” - -On the roads choked with retreating columns and fleeing refugees, -where military trucks and civilian cars were inextricably mingled, -soldiers talked of their misgivings during the waits, often hours long, -for jammed highways to be cleared so that traffic could resume its -interminable southward crawl. Scores of times, caught in such blocks, -I heard soldiers or officers say: “Why are we constantly ordered to -retreat? We haven’t been in any real engagement since the Somme. We’re -not afraid to fight, but the retreat orders keep us moving to the rear -as fast as we can get over these encumbered roads. What is the cause of -this continual flight? Aren’t they ever going to establish a line of -resistance and order us to hold it?” - -They never did. One June 16, two days after Paris had been occupied -by the Germans, I found myself on the right bank of the Loire, at the -Nevers bridge. My car, heavily loaded with the members of my family -and all our luggage, had developed motor trouble. Our most urgent need -was to get across that river; for we supposed of course, that the -retreating troops would stop on the other side of the natural line of -defense constituted by the Loire, which it should have been possible to -hold for weeks, and possibly forever. Across that bridge, we thought, -lay safety. - -We tried to persuade passing cars to tow us across. All of them, -civilian and military vehicles alike, passed us by. Their occupants -intent on the pursuing Germans, had no thought for anything except to -get across that bridge themselves. So we all got out except a young -girl who took the steering wheel, and pushed the car over what seemed -to be the longest bridge in the world. - -We felt better when we got to the other side, with the wide river -between us and the enemy. I found a colonel supervising the retreat -of his troops, and asked him if he could direct me to the officer in -charge of the sector, thinking that he could probably let me have a -mechanic to repair the car. - -“There is no officer in charge here,” the colonel said. “We are all -passing through without stopping, so there is no organization at this -point. I’m sorry I can’t do anything for you. You had better get out -of here as quickly as you can. The Germans will probably be here in an -hour.” From these words I realized with a shock that the defense of -the left bank of the Loire was not even being considered, and that the -army was retreating indefinitely. I looked up and down the long banks -of the river. There were no fortified positions whatsoever. I saw only -one lonely soldier standing by the side of a machine gun. He seemed to -be wondering whether he had been forgotten there. - -South of the Loire, the bewilderment of the troops deepened, for all -of them had expected that that line would be held. Time and again I -heard the question asked: “Where are we going?” Those who clung to hope -to the last declared desperately: “The generals must have a plan. Our -orders are to retreat as quickly as we can. There must be reasons for -it.” But most of them simply gave up the attempt to understand what was -going on, and why no effort was being made to resist. - -For three months after the armistice I remained in France. I wanted -to find out the story behind the defeat. What I have to tell is not -pure hypothesis. It is the only possible explanation which can be -deduced from a number of unknown or little known facts which I took the -greatest trouble to verify. Here is the story: - -There has been ample occasion in recent years to observe Nazi -propaganda tactics, among them the method which consists in selecting -the most appropriate arguments to convince any group the Nazis wish to -win over, even when those arguments are directly contrary to those used -with another group. Such a procedure would seem on the surface likely -to defeat its own aims; but it is the tendency of each group to believe -what it wants to believe, that Hitler is telling the truth, while -deceiving its adversaries. It is the same state of mentality which -confidence men evoke in such tested swindles as the rosary game, in -which the sucker is led to see himself as the accomplice in victimizing -someone else and thus never imagines that he is marked for the role of -victim himself. - -It was in this fashion that Germany laid the foundation for France’s -defeat by corrupting different groups of the population in different -ways. Agents of Berlin told the French Communists, for instance, that -Germany was Soviet Russia’s ally, and that if Hitler won the war, he -would not oppose a Communist Revolution in France. The new French -Soviet Republic could then conclude an alliance with Germany, Russia, -and Italy and take part in the totalitarian reconstruction of postwar -Europe. French Communist leaders swallowed this propaganda, and the -result was slowing down of production in munitions plants due to -insidious Communist propaganda against which the Interior Ministry -tried in vain to take effective measures. - -There were many evidences that Communists believed they were working -in accord with Germany. After the armistice, Communist factory workers -in the occupied region on several occasions started the singing of the -_Internationale_ in the factories where they were employed with the -idea that this would please their new masters, and were surprised that -it didn’t. - -During the war, the Communists had been given reasons for believing -that they were on the side of the Germans. Some of the French Bolshevik -leaders who deserted during the war fled to Germany. Findings of -French radiogoniometric services proved that Communist short-wave -stations broadcasting in French were operating from Germany. After the -German troops reached Paris, several young French writers known for -their Communist sympathies, who had remained behind when most other -Leftists had fled, were immediately given important places, such as -the editing of Paris daily papers, by the Nazi authorities. These -incidents demonstrate that the Germans had succeeded in establishing -relationships with French Communist leaders during the war; but it must -be recorded that the majority of Communist workmen remained definitely -hostile to the Nazis. - -This failure to enlist the support among the Communist rank and file -which had been found among the leaders convinced the German secret -service early that there was no real chance of bringing about the -defeat of France by fomenting a Bolshevik revolution. If such a method -had been feasible, Nazi Germany would certainly not have hesitated to -apply it, just as Imperial Germany did not hesitate to send Lenin and -his companions in their famous sealed railroad coach into Russia in -1917. - -Under the circumstances, the Communist movement was taken advantage -of by the Germans only to the extent of being employed to create as -much unrest as possible among French workers, who did not even realize -to what influences they were being exposed. The chief effort of -German secret agents was concentrated on conservative circles, which, -according to reports received at the Wilhelmstrasse, were in a much -better position to exert effective influence on the outcome of the war. - -There was nothing contradictory about this willingness on the part of -the Nazis to cooperate with either the extreme Left or the extreme -Right, or even with both simultaneously, since their object, whatever -their dupes might think, was not to help them to victory, but to use -them as a tool to weaken the unity and the power of the government. -Nazi propaganda welcomed any loophole through which it might penetrate -into the vitals of a foreign country with the aid of any resistance to -the regime which might already exist there. - -For years before the war, the Nazis had established contact with -reactionary Rightist circles in France. One such circle which in -America has been accused of having been influenced by the Germans and -having perhaps contributed to France’s downfall is the Croix de Feu, -at one time generally considered as the future Fascist movement of -France. I must say that I could find neither proof nor indication that -the Croix de Feu had played Germany’s game. On the contrary, the _Petit -Journal_, published by Colonel François de la Rocque, the Croix de Feu -leader, assumed a more courageously anti-German attitude after the -armistice than did most other papers published under the control of -the Vichy government. - -Two other less conspicuous, but perhaps more influential Right-wing -groups were, however, definitely approached by the Germans during the -prewar years. One of them was the secret revolutionary organization -popularly known as the Cagoulards (the Hooded ones); the other was the -group which published the weekly, _Je Suis Partout_. These contacts -were established chiefly by Otto Abetz, infamous “special delegate” -of Nazi Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, who was expelled from France -shortly before the war. On his initiative, members of both groups -undertook several trips to Berlin between 1937 and 1939 to discuss -means of action. - -The German secret service had a particular interest in these two groups -because, while entirely independent of each other, they had one thing -in common--far-reaching ties with the French Army. - -The Cagoulard group was headed by French officers of high rank--majors, -colonels, and even generals. General Dusseigneur was among those -arrested when the Cagoulard movement was uncovered shortly before -the war after it had planted bombs in Paris. The dissolution of the -movement made its members more cautious, but its underground activities -continued. - -If any further evidence of German support for the Cagoulards had been -needed beyond that already turned up by the French police, it was -provided by the Germans themselves. When they occupied Paris, one -of the first things they did was to demand that the French national -police turn over the files on the Cagoulard case. From these files, the -Germans learned the names of the police commissioners who had unearthed -the Cagoulard plot, and immediately arrested those who were in occupied -territory. - -This was in striking contrast to the treatment of the arrested -Cagoulard leaders, all of whom had been released by the French -government by the beginning of the war. Shortly after the start of -hostilities I met in the train the brother of one of the Cagoulards -who had been arrested. In the ensuing conversation, I remarked that I -was astonished that responsible adults should have indulged at such a -time in what then appeared to have been a somewhat childish imitation -of a motion picture conspiracy. Nettled by my attitude, my interlocutor -answered: - -“You don’t understand how serious this movement was. It was organized -by the Deuxième Bureau (the department of the army concerned with -espionage and counterespionage). It was at the instigation of the -military secret service that my brother and his friends organized the -Cagoulards. That can’t be told now, of course, but the day will come -when all the truth will be known, and my brother will be considered a -hero for the time he has spent in prison.” - -“The Deuxième Bureau!” I exclaimed incredulously. “Why in the world -should the Deuxième Bureau want to foster a revolutionary movement when -it’s already so near the power itself?” - -“Ever since the 1936 elections,” he answered, “important members of the -French secret service have been very much worried about the influence -the Communist movement has gained in this country, and so they decided -to take matters into their own hands. The Cagoulard movement was formed -to do that. The Popular Front ministers got my brother and his friends -put in jail, but you’ll see that they haven’t said their last word yet.” - -_Je Suis Partout_, the weekly which was another outpost of German -propaganda in France, belonged originally to the publishing house of -Fayard, which put out books and another and more prosperous political -weekly, _Candide_. _Je Suis Partout_ was a money loser and publisher -Arthème Fayard decided several years ago to discontinue it. When -the news got out, Pierre Gaxotte, editor of the paper, proposed to -Fayard that he turn the paper’s name over to him instead of giving him -severance pay, since he thought he might be able to keep the magazine -going himself. Fayard agreed, and _Je Suis Partout_ continued to appear -without interruption, and so far as the public knew, without any change -in its control. Circulation did not increase. Advertising continued -low. The paper showed no signs of prosperity--but it did not show any -signs of having financial difficulties any more either. - -Pierre Gaxotte, as well as some other members of his editorial staff, -had begun his political career in the Royalist _Action Française_ -movement, but had apparently decided to strike out for himself and -cut his own political tracks. Under Gaxotte’s direction, _Je Suis -Partout_ assumed a definitely pro-German attitude, arguing that France -and Germany should come to an understanding between themselves as the -two great continental powers, leaving England out in the cold. Paul -Ferdonnet, who won fame later as the “traitor of Stuttgart” delivering -propaganda broadcasts in French from the Stuttgart radio station during -the war (he is now supervisor of the French radio in Paris), was -also on the editorial staff until he went to Berlin to establish his -permanent residence and his own press syndicate there. From that time -on, he was the secret liaison agent between the German authorities and -Gaxotte’s paper. - -The German sympathies of _Je Suis Partout_ were apparent enough, but -no one bothered much about it, for circulation was low and the paper’s -influence was considered to be negligible. This must have been the -viewpoint of the Daladier government also, for except for friendly -arguments with the censors, the paper was able to continue publishing -unhampered even after the war broke out. - -When Daladier resigned and Paul Reynaud came in, he appointed Georges -Mandel Minister of the Interior, and thus head of the French police -organization. Although Mandel, zealous, patriotic, and uncompromising, -like his master Clemenceau whose secretary he had been during the -last war, undertook to hunt down defeatists of all descriptions, _Je -Suis Partout_ continued to appear as usual. Mandel also apparently -considered it too insignificant to be dangerous. - -But one day a well-known French journalist brought to Mandel the -proof that the principal members of the editorial staff of _Je Suis -Partout_ were simultaneously agents of the Deuxième Bureau. Mandel was -astounded. He who knew all the undercurrents of French political life, -who for years had kept secret files about all public figures, had not -dreamed that any connection could have existed between this outspokenly -pro-German magazine and one of the most influential departments of -the French Army. He had put the editors of _Je Suis Partout_ down as -innocuous fools. He now realized that though the circulation of the -paper was small, the private influence of its editors might have been -both great and disastrous. - -He did not hesitate an instant. He ordered immediately the arrest of -five members of the staff. Among them was an obscure journalist, not -generally known as a member of the staff, named Pierre Mouton, who some -years before had founded a small press syndicate called _Prima Presse_ -in partnership with Ferdonnet. Mandel quickly obtained proof that the -two men were still cooperating. Mouton, while maintaining permanent -contact with _Je Suis Partout_, was also flooding the French daily -press with cleverly prepared pro-German articles which were supplied to -the newspapers free of charge. - -With the known leaders of the _Je Suis Partout_ group in jail, Mandel -apparently thought that there was no immediate urgency for delving -further into this particular case when so many other vital matters -pressed for attention. The same attitude had been taken a few years -before in regard to the Cagoulards, who seemed to have been set down -as definitely muzzled because their figureheads had been imprisoned. -Neither the stern and Spartan Mandel, who had arrested the _Je Suis -Partout_ group, nor the vivacious and epicurean Albert Sarraut, his -predecessor, who had handled the Cagoulard case, imagined that either -of these two groups had achieved a real and lasting penetration into -the high command--a penetration which seems to have contributed largely -to the debacle of May and June. - -Possibly the two cases had never been laid side by side so that the -telltale fact that both times a trail led to the Deuxième Bureau -had not been observed. Perhaps also the two Interior Ministers had -hesitated each time before venturing to have civilian authorities -investigate the most powerful of the military departments. The Deuxième -Bureau of the French Army was sometimes called “a state within the -state.” It might more exactly have been called “several states within -the state,” for it was a complicated organism with its own currents -and undercurrents, comprising a number of competing groups. Somewhere -within this complicated office existed the only link between the -pro-German _Je Suis Partout_ and the German-inspired Cagoulards; but -on the surface, at least at the beginning, no relation seemed to exist -between these two separate activities. - -The Cagoulard movement, although it had started in the Deuxième Bureau, -soon succeeded through the interlinking relationships of high officers, -some of whom supported its activities, in putting out tentacles into -the first and third bureaus of the army as well--those concerned -respectively with direction of operations and supplies--in other words -the two departments which in June were responsible respectively for -the orders to retreat and for the failure of the front-line troops to -receive ammunition and aid from the aviation. - -It may be noted also that several of these high officers who were -sympathetic to the Cagoulard movement were in particularly close -contact with Marshal Pétain who had his own devoted followers in the -army, just as all other first-rank military leaders, like Gamelin and -Weygand, had also, whether they were on the active list or retired. - -All this may seem incredible. It is difficult to believe that French -officers of high rank should have acted in the interests of Germany -during the war, thus contributing to bring about their country’s -downfall. Even though the Cagoulards, an emanation of the Deuxième -Bureau, may have maintained contact with the Germans several years -before the war; even if unsuccessful newspapermen like Gaxotte may have -made up for deficits by accepting subsidies from the Nazis, it still -seems fantastic that the military leaders of France, whose patriotism -no one has ever doubted, should have acted as traitors in time of war. -It seems to be a moral impossibility. - -The explanation is simple. Neither the Cagoulards, nor the editors -of _Je Suis Partout_, nor the French officers who were in relations -with them, ever believed at any moment that they were traitors. If -history sets them down as having betrayed France, the verdict will be -incomprehensible to them. They believed themselves to be patriots. It -is our privilege, if we wish, to see them rather as pitiful victims of -German Propaganda. - -What happened was this: Long before the war, the Nazi secret service -realized that both the Cagoulards and the staff of _Je Suis Partout_ -were worth cultivating because of their connections with members of -the French General Staff, and with officers of influence close to such -leaders as Pétain, among others. - -Friendly relations were established, and the Germans hammered away with -arguments like these: - -“You Frenchmen consider that we Germans are your hereditary enemies. -There’s no reason why you should think so. Our two peoples should -be able to live and work side by side without friction. It’s true -we’ve had trouble in the past, but why? Because England, who can only -maintain her influence on the continent if the continental nations are -divided, has constantly stirred us up against each other. - -“Besides that, we have not fought against the real France. Our wars -were against the French Republic. For 150 years that regime has usurped -the place of the real France. In 1789 the English provoked the French -Revolution to weaken your nation, and since then your people seem to -have forgotten its great destiny. - -“The Revolution of France started in the lodges of Freemasonry, which -were implanted in your country by England. The Freemasons operated -with English and Jewish help; for the last 150 years, you have been -under the control of the same powers. For the last twenty years these -powers have been cooperating with international Communism and thus have -brought another danger into your country. - -“Wake up! Denounce the English alliance, expel the Jews from important -positions, suppress Freemasonry, as we have done in Germany. The danger -of Communism will be over, and there will be no obstacle to a happy and -peaceful understanding between France and Germany.” - -This bait was eagerly taken. It made no difference that this account -was inaccurate, and might easily have been refuted. It was the sort of -thing that right-wing Frenchmen of anti-Republican and antidemocratic -leanings were ready to hear, and it provided a moral basis for -cooperation between them and the Germans. Supplied with a patriotic -motive for destroying their domestic political opponents, convinced -that in so doing they would not open the way to the hereditary enemy -but on the contrary make him a friend, these Frenchmen no longer had -any scruples about accepting subsidies for the arming of the Cagoulards -and the publication of _Je Suis Partout_ from an ally in the common -cause of continental peace and friendship. - -The Germans had found the ideal sophism with which to gain friends -within the French Army. They realized, of course, that they could -not hope to influence a majority of General Staff officers, but they -knew also that an active minority, so convinced it is right that it -is willing to use any methods to achieve its aims, can arrive at its -objectives at decisive moments by obstructing the course of action -decided upon by the majority. And among the officers whom German -propaganda had reached were many so placed that they could easily block -the complicated intermeshing gears of the army machine at the critical -juncture. - -Relationships between the Germans and their friends in France were -maintained even after the beginning of the war through various neutral -countries. Ferdonnet continued to communicate with Mouton and the staff -of _Je Suis Partout_. Michelin, the big automobile tire manufacturer -whose name was whispered all over France as that of one of the men -behind the Cagoulards, sent frequent messengers to Switzerland. Pétain -himself was French Ambassador to Spain, and several members of his -entourage maintained contact with members of the German Embassy in -Madrid. There were even rumors that Pétain had secret meetings with the -German Ambassador, though this was denied. The theme the Germans were -singing to their French friends now was a development of that which -they had dinned into them earlier. It had evolved into this: - -“We did not want this war. You yourselves did your utmost to avoid it. -But now that it has come it is a fact which we cannot leave out of -account. Both of us wanted to create a better understanding between our -two countries, to be followed by an alliance. The war now prevents us -from reaching our goal by direct means. - -“If you concluded a separate peace with us, we could still become your -allies. We know, of course, that you and your friends, who have the -true interests of your country at heart, and can see into the future -more clearly than the others, would eagerly accept this solution. But -you have not the power to do it; and even if you had, the people who -have been worked up by war propaganda to hate us, would never agree to -it. There is only one case now in which the French people would accept -a separate peace; and that, unfortunately, is if France suffers a -military defeat. - -“It must seem monstrous to you even to envisage a French defeat. We -understand that. We sympathize with you. But suppose you knew that -it would not be a real defeat. Suppose we could arrange a simulated -defeat, which would bring the French people to accept the idea of an -armistice whether the English are ready to fight or not? - -“We can give you a binding promise that if France can be apparently -defeated in this manner, she will not be treated as a defeated nation. -On the contrary, you will immediately become Germany’s ally and we will -cooperate to build up a new order in Europe. You have only to break -definitely with England as proof of your good faith. - -“Of course, a brief occupation of certain parts of France by German -troops would be necessary to make the defeat look real and to persuade -the population to accept it. One of the purposes of the occupation -would be to purge France of the elements which you dislike just as much -as we do, and which stand in your way in your task of resuscitating the -real France from her torpor of a century and a half. But when it is -all over, when our troops have been withdrawn, you will be in control -of a new and reborn France which with the new Germany will impose upon -Europe an era of strength and prosperity for both of us.” - -Once again the bait was taken. Its effect was felt in extremely -influential circles. I have personally been able to verify conclusively -the fact that Marshal Pétain, having invited two highly placed -Spaniards to dine with him in Hendaye in November 1939, said to his -guests: “Do not judge France by its present appearance. Democracy -is finished everywhere. Next spring will see a movement in France -comparable to your own national uprising.” - -Such a phrase in the mouth of a French Ambassador who was at the same -time a French military leader was extremely significant. What other -meaning could a revolt in wartime have except that its intent was to -end the war? What other reason could there have been for waiting until -spring except that this period was the best for a German offensive? - -It was not necessary, as I have already noted above, to transform all -or even a majority of the officers of the French General Staff, into -accomplices in order to provoke a French defeat. If in a big business, -a few accountants, an assistant cashier, the head of the sales -department, and one or two keymen in the stock department took part in -a conspiracy to ruin the firm, their simultaneous coordinated sabotage -would inevitably achieve their aim--and with particular ease if the -organization of the company were faulty. - -There were some faults with the French Army, certainly. Was morale -unsatisfactory? Was equipment inadequate? Undoubtedly, but the -situation in these respects was not strikingly different from that of -1914-1918. The decisive factor seems to have been faults in the high -command--important information regarding the movements of the enemy -was not relayed in time, orders to army corps suffered considerable -delays, the supply service left equipment and matériel of all sorts in -the depots instead of sending it to strategically important points. -From June 13 on, troops in good fighting shape received everywhere -mysterious orders for retreat which puzzled them most of all, at the -same time that French statesmen were hearing from French generals (most -of them may have spoken with complete good faith), that all troops were -fleeing in disorder. Confusion was so great and news of the retreat so -unexpected that nobody thought to investigate the hidden causes of the -disaster. - -Shortly after the armistice, the same announcement was repeated in -French by the Stuttgart radio several evenings in succession. It was -this: “Frenchmen, in a few days we will give you the name of an -outstanding countryman of yours who was our principal agent in France, -and who helped to bring about your defeat.” - -Everyone in the French unoccupied zone either heard this broadcast or -heard about it. There was naturally a good deal of guessing as to the -name that would be given by the Germans. For my part, I made a bet that -no name would ever be given by Stuttgart. My reasoning was this: That -there was such a man or men I didn’t doubt for an instant. But I didn’t -doubt also that he had not expected the terrible armistice conditions -imposed upon France. He had led his country into what he had thought -would be a fake defeat on the basis of his confidence in the honesty of -the Germans. By then he had discovered that they were not honest, and -that it was a real defeat that had been inflicted upon the country. He -saw that the Nazis intended to treat the country with all the severity -of genuine conquerors, and that he and his friends had been dupes. - -I supposed then, that this man had tried to force the Germans to live -up to their promises and to treat France as an ally. He would have -pointed out that the new Pétain government had turned against England, -as had been agreed. And he would have threatened to reveal everything -if Germany did not hold to her bargain, thus ending the acceptance of -defeat on the part of the French people by letting them know that they -had not in fact been militarily defeated. - -Germany’s answer was the Stuttgart broadcast. Her French agent had -tried to threaten her. She simply returned the blackmail, reminding him -forcefully that the Reich no longer cared whether the French people -knew how it had been defeated or not, since the Army was disbanded, -the strategic points occupied, and the people helpless to resume the -fight. He was reminded also what his own position would be if the story -came out. He saw that he had to keep silence to save himself, and the -Germans, perfectly willing that silence should be kept, never honored -their promise to reveal his name. - -It was on the basis of this theory that I expected in advance that the -Stuttgart radio would not follow up its announcement. Since it did not, -I feel justified in assuming that the reasoning which enabled me to -arrive at a correct prediction was probably correct itself. - -As if to confirm all this, Pétain himself later made a very mild speech -in which he timidly asked the Germans whether they intended to accept -the new France as a full-fledged partner in the reconstruction of -Europe. France’s new rulers have kept all the promises they had given -the Germans. They have cut off relationships with England, dissolved -the Freemasons, attacked the Jews, delivered up anti-Hitler German -refugees, fought the British at Oran, Dakar, and in Syria. They have -slavishly obeyed Hitler’s commands and now they are naively surprised -because Hitler has not kept his promise to free France and make her -independent again. With the true psychology of a dupe they had believed -that Hitler might fool others, but never themselves. - -_That ends the statement of my French friend._ - - * * * * * - - -Q. _How would you sum up Pétain? Is he a patriot or a traitor, or -misguided, or what?_ - -A. He is first of all a very old, too-old man. Only a man who had -lost his judgment could surrender his country to Hitler as Hindenburg -did and as Pétain did, both under a profound misconception of -Hitler. Pétain is intensely religious and identifies Communism with -anti-Christ, the only enemy, failing to perceive that the most powerful -foe of Christianity to appear on earth since Christ lived is Hitler. -It is a mistake to call Pétain a Fascist; he is a medievalist. He -believes the principal goal of life is to prepare for the other -world, and the man who can do that best is the man whose activity is -closest to nature, the peasant, and the man whose mind is not confused -by learning, the illiterate peasant. Therefore he wants a France of -uneducated, devout peasants; he does not mind at all the plan of Hitler -to abolish French industry. - -He is a defeatist at heart; the affairs of this earth are not worth -fighting for. It is on record that at Verdun he several times wished -to surrender. As a defeatist he believes in superior force and can be -as ruthless when he is in possession of it as he can be submissive -when he has lost it. His suppression of the mutinies in the French -Army was notoriously harsh; the statistics of the killed have yet to -be published. He accepts the French birth rate as a fact of superior -force to which France must bow and his experience of the bloodletting -at Verdun reinforced his conviction that France ought not to try to -maintain a predominant place in Europe. - -As an old man his vivid memories are of the past, and Germany, though -marching under the pirate swastika, remained for him in 1940 the -Germany which let France off lightly in 1871. He once told a friend -how impressed he was with the behavior of the German commander at -Verdun who allowed French officers to retain their swords after one of -the surrenders of Douaumont. In this venerable confidence that he was -dealing with gentlemen, he gave up. The most pathetic words uttered in -this war were those of Pétain when he addressed his petition for an -armistice to Hitler with the words, “I speak as soldier to soldier.” - - -Q. _Why was that pathetic; isn’t Hitler a soldier?_ - -A. Yes, indeed, but the meaning of the old marshal’s words was, -“I speak to you as gentleman to gentleman,” and that is the most -pathetic sentence of the war, because it contains the utter failure -of the French to understand that not only is Hitler not a gentleman, -but Hitler would be the first indignantly to repudiate a title he -despises. The code of a gentleman is derived from the Christian code, -which Hitler and his Nazi-Nietzchean followers despise. They curse -Christ as a Jewish weakling whose religion is for slaves. They spit -upon the elementary idea of fair play. A group of devoted young Nazis, -a dozen strong, who have just beaten to death a crippled Jew, will be -clear of conscience, joyful as though they had done a good deed, and -utterly unable to understand the American or British notion that it is -not even enjoyable sport to attack with odds of twelve to one. It is -sport to them. Pétain had not the faintest notion that the sons of the -Germans he had known had come to this. So with his eyes closed, and -dreaming of the past, he accepted the promise of a position for France -of junior partner to Germany. - - -Q. _Is Pétain moved by personal ambition?_ - -A. He is consumed by it. He did not accept with reluctance the post -of “Chief of the Government” after Reynaud fell, but gladly, feeling -that he had finally received the recognition denied him when Foch was -made Commander in Chief. He does not consider himself a Fuehrer or a -Duce. He is much nearer the position of his fellow clericalist, the -_caudillo_, Franco, who never clearly understood the meaning of Nazism -and was repelled by what he did understand. - -Pétain does not understand Fascism or Nazism but only sees that they -control the mob, and he wishes above all to see the mob controlled as -an army, to be drilled and disciplined into hardworking, God-fearing -Frenchmen, obedient in civil as in religious life. His religious -feeling dominates all his actions. In Bordeaux, the day Reynaud -resigned, I was told Pétain’s words as he heard the debacle was -reaching its end: “France must suffer for her sins!” Mystically he -surrendered, and mystically he still exclaimed a year later to a nation -which had endured twelve months of injury and abasement with no -prospect of relief, “You are suffering and must suffer for a long time -still because we have not yet paid for all our mistakes.” - -To the old Marshal, France’s troubles began with the Revolution of -1789, and to cure them he wants to take France back to the Ancien -Regime. He wants to do away with liberty, because liberty is synonymous -with license and license with sin. Theoretically he is a monarchist, -but now that he has become Regent, like Horthy of Hungary, he does not -want a king. This period Pétain regards as France’s purgatory, which he -gladly endures, confident of a better world. Many Frenchmen recognize -Pétain’s good intentions but do not believe they will save him from -Hell. - - -Q. _Why, if the Germans have such a hold over Pétain, have they not -forced him to surrender the French fleet and to give them the use of -the North African naval and air bases? If Pétain is in fear of being -revealed by the Germans as one who helped bring about the French -defeat, why can’t the Germans get anything they want from him?_ - -A. First, because Pétain is more useful to the Germans than the French -fleet and the North African bases. Who else could lead so many of the -French people to submit and collaborate as they are doing today under -Pétain? Pétain does Hitler’s work for him. Pétain coaxes the plunder -from the French people in the form of taxes and hands it to Hitler in -the form of payment for maintenance of the army of occupation. If the -Germans ever exposed him, he would lose his position and they would -lose their most useful servant. - -Second, the more time that elapses since the armistice, the less -effective is the German blackmail threat on Pétain, because as time -passes people become less interested in what happened, and as -experience with the Germans deepens, fewer people can be found to -believe any German explanation. - -Third, Pétain, with all his senility, must have realized that it is -not nearly as certain now that Germany will win, as it was when he -surrendered. The Russian resistance, much as Pétain hates and despises -Bolshevism, must have made him think; and the growing belligerence of -America must have had some effect upon him. As he becomes less and less -convinced that Germany is certain to win he should logically become -less submissive to the Germans. On the other hand, he is not likely to -revolt openly until he is convinced Germany will lose; and the only way -to give him such conviction is for the United States to enter the war. - - -Q. _What would Hitler do if he finally tired of fooling with Vichy?_ - -A. He would simply march in and occupy all of France. He could do -it with a handful of divisions, since the French have been totally -disarmed or at least as fully disarmed as it was possible for -the Germans to do. But from then on he would have the trouble of -administering the whole country and collecting the taxes which Pétain -collects for him now. I do not think he is anxious to increase his -responsibilities that way now. Pétain knows this too, and that stiffens -the old man’s backbone a little. Essentially though the Vichy attitude -will always depend on the question who is going to win the war. I -should think that when the defeat of Hitler is assured, the Vichy -government may be overthrown and another or Free French, de Gaulle -government may re-enter the war on our side. Pétain and Darlan it seems -to me are too compromised ever to do that. - - -Q. _What about Darlan?_ - -A. Darlan undoubtedly sees more clearly than Pétain, but he is less -honorable; indeed I have heard highly placed Englishmen who knew -him intimately curse him with concentrated bitterness as the vilest -traitor of the lot. Few people would describe Pétain as consciously -dishonorable. Few of the men around Pétain are spared the charge by -Frenchmen who know them best. - -Darlan has no respect from anybody. He has been all his life a -political sailor, having had his start from his father, one-time -Minister of Justice. His politics were consistently opportunistic. -Today he helps head a government that has suppressed Freemasonry; yet -he was a Freemason when to be a Freemason was an asset. He helps keep -Leon Blum in confinement; yet he supported Blum when Blum was in power. -He is now the fiercest advocate of fighting England; yet until Reynaud -fell he supported the policy of moving the government to North Africa -and carrying on. - -He switched when he perceived the chance of becoming head man in the -appeasement government. His change of heart was literally overnight. -In London immediately after the fall of France, an old friend of mine, -an officer of the French Navy whose ship had broken away and come to -England, told me Darlan had issued an order to all vessels of the Navy -that with the signing of the Armistice they should make for French -African or other friendly ports and prepare to go on with the war; -twenty-four hours later another code message from Darlan countermanded -the order and directed all ships to make for French ports. In the -interval Darlan had been promised a seat next to the Chief of the Vichy -State. - -Nothing in Darlan’s record indicates that he has ever acted except -for the purpose of furthering his career; he is characterized by the -French as the perfect careerist, and the word has even less flattering -connotations in French than in English. The one instinct in him -which seems to have persisted without variance is his hatred of the -British, based upon the centuries-old rivalry of the French and British -navies. While the French were in the war we Americans forgot that the -memory of Trafalgar is for the French Navy, or for its older officers -anyway, stronger than the memory of the four years of Franco-British -comradeship on the battlefields of 1914-1918. - -In Darlan this feeling was always strong. At the London Naval -Conference of 1930 he fought for parity with the British, but they -refused it to him, with a prescience blessed by the event. Suppose -the French had possessed as powerful a navy as the British when the -French Army fell and Darlan had commanded a force able to challenge -the British! After the Battle of Oran, July 3, 1940 when the British, -rightly suspecting the intentions of Darlan, attempted to disable the -French Fleet at Mers-el Kebir in order to prevent its falling into the -hands of the Germans, Darlan led the outcry against the “perfidious” -assault. The British are convinced that if ever the chance comes Darlan -will use every means in his power to injure them. Whatever his motives -may have been at the beginning for joining the capitulation, Darlan -like most of the men of Vichy has by now so compromised himself with -the French people that, as one French friend of mine expressed it: “If -Germany is defeated the best these men of Vichy could hope for would -be dishonorable, furtive retirement, but I think most of them would be -killed.” - -And if Germany wins? For a while Darlan and his colleagues seemed to -feel confident that Hitler would be good to them, but now he exclaims: -“If we do not get an honorable peace, if France is cut up into many -departments and deprived of important overseas territories, and enters -diminished and bruised into the New Europe, it will not recover and -our children will live in the misery and hatred which breed war.” -These words of the appeaser indicate that he has already discerned the -outlines of the fate Hitler has in store for France; yet what is the -alternative for him and those like him now? Free Frenchmen declare the -alternative is death, as traitors. - - -Q. _And Laval?_ - -A. He is wounded but he is surely enjoying himself because for the -moment he can say, “I told you so.” He is probably the world’s most -delighted observer of the Battle of Russia. My last glimpse of him -was in Bordeaux at the restaurant “Chapon Fin” the night France -capitulated. The restaurant was crowded with the wealthy, the powerful, -the noted and notorious of France. The door was locked; without an -introduction from at least a Cabinet Minister or a millionaire nobody -could get in. That night ten thousand refugees were pounding for -admission to the restaurants of Bordeaux. Our Ambassador to Poland, -Tony Biddle, unmarked from his harrowing escape across Poland under -Luftwaffe machine-gun fire, and as fresh here at the collapse of the -world as though he were attending a bridge party at home, rescued us -and with a gesture which implied we were all ambassadors, requisitioned -a table for our party of American newspapermen. From one corner Otto of -Habsburg greeted us in his cordial democratic way. He was one victim -Hitler would have liked to catch. I looked around the grotesque dining -room, decorated as an artificial rock garden of papier-mâché and now -populated by as queer a throng as ever assembled to dine at the funeral -of a nation. Nearly every French politician I had ever seen was there, -most of them drinking copiously of the wine for which the city was -famous. There was no gloom perceptible; not among the Frenchmen. The -atmosphere was excited, laughter was frequent and high-pitched. Perhaps -it was bravery; the gay talk and conviviality sounded very courageous -or else very frivolous at that moment. Who could have realized that -there were Frenchmen there calculating to improve their careers by the -fall of their country? We American newspapermen looked more depressed -than any of the men whose motherland was about to be strangled. -Presently a waiter brought me a note from Laval inviting me to his -table. I had not seen him enter. There he was, swarthy, ebony-haired, -with his famous white string tie, presiding over a company of half -a dozen friends, all talking, as everybody in the Western World was -talking, about the fate of France. - -Abruptly Laval asked, “What do you think, M. Knickerbocker?” - -I spoke with all the emphasis I could muster and placing my fist on -the table to help express my sincerity talked directly to him: “Mr. -President, I think that if you give up, if you surrender, it will -mean the end of France as a nation, the end of France forever unless -another, outside power comes to your rescue. But Mr. President, if you -go on fighting, if you refuse to surrender, even if you have to go to -North Africa and base your government on Morocco, then France will live -because she and her friends will win this war, however long it may -take. But please believe me, Mr. President, when I say I know what the -Nazis mean to do to France, and I know because I have lived for nine -years in Germany as a professional observer and I know Adolf Hitler, -and the Nazis, and the German people better than I know any politician, -or political party, or people in the world, and I know they mean the -utter destruction of France.” - -There was dead silence, and to my gratification everybody at the -table, all of Laval’s friends, nodded in agreement with me, but M. -Laval himself, grave as a judge, leaned back and with that inscrutable -Moorish air of his said, “No, M. Knickerbocker, you do not understand. -Hitler does not want to destroy France; Hitler only wants to destroy -the Soviet Union.” - -That was Laval’s belief, and because this belief was shared by so many -other Frenchmen, it became one of the principal reasons for the fall of -France. - -Whatever else one may think of him, Laval has guts and is no hypocrite. -He hates democracy and says so. He is out to promote the fortunes of -M. Laval and admits it. He calls himself a realist; and realistically -he long ago estimated the strength of France as inadequate to stand -up against Germany. He learned to hate Britain during those long years -when every French move to bolster their position against the doubly -powerful Reich was checked by an imbecile British Foreign Office which -continued to think that the balance of power required a stronger -Germany and a weaker France. So Laval’s belief in the desirability of a -Franco-German “understanding” was not born of defeat alone. - -He was the first French Premier to visit Germany after the war. I was -in Berlin when he arrived in the autumn of 1931 with the aging and -feeble but still brilliant Briand, then Foreign Minister. Bruening was -Chancellor and that farsighted benevolent statesman, whom the Allies -could have helped suppress the growing menace of Hitler, wished to make -the visit the foundation for a new era of Franco-German friendship. How -futile his hopes were came to light as the train bearing the French -ministers rolled in. I was standing with a small crowd of Germans at -the foot of the steps of the Friedrichstrasse Bahnhof, and noticed -that the streets had been cleared and roped off all the way to the -Hotel Adlon. Masses of police manned the ropes but there was almost no -crowd to hold back. Around the station were about five hundred people. -I noticed they looked curiously alike, as though all from the same -neighborhood, the same class. Presently I saw a friend, a plain-clothes -man from Police Headquarters, all dressed up in his Sunday best, with -gloves and a derby hat and the inevitable big detective’s shoes. I -greeted him. He introduced his wife and children. A little surprised, -I asked if he were such a great advocate of Franco-German friendship -that he had brought his whole family to cheer the visitors from Paris. -“_Ja wohl!_” he replied. “Orders, you see. They sent us all down here. -Everybody here is from Police Headquarters, _mit Frau und Kinder_. -Nobody else; no outsiders. We get a day off for coming.” Sure enough, -that was the makeup of the entire crowd. They dutifully thronged around -the steps and shouted “_Hoch Frankreich!_” Laval and Briand then passed -through empty streets to the Hotel Adlon where another group of -policemen and their wives and children cried “_Hoch!_” again. And that -was the length and breadth and depth of Franco-German friendship. - - -Q. _Has Laval a chance to come back?_ - -A. Yes, if the Germans win he has the best of chances. Laval today is -the only master politician left in France; Pétain is senile; Darlan -is ward-heel size; none of the others in the Vichy camp is even that -large, and the politicians of the Republic are dead and buried. Laval -is the best-hated Frenchman alive; the shots fired into him by Colette -were cheered from one end of France to the other, but he is still the -only Frenchman capable of ruling France as a dictator. - -He is much like Stalin, an Asiatic, with more than his share of the -Eastern blood of the Auvernacs. He has the psychology of the Oriental -and like Stalin he has the Oriental’s lack of human consideration. As -Stalin regards Russia without love, as an object, so Laval regards -France. He has few real friends but possesses a marvelous power of -extemporized comradeship and can talk the language of any man with whom -he converses, including, as one of his enemies suggested, “even an -honest man.” Once a friend of his exclaimed, “You ought to be dictator -of a South American Republic!” “How did you know?” asked Laval, -genuinely surprised. “Oh, just a joke,” answered the friend. “But no,” -said Laval, “I am amazed, because when I was a boy that was just what -I always dreamed of becoming--dictator of a South American state.” -Perhaps he may get his wish yet, as the malicious wits of the Riviera -have called Vichy France, “a banana republic without bananas.” - -Laval’s hatred of England is extended now to America, because American -support upholds Britain, and Laval will never be safe until Britain -is defeated. He is still unwavering in his conviction that Germany -will win, but even if we entered the war and it became evident Germany -would lose, Laval cannot now change his position. He is one of those so -totally committed to the German cause that he stands or falls with it. - - -Q. _You have said that we Americans were very much like the French; now -in what way are we? Have we also traitors in our ranks?_ - -A. No, we have not, I am convinced, any traitors among our officers, as -the French had. There are many Nazi agents among us, and a few may have -penetrated to positions of some importance, but I do not believe they -could affect the issue of the war as they did in France. There are many -Communists as well among us, probably more than there are Nazis, and -we ought never to forget that whether they are native-born Americans -or not makes no difference. Nor does the fact that Soviet Russia is -momentarily engaged in fighting our enemy change the essential fact -that Communists cannot be loyal Americans. Their loyalty is to Moscow -alone, and if a change in Russia’s position should make it expedient -for the Kremlin to order American Communists to sabotage America’s war -effort, the order would be zealously obeyed. - -Our chief danger of this sort lies in the wrongheaded activity of -our isolationists who, whether they wish it or not, serve the cause -of Hitler more effectively than all the paid agents of Germany and -Italy and Japan could do if their numbers were multiplied many times. -Consider carefully the account given you by my French friend of the -way the Germans appealed to Parisian conservative circles, and ask -yourself if their arguments do not sound remarkably like the speeches -of Lindbergh and Wheeler. - -Treason can be difficult to define. I had a French friend, whom -I can call a friend no longer because he became one of the chief -collaborationists with the Germans. I think--I am not sure--but I -think we have no one like him in America, but he was so representative -of the group that betrayed France, that I want to quote a conversation -I had with him just before the war began. I said, “Jean, you seem to -believe profoundly that Germany is strong enough to win a war no matter -how France fights to prevent it; and you also seem to believe that the -German kind of National Socialism would be a good thing for the whole -continent, including France. Now what would you do, believing as you -do, if France were to be at war with Germany, and you thought defeat -was inevitable, and you foresaw a long and bloody conflict, and you -suddenly found yourself in possession of a military secret which would -end the war immediately in favor of Germany if the Germans knew it. -Would you give this decisive military secret to the Germans?” Jean -answered, “Yes, of course I would.” “But wouldn’t that be treason?” I -asked. “Not at all,” Jean answered. “It wouldn’t be treason to France; -it would only be a blow at what I consider the treasonable government -of the Republic.” Now I submit that even our rabid isolationists would -reject a position like Jean’s, but we ought nevertheless clearly to see -the fact that Lindbergh and Wheeler by their powerful discouragement of -the whole war effort of America are doing this country the same kind of -harm that came to France. - - -Q. _In what other ways do we compare with the French?_ - -A. It is astonishing to see how many points of similarity we can -discover, beginning with the well-known Maginot line complex which we -parallel with our Atlantic Ocean complex. I remember back in 1930 at -a cocktail party in Berlin a German Lieutenant Colonel remarked to me -about the Maginot line, which the French were just completing: “That -line of fortifications will be the death of France. If soldiers have -such an impregnable fortress to live in, they will never willingly -leave it to take the offensive, and without taking the offensive you -can’t win a war. The Maginot line will give the French Army a permanent -defense complex and out of its sense of security we will eventually -defeat it.” Our complacency behind the Atlantic Ocean, which we fondly -fancy could always protect us from attack, is precisely the same as -the French had. The French also were brought down by their skepticism; -they had ceased to have any faith in anything, whether the Republic, or -democracy, or God, just as millions of Americans lack faith in anything -and think it smart to deride any kind of ideals, particularly anything -so old-fashioned as sacrifice for one’s country. - -The French had up to the bitter end, so little primitive, full-blooded -spirit that they neither sang on the way to battle nor cursed while in -action; they harbored no anger toward the enemy, no hatred for him, and -they had no will to kill. They were apologetic for being at war, until -catastrophe was upon them, and it was too late. Most Americans feel -apologetic about the war and behave as though they were not sure of the -rightness of our cause. - -Another curious and not unimportant item of coincidence is that there -was a strong current of anti-British feeling in France at the beginning -of the war, just as there is here. In France it was grounded largely in -the argument, which had much truth in it, that Great Britain had been -largely responsible for the war by her shortsighted support of Germany -against France for so many years, and that the British would “fight -to the last Frenchman.” This latter argument seemed silly to me when -I first met it early in the Battle of France, at the front near Sedan -where I picked up a little printed leaflet in French, dropped by German -aviators. - -It read: - - “Where is Tommy? The units of the British army which had occupied - certain sectors of the Maginot line were immediately withdrawn after - the beginning of the German offensive. They were transported as - quickly as possible in the direction of the Channel. For political - reasons it was necessary to conceal this movement, so it was carried - out at night. Nevertheless the population of Lorraine could observe - easily enough that the English were retiring, and in various cities - and towns hostile demonstrations took place against them. Several - times the police and French troops had to intervene to calm the - crowds and suppress the demonstrations. _French Soldiers!_ You see - how the English are trying to get out just as they did in Norway. - _They are taking ‘English leave.’_ They are leaving you alone on the - battlefield. Are you stupid enough to die for those who are quitting - you to save their precious skins? You had better give the English the - answer they deserve for having betrayed you.” - -Now there was not a word of truth in this propaganda about trouble -between British troops and French civilians, and I thought the leaflet -far too crude to have any effect, but I was mistaken; it corresponded -to the unreasoning feeling of many Frenchmen that the French Army -was bearing all the burden. They particularly resented the fact that -whereas at the beginning of the war the French mobilized all men from -twenty to forty-seven years old, the British at first mobilized only -those from twenty to twenty-five years old. The British Fleet, the -French knew theoretically, was just as important for beating Hitler as -the French Army, but the British Fleet was far away and its actions -were unobserved. Just so today in America we all know theoretically -that the presence of the British Fleet in the Atlantic is imperative -for our safety, but the British Fleet is far away, and so even when -we are sending supplies to the British Fleet and other arms standing -between us and our enemy, many Americans think of it as “aiding -Britain,” and feel quite unselfish about it. - -A minor group in America also persists in blaming the British so -heavily for their now amply admitted and fully atoned faults of the -past, that some of them would almost rather see Munich revenged by -German troops in England than have America defend herself there. -Finally we have our anti-British Americans of Irish origin who -consider Oliver Cromwell more blameworthy than Hitler, although all -Irish-Americans are not so purblind by any means. Taking it all in -all, however, I should say that there is an even stronger anti-British -sentiment in America today than there was in France during the war, and -this when coupled to the broader anti-Europe feeling of a great many -Americans, increases the difficulty of our acting realistically against -a powerful enemy who is taking every advantage of these enfeebling -prejudices of ours. - - -Q. _You have named so many similarities between ourselves and the -French that it is discouraging indeed, but we have one undeniable -advantage of a large population, and we surely are not obsessed by our -birth rate._ - -A. It is true that we do not worry about our birth rate, although -perhaps we ought to, but we suffer just the same from something -very much like the French obsession with theirs. It was the French -preoccupation with their inferiority in numbers, and their falling -birth rate, which prevented them not merely from wasting lives, but -even from using them thriftily on the battlefield, and the result -was the debacle. During the Battle of France I seldom saw Colonel -Schieffer, in the French Ministry of Information, that he did not -exclaim, “We cannot bleed like this again. Twice in a generation is -too much. We have only twenty million Frenchmen. This time we must -make an end of the Boches so they can never empty our veins again.” -The Colonel, who was personally most warlike, was under the impression -we all had that the French Army was losing lives heavily, and he was -willing that it be done to prevent ever again such bloodshed in the -future, yet as a matter of fact, the impulse to save French lives had -already become so strong in the Army High Command that it governed all -great decisions and contributed seriously to the defeat. - -Now despite the fact that we are a nation of 130,000,000 we are -obsessed to an equal degree with the fear of having to fight in large -numbers; we have what amounts to a phobia against sending an American -Expeditionary Force to Europe. We seem not to mind nearly so much the -idea of American boys in the Navy or the Air Force fighting and dying -abroad, but when it comes to the Army we recoil at the idea of an -A.E.F. Why the life of an infantryman should be more precious than that -of an aviator or sailor is not clear. The explanation of this attitude -must be found in the comparative numbers of men involved. - -A.E.F. brings up the idea of millions of American boys laying down -their lives on the battlefield, and most Americans completely forget, -if they ever did know, that although we had 4,355,000 men mobilized -during the last war, the total number of them killed in action and died -of wounds received in action was 50,475. This is roughly one-half of -the number of persons killed by accident in the United States every -year. We nevertheless erected in every village and city of the land -large expensive monuments to our war dead, and the impression became -indelibly fixed in the American mind that we had lost millions, or -at any rate hundreds of thousands of dead. The vision of this mass -sacrifice of American youth is what moves the American people to reject -so violently the idea of an expeditionary force. We ought now to be -adult enough to see that our penurious attitude toward our precious -American blood reflects the same feeling as the French, with more -justification, had toward their birth rate, and that if persisted in, -this attitude will lead us to similar disaster. - - -Q. _Aren’t there any encouraging differences between ourselves and the -unfortunate French?_ - -A. I am glad to say there are, and enough, I devoutly hope, to save -us from their fate. We have a leader; the French had none. We are not -divided as badly as the French were divided. Despite the fierceness of -our political passions, it would be a very exceptional American indeed -who would say, “I’d rather have Hitler than Roosevelt,” as so many -Frenchmen used to say, “We’d rather have Hitler than Leon Blum.” We are -physically a healthier people than the French. There is hardly one of -the weaknesses now perceptible in the American people that would not be -swept away by the fact of our going to war, but there is hardly one of -them which can be removed by any other means. - -The most encouraging difference between the French and American -democracies is the quality and character of our newspapers. American -newspapers bring to their readers today a greater volume of news, -of greater accuracy, than has ever been delivered to an audience of -newspaper readers in the history of the world. It has been my job for -nearly two decades to study the newspapers of a score of countries, not -superficially but with the businesslike object of gleaning news. I had -to read thirty-two German newspapers a day when I was correspondent -in Berlin; and a dozen or so daily in Paris. It is no exaggeration -to say that the reader of the _New York Times_, or the _New York -Herald-Tribune_, or the _Chicago Daily News_, or any one of half a -dozen of our great metropolitan dailies, has more detailed and true -information about what is going on in the world than if he were able -by magic to accumulate all the newspapers published everywhere else on -earth, and were able equally by magic to read them all in the original. - -Often I am asked, “How can we know the truth? Everything is so -confusing. Aren’t we fed with propaganda?” The answer is you can know -the truth by reading your newspapers thoroughly and exercising common -sense in balancing the reports from the belligerent countries against -each other. - -No war has ever been fought in such a blazing light of information. -Never has such a quantity of news been put before a people as we -Americans have before us at breakfast every day and from then on until -midnight. American newspapers are doing today the most superb job ever -done by daily journals. But that is not their chief merit. Their chief -merit is their honesty and incorruptibility and their sincere endeavor -to be fair and objective. These qualities have enabled the American -press, since the foundation of the United States, to be the equal in -importance to the executive or the legislative or the judicial branch -of government. It is the vigilant watchman over the functioning of the -other three branches of government. - -In no other country has the newspaperman the rights and privileges that -he has here. He is as important for the preservation of our liberties -and our security as any legislator, judge, or executive. One can almost -formulate a law that one can judge the quality of a democracy and its -expectancy of life by its press. By that standard France was doomed to -fall. France under the Republic had the most venal newspapers on earth. -As the American press is honest, so was the French press dishonest. The -French government was a faithful reflection of its press, one might -say almost a creation of its press. Some good Frenchmen even go so far -as to lay the major responsibility for the fall of France on their -newspapers whose editorial opinions for the most part were as plainly -for sale as the vegetables in the market. - -The reasons for their venality go back to the period at the end of -the nineteenth century when all the states of Europe were floating -government loans in Paris, the banking center of the continent. The -French peasant, who kept his gold in his _bas de laine_, his woolen -stocking, was the chief investor, and the French newspapers were the -chief salesmen. Profits from the flotation were so enormous that the -governments concerned could afford to pay very large bribes to the -French newspapers to recommend their bonds. The French peasants at -that time believed their newspapers, bought the bonds, and the corrupt -newspapers grew rich and content. This easy money made it unnecessary -for them to go out and get advertising, and from that day to this -French newspapers have lacked the economic foundation that American -newspapers have. After the war, the bribes from financial quarters -largely disappeared and the French newspapers, without advertising, and -with the habit of venality, became more unscrupulous, because hungrier -than ever. French newspapermen, worse paid than ever, were reduced to -selling their services cheaper than ever before, and the corruption -became almost universal. - -One famous French correspondent was fired by his famous newspaper -because he had taken a bribe from a foreign government--and had failed -to split it with the managing editor. Hardly a newspaper in Paris would -refuse a subsidy from a foreign government, but all this giving and -taking of bribes became trivial when Hitler came to power in 1933. From -then on the French press was inundated with German money, and from then -on could be dated the certainty that France would fall. - -I want above all things to emphasize that there were a few honest, -capable, patriotic, and incorruptible French journalists. It is -sufficient commentary on the Vichy government that most of them had to -flee when the Germans came. - - -Q. _Is there any hope for the French? Do you think they can come back?_ - -A. Yes, because they have learned to hate; the Germans have taught -them. I know it sounds most un-Christian to insist upon the necessity -of hatred, but the thoughtful will remember that Christ hated evil, -and when he scourged the money-changers from the Temple he did it with -fury. Who will dispute that Hitler is more evil than money-changers in -a Temple, and that all the forces of Christianity ought to be ranged -together to destroy his hateful power. You cannot win a battle, you -cannot win a war, you cannot win any kind of fight that involves -killing unless you have the spirit to kill. You cannot have that spirit -unless you are convinced of the justice of your cause, and you know -that God is on your side, and that God approves your killing your -enemies. - -The French never had any such spirit during the war, except perhaps -at the very end, but they have it now. During the war they were all -the time debating in their hearts whether it would not be better to -quit and make friends with the Germans. They thought in terms of the -last war. They thought of the Germans as the same sort of human beings -as the Germans of 1870 or of 1914-1918. They simply failed to grasp -the most important fact in the world of international affairs today, -namely that the Nazi Germans under Hitler are a new species of creature -never seen before in modern times, a deliberately amoral species of -men who reject every tenet of Christianity or of any other religion -which enjoins kindness, truth, and justice, and who are possessed of -such unique talents for war that they could conceivably achieve their -ambition to conquer the world if they were not stopped by a coalition -of all the decent peoples on earth. The French above all failed to -take seriously Hitler’s cool, considered statement that he intended to -exterminate France as a nation. - - -Q. _How about the treatment Hitler has given France so far; he hasn’t -tried to exterminate them, has he?_ - -A. No, but Hitler is not through with the French; he has not even begun -to treat them the way he intends to ultimately. There are several -reasons why he has been comparatively lenient to France so far. First, -he wished to end French resistance immediately in order that the whole -force of the German Army might be thrown at England. Second, he wished -to lull the French into a belief that by collaborating with the Germans -they might obtain the “honorable peace” Pétain talks about. Third, he -wished to make it appear to the British and eventually to the Americans -that surrender to Hitler is not so bad. Finally, he wished to get from -the Vichy government several important things he either did not dare -demand or was refused at the Compiègne armistice, chiefly that the -French should go to war against Britain or at any rate turn over the -French fleet and naval bases to the Germans for use against the British. - - -Q. _Do you imply that later on Hitler’s treatment of France will be -different?_ - -A. I do indeed. He will eventually fulfill the one principle which -has guided his foreign policy more than any other; to destroy the -power of France _ever_ to threaten Germany again. How could any -Frenchman forget the words of Hitler in _Mein Kampf_ when he wrote: -“We must at last become entirely clear about this: the German people’s -irreconcilable mortal enemy is and remains France”? And again: “The -political testament of the German nation ... must read substantially: -See an attack on Germany in any attempt to organize a military power -[_i.e._, France] on the frontiers of Germany, be it only in the form of -the creation of a state capable of becoming a military power [_i.e._, -France] and in that case regard it not only a right but a duty to -prevent the establishment of such a state [_i.e._, France] by all means -including the application of armed force, or in the event that such a -one be already founded, to repress it.” So you see what the fate of -France is bound to be, now that she has given up her arms and her will -to fight. - -If left alone her fate will surely be that defined by Churchill in -his address to the French people while Vichy still hesitated: “I tell -you truly and what you must believe when I say this evil man, this -monstrous abortion of hatred and deceit, has resolved on nothing -less than the complete wiping out of the French nation and the -disintegration of its whole life and future. By all kinds of sly and -savage means he is plotting and working to crush forever the fountain -of characteristic French culture and French inspiration to the world. -It is not defeat that France will now be made to suffer at German -hands, but the doom of complete obliteration. Army, navy, air force, -religions, laws, language, culture, institutions, literature, history, -tradition, all are to be effaced by the brute strength of a triumphant -army and the scientific low cunning of a ruthless Police Force.” - -This is true. This will be the fate of France unless the United States -and Britain and Russia defeat Hitler. Of course so long as the French -under the men of Vichy remain the strictly obedient vassal, Hitler will -have no need for sharper measures until the time comes for him to shape -France into her ultimate permanent role of coolie agricultural colony -of the Reich. - - -Q. _What did Hitler promise Pétain?_ - -A. He promised that if Pétain would sign the armistice, very soon -afterward he would give France a permanent and just peace, that German -troops would evacuate France, and in the New Order of Europe Germany -would help France become a free and independent partner. All this -was, however, tacitly contingent on the defeat of Britain. The German -excuse for not freeing France now is that the battle against Russia and -Britain is still going on. France meanwhile is compelled to suffer in -a slavery worse than she ever suffered in her entire national history. - - -Q. _What do you mean by the term “slavery”? The French people are not -being driven about in slave gangs, are they, with an overseer carrying -a black-snake whip and all that as in_ Uncle Tom’s Cabin_? I understood -the Germans were behaving very “correctly.”_ - -A. It is true that only the prisoners of war, who still number about -a million and a half, are in this literal, physical sense enslaved. -The rest of the French people, though, are just as much the slaves of -the Germans as if they were housed in slave pens and driven to work -in chains. Why? Because they must give up to their German masters -all the fruits of their labors except a bare subsistence. The French -people have been paying the Germans an indemnity of roughly ten million -dollars a day, or $3,650,000,000 a year, and with this money the -Germans have been buying from the French, who are forced to sell, all -the property of any value in the country, from objects of art to great -industrial plants. Consider the size of this indemnity. The maximum -yearly reparations payment Germany had to make after the last war was -$600,000,000. That is one sixth of what the French have had to pay in -the first twelve months of German rule in this war. - - -Q. _How was this indemnity fixed?_ - -A. In the armistice agreement which Pétain so trustfully signed, it -was stipulated that the French would pay for the cost of maintaining -the German Army in France. No sum was named. You can imagine the -astonishment of the French when, after they had laid down their arms -and there was no possibility of refusing, they learned they had to -pay the Germans 400,000,000 francs, or roughly $10,000,000 a day. It -will give you some notion of the difference between the old-fashioned -German conqueror and the new-fashioned Nazi to recollect that after -the Franco-German War of 1870 Bismarck exacted a _total_ indemnity of -$1,250,000,000, or one-third of what the French of today are forced to -pay _yearly_. - - -Q. _How does this French payment compare with the total amounts Germany -paid for reparation after the last war?_ - -A. The maximum estimate of German reparations payments in cash and kind -is about $5,000,000,000, which is almost precisely the amount of money -Americans lent Germany and never got back. It is the literal truth -that Germany paid no reparations. The United States paid them. I was a -correspondent in Germany during all those crucial years from the French -occupation of the Ruhr onward, and most of us who were on the spot -agree that despite the dislocation of wealth in Germany the country as -a whole had not lost wealth through payment of reparations, since for -every dollar that went to France or England, an American dollar came in. - -All critics of the Versailles treaty insist that its worst feature was -the reparations, but if you keep in mind the fundamental fact that the -Germans borrowed (and never repaid) every cent they used to meet the -reparations claims, the Versailles treaty and the German complaints -about it take on a very different aspect. This is so important that it -cannot be overemphasized, because one of the principal reasons why the -United States withdrew from the peace and why England and eventually -France relaxed their vigilance and permitted Germany to arm and grow -into the terrible power she is today, was the feeling that the Germans -after all had been treated unjustly. - -You could make a case for the argument that our own “guilt complex” -about Versailles allowed Hitler to tear up the treaty and finally -attack the world. Paul Birdsall has pointed out that this “guilt -complex” received powerful encouragement from John Maynard Keynes, -who correctly analyzed the economic impossibility of the reparations -clauses, but went on from there to condemn the whole treaty as a -Carthaginian peace. It has taken Hitler, who climbed to power on his -denunciation of Versailles, to show us how lenient a peace it was. - -Remembering that the Germans actually paid no reparations, it is -instructive to examine what they formally paid in comparison with -what they are now extorting from the French. The Allies at the London -conference in April 1921 fixed their demands on Germany for “damage -done to civilians” at $33,000,000,000--which at the time was considered -insanely high, but incidentally is $11,000,000,000 less than the -$44,000,000,000 the United States has now appropriated and recommended -for national defense. Isn’t this a startling confirmation of the -mistake the American Congress made in repudiating the League of Nations -and refusing to ratify the security treaty with England and France? - -It is fantastic to realize that we could have paid the entire bill -for the last war and if by so doing we could have prevented this war, -we would still have saved money. We will eventually learn that the -isolationists’ or appeasers’ program for America is not only the most -dangerous but infinitely the most costly. France has certainly learned -how true this is. - -_At the rate they are now paying, the French will have paid the Germans -in about seventeen months an amount equivalent to all the reparations -payments ($5,000,000,000) made by the Germans with American money in -the twelve years during which the Germans pretended to pay._ They -stopped even the pretense of payment you remember after the Lausanne -Conference in 1932, even before Hitler came to power. This immense -indemnity the French are paying now is merely an interim payment for -the alleged cost of maintaining the German Army. Actually the cost of -maintaining the army is estimated to be not 400,000,000 but 125,000,000 -francs, so that the Germans have a surplus of 275,000,000 francs or -around $7,000,000 for their daily “purchases.” - - -Q. _Why did the Germans select the figure 400,000,000 francs daily?_ - -A. Because this was the amount the French were spending on the war. -In their 1940 war budget they allocated 106 billion francs to the air -force, 36 billion to the army, and 15 billion to the navy, making a -total of 157 billion, which is roughly 400,000,000 francs a day. Hitler -reckoned if the French could afford to spend this sum on fighting the -Germans, they could spend the same amount to feed, clothe, transport, -lodge, amuse, and otherwise support the Germans as they are doing now. - - -Q. _But if the French were spending this much money on the war anyway, -how are they economically worse off by continuing the same expenditure?_ - -A. They are incomparably worse off because formerly the proceeds -of this sum were consumed by Frenchmen; today they are consumed by -Germans. The money formerly circulated throughout the French economic -body as healthy blood; today it is sucked and swallowed by the vast -German leech. Furthermore the French expenditure on the war did not -cease with their defeat; they still have large expenses besides their -tribute to Germany. - - -Q. _What means do the Germans use to buy up French businesses? Why -don’t the French refuse to sell?_ - -A. Some of them do, but the Germans always have the power to force them -to sell. - - -Q. _Why do the Germans bother to go through the form of buying, if they -can confiscate whatever they want?_ - -A. Because they can get what they want with much less trouble and in -better shape and be able to make better use of it if they go through -the form of purchase. They had their whole system of plundering France -worked out before the war. During the prewar period thousands of -Germans crisscrossed France, as tourists or traveling salesmen. They -located the most desirable industrial or other properties, nearly all, -incidentally, in the rich Northern half now Occupied France. When the -Germans came in they rushed a specially trained corps of experts to -all the banks and business houses, embargoed banking transactions and -ordered every security holder in France to give a list of his property. -Soon they knew the precise financial position of every important -corporation or individual in France. With this knowledge they were able -to buy into the control of all the businesses they wanted. Sometimes if -the French owner refused to sell, the Germans could make the owner’s -bank foreclose on his loan and thus force the owner to raise money -by selling a share of his business. The Germans were modest; usually -they wanted only 51 per cent. Sometimes the Germans would withhold -raw materials from a stubborn industrialist. Sometimes the German -authorities forcibly confiscated the property; just often enough to -remind Frenchmen that, if they liked, the Germans could take every -machine, sack of flour, and stick of furniture in the country without -recompense. - -Another most effective weapon used by the Germans to force the French -to sell their businesses is the German edict that all concerns, from -shops to factories, must remain open and keep their full roll of -employees. Since almost no business is being done, and most concerns -would normally have closed, this rule drives most businessmen into -bankruptcy, as it was intended to do. By these and other similar means, -the Germans, using the francs paid them by the French, have gone far -toward buying “legal” control of the most valuable property in France. -With appalling swiftness the French people are being pauperized and -reduced to slaves in what used to be their own homes. - -They are like the Negroes on a pre-Civil War plantation in our own -South. The Germans, like the white folks, live in the big house, eat -caviar and chicken, drink the wonderful wines of France, clothe their -women with the creations of the great couturiers, and promenade the -Boulevards while the French people, half-starving, broken, humiliated, -work desperately hard to support their masters. The French are now not -even being treated as well as slaves under a master considerate enough -to wish to keep his slaves in good health and fit working order. I -should think it would be fair to say that out of an eight-hour day the -Frenchman today has to devote four hours to working for the Germans. - - -Q. _If these are the interim armistice terms imposed on France, what -will the final terms of peace be like?_ - -A. You can be sure that the German demands will be limited only by the -total wealth of France. We know Hitler intends the total productive -wealth of the country to pass into German hands. Without waiting for -peace, the Germans are, as we noted, already systematically stripping -France of her movable valuables and taking them to Germany, and -buying control of the immovable property they want. But if the time -ever comes, when Hitler makes a so-called peace with France, we may -expect that he will take pleasure in basing his demands partly on the -Versailles treaty. - -He will first demand that the reparations Germany paid after the last -war be paid back; then he will demand full compensation for the German -merchant and fishing fleets, and the railroad equipment, cattle, etc., -turned over to the Allies after the last war to make up for similar -items seized by the Germans; he will demand replacement of all the -shipping Germany was compelled to build for the Allies to take the -place of the ships sunk by the Imperial Navy; he will bill the Allies -for the coal Germany delivered the Allies to replace the coal taken -from the mines of Northern France during the war. After the broad -category of claims from the last war has been put down, Hitler will -then ask for reparations for this war, and of course he can set any sum -he likes. - - -Q. _But why should Hitler take so much trouble to claim formal -reparations? Since he obviously intends permanently to cripple his -victim, why should he bother to go through the legalistic form of -itemizing his claims?_ - -A. Because that is the way Hitler and his Nazis always do things. The -German, even the Nazi, is an orderly fellow. The first principle of -all Germans is “_Ordnung muss sein._” Aside from that, or above it, is -the fact that Hitler, deeply conscious of the illegality of all his -actions, beginning with the seizure of power, has always insisted on -clothing everything he does with the appearance of lawfulness. When he -seized power he did it by banning the Communist and then the Socialist -parties from the Reichstag, and thus obtaining a majority vote in the -Reichstag. Whenever he attacks a nation he announces a long list of -reasons, backed sometimes by an extraordinary array of documents, many -of them forged, to prove he not only had a right to attack but was -compelled to do so. - -This necessity for self-justification explains also one of the -queerest Nazi practices in their torture chambers. When they have -finished torturing a victim, they invariably make him sign a statement -testifying that he had been well treated. One would think since the -Nazi power is absolute, they would not care, or bother to take this -trouble, but they seem to be under a profound compulsion to make this -gesture toward the justice they have in practice abolished. - - -Q. _What is the use of our maintaining diplomatic relations with Vichy? -In view of all that you have said I should think we ought to withdraw -our recognition of Vichy and transfer it to de Gaulle and the Free -French._ - -A. I suppose the chief reason we do not break diplomatic relations -with Vichy is the same reason why we have not broken formal relations -with Germany: in both cases we wish to keep a diplomatic observer on -the scene. That is understandable in the case of Germany, since we -are only formally at peace with her, and are morally at war and all -the world knows it. In other words, until we begin to shoot, it would -not make much difference whether we broke relations with Germany or -not. But in the case of Vichy, it would make a world of difference if -we took our recognition away from Pétain and gave it to de Gaulle. It -is true that de Gaulle is actually in control of only some central -African French territory while Pétain nominally rules all France, but -we have continued our recognition of all the governments in exile and -refused any kind of recognition to the Quislings and Rexists, and in -this spirit we ought to withdraw our recognition from Pétain. It would -immensely hearten the Free French to have our recognition and if we -extended Lease-Lend aid to de Gaulle’s forces it could have important -military consequences. However, I suppose Washington is still hoping -against hope that we may one day be able to gain some profit from -having treated Pétain as well as we have. I personally do not believe -we ever will. - - - - -6. THE UNITED STATES - - -Q. _What is the greatest danger we face as a nation?_ - -A. Our complacency. It is colossal, cosmic, suicidal. - - -Q. _Can you still call us complacent after we have conscripted an -Army, begun to create an Air Force, gone far toward building a -two-ocean Navy, flung a line of outposts from Iceland to South America, -appropriated and recommended fifty billion dollars for defense, and -told our Navy to sink German fighting ships?_ - -A. The very list you name reeks with complacency. All of that put -together does not equal a week of what even the “despised” Russians -are doing now. The bitterest thing yet said about us was: “Better a -Bolshevik who kills Germans than a Democrat who kills time.” We still -unwaveringly and unblushingly expect somebody else to do the job for -us. Now it is Russia. - -To begin with we said France and England would do the job; then Norway; -then the Low Countries; then the Balkans; and now we sit back and -actually rely on the Russians. We cheer the news that the Navy is -going to fight but shrink at the idea of an American Expeditionary -Force. Why? For the same reason that war with Japan has many more -advocates than war with Germany, because we could leave a sea war to -the professional fighting men of the Navy. We shirk calling things by -their proper names. Never have we used so many weasel words. Conscripts -are “selectees”; naval war is “hunting pirates”; hiring the British -to do our fighting for us is “lease-lend”; isolationists become -“noninterventionists”; interventionists argue tediously for “all-out -aid,” but few of them ever come out plainly and say we ought to go to -war. All of this evasion stems from the refusal to face the supreme -reality, namely that we have to go to war, that it is our war and was -our war from the beginning. - - -Q. _But haven’t we gone far toward recognizing that it is our war by -our lease-lend appropriations of around thirteen billion dollars?_ - -A. Do you realize that we actually delivered only $190,000,000 worth -of goods in the first six months of lease-lend to Britain and China? -That is only a little over one per cent of the total lease-lend money -involved. If it takes us six months to deliver one per cent, how -long will it take to deliver 100 per cent? Certainly, the beginning -is slowest; certainly speed of deliveries will increase almost -geometrically after the new factories begin to produce. But the fact -is that we will never produce enough to win this war without going -formally to war. As Donald M. Nelson, chief defense buyer, suggested, -the only way to get capacity production for armaments is to make the -program so big that civilian needs will be irresistibly pushed into the -background, and every factory capable of producing armaments will be -forced to drop its civilian business and go immediately to work on war -materials. - -What does “pushing our civilian needs into the background” mean? -It means sacrifice; it means a lowering of our standard of living. -Do you know anyone, have you a single person in your acquaintance -in civilian life, whose standard of living has deteriorated as a -result of sacrifice for our so-called defense effort? Leaf through -your smart magazines, read the news of the shops, and ask yourself -what the fighting folk of Europe would think of the war effort of a -country whose rugged males in the bloody autumn of 1941 are asked in -full-page advertisements: “Have you seen the new brown diamonds for -men? These interesting, subdued stones are rapidly becoming a major -item in the well-dressed man’s wardrobe.” Would this make very good -evidence against Hitler’s assertion that we are a “decadent, degenerate -democracy not to be taken seriously in war”? - - -Q. _But how can we expect to improve morale by criticism? Isn’t it true -that if you tell a healthy man he looks ill, and tell him frequently -enough, he may actually fall ill?_ - -A. Yes, but if you tell an ill man he looks well, and he therefore -fails to take care of himself, he may die. It is not fear that we need; -it is awareness. What was the common cause of the death of the fifteen -nations which have fallen to Hitler? It was lack of awareness of his -threat to their national existence. From Poland to Greece they were -all overconfident and hence for six long years did nothing to bring -about that coalition which might have saved them. Overconfidence is our -danger, not defeatism. The moment our Navy was given orders to convoy -and shoot, one prominent voice was raised to suggest that now we might -diminish our Army, as though the war were virtually won. - - -Q. _Our morale is very bad, then?_ - -A. No, that is not true. Our morale is high. That sounds like a -contradiction but it is not. It is my conviction after talking to -audiences all over the country that the American people are eager -to find out the truth and when they hear it they are eager to act; -that they are far ahead of their leaders in Congress, and even of the -President; and that if the President wanted it, he could get directly -from the American people, not from Congress, but from the twenty-seven -million Americans who voted for him, plus many million more, approval -of any measure he advocated, including a formal declaration of war. -National morale depends so much on leadership that a great figure, as -Roosevelt in this country and Churchill in England, can influence it to -great decisions with one broadcast. - -But without leadership we soon sink back into smug apathy, and the kind -of thoughtlessness which led Americans in the first six months of 1941 -to buy 35 per cent more automobiles, 42 per cent more refrigerators, -and 51 per cent more electric ranges than in the same period of -1940--all of these luxury articles being built of materials vital for -our defense industry. The French too, right up to the collapse, went on -eating tremendous meals, loafing behind their Maginot line, and reading -illustrated magazines with pictures just like ours showing magnificent -fleets of planes and tanks. An unwitting reader of some of our great -periodicals would get the impression that we have one of the world’s -most powerful tank armies and that our warplanes could darken the -skies. We lay down the magazine with a sigh of content. Good old U.S.A. -We knew we could do it. What was all that talk about unpreparedness? - - -Q. _Haven’t we a tank army?_ - -A. We have four armored divisions now being organized. We see them -under such titles as “Uncle Sam’s Mighty Tanks Move Into Action,” and -only the closest examination of the picture reveals that most of the -tanks are armored cars. In 1940 we produced 20 light, no medium, and -no heavy tanks a month; in 1941, 260 light, 130 medium, and no heavy -tanks a month; and in 1942 we shall produce 390 light, 300 medium, and -still no heavy tanks a month. I quote from an authoritative release of -July 4, 1941: “None of the four existing armored divisions is regarded -as complete and ready for combat on the European scale because medium -and heavy tanks have not arrived yet, and because _coordinated practice -with the air arm regularly attached to the divisions has not yet been -possible_ and because much of the training time must be devoted to -the basic training of new men.” There is the mechanized force of the -United States of America in the third year of the mechanized world war. -Our armored strength consists of light tanks only, completely useless -against heavy or medium tanks. But most appalling is the revelation -that this late in a war in which every victory has been won by the -famous dive bomber plus tank team, we seem not to possess any such team -at all, for that must be the meaning of the statement that there has -been no practice of coordination between planes and tanks. These teams -cannot be improvised. An army without them today is like an army would -have been without artillery yesterday. - -In effect we still do not possess an effective armored force and the -production figures indicate we shall not have one in 1942 either, for -until we have heavy tanks we cannot face heavy tanks. What have the -Germans in the way of mechanized armament? We cannot tell what changes -have taken place since the Battle of Russia began, but we know that -their losses are constantly replenished from the industrial plants of -all Europe now working feverishly for the Germans. At the Battle of -France the Germans had ten Panzer divisions and it was these steel hack -saws which cut the body of France into bleeding ribbons and ended the -French nation in five weeks. The Germans captured from the French 4,000 -or 5,000 tanks and since that time have produced incessantly until it -is estimated that they entered the Battle of Russia with a total of 20 -to 30 Panzer divisions and with at least 25,000 tanks. The German Army -is obviously the army we are preparing to fight. Its armored strength -is conservatively estimated about twenty-five times ours, and it has -more than two years of battle experience. We not only have not got an -army that could take part in modern warfare at all, but we are not even -preparing to create such an army. We may get one. We will get one if -we have time. We will get an army if we go to war in time to keep the -British between us and our enemy for the period it will take to build -an army. We will never get an army so long as we are satisfied with -what we have. - -We American people have been like a neurotic who refuses to listen to -bad news; who will not go to a physician for fear of what he may find -out. We could afford to view the matter less darkly if it appeared -that our production would give us an effective fighting machine -sometime in the future, but this does not seem to be the case. Our -gun production indicates that we expect to be ready to fight a modern -army sometime around the 1950’s. It shows that in the middle of 1941 -we had a production of 4 big, 29 medium, and 20 small antiaircraft -guns per month. At that rate it would take a year to make enough -antiaircraft guns to guard New York City alone. In mid-1942 we shall, -if we are lucky, have a production of 22 big, 23 medium, and 300 small -antiaircraft guns monthly. At this rate we should be able properly to -guard the large cities of the Eastern seaboard in about ten years. - -In 1941 we did not produce any 155 mm. cannon, but we will make -fourteen of them monthly in 1942; just as we produced no 105 mm. cannon -in 1940, but put out 22 per month in 1941 and in 1942 hope to make 155 -a month. At this rate we ought to be able to finish enough artillery -to match the German artillery in about 1951. We are still turning out -37 mm. antitank guns, although tests have shown that this gun will not -penetrate the armor of the tanks it would have to meet. Even our famous -Garand rifle apparently cannot be manufactured anything like fast -enough to supply the growing army. In mid-1941 it was being turned out -at the rate of 22,500 a month; and in 1942 it is due to be produced at -the rate of 52,000 a month. That is only 624,000 a year. At this rate -it would take well over three years to equip the two-million-man army -which is our initial goal in the face of the fact that the forces it is -being built to meet number upward of ten million. - -In airplanes we have the one advantage that we came so late into the -field that we have few obsolescent types. The British and Germans -have the immense advantage of daily contact with battle experience. -In mid-1941 we produced 206 fighters and 60 bombers per month for -ourselves and sent an average of 390 planes monthly to Britain. Our aid -to Britain, “all out, short of war,” amounted to this, that after two -years of war we were sending Britain about one-eighth as many warplanes -as Germany’s production, believed to be around 3,000 a month. Even in -1942 when we shall have reached capacity production, we expect to send -Britain only 650 planes a month, and to make only 600 bombers and 600 -fighters monthly for ourselves. That is, even in the third year of war -we propose to have a production of only about three-quarters the German -production. We have pitched our sights far too low. We might as well -quit if we cannot set the sights up. - -Raymond Swing always tells me as he rakes in the pot, “Knick, it is -not good hands that win in poker; it is better hands.” So it is in -this war. We shall never win with a good army, navy, and air force; -they have to be better than the enemy’s and bigger too. Before the -Battle of Russia some military critics held that we did not need even -the 1,500,000 men we now have under arms; that we needed only a highly -mechanized force. Now we see that to win in this war an army needs mass -as well as machines. As yet we have neither. - - -Q. _Why haven’t we at any rate planned an adequate army of four or five -million men with at least as many armored divisions as the Germans?_ - -A. Because to plan an adequate army would indicate we intended to go -to war. To make it big enough and well enough equipped to fight the -Germans would indicate that we intended to fight the Germans. The -consequence of our ostrich hypocrisy, our faint-hearted catering to the -pacifist, isolationist-obscurantist bloc is that we not only do not -but we cannot build an army to perform the function for which it was -called into existence: fight the Nazis. If we equip it to go abroad, up -go cries of alarm from the Wheeler-Lindbergh crowd: “Foreign war! See, -the President is going to put us into a foreign war!” - - -Q. _But if we have nothing to fight with, how can we go to war?_ - -A. Only by going to war can we guarantee the continued existence of the -British fighting machine and the control of the Atlantic by the British -Navy and our own. As long as the Atlantic is thus controlled we can arm -ourselves in safety. - - -Q. _But why can’t we arm ourselves, as we are now doing, without going -to war, and after we are thoroughly prepared, then, if it is still -necessary, go in and win? Wouldn’t that be more sensible?_ - -A. No, because until we go to war we shall never arm ourselves -adequately or send to Britain and Russia anything like the supplies -we would send if we went to war. Second, if we do not go to war at -once there exists always the possibility of German victory. Although -the German Army is busy for the time being in Russia, Hitler knows he -has to conquer Britain to win. He intends to return to the Battle of -Britain. The Battle of the Atlantic is constantly going on. Events move -with such lightning speed in this war that a sudden overwhelming Hitler -victory is still quite conceivable. Beaverbrook only the other day said -he was convinced Hitler still intended to try to invade the British -Isles. - - -Q. _Do you think Hitler could succeed in invading Britain?_ - -A. If Hitler is willing to lose half a million or a million men in a -super-Blitz--and we know that he is quite willing to invest that many -more German lives in his dream of 1,000 years of Nazi Empire--even -British authorities admit he might get a foothold in England. The -German tactics would probably be similar to the attack on Crete, except -that against the British Isles they would try many more landings by -sea. Everything would be on a gigantic scale. The air bombardment to -precede the attempt would surpass anything experienced in the Blitz -of the autumn of 1940 which I witnessed. In this super-Blitz the -Germans would attempt to paralyze the R.A.F. They were not able to do -it before. The R.A.F., as Churchill said, won the climacteric victory -of the First Battle of Britain by knocking down three German planes -to every one they lost, and in that fight the Germans outnumbered the -British three to one. But if Hitler gets the airplane factories of -Russia, to add to the production of the French, Czech, Belgian, and -Greater German production, is there anyone who would undertake to prove -that he could not concentrate in one furious attack more force than -even the dauntless R.A.F. could repel? - -The Germans can never beat the British but they might suffocate them. -Hitler so far has never used more than 500 or 600 warplanes in a single -attack on England. Suppose he uses 5,000. Why has he not done this -before? Every aviation and military authority I talked with during the -Blitz in England was baffled at this. There were scores of guesses. The -most popular answer now is that the Germans did not have the airfields -from which to launch so many planes at once. This is a limiting factor -in air warfare which is now given great weight. It is pointed out that -it takes a huge airfield to send off 100 planes. It is even argued -that the British are bound to lose the war eventually because their -island can accommodate only a restricted number of airfields, which -fix an upper limit for their R.A.F., while the Germans can build an -indefinitely large force. Since the First Battle of Britain the Germans -have had plenty of time to build airfields from Norway to France -sufficient to take care of the air fleets of all the world. We know -they have built many secretly along the coast of Northern France and -the Low Countries. Hitler’s tactic of surprise would lead him to keep -them in reserve for the great invasion. Few observers would exclude the -possibility that the Germans may be able to use thousands of planes in -the Second Battle of Britain where they used hundreds in the first. - - -Q. _Why doesn’t Hitler use poison gas?_ - -A. I am convinced he will use it whenever he becomes desperate. Why has -he not used it before? The British know he has vast quantities of it. -He may be afraid of reprisals. When he uses gas at all I should think -it would be in a once-for-all storm. Imagine what the effect of a giant -attack with a heavy gas might be on London where as many as 4,000,000 -persons sleep in underground shelters. The English have virtually -ceased to carry gas masks. At the beginning of the war not one person -in a hundred appeared on the streets of London without one. Today not -one person in fifty carries one. - -Hitler would probably not use gas at all except as a part of a knockout -blow so violent that the British would not have a chance to strike -back. Whatever the outcome, it is possible that such a mass gas assault -might kill hundreds of thousands in one night. While the gas attack -was being poured upon the large cities, in the hope also of wiping -out the government and other leaders in urban headquarters, swarms of -flat-bottomed scows and other vessels would put out from the coasts -of the Channel and the North Sea, to make for landings at perhaps -a dozen different places, anywhere along the coast of both England -and Scotland. Some of these objectives would be feigned to divert -English defense forces from the real ones, which might number five or -six. Meanwhile great numbers of parachute troops would be landed to -capture British airfields and hold them long enough for troop planes -and gliders to land reinforcements, and these landings would also be -attempted at the immediate rear of the coastal points where the German -troops were coming in by sea. - -British authorities admit that it would be a serious matter if the -Germans could establish one or more such bridgeheads on the coast and -land heavy tanks, for the British even yet are not satisfactorily -equipped with this indispensable weapon. The British believe they -could concentrate and recapture any points seized by the Germans, but -who knows? Crete showed what could be done with air-borne troops, and -although the British Isles would be in most respects more difficult to -capture than Crete, they would not be in all respects. The Germans are -much nearer the British Isles, and could concentrate many times the -force they used on Crete. - -If the invasion of Britain ever takes place, Hitler will doubtless make -it a win-the-war or lose-the-war battle, on a scale of the highest -concentrated violence. Neither side will hold back reserves, as the -R.A.F. did even in the worst days of the 1940 Blitz, because they were -waiting to use their last fighters and bombers against the expected -invaders. The British Navy will drive regardless of mines or submarines -through the narrow waters of the Channel to throw itself between the -invaders and the island. The odds would still be on the British to win, -in my judgment. They are in an incomparably stronger position than in -1940 when after Dunkirk they were practically weaponless. Today they -have two to three million first-class, well-equipped, and well-trained -troops and over a million Home Guards on the island; their coast -defenses, as I have seen on visits around the island, are formidable -and deep; the R.A.F. is present in full strength on its home bases, -and the British claim it is growing steadily stronger relative to the -Luftwaffe; and the Royal Navy, sallying from its home ports, here -has the protection of air forces which were not available at Crete. -Finally, the British would be defending their homes, and this lends an -astonishing extra strength to fighting men. I would not like to be a -member of the German Army trying to occupy and pacify England. At the -school of Cad’s Warfare, run by Tom Wintringham outside of London, they -have taught the old fellows and the youngsters in the Home Guard many -odd and useful tricks, from the best way to strangle a German sentry -from behind, to the best way to stab a German sentry from in front. - -Even if the chances are in favor of the British, there are so many -surprises in war, and especially in this war, that it would be folly -for us to behave as though we knew Britain would win without us. If she -falls, we must be prepared to meet the whole German war machine alone. - - -Q. _Is it true that the Germans once tried to invade Britain and failed -as we heard rumored here?_ - -A. I am convinced those rumors were without foundation; I do not think -the Germans have ever tried to invade the British Isles. I remember -the September story. I was in England then and about mid-September I -learned that the highest British authorities believed the invasion -might come at any moment. With the invincible Virginia Cowles we went -“Looking for Trouble” and motored to Dover and spent a week along the -coast, in constant contact with the British military authorities. We -heard not a whisper of the yarn about invasion until later in London -when rumors came from the continent that the R.A.F. had broken up a -fleet of German invasion vessels and drowned or burned with flaming -oil on the surface of the sea thousands of German soldiers. Now it is -perfectly possible that the R.A.F. may have surprised and thus treated -German invasion vessels engaged in maneuver or in moving from one -port to another, but it is out of the question that it should have -been a serious attempt at invasion. When that happens there will be -500,000 Germans concerned, not 50,000, and there will be no attempt at -concealment. - -The decisive consideration is that if the Germans had tried an invasion -and the British had beaten it back, the British would have been -certain to advertise their victory as widely as possible. But British -authorities never said anything about a repulsed invasion attempt. We -may be sure that when and if the invasion attempt comes, there will be -no question about what is happening; not even the most enterprising -American newspaperman will be able to get a scoop on the story. - - -Q. _Would the Germans first invade Ireland in order to be able to -attack the British Isles from all sides?_ - -A. Possibly, though not necessarily. The Germans might consider the -disadvantages of taking Ireland greater than the advantages. The Irish -Channel is as wide as the English; the Germans would be no nearer -England than they are now. The possession of submarine bases in Ireland -would be the most important gain for the Germans. Against this the -Germans have to balance the cost of the operation, since there are -strong British units in Northern Ireland; the time lost; the alarm -given; and the effect on the Irish in America. - - -Q. _Why doesn’t Ireland allow the British to take over for the duration -of the war or at any rate let them use the Irish naval bases they need -so badly?_ - -A. Because the Irish still consider Oliver Cromwell a far more -unpleasant fellow than Adolf Hitler. They still distrust and to a -degree hate the British. Also they know they would be enslaved if -Hitler won; but they do not expect Hitler to win. They expect Britain -to win, but they will do nothing or practically nothing to help win. -To be fair to the Irish, their attitude is based less on historical -prejudice than on today’s life or death. If De Valera were to give -the British permission to occupy the Irish ports, the moment the news -became known, the Germans would bombard Dublin and other Irish cities, -and deliberately attempt to kill as many Irish men, women, and children -as possible to punish them for siding with the English. This is the -threat that so far has kept the Irish from allowing the British in. - - -Q. _If the Russians hold the German Army long enough, won’t the time -come when the German people will revolt? Why not wait for that?_ - -A. Because it is extremely unlikely ever to happen unless we go to war. -The German people will revolt only when, as Walter Lippmann expressed -it, they feel that it has become more dangerous to go on with Hitler -than to get rid of him. Such a time will come only when the German -people become convinced that they are going to be defeated and invaded. -It will not come merely because the German Army falls into a prolonged -deadlock with the Russians. - -There has to be the conviction that foreign troops are going to enter -Germany itself, and that if the German people overthrow Hitler they -will receive milder treatment at the hands of their liberated victims. -The danger of going on with Hitler has to be very imminent and great -to move the German people to revolt, because the crimes of the Nazis -have been so atrocious that the Nazis know they will be killed if they -are overthrown. There must be ten thousand Nazis who anticipate death -if they lose their power either by revolt or by loss of the war. They -will meet any attempt at revolt with the utmost mercilessness. In the -last war there were no Germans who expected to be killed if Germany -lost. The Nazi gang whose life and death hang on the outcome of the -war is larger than the clique of the German ruling class which had an -urgent, though not life-and-death interest, in seeing the last war to -a successful conclusion. Any hopes that a German revolt would end the -war if the deadlock lasts long enough are based on wishful thinking. - - -Q. _What makes you think Hitler would want to destroy us?_ - -A. First, because he could not afford to allow any democracy, any free -state, to exist in his totalitarian world. In his world there would be -only one kind of freedom, the freedom of the German to do as he likes -with all other varieties of men. If Hitler is not interfered with and -has time to accustom his slaves to slavery, his dynasty of tyrants -might last far beyond our lifetime, but not if a single democracy -persists to tempt and challenge his slaves to revolt. Witness today how -for a long time the subjugated peoples of Europe seemed sunk in abject -apathy, but awakened to demonstrate against their despot the moment -Russia’s resistance awakened the hope of eventual victory. If Hitler -wins over the rest of the world, he must destroy us in order to be safe -in his own Empire. - -As long as a democracy exists on earth it will hold out before the eyes -of hundreds of millions of Hitler’s subjects the vision of a place on -earth where the body and soul of a man belong to himself and there -are no masters and slaves. Especially dangerous to his rule would be -a democracy which not only offered this vision but was potentially -powerful enough to be a positive threat, as the United States. For this -reason alone Hitler could not allow us to continue to exist, a free -oasis in his vast helot Reich. - -Second, Hitler could not afford to give us time to translate our -potential into real strength. He professes two opinions of America. -One is that we are negligible; the other is that as the last war was -decided by America, this one may be. He once told a diplomatic official -of his who still occupies a high post in this country: “The United -States is a degenerate democracy in the backwash of civilization -and too demoralized by pacifism to play any important role in the -war to come.” He is truly contemptuous of our democracy, as of all -democracies, which he judges on the basis of those he has overthrown or -conquered, from the German to the French. He concludes that we must be -weak, since our democratic system dispenses justice, as far as humanly -possible, to the weak as well as to the strong, and because since the -conquest of the continental United States we have shown little or no -interest in building an empire. To the Nazi heart justice to the weak -is a proof of weakness; and to the Nazi mind only one thing prevents -a human being from seizing the property of a neighbor, weakness. -So Hitler on the one hand thinks us weak, but on the other hand he -recognizes that we could become strong. - -As he once told me that he admitted the entry of the United States into -the last war had decided the struggle, so now when America is preparing -to throw its whole weight against him, he shows signs of wishing to -keep us out. By now Britain has taught him that even a democracy can -become tough if it has time. Would Hitler, after he had crushed the -British, willingly give us time to become morally strong enough to -fight him as the British fought him? Could he afford to let us have the -two years or more still necessary for the physical job of creating the -cannon, tanks, airplanes, and naval vessels and for the training of the -officers and men for an armed force strong enough to face his? - -The third simple reason for his wishing to subjugate the United States -is that he wants the loot of America, richest on earth, and wants us -to pay tribute to the Greater German Reich as France and the other -conquered countries are doing now. - -Fourth, and not the least, important reason to believe that Hitler -wishes to destroy the United States, is because he has said so. You -remember his speech in the second year of the war when he said, “We -shall destroy Britain and every country which has fed Britain.” To whom -do you suppose he referred if not to the United States? And do you -not think now that it is high time to pay attention to this no longer -funny little man when he announces what he intends to do? He is unique -among conquerors, because he always, by one means or another, warned -his victims of what he intended to do to them, and in most cases, the -Lindberghs of the world have looked up appeasingly and archly inquired, -“Oh no, Mr. Hitler, you surely don’t mean that, do you?” - -As someone expressed it, Hitler has never kept a promise but never -failed to carry out, or at least try to carry out, a threat. His threat -to destroy us has been documented scores of times. Hermann Rauschning -quotes Hitler as declaring privately to friends that he would conquer -the United States first from within, with his Fifth Column, and -Walther Darre, his Minister of Agriculture, has developed the topic -thus: “I have been asked about my opinion of America, especially the -United States, and the danger of this pseudo-democratic Republic’s -possible attempts to hinder us in our historical development. There -is no fear that this demoralized country will mix in this German war. -In the first place, as in France and other countries, also in the -United States, we have many of our compatriots and even more friends -among the citizens of the United States. Many of the latter hold the -most important positions in political and economic life and will not -permit public opinion to allow something so senseless and insane as war -against Germany.... The United States is at present so demoralized and -so corrupted that, like England and France, it need not be taken into -consideration as a military adversary.... The United States will also -be forced by Germany to complete and final capitulation.” - -Finally, as we discussed before, Hitler as every conqueror, cannot stop -trying to conquer, and after he had finished with the Old World, his -momentum would force him to attack the New. - - -Q. _Haven’t we plenty to do at home, without getting into a foreign -war? Why don’t we try to make a real democracy in America before we go -out to try to improve the rest of the world?_ - -A. This argument that we should pay no attention to the fire in the -house next door because we are busy cleaning the windows of our house, -polishing the floor, and cleaning up the kitchen has the same amount -of logic and common sense as the doctrine that we ought not to fight -on our enemy’s territory but only on our own. President Hutchins of -the University of Chicago has put this argument of perfectionism in -scholarly form. He maintains that we are going to war to establish -throughout the world the Four Freedoms--of speech, of worship, from -want, and from fear--but he says we have no right to crusade for them -until we have established them at home. But we are not going to war to -crusade for the Four Freedoms; as we have pointed out before, we are -going to war to make the world safe for the United States, and at the -same time or thereafter do what we can to establish the Four Freedoms -elsewhere as well as in America. If we do not go to war, we risk losing -even what we have of the Four Freedoms, even the small quantities of -them measured by Dr. Hutchins. - -Something of what he says about the failure of the Four Freedoms in -this country to reach perfection is true; not all of it. He says we -have freedom of speech to say only what everybody else is saying, but -Dr. Hutchins will admit we have more of this kind of freedom than any -other country at this moment. He will also admit that everyone else is -not saying the things Dr. Hutchins is saying and yet he may say them -without let or hindrance. He says we have “freedom of worship if we -don’t take our religion too seriously,” but one must ask oneself what -examples of religious intolerance have given rise to such a statement? -Where are the persecuted religionists and to what country would they -flee to escape from the alleged deficiency of freedom of worship in -America? - -Dr. Hutchins says that as for freedom from want and freedom from -fear, so long as one-third of the nation is ill-fed, ill-clothed, -and ill-housed, as Roosevelt says it is, we have no right to try to -establish these freedoms in other countries. Again, we can admit that -the matter is precisely as President Roosevelt has stated it, and yet -assert that the people of the United States have as a whole better -food, clothing, and living conditions than those of any other country -with comparable climatic conditions. He says that as for democracy, “we -know that millions of men and women are disfranchised in this country -because of their race, color, or condition of economic servitude.” -But if by reason of the passive attitude toward the war advocated by -Dr. Hutchins, this country should fall under Hitler’s power, whether -directly, with der Fuehrer in Washington, or indirectly with der -Fuehrer’s Gauleiter, chosen from the America First Committee as our -President, all of America’s 133,000,000 men and women would be wholly -disfranchised. - -Dr. Hutchins says that we must abandon the Four Freedoms if we go -to war, and that “We cannot suppose, because civil liberties were -restricted in the last war and expanded after it, that we can rely -on their revival after the next one.” Why not? If we cannot rely on -experience, what can we rely on? In every war the United States has -ever fought we have delegated to the executive the powers necessary -to win victory and afterward we have always taken them back, but -without even an argument, much less any forcible attempt to prevent -such action. Dr. Hutchins says, “If we go to war we cast away our -opportunity and cancel our gains. For a generation, perhaps for -hundreds of years, we shall not be able to struggle back to where we -were. In fact, the changes that total war will bring may mean that -we shall never be able to struggle back. Education will cease. Its -place will be taken by vocational and military training. The effort to -establish a democratic community will stop. We shall think no more of -justice, of the moral order and the supremacy of human rights. We shall -have hope no longer.” - -Why should these things happen to us if they have never happened in -past wars? Because, says Dr. Hutchins, “this war, if we enter it, -will make the last one look like a stroll in the park.” But has the -war done any of these things to Britain? On the contrary it is the -unanimous judgment of observers of Britain in wartime that the British -are more just, humane, democratic, and obedient to a higher moral -regime than ever before in their history. The British are nearer their -enemy and more deeply immersed in total war than we can ever be. Why -should we be expected to fare worse than the British? - -Dr. Hutchins expresses concern for “suffering humanity” and declares -we could best serve it by staying out of war, and extending aid to -Britain and China “on the basis most likely to keep us at peace -and least likely to involve us in war.” Is it really helpful to -suffering humanity in Britain, China, France, Russia, Norway, Poland, -Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Holland, Belgium, Austria, yes and in Italy -and Germany itself, to practice a policy directed solely to avoiding -conflict with the author of the misery of half the world? - -Aside from that, there is only one choice before America now and the -choice is not between going to war or not going to war. The choice -today is between going to war in time to win it, and going to war too -late to win it. We can best serve “suffering humanity” by attempting -with all the strength of our bodies and souls to destroy the prime, -immediate mundane cause of humanity’s suffering. Finally, Dr. Hutchins -declares that the argument that we should go to war now when we have -Britain to help us, to avoid having to go to war later, when we should -have to face the whole world alone, rests on the improvable assumptions -that Britain must fall and that the totalitarian powers will wish to, -and be able to, and will attack us. We could debate on these grounds -and make a strong case for even this simplest, most direct form of -possible events. But the argument for war now does not rest alone on -this succession of possible events. - -Germany may not be able to conquer Britain, but Britain may become so -weary and so convinced that she cannot defeat Germany without us, -and so persuaded that we shall never come into the war, that Britain -might make a negotiated peace. Such a peace would be as disastrous to -us as a lost war; to prevent it is as strong a motive for our going -to war now as is the motive of preventing the actual fall of Britain. -Again, unless Britain falls or makes a negotiated peace, how is any -kind of peace to come to the world? By Britain’s defeating Germany? -No, if Russia falls or defects, Britain alone certainly cannot conquer -Germany; no informed person thinks it possible. Does Dr. Hutchins think -Britain could? Does he think it would be desirable to allow Bolshevik -Russia the credit and opportunity of the land conquest of Germany, -which by now is Europe? - -Failing to enter the war, we have to face the alternatives; First: Fall -of Britain followed by Axis economic, political, and military attack -on the Western Hemisphere and probable American defeat by Nazis within -as well as without. Second: A negotiated peace between Britain and -Germany; followed by Nazi attack on the Western Hemisphere as before. -Third: Defeat of Germany by Britain at sea and in the air, and by -Russia on land; followed by Russian Communism throughout Europe. Does -Dr. Hutchins believe this a desirable end, or that the United States -would remain immune from its effects? Fourth: An interminable deadlock -in Europe with the entire world from year to year slipping backward -politically, economically, and morally with no prospect of anything -except more ruined cities, more starving people, more dead from battle -and bombardment, famine and pestilence. Is it helping suffering -humanity to remain aloof and permit any of these alternatives to come -to pass? - - -Q. _Why do you think we ought to go to war with Germany today?_ - -A. Because until Nazi Germany is defeated the world will never be safe -for us to live in; because it will require the total war effort of the -United States and Britain and Russia to defeat Germany; and because our -formal declaration of war would be worth more in the struggle against -Germany than all the material aid we shall be able to send the Allies -for the next year or more. - - -Q. _But wouldn’t it be better to wait and let Hitler declare war on us?_ - -A. It would best serve our interests if Hitler would declare war, -but since he knows this is true, he is not likely to do so under any -provocation. I should think he would hesitate to declare war even if -we were to have a pitched naval battle and sink his ships and announce -it. He knows that even if our Navy is fighting his, there is still a -body of American public opinion which is opposed to the participation -of our Army in an A.E.F. He knows that if he declared war it would help -immensely to unify the American people. He might go into a fury and -declare war, but it would be unlike him. Behind all his tantrums there -is usually calculation. - - -Q. _But isn’t our present state of “undeclared war” just as effective -as being formally at war? Why would our declaration of war be worth so -much immediately?_ - -A. Because of its moral effect upon ourselves, our enemies, and our -friends. We can talk all we like about being in a state of undeclared -war, but until we are formally at war we will continue to behave -as though we were at peace. Only by going to war can we discipline -ourselves, our workingmen, and our employers to defeat the Axis in -the battle of production. At this moment when Britain and Germany are -devoting four hours of each working day to making arms, we are devoting -thirty minutes to making arms. Only by going to war can our citizens’ -army get the morale to be a fighting force. - -On the Germans the effect of our declaration of war would be -catastrophic. Every German would say to himself, “Now we can’t win; -we can hold on for a long time, perhaps, but we can’t win.” On the -Italians the effect would be to depress their feeble efforts still -further toward zero. - -On the British the effect would be to give them what they lack and what -they most need: the assurance of victory. The British are convinced -that they cannot be defeated, but how are they going to defeat the -Germans without the United States actively in the war? - -Upon the Soviet Union the effect would be to strengthen the resolution -of Stalin and the Russian people not to make a compromise peace nor -succumb to any of the temptations Hitler may offer; and the longer the -Red Army fights the Germans the fewer sacrifices will have to be made -by the United States to help win the war. - -To France our declaration of war would bring the will to live again. -Belief in eventual German victory over Britain was the basis upon which -the French surrendered. It was the foundation of Vichy’s policy. Our -declaration of war might not change Pétain and his men of Vichy, for -they are prisoners of their own deeds, and probably cannot withdraw -from their fatal collaboration with the Germans, but it would move -the people of France profoundly. Pétain does not represent the people -of France. I believe far more in the spirit of my French friend who -wrote me: “Soon we shall all be starving, but send no food. When we are -starving will be a good moment to throw by parachute on every French -farm and on the suburbs of Paris thousands of small machine guns, -with the necessary bullets. Then the German Army will be in France -as Napoleon’s Army was in Spain in 1813.” America’s entry into the -war would be worth to Frenchmen like this more than machine guns. It -would give them the certainty that France will live again. General de -Gaulle’s army would swell by the tens of thousands. - -We could reckon on the possibility of being able to occupy the -strategic positions we need in North Africa and on any other -advantages within the power of the French to give us. We could for the -first time anticipate serious revolt by the peoples of all the occupied -territories when the time came; and help for the Allied Expeditionary -Force which some day must invade the continent. All the enslaved -peoples would be equally affected. The Nazi Terror works perfectly so -long as its victims feel that it is hopeless to revolt. Revolt becomes -possible only when the victims feel that they can afford to risk all, -since freedom will eventually be the reward. - -A very important effect of our declaration of war upon Germany would -be the effect upon Japan. The Japanese mental processes are difficult -indeed to understand but I venture to guess that if they saw us -formally aligned with the British for the duration, they would be -likely to take a milder rather than stronger attitude toward us. -Needing principally smaller vessels in the Atlantic, we could base our -main Battle Fleet on Singapore and confidently await any move Japan -might make. Our declaration of war might well force Japan out of the -Axis. - -China, like Britain, would be given the most precious possession in -warfare, the assurance of final victory. For even if Japan continued -to fight China, once the Allies’ main task was performed and Germany -defeated, the combined British and American navies could be counted -on to bring Japan back to reason without much difficulty. On all the -other countries, as neutral Portugal, non-belligerent Spain, encapsuled -Sweden and Switzerland, the effect of our going to war would be -revolutionary. Our South American friends would become even better -neighbors. All over the world the conviction that now Germany will -be defeated would become the decisive element in the policy of every -government. - - -Q. _But would we really go to work if we did declare war? Britain -didn’t at first and neither did France. What makes you think we would?_ - -A. You are right. It took Dunkirk to wake Britain up and France never -did awake; she passed without regaining consciousness from deep sleep -to death. Perhaps we too would not awaken even if we went to war, but -we will never awaken until we do go to war. Most nations in this war -have remained curiously apathetic until their first battle experience; -this may be true of us. But the fact of our being actively belligerent -would be bound to improve our spirit since it would put our moral -position right. Ever since the beginning of the war we Americans -have suffered from a divided personality. Half of our minds clung -to the idea that we could keep at peace if we wished for peace hard -enough, and this half declared: “It is not our war.” This half of our -minds made the Neutrality Act. The other half of our minds realized -all along that we should have been in the war from the beginning, -that Hitler was fighting to conquer the world, that it was for us a -matter of life or death to keep him from succeeding and that every -consideration of self-interest, as of honor, urged us to take our full -part in the world-wide struggle against the new Barbarism. This half -was responsible for the Lease-Lend Bill, a half-measure, condemned by -the very definition: “All aid to Britain _short of war_!” Our souls -remained divided, and this division has made us an ailing nation, -hypochondriac, complaining of low morale, nervous, and subject to fits -of depression alternating with elation. We are unreasonably discouraged -or cheered as the tide of battle ebbs and flows, and always we try to -interpret whatever happens as a sign at last that we do not have to do -our duty, that after all we can get out of this task, so onerous, so -painful, and so unavoidable. - -Completely opposite arguments are employed to prove that we may escape -our obligation. If the British suffer a setback, up goes the cry: “The -British are already beaten; there’s no use trying to save them now; -let’s not throw good money after bad.” If the British win a victory, -there is a rousing cheer: “The British are winning without us; thank -God now we will not have to fight.” When I came home from the Battle -of Britain, it struck me as it had struck many others who have come to -America from the war zone, that we were far more nervous and agitated -than the peoples at war, even and especially more than those under -actual heavy bombardment. Eve Curie, that admirable French patriot and -gallant fighter for civilization, who was one of our group when we -escaped from France, put it perfectly when she said: “There is no fear -in the countries which are fighting. Extraordinarily enough, fear has -gone somewhere else, to the countries which are not menaced, to the -countries ‘at peace.’” - -Is there any reason to suppose that our reactions would be -substantially different from those of the peoples at war? Once we -take a bold stand for the position we know to be just, right, and -inevitable, we shall for the first time since this war began, lose our -fear and become well, strong, hopeful, and proud. The sense of guilt -which has made us nationally unhappy will leave us and we shall rejoice -in a clear conscience. - - -Q. _What effect would our declaring war have upon the morale of the -Army, particularly on that of the selectees, which has been criticized -so much?_ - -A. Going to war would unquestionably cure all the troubles of the Army -sooner or later. It is not our soldiers’ fault if today in peacetime -they are restless and discontented at being compelled to do what must -seem to them very like playing at being soldiers. Would the spirit of a -football team be good if the team did nothing but practice football all -day long, month in and month out, and never played a game, and had no -games scheduled? What would be the spirit of a cast of players if they -had rehearsals every day for months and never staged a performance to -an audience, and had no performances scheduled? - - -Q. _From your travel throughout the country have you formed any -impression of what the morale of the Army actually is?_ - -A. Yes, from personal observation, I have reluctantly had to admit the -impression that many of the selectees, at any rate, do not understand -why they are in the Army, nor why there should be conscription, nor why -their period of service was extended. In a word, they have no desire -to fight. Now this could be a most serious matter, since any nation -is doomed if its youth, or any considerable number of them, are not -willing to fight for it, yet this mood would vanish on our entry into -war. The boys are not to blame. To blame are all the leaders who have -confused and deceived them, the teachers who taught them pacifism and -the isolationist politicians who do the work of Hitler. One of the -elements most confusing in the Army mind is the promise rashly made in -the presidential campaign that we should never engage in a “foreign -war,” a promise no American should have made because nobody except -Hitler had the power to fulfill it. - -Now we are paying the penalty democracy always has to pay for hypocrisy -and for deceptions in elections. The penalty is the state of mind -exposed in a questionnaire taken at Camp Callan, San Diego, among -selectees, and published with elation by an isolationist journal. The -soldiers answered: (a) Should the United States go to war with the Axis -immediately? Affirmative, 1 per cent. (b) Should the United States -continue its policy of all-out economic aid to Britain and expand -America’s military and naval forces in order to fight the Axis powers -overseas if the Axis powers are not defeated by Britain? Affirmative, -25 per cent. (c) Should the United States guard the Western Hemisphere -but send no military aid outside this area? Affirmative, 39 per cent. -(d) Should the United States be strictly neutral and prepare to defend -only our own territory and possessions? Affirmative, 37 per cent. -These answers would have distressed Count Leo Tolstoy if Tolstoy were -an American living today. - -Tolstoy, who was as great a student of war as he was a novelist, has -a formula whereby he could interpret this poll and give us a rough -estimate of the military effectiveness of an army made up of soldiers -with the attitude revealed by this questionnaire. In _War and Peace_, -his epic novel on Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, he says: “_In warfare_ -the force of armies is the product of the mass multiplied by something -else, an unknown X. X is the spirit of the army, the greater or less -_desire to fight_ and to face dangers on the part of all the men -composing the army.” Note that Tolstoy says “_desire_ to fight” not -just “_willingness_ to fight.” The emphasis is on the positive desire -not passive willingness. This is another way to express the paramount -importance of morale. What is morale? It is knowing what you have to -fight about and having the desire to fight for it. But only one per -cent of the selectees questioned indicated they knew what they had to -fight about and desired to fight; one-third thought we ought to be -“strictly neutral,” and three-fourths were against fighting anywhere -outside of our hemisphere. - - -Q. _The selectees evidently had been influenced by the arguments for -passive hemisphere defense, but what do you think of the argument that -we should never fight on foreign soil, but if we have to fight, let it -be in America?_ - -A. It reminds me of the Chinese and the Japanese soldiers at the -beginning of their war. I saw the fall of Shanghai, and I couldn’t help -but remark that while the Chinese soldier said, “I will die for China,” -the Japanese soldier said, “I will kill for Japan,” and so for a long -time the two got along perfectly together. For every American who may -declare, “I don’t want to fight on foreign soil; if I have to fight I -want to fight only at home,” there is a German who declares, “I don’t -want to fight at home; I fight only on foreign soil,” as the Germans -have consistently done to the best of their ability for the last -hundred years. May we never accommodate the Germans in this respect. -Surely of all the isolationist arguments this is the least intelligent, -to prefer that the fearful destruction of war be wrought on our own -homes. It is an argument you will never hear in our Southern states. - - -Q. _What should we do with conscientious objectors?_ - -A. Reason with them. Many honest conscientious objectors can be -converted by the right kind of reasoning, and the more honest they -are the easier it is to straighten out their misunderstandings. If -this fails then they ought to be given work to do at some enterprise -of national interest, and be compelled to do it, as the government is -now doing in its camps for conscientious objectors. If they refuse to -register, they go to jail, as no government could afford to tolerate -deliberate defiance of its laws. We as a democracy must observe the -rights even of a minority which would bring ruin upon the country -if its policies were to rule. This is something we can be proud of, -something that marks us more than any other one thing as different -from the tyrannous Nazi state where conscientious objectors and every -variety of pacifist or obstructionist is put to death. We can afford -to treat our objectors as we would defectives. Hitler has to kill his. -He held from the beginning that pacifists were the greatest danger -to the state, and from the moment he came to power he has sought out -and executed every German pacifist who has revealed himself. Hitler -thus proves he feels that pacifist doctrine would be dangerous to his -regime, as it would. - -The German nation is being led by Hitler in _aggressive_ war. -Opposition to aggressive war is a form of pacifism which makes sound -sense. The war we and the British are called upon to fight, a war -we did not want but are compelled to carry on in order to save our -national lives, is a war that even a pacifist ought to support. -In this war the man who refuses to fight for his country is like -a person in a lifeboat who refuses to pull an oar. In England a -conscientious objector was asked at his examination whether he would -do non-combatant war work. He answered, “No.” The Judge asked “Would -you not help build an air-raid shelter?” The man answered, “No.” The -Judge then asked, “But if there were an air raid on would you go into -a shelter someone else had built?” The man answered, “Yes.” I wonder -how many of the 1,800 young Americans who have been classified as -conscientious objectors would contend that this is honest, and yet -it is fundamentally the attitude of all conscientious objectors. The -nation shelters the lives, liberty, and property of all its citizens. -Everyone living in the nation is enjoying this protection. Everyone has -a primary obligation to help maintain it. In England today, however, -the government permits more than 40,000 registered conscientious -objectors to enjoy the protection of the air-raid shelters, and of the -Royal Air Force, Army, and Navy, without contributing to it. Is this -not a tribute to the invincible liberalism of Anglo-Saxon democracy? - -The conscientious objector had a better case in almost all other wars -than he has in this one. The modern pre-Hitler war had a superficial -course something like this: The victor occupied the vanquished country, -made a peace treaty, collected an indemnity, then withdrew to his -own country with what loot he could carry. A part of the vanquished -country might be annexed to the victor. The defeated nation smarted -under the humiliation but in time the population resumed its ordinary -life, and within a few years a stranger could hardly find signs of any -change as a result of the loss of the war. A pacifist might argue that -under these circumstances it would pay not to resist since the loss by -fighting would be greater than the loss by nonresistance, considerable -though that might be. This is not that kind of war. Hitler does not -intend to restore the sovereignty of the nations he conquers. All -Hitler’s wars are more or less Carthaginian. For as long as Hitler -remains the master, his vanquished will be slave states, with their -citizens chained to the Nazi machine, their women degraded, their -religion persecuted, their schools closed, their books burned, and -all this will continue until Hitler is overcome by force. It is not a -choice between greater or lesser evils. It is a choice between life and -death, for those who physically survive under the Hitler tyranny are -condemned to a living death, as the Poles can testify. - -Most of the great pacifist leaders have been converted by their -observation of Hitler. Albert Einstein was thought of as the world’s -greatest pacifist, but he abandoned the doctrine of non-violence after -only a few months spent under the Hitler regime before he escaped to -America. On his way here Einstein passed through Belgium and in an -interview published in a Brussels newspaper declared: “If I were a -young Belgian today, I would not refuse military service.” From a man -who all his life had been a militant pacifist, taking part in world -campaigns against war, this statement ought to persuade any young -man. Britain’s leading pacifist, Bertrand Russell, has likewise been -persuaded to give up his “isolationism” and to advocate that we give -up ours, because the airplane, annihilating distances, has made it -impossible for any nation “to secure peace for itself by isolation.” -But Hitler is more persuasive, it seems to me. - -Hitler writes that the Germans “will give what many blinded pacifists -hope to get by moaning and crying,” namely, “a peace, supported not by -the palm branches of tearful pacifist professional female mourners, but -founded by the victorious sword of a people of overlords which puts -the world into the service of a higher culture.” And again he wrote: -“Indeed the pacifist-humane idea is perhaps quite good whenever the -man of the highest standard has previously conquered and subjected the -world to a degree that makes him the only master of this globe.” That -is surely clear enough to convince the most conscientious objector that -if everyone refused to fight Hitler he would conquer the world, and as -President Conant of Harvard says, men would have no more freedom than -horses have now. It is not pleasant to have to agree with Hitler, but -one must admit he defined the conscientious objector correctly when he -declared the healthy, unspoiled boy would willingly give his life for -his country and thus “obeys the deeper necessity of the preservation -of the species, if necessary at the expense of the individual,” while -the pacifist egotistically puts his interest ahead of the nation. The -charge of cowardice is easy to make, and I for one shall not make it. -I prefer to think of most conscientious objectors as men who have not -thought the problem through. After all, one of them was named Sergeant -York. - - -Q. _Why don’t we have a department in our Army to tell the soldiers why -they are in uniform?_ - -A. We have a morale section in the Army but it cannot operate -effectively until we are at war. It is forbidden to discuss “politics” -with the soldiers and it would be “politics” now to explain that they -are in uniform to fight the Germans. Yet nothing could be more valuable -for our war effort than to have qualified men visit each army camp, -and after a series of public lectures on America and the war, conduct -a question-and-answer period, followed by individual conferences with -soldiers interested enough to ask for them. Officers would probably -benefit as much from such instruction as the men. - -One of the most useful departments of the German Army is its morale -section which teaches a recruit above all things to be proud to be a -soldier, and that it is the highest honor for him to be permitted to -fight for his country. It is my impression that we would have to be -even more elementary than that. Some American youths need to have it -explained that from time immemorial the young men of a family, a tribe, -or a nation have been by nature required to be its physical defenders; -that the old men, women, and children have other duties to perform, -but the young men are the only ones strong enough to go out and fight. -Statements as simple as that are necessary after our last twenty years -of pacifism and materialism. Too many times young men have asked me why -they should fight for a society they do not approve, a society which -does not provide them with good jobs and a comfortable life. The answer -is that if they do not understand now, Hitler will provide a sufficient -explanation later, as the pacifist students of the University of Paris -found out when the Germans occupied their city and shot a score of them -as a lesson. - -Hitler will make it plain that this is no class war. Hitler will make -it clear that it is a simple tribal war of a brute soldier-state bent -upon the subjugation of all other states and peoples, good, bad, or -indifferent, and of all classes. The English have learned this is no -class war and every kind of Englishman, rich and poor alike, are united -now in one great fighting tribe. Our youth could learn from the example -of the youth of conquered Europe that if they do not successfully -defend their country, imperfect though it may be, they will be -conquered and cast into slavery. - -It would be useful to point out that this generation of American youth -is alive and enjoying the privileges of this country because other -young men years ago and centuries ago fought and defeated the enemies -of America. It would clear up many a young soldier’s difficulties if -he were given an explanation in the simplest language of the origins -and issues of the war. Many of them hardly know the bare facts of who -is fighting whom. The American soldier has a right to be given the -overwhelming evidence that Germany intends to destroy the American form -of life, and subjugate us if she can; and that just now while Britain -and Russia are absorbing so much German energy is the best time for -us to defend ourselves by the only method of defense that has ever -succeeded, by attack; by striking with all the power we possess at the -enemy while he is still far from our shores. The American soldier -should understand that much as we may wish for it, there is little -hope that Britain and Russia alone could defeat the mighty German war -machine, built as it was during the nine years while we slept. He -should understand that this means we must fight in Europe, help destroy -the German Air Force, invade the continent, and finally occupy Germany; -that this will require every available resource of muscle and money and -brain and blood and several more years of war, but that the reward for -this immense payment is the immense reward of freedom. The American -soldier has a right to have outlined to him the kind of world Hitler -would make if he won; and the kind of world we hope to make if we win. -This is the ABC of war, and it is what our soldiers desperately need, -but it is unlikely that they will get it until we go to war. - -It takes a great deal of re-education to counter the last two decades -of intellectual rule by our “Irresponsibles,”--professors, writers, -artists, and scholars who debunked our past history and every ideal, -taught that man’s economic life is all that matters, that soldiers are -suckers, that we fought the last war for J. P. Morgan, and so on until -bewildered American boys exclaimed: “My country owes me a living; I -owe it nothing.” Yet that is not youth’s natural way. Hitler won the -German youth not by offering them fun or comfort or material reward; he -appealed to them to sacrifice themselves for their Fatherland, and they -responded joyously, “like demons,” as Colonel Schieffer said. Nobody -can persuade me that our American youth would not respond even more -joyously to an honest appeal, but the appeal has to be clear, simple, -ringing as the notes of a bugle in the morning. Let the cynics and the -selfish jibe, but American youth will eventually respond to the call of -President Roosevelt for the Four Freedoms, not just for themselves, but -for all the world. - - -Q. _But weren’t we suckers in the last war?_ - -A. No, we were not suckers in the last war. By fighting and beating -Germany in the last war, side by side with our Allies, we won -twenty-three years of national independence. - - -Q. _But didn’t we fight the last war to “make the world safe for -democracy” and to “end all war”? We certainly failed to do either. -Weren’t we suckers to have tried and failed?_ - -A. Don’t you think it was worth while for us to gain the right to live -in peace and freedom from 1918 to 1939 even if we failed to achieve -our whole program? We did not fight the last war just “to make the -world safe for democracy” or to “end all war.” We fought the last -war primarily to make the world safe for the United States, and we -succeeded in that for a good many years. The world has not been safe -for democracy everywhere for a score of years, but only now do we find -it necessary to fight again because only now has it become plain that -the world is again no longer safe for the United States. In the last -war we fought first to preserve America, second to make the world safe -for democracy, and to end war. In this war we are fighting first to -preserve America, second to establish the Four Freedoms everywhere we -can, but we modestly refrain this time from announcing that we expect -to end war. Instead we have much more practically declared that when we -win we will disarm the nations that made this war. - - -Q. _But what difference would it have made to us if we had not entered -the last war at all?_ - -A. It would have meant that the Germans probably would have won the -war. The Commander in Chief of the Allies, Foch, and the actual -Commander in Chief of the Germans, Ludendorff, both admitted that the -American entry into the war was decisive. It was not that America “won -the war,” but that without us the Allies could not have won. - - -Q. _Suppose the Germans had won the last war; what difference would -that have made to us?_ - -A. If the Germans had won, we should certainly have had to fight -them thereafter and fight them alone. We may have had a few years -respite, long enough for the German Navy to become strong enough to -challenge ours. The general situation today is parallel with the one in -1914-1918, except that Hitler’s Germany is much more powerful and evil -than Hohenzollern Germany. Nevertheless Kaiser Wilhelm had the same -ambition Hitler has. He believed also that the Germans were a master -race, with a divine mission to rule the world. The Germans came late -to nationhood, too late to receive “their share” of the colonies. This -helped give them a bitter sense of resentment against a world which -refused to recognize their superiority. This German belief that they -are superior to everyone on earth is unfortunately strengthened by the -fact that in this industrial age they are among the most talented of -all peoples, and in the natural sciences superior to most others. They -have proved themselves incorrigible except by force. - - -Q. _Some people argue though, that Hitler actually wants the United -States to come into the war, so that we would keep our war supplies, -instead of sending them to England and to Russia. Is this true?_ - -A. How could it ever have been true, since Hitler always, at any -moment, could have brought us into the war if and when he wished. He -has only to order one or more of his transatlantic submarines to come -over and sink a few American ships in our territorial waters and even -a pacifist Congress would vote war. A score of other easy devices have -always been at his hand if he wanted war with us, but wished us to -declare it. But why should he wish to bring against him the greatest -single potential power, even if he thought that our entering formal war -would cause us to withhold supplies from Britain and Russia? And what -is there anyway to make anybody think that if we ever became sensible -enough to go to war we would at the same time become so unintelligent -as to cripple the war effort against our enemy? What point would there -be in withholding supplies from Britain and Russia just because we had -gone to war with Germany? Would we in the United States be in any more -danger after having gone to war than before? No, we would actually be -safer, since the safety afforded us by the British Fleet’s control of -the Atlantic would now be augmented by removal of all limitation on the -use of the extra power of our own Atlantic vessels. Suppose, however, -that we thought it desirable for a time to curtail some shipments to -the Allies while we filled in certain gaps in our own armament. Could -this temporary diversion of strength outweigh the danger to Hitler of -America’s strength in the long run? - -I venture to say that this argument against our going to war has done -as much harm as almost any other, and upon examination it seems it must -have been of German origin, despite the fact that many a good American -and even some good Englishmen have thoughtlessly repeated it. The -person most competent to judge whether Hitler wants us in the war is -Hitler. As I recently recollected when looking over some old clippings, -Hitler in an interview in 1932 expressed it to me this way: “I was -a soldier in the war and it was my conviction that without American -participation on the side of the Allies, we would surely have won the -war.” This is what he thought of America in the last war. You may be -sure he thinks exactly the same of America in this war. - - -Q. _But the Germans have frequently expressed not merely indifference -but contempt of us, and have spoken as though they did not care -whether we entered or not. Isn’t it then an exaggeration to say that -our declaration of war would have such a tremendous effect on their -morale?_ - -A. No, because the Germans have expressed indifference to whether we -enter the war only because they were absolutely convinced that we would -not do so; when we do enter the war it will be an even greater shock -than if they had anticipated it all the time. Our official behavior -for a long time, and the utterances of our isolationists all the time, -led the Nazis to believe we were really for peace at any price; that -nothing, neither injury nor insult, could move us to war. When the -first Neutrality Act was passed in August, 1935, the Germans, as I have -recently been reminded by a friend who was in Berlin at the moment, -chortled with glee, and editorials boasted that now Europe could settle -its troubles secure from the meddlesome Yankee. No one can estimate -how much influence this surrender of American rights had upon Hitler -during that critical time when he was weighing his strength against all -his possible enemies. The Germans are convinced we are a money-loving -people and when the Johnson Act was passed, forbidding credit to any -nation in default on payment of its debt to us, they exclaimed: “Now -the Americans will never go to war again because they can’t make money -out of it.” - -The Johnson Act almost persuaded some Germans that we had changed -sides, and Nazis revived their chatter about the essentially Germanic -character of America. We Americans may be wishful thinkers, but the -Germans, fortunately, are even more addicted to the vice than we. -Goebbels’ control of the press promotes it. Every isolationist speech -made is printed at length in the German newspapers and the voice -of Lindbergh is taken as the voice of America. The re-election of -Roosevelt was the first warning the German people had that America -might act to defend herself. Now sensible Germans are beginning to be -frightened. I know how the German people regard America. They call it -the “land of unlimited possibilities.” It has always been the dreamland -of the Germans, and if our immigration laws had permitted it, we should -have had tens of millions of Germans coming to this country after the -war. The tremendous size and economic power of America fascinate all -classes of Germans; they have never forgotten the shock they received -when, after the armistice in 1918, they learned for the first time what -their government had concealed from them, that there were over two -million American soldiers in France. Hitler tried to stamp out German -admiration or regard for any foreign country, and doubtless German -successes in this war have influenced the German attitude to a degree, -but the fundamental element in German thought about America is their -ineffaceable memory of the last war: “America joined our enemies; we -lost. If America goes to war against us again, we cannot win.” It would -be decisive. - - -Q. _But where would we fight Germany? What is the good of America’s -entering the war if there is no battleground?_ - -A. We would fight her first where we are fighting her now, in the -Atlantic and on all the seas. The difference between our naval action -if we were at war and as it is under the President’s orders to hunt -down pirates, would be considerable. At war we would fully collaborate -with the British Navy in the critical waters along the coast of Europe -and in the zone of greatest danger just west of England where the -Germans sink about nine-tenths of their victims. The reason the Germans -have been so much more effective in counter-blockading England in this -war than they were in the last war is of course the airplane, which not -only bombs and sinks as many ships as the submarine, but also provides -the submarine with eyes in the air. - -Our air force, and especially our naval air force, greatly augmented -after our entry into the war, would play a large role in cleansing -the air of these German raiders. Eventually our air force operating -with the R.A.F. and based wherever the R.A.F. is based would, we hope, -become strong enough to dominate the air over the continent. That is -the goal toward which all efforts lead; it would be the turning point -of the war. Experts estimate that it will probably take two years to -reach quantitative superiority over the Germans, and then only if we -are not only formally at war but actually making war with all our might. - -The site of the battlefields after the winning of the Battle of the -Atlantic and the Battle of Britain, depends upon too many unknown -factors to make more than a guess now. Possible landing places for an -expeditionary force extend from Norway to the Spanish frontier, North -Africa, the Near East, and the Balkans. There are also the immense -possibilities opened by the Battle of Russia. In considering the -possibilities of success for an expeditionary force to invade German -Europe we ought not to be discouraged by the failure of the Allies -in Norway, Greece, and Crete, because the German Army’s morale and -strength will be quite different whenever the conditions for invasion -of the continent exist. It was the German Air Force which, more than -any other factor, defeated the Allies in these three early affrays. - -When the Luftwaffe has lost control of the daylight air and the German -Army is still further weakened by its colossal losses in Russia, and -the German people are weighed down by the fear of ultimate defeat and -apprehension of vengeance, and the population of conquered Europe, -elated at the prospect of liberation, is revolting, the chances of -success for an Allied Expeditionary Force would be strong. Military -experts are agreed that it would court disaster to try it before these -conditions are fulfilled. Ever since the Battle of Russia began, -impatient groups in England have clamored for an immediate attempt at -invasion of the continent, and one can imagine how painful it must -be for the perpetually aggressive Churchill to be forced to counsel -prudence. He knows that if such an attempt were made and failed it -could be fatal. On the other hand, if the Allied High Command waits for -the favorable circumstances which are to be expected if we enter the -war, we could justly hope not only to be able to invade the continent -successfully but at low cost. - - -Q. _Would United States troops be required for such an expeditionary -force? Are we going to have another A.E.F.?_ - -A. I should think so, although one must admit the bare possibility that -the Battle of Russia could make our participation with land troops less -necessary militarily, although the political reasons for our entry -would be strongest if the Red Army were winning. If the Russians were -to whittle down the German land army sufficiently, the British might -become strong enough eventually to deliver the knockout blow alone, but -I doubt it. There are just twice as many Germans as there are English, -and numbers still count, as we observe in Russia. A cool appraisal of -the future indicates that the chances are against our being able to -win the war without sending an A.E.F. If we go to war, it cannot be -with any reservations. We cannot make war on a limited liability basis. -There are strong reasons also for us to want to be represented in the -armies of liberation. By the time matters have reached the stage for -contemplation of an invasion of Europe, the temper of America may have -so changed that there may be a great popular demand for an A.E.F. - - -Q. _What are the strong reasons for our wanting to be represented with -the armies of liberation?_ - -A. In order to be fully represented at the peace. There is no -substitute for an army at a Peace Conference, and we may be sure that, -no matter what arrangements may be made between Mr. Churchill and Mr. -Roosevelt, if we are not in the war we will not be in the peace. There -were many jokes about the famous eight-point meeting to the effect -that we were trying to get in the peace before we got in the war. I do -not agree that that was the purpose of Mr. Roosevelt in meeting Mr. -Churchill, but if it were, it is unlikely to succeed. We will have the -influence we wish to have at the peace conference only if we have done -our full share in making peace possible by beating Hitler. We ought -not to deceive ourselves. We are unpopular enough as it is now. If we -stay out of the war, and by a miracle not now foreseeable, Hitler were -after all to be defeated, what do you think the victors would think of -us? Do you think they would invite us to come in and tell them how to -rearrange the world? - -Yet if we do not look forward to establishing a peace which will -postpone for a long time, if not forever, a repetition of this war, -many Americans would feel too discouraged to act. We would be foolish -not to fight the Germans now even if we were mathematically certain -that we were going to have to go on fighting them once every twenty -years for the rest of time. Nevertheless we do not want to face such a -prospect; we want to rule out war for as long a time as possible, and -we can do it only by repairing at this Peace Conference the errors made -after the last one. - -These errors were not what they have been represented to be, faults -in the Versailles treaty. The mistake we made was that we dodged our -responsibility for the peace after we had helped finish the war. First -we invested our blood and treasure, and then after the victory, when -we were about to gather the dividends of international security and -prosperity in the League of Nations, suddenly, because everything in -the peace did not completely please us, and because a few politicians -hated the President, we withdrew and declined to collect our profits. -This ruined the peace, made the League impossible, and another war -certain. - - -Q. _How much American blood and treasure did we spend in the last war?_ - -A. Very little blood compared with our Allies. Out of our total -mobilized force of 4,355,000 we lost 126,000 dead of all causes, or -two and one-half per cent. Out of the total of 17,314,000 British and -French soldiers, 2,266,171 lost their lives, or 13 per cent. If we -had been compelled from 1914 on to fight as totally as our Allies, -with our population more than double the combined French and British -populations, we would have lost more than 2,000,000 dead during the -time we were leaving the fighting to our Allies, from 1914 to 1917. We -sent money instead; altogether our war loans totaled thirteen billion -dollars. It is fair to say that this investment of money took the place -of investment of lives. It cost us less than $7,000 apiece to save -2,000,000 American men’s lives. Any insurance company would call that -a bargain, considering the American man merely from the point of view -of what he is economically worth to his nation. Nevertheless we asked -for the thirteen billion back. At the same time we put up our tariffs -so high that the nations concerned could not pay, but aside altogether -from the economic aspect of our war debts, consider what could have -happened had we been wiser. - -Suppose, at an appropriate period after passions had subsided, we -had proposed to Britain and France that we cancel the war debts if -they would cancel the reparations owed by Germany. There was a time -when such a proposal might have succeeded. What would have been -the probable, or at any rate possible, outcome? No war debts, no -reparations, no inflation in Germany, no Hitler, no war now. Even if -there were only a chance of such miraculous results, it would have -been well worth trying, since the actual results of our unenlightened -egotism were that we were never paid the money anyway, and the chain of -reparations--inflation--Hitler--brought us to this war upon which we -are planning already to spend as a mere first installment four times -as much as the whole sum we lent the Allies and lost in the last war. -It is significant that the very men who urged that we press without -respite for full payment of our World War debts, and thus helped make -this war inevitable, are the very men who today continue to try to make -America shirk her responsibilities. - - -Q. _Do you think a new League of Nations could be successful, since the -old one failed so miserably?_ - -A. Yes, if we do our duty and make it possible for the League to work. -We blew the old League up when we refused to join it, and rejected the -Versailles treaty and declined to join France and England in a treaty -of mutual guarantee. With us not participating, the League was doomed -from the start. Our withdrawal from Europe upset the balance of power -so heavily in Germany’s favor that France, and eventually Britain, had -to make out of the League a coalition against Germany. This they did. -Even so it failed to keep the peace because Germany was stronger than -all the League members together. Had we stayed in the League we might -have made collective security really work. - - -Q. _How could America have made the League work?_ - -A. There is a popular belief that Germany might have remained a good -neighbor and respectable member of society if the Weimar Republic had -been better treated by France and her Allies. I am not sure of that, -but if it is true, let us ask why France treated Germany harshly -throughout the life of the Weimar Republic. The answer is that France -was afraid of Germany, and as we see today, with good reason. The -French fear was based on the facts that there were twice as many -Germans as French, and that these Germans had just about beaten France -and all her Allies, including Great Britain, until the United States -stepped in. Obviously the French reasoned the United States’ protection -was indispensable to French security. Without the United States in -the League the French had to look for security elsewhere. They sought -it in encirclement of Germany and conversion of the League into an -anti-German alliance. - -If you object that the League is impracticable, let us ask what -there is to put in its place. I use the term League to indicate any -association of nations for collective security. Isolationism was our -policy from 1919 to 1941. Its failure has been cosmic. The group of -Senators and Congressmen who killed the League by preventing us from -joining it were as responsible as Hitler for the war today. Twenty-two -years later the political successors of Wilson’s “willful men” made it -appear to Hitler and Mussolini and the war party in Japan that we would -never stir and that aggressors could leave the United States completely -out of their reckoning. Many of these men in the Senate and the House -are today, as the isolationists were in 1919, actuated chiefly by an -ignoble hatred for their political opponent, the President. - -Carlton J. Hayes, professor of history at Columbia, says: “We were the -final determining factor in winning the last World War, but more than -any nation, even more than Nazi Germany, we have been responsible for -losing the peace and bringing on the present world war. We insisted -on our rights and spurned our duties. Victim ourselves of a bad kind -of narrow nationalism, we repudiated the League of Nations which our -President had fashioned and we thus set the pace for all of its later -floutings by other powers. Moreover we selfishly and shortsightedly -refused to forgive the inter-Allied debts and thereby prevented any -timely forgiving of the fateful German reparations. The result is that -Germany now has Hitler, while we are accumulating a debt for national -defense which makes the inter-Allied debts and the reparations of the -last war seem trivial.” - - -Q. _If we did defeat Germany, could we then return to the kind of -peaceful lives we led before this war began?_ - -A. No, but the defeat of Germany is the indispensable condition for -us to have any kind of tolerable life again. After this war, which is -likely to last many years still, we are going to be a different nation. -We are going to be more united than ever before. We are going to have -shared common dangers, hopes, and fears, and for the first time since -the Civil War we are going to rise above our materialism and act for an -ideal. - -We have never had to face real trouble together since the thirty -million new members of our family arrived between 1870 and 1930. We did -not really suffer in the first World War; we never had a chance to test -the strength of our arms or the temper of our spirit. How many times -have we heard the question asked, whether we were “really” a nation? -Now we shall have the chance to prove that we are. Now America will -come of age. - - - - -7. FIFTH COLUMNISTS - - -Q. _What makes Lindbergh the way he is?_ - -A. I am glad you asked this question because Lindbergh is our greatest -native individual threat to American safety and so deserves careful -scrutiny by his fellow citizens who some day may be compelled to decide -what to do with him. There is nothing to be gained by abusing him, nor -is there any merit in arguing that his sincerity ought to protect him -against the charge that he assists America’s Fifth Column. - -Hitler’s most effective Fifth Columnists in every country have for -the most part been sincere men, but their sincerity has not relieved -them of the verdict of the fellow citizens they betrayed, nor of the -verdict of history. The President of the United States has delivered -that verdict upon Lindbergh already. In the most polite and restrained -language he classified Colonel Lindbergh as a “Copperhead,” which was a -Civil War name for a man in the North who sympathized with the Southern -cause. Translated into today’s situation it would mean an American -citizen who sympathizes with the enemy of America, Germany. - -You recollect the President was asked why Lindbergh, who was given a -reserve commission in the Army Air Corps after his flight to Paris, had -not been called into active service. The President replied that during -the Civil War both sides let certain people go; that is, did not call -them into service. - -He said the people who were thus ignored were the Vallandighams, -and explained that the Vallandighams were the people who from -1863 on, urged immediate peace, arguing that the North could -not win the war between the states. The President’s reference to -Vallandigham sent many to their reference books where they found -that Clement Laird Vallandigham, an Ohio Congressman “in 1863, made -violent speeches against the administration and was arrested by the -military authorities, tried by military commission and sentenced to -imprisonment. President Lincoln commuted his sentence to banishment and -Vallandigham was sent into the Confederate lines, whence he made his -way to Canada.” - -President Roosevelt was choosing his word carefully, in order to get -the precise shade of meaning attributed to it. The President apparently -tried to find in American history as accurate a parallel to the -Lindbergh case as possible. His choice was significant. It would be -interesting to know if the President had in mind that when this country -is formally at war with Germany we shall incarcerate or deport members -of the community who for whatever reason and with whatever motives -hinder the prosecution of the war. The expulsion of Vallandigham to -the enemy’s territory raises the question of the physical possibility -as well as the political expediency of deporting our Fifth Columnists -to German-controlled territory after we are formally at war. Few of us -will dispute the desirability of just such a radical solution. - -Lindbergh replied to the President by resigning his commission in -a letter saying, “I had hoped that I might exercise my right as -an American citizen to place my viewpoint before the people of my -country in time of peace without giving up the privilege of serving my -country as an Air Corps officer in the event of war.” Thereafter many -professional critics of the President accused him of having attempted -to gag Lindbergh. But the very opposite is the case since if the -President had wanted to shut Lindbergh’s mouth, all he had to do was -to call him to active service where the rule is universal that serving -officers may not make public political statements. - -It should be remembered that Lindbergh, although a reserve officer, -had violently attacked his Commander in Chief’s actions in the field -of foreign policy, which naturally involves military affairs, and this -could certainly be regarded as a breach of discipline in the spirit if -not in the letter of the officers’ code. If President Roosevelt had -wished not only to muzzle, but to discipline Lindbergh, nothing would -have been easier than for the President to have ordered the Colonel to -duty in some obscure, remote, or unpleasant post, a frequent method of -discipline in the armed services of all countries. But the President -did nothing of the sort. On the contrary, by accepting Lindbergh’s -resignation he released the flyer from any hindrance to the free speech -which he has since been exercising so vigorously. - -But Lindbergh is far more dangerous to American security than was -Vallandigham a danger to the Union in our Civil War. Lindbergh is -already the avowed candidate of our enormous crop of Copperheads for -the Presidency of the United States. He has the applause of the enemies -of democracy and of the United States throughout the world. A Belgian -businessman, a devout “collaborationist” with the Nazis, told a friend -of mine recently, “Lindbergh will be the next President of the United -States. He could get along splendidly with Hitler. We are all for him.” -By “We” this Belgian meant the entire herd of Hitler followers, from -his own disciplined legions to the servile rabble of Vichy France and -the Copperheads of the United States. Whether Lindbergh welcomes it or -not, he has the enthusiastic applause of the Nazi Bund, the Fascist -societies, and of all the most violently antidemocratic groups in this -country, from the followers of Father Coughlin to the most eccentric -Kluxers. - - -Q. _But are we being fair to Lindbergh in calling him a Copperhead and -a Fifth Columnist? Didn’t you say yourself that there is nothing to be -gained by abusing him?_ - -A. Yes, I maintain there is nothing to be gained by abusing him, but -there is much to be gained by identifying him. Nobody has done it any -better than the country’s wittiest enemy of our enemies, Alexander -Woollcott, in his “Voice from a Cracker Barrel” broadcast, when he -said: “By the pledges of both candidates in the last election, by -the testimony of every poll yet taken by Dr. Gallup, by the action -of our representatives in Congress and of the President himself, we -pledged full aid to England. Ex-Colonel Lindbergh now argues that this -assistance be withdrawn. - -“He wants us to break our promise in the matter, to run out on the -British, and, so curious is his mentality, he thinks to encourage us -in such base desertion by assuring us that England is going to be -defeated. On this point he may be right. I would not know about that. -Neither would he. If the words of our retired eagle ever reach as far -as England, Mr. Churchill must derive some comfort from his knowledge -that all fighters in a tight place have heard such talk since the world -began. Among Washington’s discomforts during the long winter at Valley -Forge was the repeated prediction from the Lindberghs of his day that -he didn’t have a chance. Yes, Lindbergh keeps announcing the doom of -England, and always his statement is received with cheers and bursts of -applause. This gives you a rough idea of what kind of people bulk large -in his mass meetings. - -“For here is a fact which Lindbergh and his colleagues of the America -First Committee must face. Whether they admit it or not, whether they -like it or not, whether, indeed, that is any part of their purpose, -they are working for Hitler. Have you any doubt--any doubt at all--that -Hitler would have been glad to pay Lindbergh an immense amount, -millions, for the work he has done in the past year? - -“Indeed, if Lindbergh shares the opinion of Hitler held by the rest -of us--on this point, to be sure, he has thus far been ominously -silent--his heart must skip a beat when, in the still watches of the -night, he realizes that if he had returned to this country as Hitler’s -paid and trusted agent, his public activity would have been in every -particular just what it has been to date. - -“Now don’t get me wrong about this. I doubt that Lindbergh has taken or -would take German money. It so happens that we do not know, and, thanks -to the reticence of General Wood, have been unable to find out just -who has put up all the money for the costly goings-on of the America -First Committee. But I should be greatly surprised to learn that any -considerable part of that money came directly or indirectly from -Hitler. That does not alter the fact that they are all working for him. -For they, like the rest of us, are trapped in a tragic irony. In this -world today there is no such thing as neutrality. You are either for -Hitler or against him. You either fight him or you help him.” - - -Q. _Why can’t we put Lindbergh away somewhere now, so he can’t do any -more harm?_ - -A. It is certainly an index to the feelings of the vast majority of -the American people that despite the fact that Lindbergh and Senator -Wheeler can draw large crowds of their Copperhead followers, I have -received hundreds of questions like the one you ask, and there seems to -be little sectional, geographical difference in American feelings on -the subject. - -Just as many have made the inquiry in California as in Texas or -Pennsylvania. The answer is that we cannot, and if we reflect upon it, -we do not want to put any limitations upon free speech for American -citizens in peacetime. Until we are actually at war it is the right of -every American to advocate, if he likes, that we should ally ourselves -with Germany and go to war against Great Britain. The distinguishing -characteristic of democracy is not merely that the majority shall -govern, but that the majority should always give to the minority -exactly the same rights and privileges as the majority enjoys. - -We often overlook the fact that this is the essential nature -of democracy. Rule by majority may obtain under any successful -dictatorship. Hitler undoubtedly has a strong majority of Germans -behind him and will probably continue to have it until he falls by -force from abroad. But that does not make his rule democratic. He -refuses to give the minority opposing him any rights whatever. He -considers it contemptible weakness of the democracies that they should -protect the rights of their minorities, and even of minority groups -who, if they were to come to power, would abolish democracy. - -Here is our central difficulty. We recognize that Lindbergh and his -followers, the Nazis and Fascists, as well as that other antidemocratic -group, the American Communists, would destroy America as we know it if -they were successful in their policies. Yet if we suppress them for -anything less than formally treasonable acts, we shall have violated -the most precious tenet of democracy. Giving aid and comfort to the -enemy in wartime is a formally treasonable act, and we may take -consolation in the fact that Wheeler and Lindbergh and their lesser -associates are not likely to be able to continue after we have gone -to war to render to Hitler the aid and comfort they now render him. -At this moment, when we are not yet in a formal state of war, about -the most effective control that can be exercised over Lindbergh and -his associates is for the President to have identified him publicly -as a “Vallandigham,” and for others to do what they can to expose his -purposes. - - -Q. _Why do you single out Lindbergh for special attention, since there -are many others of equal prominence who are also helping Hitler, such -as ex-President Hoover, Senators Wheeler and Nye, Congressman Fish, and -so on?_ - -A. No, they are not of equal prominence, not even the ex-President, -because Lindbergh had something that appealed so profoundly to America -that he has not lost it all yet, and he towers in influence above our -other isolationists, some of whom are plainly patriotic but deluded -citizens. Lindbergh, however, is, I am convinced, mainly responsible -for the long hesitation of this country to go to war to defend its -life. I do not intend to impugn Lindbergh’s sincerity, but surely there -is something wrong with a man who declares as he does that we should -not go to war, among other reasons, because we are not united, then -does his utmost to disunite us still further. - -Mayor La Guardia, in his capacity as Director of Civilian Defense, -pleaded at a mass meeting in Philadelphia for all Americans not in -agreement with the Administration’s foreign policy not to do or -say anything that might give aid or comfort to a potential enemy. -Exactly twenty-four hours later, stepping on La Guardia’s heels, -Lindbergh addressed another mass meeting in Philadelphia and attacked -the President of the United States in terms so violent that they -were widely interpreted as calling for a revolution against the -Administration. - -It was that famous speech which he was compelled to retract in part -since it alarmed so many even of his followers. Mrs. Kathleen Norris, -the novelist, a prominent member of the America First Committee, and -present on the platform with Lindbergh, told reporters that afternoon, -in answer to a question, that she could “swear that no member of the -committee is mixed up with any subversive activity.” “Subversive” means -“tending to overthrow, upset, or destroy,” which is precisely what -Lindbergh’s speeches attempt to do to the Administration of the United -States. - -None of the isolationist crowd can compare with Lindbergh in -importance to the Fifth Column in America. From the point of view -of American national security and the future of this country he is -America’s Public Enemy Number One, because he was once so incomparably -America’s National Hero of Heroes, and some American people still hope -that now from their former idol, politically unbranded, apparently -disinterested, they can finally get the truth and the light. For -the most part, Americans do not realize what has happened to their -National Hero, although fortunately throughout the country there is a -deep-seated distrust of anyone who has taken up an attitude so palpably -favorable to the nation’s enemies. - - -Q. _What is the reason for the divorce between Lindbergh and the -American people who used to worship him unanimously? The crowds he -has at America First rallies may number thousands--mostly Nazis and -their sympathizers, I take it--but Lindbergh used to have 130,000,000 -Americans cheering him._ - -A. Yes, what is it that has happened to Lindbergh to cause such a -radical change? In 1927 Coolidge called him “noble”; in 1941 Roosevelt -said he was “not wanted.” What a contrast! I have just finished reading -for the first time Lindbergh’s book called _We_, as he referred to -himself and his airplane, the _Spirit of St. Louis_, containing -the story of his life and flight. It moves one to sadness to look -back and remember the way that world of long ago reacted to the -twenty-five-year-old American’s feat. Many of us have forgotten that -the flight itself became secondary to the world’s intoxication over the -event. - -Lindbergh received a more spectacular ovation, attended by more -persons, who were more excited, in France, Belgium, England, and the -United States than had ever been given any human being in the history -of the world by any of the multitudes which have welcomed conquerors -and kings. - -Consider the terms used by President Coolidge in referring to -Lindbergh; “this sincere and genuine exemplar of fine and noble -virtues”; “illustrious citizen”; “this genial, modest American youth -with the naturalness, the simplicity and the poise of true greatness”; -“this wholesome, earnest, fearless, courageous product of America.” And -as if this were not enough, Coolidge read off a list of “some of his -qualities noted by the Army officers who examined him for promotion, -as shown by reports in the files of the Militia Bureau of the War -Department: - -“‘Intelligent,’ ‘industrious,’ ‘energetic,’ ‘dependable,’ ‘purposeful,’ -‘alert,’ ‘quick of reaction,’ ‘serious,’ ‘deliberate,’ ‘stable,’ -‘efficient,’ ‘frank,’ ‘modest,’ ‘congenial,’ ‘a man of good moral -habits and regular in all his business transactions.’” - -And then President Coolidge went on to say that “One of his officers -expressed his belief that the young man ‘would successfully complete -everything he undertakes.’ This reads like a prophecy.” - -Heaven protect the American people if Lindbergh succeeds in his present -undertaking, because he has undertaken now to keep America from meeting -her peril before it becomes overwhelming. He wants us to wait until the -only allies left in the world for us are stricken down and we stand -by ourselves to face a combination of powers stronger than we and -unappeasably resolved to destroy us. - -He has undertaken this task apparently as a sort of crusade. We are -assured that his father before him, Charles Lindbergh, Congressman -from Minnesota, also possessed the Lindbergh sincerity as he declaimed -throughout the last war against American participation. We recognize -sincerity, persistence, and courage as admirable qualities when linked -with a just cause, but the possession of them only makes the matter -worse when they are associated with a disastrous and cynical policy. - -You ask “cynical”? Yes, Hitler, for example is a sincere cynic, and -so is Lindbergh. His policy shamelessly declares we should withdraw -aid from Britain, coolly watch her fall, and then as quickly as -possible trade with Hitler and make what we can out of the defeat -of civilization. Lindbergh genuinely sees nothing to be ashamed of -in advocating such a policy, and that makes him deserve the title -“sincere.” It is nevertheless as cynical as any Nazi could invent. We -could stomach that if the cynicism were realistic. It is not. This -would-be smart policy has no more chance to succeed than the would-be -Machiavellian policy of Mussolini, who has given the world its least -appetizing sight of the war: the avowed brute too feeble to be brutal. - -Lindbergh’s personality is important to us all, since he has assumed -office as a member of what they would call in England “the disloyal -opposition,” and so it is not too minor a point to note that of all -the qualities he was ever credited with, the quality of generosity is -lacking. Witness his experience with France and England. To France -and the French people he owed the beginning of the ovation which was -to make his fame and fortune, and he acknowledged his debt this way -in _We_: “The whole-hearted welcome to me--an American--touched me -beyond any point that words can express. I left France with a debt of -gratitude which, though I cannot repay it, I shall always remember.” -That was the old Lindbergh, or rather the young one, still unspoiled. - -Thirteen years later, when France stood more in need of a friend than -ever in her long and troubled history; when a mere gesture of American -solidarity with her cause might have put heart in her bewildered troops -and kept the enemy at bay; when the word of a Lindbergh could have been -effective in the awakening of American public opinion to our obligation -not to let France fall, for our own sake as well as for hers; Lindbergh -spoke. He spoke against America’s giving France any aid whatever. -It was May 20, 1940 and the Germans stood on the Somme. Lindbergh’s -broadcast summarized everything he has had to say since: “Years ago we -decided to stay out of foreign wars. We based our military policy on -that decision. We must not waver now that the crisis is at hand. There -is no longer time for us to enter this war successfully.” - -I was with the French at that time and can testify that Lindbergh’s -words struck France like a blow between the eyes. The famous Lafayette -Escadrille announced that it had deprived Lindbergh of his honorary -membership. Lindbergh’s response to England was identical. He took -his child to England after he had suffered his great family tragedy -in America, and in England he received everything he desired: quiet -hospitality and all the privacy he has said he wanted. But when -England stood with her back to the wall, and once again the American -attitude to the war became decisive; and once again the voice of a -Lindbergh could have worked powerfully to shake our people into the -tardy realization that this time would be the last time and that if -we did not awaken now we might never be given the chance again; when -our people needed to realize that the fate of America was inextricably -bound up with the fate of Britain, and that if Britain fell our hopes -would all become forlorn; then Lindbergh spoke. - -Now, he declared, we should cease to aid Britain in any manner, because -Britain was beaten, Germany had won, and we had better make the best -terms we could with the conqueror. With the total lack of shame -which characterizes Hitler’s and Lindbergh’s political philosophy he -declaimed in the same speech of June 16, 1940 that, “Fortunately, the -wide wall of the Atlantic stands between us and the shooting that is -going on.” It is, of course, the strong wall of the British Navy that -stands between us and the shooting that is going on, but Lindbergh has -never admitted that the British Navy plays any role in keeping the -Germans from crossing the Atlantic; his implication is that the water -of the Atlantic constitutes the sole hindrance to German passage. - -This incomprehension sometimes reaches a degree which is puzzling to -an observer convinced that “at any rate Lindbergh is sincere.” Some -obviously honest Americans argue that we can successfully hold aloof, -but can any American really believe as Lindbergh said in his speech -at the opening of the war, September 16, 1939: “These wars in Europe -are not wars in which civilization is defending herself against some -Asiatic intruder. There is no Genghis Khan or Xerxes marching against -our Western nations. This is not a question of banding together to -defend the white race against foreign invasion. This is simply one more -of those age-old struggles within our family of nations.” - -If Lindbergh believes this, he has failed utterly to understand what -Hitlerism is, or if he understands it, then he must approve of it; and -we surmised some months later with the publication of Anne Lindbergh’s -_The Wave of the Future_, that he was indeed a convert. Surely it is -not the color of Hitler’s skin and of his Nazi warriors that make -the difference, nor their geographic home. Lindbergh implies that if -they were yellow-skinned and came from Tibet, he would understand and -perhaps not oppose our fighting them, but being white and living in -Central Europe they cannot, he implies, be enemies of civilization. -This and other examples of Lindbergh’s apparent naïveté, or as Raymond -Clapper put it once, his childishness, are not the result of an obtuse -mind, but the consequence of his having constantly to hide one element, -the most important element in his political attitude, and that is his -secret approval of the totalitarian idea and of the German Nazis’ right -to conquer. - -This is too unpopular an idea to admit publicly now, and the -concealment of it leads to the most glaring discrepancies in his -arguments. Only a person who approved of Hitler could deny that he is -waging a war against civilization. Only Lindbergh can tell how far he -approves of Hitler’s right to conquer. We can observe that in other -countries, as France, men who talked before the defeat as Lindbergh -does now, were elevated to power in Hitler’s puppet government. - -I was in England when Lindbergh delivered the first of his broadcasts -calling it “just another war,” and putting both belligerents on the -same level. The British were hurt. They felt that a man whom they had -considered a friend had let them down. They did not know that he had -never been a friend, but beneath a serene, impenetrable demeanor had -harbored an antipathy for England which has contributed to making him -“the way he is.” - -This antipathy he has more than once documented, as in the _Collier’s_ -article when he wrote the astounding sentence: “We in America should -not be discussing whether we will enter _the war that England -declared in Europe_.” Let those who set such store by the quality of -sincerity ask themselves if anyone on earth, including a German, could -_sincerely_ define the present war as one “that England declared in -Europe.” - - -Q. _But you still have not explained why Lindbergh is the way he is. -You have only defined what he is._ - -A. Very well, but this is merely a personal interpretation of what -built his character and formed his motives. I believe in the importance -of emotional causes for most of men’s attitudes, and so I should -like to mention these causes first. The young Lindbergh, as one can -discover from _We_, seems really to have been possessed of the virtues -catalogued by President Coolidge. He became the Lindbergh of today -only after his flight. First came the initial impact of the hysterical -reaction of the world to his accomplishment. It is bound to have -affected him, and it did, despite the fact that he appeared to the -public as still the simple, modest, somewhat shy boy who carried with -him on his flight an introduction to the American Ambassador to Paris. - -It took the public a long time to learn otherwise, because from the -moment of his landing in Paris until only a comparatively short time -ago, Lindbergh was protected by the press of America in a way that -could happen only in this youthful country of hero-worshipers. When -America has a hero, he remains a hero of purest ray serene, and no flaw -may be found in him, and if any are privately discovered by newspaper -reporters, or others, they are carefully hidden. This is our standard -behavior toward heroes, but in the case of America’s hero of heroes the -inhibitions voluntarily imposed by the press upon itself were Spartan. - -In newspaper parlance a sacred cow is an individual who for reasons of -policy must be protected from criticism. Every newspaper has its sacred -cows. Lindbergh became the Supreme Sacred Cow of all the newspapers -in America. Long after it became apparent to the working newspapermen -who came in contact with him that he had succumbed to the adulation -poured upon him and had completely lost that original modesty which -had endeared him to the American public, perhaps above all his other -qualities, and that he had, in fact, become impatiently egotistic, -and convinced that he “knew it all,” he still was represented as the -unassuming young man who aspired only to be left alone. He complained -that the press would not let him alone, gave him no privacy, harassed -him. Publicity, he declared, he hated worse than anything in the world. -Newspapermen nevertheless observed that he and Greta Garbo appeared to -have the same technique, and that he managed always to behave himself -in such a way as to receive the greatest amount of public attention. - -The normal cycle of publicity received by a celebrity of the type of -Lindbergh was summed up by Sinclair Lewis. He and I were standing -at the bar in the Adlon Hotel in Berlin a few days after Lindbergh -landed in Paris, and the world had gone mad over him. It seemed as -though never had such adulation been poured upon the head of any young -man, and those who were not joining in the almost universal blaze of -hysterical feeling were curiously examining the blaze, wondering what -made the world go crazy. - -Surely there had been more heroic exploits, even in the realm of -aviation. The flight of Bleriot over the Channel in the primitive -machine at his disposal in 1909 has been estimated a more important -feat; while the flight of John Alcock and A. W. Brown from Newfoundland -to Ireland, June 14, 1919, although almost forgotten in the din of -Lindbergh’s ovation, was not only the first transoceanic flight, but -considering that it was made eight years before Lindbergh’s with a -machine correspondingly less modern, should rank as a greater feat. All -these things were subjects of discussion, but Sinclair Lewis settled -the matter by saying: “It doesn’t matter. Lindbergh is the best-known -man in the world today, but ten years from now he will go into a hotel -in Detroit and sign the register, ‘Charles A. Lindbergh,’ and the room -clerk will say ‘Lindbergh? Yes, Mr. Lindbergh, Room 502. Boy! Show Mr. -Lindbergh his room,’ and the clerk won’t know him from Adam’s off ox. -That’s the way it is with fame. He has come by his with incredible -speed; it will go the same way.” - -But it did not. Lindbergh saw to that by behaving so eccentrically at -times that even his mother-in-law, Mrs. Dwight Morrow, has been heard -to complain of it. I was in London at the time of the birth of his baby -there. Lindbergh for reasons of his own withheld formal announcement of -the birth until long after it had taken place and the fact was known to -so many persons that eventually the newspapers, although with British -reticence, carried the report and queried Lindbergh to his great -annoyance. - -“I said to Charles,” Mrs. Morrow exclaimed to a friend, “if you want to -avoid being bothered by the press, why don’t you simply announce the -birth of your child? After all he’s normal and born within wedlock.” -Douglas Corrigan confirmed the judgment of Lindbergh’s mother-in-law. - -“Wrong-way Corrigan,” who flew to Ireland in the alleged belief that he -was flying to California, was a devoted disciple of Lindbergh. I met -Corrigan in Dublin shortly after he landed, and I remember two things -he told me which shed some light on Lindbergh’s character. I was -almost the first newspaperman to see Corrigan, and in our introductory -conversation the little Irish flyer, whose flight in many ways was more -remarkable than Lindbergh’s, said: “I’m not going to do like Lindbergh -and be hounded to death by newspapermen. He refuses to see them and -won’t say anything for quotation and makes himself so mysterious that -they never have stopped going after him. If he had only opened up to -them from the very first and never refused to see them, very soon -they would have let him alone. That’s what I’m going to do--tell you -anything you want to know, and go on seeing anybody who wants to see -me, and pretty soon you will all get tired of it.” - -Corrigan did just that and it all worked out exactly as he had -planned. He was soon left in peace and never suffered from Lindbergh’s -complaint. If Lindbergh had behaved as Corrigan did, there never would -have grown up between American newspapermen and himself the secret feud -that required all his prestige as national hero to keep under cover. -You may say that Corrigan’s flight could not be compared to Lindbergh’s -in its sensational appeal as the first solo flight across the ocean. -Yes, but in another way the obscure little Irishman’s flight was the -more audacious of the two. Lindbergh had a plane specially constructed, -the finest money could buy. He had lavish financial backing, friends -to help him at every turn. Corrigan had nothing but his own ambition, -courage, and ability. His plane, a nine-year-old Curtis Robin, was the -most wretched-looking jalopy. - -As I looked over it at the Dublin airdrome I really marveled that -anyone should have been rash enough even to go in the air with it, much -less try to fly the Atlantic. He built it, or rebuilt it, practically -as a boy would build a scooter out of a soapbox and a pair of old -roller skates. It looked it. The nose of the engine hood was a mass of -patches soldered by Corrigan himself into a crazy-quilt design. The -door behind which Corrigan crouched for twenty-eight hours was fastened -together with a piece of baling wire. The reserve gasoline tanks -put together by Corrigan, left him so little room that he had to sit -hunched forward with his knees cramped, and not enough window space to -see the ground when landing. It had cost Corrigan $325, saved nickel by -nickel. - -The inspiration for all of Corrigan’s sacrifice was his hero worship of -Lindbergh. As a young mechanic Corrigan had helped build the _Spirit -of St. Louis_ in the Ryan Airlines plant in San Diego, California, and -from that time on he had lived for but one ambition, to emulate his -hero. The older flyer had millions of admirers but none could have been -more fervent than the little mechanic who once wrote, “It was often -necessary to work till midnight on the _Spirit of St. Louis_ and then -come back at eight the next morning, but everyone was glad to do that -as they all seemed to be inspired by the fellow that the plane was -being built for--Lindbergh.” - -When Corrigan landed in Dublin, it was an event sufficiently -sensational, and the “wrong-way” aspect of it so eccentric, that the -world gave its attention and hundreds of cables and radiograms poured -into the American Legation where the Minister, John Cudahy, had given -Corrigan quarters. Every hour scores of congratulations were reaching -Corrigan but he was visibly unhappy. I asked him what was the matter. - -“No cable from Lindbergh,” Corrigan replied. “That was the thing I -wanted most of all. Maybe it will come later.” It never did come. -Lindbergh never found time nor inclination to send the single word -which would have meant more to Corrigan than all the other applause and -rewards he won. I have related this to friends of Lindbergh and their -answer was, “Typical.” - -After the first uproar over Lindbergh’s greatest flight had subsided -somewhat, he made his good-will flights. His marriage to the gifted -Anne Morrow, daughter of the brilliant Morgan partner, Dwight Morrow, -linked him now with America’s greatest financial house, and put the -Swedish immigrant’s son definitely in the category of those who have -a stake to protect against social disturbance, and the consequences -of war. The fact that the marriage was a love match, and that his wife -had every quality of a distinguished person and was a poet in her own -right, helped establish Lindbergh even more firmly in the affections of -the American public. The American feeling toward him had mellowed from -hysterical hero worship to what seemed to be a love which would endure. - -Then came the heart-breaking tragedy of the kidnaping and murder of his -child. All fathers, all mothers, throughout the world suffered with -the Lindberghs. Years later during the Spanish Civil War, when I was -imprisoned by orders of the Gestapo in San Sebastian, with me was a -Spanish workman who that night was taken from the cell and shot, and -I remember how just before the door opened and he was summoned by his -executioners, he was discussing the Lindbergh kidnaping. - -The world-wide outpouring of sympathy with the Lindberghs during -that woeful period of their lives was surpassed only by the intense, -personal, national compassion of America for them in their pain. Now -Lindbergh had become no longer just the national hero, but one for -whom the nation felt the intimacy of suffering shared. He responded by -leaving the country with his family to quit the scene of their sorrow, -to find a sanctuary to heal their wounds, to escape public attention, -and to find a safety for his children he felt he could not find in the -United States. - -This was the turning point of his relationship with his country. His -country was ready to forgive because it felt it could understand his -need for a refuge, but for Lindbergh his residence abroad was a true -renunciation of democratic America, and this I believe to be the key to -his subsequent political activity and his present defiance of the vast -majority of his fellow citizens. - -He found his sought-for refuge in England where he was given every -consideration. The door of every home from Buckingham Palace down -was open to him, but the British afforded him all the privacy he -wanted. If it had been only privacy he sought, he could have led a -restful secluded life in the country home of Harold Nicolson, his -father-in-law’s biographer, and could have remained at peace until -Hitler disturbed it. Lindbergh spent just enough time in England to -convince him that England was soft, England couldn’t take it, England -would lose if it ever went to war. It was bad luck that Lindbergh -should have lived in England during a time when it _was_ soft, just -as we are soft today. It was the England of pacifism, faith in the -principle that if you want peace badly enough you can have it, just -by refusing to fight. It was the England of the Oxford Union when the -debating society boys voted not to fight “for King and Country.” It was -the England which needed waking up, just as we need it today. It was -an England that could get hard, if it had the time, just as we can get -hard too, if we have the time. - -But Lindbergh formed his opinion of England then, and from his public -speeches he seems too stubborn to allow even the epic heroism of -England today in battle to change his judgment. Nicolson, long-standing -family friend of the Morrows, mailed Lindbergh a postcard every -week during the Battle of Britain, when the people of England were -persevering under a hurricane of bombs and were calling it their -“finest hour.” Each postcard had the one sentence: “Do you still think -we are soft?” Perhaps he still thinks so, long after the Germans -have stopped thinking so. At any rate, he left England for a tour of -the continent, and thereupon came the second turning point in the -development of his political views. - -When he left America he left it embittered by the tragedy of his child, -and he left convinced that it would never have happened except in a -corrupt, gang-ridden democracy. It was, indeed, one of the lowest -periods in America’s public life, when kidnaping for ransom had become -widespread for the first time in any modern civilized state, and the -power of the gangs was a national humiliation. In a sense it was true -that it was the fault of democracy, but the virtue of democracy is -that slowly but almost always sooner or later we correct the faults -and bring under control the license which ever threatens democratic -liberty. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, however, had not grown up -when Lindbergh fled America. - -He visited many places on the continent, but the visits to Germany and -the Soviet Union were decisive. Here were crystallized the political -ideas which had been fermenting within him ever since he felt the -thrill that came with the first taste of power over the throngs of -Americans gathered to adore him. In Russia he found the object of his -political hatred: the poverty, squalor, dirt, inefficiency, and cruelty -of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. He was treated well by the -Bolshevik authorities, who as Russians regarded him as an artist, a -genius of the air, a man who, like a great singer, could be considered -outside of politics. - -His political slate was up to that time blank. The Russians often -welcome foreign celebrities supposed to be without politics. They gave -Harpo Marx a cordial reception. Lindbergh was shown the Red Army, its -Air Corps, the aviation factories, and no doubt the Bolsheviks thought -he was impressed. A layman traveling through Russia is shocked at the -wretched state of the people, their poor clothing, bad food, their -brutal overcrowding. You may be sure that this was not the prime object -of Lindbergh’s attention. Lindbergh is not interested in human beings. -He is interested in machines. In Russia he saw the poorest machine -he had ever seen. He observed that the ponderous Bolshevik society -operated with an unparalleled waste of man power and with unmatched -inefficiency. He saw the Soviet Air factories, and declared he detected -the slovenly workmanship which mars all Soviet production. He reviewed -portions of the Red Army Air Corps and registered his opinion that most -of the planes were obsolete or obsolescent. - -In Nazi Germany Lindbergh found the object of his political admiration, -even affection, for here at last he had found the perfect machine. -Not only was it the antithesis in every material respect of the -Soviet Union, a streamlined, chromium-plated, eighteen-jewel model of -totalitarian clockwork, compared with the dilapidated Soviet jalopy, -but the Nazi machine also promised to banish the Soviet menace from the -face of the earth. Lindbergh had in Germany first an aesthetic delight -in the efficiency of the machine, then a moral satisfaction in the -thought that it would eradicate the blot of Bolshevism. - -Finally a personal consideration came to him. The kidnaping and death -of his baby could never have happened in Nazi Germany. Common crime -was almost unknown in Nazi Germany. He failed to reflect that under -the dictators crime is reserved as the monopoly of the State, and that -from any normal human standpoint there is more crime committed in Nazi -Germany in a year than in America in ten years of its most besotted -gangster period, only in Germany it is all committed by the State. -Lindbergh loved Germany. - -He saw the great Army, then in the last stages of readying itself to -spring upon Europe and set out to conquer the world. He saw the great -Luftwaffe, and Goering himself “surprised” him by pinning the Service -Cross of the Order of the German Eagle with Star on his breast before -he could help himself. Lindbergh has not yet divested himself of his -Nazi decoration. He laid down his commission because he quarreled with -the President of the United States, but he has no quarrel with Hitler. - -Lindbergh was so delighted with the whole atmosphere of this perfectly -functioning totalitarian machine that he was contemplating making -his residence in Berlin, where an American news agency reported -that the apartment of a Jew, liquidated in the monster pogrom of -November 1938, had been offered him. He stayed long enough to become -convinced that the Nazis were the wave, which, whether we liked it -or not, would eventually engulf the world. Lindbergh liked it. Here -were no democratic gangsterism, corruption, private crime. Here were -no Bolshevik slackness, squalor, waste. Here was the New Order, of -superior men, like himself, of tall, blond, blue-eyed Aryans, like -himself, of Nordics, like himself. He felt among his own kind. - -The Terror, the concentration camps, the murderous persecution of the -Jews and political opponents, the suppression of free speech, of the -press, of worship, even of thought and conscience! What of it! This was -only the scum on the wave of the future, and as for the suppression -of the press, _that_ at least was no scum, that was sheer progress. -The literal enslavement of a whole population! Well, they like it, -don’t they? What of the fact that the entire machine and every part -of it was built for war, and for war which if successful in Europe -would eventually reach and thrust at the heart of America? Nonsense, -the Germans could whip Europe all right, indeed Lindbergh declared his -conviction they would, but they intended no harm to America. He knew, -because hadn’t they been nice to him, an American? Anyway, he wouldn’t -say anything about it in public, but if the truth be known, America -could go a long way and do worse than by emulating some of the Nazis’ -virtues. - -Liberty? Bah, Lindbergh would take order and efficiency any day ahead -of liberty and inefficiency. Besides, Lindbergh was one of the class of -superior men, superior in talent, ability, and comprehension of what -society needs, who in a totalitarian state would enjoy all the freedom -he wanted since his ideas would conform with those of the rulers and he -would belong to the company of masters of the New Order. He had nothing -to fear from a Nazi conquest. - -With these thoughts in mind Lindbergh returned first to England -and told them they had better give up because the Russians were no -good and the Germans knew it, and the Germans were strong enough to -conquer all Europe, and the proof was in the air forces he had just -inspected. His advice was believed to have had something to do with the -disaster of Munich, when Britain and France, convinced their cause -was hopeless, lost a war without fighting it. In every point of his -argument Lindbergh had agreed with Hitler, and in every point Lindbergh -and Hitler were correct, save in one point. They made a mistake about -England. - -When England recovered from the shock of Munich, she began to throw -off her weakness and get tough. But Lindbergh had left for America. He -did not have time to see England recover the manhood which seemed lost -when he was there. Lindbergh came home now bursting with a message, -eager to lead, anxious to play a political role, and resolved as he has -been all his life to be content with nothing less than the greatest -role. “Lindbergh will be the next President of the United States. He -is our man.” So said the Belgian friend of the Nazis. The British -Lindbergh, Oswald Mosley, leader of the British Union of Fascists, is -on the political bottom; he is in Brixton prison. Mosley is no less -sincere a man than Lindbergh. Vidkun Quisling is on the political top; -he is Hitler’s man in Norway. The political future of Lindbergh will -obviously depend largely upon whether Germany or our side wins the war. - - -Q. _Why did Lindbergh attack the Jews?_ - -A. Because anti-Semitism is an integral part of Hitlerism. If you -are not against Hitler you are for him, and if you are for Hitler -you will be compelled, sooner or later, and whether you intend it or -not, to become an anti-Semite. Every country now under Hitler’s heel -has officially sponsored and promoted anti-Semitism. It was easy to -read Lindbergh’s anti-Semitism between the lines of his references to -the “foreign” influences at work in America. He waited only until he -thought the time ripe for his public announcement, but the results -proved his calculation wrong. His statement against the Jews brought a -roar of repudiation from all creeds and classes of the nation, and the -only approval came from the group around Lindbergh who constitute what -might be called the America First’s Quisling Committee. Lindbergh’s -anti-Semitism could be sufficiently explained on the ground of -temperament. He admires, he understands, and loves only machines and -he could hardly be expected to understand or appreciate, much less -approve, the spiritual values which for thousands of years have upheld -the Jews through adversities which would have annihilated scores of -more numerous but less faithful communities. - - -Q. _What is to be the fate of the Jews?_ - -A. If Hitler’s power is not destroyed, if Hitler were to win, all Jews -under his domination would be condemned to slow death. Why slow? Why -doesn’t Hitler kill them all at once? Because he enjoys watching them -suffer, has a sadistic pleasure in it; because he needs their labor -power for the menial tasks to which he assigns them; and because he -probably feels that until he conquers the whole world it would be wiser -not to outrage what there is left of world opinion. - -Besides, Hitler finds the Jews useful wherever he wishes to divide a -conquered population, as in France where the hostages he shoots are for -the most part called Jews or Communists. Every time he shoots a Jewish -hostage he says to the non-Jews, “You see, if it were not for your -Jews, you and I could get along perfectly together!” By this device of -making the Jew the scapegoat, he works to arouse anti-Semitism among -the vanquished and anti-Semitism in any form anywhere is the most -faithful handmaid of Hitlerism. - -Therefore, he has not completely eliminated the Jews from any part of -his territories, but has allowed to remain, under conditions of the -most abject servitude, 200,000 out of the original 660,000 in Germany -proper; 40,000 out of the original 190,000 in Austria; 100,000 out of -380,000 in Czechoslovakia; 20,000 out of 156,000 in Holland; 30,000 out -of 63,000 in Belgium; an estimated 380,000 native and foreign Jews in -France, occupied and unoccupied; 750,000 in Hungary, including everyone -with one-quarter Jewish blood; 300,000 in truncated Rumania; 97,000 in -Latvia; 177,000 in Lithuania; 5,000 in Esthonia; and 100,000 in Greece. -These figures are cited by _The American Hebrew_. Poland must come -in a separate category since there Hitler has apparently set out to -exterminate the 3,000,000 Jews without the restraint he seems to have -put on himself elsewhere. - -Nobody knows how many of the Polish Jews have died; their fate is only -more dreadful than that inflicted upon the entire Polish population. -Sober observers believe that twenty per cent of the Polish population -as a whole have been killed or have died as a result of the two -years of German and Russian occupation. If this is true, then of the -6,000,000 dead, one must reckon that at least 1,000,000 are Jews. -Whether this figure is too high or too low, the obvious intent of the -Germans in Poland is to wipe out the Jews altogether, and the wonder is -that any at all are living today. - -In Soviet Russia the 5,000,000 Jews are not subject to any official -discrimination, but suffer as the rest of the population from the -generally wretched conditions of life aggravated by the war. These -conditions of life in the Soviet Union would be intolerable under -normal circumstances, especially since the Jews, like other faiths, -have been deprived of the facilities formally to practice their -religion, but now that Europe under the Nazis has become a charnel -house for Jews, the Soviet Union must seem like a haven of refuge. -There seems to be no alternative for the Jews except that they suffer -death at the hands of Hitlerism, or that Hitlerism be destroyed. It can -be destroyed better with the outspoken, avowed help of the Jews of the -world, and especially the Jews of America. - -It is shocking, indeed, to observe the names of a few Jews on -isolationist committees, and one wonders what mental processes have -brought them there. Do they imagine that if America remains aloof -and Hitler wins the rest of the world, that the Jews, or any other -Americans, will be safe? No, if Hitler wins the rest of the world, the -Lindberghs of America will boldly put their anti-Semitism to work, and -the fate of the Jews in America will approximate that of their brothers -abroad. There is no choice for the Jews of America but to put all the -strength of their bodies and souls and purses to work against the enemy -of all mankind. There is no reason for them to apologize for fighting -the universal scourge. The anti-Semite is a friend of Hitler. The -friend of Hitler is the enemy of the United States. - - -Q. _I would like to read you a passage from a speech of Lindbergh -delivered shortly after the German invasion of Russia, and ask you -what you think of it, as it is quite confusing to me. The passage -reads: “The longer this war in Europe continues, the more confused its -issues become. When it started Germany and Russia were lined up against -England and France. Now, less than two years later we find Russia and -England fighting France and Germany. Winter before last, when Russia -was fighting Finland, the interventionists demanded that we send all -possible aid to Finland. Now, when Russia is fighting Finland again -they demand that we send all possible aid to Russia.... Finland and -France are now our enemies; Russia our friend. We have been asked to -defend the English way of life, and the Chinese way of life. We are -now asked to defend the Russian way of life.... Judging from Europe’s -record, if we enter this war, we can’t be sure whether we will have -Germany or Russia for a partner by the time we finish it. We don’t even -know whether we will end up with France or England on our side. It is -quite possible that we would find ourselves alone fighting the entire -world before it was over.”_ - -A. The confusion is of Lindbergh’s own making. There is a simple key -to all the apparent contradictions he brings out. The key is that -Hitler Germany was, is, and will remain the enemy until Hitlerism is -destroyed. The correct way to express the relationships which Lindbergh -has put so confusingly is: All nations fighting Germany are fighting -on our side; all nations fighting on the side of Germany are fighting -against us. When a nation, for any reason, switches sides, for or -against Germany, it automatically switches sides for or against us. -The question of friendship, of liking for any of these nations, or of -approval of their “way of life” does not decide the matter. The matter -is decided solely by the effect the particular nation is having on -Germany’s war. - -Let us examine each of Lindbergh’s statements in turn. He says the -longer the war continues, the more confused its issues become. Not at -all--the longer it lasts the more plain it becomes that the issue is: -Germany against the world. Do not be confused by the fact that some -countries which were fighting Germany, now come out on Germany’s side. -As Germany conquers one country after another, she attempts to force -them into fighting for her, as in the case of France. No matter what -Hitler’s puppet government in France does, we know that the true France -is no friend of Germany, but an implacable enemy. Napoleon at one time -had half a dozen armies raised from among the peoples he had conquered, -marching under his banners. But the moment Napoleon suffered reverses, -they revolted. So it will be with Hitler. - -Finland’s position is easy to understand if you reflect that she was -so much subject to Hitler’s coercion that she had to behave almost -as though she too had been conquered. It would have been suicide if -Finland, resisting Germany’s demands that she join the German side, -should have had to fight both the German and the Russian armies. That -way Poland was torn to pieces. It would have been unthinkable that -Finland, so recently mutilated by Russia, should have admitted the Red -Army to her territories. It was inevitable that Finland should choose -the lesser of two evils. And so we, understanding Finland’s plight, -must classify her on Germany’s side and embargo goods to her. But we -can still think of her as a friend, and only as a technical enemy by -force of circumstances. - -The position of Russia is equally clear. Bolshevik Russia, the Soviet -Union, is nobody’s friend, and never pretended to be. She, like -Germany, is “against the world,” and by making the pact with Germany -at the beginning of the war she expected to see the world eventually -collapse and become her loot. Now that Germany has forced Russia to -fight, Russia should enjoy every material aid we can give her. As long -as she continues to fight Germany, we should do all we can to help -her blows injure our enemy. So it is only in order to confuse us that -Lindbergh phrases it the way he does: “Finland and France are now our -enemies; Russia our friend.” - -Lindbergh says we are asked to defend the English, the Chinese, and now -the Russian way of life. It would not make any difference to us if the -English, the Chinese, and the Russians lived like lizards, crocodiles, -and alligators, so long as they were aiding directly and willingly -as the British, or directly though unwillingly, as the Russians, or -indirectly as the Chinese, to protect us by opposing our enemies. We -are only helping ourselves when we help them. - -Lindbergh ends: “It is quite possible that we would find ourselves -alone fighting the entire world before it was over.” No, it is not just -“quite possible,” it is absolutely certain that we will find ourselves -fighting the entire world if we do not intervene to save some part of -the world to fight on our side. - - -Q. _In one of Lindbergh’s speeches he made the statement that “the only -reason we are in danger of becoming involved in this war is because -there are powerful elements who desire us to take a part.” Is this -true?_ - -A. There are powerful elements who desire us to take part, namely all -the intelligent patriotic Americans who wish to defend their country -while there is yet time, but that is not what Lindbergh meant. He is -using veiled language to express what his admirers, the Nazi Bundists, -the Fascists, and the Kluxers say openly when they charge that America -is being “driven into war by the Jews, the international bankers, and -the armaments manufacturers.” It is a rule of the politics of this era, -as Alexander Woollcott pointed out, that if you are not against Hitler, -you are for him, and sooner or later, willingly or unwillingly you -become lined up for all the things he stands for, some of which you may -not have wished to embrace, as racial hatred, anti-Semitism, and the -rule of the man with the gun. - -The rich men in the America First Committee of Lindbergh and General -Wood, fancy they are protecting their investments by lining up against -beating Hitler, but if they permit him to win they will lose their -wealth as surely as if they had helped run up the Red Flag. - - -Q. _Can you give us a brief, objective resumé of Lindbergh’s argument -against our entering the war?_ - -A. Yes, he has set it forth very clearly in his “Letter to America” -published in _Collier’s_ magazine, where his principal ideas are -summed up, without any omission save the fact of his contempt for -the democracies and his admiration for the totalitarian system. It -runs as follows: England and France have only themselves to blame for -their defeat. (He takes for granted that England is defeated.) First, -because they did not make a reasonable adjustment with Germany while -there was still time. Second, because they made the Versailles treaty -too harsh to appease Germany and too lenient to hold her down. Third, -because when Germany rose under Hitler they did not take advantage of -the last chance to stop him when they could, at his reoccupation of the -Rhineland in 1936. They were always too late, and now we in America are -too late to stop him. We are unarmed and unable to fight. We have not -as many thoroughly modern fighting planes in our Army and Navy combined -as Germany produces in a single week. “If we enter the war now, it -would mean humiliation and defeat.” It is impossible for us to invade -Europe. On the other hand, it is impossible for Germany to invade us. -They cannot invade us by air over Greenland because it is too cold, nor -by way of South America because it is too far, and the South Americans -with our aid could prevent them from constructing landing fields. We -can stay out of the war, make ourselves impregnable, and afterward -force other nations to trade with us. That should be our policy. - -Counterattacking, he demands to know if we enter the war, first, how -are we to defeat Germany? Second, how are we to “impose our ideology” -on our enemies? Third, what would it cost to win the war in American -lives and how long would the war last? Fourth, what are our war aims? -But he always comes back to the question: “How could we win the war if -we entered it?” - - -Q. _How can we win?_ - -A. I have an answer. There are too many surprises in warfare--witness -the German attack on Russia--for anyone, including the military -experts, to be sure of anything, and I am not a military expert. But -I should like to preface my reply to Lindbergh’s whole argument by -remarking that he assumes we have a choice in the matter, and that we -can avoid going to war if we want to. I do not believe we have any -choice except in the matter of timing. I should like to ask Lindbergh -if he believes that by adopting his complete program, even withdrawal -of all aid to Britain, thus insuring British defeat, we could thereby -induce Hitler to grant us better terms? Leaving aside all national -honor and pride, suppose we were to switch our policy completely and -not only abandoned Britain but like Vichy France made clandestine war -upon her, or openly stabbed her in the back with a declaration of war -à la Mussolini. Even in that case can anyone believe we would receive -any better treatment than Hitler has in store for Vichy France or his -ally Italy? It is plain that all we should gain by such conduct would -be an increase in the unbounded contempt he already has for us. - -We have not the choice of war or isolation. We have only the choice of -war or surrender. - -Let us take his points one by one. First, that England and France have -only themselves to blame for their defeat. But England is not defeated, -and I am convinced that she can be defeated only by our defection on -the lines advocated by Lindbergh. She was to blame for her refusal -to see her danger in time, and for the same reason France was to -blame for her defeat. I agree to this, but to waste time now in such -recriminations is folly. Lindbergh says England and France were always -too late and that now we in America are too late to save England. But -it is our Lindberghs who are making us late. We are still not armed, -agreed, but how can we win the time to arm? We can gain the time to -arm only by upholding Britain, keeping her fighting, and keeping the -Germans out of control of the Atlantic. We can do that now by going -to war with Germany and reinforcing Britain with all the force at our -disposal, which is adequate when ranged beside the present strength of -Britain but inadequate to fight alone. Only our entry into the war now, -before it is too late, can guarantee that Britain stands, and as long -as Britain stands we can build our arms in perfect security until the -combined British and American might is strong enough to defeat Germany. -Lindbergh’s argument is that if we fight beside Britain now we lose; if -we fight alone later, we win. - -He says we cannot be invaded: “I believe that we can build a military -and commercial position on this continent that is impregnable to -attack.” But in the preceding paragraph he says that for us to win a -war we must prepare for it “not for one year, or for two, but for ten -years or for twenty as Germany has done.” Does he imagine that Hitler -would give us twenty years to prepare for war, or ten, or two, or even -one after he had beaten Britain? - -But they cannot get at us, says Lindbergh, citing the difficulty of -air-borne invasion by Greenland or South America. Nobody imagines an -exclusively air-borne invasion of America is possible. But if the -British lose the war before we complete our two-ocean navy in 1947, -sea power goes to the Germans. Lindbergh at no time discussed this -all-important fact. Nor the fact that a defeated Britain, like defeated -France, would be yoked into the Nazi war machine to be used against -the last enemy, ourselves. Does he really believe that if this happens -within the next year or eighteen months, much less in shorter time, we -shall be able alone to repel a German attack on this hemisphere, an -attack supported by all the navies and warplanes left on earth except -our own? We have already set forth the fact that after conquest of -Britain Germany would possess shipping to transport millions, twenty -to thirty thousand tanks, five or six times the number of warplanes we -shall be able to produce in eighteen months, and the most formidable -army the world has ever seen, driven by the indomitable will of Hitler -to conquer the globe or die. - -Leave aside, though, the possibility of direct invasion of the -continental United States, and let us discuss with Lindbergh the -possibility of German invasion of South America. He declares this, too, -would be impossible “in opposition to the armed forces of Brazil backed -by our own Army, Navy and Air Corps.” But it is 4,258 miles from New -York to Pernambuco, Brazil, the place nearest to us where the Germans -might want to land, while it is only 3,847 miles from New York to -London. Lindbergh advocates that we should attempt to defend Pernambuco -though it is 400 miles farther from New York than London, which he says -we should not defend because, among other things, of the difficulty -of sending an expeditionary force so far. Does Lindbergh truly think -Pernambuco easier and more worth while for us to defend than London? -Does he really believe after Germany had conquered Europe and Britain -that Brazil or any other South American state would oppose Germany or -invite us to help it fight Germany? - -But he demands to know, how can we defeat Germany if we do go to war? -He knows the answer to that better than anyone. We can defeat Germany -only by obtaining mastery of the air over Germany, then destroying -the German air force; once the Luftwaffe is destroyed, the impact of -that blow alone may cause the first crack in the military and civilian -morale of Germany and lift the morale of the conquered peoples to aid -in expelling their conquerors. Let me reiterate that the conquered -peoples will never revolt until they see the possibility of successful -revolt and that will come only with the first serious military setback -of the Germans. - -Would we have to send an expeditionary land army? We probably shall -have to send our best units, and do it quickly, to prevent German -seizure of the West African ports and islands affording springboards -to America. Our troops would be useful now in North Africa and the -Near East. Wherever contact with the enemy can be had, we should be -represented as strongly as possible. It is also likely that we shall -need to send an A.E.F. to the continent, although not necessarily as -large as in the last war. If we can get air superiority, it will mean -the war is practically won. I should expect Germany then to crack up. - -Even if she did not break down at once, the demoralization entailed -by loss of control of the air would be so great that landings on the -continent should be feasible at almost any place the Allies chose. -Lindbergh persistently asks where we could land an expeditionary force. -The answer is that if we get there in time we shall have an excellent -base of operations across the seas, Great Britain. From there the coast -of Nazi Europe presents hundreds of opportunities for invasion, once -the Nazi air force is eliminated. - -Lindbergh demands to know how long it would take to win if we think, -contrary to his judgment, that we can win. I should think it would take -a minimum of three years after we enter the war, maybe four, possibly -five or six. It can be accomplished only by expanding our present -aircraft production program, which has orders now for 80,000 planes, to -whatever dimensions prove necessary. This depends on how many planes -the Germans are able to produce from their own and conquered factories, -including all the facilities of their conquests in the East. We shall -certainly have to think in terms of hundreds of thousands of planes. -We and the British will have to supply the pilots and crews and ground -crews for these planes, and it may be that our Air Corps will number -upwards of a million before we are through. We have the men and the -machines to do it. - -“How much would it cost in American lives?” Lindbergh demands. Who -can tell? We know only that until the Germans went into Russia the -casualties in this war had been inconsiderable compared with the -last war. As long as combat was confined to the air and the sea, the -numbers of combatant lives lost were in the thousands compared with -the hundreds of thousands of soldier lives lost in comparable periods -in the land fighting of the last war. The bombardment of civilians -has been ghastly, but the number of lives lost has been on the whole -surprisingly small--41,900 persons killed in Britain from January 1940 -to June 1941. It has even been asserted that in Britain, despite the -hardships, war has so elevated the tone, the spirit of the population, -that death by disease has declined until the gain has made up for the -loss of life by bombardment. The relatively small number of deaths -is explained by Mr. Churchill as the result of air raid precautions. -After the bloodiest month of the Battle of Britain, September 1940, Mr. -Churchill made a remarkable analysis. - -“We are told,” he said, “by the Germans that 251 tons of explosives -were thrown upon London in a single night, that is to say, only a few -tons less than the total dropped on the whole country throughout the -last war. Now we know exactly what our casualties have been. On that -particular Thursday night 180 persons were killed in London as a result -of 251 tons of bombs. That is to say it took one ton of bombs to kill -three-quarters of a person. We know, of course, exactly the ratio of -loss in the last war, because all the facts were ascertained after it -was over. In that war the small bombs of early patterns which were used -killed ten persons for every ton discharged in the built-up areas. That -is, the mortality is now less than one-tenth of the mortality attaching -to the German bombing attacks in the last war.... - -“What is the explanation? There can only be one, namely the vastly -improved methods of shelter which have been adopted.... Whereas when we -entered this war at the call of duty and honor we expected to sustain -losses which would amount to 3,000 killed in a single night and 12,000 -wounded, night after night, and made hospital arrangements on the basis -of a quarter of a million casualties merely as a first provision; -whereas that is what we did at the beginning of the war, we have -actually had since it began, up to last Saturday, as a result of air -bombing, about 8,500 killed and 13,000 wounded.” This was after three -months of the Blitz; today with the figure of 41,900 as the total dead, -the Prime Minister’s point is all the stronger as he concluded: “This -shows that things do not always turn out as badly as one expects.” Mr. -Churchill might have been speaking directly to Lindbergh. - - -Q. _But if air bombardment is as ineffective as these figures of -Churchill indicate, how do you expect us to be able to beat Germany -by winning air superiority and destroying the German air force? Isn’t -there a discrepancy in your argument?_ - -A. No, because Britain has come off so lightly precisely because the -Germans never have gotten air supremacy over Britain. If they ever -did, it would mean they would win the war, just as if we ever get -air supremacy over Germany, it will mean that we will win the war. -Air supremacy means you can come over in the daytime, and bomb with -precision. Antiaircraft guns are unable to prevent bombing. If there -are no fighters to beat off the bombers, the bombers can do just -about as they like. They can dive-bomb and destroy any objective they -choose with about ninety per cent accuracy. If the Luftwaffe is ever -destroyed, British and American planes can annihilate the entire German -war industry and then what will it avail Hitler to be the conqueror of -all Europe, or of Asia, too? - -The R.A.F. has never been out to bomb civilians. The Germans have -proved how useless civilian bombing is against a brave people. The -R.A.F. has preferred the more difficult job of bombing military -objectives and already it has affected the Reich’s war-making capacity. -British bombs on the invasion ports had much to do with Hitler’s -postponement of his trip to England. With the addition to the R.A.F. of -hundreds of thousands of American machines, and with our own hundreds -of thousands in the American Air Force, there is no reason to doubt -that eventually the German military apparatus can be smashed. - - -Q. _What damage have the Germans done to the British war machine; or to -the buildings of London? Lindbergh insists Britain is already beaten to -her knees._ - -A. Exactly! Well, you have seen the loss of civilian life, amazingly -small. Now Mr. Churchill has given us an interesting estimate on the -damage to London. He said: “Statisticians may amuse themselves by -calculating that after making allowance for the working of the law of -diminishing returns, through the same house being struck twice or three -times over, it would take ten years at the present rate, for half of -the houses of London to be demolished. After that, of course, progress -would be much slower. Quite a lot of things are going to happen to -Herr Hitler and the Nazi regime before ten years are up.... Neither by -material damage nor by slaughter will the people of the British Empire -be turned from their solemn and inexorable purpose.” Does Lindbergh -really think the British are beaten? - -But you may object, surely we shall not have to suffer bombing of -our civilian population. No, not if we enter the war in time to keep -it on the other side of the ocean. The oddest thing of all about the -Lindbergh policy is that it would wait for the war to come to us, -so that the bombs should fall on our homes, not on the homes of our -enemies. He represents precisely the fatal “Maginot line policy” which -he so decries in the French. He advises us to sit behind our Maginot -Atlantic and dream of our security until the Germans break through. - -Finally Lindbergh demands that we “define our war aims,” and tell “how -we are to impose our ideology on Germany, Russia, Italy and Japan.” -We do not wish to “impose our ideology” on anyone. All we wish at the -moment is to preserve our nation, keep from becoming slaves of the -Nazis, and prevent Hitler from imposing his ideology upon us. We want -only to make the world safe for the United States, which means also for -the friends and allies of the United States, and if victory is ours we -shall attempt to include in the circle of security all the nations of -good will on earth. If this means “policing the earth,” let it mean -that. The first step to organize common security was taken when men -agreed to have a police force and for it sacrificed their individual -right to exercise individual justice, and agreed to pay taxes for the -protection. We are just now vigilantes trying to rid the community of -bandits. - -It is a troublesome matter and after it is settled we may have sense -enough to organize at least for transient tranquillity and hope against -hope that education may help us to permanent peace. I have not much -hope of that myself, but if we, the United States of America, were to -put our heart into the effort, I would have hope. Unless we do there is -no hope at all. - - -Q. _But how many lives could it cost America?_ - -A. Nobody can say how many lives it will cost us to preserve -our liberty and independence. Maybe surprisingly few, maybe -heart-breakingly many. But is this a matter for bargaining? Does -Lindbergh ask us to say: “We, the United States of America will give -so and so many American lives in order to preserve our national -independence, our institutions, our children’s lives and our liberty, -but we will give so many and no more? If it costs more, we will -surrender! If it takes two years to win, we will make the trade; if it -costs ten, we give in!” If that is our attitude, we are beaten before -we begin. It is not America’s attitude. It was Vallandigham’s, but not -America’s. - - - - -Index - - Abetz, Otto, 243, 251 - - America First Committee, 311, 345, 346, 361-362, 367 - - American Expeditionary Force, 278, 293, 314, 333, 371 - - Anabaptists, 56 - - Angell, Sir Norman, 193-194 - - Anti-Semitism, in Germany, 13-14, 64-65,82, 360 - in Lindbergh’s philosophy, 361-362 - - Assassinations, political, 60-79, 239 - - Atlantic Charter, 184, 185-187, 200-202,227, 333-334 - - Atrocity stories, 79-83 - - Australian armed forces, 155 - - Austria, Dollfuss Putsch, 8-10 - independence guaranteed, 7-8 - seizure of, 27 - - - Baltic states, fate of, 193, 227-228 - - Baruch, Bernard, 170 - - Bayes, William D., 43 - - _Berliner Illustrierte_, 42 - - Bernstein, Henri, 148-149 - - Bezbozhnik Society, 99 - - Birdsall, Paul, 286 - - Black Guards, 15, 39, 56, 62-63, 83 - - Blood Purge (June 30, 1934), 12, 32, 34, 39-40, 64, 78 - - Blum, Leon, 267, 279 - - Brest-Litovsk treaty, 58, 107 - - British Expeditionary Force, 21-22 - - British Intelligence Service, 66-68 - - British Navy, and American safety, 276 - Churchill’s tribute to, 168-169 - as a fighting force, 152-156 - - Bucharest treaty, 58 - - - Cagoulard movement, 243, 251-259 - - Canada, and the war effort, 152, 154, 155, 204 - - China, 320, 366 - war economy, 109 - - Churchill, Randolph, 26, 166, 172, 176, 177-178 - - Churchill, Winston, 139-183 - address to French people, 284 - Atlantic meeting with Roosevelt, 184-185 - aversions, 176-177 - as a bricklayer, 178-179 - characteristics, 144, 148-151 - on effect of air bombardment, 372-375 - gift of prophecy, 148 - military judgment, 156-161, 182-183 - opinion of Roosevelt and the New Deal, 145-148 - opinion of United States, 144-145 - as a painter, 179 - place in history, 139 - popularity in England, 139-142 - principal interests, 166-183 - realist and idealist, 142-144 - secret of success, 163-166 - as a speaker, 171-174 - speeches on defense of Britain, 151-153, 160, 164-166 - as a writer, 163-164, 169, 170, 179 - - Ciano, Count, 7 - - Clapper, Raymond, 350 - - Cole, G. D. H., 141-142 - - Communism, compared with England’s wartime socialism, 231-233 - compared with Nazism, 84-87 - economic failure in Russia, 116-134 - in France, 241, 249-250 - in Germany, 13-14, 214-215 - in Spain, 98 - threat of revolution in Europe, 101-103 - in the United States, 273-274 - - Compiègne armistice, 283 - - Conant, James B., 323 - - Conscientious objectors, 321-324 - - Cooper, Hugh, 107 - - Corrigan, Douglas, 353-355 - - Crete, battle of, 153, 158, 303 - - Croix de Feu, 250 - - Curie, Eve, 281, 318 - - Czechoslovakia, 51-52 - occupied by Germany, 27-28 - - - Darlan, Admiral, 266-268, 272 - - Darre, Walther, 54, 309 - - _Das Kapital_, 85 - - Deloncle, Colonel Eugene, 243 - - Deuxième Bureau, 243, 251-256 - - Dneiper dam, 107-108 - - Dollfuss Putsch, 8-10 - - Dunkirk, evacuation of, 21, 22, 151, 152, 303, 316 - - Duranty, Walter, 90 - - Dusseigneur, General, 243, 251 - - - Einstein, Albert, 323 - - England, at war, 139-183 - defense against Hitler, 300-306 - and wartime socialism, 231-233 - - - Fayard, Arthème, 252-253 - - Faymonville, Colonel, 135 - - Fifth Columnists, 339-376 - - Finland, 100, 105, 175, 364-366 - - Fish, Hamilton, 344-345 - - Foreign trade, effect of Nazi slave labor on, 192-197, 208-212 - and Nazi economy, 53-54 - - France, compared with America, 273-280 - declining birth rate, 234, 263, 277-278 - future under Nazis, 283-284, 290-291 - hope for, 281-282 - indemnity and reparations to Germans, 285-292 - Maginot line complex, 234, 240, 274-275, 296, 375 - reasons for fall of, 30, 234-273 - venality of press, 234, 280-281 - - French Army, equipment of, 234-235 - morale of, 235-238 - treason in, 238-262 - - Franco, General, 264 - - Fuller, Colonel Horace M., 20 - - - de Gaulle, General, 266, 315 - recognition of government, 292 - - Garvin, J. L., 174 - - Gaxotte, Pierre, 252-253, 256 - - George, General, 243 - - Georgiev, Vlada, 63, 77 - - German Air Force, strength of, 299, 333, 359, 372-374 - - German Army, 16, 297 - Hitler’s ascendancy over, 8-9, 17-34 - - German people, attitude toward America, 329-331 - character of, 55-58, 217-218, 226-227, 282 - Hitler’s relation to, 36-38 - - Germany, 1-87 - Communism in, 15-16, 214-215 - deindustrialization vs. military occupation, 219-226 - postwar reconstruction, 56-58 - - Gestapo, 15, 62, 67-68, 228, 243 - in Holland, 67 - murder monopoly of, 79, 83-84 - and Nazi economy, 53-54 - political position of, 74-76 - in Spain, 25, 356 - - Goebbels, Joseph, 8, 15, 33, 163 - and propaganda, 80, 243, 330-331 - as a public speaker, 37 - - Goering, Hermann, 14-16, 24, 32, 163, 359 - - Glass, Senator Carter, 51 - - G. P. U., 70-71, 83-85, 119-120, 133, 228 - political position of, 74-77 - - Greece, 158-159 - - - Hackett, Francis, 43-44 - - Haushofer, Karl, 17 - - Hayes, Carlton J., 357 - - Hemingway, Ernest, 97 - - Hess’s flight to England, 15, 161-163 - - Hillenkoetter, Lieutenant-Commander, 20 - - Himmler, Heinrich, 15, 64, 67, 163, 243 - - Hitler, Adolf, 1-69 - assassination attempts analyzed, 60-69 - attack on Russia, 23, 30, 110-111, 160-161 - compared with Hohenzollerns, 263-264, 328 - and homosexuality, 34-35 - impressions of, 1-3, 10-12, 43-51 - military mistakes, 19-30 - and Mussolini, 4-10 - and Napoleon, 17, 30, 113-114 - occupation of Czechoslovakia, 27-28 - personal bravery, 30-33 - physical appearance, 1-3, 43-44 - plans for invasion of Britain, 300-305 - principal interests, 167 - as a public speaker, 37-41 - relation to German people, 35-36, 60 - reoccupation of Rhineland, 24-26, 148, 226 - responsibility for war, 12-14 - successors to, 14-17 - seizure of Austria, 8-10, 27 - treatment if beaten, 58-60 - and the United States, 306-309 - as war lord, 17-19 - and women, 36-37 - and world conquest, 37, 190-199, 202-209, 213-214, 323-325 - - Homosexuality, 33-35 - - Hoover, Herbert, 344-345 - - Huntziger, General Charles, 235-238 - - Hutchins’ Four Freedoms, 309-313 - - - Imro, 77-78 - - Irish neutrality, 144, 305-306 - - - Jankowsky, Frau Marie, 81-83 - - Japan, 112, 316 - publishes Axis peace terms, 199, 202-207 - - _Je Suis Partout_, 243, 251-258 - - Jews, persecution of, 64-65, 82, 360, 362-364 - - John of Leyden, 56 - - Jung, Dr. Carl G., analysis of Hitler and Nazism, 45-51, 54-55 - - - Keynes, John Maynard, 286-287 - - Kirov, Sergei, assassination of, 69-71 - - Korff, resigns from Ullstein Verlag, 41-42 - - - Labor party in England, 141-142 - - La Guardia, F. H., 345 - - Laval, Pierre, 239, 269-273 - - League of Nations, 143, 287, 334, 336-337 - proposed, 223, 230 - - Lenin, Nikolai, 69, 98-99, 123 - on morality, 103 - - Lewis, Sinclair, 353 - - Lindbergh, Anne Morrow, 81-83, 350, 355-356 - - Lindbergh, Charles A., 339-361, 364-376 - admiration for Nazi Germany, 358-360 - anti-Semitism, 361-362 - character and personality, 347, 348, 351-353 - classed as Copperhead, 339-341 - and free speech, 343-344 - ingratitude to France and England, 349-351 - isolationist arguments answered, 368-376 - kidnaping and murder of child, 356-357 - “Letter to America,” 367-368 - and newspaper publicity, 352-354 - as one-time national hero, 346-348 - political philosophy, 273-274, 350-351, 359, 361 - praised by President Coolidge, 346-347 - propagandist for Hitler, 198-200, 214 - supporters of, 341, 343, 346, 367 - visit to Soviet Union, 358-359 - - von Lossow, General, 11-12, 39 - - Ludendorff, General, 11, 32, 67, 327 - - - Maginot line complex, 234, 240, 274-275, 296, 375 - - Mandel, Georges, 253-255 - - Masaryk, Thomas G., 51-52 - - Master race doctrine, 37, 191-192 - - _Mein Kampf_, 1, 31, 37, 41-42, 85, 283-284 - Hackett’s index to, 44-45 - - Miller, Douglas, 111, 213 - - Morrow, Mrs. Dwight, 353 - - Mowrer, Edgar, 20, 60 - - Mosley, Oswald, 361 - - Munich Beer Hall, bombing attempt, 67-69 - - Munich Beer Hall Putsch, 1, 32 - - Munich pact, 28, 61, 360-361 - - Mussolini, Benito, 4-5, 49, 173 - and Dollfuss Putsch, 8-10 - first meeting with Hitler, 3-7 - and political assassinations, 72-74 - and yes-staff, 18 - - - Napoleon, and Hitler, 17, 30 - and Mussolini, 4-5 - - National Socialist German Workers Party, 13-14 - - Nazi Party Congress in Nuremberg, 9-10, 61-63 - - Nazi propaganda, 79-83, 239, 243, 248-262, 275-276 - - Nazism, 51-53, 83, 360 - compared with Communism, 84-87 - - Nelson, Donald M., 294 - - Newspapers, American and French, 279-281 - - Nicolson, Harold, 174, 357 - - NKVD defined, 119-120 - - Norris, Kathleen, 345 - - Norway, invasion of, 30, 157-160 - - Nye, Senator Gerald P., 149, 214, 344-345 - - - Okhrana, 75-76 - - von der Osten, Major, 25-26 - - _Out of the Night_, 68, 83-84, 163 - - - Pax Anglo-Americana, 146, 229-230 - - Peace conference, 191-192, 214-231 - Atlantic Charter, 200-202, 221, 334 - Axis terms, 198-199, 202-208 - - Pétain, Marshal, character of, 262-265, 272 - dupe of German propaganda, 239, 255-262 - as head of Vichy government, 265-266, 292, 315 - Hitler’s promise to, 284-285 - request for armistice, 243-245 - - _Petit Journal_, 250-251 - - Poison gas, 302 - - Poland, attack on planned, 18 - conquest by Nazis, 29-30, 191-193, 195, 322, 365 - fate of, 184-185 - and Russia, 100, 174-175 - - Prioux, General, 241-242 - - - Raleigh, John McCutcheon, 45 - - Rauschning, Hermann, 160, 309 - - Reichstag fire, 68 - - Rhineland, reoccupation of, 24-26, 148, 226 - von Ribbentrop, Joachim, 15, 29, 243, 251 - - Roehm, Ernst, 32-34, 39 - - Roosevelt, Franklin D., 145-147, 296 - meeting with Churchill, 184-185 - re-election and German morale, 330 - verdict on Lindbergh, 339-341, 344 - - Rosenberg, Alfred, 15, 163 - - Royal Air Force, 22-23, 301, 303, 304, 332, 374 - Churchill’s tribute to, 166 - - Russell, Bertrand, 323 - - Russia, 88-139 - approval of Atlantic Charter, 227-228 - and defeat of Germany, 101-103 - development of Red Army, 92-94, 134-137 - failure of Planned National Economy, 116, 121-123, 130-131 - Five-Year Plans, 107-108, 116, 122 - freedom of worship, 99-100 - monetary system, 129-130 - morale of people, 95-99 - political assassinations in, 67-79 - reasons for resistance to Nazi attack, 90-99 - as refuge for Jews, 363-364 - standard of living, 92, 118-123, 129 - Terror under political police, 115-120, 125-128, 131-134 - U. S. help for, 88-90, 100-104, 137-138 - weaknesses of Soviet system, 115-134 - - Russo-German pact, 29, 100, 112 - - - Schieffer, Colonel, 242, 277-278, 326 - - Schuman, Frederick L., defines dictatorship, 146 - - Selassie, Haile, 76 - - Shipbuilding capacities, 155-156 - - Siegfried line, 26, 28 - - Socialism, in wartime England, 231-233 - - South America, and the Nazis, 49, 191, 205, 208, 370-371 - - Soviet Union, _see_ Russia - - Spanish Civil War, 25-26, 52-53, 97-98, 356 - - Stalin, Joseph, 88-115, 133-138 - agreement with Churchill, 103-104 - and compromise peace with Germany, 106-112 - and political assassinations, 69-72, 76, 78 - quarrel with Trotzky, 133-134 - system of army espionage, 105-106 - - Stoddard, Lothrop, 44 - - Storm Troopers, 10, 32-34, 39, 54-55, 83 - - Swing, Raymond, 157, 299 - - - Third Reich, symbolism of, 54-55 - - Thompson, Dorothy, 43-44 - - Tolischus, Otto, 43 - - Trotzky, Leon, 42-43, 123, 133-134, 176, 180 - - - United States, 292-337 - army morale, 318-326 - Atlantic Ocean complex, 274-277, 375 - battleground for war against Nazis, 331-333 - choice of war or surrender, 369-373 - and Communists, 273 - comparison with France, 273-280 - conditions after German defeat, 337-338 - dangers to, 197-198, 293-294, 306-309 - effect of declaration of war against Nazis, 313-321, 330-331 - and the first World War, 326-328, 335-336, 338 - and the League of Nations, 334, 336-337 - lease-lend appropriations, 190, 292, 294, 317 - military preparedness, 296-300 - national morale, 295-296 - Neutrality Acts, 317, 330 - postwar economic condition, 189-190 - representation in Peace Conference, 332-334 - and Russia, 88-90, 100-104, 137-138 - - - Vallandigham, Clement L., 339-341, 344, 376 - - Valtin, Jan, 68, 83-84, 163 - - Versailles treaty, 220, 224, 334, 336 - denounced, 24, 25, 40, 290 - leniency of, 58, 286-287 - - - War Aims, 184-233 - - Wave of the Future, 83, 87, 349, 360 - - Weimar Republic, 12-13, 336 - - Weygand, General, 151, 242 - - _What Mein Kampf Means to America_, 43 - - Wheeler, Senator Burton K., 198, 200, 214, 273-274, 343-345 - - Wilson’s Fourteen Points, 186-187 - - Woollcott, Alexander, on Churchill, 164 - on Lindbergh, 342-343, 376 - - World War, first, cost and reparations, 57-58, 193, 286-287, 335-336 - - - _You Can’t Do Business with Hitler_, 213 - - * * * * * - -Transcriber’s Notes: - -Punctuation has been made consistent. - -Variations in spelling and hyphenation were retained as they appear in -the original publication, except that obvious typographical errors have -been corrected. - -The one footnote has been moved to the end of its section and relabeled. - -The following change was made: - -p. 41: XIV changed to XVI (Louis XVI had) - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK IS TOMORROW HITLER'S? *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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